
FROM ROOT TO McNAMARA



Army Organization and Administration 1900 - 1963

SPECIAL STUDIES

FROM ROOT TO McNAMARA
ARMY ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
1900–1963

by

James E. Hewes, Jr.



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Foreword

This volume is the first in a new series, SPECIAL STUDIES, which will deal with special topics of interest to the Army. The series is designed to treat selected Army activities on and off the battlefield and to provide accurate and timely accounts of neglected aspects as well as more familiar fields of military history. It will serve as a vehicle for publication of worthy monographs prepared within the Army Historical Program and of such outside scholarly works as may be deemed appropriate for publication and circulation to interested staffs, schools, and other agencies of the Army for ready reference and use.

While military history abounds in the dramatic fare of battles and campaigns, definitive analysis of the evolution of the organization and administration of the departmental headquarters in the capitals has been a relatively neglected field. Yet upon the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative apparatus needed to build, train, equip, and supply armed forces depends much of the success in the test of battle. The present study grew out of a monograph originally designed to provide a simple guide to the principal changes in Army departmental organization since 1942. Expanded later to cover the period beginning with 1900, the era of reform introduced by Secretary of War Elihu Root, and to provide a larger measure of analysis, this study traces changes relating to Army management in the central headquarters down to the early 1960s when new and dramatic reforms in Army organization were carried out during the regime of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The account focuses on a single but important theme—the management of the Army administrative and logistical structure in the era of America's rise to global power. It fills a gap in the literature and is presented as a contribution to the field of organizational and administrative history.

While the author's focus is on the Army headquarters staff, he indicates parallel trends in organization in industry and government and relates his theme to historic conflicts over centralization of control. The volume presents a useful survey in a field of continuing importance that should be of interest to administrators and managers both in and out of the Army as well as to students of military history and public administration.

Washington, D.C.
15 January 1974

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History

The Author

James E. Hewes, Jr., received his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Yale University. His principal field of study was international relations. During World War II, after serving as an enlisted man, he became a 2d lieutenant in the Field Artillery. He joined the staff of the Office, Chief of Military History, in August 1962, specializing since that time in administrative history. The manuscript he is now working on, Army Organization and Administration, 1963–1974, continues the analysis undertaken in the present volume.

Preface

The principal issue in the development of the organization and administration of the War Department/Department of the Army from 1900 to 1963 was executive control over the men, money, and other resources required to raise, train, equip, and supply the United States Army. The question was not whether there should be any centralized management of departmental operations. Tight control had existed throughout most of the nineteenth century within the headquarters of each of a series of autonomous bureaus, which largely governed themselves under the detailed scrutiny of Congress. The question was whether tight authority should be imposed on the bureaus at the level of the Secretary of War.

Except during the Mexican and Civil Wars there had been little effective authority over the bureaus before 1900. By 1963 the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and the Chief of Staff were able to rule departmental operations more effectively, while the once powerful chiefs of the bureaus had disappeared, except for the Chief of Engineers and the Surgeon General.

The purpose of the present account is to trace the development of this central theme of executive control historically. It does not attempt to treat all aspects of Department of the Army organization. Nor does it deal with the usual substance of military history, military operations in the field. As administrative history it has less in common with operational military history, as such, than with similar historical treatment of American public administration and industrial management. Failure to recognize the distinction between the way in which the Department of the Army operates and the standing operating procedures of military organizations in the field has frustrated generations of field soldiers, who have taken for granted the necessity for tight management at the top, known to them as unity of command.

This struggle for executive control within the Army has

taken place during a period of increasingly centralized authority over individual and corporate activities throughout American life. This development has been a natural consequence of the increasing industrialization and urbanization of a once predominantly rural society. The bureaus, traditionally the basic administrative units of the federal government, had developed in the context of a rural America which distrusted centralized authority and held that government best which governed least. The War Department bureau chiefs, like their colleagues elsewhere in the federal government, were as zealous as any Americans in defending this tradition. They based their careers upon it. In this account they and their supporters are called traditionalists.

Opposed to the traditionalists were those individuals and groups who believed, as a result of their own experiences, that increasing industrialization and urbanization required the abandonment or at least the modification of American rural traditions, values, and institutions. They foresaw only chaos and anarchy without greater centralized authority as urban industry and population expanded. Urban political bosses sought to impose order on a chaotic welter of independent, competing municipal agencies. Industrialists and bankers sought to impose order in major industries where unfettered competition, in their view, was leading to mutual destruction. Industrial technology was changing the character of modern warfare, demanding greater efficiency and control not only over armies in the field but over agencies responsible for their supply and equipment.

Centralized control meant the substitution of rational order and regulation from the top down for previously unregulated activities. In industry the process became known in the United States and western Europe as rationalization. Those who sought similarly to rationalize the organization and structure of the War Department are called in this account rationalists. A more common term among American historians generally for such reformers is modernists.

Among my colleagues at the Center of Military History, Dr. Robert W. Coakley should be singled out for his advice and detailed knowledge of Army logistics during World War II and after. He also prepared other helpful studies on Army military personnel management during and after World War

II, on the development of CONARC, and on the background and events leading to the establishment in 1962 of the Defense Supply Agency. Without Dr. Coakley's guidance and assistance it would have been almost impossible to prepare this volume. Dr. Stetson Conn, Chief Historian during most of the period the undersigned was writing this work, assisted by providing information on the organization of the War Department before and during World War II. Miss Hannah M. Zeidlik, Deputy Chief of the General Reference Branch, was most helpful in locating historical manuscripts on file in that branch, particularly those relating to the General and Special Staffs, AGF, and ASF during World War II. Mrs. Hazel Ward, head of the Military Records Branch of the National Archives until her retirement in 1973, provided the source material employed in those sections dealing with departmental administration from 1945 to 1955. In tracing the growth of the Army's research and development programs after World War II the author has relied heavily upon an excellent and detailed draft manuscript by Mr. L. Van Loan Naisawald of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development. Mr. Maxey O. Stewart, now retired, guided the writer through the files of Project 80 on the 1962 reorganization of the Army along with Col. Edward McGregor, U.S. Army, retired, Col. Lewis J. Ashley, Maj. Gen. Donnelly P. Bolton, and Lt. Gen. John A. Kjellstrom, now Comptroller of the Army, all of whom were members of the Project 80 team. Mr. Stewart's personal files, now in CMH, contain important material concerning departmental administration and management from 1950 to the mid-1960s.

Miss Annie Seely of the Reference Branch in the Photographic Library of the Army's Audio-Visual Agency located all but one of the photographs, that of Secretary Stimson in 1911, which came from the National Archives. Maj. Edward M. Kaprielian, Chief of CMH's Graphics Branch, and his staff prepared the charts for this book. Mr. Roger D. Clinton also prepared two special organization charts illustrating personnel management and research and development during World War II.

The author is much obliged to the people who assisted in providing the data for Appendix B: Miss Esther D. Byrne, now retired, who prepared the list of Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Army; Mr. Detmar H. Finke, Chief of the General Reference Branch, CMH, and his staff;

and Mrs. Sylvia A. Crabtree, a personal friend who gave generously of her free time to the project.

In addition to Dr. Coakley who read and criticized several drafts, Professor Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.; Col. John E. Jessup, Jr., Chief of the Histories Division; Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief Historian; Dr. Walter G. Hermes, Chief of the Staff Support Branch; Lt. Col. Heath Twitchell; Mr. Alfred M. Beck; and my colleague, Dr. Vincent C. Jones, read and commented on the manuscript. Mr. David Jaffé, senior editor, and Mrs. Barbara H. Gilbert, copy editor, worked on the final draft. Mrs. Dorothy B. Speight patiently labored to decipher the author's handwriting and mangled copy in typing the several drafts through which this manuscript has gone. The index was compiled by Miss Margaret L. Emerson.

The responsibility for the final product, of course, is the author's alone.

Washington, D.C.
15 January 1974

JAMES E. HEWES, JR.

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All illustrations are from Department of Defense files, with the exception of the photograph of Henry L. Stimson on page 16, courtesy of the National Archives.

FROM ROOT TO McNAMARA: ARMY ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION, 1900-1963

CHAPTER I

The War Department From Root To Marshall

The basic structure of the War Department and the Army down to 1903 was established after the War of 1812 by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in an effort to assert centralized control over their operations. There were and are essentially two separate elements—a departmental staff, serving directly under the Secretary of War, and the Army in the field, divided into geographical districts under professional military commanders.

The departmental staff from the beginning was called the War Department General Staff, but it was not a general staff in the modern sense of an over-all planning and co-ordinating agency. It consisted instead of a group of autonomous bureau chiefs, each responsible under the Secretary for the management of a specialized function or service. By the 1890s the principal bureaus were the Judge Advocate General's Department, the Inspector General's Department, the Adjutant General's Department, the Quartermaster's Department, the Subsistence Department, the Pay Department, the Medical Department, the Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance Department, and the Signal Corps.

While the Judge Advocate General's and Inspector General's Departments were staff advisers to the Secretary of War, the other agencies combined both staff and command functions. They acted as advisers to the Secretary of War and also directed the operations and the personnel involved in performing their assigned functions. Each had its own budget appropriated, specified, and monitored in detail by Congress.[1]

The Army in the field, known as the line as opposed to the

[1] (1) Leonard D. White, *The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829* (New York: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 221–23. (2) Raphael P. Thian, *Legislative History of the General Staff of the Army of the United States . . . From 1775 to 1901* (Washington, 1901).

staff in the War Department, was organized in tactical units and stationed at posts throughout the country. The regiment was normally the largest unit and was often scattered over a large area. The posts were grouped geographically into "departments" commanded by officers in the rank of colonel or higher. Above the geographical departments in the field the chain of command was confused and, in fact, fragmented. The titular military head of the line Army was the Commanding General, a position created by Secretary Calhoun but without Congressional authorization prescribing its duties and functions or defining its relations with the bureaus, the Secretary, and the President.

The Commanding General did not in fact or in law command the Army. Successive incumbents asserted repeatedly that in a proper military organization authority should be centralized in one individual through a direct, vertical, integrated chain of command. Instead the bureau chiefs in Washington were constantly dealing directly with their own officers in the field at all levels of command, acting they insisted under the authority and direction of the Secretary of War. When the Commanding General protested such actions as violating the military principle of "unity of command," the Secretary of War generally supported the bureau chiefs.

The President was constitutionally the Commander in Chief, and many including James Madison, Andrew Jackson, James K. Polk, and Abraham Lincoln at times exercised their command personally or through the Secretary of War rather than the Commanding General. By the end of the Civil War Lincoln had established unity of command in the field under General Ulysses S. Grant, but the extent of the latter's control over the bureaus was not clear, and, in any case, after the war the old system of divided control was revived.[2]

As prescribed formally in Army regulations the division of functions seemed reasonably clear. All orders and instructions from the President or the Secretary of War relating to military operations, control, or discipline were to be promulgated through the Commanding General. On the other hand, fiscal

[2] Col Archibald King, JAGC, Memorandum With Respect to the Command of the Army by the Chief of Staff, 30 Mar 49. Tab F of Tabbed Materials on Improvement of the Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army, Prepared by the Management Div, OCA, 22 Jul 49.

affairs were to be conducted by the Secretary of War through the several staff departments:

> The supply, payment, and recruitment of the Army and the direction of the expenditures of appropriations for its support, are by law intrusted to the Secretary of War. He exercises control through the bureaus of the War Department. He determines where and how particular supplies shall be purchased, delivered, inspected, stored and distributed.[3]

This theoretical clarity did not exist in practice. An informal alliance developed between the civilian secretaries and the bureau chiefs which hamstrung the Commanding General's control over the Army. The departmental staff's responsibility for logistics and support also diluted his authority over the territorial departments. Several commanding generals in protest moved their headquarters from Washington. Since secretaries came and went, power gravitated to the bureau chiefs, who, in the absence of any retirement system, remained in office for life or until they resigned.

The secretaries were unable as a consequence to exercise any effective control over the bureau chiefs upon whom they had to rely for information. The bureaus operated as virtually independent agencies within their spheres of interest. These spheres often overlapped and conflicted, demonstrating what Roscoe Pound, dean of the Harvard Law School, described as "our settled American habit of non-cooperation." [4] The whole system was sanctioned and regulated in the minutest detail also by Congressional legislation, and any changes almost invariably involved Congressional action. Bureau chiefs in office for life also had greater Congressional influence than passing secretaries or line officers.

In effect, the War Department was little more than a hydra-headed holding company, an arrangement industrialists were finding increasingly wasteful and inefficient.[5]

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[3] War Department, Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1895, art. LXII (Staff Administration), par. 736.

[4] Roscoe Pound, "Bureaus and Bureau Methods in the Civil War," *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* (1945), 423, 435. For a detailed, comprehensive treatment of the disruptive effects of American individualism upon social stability, see Rowland Berthoff, *An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

[5] Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971) contains a well-balanced appraisal of the War Department and the line Army in the years prior to the Spanish-American War, which, as the author demonstrates, caused much of the trouble in the early months of that conflict. See especially pages 5–68.

One War Department committee seeking means of improving its methods of operation concluded:

> The fundamental trouble was in the system of administration . . . . , a system that was the gradual growth of many years, and founded upon the idea that the bureau chiefs in Washington and the Secretary of War were the only ones who could be trusted to decide either important or trivial matters in a manner to properly protect the interests of the Government; a system that necessarily resulted in congesting the paper work in Washington, in multiplying the number of clerks required to handle and record the papers, and finally in so overloading the chiefs of bureaus . . . . by attention to unimportant details, that they had not sufficient time for the consideration of more important matters.[6]

This legacy of bureau autonomy and Congressional control in managing the affairs of the Army and the War Department was passed on from the nineteenth century to the twentieth and constituted a principal problem of Army organization.

Creation of the New General Staff, 1900–1903

When Elihu Root became Secretary of War on 1 August 1899 the moment was opportune to assert greater executive control over the War Department's operations. During the Spanish-American War the absence of any planning and preparation, the lack of co-ordination and co-operation among the bureaus, and the delay caused by red tape had become a public scandal.

President William McKinley appointed a commission headed by retired Maj. Gen. (of Volunteers) Grenville M. Dodge, a Civil War veteran and railroad promoter, to investigate the problem. After intensive hearings and investigation the Dodge Commission reported that most of the trouble stemmed from the red tape and inefficiency of the War Department's operations generally and in the Quartermaster's and Medical Departments in particular. Congress, it said, was partially to blame because of its insistence upon monitoring departmental administration in detail. Everywhere officials were forced by regulations spawned in Congress to devote too much

[6] Memorandum Report, First Division, General Staff to the Assistant Secretary of War, 27 Sep 05, sub: The Simplification of War Department Methods . . . , pp. 12–13. Copy in Cater files on Origins of General Staff, OCMH. The Army regulations running to over 1,500 paragraphs are a good reference for the detailed controls exercised by the bureaus over expenditures and accountability.



SECRETARY ROOT

time to paper work and not enough to substantive matters. "No well regulated concern or corporation could transact business satisfactorily under such regulations as govern the staff departments." The commission particularly recommended investigating the question of combining all supply operations in one agency and transportation in another, following the example of modern industrial organizations.[7]

After studying the Dodge Commission report, Secretary Root told Congress that unless drastic changes were made in War Department organization and administration to provide for greater executive control the department would be unable to operate effectively in any war. It would break down again,

[7] (1) U.S. Congress, S. Doc. 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., *Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War With Spain* (Washington, 1900), vol. I, pp. 113–16, 120–21 on War Department red tape, pp. 147–48 on the Quartermaster's Department, and pp. 188–89 on the Medical Department. Quotation is from page 113. (2) Cosmas makes it abundantly clear that the War Department and the bureau chiefs performed as well as miscreating circumstances referred to above permitted. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, pp. 245–314. (3) Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1962), pp. 1–51; Chandler, "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry" and "The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate Management," both in James P. Baughman, ed., *The History of American Management: Selections from the Business History Review* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 1–52, summarize the development of vertically integrated functionally divided headquarters in modern industry. The major railroads deliberately adopted the military staff and line principle, recognizing that effective control over their far-flung operations required unity of command.

and in its place a "jury-rigged, extempore" organization would be thrown together on an emergency basis. As a corporation lawyer he asserted that "in the successful business world" work was not done in the disorganized manner of the War Department. "What would become of a railroad, or a steel corporation, or any great business concern if it should divide its business in that way? What would become of that business?" [8]

A modern army, Mr. Root said, required intelligent planning for possible future military operations and effective executive control over current ones. Intelligent planning required an agency similar to the General Board of the Navy or the Great German General Staff. Control over current operations required a professional military adviser to act as the department's general manager with a staff to assist him along the lines of modern industrial corporations. Mr. Root proposed that Congress provide by law for a Chief of Staff as general manager with a General Staff which would assist him both in planning future operations and in supervising and co-ordinating current ones.

Mr. Root's proposal represented a major break with War Department tradition. He was the first Secretary of War to abandon the alliance between the Secretary and the bureau chiefs, replacing it by an alliance with line officers through the Office of the Chief of Staff. The alliance was deliberate because Root did not see how it was possible for any Secretary to exercise effective control over the department unless he had the active support of professional soldiers whose interests, expressed in terms of their traditional insistence on unity of command, were similar.[9]

To achieve these goals Mr. Root first had to abolish the

[8] Statement of Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, Before the Committee on Military Affairs of the United States Senate on the Bill (S. 3917) to Increase the Efficiency of the Army, 12 Mar 02. Reprinted in U.S. Congress, *The National Defense: Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Sixty-ninth Congress, Second Session—Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act, 3 March 1927* (hereafter cited as *The National Defense*), pt. I, pp. 7, 17.

[9] In planning and in negotiating with Congress Root relied heavily upon the experience and knowledge of The Adjutant General, Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, whose assistant, Lt. Col. William H. Carter, did much of the detailed investigation. At a critical moment Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield, a former commanding general, supported Mr. Root's proposals before Congress. There are excellent sketches of both Schofield and Corbin in Cosmas, *An Army for Empire*, pp. 28–29, 62–64.

position of Commanding General. He made it clear to Congress that the Chief of Staff would act under the authority and direction of the Secretary of War and the President as constitutional Commander in Chief. He would not "command" the Army or be designated as the Commanding General because command implied an authority independent of the Secretary and the President. This change in title would avoid the repeated conflicts that had arisen between successive commanding generals and the Secretary or the President during the previous century. At the same time he wanted the Chief of Staff to be the principal military adviser of the Secretary and President. There was under the Constitution only one Commander in Chief, the President, acting through the Secretary of War, and there should be only one principal military adviser for the Army, the Chief of Staff, to whom all other Army officers would be subordinate.[10]

The need for firm executive control over the bureaus, Mr. Root told Congress, was obvious. The bureaus overlapped and duplicated one another's functions up and down the line. Their traditional mutual antagonism caused disagreements, no matter how petty, to come all the way up to the Secretary personally for resolution. Supplying electricity for new coastal defense fortifications provided a glaring example. In those days, fifty years before anyone ever heard of project management, at least five overlapping bureaus were involved in supplying some part of the electricity needed to build or operate the fortifications, the Engineers in construction, the Quartermaster for lighting the posts, the Signal Corps for communications, the Ordnance for ammunition hoists, and the Artillery which had to use the guns. If the Secretary acted on the request of one bureau, the others immediately complained of interference with their work. The only thing he could do was to call in the bureau chiefs concerned and spend half a day thrashing out a decision. The Secretary simply could not spend all his time on such details, and the result was that the bureaus were continually stepping on each other's toes.[11]

In Mr. Root's scheme the Chief of Staff, assisted by the

[10] *The National Defense*, pp. 6–25, 109–60. (2) King, Memorandum With Respect to the Command of the Army by the Chief of Staff.

[11] *The National Defense*, pp. 157–58.

General Staff, would investigate and recommend to the Secretary solutions to such technical problems. Root further recommended consolidating all Army supply operations in one bureau along the lines suggested by the Dodge Commission. This was the way modern industrial corporations did business, and it did seem a pity, he thought, "that the Government of the United States should be the only great industrial establishment that could not profit" from the lessons and experiences of modern industry.[12]

Mr. Root's proposal to combine responsibility for both current and future operations in the General Staff created serious management problems from the start. Neither the General Board of the Navy nor the German General Staff, which he cited as examples of what he had in mind, had administrative responsibilities. In the government as well as in industry responsibility for current operations has always tended to drive future planning into the background. Co-ordinating bureau activities also involved the General Staff in bureau administration, especially where the bureaus came into conflict with one another as they frequently did. In practice the distinction between supervision or co-ordinating and direction or administration was largely theoretical. What was supervision to the General Staff the bureaus objected to as interfering with their traditional autonomy. They also naturally resented their proposed subordination to the Chief of Staff which would remove them from their traditional direct access to the Secretary.

A study of just this question of divided authority over and among the bureaus was the subject of a lengthy, penetrating analysis by the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff submitted on 28 February 1919. It noted how the British and German practice was to keep the planning functions of the General Staff completely separate from administration. It asserted that before 1903 there were two distinct weaknesses in the War Department, "the lack of a powerful permanent coordinating head," solved by creating the Office of the Chief of Staff, and "the lack of a sufficient number of

[12] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 6–25, 114–20. Quotation is from page 120. (2) Russell F. Weigley, "The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era," in Lt. Col. William Geffen, USAF, ed., "Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare," *Proceedings of the Second Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy*, 2–3 May 69 (Boulder: USAF Academy, 1969), p. 14.

properly delimitated administrative services" organized to perform one function only. As Mr. Root's own experience indicates, the overlap and duplication of functions among the traditional bureaus had the effect of forcing the General Staff into administrative details because there was no other agency, short of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, to resolve the recurrent conflicts among the bureaus over even the pettiest of details. If there was any fault in the General Staff becoming involved in administration it was because the bureaus refused to agree among themselves. The General Staff in the latter part of World War I attempted just such a functional division of labor among the bureaus.[13]

Mr. Root's own actions demonstrated the difficulty of trying to distinguish between these two functions. So urgent in his opinion was the need to control and co-ordinate bureau operations that he did not wait for Congress to provide for a permanent organization. In 1901 he appointed an *ad hoc* War College Board to develop plans, theoretically, for an Army War College, which actually acted as an embryonic General Staff. Its members spent most of their time assisting Root in co-ordinating current operations and little on planning.[14]

Accepting Mr. Root's recommendations, Congress in the Act of 14 February 1903 provided for a Chief of Staff assisted by a General Staff, but it did not consolidate the supply bureaus. The General Staff itself, as initially organized, consisted of three committees designated as divisions, the first charged generally with administration, the second with military intelligence and information, and the third with various planning functions.

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[13] (1) Statement of Col. John McA. Palmer, General Staff Corps, 15 Oct 19, in House Committee on Military Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st sess., *Hearings on Army Reorganization* (hereafter cited as *Army Reorganization Hearings, 1919-20*), vol. I, pp. 1230-40. (2) Maj George C. Marshall, Jr., The Development of the General Staff, Army War College lecture, 19 Sep 22, pp. 6-7. (3) War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, War Plans Div, Appendix VIII to WPD-7942-3, Report on Staff Reorganization, 28 Feb 19, pp. 25-36; quotation from p. 34. Bound as part of a larger Study of Staff Organization, 1918-19, copy in OCMH files. (4) For the difficulties industry encountered in combining planning and operating functions, see Chandler, *Strategy and Structure*, pp. 104-13, 125-62; Chandler, "Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis," in *The History of American Management*, pp. 167-243. (5) Weigley, "The Root Reforms," pp. 21-22.

[14] (1) *The National Defense*, pp. 154-58. (2) Lt Col George P. Ahern, "A Chronicle of the Army War College, 1899-1919," Washington, 24 Jul 19, pp. 1-16. Copy in OCMH.

Then in November 1903 Mr. Root established the Army War College. Its main function was to train officers for General Staff duties on the principle of learning by doing as part of a general reformation of the Army's school system. In practice learning by doing meant that instead of becoming exclusively an academic institution the War College became part of the General Staff, concentrating on military intelligence, Congressional liaison, and war planning. That left the rest of the General Staff to supervise the bureaus.

Students at the War College prepared most of the Army's war plans. They were geared closely to current contingency and operational requirements, including the occupation of Cuba in 1906–09, the Japanese war scare arising from the 1907 San Francisco School Crisis, and President Wilson's various Mexican forays. There was none of the high-level, long-range strategic thinking and planning which the War College's opposite number, the General Board of the Navy, performed.[15]

The Early Years of the General Staff, 1904–1917

The new Chief of Staff and the General Staff were immediately attacked by traditionalists in the bureaus who were opposed to any attempts to assert control over their autonomy.

[15] (1) Ahern, "A Chronicle of the Army War College," pp. 36–278. (2) Stetson Conn, The Army War College, 1899–1940, 23 Dec 64, pp. 1–6. Manuscript copy in OCMH. (3) Lt Col Marvin A. Kreidberg and Lt Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945, DA Pamphlet 20–212 (Washington, 1955), pp. 235–40, 290–94. (4) Lt Col Josiah B. Miller, Background for 20th Century Training, 1899–1917, in "Development of the Departmental Direction of Training and Training Policy in the United States Army, 1789–1954," p. 65. Draft manuscript in OCMH. (5) Report of the Chief of Staff, in *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*, pp. 235–37. (6) War Department Bulletin No. 15, 18 Sep 12. (7) John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, *Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 276–336. (8) Allan R. Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968), *passim*, especially pp. 120–43. (9) Maj. Gen. Otto Nelson in *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946) on pages 66–71 points out that initially the First Division of the General Staff was responsible for supervising the War College while the Third Division's functions included responsibility for war planning. Nevertheless, from the beginning the War College aided the rest of the General Staff in preparing war plans. "In working out and discussing the multitude of details in various plans, the War College . . . became a laboratory for the General Staff where ideas could be tested," page 71. (10) Richard D. Challener's *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) deals with what influence the General Staff had on the development of American foreign policy. Usually it was current administration policies that dictated preparation of particular war plans.

The question was whether future Secretaries of War would support the bureaus or the rationalist reformers seeking to modernize the Army along the lines of industry. The President or Congress could undercut the Chief of Staff's position, but it was the Secretary in the first instance who would have to decide what position to take.

Mr. Root resigned as Secretary of War on 31 January 1904 with his work unfinished. His successor, William Howard Taft, lacked the inclination and ability to make the new dispensation stick in the face of bureau opposition. He was distressed at having to referee disputes between the Chief of Staff and the bureau chiefs, particularly Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth, the new Military Secretary and subsequently The Adjutant General. "The Military Secretary in many respects is the right hand of the Chief of Staff," Taft vainly pleaded, "and they must be in harmony, or else life for the Secretaries and all others in the Department becomes intolerable. Let us have peace, gentlemen." [16]

Under the influence of Ainsworth, Taft abandoned Mr. Root's alliance with the Chief of Staff for the traditional Secretary–bureau chief alliance. Convinced the Chief of Staff and General Staff were too involved in administrative details, he restricted the General Staff's activities in April 1906 to purely "military" matters. On "civil" affairs the bureau chiefs were to report directly to the Secretary. It was Taft's belief that the Chief of Staff was Chief of the General Staff only and served in a purely advisory capacity.

At about the same time President Theodore Roosevelt designated the Military Secretary (later The Adjutant General) as Acting Secretary of War in the absence of the Secretary or Assistant Secretary. Taft was frequently absent for long periods on political junkets, leaving Ainsworth in charge. The Chief of Staff thus became subordinate to The Adjutant General instead of the reverse as Mr. Root had intended and as the law clearly stated.[17]

All this changed when Henry L. Stimson, a law partner and

[16] Mable E. Deutrich, *Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General Fred C. Ainsworth* (Washington: The Public Affairs Press, 1962), p. 99.

[17] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 96–107. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 102–31. (3) Henry F. Pringle, *The Life and Times of William Howard Taft* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1939), vol. I, pp. 256–357.



SECRETARY TAFT



GENERAL AINSWORTH

protégé of Mr. Root's, became Secretary of War on 22 May 1911. Taking up where Root had left off, he reasserted the principle of executive control and embarked on an ambitious program to rationalize the Army's organization from the top down along sound military and business lines. He re-formed Mr. Root's alliance with the Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, who thought along the same lines.

General Wood, the Army's first effective Chief of Staff, had been in office a year when Stimson became Secretary. He was a brilliant administrator with a much broader background in managing large-scale, multipurpose organizations than his predecessors or immediate successors. He could distinguish between the important and the unimportant. Wood could make prompt decisions. He knew how to select competent subordinates, and he freely delegated authority to them. He abolished the "committee system" within the General Staff, eliminating one source of delay. Wherever possible he sought to streamline departmental procedures in the interests of greater efficiency. He also made enemies, especially in Congress.[18]

[18] (1) Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947, 1948), p. 33. (2) Report of the Chief of Staff, in *Annual Report of the War Department, 1911*, pp. 142–48. (3) General Johnson Hagood, *The Services of Supply* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927), pp. 20–22. (4) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 132–37. (5) Miller, Background for 20th Century Training, 1899–1917, p. 79.

The Stimson-Wood reorganization called for consolidating the scattered Army into four divisions with uniform training programs, supplemented by the National Guard and an Army Reserve directly under the Army's control. To provide adequate control over the new Army General Wood reorganized the General Staff into Mobile Army, Coast Artillery, War College, and later Militia Affairs Divisions. The Mobile Army Division, the heart of the Stimson-Wood reorganization, was further broken down into Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Miscellaneous sections. When Mr. Stimson left office he was able to send a short five-line telegram to mobilize one of the new divisions along the Texas border. Under the "traditional" system, he asserted, he would have had to scrabble together an improvised task force, sending out fifty to sixty telegrams in the process.[19]

In their reforms Stimson and Wood were simply applying principles employed by contemporary industrial managers in rationalizing and integrating previously fragmented, large-scale organizations. These coincided, as mentioned earlier, with the desire of professional soldiers for unity of command over the department. They were handicapped because, unlike their industrial counterparts, they had little control over funds, the ultimate weapon in industrial reorganization, and they required Congressional action for most of their program.

The 1910 elections returned a Democratic House of Representatives, and the new chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, James Hay of Virginia, was a rural Jeffersonian opposed on principle both to a large standing army and the idea of a General Staff. From 1911 until his retirement from Congress in September 1916, Hay did his best to limit the size and activities of the General Staff with substantial assistance from War Department traditionalists, chiefly General Ainsworth.

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[19] (1) Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1912*, pp. 67–153. (2) Report of the Chief of Staff, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1911*, pp. 135–36. (3) Report of the Secretary of War, 1911, pp. 15–31. (4) Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition, A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), paperback edition, pp. 137–38. (5) Miller, Background for 20th Century Training, 1899–1917, pp. 79–82. (6) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, p. 181. (7) Stimson Diary, Personal Reminiscences, 1911–1912, pp. 61–69, 115–117, Henry L. Stimson Manuscripts, Yale University.



SECRETARY STIMSON



GENERAL WOOD

The principal complaint of the traditionalists was that Wood and the General Staff continually interfered in strictly administrative details. As Wood told Congress some years later what often appeared to be an issue of "mere administrative detail . . . was nothing of the kind." Who was to decide, for example, how much ammunition should be carried by each artillery caisson? When the Chiefs of Ordnance and Artillery disagreed, as they often did, the General Staff had to find some means of resolving the dispute. Mr. Root had earlier cited similar disagreements which had become frustrating, time-consuming daily reality within the War Department. Wood preferred to issue orders rather than engage in protracted discussions.[20]

The ideological gap between Hay and Stimson and between Ainsworth and Wood, reflected in their opposing views on Army organization, was enormous. In the face of Congressional opposition, Stimson and Wood were forced to accept half a loaf as better than none. In their proposed reorganization of the field army they wished to consolidate Army units scattered about in forty-nine separate posts, many of them no longer

[20] (1) Wood's testimony to Congress is cited in John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), p. 321. (2) For Mr. Root's complaint, see pages 10-11 above.

serving useful military purposes, into eight large posts to facilitate uniform training and mobilization. Congress vetoed this plan. On the other hand, Congress approved the long-standing proposal of Army reformers to consolidate the Quartermaster, Subsistence, and Pay Departments into a single Quartermaster Corps.[21]

Streamlining the administration of the War Department was one major area in which Stimson and Wood were free to assert firm executive control. It was this program that brought about a direct confrontation between Generals Wood and Ainsworth. Personalities aside, the immediate issue was who should control the administration of the department under the Secretary—the Chief of Staff or The Adjutant General.

Simplifying the department's paper work was a constant problem for the secretaries and the General Staff. President Roosevelt had asserted that departmental administration was an executive function. On 2 June 1905 he appointed a commission headed by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Charles Hallam Keep to study and make recommendations on how to improve the "conduct of the executive business of the government . . . in the light of the best modern business practices." Among other things he asked particularly that some means be found to cut back the useless proliferation of paper work in the Army and the Navy because "the increase of paper work is a serious menace to the efficiency of fighting officers who are often required by bureaucrats to spend time in making reports which they should spend in increasing the efficiency of the battleships or regiments under them." [22]

Congress took no action on the Keep Commission report, but it approved the later appointment by President William Howard Taft of a Committee on Economy and Efficiency under Dr. Frederick A. Cleveland, a leader in the new field of public administration, who wished to rationalize public administration along businesslike lines. The committee concentrated on administrative details. They "counted the number of electric

[21] (1) Martha Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 33-36. (2) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 132-36. (3) Report of the Secretary of War, 1912, pp. 18-23, 155-176. (4) Stimson Diary, pp. 61-64, 87-100.

[22] Elting E. Morison, ed., *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), vol. IV, pp. 1201-02.

bulbs in the Federal Building in Chicago. They counted the number of cuspidors in the corridors of Federal buildings elsewhere." Such attention to minute details was customary procedure in this early period when Frederick W. Taylor's Scientific Management with its time and motion studies was the vogue among industrial reformers.[23]

The Cleveland Commission found much to criticize in the War Department's administration. Among other things, the members thought the muster roll, a cumbersome service biography in multiple copies for each soldier, should be abolished and simpler means found to accomplish the same end. Secretary Stimson and General Wood agreed. General Ainsworth insisted the muster roll was one of the most vital documents in the Army, leaving the distinct impression that the Army could not function effectively without it. Forgetting himself, Ainsworth behaved in such a manner toward General Wood and Secretary Stimson that Mr. Stimson had no choice but to order him court-martialed for insubordination. Ainsworth's Congressional supporters persuaded the Secretary to allow him to retire instead.[24]

With General Ainsworth gone, Secretary Stimson and later Stimson's successor, Lindley M. Garrison, were able to carry out a number of the administrative reforms inspired by the Cleveland Commission. Resistance to abolishing the muster roll within The Adjutant General's Office led to compromises which kept the document alive until the huge expansion of the Army during World War I forced its abandonment. Vertical files were introduced at a great saving in space and time. Beginning in January 1914, the Dewey decimal classification was gradually substituted for General Ainsworth's cumbersome, triplicate numerical files. During this same period the Chief of Ordnance, Brig. Gen. William Crozier, with Secretary Stimson's support, sought to introduce Taylor's scientific management principles into Ordnance arsenals. Determined opposition

[23] (1) Barry Dean Karl, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 188. (2) Lloyd M. Short, *The Development of National Administrative Organization in the United States* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1923), pp. 459–60. (3) The quotation is from W. Brook Graves, Administration in the Federal Government, Recent Developments and Problems, ICAF Lecture No. 152–12, 10 Sep 51, p. 4.

[24] (1) Deutrich, *Struggle for Supremacy*, pp. 111–22. (2) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 127–31. (3) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 33–36. (4) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 151–66. (5) Stimson Diary, pp. 65–70.

from labor unions persuaded Congress to prohibit the use of Taylor's time and motion studies within the Army and Navy and later the entire federal government, a law which remained on the statute books until 1949.[25]

General Ainsworth after retirement had not given up his fight against the General Staff. He had simply shifted the base of his operations to the House Committee on Military Affairs where James Hay welcomed his assistance as an unofficial adviser. Secretary Stimson and later Secretary Newton D. Baker detected what they felt was Ainsworth's influence in seemingly minor but very hostile provisions of legislation coming from that committee.[26]

President Taft, urged by Secretary Stimson and now Senator Elihu Root, parried legislative thrusts by Hay, assisted apparently by Ainsworth, aimed at General Wood and the General Staff. Hay succeeded, however, in putting through a provision that reduced the General Staff by 20 percent, to thirty-six members. While increasing it to fifty-five four years later in the National Defense Act of 1916 he so limited the number of officers that could be assigned to the General Staff in Washington that only nineteen were on duty there when the United States entered World War I. (By contrast over 1,000 were so assigned by the end of the fighting. Yet, of these, only four had had previous General Staff experience, and all four were general officers.) [27]

The National Defense Act of 1916 was the most comprehensive legislation of its kind Congress had ever passed. It defined the roles and missions of the Regular Army, the Na-

[25] (1) Deutrich, *Struggle for Supremacy*, pp. 127–30. (2) Mabel E. Deutrich, "Decimal Filing: Its General Background and an Account of its Rise and Fall in the U.S. War Department," *The American Archivist*, XXVIII (April 1965), 199–218. (3) H. G. J. Aitken, *Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal, Scientific Management in Action 1908–1915* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). (4) Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 67–69. (5) M. J. Nadworny, *Scientific Management and the Unions, 1900–1932* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 28–103.

[26] (1) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 132–35. (2) Ltr, Newton D. Baker to Dr. Howard White, 8 May 25. In "Newton D. Baker on Executive Influence in Military Legislation," *American Political Science Review*, L (September 1956), 700–701.

[27] (1) Report of the Chief of Staff, 1912, p. 243. (2) An Act Making Further and More Effectual Provision for the National Defense, and for other purposes, 3 Jun 16 (hereafter cited as the National Defense Act of 1916). Published in War Department Bulletin No. 16, 22 Jun 16, sec. 5. (3) Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 248–49.

tional Guard, and the Reserves, placing the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) and the Plattsburg idea of summer training on a firm basis. It prescribed in detail the organization, composition, and strength of all units in the Army, National Guard, and Reserves.[28]

These provisions were a compromise between the General Staff and Secretary Garrison who favored expanding the Regular Army with Reserves under direct federal control and traditionalists like James Hay who opposed a large standing army and insisted upon a greater and independent role for the National Guard. President Wilson was convinced that with Congress and the nation at large deeply divided on the issue of preparedness such a compromise was politically necessary. Secretary Garrison, opposed to compromise, resigned, and the President appointed a pacifist, reform Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, Newton D. Baker, in his place in March 1916.[29]

The provisions of the act affecting the General Staff and the bureaus were largely the work of James Hay and General Ainsworth. Hay wrote later that without Ainsworth's "vast knowledge of military law, his genius for detail, his indefatigable industry in preparing the legislation and meeting the numerous arguments which were argued against it," the bill could not have been passed.[30]

In addition to nearly forcing the General Staff out of existence Hay and Ainsworth inserted provisions limiting its activities essentially to war planning functions and expressly prohibiting it from interfering with the bureaus and their administration. War College personnel, who had been acting as the military intelligence and war planning agencies of the General Staff, were prohibited from performing any General Staff functions. The effect was to cut back the size of the General Staff even further. The Mobile Army Division was abolished and its functions assigned to The Adjutant General's Office and other bureaus. To underline these restrictions, Hay and Ainsworth inserted a further provision decreeing that the

[28] Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 193–96.

[29] (1) Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: Confusion and Crisis* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 15–54, 328–38. (2) Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, pp. 29–56.

[30] (1) James Hay, Woodrow Wilson and Preparedness, typescript, 1930, p. 23. In James Hay Papers, Manuscripts Div, Library of Congress. (2) Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, pp. 35–40.

"superior" officer whose subordinate should violate them would forfeit his pay and allowances.[31]

From 1916 onward the bureau chiefs regarded the National Defense Act as their "Magna Carta." It legally guaranteed their traditional independence of executive control by specifying the office of each chief as a statutory agency and designating them as commanding officers of their assigned corps or departments. No President could abolish or change these provisions without Congressional approval.[32]

When war did come, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge thought "Mr. Hay by his policy did more injury to this country at a great crisis than any one man I have ever known of in either branch of Congress." [33]

World War I: The Bureau Period, 1917–1918

The apparent intent of Hay, Ainsworth, and other traditionalists was to revive through the National Defense Act the organization of the War Department that had broken down in 1898. At least Secretary Baker thought so. As soon as Mr. Hay was no longer chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee and General Ainsworth had considerably less influence, Baker announced that so far as he was concerned "The Chief of Staff, speaking in the name of the Secretary of War, will coordinate and supervise the various bureaus . . . of the War Department; he will advise the Secretary of War; he will inform himself in as great detail as in his judgment seems necessary to qualify himself adequately to advise the Secretary of War." [34]

After declaring war against Germany on 6 April 1917 Congress passed emergency legislation reversing the policies of Hay

[31] (1) The National Defense Act of 1916, Section 5, spells out all these restrictions. (2) George C. Herring, Jr., "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915–1916," *Journal of Southern History,* XXX (November 1964), 383–404, deals with nearly every aspect of the controversy except the emasculation of the General Staff.

[32] The National Defense Act, secs. 6–16.

[33] Quoted by Herring, "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy," p. 402. The same criticism applies to General Ainsworth.

[34] (1) Opinion of the Secretary of War of September 13, 1916 on the Effect of Section 5, National Defense Act, in *The National Defense,* p. 181. (2) Congress had already adjourned, and Mr. Hay had accepted appointment as a judge on the U.S. Court of Claims. Ltr, Wilson to Hay, 19 Jul 16, James Hay Papers. (3) Newton D. Baker, The Secretary of War During the World War, Army War College lecture, 11 May 29, p. 5. Hereafter cited as Baker War College Lecture.



SECRETARY BAKER

and Ainsworth by providing that the Chief of Staff should have "rank and precedence over all other officers of the Army" and increasing the size of the General Staff to nearly 100.[35] With this authority Mr. Baker could have asserted firm executive control over the bureaus through the Chief of Staff in the manner of Root and Stimson. Instead for nearly a year he went back to the traditional policy of allowing the bureaus to run themselves, with results similar to those in the War with Spain, only far more serious.

Believing he was following the confederate philosophy of Jefferson Davis, Baker asserted that "civilian interference with commanders in the field is dangerous." He applied the same principle in dealing with the bureau chiefs. President Wilson also sought to run the war along traditional lines with as little executive control as possible. Both he and Secretary Baker exercised their authority by delegating it freely. The President left the running of the Army and much of the industrial mobilization program to Mr. Baker who in turn delegated his authority freely to his military commanders and the bureau chiefs.

[35] "An Act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and for other purposes." Approved 12 May 1917 and published in War Department Bulletin No. 30 of 22 May 1917.

Overseas, the President and the Secretary delegated this broad authority over military matters to General John J. Pershing and later to Maj. Gen. William S. Graves who commanded the small expeditionary force in Siberia. In line with their Jeffersonian philosophy of limited government both men also opposed controls over the national economy even during war.

There were serious political problems also. Both the President and Congress ducked the issues of economic mobilization wherever and whenever possible because of serious political disagreements throughout the country over the role the government should play in the economy. It was a lot easier to meet each specific issue or crisis as it came up and devise what Mr. Root had referred to as a "jury-rigged extempore" solution. Only the near collapse of the economy in the winter of 1917–1918 forced the President and Congress to act.[36]

Consequently, soldiers like General Pershing regarded Baker as a great Secretary of War because he left them alone, while business leaders like Bernard M. Baruch were critical of him because he failed to exert effective control over the War Department. Unlike Root and Stimson, Baker had had little contact with the management of large-scale enterprises where the necessity for firm executive control was taken for granted. When urged to adopt such programs, he took refuge in procrastination because as a southern gentlemen he instinctively avoided controversy. Without effective leadership the War Department bumped its way from one crisis to another toward disaster.

As Assistant Secretary of War Frederick P. Keppel saw it, "Baker has learned only too well the lesson that if you leave them alone many things will settle themselves. . . . Newton D. Baker succeeds in getting to first on balls oftener than any other

[36] (1) Frederick Palmer, *Newton D. Baker, America at War* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1931), pp. 156–59, 370–73. The quotation is from page 159. (2) Daniel R. Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 50–109, 243–44. (3) Daniel R. Beaver, "Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board," *The Journal of American History*, LII (June 1965), 43–48. (4) Edward M. Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 94–103. (5) Paul A. C. Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex in Historical Perspective: World War I," *Business History Review*, XLI (Winter 1967), 385–89. Koistinen sees Baker as a typical Jeffersonian progressive favoring local solutions to modern problems (page 388).



GENERAL PERSHING

man in public life. Sometimes he is called out on strikes . . . with no evidence he has lifted the bat from his shoulders." [37]


The broad delegation of authority by the President and Secretary Baker to General Pershing resurrected the position of Commanding General which had caused so much trouble in the nineteenth century and which Mr. Root had deliberately abolished for this reason. Mr. Baker apparently failed to appreciate Mr. Root's purpose in replacing the Commanding General by the Chief of Staff as the Secretary's principal military adviser. The divided authority created by the President and Mr. Baker inevitably led to serious friction between General Pershing and General Peyton C. March, the Chief of Staff after May 1918. March was the first to assert vigorously his 1917 statutory "rank and precedence over all other officers of the Army." In ignoring Mr. Root's advice Mr. Baker was in large measure responsible for the troubles that arose.[38]

Another issue Baker ducked repeatedly was War Depart-

[37] (1) Bernard M. Baruch, *The Public Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 41-51. (2) Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex," p. 388. (3) Quotation is from a draft of a proposed article on Baker by Mr. Keppel, circa October 1919. Newton D. Baker Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 255 (Hayes-Baker Correspondence).

[38] Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword*, pp. 104-19, 169-70.

Chart 1—The War Department, Late 1917



Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917-19) Zone of the Interior, pp. 16-17.

Note: Provost Marshal General appointed 22 May 1917. The Ordnance and Fortifications Board, War Department, considered and recommended projects for fortifications and examined and reported upon ordnance and other inventions submitted to the department.

ment red tape, which became as serious a problem as in 1898. Tradition and regulations dictated that a great many trivial matters required the signature of either the Secretary or the Chief of Staff personally, especially when they involved accountability for funds. Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, when Assistant Chief of Staff during the early part of the war, continually urged drastic pruning of the department's paper work, complaining:

> In time of peace, it is possible that the Chief of Staff had time to give some consideration to the question as to whether the allotment would be made to repair a roof on a set of quarters, to repair a stable that had fallen down, etc. . . . It is entirely impossible to do so now, and the signature of the Chief of Staff on such papers means nothing.[39]

Traditionalists in the bureaus opposed any changes in the system, and Mr. Baker sided with them. Consequently, by September 1917, the paper work in the department was in serious disorder. Important documents were being delayed, lost, or mislaid. Red tape again threatened to slow down the war effort, ". . . that governmental tradition of shifting decisions about detail to higher rank, that 'passing of the buck,' which often wagged a paper along its slow course with its tail of endorsements, was to persist through the early months after our entry into the war." [40] Criticism of the Secretary increased in Congress and business circles, but the President's strong personal support and confidence enabled Baker to survive repeated crises.[41]

Mr. Baker administered the War Department during the first year of the war along the lines indicated in *Chart 1*. Despite his own earlier interpretation of the National Defense Act he acted during this period without an effective Chief of Staff, dealing with the bureaus directly in the traditional manner. He

[39] Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker H. Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934), pp. 131–39, 170–71. Quotation from p. 171.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

[41] (1) Memo, Chief of Engineers for Secretary Baker, 3 Jul 17, sub: Delay in Handling Papers. Baker Manuscripts. (2) Memo, Baker for The Adjutant General, 10 Sep 17; Memo, Baker for Ralph Hayes, 25 Sep 17; Memo, Hayes for Dean Keppel, 27 Oct 17. All in Baker Manuscripts, Box 255 (Hayes-Baker Correspondence). Hayes was Baker's private secretary during the first year of the war. (3) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, pp. 79–81, 93–44, 243–44. (4) Edward M. Coffman, "The Battle Against Red-Tape: Business Methods of the War Department General Staff," *Military Affairs*, XXVI (Spring 1962), 1–3.

treated his first two Chiefs of Staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott and General Bliss, as chiefs of the War Department General Staff only. Abroad much of the time on special missions, Scott in Russia with the Root mission and Bliss with the new Supreme War Council in Paris, they exercised little influence in Washington. Nearing retirement, they also lacked "that certain ruthlessness which disregards accustomed methods and individual likings in striking out along new and untrodden paths." So did Secretary Baker.[42]

The War Department General Staff, at that time primarily the War College Division, during this period was not a coordinating staff but simply the department's war planning agency, as some critics indicated it should have been all along. Mr. Baker looked to the Chief of Staff and the General Staff for advice and plans on raising, training, and equipping the Army. He ignored their advice on the need for more effective control over the bureaus through the Chief of Staff until the issue could no longer be postponed.[43]

There were other factors which made it difficult for the General Staff to act effectively. Fearing Congressional reaction Baker ordered that line officers only, and not War Department staff officers, should be promoted. General Pershing was allowed to select any War Department officers he wanted for his own headquarters staff. Finally experienced civil servants in the bureaus could not be commissioned and continue to serve in their former civilian capacities. They had to be transferred out of Washington.

As a result both the General Staff and the bureaus lost experienced and valuable personnel at a time when their services were needed most. Such key figures as Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn, Chief of the War College Division, and Lt. Col. John

[42] While Bliss was in Paris during November and part of December 1917 and from mid-January to March 1918, Maj. Gen. John Biddle was Acting Chief of Staff. (1) Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword*, pp. 39–44, 48–53. Quotation from p. 41. The author was their successor, General Peyton C. March. (2) Coffman, "The Battle Against Red-Tape," pp. 1–3. (3) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, pp. 80–81. (4) U.S. Army, *Order of Battle of the Land Forces in the World War (1917–19), Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949), pt. 1, pp. 16–17, 27. Hereafter cited as *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*. (5) Erna Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the Corps, 1775–1939* (Washington, 1962), pp. 599–600.

[43] (1) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, pp. 39–49, 59–61, 93–94. (2) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 216, 290–303. (3) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 29–31. (4) Coffman, "The Battle Against Red-Tape," pp. 1–2.

McAuley Palmer left for overseas as soon as possible. From July to the end of September the War College Division lost over a third of its staff, leaving only twenty-four inexperienced staff officers on duty. The bureaus suffered comparable casualties. As one critic privately wrote General Pershing, "The policy you have adopted in your General Staff should have been adopted in Washington. The highest type of men should have been selected and kept in Washington on the General Staff without prejudice to their advancement. That would have given us greater continuity of policy." [44]

The War College Division had become the General Staff in fact because of the abolition by Congress of the Mobile Army Division. Retaining its prewar organization the War College Division was divided into five functional committees and a separate Military Intelligence Section. The committees concentrated on raising the new Army in terms of organization and recruitment, military operations, equipment, and training. The fifth committee dealing with legislation and regulations, prepared the necessary administrative and legal support.

The Military Operations Committee was responsible for operational planning, including the defense of the United States and its overseas possessions. It drew up the plans for sending troops to Europe, prepared studies on the amount of shipping available, and issued troop movement schedules. The Equipment Committee was responsible for supplying troops, preparing standard tables of equipment for each unit, distributing supplies among the troops, procurement planning, and maintaining liaison with the supply bureaus. It had no authority over the bureaus. It could merely request action from them.

A serious drawback was the General Staff's awkward loca-

[44] (1) Col Briant H. Wells, The Transition of the General Staff from Peace to War, Army War College lecture, 10 Sep 22. Miscellaneous Papers No. 10, 1922-1923, pp. 4-6. (2) Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army*, pp. 602-03. (3) Edward M. Coffman, *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 24. (4) In a memorandum of 3 September 1917 Mr. Baker claimed that Congress in the Selective Service Act provided only for promotions in the mobile army, not the War Department. He had asked Congress for legislation which would permit promotions within the department, but Congress had not acted on it so far. Baker Papers, Box 240 (1917-M). (5) The quotation is from a letter of Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen of 18 March 1918 to General Pershing. Papers of General of the Armies John J. Pershing, Library of Congress. I am obliged to Lt. Col. Heath Twichell who has written an excellent biography of General Allen for calling my attention to this letter.

tion across town in the War College which inevitably created delay and ungenerous remarks that it had become a dead-letter office. Consequently, both the Military Operations and Equipment Committees moved from the War College to the main War Department building in the fall of 1917 to perform their functions more effectively and expeditiously. At that time they became known collectively as the War Department Section of the War Department General Staff.[45]

The territorial departments of the Army were reorganized and increased from four to six after the declaration of war to assist the War Department in the administration of the Army and to mobilize the National Guard and Reserve forces. The departments were the Northeastern, Eastern, Southeastern, Central, Southern, and Western. The Southern Department was responsible for coping with the continued depredations of warring Mexican factions along the border, tying down between 30,000 to 130,000 men at various times in over 255 small posts. It was a major operation and supplying these men was an added strain on the already overburdened war economy. Overseas there were the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments to which a new Panama Canal Department was added in July 1917. The Philippine Department included a small detachment of 1,500 men stationed in China with headquarters at Tientsin. It was also responsible for assembling the 2,700 men assigned to General Graves' Siberian expedition in the summer of 1918. These departments all reported to the War Department. General Pershing reported directly to Secretary Baker also, not through the Chief of Staff.[46]

The General Staff planned, scheduled, and co-ordinated its programs for mobilizing, training, and transporting the Army overseas. So far as the supply bureaus were concerned there was little planning and no co-ordination. At the outbreak of war,

[45] (1) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 216, 290–92. (2) *Order of Battle (1917-19), ZI*, pp. 30–31. (3) Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 292–93. (4) Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword*, pp. 41, 47. (5) Memo, Ralph Hayes for the Secretary of War, 29 Dec. 17, Baker Manuscripts, Box 255 (Hayes-Baker Correspondence).

[46] (1) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 221–22, 234. (2) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 549–675. (3) Report of the Chief of Staff, *War Department Annual Report, 1919*, pt. 1, pp. 467–71. (4) Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword*, pp. 113–18. (5) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, pp. 185–87. (6) Memo, AGO, 3 Jan 17, sub: Strength of Troops on Mexican Border, Baker Manuscripts.

Secretary Baker simply issued "hunting licenses" to the bureaus and turned them loose on an unprepared economy. Baker and other responsible officials should have anticipated the chaos that inevitably followed. By July more than 150 War Department purchasing committees were competing with each other for scarce supplies in the open market.

Anticipating shortages, agencies and their personnel aggressively sought to corner the markets for critical items. The Adjutant General rubbed Mr. Baker's nose into the problem personally one day by boasting that he had cornered the American market for typewriters. "There is going to be the greatest competition for typewriters around here, and I have them all." [47]

Similarly the commander of the Rock Island Arsenal cornered the market for leather. "Well, that was wrong, you know," he later told Congress, "but I went on the proposition that it was up to me to look after my particular job, and I proceeded to do so." [48]

Simply expressed this maxim has been part of the traditional American dogma of individualism. It applies to large organizations and small, government and private. It worked satisfactorily in a thinly populated, expanding rural America, but as many responsible industrialists had foreseen earlier competition could mean disaster during war in a mass urban industrial society.[49]

As one severe critic bluntly put it, "The supply situation was as nearly a perfect mess as can be imagined. . . . It seemed a hopeless tangle." [50] Among the bureaus were five, later nine, separate, independent systems for estimating requirements with no inventory controls to determine the

[47] (1) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, p. 62. (2) Quotation from Baker War College Lecture, p. 6.

[48] Quoted in Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, pp. 282–83.

[49] (1) Alfred D. Chandler, "The Large Industrial Corporation in the Making of the Modern American Economy," in Stephen E. Ambrose, ed., *Institutions in Modern America: Structure and Process* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 71–101. (2) Robert E. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968). (3) Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1963). Of course, Kolko turned the industrialists' rational search for order upside down to fit a typical populist, agrarian conspiracy theory.

[50] Hugh S. Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, 1935), p. 90.

amount of supplies available in various depots. Some depots had more space to store supplies than they needed, while others did not have enough. There were five different sources of supply and property accountability, always a source of time-consuming red tape, five different accounting systems, and as many incompatible statistical and reporting systems which were of use only to the bureau or depot concerned. For example, the War Department, according to Bernard Baruch, could not find out from the bureaus how much toluol, a basic ingredient of TNT, it needed.

There were no agencies anywhere in the department, or even within some bureaus, for determining industrial and transportation priorities similar to those the General Staff prepared for troop movement schedules. Competition among the bureaus for transportation caused bottlenecks that, by December 1917, imperiled the fuel supplies of war industries. Finally, the bureaus dealt directly with the War Industries Board, other civilian war agencies, and with Allied purchasing missions, but there was no one to represent the department as a whole. As Maj. Gen. George W. Burr, Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, after the war told Congress, "The Bureau System did not work in an emergency, and it never will work." [51]

Despite the growing evidence of impending industrial disaster Mr. Baker persisted throughout the fall of 1917 in opposing controls over industry, transportation, and over the bureaus. Ultimately in December a mammoth congestion of rail and ocean traffic developed in the New York area and the northeast generally. A particularly severe winter, which froze railswitches and even coal piled out in the open, and the menace to Atlantic shipping of German submarines made matters worse.

For lack of effective controls a vast amount of freight clogged yards in Atlantic ports and eastern industrial areas with

[51] (1) Baruch, *The Public Years*, pp. 43–62. (2) Report of the Chief of Staff, *War Department Annual Report, 1919*, pp. 245–47. (3) Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army*, pp. 609–13. (4) History of the Organization and Functions of the Central Statistical Office of the Chief of Staff, in Department of the Army World War II Statistics, c. 1947, pp. 1–2. Manuscript in OCMH. (5) Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex," pp. 388–90. (6) Memo, Col Frederick B. Wells, Director of Storage, for Historical Branch (PS&T), 7 Mar 19, sub: Development of Storage. File 029 (Storage Div.), PS&T files, RG 165, NARS. (7) Testimony of General Burr, *Army Reorganization Hearings, 1919–20*, pp. 441–62. Quotation from p. 446.

literally thousands of rail cars, which could not be unloaded for lack of space and labor or even located for lack of identification. A similar rail tie-up in New York had occurred just a year before.

The terminals in Philadelphia, for example, were filled with carloads of lumber from Washington and Oregon destined for the Navy's Hog Island site long before there were any rail facilities there for unloading the cars. In the end ships built with these materials were not completed until the war was over.[52]

For lack of adequate warehousing, wharves and docks were used, even ships, which were badly needed for transporting troops and supplies. Freight cars of coal, frozen or not, could not get through or were lost in the congestion, threatening paralysis of war industry and holding up bunkering of ships. By December more than 45,000 carloads were backed up as far as Pittsburgh and Buffalo.[53]

World War I: The March Period, 1918–1919

The crisis in December 1917 came at a time when Allied fortunes in Europe were at their lowest ebb. The British campaign in Flanders had bogged down ingloriously in mud. The Italian Army had suffered a disastrous defeat at Caporetto, the French Army was still recovering from the effects of the mutinies six months earlier, and the new Bolshevik regime in Russia was discussing peace terms with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk.

Industrialists, particularly those associated with the War Industries Board (WIB), continually warned President Wilson and others of impending disaster if firm controls over the economy were not established. Thomas N. Perkins, a Boston corporation lawyer serving with the WIB, in December wrote a memorandum calling for a civilian supply department, such

[52] (1) Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 246–47, 342. (2) Walker D. Hines. *War History of American Railroads* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), p. 13. (3) Albro Martin, *Enterprise Denied: Origins of the Decline of American Railroads, 1897–1917* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 346.

[53] (1) Memo, Wells for Historical Branch, PS&T, 7 Mar 19. (2) Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Road to France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 115.

as Britain had created, which would take over such functions from the War Department and other agencies.[54]

The paralysis of rail and ocean traffic in New York, the threat of war industry in the East shutting down for lack of coal, and similar evidence in December prompted Senator George E. Chamberlain, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, to investigate the problem. His hearings uncovered evidence of much waste and inefficiency among the War Department bureaus, and he concluded, like Mr. Perkins of the War Industries Board, that a separate civilian supply department should be created on the British model. Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York summed up the attitude of his colleagues on the committee and of industrialists generally by asserting that "the bureaus' hide-bound traditions were fouled up in red-tape." Procurement and supply was not, he said, properly a military function at all and could not be performed adequately by military men. It was a job for businessmen.[55]

These events, particularly the Perkins recommendation for a separate supply department, finally prodded Baker into attempting to centralize control over the department's disparate and fragmented supply operations. The process had actually begun in the summer of 1917 when responsibility for construction and for ports of embarkation had been transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to two new agencies under the direct supervision of the War College Division.[56] In November he replaced Assistant Secretary of War William M. Ingraham, a nonentity appointed in May 1916 along with Baker, with Benedict Crowell, a Cleveland industrialist with a Reserve Quartermaster commission and an exponent of firm executive control over the bureaus.[57]

Responding to pressure from Congress, the War Industries Board, and events themselves, Baker accepted a War College

[54] (1) Beaver, "Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board," p. 51. (2) The most sophisticated, detailed and thorough treatment of the WIB is Robert D. Cuff, *The War Industries Board: Business–Government Relations during World War I* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

[55] Dickinson, *The Building of an Army*, quotation on p. 286.

[56] (1) Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army*, pp. 605–09. (2) Report of the Chief of Staff, *War Department Annual Report, 1919*, pp. 347–49, 378–81, 420–21, 715.

[57] Information on Mr. Ingraham indicates he was a deserving Democrat who had been elected mayor of Portland, Maine, in 1915. President Wilson in December 1917 appointed him Surveyor of Customs in Portland, a job he held until 1922.

proposal in December for centralizing the department's supply system along functional lines in the General Staff. His first act was to recall from retirement Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals of Panama Canal fame, making him Acting Quartermaster General on 20 December and a week later on 28 December also appointing him "director" of a new General Staff agency, the Storage and Traffic Division. The intent in creating this agency was to establish control over such functions among the bureaus along with the Embarkation Service which was placed under its direct supervision. Next on 11 January 1918 a separate Purchasing Service was created to co-ordinate these activities in the War Department.[58]

Mr. Crowell, Goethals' immediate superior, said, "When a nation is committed to a struggle for existence, only a man impatient of hampering actions is likely to carry a great project through to success." General Goethals was such a man, he thought, and his "lack of previous intimate contact with the red tape and machinery" of the bureaus plus his judgment and a determination to succeed made him a good executive. He readily accepted responsibility and did not drive his superiors "to distraction by continual requests for authority to act." [59]

When Goethals first took charge of the Quartermaster Corps he thought the only way to control the disruptive, wasteful competition among the bureaus was to create a civilian supply department as Mr. Perkins of the WIB and Senator Chamberlain's committee recommended. Since President Wilson and Secretary Baker opposed this idea, Goethals determined to consolidate and integrate War Department purchases internally to eliminate competition.

General Goethals also shared the views of industrialists and the War Industries Board that the Quartermaster Corps was essentially a huge purchasing organization and not a military operation. Consequently he proceeded to staff it with civilians who he thought knew more about purchasing than military men. One of his first appointments was Harry M. Adams, vice

[58] (1) Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson, *The Armies of Industry* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), pp. 11–12. (2) Beaver, "Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board," pp. 51–54. (3) Testimony of General Burr, *Army Reorganization Hearings*, p. 442. (4) War Department General Orders 159, 19 Dec 17, 167, 28 Dec 17, and 5, 11 Jan 18.

[59] Crowell and Wilson, *The Armies of Industry*, pp. 237–38.



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president in charge of traffic for the Missouri Pacific Railroad, whom he made Director of Inland Traffic, later called the Inland Traffic Service, on 11 January 1918. At about the same time Mr. Baker appointed Edward R. Stettinius, a partner in J. P. Morgan and Company, Surveyor of Supplies to work under Goethals.

Goethals most valuable civilian assistant was Robert J. Thorne, president of Montgomery Ward, who came to work on 1 January 1918 as a volunteer civilian aide to Goethals. On 8 March Goethals assigned him as Assistant to the Acting Quartermaster General. Instructions and directives from Mr. Thorne in performing his duties under General Goethals "will have the force and effect as if performed by the Acting Quartermaster General himself." [60]

It would be difficult to overestimate the contribution made by representatives of industry and business, including those

[60] (1) War Department General Order 24, 8 Mar 18. (2) In 1919 Thorne was awarded the DSM for "unusually meritorious services in the reorganization of the services of supply." War Department General Order 18, 27 Jan 19. (3) The best summary treatment of General Goethals' work as Acting Quartermaster General is in Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army*, pp. 630-36. There is a serious need for a detailed account of General Goethals' wartime activities. (4) Information on Mr. Adams is from Maj. W. M. Adriance, Capt. S. T. Dana, and 1st Lt. James R. Douglas, Draft History of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, circa March 1919. Manuscript in OCMH. In the final, much abbreviated form it became part of the Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 388-449. A copy of this draft may be found in File 029 (Organization), PS&T Div., WDGS files, RG 165, NARS.

apostles of Frederick W. Taylor, the efficiency experts, in attempting to rationalize the Army's supply system. They infiltrated the department's supply organization at all levels of command, some in uniform, some not, some volunteer civilian advisers, others appointed officially. The War Industries Board, for example, loaned Mr. Baker's nemesis, Thomas N. Perkins, in April to Mr. Crowell who appointed him a member of a Committee of Three to plan a reorganization of the Army's supply system along rational businesslike lines.[61]

There were other military officers like General Goethals who believed the Army's supply system needed drastic reorganization. Brig. Gen. Robert E. Wood, an Engineer officer who had served as General Goethals' "good right arm" in building the Panama Canal, was one.[62] At Goethals' request he was recalled from France and on 10 May made Acting Quartermaster General under General Goethals who had just become Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic. Wood left the Army on 1 March 1919 to join Mr. Thorne at Montgomery Ward as vice president and general merchandise manager.[63]

Another was Col. Hugh S. Johnson. As Deputy Provost Marshal General he had been responsible for planning and executing the Selective Service Act. In March 1918 Assistant Secretary Crowell appointed him chairman of the Committee of Three to devise a plan for reorganizing the Army's supply system. Promoted to brigadier general on 15 April, Johnson became Director of Purchase and Supplies under General Goethals with Gerard Swope, vice president of Western Electric, as his assistant director. Johnson, brilliant, young, impatient, and abrasive, was determined to consolidate and integrate the Army's supply system despite the opposition of

[61] Draft Report of Committee Appointed by the Assistant Secretary of War to Plan an Organization for the Office of Director of Purchases and Supplies [hereafter referred to as Report of Committee of Three], undated [April 1919], File 029 (PS&T), PS&T files, RG 165, NARS.

[62] Chandler, *Strategy and Structure*, p. 233.

[63] (1) *Ibid.*, p. 233. (2) Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army*, p. 633. (3) General Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1932), pp. 187–88. (4) War Department General Order 46, 9 May 18. (5) By War Department General Order 18 of 27 January 1919, Wood received the DSM for his work in "the reorganization and operation of the services of supply."

the bureau chiefs who, he said, jealously guarded their "protocol, prerogatives, and functions." [64]

He was soon in hot water with many of his military colleagues, including the Chief of Staff. Disgruntled, he left for a field command in October and left the Army after the war to become an official of the Moline Plow Company. During the New Deal he gained notoriety as head of the National Recovery Administration.[65]

Secretary Baker in the meantime reorganized his own office and staff. In April Congress authorized a Second and Third Assistant Secretary of War. The Second Assistant at first was Edward R. Stettinius who was responsible for purchases and supplies under Mr. Crowell. The Third Assistant Secretary was Frederick P. Keppel, on leave as dean of Columbia University, who had been a general troubleshooter in Mr. Baker's office for some time. Now he became responsible for civilian relations and nonmilitary aspects of Army life, including relations with the Red Cross, YMCA, and Army chaplains.[66]

Mr. Stettinius went overseas in July 1918 and in August became the American representative on the Inter-Allied Munitions Council. His successor as Second Assistant Secretary was John D. Ryan, a mining engineer whom President Wilson had appointed Director of Aircraft Production in April. He now became Assistant Secretary of War and Director of the Air Service.[67]

Mr. Crowell at the same time was given additional duties as Director of Munitions. General Goethals reported both to him and to the Chief of Staff in his various capacities.

Much earlier, in October 1917, Mr. Baker had appointed Emmett Jay Scott, secretary of Tuskegee Institute, as Special

[64] (1) Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, p. 91. (2) By War Department General Order 18 of 27 January 1919 Johnson received the DSM for his work in "planning and executing the draft laws."

[65] (1) Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, pp. 87–93, 97. (2) Adriance, Dana, and Douglas, Draft History of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, pp. 28–29, 47. (3) For an account of how General Johnson's son, Col. Kilbourne Johnston, similarly attempted without success to rationalize the Army's logistics system after World War II, see Chapter V below.

[66] (1) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, p. 168. (2) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 15, 18. (3) War Department General Order 44, 7 May 18.

[67] (1) Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort*, pp. 168–71. (2) War Department General Order 81, 28 Aug 18. (3) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, p. 18.

Assistant to the Secretary of War on matters affecting black soldiers.[68]

The first wholesale reorganization of the General Staff itself took place on 9 February 1918. Instead of being an operational planning staff based on the old War College Division it was now to be, at least on paper, a directing staff responsible for supervising all War Department activities not falling under Mr. Crowell. The Chief of Staff was specifically directed to supervise and co-ordinate "the several corps, bureaus and all other agencies of the Military Establishment . . . to the end that the policies of the Secretary of War may be harmoniously executed." [69]

The General Staff, as reorganized along functional lines, consisted of the Chief of Staff and five Assistant Chiefs of Staff: one, an Executive Assistant responsible for administration, control, and intelligence; the president of the War College as head of a War Planning Division which absorbed the functions of the old War College Division; a Director of Operations who took over the functions of the Operations and Equipment Committees; the new Director of Storage and Traffic; and the Director of Purchases and Supplies, Brig. Gen. Palmer E. Pierce. The latter reported to Crowell and also served as liaison with the War Industries Board.

The War Industries Board created in the summer of 1917 was responsible on paper for economic mobilization, but it lacked the authority to make its decisions stick. Its first two chairmen, Frank Scott and Daniel Willard, quit, Scott in October 1917 because his health had broken down under the frustration of accomplishing nothing, while Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, left on 11 January 1918 in disgust, during the administration's crisis with the Chamberlain Committee.[70]

Finally President Wilson, despite the continued opposition of Secretary Baker, on 4 March 1918 appointed Bernard Baruch chairman of the War Industries Board with effective executive control over the nation's war industry and agencies of the government, including the War Department. Instead of nego-

[68] (1) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, p. 18. (2) Coffman, *The War to End All Wars*, p. 70.

[69] War Department General Order 14, 9 Feb 18.

[70] Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex," pp. 394–95.



GENERAL MARCH

tiating directly with industries the services would now have to submit their requirements for items in short supply with detailed justifications to the WIB. The War Industries Board would then determine allocation of scarce commodities and transportation priorities. This forced a major reorganization of the War Industries Board itself based on centralized authority and decentralized operations, which in turn required a parallel reorganization of the War Department's supply system under General Goethals.[71]

Baker's appointments of Benedict Crowell and General Goethals were made with the aim of establishing control over the War Department's supply system. Important as these choices were even more important was Mr. Baker's appointment of Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March, whom he recalled from France to replace General Tasker H. Bliss as Chief of Staff, who now became the American representative on the Supreme War Council in Paris. General March became Acting Chief of Staff on the same day, 4 March, that Mr. Baruch obtained the authority he needed to make the War Industries Board effective.

[71] (1) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI,* pp. 32–39. (2) Baruch, *The Public Years,* pp. 56–58. (3) Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex," pp. 399–400. (4) Grosvenor Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War: The Strategy Behind the Lines, 1917–1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923), pp. 40–64. In order to avoid an unpleasant confrontation President Wilson did not appoint Mr. Baruch until Baker was on his way to France. Baker simply had to accept a *fait accompli.* (5) See also Cuff, *The War Industries Board.*

March's official designation as Chief of Staff with the rank of general came on 20 May 1918.[72]

March, who believed the shortest distance between two points was a straight line, was a hard-working ruthless executive. He made a lot of enemies in the process, especially in Congress.[73]

March had one supreme goal, to establish effective executive control over the War Department's operations under the Chief of Staff subject to the Secretary's direction. He accepted General Goethals' special relations with Mr. Crowell, and, in fact, the two got along very well because in the area of supply they both agreed. For example, both Goethals and March agreed that General Pierce was not very effective as Director of Purchases and Supplies. March abruptly fired Pierce and replaced him with Colonel Johnson who was promoted by the President to brigadier general.[74]

When Mr. Baker returned from France in mid-April he found General March had already instituted a thorough house cleaning in the department, eliminating red tape and getting rid of deadwood. From that moment on Baker supported March loyally in his efforts to establish effective unity of command over the department just as strongly as he had earlier opposed such controls. It meant abandoning his previous traditionalist approach of working through the bureau chiefs for the Root-Stimson policy of allying himself with the Chief of Staff.

One of March's first projects was to prune back the red tape which had snarled the department's operations. The center of this program was the new Office of the Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff. At first this was Maj. Gen. William S. Graves, who was assigned in July to command the American expeditionary force in Siberia. Maj. Gen. Frank McIntyre, then Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, replaced him until January 1919. Graves had been Secretary of the General Staff, and in that capacity Col. Percy P. Bishop replaced him until he went overseas in September and was then replaced by Col. Fulton Q. C. Gardner.[75] Both the Executive Assistant and the Secretary of

[72] War Department General Orders 22, 2 Mar 18, and 53, 27 May 18.

[73] March in *The Nation at War* freely admitted his lack of tact in dealing with Congress, pp. 350–51.

[74] (1) Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword*, pp. 62–63. (2) Coffman, *The War to End All Wars*, pp. 166–67.

[75] See Appendix B, pp. 382, 385, 387.

the General Staff worked to improve the business methods of the General Staff. The Executive Division became a control division for co-ordinating departmental operations. A Cable Section was responsible for routing and ensuring prompt action on all communications to and from the General Staff as well as coding and decoding them. A new Statistics Branch, transferred from the War Industries Board, prepared a detailed weekly report on the progress of the war and economic mobilization for the Chief of Staff, the Secretary, and the President. As a result the Secretary and Chief of Staff could make decisions based on relatively accurate data instead of guesswork. Armed with these statistics the department could also present more effectively its requirements to the War Industries Board.

A Coordination Branch was responsible for studying and supervising "the organization, administration, and methods of all the divisions of the General Staff and the several bureaus, corps or other agencies of the War Department, to the end that the activities of all such agencies may be coordinated, duplication of work avoided, harmonious action secured, and unnecessary machinery of organization may be eliminated." [76]

General March replaced Maj. Gen. Henry P. McCain, an adherent of the Ainsworth school, as Adjutant General with Maj. Gen. Peter C. Harris, an infantry officer rather than a deskman. Harris continued the efforts begun under Stimson and Wood to simplify the department's paper work. He reduced the number of separate records kept on enlisted men by company commanders from nine to two, eliminating the celebrated, but cumbersome, muster roll. The War Department and the Army could no longer afford the luxury of such documents whose cost in time and manpower far exceeded their usefulness.[77]

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[76] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 261–62. (2) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 33, 35, 42. (3) Coffman, "The Battle Against Red Tape." (4) History of the Organization and Functions of the Central Statistical Office of the Chief of Staff, pp. 1–3. (5) Report of the Chief of Staff, *War Department Annual Report, 1919*, pp. 443–45. (6) Memo. Col. Percy P. Bishop for the Chief of Staff, 5 Apr 18. Copy in OCMH. (7) Baruch, *The Public Years*, pp. 56–58. (8) Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War*, p. 201. (9) Quotation is from War Department General Order 80, 26 Aug 18, sec. 2a.

[77] (1) March, *The Nation at War*, pp. 43–53. (2) Report of the Adjutant General, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1918*, pp. 202–17, and *Annual Report of the War Department, 1919*, pp. 538–41. (3) Coffman, *The War to End All Wars*, pp. 125–26.

The change from decentralized operations through the bureaus to centralized control along functional lines followed a path strewn with many obstacles. One major obstacle was that the bureaus were still solidly entrenched in power by Section 5 of the National Security Act of 1916 which Ainsworth and Hay had deliberately inserted to hamstring the General Staff. For the same reason the new authority of the War Industries Board rested on dubious legal grounds. The WIB succeeded primarily because the attitude in Congress, thanks to the Chamberlain Committee, had changed toward the bureaus whose destructive competition, red tape, and delay seriously threatened the war effort. Only the enactment on 20 May 1918 of the Overman Act, granting the President authority to reorganize government agencies in the interest of greater efficiency for the duration of the war, gave the WIB legal authority over industrial mobilization and the General Staff authority necessary to reorganize the Army's fragmented supply system.[78]

In practice the changes in organization toward a centralized supply system were a gradual process of trial and error made without interrupting the production and supply of material needed at the front; it was "like constructing Grand Central Station without disrupting train schedules." [79]

Continuing their opposition the bureaus fought consolidation and change every step of the way. As General Johnson saw it, "We did by rough assault" consolidate purchase activities but not "without agonized writhings and enmities, some of which have never entirely disappeared." [80]

Until the Overman Act's passage, the reorganization of the General Staff under General Order 14 had been really only a paper reorganization. The Directorates of Storage and Traffic and of Purchase were little more than holding companies with operations still fragmented among the still-independent, competing bureaus.

When Mr. Baruch reorganized the War Industries Board, a parallel reorganization of the War Department's supply system followed. Stettinius, Crowell, Goethals, and March

[78] (1) Risch, *Quartermaster Support of the Army*, pp. 627–29. (2) Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 344–46. (3) Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex," pp. 389, 395–96.

[79] Frederick P. Keppel, "The General Staff," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXV (April 1920), 543.

[80] Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, pp. 91, 93.

agreed to appoint Johnson chairman of the Committee of Three on 2 April to examine the problems of the Army's supply system and propose a solution. Johnson's colleagues were Thomas N. Perkins of the WIB and Charles R. Day, a well-known Philadelphia engineer and efficiency expert.[81]

The Committee of Three, as it was known, noting the inefficiency of the existing bureau system, asserted in its report that any reorganization must unify and integrate the several bureaus on functional lines. At the top its organization should parallel that of the recently reorganized WIB to provide single War Department representatives instead of five in the areas of commodities, priorities, clearances, and requirements as well as purchase, production, finance, standardization of control, and replacement of Allied war supplies. It should transmit the military supply requirements from the Operations Division of the General Staff to the supply bureaus as the basis of their own requirements.[82]

Unification of the Army's supply system meant effective centralized control over the bureaus. The committee's report went through several revisions, but they all insisted that the fundamental issue of controlling the bureaus demanded standardizing their statistics. "There will never be effective action by the Office of Purchase and Storage until it has developed statistical control over the bureaus. . . . The whole organizational pattern is clipped out of statistics." [83]

Bureau statistics, the committee insisted, should be uniform to provide the Director of Purchases with reports on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. He must also have complete access to bureau statistics for purposes of auditing them. Without such direct control it would be better to forget the whole thing. "The office is built upon a foundation of statistics or it had far better not exist." [84]

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[81] Report of Committee of Three.

[82] Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, p. 351.

[83] (1) Report of Committee of Three. (2) The best historical account of the frustrated attempts to set up uniform statistics among the bureaus is by Lt. Col. Rodney Hitt, Chief, Statistics and Requirements Branch, PS&T, Organization and Activities of the Statistics and Requirements Branch, Office of the Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, manuscript circa early 1919 on which the following account is based. File 029 (Statistical Requirements Branch), PS&T Files, RG 165, NARS.

[84] Report of Committee of Three, pp. 16–18.

The obstacles to gaining control over bureaus' statistics were enormous. At the bottom were the bureaus whose statistics were often inadequate and unreliable. For instance, The Quartermaster General's Office lacked information on the inventory in its depots across the country. Each depot had its own statistics which were unrelated to those of other depots.[85] The bureaus fought bitterly all the way against changing their traditional methods.[86]

Second, under the reorganization of the General Staff of 9 February the Statistical Branch established in the Executive Division of the General Staff was clearly assigned responsibility for collecting, compiling, and analyzing statistics "from all the areas of the Military Establishment." Headed by Dr. Leonard P. Ayres of the Russell Sage Foundation, it had been transferred from the War Industries Board because the War Department simply had no central statistical organization of its own.[87]

While the Central Statistical Branch could compile and collect, it could not standardize the bureaus' statistics. For this reason the Committee of Three insisted that the Division of Purchase and Supply should be responsible for this function.

March's response to the report of the Committee of Three was a general order of 16 April which consolidated the Purchase and Supply and the Storage and Traffic Divisions into one Directorate of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic (PS&T) under Goethals who still continued to function as Acting Quartermaster General. The order also abolished the Office of Surveyor General of Supplies held by Mr. Stettinius, who then became, as mentioned above, Second Assistant Secretary of War for Purchase and Supplies. In May General Wood returned to become Acting Quartermaster General, while General Johnson had dual responsibilities as War Department representative on the WIB Priorities Board and as Director of Purchase and Supply. Gerard Swope, vice president of Western Electric, became assistant director.[88]

[85] (1) Col. Frederick P. Wells, Development of Storage Organization, p. 2. (2) Adriance, Dana, and Douglas, Draft History of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, pp. 203–11.

[86] (1) Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, p. 91 (2) Hitt, Organization and Activities of the Statistics and Requirements Branch.

[87] (1) March, *The Nation at War*, pp. 47–48. (2) Clarkson, *Industrial America in the World War*, p. 201. (3) Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 443–45.

[88] (1) General Order 36, 16 Apr 18. (2) Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, p. 89–91. (3) Baruch, *The Public Years*, p. 51.

When the Overman Act became law, functionalizing the Army's supply bureaus began in earnest on the principle urged by industrialists of centralized control and decentralized operations. The argument over statistical control continued. Col. Rodney Hitt, Chief of the Statistics and Requirements Branch, PS&T, wrote after the war that there was "an animated and protracted discussion on this whole subject of a statistical organization for the Purchase and Supply Division, with the final result that the Chief of Staff did not approve the proposition of transferring control over the Statistical Branch of the General Staff to the Purchase and Supply Division." [89] This seems to have been the basis for the growing mutual disenchantment between March and Johnson which led to the latter's departure from the General Staff in October for a field command.[90]

The Statistical Branch did try to help the Division of Purchase and Supplies by lending them personnel, but the bureaus dragged their feet and would not provide qualified personnel from their agencies. Only in September did General March grant authority to create a Requirements Branch in the Office of the Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic responsible for co-ordinating calculations of requirements among the bureaus. Obtaining qualified personnel continued to hamper operations, and only a beginning was made in setting up control over the bureaus' statistics when the war ended. About all that was accomplished was the establishment of a uniform system for calculating requirements.[91]

Statistics aside, the Overman Act led Goethals, Thorne, Johnson, and Swope to argue that the bureaus should now be consolidated into a single service of supply. Goethals in a memorandum of 18 July to General March forcefully recapitulated the shortcomings of the existing system of separate bureaus. Despite recent changes the present system did not provide for effective executive control over their operations. What was required was consolidation along functional lines under the Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic "whose functions shall be executive—not supervisory," and "in command of the supply organization," except for procurement,

[89] Hitt, Organization and Activities of the Statistics and Requirements Branch, p. 7.
[90] Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, pp. 91–94, 97.
[91] (1) Adriance, Dana, and Douglas, Draft History of the Purchase Storage, and Traffic Division, pp. 36–40. (2) Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 355–57.

production, and supply of artillery, aircraft, and other items of a highly technical nature. To avoid interfering with current operations, the whole reorganization should take place gradually.[92]

General March approved the Goethals' proposals a month later on 26 August as part of a larger reorganization of the General Staff. *(Chart 2)*

The General Staff now had become an active operating agency, not merely a supervisory one. The titles of the several Assistant Chiefs of Staff were changed to director and the organizations under them designated services in some instances, such as the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Service.

The Operations Division retained its responsibilities for equipment, including construction and cantonment, and for the determination and development of programs setting forth the Army's requirements for equipment and other matériel. It was given responsibility for the design, production, procurement, storage, and maintenance of motor vehicles. This appeared to be a supply function and inconsistent with the organization on 18 April of a Motor Transport Service under the Quartermaster Corps and its subsequent establishment on 15 August as a separate Motor Transportation Corps with virtually the same functions as those assigned on 26 August to the Operations Division.[93] Finally on 5 September the procurement of all motor vehicles, except tanks and caterpillar types, was transferred to the Quartermaster Corps, where it remained.[94]


A responsibility added to those of the Operations Division was "the appointment, promotion, transfer, and assignment of commissioned officers" together with responsibility for dealing with "conscientious objectors." Promotion and assignment of commissioned personnel had formerly been under the Executive Office of the Chief of Staff, and on 18 September a Commissioned Personnel Branch was set up under the Operations Division and made responsible for officer personnel manage-

[92] Memo, Gen Goethals for Chief of Staff, 18 Jul 18, sub: Organization of Supply System, pp. 1-24. File 029 (Supply System), PS&T files, RG 165 NARS. Quotations from p. 10.

[93] (1) War Department General Orders 38, 18 Apr 18, and 75, 15 Aug 18. (2) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 314–19.

[94] Report of the Quartermaster General, 1919, pp. 784–85.


CHART 2—THE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, 26 AUGUST 1918



* Direct liaison with the Adjutant General.
** Direct liaison with all supply bureaus and the War Industries Board.

Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19), Zone of the Interior, p. 61

CHART 3—ORGANIZATION OF OFFICE, DIRECTOR OF PURCHASE AND STORAGE, 1 NOVEMBER 1918



SOURCE: *Annual Report of Chief of Staff, 1919, facing p. 732.*

ment throughout the Army. The personnel branches of the several bureaus and other agencies were specifically abolished.[95]

The August reorganization also removed the Military Intelligence Branch from the Office of the Executive to the Chief of Staff and made it a directorate on a par with the other major General Staff agencies.

The Quartermaster Corps was responsible for the majority of the Army's supplies and 80 percent of its depot storage space. On the principle of assigning responsibility for any particular commodity to the bureau that purchased most of the Army's requirements, the Quartermaster Corps was becoming the Army's supply service.

In September the Quartermaster Corps itself was redesignated the Purchase and Storage Service. On 12 September General Wood, Acting Quartermaster General, was appointed also Director of Purchase and Storage, replacing General Johnson who on 1 September had become Assistant Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic, in turn replacing Robert J. Thorne who became Assistant Director of Purchase and Storage under General Wood.[96] This action prepared the way for transferring all supply functions from the Quartermaster Corps and other bureaus to the new Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Service. The intent of this change, which was ordered on 18 September, was to "transfer existing supervisory controls into actual executive controls," as General Goethals had argued.[97]

At the end of September the actual transfer of functions and personnel began but was not completed when the war ended. The vestigial remnants of the Quartermaster Corps and its Remount and Cemeterial Services were transferred after the armistice. Indeed transfer of functions was still taking place as late as 30 June 1919.

The organization of the Purchase and Storage Service headquarters on 1 November 1918 is outlined in *Chart 3*. The organization of the various formerly Quartermaster Corps zones throughout the United States was also changed to

[95] War Department General Order 86, 18 Sep 18.
[96] *Order of Battle (1917-19), ZI*, p. 231.
[97] Adriance, Dana, and Douglas, Draft History of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, p. 228.

parallel that of the new headquarters organization in Washington.[98]

While the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Service absorbed the common supply functions of the Army, the Quartermaster Corps had been divested of all its nonsupply functions, including motor transportation, traffic, embarkation, and commissioned personnel management, all referred to previously. A final function it lost along with other bureaus was finance.

Before 1912 finance had been the province of the Paymaster General. For the next six years it became part of the reorganized Quartermaster Corps. The War Department on 11 October 1918 restored the independence of the Paymaster General with Brig. Gen. Herbert M. Lord as Director of Finance. As head of the Finance Department he became responsible for War Department budgets, disbursement of funds, including the pay of the Army, and internal accounting. The new agency did not, during the war or after, attempt consolidation and standardization of the many separate accounting systems in the Army.[99]

The Overman Act also allowed General March to create a number of new staff agencies and services. On 21 May 1918 the new Directorates of Military Aeronautics and of Aircraft Production, previously Signal Corps functions, were formed. They were eventually consolidated under a single Director of Air Service, patterned on the Air Service of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), on 19 March 1919.

The Chemical Warfare Service began as part of the Bureau of Mines in the Department of the Interior. In August 1917 certain Chemical Warfare functions were assigned to the Surgeon General's Office, later others to the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers. These scattered agencies were consolidated into a new Chemical Warfare Service on 28 June 1918. A new Tank Corps drawn from units previously in the Ordnance Department and the Corps of Engineers was created on 22 March 1918. A short-lived Transportation Service was created on 11 March 1919 by consolidating the Embarkation and Inland Traffic Services which lasted until 15 July 1920 when Congress ordered these functions returned to the Quarter-

[98] *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 430–43.

[99] (1) Report of the Chief of Staff, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1919*, pp. 410–14. (2) War Department Supply Circular 398, 11 Oct 18.

master Corps along with the wartime Construction and Real Estate Divisions.[100]

The managerial revolution engineered by General March with the assistance of Generals Goethals, Johnson, and Wood, their civilian assistants, and allies like Mr. Thorne, Mr. Swope, and Mr. Stettinius in little more than six months cast aside traditional methods and procedures, substituting rationalist principles of centralized control and decentralized operations. That the General Staff became an operating agency was necessary simply because Secretary Baker had allowed the department's operations to drift until the resultant anarchy threatened to paralyze the war effort. It was drastic surgery, but centralized executive control over the bureaus was necessary to avoid disaster, and the General Staff was the only agency within the War Department able to perform this task. The administration had rejected the only other alternative, a separate civilian supply department, although businessmen and some Army officers favored it.[101]

As for the bureau chiefs, they would not admit failure. Like the Bourbons they remembered nothing and forgot nothing. They complained to Congress that the new organization was inefficient and violated the principle of unity of command, meaning the unity of their commands. The Surgeon General charged that his hospitals were getting the wrong kinds of surgical gauze, the Chief of Ordnance that arsenals were getting the wrong kinds of lubricating oil, and all complained of delays. The Chief of Ordnance summed up the general attitude of the bureaus by asserting that ". . . not one single constructive thing has come out of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division." All it did was interfere with the bureaus' operations which until then, he also asserted, had been running smoothly.[102]

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[100] (1) *Order of Battle (1917–19), ZI*, pp. 92–105, 130–34, 492–93, 540–47. (2) War Department General Orders 51, 21 May 18, and 62, 28 Jun 18. (3) On production of military aircraft, see Irving B. Holley, jr., *Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I: A Study in the Relationship of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).

[101] Report of the Chief of Staff, 1919, pp. 252–53.

[102] (1) Testimony of Maj Gen Merritte W. Irland, Surgeon General, *Army Reorganization Hearings, 1919–20*, pp. 464–65. (2) Testimony of Maj Gen C. G. Williams, Chief of Ordnance, *Army Reorganization Hearings, 1919–20*, pp. 489–536. Quotation from p. 493.

General Johnson on the other hand blamed the "cluster of jealous and ancient bureaus" as responsible for the failure of the War Department to unify them completely. He predicted correctly that they would soon regain their independence. Such was the "tremendous tenacity of life of a government bureau." He wrote:

> Governmental emergency operations are entirely different from routine governmental operations. This country is so vast in every aspect that when any central authority steps in to control or direct its economic forces, coordination of such efforts is the principal problem. Lack of it is so dangerous that it may completely frustrate the almost unlimited power of this country.[103]

When World War II came the War Department was again forced to centralize control over the bureaus for the same reasons which forced March and Goethals to act as they did. The problem remains even today in almost all branches of government, federal and local, primarily because most Americans from the beginning of the republic have distrusted and resisted centralized control.

The Long Armistice, 1919–1939

Congress rejected the principle of tight executive control or unity of command developed by General March almost as soon as the war was over. The National Defense Act amendments of 4 June 1920 returned generally to the prewar traditional pattern of fragmented, diffused authority and responsibility with effective control again at the bureau level, subject as before to detailed Congressional supervision. In passing this legislation Congress accepted the General Staff as a permanent agency, but it was in the circumstances one bureau among equals. During the modest rearmament program of the late thirties the General Staff was able to assert itself over the bureaus more effectively.

In restoring the autonomy of the bureaus Congress also retained the Hay-Ainsworth provision prohibiting the General Staff from interfering in their administration. This limitation restricted the General Staff to the role of a planning and coordinating agency rather than the operating agency established by March to direct departmental activities.

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[103] Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*, pp. 93–94.

Specifically, the General Staff was to prepare plans for mobilization and war, "to investigate and report on the efficiency and preparedness of the Army," and to "render professional aid and assistance to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War." It was not to "assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertains to established bureaus or offices of the War Department" which might "imperil [their] responsibility or initiative," impair their efficiency, or unnecessarily duplicate their work.[104]

The provisions defining the functions and responsibilities of the Chief of Staff underlined the fact that he was to act under the direction of the Secretary of War and the President as their agent. "The Chief of Staff shall preside over the War Department General Staff and, under the direction of the President," direct its activities in making the necessary plans for "recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, mobilizing, training, and demobilizing" the Army and "for the use of the military forces for national defense." He was to advise the Secretary on war plans. Once they had been approved by the Secretary he was to act as executive agent in seeing to it that they were carried out properly. In short, in the legal meaning of the term, the Chief of Staff did not "command" the Army.

Congress added several new wartime agencies as permanent bureaus, the Finance Department, the Chemical Warfare Service, the Air Service (later the Air Corps), and a new one, the Chief of Chaplains. It extended the bureau system to the combat arms by creating the Offices of the Chiefs of Infantry and Cavalry in addition to the existing Chiefs of Field and Coast Artillery. The services also regained control over officer personnel, although the principle of a single promotion list for the entire Army initiated by March was retained. They also regained control over their budgets, subject to over-all control by the new Bureau of the Budget as an arm of Congress.

A major innovation assigned the Assistant Secretary of War specific responsibility for military procurement and industrial mobilization, leaving responsibility for the establishment of military requirements and supply distribution policy to the General Staff. Congress deliberately omitted provision for a

[104] War Department Bulletin No. 25, 9 Jun 20, Amendments to the National Defense Act.

general manager like the Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic to co-ordinate the technical services. Reporting directly to both the Chief of Staff and the Assistant Secretary, the supply services were the only formal link between military requirements and procurement and the principal source of information which both needed to formulate plans and policies intelligently.[105]

Congress did not prescribe the internal organization of the General Staff. When General of the Armies John J. Pershing became Chief of Staff in 1921, he appointed a board under his Deputy Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord, to recommend a proper organization. The result was a functional organization modeled on the "G" system developed in the AEF along British and French lines: G–1 (Personnel), G–2 (Intelligence), G–3 (Operations and Training), G–4 (Supply), and a War Plans Division (WPD). This involved one important transfer of functions. Training during the war had been the responsibility of the War Plans Division and its predecessor agencies. Under the Pershing reorganization this function was transferred to the new Operations and Training Division. In one form or another this remained the basic pattern of General Staff organization in the department as well as in the field for the next half century. Like March's organization it was functional in nature. But March's General Staff was an operating agency which actively administered the affairs of the department, while in accordance with the law the new General Staff was only an over-all planning and co-ordinating agency.[106]

In the 1920 act Congress reaffirmed the traditional military principle contained in the National Defense Act of 1916 of reliance on a small standing army in peacetime supported by

[105] (1) *Ibid.* (2) War Department General Order 20, 12 Aug 20, sec. II, Duties of the Assistant Secretary of War. (3) Goldthwaite Dorr, Certain Aspects of War Department Supply Reorganization, 1917–18, 1920, and 1942, pp. 10–14. Seminar on the reorganization of the War Department of 9 Mar 42, 14 Jun 45, Department of Research, Army Industrial College. (4) Goldthwaite Dorr, Memorandum—Notes on the Activities of an Informal Group in Connection With Supply Reorganization in the War Department, Jan-May 42, c. early 1946, pp. 5–6. Copy in OCMH.

[106] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 299–300. (2) War Department General Order 41, 16 Aug 21, and Army Regulation 10–15, 15 Nov 22. (3) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 380–81. (4) See Hagood, *Services of Supply*, pp. 358–85, for a criticism of applying the pattern of a tactical headquarters to the organization of a civilian cabinet agency.

a citizens' militia, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves. Within this framework the department divided the Army inside the continental United States, Alaska, and Puerto Rico into nine corps areas for administration, training, tactics, and National Guard and Reserve activities. For maneuvers, mobilization planning, and in the event of war it grouped the corps into three field armies. The latter remained largely paper organizations. Finally the department organized overseas forces on the prewar pattern into three territorial departments, the Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands. Each department had both administrative and operational responsibilities.[107]

The Harbord Board recommended that the Chief of Staff be appointed also as commander in chief of the field armies in the event of war. This reflected the fact that General Pershing had two titles, one as Chief of Staff and another conferred on him by Congress as General of the Armies. The War Plans Division would provide the nucleus of a General Headquarters (GHQ) staff, and the Deputy Chief of Staff would remain behind as Acting Chief of Staff. This concept, which the War Department did not endorse officially until 1936, dominated Army planning between the wars. Presumably this arrangement was intended to avoid the conflict which had arisen between March and Pershing, but it still revived the position of Commanding General. As Mr. Root had earlier argued, this arrangement made future friction likely between the commander in the field and the department unless the commander in the field was clearly subordinate to whoever was acting as Chief of Staff in Washington and to the Secretary.

As it was, the Chief of Staff had to share power and influence with bureau chiefs who spent the bulk of the Army's appropriations and had direct access to Congress. At times Pershing and his successors endured the frustration of having bureau chiefs undercut their position and that of the Secretary on the Hill. In these circumstances it was not possible to achieve sub-

[107] (1) Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1964), p. 17. (2) War Department General Orders 50, 20 Aug 20, and 75, 23 Dec 20.

stantive unity of command over the department under the Chief of Staff or the Secretary.[108]

The successive Secretaries of War between World War I and World War II had little impact on the Army or on Congress. The one exception was Harry H. Woodring, appointed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose feud with Assistant Secretary Louis A. Johnson in the late thirties demoralized the department and the General Staff.[109] Two of them, John W. Weeks, appointed by President Warren G. Harding, and Patrick J. Hurley, appointed by President Herbert C. Hoover, were men of considerable talent, but they served in a period when the American people and Congress deluded themselves that large armies were becoming obsolete.

The National Defense Act amendments of 1920 provided for a War Council composed of the Secretary, Assistant Secretary, "the General of the Armies" (General Pershing), and the Chief of Staff for the purpose of discussing and formulating military policy. It met infrequently and was of little significance since most secretaries chose to ignore it.

The most important function within the civilian secretariat was that of the Assistant Secretary of War to whom Congress on the recommendation of Benedict Crowell specifically assigned responsibility for procurement and industrial mobilization planning. Under his supervision the Army Industrial College, created in 1924 by Assistant Secretary Dwight F. Davis, trained officers from all the armed services in the problems of procurement and industrial mobilization. The Assistant Secretary's Office was divided into a Current Procurement Branch and a Planning Branch. The latter supervised the supply services in developing their plans and requirements. Among other areas the work of this branch included the development of contract procedures, the study of production facilities, and planning the construction of additional wartime facilities.

Industrial mobilization was hampered by the fact that the

[108] (1) Preliminary Report of the Committee on Nucleus for General Headquarters in the Field in the Event of Mobilization, 11 Jul 21, in *The National Defense*, pp. 571–73. (2) Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), pp. 20–21. (3) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, p. 432. (4) Army Regulation 10–15, 18 Aug 36. (5) Statement of General Marshall to the Secretary, re: Single Department of Defense, 18 Apr 44, pp. 1–4, Stimson Manuscripts. Copy in OCMH.

[109] See Chapter II, pages 59–60.



GENERAL MARSHALL.
(Photograph taken in 1945.)

General Staff's mobilization planning did not take into account the resources likely to be available. The argument advanced by the General Staff was that supply would have to adjust itself to strategic plans. The gap between planning requirements and material resources available to meet them did not begin to close until the middle thirties with the development of a Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP), the first such plan to take into account the industrial resources and capabilities of the nation.[110]

A major change in the organization of the War Department between the wars resulted from the efforts of Army airmen to establish an air service separate from the ground forces and independent of the General Staff. The drive had gained considerable momentum during World War I and benefited from the enthusiastic dedication of its supporters like Brig. Gen. William Mitchell. The creation of a separate Royal Air Force (RAF) in Great Britain was another factor. Finally the airmen obtained sufficient political support in Congress, which in 1926 provided for a separate Army Air Corps under its own chief, an Air Section on the General Staff, and an additional Assistant Secretary of War for Air.

[110] (1) Marshall Statement, re: Single Department of Defense, 18 Apr 44, pp. 1–4. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 284–87, 310–11. (3) Paul A. C. Koistinen, "The Industrial-Military Complex in Historical Perspective: The Inter-War Years," *Journal of American History* (March 1970).

As the celebrated court-martial of General Mitchell in 1925 demonstrated, the General Staff was determined to retain control over the development of the Air Corps in terms of equipment and doctrine for employment primarily in tactical support of ground troops. The airmen were more interested in developing long-range strategic bombers to carry the war to the enemy's industrial and transportation centers.

The airmen's drive for an independent air force marked time between 1926 and 1939. The office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air went unfilled after 1933 and was abolished by the Secretary of War in 1934. In the next year the War Department did create a separate General Headquarters for the Air Forces with control over all tactical air units in the United States whose commander, until 1 March 1939, reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff rather than to the Chief of the Army Air Corps. By the end of the thirties the Air Corps was still subordinate to the Chief of Staff and the General Staff.[111]

Such was the formal organization of the War Department in 1939 when General George C. Marshall became Chief of Staff. Until the late thirties the Army had been little more than a peacetime constabulary force of less than 150,000 men scattered in nine skeletonized divisions, not one of them ready for combat. It had been emaciated by repeated budget cuts, debilitated by the Great Depression, and demoralized by widespread public disillusionment over the United States role in World War I. Tight budgets had also cut back vital research programs for developing the air and infant armored forces, and the bureaus and combat arms quarreled constantly over dividing reduced appropriations.[112]

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[111] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 300. (2) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., *Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942*, vol. I, "The Army Air Forces in World War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 1-32. (3) See Irving B. Holley, jr., *Buying Aircraft: Matériel Procurement for the Army Air Forces*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1964), pp. 43-79, for a detailed treatment of the air arm's fortunes between the wars.

[112] (1) Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 23-56. (2) John W. Killigrew, The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929-1936, Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1960. Copy in OCMH. (3) Precedent and History Section, AGO, Quotations of War Department Spokesmen Relative to the Inadequacy of the National Defense During the Period 1919-1941, c. Sep-Oct 46. In Cater files (1941), OCMH.

CHAPTER II

The Marshall Reorganization

When General George C. Marshall became Chief of Staff in 1939, he inherited not only the staff structure sketched in the previous chapter, but also a set of planning assumptions on the nature of the next war laid down in the Harbord Board report. The basic assumption was that any new war would be similar to World War I and would require similar command and management methods. In fact the circumstances of World War II would differ radically from those of World War I, and this difference made the Harbord Board doctrine and the planning based upon it almost irrelevant from the start. In the prewar period, 1939–41, the War Department struggled along trying to adapt the Harbord concepts to the new situation, revising them piecemeal in response to the immediate needs of the moment. When war came General Marshall determined to sweep the entire structure aside and develop a new and radically changed organization adapted to the circumstances of World War II.

The Harbord Board had assumed that the next war would involve a single theater of operations, that the Chief of Staff would take the field as commanding general with the nucleus of his GHQ taken from the War Plans Division, and that military planning in GHQ would be primarily on tactics for a one-front war. It took into consideration neither the new importance of air power and armor, nor the necessity for genuinely joint operations with the Navy or combined operations with the Allies. The board also assumed there would be a single M-day (mobilization day) on which the United States would change overnight from peace to war as in April 1917, a concept which dominated mobilization planning between the two wars. Instead the nation gradually drifted from neutrality to active belligerency between September 1939 and December

1941, and the war developed as a global affair on many fronts involving combined ground, air, and naval forces. A complicated series of combined arrangements with the British evolved, and the Army found itself, from 1939 onward, caught up in vital questions of global political and military strategy for which it was not thoroughly prepared.[1]

Probably the most important assumption of the Harbord Board was one never stated, but clearly implied: that the President and Secretary of War would follow the practice of Woodrow Wilson and Newton D. Baker in delegating broad authority for the conduct of the war to professional military officers. This was a questionable assumption since President Wilson was the only President in American history who did not play an active role as Commander in Chief in wartime. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to exercise an independent role in determining political and military strategy was more consistent with the traditional concept of the President as Commander in Chief developed by George Washington, James Madison, James K. Polk, Abraham Lincoln, and William McKinley. Even if Roosevelt had not deliberately chosen to play an active role, the vital political issues raised by World War II would have forced him to do so. Every major decision on military strategy was almost always a political decision as well and vice versa. There was, consequently, no clear distinction between political and military considerations during World War II, although many, including the President himself at times, imagined there was one.

The Chief of Staff and the Secretary

Since President Roosevelt played an active role as Commander in Chief, he dealt directly with General Marshall rather than through the Secretary of War. General Marshall's primary role became that of the President's principal Army adviser on military strategy and operations. As a result, the Chief of Staff also became the center of authority on military matters within

[1] (1) For the Harbord Board report, see Chapter I, pages 52–53. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 1–39. (3) Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization, pp. 373–587. (4) R. Elberton Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 73–112. The so-called color plans developed in the War Plans Division were contingency plans and not considered by the rest of the General Staff as part of their daily operational planning.



MARSHALL AND STIMSON. *(Photograph taken in 1942.)*

the department. This fact at first complicated Marshall's relations with his titular superior, the Secretary of War. It also had important consequences ultimately for the position of the Under Secretary of War charged with procurement and industrial mobilization.[2]

There were other complications. When Marshall became Chief of Staff a bitter feud between Secretary Harry H. Woodring, a forthright, impulsive Middle Western isolationist, and Assistant Secretary Louis A. Johnson, an ambitious, active interventionist, had demoralized the department and reduced the Office of the Secretary of War to a position of little con-

[2] (1) Maurice Matloff, Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: F. D. R. as War Leader, Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, USAF Academy, 1964, pp. 3–10. (2) Vernon E. Davis, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in World War II, Organizational Developments, Vol. I, Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff*, Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1972, pp. 53–59, 221. (3) S. Doc. 170, 82d Cong., 2d sess., *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, Annotation of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 30, 1952.* For cases and interpretations concerning the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, see Article II, Section 2, Clause I, pages 389–90, 403–05.

sequence. This feud placed General Marshall in an impossible situation which the President's delay in dealing with it made worse. Roosevelt finally removed Woodring in June 1940, and for personal and political reasons replaced him with a Republican, Henry L. Stimson, previously Secretary of War, as well as a colonel in the AEF, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary of State. Stimson's great personal prestige and distinction as an elder statesman in the Root tradition became the basis for his real authority within the department rather than his ambiguous official position under a President who frequently acted as his own Secretary of War.[3]

Although the relations between the Secretary and the Chief of Staff were strained at first by the President's policy of dealing with the latter directly, Stimson and Marshall soon reestablished the alliance between the Secretary and Chief of Staff initiated by Mr. Root. Friction then gave way to a close personal relationship based upon mutual respect.

The Secretary and the Chief of Staff worked out an informal division of labor in which the general concentrated on military strategy, operations, and administration, while Stimson dealt with essentially civilian matters less directly related to the conduct of the war. Manpower problems, scientific developments, civil affairs, and atomic energy were among the most important of Stimson's concerns. On these and similar issues he acted as liaison between the Army and the heterogeneous collection of civilian agencies created from time to time to help direct the war on the home front. He also ran political interference for the general, protecting him from importunate congressmen, politicians, and businessmen. Sharing essentially the same values and priorities, Stimson and Marshall were a unique team in an environment where competition rather than co-operation was the general rule. The Secretary at the end of the war expressed his feelings to Marshall, saying: "I have seen a great

[3] (1) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 395–96, 402–03, 411. (2) Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* (New York: The Viking Press, 1966), pp. 20–22, 39–40. (3) Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1929–1945* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1950), vol. II, pp. 1041–44. F. D. R. to Woodring, 19 June and 25 June 1940. The evidence suggests Roosevelt was moved to appoint a senior Republican as Secretary of War as a means of avoiding the mistakes of President Wilson in refusing to adopt a bipartisan approach toward World War I.

many soldiers in my lifetime, and you, sir, are the finest soldier I have ever known." [4]

Mr. Stimson was fortunate in being able to recruit his own personal staff, and he gradually reorganized the secretariat as he saw fit in 1940 and 1941. He chose Judge Robert P. Patterson as Assistant Secretary (later Under Secretary) of War in charge of industrial mobilization and procurement. Robert A. Lovett became Assistant Secretary of War for Air and John J. McCloy a special Assistant Secretary who acted as a trouble-shooter on intelligence, lend-lease, and civil affairs. A personal friend of Stimson's, Harvey H. Bundy, became a special assistant who dealt with scientists and educators, and Dr. Edward L. Bowles of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, designated officially as the Secretary's Expert Consultant, worked on radar and electronics. From the ranks of these men chosen by Stimson came the civilian leadership in defense policy in the postwar period.[5]

Below the Secretary and his personal staff lay a permanent civilian secretariat. The Chief Clerk (later designated the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary), John W. Martyn, was a veteran of long service. His office was responsible for a heterogeneous collection of War Department administrative functions, including civilian personnel administration, the expenditure of contingency funds, procurement of general nonmilitary supplies and services for the department, the development of internal accounting procedures, and the control of administrative forms used in the department.

The Bureau of Public Relations was directly attached to the Secretary's office. Later it was transferred to the Army Service Forces and at the end of the war made a War Department Special Staff division. Its Industrial Services Division was responsible for publicity on labor relations. In November 1940 the President appointed a Civilian Aide for Negro Affairs, Judge William H. Hastie, who worked under Mr. McCloy. The Panama Canal Zone and the Board of Commissioners of

[4] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 664.

[5] (1) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 21–22, 41–42. (2) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, pp. 19–45. (3) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 395–414. (4) Theodore Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, 1940–1945, ch. III, pp. 1–26, ch. IV, pp. 1–36, Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1960. Copy in OCMH files. (5) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 452–502.

the United States Soldiers' Home were two agencies outside formal War Department channels that reported directly to the Secretary of War for administrative purposes.[6]

Congress redesignated the position of the Assistant Secretary of War as the Under Secretary of War on 16 December 1940. At the beginning of the war in Europe this office had about fifty officers engaged in planning for industrial mobilization. By the end of 1941 the staff had expanded to 1,200 officers and civilians. The Planning Branch consisted of eleven divisions, and separate branches were created for Purchase and Contract, Production, and Statistics. It was responsible for dealing with the rapidly proliferating civilian mobilization agencies created by the President, particularly the War Production Board. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, which dealt with the Under Secretary on military procurement, also found it necessary to expand its organization and operations. At first primarily a planning agency it quickly became an operating agency engaged in directing and co-ordinating activities of the supply services.[7]

The General Staff Breaks Down, 1939–1941

Unlike Secretary Stimson General Marshall initially could not choose his own staff nor organize it as he saw fit, and while the secretariat took shape in 1940–41 the General Staff bogged down and had to undergo a radical reorganization after Pearl Harbor. Marshall inherited an organization prescribed by Congress in the National Defense Act amendments of 1920. It was adequate for a small peacetime constabulary force with Congress tightly controlling the expenditure of every dollar. It proved inadequate for the conduct of a major war. As one historian has described it:

> By 1940 the military establishment had grown into a loose federation of agencies—the General Staff, the Special Staff for services, the Overseas Departments, the Corps areas, the Exempted Stations. Nowhere in this

[6] (1) National Archives and Records Service, GSA, *Federal Records of World War II: Military Agencies* (Washington, 1951), vol. II, pp. 70–80, 720–22. (2) *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948* (Washington, 1949), pp. 257–58, 317–18. (3) Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1966), pp. 79–80. (4) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, *Guarding the United States*, p. 312. (5) Executive Order 8232, 5 Sep 39.

[7] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 318–22. (2) Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, pp. 73–112.

federation was there a center of energy and directing authority. Things were held together by custom, habit, standard operating procedure, regulations, and a kind of genial conspiracy among the responsible officers. In the stillness of peace the system worked.[8]

By mid-1941 approximately sixty agencies were reporting to the Chief of Staff directly, creating management problems and administrative bottlenecks potentially as monumental as those that had developed in 1917. Marshall's role as general manager of the department was interfering with his duties as the President's adviser on military strategy and operations.[9]

After World War I several major industries in expanding and diversifying their operations had faced similar management problems. There was little effective control because top executives were preoccupied like General Marshall with daily administrative details to the detriment of over-all control. Major policy decisions were made on an *ad hoc* basis by compromise and bargaining among executives, each more concerned with his own area of operating responsibility than with the interests of the whole organization.

The managers of E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., General Motors Corp., and Sears Roebuck & Co. solved these problems by combining centralized control over policy with decentralized responsibility for operations. Control was centralized in a group of top executives without operating or administrative responsibilities, who concentrated on major policy decisions, planning future operations, allocating resources accordingly, and reviewing the results, a technique later referred to as "planning-programming-budgeting." Responsibility for operations was decentralized to field agencies. In one case, Sears, the experiences of the War Department General Staff under General March in World War I seem to have been a factor in the development of a modern corporate organization.

[8] Quotation from *Turmoil and Tradition, A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* by Elting E. Morison, p. 414. Copyright © 1960 by Elting E. Morison. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Company.

[9] (1) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, p. 9. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 314–30.

Engineering the reorganization for Sears was Robert E. Wood, General Goethals' Quartermaster General in World War I.[10]

General Marshall's experience as Chief of Staff in 1939–41 led him to the same general conclusion on the necessity for centralized over-all control and decentralized responsibility for operations if the War Department and the Army were to function effectively. After World War I he had foreseen that members of the General Staff might become "so engrossed in their coordinating and supervisory functions" that they would neglect their primary missions of preparing war plans and tactical doctrine.[11] In the two years before Pearl Harbor the War Department staff, including the General Staff, became a huge operating empire increasingly involved in the minutiae of Army administration. The pressing requirements of the moment eliminated all other considerations.[12]

Co-ordinating the technical services, for example, was difficult because of the complicated division of responsibility for their activities among the General Staff. Not only did they report to the Under Secretary on industrial mobilization and planning, but also to each of the General Staff divisions: G–1 on personnel, G–2 on technical intelligence, G–3 on training, and to G–4 only on supply requirements and distribution. The new lend-lease program of all aid short of war to the Allies created further complications, and a special Defense Aid Director was established in the department to co-ordinate this function among the numerous agencies concerned with it. Still another problem was created by the Army Air Forces' drive

[10] (1) Chandler, "Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis." (2) David Novick, "Origin and History of Program Budgeting," RAND Corporation Paper No. P-3427, Oct 66. Reprinted in 90th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print, *Planning-Programming-Budgeting: Selected Comment*, prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate (Washington, 1967), pp. 28–29.

[11] Marshall War College Lecture, 19 Sep 22, pp. 14–15.

[12] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 329, 390. (2) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 402–07, 446–47. (3) Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 57–81. (4) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 24–28, 37–39. (5) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, p. 238. (6) Reorganization of the War Department: Discussion With General Marshall, 5 Sep 45, pp. 1–3. Typed memorandum in Patch-Simpson Board files, copy in OCMH. (7) See the testimony of General McNarney in Patch-Simpson Board files, pp. 15–21.

for autonomy including separate administrative and supply agencies.[13]

Serious delays in military camp construction led to the transfer of responsibility for this function and for construction of airfields and other installations from an overburdened Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers, a transfer made permanent by law in December 1941.[14]

To assist him in administering the department, Marshall added in 1940 two additional Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The existing Deputy Chief, Maj. Gen. William Bryden, was responsible for general administration of the department and the Army. Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air Forces, served also as Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and participated with Marshall in the development of joint strategy. After Pearl Harbor Arnold became a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. This arrangement reflected Marshall's appreciation of the Air Forces' desire for autonomy.[15]

Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore became Deputy Chief of Staff for supply, construction, and the newly designated Armored Force. Congress, acting on General Pershing's recommendation, had deprived the Tank Corps, created during World War I, of its status as a separate combat arm. Between the wars the roles and missions of the armored forces in this country as in Europe were the subject of bitter internal dissension within the Army. The strongest opposition to the tank came naturally from the Cavalry whose chief, Maj. Gen. John K. Herr, in 1938 urged:

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[13] (1) Watson, *Chief of Staff*, pp. 69–78. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 20–30. (3) John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. 11–22. (4) Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 79–80.

[14] (1) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, p. 418. (2) Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, pp. 444–47. (3) War Department Bulletin No. 15, 16 Dec 41. (4) Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, *The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1972), pp. 244–72.

[15] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 329. (2) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, pp. 49, 84–86, 282, 290–91. (3) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 21–23, 67–70. (4) Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., *Men and Planes*, vol. VI, "The Army Air Forces in World War II" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 12–28. (5) See War Department General Order 6, 14 Jun 40, on the appointment of General Bryden.

"We must not be misled to our own detriment to assume that the untried machine can displace the proved and tried horse."[16]

Asking Congress for authority to re-create a separate armored force risked public ventilation of this dispute within Army ranks. This in turn might have embarrassed the Army in its efforts to obtain Congressional support for expanding the Army to meet the threat of Axis aggression. Consequently, the Armored Force came quietly into existence at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 10 July 1940 by direction of the Secretary of War. Congress did not designate the Armored Force as a separate combat branch until the Army Organization Act of 1950 when as the Armor Branch it officially replaced the horse cavalry. General Herr went to his grave asserting the Army had betrayed the horse.[17]

The man who delivered the *coup de grâce* to the horse was an ardent armor supporter, Brig. Gen. Lesley J. McNair. General Marshall personally selected him as his deputy in charge of General Headquarters, when it was activated in July 1940. The primary mission of GHQ was to raise and train the new Army, but, in accordance with the Harbord Board concept, it was also supposed to become the commanding general's military operations staff in the event of war.

General McNair set up his headquarters across town from the War Department in the Army War College. As in 1917 physical separation from the War Department as well as preoccupation with training made it difficult for GHQ to maintain effective personal contact with General Marshall and to keep up with the rapidly changing complexion of the war. It was the War Plans Division, physically close by, upon which Marshall came to rely for immediate assistance in planning and preparing for military operations.[18]

[16] Mary Lee Stubbs and Stanley Russell Connor, *Armor-Cavalry, Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve*, ARMY LINEAGE series (Washington, 1969), p. 54.

[17] (1) See War Department General Order 7, 15 Aug 40, on General Moore's appointment as Deputy Chief of Staff. (2) Stubbs and Connor, *Armor-Cavalry*, pp. 48–58, 75. (3) Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword*, p. 245.

[18] (1) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 11, 61–67. (2) Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), pp. 1–30, 128–42. (3) Kent Roberts Greenfield, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces, Army Ground Forces Historical Study No. 10, c. 1944, pp. 1–19. Copy in OCMH. (4) See Chapter I, pages 27–28, for the same problem encountered by the War College in 1917–18. (5) Interview, Cline with Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, 6 Aug 46. In Col Frederick S. Haydon 1942 Reorganization Notes, Cater files, OCMH.

Such was the jury-rigged, extempore manner in which the War Department under General Marshall organized for war. He had hoped to change things in this manner gradually without publicity or stirring up antagonisms among powerful interests groups like the chiefs of the supply services. Tinkering with the machinery did not produce satisfactory results, and two days after Pearl Harbor Marshall asserted that the War Department was a "poor command post." [19]

The pressing need, he later said, was for "more definite and positive control by the Chief of Staff." The General Staff, as he had warned, "had lost track of the purpose of its existence. It had become a huge, bureaucratic, red tape-ridden, operating agency. It slowed down everything." [20] Too many staff divisions and too many individuals within these staff divisions had to pass on every little decision that had to be made by the Chief of Staff. "It took forever to get anything done, and it didn't make any difference whether it was a major decision" or a minor detail.[21] The Chief of Staff and the three deputy chiefs were "so bogged down in details that they were unable to make any decisions."

> You had so many different people in there that there wasn't anybody who could get together and make a decision. . . . The Cavalry didn't agree that an Infantryman could ride on a tank; the Infantry said "Yes, we have some tanks, and we can ride tanks." General Herr said "Anybody who wants to ride in a tank is a damn fool. He ought to be riding a horse." And it was almost impossible to get a decision. There were too many people who had too much authority.[22]

The Reorganization of March 1942

The decision General Marshall reached was to substitute the vertical pattern of military command for the traditional horizontal pattern of bureaucratic co-ordination. This centralization of executive control would enable him to decentralize operating responsibilities. He would then be free, like

[19] (1) Marshall Statement, re: Single Department of Defense, 18 Apr 44. Stimson Correspondence files. Stimson Manuscripts. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 90, is the source of the quotation.

[20] Summary of Patch-Simpson Board interview with General Marshall, 5 Sep 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

[21] Interview, Patch-Simpson Board with Brig Gen William K. Harrison, 8 Oct 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

[22] Interview, Patch-Simpson Board with General Joseph T. McNarney, 26 Sep 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

the top managers of DuPont, General Motors, and Sears, to devote his time to the larger issues of planning strategy, allocating resources, and directing global military operations.[23]

Instead of the General Staff and three score or more agencies with direct access to the Chief of Staff's office, the Marshall reorganization created three field commands outside the formal structure of the War Department: Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF), and Army Service Forces (ASF), initially the Services of Supply. Army Ground Forces under Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, responsible for training the Army, and Army Air Forces under Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold were for practical purposes already functioning, the former under its designation of General Headquarters. Army Service Forces under Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was an agency new to World War II and hastily thrown together to include the Army's supply system, administration, and "housekeeping" functions within the United States. With the creation of these commands, said Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, who became the Deputy Chief of Staff in March 1942, "Immediately 95 per cent of the papers that came up to the General Staff ceased just like that." [24] During the war both ASF and AAF operated as integral parts of the War Department because they were intimately involved in military planning. AGF, on the other hand, remained a field command separate from the War Department.

The War Plans Division (soon renamed the Operations Division) became General Marshall's command post or GHQ. The rest of the General Staff, drastically reduced in numbers, were forced out of operations and confined in theory to a broad policy planning and co-ordination role for which their long, drawn-out staff procedures were more appropriate. General

[23] (1) Solis S. Horwitz, later Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration under Secretary McNamara, asserted the principle that the only way to decentralize or delegate authority for operations is to centralize executive control first as General Marshall did. Solis S. Horwitz, Secretary McNamara's Concept of Management, speech before U.S. Army Management School, Ft. Belvoir, Va., 20 Jun 63. Reprinted in U.S. Army Management School, Ft. Belvoir, Va., "Management Views," *Selected Speeches, 1962–1963*, vol. VIII, pt. 2, pp. 452–53. (2) See comments by Brig Gen John H. Hilldring, the G–1, in OCS, Notes on Conference in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff at 10:50 a.m., Thursday, February 5, 1942 [hereafter cited as Reorganization Conference, 5 Feb 42], p. 4. Collected in OCS, Notes on Conferences—1942 file. Copy in Cater files (1942 Reorganization folder), OCMH.

[24] (1) War Department Circular 59, 2 Mar 42. (2) Marshall to Palmer, 12 Mar 42. Copy furnished OCMH by Dr. Forrest C. Pogue. (3) McNarney Interview, pp. 12–13.

Marshall insisted on this change and had disapproved earlier reorganization proposals because they offered him little relief from administrative details that came up to his office through the General Staff. Without such a reduction in personnel the General Staff would work its way back into operations, and Marshall was certain the whole reorganization would be a failure.[25]

The Marshall reorganization also abolished the offices of the chiefs of the combat arms, the offspring of the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, as an unnecessary staff layer and gave their powers to Army Ground Forces which emphasized integrating the several arms into a single, unified fighting team. Among other things the creation of AGF was a triumph of the infant armored forces over the cavalry and field artillery. General Herr regarded armored forces advocates as betraying the horse, as mentioned earlier. Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford, the Chief of Field Artillery, the only combat arms chief to record his objections in writing, obstinately insisted that field artillery remain horse-drawn. One argument repeatedly made within field artillery was that horses could feed off the land, while motor trucks could not.[26]

This streamlined structure required equally streamlined staff procedures. Out for the duration were formal staff actions with their elaborate, time-consuming processes of concurrence, cognizance, and consonance, except in special circumstances where they were appropriate. Instead procedures were developed which would produce prompter and more effective decisions and action. The three major commands were also urged to use "judicious shortcuts in procedure to expedite operations." [27]

In approving this reorganization General Marshall achieved

[25] See General Marshall's comments in Notes on a Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff, November 3, 1941, WPD Conference Notes. Copy in Reorganization Conference, 5 Feb. 42, file. See also pp. 70-71 below.

[26] (1) McNarney Interview, pp. 11-12. (2) Col. Frederick S. Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941-March 1942," *Military Affairs*, XVI, No. 3 (1952), 110-11. (3) Interview, Hewes with General Creighton W. Abrams, one of the earliest officers to join the armored forces, 9 Aug 72. (4) Interview, Hewes with Col R. W. Argo, Jr., 21 Nov 72.

[27] (1) OCS, Memo, Col John R. Deane, SGS, for Assistant Chiefs of Staff . . . , 8 Mar 42, sub: Functions and Procedures, War Department General Staff, quoted in Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 366-69. (2) War Department Circular 59, 2 Mar 42.



GENERAL MCNARNEY

the same results as General March had in World War I of sweeping aside accustomed procedures. Unlike March, Marshall achieved these results without arousing widespread opposition both within and outside the department.

The Marshall reorganization actually had a rather long period of gestation, its basic outline having been proposed by Lt. Col. William K. Harrison, Jr., of WPD sometime in the fall of 1940.[28] The Harrison plan came up for formal discussion within the War Plans Division in the summer of 1941. Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, vetoed the Harrison plan at this point because it involved "extensive experimentation with untried ideas in a critical time." [29]

A conflict between the missions and responsibilities assigned General Headquarters and Army Air Corps came to a head in the fall of 1941 and was responsible for General Marshall's decision to scrap the cumbersome existing organization of the General Staff. What was really at issue was the Air Corps' determined drive for complete autonomy within the Army. The

[28] (1) The chronology here follows the account of Col. Frederick S. Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941–March 1942," *Military Affairs*, XVI No. 1, (1952), 12–29, and No. 3, 97–114. (2) Marshall to Palmer, 12 Mar 42. (3) Colonel Haydon identified a proposal referred to in Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 335–37, as Colonel Harrison's 1940 draft.

[29] Interview, Cline with General Harrison, 16 Apr 47. In Haydon 1942 Reorganization Notes, Cater files.

War Plans Division defeated Air Corps attempts to set up a separate air planning staff independent of WPD. GHQ's control over tactical planning and operations, specifically over the allocation and tactical employment of air units in the air defense of the continental United States and certain bases in the Atlantic and overseas, was another problem. The latter were already under the formal control of GHQ, and the former would follow in the event of war.

The solution to this problem, proposed to General Marshall by General Arnold in mid-November, was to limit GHQ to organizing and training ground combat forces. Its command and planning functions would be transferred to WPD as a policy and strategy planning agency with broad co-ordinating authority over the separate field commands for the future AAF, ground forces, and supply services. In substance this scheme followed the plan earlier proposed by Colonel Harrison. General McNair himself at this point favored eliminating the existing organization of GHQ as part of a general reorganization of the War Department. Favorably impressed, General Marshall ordered WPD to develop the plan in greater detail to determine its practicality.

About a week before Pearl Harbor, Marshall recalled Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney of WPD, then in London on a special mission, to head a committee to study and recommend a proper organization for the War Department. When McNarney reached Washington, President Roosevelt ordered him to serve on the special Roberts Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee. It was not until 25 January 1942 that McNarney learned from General Marshall that he was to take charge of reorganizing the department.

Pearl Harbor and American entrance into the war had intensified the Chief of Staff's problems and the need for a reorganization. General Marshall told McNarney he simply couldn't stand the "red-tape" and delay any longer. What he wanted was "some kind of organization that would give the Chief of Staff time to devote to strategic policy and the strategic . . . direction of the war." The First War Powers Act of 18 December 1941, like the Overman Act of 1918, gave the President power to reorganize the federal government as he saw fit for the duration of the war plus six months. This gave

General Marshall the opportunity to reorganize the War Department, subject to Presidential approval.[30]

After outlining the problem General Marshall turned the pick and shovel work of devising a practical reorganization plan over to McNarney and two assistants—Colonel Harrison and Lt. Col. Laurence S. Kuter. The trio discussed the issues, examined various alternative proposals, and on 31 January General McNarney recommended to the Chief of Staff a modified version of the Harrison plan. Advising against following traditional General Staff procedures, McNarney warned that submitting the proposal to "all interested parties" would result in many nonconcurrences and "interminable delay." Instead he recommended approving the plan, appointing the new commanders, and creating an "executive committee" to carry out the reorganization as soon as possible.

General Marshall announced his approval of the McNarney-Harrison plan at a meeting of representatives of the General Staff, General Headquarters, and Army Air Corps on 5 February 1942. Representatives of the chiefs of the combat arms and services and of the Under Secretary's Office were conspicuous by their absence. General Marshall said he did not want the reorganization discussed with the Under Secretary until more detailed plans had been developed. To avoid stirring up opposition General McNarney ordered that the reorganization plan be discussed only with those who had to execute it. This excluded those chiefs of combat arms whose terms were to expire shortly in any event as well as The Adjutant General, whose term was also soon to expire.[31]

General Marshall's references to the Under Secretary of War's Office emphasized that the 5 February meeting was the first time representatives of the Army's supply agencies were consulted about the reorganization. Although nearly all the reorganization plans proposed and discussed had advocated a supply or service command, they went no further than the general proposition that supply should be under a unified command. The McNarney-Harrison plan, according to Goldthwaite

[30] (1) Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941–March 1942," pp. 102–05. (2) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, pp. 292–93. Quotation from p. 293. (3) Interview, Haydon with McNarney, 4 Aug 49, Haydon 1942 Reorganization Notes.

[31] (1) Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941–March 1942," pp. 106–10. (2) Reorganization Conference, 5 Feb 42. (3) Marshall to Palmer, 12 Mar 42.

Dorr, an adviser to General Somervell, looked very much as if it had been drawn up by a group of officers who did not know much about the Army's supply system. Army Service Forces thus seems to have emerged largely as a more or less unplanned by-product of the Marshall reorganization designed to reduce the number of agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. It also reflected the tendency of combat arms officers to take logistics for granted, a tendency which had caused embarrassment during World War I and would cause further problems in World War II.[32]

Both the Under Secretary's Office and G–4 had been studying the problem of supply organization on their own. The same problems that led to the McNarney-Harrison plan, the administrative burden of increasing mobilization, red tape, and divided command naturally had affected the Army's supply system. Under Secretary Patterson asked Booz, Frey, Allen and Hamilton, a management consultant firm, to suggest improvements in the organization and operations of his office. Their report, submitted in December 1941, criticized the divided command over Army logistics and the confused relationship between the Under Secretary's Office and G–4. Their solution was to appoint a military officer as "Procurement General" with functions similar to those of General Goethals in World War I. Mr. Patterson rejected this solution.

After General Somervell became G–4 in December 1941 he asked Mr. Dorr, who had served as Assistant Director of Munitions under Benedict Crowell in World War I, to investigate the Army's supply system informally. Equally critical of divided command, Dorr also recommended re-creating General Goethals' position as executive manager of the Army's supply system under the dual direction of the Under Secretary and the Chief of Staff.[33]

By the time General Marshall approved the McNarney-Harrison plan there was general agreement among top War Department officials on the need for unified command over

[32] (1) Dorr Memorandum, p. 15. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 31–32. (3) Robert W. Coakley, The ASF, Its Creation, Role, and Demise, in Three Studies on the Historical Development of Army Logistical Organization, prepared for the Board of Inquiry on Army Logistics Organization (the Brown Board), Jul 66, pp. 1–5. In OCMH. Hereafter cited as Brown Board Historical Development of Army Logistics.

[33] (1) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 26–31. (2) Dorr Memorandum, pp. 1–4.

the Army's logistical system. Secretary Stimson and General Marshall also agreed that General Somervell should be the commanding general of ASF.[34]


The McNarney Committee conferred with Secretary Stimson who likewise approved the reorganization, suggesting only that Marshall remain Chief of Staff rather than commander in chief in order to retain the principle of civilian control. General Marshall then appointed an Executive Committee to carry out the reorganization headed by General McNarney and including representatives of the new commands and other agencies with a vested interest in making the reorganization work. McNarney emphasized that the committee was not to debate the reorganization but simply to draft the necessary operational directives to put it into effect as soon as possible. With a 9 March deadline the committee, meeting behind closed doors, hammered out the detailed plans. Secretary Stimson sent the draft of an executive order announcing the reorganization on 20 February to the President, while General Marshall undertook personally to persuade the President of its necessity. The President approved the plan with one significant change. He wanted it reworded to "make it very clear that the Commander-in-Chief exercises his command function in relation to strategy, tactics, and operations directly through the Chief of Staff." With this amendment, Executive Order 9082 of 28 February 1942 officially announced the reorganization and declared it effective 9 March 1942 for the duration of the war plus six months under the authority of the First War Powers Act of 18 December 1941. War Department Circular 59 of 2 March 1942 followed this up with a detailed operational plan for transferring various agencies and functions to the new commands.[35]

The Marshall reorganization enabled the Chief of Staff to concentrate on the larger issues of the war, while the new commands handled the administrative details and operations. *(Chart 4)* The Chief of Staff now had enough time to consider the changing strategic complexion of the war and to make his

[34] Stimson Diary, entry of 18 Feb 42.

[35] (1) Stimson Diary, entries of 2, 7, 18, 20, and 21 Feb 42. (2) Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941–March 1942," pp. 108–14. (3) Stimson to F. D. R., 20 Feb 42; Roosevelt to Stimson, 26 Feb 42. Copies in Haydon 1942 Reorganization Notes.

CHART 4—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY (THE MARSHALL REORGANIZATION), 9 MARCH 1942



Source: War Department Circular 59, 2 March 1942.

decisions more deliberately. As a result, said General McNarney, the "decisions were better; they were bound to be."[36]

The success of any large organization depends upon the ability of its leaders to select competent subordinates, not merely yes-men. In large-scale organizations governed by formal promotion systems, this approach is not always possible, and the War Department contained its share of bureaucratic incompetents. Assistant Secretary Lovett recalled there was so much "deadwood" in the department that it was "a positive fire hazard." In reorganizing the department General Marshall could select the men he wanted as his assistants, as had Secretary Stimson earlier. General McNarney became the sole Deputy Chief of Staff and acted as Marshall's general manager in running the department until McNarney went overseas in October 1944. McNarney, McNair, Arnold, Somervell, and the principal staff officers of WPD–OPD were Marshall's men, and upon them he relied heavily in the development and co-ordination of military strategy. His reputation as the Army's greatest Chief of Staff depended in no small measure upon his exceptional judgment of men.[37]

In summary the main purpose of the Marshall reorganization was to provide effective executive control over the War Department and the Army. The rationalization of the department's structure in substituting the vertical pattern of military command for the traditional horizontal pattern of co-ordination paralleled similar developments among leading industrial organizations. However disgruntled those personalities and agencies displaced by the new dispensation, the officials most directly responsible for the management of the Army as a whole testified to its effectiveness. The complaints came mostly from those responsible for only one aspect of the war and who resented the restrictions placed on their traditional freedom of action and autonomy.[38]

General Marshall's Command Post


The effectiveness of the reorganization depended on the

[36] McNarney Interview, Patch-Simpson Board files.

[37] (1) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, pp. 289–98. (2) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 415–20, 446–50. Mr. Lovett's comment is quoted on pages 417–18.

[38] For the testimony of both sides before the Patch-Simpson Board, see Chapter IV, pages 146–51.

CHART 5—THE OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, 12 MAY 1942



* This group was called Strategic and Policy Group on 12 May 1942, but was changed shortly thereafter to Strategy and Policy Group. It has changed on this chart to conform to the text.

Source: OPD Unit History File.

effectiveness of the new agencies. The successful conduct of the war depended most directly on General Marshall's military operations staff, WPD, which on 23 March 1942 was redesignated the Operations Division (OPD). Its principal reason for existence was to assist General Marshall in developing strategy and directing the conduct of military operations. It represented the Army in dealings with the Navy, the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the White House, and civilian war agencies. With the assistance of Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces OPD calculated the requirements in men and resources the Army needed to carry out the strategy and plans hammered out by the joint and combined staffs. It acted as liaison between the overseas theaters of operations and the War Department, AGF, AAF, ASF, the Navy, the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the home front. Responsible for planning the Army's global military operations, for determining and allocating the resources required, and for directing and co-ordinating their execution, OPD was the Army's top management staff.[39]

The Operations Division's internal organization reflected its several functions. *(Chart 5)* The Strategy and Policy Group was responsible for strategy and planning. It provided OPD's representation on the joint and combined planning staffs and liaison with other war agencies. The Logistics Group determined the resources required to support projected military operations. It also represented OPD on those joint and combined committees responsible for logistical planning. Necessarily, it worked closely with G–4 and Army Service Forces, and in the process considerable friction developed between OPD and ASF's Plans and Operations Division. ASF, believing OPD did not pay sufficient attention to practical logistical problems, especially the lead time required to produce weapons and other matériel, sought a greater role in strategic logistical planning. OPD, on the other hand, resented ASF's attempted intrusions into its areas of responsibility.

OPD's Theater Group was the link between the Army at home and the overseas theaters, transmitting orders to and re-

[39] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 490–92. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 24–25, 96–142. (3) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 110–23.

laying requests from them. It exercised greater control over theater operations in the initial stages of their campaigns than later when theater headquarters had developed their own experienced staffs. An Executive Group provided personnel and administrative services, including the operation of OPD's Message Center and Records Section.

With the expansion of the war the activities of these groups in OPD became so involved that it became necessary to set up a separate Current Group in February 1944 responsible solely for providing information on all current OPD operations. It prepared the War Department Daily Operational and White House Summaries, invaluable to executives for their brevity. A Pan-American Group was created in April 1945 to deal with the problems of western hemispheric defense.

The key to OPD's success was its streamlined staff procedure, which emphasized delegating authority to make recommendations or take action to the lowest possible level. Personal conferences by designated action officers, often junior staff members, with responsible officials of other agencies possessing needed information, replaced written concurrences submitted through formal staff channels. The belabored decisions reached by traditional staff procedures would have come too late to have any effect, and a wrong decision based on hasty research was considered better than a tardy one based on more thorough study. Special requests for action from General Marshall required a reply within twenty-four hours and were known as Green Hornets from their readily identifiable cover and the consequences of delaying action too long.[40]

Army Ground Forces

The obstacles GHQ encountered before the Marshall reorganization arose from the confusion of planning and operating functions within the Army staff. As General Marshall had forecast after World War I the greatest weakness of the General Staff became its preoccupation with co-ordinating operations to the detriment of its responsibilities for long-range planning and the development of tactical doctrine. Instead of revising the

[40] (1) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 131–42, 188–212, 269–89. (2) Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1968), pp. 104–09.

increasingly obsolete Harbord doctrine to meet the radically different circumstances of World War II, the department, reflecting the reactions of the nation at large, bumped from one crisis to the next between 1939 and Pearl Harbor, making adjustments here and there according to the needs of the moment.

The inability to separate planning and operating functions and responsibilities had been a characteristic vice of the Army and, indeed, of most American corporate institutions. The failure to make this distinction had hobbled the General Staff from its inception because it had been assigned both functions. The only kind of planning most Army officers understood was operational planning. When they insisted it was both impossible and impractical to try to separate planning and operations, they clearly meant immediate operational planning. With little experience in broad, long-range planning and policy-making and confined to the isolated present, they ignored the hypothetical future whose consideration almost always yielded to the demands of the moment. As a consequence the Army lagged behind in just those areas, such as research and development of weapons and other matériel and the development of tactical doctrine, where long-range planning was important.[41]

The Marshall reorganization did not settle the issue of separating planning from operations within AGF. General McNair settled that issue himself.

The reorganization directive ordered AGF headquarters to separate these two functions. A small general staff, like the reduced War Department General Staff, was supposed to be responsible for basic policy decisions and not become involved in administration or operations. Under its supervision there was to be a functionally oriented operating staff responsible for personnel, operations and training, matériel requirements, transportation, construction, and hospitalization and evacuation.

From the beginning AGF headquarters protested that this

[41] (1) Kent Roberts Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940–1942," in Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 1–31, 128–52. (2) Greenfield, A Short History of Army Ground Forces, pp. 1–13, 17–23, 55. (3) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 446–47. (4) See Chandler, *Strategy and Structure*, pp. 391–95, for similar administrative problems concerning research, planning, and operations in industry.

separation was artificial and impractical. Its general staff could not plan without information from the operating divisions, while the operating divisions felt they were better qualified to plan because they were in closer touch with operations. This arrangement also confused relations with subordinate commands and the technical services which were also organized with no distinction between planning and operations. Inevitably the AGF general staff became involved in operations and the operating divisions in planning.


It was not long before General McNair complained officially to General Marshall that separating planning and operations was inefficient and productive only of duplication, delay, and confusion. With General Marshall's assent, the AGF staff reverted in July 1942 to the traditional pattern, adding a Requirements Section responsible for developing new weapons and tactical doctrine. What remained of the offices of the chiefs of the combat arms had been absorbed in March by the Requirements Section, but in the July 1942 reorganization they disappeared entirely.[42] *(Chart 6)*

Army Ground Forces success depended ultimately on the effectiveness of the tactical doctrines it developed because they, in turn, determined the training the Army received and the requirements for new weapons and equipment. The Armored, Airborne, and Amphibious Commands and the Tank Destroyer, Mountain, and Desert Training Centers, integrating all the combat arms, were created because these were the areas where AGF concentrated its efforts in the development of new doctrine. They symbolized, in fact, these new doctrines. The testing of weapons and equipment by the Combat Arms and Technical Services Testing Boards and by the several combined arms commands and centers during maneuvers was all carried out within the framework of approved tactical doctrine. The schools disseminated these doctrines throughout the Army.

The AGF staff sections responsible for tactical doctrine, training, and requirements for new weapons and material were G–3 and Requirements. These two sections accounted for half of AGF headquarters officer strength. While G–3 concentrated on training and the Requirements Section on new weapons and equipment, they functioned as a single staff unit in the

[42] Greenfield, A Short History of Army Ground Forces, pp. 46–48 and Appendix I.

CHART 6—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY GROUND FORCES, OCTOBER 1943



Source: Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p. 407.

development of tactical doctrine, tables of organization and equipment, and the preparation of training manuals.

In training and tactical doctrine the influence of AGF within the Army was paramount. Responsibility and authority for the development of new weapons and equipment, on the other hand, were divided among many agencies within and outside the Army. The Requirements Section represented the AGF in negotiations with other War Department agencies concerned with weapons development such as the Research and Development Division of Army Service Forces, the technical services, G–4, and later the New Developments Division of the War Department Special Staff, a troubleshooting agency designed to expedite the production of new equipment and its delivery to the battlefield. Outside the Army the Requirements Section maintained liaison with the National Inventors' Council and the National Defense Research Committee, which operated under Dr. Vannevar Bush's Office of Scientific Research and Development. Representing the military consumer, the Requirements Section was responsible for assuring that the requirements of tactical doctrine received adequate consideration in decisions regarding new weapons and equipment. AGF's approved tactical doctrine, for instance, dictated that in developing tanks maneuverability was more important than firepower or armor. Durability and ease of maintenance on the battlefield were two other AGF priorities.[48]

Army Air Forces

The Marshall reorganization was a major milestone on the Army Air Forces road to complete separation from the Army. Now separate from the ground combat forces, the AAF directed its future efforts toward divorcing itself from the Army Service Forces and the technical services. By the end of the war it had succeeded in integrating the majority of some 600,000 Air technical service personnel into its own organization.

[48] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 38–48 and Appendix I. (2) D. L. McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, Army Ground Forces Study No. 34, 1946, pp. 1–31, 37–53. Draft manuscript, copy in OCMH. (3) Constance McL. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, *The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), pp. 234–45. The problems of research and development in the Army during World War II are discussed in Chapter III, pages 120–26.

The immediate reason the Air Forces supported reorganizing the War Department had been its tangled relations with General McNair's GHQ organization. The autonomous status inherent in the creation of a separate Assistant Secretary of War for Air and General Arnold's later elevation to Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air did not apply to lower staff or command levels. The Air Staff was still subordinate to the Army's General Staff, and the Air Force Combat Command (formerly GHQ Air Force) was nominally subordinate to General McNair's GHQ as well as the Air Staff. The Air Corps proper, responsible for training, logistics, and overseas movement of men and matériel, had a greater degree of autonomy.

In addition to separating Army Air Forces from Army Ground Forces the Marshall reorganization promised to improve the former's status further by providing for equal Air Forces representation on the General Staff, including OPD, and on the various joint and combined staffs. Furthermore the presence of RAF representatives on the British Joint Staff Mission made it virtually necessary to appoint General Arnold as a member of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff.[44]

The reorganization presented AAF headquarters with the same problem as AGF headquarters—how to separate staff and operating functions. The Air Staff as a policy planning staff was to be distinct from a group of operating directorates, responsible for military requirements, transportation, communications, and personnel. There was also a Management Control Directorate, responsible for administrative services, organizational planning, and statistical controls.

AAF headquarters reached the same conclusion as AGF, that it was impractical to separate planning and operations, and in a reorganization in March 1943 it reverted to the familiar Pershing pattern. There were the usual Assistant Chiefs of the Air Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Training, Logistics, and Planning as well as an additional Assistant Chief for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements with functions similar to AGF's Requirements Section. Plans Division personnel

[44] (1) William A. Goss, "Origins of the Army Air Forces," in Craven and Cate, *Men and Planes*, pp. 19–31. (2) Chase C. Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935–1945, Army Air Forces Historical Studies No. 10 (revised), Air Historical Office, Hq., Army Air Forces, Apr 47, pp. 11–52. (3) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 322–28.

were assigned as AAF representatives to OPD and the various joint and combined staff committees. An important difference with the Army at the special staff level was the separation of personnel management from the Air Adjutant General who was placed under the Management Control Directorate. This basic organization remained stable for the remainder of the war.[45] *(Chart 7)*


The Management Control Directorate, now attached to the Office of the Commanding General, AAF, borrowed heavily from the experiences of the aircraft industry. The relationship between the AAF and the aircraft industry was a uniquely close one. They had grown up together and were mutually dependent on each other. The AAF had few traditions to hamper development along new and untried lines, including the development of modern industrial management control techniques.

The principal divisions of the AAF's Management Control Directorate included the Air Adjutant General's Office and the Administrative Services Division which it absorbed, a Manpower Division, an Organizational Planning Division, a Statistical Control Division, and an Operations Analysis Division. Except for the Adjutant General's Office and Administrative Services Division, the staff of the directorate was composed largely of civilian management experts.

The Manpower Division, established in March 1943 as a result of the developing nationwide manpower shortage, was responsible for promoting the efficient utilization of all personnel, military and civilian, by eliminating unnecessary duplication of effort and nonessential functions, simplifying administrative procedures, and releasing general service military personnel for overseas combat duty by replacing them with members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC), those on limited service, and civilians not subject to the draft. It prepared job analyses and descriptions to determine the exact number of individuals by types, both military and civilian, required to perform efficiently the functions of any Air Force

[45] (1) Goss, "Origins of AAF," pp. 33–57. (2) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 53–81. (3) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 409–13. (4) L. V. Howard and Chase C. Mooney, Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, Army Air Forces Historical Studies No. 28 (revised), Air Historical Office, Hq., Army Air Forces, Aug 46, pp. 45–49.

CHART 7—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES, OCTOBER 1943



Source: Nelson, National Security and the General Staff, p. 411

unit or installation. It controlled manpower levels in the field, while the Organizational Planning Division controlled manpower authorizations in AAF headquarters.[46]

As its name implied, the Organizational Planning Division was responsible for analyzing and recommending the proper allocation of functions within the AAF. The internal organization of the Organizational Planning Division into Training and Operations, Intelligence, and Supply and Transport Branches reflected the functional organization of AAF headquarters. This division supervised the preparation of organization charts and promoted decentralized operations, the elimination of duplication, the clarification of functional responsibilities, and other measures to provide more effective co-ordination and administration. A Publications Branch reviewed, edited, and issued all AAF administrative publications, a function of the Adjutant General elsewhere in the Army.

The Organizational Planning Division planned and co-ordinated the AAF headquarters reorganization of March 1943. It developed the three directorate system—plans and operations, administration, and supply and maintenance—adopted by all continental air forces and commands in 1944. It planned and co-ordinated the complete integration into the Army Air Forces of those technical service personnel assigned to it who still retained their original technical service identities. In its own opinion this was the most significant move taken after the reorganization toward the avowed goal of a completely separate air force.[47]

The Statistical Control Division endeavored to consolidate, standardize, and rationalize the many disparate reporting systems within the AAF, particularly in the fields of personnel, matériel development, and training. By 1945 it had succeeded in centralizing control over statistical reporting to such an extent that it could decentralize some of its operations to the

[46] (1) Bruce L. R. Smith, *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 3. (2) Goss, "Origins of AAF," pp. 36–39, 43. (3) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 78, 80, 82–88. (4) Howard and Mooney, Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, pp. 37, 95–101. For further discussion of manpower and personnel problems, see Chapter III, pages 115–20.

[47] (1) Goss, "Origins of AAF," p. 37. (2) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 86–87. (3) Howard and Mooney, Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, pp. 26–35, 45–85.

field. The statistics obtained were indispensable also in establishing effective program controls and in evaluating air operations. At the end of the war the AAF's statistical controls were the most sophisticated and effective of all the armed services.[48]

In December 1942 General Arnold directed establishment of an Operations Analysis Division (OAD) within the Management Control Directorate which would apply scientific techniques to the problems of selecting strategic air targets in Germany. The British had pioneered in this area, known then and later as Operations Research. OAD's success led to the creation of similar units within the headquarters of strategic and tactical air forces overseas. The development of new weapons and other matériel and the improvement of tactical doctrine were other areas in which the AAF employed the techniques of operations research.[49]

Co-ordinating the development, production, and ultimate combat deployment of aircraft and the highly technical training required for their operation and maintenance proved extremely difficult. Program monitoring, as this process was then called, was the progenitor of contemporary systems for project management. From a purely administrative standpoint the problem created by these programs was that they cut across established lines of functional and command responsibility. Until the end of the war the AAF never successfully solved the problem because it did not provide a centralized agency high enough in the hierarchy of command to co-ordinate and synchronize the

[48] (1) Goss, "Origins of AAF," pp. 37–39. (2) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 86–87. (3) USAF Historical Division, Air Historical Study No. 57, Statistical Control in the Army Air Forces, Air University, January 1952, pp. 12–22. (4) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 417–23. (5) A former Harvard Business School professor, Lt. Col. Robert S. McNamara, was assigned to develop statistical procedures for managing the AAF's worldwide inventories. William S. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 44–45.

[49] (1) Goss, "Origins of AAF," pp. 40–43. (2) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, p. 88. (3) Statistical Control in the AAF, pp. 15, 21–22, 84–87. (4) See Arthur B. Ferguson, "Origins of the Combined Bomber Offensive," in Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., *Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK, August 1942–December 1943*, vol. II, "The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 348–70, for a detailed account of the origins, methods, and early work of the Operations Analysis Division. (5) L. R. Thiesmayer and J. E. Burchard, *Combat Scientists* (Boston: Little Brown, 1947), pp. 23–30, 79–81, 184–86. (6) Smith, *The RAND Corporation*, pp. 6–38, 160–63. (7) Bernard and Fawn Brodie, *From Crossbow to H-Bomb* (New York: Bell, 1962), paperback original, pp. 268–78. (8) Don K. Price, *Government and Science* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), paperback edition, pp. 126–29.

various program elements effectively. Although the Marshall reorganization provided for an Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Program Planning on the Air Staff, after the March 1943 reorganization this responsibility was buried as a branch of the Allocations and Programs Division under the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements.

The Statistical Control Division performed some of the work needed to balance requirements and commitments. In late 1942 it studied the requirements of the strategic air offensive against Germany on the one hand and Japan on the other. Using this study the AAF balanced resources and aircraft production schedules between the two programs. On another occasion the Statistical Control Division found that training of pilots in the United States was lagging behind the production of combat aircraft because there were insufficient aircraft available or allocated for training.

Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Plans, assumed responsibility in mid-1943 for program planning. The appointment of Dr. Edmund P. Learned, an economist from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, as Special Consultant to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces for Program Control, followed shortly. The Statistical Control Division continued to provide essential program control data relating to training, ammunition expenditure rates, intelligence, and the accuracy of strategic and tactical bombing programs. Finally in August 1945 an Office of Program Monitoring was created which reported directly to the Chief of the Air Staff. Its responsibility was to supervise all AAF programs including the resources, requirements, allocation, authority, and commitments involved in the procurement, availability, production, training, flow, storage, separation or disposition of personnel, crews, units, aircraft, equipment, supply, and facilities.[50]

At the end of the war in August 1945, there was another major reorganization of AAF headquarters in which the Management Control Office as well as its Organizational Planning

[50] (1) Goss, "Origins of AAF," pp. 47–48. (2) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 74–76, 91–98. (3) Statistical Control in the AAF, pp. 19–22. (4) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 413–17. (5) Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process, An Economic Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 79–85.

and Operations Analysis Divisions were abolished. The Air Adjutant General regained control over the Administrative Services Division and publications. Along with the new Office of Program Monitoring the Statistical Services Division became a part of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Staff. The Manpower Division was transferred to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Personnel. The previously centralized functions of the Organizational Planning Division were fragmented among the regular staff divisions of AAF headquarters. The Operations Analysis Division's functions were transferred to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations. In December 1945 the Office of Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development was created. This office sponsored the creation of the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation in 1946 as an independent private corporation employing civilian scientists on operations research and later broader systems analysis projects under contract to the AAF.

Brig. Gen. Byron E. Gates, who was Director of Management Control for most of the war, believed the reason for abolishing his directorate and its Organizational Planning Division was the resentment created by such concepts as management and control among tradition-minded military officers. Other staff agencies resented what they felt was the interference of the Organizational Planning Branch in their operations, a delicate question of cognizance. These developments reflected widespread and growing disenchantment among Army officers with industrial concepts of management control brought into the AAF and ASF during the war. In the future the civilian administrators of the Army and its sister services would urge these concepts and practices on the services against continued military opposition.[51]

The Air Forces continued drive for complete separation from the rest of the Army created other organizational problems and conflicts with the General Staff and Army Service Forces, particularly the technical services. The development of an AAF personnel system completely separate from the rest of the Army also led to conflicts with G–1. According to the theory

[51] (1) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 90–91. (2) Howard and Mooney, Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, pp. 36–37, 43–44. (3) Smith, *The RAND Corporation*, pp. 30–52. For further discussion of this problem, see pages 96–97 and Chapters IV through XI *passim*.

behind the Marshall reorganization, the Army Service Forces was supposed to provide services for both AGF and AAF, freeing the latter to concentrate on their principal mission of providing trained ground and air combat troops. At the same time, the AAF was assigned responsibility for procuring and supplying matériel "peculiar to the Air Forces." The definition of this term led to a running battle between the Air Forces and the Service Forces. According to one ASF spokesman, "Army Air Forces always regarded Army Service Forces as a service organization primarily designed for the Ground Forces and incapable of understanding Air Forces' problems." [52]

As mentioned earlier, technical service personnel, while assigned to the AAF, retained their traditional identity with their parent organizations. Ordnance Corps technicians worked alongside Air Force armaments personnel, Signal Corps men with Air Force communications personnel, and supply personnel of all arms and services with Air Corps supply personnel. Tradition required the services to draw tight jurisdictional boundaries around their activities with consequent duplication of effort and waste of manpower. Partially in the interest of efficiency General Henry H. Arnold in late 1943 requested the complete integration of technical service personnel into the Army Air Forces.

Two other jurisdictional disputes with the technical services involved responsibility for electronic equipment and missiles. Ultimately General Marshall had to decide these issues personally. In August 1944 he directed transfer of responsibility for development and procurement of radar and radar equipment used in aircraft from the Signal Corps to the AAF. A month later he split responsibility for the development of missiles between the Ordnance Department and the AAF. While the Ordnance Department would have responsibility for development of ground-launched missiles which "depended on momentum," the AAF would be responsible for "guided or

[52] (1) Statement by Maj Gen Miller G. White to Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, 14 Nov 45. Mimeographed handout included as Tab A to Summary of History of Personnel Division, G-1, War Department General Staff, World War II. Manuscript copy in OCMH. (2) Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces, History: Office of the Director of Personnel, Army Service Forces (20 July 1942-1 September 1945), p. 241. Quotation is from this source. Manuscript copy in OCMH.

homing missiles launched from aircraft" or "ground-launched missiles which depended on the lift of aerodynamic forces." [53] This somewhat vague boundary became the basis for organizing the separate Army and Air Force missile programs in the postwar years.

Most of AAF organizational problems stemmed from its drive for complete separation from the rest of the Army. The highly advanced and rapidly changing technology peculiar to the Air Forces and the aircraft industry presented another and more difficult set of organizational problems. The main issues concerned the most effective means of co-ordinating the development and deployment of aircraft along with the training of personnel required to maintain and operate them. At the end of the war the AAF was still feeling its way toward solving these problems.[54]

Army Service Forces

The Operations Division, Army Ground Forces, and Army Air Forces evolved slowly from existing organizations in the months before Pearl Harbor. There was no such gradual evolution behind the organization of General Somervell's command, just the precedent of General Goethals' Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division in World War I. What changes had preceded the creation of the Army Service Forces had been crash actions designed to meet specific problems. The lagging camp construction program led to its transfer from an overburdened, overcentralized Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers which was faced with a cutback in its own civil works programs. The lend-lease program led to creation of a new agency, the Office of the Defense Aid Director. Co-ordination between the Office of the Under Secretary of War, responsible for mobilizing industrial production, and G–4, responsible for military supply requirements, became increasingly difficult as military programs increased in size. The solution provided by the Marshall reorganization was to combine both activities under General Somervell's Army Service Forces and relieve G–4 and the

[53] Craven and Cate, *Men and Planes*, p. 261.

[54] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 423–425. (2) Alfred Goldberg, "Equipment and Services," in Craven and Cate, *Men and Planes*, pp. 260–62. (3) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 127–29. (4) Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, pp. 99–102.



GENERAL SOMERVELL. *(Photograph taken in 1945.)*

Office of the Under Secretary of War of their operating responsibilities. This had the virtue, from the military standpoint, of establishing unity of command over the entire Army supply system in the zone of interior.[55]

General Somervell was an Army engineer with a well-earned reputation as an aggressive troubleshooter and administrator who could cut through red tape and get things done. He had been assigned as head of the Quartermaster Corps Construction Division in December 1940 to expedite the Army's lagging camp construction program. He immediately reorganized the division replacing old branch chiefs with engineers who had worked with him before, Lt. Col. Edmond H. Leavey, Lt. Col. Wilhelm D. Styer, and Capt. Clinton F. Robinson. A year later Somervell was promoted to G–4 and thus a logical choice for the new command. Neither Secretary Stimson nor General Marshall ever appears to have regretted their selection. Somervell's aggressiveness did stir up controversy and bitterness

[55] (1) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 20–21, 32–59. (2) John D. Millett, Organizational Problems of the Army Service Forces, 1942–1945, vol. I, December 1945, pp. 2–11. Hereafter cited as ASF Org Hist. Manuscript in OCMH. (3) Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization*, pp. 444–47. (4) James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953*, ARMY HISTORICAL series (Washington, 1966), p. 485. (5) Dorr Memorandum, pp. 5–18. (6) Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–43*, pp. 77–80. (7) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 428–29. (8) War Department Press Release, 2 Mar 42.

within and outside the Army as General March had done in World War I, but General Marshall later reflected that if he had to do it all over again, "I would start looking for another General Somervell the very first thing I did."

General Marshall also looked to General Somervell as his chief adviser on supply, treating him as G–4 of the General Staff as well as commanding general of the ASF. Somervell also benefited from the support of Secretary Stimson and of Harry Hopkins in the White House. On the occasions when he lost a round in the constant bureaucratic feuding within and outside the department, he lost because either the Secretary or General Marshall sided with his opponents.[56]

The organization of General Somervell's headquarters in the beginning was a hurried, makeshift grouping of the agencies and personnel assigned to his command. Integrating their operations required repeated reorganization of ASF headquarters during the next year and a half. The immediate need was to link the mobilization and production functions of the Under Secretary's Office with the military supply requirements and distribution functions of G–4. General Somervell merged their staffs into one operating agency, the Directorate of Procurement and Distribution, and attached it to his own office. At the next level were nine staff divisions responsible for procurement and distribution operations, training, civilian personnel, military personnel, fiscal, military requirements, military resources, and international (lend-lease). These in turn supervised ASF operating divisions, the technical and administrative services, and the service commands.[57]

Industrial mobilization remained the principal concern of General Somervell and his staff during the first year. In 1943 emphasis shifted to supply planning for offensive military

[56] (1) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, pp. 296–98. Quotation from p. 298. See also ch. IV, pp. 139–42 below. (2) Fine and Remington, *Construction in the United States*, pp. 260–62. (3) Colonel Leavey became the second Chief of Transportation in November 1945 and the Army's first Comptroller in 1948. Styer was Somervell's deputy in the Construction Division and deputy commanding general of ASF. Captain Robinson was head of the Construction Division's Control Office and later head of ASF Control Division. Biographic data from OCMH files.

[57] (1) Dorr Memorandum, pp. 36–38. (2) Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–43*, pp. 224–27. (3) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 38–42, 53–56, 177–81, 337–39. (4) Millett, ASF Org Hist, ch. III, pp. 1–5. (5) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 254–58. (6) Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45*, pp. 228–33.

operations overseas. At this point attention focused on the ASF Operations Division, the agency responsible for logistics planning.

Organizational changes within ASF headquarters reflected this change in its primary mission. The Directorate of Procurement and Distribution had become merely one of several staff divisions a year later. The Operations Division absorbed its distribution functions because supplying overseas theaters required effective control over and co-ordination of domestic transportation and supply facilities. In a further reorganization in November 1943, the Operations Division was attached to General Somervell's office and redesignated the Directorate of Plans and Operations. The former Procurement Division became its Supply and Materiel Division. As the link between logistics, the business of ASF, and strategic planning, the business of OPD and the JCS, this agency became the most important element in ASF headquarters. Its chief, Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, and his staff, aggressively supported by General Somervell, represented the interests of ASF in the frequently rancorous disputes with OPD over the proper role of logistics in strategic planning.[58]

The organization of ASF headquarters after November 1943 remained relatively stable. Both the Directorate of Plans and Operations and the Control Division were attached to General Somervell's office, indicative of their great importance and influence within ASF headquarters. *(Chart 8)* Beneath General Somervell was a Deputy Chief of Staff for Service Commands who relieved him of this administrative burden. The ASF staff now included seven divisions: four operating divisions for personnel, military training, supply, and matériel, and three administrative services, the Fiscal Director (the Chief of Finance), The Adjutant General's Office, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General. Like AGF and AAF General Somervell's staff believed that the attempt to separate staff and operating agencies was impractical.[59]

[58] (1) Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45*, pp. 104–09. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 111–23, 337–47. (3) Millett, ASF Org Hist, ch. III, pp. 10–12.

[59] Millett, ASF Org Hist, pp. 20–27.



GENERAL LUTES


The ASF Control Division

The creation of the Control Division within ASF headquarters was a major administrative reform within the Army introduced by General Somervell. Under Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson it performed functions similar to General Gates' Management Control Division introduced about the same time in AAF headquarters. Its members for the most part were drawn largely from civilian management experts rather than military officers who had had little experience with industrial management.

Its main purpose was to develop and employ industrial management techniques in the supervision, direction, co-ordination, and control of the disparate functions and operations for which ASF was responsible. As in the AAF, there was a Statistical Branch responsible for developing statistical controls within ASF and for standardizing statistical reporting techniques. Its Monthly Progress Report, a comprehensive study covering over a dozen major functions, was one of the principal means by which General Somervell and his staff reviewed ASF operations. It alerted them to problems as they developed and helped them maintain a proper balance among the various elements of the Army's supply system.

The Work Simplification Branch, employing standard in-

CHART 8—ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES, 15 AUGUST 1944



* Under Army Service Forces for Administrative and Supply functions.

Source: Millett: The Organization and Role of Army Service Forces, p. 355.

dustrial work measurement techniques, attempted to organize routine clerical and industrial operations more efficiently and to simplify supply and personnel procedures. It was no longer sufficient to justify current procedures by claiming that "this was the way it had always been done." OPD and G–2 employed similar techniques in reorganizing their own paper work.

The Administrative Branch performed functions similar to the AAF Organizational Planning Division. It studied and developed plans for more effective organization and administration, and it promoted the use of industrial management techniques generally throughout the ASF. Its most important function was administrative troubleshooting. Employing civilian consultants, it conducted hundreds of special management surveys ranging from manpower conservation to co-ordinating the allocation of scarce commodities within the Army under the Controlled Materials Plan.[60]

The technical services, particularly the Ordnance Department, resented the Control Division and its efforts to impose management controls alien to their traditions of bureau autonomy. They regarded its efficiency experts as a horde of uninformed, meddlesome busybodies. What they resented most of all was the Control Division's persistent efforts to reorganize the Army's supply system along functional lines in the manner of the Root and March reforms. Functionalization as the technical services understood it meant their ultimate demise as independent operating agencies. Merely mentioning functionalization was enough to send the Chief of Ordnance, Maj. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., into a towering rage. As in the AAF, opposition stemmed from the fact that management control concepts were based on the experiences of modern industry rather than the Army. To combat arms officers, on the other

[60] (1) Richard M. Leighton, History of the Control Division, ASF, 1942–1945, vol. I, April 1946, pp. 1–5, 20–24, 132–212, 257–65. Manuscript in OCMH. (2) Hq., ASF, Control Division, M 703–7, Control Manual—Simplification and Standardization of Procedures, 1 Sep 44; M 103–4, Control Manual—Work Simplification (Materials Handling), 30 Oct 43; M 703–5, Control Manual—Work Measurement, 15 Jan 45; and M 703–3, Control Manual—Work Simplification, 25 May 44. (3) Clinton F. Robinson, *Administrative Management in the Army Service Forces*, Public Administration Service Pamphlet No. 90 (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1944), pp. 4–13.

hand, management controls violated the principle of unity of command.[61]

The Technical Services

The main purpose of Army Service Forces was to supply and equip the Army, including, theoretically, the Air Forces. The Marshall reorganization made this task difficult because it did not provide for the complete integration of the Army's supply services as it had the combat arms in Army Ground Forces. Instead the traditionally autonomous technical services remained intact, operating the Army's supply system and providing technical services under the direction of ASF. ASF was thus a holding company, a device industry generally regarded as inherently clumsy, inefficient, and difficult to control.

In World War II there were seven technical services. In order of seniority and tradition they were the Quartermaster Corps, the Corps of Engineers, the Medical Department, the Ordnance Department, the Signal Corps, the Chemical Warfare Service, and, after July 1942, the Transportation Corps, staffed at the top by engineers but created out of the Quartermaster Corps. Differing widely in organization and purpose, the technical services had two traditional features in common, their administrative independence and their dual roles as staff agencies and operating commands.[62]

As administratively independent agencies they continued to control their own organizations, procedures, personnel, intelligence, training, supply, and planning functions. They had their own budgets which accounted for over one-half the Army's appropriations. As operating agencies they had installations located in many Congressional districts, their principal source of political support.

Their dissimilarities were as marked as their similarities. They differed widely in their often archaic procedures, the result more of historical accident than of conscious planning.

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[61] (1) Green, Thomson, and Roots, *Planning Munitions for War*, pp. 90–95. (2) Frederick C. Mosher, *Program Budgeting: Theory and Practice* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1954), pp. 191, 203.

[62] (1) See Chapter I above. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 428–35. (3) John D. Millett, "The War Department in World War II," *American Political Science Review*, XL, No. 5 (October 1946), 885. (4) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 40–42, 298–300. (5) Millett, ASF Org Hist, ch. IV, pp. 2–5. (6) Leighton and Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–43*, pp. 228–33.

These differences generated a prodigious amount of red tape, making it difficult for the department and ASF to control their operations and for industry to do business with them. ASF and the efficiency experts of its Control Division hoped to rationalize their structure and operations along sound businesslike principles.

All the Army technical services in practice combined commodity and service functions, but in most of them one element was clearly subordinate to the other. Some were organized along commodity lines like the Ordnance Department, which was responsible for the design, development, production, distribution, and maintenance of matériel from the cradle to the grave. The Corps of Engineers, the Medical Department, and the new Transportation Corps performed services for the Army and were organized along recognizable functional lines as such. The Quartermaster Corps and the Signal Corps combined both commodity and service features in their organization. This combination created serious management problems at times. The Signal Corps in World War II had difficulty in satisfying the requirements for producing communications and electronics equipment on the one hand and on the other of providing Army-wide communications services. In the Navy communications services were a function of naval command under the Chief of Naval Operations, while the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Aeronautics were responsible for the production of communications equipment.

As a general rule the military service elements of these organizations in the field were designated as corps such as the Corps of Engineers or the Transportation Corps, while each headquarters was designated by the historic title of its chief as in the Office of the Quartermaster General, the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, or the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. Civilian employees were not members of the several military corps.[63]

[63] (1) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 302–11. (2) Millett, ASF Org Hist, ch. IV, pp. 11–19. (3) Green, Thomson, and Roots, *Planning Munitions for War*, pp. 83–120. (4) Fine and Remington, *Construction in the United States*, chs. I and VII. (5) U.S. Congress, *Proposal to Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy*, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d sess., Testimony of Rear Adm Joseph R. Redman, Director of Naval Communications, 12 May 44, pp. 208–12. Hereafter cited as *Woodrum Committee Hearings*. (6) George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulany Terrett, *The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943)*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957), pp. 59–61, 556–65.

That friction should have developed between General Somervell's headquarters and the technical services is not surprising, given the latter's tradition of resisting executive control over their operations. It was just as natural for General Somervell, saddled with the responsibility as their *commander* for supplying the Army, to seek effective control over their operations.[64]

The Administrative Services

While General Somervell's principal mission was supply, the Marshall reorganization also assigned ASF responsibility for supervising the Army's four administrative services: The Adjutant General's Office, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Finance Department, and the Office of the Provost Marshal General. To these were added responsibility for a wide variety of special staff agencies, exempted stations, and boards, including the financial and budget functions of the Budget and Legislative Branch, the Budget Advisory Committee, the National Guard Bureau, the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, the Chief of the Special Services Division, and the Post Exchange Services. The Command and General Staff School and the United States Military Academy were assigned to ASF for administrative purposes, although G–3 was responsible for curriculum and doctrine. New agencies created in World War II and added to ASF's responsibilities were the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (later the Women's Army Corps), the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), and the Officer Procurement Service (OPS). The ASTP involved specialized training of enlisted personnel at civilian universities until the manpower shortage shut down the program, while the OPS recruited civilian experts directly as officers in the Army.[65]

The only apparent reason for assigning this ill-assorted collection of agencies to an essentially supply organization like ASF was to relieve General Marshall and his staff of their administration. Their assignment to ASF, conceived in haste by officers unfamiliar with War Department administration, created serious problems of administration and co-ordination.

[64] See Chapter IV, below, pages 139–46.
[65] Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 347–54.

General Somervell and the Control Division, interested in integrating ASF headquarters on functional lines, tried first to group these agencies under a loose Administrative Services Division. But they had so little in common with one another that this solution was abandoned in November 1943. Some were assigned to The Adjutant General's Office as essentially personnel functions; others became specialized staff agencies within ASF headquarters. Congressional pressure made the National Guard Bureau a separate staff agency, and in May 1945 it became once more a War Department Special Staff division. The Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs remained under the Directorate of Personnel until May 1945, when it, too, became a special staff division. Congressional pressure also led to the removal of the Budget Division together with the Budget Advisory Committee from the Chief of Finance's Office and its establishment as a special staff agency in July 1943.[66]

The status of the newly organized Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was the center of a running feud between its determined director, Col. Oveta Culp Hobby, and General Somervell's staff. At first placed under the Director of Personnel in November 1943, the Office of the Director of the Women's Army Corps became a special staff agency of ASF attached to General Somervell's office. His staff continued to veto Colonel Hobby's proposals for improving the status of women in the Army, and in February 1944 General Marshall agreed to remove the Office of the Director of the Women's Army Corps from ASF and place it under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, whose chief, Maj. Gen. Miller G. White, proved to be more hospitable. Such was the opposition to the WAC among conservative Army officers that General Marshall personally had to intervene repeatedly to ensure that his directives aimed at improving the status of the WAC were carried out.[67]

Personnel functions within the Army were divided by the reorganization between G–1, as the policy planning agency, and ASF, which through the Directorate of Personnel and The Adjutant General's Office was responsible for personnel operations. In fact, responsibility for personnel was divided among

[66] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 148–55. (2) Dorr Memorandum, pp. 46–53.

[67] Mattie E. Treadwell, *The Women's Army Corps*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), pp. xiv, 31–32, 259–63, 269–77.

a great many agencies throughout the Army. The growing manpower shortage which emerged at the end of 1942 led to the creation of several more personnel agencies at the War Department Special Staff level, further diffusing responsibility for this function. ASF shared responsibility for one major supply function, the research and development of new matériel, with AGF and other agencies, both civilian and military. Postwar planning was another function initially assigned to General Somervell's headquarters but made a special staff agency when it began operations. The work of the Judge Advocate General and the Chief of Chaplains was so professional in nature that they conducted their operations largely independent of control by ASF. They were attached to General Somervell's office for administrative purposes only.[68]

For reasons over which it on the whole had little control, ASF was less effective in supervising and directing these various administrative agencies than in performing its essential functions of supplying and equipping the Army. One major reason was the haste with which these functions were assigned to ASF without considering the inadvisability of assigning them to an agency concerned primarily with supply and distribution all over the world. Additionally, there were some functions like the National Guard Bureau and the Budget Division whose political implications were such that the Secretary or the Chief of Staff had to assume responsibility for them whether they wanted to or not. Finally, in some instances, the division of responsibility among numerous agencies of the department, particularly in the case of personnel operations, necessarily weakened ASF's control over these functions.

The Service Commands

Army Service Forces responsibilities for administering the Army extended to the old corps areas, which were reorganized into eight, later nine, service commands plus the Military District of Washington (MDW). They became the Army's housekeepers. The theory behind the housekeeping concept was functional. The new service commands were to free the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces from such chores to concentrate on training the Army. Under this concept all Army

[68] See pages 115–120 below, and Chapter IV, pages 131–37, for ASF postwar planning activities.

installations within the United States were divided into four classes. Class I stations, directly under the commanding generals of the service commands, included a wide variety of organizations from induction stations to general hospitals and prisoner of war camps not assigned to the AGF, AAF, or the technical services. Class II installations housed AGF troops and Class III AAF units. Class IV stations were those that traditionally had been under the command of the chiefs of the technical and administrative services.

The housekeeping functions the service commands performed at Class II, III, and IV installations were standard community services such as construction of buildings and their maintenance and the provision of public utilities, post exchanges, and recreation facilities.[69] The friction between ASF "landlords" and their "tenants" developed because ASF, acting through the service commands and post commanders, determined the allocation of men, money, and matériel for these functions. AGF and AAF commanders might request facilities, but it was the post commander or his superiors who determined what money was to be spent where. In one instance a division commander requested construction of a .22-caliber range. The post commander disapproved, and the dispute went all the way up through channels to General Marshall personally for decision.[70]

Because it sought complete independence from the Army the AAF naturally wanted control over its own housekeeping functions, including control over the allocation of funds. This dispute involved the technical services as well because AAF wished also to set up its own independent technical air services. A temporary compromise, reached in 1944, designated the chiefs of the technical services rather than ASF as "agents of the War Department General Staff" in supervising their respective activities at AAF installations. The technical services to this degree regained their status as special staff agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff rather than General Somervell.[71]

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[69] (1) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 312–37. (2) Millett, ASF Org Hist, ch. V, pp. 1–58.

[70] (1) General Patch's comments in interview with General Gerow and others, p. 4, and with General Lutes, p. 18. Patch-Simpson Board files. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 393–94.

[71] (1) Millett, ASF Org Hist, ch. VIII, pp. 12–48. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 129–37. (3) Craven and Cate, *Men and Planes*, pp. 374–75. (4) Millett, "The War Department in World War II," pp. 886–97.

Combat arms officers as well as those from the technical services wanted to abolish the service command idea because it violated the sacred principle of unity of command. If they were to be responsible for training troops then they also wanted the authority to control everything needed to do the job, including housekeeping functions.[72]

[72] Comments of General Patch in interview with General Gerow. Patch-Simpson Board files, p. 4.

CHAPTER III

Changes in the Marshall Organization

The War Department General Staff

The Marshall reorganization deliberately bypassed the General Staff in favor of expediting the conduct of the war through the Operations Division and the three major commands. Although technically still part of the General Staff, OPD had become a super general staff, the GHQ which War Department planners envisaged after World War I. General Marshall and Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney were determined to remove the General Staff from operations entirely because it took too long to get decisions from its members. The most effective means of accomplishing this was to reduce their staffs so drastically that they could not operate for lack of personnel.[1] In this reduction G–1 and G–3 lost 75 percent and G–4 over 90 percent of their personnel. Maj. Gen. Raymond G. Moses, who succeeded General Somervell as G–4 on 9 March 1942, recalled that he had inherited a lot of empty filing cabinets and some typewriters, but no one who could type.[2]

The Operations Division as General Marshall's operating command post expanded 250 percent, while G–2 remained an operating agency in fact because it successfully opposed separating its operating arm, the Military Intelligence Service, from headquarters. The nature of its work also made it difficult to assign G–2 operations logically to any of the three major commands.[3]

Accompanying the cutback in the General Staff was the assignment of all but two special staff agencies, the Legislative and Liaison Division and the Office of the Inspector General, to the Army Service Forces.

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[1] See Chapter II, above, pages 68–69.

[2] Interview, Hewes with General Moses, 16 Oct 68.

[3] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 394–98. (2) McNarney Interview, pp. 14–17. Patch-Simpson Board files.

As long as General McNarney remained Deputy Chief of Staff he exercised tight control over the General Staff and the department, although five new special staff divisions were added before he left. Under the reorganization, the Chief of Staff's Office consisted of a Deputy Chief of Staff, General McNarney, and the secretariat. By the end of the war there was an additional Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, an Assistant to the Deputy Chief, and a Director of Information, while the General Staff had doubled in size.[4]

There were several reasons for the increase in size of the General Staff toward the end of the war. The events themselves indicate that Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, who succeeded McNarney as Deputy Chief of Staff, did not exercise as tight a control over the department as General McNarney. Perhaps a more important reason was the traditional confusion in the Army between the role of the General Staff as a planning organization and its role as an administrative agency assisting the Chief of Staff in directing and controlling the War Department bureaus. While General Marshall and General McNarney tried to confine the General Staff to planning, the General Staff still had to co-ordinate and supervise the three commands and it could not avoid involvement in their activities. G–1 and G–4 complained that co-ordinating the commands was laborious because they had to go to them for the information required to make decisions. General Somervell's Director for Plans and Operations, Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, admitted that the reason ASF represented the Army on various joint and combined supply committees was that ASF had the information required for prompt action, and that going through G–4 would simply delay matters. Similarly General Marshall consulted General Somervell on supply matters rather than G–4 because his staff had the information required.

So far as planning was concerned, G–1 complained its staff

[4] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 467–70. (2) Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, WDSS, History of the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office. Draft manuscript in OCMH. (3) Organization and Manpower Charts of SARO. OCMH files. (4) History of the National Guard Bureau. Draft manuscript in OCMH. (5) "Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, FY 1946," Washington, 1947, p. 5. (6) Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, Survey of History of Office for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 1923–1946, pp. 2, 116. Draft manuscript in OCMH. (7) Organization chart, War Department, 30 Sep 45. OCMH files.

had so few people that they did not have time to read many of the elaborate studies and reports prepared by the large staffs in ASF, AGF, or AAF headquarters. G–1's current operating responsibilities forced planning functions aside. "Future planning was limited to those problems which had to be solved at the moment; others which did not require immediate decision were relegated to the bottom of the basket." [5] A separate agency, the Special Planning Division, was set up to develop the Army's demobilization plans, normally a G–1 responsibility, because G–1 simply did not have the staff to do it.[6]

G–1

With its reduced staff G–1 consisted of the Officers, Enlisted, and Miscellaneous Branches. A Statistics Branch was added in July 1943 to help develop uniform personnel reporting in the Army. A new Legislative Section merged with the Miscellaneous Branch to form a Legislative and Special Projects Branch. In March 1944 the Office of the Director of the Women's Army Corps was assigned to G–1.

A major reorganization in April 1945 set up a Personnel Group (later called the Policy Group). A Planning Branch was added to it later to deal with personnel readjustment policies and universal military training. Finally in August 1945 a Control Group was set up to include the Statistics Branch, plus a Requirements and Resources Branch and an Allocations Branch responsible for the replacement system generally. Both branches were transferred from G–3. G–1's remaining functions were consolidated into a Special Group, including a Miscellaneous Branch now responsible for personnel and morale services previously performed by The Adjutant General's Office and the Special Services Division of Army Service Forces.[7]

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[6] War Department General Staff, G–1, History of Personnel Division, G–1, War Department General Staff, World War II, pt. II, History of Planning Group, G–1, p. 3. Manuscript copy in OCMH.

[5] (1) Nelson, McNarney, Lutes, and Moses Interviews. Patch-Simpson Board files. (2) War Department General Staff, G–1, History of Personnel Division, G–1, War Department General Staff, World War II, pt. II, Summary History of Personnel Division, G–1, and History of Planning Group, G–1, pp. 1–3.

[7] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 362. (2) History of Personnel Division, G–1, pt. II, Summary History of Personnel Division, G–1; Tab C, Chronology of Organization, G–1, WDGS; and Tab D, War Department Staff Circular 5–1, 18 Apr 45, Organization, Personnel Division, G–1.

A major factor complicating G–1's burden of co-ordinating and supervising Army-wide personnel operations was the division of responsibility for personnel functions among a great many different agencies at all levels of the War Department from the Secretary of War's Office on down the chain of command.[8]

G–2

Too large rather than too small a staff created serious management and organization problems for G–2. Its staff more than doubled in size from 1,000 in 1941 to 2,500 at the end of the war.[9] In order to separate G–2's staff from its operating functions, the Marshall reorganization had created a new field agency, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), theoretically outside the department, as an operating command. Almost immediately the distinction between G–2 and the MIS was largely wiped out by appointment of the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, as the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service and the G–2 Executive Officer as Assistant Chief of the Military Intelligence Service for Administration.

Initially the MIS was divided into four groups, each under an assistant chief: Administrative, Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Operations. A Foreign Liaison Branch and a Military Attache Section reported separately to the Chief of the Military Intelligence Service.[10]

Maj. Gen. George V. Strong became the G–2 in May 1942. He, like most other Army officers, thought the whole concept of separating staff and operating functions impractical and recommended the abolition of the Military Intelligence Service as a separate agency. In the two years that he was its chief, G–2 and the MIS underwent four major reorganizations resulting finally in the abolition of the MIS. The principal issue was the function of evaluating intelligence and whether this should be performed by G–2 as a staff function or by the MIS. This version

[8] Summary History of Personnel Division, G–1, WDGS, p. 6.

[9] Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, A History of the Military Intelligence Division, 7 December 1941–2 September 1945, p. 380. Manuscript in OCMH.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–16.

of the staff versus operations controversy would remain a major issue within the American intelligence community.[11]

Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and General McNarney became progressively dissatisfied with the management and organization of the Army's intelligence operations. This dissatisfaction came to a head after General Strong's departure as chief in February 1944. A special War Department board under Assistant Secretary McCloy, assisted by a working group under Brig. Gen. Elliot D. Cooke from the Inspector General's Office, met to study means of strengthening Army intelligence. The resultant reorganization once again separated G–2 and the Military Intelligence Service, although the latter retained the function of evaluating intelligence. At the same time the MIS was relieved of all other functions except the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information. Counterintelligence, training, and propaganda operations were removed from MIS and continued under the General Staff supervision of G–2 along with a World War II Historical Section, which had been established in August 1943. The Military Intelligence Service itself was reorganized along functional lines with a Directorate of Information responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence, a Directorate of Intelligence responsible for evaluation, and a Directorate of Administration. Co-ordinating and directing the MIS and other intelligence operations within G–2 was a policy staff similarly organized along functional lines.[12]

These changes, according to General McNarney, created much bitterness and resentment within G–2 and the MIS, but "frankly," he told the Patch Board, "G–2 defeated me. I never got G–2 organized so that I thought it was functioning efficiently." The principal reason, he thought, was the innate conservatism of professional intelligence personnel and their resistance to new ideas. "What I would like to do," he said, "is get rid of anybody who has ever been military attache and start new from the ground up." [13]

[11] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 17–32. (2) Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956). (3) Interview with Richard M. Bissell, former Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 5 Aug 67. (4) Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, c. 1953, pt. II, chs. I and II, pp. 1–40. Manuscript in OCMH.

[12] Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, pp. 33–55.

[13] (1) McNarney Interview, p. 17. (2) Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, ch. I, pp. 21–38.

G–3

Of all the General Staff divisions G–3 was least affected by the Marshall reorganization. In contrast to the others its organization remained rather stable throughout the war. There were an Organization and Mobilization Group and a Training Branch, both divided along ground, air, and service forces lines. A Policy Branch was added at the end of the war. At this time also responsibility for the Army's replacement system was transferred to G–1 from G–3.[14]

G–3 officers like their colleagues found that it was impractical to try to draw a strict line between planning and operating functions. For example, as a policy planning agency G–3 made monthly allocations of training ammunition to AGF troops. In the process it also had to determine the necessity, suitability, and utilization of training facilities before their procurement, all of which were operating functions.[15]

The fragmentation of responsibility for personnel, aggravated by the manpower shortage, was the principal frustration for G–3 during the war. It was responsible for mobilizing, demobilizing, and training the Army, for determining the overall size or troop basis of the Army, for establishing unit tables of organization and equipment, and for dealing with OPD on allocating troops for overseas shipment. All of these functions depended upon the availability of military manpower.

Until the end of the war when these functions were transferred to G–1, G–3 was responsible for maintaining statistics on the availability of troops and units for deployment overseas and for bulk allocation of military personnel to the three major commands. G–3 correlated statistics reported periodically by Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. Using these statistics as a base OPD would then determine what units or troops were to be sent overseas in response to forecasts or requests from theater commanders. Since the basic statistics were prepared by the major commands and the decisions on deployment of troops overseas were made by OPD, G–3 in practice was little more than an intermediate co-ordinating staff layer. Its difficulties were increased by the

[14] Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 510–14.

[15] Richard W. Armour, and Others, History of G–3 Division, War Department General Staff During World War II, c. Feb 46, pp. 8–13. Manuscript in OCMH.

manpower shortage and the apparent irreconcilability of statistics from various sources on the number of men actually in the Army at any given time.

Other problems aggravated the manpower shortage, particularly the distribution of troops between combat and support elements. General Somervell and his staff were firmly convinced that throughout the war overseas commanders, OPD, and AGF continually underestimated the need for service troops overseas. This problem was particularly acute in the year following Pearl Harbor and frequently required General Somervell's personal attention and intervention at the highest levels of command.[16]

G–4

While division of responsibility created serious problems for G–1, the reverse was true in the case of G–4. Its major problem was the deliberate centralization of responsibility for supply and supply planning in General Somervell and ASF by General Marshall. For most of the war his staff rather than the G–4 staff dealt with OPD and the various joint and combined committees on logistical planning. When General Somervell attempted to obtain formal recognition of his status as General Marshall's supply adviser instead of G–4 in mid-1943, his proposal backfired. As a result G–4's formal functions and its staff were increased.[17] The assignment to G–4 of officers unfamiliar with the Army's supply system created additional problems.

Under the Marshall reorganization, G–4 at first consisted of the Planning, Supply, and New Weapons and Equipment Branches. After a reorganization in October 1943, the investigation of overseas supply problems by a board under Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, and further reorganizations in July and October 1944, G–4 consisted of three branches, Planning, Policy, and Programs. Theoretically the Planning Branch prepared long-range plans. Looking forward as far as the next war the Programs Branch was to translate long-range plans into

[16] (1) R. W. Coakley, B. C. Mossman, and B. F. Cooling, Review of Deployment Procedures in World War II and in the Korean War, OCMH Monograph, 1966, pt. I, A and B. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 57–92.

[17] (1) McNarney Interview, pp. 8–9; Lutes Interview; and Nelson Interview, Patch-Simpson Board files. (2) Supply Division, War Department General Staff, History of Supply Division, G–4, War Department General Staff, no date, Division Development Section, pp. 1–5. Manuscript in OCMH. (3) Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45*, pp. 100–104.

supply programs covering the next year or two, while the Policy Branch made "policy" decisions on current matters. As a practical matter it was still the ASF Planning Division under General Lutes that performed the detailed logistical planning for current and projected overseas operations in conjunction with strategic plans developed by OPD.

The Planning Branch had a Theater Section which supposedly developed broad policies and directives for the use of the Army's logistical forces both overseas and in the zone of interior. It had special responsibilities for hospitalization and evacuation. Another mission was to develop a uniform, coordinated set of supply regulations out of the welter of conflicting directives on the subject issued by various agencies at all levels of command.

An Organization Section studied, reviewed, and revised the Army's logistical organizations. A Special Projects Section studied logistical doctrine, supervised management of Army logistics, and was responsible for logistical aspects of mobilization, demobilization, and postwar planning.

The Programs Branch was responsible for balancing military requirements with the resources available and for approving new equipment and matériel. Its Equipment Section dealt with new weapons and equipment. A Requirements Section developed the Army's supply requirements. After July 1944, it also prepared the supply section of the Army's Victory Program Troop Basis and the Overseas Troop Basis and coordinated the Army Supply Program generally. All three functions had been previously performed by OPD. An Allowances Section analyzed and approved standard as well as special allowances of equipment for Army combat units and other organizations. An Installations Section determined supply plans and policies as they applied specifically to posts, camps, stations, and other facilities under the Army Installations Program.

The Policy Branch was responsible for solving problems arising out of current supply operations. A Distribution Section handled issues affecting the distribution, storage, issue, and maintenance of equipment. A Property Section handled questions concerning the acquisition of land, construction of facilities and installations, and similar housekeeping functions. An Economics Section dealt with issues involving Allied supply

programs under lend-lease and supply requirements for liberated and occupied territory. As such, it was the point of contact within G–4 for the new Civil Affairs Division.[18]

The War Department Special Staff

Of the five new War Department Special Staff divisions added after the Marshall reorganization, two of them, the War Department Manpower Board and the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, concerned personnel; another, the New Developments Division concerned research and development of new weapons and material; a fourth, the Civil Affairs Division, dealt with military government of liberated and occupied territories; a fifth, the Special Planning Division, was responsible for demobilization planning, universal military training, and the postwar organization of the Army. Three former special staff agencies assigned by the Marshall reorganization to Army Service Forces, the Budget Division, the National Guard Bureau, and the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, were restored by the end of the war as special staff divisions as the result of political pressure from Congress. The Information and Education Division, an outgrowth originally of The Adjutant General's Office's responsibilities for personnel and morale services, became a special staff agency in September 1945, when the War Department decided to merge all information services under a Director of Information who reported to the Chief of Staff. The other agencies involved, the Bureau of Public Relations and the Legislative and Liaison Division, were already special staff agencies.

The Civil Affairs Division

The political consequences of American military operations in liberated and later occupied enemy territory were such that neither Secretary Stimson nor General Marshall could avoid assuming personal responsibility for them. Secretary Stimson centralized War Department responsibility for this function in the Civil Affairs Division created on 1 March 1943 as a special staff division of the War Department General Staff.

[18] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 514-21. (2) History of Supply Division, G-4, Division Development Section, pp. 1-6, and Planning Branch History. (3) Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45*, pp. 100-105.



GENERAL EISENHOWER. *(Photograph taken in 1945.)*

Military government policy had become a critical problem shortly after the landings in North Africa at the end of 1942 when Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in political difficulties because of his dealings with Admiral Jean F. L. Darlan as *de facto* head of the local French administration. Eisenhower requested instructions from the War Department on how to deal with the situation.

At that time, following the precedent of World War I, military government was the responsibility of the local overseas theater commander. There was no single agency within the War Department to provide direction on this subject. By default OPD, as the liaison between General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was handed the problem.

In March 1942 a military government training school at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville was established under the Provost Marshal General. Efforts to develop military government policy bogged down in disagreement within the administration over whether control over civilian populations in militarily occupied areas should be a military or civilian function. Similarly, efforts to agree on a War Department position on military government were stymied by disagreement within the General Staff until General Eisenhower's request made the problem immediate and urgent.

Secretary Stimson sent Assistant Secretary McCloy overseas to North Africa to investigate and report on the problem. The creation of the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was the result of recommendations Mr. McCloy made on his return. Now a single staff division was responsible for advising the Secretary and the Chief of Staff on nonmilitary matters "in areas occupied as the result of military operations." Its staff was small, and it had no operating functions. The Provost Marshal General continued to run the Military Government School, and theater commanders carried out policies and instructions issued through the Civil Affairs Division.[19]

Having created the Civil Affairs Division, Secretary Stimson had also to decide whether the chief should be a military man or a civilian in uniform. Choosing the former, he selected Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, an experienced General Staff officer and former G–1, who remained chief of the division throughout the war. The division staff was organized along functional lines based on essential community services, and each functional branch was divided along geographic lines.[20]

CAD dealt with theater commanders overseas through OPD which had one representative on the staff of CAD. The International Division of ASF, concerned with civilian supply problems overseas, also had a representative in CAD.

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in December 1944 to co-ordinate foreign and military policies. CAD had a representative on this committee and on the Working Security Committee set up in Washington to assist the European Advisory Commission, working under General Eisenhower in London, on the development of postwar policy toward Germany. Finally CAD had to deal with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Under

[19] (1) Edwin J. Hayward, History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II to March 1946, no date, pt. I, ch. I, pp. 9–19. Manuscript in OCMH. (2) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. XI, pp. 5–6. (3) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 553–59. (4) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 320–22.

[20] Hayward, History of the Civil Affairs Division, pt. II, pp. 5–20.

former Governor Herbert H. Lehman of New York UNRRA had an obvious direct interest in civilian relief supplies.[21]

Personnel and Manpower Problems

Because no critical manpower shortages developed during World War I, the War Department did not anticipate the problem in World War II. A second complicating factor was the division of responsibility for personnel policy and operations among many agencies within the department. *(Chart 9)* Centralizing responsibility for this function in one agency would have required a major reorganization causing dislocation and administrative turmoil throughout the Army.


Responsibility for military personnel operations was divided among G–1, G–3, OPD, the three major commands, the seven technical services, and the administrative services. Responsibility for civilian personnel was divided among the Secretary of War's Civilian Personnel Office, Army Service Forces, and the technical services.

After the Marshall reorganization, G–1 was supposedly limited to policy planning and co-ordination among the three major commands. But, in practice, as indicated earlier, with its drastically reduced staff it became a co-ordinating agency more concerned with administration than planning.

Army Ground Forces resisted the authority of ASF over military personnel operations, and the Air Forces were busy developing their own separate system of personnel administration. Within ASF both the Personnel Division and The Adjutant General's Office were responsible for Army-wide military personnel operations, including personnel and morale services. The Adjutant General was responsible for the induction, classification, and assignment of military personnel. G–3 prescribed the size and composition of units in the Army through tables of organization, and it allocated military personnel in bulk to the major commands. OPD regulated the flow of units and replace-

[21] (1) Hayward, History of the Civil Affairs Division, pt. II, Civil Affairs Liaison Functions—War Department, pp. 1–7; Joint Chiefs of Staff Agencies, pp. 1–13; Civilian Departments and Agencies, pp. 1–7; and Civil Affairs Machinery—Liaison Functions With Civilian Agencies, pp. 1–63. (2) Wyckoff, The Office of the Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. XI, pp. 4–9. (3) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 553–61.

CHART 9—FRAGMENTATION OF WAR DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS, 1944–1945



Sources: Nelson, National Security and the General Staff; Dorr Memorandum; G-1 History; G-2 History; Strength Accounting and Reporting Office History; New Developments Division History; Special Planning Division History; Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War; and Millett, Army Service Forces.

ments overseas. The technical and administrative services had their own traditional personnel management systems.

The Civilian Personnel Division in the Secretary of War's Office was responsible initially for all War Department civilian personnel operations, while ASF's Industrial Personnel Division took over responsibility for civilian personnel management among technical service installations in the field including labor relations. The Civilian Personnel Division continued to be responsible for civilian personnel management within the War Department itself. The latter's actions frequently conflicted with similar activities in the headquarters of the technical services and, of course, AAF headquarters.[22]

Lacking centralized responsibility for personnel policy and operations, the only practical alternative for the War Department when the manpower shortage did develop in late 1942 was to create another special agency—the War Department Manpower Board—for dealing with this aspect of the problem. Divided responsibility led to conflict among the various agencies of the Army over just how many men there were in the Army. Another special agency, the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, was established within the Chief of Staff's Office to co-ordinate and standardize personnel statistics within the Army.

Government leaders, including General Marshall, gradually became aware by the end of 1942 that there was not enough manpower available in the country to meet all the nation's requirements, both civilian and military. The Bureau of the Budget inaugurated a program to conserve manpower within the federal government and was responsible for setting civilian manpower ceilings for each agency. In March 1943 General Marshall, on the recommendation of an emergency committee of the General Staff and the three commands, created the War Department Manpower Board under another former G–1, Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser. The board reported directly to the Chief of Staff, recommending specific manpower savings, both civilian and military, on the basis of detailed surveys of War

[22] (1) Millett, ASF Org Hist, pp. 378–82. (2) Craven and Cate, *Men and Planes*, pp. 34–38. (3) Green, Thomson, and Roots, *Planning Munitions for War*, pp. 121–68. (4) History of the Personnel Division, ASF, pp. 232–62. (5) Robert W. Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System, 1965, OCMH Study, pp. 1–4.

Department activities and installations within the continental United States. Most of the surveys were conducted by teams located in each of the nine service commands and the Military District of Washington. The activities surveyed were under ASF's jurisdiction. Its Control Division assisted teams, using industrial work measurement, work simplification, and standardization techniques which produced considerable savings in manpower. The Industrial Personnel Division conducted similar surveys. As a result of these combined efforts, the War Department Manpower Board claimed at the end of the war that it had reduced the number of civilian and military employees of the War Department and the Army within the United States by about one-sixth of its wartime peak in June 1943. It said further savings could be obtained if unnecessary duplication of functions among the technical and administrative services were eliminated, particularly in their headquarters.[23]

Conserving military manpower was harder than conserving civilian manpower. The main problem that developed in this area was to provide an effective replacement system that would meet the needs of overseas commanders. The latters' advance estimates of how many people they would require were generally inaccurate, but the greatest difficulty was the inability of the Army to account accurately for troops "in the pipeline," moving from one organization, station, or area to another, in hospitals, on leave, on detached service, or at school.

Divided responsibility for personnel administration inevitably led to conflicting reports on the number of men actually in the Army which the department could not reconcile. Public ventilation of these discrepancies caused Secretary Stimson and General Marshall acute embarrassment, especially in their relations with Congress.

The department first sought to alleviate the problem by requiring that all public statements on Army strength be cleared through G–1. General McNarney also appointed an *ad hoc* committee to investigate the problem. The result was

[23] (1) Bureau of the Budget Circular 408, 24 Dec 42. (2) George W. Peak, "The War Department Manpower Board," *The American Political Science Review*, XL, No. 1 (February 1946), 3–10. (3) George W. Peak, History of War Department Manpower Board, c. Mar 46, pp. 1–17. Manuscript in OCMH. (4) See page 96, above, on work of ASF Control Division in manpower conservation.

the creation in May 1944 of a new special staff agency within the Office of the Chief of Staff, the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, which was to improve and standardize manpower reporting. With the issuance of its first monthly edition of the Strength Report of the Army series in July 1944, this office steadily improved and refined military manpower reporting within the Army.[24]

Manpower conservation and improved statistics were not enough. Divided responsibility for control over personnel management was a stubborn obstacle that did not yield to piecemeal solutions. The Army never did succeed in developing a satisfactory replacement system during the war. Only the end of the war and the shift to demobilization removed the problem for the time being. Two Air Force management experts, Drs. Edmund P. Learned and D. T. Smith, appointed specifically to study the Army personnel replacement system reported:

> No single agency in the War Department General Staff has adequate responsibility or authority to make an integrated Army-wide personnel system work. There are too many offices . . . in the personnel business; there is some confusion in responsibility and no one place that can be held responsible for a total summary of the situation.[25]

Of their recommendations for centralizing responsibility for the replacement system, the department acted on only one—to transfer responsibility for allocating replacements from G–3 to G–1. OPD continued to allocate combat replacements and so spread the over-all manpower shortage among the various overseas theaters.[26]

Had the Army and the department been able to resolve all internal personnel problems and conflicts a nationwide man-

[24] (1) History of the Organization and Functions of the Central Statistical Office of the Chief of Staff, pp. 4–6. (2) Strength Accounting and Statistics Office, OCS, The Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, c. May 46, pp. 1–11. Manuscript in OCMH. (3) Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System, p. 3. (4) History of Personnel Division, G–1, Summary History of Personnel Division, G–1, pp. 1–8; History of Control Group, pp. 1–6; and History of Statistics Branch, Control Group, pp. 1–8.

[25] History of Personnel Division, G–1, Summary History of Personnel Division, G–1, p. 6.

[26] (1) Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System, pp. 3–4. (2) History of Personnel Division, G–1, Summary History of Personnel Division, G–1, p. 6. (3) Armour, History of G–3 Division, pp. 12–13. (4) See General Somervell's remarks in U.S. Congress, *Department of Armed Forces/ Department of Military Security, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs*, United States Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 17 Oct–17 Dec 45 (Washington, 1945), pp. 649–50. Hereafter cited as *Thomas Committee Unification Hearings*.

power shortage would still have been beyond their power to solve. Both Secretary Stimson and General Marshall were frustrated in trying to deal with this problem because neither the President nor Congress was willing to vest in one agency sufficient authority to determine manpower allocations among all the claimants. The Secretary and General Marshall repeatedly urged enactment of compulsory national service legislation similar to the system adopted by the British. This would have meant the conscription of industrial and agricultural labor. Strong opposition by labor unions and farm organizations to this proposal led to its rejection in Congress and within the administration.[27]

Research and Development of New Matériel


Research and development of new weapons and equipment in the Army suffered from subordination to production throughout the war. Agencies responsible for research and development, whether at the General Staff, ASF, or technical services, were subordinate elements within organizations primarily concerned with production and supply.

Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, chairman of the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and chairman of the Military Policy Committee of the Manhattan District, told the House Committee on Military Affairs that the armed services did not sufficiently realize the importance of science because military personnel by training and tradition did not appreciate the contribution it could make to national defense. They had not learned as industry had "that it is fatal to place any research organization under production departments. In the services it is still the procurement divisions who maintain the research organizations."

Basically, research and procurement are incompatible. New developments are upsetting to procurement standards and procurement schedules. A procurement group is under the constant urge to regularize and standardize, particularly when funds are limited. Its primary function is

[27] (1) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 470–88. (2) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. X, pp. 1–40. (3) Byron Fairchild and Jonathan Grossman, *The Army and Industrial Manpower*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), pp. 219–45.

CHART 10—RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS AND MATÉRIEL WITHIN THE WAR DEPARTMENT, SEPTEMBER 1945



Sources: Nelson, National Security and the General Staff; New Developments Division History; McCaskey, The Role of the Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment; History of Research and Development Division, ASF; Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions for War; Millett, Army Service Forces; Stewart, Organizing Scientific Research for War; Morison, Turmoil and Tradition; and Hewlett and Anderson, The New World.

to produce a sufficient supply of standard weapons for field use. Procurement units are judged, therefore, by production standards.

Research, however, is the exploration of the unknown. It is speculative, uncertain. It cannot be standardized. It succeeds, moreover, in virtually direct proportion to its freedom from performance controls, production pressures and traditional approaches.[28]

Functionally, the issue was again one of planning versus operations where mixing planning with operational responsibilities led to the neglect of planning. A second and more immediately important obstacle was the division of responsibility for the research, design, development, production, testing, procurement, and battlefield deployment of new weapons and equipment among many agencies. *(Chart 10)* The most serious division and the one which caused the most delay was that between the technical services as producers and the AGF and combat arms as users.

Within the Army the technical services throughout the war were the agencies responsible for nearly all military research and development except for the AAF, which had its own programs. G–4 exercised General Staff supervision over the technical services activities through a Research and Development Section created in 1940. The combat arms were responsible for establishing military requirements and characteristics of new weapons and equipment, for service testing them under simulated combat conditions, and finally for accepting or rejecting them as standard Army equipment. Military requirements for new equipment in turn depended on the development of tactical doctrine. These two functions were under the General Staff supervision of G–3.

Under the Marshall reorganization, Army Service Forces took over responsibility for research and development operations from G–4, which continued to have a Developments Section within its Requirements and Distribution Branch. Throughout the war this function was buried within ASF under the Directorate of Materiel and did not even achieve the status of a separate division until the war's end. This reflected

[28] (1) Dr. Bush's Congressional testimony quoted in New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff, History of New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff, c. Apr 46, pp. 4–5. Manuscript in OCMH. (2) See also James N. Mosel, "Group Relationships and Participative Management," *Perspectives in Management*, ICAF, March 1968, pp. 1–10, especially pp. 4–5. (3) Vannevar Bush, *Pieces of the Action* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1970), pp. 26–68, contains an excellent account of the development of OSRD and Dr. Bush's role as its director.

the fact that the Materiel Directorate's primary interest in this area was in the requirements and specifications of those weapons and equipment already developed and proposed for adoption as standard equipment by the Army. Since technical services were the agencies mainly responsible for the conduct of the Army's research and development efforts, ASF's Research and Development Division was largely a co-ordinating staff between them and AGF. There were lengthy delays caused by disagreement between the latter, representing the users, and ASF's research and development staff, representing the producers, over specifications which had to be negotiated. Another mission was to promote the use of common items of supplies, and there were lengthy delays in trying to get the technical services, particularly the Ordnance Department, to change their specifications. The Research and Development Division also assisted the technical services when they had trouble obtaining raw materials, equipment, and facilities for their research and development programs.

AGF took over operational responsibility in March 1942 for establishing military requirements for weapons and equipment and for the development of tactical doctrine from G–3 and the former combat arms, assigning these functions to its own G–3 and Requirements Division.[29]

Conflicts between the technical services and AGF delayed production and procurement of new matériel. Often differences between them could not be resolved short of General Marshall himself. A classic example was the dispute between the AGF in the person of General McNair and the Ordnance Department over the development of a heavy tank. Armored doctrine held that there was no need for a heavy tank because it moved too slowly. Mobility was the vital characteristic, and both armor and firepower should be subordinated to it. One result was the development of a light, half-track armored vehicle known as a tank destroyer which proved unable to cope with heavier German tanks in North Africa. (Later tank destroyers,

[29] (1) Robert W. Coakley, Richard Kugler, and Vincent H. Demma, Historical Summary of Evolution of U.S. Army Test and Evaluation System— World War II to the Present, OCMH Monograph, 1964, pp. 1–4. (2) Interview, Hewes with General Lutes, 22 Sep 71. (3) McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, pp. 1–27. (4) Research and Development Division, ASF, *History of Reserach and Development Division, 1 July 1940–1 July 1945 With Supplements to 1 January 1946*, vol. I, pp. 1–12, 37–41, and vol. II, pp. 1–4, 11–13.

like tanks themselves, were full-tracked.) Another was the repeated veto by General McNair of heavy tanks proposed by the Ordnance Department. Such a tank finally saw action at the end of the European war, having been held up for over two years.[30]

There was a tendency among combat officers, the Air Forces excepted, to ignore radically new departures in development of new equipment in favor of tinkering with or improving existing weapons. This conservative tendency stemmed in part from their general unfamiliarity with scientific and technological developments or with production and engineering. Second, the better tended to be the enemy of the good. Developers charged that representatives of the combat arms repeatedly rejected equipment that was not perfect. This often involved redesigning and further delay simply to incorporate some new feature.[31]

Secretary Stimson was dissatisfied with the slowness of research in the Army, particularly in the field of electronics. His special assistant, Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, was a troubleshooter on scientific problems and acted as liaison with the scientific community. His special task was to oversee the development of the atomic bomb. In the spring of 1942, Mr. Stimson appointed Dr. Edward L. Bowles of MIT as his Expert Consultant to push the development of radar in particular and other improvements in the field of electronics. He had a staff of forty-seven specialists who made frequent trips overseas to obtain firsthand evidence of combat requirements.[32]

Mr. Stimson also became a close friend of Dr. Bush who urged greater emphasis on scientific research in developing new military equipment. An engineer by profession, Dr. Bush

[30] (1) McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, pp. 37–54, 62–67. (2) Green, Thomson, and Roots, *Planning Munitions for War*, pp. 231–40, 275–87. (3) Bush, *Pieces of the Action*, pp. 100–102.

[31] Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of National Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 105–255.

[32] (1) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 552. (2) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 408, 466–67. (3) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 464–69. (4) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. III, pp. 11–13. (5) McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, pp. 29–31. (6) Millett, ASF Org Hist, pp. 154–55, 239–55, 343. (7) New Developments Division History, pp. 4–8, 14–15. (8) Irwin Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War, the Administrative History of the Office of Scientific Research and Development* (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown and Company, 1948), pp. 34–43. (9) Bush, *Pieces of the Action*, pp. 89–91.

was by virtue of the many key positions he held during the war probably the most influential and the most articulate representative of the scientific community in the defense program. He and Dr. Bowles, acting through Stimson, were responsible for increasing the Army's participation in the development of new weapons and other matériel. They were dissatisfied with the Army's research and development programs. Partly because of their slowness to act in this area, the Chief of Ordnance in 1942 and in 1943 the Chief Signal Officer were replaced. The influence of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and Dr. Bowles on AAF research and development and on the use of operations research techniques has been mentioned previously. The Ground Forces never did make any significant use of the latter during the war.[33]

Pressure on the department also came from the battlefields. Reports from the Pacific on the unsuitability of existing equipment for jungle or amphibious combat led General Marshall to send a team of experts to that area under Col. William A. Borden to investigate and report directly to him on the kinds of weapons and equipment needed in the area. Colonel Borden, an Ordnance expert with a flair for salesmanship and diplomacy, was then General Somervell's Special Assistant to the Director of Plans and Operations, a cover for his primary function as a troubleshooter.

In October 1943, acting on the recommendations of Bundy, Bush, and Bowles, Stimson created the New Developments Division as a special staff division to expedite production and procurement of new and improved equipment. Under Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry the New Developments Division was primarily a troubleshooting agency with a limited staff of about two dozen civilian and military personnel. They tried to bridge the gap between producer and consumer and to hasten delivery of equipment to the battlefield.[34]

The division's members accompanied scientists and technicians of OSRD's field service overseas to test and evaluate new matériel. The principal problem as well as that of the Research and Development Division of ASF was the delay

[33] (1) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. VII, pp. 8–10, 12–13. (2) Bush, *Pieces of the Action*, pp. 91–92. (3) See Chapter II, page 86.

[34] (1) New Developments Division History, pp. 8–15. (2) Millett, ASF Org Hist, p. 343. (3) Green, Thomson, and Roots, *Planning Munitions for War*, pp. 253, 313.

caused by disagreements between the technical services and the combat arms over testing equipment. While the Research and Development Division was flooded with the paper work created by this problem, the staff of the New Developments Division spent more of its time in the field trying to find short cuts around the rigid testing requirements of AGF. This was handled on a case-by-case basis, and with a small staff its success was limited. The problem remained unsolved at the end of the war.[35]

Another duty assigned the division as the result of the manpower shortage was to provide a pool of technical and scientific specialists drafted into the Army. Induction centers, pressed for combat replacements, generally assigned these individuals to the combat arms. An Army Technical Detachment added to the New Developments Division in October 1944 tried to locate such personnel before they became assigned as combat replacements. In its year of operation the detachment had located and assigned four hundred such specialists to the technical services and other installations performing research and development, but it still had a backlog of over eight hundred unfilled requests.[36]

The Manhattan Project, organized to supervise the production of the atomic bomb, pioneered in what later became known as project management. The Army took over direction of the atomic program in mid-1942, when scientists working under the Office of Scientific Research and Development had demonstrated that an atomic weapon was technically feasible. Producing the fissionable material required to detonate the bomb involved enormous outlays of men, money, and resources, including huge amounts of electricity and water. The Corps of Engineers was selected to construct and operate the required installations and facilities because of its experience with large-scale public works projects.

[35] (1) Coakley, Kugler, and Demma, Evolution of U.S. Army Test and Evaluation System, pp. 3–4. (2) Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 464–65. (3) New Developments Division History, pp. 20–29, 49–56. (4) *History of Research and Development Division, ASF*, vol. II, pp. 1–33, and vol. I, pp. 37–41. (5) Stewart, *Organizing Scientific Research for War*, pp. 149–54. (6) James Phinney Baxter, *Scientists Against Time* (Boston: Little Brown, 1946), pp. 411–16. (7) Bush, *Pieces of the Action*, p. 51.

[36] (1) New Developments Division History, pp. 111–22. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, pp. 468, 526.

Secretary Stimson with the approval of President Roosevelt placed Brig. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, the man responsible for building the Pentagon, in charge of the project. His organization was known as the Manhattan District of the Corps of Engineers, but the Chief of Engineers was relieved of responsibility for the project shortly after General Groves' appointment. For practical purposes, it was an independent agency. General Groves reported to a Military Policy Committee set up to oversee the project and determine general policy. Dr. Bush was its chairman. On the committee were Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, General Somervell's deputy, Admiral William R. Purnell, and Dr. James Bryant Conant, president of Harvard and head of the National Defense Research Advisory Committee of OSRD. Conant and Bush represented the interests of the scientific community. General Groves also reported directly to General Marshall and to Secretary Stimson, usually through Mr. Bundy's office.[87]

The Marshall Reorganization in Retrospect

As Chief of Staff of the Army during World War II, General Marshall had two principal missions. He was the Army's chief strategy adviser and also general manager of the department. The increasing size and complexity of the Army's operations as the United States gradually mobilized for war made it physically impossible for Marshall to perform both functions. Since his major function was to advise President Roosevelt on strategy and military operations, he was forced to divorce himself more and more from his administrative functions as general manager of the department.

From Marshall's viewpoint the existing structure and standard procedures of the Army's General Staff made it practically impossible for him to delegate responsibility for administration to the General Staff. Its committees were too slow in reaching collective decisions and could not distinguish between important questions and minor details which they constantly thrust at him for decision.

[87] (1) Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), pp. 2, 23–25, 417. (2) Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *The New World, 1939–1946* (State College, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University, 1962), pp. 81–82. (3) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, pp. 509–10. (4) Bush, *Pieces of the Action*, pp. 52, 56–62.

Passage of the First War Powers Act in December 1941, right after Pearl Harbor, gave Marshall the opportunity to streamline the department's organization. Under the new organization he delegated his administrative responsibilities to a single Deputy Chief of Staff within the department and to three new major field commands, Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. At the same time he selected his own principal deputies and subordinates. The reorganization left him free, as he insisted, to concentrate on military strategy and operations aided by the staff of the War Plans Division. Redesignated the Operations Division it became an operating headquarters instead of a planning agency. In effect it became a super general staff, bypassing the other General Staff divisions in the interests of prompt action.

In this manner General Marshall could control departmental operations by decentralizing responsibility for their administration just as the pioneer industrial managers at DuPont, General Motors, and Sears had done in the previous decades. Although Marshall was apparently not familiar with these earlier industrial management reforms, it is not surprising that he, faced with similar problems, came up with similar solutions. Marshall's understanding of the basic principles of management as well as his exceptional judgment of men made him one of the department's most effective administrators. The results of his reorganization were so satisfactory that he strongly recommended applying the same principles in organizing a new department of the armed services after the war.

General McNarney, as Deputy Chief of Staff and general manager, exercised tight control over the department, except for his increase in the functions and personnel of G–4 in mid-1943. General Handy, his successor who had previously been Chief of the Operations Division, was more sympathetic to the General Staff, which Marshall and McNarney had largely ignored. Handy was also more critical of Somervell's ASF than McNarney.

The difficulties Marshall and McNarney had with the management of intelligence, personnel functions, and research and development of new weapons indicated that the reorganization had not solved all problems of administration. The relations between the functionally organized ASF headquarters and the

offices of the chiefs of the traditional technical services presented another difficult problem. Large industrial corporations which attempted to combine a functionally organized headquarters with a decentralized product-oriented field structure were experiencing similar difficulties.[38]

Supervising and co-ordinating the technical services along functional lines which cut across formal channels of command inevitably generated friction. If the offices of the chiefs of the services had been phased out of existence as had been done with the chiefs of the combat arms within AGF, there might have been less friction and ill-feeling. AAF headquarters deliberately created its own integrated supply system from the start and did not have to deal with any technical services with long-established traditions and influence.

ASF might have solved its organizational and management problems by confining its top staff to broad policy planning and co-ordinating functions. The technical services chiefs argued for this alternative, but the experiences of the three major commands led their commanding generals to insist that their headquarters staff must operate in order to exercise effective control over their subordinate agencies and commands.

There were conflicts and jurisdictional disputes between General Somervell's headquarters and OPD over logistical planning responsibilities and with AAF headquarters as a result of the latter's aggressive drive for autonomy.

Although put together in haste, the Marshall reorganization worked as well as it did because General Marshall was the real center of military authority within the department. Both Roosevelt and Secretary Stimson supported him. In turn General Marshall delegated broad responsibility with commensurate authority to Generals McNarney, McNair, Arnold, and Somervell. While the Marshall reorganization lasted only as long as he was Chief of Staff, it was based upon the accepted military principle of unity of command and similar to concepts of administrative management developed by major industrial corporations.

[38] Chandler, "Management Decentralization," pp. 211–12.

CHAPTER IV

The Eisenhower Reorganization

After World War II the United States abandoned its prewar isolationism and assumed global responsibilities in international affairs that vastly increased the commitments of its military establishment and required new patterns of defense organization. The World War II Army of over eight million was reduced by mid-1947 to approximately one million (including the Army Air Forces), but was still five times greater than the Army of the 1930s. This force was no longer deployed solely in the United States and its possessions but was widely dispersed in occupation and other duties in Europe and Asia. The Army could no longer be viewed as a virtually independent entity but as one interrelated in complex patterns with the other elements in the defense establishment, including after 1947 a separate Air Force. The pace of technological advance illustrated most dramatically by the appearance of the first atomic bomb at the end of the war introduced further complications into the management of defense and Army affairs. Between 1945 and 1950 Congress and the Executive Branch wrestled with the problems of establishing a new defense organization to fit the new circumstances. Within the Army itself these events produced crosscurrents of opinion that led to a new phase in the long struggle between rationalists and traditionalists over the nature of the organization of the department.

General Marshall's Views on Postwar Military Organization

General of the Army George C. Marshall repeatedly asserted he could not have "run the war" without having radically reorganized the department to provide centralized, unified control through decentralized responsibility for administration. The essential features of his reorganization, he strongly advised, should be retained after the war and the armed services

should be unified or integrated along the same lines.[1] This approach was preferable to continuing the unsatisfactory extemporaneous wartime organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS operated on the traditional committee system, which, Marshall told Congress, made the development of balanced national defense policies and effective control over the armed services impossible. "Committees," he said, "are at best cumbersome agencies." They reached agreement only after interminable delay. Their decisions represented compromises among the competing interests of individual agencies rather than rational calculations based on the interests of the nation as a whole. They wasted time, men, money, and matériel.[2]

Marshall's basic proposition was to integrate the services into a single department along the same lines as his wartime organization of the Army. A civilian secretary would be responsible for the nonmilitary administration of the services, a role similar to Secretary Stimson's during the war. Under him would be a single Chief of Staff for the Armed Forces directing the military activities of four operating commands: the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and a Common Supply and Hospitalization Service patterned after Army Service Forces. Overseas theater commanders would report directly to the Chief of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would continue as a top-level planning and co-ordinating staff, with no administrative responsibilities, under a "Chief of Staff to the President" like Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. The new Chief of Staff would present the views of the JCS to the President instead of the reverse as Admiral Leahy had done. The JCS would also continue to report directly to the President rather than through the civilian secretary. Its vital function would be to recommend to the President military programs which integrated military strategy and policy with the budgets required to support them.

National military policies should be balanced against the resources available to meet them, Marshall insisted. Otherwise the services would find themselves again unable to carry out their assigned responsibilities. He also sought to prevent the services from bypassing the Chief of Staff and the Secretary as the technical services had done in obtaining their own funds

[1] Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, p. 298. (2) Marshall, Harrison, and Lutes Interviews. Patch-Simpson Board files.

[2] *Thomas Committee Unification Hearings*, pp. 50-51. Quotation from p. 50.

directly from Congress. Thus General Marshall's plan also involved a radical reorganization of the nation's defense budgets along rational lines.[8]

The Special Planning Division and the Marshall Program

Even before Pearl Harbor General Marshall realized the importance of planning ahead to avoid the kind of chaotic demobilization which followed World War I. On 13 November 1941 he recalled to active duty Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, with whom he had served under Pershing, as his personal adviser on the postwar organization of the Army. On 24 June 1942 he also appointed a Post-War Planning Board to advise General Palmer on postwar organization matters. Its members, including the G–1 and G–3, were too preoccupied with current operating responsibilities to pay much attention to postwar problems. Eventually they agreed on the need for a special staff agency that would devote its entire time to problems of demobilization and postwar planning.

General Marshall then asked General Somervell on 14 April 1943 to initiate preliminary studies on demobilization planning. Accordingly, General Somervell set up a Project Planning Division within the Office of the Deputy Commanding General for Service Commands to define the problem in the light of American experience in World War I and recommend a proper organization and procedures for dealing with it.

Assisted by General Palmer, the Project Planning Division submitted a Survey of Demobilization Planning to General Marshall on 18 June 1943. Based on these recommendations, Under Secretary Patterson on 22 July 1943 directed creation of a Special Planning Division as a War Department Special Staff agency to develop plans for demobilization, universal military training, a single department of defense, and the postwar organization of the Army.

Taking over the personnel of ASF's Project Planning Division, the Special Planning Division (SPD) was a group of approximately fifty people under Brig. Gen. William F. Tompkins and later Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter. Col.

[8] (1) Interview, Marshall with Stimson, 24 Apr 44. (2) Stimson Diary, entries of 18, 19, 21, and 24–27 Apr 44. (3) Marshall Interview. Patch-Simpson Board files. (4) *Thomas Committee Unification Hearings*, pp. 49–65.

Gordon E. Textor became deputy director, and General Palmer continued to serve as adviser. Collectively, they had sufficient rank to command respect from the other War Department agencies and commands with whom they had to work.[4]

The Special Planning Division's internal organization consisted of five functional branches: Organization; Personnel and Administration; Service, Operations, and Transportation; Materiel; and Fiscal. Three other branches, Legislative and Liaison, Administration, and Research, provided administrative support.

The Organization Branch developed the War Department's Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment and the Army's positions on unification and universal military training along the lines outlined by General Marshall. The Personnel and Administration Branch prepared the Army's demobilization program together with the Readjustment Regulations governing its operations. The Service, Operations, and Transportation Branch, the Fiscal Branch, and the Materiel Branch, which were combined in 1945 as the Supply and Materiel Branch, concentrated on planning the Army's postwar supply organization and industrial demobilization. The Research Branch collected and evaluated reports from other staff agencies and prepared the division's periodic progress reports. On military matters the SPD reported to the Chief to Staff and on industrial matters to Under Secretary Patterson.[5]

The Special Planning Division followed traditional Army staff action procedures. It assigned problems for investigation to appropriate staff agencies or commands, reviewed their reports, and then submitted them for comment and concurrence to all interested agencies. After adjusting conflicting views, SPD submitted the final results to the General Staff, General Marshall, Under Secretary Patterson, and Secretary Stimson for

[4] (1) Memo, Brig Gen John McAuley Palmer (U.S. Army, retired) for the Committee on Civilian Components, 9 Jan 48, sub: Inter-relations between professional and non-professional personnel in the armed forces of a democratic state, pp. 2–3. Hereafter cited as Palmer Memorandum. (2) John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*, (Washington, 1952), pp. 32–34. (3) Special Planning Division, War Department General Staff, History of the Special Planning Division, War Department General Staff, c. Mar 46, 4 vols., vol. I, pp. 1–9, and vol. II, Tabs A–K. Manuscript in OCMH.

[5] (1) Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization*, pp. 35–37. (2) Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff*, p. 468. (3) Special Planning Division History, vol. I, pp. 1–9, vol. II, Tab L, vol. IV, Tab S.

approval. In September 1945, two and a half years after it had begun operations, the SPD had completed action on about one half of the 150 problems initially assigned. Those remaining generally concerned Army supply and administrative organization, the subject of heated debate between ASF and the Army staff. While the Special Planning Division continued to exist until May 1946, the Under Secretary's Office absorbed the functions of the Materiel Branch in September 1945, while the Patch-Simpson Board on the Postwar Organization of the Army removed that function from the Organization Branch.[6]

A primary responsibility of the Special Planning Division was the detailed planning required to carry out General Marshall's postwar programs for unification of the armed services, universal military training (UMT), and the postwar organization of the Army. Before any detailed planning could be undertaken the SPD and the Army staff had to agree on certain operating assumptions concerning the nature of the postwar world and likely U.S. military commitments in that period.

The SPD's Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment, dated 9 November 1945, assumed for planning purposes the existence of some kind of international security organization like the proposed United Nations "controlled by major powers," including the United States. Control over the sea and air "throughout the world" would be the "primary responsibility of the major powers, each power having primary control in its own strategic areas." Finally, the "total power" of the world organization would be sufficient to deter any aggressor, including one of the major powers.

Within this framework the SPD and the Army staff made the following planning assumptions concerning the nature of the next war. The United States would have recognized the possibility of such a war at least a year ahead and have undertaken some military preparations. The conflict would be a "total war" begun without any declaration of war by an "all-out" attack on the United States as the initial objective of the aggressors. The war would last five years, and the United States would be without major Allies for the first eighteen months.

[6] Special Planning Division History, vols. II and III, Tabs P-P31, Jun 43-Jan 46, Monthly Progress Reports on Demobilization and Post-War Planning, and vol. IV, Tab R.

Additional assumptions were that the United States would be able to mobilize 4,500,000 men within one year and that the maximum rate of production during the war would be that of 1943.


Given these assumptions the armed services should be strong enough to maintain "the security of the continental United States during the initial phases of mobilization," "support such international obligations as the United States may assume," hold those "strategic bases" required "to ensure our use of vital sea and air routes," and be able to expand rapidly through partial to complete mobilization.[7]

In summary, Army plans assumed the next war would be much like the last, complete with another Pearl Harbor. Basing them on these assumptions the Army submitted two versions of General Marshall's unification proposals to Congress. General McNarney introduced the first version to a special House Committee on Post-War Military Policy headed by Congressman Clifton A. Woodrum, Democrat of Virginia, on 25 April 1944. The committee took no action because of strong Navy opposition. A JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense recommended certain changes in the Marshall-McNarney plan in the summer of 1945. As a result the Army staff modified its earlier proposals, and Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, presented the second and final War Department proposals, the Marshall-Collins plan, to the Senate Military Affairs Committee on 30 October 1945.

The basic features of these two plans followed General Marshall's concept of unification. They also paralleled Marshall's wartime organization. The new Secretary of the Armed Forces and his principal assistants would be responsible for those nonmilitary functions Secretary Stimson and his staff had handled—research and development, procurement, industrial mobilization, legislative liaison, and public information. *(Chart 11)* The services together with a separate Directorate of Common Supply would be autonomous operating agencies like the Army Ground Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces rather than

[7] Special Planning Division History, Tab C, The War Department Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment, 9 Nov 45, pp. 3–4, 7–9.

CHART 11—THE MARSHALL-COLLINS PLAN FOR A UNIFIED DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, 19 OCTOBER 1945



Source: Thomas Committee Unification Hearings, p. 156.

through separate civilian secretaries. The Secretary of Defense would supervise and direct the services through an integrated functional staff rather than through a more traditional, service-oriented one. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be responsible for co-ordinating policies and programs with the men and resources required, much as OPD had done for the Army during the war.

Both General Marshall and General Collins in their Congressional testimony stressed the integrating and co-ordinating functions of the JCS more than any other feature of the Army's proposals. One feature they did not discuss was the assignment of land-based air forces to the Air Forces without any reference to land-based Marine Corps aviation. The omission was significant because the role of Marine Corps aviation caused the most bitter interservice disputes in the ensuing Congressional battles on unification.[8]

The second part of Marshall's postwar program which the Special Planning Division worked on was universal military training. From the beginning it was hobbled by a renewal of

[8] (1) See pp. 163-65, below. (2) *Woodrum Committee Hearings*, pp. 33-45. (3) *Thomas Committee Unification Hearings*, General Marshall's testimony, pp. 49-62, and General Collins' testimony, pp. 155-80. (4) Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

the old Army dispute over whether the United States should rely for its defense upon the Uptonian concept of a large standing army or continue to rely upon a trained militia. Remembering that Congress had twice rejected the Uptonian approach in the National Defense Act of 1916 and again in 1920, Marshall did not believe Congress would support a permanent peacetime army larger than 275,000. Consequently he, General Palmer, and Secretary Stimson supported the traditional policy of relying upon trained Reserves against the determined opposition of practically the entire Army staff which favored the Uptonian view. Marshall proposed the UMT program as the most practicable means of providing a trained militia. As developed by the SPD in agreement with the Navy, the UMT plan proposed that every able-bodied male between seventeen and twenty would receive a year's military training followed by five years of service in the Organized Reserves or National Guard. UMT would be for training only, and trainees would not be considered part of the armed forces available for normal peacetime military operations. The peacetime military establishment would be "no larger than necessary to discharge peacetime responsibilities" because UMT would provide the forces needed in the event of a national emergency.

Paragraph II of War Department Circular 347 of 27 August 1944 instructed the War Department to follow the traditional American policy of relying upon trained National Guard and Reserve forces as the basis for its postwar planning. Despite General Marshall's directive the Army staff continued to oppose reliance upon the militia right down to his retirement in November 1945. A War Department Special Committee on the Strength of the Permanent Military Establishment appointed in August 1945 under Brig. Gen. William W. Bessell, Jr., initially proposed a million-man army. This figure included the Air Staff's proposal for a seventy-group air force. Marshall informed the Bessell Board that this total was unrealistic because Congress would not provide the funds needed to maintain such a large force and because without universal military training or the draft the Army could not obtain the volunteers needed. The board then revised its estimates downward to about 550,000, but General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who succeeded Marshall as Chief of Staff, rejected this

figure as inadequate. The cold war soon made these internal Army disputes academic, while UMT was pigeonholed in Congress.[9]

The last part of Marshall's postwar program tackled by the Special Planning Division was the future organization of the War Department and Army. By the end of the war the Army staff had been unable to reach agreement on this subject, and the SPD assumed "for planning purposes only" the continued existence of the "Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Service Forces." At this point the Board of Officers on the Reorganization of the War Department under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch took over this function from SPD.

The War Department's basic plan assumed that the Air Forces would be organized into "a headquarters and such Air Forces, Commands and other elements as may be provided," that the Ground Forces would similarly be organized into a "headquarters and such Army and Corps headquarters and separate commands as may be provided," but concerning the Service Forces it assumed only that they would be "organized administratively to support the requirements of the Ground and Air Forces." The omission of any reference to ASF headquarters was deliberate. The postwar organization of the Army was to be heavily influenced by the bitter opposition provoked within the Army staff by General Somervell's wartime proposals to reorganize the Army's supply and administrative systems along functional lines.[10]

General Somervell and a Single Service of Supply

General Somervell and his industrial management experts in the Control Division under General Robinson made four

[9] (1) Palmer Memorandum, 9 Jan 48, pp. 3–8. (2) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. XI, pp. 57–59. (3) Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," vol. IV, pp. 310–15. (4) Daniel P. Griffin, The Size and Composition of the United States Army Since 1945, draft manuscript, OCMH Project 118, Introduction, pp. 1–14; Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 20 Sep 45; and Report of the Committee on the Strength of the Permanent Military Establishment, 29 Nov 45, attached to Memo for Record, 12 Dec 45, sub: Presentation to the Chief of Staff of Report of Bessell Board on 11 Dec 45. All in OCMH Project 118 files. (5) Robert W. Coakley, Ernest F. Fisher, Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, Resume of Army Roll-Up Following World War II (revised), OCMH Study, 31 Oct 68, pp. 15–18.

[10] (1) Special Planning Division History, Tab O, pp. 10, 12. (2) Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, p. 298.

proposals between 1943 and 1946 aimed at rationalizing the Army's supply and administrative systems.

The first, made in both April and June 1943, would have established General Somervell formally as the Chief of Staff's principal adviser on supply and administration, replacing G–1 and G–4. The opposition of the Army staff, including OPD, killed this plan. The next three proposals made in the fall of 1943, the summer of 1944, and late 1945, all would have "functionalized" the technical and administrative services out of existence as autonomous commands. Secretary Stimson himself vetoed the first, Under Secretary Patterson the second, while the third effort, disguised as logistics "Lessons Learned" in World War II, remained buried in the files of ASF and its successor agencies.

General Somervell was not satisfied with his informal status as General Marshall's chief adviser on supply and administration. With his passion for organizational tidiness and clear-cut command channels he wanted to make this position formal, resurrecting the dual position held by General Goethals in World War I. In his view there was no need for G–1, G–4, or the Logistics Division of OPD, and in April and June 1943 he proposed to abolish them. His argument was that separating operations from planning was impractical. G–1 and G–4 were unnecessary because ASF was actually performing their functions. "The enforcement of policy inevitably tends to become the actual operation of that policy with all of the extra administrative detail and personnel required for an additional agency to do the work of another." [11] Going one step further Somervell argued that the Operations Division ought to absorb G–3 functions, leaving as the General Staff only OPD and the Military Intelligence Service, both essentially operating agencies. Thus the General Staff would be eliminated as a coordinating or supervising agency. Summarizing this concept several years later as one of the lessons learned in the war, General Robinson wrote:

> The commander of the logistic agency must be recognized as the adviser to and staff officer for the Chief of Staff on logistic matters. . . . The General Staff should be a small body of direct advisers and assist-

[11] Memo, General Somervell for Chief of Staff, 3 Apr 43, sub: Suggested Changes in the Organization of the War Department. Copy in ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

ants to the Chief of Staff, concentrating its attention primarily on strategic planning and the direction of military operations. The Chief of Staff and the General Staff should not be burdened with the coordination and direction of administrative and supply activities, procedures and systems.[12]

Without commenting one way or another, General Marshall submitted these proposals to the General Staff and other interested agencies that almost unanimously opposed them. G–1 and G–4 remained, and their staffs and functions actually increased during the rest of the war, probably as a reaction to General Somervell's projected plans.[13]


General Somervell's next campaign was to integrate the operations of the technical services along functional lines. *(Chart 12)* This was the heart of a proposed wholesale reorganization of the Army Service Forces from the top down known as the Long-Range Organization Plan for the ASF prepared in the Control Division. The reorganization of ASF headquarters actually carried out was that in November 1943, which centered on a Directorate of Plans and Operations. The headquarters of the several service commands were to be realigned similarly.

The offices of the chiefs of the technical services were also to be reorganized on parallel lines as the first step toward their complete functionalization. In the last stage they would be divested of their field commands and combined with the staff of ASF headquarters into a single functional staff for procurement, supply, personnel, administration, fiscal, medical, utilities, transportation, and communications. The field activities of the technical services were to be transferred to six instead of nine service commands and their various field operating zones realigned to correspond to the latters' geographical boundaries. There would be no more Class IV installations or "exempted stations" except for certain special installations such as ports

[12] Draft Chapter 16, Logistics Organization, prepared for but not included in Logistics in World War II (Nov 45). Copy in ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

[13] (1) Memo, General Somervell for Chief of Staff, 3 Apr 43, sub: Suggested Changes in the Organization of the War Department and 1 Jun 43, sub: Reorganization of Service Activities. Copies of both in ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization file, OCMH. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 138–43. (3) Draft Chapter 16, Logistics Organization. (4) Coakley and Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–45*, pp. 100–104. (5) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 266–77.

CHART 12—LONG-RANGE ORGANIZATION PLAN FOR ARMY SERVICE FORCES, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1943



Sources: Control Division, ASF, Report No. 56, Oct-Nov 43. Dir, SSP, "Briefing Book: The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command," Feb-Apr 48.

of embarkation and proving grounds which would report directly to ASF headquarters in Washington.[14]

General Marshall and General McNarney supported General Somervell's plan, which they both recognized would wipe out the traditional technical and administrative services. Secretary Stimson, Under Secretary Patterson, and Mr. McCloy, on the other hand, realized the opposition and resentment this would provoke among the technical services. The Secretary doubted that the game would be worth the candle. General Somervell, "whose strong point is not judicial poise," the Secretary confided in his diary, reminded him in many ways of General Wood, especially "in his temperament." He recalled for General Marshall how Wood's efforts to reform the Army back in 1911–12 aroused such opposition that Stimson had all he could do to prevent Congress from abolishing the position of Chief of Staff altogether. General Marshall, whose experiences under General Pershing had taught him the political power of the technical service chiefs, yielded at this point to the Secretary's judgment. General McNarney, although overruled, continued to believe "washing out" the technical services was a sensible idea.[15]

As if to underline Secretary Stimson's arguments, opponents of General Somervell's plan within the Army leaked information about it to the press, which in turn stirred up a hornet's nest in Congress, just as the Secretary feared it would.[16] One of those most strongly opposed to functionalization was the resourceful Chief of Ordnance, General Campbell, who complained to Bernard Baruch, a member of his Industrial Advisory Committee. Mr. Baruch protested to President Roosevelt personally and also wrote Mr. Stimson. The Secretary in reply said: "I stopped the foolish proposal in respect to the Technical Services when it first reached me several weeks ago." [17] General Somervell was abroad on an important political mission for General Marshall during all these events. Surveying the

[14] (1) Control Division History, vol. II, Report No. 56, 1943. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 398–405. (3) Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command, 1948. ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

[15] McNarney Interview. Patch-Simpson Board files.

[16] (1) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 405–13. (2) Stimson Diary, entries of 16–18, 21, and 24 Sep 43.

[17] Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, p. 299.

damage on his return, he ordered all papers and studies on the whole project destroyed.[18]

Undaunted, General Somervell and the Control Division continued to press for consideration of their plan to functionalize the technical services. Responding to a request from the Special Planning Division, the Control Division on 15 July 1944 resubmitted a combined and revised edition of its earlier proposals as a Plan for Post-War Organization of the Army Service Forces. This included its recommendations to confine the General Staff to strategic planning and the direction of military operations, to make the Commanding General, ASF, the Chief of Staff's adviser on supply and administration, and to create a "single, unified agency for all supply and administrative services for the Army," including the AAF. In addition to abolishing G–1 and G–4, the report requested restoration of the War Department's budget function to the ASF because "all fiscal operations should be placed in one organizational unit," suggested abolition of the New Developments Division because it duplicated and complicated the research and development work of ASF headquarters, and asked that the civilian personnel functions be transferred from the Office of the Secretary to ASF on similar grounds.

Complaining that the AAF was attempting to make itself completely "self-contained and independent," the report recommended that ASF should be responsible for most AAF housekeeping functions and for "the procurement and supply of all items of supply and equipment, including those peculiar to Army Air Forces. There is no more reason for making the present exception for aircraft than for making an exception for tanks or radio or artillery." Under the ASF there would also be one transportation system for land, sea, and air, except for elements organic to tactical units.


[18] (1) Control Division History, vol. II, Report No. 56, 1943. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 405–13. (3) Stimson Diary, entries of 16–18 and 21–22 Sep and 5, 13, and 29 Oct 43. (4) McNarney Interview. Patch-Simpson Board files. (5) For Secretary Lovett's later views, see Chapter VI, page 218. (6) Wyckoff, The Office of Secretary of War Under Henry L. Stimson, ch. VII, pp. 10–11. (7) Baruch, *The Public Years*, pp. 298–99. (8) Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition*, p. 499. (9) Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply*, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1960), p. 425. (10) Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* (New York: The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 263–71.

ASF's mission, the Control Division argued, was "to integrate in an *economical* manner all the supply, administrative, and service functions of the Army." The continued existence in law of the technical and administrative services as semi-autonomous agencies was inconsistent with this principle, and the National Defense Act should be amended accordingly. The law ought only to provide for the principal officers of the department: the Secretary, Under Secretary, and assistant secretaries, the Chief of Staff and the General Staff, and the three major commands. The detailed subordinate organization of the department should be left "for administrative determination" by the Secretary of War. Similarly the commissioning of officers in the separate arms and services was inconsistent with the organization of the Army into three major commands. The law should provide for commissioning and assigning all officers only in the "Army of the United States," and branch insignia should be abolished.

The report again recommended abolishing the distinction between Class I and Class IV installations and the adoption of a single organizational pattern along functional lines under the service commands for all field activities within the zone of interior.

The chiefs of the technical and administrative services would continue to exist in this plan, unlike the previous one, but they would serve simply as a functional staff and command no field agencies. Under this scheme, the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, organized internally along commodity lines, would be the staff agency responsible for procurement and production, including research and development and maintenance and repair. *(Chart 13)* The Quartermaster General's Office, also organized on a commodity basis, would be responsible for storage, distribution, and issuance of all supplies and equipment. The Office of the Chief of Engineers would be responsible for all construction, real property (including national cemeteries), mapping, and its traditional "civil functions," the Office of the Surgeon General for all medical activities, the Office of the Chief of Transportation for all types of transportation and the Army postal system, and the Office of the Chief Signal Officer for signal communications and for photographic

CHART 13—POSTWAR ORGANIZATION, ARMY SERVICE FORCES, PROPOSED BY ASF HEADQUARTERS, 15 JULY 1944



(1) Primary duty of co-ordinating all planning and programing.
(2) Number of service commands would vary from time to time depending upon workload.
(3) Staff organization parallels that of headquarters.

Source: Control Division, ASF, 020 Organization, 1944 file, Organization of the Army Service Forces in the Post War Military Establishment, Headquarters, ASF, 15 July 1944.

and motion picture services. The only office abolished would be the Chief Chemical Officer.

The Judge Advocate General would be responsible for all legal activities currently performed in the technical services. The Office of the Provost Marshal General would be assigned responsibility for civil defense in addition to its other duties. All fiscal activities of the technical services would be transferred to the Office of the Chief of Finance, and The Adjutant General's Office would be responsible for all personnel functions, publications and records, personnel services, and labor relations. The National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs would be abolished and their functions assigned to the ASF Chief of Military Training and to The Adjutant General.

The Control Division advocated organizing the supply and administrative services of overseas theaters and commands on the same pattern as the ASF and the service commands. All supply and service troops not organic to a subordinate tactical unit would be placed under a single service of supply whose commander would bear the same relation to the theater commander as General Somervell did to General Marshall. Within tactical units from armies down to regiments a single service troop commander would replace the special staff, G–1 and G–4.

The Control Division concluded its report with a recommendation that in any proposed single department of the armed services there should be a separate Service Forces agency for common administration, supply, and service activities.

These "reforms" were so radical and comprehensive that they affected nearly every agency in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. To the extent that they were known throughout the Army they added fuel to the existing animosity toward the ASF. Under Secretary Patterson vetoed the plan, saying that roles and missions of the technical services and the service commands should be left unchanged. Consequently the proposal was not submitted to the Special Planning Division, but General Robinson presented a copy of it to the Patch Board a year later as part of his testimony.[19]

[19] (1) Control Division History, vol. II, Report No. 92, 1944. (2) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 422–24. (3) Organization of Army Service Forces in the Post War World, Hq., ASF, 15 Jul 44. ASF-Somervell Post-War Organization files, OCMH.

The final proposals developed in the Control Division for inclusion as Chapter 16 of General Somervell's final report retained the same basic organization proposed earlier with the following exceptions. The Chief of Ordnance and the Quartermaster General would administer and control major field activities including arsenals, large procurement and storage depots, and major maintenance and repair facilities. The plan developed in some detail the procedures by which the Army's supply system would operate under this pattern of organization. Second, it proposed separate seacoast commands to control ports of embarkation, holding and reconsignment points, distribution depots, staging areas, and personnel replacement centers. Finally the report offered a detailed war mobilization organization plan for the federal government in which an Allocations Board would ration scarce resources, production facilities, labor, and transportation among government agencies in a manner similar to the Controlled Materials Plan of World War II.

These proposals, submitted to General Somervell in November 1945, were deleted from his final report, which was published in 1948 as "Logistics in World War II: The Final Report of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces," because the War Department reorganization of May 1946 and the National Security Act of 1947 had overtaken them.[20]

The Patch-Simpson Board

The Army staff's opposition to continuing Army Service Forces after the war stemmed from animosity engendered by General Brehon B. Somervell's aggressiveness and the huge size of his headquarters as well as from opposition to his various reorganization proposals. The opportunity to abolish ASF came with General Marshall's retirement as Chief of Staff and his replacement by General Eisenhower after the war. The latter's impending appointment was common knowledge, at least in the higher echelons of the department, in the summer of 1945.

In August 1945 Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, asked Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter, Director of the Special Planning Division, to recommend an appropri-

[20] (1) Control Division History, vol. II, Report No. 186, 1945. (2) Draft Chapter 16, Logistics Organization.

ate course of action on reorganizing the department. General Porter replied by suggesting the appointment of an *ad hoc* board of high-ranking officers representing the General Staff and the three major commands to assist the Special Planning Division in developing a proper organization for the department and the Army in the immediate postwar period.

Consequently General Thomas T. Handy, the Deputy Chief of Staff on 30 August created a Board of Officers on the Reorganization of the War Department, headed first by General Patch, and, after his death in November, by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson. Handy made the board itself rather than SPD responsible for recommending a suitable organization, and appointed representatives from the technical services instead of the three major commands, flatly rejecting a personal request from General Somervell to appoint General Robinson. The board included one representative each from OPD and SPD, the Chief Signal Officer, and a veteran Ordnance organization and management expert, Maj. Gen. Charles T. Harris, Jr. As head of a blue-ribbon Committee on the Post-War Organization of the Ordnance Department Harris had recommended continuing the department's division along commodity lines with responsibility "from design to obsolescence" assigned on this basis, a concept directly contrary to General Somervell's functional approach. Of all the members of the Patch-Simpson Board General Harris was the only one with much experience in organizational planning. General Patch himself, a blunt combat veteran with no General Staff experience at all, was frankly baffled by the complex organization, procedures, and vernacular of the department and relied heavily upon the judgment of his colleagues. The end result was a committee deliberately weighted against the Army Service Forces.[21]

The Patch Board based its recommendations on approxi-

[21] (1) Interview, Hewes with Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, 6 May 69. (2) Memo, Asst Dep CofS for Dir, SPD, 19 Aug 45, sub: War Department Reorganization; Memo, General Porter for Asst Dep CofS, 25 Aug 45, same subject; WDCSA 020 (30 Aug 45), Memo, Dep CofS for Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch and others, 30 Aug 45, sub: Reorganization of the War Department; Memo, Asst Dep CofS for General Patch and others, 11 Sep 45, same subject. All in WDSSP 334 Reorganization of the War Department (Patch Board) Simpson Board, 19 Aug 45, NARS, Washington, D.C. This was the Special Planning Division's file on the Patch-Simpson Board [hereafter cited as SPD Patch-Simpson Board file.] (3) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, pp. 421–22. (4) Thomson and Mayo, *Procurement and Supply*, pp. 472–476. (5) On General Patch's bewilderment, see Patch Board Interviews.

mately seventy-five personal interviews and other communications from War Department officials, civilian and military, and from General Eisenhower, already selected as General Marshall's successor, and his European Theater of Operations staff.

There was a small group of veterans who had been responsible for the operation of the War Department during the war and who favored continuing the Marshall organization. Besides General Marshall these included Mr. Patterson, Mr. Lovett, General Somervell and his staff, Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, the G–4, and General Joseph T. McNarney and the three members of his 1942 Reorganization Executive Committee, Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, and Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr. The latter were questioned primarily on the background and rationale of that reorganization. General Marshall and General McNarney emphasized the need to keep the General Staff out of operations because its procedures delayed action too long. General McNarney went further and recommended abolishing the technical services entirely.

The second and largest group consisted of representatives from the technical services and General Eisenhower's staff who opposed ASF because they regarded a separate supply command as violating the principle of unity of command. General Handy was only formally neutral on ASF, while Dr. Bush, Dr. Bowles, and Brig. Gen. William A. Borden were interested primarily in the future status of the Army's research and development program.[22]

Knowing General Eisenhower would be the next Chief of Staff, the Patch Board paid particular attention to a rough plan suggested by him for dividing the Army staff into a small planning and co-ordinating staff at the top and a series of functional operating "directorates" for "technical coordination and supervision." Below these staff elements the Air Forces, Ground Forces, and the technical services would exercise "command functions." The board found it difficult to determine just what General Eisenhower intended by having a planning and co-ordinating staff as well as a system of directorates, and

[22] (1) Patch Board Interviews. (2) Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses, Organizational Difficulties in the European Theater of Operations, c. 12 Sep 45, Inclosure 2 to Memo, General Handy for General Patch, 16 Sep 45, sub: Organizational Difficulties in ETO. Patch-Simpson Board Interviews.

his reference to the former as a "General Staff" added to the confusion. General McNarney thought Eisenhower's plan was "a more or less bastard conglomeration of the War Department General Staff and the Naval System of Bureaus" with two of everything. To him it meant a return to the prewar organization with the General Staff thoroughly involved in operational matters, and everything bogging down. Why, he asked, go back to an "outmoded" organization which was incapable of running the department in an emergency. The only improvement he could see was that it did not propose to resurrect the old combat arms chiefs.[23]

Where General Marshall had insisted that the General Staff must stay out of operations, the Patch Board came to the opposite conclusion. In its report it asserted that the "old theory that a staff must limit itself to broad policy and planning activities has been proved unsound in this war." It blamed the Marshall reorganization for stripping the General Staff of its operating functions so that it could not perform its missions properly. On the other hand, it stated that the General Staff "should concern itself primarily with matters which must be considered on a War Department level." Authority to act on all other activities must be "delegated to the responsible commands." What the General Staff should do when these commands disagreed among themselves the Patch Board did not say.

The board's proposed reorganization represented a return to the prewar Pershing pattern with two exceptions. It did not recommend resurrecting the old combat arms chiefs, and, second, it suggested that all officers should be commissioned in the Army of the United States rather than by arm or service. By comparison the Navy had been organized in this manner since 1889.

The Patch Board plan divided the department and the Army into four echelons: the Office of the Secretary of War, the General and Special Staffs for staff planning and direction, the administrative and technical services restored to their prewar autonomy, and an operating level, the Air Forces, Ground Forces, and Overseas Departments.

[23] (1) WDCSA (10 Sep 45), Memo, General Handy for General Patch, 10 Sep 45, sub: General Eisenhower's Plan for Reorganization of the War Department, and attached Organizational Chart. (2) McNarney Interview.

Within the Secretary's Office it proposed a new Assistant Secretary for Research and Development aided by a civilian advisory council and a separate Research and Development Division. These proposals reflected recommendations by Dr. Bush, Dr. Bowles, and General Borden. They had insisted that research and development must be removed from the control of procurement and production officials because these two sets of functions were antithetical.

The General Staff divisions were designated Directorates instead of Assistant Chiefs of Staff, emphasizing that they were not merely staff advisers but would have "directive authority" as well. The Operations Division was abolished and its functions parceled out among other divisions. The control over overseas military operations went to the new Directorate of Operations and Training. The Strategy and Policy Group became the nucleus of a revived WPD known as the Plans Division. In restoring the technical services the Patch Board recommended legislation to make the wartime Transportation Corps a permanent agency. This was a major change from the interwar period when transportation was fragmented among several services.

In the zone of the interior (ZI) the board recommended abolishing the service commands and transferring their installations and housekeeping functions to four Army commanders under AGF. The Military District of Washington would continue to operate under the direct jurisdiction of the department. The technical services would be supervised by the new Directorate of Service, Supply, and Procurement, which would combine G–4 with allied functions of ASF headquarters. All other ASF administrative functions it would transfer to appropriate General or Special Staff divisions. "Thus there is no need for an Army Service Forces headquarters organization," the board concluded.

Of the combat arms it recommended abolishing the Cavalry arm and its replacement by an Armored arm and a merger of the Coast Artillery with the Field Artillery into a single Artillery arm. These changes would require Congressional action.

The whole organization, the Patch Board asserted, would be more simple, flexible, and "capable of carrying out the

Chief of Staff's orders quickly and effectively." It would have a single "clear-cut," continuous command channel from top to bottom.[24]

The report, submitted on 18 October, was circulated among all interested agencies within the department, among the three major commands, and overseas. General Eisenhower approved the report, but added that he wanted to limit procurement to only three or four services. General Marshall, not wishing to tie his successor's hands, also approved.[25]

In a vigorous valedictory General Somervell dissented from the report in principle and in particular. Although largely ignored at the time, the objections he raised were important. They involved problems either created or unsolved by the Patch Board and the ensuing reorganization that would come up again and again in the next two decades.

The Patch Board's recommendations amounted to returning to the prewar organization of the department, General Somervell asserted, repeating the errors made after World War I and ignoring the lessons of World War II. The ideal organization for supply and services was to place all command authority and responsibility for such operations in one agency which would also act as the Chief of Staff's adviser on these functions. General Goethals had managed to develop such an organization which might have been more efficient than the one ultimately adopted.

The basic organizational pattern might be functional, commodity, geographical, or staff and line, but major industrial corporations had found that combining more than two of these patterns resulted in "diffusion of responsibility, crossing of lines of authority, and general confusion." The Patch Board proposed to combine three or four different patterns and so did not provide the same simple, clear-cut command channels it recommended in the case of AGF. The logic of eliminating

[24] (1) Memo, General Patch for CofS, 18 Oct 45, sub: The Report of the Board of Officers on Reorganization of the War Department. Copy in OCMH files. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 355.

[25] (1) Millett, *Army Service Forces*, p. 425. (2) S-30526 to AGWAR for Handy from USFET Main from Eisenhower, 6 Nov 45, sub: Patch Board Report. SPD Patch-Simpson Board file. (3) For the Navy Department personnel organization, see Julius A. Furer, *Administration of the Navy Department in World War II* (Washington, 1959), pp. 200, 262-265.

the chiefs of the combat arms while retaining the chiefs of the technical services Somervell found hard to follow.

If the Patch Board report were approved, General Somervell suggested certain specific changes in its recommendations. He thought Congress should be requested to amend the National Defense Act of 1916 to permit the Secretary to change the internal organization of the department at his discretion by administrative regulation.

Second, he objected strongly to the separation of research and development from procurement and production. Instead he would place the proposed Assistant Secretary under the authority of the Under Secretary who was responsible for procurement and the proposed Research and Development staff agency under the new Directorate of Service, Supply, and Procurement. During the war, he asserted, it had been difficult to "reconcile conflicts between the desirability of introducing improvements and the requirements of mass production. Only if one agency included responsibility for both research and procurement could the inevitable conflicts, . . . be settled expeditiously so that deadlocks do not delay or prevent the procurement of adequate weapons in the necessary quantities. . . ."

Concerning the technical services he said there ought to be a single command and communications line from the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement (SS&P) to all the technical services as there was from the Director of Personnel. The many functions performed by the technical services as autonomous commands—personnel, training, intelligence, planning, and operations as well as supply—should pass through the Director of SS&P and be co-ordinated by him with other General Staff divisions. Any other organization would result in confusion, duplication, and overlapping of authority.

He also disagreed with the proposal to make the AGF and AAF responsible for housekeeping and similar Army-wide services throughout the zone of the interior. The ZI organization should have a permanency during emergencies and mobilization which tactical organizations would be unable to provide. Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces were primarily tactical and training organizations and should not be burdened with service and supply functions not organic to their units. At

the least all service and supply functions should be assigned to the technical services under the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement.[26]

When General Patch died the board was reconvened in December under General Simpson to consider changes suggested by various agencies and to recommend a final reorganization plan. In its report submitted on 28 December the Simpson Board singled out General Eisenhower's suggestion to limit procurement to three or four services for special comment. Admitting that there was considerable duplication among the services in procuring identical items, the Simpson Board defended the existing conditions with each technical service doing its own procuring. This was, it said, not an organizational but an administrative matter to be dealt with by reviewing such cases item by item.

The board made several changes in the original plan. It proposed placing research and development under the Under Secretary instead of adding a separate Assistant Secretary, but it retained a separate division on the General Staff. After protests from the Operations Division against splitting responsibility for planning and operations the board reduced the number of directorates by merging the Directorate for Plans with that of Operations and Training and suggested six rather than four field armies. It also kept the Civil Affairs Division and a new Historical Division, created on 17 November 1945, as special staff divisions.

These changes were relatively minor. More important was a shift in emphasis. While the General Staff must operate and at the same time decentralize operating responsibilities, the board said, it should also act to eliminate duplication. While there should be greater autonomy for the AAF, it should be granted without creating unnecessary duplication in supply, service, and administration. "The only workable procedure for removing and preventing duplication," it concluded, "lies in the good faith and friendly collaboration of the using commands and services under the monitorship of the appropriate General Staff director." Friendship, co-operation, persuasion,

[26] Memo, General Somervell for Dep of CofS, 12 Nov 45, sub: Report of Board of Officers on Reorganization of the War Department, with two inclosures. Patch-Simpson Board files, copy in OCMH.

and teamwork, as General Eisenhower himself said, would solve such problems.[27]

The Eisenhower Reorganization of 1946

On 23 January 1946 General Handy approved a final version of the Simpson Board report with minor changes. Again, after comments from the Operations Division the proposed Directorate of Operations, Plans, and Training was split into separate divisions for Plans and Operations and for Organization and Training. The former inherited OPD's principal responsibility for integrating plans and operations. At the same time, General Handy appointed five directors for the new organization. A few days later General Eisenhower placed General Simpson in charge of executing the Simpson plan with authority to decide all questions "that cannot be resolved by the interested parties" and to "monitor and direct" the reorganization itself.[28]

Originally set for 1 March the effective date of the reorganization was postponed three months because certain problems required further study. One concerned the relations between the Air Forces and the rest of the Army. Until this matter had been finally settled, the Simpson Board decided not to request formal legislation making the Transportation Corps a permanent agency. As a result General Eisenhower found it necessary to reaffirm on 6 February the War Department's intention to request permanent status for the Transportation Corps at some later date.

Pending Congressional action on a separate air force, the relationship between the AAF and the AGF was based on the principle of granting greater autonomy to the AAF. The Air

[27] (1) Memo, General Simpson for CofS, 25 Dec 45, sub: Report of Board of Officers to Study Organization of the War Department. Copy in OCMH files. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 355–356. (3) Memo, General Eisenhower for ACofS, G–1, and others, 10 Dec 45, sub: Responsibility of Staff Officers, Scope, Approach, and Execution (comments of Chief of Staff before group of staff officers, 5 Dec 45). Copy in OCMH files.

[28] (1) Memo, General Hodes for President of the Board of Officers on Reorganization of the War Department and others, with inclosure, Simpson Board Report revised as of 18 Jan 46; Memo, SGS for Chiefs of War Department General and Special Staff Divisions and others, 23 Jan 46; Memo, General Hodes for Chiefs of All War Department General and Special Divisions and others, 28 Jan 46, sub: War Department Reorganization. All in SPD Patch-Simpson Board file. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, pp. 356–57.

Forces would provide 50 percent of the officers assigned to the General Staff as it theoretically had done under the Marshall reorganization, while the number of technical and administrative service officers assigned to the AAF would be decided by mutual agreement between the latter and the individual technical services concerned.[29]

Two attempts were made to establish greater General Staff control over the technical services than that provided for in the Simpson plan. General Lutes, General Somervell's successor and the first Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, requested that responsibility for supervising "strictly" technical training be transferred to the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement from the Director of Organization and Training.

General Hodes rejected this proposal. The whole purpose of the reorganization, he said, was to reduce the large War Department overhead. That was why the Patch and Simpson Boards had recommended abolishing ASF headquarters and the service commands in the first place. Under the new organization no functions should be performed at the General Staff level if they could be delegated to the administrative and technical services. Consequently the Director of SS&P "must decentralize his activities" to the appropriate services and "avoid duplicating and overlapping organizations on the General Staff level." General Eisenhower and the Simpson Board intended that the training of technical service troops not assigned to tactical air or ground units should be "under the General Staff supervision of the Director of Organization and Training." Thus were the basic principles of the Simpson Board report spelled out in practical terms. Decentralization and avoiding duplication meant that effective operational control over the Army's supply and administrative systems would return to the chiefs of the technical and administrative services. As a practical matter, on technical training the services would

[29] (1) WDCSA 020 (2 Feb 46), Memo, General Hodes for President of the Board of Officers for Organization of the War Department and others, 2 Feb 46; Memo, General Hodes for President of the Board of Officers for Organization of the War Department and others, 21 Feb 46, sub: Report of the Board of Officers on Organization of the War Department; *Ibid.*, 4 Apr 46, sub: Statement of Approved Policy to Effect Increased Autonomy for the Army Air Forces within the War Department. All in SPD Patch-Simpson Board file. (2) Cline, *Washington Command Post*, p. 117, n. 26. (3) Harry Yoshpe, "The Quest for a Statutory Base," Office, Chief of Transportation, 1954, pp. 4–10.

also have to report to the Director of SS&P. The General Staff divisions thus had to deal with eight headquarters instead of one.[80]

General Simpson reiterated his and General Eisenhower's determination to restore effective control over operations to the technical services once more after a committee Simpson had appointed on the Territorial Sub-Division of the Zone of the Interior proposed to transfer control over the assignment of officer personnel from the services to the Directorate of Personnel.

The committee, headed by Brig. Gen. George L. Eberle, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, suggested that "personnel functions should not be vested below the War Department." Following the pattern established for officer personnel of the combat arms (and by the Navy in 1889), he proposed establishing a Central Officers Assignment Division under the Director of Personnel and Administration to be staffed by senior field grade officers from each arm and service selected by mutual agreement among the chiefs of the services, AGF, and AAF. They would advise the Director of Personnel and Administration on policies and procedures governing the assignment of officers. They would also direct the assignment of officers, except general officers, "to and from special details and assignments directly under the War Department" and on the transfer of officers among the arms and services.

General Simpson rejected the Eberle Committee's proposal that control over personnel not be delegated below the General Staff level. There would be no changes "in the functions, duties, and powers" of the chiefs of the technical and administrative services, and they would continue "to exercise appropriate officer personnel functions. Further centralization of authority in the War Department itself, he said, was "entirely contrary to the principles of the Simpson Board." [81]

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[80] Memo, General Lutes for CofS, 22 Jan 46, sub: Reorganization of the War Department; Memo, General Hodes for CG, ASF, 1 Feb 46, same subject. Both in G–3 Div, O–M, Simpson Board Report file, NARS.

[81] WDG/T 320 (4 Mar 46), Memo, Committee on Territorial Sub-Division of the Zone of the Interior for President of the Board of Officers for Organization of the War Department, 4 Mar 46, sub: Simpson Board Report; Memo, General Simpson for General Eberle, 5 Mar 46, same subject. G–3 Div, O–M, Simpson Board Report file.

The research and development functions of the War Department received special emphasis on 29 April 1946 when General Eisenhower directed the establishment, effective 1 May, of the Research and Development Division as a General Staff division ahead of the general reorganization of the War Department itself. In addition to his responsibilities as adviser on research and development matters to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff, the Director of Research and Development would also be responsible for supervising testing of new weapons and equipment and for the development of tactical doctrines governing their employment in the field. This proposal would have centralized supervision over what became known later as "combat developments" for the first time in a single General Staff agency.

The following day General Eisenhower issued a policy statement on Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets, which stressed the importance of research and development to the whole Army. World War II could not have been won, the general stated, without the expert knowledge of scientists and industrialists. In the future the Army should promote close collaboration between the military and civilian scientists, technicians, and industrial experts. The Army needed the advice of civilians in military planning as well as for the production of weapons and should contract out to universities and industry for this assistance. Such experts require "the greatest possible freedom to carry out their research" with a minimum of administrative interference and direction. In considering the employment of some industrial and technological resources "as organic parts of our military structure" in national emergencies, he thought there was little reason "for duplicating within the Army an outside organization which by its experience is better qualified than we are" to do this work.

The Army itself, he said, should separate responsibility for research and development from "procurement, purchase, storage, and distribution" functions. Finally, he believed all Army officers should realize the importance of calling on civilian experts for assistance in military planning. The more the Army can rely upon outside civilian experts in such fields, "the more

energy we have left to devote to strictly military problems for which there are no outside facilities." [32]

Formal proclamation of the Eisenhower reorganization required Presidential action. Under the First War Powers Act of 1941 (55 *U.S. Statutes,* 838) President Truman in Executive Order 9722 of 13 May 1946 amended Executive Order 1082 of 28 February 1942 by calling for "decentralization" within the War Department. It "authorized and directed" the Secretary of War within thirty days "to reassign to such agencies and officers of the War Department as he may deem appropriate the functions, duties and powers heretofore assigned to the services of supply command and to the Commanding General, Services of Supply."

Carrying out this directive War Department Circular 138 of 14 May 1946 prescribed the new departmental organization effective 11 June 1946. *(Chart 14)* Formally abolishing ASF and the service commands, it also provided greater autonomy for the AAF. At the General Staff level greater emphasis on research and development had already been provided for by removing this function from procurement and supply and making it a separate General Staff directorate.

The reorganization directive explained that


> The necessary degree of efficiency and initiative in the top echelons of the War Department can be attained only through the aggressive application of the principle of decentralization. Thus no functions should be performed at the staff level of the War Department which can be decentralized to the major commands, the Army areas or the administrative and technical services without loss of adequate control by the General and Special Staffs.

The General and Special Staffs will "plan, direct, coordinate, and supervise. They will assist the Chief of Staff in getting things done." The AAF, it added, should be permitted the maximum degree of autonomy without creating unwarranted duplication in the areas of supply and administration.

The reorganized General Staff was still functional in nature with six instead of five divisions, renamed directorates to indicate their directive as well as their advisory nature. The

[32] Memo, General Hodes for CG's, AAF, AGF, ASF, and others, 29 Apr 46, sub: Research and Development Division, War Department General Staff; Memo, General Eisenhower for Directors and Chiefs of War Department General and Special Staff Divisions and others, 30 Apr 46, sub: Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets. Both in G-3 Div, O-M, Simpson Board Report file.

Chart 14—Organization of the War Department, 11 June 1946



Source: War Department Circular no. 138, 14 May 1946.

changes made in addition to the new Directorate for Research and Development were the demotion of OPD from its wartime position of a top co-ordinating staff to theoretically one among equals. The reorganization directive also called for "adequate means for carrying on . . . intelligence and counterintelligence activities." In September 1945 a new field command, the Army Security Agency, was established under the direct supervision of G–2 and separate from the Military Intelligence Service.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, became the Director of Personnel and Administration and G–2 Director of Intelligence. G–3 became the Director of Organization and Training, with responsibility for War Department as well as Army-wide organizational planning added as an afterthought because the Patch-Simpson Board had neglected to consider this subject. G–4 became the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement with responsibility for logistical planning, a function previously shared with OPD and ASF headquarters.

The Operations Division became the Directorate of Plans and Operations, inheriting OPD's role as the Army's representative with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its various committees, simply identified as "appropriate joint agencies" because JCS as yet had no legal status. Except for the Historical Division created in November 1945, the special staff agencies were the same as those existing at the end of the war. By that time the Information and Education Division, National Guard Bureau, and the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs had been removed from ASF headquarters and made separate staff agencies.

Having abolished the service commands, the Eisenhower reorganization transferred their functions to six zones of interior armies under the Commanding General, AGF, on the principle of unity of command. Ground and Air Force officers in the United States and the ETO had resented their lack of control over the resources required to train troops and carry out military operations. The friction between Ground and Air Forces commanders in the zone of interior and post and installation commanders under the service commands had been paralleled in the ETO. For example, Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, had complained that ASF was "a blood-sweating behemoth." [33]

[33] Interview with General Smith, 24 Sep 45. Patch-Simpson Board files.

In the Eisenhower reorganization installations or activities under the traditional command of the chiefs of technical services were exempted from control by the AGF armies as was the Military District of Washington which continued to operate directly under the Deputy Chief of Staff. When technical or administrative service activities were located on installations under AGF or AAF control, AGF and AAF were to perform approximately forty, later sixty housekeeping or community service functions for their tenants. These functions also included responsibility for national cemeteries, induction centers, counterintelligence, and "action in domestic emergencies." Finally a separate Replacement and School Command was set up distinct from the ZI armies themselves and under the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces. To add geographic to the existing functional decentralization of Army operations the reorganization directive announced that Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, would move to Fort Monroe, Virginia, as soon as practicable.

The Eisenhower reorganization was a victory for those favoring a return to the Pershing organization based on the experiences of a single operational theater command, such as the AEF in World War I, and Eisenhower's ETO in World War II. It was a victory of the General Staff and the technical services over the Army Service Forces, of Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces over the service commands, and for those insisting on separating research and development from production and procurement.

The victory of the technical services was the most important. In destroying ASF, they had re-established the traditional principle of vesting effective executive control over the Army's supply and service activities with the bureau chiefs. They had also knocked down an effort by combat arms officers to place the assignment of officers under the Director of Personnel and Administration. Internally they kept their own research and development functions, which remained subordinate to production and procurement almost by definition since the technical services were themselves commodity or service commands. They had eliminated the ASF service commands in the zone of the interior but retained their traditional exemption from control by Army field commanders.

The War Department again became a "loose federation of warring tribes" with "little armies within the Army," as Mr. Lovett said to the Patch Board. In abolishing ASF and its agencies, the department could not avoid the management problems which General Somervell and General Marshall had solved by establishing firm executive control at the top. The lack of effective control by the functionally oriented General Staff over the multifunctional agencies and commands they were supposed to supervise and direct remained an unsolved problem. General Eisenhower's view was that teamwork, cooperation, and persuasion were better than tight executive control as a management philosophy. He stated:

> Each bureau, each section, each officer in this War Department, has to be part of a well-coordinated team. Our attitude one toward the other has to be that of a friend expecting assistance and knowing that he will get it. If we will always remember that the other fellow is trying to fulfill our common purpose just as much as each one of us is, I think no more need to be said about teamwork. But I will insist on having a happy family. I believe that no successful staff can have any personal enmities existing in it. So I want to see a big crowd of friends around here.[84]

[84] Eisenhower Comments to General Staff officers, 5 Dec 45.

CHAPTER V

Between Peace and War

Unification

While the Army, under the rubric of decentralization, rejected General Marshall's principle of firm executive control, Congress similarly opposed his proposal for firm executive control over all the armed services under a single Department of Defense. A month after the War Department had presented the Marshall-Collins plan, President Harry S. Truman sent to Congress on 19 December 1945 a similar plan minus the Directorate of Common Supplies and Services. This omission was understandable since the Army had already accepted the Patch Board's recommendation to abolish the Army Service Forces. The Truman plan also proposed rotating the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces annually among the services. The service chiefs themselves would continue to have direct access to the President, weakening control by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces still further. The three civilian service secretaries, eliminated in the Marshall-Collins plan, remained as assistant secretaries. So far as naval aviation was concerned the Truman plan referred simply to carrier or water-based operations with no reference to Marine Corps land-based aviation.[1]

Within the Army the General Staff, the technical service chiefs, and ETO veterans formed a coalition which had successfully opposed continuing the tight executive control over the Army recommended by General Marshall. Opposition to Marshall's proposals for unification of the armed services, on the other hand, came from the Navy and its Congressional supporters, particularly Congressman Carl Vinson (Democrat of Georgia), chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. He opposed centralized control over the armed services through

[1] U.S. Congress, *National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services), Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services*, U.S. Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1947), pp. 9–10.

any kind of "General Staff" as "Prussian militarism," a false analogy dating back to the days of Josephus Daniels. He was intensely loyal to the Navy which from the beginning had opposed Marshall's unification program. The Navy did not support the Army-AAF's program for a separate air force because it feared it would lose its air arm. The Royal Navy, it repeatedly pointed out, had lost its air arm to the Royal Air Force following World War I with disastrous consequences. More immediately the Navy feared it would lose its land-based naval aviation forces, particularly its Marine Corps aviation. Under the Marshall-Collins plan the Navy was to retain its fleet air arm and the Marine Corps, but the plan assigned responsibility for land-based air forces to the new U.S. Air Force.

Second, the Navy opposed the concept of unification itself. In contrast to General Marshall it preferred to continue the common direction of military and naval forces through cooperation under the JCS committee system.

By the end of the war the Navy had withdrawn its opposition to a separate air force, provided that the Navy continue to retain its own naval and Marine Corps air arms intact. Instead of a unified department of the armed services it proposed three separate but equal departments co-ordinated through the JCS.[2]

Congress deadlocked over the unification issue, although eventually it adopted an organization similar to that recommended by the Navy. The most bitter Congressional battles were over the future status of naval and Marine Corps aviation. In these battles Army spokesmen played an insignificant role. The principal antagonists were the Army Air Forces and the Marine Corps with victory going to the Marine Corps partly because it had a representative, Lt. Col. J. D. Hittle, temporarily assigned to the staff of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments which drafted the

[2] (1) *Woodrum Committee Hearings*, pp. 121–241. (2) *Thomas Committee Unification Hearings*, pp. 6–9. (3) U.S. Congress, *Unification of the War and Navy Departments and Post War Organization for National Security—Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, etc.* (known as the Eberstadt Report) (Washington, 1945), Senate Committee Print, 79th Cong., 1st sess., for the use of the Committee on Naval Affairs. (3) Alfred D. Sander, "Truman and the National Security Council, 1945–1947," *Journal of American History*, LIX, No. 2 (September 1972), 369–88.

legislation. There he helped guarantee the independence of Marine Corps aviation in law.[3]


The final compromise, the National Security Act of 26 July 1947, reflected more the Navy's views than the Army's but did provide for a separate air force organization within a National Military Establishment (NME). It provided for a civilian "Secretary of Defense" with only nominal "general direction, authority, and control" over the military services. *(Chart 15)* Congress permitted him only a small staff of assistants, retaining cabinet rank for the service secretaries along with direct access to the President. The Secretary of Defense was "to take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research." That was all that was left of the Marshall-Somervell plan for a Directorate of Common Supplies and Services.

The principal innovation, following Navy recommendations, was the creation of a National Security Council to aid the President in co-ordinating over-all national security policy. The three armed services and the Department of State were represented on the council which was provided with its own staff or secretariat. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), replacing the wartime Office of Strategic Services, reported directly to the council, while a National Security Resources Board, replacing the wartime War Production Board, reported directly to the President.

Within the National Military Establishment a Munitions Board responsible for industrial mobilization and a Research and Development Board reported directly to the Secretary of Defense. An Armed Forces Policy Council was created, composed of the service secretaries and military chiefs, to advise the Secretary. The law also legalized the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but limited its staff to a hundred officers. These agencies, composed of representatives of the three armed services, were co-ordinating committees rather than executive organizations. Congress, following Navy recommendations, deliberately did not provide for effective executive control above the service level. As a consequence, President Dwight

[3] Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification*. On Colonel Hittle's assignment, see pp. 229–33.

CHART 15—THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, 1947



Source: Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 81.

D. Eisenhower commented a decade later: "In the battle over reorganization in 1947 the lessons of World War II were lost. Tradition won. The resulting National Military Establishment was little more than a weak confederacy of sovereign military units . . . a loose aggregation that was unmanageable."[4]

Congress also did not make any provision for integrating military budgets with military strategy. Supervising the military budgets was the responsibility of the several civilian secretaries, and Congress continued to provide funds according to an increasingly archaic appropriations structure. As a result

[4] President Eisenhower's message to Congress, 5 Apr 58. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Document 316, 85th Cong., 2d sess., *Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.*

the gap was to widen between military strategies developed by the JCS and the military budgets appropriated by Congress.[5]

The immediate impact of the National Security Act on the Army was the final separation and independence of the Army Air Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff-designate of the Air Force signed an agreement on 15 September 1947, known as the Eisenhower-Spaatz agreement, which provided the framework within which men, money, and resources were to be transferred from the Army to the new Department of the Air Force. Among other things it said "Each Department shall make use of the means and facilities of the other departments in all cases where economy consistent with operational efficiency will result." The last phrase was a deliberately oracular expression allowing the Air Force to justify creating its own supply system despite the fact that it would duplicate and overlap facilities and services provided by the Army in many cases.[6]

The National Security Act made one minor change affecting the Army by redesignating the War Department as the Department of the Army.

Army Ground Forces and Unity of Command

While the Air Forces and the Navy struggled with each other over unification, the Army sought to solve several internal problems created by the Eisenhower reorganization. At a conference with General Eisenhower on 13 November 1946, the Army staff proposed a radical reorganization of both the headquarters and field establishment. General Eisenhower vetoed this plan. "Nothing should be done," he said, "to disrupt

[5] (1) War Department Bulletin No. 11, 31 Jul 47, containing Public Law 253, 80th Cong., *The National Security Act of 1947*, approved 26 Jul 47. (2) J. C. Goldberg, "A Fourth Military Service." Individual Report on Problem No. 233, ICAF Mobilization Course, 1951–52, 30 Jan 52, pp. 1–7. (3) Warner R. Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal Year 1950" and Paul Y. Hammond, "NCS-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 1–266, *passim*. (4) Charles J. Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 3–18.

[6] See Chapter VII, pages 285–91.

the relationships which have already been established until the outcome of unification has been decided upon." [7]

In the field, relations among the Army staff, the technical and administrative services, AGF headquarters, and the ZI armies were confused. The problem was aggravated by the constant referral of petty local disputes all the way up the line to the General Staff and the Chief of Staff. Decentralization was not working in this area.

The Directorate of Organization and Training (DOT), responsible for implementing and interpreting the Eisenhower reorganization, outlined the problem in a staff study of 15 August 1947. Confusion, it said, existed at all levels of command: at the installation level, in the ZI Army headquarters, in AGF headquarters, and within the Army staff. In the field the greatest number of complaints arose over the ZI Army commanders' responsibility for some sixty housekeeping activities at Class II installations,[8] those directly under the command of chiefs of technical or administrative services in Washington.

The Directorate of Organization and Training estimated an average of one dispute a day was being referred to them by ZI Army commanders involving these housekeeping functions, the number of people performing them, or the funds required. The most important functions were repairs and utilities, including custodial services, fixed communications services such as long-distance telephone lines, and transportation services, particularly administrative motor pools. The Army commanders, for instance, found it difficult to control the expenditure of limited funds for long-distance calls between technical service installations and their Washington headquarters. Differ-

[7] (1) An Analysis of the Faults Contained in War Department Circular 138 as Amended and a Determination of the Action That Should Be Taken To Correct These Faults, 15 pages, Inclosure to Memo, Lt Gen C. P. Hall, Dir, O&T, for CofS, 15 Aug 47, sub: Revision of War Department Circular 138. Hereafter cited as DOT Staff Study on Army Organization. (2) Army Personnel: Cook Report, Personnel, 1947. Hereafter cited as Cook Report file. Located in RG 117, NARS. (3) Memo, Brig Gen. H. I. Hodes, Asst DCofS, for Dir, Pers and Admin and others, 15 Nov 46, sub: Reorganization of the War Department. Cook Report file. A search of the NARS files failed to reveal any documents containing the substance of the proposals submitted to General Eisenhower on 13 November 1946 by the Army staff.

[8] During World War II these had been called Class IV installations; they were designated Class II under War Department Circular 138 of 13 May 1946. War Department Circular 47, 21 February 1947, listed sixty housekeeping functions of the ZI Army commanders.

ing ZI Army and technical service personnel systems and wage scales created additional problems.

A second problem concerned the divided loyalties of Army commanders reporting to the War Department on administrative matters and to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, on tactics and training. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, often intervened in primarily administrative matters.

To solve these problems the Director of Organization and Training recommended a detailed survey of Class II installations to determine which could be reclassified and brought directly under the control of ZI Army commanders. It also recommended removing Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, from the administrative chain of command and restricting it to tactical and training functions.[9]

A similar proposal discussed by Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the Deputy Chief of Staff, with Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, the Chief of Engineers, and Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, the Quartermaster General, would have transferred responsibility for all training, schools, and boards from the technical services to the Army Ground Forces. Generals Wheeler and Larkin opposed this scheme because it would deprive the technical services of a vital command function. The proposal in their opinion was not only undesirable. It would not work. Only their own personnel possessed the specialized knowledge and experience needed for proper training.[10]

General Jonathan M. Wainwright, Commanding General, Fourth Army, supported the diagnosis and views of Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall, Director of Organization and Training, in a personal letter to General Eisenhower. He complained of having to plan expenditures and account for funds spent by agencies over which he had no control. The solution he recommended would place ZI Army commanders in charge of *all* posts and installations in their areas. General Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, agreed with General Hall and proposed to reduce the number of Class II installations by limiting them to those serving more than one

[9] DOT Staff Study on Army Organization, p. 15. Cook Report file.

[10] Ltr, General Wheeler, Chief of Engineers, to General Collins, 26 Aug 47; Ltr, General Larkin, the Quartermaster General, to General Collins, 24 Sep 47. Both in Cook Report file.



GENERAL LARKIN

Army area, such as Ordnance arsenals and Quartermaster depots.[11]

General Lutes, Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, pointed out that General Wainwright, in urging unity of command for the ZI armies, assumed falsely that such armies were like overseas theaters. They were not, Lutes said, because arsenals and depots within the United States served the entire Army, not just the installations under a particular Army commander. Placing them under local Army commanders would be impractical.[12]

General Eisenhower referred the problem to an Advisory Group he had set up in June 1946 under Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip to study Army organization and management problems. In its final report, submitted on 29 December 1947, known as the Cook report after its principal author, Maj. Gen. Gilbert R. Cook, the Advisory Group recommended that Army Ground Forces should be eliminated as such and become a special staff agency in Army headquarters with responsibility for schools, combat arms boards, organization and training of

[11] Ltr, General Jonathan M. Wainwright, Commanding General, Fourth Army, to General Eisenhower, 31 Aug 47; Ltr, General Jacob L. Devers, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, to General Eisenhower, 12 Sep 47. Both in Cook Report file.

[12] DF, Lt Gen LeRoy Lutes, Dir, SS&P, 20 Sep 47, sub: Wainwright Letter of 31 August 1947. Cook Report file.

units and individuals, and combat doctrine. The field armies would command all military installations in their areas including Class II installations and report directly to the Chief of Staff. Each Army area would then be organized and would function like an overseas theater of operations.

Realizing the proposed changes could not be made overnight, the Advisory Group recommended selecting a specific ZI army as a theater of operations and giving its commander complete control over every Army installation, facility, and activity in his army's assigned area for about six months in order to give the idea a fair trial.[13]

After studying these recommendations General Collins instructed General Hall to prepare a revision of War Department Circular 138 that would redesignate Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, as Headquarters, Army Field Forces, and limit its functions to staff supervision over all Army training, "including training of technical and administrative troops," to supervision of all service schools and former Army Ground Forces boards and to responsibility for the development of tactical doctrine. Army Field Forces was to be "removed from the chain of command and administration" except for specified training functions. Collins also tentatively decided to war game the theater of operations proposal of the Advisory Group for a three to six months period to determine its practicality.[14]

After consideration and amendment by the Army staff General Collins' plan emerged as Department of the Army Circular 64 of 10 March 1948. Army Ground Forces, stripped of its command functions, became the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, the field operating agency for the Department of the Army within the continental United States, for the general supervision, co-ordination, and inspection of all matters pertaining to the training of all individuals utilized in a field army.[15] It was responsible for supervising training, preparing training literature, developing tactical doctrine, and supervising the activities of Army Ground Forces boards in developing military equipment. Because the technical and administrative services commanded personnel and schools *not* "utilized in a

[13] Memo, Gen Haislip for the D/CS, 29 Dec. 47, sub: Army Organization. Cook Report file.

[14] Memo, General Collins for Dir, O&T, Jan 48. Cook Report file.

[15] For Department of the Army organization under Circular 64, 1948, see Chart 16.


field army" the circular urged "the closest collaboration and coordination between the Chief, Army Field Forces, and the heads of the Administrative and Technical Services in all matters of joint interest." Exempting Class II activities and installations from control by the ZI Army commanders was a major departure from the recommendations of General Collins and the Advisory Group and another victory for the technical services.

There were minor changes under Circular 64 in Army headquarters. The Secretary of the General Staff appears for the first time on the official organization chart of Department of the Army headquarters, and the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement was redesignated as Director of Logistics. *(Chart 16)* One major change, the abolition of the Directorate of Research and Development as a separate staff agency and its absorption by the Directorate of Service, Supply, and Procurement, had taken place earlier under Department of the Army Circular 73 of 19 December 1947. The ostensible reason for this change was to limit the number of agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff. A more practical reason was the lack of funds for research and development activities.

The next step was to carry out General Collins' decision to war game the theater of operations concept. The Third Army area was chosen and the project was designated as the Third Army Territorial Command Test (TACT). In October 1948 the Director of Logistics placed all production, supply, and training activities and installations in that area, including control over their operating funds, under the Third Army commander for six months. Later the experiment was extended to 1 November 1949.

The technical service chiefs remained opposed to transferring their Class II functions and to Operation TACT. The substantive issue was control over those installations and related activities with Army-wide responsibilities, arsenals, Quartermaster depots, and ports of embarkation. The Chief of Ordnance complained that placing control over such operations under an Army commander removed from the agency responsible for such functions the authority necessary to do the job. Such a move was a clear violation of the principle of unity of command which asserted that a commander assigned a task

Chart 16—Organization of the Department of the Army, 10 March 1948



Source: DA Circular 64, 10 Mar 48.

should be given control over the means to perform it. This was, of course, the very reason the ZI Army commanders wished control over Class II installations. Unity of command was not the clear-cut principle envisaged by the Patch-Simpson Board, but rather a misleading expression which simply fueled factional disputes.

The Third Army commander considered the test a success and recommended that Class II installations remain under his control. General Wade H. Haislip, as the new Vice Chief of Staff, decided in favor of the technical services and directed that the test be discontinued on 1 November 1949. The only changes made were to assign a few additional administrative or housekeeping duties to the Army commanders.[16]

Planning for a Logistics Command

Operation TACT was a minor skirmish in the continuing battle over the role of the technical and administrative services as independent commands. At the time Operation TACT was first being considered, a more important battle took place over a proposal to resurrect Army Service Forces in some form as an Army logistics command. This conflict had begun on 15 February 1947 when General Eisenhower appointed General Haislip president of a Board of Officers to Review War Department Policies and Programs, a board composed of representatives from the Army staff, the Air Forces, and the Ground Forces. The Haislip Board, as it was known, made two reports—a preliminary one on 25 April 1947 and a final one on 11 August 1947. Like the Chief of Staff's Advisory Board the Haislip Board was interested in attaining greater unity within the Army and greater efficiency and economy of operation. This policy meant greater executive control over the department's operations than the Eisenhower reorganization had provided. As one means of accomplishing this goal, both boards recom-

[16] (1) Raymond J. Snodgrass, Organization and Management of the Ordnance Corps, 1945–1958, Monograph, Office, Chief of Ordnance, Jul 58, pp. 31–34. (2) Harry B. Yoshpe, Pre-Korean Role and Operations of the Transportation Corps, 1946–1950, Monograph, Office, Chief of Transportation, 30 Jun 55, pp. 27–33. (3) Conference Memo, Minutes of Conference on Army Reorganization Plan, 5 Oct 49, pp. 6–8, incl. in draft Recommendations of the Vice Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army, C/S 320, 1949 files, RG 110, NARS. Hereafter cited as Minutes of Conference on Army Reorganization Plan, 5 Oct 49.

mended limiting the number of staff agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff directly. This recommendation was one factor in eliminating the Research and Development Division in December 1947. The Haislip Board suggested expanding the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff by adding an assistant for planning and another for operations in order to keep these functions separate. The Cook report suggested a deputy for ZI administration and one for field operations. Once these agencies were operational "authority to issue orders to the field [should] be withdrawn from levels below the Deputy Chiefs of Staff." [17]

An obvious means of limiting the number of agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff was to resurrect ASF. General Eisenhower had kept the issue alive after the demise of ASF in a hurried penciled note in December 1946 to the Deputy Chief of Staff, stating: "My own belief is that if war should come, ASF should be immediately reestablished. Should not our plans so state?" [18]

Sometime later he directed General Lutes, the Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, to develop an organization capable of expansion as the headquarters for such a matériel command. General Lutes himself believed the best solution was to create a matériel command similar to that of the newly created Department of the Air Force in peacetime, if only to train its personnel to operate as a team in war.

The subject came up at a meeting attended by General Eisenhower, General Omar N. Bradley, who was shortly to succeed him as Chief of Staff, General Collins, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Lt. Gen. Henry S. Aurand, General Lutes' successor as Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, on 21 January 1948. General Eisenhower said the Directorate of Service, Supply, and Procurement should remain as a staff division in peace "under the concept of Circular 138, but provide the nuclear organization for an ASF as an operating command in war." This command would also absorb the lo-

[17] (1) Memo, Gen Haislip for the D/CS, 29 Dec 47, sub: Army Organization. Cook Report file. (2) Final Report of the War Department Policies and Programs Review Board, 11 Aug 47, p. 54. Hereafter cited as Haislip Board Report.

[18] Photostat of handwritten order, General Eisenhower to DCofS, Dec 46. Tab A-2, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948, OCMH.

gistic functions of the Army staff but not the administrative services as ASF had done in World War II.[19]

General Collins then instructed General Aurand on 2 February 1948 to develop an "outline plan for a wartime ASF" in co-operation with the other General Staff directorates. An informal *ad hoc* committee headed by an officer from General Aurand's office considered several alternative methods. The committee considered first three parallel commands, personnel, training, and logistics, each under a General Staff director. The training command would include the training of technical and administrative service personnel. These three commands would function under a "Deputy Chief of Staff for Mobilization" and ZI administration. A "Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations" would be responsible for overseas commands and any ZI combat operations. Within the continental United States the Army commanders would control housekeeping functions in their areas along the lines suggested in Operation TACT.

Such a plan would have stripped the technical and administrative services of their training and personnel functions, subordinating them to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Mobilization. In the field the services would be subordinate to the Army commanders. Those services performing such unique functions as medicine, communications, construction, and transportation would become Army staff directorates. The Chemical Warfare Service would be eliminated.

A less drastic alternative proposed to adopt the ASF Post-War Organization Plan of 1944, retaining the technical and administrative services as such. The final proposal suggested a Logistics Command similar to that recommended in the Somervell Plan of 1943. Under a "Director of Logistics" and five functional directorates, plans, requirements and resources, operations, administration, and control, the technical services would be reorganized into functional groups—research and

[19] (1) DF, Lutes to DCofS, 30 Sep 47, Cook Report file. (2) Memo, General Collins for General Aurand, Dir, SS&P, 2 Feb 48, sub: Role of the Service, Supply, & Procurement Division, summarizing General Eisenhower's views at the meeting on 21 January. Tab A-4, Briefing Book, Dir Log, 29 Mar 48, sub: The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command, OCMH.



GENERAL BRADLEY. *(Photograph taken in 1945.)*

development, procurement, supply, fiscal, construction, communications, medical, and transportation.[20]

General Aurand wanted to present these proposals to the General Staff for comment first and, after obtaining agreement within the General Staff on what position to take, to consult the technical services. Learning that General Aurand was to brief the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, on The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command, the Chief of Engineers, General Wheeler, acting as spokesman for all the technical service chiefs, requested permission to present their case to Mr. Gray at the same time. At this point General Eisenhower revised his earlier position. In a letter to General Bradley written after he had resigned as Chief of Staff and retired he said his 1946 note did not "imply any thought that the technical and procurement services should be abolished." To this he was "violently" opposed. He simply meant that "*in war,* a single command, responsible only to the Chief of Staff should

[20] (1) Memo for Record, 6 Feb 48, sub: ASF Type Organization. Tab 5, Right, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948. (2) Staff Study, c. Feb 48, sub: Organization of a Logistic Command. Tab 1, Left, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948, OCMH files. (3) Staff Study, Lt Col Bernard S. Waterman, Ch, Projects Br, Control Office, Log Div, 18 Mar 48, sub: Organization for Logistic Functions. Tab 2, Left, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948. (4) Organization chart of Logistics Command. Tab B-11a, The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command.

be established over all this type of activity and organization." This system was not "desirable in peace." [21]

Armed with a copy of this letter General Wheeler and the other technical service chiefs confronted General Aurand on 13 April 1948 in Mr. Gray's office. Speaking for his colleagues, General Wheeler attacked the proposed logistics command. He cited the Patch-Simpson Board recommendation that ASF be abolished, General Eisenhower's letter, and the current organization of the Army staff outlined in Department of the Army Circular 64, 10 March 1948. He referred to the contributions made by the technical services in two world wars and emphasized the undesirability of introducing an additional staff layer between the technical services and the Chief of Staff which would require additional scarce technical specialists. He claimed that industry favored the Army's present "technical procedures."

Eliminating the technical services, he said, would require reorganization and re-education of all the armed forces and war industries. Further, the proposed logistics command did not deal with other important technical service problems like training and intelligence. In conclusion, General Wheeler stated that the chiefs of the technical services believed a logistics command would result in confusion and conflict in command and "in conspicuous extravagance in the utilization of critical personnel." In substance they opposed creating another ASF or logistics command whether in peace or in war.[22]

Faced with this opposition Assistant Secretary Gray suggested continued planning for a wartime ASF but designated the project more euphemistically as a proposal rather than a plan since it had not yet been approved. General Aurand, concluding that the decision earlier agreed upon in favor of formal planning for a wartime ASF had been practically abandoned, asked that his office be relieved of responsibility in the matter. General Collins agreed and ordered responsibility

[21] (1) Memo for Record, 31 Apr 48, concerning presentation in Mr. Gray's office, with copy of General Aurand's speech. Tab 15, Right, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948. (2) Carbon copy, Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 8 Apr 48. Tab 4, Left, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948.

[22] (1) Memo for Record, 14 Apr 48, sub: Briefing on Plan for a Wartime ASF. Tab 16, Right, Planning for a Logistics Command—1948. (2) Ltr, General Wheeler for General Aurand, 12 Apr 48. The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command.

for studying the issue of a logistics command transferred to the Management Division of the new Army Comptroller's Office.[23]

The Comptroller of the Army

Both the Advisory (or Cook) and Haislip Board reports had recommended establishment of a management planning or comptroller's office at the General Staff level. On 3 September 1947 Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall, who had served under General Somervell in ASF headquarters during the war, appointed Edwin W. Pauley as his special assistant to study the Army's various logistics programs and "business practices" and to recommend improvements "in the interest of economy and efficiency as contemplated by unification legislation." [24]

Mr. Pauley in investigating Army fiscal procedures found that no one from the Secretary on down, including the chiefs of the technical services, knew the real dollar costs of the operations for which they were responsible. The principal reason was that each technical service employed its own unique accounting system which did not cover all its functions and missions. Pauley recommended organizing an office of "Comptroller" for the Army to correct these deficiencies through the development of sound business management and cost accounting practices which would cover the total costs of the Army's major missions, programs, and activities, including the operating costs of each Army installation by major activity. These revolutionary proposals required a degree of control by the Secretary and the Chief of Staff over the Army's budget which traditional Congressional methods of appropriating funds would hardly permit.[25]

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[23] (1) Memo, Asst Secy Gray for General Collins, 15 Apr 48. Tab 17, Right, Planning for a Logistics Command–1948. (2) Memo, General Aurand for CofS, 22 Apr 48, sub: Logistics (ASF Type) Command in War. Tab 18, Right, Planning for a Logistics Command–1948. (3) Memo for General Aurand, 1 May 48, re: Planning for a Logistics Command. Tab 19, Right, Planning for a Logistics Command–1948.

[24] (1) Memo, Gen Haislip for the D/CS, 29 Dec 47, sub: Army Organization. Cook Report file. (2) Haislip Board Report. (3) Report of Edwin W. Pauley submitted to Secretary Royall, 5 Feb 48. Department of Army Press Release in ALP: Pauley Report–Work Measurement and Cost Accounting, May 1949 file, RG 117, NARS. Hereafter cited as Pauley Report.

[25] (1) Draft Memo, Advisory Group for DCofS, 21 Oct 47, pp. 12–13. Cook Report file. (2) Pauley Report. (3) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 19–46. (4) Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword, Control of the Army Through Military Appropriations, 1933–1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 393–407.

The Haislip Board had also criticized the Army's financial management in the context of its broad review of the Army's missions and the resources needed to fulfill them. Noting the inadequacy of the Army's current budget, it warned, "Either the War Department must revise its programs downward to come within the means which the country seems willing to furnish in men and dollars, or the country must revise upward its estimate of the imminence of the threat to its security and increase the means to meet the War Department's requirements."

Inadequate funds made economy of operations all the more essential, but in the board's opinion ". . . neither the organization, the procedures, nor the general attitude of the Army is conducive to maximum economy." It did not see how substantial economies could be made within the existing fiscal structure of the Army "which largely divides fiscal authority from command responsibility." It urged employment of improved management techniques in "organization, procedures, statistical reporting, budgeting, cost accounting," and similar activities. As a first step in this direction it recommended establishing in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff "an agency similar to the Navy's Management Engineer or the Air Force's Comptroller to attack this problem on a specialized and continuing basis." [26]

Similarly General Cook had recommended that Congress enact legislation freeing the Army from an archaic budget structure where the tail wagged the dog. The existing appropriations structure recognized only the technical services. New legislation should provide that money be appropriated for the Department of the Army and not to individual technical services and that budget categories be related to the Army's missions. The Army itself needed an agency where organizational, management, and financial problems would be treated together as one problem. A staff division concerned with "organization and training" was not such an agency. The least the Army could do would be to set up a management planning branch within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. The Cook report recommended placing such functions under a Deputy Chief of

[26] Haislip Board Report, pp. 54–57.

Staff for Zone of Interior Administration along with responsibility for Army logistics and personnel.[27]

After considering these reports, both Secretary Royall and General Eisenhower agreed on the need for an agency at the General Staff level which would be responsible for the Army's budget and fiscal programs as well as organization and management. Secretary Royall favored appointment of a civilian as comptroller who would work directly under the Secretary, while General Eisenhower preferred that the comptroller be part of his military staff.[28]

General Eisenhower's view prevailed. Department of the Army Circular 2 of 2 January 1948 provided for a military comptroller with a civilian as deputy within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. The directive transferred to this office the functions and personnel of those staff agencies principally concerned with the Army's financial management, the Budget Office, the War Department Manpower Board, the Central Statistical Office, and the Chief of Staff's Management Office. As the department's fiscal director the Comptroller was to supervise also the operations of the Office of the Chief of Finance. Department of the Army Circular 394 of 21 December 1948 additionally transferred supervision of the Army Audit Agency to his office from the Assistant Secretary of the Army. As the Army's management engineer the Comptroller would play a major role in the Army management and organization in the next decade.

The functions and responsibilities of the Army Comptroller lacked statutory authority until the passage of the National Security Act amendments of 10 August 1949, which emphasized the Comptroller's fiscal responsibilities.[29]

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[27] Memo, Gen Haislip for the D/CS, 29 Dec 47, sub: Army Organization. Cook Report file, pp. 12–13.

[28] (1) Memo, Mr. Cockrill, OCSA, for Mr. Jordan, OCSA, 12 Feb 58, sub: Background and Information on the Organization and Functions of COA. Hereafter cited as OCA History. OCMH files. (2) SR 10-80-1, 21 Mar 51, sub: Organization and Functions, Department of the Army, Office of the Comptroller of the Army. (3) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 211–12.

[29] (1) OCA History. (2) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 211–12. (3) The title of this office was changed in Department of the Army Circular 109, 15 October 1949, to Comptroller of the Army to conform to the provisions of Title IV, Public Law 216, 10 August 1949, the National Security Act amendments of that year.

The Johnston Plan and War Department Circular 342 of 1 November 1948

Col. Kilbourne Johnston, the son of Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson of World War I and NRA fame, was the first Chief of the Management Division of the Comptroller's Office. Like his father before him he was an aggressive promoter of the concept of a functionally organized Army staff. Like his father he also encountered bitter opposition from the chiefs of the technical services.

Among his first assignments was the development of a plan for reorganizing the Army staff under a proposed "Army Bill of 1949," including a re-examination of the question of resurrecting Army Service Forces in some form or other. The result was a lengthy two-volume interim staff study on The Organization of the Department of the Army, submitted on 15 July 1948. Known as the Johnston plan, it was the first detailed analysis of Army organization in the postwar period and the predecessor of several more to come.[80]

In the Johnston plan the Management Division noted that previous studies by the Organization and Training Division, the Haislip and Cook Boards, and the Logistics Division had raised two basic questions: "Are the Technical Services to be functionalized?" and "Are Departmental functions to be decentralized to area commands through a single command channel?"

Echoing General Somervell's views, it asserted that in both world wars the Army had had to abandon its "permanent statutory structure" and create an emergency organization for two major reasons: the lack of a genuinely functional staff with single staff agencies responsible to the Chief of Staff for each of the department's major functions, and "an unwieldy span of control" with too many agencies responsible and reporting directly to the Chief of Staff.

After both wars the emergency organization had been abandoned because it had placed single-function operating agencies like ASF on top of permanent multifunction bureaus.

[80] (1) The family's original name was Johnston. For an explanation of why General Johnson's father dropped the "t" in the family name, see Johnson, *The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth*. (2) Management Division, OAC, Organization of the Department of the Army—A Staff Study, 15 Jul 48, vol. I, pp. 6–7. Hereafter cited as the Johnston Plan. Misc. 320.1, Army Reorganization, 1948, OCMH files.

A tremendous headquarters staff and much duplication of effort was the result. Another reason was overcentralized control by wartime agencies which had created friction, delay, and difficulties in co-ordination. On top of this most military personnel misunderstood or misinterpreted the reasons which led to creating wartime organizations and their emergency procedures.[31]

The Management Division next surveyed current departmental operations and concluded that there were eight major weaknesses. Too many agencies were reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, a situation duplicated in the internal structure of the various staff agencies themselves. Army staff functions, such as training and supply, were fragmented among several agencies and staff levels, producing conflict and duplication. There was too much centralization within each agency. There were multicommand channels including the technical and administrative services and various special staff agencies in addition to the General Staff. There was a gap between strategic and logistical functions within the General Staff and the technical services, little integration and control, continual duplication, and a waste of manpower and money which still failed to produce any "authoritative, integrated logistical-strategical plans." The General Staff neglected its planning functions because it was involved in daily operational details. The staff's complicated organizational structure caused delays through excessive staff-layering and too much attention to minor activities. The survey counted 294 divisions, 884 branches, and 638 sections in Army headquarters plus 86 standing committees and boards, not to mention many temporary committees. Last, rigid compartmentalization created situations in which the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing, and intramural disputes, even on minor matters, continued to go all the way up the chain of command to the top. Consequently the Army staff and individual agencies could not act promptly and effectively.

All these were age-old problems dating back at least to Mr. Root's day, but there were others. On the basis of the Haislip Board's study of the Army fiscal year 1949 budget requests, the Management Division agreed there were no effective procedures for integrating and balancing requirements with resources. The

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-6, 11-12.

General Staff's logistics planning bore little relation to the Congressional archaic appropriation structure based on the technical services. Additionally, appropriations failed to follow recognized channels of command. No adequate machinery existed for readjusting budgets after the Bureau of the Budget and Congress had altered the Army's initial budget request. Finally, diffusion and fragmentation of manpower controls among many agencies made integrated, rational control over manpower impossible.[32]

The current organization of the Army, the study said, was bad enough, but when the President's authority under the First War Powers Act of 1941, which Congress had extended several times, expired things would be worse because the department would have to return to its even more chaotic prewar organization.

Permanent legislation was necessary to provide a sound organization that would not require drastic changes in order to fight a war, would improve efficiency, and reduce overhead in Washington. As the basis for such legislation the Johnston plan suggested a number of guiding principles, repeating many familiar ASF arguments.

The Army should have a functional staff where single agencies were responsible to the Chief of Staff for each major functional program. "Traditional service organization is neither functionally nor professionally constituted in the light of modern warfare even though originally so conceived. Evolution has rendered the Technical Services bureaucratic to the point of obsolescence." There should be a reduction in the number of agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff, a single staff layer in the General Staff, and genuine decentralization of operations to the field. A properly organized staff should provide a simple, easily understood structure, divorce operations from planning, integrate current program planning with war and mobilization planning, integrate logistical operations and planning, provide a single command channel to the field, reduce the size of Army headquarters by limiting such activities in Washington to those which had to be performed there, and

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–14 and pt. IX ,Tab III-C, Inclosures 3 and 4, pp. 142–53.

provide "self-contained" continental Army areas capable of independent action in case of a national emergency.[83]

The three principal features of the Johnston plan designed to achieve these objectives were (1) to reduce the number of agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff by creating a Vice Chief of Staff and two Deputy Chiefs of Staff who would supervise the General Staff; (2) to functionalize the Army staff, meaning the technical and administrative services, along lines similar to the old Somervell-Robinson proposals; and (3) to place all ZI field installations and activities under the Army commanders, including those Class II installations commanded by the chiefs of the technical and administrative services. In summary, the principal aim of the Johnston plan, like its predecessors, was to abolish the technical services as independent commands, making them purely staff agencies.

The Johnston plan provided the Secretary with two new assistant secretaries, one for politico-military matters and the other under the Under Secretary for resources and administration. The Chief of Staff would have a vice chief and two deputy chiefs, one for plans and another for operations, which would keep these functions separate. Other agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff would be the Army Comptroller, the Chief of Information, and the Inspector General. Under the two deputy chiefs the plan proposed ten functional directorates—Personnel and Administration which would supervise The Adjutant General's Office; Intelligence; Training, which would supervise the Chief of Army Field Forces; the Quartermaster General for Supply and Maintenance; the Chief of Transportation; the Chief Chemical Officer for Research and Development; the Chief of Ordnance for Procurement; the Chief of Engineers for Construction; the Chief Signal Officer for Communications; and the Surgeon General. As alternatives, it suggested placing the Chief of Transportation under the Quartermaster General, reverting to the pre-World War II pattern, or placing the Chief Chemical Officer as Director for Research and Development under the Chief of Ordnance.[84]

Since all these changes could not be made overnight the Johnston plan suggested reorganizing the General Staff itself

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15, 18–20, and pt. IX, Tab IV–E, pp. 225–26.
[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 20–34, 38–41.

as "Phase I." Functionalizing the technical and administrative services would come later. Under Phase I the vice chief and two deputy chiefs would be appointed to carry out the reorganization. The existing Plans and Operations Directorate would be transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff level to assist them, along with four reorganization "command posts," one each within the secretariat, in Plans and Operations for the zone of interior, in the Director of Logistics Office to reorganize the technical services, and one under the Director of Personnel and Administration for the administrative services.

Colonel Johnston thought transferring personnel, administrative, and training functions to appropriate staff divisions could be done with little difficulty as a second phase of the reorganization. The last phase, transferring logistical functions, would be much more difficult because it involved many field installations.[85]

To reduce the number of agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff the Johnston plan proposed to place the Office of the Chief of Finance under the Comptroller and the Historical Division under The Adjutant General, the Inspector General in the Office of the Vice Chief of Staff, and the Legislative and Liaison Division, the Public Information Division, and the Troop Information and Education Division under the Office of the Chief of Information. The technical and administrative services would "normally report" to the Chief of Staff "through" either the Director of Logistics or the Director of Personnel and Administration.[86]

Colonel Johnston submitted his study and recommendations on 15 June 1948 to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Collins, to the Chief of Staff, General Bradley, on 20 July, and to the General Staff and technical services for comment in August.[87] Most of the General Staff agreed with the general

[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.

[86] (1) Memo, Colonel Johnston for CofS, 20 Jul 48, sub: Army Organization; Tab E to above memo, sub: Draft Circular—Subject: Organization, Office, Chief of Staff. Both in CS/USA 320 D/A (27 Jul 49), RG 110, NARS. (2) Army: O&M, CMP: Round-Up (McCrimmon), Mar 49, pt. XXVI, RG 117, NARS. Hereafter cited as McCrimmon Round-Up.

[87] (1) Brief Chronology of Staff Study—Organization of the Department of the Army. In Army: O&M: Circular 342, 1948—Revision & Writing of—Nov 48. Hereafter cited as Circular 342 file, RG 117-A56-453, NARS. (2) Army: O&M: Base & Top—Comments on—from Agencies, Jul-Aug 48. Hereafter cited as Johnston Plan—Comments. (3) Memo, Colonel Johnston for CofS, 20 Sep 48, sub: Analysis and Discussion of Highlights of Comments on Reorganization Plan, pp. 1-2.

principles of the Johnston plan. Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, Acting Director of Organization and Training, however, proposed an alternative solution that was closer to the organization finally adopted. Separating plans and operations, he said, would create an awkward span of control for the Deputy Chief for Operations. Instead there should be three deputy chiefs, one for plans, another for operations, and a third for administration, including logistics. He would also replace the existing directorates with four functional Assistant Chiefs of Staff. He would not functionalize the technical services, but he would relegate them to a purely advisory role by removing from them control over personnel, intelligence, training, and logistics operations and taking away their command over field installations and activities.[38]

Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce, the Deputy Director of Logistics, told General Aurand the technical services might oppose the Johnston plan. He recalled their successful opposition to General Somervell's earlier proposals. Unless they were "brought into the picture" and "sold . . . as partners in the new reorganization," their opposition would wreck the Johnston plan. Its chief defect, he thought, was the concept of functionalization itself which would divide responsibility for commodities among several agencies.[39]

Brig. Gen. John K. Christmas, an Ordnance officer serving as Chief of the Logistics Directorate's Procurement Group, recommended retaining the technical and administrative services. He would go no further than placing them solely under the supervision of the Directors of Personnel and Administration and of Logistics. His Ordnance background was apparent when he asserted functionalization was unworkable in any organization which produced, procured, and used as many and as wide a variety of products as the Army did. Functionalization would divide responsibility for producing, procuring, and supplying commodities instead of placing responsibility for them properly in one agency "from factory to firing line." [40]

[38] Tab B, SS, General Bull for CofS, 30 Aug 48, sub: Comments on the Report by the Management Division on the Reorganization of the Army. Johnston Plan—Comments, Tab 4.

[39] Ltr, General Noce to General Aurand, 6 Aug 48. Johnston Plan—Comments, Tab 13.

[40] Memo, General Christmas, 4 Aug 48 (revised 12 Aug 48), sub: Army Reorganization. Johnston Plan—Comments, Tab 13.

Except for Maj. Gen. Frank A. Heileman, the Chief of Transportation, the technical service chiefs opposed the Johnston plan in principle and in detail, both individually and collectively, in writing and in person. Collectively, on 31 August 1948, they signed a joint round robin protest to the Chief of Staff. As their appointed spokesman Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, the Chief of Ordnance, expressed in person their opposition on 15 September 1948 to the Chief of Staff, General Bradley, and the Army staff.

General Hughes said the basic proposition of the Johnston plan was to abolish the technical services through functionalization. The Army had debated this issue before. The Patch-Simpson Board had rejected it, and General Eisenhower himself was on record as "violently" opposed to the concept. Industrial leaders whom he had consulted opposed functionalization. He would agree to the control over the technical services but not to their abolition or consolidation. The question he did not consider was how a functionally oriented organization like the General Staff could effectively control the operations of commands with multiple functions like the technical services.

General Hughes then presented another round robin letter signed by himself and six other technical service chiefs opposing the Johnston plan. In an organization the size of the Army which had developed through "generations of experience," it stated, major changes should not be made unless they were "conclusively advantageous." The proposed reorganization was not. It was unsound. It would break up the technical services which had proven themselves in all American wars and had a right to continue serving the country. It would destroy "their team spirit, their team knowledge, their team power for action and their team contacts with each other and with the industrial and professional world." Instead of the Johnston plan, they proposed:

> . . . to continue the present responsibility and statutory authority of the various Technical Services, which means they should continue to render specialized services, to train personnel, to do research and develop, to design, procure, store, issue and maintain the closely related family groups of commodities with which they are charged.

Additionally they asked that the technical services continue to

command their own field installations, personnel, and operations.

After General Hughes' talk, General Bradley said no firm decision had yet been made. It would not be easy to reach one, but he and others felt something had to be done. It was not enough to say that because we have always "done it this way" that we should continue doing it. General Collins urged the technical service chiefs to consider at least reducing the procurement services to Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal.[41]

Colonel Johnston then revised his plan after conferences with the General Staff. The principal change, reflecting the views of the Director of Organization and Training, involved the functions of the two new Deputy Chiefs of Staff. Instead of one for plans and another for operations, there was one for plans and operations and another for administration. Phase I would also place the technical and administrative services directly under the authority of the Directors of Personnel and Administration and of Logistics.

General Bradley urged approval of Phase I of the Johnston plan at least because "We are every day convinced that the present organization here at the top will break down. We just can't handle it." Secretary Royall still hoped to restrict procurement to Ordnance and Quartermaster. General Lutes also reminded him there was no provision for effective control over the technical services because their supervision was divided among the Army staff. General Eisenhower, who was also present warned against rejecting the technical service chiefs' views as "hopeless" and "bureaucratic." They sincerely believed they could perform properly under the existing system. But he did wonder what had become of his earlier suggestion to limit the number of technical services involved in procurement.

General Aurand and his staff also opposed the Johnston plan proposal to divide responsibility for commodities along functional lines. He did criticize the Ordnance Department for continuing to base its field organization on Ordnance districts

[41] (1) Round Robin Memo, Six Technical Service Chiefs or Deputies to CofS, 31 Aug 48, sub: Proposed Reorganization of the Army, 15 Jul 48. Johnston Plan—Comments Tab 1. (2) Address by Maj Gen E. S. Hughes before CofS and Army staff, 15 Sep 48, sub: Reorganization of the Army as Viewed From the Technical Services Level. Misc. 320 (Reorganization), OCMH files. (3) Transcript of Conference on Reorganization of the Army, 15 Sep 1948. D/A: O&M: Reorganization by Maj Gen Everett Hughes, C/Ord, Sep 48, pp. 6-11. RG 117, NARS.

which handled all commodities in their areas, a system abandoned by the other technical services in favor of single national procurement offices for individual commodities or groups of commodities.[42]

Following conferences with Generals Bradley and Collins, and with Colonel Johnston, Secretary Royall on 20 September said he enthusiastically agreed with the ultimate goals of the Johnston plan as well as the detailed proposals for Phase I. He agreed to place the technical services under the control of the Director of Logistics but wanted a parallel link to the Assistant Secretary of the Army in charge of procurement. Secretary Royall asked that the concept of a single personnel and administrative agency be explored further. Finally, he selected General Collins as the new Vice Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, and General Haislip as Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration.[43]

A General Staff working committee revised Colonel Johnston's amended plan further. The knottiest problem remained the relations between the General Staff directorates and the technical services now that they were to be placed under the control of the Director of Logistics. The Acting Director of Organization and Training pointed out that "All General Staff Divisions have a vital interest in both budget and manpower requirements of the Technical Services in carrying out their assigned missions." The Director of Logistics, he said, should review rather than control these operations. General Aurand, on the other hand, while agreeing to allow direct communications between the Director of Personnel and Administration or the Director of Intelligence and the technical services, strongly opposed direct dealings between the technical services and the Director of Organization and Training on manpower allocations or the Comptroller on budget requests. He insisted that the Director of Logistics should be responsible for allocating manpower and appropriations among the several technical services. The services objected to being cut off from direct

[42] (1) Transcript, Mr. Royall's Office—Conference on Reorganization of the Army, 20 Sep 48. Located in Reorganization Conference—Mr. Royall—18 Oct 48. RG 117, NARS. (2) Johnston Plan Chronology.

[43] (1) Johnston Plan Chronology. (2) Memo for Record, Colonel Johnston, 22 Sep 48, sub: S/A's Approval of the First Phase—Reorganization of Hq D/A with two inclosures. McCrimmon Round-Up file.

contact with other General Staff agencies because of the tremendous amount of daily business they had to conduct with them.[44]

On 18 October 1948 Secretary Royall approved the revised Phase I proposals with one more major change. He thought there was insufficient civilian control over the business and financial side of the Department of the Army and requested amending the draft circular to stress the civilian secretariat's supervisory role over Army logistics.[45]

Phase I of the Johnston plan was announced in Department of the Army Circular 342, 1 November 1948, effective 14 November 1948. *(Chart 17)* The three principal changes from the Johnston plan were (1) the creation of two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for plans and combat operations and another for administration, (2) spelling out in greater detail the role of the Assistant Secretary of the Army in procurement and industrial relations in accordance with Secretary Royall's request, and (3) an attempt to delineate more precisely the authority of the Director of Logistics over the technical services in their relations with other Army staff agencies.


Minor changes resulted in retaining both the Judge Advocate General and the Historical Division as independent special staff agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff instead of placing the former under the Director of Personnel and Administration and the latter under The Adjutant General.

Circular 342 stressed the temporary nature of the reorganization, pending development of a "more effective organization." At the same time it stressed that the only changes being made concerning the technical and administrative services were to place them "under the direction and control" of the Directors of Logistics and of Personnel and Administration so far as their relations with the rest of the Army staff were concerned. "The

[44] (1) Memo, General Bull for Secretary of the General Staff, 8 Oct 48, sub: Comments on Proposed Circular "Organization of the Department of the Army." (2) D/Log Comments on Management, 11 Oct 48, Proposal for Paragraph 12c. Amending Circular 64. (3) Comments, General Wheeler to General Leavey on telephone, 14 Oct 48, re: Proposals to Change Circular 64. All in Army: O&M: Revision of Circular 342, 1948. RG 117, NARS.

[45] Memo for Record, Colonel Johnston, 18 Oct 48, sub: Conference With Mr. Royall Covering First Phase of the Reorganization of the Department of the Army at 1330, Monday, 18 October 1948. In Reorganization Conference—Mr. Royall—18 Oct 48 file. RG 117, NARS.

CHART 17—ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 11 NOVEMBER 1948



Source: DA Circular 342, 11 Nov 48.

Directors of Personnel and Administration and Logistics," it said, were "placed in the direct channel of communication" between the services, and other Army staff agencies. The two directors would direct and control the services' operations and activities, while other General Staff directorates would supervise their functions through them. The Assistant Secretary of the Army would also exercise some supervision over the services, contacting them normally through the Directors of Personnel and Administration and of Logistics.

The precise nature of the control to be exercised by the Directors of Logistics and Personnel and Administration over the still powerful technical services remained unclear. They still retained their own personnel, intelligence, and training functions and their own budgets even if under supervision by the General Staff. They still continued to command their own field installations. The question remained how a staff agency like the Directorate of Logistics, responsible for a single function, could effectively control all the activities of such multifunctional staff agencies and military commands. As General Larkin explained it to General Collins some months later: "My first act as Director of Logistics was to tell the Service Chiefs that, despite their appearing under me on the chart, I expected them to deal with any appropriate Director without coming through me." In practice the control of the Director of Logistics over the technical services was limited to those logistical matters he had formerly controlled and no more. Under Department of the Army Circular 342 there was no change in the traditional status of the technical services so far as their supervision and control were concerned.[46]

The Cresap, McCormick and Paget Survey

The Management Division continued to urge action on the later phases of the reorganization supposedly initiated by Department of the Army Circular 342. After additional investigation Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey, the Comptroller, recommended in March 1949 the consolidation of training functions under the Army Field Forces and personnel functions under the Directorate of Personnel and Administration as

[46] (C) Memo, General Larkin for General Collins, 5 Aug 49, re: Cresap, McCormick and Paget Report. CS/USA 320 D/A (27 Jul 49), RG 110, NARS.

"Phase II" of the Johnston plan. He also wanted further planning on development of a new system for "program review and analysis," the consolidation of matériel functions, and transforming the technical services into functional staff agencies.

The existing organization, he said, was unsatisfactory because it was "neither a true functional staff nor a true integrating staff," both of which Secretary Royall had approved as organizational objectives. Department of the Army Circular 342 was only a step in the right direction. Revising the National Defense Act of 1916, as amended, would be another.[47]

A six-month independent staff study by the management advisory firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget, requested by Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray in October 1948, also demonstrated the need for improving further the organization of the department. Cresap, McCormick and Paget formally submitted its study to Secretary Royall on 15 April 1949. This and General Leavey's proposals for further reorganizing the Army staff provoked an angry outburst from Lt. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, the new Director of Logistics. As Quartermaster General he had strongly opposed the Johnston plan, and his new position gave the technical services a much stronger voice on the Army staff. He complained to General Leavey that the latter's apparent objective was "a functional organization, naively assumed as a panacea for all ills real or imaginary." His own experiences overseas during the war contradicted this idea. "Concrete results [in improving the operation of the Army's logistics system] will appear soon if I am not forced to waste the time of my staff probing abstruse theories as desired by Col. Johnston." The plans of Colonel Johnston's he had seen "would make top organization still more complex. Much is beyond my comprehension." As for the Cresap, McCormick and Paget Survey, he added, "I do not see where it helps to pay outside firms large sums to tell the Army how to organize." Instead he recommended reducing the Army staff 30 percent across the board and giving "the organization a chance to work without constantly proposing changes to try out new theories. . . . I do not understand why the Army should persist in harassing

[47] SS, General Leavey, c. 14 Mar 49, sub: Status of Organizational Planning and Proposals for Further Action. McCrimmon Round-Up file.

itself with unproved theories instead of devoting full time and attention to the job in hand." [48]

The principal reason for his antagonism toward the Cresap, McCormick and Paget survey was evident. Like the Johnston plan it recommended functionalizing the Army staff. Its final report identified several familiar problem areas in the Department of the Army. The department's activities cost too much money and required too many people to perform them. Departmental personnel lacked "cost consciousness." It took too long and was too difficult to get action or decisions. There was too much duplication and red tape, inadequate co-ordination, inadequate planning, and too much centralization. The department had poor procedures for planning, programing, and controlling its operations. Its organizational structure was weak because its headquarters was divided into too many separate agencies. At the same time some important functions were not being performed at all, and responsibility in some instances was assigned to the wrong agency. Finally, organizational relations between Army headquarters and field installations were too complicated and confusing.

To economize on manpower and money, to get prompt action, to cut down red tape and eliminate confusion, to create an organization more nearly like those of the Navy and Air Force and one suitable for wartime expansion, Cresap, McCormick and Paget proposed a number of objectives. The Army should integrate responsibility for long-range, basic planning and separate it from operational planning and operations themselves which should remain integrated. The Army's budget structure should parallel its organizational responsibility. The Army staff should be functionalized by concentrating responsibility for basic functions in single agencies, reducing the number of independent and autonomous agencies, and in general grouping related activities. Finally, departmental relations with the field should follow a single staff and line command channel.

The Cresap, McCormick and Paget proposals were similar to those of General Somervell and to the Johnston plan. The organization Cresap, McCormick and Paget proposed for the

[48] Copy, Memo, Larkin for Army Comptroller, 29 Apr 49, re: Reorganization of the Army. Case 1, CS/USA 320, D/A, 1-10, 1949, RG 110, NARS.

top level of the Army staff was similar to those established under Department of the Army Circular 342, with one important difference. Instead of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations and one for Administration, it proposed a functional realignment with plans and programs, including programing and budgeting, under one deputy and operations and administration under another. The Army Comptroller would become in effect a third deputy. This three-deputy concept, as it later became known in the Army staff, essentially provided for broad, across the board planning, execution, and control or review and analysis of performance. It was the type of centralized executive control engineered earlier at DuPont and General Motors and adopted in the Marshall reorganization. Following World War II an increasing number of major industries adopted this approach, notably the Ford Motor Company.[49]

The Cresap, McCormick and Paget study proposed that the only other Army staff agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff would be The Adjutant General, Judge Advocate General, the National Guard Bureau, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, the Chief of Information, and the Inspector General.

The Army's functional staff would consist of nine directorates under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration: War Plans and Operations, Personnel, Security, Training, the Surgeon General, the Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Engineers, Procurement (Ordnance), and Supply (Quartermaster). Finally the Cresap, McCormick and Paget proposals would make all Army headquarters agencies purely staff advisers to the Chief of Staff with operating responsibilities decentralized to the field. The continental armies and other regional commands would direct all field operations under the staff supervision of the Department of the Army.[50]

Representatives from Cresap, McCormick and Paget explained their proposals to the Army staff and the technical

[49] (1) Chandler, "Management Decentralization." (2) Study Group B, OSD Project 80, The Three-Deputy Concept—Its Evolution and Disappearance, Working Paper No. 18, 27 Jun 61. Project 80 files, OCMH.

[50] Cresap, McCormick and Paget, Survey of the Department of the Army—Final Report, 15 Apr 49, secs. II, pp. 1-19, III, pp. 37-61, IV, pp. 6-16. CS/USA Survey of the Department of the Army, 1949. RG 110, NARS.

service chiefs at two conferences in May and June 1949. The Management Division also prepared a review of the proposals. The principal objections came from General Larkin and the technical service chiefs. For the third time in less than a year they presented united opposition to any proposals for functionalizing their agencies out of existence. In yet another round robin letter, dated 19 May 1949, the chiefs complained to the Chief of Staff:

> The recommendations made in the report revolve about the theory that a functional breakdown of the Army's mission is a more suitable basis for primary organization than is a product-technical division. Nowhere in the report is this statement proven, and nobody has even been able to present to us an example where such a type of organization has proven effective when applied to an operation of the magnitude, diversity, and scope of the United States Army.[51]

The Chief of Ordnance, General Hughes, sent a memorandum to the Comptroller, General Leavey, wondering whether $25,000 paid to some other firm instead of the $75,000 paid to Cresap "would not have elicited a more reasoned report."

> The report is basically unsound in its reasoning. It follows the line that any error in a huge organization can be cured only by a reorganization. I have been in the Army since 1908 and in the Ordnance Department since 1912. During that time I have participated in n + 1 reorganizations and have observed that always afterward the ignorant, the undisciplined, the empire-builders, the lazy, and the indecisive continued to make the same mistakes they made prior to the reorganization. . . .

Hughes denied that the "buck-passing" and "red-tape," which Cresap, McCormick and Paget asserted were endemic in Army administration, were caused by faulty organization. The proposals to functionalize procurement and supply at the level of the Army staff were "both unwise and dangerous."

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[51] (1) Army: O&M: CMP—Comments and Papers, 28 Mar–1 Jul 49, pt. XIII, *passim*, RG 117, NARS. (2) Tab A to Tab 1, Comments submitted by Departmental Staff Agencies on Final Report of Cresap, McCormick and Paget on Survey of the Department of the Army, assembled by the Management Division, OCA, 27 Jun 49, and Tab Rd Rob, Memo for CofS, 19 May 49. Both in Tabbed Materials to Accompany a Study on Improvement of Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army—prepared by the Management Division, Office of the Army Comptroller, 22 Jul 49. Original in RG 117, NARS. Comments by the staff agencies accompanied only the original copy of the Tabbed Materials. The rest contained only an analysis of them by the Management Division.

> The only proponents of such a scheme whom I have known to date have been theorists who have not lived and worked in a Technical Service and have not become familiar with the complete and absolute necessity for an organization established on a product basis from research and development through to final disposition of the end item. . . . I conclude that the report is biased and unscientific and prepared not to reach a conclusion but to support a conclusion already in mind.[52]

In another, more detailed memorandum General Hughes said:

> The proposed reorganization would prove thoroughly unsatisfactory at the management level, the operational level, and the field level. The cost of the change would be exorbitant in time, money, personnel, efficiency, and morale. The present approach to merge the Technical Services and the General Staff into one Army Staff can only result in failure of the Army to accomplish its mission in a time of emergency. . . .[53]

All of Cresap's arguments were founded, he said, on the erroneous idea that a functional organization was more suitable than the existing product-technical organization of the technical services. The National Defense Act recognized that the Army had two radically different missions, military operations on the one hand and procurement and industrial mobilization on the other. Recognizing this difference the National Defense Act kept them separate by statute. The Cresap proposal to "scramble" these two different missions was unsupported by anything but opinion. He saw no need for any basic change in the technical services currently assigned responsibilities for co-ordination, operation and direction of research, development, procurement, and supply or for their command over their own field installations and activities.[54]

Similar comments came from other technical service chiefs. General Larkin, on 13 June 1949, endorsed the views of his former colleagues. Based on "a preconceived idea of functional organization advanced a year ago by the Army Comptroller," the Cresap, McCormick and Paget plan would abolish the technical services in all but name. "With them would go

[52] Memo, General Hughes for Army Comptroller, 23 May 49, sub: Survey of the Department of the Army Final Report by Cresap, McCormick and Paget. Attached to Tab A to Tab 1, Tabbed Materials.

[53] Mimeographed copy, Memo, General Hughes for CofS, 10 Jun 49, sub: Survey of the Department of the Army Final Report by Cresap, McCormick and Paget. Tab Ord to Tab 1, Tabbed Materials.

[54] *Ibid.*

decades of sterling service in peace and war." It would discard proven ability to perform specialized services for "an entirely unproved theory." It would diffuse responsibility for individual commodities or services instead of concentrating them as the existing system did in the technical services. Larkin questioned the so-called economies to be obtained from adopting the Cresap, McCormick and Paget recommendations. He objected to the fact that a civilian organization was prescribing for a purely military organization instead of the "best professional Army minds." He doubted that any major reorganization was necessary other than to reduce the size of the Army staff and improve its quality.

Among General Larkin's specific objections was the proposal to align the Army budget along organizational or functional lines. Co-ordinating a functional budget program would be at least as difficult as co-ordinating the existing budget, he thought, and might result in creating "a more severe financial strait-jacket." In a final criticism he denied that the technical services were "autonomous" or independent agencies. They were not. Their budgets and personnel ceilings were established by higher authority "just as any other Army agency." In the field their operating agencies were responsible to the regional Army commanders on a great many matters. The Organization and Training Division approved their organization, equipment, and functions. The Director of Personnel and Administration supervised the career management of their military personnel and Army Field Forces their schools and training.[55]

The Management Division in its Final Recommendation to the Chief of Staff for Action on the Report of the Cresap, McCormick and Paget Survey of the Department of the Army asserted that the crux of the issue lay in the difficulty the Army's functionally organized General Staff had in controlling the operations of the technical services, which individually performed all General Staff functions for themselves as independent field commands. The Cresap, McCormick and Paget report, said the Management Division, had firmly asserted that

[55] Memo, General Larkin for Army Comptroller, 13 Jun 49, sub: Final Report of Cresap, McCormick and Paget on Survey of Department of the Army, Tab Log to Tab 1, Tabbed Materials.

. . . if the parallel, duplicating, and overlapping product-technical or "bureau" organization is adhered to multiple command channels are unavoidable. If there are multiple command channels at the top of each there must be a Commanding General—not a staff officer. It is thus necessary to organize a *complex* of headquarters and *over* this complex to superimpose another headquarters staff. That is why there is so much "red-tape" and "layering." . . . If a single command channel is provided and operating functions decentralized down that chain, all that need remain in Washington is the pure staff coordinating function and the necessary central control function appropriate to a supreme headquarters. This is the fundamental argument on which the CMP recommendations are based. The [other] deficiencies . . . were largely found to stem from this basic deficiency. It is the main root of the trouble. Any definitive organizational solution must correct this root evil. CMP recommends a single command chain.[56]

The Management Division prepared a synthesis of all comments and criticisms on the Cresap report with summaries of previous Army staff surveys and the current reports of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. It concluded that the CMP report and its recommendations were sound although it suggested some changes. Instead of eliminating Class II installations, it suggested retaining them until the entire Army supply system could be reorganized and integrated. In the department it recommended retaining instead of abolishing the traditional General and Special Staff system. It would retain rather than eliminate the Director of Logistics to direct the Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Chemical Warfare Service as the nucleus of a reorganized Army supply system. The Transportation Corps would retain its current special staff status instead of being merged with the Quartermaster Corps again. Finally, the Management Division would leave The Adjutant General's Office within the Directorate of Personnel and Administration instead of separating its administrative from its personnel functions.

The Cresap, McCormick and Paget recommendations the Management Division approved were the consolidation of all personnel offices under the Director of Personnel and Administration, including the Civilian Personnel Division in the Under Secretary's Office and the Army's manpower ceiling and

[56] Management Division, Office of the Army Comptroller, Report of Final Recommendations to the Chief of Staff for Action on Report of the Cresap, McCormick and Paget Survey of the Department of the Army, 22 Jul 49, pp. 5–6. In OCMH.

bulk allocation functions; consolidation of all Army staff training functions under the Director of Organization and Training and all training operations under the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces; and transfer of the troop basis and mobilization planning functions to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. After consolidating the Army's supply system under the Director of Logistics it would change the Corps of Engineers on military matters, Signal, Medical, and Transportation Corps into advisory staff agencies. It would place the Historical Division under the Chief of Information and retain the civilian component, National Guard and the Reserve, offices as special staff agencies. Concerning the Army's financial affairs it recommended that the Army adopt the Hoover Commission's concept of a "performance budget" reorganized along regular command lines. The Army Comptroller should be responsible for integrating the Army's "program review and analysis" functions with the rank of a third Deputy Chief of Staff.[57]

General Haislip, the Vice Chief of Staff and a strong wartime critic of the Army Service Forces, made the principal decisions to accept, modify, or reject the Management Division's recommendations. On 23 December the new Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, forwarded his recommendations based largely on those made by General Haislip, to Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, who had replaced Mr. Royall, accompanied by a lengthy memorandum of explanation.[58]

"Reorganization itself," General Collins said, "was not a panacea for all ills." Economy and efficiency depended more on capable administration than on organization as such. Many

[57] Management Division, Office of the Army Comptroller, Staff Study—Improvement of the Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army—Based on the Cresap, McCormick and Paget Report, Hoover Commission Report, and Other Factors, 22 Jun 49, pp. 1–9. In OCMH.

[58] (1) Interview with Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, 6 May 69. (2) Memo for Vice CofS and others, 9 Aug 49, sub: Conference on Organizational Proposals to be Conducted by the Vice Chief of Staff at 1500, 12 Aug 49. Tab 4, Left, Army: O&M: COMP: Comments and Papers . . . , pt. XIV, RG 117, NARS. (3) Memo, General Moore, SGS, for Army Comptroller and others, 11 Oct 49, transmitting minutes of conference on Army Reorganization Plan on 5 Oct 49. Inclosed in file of draft Recommendations of the Vice Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army, c. 14–17 Nov 49. CS/USA 320, Box 504, 1949, RG 110, NARS. (4) Memo for Record, 29 Nov 49, sub: Army Reorganization Conference: Time: 1040, 25 Nov 49. CS/USA 320, Box 504, 1949, RG 110, NARS. (5) Recommendations of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army, 23 Dec. 49. Army: O&M: SR's on Organization—1st Typed Draft—for C/S, 23 Dec 49, pt. I, RG 117, NARS.

of the proposals made by Cresap, McCormick and Paget and the Management Division did not analyze problems in sufficient detail to determine whether the troubles were those of administration or organization, and where they lacked sufficient detail or analysis Collins had rejected them. Where he had to reach decisions arbitrarily or "unilaterally," he said he had relied heavily upon his own experience and judgment which had taught him that a proper organization should be based on the sound principles of Field Manual 101–5, the staff officer's handbook.

The internal self-analysis of Army organization over the past two years had been useful, he said, but there had to be some organizational stability if the Army was to operate effectively. "The Army can ill afford the loss of day to day operating efficiency which arises from spasmodic, major organizational change. Since the termination of World War II, our Army organization has been in a state of flux. I believe that the time has now come when a measure of stability must be assured."

General Collins' major recommendations dealt with the number of ZI armies, the relations between Class II installations and the Army commands, the degree of centralized control over the Army supply system, the role of the Army Comptroller, the suitability of the General and Special Staff system for directing the Army, the assignment of personnel to the General Staff, and the further decentralization of operations from the General Staff to Army Field Forces, the Army commanders, and the chiefs of the technical and administrative services.

Collins recommended retaining the existing number of six ZI armies and the Military District of Washington and rejected any substantial changes in the existing Class II command structure. Based on the results of Operation TACT, he suggested adding further housekeeping functions for Class II installations to the responsibilities of the ZI Army commanders. He would also increase their responsibilities for local operations and activities confined to a single Army area. In continuing to exempt Class II functions from ZI Army control, General Collins had followed the judgment of General Larkin and the chiefs of the technical services.

He thought the existing Directorate of Logistics could be

expanded in the event of war into a consolidated service force or matériel command without any major reorganization. He asserted the technical and administrative services had functioned successfully and effectively during two world wars, and he could see no reason for any major change in their structure or missions. The Director of Logistics was directed to study the possibility, however, of reducing the number of procurement agencies to three: Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Signal. He recommended that The Adjutant General's Office absorb the functions of the Chief of Special Services except for procurement, which the Quartermaster General should perform. He recommended giving the Comptroller the status and authority of a Deputy Chief of Staff but not the title.

Collins would retain the General and Special Staff system on the grounds "that our departmental staff organization should be as analogous as possible" to Field Manual 101–5, "with which the entire Army is familiar and which has proven itself so often." This meant returning to a four-division General Staff with each division headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff. He recommended consolidating the Organization and Training and the Plans and Operations Divisions into one staff agency and transferring manpower controls from Organization and Training to G–1 and Army Field Forces. He would initiate programs for improving the quality of officers assigned to the General Staff while reducing its numbers by decentralizing more operating responsibilities to the Chief of Army Field Forces, Army commanders, and the chiefs of the technical and administrative services.

He rejected the recommendations for consolidating all personnel functions in a single agency, removing personnel functions from The Adjutant General's Office, and consolidating all Army training, including the technical services, into a single agency.[59]

General Collins' recommendations were another clear vic-

[59] (1) Recommendations of the Chief of Staff . . . on the Organization of the Department of the Army, 23 Dec. 49, especially Inclosure 1, An Analysis of Recommendations—Table Showing Principal Issues, CMP Proposals Relating Thereto, Final Recommendations of the Chief of Staff, and Brief Analysis. Army: O&M: SR's on Organization, 1st Typed Draft, RG 117, NARS. (2) Compare this with Recommendations of the Vice Chief of Staff to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army, 17 Nov 49, with inclosures. CS/USA 320, Box 504, 1949, RG 110, NARS.

tory for the technical services over functional reformers. A memorandum of 14 November 1949 from General Larkin to General Haislip shows how much influence he had on the Chief of Staff's final recommendations. General Larkin, reviewing once more the history of recent organizational developments affecting Army logistics, repeated arguments he had made earlier against the Johnston plan and the Cresap, McCormick and Paget report. The technical services had performed their missions effectively during war and in peace time. They had "an esprit de corps, a professional focus and internal and external relationships" impossible in the "indistinctive," "nebulous" functional organization proposed to replace them.[60]

Secretary Gray replied to General Collins on 9 January 1950, accepting with minor exceptions his recommendations. He had serious reservations, however, about General Collins' preference for adhering as closely as possible to the principles of Field Manual 101–5.

> The organizational arrangements envisaged by Field Manual 101–5 have indeed admirably met the exacting demands of combat operations and I do not question their suitability. But we are here concerned with different problems and different requirements. To me the differences are striking, and it does not seem logical that the organizational design of the headquarters of an Army Group, an Army, Corps or Division should closely resemble the organizational design of the D/A.

He listed dissimilarities, such as public and Congressional relations, relations with other defense and governmental agencies, industrial mobilization, the military implications of foreign policies, and relations with the Army's civilian components.

> A field army, corps or division, etc. it [sic] is not required to provide for most of these responsibilities, except in unusual circumstances. And when such circumstances arise, as for example, during occupation, the organization of the field headquarters concerned undergoes many changes. There are perhaps, therefore, persuasive reasons for supposing that the influences which have twice compelled major reorganizations at the Seat of Government when war was upon us, flow from the inclination to conform our organization here to that of a field army and the like.

Gray had a number of other questions he thought needed answers. What steps could be taken to provide the Secretary

[60] Memo, General Larkin, 14 Nov 49, on Reducing the Number of Procuring Technical Services. Inclosure 5 to Recommendations of the Vice Chief of Staff . . . , 17 Nov 49. CS/USA 320, Box 504, 1949, RG 110, NARS.

"with knowledge commensurate with the responsibilities for the Army's budget?" What steps should be taken to minimize the number of instances in which important decisions had to be made under the most extreme pressure without adequate background information. Perhaps consolidating his own office and those of his civilian staff with the General Staff into "a single Executive Office" would produce greater teamwork and more informed participation.

Secretary Gray did not think that General Collins' preference for maintaining organizational stability and the *status quo* was necessarily sound. "I am at a loss to know how we can meet new challenges or deal with old ones if we are to limit ourselves to what has already been tried. I feel we should all continuously maintain inquiring, open, and receptive minds respecting these matters." [61]

SR 10–5–1 and SR 10–500–1, 11 April 1950

General Collins assigned the Management Division and the Organization Branch of the Directorate of Organization and Training responsibility for monitoring the changes Secretary Gray and he had agreed upon, for co-ordinating their details with the Army staff, and for preparing their publication. The results of this struggle between the functionalists in the Management Division and the traditionalists on the General Staff appeared in two Department of the Army special regulations, SR 10–5–1, Organization and Functions of the Department of the Army, of 11 April 1950, effective at once, and SR 10–500–1, Organization and Functions, Continental Armies and Army Areas (Including the Military District of Washington), of the same date, but effective 1 July 1950. Over the next several years additional regulations in the SR-10 series appeared, prescribing the organization and functions of all Department of the Army agencies, including the technical services and special staff agencies.[62]

[61] Memo, Secy of Army for CofS, 9 Jan 50, sub: Recommendations of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Army on the Organization of the Department of the Army. Unclassified Xeroxed copy of carbon copy, Misc. 320.1, Army Reorganization, 1950, OCMH files. Also located in Tab 2, Left, Army: O&M: SR's on Organization—Correspondence—Nov-Feb 50, pt. VIII, RG 117, NARS.

[62] Army: O&M: SR's on Organization—Correspondence—Nov-Feb 50, pt. VIII, RG 117, NARS.


SR 10–500–1 listed the new or increased responsibilities of Army commanders over Class II installations and activities including inspection of personnel and administration, intelligence, training, and logistics. Most of the functions assigned were still of a local administrative or housekeeping nature, ranging from Quartermaster laundries to administrative motor pools. These details remained a constant source of irritation between post commanders and the commanders of Class II installations, particularly where the funds involved were limited.

SR 10–5–1 began with a summary of Army organization history since 1789. Pending Congressional action on a new Army organization act, the legal basis for the current organization of the Department of the Army remained the First War Powers Act of December 1941, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. It listed thirteen major military and civil functions of the Army based on a series of program definitions prepared in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and designed to assist the Army in controlling its operations through the program review and analysis techniques recommended by Cresap, McCormick and Paget. Besides traditional Army staff functions there were programs for command and management, construction, joint projects with other services, and civil works. These programs were functional in nature, and few of them coincided with the missions or budgets of the several technical services.[68]

The new organization adopted the three-deputy concept recommended by Cresap, McCormick and Paget and Colonel Johnston. *(Chart 18)* It provided for a Secretary, Under Secretary, two assistant secretaries, one for General Management and another for Materiel, and a Counsel as the Secretary's special legal adviser. The Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff had three deputies, one for Administration, another for Plans, and the Comptroller as a third. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans

[68] (1) Opening remarks of Lt Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, DCofS, Administration, Conference on Draft of Special Regulations 10-500-1 and 10-5-1, 30 Mar 50. Tab 15, Right, Army: O&M: SR's on Organization—Correspondence—Mar-Apr 50, pt. VI. RG 117, NARS. (2) Haislip Board Report, pp. 53-56. (3) Johnston Plan, pt. V-C, pp. 15-21. (4) Cresap, McCormick and Paget, Survey of the Department of the Army—Final Report, pt. IV, pp. 1-45. (5) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 64-70.

CHART 18—ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, 11 APRIL 1950



1 Under direct supervision and control of the Comptroller of the Army on Comptroller Statutory functions
— — Supervision over procurement procedures and contracts (see AR 5-5).
Source: SR 10-5-1, 11 Apr 50.

no longer was responsible for combat operations on the principle that planning and operations should be separated. The Comptroller gained the status of Deputy Chief of Staff but not the title because, unlike his colleagues, he was directly responsible to the Secretary as well as to the Chief of Staff. Following the Cresap, McCormick and Paget report the Comptroller's functions included responsibility for "integrating program review and analysis," but not "management engineering" because this was not a "statutory" responsibility of the Comptroller. Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, believed this function ought to be assigned to his agency. The particular agency involved, Colonel Johnston's Management Division, remained in the Comptroller's Office.[84]

At the General Staff level, instead of the previous five directorates, the Army returned to the familiar Pershing pattern of four Assistant Chiefs of Staff as General Collins had recommended. The Directorate of Organization and Training was eliminated with its personnel functions transferred to G–1 and most of its training functions transferred to the Chief, Army Field Forces. Responsibility for training policies and mobilization planning remained with G–3.

Along with the General Staff were five familiar special staff agencies, the Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Military History, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. Also at the special staff level there was one change separating the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison from the Office of the Chief of Information. The Civil Affairs Division and its functions had been taken over by G–3, as recommended by Cresap, McCormick and Paget. The Office of the Chief of Finance was made a special staff agency under the Comptroller.

Among the administrative services, the Chief of Special Services and his functions had been absorbed by The Adjutant General's Office. There were no changes in the number of technical services or their major functions. Among the Department of the Army field agencies the principal change was to

[84] (1) Memo, Maj. T. H. Scott, Asst SGS, for VCofS, 31 Mar 50, sub: Proposed Special Regulations Dealing With Army Reorganization. Tab 6, Left, Army: O&M: SR's on Organization—Correspondence—Mar–Apr 50, pt. VI, RG 117, NARS. (2) For the development of the Army's program review and analysis functions assigned to the Management Division, see Chapter VII, pages 279–84.

delegate to the Chief of Army Field Forces responsibility for supervising schools and staff responsibility for the supervision, co-ordination, and inspection of training.

The increased status of the Comptroller, the return to the Pershing pattern with Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and the elimination of the Office of the Chief of Special Services as a separate agency were not substantial changes. The only important one was the adoption of the three-deputy principle, which required transferring responsibility for supervising combat operations from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration and eliminating the Directorate of Organization and Training.

The Army Organization Act of 1950

The technical services had been successful, in the reorganization just described, in defending their independence and integrity against the functionalists. They were less successful in defending their statutory base in the Army Organization Act of 1950. Lt. Col. George E. Baya of the Comptroller's Management Division on 1 December 1948 prepared a 114-page compilation of laws of a permanent and general nature affecting the organization of the Army which listed nearly four hundred provisions governing the Army passed piecemeal by Congress since 1916. Many involved picayune details of administration. Some provisions conflicted with others. The total effect was to hamstring the Secretary and the General Staff in carrying out their responsibilities of managing and directing the department and the Army. In Colonel Baya's words, ". . . the laws governing the organization of the Army and the Department of the Army were in a mess." [65]

In a separate study Colonel Baya concluded that the Secretary of the Army with the approval of the President had sufficient authority to reorganize the Army staff along functional lines provided he did not abolish statutory offices, such as the technical service chiefs. There were forty-seven agencies re-

[65] (1) A Compilation of Laws (of a permanent and general nature) Affecting the Organization of the Army, 1 December 1948, Management Division, Office of the Army Comptroller, CS/USA 320, 12/48, sub: as above. RG 110, NARS. Colonel Baya was assisted by Capt. Roderick F. Greig, JAGD. (2) The quotation is from DF by Lt. Col. George E. Baya, An Explanation of the Army Organization Act of 1950, 27 Jul 50, p. 3. Mimeographed copy in OCMH files.

quiring an act of Congress to abolish and eighteen which could be abolished by executive action, but there were no provisions of law requiring any specific organization of the General Staff. If he wished, the Secretary could probably transfer responsibility for procurement to the Chief of Ordnance, for supply to the Quartermaster General, and for research and development to the Chief Chemical Officer.

Colonel Baya also prepared a Plan for a Bill which Colonel Johnston submitted at this time to the Army staff for comment. The object was "to provide for the Organization of the Army and Department of the Army." It was not a reorganization bill but only a legislative study proposing to place the Army "on a sound statutory basis" with greater authority granted to the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the President to adapt the Army's organization to changing conditions than existing legislation permitted. It did not assign specified functions, duties, or powers to any particular agency within the Army, leaving this up to the Secretary's discretion, except for the civil functions of the Engineers and the duties of the Judge Advocate General, Surgeon General, and Chief of Chaplains.[66]

The Baya bill led to another battle with the technical service chiefs concerning their assigned statutory responsibilities. While the bill proposed to continue the offices of the chiefs as statutory agencies, it granted the Secretary authority to change their duties and functions as he saw fit. Individually and collectively the technical service chiefs attacked this provision. In another round robin they objected to this grant of authority to the Secretary. They believed the "soundest statutory basis" for organizing the Army was still the National Defense Act of 1916, in particular Section 5 which recognized them and their authority and restricted the General Staff to

[66] (1) Memo for Secretary of the Army, thru: Chief of Staff by Lt. Col. G. E. Baya, FA, sub: Extent to Which the Target Organization May Be Put into Effect Under Existing Law without Enactment of Additional Legislation, 21 Dec 48. OCA: O&M: Memo for the Secretary of the Army (Brown Binder) RG 117, NARS. (2) Plan for a Bill (Draft of 20 Dec 48) To provide for the organization of the Army and the Department of the Army, and for other purposes by Colonel Baya. Designated as Inclosure 1 to DF, 20 Dec 48, from Army Comp., sub: Army Organization Bill. CS/USA 320 D/A (20 Dec 48) Plan for a Bill. RG 110, NARS. (3) DF, 20 Dec 48, sub: Army Organization Bill of 1949, to: Directors, General Staff Divisions and others, by Col. Kilbourne Johnston. Army: O&M: Organization Bill of 1950, Implementation of Project 0–133, pt. II. RG 117, NARS. Col. Archibald King, JAGD, drafted this DF.

duties "of a general nature," forbidding it "to assume or engage in work of an administrative nature that pertain to established bureaus or offices of the War Department."

The Baya bill placed "unrestricted power," they said, in the hands of the Secretary.

> The traditional system of necessary checks and balances and the protection against weaknesses in the human element, to which even the greatest minds are susceptible, have not been insured. The broad peacetime powers requested are like a two-edged sword in that the Secretary of the Army could be subjected to pressures from all echelons to reassign duties and functions in order to increase their prestige and power. Experience shows that the Army is safeguarded against ill-conceived changes only as long as organization and functions are prescribed by statutes.

Proper legislation ought also to prescribe a commodity-type organization "from factory to firing line" for the technical services.

The chiefs objected that the bill would undermine morale. It did not provide the same status in law for all the technical services, granting professional recognition only to lawyers, doctors, clergymen, and civil engineers, but not to others. By eliminating those provisions guaranteeing the services their independent status, the bill left the impression that they might one day be liquidated. Otherwise why remove these provisions? Finally there was the question of *esprit de corps*.

> In the proposed organization military and civilian personnel of the Army are members, perhaps very temporarily, of some nebulous organization called a service, a service without functions, without permanence, without stability. There can be no esprit de corps since there is no corps in which to have any esprit. In order to maintain the high standards of morale and insure its everlasting continuance, currently designated names and appropriate functions of the Technical Services should be retained.

In conclusion the chiefs wanted the Baya bill referred back for redrafting to a committee on which they were represented.[67]

The chiefs' statements about morale and *esprit de corps* were questionable because, as Colonel Baya's compilation of

[67] Round Robin Memo, Chiefs of Technical Services, thru: Director of Logistics, to: Army Comptroller, 14 Jan 49, sub: Proposed Army Organization Bill of 1949, Tab Tech Ser., Army: O&M: Organization Bill of 1950 (*sic*)—Comments—1949. RG 117, NARS. In addition to the round robin there were individual memorandums from each of the Army staff divisions, general and special, and also each of the technical service chiefs.

existing legislation demonstrated, nowhere in the National Defense Act of 1916 or its amendments was legal recognition or status granted to the several technical services, corps, or departments as such. The law designated and assigned specific functions to the offices of the chiefs of these services only. The question was not one of unrestricted power and authority but where and at what level such power and authority should be exercised. Traditionally and in law it lay with the chiefs rather than the secretaries.

While the technical services chiefs opposed the Baya draft, the rest of the Army staff agreed in general with its provisions. The Management Division revised the Baya draft in the next six months as the result of specific criticisms and suggestions from the Army staff, the Navy, the Air Force, the Secretary of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget before sending it in July 1949 to the Secretary of the Army for submission to Congress.[68]

The bill, finally submitted to Congress on 21 July, followed the general outlines of the Baya draft. Secretary Gray in a covering letter pointed out that "the desired flexibility in organization in the Department of the Army is in part accomplished by the repeal of laws specifying the duties of various officers in the Department, and by providing that the Secretary of the Army under the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, be authorized to describe the duties of these offices." Hereafter, various duties and functions could be performed by whatever office or branch of the Army the Secretary might designate. Among other provisions specifically proposed for repeal were the first twenty sections of the National Defense Act of 1916, which the technical services regarded as their "Magna Carta." [69]

The bill was submitted too late in the session for action, and it was not until March 1950 that the House Armed Services Committee held hearings on it. General Collins and Colonel

[68] Material bearing on the Army Organization Bill of 1949 is in CS/USA 320, D/A, Cases 1-10, 1949, RG 110, NARS. The file, unindexed, indicates that this material is probably Case 2.

[69] Secretary Gray's letter to Congress explaining the bill is included in Department of the Army, Analysis and Explanation of Army Organization Bill—81st Congress, 1st Session, S. 2334, H.R. 5794—a bill to provide for the organization of the Army and the Department of the Army and for other purposes, February 1950. Copy in OCMH files.

Baya testified at great length. The Army Organization Act of 1950 passed by Congress basically followed the Baya draft. It contained only three substantive changes. To control the number of Army officers serving in Washington it provided that "not more than 3,000 officers of the Army shall be detailed or assigned to permanent duty in the Department of the Army, and of this number, not more than 1,000 may be detailed or assigned to duty on or with the Army General Staff, unless the President finds that an increase in the number of such officers is in the national interest." Second, the law protected the medical and legal professional staffs by stating that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as reducing or eliminating the professional qualifications required by existing laws or regulations of officers of the several different branches of the Army." Finally, it added that "nothing in the Act shall be construed as changing existing laws pertaining to the civil functions of the Chief of Engineers or the Engineers Corps of the Army." This prevented assigning the civil functions of the Engineers to any other Army agency. Other provisions continued unchanged concerned the military functions of the Engineers, the functions of the Judge Advocate General and the administration of military justice, and the National Guard and Organized Reserves.[70]

The new law marked the end of a five-year period of continual organizational change within the department and the Army. The technical services were the victors in several campaigns designed by their opponents to functionalize them out of existence. The Army Organization Act of 1950 left this issue open by providing that the Secretary of the Army could legally reassign the duties of any technical service, except the Corps of Engineers, along functional lines. To this limited extent Congress had now granted the Secretary executive authority previously denied him under the National Defense Act of 1916.

The Command of the Army

One issue the Army Organization Act of 1950 and parallel

[70] (1) Memo for Record, Colonel Embry, typed on carbon of DF, 12 Jul 50, sub: Proposed Changes to SR's 10-5-1 and 10-500-1. Tab 1950, O&M: SR 10-5-1, General, RG 117, NARS. (2) DF, Colonel Baya, 3 Aug 50, sub: An Explanation of Army Organization Act of 1950. Misc. 320.1, Army Organization Bill of 1950, OCMH.

Army Special Regulation 10–5–1 settled, presumably for good, was the question of the "command" of the Army. According to existing law and the Constitution the President was Commander in Chief of the Army, a function he normally exercised through the Secretary of War. The Chief of Staff acted under the direction of the Secretary of War and, after 1947, the Secretary of the Army, except as otherwise directed by the President.

Congress had abolished the Office of Commanding General to eliminate the friction between that office and the War Department under the Secretary. Unfortunately Secretary Baker ignored this and resurrected the problem by making General Pershing commander of the American Expeditionary Forces independent of the War Department General Staff. The subsequent antagonism between General March and General Pershing was almost inevitable.[71]

The Pershing reorganization tried to eliminate this friction by providing that the Chief of Staff in the event of war would command the "field forces," leaving the Deputy Chief of Staff behind and subordinate to him as Acting Chief of Staff. Army Regulation 10–5 of 18 August 1936 went further, stating that the Chief of Staff was also "in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding General of the Field Forces." [72]

President Roosevelt at the outset of World War II chose to exercise his role as Commander in Chief actively by dealing directly with General Marshall on strategy and military operations, bypassing the Secretary of War. He repeated his intention to deal directly with Marshall in his executive order of 28 February 1942, approving the Marshall reorganization. As a result General Marshall in reality did command the Army throughout the war under the President's direction.[73]

War Department Circular 138 of 14 May 1946 actually had gone much further than previous regulations in stating that the Chief of Staff "had command of all components of the Army" within the continental United States and overseas.

There was no legal or constitutional basis for such a statement. This was the conclusion of a study undertaken by the Management Division of the Comptroller's Office as part of its

[71] See Chapter I, above, page 24.
[72] *Ibid.*, page 53.
[73] See Chapter II, above, pages 58–59 and 74.

over-all investigation of the organization of the Department of the Army. Lt. Col. Archibald King, ASC, submitted to the Management Division a memorandum on the Command of the Army, accompanied by a short legal history of the relationships among the Presidents, Secretaries of War, Commanding Generals, and Chiefs of Staff. Both documents were widely distributed throughout the Army as part of the recommendations on Army reorganization prepared by the Management Division and Cresap, McCormick and Paget.[74]

As a consequence of these criticisms the Army Organization Act of 1950 and the parallel Army regulations eliminated all references to the Chief of Staff's "command" role. The Army Organization Act clearly stated that the Chief of Staff should supervise the operations of the Department of the Army and the Army, preside over the Army staff, and, in general, "perform his duties under the direction of the Secretary of the Army," except when otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Army regulations stated:

> Command of the Army and all components thereof is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, who directly represent him; and, as the personal representatives of the President, their acts are the President's acts, and their directions and orders are the President's directions and orders.

The language followed historical precedent as far back as Secretary of War John C. Calhoun.

In these regulations the Chief of Staff was the "principal adviser" to the Secretary of the Army, responsible to him for planning, developing, and executing Army policies. He supervised the activities and operations of the department and the Army, performing these duties and others prescribed by law or assigned him by the President and the Secretary of the Army. Unless directed otherwise, the Chief of Staff normally performed his duties "under the direction of the Secretary of the Army." The principal exceptions to this rule were the statutory functions assigned him under the National Security Act of 1947 as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally,

[74] (1) King, Memorandum With Respect to the Command of the Army by the Chief of Staff. (2) Col Archibald King, The Command of the Army: A Legal and Historical Study of the Relations of the Presidents, the Secretaries of War, National Defense, the Army, the General of the Army, and the Chief of Staff With One Another, c. 30 Mar 49. See also a much larger study on the same subject submitted in draft by Colonel King in 1950. Copies of both studies in OCMH files.

he presided over the Army staff, forwarding their plans and recommendations along with his own to the Secretary and acted as the Secretary's agent in carrying out plans and policies approved by the latter.

The key phrases in the law and regulations are "advise," "supervise," "preside," and "perform" his duties under the direction of the Secretary of the Army. The word "command" and similar words such as "direct" and "control" are absent. Whether the Chief of Staff would ever "command" the Army in a practical sense depended on whether the President or Secretary of Defense chose to act as President Roosevelt did in dealing with General Marshall. Since World War II, Presidents have not done so, dealing with Army Chiefs of Staff through the Secretaries of Defense and Army or as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In any case, after 1947 the Chief of Staff occupied a dual role as the executive manager of the Department of the Army for the Secretary and as one of the several military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Army staff served him in both these capacities.

CHAPTER VI

The Post-Korean Army

The Army Organization Act of 1950 became law with President Truman's signature on 28 June 1950. Three days earlier, at dawn on 25 June, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of South Korea. President Truman almost immediately ordered troops of the Eighth Army in Japan under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to support the small and ill-equipped South Korean Army. Thus began a war lasting three years until an armistice was negotiated in July 1953.

The Korean War was a test of the effectiveness of the Department of the Army created by the Army Organization Act of 1950. The Army expanded in three years from 600,000 in June 1950 to 1,500,000 in June 1953, while the Army's appropriations tripled during the same period from $6 to $17 billion without requiring a major reorganization. The limited nature of the Korean War was one cause, although the Army was required at the same time to provide troops to support the recently negotiated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There was no major reorganization of the Army because it was not necessary to raise, train, and equip a mass army almost from scratch, a major reason for reorganizing the Army in World War I and World War II.

The reduction in the size of the Army and its budgets after the Korean War was also more moderate than after the earlier global conflicts. During the 1950s the Army did not drop much below 900,000 men, while its budgets fluctuated between $9 and $10 billion, considerably higher than after World War II. The Army continued to be deployed all over the world, in Europe to support NATO and in the Far East to support South Korea, the Nationalist Chinese regime on Formosa, and Japan. Additionally it provided small and large military advisory

groups to help train the armies of anti-Communist governments in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

The principal internal adjustments within the Department of the Army during this period involved the perennial issue of effective control of the Army's supply system, particularly the still autonomous technical services. To solve this problem a series of reorganizations of the Army staff was put through between 1955 and 1956. Two other serious logistical problems were the research and development of new weapons systems and the development of new combat doctrines for their battlefield deployment. The revolution in science and technology and the increasing complexity and costs of new weapons in a period of financial austerity focused attention on these problems. A determined drive by scientists to remove research and development from the control of agencies primarily concerned with procurement and supply led to creation of a new General Staff division, the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, in 1955.

The war in Korea, fought mainly with the same weapons and doctrines as World War II, demonstrated a need for development of new weapons and tactical doctrine. Consequently, in 1952 a combat developments program was initiated under the Army Field Forces which, among other things, employed modern scientific operations research techniques developed since World War II.

Shortage of funds for the operation of Army installations throughout the continental United States aggravated the continuing dispute between the continental armies and the technical services over responsibility for housekeeping functions at Class II (technical service) installations. This dispute was solved in 1955 by assigning financial responsibility for such functions to the technical services involved. At the same time the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces was reorganized as the United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC) and, following the pattern of the Army Ground Forces in World War II, placed in command of the continental armies and the Military District of Washington.

The Palmer Reorganizations of the Army Staff, 1954–1956

In a valedictory letter to President Truman on 18 Novem-

ber 1952 Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett commented on the difficulties he had had in asserting effective control over supply matters because "certain ardent separatists occasionally pop up with the suggestion that the Secretary of Defense play in his own back yard and not trespass on their separately administered preserves."

> There are seven technical services in the Army. . . . Of these seven technical services, all are in one degree or another in the business of design, procurement, production, supply, distribution, warehousing and issue. Their functions over-lap in a number of items, thus adding substantial complication to the difficult problem of administration and control.
>
> It has always amazed me that the system worked at all, and the fact that it works rather well is a tribute to the inborn capacity of team-work in the average American. . . .
>
> A reorganization of the technical services would be no more painful than backing into a buzz saw, but I believe that it is long overdue.[1]

Explaining the lack of progress in carrying out the financial reforms called for in the National Security Act amendments of 1949, Lovett told a Congressional investigating committee that it was very difficult to obtain accurate statistics from the Army's technical services. Adequate supply control was impossible at that level, he said, because a single depot might receive its funds from fifty or a hundred sources. The basic problem, he said, was the resistance of the technical services and the Army's General Staff to change combined with a natural dislike of outsiders trespassing on their preserves of authority. All this had led to a "mental block," he maintained, in some of the services against financial reforms.[2]

Karl R. Bendetsen, an attorney and former Under Secretary of the Army, submitted a proposal to Secretary Lovett in October 1952 for reorganizing the Army and the technical services along functional lines. The weakness of previous reorganizations, he said, had been that they treated symptoms instead of attacking the basic issue, the Army's fragmented field organization where seven major commands were each involved in buying, mechandizing, warehousing, distributing, and even

[1] *Army, Navy, Air Force Journal*, vol. 90, 10 Jan 53, pp. 542–43.


[2] U.S. Congress, *Implementation of Title IV, National Security Act of 1947, as Amended, Hearings Before the Preparedness Subcommittee No. 3, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 83d Congress, 1st Session, November 2, 3, and 4, 1953* (Washington, 1954), pp. 25–27. Hereafter cited as *Flanders Committee Hearings*.

research and development. They were "virtually self-contained" autonomous commands, each with its own personnel and training systems, no matter what its designation might be as part of the Army staff. He could not identify any consistent functional pattern in their arrangement. They were organized rather on a professional basis with civil engineers, electrical engineers, and mechanical engineers in separate commands. There was fragmentation and duplication of effort in research and development and no effective means of bringing the user, the combat soldier, into the picture. Disagreement among the technical services forced the General Staff, particularly G–4, to intervene in matters for which it lacked both the staff and authority to act. The continental Army commands followed different personnel policies and procedures, forcing G–1 into personnel operations of the Army although it lacked the necessary staff. There was the administrative chaos and friction created by housekeeping functions, especially repairs and utilities, performed for technical service installations by local Army commanders. Here again disagreement forced administrative details "which have no business in the Pentagon" to the top.

To provide more effective management Mr. Bendetsen proposed to reorganize the Army from the bottom up, replacing the continental armies with seven nationwide functional commands, using the Secretary's new authority to distribute nonmilitary functions within the Army as he saw fit. *(Chart 19)*

A Personnel Command would be responsible for all personnel operations in the Army, including manpower procurement, induction of draftees, replacement training centers, prisoner of war camps, and disciplinary barracks. It would provide basic training for individuals. A Combat Command would take up where the Personnel Command left off, concentrating on organizational training and mobilization. It would have four subordinate commands: an Eastern Defense and a Western Defense Command, an Antiaircraft Command, and the "Army University," a school command including all training schools, Reserve training, ROTC, and the U.S. Military Academy. A Development Command would be responsible for both research and development and for combat development functions, including operations research, war gaming, and human resources research. A Service Command would include most of the

CHART 19—THE BENDETSEN PLAN, 22 OCTOBER 1952



Source: OCMH files.

Quartermaster Corps functions, Army hospitals, finance centers, transportation, maintenance facilities, and surplus disposal facilities. A Procurement Command would combine the procurement and production functions of the Ordnance Department with the construction activities, both military and civilian, of the Corps of Engineers. It would be, like them, organized geographically into regional divisions or districts.

Bendetsen thought there might be a continued need for a separate Army headquarters command like the Military District of Washington. Turning to the organization of the General Staff and the Department of the Army, Bendetsen criticized the Pershing tradition of attempting to run the department as if it were a field command. The organization of a field army, he said, was inappropriate for the department because the latter's mission was not to direct military operations but to supply matériel and trained manpower for such operations. He would relieve the General Staff of all operational responsibilities, leaving five staff divisions: Manpower, Intelligence, Operations, which he would separate from Force Development (Training), and Procurement, Supply, and Services. The technical services would become staff agencies with no field commands or installations under them. At the special staff level he would assign Military History and Troop Information to the Adjutant General's Office.

There would be a vice chief and two deputy chiefs, Bendetsen went on, to assist the Chief of Staff, one for Plans and Research who would link long-range strategic planning with research and development and a deputy for Operations and Administration. Like others, he insisted that combining plans and operations in one agency did not make sense. He would also appoint special assistants for political-military affairs and for Reserve Components.

The Secretary of the Army would have three assistant secretaries, one for Personnel, another for Procurement, Supply, and Services, and a third, the Comptroller, because the latter should parallel the role of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense who was a civilian.[8]

While nothing came of Mr. Bendetsen's plan at the time, it

[8] Address by K. R. Bendetsen before the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1 Dec 52. The substance of this talk appeared also in *Military Review*, vol. XXXIII, No. 10, January 1954, pp. 39-60, as "A Plan for Army Reorganization."

was representative of the continuing criticism of the Army's organization and management outside the department. Some of its criticisms and recommendations were also reflected in the reports of various committees that were appointed by or under General Eisenhower when he became President in 1953.

President Eisenhower appointed Charles E. Wilson as Secretary of Defense. One of Wilson's first acts was to designate Nelson A. Rockefeller on 19 February 1953 as chairman of an *ad hoc* committee on the organization of the Department of Defense. It was a blue-ribbon jury, consisting of General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Vannevar Bush, both of whom had publicly criticized the national defense organization; Dr. Milton Eisenhower; former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett; Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; and Brig. Gen. David A. Sarnoff, U.S. Army Reserve, of RCA. Other senior military consultants were General of the Army George C. Marshall, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and General Carl Spaatz, U.S. Air Force.

The Rockefeller Committee examined the entire spectrum of defense organization and procedures. It sought a Department of Defense so organized and managed that it could "provide the Nation with maximum security at minimum cost and without danger to our free institutions." This required a flexible military establishment "suitable not only for the present period of localized war, but also in time of transition to either full war or relatively secure peace."

The committee severely criticized the various boards created under the National Security Act of 1947 which had been hamstrung, as Mr. Lovett pointed out, by interservice rivalry. It recommended replacing them with seven Assistant Secretaries of Defense with power to act for the Secretary. For the Research and Development Board, the committee recommended one Assistant Secretary for Research and Development and another for "Applications Engineering," who would act in the area of development engineering, thus linking research and production. To replace the Munitions Board it recommended an Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics. Other assistant secretaries would be responsible for Properties and Installations, for Legislative Affairs, and for Health and Medi-

cal Services. It also recommended adding a General Counsel for the department.[4]

President Eisenhower accepted many of the recommendations of the Rockefeller Committee in forwarding his Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 to Congress. The new organization strengthened the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over his colleagues and over the joint staff. Following the Rockefeller Committee's recommendations Reorganization Plan No. 6 abolished the several defense boards, assigning their functions to the Secretary of Defense, and provided him with six new assistant secretaries and a General Counsel.[5] Finally it made the service secretaries "executive agents" for carrying out decisions of the JCS. The chain of command now ran from the JCS through service secretaries to the various overseas commands.

The three service secretaries, at Secretary Wilson's request, were also studying ways of improving the effectiveness of their own organizations. The new Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, on 18 September 1953 appointed an Advisory Committee on Army Organization which looked like a gathering of Ordnance alumni. The chairman was Paul L. Davies, vice president of the Food Machinery and Chemical Corporation and a director of the American Ordnance Association. Other members were Harold Boeschenstein, president of Owens-Corning Fiberglas; C. Jared Ingersoll, director of the Philadelphia Ordnance District during World War II and president of the Midland Valley Railroad; Irving A. Duffy, a retired Army colonel who was a vice president of the Ford Motor Company; and Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research.

Secretary Stevens had requested the committee to consider all elements of the Army, field commands as well as the departmental organization in Washington. Areas of particular interest

[4] U.S. 83d Cong., 1st sess., Senate Committee Print, *Report of the Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization*, 11 Apr 53 (Washington, 1953). For General Bradley's and Dr. Bush's criticisms, see Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 256-61. For Mr. Lovett's criticism, see his letter of 18 November 1952 to President Truman.

[5] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Document 136, *Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 Message From the President of the United States . . . .*, 30 Apr 53. The plan was submitted under the Reorganization Act of 20 June 1949 which provided that unless Congress disapproved or amended the proposal it would become law after thirty days.

were the organization of the Army's top management in the light of President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6; the organizational changes required to carry out the Secretary's new assignment as the JCS's executive agent for certain overseas commands; organizational changes necessary in supervising and co-ordinating the technical services effectively; changes required for proper direction of the Army's research and development program; the proper locations within the department of its legal and legislative liaison functions; and, finally, the organization and functions of the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces.[6]

The committee hired McKinsey and Company, a Chicago management consulting firm, as its full-time civilian staff with John J. Corson as its head, and interviewed 129 witnesses over a three-month period, including the heads of every major organizational unit in the Army. The committee submitted its report to Secretary Stevens on 18 December 1953.

The committee proposed four major changes in the organization of the Army. Among other things it would strengthen the Secretary's fiscal control by adding an Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and increase the authority of the newly appointed Chief of Research and Development—within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research—by transferring responsibility for research planning to his office from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4. The most important recommendation would remove the Army staff entirely from "operations" by creating two new field commands, a Continental Army Command which would be responsible for supervising Army training instead of G–3, and a Supply Command which would relieve the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, of the responsibility for "directing and controlling" the technical services.[7]

The Davies Committee recommended that the Secretary of the Army "participate actively in the formulation" of basic national policies and strategies affecting the Army by, among other things, attending National Security Council meetings as

[6] Department of the Army, Organization of the Army, Report of the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, 18 December 1953. Hereafter cited as the Davies Committee Report. Exhibit C, Charter for the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, 18 Aug 53.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 9–16.

an "observer." The Under Secretary would be replaced by a deputy secretary who would act for the Secretary in administering the department. Adding a third assistant secretary would permit each to specialize in one functional area, that is, manpower, matériel, and financial management.

The Chief of Staff, the committee asserted, should be the "operating manager" of the Army. "The view is often expressed in the Army that the Chief of Staff commands no one and is merely chief of the Secretary's staff. In practice this is not the case. He is the operating manager of the Army Establishment. . . ." It recognized his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and suggested reducing the number of agencies reporting directly to him.[8]

Other organizational changes proposed were to strengthen the Army's Reserve program; to place the Secretary's Office of Civilian Personnel under the control of the Chief of Staff because he was ultimately responsible for the work done by Army civilians; to place greater emphasis on Civil Affairs and Military Government; and to make the Judge Advocate General the responsible legal adviser in the department with supervision over all legal staffs throughout the Army.[9]

The committee rejected the concept of a separate Operations Division such as proposed by Mr. Bendetsen because, it said, strategic planning was now largely a function of the joint staff and much of the responsibility for training would now be delegated to a new Continental Army Command. It also rejected the idea of a separate "intelligence corps" because this would create additional operating responsibilities for G–2. It recommended that the Corps of Engineers retain its civil works functions rather than transferring them to another department of the government.[10]

The committee's proposal for a training command was a return to the wartime concept of Army Ground Forces. The Continental Army Command, operating under the supervision of G–3, would be responsible for all "combat arms" training in the Army, individual as well as unit, basic and combined, Regular and Reserve.

A training command was necessary, the Davies Committee

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11, 18–25.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12, 35–39.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 33–34, 51.

said, because the six continental armies and MDW were attempting to serve too many masters. The General Staff divisions each supervised a part of their activities. Under a single Continental Army Command there would be more effective control and direction over their activities.[11]

The Davies Committee proposals concerning the Army's supply system represented a partial return to the concept of General Somervell's wartime ASF. Its members suggested three major changes in this area: creation of a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply; creation of a Supply Command; and elimination of the division of responsibility between the ZI armies and the technical services for operating Class II installations. A Vice Chief of Staff for Supply and another for Operations were necessary, it said, because direction of the Army's supply system required the full-time services of "a highly experienced and qualified individual" familiar with all aspects of supply management and planning.[12]

A Supply Command was necessary for the effective control over the technical services. Under the existing organization G–4, although responsible for directing and controlling the activities of the technical services, shared authority over them with other staff divisions, principally the Army Comptroller and G–1. A Supply Command would have greater control over the technical services in these areas and over training, while G–4 would remain responsible for logistical planning and policies.

The committee did not think it would be necessary or desirable to reorganize the technical services along "functional" lines. "The controlling consideration," it said, "is whether the advantages of greater specialization, coordination, and uniformity with respect to a *function* . . . are more important than the need for coordinating and resolving all differences among functions with respect to an item. . . . Coordination of the development, procurement and distribution of an item is a more meaningful basis for organization . . . than specialization in each function." This view accorded with that of the Ordnance Department.[13]

For research and development as mentioned above the

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 39–42.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14, 45–47, 53–55.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 49–52.

Davies Committee proposed to strengthen the existing authority of the Chief of Research and Development in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research by transferring to his office the planning functions in this area then assigned to G–4. Research and development operating responsibilities it would transfer to the Supply Command.

The existing organization of the Army staff, it admitted, diffused responsibility for research and development, and it acknowledged that many people felt that research, essentially a planning function, had been subordinated to current production and procurement operations.

The committee, on the other hand, believed a separate research and development division on the General Staff or the creation of a separate "Development" Command would cause more difficulties than it would overcome. It did not believe that a special staff division would improve the co-ordination and management of research and development in the Army. A separate "functional" command would "separate research and development from closely related procurement and distribution activities." The Army would then have to find a new means of integrating these "essentially integral activities." Removing "development" from the influence of those concerned with production and procurement would "insulate" research personnel from the views of the user of weapons and other matériel. This, too, was the view of the Ordnance Department.

A more effective research and development program it believed would come from employing qualified civilian scientists and "project managers" and from contracting directly with civilian institutions "for special research undertakings." [14]

Eliminating the existing division of responsibility between the technical services and the continental armies for operating Class II installations was also necessary. Commanders of such installations were responsible to the technical service chiefs for the performance of their missions. At the same time they depended on the continental Army commanders for housekeeping funds. This violated the principle of unity of command and made it impossible to determine the costs of operating such installations. The committee recommended that housekeeping funds and personnel be allotted directly to the technical services

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 56–63.

who would then have complete financial responsibility over the operations of their field installations.[15]

Another area the committee investigated was financial management. The addition of another assistant secretary with responsibility for such matters it hoped would strengthen the program. But further improvement required aligning fiscal responsibility with the department's organizational structure. The new budget and program system had not yet produced satisfactory results, partly because it did not conform to the Army's organization pattern and partly because it did not extend all the way down to the installation level.[16]

Like earlier civilian reorganization proposals the Davies Committee report insisted the Army staff should get out of operations, while military officers like those on the Patch-Simpson Board had asserted that this simply could not be done. The proposal that met the strongest opposition within the Army, creating a Supply Command, involved this principle. The basic military argument against it was simply that it was impossible to divorce the General Staff from its responsibility for supply operations. The Army staff's reaction was to turn the Davies proposal upside down. Instead of a Supply Command the Army staff proposed making the G–4 a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics with greater "command" over the technical services.

The principal protagonist of this view was Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, the new G–4. General Palmer, unlike his predecessors, Generals Somervell, Lutes, and Larkin, who were primarily logisticians, was a combat veteran. Most recently he had served in Korea as commanding general of the X Corps. As a combat commander General Palmer insisted on unity of command and felt that he should have all the authority and resources needed to carry out his command responsibilities. In his view it was necessary either "to give G–4 substantial command over the Technical Services" or to resurrect Army Service Forces, which would cause considerable confusion. If the first alternative were chosen, the G–4 should be given authority over personnel, organization, and review and analysis. While he had

[15] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 52–53. (2) See pages 263–70, below, for a more detailed treatment of the subject.

[16] (1) Davies Committee Report, pp. 15, 68–69. (2) See Chapter VII, pages 272–85, for a more detailed treatment of Army financial management.



GENERAL PALMER. *(Photograph taken in 1955.)*

no wish to interfere with the responsibilities of his colleagues, General Palmer said, "I must have within my own hands the management tools and the primary control over personnel and organization questions within the logistic area." In these arguments General Palmer reiterated General Aurand's position in 1948 concerning greater substantive control over the technical services.[17]

In briefing the new Chief of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, on 19 August 1953 General Palmer resorted to the Constitutional doctrine of "implied powers," quoting Chief Justice John Marshall's decision in *McCulloch* versus *Maryland* to support his point. His authority under Special Regulation 10–15–1 included not only logistic staff functions but also direction and control of the technical staffs and services. "All the responsibility is given me, and all powers necessary to discharge the responsibilities must be inferred as granted. . . . The Chiefs of Technical Services are commanders, and their commands are huge. I would judge it to be true that real control over them lapsed when ASF was disbanded." For this reason he requested greater authority over personnel, including general officers in the technical services, and over Class II

[17] Memo for Record, General Palmer, 12 Jun 53, sub: Authority of G–4 to Command Technical Services. Tab 13, Events Leading to the Reorganization of the Army, 1954.

industrial installations. He also wanted better qualified "management" personnel because "the civilian secretaries are challenging us to show that the Army staff is capable of running the Army supply system." [18]

While the Davies Committee deliberated, there were rumors within the Army staff that creating a Supply Command would be one of its major recommendations. A General Staff committee requested the G–4's formal position on the Army's "Logistic Structure at the Departmental Level." Speaking for General Palmer, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, his deputy, said that G–4's existing authority, based on applying the theory of implied powers, was adequate for managing the Army's supply system. "Creation of a Logistics Command," he said, "would require a large headquarters and would interpose a ponderous additional step in doing business, with no obvious improvement in management." The experience of both world wars demonstrated that the supply organization finally evolved combined both logistical staff planning with command over the supply services. General Somervell himself, General Magruder asserted, "favored an ASF commander who would also be the Chief of Staff's advisor on logistics." The organization of the technical services themselves was "fundamentally sound." Simple directives could reassign functions among them whenever necessary. What they needed was "vigorous direction, control, and coordination by a single authority."

General Magruder's principal complaint was that civilian officials in the Secretary's Office and above were becoming increasingly involved in administrative details. "Many decisions have to pass *three* [*sic*] Army secretaries and then go to more than one secretary in Defense." [19]

General Palmer encountered opposition from Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, on control over technical service personnel. The latter said that, according to "the General Staff concept," G–4 should not exercise authority over personnel. General Palmer's spirited rebuttal was that every effort on his part to obtain authority matching his

[18] *Ibid.*, Tab 14. Extract from G–4 Briefing of General Ridgway, New Chief of Staff, by Lt Gen W. B. Palmer, 19 Aug 53.

[19] *Ibid.*, Tab 15, Memo, Maj Gen Carter B. Magruder, Deputy ACofS, G–4, for the Comptroller of the Army, 31 Aug 53, sub: Logistic Structure at Departmental Level.

responsibility met objections based on the "General Staff concept." ". . . Experience since 1917 in three [*sic*] national emergencies shows that we always come to the same solution, of placing on one man the dual function of principal logistic adviser and logistic commander. That is where the facts of life push us every time. The General Staff concept needs to be rewritten if it doesn't conform."[20] He objected on the same basis to a statement by another colleague that "The Assistant Chiefs of Staff do not command, and it is not consistent with Army doctrine to show the administrative services under G–1 and the Technical services under G–4." [21]

General Palmer's reaction to the Davies Committee report was mixed. He seemed to accept the general outlines of the report in principle, including a Vice Chief of Staff for Supply, because he thought it would improve the conduct of the Army's "business affairs." But he firmly objected to interposing a Supply Command between the technical services and the Chief of Staff. "The Chiefs of the Technical Services *must* remain at as high an echelon as now. In a thousand cases a day, they must be spokesmen for the Department. Displacement from their departmental functions would hopelessly snarl Congressional, executive, and inter-service relations, and could only end in creating a whole new set of technical staffs which would, inevitably, include the Chiefs of Services personally." As an alternative he proposed placing a "Director of Logistics Services" directly under the Vice Chief of Staff for Supply and so avoid "futile argument" over creating a field "Command" within the department.[22]

General Palmer continued his argument with General Young over personnel functions. General Young proposed removing responsibility for career management from the technical services and placing it along with responsibility for career management for combat arms officers in G–1. General Palmer and the chiefs of the technical services all strongly disagreed with this proposal. Among other things it was contrary to the Davies Committee's recommendation that responsibility for

[20] *Ibid.*, Tab 16, Memo, General Palmer for Maj Gen R. N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, 16 Oct 53, sub: Additional Services to be Performed by G–1.
[21] *Ibid.*, Tab 17, Memo, General Palmer for General Bolté, c. mid-October 1953.
[22] *Ibid.*, Tab 20, Memo, General Palmer for the Comptroller of the Army, 12 Feb 54, sub: Report of the Advisory Committee on Army Organization.

technical service career management be placed under the new Supply Command.[23]

The Department of the Army publicly announced "the Secretary of the Army's Plan for Army Organization," known as "the Slezak Plan" after the new Under Secretary of the Army, John Slezak, on 14 June 1954, and the Secretary of Defense approved it on 17 June 1954. In general the plan followed the recommendations of the Davies report except in the field of logistics. There it reflected the views of General Palmer in rejecting the concept of a Supply Command and giving a new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics "command" over the technical services.[24] *(Chart 20)*

The plan agreed with the Davies Committee that G–4 lacked the authority needed to control and direct the technical services. "The major weaknesses in the Army's structure and operations," it said, "do not lie in the field of military operations, but are traceable to a lack of recognition of, and preparation for, changes in the character, size, and complexity of the Army Establishment necessary to produce and support the combat forces." But the Slezak plan in disagreeing with the Davies Committee's remedy said:

> If an integrated Army logistics system is to be achieved, the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is a vital first step. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics must be given full authority for the provision, administration, and control of military personnel, civilian personnel, and funds for, and the direction and control of, the seven Technical Services.


He "should have a command relationship to the Technical Services" and exercise staff supervision over "wholesale-level logistics activities overseas."

The Army should first transfer from other Army staff agencies to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics all functions involving the technical services, "including, but not limited to, career management, personnel administration, and manpower control; budgeting, apportionment, and allocation of all funds among the Technical Services, and other financial management functions and activities; matériel research and development;

[23] *Ibid.*, Tab 21, Memo for Record, General Palmer, 28 Apr 54, sub: Statement by General Palmer on Transfer, Reorganization and Redesignation of Career Management Division, TAGO.

[24] *Ibid.*, Tab 7.

CHART 20—SECRETARY OF THE ARMY'S (THE SLEZAK) PLAN, 14 JUNE 1954



1/ General Management, Analysis and Review
2/ Panama, Alaska, Civil Functions, Politico-Military-Economic Affairs
3/ Direct working relationships with civilian and military personnel elements of Army staff
4/ Additional direct responsibilities to Assistant Secretary (Civil Military Affairs)

Source: Secretary of the Army's (the Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954.

requirements, procurement, supply, services, and programing and control functions in the logistics field; and legal functions of the Technical Services." It would also transfer responsibility for technical service training to the new deputy chief. For the time being at least responsibility for logistics planning would remain with a vestigial Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4. The General Staff was thus removed from logistics operations entirely.[25]

An *ad hoc* Committee to Implement the Reorganization of the Army composed of the Comptroller, the G–4, and other General Staff divisions under the chairmanship of George H. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, met repeatedly during the summer of 1954 to work out the details of the reorganization.[26]

Mr. Slezak, in a memorandum for General Ridgway on 8 September 1954 approving the detailed reorganization plan, called his attention principally to the Charter for the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

> a. The purpose is to combine the seven technical services into an integrated logistical system, subordinating the Chiefs of Technical Services to the head of this system and giving him authority to modify the respective Technical Service missions in order to achieve one integrated system in place of seven autonomies.
>
> b. Accordingly, it is intended that wherever the authority granted the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics involves transfer to him of authority heretofore exercised by other parts of the Army staff, the extent of the transfer shall be interpreted so as to insure that the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics can carry out the objectives set forth in paragraph *a*. above.

Specifically this meant that he would have authority over "the career management of all Technical Service personnel, whether serving under their Chiefs or not." [27]

The Charter to which Mr. Slezak referred was published as Change 4 to Special Regulation 10–5–1 of 8 September 1954. As revised later in Change 6 of 17 January 1955, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics had "Department of the Army Staff responsibility" for "development and supervision of an integrated Army logistics organization and system, including all controls over policies, procedures, standards, funds, manpower,

[25] The Slezak Plan, pp. 2, 5–6, 12–14.
[26] *Ibid.*, Tab 9, Memos for Record on Third to Eighteenth Meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee to Implement the Reorganization of the Army, 19 Jul–29 Sep 54.
[27] *Ibid.*, Tab 11.


and personnel which are essential to the discharge of this responsibility." He would be responsible for the development of logistics doctrine and manuals, for supervising logistics training and education where more than a single technical service was involved, for logistics planning, for development of logistics programs and budgets, for development and supervision of financial management, including stock and industrial funds within the technical services, and for development of the Army's logistics requirements. Acting on the basis of this authority he was to prescribe the missions, organization, and procedures of the technical services, to supervise their training, develop and supervise "a single, integrated career system" for technical service personnel, to exercise manpower controls over both their civilian and military personnel, to administer their civilian personnel programs, including industrial and labor relations, and to supervise all aspects of financial management within the technical services, including budgets, funding, allocation of personnel ceilings, review and analysis, and statistical reporting controls under the authority of the Comptroller of the Army. The Surgeon General was allowed direct access to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff on matters involving the health and medical care of troops and utilization of medically trained military personnel. Responsibility for the civil functions of the Chief of Engineers was not included. Change 6 also removed from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics responsibility for directing the research and development activities of the technical services. The organization of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to carry out these new duties is outlined in *Chart 21*.

The Secretary of the Army reappointed McKinsey and Company on 3 February 1955 to conduct an "Evaluation of Organizational Responsibilities" within the Department of the Army. This review concentrated on the Army's civilian secretariat, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the new Continental Army Command.[28]

The only major recommendation made concerning the Sec-

[28] Ltr, McKinsey and Company to Hon. Charles C. Finucane, Under Secretary of the Army, 31 Mar 55, contained in McKinsey and Company, Evaluation of Organizational Responsibilities, Department of the Army, Mar 55, vol. II. OSD Project 80 (Army) files, OCMH. For McKinsey and Company views on CONARC, see pp. 267–68 below.

CHART 21—OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, 9 SEPTEMBER 1954



Source: SR 10-5-1, Change 4, 8 Sep 54, and Internal Deplog Organization Chart of 9 Sep 54.

retary's Office was that an Office of Director of Research and Development be created separate from the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Research and Development. This change was adopted and announced in General Order 64 of 3 November 1955. The remainder of McKinsey and Company's comments in this area concerned redistributing the work load among the various assistant secretaries and preventing them from becoming involved in minor administrative operations.[29]

McKinsey and Company thought that the responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics under Changes 4 and 6 to Special Regulation 10–5–1 were not clear, particularly in the areas of overseas supply activities, doctrine, training, and logistics planning. The report warned that this office might become so involved in operations that it could not give sufficient attention to logistics planning which might better be assigned to a new G–4 division. Greater responsibility for operations ought to be given to the chiefs of the technical services as "operating Vice Presidents." The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics should instead concentrate his efforts on developing policies and programs common to more than one technical service and follow the principle of "management by exception," or trouble-shooting, in dealing only with critical problems. He should limit reports to those providing information needed to develop and review policies and programs. Other minor suggestions concerned personnel management, program review and analysis, and financial management.[30]

The Comptroller of the Army asked Karl R. Bendetsen, then a Reserve colonel on active duty, to prepare a special study on "A Plan for Army Organization in Peace and War," which he submitted on 1 June 1955. While he repeated the recommendations he had made to Secretary Lovett in 1952 for a series of functional field commands, he also reviewed recent developments in departmental organization. He thought the only real advantage of the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics was his increased authority over career management in the technical services. He still was not a "commander," no

[29] *Ibid.*, Working Papers, Study Group D, OSD Project 80 (Army) files, Prior Studies of Army Organization, sec. 5, Summary of McKinsey and Company Report.

[30] McKinsey and Company, Evaluation of Organizational Responsibilities, Department of the Army, vol. II, pp. 2–16, 20–36.

matter how that term was defined, but a General Staff officer acting for the Secretary of the Army.

Mr. Bendetsen thought the Army had been following a "circular course" since World War II of first rejecting the idea of ASF and then working back toward it gradually. There were still seven independent technical services. General Somervell had tried hard to get rid of them, but he had failed. Since then the deficiencies which General Somervell had tried to correct had repeatedly come to the department's attention. It had tried to solve them, but so far without success. The one major weakness, the independence of the technical services with their duplication of each other's functions, had not been rectified. "Every proposal which has advanced the concept of bringing like functions under effective management has met the same fate—it has been rejected." So far as the new organization of the Army's supply system was concerned, he saw no reason why it should succeed where its predecessors had failed, since it did not deal effectively with this critical issue.[81]

The new organization had other critics besides Mr. Bendetsen. Civilian scientists had repeatedly complained about the continued subordination of research and development to procurement and production. When General Williston B. Palmer had been promoted to Vice Chief of Staff, he warned that research and development needed "rank and prestige which would place the Army on equal terms with the other services before the innumerable outside scientists and advisory groups get into the act." The result was Change 11 to Special Regulation 10–5–1 of 22 September 1955 creating the Office of Chief of Research and Development at the Deputy Chief of Staff level. The designation chief was necessary because Congress had specifically limited the Army to three Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army Organization Act of 1950.[82]

This organization left a General Staff of five Deputy Chiefs of Staff co-ordinating operations with three Assistant Chiefs of Staff below them, presumably divorced from operations. General Palmer's view was that "The General Staff has always

[81] Karl R. Bendetsen, A Plan for Army Organization in Peace and War, 1 Jun 55. Group B, OSD Project 80 (Army) files.

[82] (1) Path of Progress, U.S. Army R&D Organizational Changes, pamphlet prepared by OCRD, 1960, pp. 4–7. (2) General Williston B. Palmer, "The General Staff, U.S. Army," *Armed Forces Management*, vol. IV, No. 1, Oct 57, p. 12. For further discussion of research and development problems, see pp. 242–58 below.

operated." If it was responsible only for plans and policies, "what agency would supervise their execution?" On this basis the Army staff was reorganized as of 3 January 1956 under Change 13 to Special Regulation 10–5–1 of 27 December 1955 into three Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for Personnel, another for Military Operations, and the third for Logistics, a Chief of Research and Development, the Army Comptroller, and an Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. *(Chart 22)* The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel absorbed the functions of the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration plus G–1. He was also assigned direct supervision and control over The Adjutant General's Office, the Chief of Chaplains, the Provost Marshal General, and the Chief of Information and Education. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations absorbed the functions of the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans plus G–3. He was also assigned General Staff supervision and control over the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government, the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and the Chief of Military History.[33]


Thus was abandoned the three-deputy concept for co-ordinating and supervising the operations of the Army staff. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans (Research) and for Operations and Administration as well as the Comptroller, which had performed these functions since 1949, were now demoted to the status of coequal General Staff agencies. To fill the vacuum left at the top the Chief of Staff created two new agencies within the secretariat of the General Staff, a Coordinating Group and a Programs and Analysis Group (initially called the Progress Analysis Group). The secretariat thus began to develop into a super co-ordinating and planning staff between the General Staff and the Chief of Staff.[34]

The Coordination Group's formal mission was to assist the Chief of Staff in the development and evaluation of long-range strategic plans. It acted as liaison also with other Army and defense committees, including the Joint Chiefs. In practice

[33] General Order 70, 27 Dec 55, and Change 13 to Special Regulation 10–5–1, 27 Dec 55. "General Staff supervision" is a nebulous term. Under it, for instance, the Chief of Military History, if necessary, could go directly to the Chief of Staff. The use of this term seems meant to give the impression that fewer agencies are reporting to the Chief of Staff.

[34] (1) "Office of the Chief of Staff," *Armed Forces Management*, vol. IV, No. 1, Oct 57, pp. 19–20. (2) Chief of Staff Regulation 10–1, 3 Jan 56.

CHART 22—DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CHIEFS AND EXECUTIVES, 3 JANUARY 1956



1 Not an Official Organization Chart.
2 For Practical Purposes Those Agencies Listed as Technically Subordinate to OCSOPS, OCSPER, and OCSLOG, Actually Reported Direct to the Chief of Staff.
Source: DA, GO No. 70, 27 Dec 1955, CSR 10-1, 2 Jun 56.
Prepared by: TAGO.

this meant the Coordination Group assisted General Maxwell D. Taylor, the new Chief of Staff, in developing an integrated Army philosophy which would serve to revitalize the Army's missions and roles. Some such conscious, explicit philosophy, General Taylor believed, was necessary, spelling out the role of the Army in the national defense establishment, if the Army were to obtain the support of the administration, Congress, and the public. General Taylor first presented his ideas in "A National Military Program" to the JCS in the fall of 1956. The Coordination Group, meanwhile, prepared a Department of the Army Pamphlet, A Guide to Army Philosophy, which was widely distributed within the Army in 1958. Later in *The Uncertain Trumpet* General Taylor published the substance of this program, which became the basis of the Army's program in the 1960s.[35]

Co-ordinating the Army's program system was the responsibility of the new Programs and Analysis Group. This meant the proper balancing of Army programs with resources in men, matériel, and money. The planning, execution, and review and analysis of the Army's programs at the Army staff level were now under one small agency in the Chief of Staff's Office.

Under the new dispensation the Management Office within the secretariat became, in effect, the Comptroller of the Army staff but the relationship between this agency and the Office of the Comptroller of the Army was not clear. In theory the Management Office's responsibilities for management functions within the Army staff included the Comptroller's Office, while the Comptroller of the Army was responsible for such functions throughout the Army. Theoretically the Comptroller's Office would review the Army staff's budget and manpower ceilings, including those of its own headquarters, prepared by the Management Office. In practice, the Comptroller had been reduced to the level of a Deputy Chief of Staff coequal with but not superior to his colleagues as he had been before 1956.

No major change took place in the organization of the Army staff or the Chief of Staff's Office from 1956 until John F.

[35] (1) *Armed Forces Management*, vol. IV, No. 1, Oct 57, pp. 19–20. (2) OCMH Study, Effect of Post-War Attitudes on Army Posture and Programs—An Historical Summary, Oct 70, pp. 14–20.

Kennedy became President and appointed Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense in January 1961. The size of the Army staff and of the secretariat both remained fairly constant during this period.[36]

The Feud Over Research and Development

The emergence of the Office of Chief of Research and Development on 10 October 1955 as an independent General Staff agency ended a strenuous five-year campaign for recognition by civilian scientists both within and outside the Army. It was also part of the continuing struggle for control over the technical services because they performed most of the research and development within the Army.[37]

Under the Eisenhower reorganization of 1946 recognition of research and development within the Army as an activity separate from logistics seemed assured with the creation of a separate Directorate for Research and Development. The War Department Equipment Board, known as the Stilwell Board, in its report of 29 May 1946 reiterated General Eisenhower's statement of Army policy on research and development.

> Scientific research is a paramount factor in National Defense. . . . It is mandatory that some procedure be adopted whereby scientific research is accorded a major role in the post war development of military equipment. The scientific talent available within the military establishment is not adequate for this task and must be augmented. . . . In general the scientific laboratories of the Technical Services should be devoted to those problems so peculiarly military as to have no counterpart among civilian research facilities, meanwhile utilizing, on a contract basis the civilian educational institutions and industrial laboratories for the solution of problems within their scope.

The board recommended a separate Directorate of Research and Development as the best means for supervising the program. The director should be a senior general officer of the Army, it said, and key personnel should include knowledgeable

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[36] (1) The Organization, Development, and Growth of the Office of the Secretariat of the General Staff From 1939 to the Present (June 1963), OCMH Monograph, Jul 63. (2) In late 1956 the Army staff was officially redefined to include the offices of the chiefs of the technical services, thus increasing the size of the Army staff on paper. Department of the Army General Order 59, 31 December 1956, Designation of the Tables of Distribution of Units of the Army Staff.

[37] L. Van Loan Naisawald, OCRD, The History of Army R&D Organization and Programs, pt. I, Organization—The Formative Years, 1960. Draft manuscript in OCMH files. Hereafter cited as Naisawald, Army R&D History.

officers from each technical service, a nationally known scientist as senior assistant to the director, and an outstanding scientist in each major field of science assigned on rotation from the major scientific colleges and industrial laboratories. General officers from the field commands and officers from each arm and service should represent the using arms in the development of new or improved weapons.

The mission of the Directorate of Research and Development was to supervise all Army research activities and to coordinate the research and development activities of the arms and services. It would establish priorities, make certain that the technical services and arms maintained contact with civilian research programs, supervise and review the Army's long-range research and development program, confirm the need for new and improved equipment, and advise the Budget Division on the funds required for its work.

To increase the Army's scientific talent, the Stilwell Board report recommended commissioning outstanding civilian scientists in the Army Reserve or National Guard, sending Army officers as students to leading scientific colleges and industrial laboratories, granting commissions annually to graduates of scientific colleges, and providing salaries that would attract qualified civilian scientists to work for the Army.[38]

The department neglected most of the Stilwell Board's recommendations because of reduced budgets following World War II. Dr. Cloyd H. Marvin, the first "Scientific Director," complained in late 1947 that the Army lacked a vigorous, modern research and development program. He recommended a reorganization with an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development and conversion of the General Staff to a purely planning agency supporting functionally organized field commands. One of the commands would consolidate the Army's research laboratories, and another would determine the development of tactical doctrine and military requirements for new material. It would be responsible for testing new weapons and equipment and for operating the Army's advanced schools. For an effective program the Army

[38] War Department Equipment Board (Stilwell Board) Report, 29 May 46, as modified and approved by the Chief of Staff, 22 May 46, pp. 3–4. OCMH files.

ought also to have a separate research and development budget.[39]

Abolishing the Research and Development Directorate and subordinating the function to Logistics in December 1947 was a step backwards. Severe budget limitations, a factor beyond the Army's control, forced the Army to get along with surplus weapons and equipment left over from World War II. New weapons, except for missiles, were out of the question. General Aurand, the first Director of Research and Development, also complained he had found it extremely difficult to obtain agreement from the Logistics Directorate on research and development projects.[40]

None of the reorganization studies of the Army by the Management Division, Cresap, McCormick and Paget, and the Hoover Commission Defense Task Force dealt with research and development. In recommending a functional Army staff and functional field commands, their proposals contained no provisions for research and development as a separate activity at any level. The only important advance in this otherwise sterile period for Army research and development was the signing of a contract with the Johns Hopkins University in July 1948 setting up a General Research Office, later known as the Operations Research Office (ORO), to perform research for the Army. As the title indicated, ORO's principal activities were limited to employing scientific methods, specifically operations research techniques, in improving current tactical doctrine rather than developing new weapons or equipment.[41]

Distinguished civilian scientists like Dr. Vannevar Bush complained about the way the services were handling research. A major irritant was the relationship between scientists and their military superiors in the development of new weapons. Writing in 1949 Dr. Bush, the first chairman of the Research and Development Board, asserted:

> The days are gone when military men could sit on a pedestal, receive the advice of professional groups in neighboring fields who were maintained in a subordinate or tributary position, accept or reject

[39] Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 18-21.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

[41] Lynn H. Rumbaugh, A Look at U.S. Army Operations Research—Past and Present, Research Analysis Corporation, Apr 64, p. 6. OCMH files.

such advice at will, discount its importance as they saw fit, and speak with omniscience on the overall conduct of war. . . . If military men attempt to absorb or dominate the outstanding exponents in these fields, they will simply be left with second-raters and the mediocre. . . . The professional men of the country will work cordially and seriously in professional partnership with the military; they will not become subservient to them; and the military can not do their full present job without them.[42]

As a member of the Army Policy Council, Dr. Bush also expressed his dissatisfaction with the progress of the Army's research program to Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray in the spring of 1950. Gray in turn sent a memorandum to the Chief of Staff complaining that the Army was placing too much emphasis and spending too many dollars on maintaining its current arsenal at the expense of the future. Given the pace of scientific advance, the next war was not likely to be the same kind of "total war" as World War II.[43]

Secretary Gray's memorandum led to a formal staff study of the entire Army research and development organization. The Kilgo report, so designated because Mr. Marvin M. Kilgo of the Comptroller's Office reportedly collected most of the information, was sent to the Secretary on 12 January 1951. In substance it argued that the Army's research and development program lacked effective leadership from the Defense Department and inside the Army. It recommended a separate Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Development with control over funds for such activities and a Deputy Chief of Staff for Development. There should be a direct link, it said, between these programs and the Army's strategic planning, and greater use should be made of "operations research" techniques by setting up organizations for this purpose in all major commands.[44]

General Larkin, the G–4, spoke for the Army staff in rejecting the major proposals of the Kilgo report. He and all the technical service chiefs were opposed to a separate Research and Development Division on the General Staff. It had been tried and found wanting, they said. The Army could perform this mission just as well under the supervision of G–4, and it was

[42] Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1949), p. 106.

[43] Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 27–28.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

important to retain the link between research and procurement. Besides, the technical services ought to report through only one direct command channel.

The Chief of Staff, General Collins, repeated General Larkin's comments in his recommendations to the new Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, Jr. Staff responsibility for research and development should remain, he said, with G–4. It was also essential to integrate this program with production because at the technical service level they were combined. Further, he did not see how "pure" research could be separated from development.[45]

Secretary Pace accepted these recommendations but left the issue of a separate Research and Development Division open. Some Army staff officials believed that the main current problem was the lack of firm strategic planning on which to base projections of future research and development requirements. The Chief of Research and Development in G–4 believed a change was desirable in the technical services, which would make the head of research and development in each service responsible directly rather than indirectly to the chief of the service. Civilian personnel shortages were also hindering progress.[46]

In the fall of 1951 Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, then Deputy Chief of Staff for Organization and Training, sought to reopen the question of a separate Research and Development Division because "its increased importance and extended scope make increasingly apparent the lack of logic in assigning Research and Development to G–4." Secretary Pace agreed that "the departmental research and development functions must be removed from G–4." By this time opinion within the General Staff had shifted. Most favored a separate General Staff division in some form, but the G–2 and G–3 suggested placing this function under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. General Larkin and General Collins still opposed a separate staff agency.

At this point General Taylor canvassed senior officers of the Army including the chiefs of the technical services on the subject. The G–1, Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, strongly

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 34–37.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–39.



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urged removing the function from G–4. Placing it under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans with additional research and development elements in each major staff agency he thought "a screwy idea" that would further fragment responsibility for the program. General Taylor himself favored such a plan because he thought it would force all General Staff agencies to focus attention on the subject. No one at this time proposed changes at the technical service level where the greater part of the Army's research and development work was done.[47]

After considerable debate the Army staff reached a compromise acceptable to Secretary Pace. As a result, on 15 January 1952 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. He was responsible for co-ordinating the Army's research and development activities with JCS assigned missions, war plans, and with the latest tactical doctrines. A Chief of Research and Development under him was directly responsible for supervising this activity as Program Director for Army Primary Program 7, "Research and Development," including responsibility for allocating its appropriations within the Army. He would also be the Army's spokesman on such matters in dealing with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and other government agencies.[48]

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 39–44.

[48] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 44–58. (2) Department of the Army General Order 4, 11 Jan 52.

Severe personnel limitations forced the new Chief of Research and Development to delegate much of his authority to the General Staff, particularly G–4. G–3's new responsibilities included supervising the Operations Research Office, while G–1 became responsible for supervising the activities of the Human Resources Research Office (HumRRO) established at George Washington University in 1951 under contract to the Army for research involving "human factors," the individual soldier, his training, and combat environment. What remained of the old Research and Development Division in G–4 was responsible for supervising these activities in the technical services.[49]

Secretary Pace thought the "new organization had elevated the research and development function from its former position subordinate to the logistics function in the Army," and there the matter rested until the Army staff reorganization proposals of 1954.[50]

Civilian scientists continued their efforts to separate research and development completely from logistics at the General Staff level. In November 1951 Secretary Pace appointed twelve "outstanding scientists and industrialists" as members of an "Army Scientific Advisory Panel" to assist him and the Chief of Staff in creating a fighting force "as effective, economical, and progressive, as our scientific, technological, and industrial resources permit." Dr. James Killian was the first chairman of this group and a leader in the effort to remove research and development from G–4.[51]

Scientists now had more direct influence within the Army itself as part of the establishment. They played a direct role also in the Korean War when representatives of ORO went there to apply operations research techniques. These scientists returned certain that "something had to be done to improve our capability to conduct land warfare." [52] Out of this developed

[49] (1) Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 58–59. (2) Rumbaugh, Army Operations Research, p. 8.

[50] Secretary of the Army's Report in Department of Defense, *Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1 January–30 June 1952* (Washington, 1952), p. 85.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[52] Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 132. General Gavin as Director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, an operations research organization under the Office, Secretary of Defense, accompanied the scientists on their Korean investigation.

Project VISTA, conducted by the California Institute of Technology under the joint auspices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and designed "to bring the battle back to the battle field." One major recommendation was to create a Combat Developments Center for testing new tactical concepts on troops in the field. The Combat Developments Group set up in 1952 under Army Field Forces was a direct consequence of this recommendation.[53]

President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 reopened the question of the relationship of research and development to logistics within the Army. The new Defense Department organization had strengthened control over research and development by replacing the unwieldy Research and Development Board with two assistant secretaries, one for Research and Development and another for Applications Engineering, both separate from the Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics. The Davies Committee on Army organization considered separation of research from supply in its own deliberations.

General Palmer, the new G–4, opposed any change, asserting the main issue was control over the technical services. Another General Staff division for research and development to whom the technical services would have to report would make matters worse.[54]

Dr. Killian told the Davies Committee he was unhappy with the Army's research program. There was still little coordination between strategic planning and research and development. He had welcomed the appointment of Maj. Gen. Kenneth D. Nichols as the Chief of Research and Development, but the latter's emergency assignment to the Army's guided missiles program obviously interfered with his main job. Dr. Killian still wanted a separate General Staff division for research and development with direct access to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army together with a separate Assistant Secretary for Research and Development. He did not think creation of a separate research and development command, such as Mr. Bendetsen had suggested, would be practical because of

[53] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 132–35. (2) On the Combat Developments Group, see pages 258–62 below.

[54] (1) See pages 228–32 above. (2) Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 71–74.

the necessarily close relationship between the researcher and "the user" who developed and produced the finished product.[55]

The recommendations of the Davies Committee regarding the Army's research program were a compromise. While the committee did not advocate removing this function entirely from G–4, it suggested transferring research and development planning from G–4 to the Chief of Research and Development. Operating functions should be transferred from G–4 to the new Supply Command. In the Secretary's Office it recommended transferring responsibility for this program from the Under Secretary to the Assistant Secretary for Materiel. It also recommended making the Army Scientific Advisory Panel permanent.[56]

The final Slezak plan on Army organization irritated Dr. Killian. Writing to Secretary Stevens he complained that the proposed organization "would serve seriously to handicap the management and further development of the Army in Research and Development activities. . . ." It had two serious defects. "It brings Research and Development under the domination of logistics and procurement philosophy, and this has repeatedly been demonstrated to be the wrong environment for the top direction of research in military services." Second, it actually reduced the status of the Chief of Research and Development by making his role ambiguous.[57] General Lemnitzer, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, endorsed Dr. Killian's views. Stressing the incompatibility of research and logistics, he wrote George H. Roderick, chairman of the *ad hoc* Committee for Implementation of the Reorganization of the Army, that the only solution was to consolidate under the Chief of Research and Development all of the existing G–4 research and development work as well as those portions of the program scattered among other General Staff agencies.[58] Maj. Gen. John F. Uncles, Chief of the Research and Development Division, wrote Lemnitzer, his superior, that "we are paying too high a price for rigid adherence to the prin-

[55] Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 77–78.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–82.

[57] Ltr, Dr. James R. Killian to Secretary Stevens, 23 Jul 54. CS/USA 320/1–3, 1954, NARS.

[58] Memo, Lt Gen L. Lemnitzer, DC/S, P&R, for Mr. Roderick, AS/A (FM), 21 Jul 54. In CS/USA 320/1–3, 1954.

ciple that only a Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics can issue instruction to the Technical Services." He favored centralizing all Army staff research and development functions under General Lemnitzer's office rather than the "present dispersed and inadequate staff organization." [59]

James Davis, special assistant for research and development to Under Secretary Slezak, warned that G–4's Research and Development Division was currently too involved in administrative details. What was needed was an agency devoted to original studies and analyses which would bring together problems of new weapons or equipment needed in combat with new technical ideas. This would give concrete direction to the research and development program. For years relating weapons and technology had been swept under the rug as a secondary mission of the Army schools, which were also so isolated from technology and science that they could not perform the function properly.[60]

The Palmer Reorganization and the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics represented another defeat for those who demanded separation of research and development from logistics. The deputy chief now supposedly had greater control over the operations of the technical services, including research and development, than before. The scientists, led by Dr. Killian, refused to surrender. A Congressional investigation of the Defense Department's research and development programs under Congressman R. Walter Riehlman, Republican of New York, supported their efforts. General Uncles, Dr. Killian, and Dr. Bush in testimony before this group publicly ventilated the arguments they had been urging within the Army staff.[61]

The Riehlman Committee's report warned that "unless the military departments, and our military leaders in particular, choose to correct these problems caused largely by military administrative characteristics, the forces of logic and civilian scientific dissatisfaction could well dictate that research and

[59] Naisawald, Army R&D History, p. 91.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[61] U.S. 83d Cong., 2d sess., House Report 2618, *Organization and Administration of the Military Research and Development Programs, Twenty-Fourth Intermediate Report of the Committee on Government Operations*, 4 Aug 54 (Washington, 1954), pp. 3–5.

development be rightly considered incompatible with military organization." [62]

The report also discussed the Davies Committee recommendations, concluding that the Secretary of the Army's plan had treated the problem too superficially. It agreed with Dr. Killian and other scientists that research and development were incompatible with logistics and that the Army Scientific Advisory Panel should be strengthened in numbers and authority. It urged creation of an additional Assistant Secretary for Research and Development and criticized the Department of the Army for failing to "attract adequate support and interest from civilian scientists" largely because of massive red tape and an apparent lack of interest in the subject.[63]

The struggle entered a new phase when the now permanent and expanded Army Scientific Advisory Panel (ASAP) held its first formal meeting on 16 November 1954. It discussed the continued conflict between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research and the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics over the research and development program. The new Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Research and Development, Frank Higgins, a former president of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, concluded that "the Army Research and Development Program, especially at the top, should be reorganized without delay." [64]

Dr. Killian, as chairman of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel, then personally urged Secretary Stevens to separate research and development from logistics and raise the status of the Chief of Research and Development to the Deputy Chief of Staff level. Secretary Stevens finally agreed, and on 23 December 1954 all research and development functions and responsibilities assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics were transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. A new General Staff division under a Chief of Research and Development would be responsible for "planning, supervising, coordinating, and directing" all Army research and development.[65]

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[62] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[63] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 11–16. (2) Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 95a–95d.

[64] Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 95e–102.

[65] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 104, 104a–104c. (2) Department of the Army General Order 88, 22 Dec 54.

The new organization was not satisfactory because both the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Research and Development and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research were overburdened with work. The McKinsey and Company report of March 1955 said that the Army should create a new Research and Development Directorate, relieving the existing Assistant Secretary for Logistics of this burden. The Second Hoover Commission of 1955 recommended assigning to the Assistant Secretary for Logistics responsibility for almost all Army logistical functions, including research and development and supervision of the technical services, removing these functions entirely from the General Staff.

Brig. Gen. Andrew P. O'Meara, the new Chief of Research and Development, on 3 August 1955 formally proposed creating a new deputy chief of staff for Research and Development. The Army staff agreed, including Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin and General Palmer, who had become Vice Chief of Staff. The new Secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker approved, and the new office began operations on 10 October 1955 with General Gavin appointed as the Army's first Chief of Research and Development. A new civilian post, the Director of Research and Development, was created on 3 November 1955 at the assistant secretary level. Dr. William H. Martin, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Applications Engineering, became the first director.[66]

Despite these changes the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics still controlled the technical services, including their budgets and personnel. As the historian of OCRD noted:

> The Chief of Research and Development had little or no say in the placement of personnel . . . in responsible research and development positions within the Technical Services. And even if he were consulted there was no means by which he might reward outstanding effort or penalize unsatisfactory performance. . . .

A management subcommittee of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel in the fall of 1958 concluded it was unrealistic "to expect the Chief of Research and Development to assume responsibility for success in this field without having direct control

[66] (1) Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 104d, 105–10. (2) Department of the Army General Orders 57, 6 Oct 55, and 64, 3 Nov 55.

over funds, personnel, and facilities to accomplish his mission." [67] The full ASAP urged that the Chief of Research and Development have sole responsibility for all policy decisions in his area and sole control of funds required to carry out his missions, including the construction, evaluation, and testing of prototypes.

Another development came with the announcement by the Department of Defense in November 1958 that beginning with fiscal year 1960 all research and development appropriations as well as identifiable research and development activities under other budget programs would be included in one new research, development, test, and evaluation budget category.[68]

During this same period the ASAP conducted a series of studies and held conferences aimed at reducing the lead time between the point when a new weapon is conceived and the time it reaches the soldier on the battlefield. The ASAP believed that much time was wasted simply in unproductive red tape and that more authority for the Chief of Research and Development would reduce it.

As an example it took ten years, from 1950 to 1960, for the Army to produce a replacement for the World War II amphibian veteran known as the DUKW. Research was not involved, just development engineering. The Ordnance Corps received the assignment in late 1950. Six years later in 1956 only an unsatisfactory prototype had been produced. The Transportation Corps in the meantime had produced a larger amphibian, the BARC, for testing in less than two years. Disagreement between the Transportation Corps and Ordnance Department over the type of smaller amphibian required stalled progress for more than two years. In late 1958 a contract for developing a prototype of a new small amphibian, the LARC, was finally negotiated by the Transportation Corps. Two more years passed, again partly because of continued opposition by the Ordnance Corps, before the LARC was finally accepted or "type classified" as standard equipment for

[67] Naisawald, Army R&D History, p. 111.

[68] (1) Copy of Ltr, Richard S. Morse to S/A, 31 Oct 58, and inclosure, Recommendations to Reduce Army R&D Time Cycles, ASAP Meeting, Colorado Springs, 27–28 Oct 58. (2) Transcription of speech of Brig Gen Charles A. Duff, OCA, 10 Dec 58, in Record of Research and Development Lead Time Symposium, 9–10 Dec 58, OCRD, p. 88. Both in OCRD Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1959, pt. II. (3) Naisawald, Army R&D History, p. 113.

the Army on 20 July 1960. As this case demonstrated, a major reason for delay in developing new equipment was disagreement among the technical services.[69]

ASAP pressure also resulted in establishing the Army Research Office (ARO) on 24 March 1958 under the Office of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) "to plan and direct the research program of the Army," to make maximum use of the nation's scientific talent, to provide the nation's scientific community with a single contact in the Army, and ensure that the Army's research and development program emphasized the Army's future needs. ARO would also co-ordinate the Army's program with similar programs in the Navy, Air Force, and other government agencies. Within the Army it would co-ordinate the research and development programs of the technical services.[70]

The next official to grapple with the issue of control over the technical services' research and development programs was the Army's new Director for Research and Development, Richard S. Morse, formerly president of the National Research Corporation and vice chairman of the Army Scientific Advisory Panel. The 1958 reorganization of the Department of Defense had created a Director of Defense Research and Engineering. President Eisenhower had also established a special White House Assistant for Science and Technology, appointing Dr. Killian, former chairman of ASAP, to that post. These events led Mr. Morse to suggest a complete re-evaluation of the Army's research and development organization. Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, General Gavin's successor as Chief of Research and Development, agreed. Following recommendations from the Chief of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Secretary Brucker appointed a seven-man board under the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management, George H. Roderick. The Roderick Board, which included Mr. Morse, General Trudeau, and Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier, the new Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, was to study the problem and make recommendations "without disturbing the existing organization of the Department." Mr. Morse tried to resurrect

[69] OCofT, Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 Jul 59 to 30 Jun 60, May 61, pp. 103–14. The LARC was chosen because the Ordnance's version sank in trials.
[70] OCRD Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1959, pp. 275–77.

the idea of a separate research and development command, but the chiefs of the technical services remained unanimously opposed.[71]

The Roderick Board report, submitted in March 1959, suggested only a few minor changes, most of them aimed at improving the management of the Army's research and development programs. The Chief of Research and Development should improve long-range planning review and analysis, and change the Army's procedures for advising industry and the scientific community of its research objectives and requirements. His office should improve its performance in making scheduled reports on time. Greater emphasis on combat developments was also necessary.[72]

A year later, on 23 March 1960, Mr. Morse once more submitted his own proposal for a separate research and development command. His chief targets were the technical services which did not, he believed, enjoy "an unqualified reputation in the scientific community." The Army would have a satisfactory research and development program only if it were to increase its prestige and "overcome tradition." The command, he proposed, would serve under a Chief of Research and Development with full Deputy Chief of Staff status and an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development.

Such a field command would mean at least partially dismantling the technical service organization. The technical service chiefs naturally considered it as another attempt to functionalize them out of existence.[73]

The Army Scientific Advisory Panel approved Mr. Morse's proposal, but Secretary Brucker turned the matter back to the Roderick Board. General Trudeau opposed the Morse plan because it would involve "drastic changes in the basic structure and operating procedures of the Army." What was essential for a workable program was control over the men and money required to do the job. To achieve this goal he thought the Chief of Research and Development should be given "operational control" over technical service funds and personnel for research and development. He should be given a voice in assigning key research and development personnel throughout the Army and

[71] Naisawald, Army R&D History, pp. 114–17.
[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 116–21.
[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 121–24.

should rate the performance of technical service research and development chiefs. This would require giving research and development officials in the technical services greater authority over funds and personnel also.[74]

The senior officials of the department and the Army staff met on 15 June 1960 to consider the Roderick Board report, the Morse plan, and General Trudeau's proposal. Secretary Brucker requested that General Trudeau submit specific examples of difficulties he claimed he had been having with the technical services. General Trudeau came back with twelve instances, nearly all of them involving the Ordnance Corps, which accounted for over two-thirds of the Army's research development, testing, and evaluation funds. In one case the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics had told the technical services chiefs to ignore instructions from the Chief of Research and Development if they thought they conflicted with instructions from his office or were "not otherwise in the best interest of the service." Other complaints involved shifting research and development funds without the approval of the Chief of Research and Development, failure to consult with him on key personnel assignments, and failure to notify him of major development problems.[75]

After additional prodding from the Secretary of Defense, the Roderick Board recommended changes on 6 July along the lines suggested by General Trudeau. On 30 July 1960, Secretary Brucker repeated that no changes would be made in the existing structure of the Army. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics would still remain the principal channel of command between the Army staff and the technical services. The Chief of Research and Development would have a "parallel" line of authority to the technical services on matters in his area. He would control research and development personnel within the technical services through the bulk allotment of civilian personnel spaces to his office for further allocation to the technical services. He would contribute to the efficiency reports of research and development personnel in the technical services and be consulted on the assignment of key personnel throughout the Army's research and development organization. He would

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 125–29.
[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 129–31.

control allocation of such funds among the technical services. Finally, in line with the recommendations of the Roderick Board, he was instructed to improve the Army's long-range research and development planning, including forecasts of future requirements and technological developments, and to improve the Army's relations with industry and the scientific community.[76]

In summary, after World War II the Army's research and development program went through three distinct phases. Before the Korean War declining appropriations and the department's constant preoccupation with current daily crises led to the disappearance of "Research and Development" as a major effort. The Korean War renewed interest in the subject, and a struggle began between scientists, who wished a separate General Staff division, and elements of the Army staff, who insisted on its continued subordination to logistics. Between 1955 and 1961, as Chiefs of Research and Development, General Gavin and General Trudeau fought to remove controls from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics over the men, money, and matériel required for their programs. Except for the civilian scientists, the Army staff continued to oppose creating an independent research and development command because it involved the independence and integrity of the technical services.

Combat Developments

In the fall of 1950 General Gavin, then Director of the Defense Department's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, accompanied a group of scientists, including Dr. Edward Bowles, to Korea to investigate tactical air support problems. They came away convinced that "something had to be done to improve our capability to conduct land warfare." [77]

The Army, Navy, and Air Force jointly requested the California Institute of Technology to investigate the problems of tactical air support and of generally how to improve weapons, techniques, and tactics. In addition to specific recommendations for developing new weapons, Project VISTA advocated

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 131–40 .

[77] (1) See pages 248–49 above. (2) Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, pp. 129–32.

creation of a "Combat Developments" organization within the Army to include a Combat Developments Center for testing new tactical doctrine of troops in the field.[78]

Following these recommendations the Chief of Staff in June 1952 ordered the Chief of Army Field Forces to establish a combat developments organization within his office. This was done with the creation on 1 October 1952 of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments. The Chief of Army Field Forces in turn ordered that combat developments departments be established at the Command and General Staff College and the four combat arms schools. An Office of Special Weapons Developments was set up at Fort Bliss, Texas, in December 1952 as the first combat developments field agency of the Army to assist in developing and testing "the military application of atomic energy as it affects the doctrine, organization, equipment, and training of the Army in the field." At the same time Army Field Forces contracted with the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University to set up an operations research office within the headquarters of the Chief of Army Field Forces.[79]

As Army Field Forces defined the concept in 1953, combat developments was "The research, development, testing, and early integration into units in the field, of new doctrines, new organization, and new materiel to obtain the greatest combat effectiveness using the minimum of men, money, and materials." There were thus three distinct areas, the development of doctrine, the development of organization, both former functions of G–3, and also the development of weapons and matériel, a function of the Research and Development Section in Headquarters, Army Field Forces.[80] Under Change 3 to Special Regulation 10–51 of 16 July 1953 Army Field Forces responsibilities for developing new tactics and techniques included determining the effect of new weapons, matériel, and

[78] (1) Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, p. 132. (2) Marshall D. Moody, The Transportation Corps Combat Developments Program: Its Origin and Status, OCofT, 30 Apr 58, pp. 1–4. (3) Historical Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Unit Training and Readiness, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, Historical Background of USCONARC Participation in Combat Development and Materiel Development Activities, Dec 63, p. 3. Hereafter cited as CONARC Combat and Materiel Development History.

[79] CONARC Combat and Materiel Development History, pp. 4–5.

[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–3, 8, 46–49.

techniques on tactics and doctrine, formulating new doctrines and procedures for their employment, and supervising the various boards and agencies which tested them. In the development of matériel Army Field Forces responsibilities were limited to determining military requirements for new weapons and equipment normally used by field armies. The technical services remained responsible for matériel not normally used in field armies.

This regulation indicated the complex organizational relationships that were involved in combat developments. Coordinating the efforts of Army Field Forces with those of individual Army staff agencies, with the technical services, and with the Air Force and Navy in joint projects involved an enormous amount of administrative delay.

Within Army Field Forces one of the earliest problems arose out of the difficulties the Combat Developments Division within G–3 experienced in developing long-range programs. Understandably, it had become too involved in current operations. The solution was to form a special study group of military officers, who were to work closely with the Johns Hopkins University civilian analysts as a combat operations research group, known as CORG.

At approximately the same time the Combat Developments Division itself was abolished and reorganized as the Combat Developments Group. While the G–3 division remained responsible for short-range developments in doctrine, the new group would project requirements for and develop necessary changes in organization, doctrine, tactics, and requirements for new matériel "at least ten years in the future." [81]

Dissatisfaction with the progress of combat developments led Secretary of the Army Stevens in February 1954 to appoint Dr. Leland J. Haworth, Director of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, chairman of a small group of civilian scientists known as the Ad Hoc Committee on Combat Developments to investigate the problem. The committee's report recommended strengthening the Army's combat developments program through greater centralized control. The Davies Committee and Slezak reports agreed, and on 1 February 1955 the formal controls of the U.S. Continental Army Command, successor of

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–10.

the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, over the Army's combat developments program were strengthened. Supervised by the General Staff divisions most directly concerned (Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and later the Chief of Research and Development), CONARC was henceforth responsible for the general direction of this program throughout the Army, including the technical services. The department made this clear by directing the seven technical and three administrative services to create their own combat developments agencies to work with CONARC's combat developments organization. This forced the technical services to concentrate their previously scattered combat developments functions into a single agency.[82]

The Combat Developments Section became a CONARC general staff division in September 1956. The U.S. Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center at Fort Ord, California, was established on 1 November 1956 to conduct tests and experiments with new concepts, organizations, doctrine, and tactics for future combat operations armies in the field. At about the same time a scientific research office, the Research Office Test and Experimentation Center (ROTEC), was set up in Monterey, California (later moved to Fort Ord), to work with this new agency.[83]

CONARC's responsibilities for the development of matériel also increased. The Development and Test (later called the Materiel Development) Section became a fifth general staff section of CONARC, reflecting similar changes in the Army General Staff. This agency was to supervise development of matériel for use in combat, advise CONARC and the Department of the Army on matériel requirements, co-ordinate preparation of the military characteristics of new weapons and equipment, supervise matériel testing by CONARC boards, maintain contact with development agencies like the technical services and outside contractors, evaluate CONARC matériel service tests, and, finally, to recommend adoption, or type classification, of matériel by the Army for combat deployment.[84]

The Armour Research Foundation (ARF) of the Illinois

[82] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 12–14. (2) Moody, TC Combat Developments History, pp. 4–7.
[83] CONARC Combat and Materiel Development History, pp. 14–15, 51–52.
[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 50–54.

Institute of Technology, under contract to CONARC, submitted a "Management Engineering Study of the Combat Developments System" on 31 March 1959. This study suggested among other things that the combat developments activities of the technical and administrative services be placed under the direct command of the Deputy Commanding General for Development, CONARC, and that the combat developments groups at the CONARC schools report directly to the Commanding General, CONARC, rather than through the school commandants. CONARC rejected these recommendations on two grounds. It said that current procedures for dealing with the technical and administrative services were satisfactory and that the change proposed would conflict "with established command channels within the overall Army organization." As a practical matter the suggested change in the relations between the combat developments groups in the schools and CONARC, the latter asserted, would require establishment of "an autonomous command which included at one site the staff, facilities, and troops necessary to execute all aspects of combat developments." The Haworth Committee had recommended this, but CONARC was not prepared to go this far.[85]


CONARC's organization indicating the status of its combat and matériel development agencies in January 1959 is outlined on *Chart 23*. After ten years the Army's program for combat developments was still a loose-jointed arrangement among CONARC, the General Staff (where three agencies were involved), and the technical and administrative services. Coordination and concurrences required to reach decisions on new weapons and equipment among so many agencies still required an enormous amount of time. This was equally true of the Army's research and development programs and symptomatic of the lack of effective executive control in these areas.

The Continental Army Command

The continental armies went through three major changes in their relations with the Department of the Army during the 1950s. One change was the inauguration of a combat developments program, discussed above. Another concerned the house-

[85] Tab B: Program and Review, Semiannual Report for USCONARC Summary, Combat Developments Section, 1 Jul-31 Dec 59, pp. 10-14.

CHART 23—OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS, HEADQUARTERS, USCONARC, 1 JANUARY 1959



Source: Organization & Functions Manual, Hq, USCONARC, 1 January 1959.

keeping functions performed by the continental armies for the technical service Class II installations within their jurisdiction. A third change involved resurrecting the principle of Army Ground Forces as a field command with command authority over the continental armies.

Housekeeping

The housekeeping functions performed after World War II by continental Army commanders as landlords for their tenants, the Class II technical service installations, became a chronic source of irritation for the Army commanders who had to perform them, the technical services chiefs who complained service was inadequate, and the Army staff which had to referee the disputes that constantly arose.

The Army commanders in 1948 had sought full command and authority over all installations in their areas. This led to setting up Operation TACT in the Third Army area as a pilot project for testing the practicality of the Army commanders'

proposals. The Army staff considered the test a failure and attempted only to define more precisely the housekeeping responsibility of Army commanders for Class II installations in Special Regulation 10–500–1 of 11 April 1950.

This regulation listed more than sixty administrative and support functions that Army commanders were responsible for providing for Class II installations in their areas. The principal functions were repairs and utilities, accounting for 48 percent of the funds involved, and motor transport, accounting for another 17 percent. Others included manpower ceilings and authorizations; personnel funds; security and intelligence; information, education, and special services for military personnel and public relations; inspections; and common supply services such as food, medical care, and general supplies for installation operation.[86]

Despite this effort Army commanders and technical service chiefs continued to quarrel over responsibility for repairs and utilities, personnel authorizations, and motor pools. The Management Division of the Army Comptroller's Office, after a series of detailed investigations of technical service installations between 1950 and 1953, concluded that at least budgets and personnel required for repairs and utilities at these installations should be charged to the technical services.[87]

During this same period the Management Division of Headquarters, First Army, surveyed the housekeeping problems of selected technical service installations within its area. One major finding was that First Army did not have sufficient personnel to carry out its assigned housekeeping responsibilities. On the average, 32 percent of the military personnel spaces authorized in 1953 were not filled. Requests to convert these spaces to civilian positions were rejected by the General Staff because of arbitrary manpower ceilings imposed by Congress. As a result, Class II installations often had to divert their own funds to these functions.[88]

Repairs and utilities (R&U) created conflicts between

[86] (1) See Chapter V, above, pages 171–74. (2) Management Division, Headquarters, First Army, First Army Survey Appraisal of Relationships Now Established by Special Regulation 10-500-1, c. Oct 53, pp. 1–4, and Annex, pp. 1–6. In OCMH files. Hereafter cited as First Army Survey.

[87] First Army Survey, p. 4.

[88] *Ibid.*, Tab H, pp. 1–4.

Army commanders and their technical service tenants because failure to perform these functions directly interfered with the latter's primary functions. Without them they could not operate. These functions included changes to and maintenance of real property, permanently installed equipment, utility services, plants and systems, fire protection, packing and crating, and insect and rodent control. Ordnance Department and Chemical Warfare Service industrial plants and arsenals which built and operated their own utilities were exempted.

It was difficult to determine what was properly repairs and utilities and what was the responsibility of the technical services. Maintaining and repairing production machinery and equipment, a responsibility of the technical services, was "dependent upon" maintenance functions paid for by R&U funds. Often there were separate repair shops set up for each category.

Planning and budgeting through two separate command channels created frequent delays, particularly when there was disagreement over priorities. The technical services resorted to diverting funds from their primary missions when they could not obtain sufficient funds from Army commanders. The First Army survey pointed out that had the technical services not diverted these funds the operations of their installations might have broken down or at least been seriously impaired. At one Quartermaster depot in upstate New York there were no R&U funds for snow removal. Prompt shipments in and out of the depot were considered vital for national defense; therefore Quartermaster funds were diverted to meet the immediate emergency. The Ordnance Corps often used emergency "expediting-production" funds for R&U projects. In defense of the Army commanders, the First Army survey said that they were often not informed sufficiently in advance of Class II requirements for R&U projects, a weakness it attributed directly to the system of dual command.

The survey concluded that, while there were many areas that could be improved within the existing system, basically the system of dual command was at fault. The Army commanders ought not to be assigned responsibility for support functions directly affecting the primary operations of Class II installations. Such matters as Red Cross, military police and justice, or fire protection did not fall in this category and

should remain the responsibility of Army commanders. These minor functions aside, "Class II installations and Class II activities should be provided with funds and personnel authorizations for mission and support functions through a single channel—the Parent Department or Army agency." [89]

The Davies Committee studied the First Army survey and recommended that responsibility for funds and personnel required to support Class II installations be assigned to the technical services. The Slezak report agreed and decided that this time unity of command, the basic concept that "a Commander must have control of the resources required for the accomplishment of his mission," should be decided in favor of the technical services instead of the Army commanders. As a result, under Army Regulation 10–50 of 25 March 1955 Army commanders were relieved generally of responsibility for providing funds, personnel, and other resources for principal Class II mission and support activities. They retained responsibility only for common support functions incidental to these primary missions: chaplains, military justice and provost marshal services, counterintelligence, medical and dental services, public information and troop education programs, and general inspection and review. Thus ended a decade of constant irritation and friction between the continental armies and the technical services.

The Establishment of CONARC

The Davies Committee's major criticism of the continental armies was that the Army's organizational framework for military operations and training was diffuse and confusing. The commanders of all the continental armies and the Military District of Washington reported directly to the Chief of Staff, and the General Staff was too involved in minor administrative decisions concerning the continental armies that ought to be made at a lower level.

The committee believed a Continental Army Command along the lines of the wartime Army Ground Forces would provide more effective control over the continental armies and relieve the General Staff of unnecessary involvement in operations. In addition to absorbing the current functions of the

[89] *Ibid.*, Tab I, pp. 1–19, and Main Report, pp. 6–8.

Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, a revitalized AGF should review plans, programs, and budgets for the continental armies, supervise individual and unit training, and direct the activities of the testing boards and the preparation of long-range combat developments plans.[90]

The Slezak report approved these recommendations, and under Change 7 of 1 February 1955 to Special Regulation 10–5–1 the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, was redesignated Headquarters, Continental Army Command, with command over the six continental armies, MDW, the five service test boards, an Arctic Test Branch, and three Human Resources Research units.[91]

In addition to performing the functions recommended by the Davies Committee, CONARC was also to be responsible for logistical and administrative support of the continental armies, except Class II installations. It assumed the functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, for approving tables of organization and equipment and for preparing and reviewing tables of allowances. It was also assigned responsibility for preparing and executing plans for the "ground defense of the United States" and for preparing plans to assist civil authorities in disaster relief and controlling domestic disturbances.[92]

Despite its increased responsibilities on paper for financial management CONARC remained in concept and practice a tactical command like an Army group headquarters, "with the ZI Army Commanders acting as deputies to the CG, USCONARC for the administration of their own army areas," functions they had been performing since 1948. McKinsey and Company in its 1955 report thought effective control over the continental armies required that CONARC assume greater administrative responsibilities for supporting the ZI armies and eliminating General Staff involvement in these functions.[93]

More specifically McKinsey and Company recommended

[90] Davies Committee Report, pp. 39–41.

[91] Summary of Major Events and Problems, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, 1 Jul 54–31 Jan 55, and 1 Feb–30 Jun 55, pt. I, Introductory Narrative, pp. 1–2.

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 3–10.

[93] (1) Expansion of the United States Continental Army Command Mission—1, General Concept of CONARC Mission. Summary of Major Events and Problems, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, 1 Jul 56–30 Jun 57, p. 1. Hereafter cited as CONARC Annual Summary, FY 1957. (2) McKinsey Report, pt. II, pp. 3-1–3-3.

that CONARC be assigned responsibility for distributing bulk manpower authorizations and for allocating personnel spaces within its command. Instead of confining itself to the Army's troop training program, CONARC should direct development and execution of all programs and missions of the CONUS armies, including supply and administrative support. The essential requirements, it asserted, was that CONARC gain "control over missions, programs, money, and manpower resources for managing the ZI Armies." [94]

Under Army Regulation 10–7 of 4 April 1957 the Army group concept of CONARC was replaced by that of an overseas theater command with full control over the resources needed to direct the operations of the ZI armies as McKinsey and Company had recommended. CONARC's new responsibilities included manpower controls over both civilian and military personnel and the planning, direction, and control of nearly all major administrative and logistical support activities within the ZI armies. Under the Army's revised "Program System," as outlined in Army Regulation 11–1 of 31 December 1956, CONARC was made responsible, beginning in fiscal year 1959, for development, execution, and review and analysis of the new installations, matériel, reserve components, and research and development programs. Its new financial management responsibilities included the direction of progress and statistical reporting and the provision of "management engineering" assistance. It was also assigned responsibility for intelligence activities within the continental armies and for the management and direction of Army aviation training except for units under the command of the Chief of Transportation.

Further changes gave CONARC control over training of civil affairs and military government personnel and units in both the active Army and Reserve Components and over the management of hospitals, dispensaries, and other medical facilities. Following the 1958 recommendations of the "Report of the Officer Education and Training Review Board," in September 1960 the Commanding General, USCONARC, was designated Director of the Army Service School System and assigned responsibility for supervising curricula and instruction, among other things. The Military Academy and certain

[94] McKinsey Report, pp. 3-10–3-22.

advanced Army schools like the War College, the Army Logistics Management School, and professional medical courses were excluded. At this same time, CONARC's practical control over technical and administrative service schools remained very limited.[95]

The organizational changes discussed in this chapter were internal ones within the Department of the Army and the continental armies. The Palmer reorganizations of the Army staff represented a swing of the pendulum away from the effort made in 1950 to centralize control over the department and the Army under the three-deputy system. General Palmer sought instead to centralize control at the next lower level under the several General Staff divisions, vesting them with greater authority over the technical services and special staff agencies.

Despite General Palmer's efforts, control over Army logistics and the technical services remained necessarily fragmented among the General Staff divisions. The addition of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, created as the result of pressure from the scientific community both within and outside the Army, complicated the problem further.

The establishment of CONARC as a unified field command represented a return to the wartime concept of Army Ground Forces. In this change the fragmented control over the continental armies among the General Staff divisions was abandoned for centralized control in a single command. At the same time the divided authority exercised by the continental Army commanders and the chiefs of the technical services over housekeeping functions performed at technical service installations, a constant headache for all concerned after World War II, was abolished. The technical services were made responsible for the bulk of their own housekeeping functions.

The same technological developments which led to creation of the Office of the Chief of Research and Development and a separate Assistant Secretary for Research and Development resulted at the level of CONARC in efforts to set up an effective combat developments program which would combine new weapons and equipment with new tactical doctrines. The pro-

[95] (1) CONARC Annual Summary, FY 1957, pp. 1–11. (2) Introductory Narrative, Summary of Major Events and Problems, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, Fiscal Year 1960, p. 1. (3) *Ibid.*, 1961, p. 3.

gram was still in its infancy at the end of the decade, plagued by the same fragmented control over its operations that bedeviled Army logistics generally.

These internal changes within the Department of the Army took place within the framework of organizational changes at the Department of Defense level that not only influenced Army structure but also changed the position of the Department of the Army within the Department of Defense. Particularly important were changes in the fields of financial management, common supply activities, and control over military operations.

CHAPTER VII

The Defense Environment of the 1950s

The Secretary of Defense under the National Security Act of 1947 had little authority over the three armed services. The first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, in fact, had been hoist by his own pétard. As Secretary of the Navy he had helped convince Congress that the new Secretary should have a bare minimum of authority over the services and only a very small staff. As the first Secretary of Defense, Forrestal found himself embarrassed and harassed by open interservice rivalries which he lacked the authority to settle. Twice, in conferences with the Joint Chiefs at Key West in March 1948 and at Newport in September of the same year, he thought he had negotiated an armistice only to discover that the services interpreted these agreements in terms of their own parochial interests. Another discovery was that he had little effective control over defense budgets either.[1]

Forrestal in 1948 recommended to the President amending the National Security Act of 1947 to provide the Secretary of Defense with greater authority and control over the military services. The Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government established by Congress in July 1947 under former President Herbert C. Hoover agreed with the Secretary in its report. Acting on these recommendations Congress passed the National Security Act amendments of 1949 (Public Law 216 of 10 August 1949) which redesignated the National Military Establishment as the Department of Defense, provided the Secretary of Defense with a deputy and three assistant secretaries, including a Comptroller, and created a nonvoting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The service secretaries lost their seats on the National Security Council,

[1] Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics," in Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 467–89.

their cabinet status, and their direct access to the President but not to Congress.[2]

The Introduction of Functional Budgets

The National Security Act amendments of 1949 had also granted the Secretary of Defense greater control over financial management which he used to reorganize the military budgets along functional lines. The impetus for the reform came from industrialists outside the military establishment, in particular the Hoover Commission Task Force on National Security Organization headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a New York investment broker who had assisted Mr. Forrestal earlier in developing the Navy's unification proposals.[3]

The Hoover Commission in its recommendations for reforming federal administrative management to provide greater executive control over operations had taken up where President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management had left off ten years earlier. Before then the traditional focus of administration generally and of budgets in particular was honesty, efficiency, and economy epitomized in the Army's doctrine of accountability. The Roosevelt Committee, opposed at the time by traditionalists, had inaugurated a new period of administration where the emphasis was on executive control over operations through vertical integration along functional lines, management engineering techniques for work measurement, and functional budgets. The Bureau of the Budget took the lead in this movement. In the Army the leadership had come from General Somervell and his Control Division. The demise of Army Service Forces at the hands of the traditionalists

[2] (1) Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 236–44. (2) Schilling, "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal Year 1950," pp. 98–109. (3) Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 149–50. (4) Timothy W. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), pp. 84–94.

[3] (1) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 32–37. (2) 81st Cong., 1st sess., House Document 86, *The National Security Organization—Letter from the Chairman, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government . . . 28 February 1949* (Washington, 1949), pages 23–24 list fourteen members of the Eberstadt Task Force, plus a nine-member Military Advisory Committee, and nine consultants of whom six were military officers, one an investment banker, another a journalist, and one an industrialist. Of the task force committee besides Mr. Eberstadt, six were industrialists, three were university presidents, two journalists, one a member of the AEC, and former Secretary of War Patterson.

stalled the movement within the Army until the Hoover Commission sparked its renewal, this time under the leadership of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense.[4]

The Army's budget reflected its fragmented organization. There were twenty-five major "projects" or appropriations classifications based upon the technical services, each with its own individual budget, which accounted for 80 percent of the funds spent by the Army. *(Table 1)* Neither the Secretary of the Army nor the General Staff possessed any effective control over these funds. Congressionally oriented procedures for spending and accounting for appropriated funds also made financial control difficult. The Army's various accounting systems only told Congress how much of the funds in any appropriation had been committed or obligated, not how much had been actually spent or when. They contained no information on what happened to matériel or supplies after their purchase. The existence at all levels of command of unfunded obligations, principally military pay, and expendable items were added impediments to rational financial control.

Congress emphasized the independence of the technical services in its traditional restrictions on transferring funds among major appropriations categories. Technical service chiefs could and did transfer funds freely among their various activities, functions, and installations, but neither the Secretary nor the General Staff could legally transfer funds among the several technical services or other staff agencies without going to Congress for approval.

Given these conditions there was no rational means of determining how much the Army's operations cost, no means of distinguishing between capital and operating expenses in most instances, and no means of determining inventory supplies on hand. Repeated requests for deficiency appropriations each year made even control by Congress over spending difficult.

Finally it was not possible to correlate budgets and appro-

[4] (1) Barry Dean Karl, *Executive Reorganization and Reform in the New Deal.* (2) Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," *Public Administration Review,* XVI, No. 4, December 1966, 243–53. (3) Arthur Smithies, "Conceptual Framework for the Program Budget," in David Novick, ed., *Program Budgeting: Programming and Analysis and the Federal Budget* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 29–34.

TABLE 1—LIST OF MAJOR PROJECTS AND SUB-PROJECTS INCLUDED IN FISCAL YEAR 1949 BUDGET OF THE ARMY MILITARY (ACTIVITIES) FUNCTIONS

Office of the Secretary of the Army
- A. Contingencies of the Army
- B. Penalty Mail—Military Functions

General Staff Corps
- C. Field Exercises
- D. National War College
- E. Inter-American Relations—Department of the Army

Finance Department
- F. Finance Service, Army
  1. Pay of the Army
  2. Travel of the Army
  3. Expenses of Courts-Martial
  4. Apprehension of deserters
  5. Finance Service—for compensation to clerks and other employees of Finance Department
  6. Claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property, or personal injury, or death
  7. Claims of military and civilian personnel of the Army for destruction of private property
- G. Retired Pay, Army

Quartermaster Corps
- H. Quartermaster Service, Army
  1. Welfare of enlisted men
  2. Subsistence of the Army
  3. Regular supplies of the Army
  4. Clothing and equipage
  5. Incidental expenses of the Army

Transportation Corps
- I. Transportation Service, Army

Signal Corps
- J. Signal Service of the Army

Medical Department
- K. Medical and Hospital Department

Corps of Engineers
- L. Engineer Service, Army
  1. Engineer Service
  2. Barracks and quarters, Army
  3. Military posts

Ordnance Department
- M. Ordnance Service and Supplies, Army

Chemical Corps
- N. Chemical Service, Army

Army Ground Forces
- O. Training and Operation, Army Ground Forces
- P. Command and General Staff College

TABLE 1—LIST OF MAJOR PROJECTS AND SUB-PROJECTS INCLUDED IN FISCAL YEAR 1949 BUDGET OF THE ARMY MILITARY (ACTIVITIES) FUNCTIONS—*Continued*

United States Military Academy
- Q. Pay of Military Academy
- R. Maintenance and Operation, U.S. Military Academy

National Guard
- S. National Guard

Organized Reserves
- T. Organized Reserves

Reserve Officers' Training Corps
- U. Reserve Officers' Training Corps

National Board for Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army
- V. Promotion of Rifle Practice

Departmental Salaries and Expenses
- W. Salaries, Department of the Army
  1. Office of Secretary of the Army
  2. Office of Chief of Staff
  3. Adjutant General's Office
  4. Office of Inspector General
  5. Office of Judge Advocate General
  6. Office of Chief of Finance
  7. Office of Quartermaster General
  8. Office of Chief of Transportation
  9. Office of Chief Signal Officer
  10. Office of Chief of Special Services
  11. Office of Provost Marshal General
  12. Office of Surgeon General
  13. Office of Chief of Engineers
  14. Office of Chief of Ordnance
  15. Office of Chief of Chemical Corps
  16. Office of Chief of Chaplains
  17. National Guard Bureau

Office of the Secretary
- X. Contingent Expenses, Department of the Army
- Y. Printing and Binding, Department of the Army

Source: Cresap, McCormick and Paget Final Report, 15 Apr 49, p. III-17.

priations with the military plans, missions, functions, and operations of the Army as a whole.[5]

After investigating these conditions Mr. Hoover told Congress that he and his committee thought the military budget

[5] (1) Cresap, McCormick and Paget Final Report, sec. III, pp. 16–22. (2) Testimony of Wilfred J. McNeil, DOD Comptroller, in U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1952, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee of Appropriations*, House of Representatives, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1951), pp. 1187–88.

system had broken down. The Army and Navy budget structures were antique. "They represent an accumulation of categories arrived at on an empirical and historical basis. They do not permit ready comparisons, they impede administration, and interfere with the efficiency of the Military Establishment. Congress allocates billions without accurate knowledge as to why they are necessary or what they are being used for." Both Hoover and Eberstadt agreed that the efficient operation of the Defense Department required a complete overhaul of the military budget structure and its procedures and fiscal policies.

Hoover urged reorganizing the budget "on a functional or performance basis, by which the costs of a given function can be compared year by year. . . ." Eberstadt recommended that the Secretary of Defense have full authority and control over the preparation and expenditure of the defense budget, assuring "clear and direct accountability to the President . . . and the Congress through a single official." [6]

Title IV of the National Security Act amendments reflected the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and the Eberstadt Committee on financial management. Section 401 established the Office of Comptroller in the Department of Defense and delegated broad authority to him over the financial operations of the department. The Comptroller was to direct preparation of the department's budget estimates, including the formulation of uniform terminology, budget classifications, and procedures. He was responsible for supervising accounting procedures and statistical reporting. Section 402 provided for comptrollers in each of the three services responsible directly to the service secretaries and acting in accordance with directions from the Defense Department Comptroller. The fiscal, administrative, and managerial organization and procedures of the several departments, it declared, should be compatible with those of the Office of the Defense Department Comptroller.

[6] (1) Summary of Pertinent Findings . . . by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Tab H to Tabbed Materials on Improvement of the Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army, Management Division, OCA, pp. 15–16. (2) Herbert Hoover, "Removing Obstacles to Economy and to Competence in Government," in Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report, *The National Reorganization Conference* (New York, 1949), vol. III, sec. 1, p. 8. (3) "Comparison of Deficiencies and Recommendations Noted by the Hoover Commission and by This Report," in Cresap, McCormick and Paget Final Report. (4) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 32–37.

Section 403 called for adoption of "Performance" budgets and new accounting methods which would "account for and report the cost of performance of readily identifiable functional programs and activities, with segregation of operating and capital programs." It also required the service budgets to follow a uniform pattern. Section 405 provided for working capital funds to finance retail and industrial activities within each service such as Quartermaster depots and Ordnance arsenals.[7]

Performance budgets meant nothing until the new Department of Defense Comptroller identified what functional budget classifications to adopt. The first Comptroller of the Department of Defense was Wilfred J. McNeil who remained in this position for a record ten years. He was intimately familiar with defense budgets and financial practices as *de facto* Comptroller of the Navy since 1945, following similar service in uniform during World War II. He helped Mr. Eberstadt prepare his report on military financial management and participated in drafting Title IV of the National Security Act amendments of 1949.

Mr. McNeil later said "There were entirely too many fiscal masters; fiscal management was divorced from management responsibility; and there were no clear lines of authority for responsibility and management; it was all diffused. Money and responsibility should parallel each other in any business operation—otherwise there can't be any tight reins on spending. If the man responsible for operating something has to account for where the money goes, he's naturally going to make sure it isn't spent for something it should not be." [8]

One of McNeil's first reforms was the inauguration on 17 May 1950 of the new performance budget with eight broad functional classifications in place of the traditional technical service oriented budget. For the Army they were military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and produc-

[7] Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 36–42.

[8] (1) William O. Harris, An Appraisal of Military Comptrollership, ICAF Student Thesis No. 59, 31 Mar 61, M61-92, *passim*. Harris identifies Mr. McNeil on page 60. On page 24 he quotes Mr. McNeil who indicated that the name "Performance Budget" was more or less accidental. Mr. Hoover, Mr. McNeil, and several others in a conference struggled with various names until Mr. Hoover concluded, "You have been talking about measure of performance. Why not call it a Performance Budget?" (2) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, p. 37. (3) Charlotte Knight, "Mystery Man of the Pentagon," *Colliers* (22 January 1954), pp. 30–36. The quotation from Mr. McNeil is from this article, page 31.

tion, research and development, military construction, army national guard, reserve personnel requirements, national guard military construction, and army civilian components.

With this one directive McNeil wiped out the independent budgets of the technical services dating back in some instances to the Revolution. The chiefs no longer would defend their budgets before Congress. Instead this would be the responsibility of the several General Staff divisions. Congressional restrictions on transferring funds among appropriations would hamstring the technical services rather than the General Staff. Although they would continue to spend the largest amount of the Army's budget, the technical services would do so under the supervision and control of several General Staff divisions.[9]

The General Staff gained further control over technical service budgets through its membership on a new Budget Advisory Committee (BAC) (Army Regulation 15–35, 2 October 1951). The technical services were not represented on this committee which passed on their budget requests. Under the old system the General Staff had little choice but to forward the technical services' requests. Under the new system the technical services had to justify their budgets in detail before the BAC.[10]

The Army's functional budget was similar to those developed in modern industrial corporations to control their operations. It told in detail what it cost to support the Army in terms of men and material resources. It did not reveal the other side of the picture, the cost of the Army's operations at home or abroad. It did not reveal the gap which had grown, as General Marshall had warned, between American military commitments and the resources available to meet them following World War II.

To close the gap both the Hoover Commission and Cresap, McCormick and Paget had recommended the development of an "Army Program System" that would translate strategic plans into functional operating programs which in turn could be translated into the new functional budget.

The Army accepted these recommendations in principle

[9] Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 87–90.

[10] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 124–90. (2) Charles A. Riegle, Program Management in the Department of the Army, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, Jun 53, pp. 134–36. Copy in Army Library.

and on 12 April 1950 announced the inauguration of the new system which would assist in the alignment of resources and military requirements. Theoretically the Army Programs were intended to be concrete operational plans designed to translate JCS strategic plans into action. They were to include a detailed time schedule for meeting specified program objectives, the resources required in detail, and a means of reviewing progress. The program cycle would contain three phases: program development, when plans would be translated into operating programs; program execution, when they would be translated into budgets, later into appropriations, and finally carried out; and program review and analysis. The department assigned responsibility for program development to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, for program execution to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, and program review and analysis to the Comptroller.[11]

Translating these theoretical concepts into action required time to adjust and revise operating programs in practical terms to reflect planning missions at one end and at the other to relate as closely as possible to budget classifications. It also took more time to educate all levels of the Army in the mechanics of the new system.

There were interruptions. The Korean War pushed the new Program System into the background. Budget requests to support the Korean War were developed in a series of "crash actions" as deficiency appropriations requests in addition to the normal annual budget requests. Deadlines imposed by the Korean emergency did not allow time to translate plans into programs and then into budgets. It was not until after the

[11] (1) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 50–56. (2) Management Division, OCA, Programming—A Presentation to the General Staff, Jun 49. Tab V to Management Division, OCA, Tabbed Materials on Improvement of Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army. (3) Riegle, Program Management, pp. 180–92, 215. (4) Joseph Bykofsky, Program Management: A Tool of Command, OCofT, HRO Monograph, 31 Jan 60. (5) Cresap, McCormick and Paget Final Report, secs. II, pp. 15–16, III, pp. 10–16, and IV, pp. 6–10, 17–36. (6) Field Manual 101–51, Department of the Army Planning System, 22 Sep 49. (7) Special Regulation 10–5–1, Organization and Functions, Department of the Army, 12 Apr 50. (8) Special Regulation 11–10–1, Army Programs, 25 May 50, revised as Army Programs—Primary Programs of the Army, 13 Sep 50. (9) *Ibid.*, Army Programs—Primary Programs of the Army—Program Structure and Development, 6 Aug 53. (10) Field Manual 101–54, Department of the Army Program Management, 2 Aug 50. (11) Field Manual 101–51, Department of the Army Planning and Programming Manual, 1 Jul 53.

Korean armistice in July 1953 that any attention could be paid to developing the new Program System.

It took two years just to develop the "Program Budgets" themselves into sufficient detail for submission to Congress. The element that caused the greatest difficulty and required the most indoctrination was the program planning phase. The Army was accustomed to submitting its budget request six months before the President submitted his total budget to Congress and a year in advance of the fiscal year for which the funds were requested. Under the Army Program System the cycle for translating strategic plans into detailed operating programs began one year ahead of the budget cycle or two years before the target fiscal year. The programs in turn were based on JCS mid-range planning projected several years ahead of the target year. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, as it was designated to distinguish it from long-range planning estimates and short-range contingency or capabilities planning, set forth concrete military requirements in terms of major forces, strengths, facilities, and matériel. These became the Army Strategic Objectives Plan developed for two years before the target fiscal year that formed the basis for later developing Army Control Program Objectives. Concrete Program Objectives came next, accompanied by instructions, operating assumptions, and schedules for completing approved Control Programs in time to prepare budget requests for carrying out the programs. The co-ordination of plans and programs is indicated in *Chart 24*.[12]


Translating mission-oriented strategic plans into functionally oriented operating programs and again into functional budgets on schedule proved impossible. By the end of the decade the gap between military requirements laid down in strategic plans and the resources available in military appropriations was still enormous.[13]

The principal reason for this gap was the continued divorce at the very top of responsibility between strategic planning and budget preparation which General Marshall had warned against. The Joint Chiefs conceived their plans in terms of requirements for men and matériel without considering the

[12] (1) Field Manual 101-51, Department of the Army Planning and Programming Manual, 1 Oct 57, pp. 15-27. (2) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 60-70.

[13] Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense*, pp. 23-26.

CHART 24—JOINT-ARMY PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS



* When the initially developed budget undergoes a subsequent change resulting from decisions by higher authority, these changes are reflected through a corresponding revision of the control program.

Source: FM 101-51, DA, 1 Oct 57, DA Planning & Programming Manual, p. 16.

available funds. The Secretary of Defense continued to make decisions on budgets, particularly budget reductions, without adequate knowledge of the impact these decisions might have on U.S. military capabilities. He allocated funds in bulk to each of the three services which made further allocations within their own departments in accordance with their own priorities. Joint operations frequently suffered, notably when the Air Force could not provide the Army with military air transport.

Another reason for the disparity between Army plans and budgets was that its programs were rarely completed in time to be incorporated into current budget requests. Since generally the organizations or agencies responsible for developing programs also prepared the Army's budget estimates, the pressing requirements of current operations hampered program planning for the future. This handicap continued despite repeated revisions of the Army Program System.

Beginning in 1954 the Army developed a different approach, finally designated in 1959 as the Army Command Management System (ACMS). Under this system installation commanders received budget guidance in the form of five-year projected estimates, based on Army mid-range planning, which were revised annually with changes in Congressional appropriations. These estimates, called "Control Programs," involved five major areas: Troop, Materiel, Installations, Reserve Components, and Research and Development. Using these estimates installation commanders were supposed to prepare detailed requests for funds under twenty-one major functions covering the Army's nontactical peacetime support activities. *(Table 2)* The ACMS was intended to provide both cost and performance data for the amorphous budget category, Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&MA). However, Mr. McNeil's continued insistence on archaic obligation and expenditure data remained a major obstacle. Another problem was the effort to develop a prototype Class I installation automatic data processing system at Ft. Meade which would integrate supply, personnel, and financial reporting. In this pioneering research project one officer involved said the actual programming was "like dropping a ping-pong ball into a box-full of mouse traps and ping-pong balls. If you've ever tried it, you know that all hell breaks loose. We hit problems that were far more complex than

TABLE 2—TITLES AND CODE ZONE DESIGNATIONS OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ARMY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

Major Activity	Code Zone
Military Personnel, Army	1000.0000-1990.0000
Tactical Forces	2000.0000-2090.0000
Training Activities	2100.0000-2190.0000
Central Supply Activities	2200.0000-2290.0000
Major Overhaul and Maintenance of Materiel	2300.0000-2390.0000
Medical Activities	2400.0000-2490.0000
Army-wide Activities	2500.0000-2590.0000
Army Reserve and ROTC	2600.0000-2690.0000
Joint Projects	2700.0000-2790.0000
Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army	4000.0000-4990.0000
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation	5000.0000-5990.0000
Military Construction, Army	6000.0000-6990.0000
National Guard Personnel, Army	7000.0000-7090.0000
Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard	7100.0000-7990.0000
Reserve Personnel, Army	8000.0000-8490.0000
Military Construction, Army National Guard	8500.0000-8590.0000
Military Construction, Army Reserve	8600.0000-8690.0000
Operation and Maintenance of Facilities	9000.0000-9090.0000
Promotion of Rifle Practice	0500.0000-0590.0000
Army Industrial Fund Activities	3000.0000-3990.0000
Other Operational Activities	0800.0000-0990.0000

Source: AR 1-11, 17 Jan 58.

anyone ever dreamed. Every problem we hit begat a host of new ones, chain-reaction style. And on anything like this, you have to have all the kinks out." [14]

The development of functional budgets and programs was the principal effort in the 1950s to improve the Army's financial management. During this period continued criticism from agencies outside the Department of Defense focused on other problems that made effective control over the Army's finances difficult. The Flanders Committee in 1953 investigated the efforts of the military services to carry out the fiscal reforms

[14] (1) Bykofsky, Program Management, pp. 12-17, is an account at the working level of the difficulties which led the Army to adopt the ACMS instead of its more ambitious Primary Program System. (2) Harris, Military Comptroller, pp. 24-26, 39-40. (3) Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense*, pp. 23-27. (4) Fred Hamlin, "Why Frustration at Fort Meade?" *Armed Forces Management*, vol. VI, No. 10, Jul 60, pp. 27-28, 33. Quotation from p. 33. (5) AR 1-11, 17 Jan 58, Army Management Structure.

called for in the National Security Act amendments of 1949. It complained of the lack of progress in setting up uniform budget and accounting systems, revolving operating funds, and the development of adequate financial statistical reports.[15]

The Davies Committee report in December 1953 recommended integrating the Army's financial management systems with its formal command organization. The new functional budget and programing system ought to reflect the actual cost of Army operations, it said, on the basis of the "missions" the Army had to perform rather than the functional means of accomplishing them. The committee also criticized the existence within the Army of more than thirty separate accounting systems which could not be correlated rationally. There should be a single, uniform system of accounting that would adequately measure the "costs of performance." That meant the adoption of modern, "accrual" cost-accounting systems and double-entry bookkeeping at all levels of the Army.[16]

President Eisenhower's first Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, appointed a special Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization and Procedures within the Department of Defense, known as the Cooper Committee, which recommended replacing the traditional "obligation-allotment" form of accounting with modern "cost-of-performance" budgets as a more rational means of controlling defense costs. One committee member, Wilfred McNeil, disagreed. As Comptroller of the Department of Defense he was successful in preventing the adoption of this recommendation.[17]

The Second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government in 1955 again criticized military budgeting and accounting systems as archaic and recommended that Congress require budgets and accounting systems based on a cost-of-performance or "accrual" basis. Congress passed such a law in 1956 (Public Law 863, 89th Congress,

[15] *Flanders Committee Hearings.* See especially the Preliminary Report prepared for the committee by Franz Schneider and Carter L. Burgess of 28 July 1953, pages 159-207.

[16] Report of the Secretary of the Army's Advisory Committee on Army Organization, 18 Dec 53, pp. 15, 68-69.

[17] (1) Harris, Military Comptrollership, pp. 14-16. (2) See, for example, Report of the Industrial Activities Working Group, Prepared for the Advisory Committee on Fiscal Organization and Procedures, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Jul 54, pp. 15-51.

1 August 1956), but because of Mr. McNeil's opposition it remained largely a dead letter.[18]

The Area of Common Supplies and Services

Certainly one of the original reasons for the whole movement toward unification in the armed forces was the belief that separate service supply organizations were duplicating and wasteful. General Somervell's Army Service Forces was the principal champion of the idea of a completely unified supply and service system for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and it was largely because of the ASF influence that the War Department, in the first phases of the unification hearings, supported the idea of a unified supply organization. General Lutes, wartime ASF Director of Operations and in 1947 Director of Supply, Services, and Procurement on the General Staff, had a study prepared in January 1947 that declared:

> Procurement, supply and service operations will never be as efficient on the basis of voluntary cooperation as they can be if integration is required. . . . There are large savings to be had in unified service, supply and procurement for the Armed Forces. These are not only savings in money, but also savings in the resources that are scarce in time of war—men, material, facilities, time.[19]

By 1947, however, Lutes represented a voice crying in the wilderness as the Army in general backed away from the concept of a fourth military department handling supplies and services, even as it fragmented its own functions in this area by restoring the technical services to their former power and authority. The Navy had consolidated its own common supply functions in the 1890s under the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts but championed "voluntary cooperation" among the services in supply as well as in other fields. The fledgling independent Air Force, irked with its dependency on the Army supply system for many common supplies and services, sought to establish its own independent supply system. The Eisenhower-Spaatz agreement of 15 September 1947 provided that the Army and Air Force would use each other's services and facilities

[18] (1) Commission of the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Business Organization of the Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Jun 55, pp. 75–83. (2) Harris, Military Comptrollership, p. 10.

[19] J. C. Goldberg, Fourth Military Service, Individual Report on Problem No. 233, ICAF Economic Mobilization Course, Procurement Branch, 1951–52, 30 Jan 52, p. 4.

"where economy consistent with operational efficiency will result." According to some critics the Air Force interpreted "operational efficiency" as requiring a completely separate supply system regardless of duplication and overlap.

The Army position by the early 1950s had changed similarly. A single supply service, the Assistant Secretary of the Army asserted in 1951, would mean the military would lose "command control of supply and thus direction of military operations." The necessity for unity of command over military operations became, in all three services, the basis of opposition to any revival of the Somervell-Lutes proposals.[20]

The principal champions of integrated supply systems were to be found in Congress and the business world, not in the military services. Under constant prodding from the outside—by Congress and the two Hoover Commissions—the movement toward increased co-ordination and integration of service supply systems gained momentum between 1947 and 1960. The impact on the Army's technical services was considerable.

The National Security Act of 1947 gave the Secretary of Defense an ill-defined authority to eliminate duplication and overlap among the services in the supply area and created a co-ordinating authority in the Munitions Board which, along with other functions, was to work toward these ends.[21] The accomplishments of the Munitions Board along this line were not great, at least in part because some regarded it as the forerunner of a single defense supply service, but it did initiate some important programs that laid the basis for future developments, and it conducted many studies. Its main work was in the area of procurement where it originated what was later to be known as the Coordinated Procurement Program under which one service acted as purchasing agent for certain categories of items for the others. This arrangement provided benefits of consolidated purchasing such as lower prices and fewer purchasing personnel. It did not provide effective control over inventories nor eliminate the duplication created by the existence of

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 1–11.
[21] Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 27 July 47 (61 *Stat.*, 495), Sec. 213.

different storage and distribution systems, including the seven different systems of the Army technical services.[22]

Meanwhile, in 1948, Congress passed the Armed Forces Procurement Act, requiring the development of uniform procurement procedures for all the military departments. The main purpose of the act was to free the military services from the prewar requirement that all procurement in peacetime be by open competitive bidding, a requirement that was impractical in many cases. The act spelled out specific requirements that must be met to justify negotiated contracts. To carry out the purposes of the act a special committee drafted a set of Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR's) that became, with their periodic revisions, the bible of procurement procedures for the Department of Defense.

Not unexpectedly performance did not live up to ASPR's promise. The Second Hoover Commission Task Force on Military Procurement in 1955 stated the ASPR lacked adequate coverage. Consequently it had spawned a mass of subordinate individual service regulations. There was also, it said, a wide gap between the ASPR and actual procurement procedures at the working level in the field which frustrated contractors. The Task Force recommended rewriting the ASPR to take care of these deficiencies.[23]

Other important steps in the 1947–50 period included the establishment of the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) and the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) with responsibilities for handling ocean surface transportation and air transportation, respectively, for the three services. The

[22] (1) H. D. Linscott, Jr., The Evolution of Integrated Materiel Management in the Department of Defense, ICAF Student Thesis No. 76, M 61–49, 31 Mar 61, pp. 4–14, 101–02. (2) Robert R. Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management in the Department of Defense: Development and Prospects, ICAF Student Thesis No. 48, M 63–96, 29 Mar 63, pp. 4–5, 11–12. (3) Hubert S. Cunningham, The Organization and Management of the Department of Defense Wholesale Supply System, USAWC Student Thesis AWC LOG 61-2-41U, 10 Feb 61, p. 27. (4) 86th Cong., 2d sess., Joint Committee Print, *Background Materials on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply*. Materials prepared for the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 16 Feb 60, p. 38. Hereafter cited as Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*.

[23] (1) John P. Miller, *Pricing of Military Procurement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 227–29. (2) Task Force Report on Military Procurement, Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, June 1955, p. 101. The chairman of the Task Force was Roger W. Wolcott, chairman of the Board of the Lukens Steel Company.

activation of MSTS removed the Army Transportation Corps from the field of shipping in which it had been engaged since the Spanish-American War. On the other hand, insistence on unity of command over operations frustrated efforts to create an integrated military land transportation service in the United States until 1956.[24]

The First Hoover Commission report in 1949 did not, as the second report was to do, recommend a radical alteration of the DOD logistics structure. However, it did recommend that ". . . the National Security Act of 1947 be specifically amended so as to strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense in order that he may integrate the organization and procedures of the various phases of supply in the constituent departments of the National Military Establishment." [25] The provisions of the National Security Act amendments in 1949 concerning the establishment of performance budgets, stock and industrial funds, and cost-of-performance accounting made greater integration of defense activities possible. The stock fund principle introduced in the Army as a result—the Navy had long had one and the Air Force was never to use stock funding to any considerable degree—greatly facilitated cross-servicing and provided a mechanism for the later operation of single managers.

Another outgrowth of the Hoover Commission report was the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 creating the General Services Administration (GSA) with government-wide responsibility for central purchasing and management of common supplies and services. However, it provided that the Secretary of Defense might use his discretion in exempting the military services from purchasing common supplies through GSA. For the most part successive Secretaries of Defense did so, but under a policy that provided for maximum use of GSA facilities where it would promote efficiency and economy. As the situation developed, GSA assumed responsibility for providing general office supplies and equipment for the armed services and for planning, constructing, managing,

[24] (1) Harry B. Yoshpe, The Impact of Unification, 1946-50, OCofT, 15 Nov 55, p. 44. (2) Harry B. Yoshpe, MTMA: Single Managership of CONUS Traffic, OCofT, 6 Aug 56, pp. 1-23.

[25] *The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government* (New York, 1949), p. 104.

and operating buildings occupied by the military establishment in the United States. Beyond this the extent to which each service used GSA as a purchasing agent for common supplies was a decision to be made by that service.[26] Indeed defense policy quite specifically stipulated that there should be separate service supply establishments. The philosophy under which successive Secretaries of Defense proceeded, at least until 1955, was set forth in 1949 by Secretary Louis A. Johnson: "Each of the services is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreement or assignments as common servicing, joint servicing, or cross servicing at force, command, department or Department of Defense level." [27]

Congress, demanding greater progress in integrating supply management, became disenchanted with the Munitions Board. In the Defense Cataloging and Standardization Act of 1952 it transferred the board's functions to a new Defense Supply Management Agency. The Eisenhower Reorganization Plan No. 6 abolished both this agency and the Munitions Board, replacing them with a single executive, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics.[28]

The Korean War led to several investigations by Congress of military supply management which threatened to impose a common supply service on the military services from the outside. The investigation begun in 1951 by the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, known as the Bonner Committee, was the most important. It charged that, contrary to the Eisenhower-Spaatz agreement, the Air Force in developing its own supply system had included items commonly used by both the Army and Air Force. It criticized the lack of co-ordinated supply management among the Army's technical services, citing conspicuous examples of waste in competitive buying, overstocking, and duplication in the use of personnel, space, and facilities. It accused the services of giving only lip service to the principles of integrated supply manage-

[26] Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*, pp. 38–39.

[27] Memo, Secy of Def for Secys of Army, Navy, and Air Force, Chmn, Muns Bd and R&D Bd, 12 Oct 49, sub: Basic Principles Governing Assignment of Logistic Responsibilities, published in JAAF Bulletin 32, 4 Nov 49, sec. II.

[28] (1) Linscott, The Evolution of Integrated Materiel Management, pp. 4–6. (2) Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*, pp. 38–39.

ment and quietly agreeing among themselves to emphasize separatism rather than integration.

The Bonner Committee concluded that supply management within the Department of Defense and the services lacked adequate centralized control. As a result of its recommendations Congress adopted the O'Mahoney amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act of 1953 prohibiting the "obligation of any funds for procurement, production, warehousing, distribution of supplies or equipment or related supply management functions, except in accordance with regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense." Complying with this provision, Secretary of Defense Lovett on 17 November 1951 issued DOD Directive 4000.8, Basic Regulations for the Military Supply System, ordering the Air Force to abide by the principles of the Eisenhower-Spaatz agreement, among other things. It listed eleven general principles governing the management of defense supply and service activities, including cross-servicing, single procurement, cataloging and standardization, conservation, surplus disposal, transportation, and traffic management. It expressly prohibited the addition of new independent or expanded supply functions involving standard, common-use items without the approval of the Secretary of Defense. One provision required the services to establish "one single supply and inventory control point for each specified category of items." By 1960 there were twenty-four such "National Inventory Control Points" in the Army.[29]

The Bonner Committee became the Riehlman Committee in January 1953 with the change in Congressional control to the Republican party and continued its investigations. Later that year it reported that the services were still too slow in improving their management of supply, asserting that one major reason was that each service was "dedicated to its own systems and procedures." The new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, Charles E. Thomas, and his successor, Thomas P. Pike, both disagreed with these findings and opposed further efforts to integrate common supply activities as a fragmented approach which did not recognize "the

[29] (1) Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 6-7. (2) Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*, pp. 39, 152-61. (3) Rose C. Engelman, MASA—Single Managership of Military Automotive Supplies, U.S. Army Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command, 15 May 61, pp. 10-14.

basic fact that each military supply system is maintained solely to provide supplies as needed by the tactical forces that they were called upon to support." [30]

While the Riehlman Committee produced no tangible results, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government created by Congress on 10 July 1953 and known as the Second Hoover Commission did. Its Task Force on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense charged the Department of Defense and the military services with continued waste, overlapping, and duplication of effort in nearly all aspects of supply management. Co-ordination was piecemeal and fragmentary. Substantial economies and greater efficiency could only be achieved by creating within the Department of Defense a civilian defense supply and service administration, which would perform common supply and service functions all over the world.[31]

The military services opposed a civilian common supply agency even more than a military one. They charged it would be less responsive to military requirements and so jeopardize the success of military operations. An Army staff study, The Fourth Service of Supply and Alternatives, prepared in the Business and Industrial Management Office of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics in September 1955 followed this line of argument. The Hoover Commission and its Task Force on the Business Organization of the Defense Department, it said, did not give adequate attention to the military aspects of military supply management. They emphasized peacetime operations. The Task Force's assertions concerning the inefficiency of military supply management were based on "unsupported assumptions."

A civilian agency, according to DCSLOG, would produce further duplication of personnel and functions, increase competition for scarce professional and technical skills, and make it difficult for the Army to train its own military logistical

[30] (1) Engelman, MASA, p. 15. (2) Cunningham, DOD Wholesale Supply System, p. 11. (3) Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 9–10. (4) Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*, pp. 231–34.

[31] (1) Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Business Organization of the Department of Defense, Jun 55, pp. 3–52. (2) Engelman, MASA, pp. 16–17. (3) Cunningham, DOD Wholesale Supply System, pp. 30–37. (4) Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*, p. 40. (5) Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 11–14.

managers and service troops. Recruiting civilian supply personnel in wartime or for overseas services was also undesirable. In conclusion the Task Force said that a civilian "Fourth Service of Supply" would impair the Army's ability to carry out its assigned military missions.

It admitted the existence of deficiencies in supply management, but it said the best way to correct them was to improve management practices within the existing organizational framework rather than create a separate agency. Among the alternatives it suggested were to accelerate adoption of uniform inventory management practices, the standardization of supply documents, and some form of integrated management for subsistence and for medical supplies.[32]

Congress did not appear as impressed with the argument of military necessity as it was with the Hoover Commission's indictment of waste and inefficiency in the military services. To avoid having Congress take the matter away from the services entirely, the Department of Defense did an about face. A prime mover in bringing about a more favorable attitude toward greater integration in supply management was the new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics, Robert C. Lanphier, Jr., a Midwestern electric and utility company executive. Beginning in late 1954 a task force in his office spent several months exploring how best to achieve a maximum degree of integration with a minimum of disruption to the existing service organizations. The solution proposed and approved by the Secretary of Defense was to appoint "Single Managers" for a selected group of common supply and service activities.

The single manager concept was the most significant advance toward integrated supply management within the Department of Defense or the armed services since the end of World War II. Basically it was an expansion of the Single Service Procurement Program to provide more effective control over inventories at one end of the supply cycle and greater control over wholesale distribution at the other. Like the Single Service Procurement Program it superimposed a new organiza-

[32] (1) Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, The Fourth Service of Supply and Alternatives, Staff Study, 26 Sep. 55. (2) Memo, General Magruder for General Palmer, 5 Oct 55, accompanying completed study. The head of the Task Force was Col. Benjamin L. Pickett of the DCSLOG Business and Industrial Management Office.

tional pattern on the existing one instead of creating a new organization.

When the concept was presented to the Secretary of Defense and the services the Navy, adhering to its traditional opposition to integration in any form, opposed it on principle. A new Deputy Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., a paper company executive who had served as vice chairman of the Second Hoover Commission's Committee on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense, overruled the Navy's objections and approved a directive outlining the procedures and principles to be followed in setting up single managerships.

Under this directive the Secretary of Defense would formally appoint one of the three service secretaries as single manager for a selected group of commodities or common service activities, and he, in turn, would select an executive director to operate the program. Single managers in the Army were established within the existing technical service organizations. The Secretary of the Army designated a major general as executive director who served under the chief of the technical service responsible for the particular type of commodity or service involved. The Single Managers for Subsistence and for Clothing and Textiles operated under the Quartermaster General, while the Single Manager for Military Traffic Management was under the Chief of Transportation.

The responsibility of the single managers for determining requirements involved common cataloging and standardization as well as inventory control. They operated under a stock or consumer revolving fund, buying what they needed, selling to the military departments and consumers, and using the funds paid to replenish their stocks. This eliminated the expense and delay in calling for open bids each time supplies were requested. Through their control over wholesale storage they were able to direct distribution to consumers from the nearest depot, regardless of the service operating it, in such a manner as to avoid the needless and expensive cross-hauling involved when each service maintained its own completely separate distribution systems.

Under this system the technical services preserved their organizational integrity. The single managers operated through

normal command channels, reporting to the Secretary of the Army through the chiefs of the technical services and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, who was assigned Army staff responsibility for the single manager programs. The impact of losing control over their inventories was minimal because this was a function the technical services had never chosen to exercise effectively. They continued to calculate their own requirements, and they retained their own wholesale and retail distribution systems. The chief difference was that they operated their wholesale depots now as agents of the single managers rather than the several technical services. In sum, the single manager concept balanced demands for greater integration of supply management with the military services' insistence that effective military operations required each service to maintain its own independent supply system.

One factor which delayed expansion of the single manager system was the requirement for common cataloging, standardization, accurate inventories, and the necessity to set up cost-of-performance accounting systems for each single manager stock fund.[88]

According to Mr. Lanphier, in late 1955, the most appropriate categories for initial single manager assignments were subsistence and clothing and textiles, both of which were assigned to the Army's Quartermaster Corps, and petroleum and medical and dental supplies, both of which were assigned to the Navy's Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. These were areas of largely common-use items, where common cataloging was relatively complete, where some defense-wide co-ordination existed, and where much of the wasteful duplication of inventories and cross-hauling existed. The Military Subsistence Supply Agency was the first to be inaugurated on 4 November 1955, followed in the next year by the three others. The coordination of transportation services was also far advanced. Creating single managerships out of the existing Military Air Transport Service and the Military Sea Transportation Service was simply a change in designation. The single manager for land traffic management, the Military Traffic Management

[88] (1) Robert C. Lanphier, Jr., Single Manager Plan, ICAF Lecture L56-63, 23 Nov 55, p. 42. (2) Cunningham, DOD Wholesale Supply System, pp. 24-27. (3) Linscott, The Evolution of Integrated Materiel Management, pp. 15-17. (4) Engelman, MASA, pp. 17-20. (5) Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 15-20.

Agency (MTMA), was a new agency and assigned to the Transportation Corps. This function had gradually developed over a decade against considerable Air Force opposition.[34]

Assignments in 1959 of single managers for general supplies to the Army's Quartermaster Corps as the Military General Supply Agency (MGSA), for industrial supplies to the Navy's Bureau of Supplies and Accounts as the Military Industrial Supply Agency (MISA), for construction supplies to the Army's Corps of Engineers as the Military Construction Supply Agency (MCSA), and for automotive supplies to the Ordnance Department as the Military Automotive Supply Agency (MASA) were the result of studies undertaken by the Armed Forces Supply Support Center mentioned below. They required much more work in common cataloging, standardization, accurate inventorying, and the installation of cost-of-performance accounting. Further studies by the Armed Forces Supply Support Center in 1960 envisaged an additional single managership for electrical and electronic supplies.[35]

The impact of the single manager system within the Army was greatest on the Quartermaster Corps, which was, by 1960, responsible for three of them. Three of its four identifiable procurement systems were single managerships, and the Quartermaster General asserted that nearly all his supply and procurement personnel were involved either with the single managerships or other efforts to integrate defense supply management.[36]

Another program designed to eliminate duplication and prevent waste by permitting the transfer of surpluses among the services was the Interservice Supply Support Program begun in 1955. It consisted of six area co-ordination groups under a joint council of the services and governed thirty-three commodity co-ordination groups.[37]

[34] (1) Lanphier, Single Manager Plan, pp. 33–42. (2) Yoshpe, MTMA, pp. 7–9, 13–19, *passim*. (3) Linscott, The Evolution of Integrated Materiel Management, pp. 16–20.

[35] (1) Douglas Committee, *Background Materials*, pp. 48–51. (2) Engelman, MASA, pp. 16–36. (3) Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 28–29. (4) Linscott, The Evolution of Integrated Materiel Management, pp. 20–34, 56–66.

[36] (1) Linscott, The Evolution of Integrated Materiel Management, pp. 16–34, 56–66. (2) OSD Project 80, vol. II, pt. IV, ODCSLOG, The Technical Services and Logistical Functions, pp. 139–43. (3) OCofT Senior Staff and Division Chiefs Conference No. 28, 21 Sep 61.

[37] Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 15–16.

Finally, in June 1958, the Department of Defense created the Armed Forces Supply Support Center (AFSSC) to administer the common cataloging, standardization, and Interservice Supply Support programs, the latter redesignated as the Defense Utilization Program. It was also to study military supply activities continually and recommend improvements in their management. From such analyses came proposals leading to the creation of the four additional single managerships in 1959 and 1960, referred to above.[88]

While all these efforts were being made within the Department of Defense to improve supply operations, Congress continued its criticisms of waste, duplication, and overlap and of the slow progress being made to eliminate them. In 1958 nearly a dozen different bills were introduced into Congress to establish a fourth service of supply. The outcome was the addition of the McCormack-Curtis amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 which granted the Secretary of Defense explicit authority to consolidate or integrate the supply and service functions of the three services, subject to a Congressional veto where this involved legislative changes. The amendment stated:

> Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines it will be advantageous to the Government in terms of effectiveness, economy, or efficiency, he shall provide for the carrying out of any supply or service activity common to more than one military department by a single agency or such other organizational entities as he deems appropriate.[89]

Congress continued to scrutinize defense supply management and to demand further integration.

The Increasing Authority of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS

At the end of the fifties the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff possessed much greater authority and control over the three military services than Congress had provided for or intended in the National Security Act of 1947. The cold war, the revolution in technology, mounting defense costs, and pressure from industry and Congress were responsible for this increase in power. It was most apparent in four

[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 23–29.

[89] (1) Cunningham, DOD Wholesale Supply System, pp. 4–15. (2) Public Law 85–599, 85th Cong., 6 Aug 58.

areas—strategic planning and the direction of military operations, financial management, logistics, and research and development.

The first substantial increase in the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff came with the passage of the National Security Act amendments of 1949. The Secretary of Defense's increased authority over defense budgets, calling for their reorganization along functional lines, was perhaps the most significant change. At the same time the Secretary's civilian staff and the joint staff serving the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also increased in size.

The Eisenhower Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 brought about further increases in the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs. The various functional boards set up under the 1947 act, stymied by interservice rivalry, were replaced by a series of functional assistant secretaries with authority to act on behalf of the Secretary. The civilian staffs of the service secretaries were also reorganized on functional lines, reflecting the changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The joint staff was again increased in size and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs given greater authority over the joint staff's operations.

Congressional prodding and Soviet technological achievements led to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 which centralized authority over the services in the Secretary of Defense and his office even further. The chain of command over military operations was changed to run from the President and Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs rather than through the service secretaries who had acted as executive agents since 1953. The JCS, its staff doubled to four hundred, was completely reorganized along conventional military staff lines, replacing the system of JCS committees, most of which were abolished. The authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the joint staff was increased, and at the request of President Eisenhower he was given a vote in JCS decisions previously denied him by Congress.

Authority over the research and development of new weapons and weapons systems was centralized under a new Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The McCormack-Curtis

amendment also gave the Secretary of Defense greater discretional authority to integrate service supply activities.[40]

This increasingly centralized control by the Secretary and the Department of Defense obviously diminished the role of the services. They had become support commands, responsible for training, administration, and logistical support of military operations, limited further by the authority of the new Director of Defense Research and Engineering over the development of new weapons.

The Department of the Army became responsible largely for functions performed by the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces during World War II. There was continual discussion of whether the Secretary of the Army should act as an independent spokesman for the Army or as an executive vice president for the Secretary of Defense. The answer depended somewhat on the personalities involved and their length of service. The long tenure of Mr. McNeil as Defense Comptroller and Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker undoubtedly increased their personal influence, but generally the tour of duty for top-level civilian administrators was relatively brief as it had been in the past. Other things being equal, under a strong Secretary of Defense the service secretaries were more likely to act as his executive agents than under a weak one.[41]

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[40] (1) Huntington, *The Common Defense*, p. 423. (2) Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 288–313, 372. (3) OSD Project 80 (Army), Reconnaissance Report on Changes in the Defense Environment Affecting the Army, 15 Mar 61, pp. 2–7, *passim*. Mr. Hoelscher's files located in Project 80 files. Hereafter cited as Hoelscher, Changes in Defense Environment. (4) Harris, Military Comptrollership, pp. 35–36. (5) Marshall K. Wood, The Budgetary Process and Defense Policy, Harvard University Defense Policy Seminar, 1957-58, Serial No. 122, 18 Nov 57. (6) Peck and Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process, An Economic Analysis*.

[41] (1) C. W. Borklund, *Men in the Pentagon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 198–200. (2) Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 219–98. (3) Hoelscher, Changes in Defense Environment, sec. 2.

CHAPTER VIII

The McNamara Revolution

One of the major issues of the 1960 Presidential campaign was the alleged inadequacy of the Eisenhower administration's direction and management of the nation's security. Two of the principal critics were retired Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor and the former Army Chief of Research and Development Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin. The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate's Committee on Government Operations, under Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, began a series of hearings and investigations in January 1960 which also concentrated on the inadequacy of this country's national security organization. Senator John F. Kennedy, when running for President, appointed Senator Stuart E. Symington of Missouri, a former Secretary of the Air Force under President Truman, chairman of an advisory committee to investigate the organization and operations of the Department of Defense. Finally two RAND Corporation officials, Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, criticized the financial management of the Department of Defense in *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age.*

General Gavin charged that the roles of the Joint Chiefs as heads of separate military services were incompatible with their functions as the nation's top military planners because they could not in practice divorce themselves from the particular interests of their individual services. There were "interminable delays" in reaching decisions caused by disagreement and deadlock among the services. He suggested abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and substituting a Senior Military Advisory Group to the Secretary of Defense. Its members would be senior officers who had just completed a tour of duty as their service's chief of staff, and a functional joint staff would support them.[1]

[1] Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age*, pp. 257–62.

General Taylor had become the principal military spokesman of the Marshall tradition of tight executive control over the armed services before and after his retirement as Chief of Staff of the Army. In *The Uncertain Trumpet,* he, like General Gavin, was critical of current military strategy because it neglected the Army in favor of the massive deterrent of the Strategic Air Command. Concentration on total nuclear war similarly neglected the requirements of conventional and limited warfare, the principal type of conflict that had developed during the cold war.

Like General Gavin, Taylor also criticized the procedures by which the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached their decisions. Repeating General Marshall's dictum, he told the Jackson Committee that "you cannot fight wars by committee." A single armed services chief of staff should run the Secretary of Defense's "command post" for him, assisted by an advisory council. In summary effective control over operations required more efficient planning as well as a more efficient planning organization.

The current role of the Defense Department Comptroller disturbed General Taylor. Given the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were often in deadlocked disagreement, he asserted that "strategy has become a more or less incidental by-product of the administrative processes of the defense budget." To avoid this situation he would restructure defense budgets on the basis of the strategic missions to be performed rather than on the resources or functions required to perform them. What was needed was a strategy of "flexible response" capable of meeting all levels of conflict from "cold" through "limited" to "total" war; "atomic" deterrent forces based on intercontinental missiles rather than manned bombers; "counterattrition forces" capable of fighting "brush fire wars;" guerrilla and other "limited" conflicts; mobile reserve forces, including mobilization stockpiles; air lift and sea lift forces; antisubmarine warfare forces; continental air defense based on the development of antimissile missiles; plus whatever resources were required to support general mobilization and civil defense programs. The three military services would be reorganized similarly as operational commands while the three service departments would be organized to mobilize, train, and support

them. In this manner American military commitments could be balanced effectively with the resources required to fulfill them, another objective which General Marshall had posited at the end of World War II.[2]

Outside the military services a special Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee under the chairmanship of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Democrat of Texas, in 1957 began a continuing series of inquiries into satellite and missile programs, into the role of the Bureau of the Budget in formulating and executing defense budgets, and into other major issues.

Senator Jackson's Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery investigated "whether our Government is now properly organized to meet successfully the challenge of the cold war." [3]

Former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, a leading civilian disciple of General Marshall, was the first witness to testify before this committee. Echoing his predecessor, he said bluntly that the "committee system" under which the Department of Defense and, indeed, the entire federal government operated traditionally was the principal obstacle to effective decision-making. He admitted that the committee system had developed out of the federal form of government as part of "a series of checks and balances" to prevent any one group within the government from becoming too powerful.

> The often forgotten fact is that our form of government, and its machinery, has had built into it a series of clashes of group needs. . . . This device of inviting argument between conflicting interests—which we can call the "foulup factor" in our equation of performance—was obviously the result of a deliberate decision to give up the doubtful efficiency of a dictatorship in return for a method of protection of individual freedom, rights, privileges, and immunities.

Mr. Lovett feared that within the executive branch alone there was an observable trend to expand the committee system

[2] (1) Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 88–164. Quotation is from page 121. (2) United States Senate, "Organizing for National Security," Inquiry of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, United States Senate (Washington, 1961), vol. I, *Hearings*, pp. 768–99. Quotation is from page 774. Hereafter cited as *Jackson Subcommittee Hearings*.

[3] (1) *Jackson Subcommittee Hearings*, vol. II, "Studies and Background Materials," pp. 94–95. (2) *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 1. (3) See also Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, pp. 288–320, 371–92, and Ernest R. May, "Eisenhower and After," in Ernest R. May, ed., *The Ultimate Decision, The President as Commander-in-Chief* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1960), pp. 179–237.

. . . to the point where mere curiosity on the part of someone or some agency and not a "need to know" can be used as a ticket of admission to the merry-go-round of "concurrences." This doctrine, unless carefully and boldly policed, can become so fertile as spawner of committees as to blanket the whole executive branch with an embalmed atmosphere. . . . The derogation of the authority of the individual in government, and the exaltation of the anonymous mass, has resulted in a noticeable lack of decisiveness. Committees cannot effectively replace the decision-making power of the individual who takes the oath of office; nor can committees provide the essential qualities of leadership.[4]

Thus did Mr. Lovett compare the Marshall tradition concept of tight executive control with the traditional procedures of completed staff actions.

Senator Stuart Symington represented Air Force critics of the JCS committee system. As chairman of a task force on defense organization and management appointed by Senator Kennedy during his 1960 campaign for President, Symington heavily weighted his committee with Air Force spokesmen. One was Thomas K. Finletter, the first Secretary of the Air Force. Another was former Assistant Secretary and later Under Secretary of the Air Force Roswell L. Gilpatric.

Not surprising, the criticisms and recommendations made by the Symington Committee reflected policies advanced by the Air Staff in 1959 in its "Black Book on Defense Reorganization" favoring "total unification." Interservice rivalry, the committee said, prevented the JCS from functioning effectively. To eliminate this rivalry it recommended abolishing the Joint Chiefs of Staff in favor of a single armed forces Chief of Staff, called the "Chairman of the Joint Staff," who would be chief military adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the President and direct the activities of the joint staff. He would also preside over a Military Advisory Council composed of those senior officers who had just completed tours of duty as chiefs of staff. Divorced from their services they would no longer feel required to place service interests above everything else.

Second, the Symington Committee proposed to abolish the three "separately administered" services and reorganize them as "organic units within a single Department of Defense." The Secretary of Defense would be assisted by two Under Secretaries, one for Weapons Systems and another for Administration. The former would be responsible for all logistical support

[4] *Jackson Subcommittee Hearings*, pp. 14–17.



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activities, including research and development, production, procurement, and military construction and installations. The latter would be responsible primarily for personnel and financial management. A series of functional directorates similar to the existing Assistant Secretaries of Defense would act as the department's staff.

Finally, to integrate the services completely the committee recommended adopting uniform recruitment policies, uniform pay scales, unified direction of all service schools, and a more flexible policy of transferring personnel among the services. The military services would retain their individual chiefs of staff who would have direct access to the Secretary of Defense. The services would also retain such vestiges of their former separate identities as their distinctive uniforms.[5]

Spokesmen for the Army's Marshall tradition and the Air Force were the major critics of the Eisenhower defense policies and organization. Representatives of the Navy, which remained the principal supporter of the JCS committee system, were conspicuous by their absence. Supporting the critics was the

[5] (1) Eugene M. Zuckert, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?" *Foreign Affairs*, XLIV, No. 3, April 1966, 462–63. (2) Copy of "Report to Senator Kennedy From Committee on Defense Establishment," n.d., attached to L. W. Hoelscher, "Comments on Report of Committee on the Defense Establishment (Symington Committee)," prepared for General G. H. Decker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1 Feb 61. Hoelscher Office files, Project 80 files.



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observable trend of the previous decade in the direction of greater authority and control over the services by the Secretary of Defense. As one student of the defense organization put it: "Gradually, and with a finesse which demands respect, the services are being dismembered and disembowelled, so that the question of their utility is decided continually in decrements. Since we cannot reasonably expect to turn the clock back, the only relevant question is whether the process is too fast or too slow." [6]

The trend toward centralized authority in the Secretary of Defense seemed likely to continue, but future developments were partly contingent on the man President Kennedy selected as his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. McNamara was a highly successful industrial manager, a "comptroller" in the broadest sense of that much-abused and misunderstood term. Most of the reforms he instituted as Secretary of Defense and the techniques he employed were ones which management experts since the days of General Somervell's Control Division had repeatedly recommended. What was unique was the rapidity with which he absorbed information and made decisions. What had disturbed him most at the outset was the long time it took to get decisions out of the Department of

[6] Hammond, *Organizing for Defense*, p. 374.



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Defense. In the General Marshall tradition he placed the blame for delay on the committee system with its endless bargaining and compromises. He intended to replace committees where possible by asserting greater executive authority, responsibility, and control over the department and its operations. As he said, "The individual in the position of responsibility must make the decision and take the responsibility for it." [7]

Secretary McNamara was surprised to find that there was no management engineering agency within his office responsible for reviewing organization and procedures. He promptly assigned this function to the department's new General Counsel, Cyrus R. Vance, a veteran of the Johnson Defense Preparedness Subcommittee. Another Johnson subcommittee veteran, Solis Horwitz, became Director of the Office of Organizational and Management Planning under Mr. Vance. This agency was responsible for directing or supervising studies requested by Secretary McNamara in its assigned area and for monitoring major organizational changes in the Department of Defense stemming from such projects.

One study led to regrouping the functions of the Assistant

[7] (1) Hoelscher, Changes in Defense Environment, pp. 31–58. (2) "Profile: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara," *Armed Forces Management*, VIII, No. 2 (November 1961), 22–24. Quotation is from page 23. (3) Borklund, *Men in the Pentagon*, pp. 211–19. (4) *Jackson Subcommittee Hearings*, pp. 1190–91.

Secretaries of Defense. The two Assistant Secretaries for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve and for Health and Medical services were combined under one Assistant Secretary for Manpower. The Assistant Secretaries for Supply and Logistics and for Property and Installations were also combined under one Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics. An Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense was added because this function had been transferred to the Defense Department. Other studies resulted in abolition of more than five hundred superannuated departmental committees and in a major reorganization of the Air Force's field establishment into a research and development or Systems Command and a Logistics Command.[8]

Mission or Program Budgets

Secretary McNamara's first major reform was to revise the Defense Department's budget to reflect the military missions for which it was responsible. The person most directly responsible for this project was the new Defense Comptroller, Charles J. Hitch. The Office of the Comptroller in the Army for several years had advocated such a budget. When McNamara became Secretary of Defense the Army's Chief of Staff was General George H. Decker, a former Comptroller, who sought to develop some means of presenting the Army's costs of operation in mission terms. In the fall of 1960 shortly after he became Chief of Staff, Decker had initiated additional investigations of this concept.[9]

Mr. Hitch believed that the combination of functional budget categories and the rigid budget reductions of the Eisenhower administration had created unmanageable problems, with each service favoring its own projects at the expense of joint ones, concentrating on new weapons systems at the expense of conventional ones, and neglecting maintenance.

The Army's own modernization program emphasized the development of missiles and Army aviation at the expense of conventional weapons and equipment, Mr. Hitch charged. In

[8] (1) "Where Reorganization Ideas Are Born," *Armed Forces Management*, VIII, No. 2 (November 1961), 66–67. (2) *Armed Forces Management*, XI, No. 2 (November 1964), 120. (3) Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy*, pp. 190–91. (4) *Jackson Subcommittee Hearings*, pp. 1186–87.

[9] (1) Mosher, *Program Budgeting*, pp. 90–122. (2) Chester E. Glassen and J. R. Loome, "Program Packages," *Army*, XI, No. 12 (July 1961), 37–44.

an era of financial austerity the Army's major overhead operating costs, the operations and maintenance program, suffered most. More and more equipment was useless for lack of spare parts. Deferred maintenance seriously impaired the Army's combat readiness. Local commanders often had to transfer operations and maintenance funds intended for repairs and utilities for more urgent missions, an illegal transaction made possible by the thin dividing line that existed in practice between procurement activities and overhead operations.[10]

Another major weakness of the existing budget was the failure to relate functional appropriations to major military missions or objectives. Mr. Hitch proposed a series of nine "Program Packages" designed to solve this problem. *(Table 3)*

TABLE 3—MAJOR PROGRAMS, TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY [1]

(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

	FY 1961 Actual [2]	FY 1962 Original	FY 1962 Actual	FY 1963 Estimated
Major Programs				
Strategic Retaliatory Forces		7.6	9.1	8.5
Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces		2.2	2.1	1.9
General Purpose Forces		14.5	17.5	18.1
Airlift/Sealift Forces		.9	1.2	1.4
Reserve and Guard Forces		1.7	1.8	2.0
Research and Development		3.9	4.3	5.5
General Support		12.3	12.7	13.7
Civil Defense			.3	.2
Military Assistance		1.8	1.8	1.6
Total Obligational Authority	46.1	44.9	51.0	52.8

[1] Total obligational authority represents the total financial requirements for the program approved for initiation in a given fiscal year, regardless of the year in which the funds were authorized or appropriated.

[2] Breakdown not available for fiscal year 1961.

Source: Annual Report of the Department of Defense, FY 1962, p. 367.

[10] (1) Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense*, pp. 18, 23–26. (2) Hitch and McKean, *The Economics of National Defense*, pp. 44–54, 236–39. (3) *Jackson Subcommittee Hearings*, pp. 1004–14. (4) "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960," in Department of Defense, *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense . . .* (Washington, 1961), pp. 157–66, 216–19. (5) Fred R. Brown, ed., *Management: Concepts and Practices*, Industrial College of the Armed Forces series, "The Economics of National Security" (Washington, 1963), p. 92. (6) DCSLOG, Summary of Major Events and Problems, Fiscal Year 1958, 1 Oct 59, pp. 4–5, 107, 219, 229, 252.

Only three of the new categories referred to major military missions: strategic retaliatory forces, continental air and missile defense forces, and general purpose forces for conventional or limited war. Four categories, air lift and sea lift forces, research and development, general support, and reserve forces were supporting activities. Military assistance and civil defense, the latter soon replaced as a separate category by retired pay, were separate categories for political reasons as much as anything else because Congress insisted on treating these areas separately from regular defense appropriations.[11]

Congress did not accept these program packages as a substitute for the service-oriented, functional appropriations structure developed in the previous decade. As a consequence, Mr. Hitch and the services with the aid of computers developed a means, known as a torque converter, of translating program packages into appropriations categories and vice versa, both for the current fiscal year and projected several years into the future.

Applying appropriations categories to major military missions or to the research and development of major new weapons systems was not too difficult. The problem was how to apportion overhead operating costs like operations and maintenance among the major missions and similarly to break down the general support package into standard appropriations.[12]

Since the major purposes of Mr. Hitch's reforms were to enable Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Defense to assert greater control over defense budgets and operations and to balance military requirements with the resources available to carry them out, much depended on the accuracy and uni-

[11] (1) Department of Defense, *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1962*, pp. 32-34. (2) Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense*, pp. 29-30. (3) Novick, *Program Budgeting: Program Analysis and the Federal Government*, pp. 3-106, contains a valuable summary of program budgeting.

[12] (1) Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense*, pp. 21-26. (2) Charles J. Hitch, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting System," in W. W. Posvar and Others, *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 405-07. (3) Charles J. Hitch, "The Changing Role of the Comptroller in the Defense Department, U.S. Army Audit Agency, *Bulletin*, December 1963, pp. 8-9. (4) Glassen and Loome, "Program Packages," pp. 38-39, 43, 44. (5) R. L. Snodgrass, The Concept of Project Management, AMC Historical Studies, No. 1, Jun 64, Historical Office, USAMC, p. 37. (6) "Program Packaging Report," *Armed Forces Management*, IX, No. 6 (March 1963), 43. (7) Interview, Hewes with Michael Dugan, Office, Executive for Programs, OCofT, 16 Jul 62. (8) Interview, Hewes with A. B. Little, Budget Plans Division, OCA, 16 Feb 67.

formity of the statistical information contained in budget requests. If inaccurate information were fed into computers, the answers would be inaccurate. The lack of reliable cost data, particularly for the Army's operations and maintenance program with which the department and the Army had been struggling for more than a decade, remained a major unsolved problem complicated by the continuing shortage of funds available for this category of appropriations.[18]

The analysis of resource requirements and their allocation among competing military programs on a rational basis was the responsibility of a new Office of Programming within the Department of Defense Comptroller's Office under Hugh McCullough, a veteran with twenty years' experience in military financial management including the research and development of the Navy's Polaris missile system. Within this new office a Systems Planning Directorate developed means by which to measure and translate into financial terms the matériel, manpower, and other resources required by the military services, a function currently known as force planning analysis.

The most difficult assignment was that of the Weapons Systems Analysis Directorate under one of Secretary McNamara's famous "whiz kids," Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, a young RAND Corporation alumnus. The failure to relate appropriations to new weapons systems from their conception to their operational deployment and ultimate obsolescence was, Hitch asserted, another great weakness of the existing budget structure. What was needed, and what Dr. Enthoven's office attempted to supply, was a rational means of estimating the costs of new weapons systems, including not only the costs of research and development and of procurement and production but their annual operating costs. Military officers neglected the latter in their estimates because they were not accountable for these costs. In evaluating alternative weapons systems and strategies Enthoven and his staff employed cost-effectiveness analysis developed by economists and systems analysis developed by operations research analysts. Their evaluation included analysis of the objectives of competing strategies and

[18] (1) Little Interview. (2) OCS, Department of the Army Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1967–68, as revised 15 Dec 66, pp. 4–6. (4) On the shortage of operations and maintenance funds, see USAMC, Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1965, pp. 93–96, 530–43.

their often unstated underlying basic assumptions. It sought wherever possible to substitute rational judgment for guesswork in reaching decisions. As Mr. Hitch said:

> In no case . . . is systems analysis a substitute for sound and experienced military judgment. It is simply a method to get before the decision-maker the relevant data, organized in a way most useful to him. . . . What we are seeking to achieve through systems analysis is to minimize the areas where unsupported judgment must govern in the decision-making process.[14]

Cost effectiveness and systems analysis introduced the jargon of statistics and computer technology into military planning. When "the standard economic model of efficient allocation" employed in cost effectiveness studies was defined as "the maximization of a quasi-concave ordinal function of variables constrained to lie within a convex region," a communications gap opened between the systems analysts and those combat veteran officers unfamiliar with the language. Within the Army it was several years before similar agencies for Force Planning Analysis (21 February 1966) and Weapons Systems Analysis (20 February 1967) were established on the Army staff to match the organization in the Department of Defense Comptroller's Office. By that time the urgent requirements of the Vietnam War had displaced cost effectiveness in priority within the Department of Defense.[15]

Centralized Defense Functions

When McNamara became Secretary of Defense the centralization of authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was apparent in the number of agencies operating directly under the Secretary or the Joint Chiefs rather than under the

[14] Hitch, "The Changing Role of the Comptroller in the Defense Department," p. 8.

[15] (1) Charles J. Hitch, "Programmer to Bridge Defense Planning Gap," *Armed Forces Management*, VII, No. 7 (April 1961), 46. (2) Hitch, "The Changing Role of the Comptroller in the Defense Department," pp. 6–8. (3) Hitch, *Decision-Making for Defense*, pp. 43–58. (4) Hitch and McKean, *The Economics of National Defense*, pp. 105–33, 158–81. (5) Dr. Enthoven and a RAND Corporation colleague, subsequently Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Dr. Henry Rowen, defined the standard command model of efficient allocation in a RAND Corporation monograph, Defense Planning and Organization, P–1640, 17 Mar 59, revised 28 Jul 59, pp. 52, 76. (6) OCS, Department of the Army Program and Budget Guidance, FY 1967–68, pp. 4–6. (7) Department of the Army General Orders 6, 15 Feb 66, and 14, 29 Mar 67. (8) Chief of Staff Memo 67–121, 24 Mar 67, sub: Reorganization of Office, Chief of Staff. See Chapter XI below.

service departments. One of the earliest of these was the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), an *ad hoc* interdepartmental, triservice organization, set up on 1 January 1947 by joint directive of the Secretaries of the Army and Navy as the successor to the Manhattan District when the new Atomic Energy Commission took over most of the latter's functions and facilities. AFSWP was a combined logistical support, training, and combat developments agency for the military application of atomic energy. Serving the Army, Navy, and later the Air Force it was never a joint agency as such. It reported to the Secretaries of War and Navy and later to the Secretary of Defense through the service chiefs.

Following the Department of Defense reorganization of 1958, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was redesignated as the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) and placed under the JCS. The National Security Agency (NSA), created in 1952, continued to perform highly specialized technical and coordinating functions in the intelligence area under the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was created in February 1958 as a separately organized research and development agency of the Department of Defense.

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) was created on 12 May 1960 as an agency of the Department of Defense responsible to the Secretary through the JCS for the "operational and management direction" of the Defense Communications System, including all Department of Defense "world-wide, long-haul, Government-owned and leased, point-to-point circuits, terminals, and other facilities," to provide secure communications among the President, the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, and other government agencies, the military services and departments, the unified and specified commands, and their major subordinate headquarters.

The first joint defense agency Secretary McNamara established was the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), established under the JCS by a directive on 1 August 1961 to "organize, direct, and manage the Department's intelligence resources and

to coordinate and supervise such functions still retained by the three military departments." [16]

Nearly all these agencies transferred some functions or activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the Department of Defense under the JCS. Another function Secretary McNamara wanted to investigate, common supplies and services, affected the Army more directly. The issue was whether the existing single manager system provided the most effective means of integrating these activities. As outlined earlier this system had been adopted as a means of avoiding complete integration under a fourth service of supply and against considerable opposition from the military services. They continued resistance to further integration, disagreeing on what items should be classified as common supplies and services and on the development of more uniform supply distribution procedures. Congress continued to exert strong pressure for further if not complete integration through a separate defense common supply and service agency.[17]

On 23 March 1961 Secretary McNamara asked Mr. Vance and the several Assistant Secretaries for Installations and Logistics to study this question, which he labeled Project 100. They were to investigate and list the advantages and disadvantages of (1) continuing the existing single manager system operating under the several service secretaries, (2) assigning responsibility for operating a consolidated supply and service agency under one secretary, or (3) operating such a service under the Secretary of Defense.[18]

The Project 100 Committee submitted its report on 11 July 1961. The principal weaknesses, it thought, of continuing the existing system of multiple single managers were that the numerous channels of command and staff layers required de-

[16] (1) On AFSWP/DASA, see U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1958-59* (Washington, 1960), p. 194. (2) Ltr, Secy of War and Secy of Navy to CofS, USA, and CNO, 29 Jan 47, sub: AFSWP; War Department Memo 850-25-8, 18 Mar 47, same subject. (3) U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1959-60* (Washington, 1960), p. 200. (4) *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1959* (Washington, 1960), pp. 335-37. (5) On other agencies, see U.S. Department of Commerce, *U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1962-63* (Washington, 1963), pp. 195-99. (6) *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1962* (Washington, 1963), pp. 26-30.

[17] Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 30-35.

[18] Memo, Mr. McNamara for the Deputy Secretary of Defense and others, 23 Mar 61, sub: Integrated Management of Common Supply and Service Activities. Located in Single Manager Activities (Project 100), Group D, Project 80 files.

layed decisions and impeded effective control over operations. Any increase in the numbers of single manager assignments would further complicate this problem, producing duplication and greater diversity of procedures. Finally the single managers had to compete for limited manpower and operating funds with other service functions.

The principal disadvantages of consolidating these functions under one department were that the service selected might tend to favor its own programs and at the same time interfere in the supply management of the other two services. It would also call for a major reorganization with all the attendant confusion, disruption, and temporary loss of efficiency. Interference in the supply management of the services and the disruptive effect of a major reorganization were also disadvantages of setting up a separate consolidated common supply and service agency. It might also be less responsive to combat support requirements.[19]

The committee recommended that whatever organizational pattern was selected common supply and service functions should remain a military responsibility because their sole purpose was to support military operating forces. Such an integrated system should also be adaptable to wartime use immediately. Each service should retain full control over the development and management of its assigned weapons systems. All of them would continue to require military personnel trained in supply and service management. Common supply and services activities should be restricted to wholesale distribution within CONUS, and the services should retain their own retail distribution systems and facilities as under the existing single manager systems.[20]

The service chiefs and secretaries split in their choice of alternatives. Secretary McNamara publicly announced his decision on 31 August 1961 that a separate common supply and service agency to be known as the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) would be established. The Department of Defense directive issued on 6 November 1961 establishing DSA, effective 1 January 1962, differed from the Project 100 Committee's concept in two important respects. The committee thought

[19] Department of Defense, "Integrated Management of Common Supply Activities," Report of the Study Committee, 11 Jul 61, V, p. 5, VI, p. 4, and VII, p. 7.

[20] *Ibid.*, III, pp. 4–5.

there should be a Defense Supply Council composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics. This council would actively supervise DSA's operations. Secretary McNamara made the council a purely advisory agency and granted the director broad executive authority to run the Defense Supply Agency. Second, he did not limit the choice of the director specifically to a military officer as recommended by the committee. The man he chose, however, was a former Quartermaster General of the Army, Lt. Gen. Andrew T. McNamara. Finally, at the request of the JCS which did not want the responsibility for DSA, Mr. McNamara ordered the director to report directly to him instead of through the JCS as was the case with nearly all the other joint defense agencies.[21]

When the Defense Supply Agency was set up, it took over the eight commodity single managers, the Military Traffic Management Agency, the Armed Services Supply Support Center, the thirty-four Consolidated Surplus Sales offices, the National Surplus Property Bidders Registration and Information Office, the Army and Marine Corps clothing factories, and the management of a proposed electronics supply center. DSA was to administer the Federal Catalog Program, the Defense Standardization Program, the Defense Utilization Program, the Coordinated Procurement Programs, and the Surplus Personal Property Disposal Program.

The Defense Supply Agency staff included both military and civilian personnel from all services on a joint basis, but 95 percent of its staff were civilians. Originally nearly 60 percent of its staff came from the Army, including most of the Quartermaster's supply management personnel. By the end of June 1963, DSA was managing over a million different items in nine supply centers with an estimated inventory value of about $2.5 billion.

In general DSA was to act as a wholesale distributor of supplies to the services within the continental United States. The military services would decide what they wanted, where they wanted it, and when. DSA would decide how much to buy, how much to stock, and how to distribute it to meet the

[21] Fairburn, Integrated Supply Management, pp. 32–47.

needs of the services. The services retained responsibility for selecting those items which should be placed under integrated management.[22]

[22] (1) "Annual Report of the Defense Supply Agency," annexed to *Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1962* (Washington, 1963), pp. 67–70; *Ibid., Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 1963*, pp. 78–79. (2) The Defense Supply Agency, Presentation to the Special Subcommittee on Defense Agencies of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 5 Jun 62, pp. 29–40. OCMH DSA files. (3) Robert W. Coakley, A Review of the Logistics Organization Created by Projects 80 and 100 and Subsequent Changes, in Three Studies on the Historical Development of Army Logistical Organization, prepared for the Board of Inquiry on Army Logistics System, Jul 66, pp. 17–19. In OCMH.

CHAPTER IX

Project 80: The Hoelscher Committee Report

Of all Secretary McNamara's study projects the one known as Project 80 entitled Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army was the most important for the Army. In substance, it took up the question of functionalizing the technical services where previous studies and reorganizations had left it.

As in the case of Project 100 Secretary McNamara assigned responsibility for this study to Cyrus R. Vance, who appointed Solis S. Horwitz, the Director of Organizational Planning and Management, to supervise the project directly under him. They agreed and informed the new Secretary of the Army, Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., that the Army would be allowed an opportunity to study and evaluate its own organization and procedures. On the recommendation of the Chief of Staff, General Decker, Secretary Stahr selected the Deputy Comptroller of the Army, Leonard W. Hoelscher, as the project director to work directly with Horwitz's office.[1]

Mr. Hoelscher brought to his task greater knowledge, experience, familiarity, and professional accomplishment in the area of Army administration, organization, and management than anyone, civilian or military, associated with the Army's previous reorganizations as far back as Secretary Root. He had come to Washington in 1940 as a colleague and protégé of Luther Gulick and John Millett from the Public Administration Service in Chicago where he had been a specialist in municipal administration after a decade as city planner and city manager of Fort Worth, Texas. He had joined the Bureau of the Budget after its transfer to the Executive Office of the President in 1940 as a consultant on the organization and management of federal agencies. During the war he had as-

[1] Martin Blumenson, Reorganization of the Army, 1962, OCMH Monograph No. 37M, c. Apr 65, p. 409. Hereafter cited as Blumenson, Project 80 History.



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sisted the Army Air Forces in its reorganization under the Marshall plan and later worked with General Gates in developing the concept of program planning. He also assisted in improving the War Department's manpower statistics through the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office. After the war he became Chief of the Management Improvement Branch of the Bureau of the Budget at a time when it was actively seeking to rationalize the federal bureaucracy along functional lines. From 1950 on, as Special Assistant to the Army Comptroller, and from November 1952, as Deputy Comptroller, he was actively involved in developing the Army's functional program and command management systems, in attempting to secure the adoption of modern cost-accounting systems, and in improving the Army's management procedures generally. With General Decker he had also worked to develop a mission-oriented Army budget. Over a period of twenty years he had developed an unparalleled, intimate working knowledge of Army organization and management and its problems both as a planner and as an operator.[2]

The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric,

[2] (1) For a historical account of the role of the Bureau of the Budget in promoting functionalism within the federal government paralleling Hoelscher's career, see Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," pp. 243–58, *passim*, especially 249–53. (2) Biographic data on Mr. Hoelsher, OCMH files.

gave Mr. Hoelscher some broad, informal instructions. He suggested the study should first determine what major changes had taken place in the defense environment since the Army's last reorganization in 1955 and, second, outline what basic considerations or standards the Army should meet in the light of these changes. The study should then recommend changes required in the functions, organization, and procedures of the Department of the Army to meet these basic considerations.

The committee, Mr. Gilpatric went on, should assume no further major changes in the National Security Act of 1947 or in the Army's current assigned missions and functions to train and support forces assigned to the unified and specified commands. The Army's Chief of Staff would continue to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the assistant secretaries of defense would remain advisers supposedly without operating responsibilities.[3]

Mr. Horwitz and his staff wanted other areas investigated. A perennial question was whether the General Staff should be involved in operations, how responsive it was to demands from higher echelons, and what should be its relations to other Army elements. Was CONARC necessary as a kind of "second Department of the Army?" Should the technical services be subordinated to a "Service Command" or replaced by a "Research and Development" or "Materiel Command?" Should the Army continue to perform such "non-military" tasks as managing the Panama Canal or the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers? [4]

On the basis of these instructions, assumptions, and questions Mr. Hoelscher drew up an outline showing how he proposed to conduct the study. He recommended that there be a project director with full executive authority to conduct the study and make its final proposals, assisted by a Project Advisory Committee and supported by a working staff divided into task forces assigned to investigate particular areas, organizations, or functions. General Decker approved this plan on 17 February and, as already noted, appointed Mr. Hoelscher as Project Director.

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[3] Department of the Army, Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army, OSD Project 80, Oct 61, pt. I, Overall Report, pp. 8–9. Hereafter cited as Hoelscher Committee Report.

[4] Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 5–9.

He was to report periodically through him to Mr. Stahr and through Mr. Horwitz's office to Mr. Vance on his progress.[5]

Hoelscher had a small project headquarters staff which organized the several task forces, co-ordinated their activities, and helped prepare the final report. The Project Advisory Committee consisted of representatives of the General Staff and CONARC. The seven task forces, or study groups, were assigned to investigate the Secretary of the Army's Office and the General and Special Staffs and to evaluate the general management of the Army: CONARC, including training and combat developments; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), the technical services and Army logistics; Research and Development; personnel management; Reserve Components; and the Army's nonmilitary functions. No action was ever taken on the recommendations of the group studying Reserve functions, and the study group on nonmilitary functions was never formed. Later another study group was organized at the request of the Chief of Staff to investigate Army aviation.[6]

Hoelscher considered the selection of personnel so critical that he obtained special permission from General Decker to examine the personnel files of qualified persons rather than rely upon the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel's (ODCSPER) résumés, the usual procedure. Hoelscher was looking particularly for people whose records indicated they had inquiring, analytical minds and the kind of broad-gauged training at the Army War College or the Command and General Staff School which emphasized the Army as a whole rather than the interests of a particular arm or service. For each task force he sought a combination of officers and civilians with a general background, management analysts, and functional specialists.

DCSPER sent him the records of more than four hundred officers and civilians who met these qualifications. Following two months of examining these records, Hoelscher and his staff selected fifty officers and thirteen civilians, exclusive of clerical

[5] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 9–12, 17–18. (2) L. W. Hoelscher, The Story of Project 80 and the Reorganization of the Army, transcript of Army Management School address, c. Mar 63, p. 120. Hereafter cited as Hoelscher, Story of Project 80.

[6] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 12–19. (2) Hoelscher, Story of Project 80, pp. 119, 133.

assistance. Most officers were colonels, but two were general officers. Perhaps the most important was Brig. Gen. Ralph E. Haines, assistant commander of the 2d Armored Division, who was chief of the task force on logistics. He was an armor officer who had spent nearly all of his career in military operations. Hoelscher's headquarters staff came largely from the Comptroller's Directorate of Management Analysis and were chosen for their knowledge of this area and because they were available and would remain so after completing the study to follow up the committee's work.[7]

Second to selecting properly qualified personnel, Hoelscher stressed what he considered the proper methods of analyzing the Army's problems rather than compulsively drawing organization charts at the outset. As he saw it, this should be the very last item on the agenda after methodical analysis. To a management expert like Hoelscher, organization charts were a red herring leading people away from the real problems, the methods and procedures by which an organization conducted its affairs. If the management of the Army was inefficient, merely redrawing organization charts would not solve the problem. That was one lesson to be learned from studying previous Army reorganizations.[8]

The study groups spent considerable time assembling facts and analyzing them. They studied nearly four hundred reports and conducted approximately six hundred interviews. They

[7] (1) Hoelscher, Story of Project 80, pp. 121–23. (2) Interviews, Martin Blumenson with Colonel Thomas, 20 Feb 62, and Hoelscher, 27 Feb 62. OCMH Project 80 files. (3) Interview, Hewes with M. O. Stewart, 7 Mar 67, concerning personnel selection procedures. (4) General Haines briefing to Project Advisory Committee, 28 Jun 61. Group D Basic Studies file. (5) The later assignments of several Hoelscher Committee alumni give some indication of the quality of personnel selection: General Haines became, CG, USCONARC, having also served as Vice Chief of Staff and CINCUSARPAC; Lt. Gen. John Norton, CG, CDC; Maj. Gen. Donnelly P. Bolton, Director of Military Operations, ODCSOPS; and Maj. Gen. John A. Kjellstrom, Director of the Army Budget, OCA. Except for General Haines these officers were lieutenant colonels while they were serving on the Hoelscher Committee. As this volume went to press General Kjellstrom had been promoted to lieutenant general and appointed Comptroller of the Army on 8 Jul 1974, General Bolton was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USARPAC. General Norton was Chief of Staff, Allied Forces, Southern Europe, while General Haines had retired.

[8] (1) Hoelscher, Story of Project 80, pp. 123–28. (2) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 15, 22. (3) Interviews, Blumenson with Hoelscher, 1 Mar 62, and Colonel Thomas, 20 Feb 62. (4) Memo, Hoelscher for Working Groups, 13 Jun 61. (5) Working Paper, Study Group D, Study of Army Functions, Organization, and Procedures, OSD Project 80 (Army), 5 Jul 61, sub: Prior Studies of Army Organization. Project 80 files.

made sixty field trips including a visit overseas to investigate the U.S. Army's European Command. By June they began discussing the basic considerations or standards the Army should meet. After defining these objectives they developed, evaluated, and chose among alternative patterns of organization and management.[9]

In investigating changes in the defense environment since 1955, the study groups concluded that there were two paramount trends which affected the Army's operations. The first was the observable trend toward assigning all combat forces to the unified and specified commands, operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, in the future the role of the services would be to organize, train, and supply these commands. Second was the equally obvious trend toward centralizing control over most programs in the Department of Defense. In these circumstances, the Secretary of the Army had more and more become an extension of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, instead of being a spokesman for Army interests and objectives. Centralization was most apparent in the areas of research and development, common supplies and services, and financial management. The increasing cost and complexity of new weapons systems had led to increasing emphasis on systems or project management which cut across service lines. The new program packages required the development of uniform management information and control systems throughout the Department of Defense for purposes of budgeting and accounting.

The study groups by mid-June had settled on two dozen basic considerations for improving the Army's performance in the areas of financial management, Army staff co-ordination and control, personnel management, supervision and co-ordination of training, control of combat developments, research and development, management of the Army's logistic systems, and the Army's relations with industry and academic life. The ultimate objective was an Army capable of meeting the requirements of "cold, limited or general war." [10]

[9] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 28–40. (2) Hoelscher, Story of Project 80, pp. 123–30. (3) Brig Gen Robert N. Tyson, Reorganization of the Army Under Project 80, address before Ninth Annual Conference of Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army, 3 Dec 62.

[10] Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. I, pp. 23–42.

The committee began by pointing out what Army reformers had been saying since World War II. In two world wars the Army had had to change its organization, particularly its supply system, after the outbreak of war. A properly organized Army should be able to function in peace and war without such upheavals. A further consideration was that another major war probably would not allow the Army the luxury of reorganizing in the midst of combat. Therefore, if any changes were necessary, they should be made now.[11]

The improvements recommended in financial management had also been an Army objective for a decade: more effective long-range planning and programing, integration of planning, programing, and budgeting, and the development of programs and budgets in terms of missions performed. The development of new weapons required some form of project or systems management outside normal command channels. The Army should integrate its various programs for review and analysis and for measuring performance more effectively with less emphasis on minor details and more on anticipating future developments. The committee suggested also creating a single automatic data processing authority to assist the Army staff in controlling, integrating, and balancing its growing array of information systems.[12]

The committee's proposals for improving Army staff coordination indicated the need for some organizational readjustments. There was an apparent duplication of effort between the Secretary of the Army's staff and the General Staff which should be corrected. The Army staff should get out of operations. "There is an inevitable conflict between staff and command viewpoints," it said, indicting the technical service chiefs. "Placing both staff and command responsibilities on a single officer detracts from his capability to perform either job well." If he were responsible for a particular segment of the Army under his command, he could not see a problem from the viewpoint of the Army as a whole.[13]

Personnel management had not been the subject of previous general studies of Army organization. Here the emphasis

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–31.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 31–33.

was on the need to utilize military personnel on the basis of their capabilities rather than their branch of service. There should be broader career opportunities for both military and civilian personnel. Referring to the technical services, the report pointed out that the increasing complexity of weapons systems made greater flexibility necessary in the assignment of people with specialized talents. The major problem in training was that responsibility was fragmented among too many agencies, including the technical and administrative services. On Reserve matters the committee suggested greater participation by CONARC in command, supervision, and support of Reserve units along with an overhaul of the ROTC program.[14]

The committee found responsibility for combat developments similarly fragmented. Long-range planning of new doctrinal concepts and matériel requirements was inadequate. Essentially a planning function, combat developments required an environment free from operating responsibilities and from the conservative outlook of those who distrusted changes. The emphasis in combat developments as in operations research, the committee said, should be on the application of research and development techniques to concrete military requirements. Research and development within the Army required an environment that would attract qualified scientists, engineers, and other professional experts.

The Army's logistics systems still needed greater integration and co-ordination. Finally, the Army should improve its relations with businessmen and professional scientists who were impatient with its red tape and delay.[15]

Following agreement on these twenty-three "Basic Considerations" the study groups discussed alternative solutions, including alternative organizational patterns. By the end of August general agreement was reached on most major issues. During September the study groups wrote their reports, while Hoelscher and his immediate staff drafted an over-all report and dealt with criticisms made by senior members of the Army staff.

Hoelscher presented his recommendations orally to Secretary Stahr, General Decker, and the General Staff on 11

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 33–37.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 38–42.


October and to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, General Colglazier, and representatives of the technical service chiefs two days later.[16]

The Army as a whole was especially interested in the organizational changes the committee proposed. The most drastic was its proposal to functionalize the technical services. To perform the Army's major research, development, production, and supply functions, the Hoelscher Committee recommended creation of a Systems Development and Logistics Command, a concept dating back at least to General Goethals in World War I. It recommended transferring the training functions of the technical services to CONARC, reorganized as a Force Development Command. Responsibility for military personnel management, it said, should be transferred, with certain exceptions, to a new Office of Personnel Operations (OPO). In line with this the committee recommended abolishing The Adjutant General's Office with its personnel functions going to OPO and its administrative functions reorganized under a new Chief of Administrative Services. An entirely new functional command, the Combat Developments Agency, later designated the Combat Developments Command (CDC), would assume responsibilities for this program formerly fragmented among CONARC, the technical services, and the Army staff.

The Hoelscher Committee and its task force on Army headquarters (Group B) also proposed important improvements in the organization and procedures of the Army staff. These included the addition of a Director of the Army Staff under the Chief and Vice Chief of Staff and splitting the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS) into two agencies, a Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and International Affairs and one for Plans, Programs, and Systems. It proposed to regroup the Army's special staff agencies in order to reduce the number of separate organizations reporting directly to the Chief of Staff. The technical services would continue under different titles as staff agencies relieved of their field commands. The Office of the Chief of Ordnance and the Chief Chemical Officer would be abolished entirely. The proposed organization of Headquarters, Department of the Army, is outlined in *Chart 25*.

[16] Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 27-57.

CHART 25—HOELSCHER COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR REORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS
OCTOBER 1961



*Chief of Public Information also serves as Chief of Information.
[1]General Staff Agency.
[2]No change contemplated in status of Army Audit Agency.

Source: Hoelscher Committee Report,II, p. 120.

A Director of the Army Staff, the committee said, was necessary to co-ordinate the activities of the General Staff for two reasons. Neither the Chief nor the Vice Chief of Staff could perform this function effectively because they did not have the time to devote to it. They were too busy with activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies outside the department. Second, co-ordinating the activities of the General Staff had become a serious problem in recent years, serious enough to justify such a position as a full-time job. The increase in the size of Army staff agencies, their expanding operations, and the frequent overlapping of their jurisdictions created conflicts which the secretariat of the General Staff could not resolve. Making the director senior to the deputy chiefs would prevent many of these conflicts from reaching the overburdened Chief and Vice Chief.[17]

In recommending splitting DCSOPS into a Deputy Chief for Strategy and International Affairs and another for Plans, Programs, and Systems, the committee asserted that DCSOPS responsibilities for joint staff activities were so great that it did not have time for its other assigned functions. Responsibility for organization and training was fragmented among numerous Army staff agencies. This required so much co-ordination that DCSOPS had little time for policy planning. Joint staff activities and organization and training were really two different functions that ought to be treated separately.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and International Affairs would be responsible to OSD and JCS for all joint staff activities and for international and civil affairs concerning the Army. It would relieve the rest of the General Staff of these functions and so eliminate some of the delay required to obtain concurrences from many different agencies. As the Army's operations deputy the DCSOPS would continue to run the Army War Room.[18]

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs, and Systems would take over the other functions of DCSOPS including organization and training, Army long-range planning, combat developments, and Army aviation. This office would be respon-

[17] Hoelscher Committee, pt. I, p. 50, and pt. II, pp. 75–78, 119–22.

[18] (1) *Ibid.*, pt. I, pp. 47–48, and pt. II, pp. 87–90, 122–24. (2) Hoelscher, Story of Project 80, p. 133.

sible for eliminating the gap between plans, programs, and budgets. Creating a Systems (Management) Directorate would provide for supervision of this new technique within the Army staff.[19]

Financial management, the committee thought, could be improved by strengthening the authority of the Comptroller, the Budget Officer of the Department of the Army, as an independent review and analysis agency for the Army staff, and as the department's Chief Management Engineer. It also recommended the adoption of mission-oriented budget packages and improved review and analysis procedures. It recommended that the Comptroller co-ordinate and integrate the development of automatic data processing systems within the department as well as systems analysis functions which relied heavily on the use of automatic data processing.[20]

The Army staff was bogged down in excessive co-ordination involving lengthy procedures of concurrences and nonconcurrences.

> Action officers complained they must spend many hours seeking out those who may have an interest in a particular problem—and then waiting long intervals for formal concurrence from the other agencies. The system emphasized the formality of concurrence as opposed to the substance of the problem. Partly by custom, partly by the tradition of leaving no stone unturned to assure that the staff action is complete, agencies having only minor interest in a particular problem still must be shown as concurring formally before the paper can be forwarded to the top officials of the Department.[21]

The committee proposed a system of "active co-ordination" which would abolish the time-consuming, traditional system of formal concurrences. The action agency responsible for a particular project would be required to determine and develop all the possible considerations, ramifications, and consequences affecting its proposed solution, whether for or against. It would submit alternative courses of action to decision-makers along with the information needed on which to base their decisions. This system would have the further advantage of reducing the incentive to produce meaningless compromises for the sake of agreement.

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[19] Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. I, pp. 47–51, and pt. II, pp. 87–90, 124–25, 142–43.

[20] *Ibid.*, pt. II, pp. 144–48.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

Such a plan, while it resembled the decision-making techniques of General Marshall and Secretary McNamara, meant a radical break not only with traditional Army procedures but those of the entire federal bureaucracy. In this sense the proposal made by the Hoelscher Committee for active co-ordination was far more revolutionary and radical than the more publicized organizational changes it recommended.[22]

The task force which investigated CONARC's training and combat developments program found that the greatest weakness was fragmentation of responsibility for these two functions among too many agencies. The situation was bad in regard to training. It was even worse in the area of combat developments. The independent technical services were major obstacles to effective integration of these programs, but too many Army staff agencies were involved as well. They complicated matters further not only by causing additional delay, but their deliberations and compromises also made it difficult to obtain clear policy decisions and instructions.

A particular weakness of the combat developments program was the failure to develop any adequate long-range planning, a natural consequence of mixing responsibility for planning with operations at all levels in the Army.[23]


The CONARC task force recommended integrating training. *(Chart 26)* CONARC would become a Force Development Command responsible for induction and processing (functions of The Adjutant General's Office), individual military training, the organization, training, and equipment of units for assignment to operating forces, and for supporting them and designated Reserve units at required levels of mobilization or readiness. The Force Development Command would also take over CONARC responsibilities for the CONUS armies.

If individual training remained a function of the Force Development Command's headquarters, it would have to compete for attention with unit training and installation support functions. Transferring to the Force Development Command the schools and training centers of the technical and administra-

[22] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 159-60. (2) For a view defending the traditional approach, see Aaron Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting," *Public Administration Review*, XXVI (December 1966), 292-310. (3) See also Chapter XI, below, pages 370-73.

[23] Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. III, Annex C-1 and C-3.

CHART 26—HOELSCHER COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR REORGANIZATION OF CONARC, OCTOBER 1961



Source: Hoelscher Committee Report, III, p. 55.

tive services would add further responsibilities to an overburdened headquarters.

A separate but subordinate Individual Training Command could concentrate singlemindedly on integrating the Army's individual training activities. It would also supervise the Army's service schools, training centers, and personnel processing activities. Specifically exempted because of their special nature would be West Point and its Preparatory School, the Army War College, certain intelligence schools, the Army Logistics Management Center, and "courses of instruction of a professional medical or non-military character." [24]

The task force, in discussing problems of installation support under the Force Development Command, emphatically rejected any resurrection of the housekeeping command concept that had caused so much trouble before the CONARC reorganization of 1955. The chief problem remaining in this area was financial management. Installation support funds came under the amorphous, catchall category designated "Operations and Maintenance of Facilities." There was no such category in


[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 35–47, 51–77, Annex C, Appendix I.

the Army's appropriations structure. Most of the funds to support installations came not only from the Operations and Maintenance budget but also from the Operating Forces, Training Activities, and Central Supply Activities appropriations. Here again Congressional limitations on transferring funds from one appropriations category to another were the principal cause of the trouble and led to illegal transfers among appropriations categories, as indicated earlier. The task force recommended making Operations and Maintenance of Facilities a separate and legally distinct category as the most efficient way of solving these problems.[25]

In recommending the integration of combat developments under a single agency the CONARC task force followed recommendations made by Project VISTA in 1952, the Haworth Committee in 1954, and the Armour Research Foundation in 1959. In its analysis, the task force suggested that four separate functions or stages were involved: long-range planning, the development of matériel, combat arms testing, and implementation, meaning the incorporation of new doctrines and weapons in military training. The combat developments agency proposed would cover only the first or planning stage. The CONARC task force suggested assigning development and user acceptance tests to the proposed logistics command, while training and doctrine would remain under the Force Development Command. The "Combat Developments Agency" would be responsible for preparing detailed military specifications for new weapons and equipment, for developing new organizational and operational concepts and doctrines, for testing these ideas experimentally in war games and in field maneuvers, for conducting combat operations research studies, and for analyzing the results in terms of cost-effectiveness. The proposed agency would include all such functions and personnel currently located at USCONARC headquarters and its school commands as well as in the technical and administrative services, the Army staff (principally the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and DCSLOG), and the Army

[25] (1) See Chapter VII, above, page 282. (2) Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. III, Annex C, Appendix 2. (3) Congress has not yet accepted Operations and Maintenance of Facilities as a separate budget category, but the Army in fiscal year 1972 instituted an administrative base operations program which amounts to practically the same thing. Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

CHART 27—HOELSCHER COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR A COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS AGENCY, OCTOBER 1961



Source: Hoelscher Committee Report, III, p. 87.

War College. *(Chart 27)* Under its command would be the Office of Special Weapons Development at Fort Bliss, Texas, concerned with tactical nuclear operations, and the Combat Developments Experimentation Center at Fort Ord, California. Combining these elements in a separate Department of the Army staff agency, designated as such rather than as a field command, was suggested as the best means of emphasizing that its function was planning as distinct from current operations. "This agency would emphasize creative activity requiring imagination and the ability to focus on the future. It would be a challenger of current doctrine and an innovator of new concepts, which, in turn, demand new hardware." [26]

The most important Project 80 task force was the one under General Haines responsible for studying DCSLOG, the technical services, and Army logistics in general. The central issue, as in previous reorganizations, was how to assert effective executive control over the operations of the services. The services themselves had continued to deny the need for controls limiting their traditional freedom of action either through placing them under a logistics command or by breaking them up along functional lines. The Palmer reorganization of 1955 which tried to place them under the "command" of DCSLOG simply had not worked. DCSLOG had never been able to assert effective control over them because it had to share this authority with the rest of the Army staff. In 1961 they remained seven organizationally autonomous commands. They employed nearly 300,000 military and civilian personnel at approximately four hundred installations inside the United States with an estimated real estate value of $11 billion and a current annual budget of $10 billion.

General Haines' task force initially identified thirteen problem areas requiring detailed investigation. Approximately half involved DCSLOG and the Army's logistics systems only. The rest involved other Army staff agencies, including personnel management, training, and intelligence.[27] Another important task was to conduct interviews and obtain the opinions of a broad spectrum of individuals inside and outside the Army.

[26] Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. III, pp. 77–93, 104, Annex C, Appendix 3. Quotation is from page 92.

[27] *Ibid.*, vol. II, pt. IV, pp. 207–350.

One was the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, Thomas D. Morris, a career civil servant with intimate knowledge of financial management and logistics. His deputy, Paul Riley, who had worked on logistics management problems in the Department of Defense since 1958 was another. Both criticized the Army for excessive delay in making decisions. They also felt that while the Air Force and Navy came up with firm, long-range logistics programs the Army generally presented only one-year projections which merely summarized the technical services annual programs. Dr. Richard S. Morse, the new Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, asserted the Army must cut red tape and make decisions more promptly. All three thought the independence and conservatism of the technical services caused most of these problems.[28]

After investigating the thirteen logistics problem areas General Haines' group concluded by making a number of recommendations, many of which had been made before. Effective management of Army logistics, it said, required that the Army staff should confine itself to planning and policy-making and divorce itself from the details of administration. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, the principal offender, was so involved in overseeing administrative operations that it neglected its planning functions. It could not function effectively as commander of the technical services because of the concurrent jurisdiction exercised by other Army staff agencies over the technical services. Second, below the Army staff there should be "positive, authoritative control over the wholesale Army logistic system." Third, both in the Army staff and in the field, development and production must be closely related. Fourth, the argument of commodity versus functional organization oversimplified the problem. Whatever logistics system was adopted, both elements would have to be present at one level or another. The principal aim should be to eliminate the duplication, unnecessary staff-layering, and rigid compartmentalization of the existing system. Such an organization should also be adaptable to "systems management" which cut across

[28] (1) L. W. Hoelscher, Summary of Some Views Expressed by ASD (I&L) Tom Morris and his Deputy, Paul Riley, 11 April 1961, and Some Comments and Views of Dr. Richard Morse, ASA (R&D), 29 May 1961, 2 Jul 61. Hoelscher files, Project 80. (2) Interview, Hewes with Mr. Morris, 10 May 74.

traditional command lines. Finally, the Army must overcome the "divisive influence" caused by the relative autonomy and self-sufficiency of the technical services.[29]

The whole Hoelscher Committee generally agreed that the technical services should be functionalized. It agreed that the General Staff should get out of operations and that training, combat developments, and personnel functions within the Army logistics system could be more effectively performed if these functions were transferred to the proposed Force Development Command, Combat Developments Agency, and the Office of Personnel Operations. Other Army-wide services of the technical services could be transferred to special staff agencies without harming the Army's logistics system.[30]

The logistics task force considered three alternative organizational patterns for managing Army logistics. The first involved two functional field commands, one for research, development, and initial production and a second, the Army Supply and Distribution Command, for the later phases of the matériel cycle. The second alternative was to create two commodity commands, one for military hardware, including all major weapons systems, and another for general supplies and equipment, many of which were under single managerships. Finally, the task force considered setting up a single Systems and Materiel Command responsible for the entire spectrum of supply from research and development through distribution and maintenance.

The Haines task force and the Hoelscher Committee, except the task force considering research and development, believed that two separate functional commands would create complex problems of co-ordination in addition to splitting the matériel cycle. Two separate commodity commands would deal with research and development and with distribution. Here, the likely transfer of the single manager agencies to the newly created Defense Supply Agency made it questionable whether a separate supply command was really necessary. Conse-

[29] Hoelscher Committee Report, vol. I, pt. IV, pp. 48-52.

[30] (1) Interview, Blumenson with Hoelscher, 27 Feb 62. (2) Hoelscher Committee Report, vol. I, pt. IV, pp. 54-57. (3) Joseph Zengerle, representing the Ordnance Department, disagreed with nearly everything proposed by the Hoelscher Committee that affected his agency. Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

quently they preferred a single "Systems and Materiel Command." [31]


The research and development task force protested that such a command would subordinate research and development to production and operations. World War II demonstrated that successful research and development resulted from a separation of research and development from supply activities, while industrial production and military supply were not adversely affected to a material degree by such a separation. "Furthermore, historical events reveal the suppressive effect of the prevailing social order on innovating activities, which on that account must be removed from the control of day-to-day operations for maximum results." As an alternative this group preferred an organizational pattern in which research and development was separated from other supply functions. The pattern proposed by General Haines' group, they believed, was worse than the existing organization. They also wanted to strengthen the role of research and development at the Army staff level by reverting to a three-deputy chiefs of staff concept, one for joint plans, another for operations and readiness, and a third for Army programs and resources.[32]

The Hoelscher Committee replied by pointing out that the Army's research and development program would continue to be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Research and Development and on the General Staff by the Chief of Research and Development. Important elements of the Army's research and development program would be under the new Combat Developments Agency. The Haines group added that under its proposed organization the new Systems and Materiel Command would place sufficient emphasis on research and development by appointment of a Chief Scientist as adviser to the commanding general, a Director for Research and Development, and by providing a special office for Project Management.

The overriding reason that the Hoelscher Committee and General Haines' logistics task force selected a single logistics command was that they considered it both unwise and impractical to separate research and development from production because of the need for close co-ordination between these func-

[31] Hoelscher Committee Report, vol. I, pt. IV, pp. 57-82.
[32] *Ibid.*, vol. IV, pp. 51-77. Quotation is from page 74.

CHART 28—HOELSCHER COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR A LOGISTICS COMMAND, OCTOBER 1961



Source: Hoelscher Committee Report, IV, p. 72.

tions at the operating level. To confirm this opinion, Hoelscher conducted additional interviews with logistics management experts and made special field trips in August to several technical service industrial installations.

The basic organization proposed for the Systems and Materiel Command, later to be called the Army Materiel Command (AMC), consisted of a headquarters with three functional directorates for research and development, production and procurement, and supply and maintenance plus a supporting staff. *(Chart 28)* The Haines task force had deliberately placed Project Management, Plans and Programs, and a Chief Scientist inside the office of the commanding general to emphasize the importance and priority of these functions. The principal field agencies were a series of commodity-oriented development and production commands similar to the existing Ordnance Department's field agencies and a functional supply command responsible for both transportation and distribution.[88]

The Personnel Management report was a unique feature of Project 80 because previous Army organization studies had paid little attention to this subject. They had said little beyond asserting that in any functional reorganization the technical services should lose their personnel as well as other nonlogistical functions.

The Personnel Management task force asserted that responsibility for this function continued to be fragmented among twenty different agencies on the basis of historical accident rather than rational design. There had been little improvement since 1945 when Drs. Learned and Smith had complained: "No single agency in the War Department General Staff has adequate responsibility or authority to make an integrated Army-wide personnel system work."

The mixture of staff and operating responsibilities within these agencies made integrated control even more difficult. The agencies primarily responsible for personnel management were DCSPER, The Adjutant General's Office (TAGO), and the technical services. But nearly all other Army staff agencies were involved, and all combined staff and operating responsi-

[88] (1) *Ibid.*, pt. I, pp. 98–113, and vol. I, pt. IV, pp. 70–82. (2) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 32–35.

bilities. For practical purposes responsibility for personnel management in the Reserve Components was a separate area with its own personnel management program. TAGO also supervised Army recruiting, induction, and personnel processing in the field. It ran the Army's welfare and morale programs. Finally TAGO was the Army's chief administrative officer, records keeper, postman, and printer.[34]

Improvements in personnel management since World War II had been piecemeal. Personnel and manpower statistics had greatly improved, especially after TAGO obtained the use of a large computer in the 1950s. As a consequence, manpower controls were more effective. Personnel classification and career management, both military and civilian, had also improved. Combat arms officers, in particular, were receiving much broader educations, both within and outside the Army. This was less true for technical service officers.[35]

The Personnel Management task force did not believe that further major improvements in Army personnel management were possible under the existing system. Co-ordination and control were extremely difficult when twenty agencies shared responsibility for the program. Second, the Army staff and DCSPER in particular were too heavily involved in operations, and the Army staff's long-range personnel planning had suffered as a consequence. A third major criticism was that career management, especially in the technical services, tended to be narrowly tailored to serve branch or service interests.[36]


According to Mr. Hoelscher, the most difficult area in reaching final agreement among the committee as a whole concerned the initial or basic military training of the individual soldier. This area extended from planning the Army's enlisted military personnel requirements in terms of individual military occupations, through induction, basic training, and ultimate assignment to specific units or services. This was precisely the area where current responsibilities were most fragmented and

[34] (1) Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System. (2) See Chapter III, pages 115–20. (3) Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. VI, pp. 9–21. (4) Department of the Army Regulation 10–5, Organization and Functions, Department of the Army, 5 May 61, par. 36.

[35] Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System.

[36] Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. VI, pp. 25–27, 36–37, 42–43, 49, 56.

CHART 29—HOELSCHER COMMITTEE PROPOSAL FOR OFFICE OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS, OCTOBER 1961
(AN ILLUSTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF OFFICE OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS)



Legend:
XXX Lt Gen
XX Maj Gen
X Brig Gen

Note: Organizational structure shown in broken lines illustrates proposed pattern for each of the similar groups above.

Source: Hoelscher Committee Report, VI, p. 57.

confused among the major Army staff agencies and the technical services who were often at loggerheads with each other. Known as the "Flow of Trainees through the Training Base," this problem would continue to cause trouble.[37]

The Personnel Management task force's principal recommendation was to consolidate control over Army military personnel management in a single Office of Personnel Operations and transfer to it all such functions performed by the Army staff, including TAGO and the technical services, except for such professional groups as the Army Medical Corps, the Judge Advocate General's Corps, and the Chaplains Corps. DCSPER would retain responsibility for general officer assignments. It also recommended organizing officer personnel management within OPO along "branch" lines for technical service as well as combat arms officers with brigadier generals assigned as branch chiefs to provide proper top-level supervision. *(Chart 29)*

OPO would operate under the General Staff supervision of DCSPER, and the Hoelscher Committee stressed that the DCSPER and the Chief of OPO should not be the same person since the purpose of OPO was to relieve DCSPER of all operating responsibilities. TAGO would be abolished and its personnel responsibilities transferred to OPO, including welfare and morale services. Its personnel research function would be transferred to the Army Research Office. The Hoelscher Committee also recommended transferring responsibility for induction and recruiting, examination, reception, transfer, and separation of enlisted personnel to the proposed Individual Training Command under CONARC as mentioned earlier.[38]

Civilian personnel management received little attention. The Hoelscher Committee simply recommended transferring this function from the technical services and from the Army

[37] (1) Hoelscher, Story of Project 80, p. 128. (2) Memo for Record, 22 Aug 61, sub: Discussion of Office of Personnel Operations at OSD Project 80 (Army) Committee Meeting; Memo for Record, 29 Aug and 31 Aug 61, sub: Discussion of the Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) and the Overall Headquarters, Department of the Army, Organization Pattern. Hoelscher files, Project 80. (3) See also Chart 29 below.

[38] (1) Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. VI, pp. 62, 67, 72-83. (2) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

staff to OPO, stressing that it remain a separate and distinct operation from military personnel management.[39]

When Mr. Hoelscher's over-all report and those of the task forces had been drafted, he submitted them to the Secretary of the Army's staff and to the General Staff representatives on the Project Advisory Committee for comment.[40] The technical services, the agencies most vitally affected by the proposed reorganization, were not consulted. General Colglazier, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, informed technical service chiefs in late September that their comments were not wanted at this time and cautioned them against revealing information on Project 80 to "unauthorized" persons.[41]

General Colglazier's office had kept the technical service chiefs reasonably well informed of developments. Brig. Gen. James M. Illig, Chief of DCSLOG's Office of Management Analysis, and his assistant chief, Dr. Wilfred J. Garvin, as members of the Project Advisory Committee, were the principal contacts between the Hoelscher Committee and the technical services. At the end of July General Illig and Dr. Garvin learned of the alternative organization patterns being considered and developed a set of DCSLOG counterproposals.

The "Illig-Garvin" proposals and the criticisms of the final Hoelscher Committee report, also made by General Illig and Dr. Garvin, represented a rough consensus among DCSLOG and the technical services. They accepted the Hoelscher Committee concept of one or more logistics commands, but insisted the technical service chiefs should remain as such on the Army staff with responsibility for personnel management and training.[42]

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[39] Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. VI, pp. 80-81, Annex C.

[40] Comments Re Study Reports, pts. I-VII. Hoelscher files. Hereafter cited as PAC Comments.

[41] (1) OCofT Staff Conferences, Mar-Oct 61, *passim*, especially No. 28, 21 Sep 61. Project 80 files. (2) Blumenson, Project 80 History, p. 57. (3) *Army, Navy, Air Force Journal*, 99, No. 5 (September 1961), 12. (4) Memo, Hoelscher for Horwitz, 20 Oct 61, sub: Status Report on Project 80. (5) Interview, Hewes with M. O. Stewart, 27 Feb 67.

[42] (1) Summary of Proceedings, Meeting of Project Advisory Committee, 27 Jul 61, dated 1 Aug 61. Located in PAC—Materials Presented to the Project Advisory Committee. (2) Memo for Record, Mr. Garcia, 3 Aug 61, sub: Briefing of the DCSLOG on Reorganization of the Logistics Establishment Within the Department of the Army. Copy obtained from files of Management Division, OCofT, Project 80 files. Hereafter cited as Garcia Memorandum. (3) Comments by Management Division, OCofT, to Garcia Memorandum. (4) Interview, Blumenson with Colonel Kjellstrom, 22 Mar 62, on Carlisle Barracks Briefings.

The creation of a logistics command, General Illig and Dr. Garvin said, was preferable to the situation that had developed since the Palmer reorganization of 1954–55 were there was no effective direction and control over the technical services short of the Chief of Staff himself. The evil, as they saw it, and the great "divisive" influence within the Army was the progressive "functionalization" of Army operations, programs, and budgets. "The preoccupation of multiple Army staff agencies with specialized functional areas and related programs and budgets had impaired the command integrity of the Technical Services and prevented effective management of their several functions towards a common end." The technical services were the victims rather than the cause of the trouble. Illig and Garvin believed a Systems and Materiel Command such as the Hoelscher Committee proposed was clearly preferable to the evil consequences of the creeping functionalization of the past decade.

They did not agree with the Hoelscher Committee's contention that the Army staff should divorce itself from operations. The technical services had long and successfully exercised both staff and command functions. Detailed control by the Army staff was necessary to answer questions and meet criticisms from the Bureau of the Budget, the General Accounting Office, and Congress. Increasing costs, decreasing appropriations, and technical problems encountered in the earlier stages of research and development were other reasons why DCSLOG and other Army staff agencies had to exercise detailed controls over operations.[43]

Concerning the organization of the Army staff General Illig and Dr. Garvin opposed continued separation of research and development from production, preferring an arrangement which separated development and production from supply and distribution. They opposed a separate Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and International Affairs, suggesting instead creating an operating deputy for JCS affairs within the Office of the Chief of Staff. They objected to the proposal for a Director of the Army Staff as an additional unnecessary staff layer. This

[43] Memo, General Illig and Dr. Garvin for Mr. Hoelscher, 27 Sep 61, sub: Comments on Study of the Functions, Organization, and Procedures of the Department of the Army, pt. III, Inclosure 1, pp. 1-8, PAC Comments. Quotation is from page 8.

was the Vice Chief of Staff's responsibility. An assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff who would direct Army staff programing and systems management was preferable to the proposed deputy for these functions. The heads of Army staff agencies also should retain their right of personal access to the Chief of Staff. No change in traditional Army staff procedures which eliminated this right was acceptable.[44]

General Illig and Dr. Garvin agreed on the creation of a separate combat developments agency. They opposed making CONARC responsible for all technical training because technical service specialists, including civilian experts, not only worked with the combat arms but also within the Army's wholesale logistic system and in jointly staffed defense agencies like the new Defense Supply Agency on functions unrelated to CONARC's training mission. For similar reasons Illig, Garvin, Colglazier, and the technical service chiefs opposed transferring technical service military officer personnel management to the proposed Office of Personnel Operations where the influence of the combat arms would be predominant. They simply did not believe combat arms oriented agencies like CONARC or OPO could produce the kind of skilled technicians required in an era of rapid technological change for service throughout the Army and Department of Defense. It was clear from all their comments that DCSLOG and the technical service chiefs objected more to losing responsibility for military training and officer personnel management than any other features of the Hoelscher Committee report.

Under the alternative organization proposed by Illig and Garvin, responsibility for individual training and personnel management would remain under the technical service chiefs as Army staff agencies. To the new Systems and Materiel Command they proposed also transferring "career management and personnel operations" of the Army's wholesale logistic establishment as part of "the command function of the Technical Services" it would inherit. In summary, they recommended that

> . . . the Army assure the retention at departmental headquarters of a strong technical staff to perform all staff functions currently prescribed

[44] Memo, General Illig and Dr. Garvin for Mr. Hoelscher, 20 Sep 61, sub: Review of Draft Report—Project 80, pp. 2-3, and Inclosure 1, pp. 6-8, 13, 15-18.

for the Chiefs in the Technical Service [sic] in AR 10-5, to manage the careers of all military personnel assigned to Army technical corps, to direct and control Army technical schools, and to furnish those currently assigned Army-wide services which are not transferred to the Systems and Materiel Command.[45]

The Hoelscher Committee made some minor adjustments as the result of Army staff criticisms. The final report as submitted to the Chief of Staff on 5 October 1961 and on 16 October to Secretary McNamara included the following principal recommendations:

The technical services and The Adjutant General's Office were to be functionalized. The agencies primarily affected were the offices of the chiefs of the technical services which were either abolished or reorganized functionally as Army staff agencies except for the Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers. The field installations of the technical services were to remain, although their exact relations to the new field commands were undecided. Technical service personnel would still retain their branch insignia and designation just as the combat arms had after the abolition of the chiefs of the combat arms under the Marshall reorganization in 1942.

The principal logistics agency of the Army in place of the technical services was to be a single Systems and Materiel Command. It would be responsible for the entire matériel cycle from research and development through distribution and major maintenance activities, except for combat development functions. It would inherit most of the personnel and field installations of the technical services.

A second new major field command would be a Combat Developments Agency. It would be responsible for integrating this function, fragmented until then among the several technical services and CONARC, and its personnel would be drawn largely from these agencies.

CONARC would be reorganized as a Force Development Command, a designation later dropped, to include all the technical service schools and training facilities, while losing its combat development functions to the Combat Developments Agency. A new major field command under CONARC would be responsible for training individuals, including their

[45] (1) *Ibid.*, p. 2, and Inclosure 1, pp. 1–4, 8–9, 14–15. Quotation is from page 15. (2) Illig-Garvin Memorandum, 27 Sep 61, Inclosure 1, pp. 10–11.

induction and processing, functions currently assigned to The Adjutant General's Office.

Another new field agency rather than a command was to be the Office of Personnel Operations responsible for all Army personnel management functions previously performed by DCSPER, The Adjutant General's Office, and the technical services. The management of general officer careers would remain a DCSPER function.

The real change centralized the personnel management of technical service officers under OPO because personnel management of technical service enlisted personnel had already been centralized in The Adjutant General's Office.

Less noticed was the reorganization of Army headquarters proposed by the Hoelscher Committee because this feature was largely eliminated in the final reorganization plan approved by Secretary McNamara. The principal changes proposed were to create a Director of the Army Staff with the rank of lieutenant general to act as the deputy of the Vice Chief and Chief of Staff in supervising the work of the Army staff. Second, the committee proposed to separate the operational planning and training functions of DCSOPS into two agencies, a Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy and International Affairs and another for Plans, Programs, and Systems, which would include responsibility not only for organization and training but also for co-ordinating Army plans, programs, and budget functions in these areas.

The Adjutant General's Office was to be abolished with its personnel functions going to OPO and CONARC, while its administrative functions would be reorganized under a new Chief of Administrative Services. The Office of the Chief of Military History would be abolished also and its functions transferred to the latter agency.

While public attention focused on the organizational changes proposed by the Hoelscher Committee, the latter made two major recommendations for improving Army staff procedures. First, it recommended that the General Staff divorce itself from operating responsibilities by transferring personnel responsible for such functions to the new major field commands. The principal agency affected would be DCSLOG, which as a

result of the Palmer reorganization in 1955 had greatly increased its staff. Second, it proposed to reform the General Staff's "staff actions" procedures by cutting down on the number of formal concurrences required in favor of procedures which were aimed at producing quicker and clearer decisions and actions.[46]

Six months of detailed research by a carefully selected staff which balanced professional and military talent in many areas made the Hoelscher Committee report the most thorough and detailed investigation of Army organization and management since World War I. Following submission of his report, Hoelscher and his headquarters staff conducted special briefings at Carlisle Barracks in mid-October for Secretary Stahr, General Decker, the General Staff, and representatives of the technical services. General Decker then disbanded the Hoelscher Committee, except for a small headquarters staff.

[46] (1) Hoelscher Committee Report, pt. I. (2) *Ibid.*, pt. II, Hq., DA, pp. 159-60.

CHAPTER X

Project 80: The End of a Tradition

At Secretary Stahr's request General Decker appointed a General Staff committee under the Comptroller of the Army, Lt. Gen. David W. Traub, to study the Hoelscher Committee report and recommend what action the Army should take. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, and Office of the Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) were directed to prepare supporting studies with recommendations on the internal organization of the proposed logistics, training, and combat development commands.[1] At the same time Secretary Stahr forwarded the report to Secretary McNamara notifying him that the Traub Committee would probably take three or four weeks to make any recommendations but that it was "better to be right than rapid." While he welcomed suggestions from Mr. Vance and would supply him with whatever information he wanted in accordance with Secretary McNamara's instructions, he firmly believed that as Secretary of the Army he should retain the initiative in Project 80 until he had submitted his recommendations.[2]

Instead Secretary McNamara seized the initiative. At the end of October he told Secretary Stahr he wanted more details on the internal organization of the new commands, especially the logistics command. The lack of clear-cut assignment of responsibility for requirements, procurement, and supply particularly bothered him.[3]

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[1] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 53–57. (2) Copy of Chief of Staff Memo 320 (14 Oct 61) for Deputy Chiefs of Staff and others, 14 Oct 61, sub: Study of Army Organization. Tab A to Report of the Committee Appointed to Develop and Recommend to the Chief of Staff the Views of the Army General Staff on Project 80, 22 Nov 61. Hereafter cited as Traub Committee Report.

[2] Ltr, Secy Stahr to Secy McNamara, 16 Oct 61. Kjellstrom Briefing files, Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office (DARPO) files.

[3] Copy of Memo for Record, Col H. W. O. Kinnard, Executive, OSA, 1 Nov 61. In Kjellstrom Briefing files, DARPO.

For the Hoelscher Committee veterans, Project 80 soon became a series of frenzied crash actions in response to a continuing barrage of detailed questions from Secretary McNamara and Mr. Vance, such as should there be four, five, seven, or ten subordinate commands within the logistics command? How many people would be assigned the new commands and where would they come from? What major steps were required in changing over from the old to the new organization? What were the pros and cons of alternative proposals for grouping the various commodity commands and the functional supply command? Secretary McNamara also wanted detailed organization charts for each of the new commands showing where they would come from.[4]

Secretary McNamara and Mr. Vance bypassed the Traub Committee and worked directly with the harried band of Project 80 veterans under Col. Edward W. McGregor. General Illig's office in DCSLOG and the office of Lt. Col. Wilson R. Reed, Deputy Director for Plans and Management in OCRD, provided expert assistance in rushing through one organization chart after another. These Colonel McGregor personally carried from one office to another for approval and finally to Mr. Vance's office.

This disregard for traditional staff procedures dismayed the Army staff. The Traub Committee could not keep up with the rapidity of Secretary McNamara's requests and decisions. A disagreement between DCSLOG and OCRD over the internal organization of the logistics command proved very embarrassing when it went directly to Secretary McNamara. Under Secretary Stephen Ailes directed General Traub to "insure that everything that goes forward to OSD from now on out in fact represents an Army position as decided by the Undersecretary or other proper authority." Finally on 28 November Mr. Ailes was able to recommend creating five subordinate commodity commands under the logistics command: missiles, munitions (including chemical, biological, and radiological material), weapons and mobility, communications and electronics, and

[4] (1) *Ibid.* (2) Mimeographed Outline, ODCSLOG (General Illig's office), 17 Nov 61, sub: Criticism and Justification for Commodity Assignments Within a Five Command Group. (3) Memo, Mr. [Paul R.] Ignatius, ASA (I&L), for General Traub, 18 Nov 61, on the former's conversation with Mr. Vance and Mr. Horwitz. All in Kjellstrom Briefing files. (4) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 15 Nov 61.

general equipment (formerly Quartermaster and Engineer functions). Secretary McNamara approved this disposition without further changes.[5] Similar procedures were followed in developing the internal organization of the Combat Developments Command.

The Traub Committee Report

While Secretary McNamara was principally interested in Army logistics, the Traub Committee worked on training and Army headquarters organization. These were also the major areas where the final decisions made departed substantially from the Hoelscher Committee recommendations. At the insistence of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup, the Traub Committee deliberately avoided the area of personnel management on the grounds that this function should be dealt with by DCSPER. The only substantive comment the Traub Committee made was that OPO begin operations by simply taking over in place the personnel management staffs of the technical services pending physical consolidation when space became available in the Pentagon. There were no organization charts or annexes on OPO's internal structure. Neither its functions nor its relations with DCSPER and the rest of the Army were clearly defined.[6]

The Traub Committee rejected the principal Hoelscher Committee recommendations on Army headquarters except for agreeing that OPO should be an additional Army staff agency. Its members were unanimous in opposing a Director of the Army Staff as unnecessary.[7] They objected to the Hoelscher Committee's recommendation for splitting DCSOPS into one agency for joint planning and military operations and a separate one for training and programs. Neither the Vice Chief of Staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, nor the Deputy Chief of Staff for

[5] (1) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 15 Nov 61. (2) Interview, Blumenson with McGregor, 1 Mar 62. (3) Draft of proposed Talking Paper for General Traub . . . . c. 21 Nov. 61, and Draft of Fact Sheets for Sec Def to Remind Him of Sequence of Events, no date. Kjellstrom Briefing files. (4) Traub Committee Report, p. 11.

[6] (1) Traub Committee Report. On OPO, see pages 2–4, 17. (2) Interview, Blumenson with McGregor, 1 Mar 62. (3) Interview, Hewes with Lt Col Lewis J. Ashley, 21 Sep 62. Colonel Ashley had been a member of Group F (Personnel) and remained as a member of DARPO to assist in carrying out the final decisions on Project 80. (4) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

[7] (1) Traub Committee Report, p. 4. (2) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 24 Oct 61. (3) Carlisle Barracks Briefings, Project 80 files.

Military Operations, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, saw any need for a separate Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Programs, and Systems. Instead the committee recommended creating a new post of Director of Army Programs within the Chief of Staff's secretariat who would be responsible for co-ordinating plans, programs, and systems within the Army staff itself. It rejected the proposal for a new Chief of Administrative Services and the abolition of The Adjutant General's Office. On the other hand it accepted the Hoelscher Committee proposal to abolish the Office, Chief of Military History, assigning its functions to TAGO.

To reduce the number of separate agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff directly, the committee proposed to group the special staff, except for the Chief of Information, the Inspector General, and the Judge Advocate General's Office, under the existing Deputy Chiefs of Staff, including the vestigial technical and administrative services. Finally the Traub Committee ignored recommendations concerning improved management and co-ordination of the Army's plans, programs, and systems and for streamlining Army staff procedures.[8]

Concerning training, the Traub Committee, following recommendations from DCSOPS and CONARC, recommended making "individual training" a directorate within CONARC headquarters under a Deputy Commanding General for Training instead of creating a separate command. The training centers would in this case continue to remain under the several CONUS armies.[9]

In accepting the Hoelscher Committee proposals for a Combat Developments Agency which it designated as a field command, the Traub Committee recommended expanding its functions. It suggested transferring from the Army's school system those functions and personnel connected with the development of doctrine, preparation of tables of organization and equipment, and combat developments field manuals. Within the schools these functions were often assigned to individuals whose main responsibilities were for training or teaching and who neglected combat developments as a consequence.[10]

[8] (1) Traub Committee Report, pp. 1–4, 17, 20. (2) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

[9] Traub Committee Report, pp. 7–9.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–13.

Considering the magnitude of the proposed reorganization the Traub Committee thought eighteen months would be a highly optimistic estimate for an operation involving nearly 200,000 people and nearly two hundred installations. There would be three phases: planning, activation, and adjustment. While it might take only three months to reorganize Army headquarters and the Office of Personnel Operations, it might take ten months to set up the Combat Developments Command headquarters. Another factor determining how long it would take to complete the reorganization was the location of the new commands. To avoid losing key technical service personnel, the committee thought the logistics command should be headquartered in the Washington area where the people were.[11]

The Traub Committee recommended assigning "General Staff responsibility" for planning and co-ordinating the actual reorganization to the Comptroller of the Army, General Traub. To assist him it recommended creating a special "project office" within the Office of the Comptroller to "maintain current information on the progress of the planning or execution as appropriate" of the reorganization and to serve as "the focal point for all coordination, periodic reports, and information required prior to and during the transition." Other Army staff agencies should "assist" as required.[12]

The Approval and Execution of Project 80

After approving the Hoelscher Committee report, as amended by the Traub Committee and himself, Secretary McNamara sought the support of General Maxwell D. Taylor, then President Kennedy's military adviser. A formal briefing for him by Mr. Hoelscher and the Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office (DARPO) staff was arranged for 22 November 1961.

General Taylor had earlier told members of the Hoelscher Committee personally that he considered the Army's mission was to support the fighting man and that everything should be subordinated to this goal. Mere change for its own sake was

[11] (1) *Ibid.*, pp. 10–21. (2) Tab C, Preliminary Study Plan of Implementation for a Systems and Materiel Command in the Department of the Army (OSD Project 80), DCSLOG, 1 Nov 61, pp. 80–98. (3) Tab E, A Study of the Establishment of a Combat Developments Agency, OCRD, 1 Nov 61, p. 17.

[12] Inclosure 1 to Traub Committee Report.

wrong because any organization the size of the Army required stability to function effectively. This comment represented the position of combat arms officers generally. He might organize the services along functional lines, were he starting from scratch. But, considering Army traditions and the large number of people accustomed to them and to the existing system, he questioned whether any drastic changes were really desirable such as a major overhaul of the technical services.[13]

At his Thanksgiving DARPO briefing General Taylor repeated these ideas, again emphasizing the importance and value of Army traditions for Army morale. The proposal to eliminate the technical services was not new, and he wryly wished the committee good luck in its venture.

While impressed with the thoroughness of the Hoelscher Committee report, he wanted further details on Army logistics under the current organization as well as the proposed future organization. Taylor also asked for more details on personnel management and training, the impact of the Combat Developments Command on the combat arms, and the effect of the reorganization on the Army's "combat readiness." Last he wanted to know the views of the technical service chiefs and other Army staff officials on Project 80 proposals.[14]

To answer these questions a second briefing for General Taylor was scheduled for 21 December. In the meantime two formal briefings for the technical service chiefs were held on Friday, 8 December, known afterward as Black Friday among the once proud technical service headquarters, to obtain their views. Observers noted at the outset three empty chairs reserved for Secretary Stahr, General Decker, and Mr. Vance. When they did appear toward the end of the briefing they were preceded by Secretary McNamara whose presence had been unannounced. He said that while he would welcome the views of the technical service chiefs, he also felt that when the

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[13] (1) Memo, Colonel McGregor to General Tyson, 16 Nov 61, on briefing for General Taylor. Kjellstrom Briefing files. (2) Memo for Record, Group A, OSD Project 80 (Army), 31 May 61, sub: Meeting With General Maxwell D. Taylor. Located in Various Military and Civilian VIPS—Briefing and Meeting Memos. Hoelscher files.

[14] (1) Memo for Record, Colonel Kjellstrom, 24 Nov 61, sub: Briefing of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Assistant to the President, on Reorganization of the Army, Kjellstrom Briefing files. (2) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

President made his decision, they should support it and not engage in public controversy.

The technical service chiefs did not present a united front. General Colglazier, a Reserve officer and civil engineer in private life, was not a career technical service officer himself and had spent most of the previous decade dealing with DCSLOG management problems. The new Defense Supply Agency would remove the bulk of the Quartermaster Corps from the Army and as a result had created some confusion among the chiefs. Few appeared to have digested the details or to have read the several volumes of the Hoelscher Committee report. They were very concerned about those proposals which would relieve them of their responsibilities for training and for officer personnel management. They did not believe the new organizations could or would provide the kind of trained specialists the Army needed to keep up with changing technology.

The Chief of Ordnance, Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, questioned some details of the organization, to which Secretary McNamara replied that he was interested primarily in the view of the chiefs on the broad concepts of Project 80, not the details. Maj. Gen. Webster Anderson, the Quartermaster General, complained that the new DSA had practically eliminated his agency. The Surgeon General, Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Heaton, was neutral. Maj. Gen. Ralph T. Nelson, the Chief Signal Officer, favored the reorganization, while Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs, the Chief Chemical Officer, violently opposed Project 80 since it proposed to eliminate his office entirely. The Chief of Engineers, Lt. Gen. Emerson C. Itchner, objected to Project 80 proposals dealing with the training functions of his office. Maj. Gen. Frank S. Besson, Jr., the Chief of Transportation, who favored the reorganization, strongly endorsed the basic management concepts advanced by the Hoelscher Committee. Those present at the briefing were not surprised later when General Besson was selected as commanding general of the Army Materiel Command and promoted rapidly to a four-star general.

After Secretary McNamara had left, General Hinrichs returned to the attack, accusing the Army staff of allowing itself



GENERAL BESSON. *(Photograph taken in 1972.)*

to be stampeded by the Secretary of Defense who, he asserted, had taken over the direction of Project 80 from them.[15]

At his second briefing on 21 December General Taylor expressed greatest concern over technical service officer personnel management, reflecting the lack of precise information on the division of responsibility for this function in the Hoelscher Committee report. Like the technical service chiefs, General Taylor asked how the proposed Officer Personnel Division of OPO would improve the quality of technical service officer personnel management. Lt. Col. Lewis J. Ashley, Project 80's veteran on personnel management, said that the officer personnel branches of the technical services would be transferred intact. They would retain their separate service identities but under larger control groups "combat, combat support, support, and colonels," permitting greater flexibility in career management than had been possible under technical service control. A separate Specialist Branch would manage careers of officers assigned to the Army's nine specialist programs of which aviation and logistics were currently the largest. Technical

[15] (1) Memo for Record, Colonel McGregor, 8 Dec 61, sub: Discussion With Chiefs of Technical Services Concerning the Proposed Reorganization of the Department of the Army on 8 December 1961. Colonel Kjellstrom drafted this Memo for Record. (2) Memo for Record, Colonel Ashley, 8 Dec 61 as revised on 26 Dec 61, sub: Project 80 Presentation to Chiefs of Technical Services. Both in DARPO Briefing files. (3) Memo, General Kjellstrom for Hewes, 21 Sep 71.

service officer personnel management under OPO would be "branch-oriented, but not branch-tied." The proposed assignment of officer personnel to OPO, from all branches of the Army, would also promote greater flexibility on the career management of officers based on the interests of the Army as a whole rather than its separate branches.

Colonel Ashley also stressed that officers would continue to be assigned on the basis of their technical service branch and that there would continue to be technical service units identifiable as such in the field. All that really was eliminated was the "command functions" of the technical service chiefs. In the 1942 Marshall reorganization the chiefs of the combat arms had been abolished, but officers continued to be assigned as infantrymen or artillerymen to infantry and artillery units. Under the Office of Personnel Operations this concept would be extended to the technical services with the advantage that positions associated with particular services or as "branch immaterial" with no particular service could be filled by the best-qualified personnel regardless of their assigned branch.

Second only to officer personnel management was General Taylor's interest in testing new equipment in the field and on maneuvers. His particular concern was that, under the proposed Combat Developments Command, the "consumers" or "users," the combat arms, would not have sufficient voice in deciding the weapons and equipment they would have to use. He thought a combat arms officer should command the new Test and Evaluation Agency under the Army Materiel Command. When General Taylor was told that under Project 80 combat arms officers would serve with technical service officers on tests boards and in the environmental or field maneuver testing center and that it was intended that a combat arms officer command the Test and Evaluation Agency, he appeared satisfied.

Eleven other topics were discussed at this second and final briefing of General Taylor. General Traub said the proposed reorganization affected Army headquarters only and would not have any direct effect on the Army's combat formations or on their combat readiness. Mr. Vance, speaking for Secretary McNamara, outlined the alternative organizational patterns considered for Army logistics. He said the Secretary believed the

Army took too long to make decisions and that the technical services were a major cause for this delay. Those alternatives which left the technical services intact with only one or two major functions removed did not seem much of an improvement over existing conditions. A return to the holding company concept of ASF was rejected for similar reasons and because it would leave a number of services and functions that properly belonged at the Army staff level under a subordinate command. Alternatives which would remove more than two functions from the technical services seemed just as drastic as "functionalizing" them entirely. In the end, Mr. Vance said, it seemed "better to go all the way," although he admitted it was "radical surgery."

General Taylor indicated his approval of the over-all reorganization, but he also wanted a summary of the problems anticipated in dealing with Congress, the public, and within the Army itself. Mr. Vance said OSD wanted approval from the President to notify Congress of the proposed reorganization as soon as possible according to the terms of the McCormack-Curtis amendment to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which allowed Congress thirty days to reject or amend the plan. But for this provision Secretary McNamara's proposals would have had to run the usual gamut of hearings and action in both houses of Congress, including the possibilities of amendment and rejection. Those opposed to the changes involved, especially the technical services, might have organized their forces successfully to scuttle the project as they had in the past.[16]

From the middle of November 1961 to the end of January 1962 Colonel McGregor and his staff prepared over seventy-five formal briefings besides those for General Taylor and the technical service chiefs, including the White House staff and key Congressional leaders such as Chairmen Carl Vinson and Richard B. Russell of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They also prepared a summary, Report on the

[16] (1) Memo for Record, Colonel Ashley, 26 Dec 61, sub: Briefing of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Special Assistant to the President, Concerning Reorganization of the Army, with two inclosures. Kjellstrom Briefing files. (2) From the personal observation of the author, who was then serving in the Transportation Corps, many technical service personnel mistakenly believed abolition of the offices of the chiefs of the technical services still required positive action by Congress under the Army Organization Act of 1950.

Reorganization of the Department of the Army, explaining the proposed plan. Known as the Green Book, this was the document through which the Army and the public at large learned of Project 80.[17]

On 10 January Secretary McNamara issued an executive order on the reorganization of the Army which abolished the statutory positions of the technical service chiefs and transferred them to the Secretary of the Army subject to Congressional approval. The same day he forwarded to the President identical letters for Congressmen Russell and Vinson explaining Project 80 and including copies of the reorganization plan. President Kennedy formally transmitted Secretary McNamara's letters to Congress on 16 January.[18]

Careful preparation of Congressional briefings under the direction of Mr. Horwitz helped ensure favorable Congressional reaction to Project 80. Chairman Vinson's public endorsement on 5 February seemed to indicate this. "I am satisfied in my own mind," he said, "from the information I have received, that this is an important and forward moving step on the part of the Department of the Army and that its adoption will lead to more efficiency, particularly in procurement activities and in personnel planning in the Army." [19]

Some adjustments were required. In response to protests from Michigan's congressmen and governor, Secretary McNamara personally decided not to transfer functions from Detroit's Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command to the proposed new Weapons and Mobility Command at the Rock Island Arsenal. As a consequence the Weapons and Mobility Command was separated into a Weapons Command with headquarters at Rock Island and a Mobility Command with headquarters in Detroit.[20]

No formal objections arose in Congress to Secretary Mc-

[17] (1) Interviews, Blumenson with Colonel McGregor, 1 Mar and 10 Sep 62. (2) Public Information and Congressional Briefings Folders, DARPO Pre-planning files. (3) Summary of Major Events and Problems, OCA, 1 Jul 61–30 Jun 62, p. 34.

[18] *Ibid.*, DARPO Weekly Activities Report to ODOM, 4 and 12 Jan 62.

[19] (1) DARPO Weekly Activities Reports for 28 Dec 61, 4, 12, and 26 Jan 62, and 9 and 21 Feb 62. (2) DARPO Congressional Briefing file.

[20] (1) Copy of Ltr, Secretary McNamara to Congressman James G. O'Hara and others, 24 Feb 62. DARPO Congressional Inquiry file. (2) Memo, Secretary of Army for Secretary of Defense, 21 Mar 62, sub: Organization of Subordinate Structure of Materiel Development and Logistics Command; Memo, Secretary McNamara for Secretary of Army, 28 Mar 62, same subject. In DARPO MDLC file.

Namara's reorganization plan and it went quietly into effect at 1115 on 17 February.[21]

Carrying out the reorganization was the responsibility of the Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office. This was another name for the Management Resources Planning (MRP) Branch of the Comptroller of the Army's Directorate of Organization and Management Systems (ODOMS). Brig. Gen. Robert N. Tyson, the Director of ODOMS, had created this office on 10 November 1961 under Colonel McGregor as chief so that Project 80 would have a formal organization base. The formal functions of the new branch involved "broad basic research" in the fields of management and organization and long-range Army planning in these areas. Temporarily its mission was to provide administrative support for Project 80 until final decisions had been made and then to direct and supervise the resultant reorganization under General Traub. DARPO's location within the Comptroller's Office instead of the Chief of Staff's Office was to create awkward problems of co-ordination in dealing with other, coequal General Staff divisions.[22]


From a small staff of eight people with only two clerks during the hectic days of November, the DARPO headquarters staff had expanded by March 1962 to twenty people, including six clerks and technical assistants.[23] As finally organized, under a TAGO letter of 26 January 1962, the Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office operated under the direction of a Project Planning Council, consisting of General Traub as chairman and the newly appointed chairmen of the reorganization planning groups, one each for Army headquarters, Continental Army Command, Combat Developments Command, Office of Personnel Operations, and Army Materiel Command, who provided the detailed planning required to carry out Project 80. *(Chart 30)* In the Project Office one section, an Operations Office, was responsible for briefings, Congressional relations, and other special assignments, while a

[21] For administrative purposes the effective time of the reorganization within the Army was made retroactive to 2400, 16 February 1962. DARPO Weekly Activities Report, 21 Feb 62.

[22] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 83–84. (2) General Traub's Remarks on Reorganization of ODOMS, c. Nov 61. In DARPO Organization file.

[23] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 61–63, 81–89. (2) DARPO Administrative and Personnel file.

CHART 30—DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REORGANIZATION PROJECT, FEBRUARY 1962



* Member Planning Council
Source: DARPO files

Plans Office, as its name implied, developed and co-ordinated the detailed planning and execution of the reorganization.

The Planning Council met weekly to review progress and resolve problems and conflicts that arose among its members on the basis of majority rule. Two of the planning group chairmen, General Besson and Lt. Gen. John P. Daley, were also slated to be the first commanding generals of Army Materiel Command and Combat Developments Command and thus had a vested interest in the success of the reorganization. Maj. Gen. George E. Martin, temporary chairman of the OPO Planning Group, was in ill-health and about to retire. Not until April was a commanding general of the Office of Personnel Operations selected, Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Hanmer, who then became the OPO Planning Group chairman.

General Traub in addition to being Comptroller of the Army and Project Director was also chairman of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Planning Group. Consequently, Col. Frederick B. Outlaw of ODOMS, acted as chairman of the latter group most of the time. General Decker, General Eddleman, and General Traub were all to retire soon and, unlike Generals Besson and Daley, would not have to live with the consequences of their decisions. As a result the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Planning Group, lacked strong executive support in dealing with other General Staff agencies and planning groups.

General Traub's position as Comptroller and merely one among equals also complicated his role as Project Director because his colleagues on the General Staff refused to accept the decisions of the Planning Council, composed largely of "outsiders," where their interests were involved. General Vittrup, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, bluntly told the Chief of Staff that he would accept the Planning Council's decisions so long as CDC and AMC did not attempt to make decisions affecting the General Staff. General Decker and General Eddleman finally agreed that they personally would have to settle disagreements arising between the DARPO Planning Council and the General Staff. As a result General Eddleman

himself had to decide finally which individuals were to be transferred from the General Staff to the new commands.[24]

Secretary McNamara played as vital a role in the execution of Project 80 as he had in its initiation. The principal reason for his later intervention was the Army's slowness in carrying out the reorganization. The final detailed planning directive, known as DARPO 10–1, did not appear until 19 March. Preliminary implementation plans, or PIPS, would not be ready until the end of April. They were then to be revised as "Activation Plans." The Army Materiel Command was scheduled to begin its operations on 19 September 1962 and assume full responsibility for the Army's logistics system in February or March 1963.

At the end of March 1962 Secretary McNamara told Secretary Stahr to accelerate the reorganization so that AMC would be in full operation by 1 July 1962, nine months ahead of the DARPO schedule. Secretary Stahr protested. This decision was only the latest in a series of what he considered unwarranted interferences by Secretary McNamara in the internal affairs of the Army. On 2 May he resigned and was replaced in July by Cyrus Vance, who supervised the final stages of Project 80.[25]

The General Staff also protested that the proposed revised schedule would seriously disrupt current operations, create unnecessary turmoil among personnel, and turn the reorganization into a series of crash actions of "gargantuan proportions." Several DARPO planning group chairmen complained that the General Staff was dragging its feet and delaying decisions. At this stage neither the principal subordinate commanders of Army Materiel Command had been selected nor the sites of their headquarters. The location of AMC headquarters was also undecided.[26]

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[24] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 84–93. (2) Army General Staff Council Minutes, 15 May 62, for General Vittrup's remarks and General Decker's reaction. (3) Memo, Hq, DA, Planning Group, for General Traub, 15 May 62, sub: Establishment of Preliminary Ceilings for Army Staff Agencies for Implementation of Project 80 Reorganization. DARPO Chronological Stayback file, No. 110.

[25] (1) Zuckert, "The Service Secretary," p. 465. (2) Interview, John Raymond with Mr. Stahr, c. Jul 62. Cited in John Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 298. (3) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 98–102.

[26] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 98–102. (2) DARPO 10–1, 19 Mar 63. (3) AMC Annual Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1963, pp. 25–26, 41–50. (4) DARPO Planning Council Meeting No. 6, 2 Apr 62, MDLC Agenda Items for DARPO Planning Council Meeting on 9 April 1962, attached to Minutes of Planning Council Meeting No. 7, 9 Apr 62. (5) DARPO Early Activation of MDLC file.

Despite these problems General Besson and his staff developed a three-stage plan under which Army Materiel Command would assume responsibility for the Army's logistics system by 1 July, simply by "taking over in place" the matériel functions and elements of the technical services. This depended on the prompt assignment of two hundred key personnel for AMC headquarters and those of its subcommands to provide essential continuity of operations. The complete transfer of all personnel assigned to AMC would take another six months beyond 1 July.

After approval by the General Staff and Under Secretary Ailes, the Besson plan was finally approved by Secretary McNamara on 25 April. The only change made in the Besson plan timetable was to advance the date when Army Materiel Command would assume its operational responsibilities from 1 July to 1 August.[27]

On 1 August 1962, when AMC assumed responsibility for the Army's wholesale logistics system, the Offices of the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Ordnance, and the Chief Chemical Officer disappeared. AMC took over most of the Chief of Ordnance's responsibilities. The Defense Supply Agency had already assumed most of the Quartermaster General's functions. The remainder, certain personnel support and supply services, including the care and disposition of deceased Army personnel and responsibility for the National Cemetery System, became the responsibility of the new Chief of Support Services.

The most difficult problem DARPO and the Planning Council had to deal with was the transfer of functions and personnel from DA headquarters to the field commands. Ultimately about 3,200 persons were transferred from the Army staff to the field, although most of them remained in the Washington area in Army Materiel Command or Combat Developments Command headquarters.

[27] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 103-04. (2) AMC Historical Summary, pp. 50-78. (3) Department of the Army General Order 23, 4 May 62, activating AMC on 8 May. (4) AMC General Order 4, 23 May 62, activating AMC commands. (5) Department of the Army General Order 27, 17 Mar 62, activating CDC on 20 Jun. (6) Department of the Army General Order 34, 19 Jun 62, activating OPO on 1 Jul. (7) TAGO Ltr, 13 Jun 62, on assumption of responsibilities by these new commands, and CONARC on 1 Jul and 1 Aug 62. (8) Department of the Army General Order 46, 25 Jul 62, transferring over 250 installations and activities in place from the technical services on 1 Aug 62.

Secretary McNamara's intervention had exacerbated the already existing antagonism between the General Staff and the DARPO Planning Council.[28] The General Staff's refusal to accept decisions by "outsiders" on the DARPO Planning Council continued to delay transferring people from Headquarters, Department of the Army, to the new field commands because, among other reasons, the demand for such personnel exceeded the supply. How to separate command and staff functions inextricably intertwined at the General Staff level, how to deal with the "hidden field spaces" in various Washington headquarters staffs, how to allocate spaces for overhead administrative support, and how to determine where to assign an individual performing functions belonging to several organizations under the new dispensation—were the specific issues which delayed action.[29]

Faced with this critical situation, the new Vice Chief of Staff, General Barksdale Hamlett, agreed that he would personally decide what people were to be transferred based on recommendations from DARPO. On 8 June he approved the personnel ceilings for the Army staff and the new commands on the basis of which DCSPER then made bulk allocations to the new commands which they could draw on as needed.[30]

There were other disagreements about transferring functions and personnel. Beginning in March, CONARC and CDC disagreed over assigning responsibility for preparing tables of organization and equipment and field manuals. CONARC insisted that transferring these functions to CDC, as the reorganization directive proposed, would disrupt the operations of its school system. The Planning Council backed by the Chief of Staff decided in favor of CDC, but dividing the functions, spaces, and personnel involved remained a problem. The basic issue was the fragmentation of these disputed functions among CONARC school personnel whose primary responsibilities were for training. In many cases, the same person was perform-

[28] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, p. 112. (2) Notes on Special DARPO Planning Council Meeting, 13 Apr 62.

[29] (1) Summary of DARPO Planning Council Meeting No. 15, 25 May 62. (2) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 110-12. (3) General Traub's Remarks at General Staff Council Meeting, 15 May 62.

[30] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 110-12. (2) Minutes of General Staff Council Meeting, 15 May 62. (3) DARPO Biweekly Progress Report to Mr. Horwitz, 22 Jun 62.

ing both training and doctrinal functions. In the end DARPO had to send a three-man team to visit the schools, investigate the problems, and make recommendations. Lt. Gen. Charles Duff, the new Comptroller and Project 80 director, approved the recommendations of the teams on 31 August.[31]

Another dispute arose between the Office of Personnel Operations and CONARC over controlling the "Flow of Trainees through the Training Base," a battleground already worked over by the Hoelscher Committee. CONARC wished to control enlisted assignments from induction through basic training. OPO, supported by DCSPER, wished to retain TAGO's former responsibilities for induction. General Traub appointed an *ad hoc* task force to study the problem and make recommendations. Its solution, acceptable to both CONARC and OPO and approved by General Traub, was that OPO should exercise "staff supervision" over trainees while CONARC would exercise "operational" control over them from induction through basic training. At that point OPO would assume responsibility for future assignments.[32]

In other areas OPO lost its responsibilities for Army headquarters civilian personnel management and for military personnel support and morale services. On 22 March General Eddleman ordered Army headquarters civilian personnel management to remain where it was within the Office of the Chief of Staff. Personnel Support and Morale Services remained within TAGO.[33]

The principal Army staff deviation from the Green Book involved the Office of the Chief of Military History which the DARPO Planning Council agreed should retain its special staff status and not be transferred to TAGO where it might be submerged under records keeping. Otherwise the Army staff emerged from Project 80 relatively unscathed except for the painful transfer of personnel, spaces, and functions to the new field commands which reduced it from approximately 13,700 to 10,500 people. DARPO as such ceased operations on 30

[31] Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 106-07.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 107-08.

[33] (1) Memo, General Eddleman for Comptroller of the Army, 22 Mar 62, sub: Location of Civilian Personnel Offices for Headquarters, Department of the Army, Upon Reorganization, attached to Minutes of DARPO Planning Council Meeting No. 6, 26 Mar 62. (2) Minutes of DARPO Planning Council Meeting No. 14, 23 May 62. DARPO OPO file.

September 1962, and responsibility for further reorganization of the Army staff passed to the secretariat in the Chief of Staff's Office under Project 39a.[84]

Project 39a, announced by Secretary McNamara in May 1962, aimed at streamlining decision-making within the three service headquarters and reducing their personnel by 30 percent during 1963. The reduction of the Army staff under Project 80 was to count for one-half this total, or 15 percent. Mr. Horwitz was again project co-ordinator and on 11 July 1962 outlined for the three service secretaries the criteria and objectives of this review. Secretary Vance took personal responsibility for this study, acting through Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Oberbeck, Director of Coordination and Analysis, whom he designated as Project Director. He did not want the completed report submitted to the General Staff for its opinions. Instead he wanted it sent through General Wheeler, the new Chief of Staff, directly to him for approval.[85]

Army staff agencies made detailed manpower surveys of their offices to determine how the new 15 percent reduction could be achieved without any mass reduction in force by consolidating similar functional elements, eliminating overhead and duplication, and transferring some functions to the field. After reductions had been made based upon these surveys, the secretariat claimed that Army headquarters personnel had been reduced during 1963 by another 14.8 percent, a total of 38 percent—from 13,700 people before Project 80 to about 8,500.[86]

The relationship between the Army staff and the Secretary of the Army's secretariat was reviewed. Mr. Vance, to avoid developing a civilian staff which duplicated the work of the

[84] (1) BOM, OCSA CS 320 (23 Mar 62) to General Decker and General Hamlett from SGS, dated 10 Apr 62, sub: Army Reorganization, and attached SS from OCMH, dated 23 Mar 62, drafted by Col. Louis G. Mendez, Jr., Chief, Histories Division, OCMH, approved by VC/S, U.S. Army, 11 Apr 62, with inclosures detailing reasons for retaining OCMH as a special staff agency. OCMH files. (2) Blumenson, Project 80 History, p. 97. (3) DARPO Biweekly Progress Report to Mr. Horwitz, 14 Sep 62.

[85] (1) Memo, Mr. Horwitz for Secretary of the Army and others, 11 Jul 62, sub: Project 39a. (2) Memo, General Oberbeck for Chief of Engineers and others, 16 Jul 62, sub: Defense Project 39a, Study of Headquarters Staffs. (3) Memo, General Oberbeck for General Decker and General Hamlett, 21 Sep 62, sub: Submission of Project 39a. Located in Project 39a files, SMD, OCS.

[86] Memo, SGS for General Wheeler, 31 Dec 63, sub: Objective 8 assigned personally by Secretary Vance. Located in Objective 8 files, SMD, OCS, OCMH files.

General Staff, undertook to confine himself and his staff to broad policy and program decisions demanding his personal attention.

Streamlining the Army staff's decision-making process was the subject of an Office of the Chief of Staff memorandum on 28 May 1963, which attempted to reach a compromise between the rapid decisions of Secretary McNamara and the slower traditional summary staff actions of the Army staff.[37]

One result was to establish a Staff Action Control Office within the Office of the Chief of Staff to improve co-ordination. The functions of the Director of Coordination and Analysis were also redefined to include responsibility for cost-effectiveness studies and systems analysis within the Army staff.

The most important organizational change by Project 39a was to resurrect at Mr. Vance's request the recommendation of the Hoelscher Committee to split DCSOPS into two agencies. DCSOPS would remain responsible for joint planning and serve as the Army's contact with the JCS and the joint staff. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, OACSFOR, created by Department of the Army General Order 6 of 7 February 1963, would be responsible not only for training and doctrine but also for force planning and programs, weapons systems, Army aviation, chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) material, and later nuclear operations.[38] A minor organizational change eliminated the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve and ROTC by merging it with the Office of the Chief of Reserve Components under Department of the Army General Order 7 of 13 February 1963.

The Offices of the Chief of Ordnance and the Quartermaster General had disappeared under Project 80. The functions of the Chief Chemical Officer, absorbed by DCSOPS under Project 80 as a separate CBR directorate, were now

[37] (1) Status Report, 31 Dec 63, sub: Army CY 63 Objective 8—Further Improvement in the Quality of Staff Work within the Army Headquarters. Attached to Memo, SGS for General Wheeler, 31 Dec 63. (2) Hq., DA, Memo 10-7, 20 Nov 62, sub: Organization and Functions—Organization Relationships, Headquarters, Department of the Army. This memorandum was drafted at the personal request of Mr. Vance as a statement of his philosophy concerning the relationship between the Army staff and the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Project 39a files, OCMH.

[38] (1) Blumenson, Project 80 History, pp. 114-17. (2) MRP Briefing on Army Reorganization, 2 Apr 63. Located in DARPO Briefing files. (3) See Chapter XI, below.

transferred to the new Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Placed under the general staff supervision of DCSOPS on 1 August 1962 the Chief Signal Officer became the Chief of Communications-Electronics, still under DCSOPS, on 1 March 1964 by Department of the Army General Order 28 of 28 February 1964, and its field activities were transferred to a new major field command, the United States Army Strategic Communications Command. Department of the Army General Order 39 of 11 December 1964 redesignated the Office of the Chief of Transportation on 15 December as a Directorate of Transportation within the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG). Of the traditional technical service chiefs only the Office of the Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers remained in 1965. The Department of the Army major command structure and the organization of Headquarters, Department of the Army, as of April 1963 are outlined in *Chart 31*.


In summary, the chief impact of Secretary McNamara's reforms on the organization and administration of the Department of the Army was the elimination of the offices of five of the chiefs of the technical services. Their command functions were taken over by the Defense Supply Agency and by the new field commands of the Army, Army Materiel Command and Combat Developments Command, their training functions by CONARC, their personnel functions by DCSPER, and their staff functions distributed among the remaining Army staff agencies.

While the Army staff, especially DCSLOG, lost about a third of its personnel to the new field commands, it had successfully rejected a number of changes proposed by the Hoelscher Committee, particularly in the area of personnel management. DCSPER remained heavily involved in personnel operations, while TAGO continued to combine administrative and personnel functions.

Instead of creating a new three-star position of Director of the Army Staff as recommended by the Hoelscher Committee, the role and functions of the Secretary of the General Staff under the Vice Chief as a super-co-ordinating staff were expanded.

While the McNamara reforms, and Project 80 in particular,

CHART 31—ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, APRIL 1963



1/ THE GENERAL COUNCIL ALSO SERVES AS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR CIVIL FUNCTIONS.
2/ THE CHIEF OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ALSO SERVES AS CHIEF OF INFORMATION.
Source: AR 10-5, Change 2, 19 Apr 63.

appeared on the surface to be radical surgery, they were in fact part of a continuing evolutionary process dating back to the Marshall reorganization of 1942. Reformers within and outside the Army had struggled for over twenty years to rationalize the Army staff along recognizably functional lines. Traditionalists, represented by the chiefs of the technical services, countered by conducting a series of rearguard actions aimed at preserving their dual status as both staff and command agencies.

At the same time the Department of the Army was growing larger and its operations more complex and diverse. Reformers sought a means of establishing more effective executive control over these expanding activities along lines similar to those developed by DuPont and General Motors in the 1920s. One means was to functionalize the archaic structure of Army and Defense Department appropriations and later to reorganize them on the basis of military missions performed. Another and parallel effort was to establish such controls through a top-level staff above the Army staff which would co-ordinate and integrate military budgets with military plans. Project 80 and Project 39a were part of this evolutionary process which, judging on the basis of past performance, was likely to continue indefinitely into the future.

CHAPTER XI

Conclusion

Reflecting on the struggles over executive control in business and government Elihu Root concluded: "The natural course for the development of our law and institutions does not follow the line of pure reason or the demands of scientific method. It is determined by the impulses, the sympathies and passions, the idealism and selfishness, of all the vast multitude, who are really from day to day building up their own law." [1]

The history of the organization of the War Department since Root's day has amply illustrated his observation. The central issue from 1900 to 1963 has been the nature of executive control—not whether there should be any executive control at all but whether this control should be exercised at the traditional bureau level or at the level of the Secretary and the Chief of Staff or, more recently, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In turn, this struggle has reflected a similar one in the American society at large as the nation evolved from a loose-jointed agrarian federation into a highly industrialized, urban nation. Secretary McNamara in 1963 represented the rationalists, beginning with Root, who sought to apply pure reason and scientific method to military organization. He once remarked:

> Some of our gravest problems in society arise not from overmanagement but out of undermanagement. . . . Exploding urbanization has been a fact of life in the Western world for more than two hundred years . . . . , but there is no evidence that man has overmanaged this problem; there is much evidence that he has undermanaged it.[2]

A military organization would appear to be far more amenable to centralized and rational management than the process of

[1] "Public Service by the Bar," address of the president [Elihu Root], reprinted in *Report of the 39th Meeting of the American Bar Association*, Chicago, Ill., 30–31 Aug and 1 Sep 16.

[2] Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 119.

industrialization and urbanization of society at large in a democratic state devoted to the principle of free enterprise. Yet it too has been subject to the "sympathies and passions, the idealism and selfishness" both of members of the organization itself and the political representatives of the larger society it serves.

From Mr. Root's institution of the General Staff as a means of controlling the bureaus until 1917, when the United States entered World War I, that agency had to struggle merely for the right to exist in a hostile political environment. At the end of this period Congress, influenced by traditional, agrarian antimilitarism, had all but legislated the General Staff out of existence. In World War I the resultant tiny staff devoted its efforts at first to organizing, partially training, and transporting overseas a huge citizen army. The failure of Secretary Baker, an old-fashioned Jacksonian, to assert effective authority over the bureaus led to an almost complete breakdown of the war effort in the winter of 1917–18. Under the pressure of events and goaded by industry and Congress, a revitalized General Staff under General Peyton C. March established effective control for the first time over the bureaus.

After the war the immediate necessity for these controls disappeared, and the bureaus reasserted their traditional freedom through Congress. In the long armistice that followed the General Staff did not have to struggle for existence. It was practically one bureau among equals, although in the late thirties under the impact of a modest rearmament program it was able to assert itself with greater confidence.

The infinitely greater mobilization required in World War II demanded correspondingly greater executive control, and General Marshall found it necessary to establish control not only over the traditional bureaus but the General Staff as well. He centralized administrative responsibility in three major commands—Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. This left him free to devote his own efforts to his principal function of advising President Roosevelt on strategy and the conduct of military operations around the world. In carrying out these duties Marshall relied heavily upon a greatly expanded Operations Division of the General Staff, while the rest of the latter body was shunted to one side for most of the war.

General Marshall wanted to establish equally firm executive control over a unified department of the armed forces after the war. The Navy frustrated his plans for unification while the Army staff, led by the traditional bureaus, abandoned General Marshall's tight control over the Army for a decentralized organization similar to the prewar pattern.

After passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendment two years later, effective executive control over the Department of the Army gradually passed from the Secretary of the Army to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Defense Comptroller, culminating in the managerial revolution of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Control over military operations in this period passed from the services to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Within its own administrative sphere the Department of the Army sought to assert increasingly greater control over internal operations through new functional program and command management systems. It made special efforts to develop more effective means of co-ordinating the technical services which led ultimately to their demise as independent commands in the Army reorganization of 1962.

As the pendulum swung back and forth, the protagonists remained the same. On the one side were the traditionalists, both civilian and military; on the other were the rationalists seeking to establish the same kind of executive control over the Army and Navy that had been imposed on some industries by modern, giant corporations.

The traditionalists represented the customary methods of conducting the business of the Executive Branch of the federal government where power and responsibility have been deliberately fragmented among competing bureaus. As a permanent bureaucracy they possessed intimate, detailed knowledge of how the Army and the War Department operated. Temporary, politically appointed secretaries came and went with little knowledge of these details. They were forced to rely upon the bureaucrats for information, and thus the bureaus more often than not controlled the secretaries instead of the reverse.

Secretary Root intended the General Staff to be a permanent agency whose knowledge could be used to balance that of the bureaus and to supervise their operations. Instead of con-

trolling the bureaus the General Staff adapted itself to their traditional procedures. Before the World War II reorganization General Marshall accused it of the very bureaucratic vices for which Mr. Root had criticized the bureaus. The General Staff in effect became another collection of bureaus.

Except during wartime, when tight controls over their operations were forced upon them, the traditionalists were able to hold their own. After both world wars they reasserted their independence. They were also able to dilute several boldly announced reforms in the process of executing them, notably the Palmer reorganization of 1954–55. Except in the cases of Generals Wood, March, and Marshall, they were successful in sidetracking attempts to reform their methods of reaching decisions through "completed staff actions."

The principal rationalists reflected experience with large corporate enterprises. Secretary Root, his protégé Henry L. Stimson, Robert Lovett, and others sought to establish control by integrating the operations of the department along functional lines. The General Staff was functionally oriented, a pattern first adopted by continental railroads in the United States. Secretary McNamara's program budgets was a management control technique pioneered by DuPont and General Motors after World War I. After World War II a number of large industrial corporations followed their example, including the Ford Motor Company who hired Mr. McNamara and others to revitalize that company's antiquated management procedures.

The principal military reformers were Generals Wood, March, and Marshall. Their civilian allies included industrial management experts and specialists in public administration, particularly Bureau of the Budget officials like Leonard W. Hoelscher, Charles J. Hitch, and Thomas D. Morris. The most prominent spokesman for rationalization along functional lines during World War II was General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces, and his principal instrument for carrying out these reforms was the Control Division, under Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson.

In 1946 the abolition of ASF and its Control Division was a major goal of War Department traditionalists because of its insistence on functionalizing the Army's supply and administra-

tive services. But the emerging cold war with the Soviet Union did not permit the relaxation of international tensions and a return to the relatively control-free atmosphere of a small peacetime army. New conditions required greater controls over the Army's supply and administrative system, and the new Office of the Army Comptroller picked up where the ASF's Control Division had left off at the end of World War II.

In their efforts to modernize the Army's administration, the rationalists were aided by outside management consulting firms and by special commissions on governmental organization chartered by Congress. The prestige of the members of these commissions, particularly the two Hoover Commissions, greatly influenced Congress and led it to abandon its traditional alliance with the bureaus in the Army and Navy.

The revolution in technology and the consequent mounting costs of new weapons systems also created conditions requiring greater controls over military research and development programs. At the same time, the development of automatic data processing equipment gave managers a device for asserting greater centralized control than had been physically possible earlier, once they learned how to employ them effectively.

The increased employment of industrial management techniques and greater sophistication of statistical and fiscal controls did not solve all the Army's management and organizational problems. From the days of Secretary Root certain problems appear again and again, and there is no indication that they have yet been solved. They all have one feature in common. They are characteristics of large bureaucratic or corporate organizations and testify to the resistance of traditionalists to changes in their accustomed methods and procedures.

Reformers have repeatedly insisted that the Army staff divorce itself from the details of administration. Just as repeatedly, Army staff spokesmen have insisted that it was practically impossible to separate planning from operations. Minutely detailed centralized control over field operations at the bureau and later the General Staff level has been characteristic of the federal government from the earliest days of the republic. Each time reformers succeeded in removing the Army staff from operations through drastic reductions in personnel and other devices, a reaction has set in and in a few years the Army staff

had proliferated again in numbers and functions. The pendulum continues to swing back and forth.

Another problem reformers have sought to eliminate unsuccessfully has been the inability of the Army staff to distinguish between minor administrative details and major policy issues. Decisions over the issuance of toilet paper or belt buckles seemed to critics like Generals Hagood and Besson to receive equal attention with decisions over the development of missiles. An allied factor was the compartmentalization characteristic of bureaucratic organizations where even minor differences of opinion tended to go all the way to the top before they could be resolved. Secretary Root tried to rid himself of this problem by passing it on to the Chief of Staff. Secretary Baker allowed much of his time to be frittered away on such matters. General Marshall delegated authority freely to deal with these details to his three major field commands. Management experts counseled executives to "manage by exception" and avoid immersion in details which prevented them from asserting effective control over their organizations.

Perhaps the most important of the bureaucratic vices that rationalists sought to eliminate was the lengthy delay built into the Army staff's decision-making process by the requirement to obtain concurrences from all agencies with a "cognizant" interest in any issue. The resulting reduction of decisions to the lowest common denominator in order to obtain agreement was a constant frustration. General March disapproved of decisions by committees or boards, saying that boards were "long, wooden, and narrow." General Marshall demanded quick action and quick decisions through his Green Hornets, a method that survived only so long as he was Chief of Staff. Secretary McNamara, in criticizing the committee system, tried to impress on the services the need for prompt decisions. Despite his efforts, the completed staff action still remained the standard procedure for making decisions within the Department of the Army with its traditional delays and compromises.

Brilliant managers and administrators may be relatively rare in the federal bureaucracy, but in both world wars such men arose who met successfully the challenges of the war by asserting effective control over the department's operations. When Mr. Root outlined the administrative mismanagement

of the War Department during the Spanish-American War to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, its chairman, Senator Joseph Hawley of Connecticut, a Civil War veteran who was customarily called General, suggested that General Grant would have solved the problem easily. When reminded that General Grant was unfortunately no longer available, the senator replied that "God always sends a man like him" in time of need.[3]

The men who have arrived in time of need have, however, normally stamped their own personalities on the organization and have not necessarily created organizations that fitted the style of their successors. The reorganization of the Army in 1963 seemed in many ways a final triumph of the rationalists over the traditionalists. Yet the undertones of the old struggle did not disappear, and changing technology and conditions have dictated piecemeal changes in defense and Army organization since 1963. The organization on which Secretary McNamara had heavily placed his personal stamp came in for its share of criticism by a "Blue-Ribbon Panel" headed by Gilbert W. Fitzhugh, chairman of the Board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, in 1970. The panel reiterated the standard complaints of reformers since the time of Root about fragmentation of responsibility for decisions, excessive size of staffs, the constant thrusting of minor issues to the top for decision, and the delays in making decisions through committees and staff co-ordination.[4]

The organization and management of the Department of the Army since the McNamara reforms confirms these observations. Efforts to streamline decision-making by the Army staff were abortive. As a result of the recommendations made by Project 80 and Project 39a, Chief of Staff Regulation 1–13 of 10 June 1963 changed the traditional procedures involved in obtaining concurrences to require that concurrences needed be obtained only from those agencies with "primary staff responsibility" for any proposed action. Five years later, on 9 April 1968, this restriction was diluted by eliminating it so far as the Deputy and Assistant Chiefs of Staff were concerned. The re-

[3] *The National Defense*, pp. 17–18.

[4] Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, 1 Jul 70, pp. i–ii, 10–53.

striction applied afterward only to the Army's special staff agencies.

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel noted that the only means which had been developed within the Defense Department to circumvent the delays inherent in normal staff actions was to pull selected projects of high priority out of the system and place them under project managers or special assistants. As Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard said: "Everytime we want something done in a hurry and want it done right, we have to take the project out of the system. We give a good man direction and authority and let him go—and it works. . . . On the other hand, when we are not in a hurry to get things done right, we over-organize, over-man, over-spend and under-accomplish." [5]

Within the Army there was an increase in the number of agencies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, contrary to the recommendation of the Hoelscher Committee. Two of the traditional technical services were restored to their positions as special staff agencies reporting to the Chief of Staff on the grounds that the importance of their functions required it. The former Chief Signal Officer, designated as the Chief of Communications-Electronics but without any field installations under his direct command, became a separate staff agency in 1967, while the Chief of Engineers regained his special staff status formally in 1969.

The increasing use of Army troops in civil disturbances during the 1960s led to the creation of a Directorate of Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (DCDPO) directly under the Chief of Staff in 1968. At the end of 1970 a Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA) was created directly under the Chief of Staff. By the end of the decade also two project managers had been appointed who reported directly to the Chief of Staff, for the SAFEGUARD missile system in 1967 and for the Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation (STANO) in 1969.[6]

Bypassing normal staff and command channels in these instances tended further to centralize authority of the depart-

[5] Address by Hon. David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, at the Armed Forces Management Association Dinner, 20 Aug 70.

[6] OCMH Study 63, Evolution of the Army Staff and Secretariat, 1775–1970, 8 Oct 70, pp. 56–61.

ment's operation under the Chief of Staff. This was most apparent in the changes after 1963 leading to the creation in February 1967 of an Assistant Vice Chief of Staff responsible for the co-ordinating functions performed before 1955 by the three Deputy Chiefs of Staff. As indicated earlier, after 1955 these co-ordinating functions were placed under the Secretary of the General Staff whose responsibilities in this area increased greatly after 1963. The introduction of sophisticated automatic data processing systems at all levels in the Army and Defense Department, the introduction of cost-effectiveness studies of weapons systems, force requirements, and the new "Program Budgets" categories based upon computers were responsible for this growth in the role of the Secretary of the General Staff and, ultimately, the assignment of responsibility for co-ordinating these functions to the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, a three-star position. At that point SGS reverted to its pre-1956 role of providing administrative, communications, personnel, and management services for the Chief of Staff and the Army staff, including control of staff actions.[7]

Whatever future changes take place in Army organization and management, they will doubtless reflect the continuing struggle between the rationalists and traditionalists. This development, as mentioned earlier, partially reflects the larger effort of the American people to adapt their traditionally rural outlook, reflexes, priorities, values, and institutions to the requirements of an increasingly complex, urban, industrial society which places increasing restraints on the freedom of action, not only of individuals, but also of the myriad corporate organizations, large and small, public and private, that make up the American federal system of government and free enterprise. These developments also reflect the restless, shifting world environment in which the United States lives where the specific requirements of national security are constantly, often unpredictably, changing. The survival of the United States depends upon its success in adapting itself to these changes.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 58-61.

Appendix A

Principal Laws and Regulations Governing the Organization of the War Department and the Department of the Army, 1903–1963

Act of 14 February 1903, "An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Army." Published in War Department General Order 15, 18 February 1903. Provided for a Chief of Staff and a General Staff Corps.

War Department General Order 120, 14 August 1903. Prescribed in detail the duties and functions of the General Staff.

War Department General Order 68, 26 May 1911. The Stimson-Wood Reorganization. Reorganization of the General Staff into a Mobile Army Division, Coast Artillery Division, Bureau of Militia Affairs, and Army War College Division.

Act of 3 June 1916, The National Defense Act of 1916. Published in War Department Bulletin No. 16, 22 June 1916. Basic law governing the organization and administration of the War Department and the Army until 1950. Restricted the General Staff to an advisory role and reduced its numbers drastically.

War Department General Order 14, 9 February 1918. Reorganization of the General Staff along functional lines, subordinating the supply bureaus to a Director of Purchases and Supplies and a Director of Storage and Traffic.

War Department General Order 80, 26 August 1918. The March Reorganization. Reorganization of the General Staff, providing for centralized direction and control over departmental operations under the Chief of Staff, abolishing the bureaus as independent agencies and assigning their functions to General Staff directorates.

National Defense Act Amendments, 4 June 1920. Published in War Department Bulletin No. 25, 9 June 1920. Abolished wartime organization. Restored bureaus' independence, increasing their number to seventeen. Assigned responsibility for

procurement and industrial mobilization to assistant secretary.

War Department General Order 41, 16 August 1921. The Pershing Reorganization. Reorganization of the General Staff, substituting assistant chiefs of staff for directors on the General Staff and introducing the "G" system of the AEF.

War Department Circular 59, 2 March 1942. Authorized by First War Powers Act of 18 December 1941. The Marshall Reorganization delegated authority over War Department operations and administration to OPD, AGF, AAF, and SOS (later ASF), under Executive Order 9082 of 28 February 1942.

War Department Circular 138, 14 May 1946. The Eisenhower Reorganization. Under Executive Order 9722, 13 May 1946. Revived War Department General Staff with directive authority and restored bureaus to prewar status.

National Security Act, 26 July 1947. Published in War Department Bulletin No. 11, 31 July 1947. Provided for unification of the armed services, including a separate Air Force, in a loose federation, the National Military Establishment, under a Secretary of Defense with little authority. Legally recognized the JCS and created Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Council.

Department of the Army Circular 2, 2 January 1948. Created Office of the Army Comptroller, a military officer who would report directly to the Secretary of the Army on some matters and a civilian deputy.

Department of the Army Circular 64, 10 March 1948. AGF abolished, replaced by a staff agency, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, with no command functions. Continental armies to report directly to Chief of Staff.

Department of the Army Circular 342, 1 November 1948. Reorganization of the Army staff, creating two deputy chiefs, one for Plans and Operations and the other for Administration, and a Vice Chief of Staff.

National Security Act Amendments, 10 August 1949. Published in Department of the Army Bulletin No. 22, 22 August 1949. Gave Secretary of Defense more authority over services. Established comptrollers in the Department of Defense and the three services and directed adoption of program or functional budgets. The latter effectively eliminated the traditional individual budgets of the Army's bureaus or technical services.

Department of the Army Special Regulation 10–5–1, 11 April 1950. Established the three-deputy pattern for planning, programing, and reviewing departmental operations. Restored "G" system, replacing directors with assistant chiefs of staff.

Army Organization Act, 28 June 1950. Published in Department of the Army Bulletin No. 9, 6 July 1950. Replaced National Defense Act of 1916 as basic legislation governing organization and administration of the Department of the Army. Granted Secretary of the Army authority to organize the Army staff as he saw fit. Removed the statutory basis which the technical services had relied upon for their independence.

Presidential Reorganization Plan 6, 30 April 1953. Strengthened authority of Secretary of Defense by centralizing functions previously performed by interservice boards on supply and research and development. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs made Director of the Joint Staff. Service secretaries become executive agents of the Secretary of Defense in dealing with unified and specified commands.

Change 4 to Special Regulation 10–5–1, 8 September 1954. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) replaces Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4, with command authority on paper over the technical services.

Change 7 to Special Regulation 10–50–25, 1 February 1955. Office of Chief of Army Field Forces redesignated as Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC), with command over six continental armies and Military District of Washington (MDW), reverting to pattern of AGF during World War II.

Change 11 to Special Regulation 10–5–1, 22 September 1955. Created Office, Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) at Deputy Chief of Staff level, removing this function from Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

Department of the Army General Order 64, 3 November 1955. Created Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development.

Change 13 to Special Regulation 10–5–1, 27 December 1955. Abolished three-deputy system, designating chiefs of General Staff divisions as deputy chiefs. Comptroller of the Army and Chief of Research and Development have status of deputy chiefs of staff. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

remains. Staff co-ordinating functions assigned to Secretary of the General Staff in the Chief of Staff's Office.

Department of Defense Directive 5160, 31 January 1956. Subject: Policies for Implementation of Single Manager Assignments.

Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 6 August 1958. Published in Department of the Army Bulletin No. 6, 25 August 1958. Authority of the chairman of the JCS and the JCS strengthened with JCS replacing service secretaries as executive agents of the President and Secretary of Defense in dealing with unified and specified commands. Also created Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering at assistant secretary level. McCormack-Curtis amendment authorized Secretary of Defense to reorganize nonmilitary functions of the services as he saw fit in the absence of Congressional objection.

Department of Defense Directive 5105.22, 6 November 1961. Created Defense Supply Agency, effective 1 January 1962, taking over most of the functions of the Quartermaster General of the Army.

Department of Defense Reorganization Order, 10 January 1962, and *Department of the Army General Order 8,* 15 February 1962. McNamara Reorganization of the Department of the Army and the Army. Under Section 3 (a) of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 President Kennedy submitted this plan to Congress on 16 January 1962 which abolished the headquarters of the technical services, except the Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers. Their functions were transferred to two new field commands, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Combat Developments Command (CDC). Training functions were transferred to USCONARC and personnel functions to a new Office of Personnel Operations (OPO) under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. The reorganization became effective in the absence of Congressional objections on 17 February 1962.

Department of the Army General Order 6, 7 February 1963. Created Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFOR) out of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations Office. OACSFOR responsible for training and DCSOPS for planning and joint planning functions.

Appendix B

Principal Officials of the War Department and Department of the Army, 1900–1963

Secretaries of War

Elihu Root	1 August 1899–31 January 1904
William Howard Taft	1 February 1904–30 June 1908
Luke E. Wright	1 July 1908–11 March 1909
Jacob M. Dickinson	12 March 1909–21 May 1911
Henry L. Stimson	22 May 1911–4 March 1913
Lindley M. Garrison	5 March 1913–10 February 1916
Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott (ad interim)	11 February 1916–8 March 1916
Newton D. Baker	9 March 1916–4 March 1921
John W. Weeks	5 March 1921–13 October 1925
Dwight F. Davis	14 October 1925–5 March 1929
James W. Good	6 March 1929–18 November 1929
Patrick J. Hurley	9 December 1929–4 March 1933
George H. Dern	5 March 1933–27 August 1936
Harry H. Woodring	25 September 1936–20 June 1940
Henry L. Stimson	10 July 1940–21 September 1945
Robert P. Patterson	27 September 1945–17 July 1947
Kenneth C. Royall	18 July 1947–17 September 1947

Secretaries of the Army

Kenneth C. Royall	18 September 1947–27 April 1949
Gordon Gray	20 June 1949–11 April 1950
Frank Pace, Jr.	12 April 1950–20 January 1953
Robert T. Stevens	4 February 1953–20 July 1955
Wilber M. Brucker	21 July 1955–20 January 1961
Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.	24 January 1961–30 June 1962
Cyrus R. Vance	5 July 1962–27 January 1964

Under Secretaries of War

Robert P. Patterson	16 December 1940–26 September 1945

Kenneth C. Royall	9 November 1945–23 July 1947
William H. Draper, Jr.	29 August 1947–17 September 1947

Under Secretaries of the Army

William H. Draper, Jr.	18 September 1947–28 February 1949
Gordon Gray	25 May 1949–19 June 1949
Tracy S. Voorhees	22 August 1949–24 April 1950
Archibald Alexander	24 May 1950–11 April 1952
Karl R. Bendetsen	7 May 1952–3 October 1952
Earl D. Johnson	6 October 1952–25 January 1954
John Slezak	8 February 1954–16 January 1955
Charles G. Finucane	9 February 1955–30 April 1958
Hugh M. Milton II	25 August 1958–20 January 1961
Stephen Ailes	27 February 1961–27 January 1964

Assistant Secretaries of War

George D. Meiklejohn	16 April 1897–13 March 1901
William Cary Sanger	14 March 1901–28 August 1903
Robert Shaw Oliver	29 August 1903–29 April 1913
Henry S. Breckenridge	30 April 1913–10 February 1916
William M. Ingraham	20 April 1916–9 November 1917
Benedict Crowell (Director of Munitions)	10 November 1917–26 June 1920 28 August 1918–26 June 1920
Edward R. Stettinius (Second Assistant for Supply)	9 April 1918–27 August 1918
Frederick P. Keppel (Third Assistant for Personnel)	23 April 1918–1 June 1919
John D. Ryan (Second Assistant for Air)	28 August 1918–23 November 1918
William R. Williams	30 July 1920–27 March 1921
Johnathan M. Wainwright	28 March 1921–3 March 1923
Dwight F. Davis	5 March 1923–13 October 1925
Hanford MacNider	16 October 1925–11 January 1928
Trubee F. Davison (Assistant Secretary for Air)	20 February 1926–15 December 1932
Charles Burton Robbins	12 January 1928–14 March 1929
Patrick J. Hurley	15 March 1929–8 December 1929
Frederick H. Payne	20 December 1929–5 April 1933
Harry H. Woodring	7 April 1933–24 September 1936
Louis A. Johnson	28 June 1937–25 July 1940
Robert P. Patterson	31 July 1940–15 December 1940
John J. McCloy	24 April 1941–29 November 1945

Robert Lovett (Assistant Secretary for Air)	26 April 1941–15 December 1945
Howard Peterson	29 December 1945–31 July 1947
W. Stuart Symington (Assistant Secretary for Air)	1 February 1946–17 September 1947

Assistant Secretaries of the Army

Gordon Gray	24 September 1947–24 May 1949
Tracy S. Voorhees	17 June 1948–21 August 1949
Archibald S. Alexander	22 August 1949–23 May 1950
Karl R. Bendetsen (General Management)	2 February 1950–6 May 1952
Earl D. Johnson (Research and Materiel after 7 May 1952)	31 May 1950–5 October 1952
Francis Shackleford (General Counsel)	24 July 1950–25 August 1952
Fred Korth (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)	22 May 1952–20 January 1953
Bernard A. Monaghan (General Counsel)	26 August 1952–14 August 1953
Francis Shackleford (General Management)	26 August 1952–20 January 1953
James P. Mitchell (Manpower)	4 May 1953–8 October 1953
John Slezak (Materiel)	4 May 1953–7 February 1954
John G. Adams (General Counsel)	1 October 1953–31 March 1955
Hugh M. Milton II (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)	19 November 1953–24 August 1958
George H. Roderick (Financial Management)	9 February 1954–25 August 1954
Frank Higgins (Logistics and Research and Development—Logistics from 21 July 1955)	26 August 1954–31 March 1959
George H. Roderick (Civil-Military Affairs)	26 August 1954–29 February 1957
Charles G. Finucane (Financial Management)	26 August 1954–8 February 1955
Chester R. Davis (Financial Management)	10 March 1955–15 December 1956

Frank G. Millard (General Counsel)	1 April 1955–28 February 1961
William Martin (Director of Research and Development)	29 August 1955–25 May 1959
George H. Roderick (Financial Management)	1 March 1957–20 January 1961
Dewey Short (Civil-Military Affairs)	15 March 1957–30 November 1958
Dewey Short (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)	1 December 1958–20 January 1961
Courtney Johnson (Logistics)	1 April 1959–20 January 1961
Richard S. Morse (Director of Research and Development—ASA from 3 March 1961)	1 June 1959–31 May 1961
William F. Schaub (Financial Management)	2 March 1961–31 December 1962
Powell Pierpoint (General Counsel)	6 April 1961–30 June 1963
Paul R. Ignatius (Installations and Logistics)	22 May 1961–27 February 1964
Finn J. Larsen (Research and Development)	14 August 1961–30 July 1963
Edmund T. Pratt, Jr. (Financial Management)	23 March 1963–25 November 1964

Chiefs of the Bureau of Insular Affairs
1900–1939

Brig. Gen. Clarence R. Edwards (Chief of Customs and Insular Affairs to 1 July 1902)	12 February 1900–23 August 1912
Brig. Gen. Frank McIntyre	24 August 1912–5 January 1929
Brig. Gen. Charles S. Walcutt (Acting)	17 July 1918–1 July 1920
Brig. Gen. Francis LeJ. Parker	6 January 1929–8 January 1933
Brig. Gen. Creed F. Cox	9 January 1933–23 May 1937
Brig. Gen. Charles S. Burnett	24 May 1937–30 June 1939

On 1 July 1939 the Bureau of Insular Affairs was transferred to the Department of the Interior.

Chiefs of Information

Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr.	11 February 1941–25 July 1941
Maj. Gen. Alexander D. Surles	6 August 1941–31 December 1945
Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins	1 January 1946–20 July 1947
Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy	21 July 1947–2 January 1948
Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain	3 January 1948–31 July 1949
Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks	2 September 1949–31 August 1953
Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett	1 November 1953–4 August 1955
Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Jr.	3 January 1956–16 August 1957
Maj. Gen. Harry P. Storke	10 September 1957–31 May 1959
Maj. Gen. William W. Quinn	1 August 1959–30 September 1961
Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge	1 October 1961–28 January 1963
Maj. Gen. George V. Underwood	1 February 1963–31 January 1966

Before 11 February 1941 this agency was a subordinate branch of G–2. On that date it was redesignated the Bureau of Public Relations and attached to the Secretary's Office where it has remained. From 16 January 1955 the Chief of Public Information has also served as Chief of Information of the Army under the Chief of Staff.

Chiefs of the Legislative and Liaison Division

Maj. G. W. Cocheu	1 September 1921–20 December 1921
Lt. Col. J. H. Bryson	21 December 1921–30 June 1925
Col. F. R. Brown	1 July 1925–13 May 1928
Lt. Col. J. L. Benedict	6 August 1928–30 June 1930
Maj. A. W. Bloor	2 August 1930–9 February 1931
Maj. L. S. Tillotson	10 February 1931–29 April 1931
Maj. L. H. Hedrick	30 April 1931–31 July 1935
Lt. Col. Allen M. Burdett	1 August 1935–18 November 1937
Col. Russel H. Brennan	19 November 1937–24 June 1942
Maj. Gen. Wilton B. Persons	9 March 1942–28 July 1948
Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner	29 July 1948–7 August 1950
Maj. Gen. Miles Reber	5 August 1950–30 September 1953
Maj. Gen. Clarence Hauck	1 October 1953–11 July 1956
Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis	1 November 1956–24 August 1959
Maj. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup	6 August 1959–19 January 1961
Maj. Gen. Harrison A. Gerhardt	13 March 1961–16 September 1962
Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand	17 September 1962–5 July 1964

The Legislative and Liaison Division was established first as a Legislative Branch under the Deputy Chief of Staff on 1 September 1921.

It was merged with the Budget Section as the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch of the War Department General Staff on 3 February 1931. As the Legislative and Liaison Division it was designated a War Department Special Staff division on 9 March 1942, and on 26 September 1945 placed under the general supervision of the Chief of Public Information. On 17 February 1955 it was attached to the Office of the Secretary of the Army.

Chiefs of Staff

Lt. Gen. Samuel B. M. Young	15 August 1903–8 January 1904
Lt. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee	9 January 1904–14 January 1906
Lt. Gen. John C. Bates	15 January 1906–13 April 1906
Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell	14 April 1906–21 April 1910
Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood	22 April 1910–21 April 1914
Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon	22 April 1914–16 November 1914
Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott	17 November 1914–22 September 1917
General Tasker H. Bliss	23 September 1917–19 May 1918
General Peyton C. March	20 May 1918–30 June 1921
General of the Armies John J. Pershing	1 July 1921–13 September 1924
Maj. Gen. John L. Hines	14 September 1924–20 November 1926
General Charles P. Summerall	21 November 1926–20 November 1930
General Douglas MacArthur	21 November 1930–1 October 1935
General Malin Craig	2 October 1935–31 August 1939
General of the Army George C. Marshall	1 September 1939–18 November 1945
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower	19 November 1945–6 February 1948
General Omar N. Bradley	7 February 1948–15 August 1949
General J. Lawton Collins	16 August 1949–14 August 1953
General Matthew B. Ridgway	15 August 1953–29 June 1955
General Maxwell D. Taylor	30 June 1955–30 June 1959
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer	1 July 1959–30 September 1960
General George H. Decker	1 October 1960–30 September 1962
General Earle G. Wheeler	1 October 1962–2 July 1964

Secretaries of the General Staff

Brig. Gen. Henry A. Greene	15 August 1903–30 June 1904
Brig. Gen. Benjamin Alvord	1 July 1904–27 June 1905
Col. Robert E. L. Mechie	28 June 1905–31 July 1907
Maj. Gen. William M. Wright	1 August 1907–6 April 1908

Maj. Gen. Fred W. Sladen	7 April 1908–19 January 1911
Maj. Gen. William S. Graves	20 January 1911–25 June 1912
Brig. Gen. Jesse McI. Carter	26 June 1912–10 June 1913
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Hodges	11 June 1913–31 August 1914
Maj. Gen. William S. Graves	3 September 1914–22 March 1918
Col. Percy P. Bishop	23 March 1918–11 September 1918
Maj. Fulton W. C. Gardner	12 September 1918–14 August 1921
Lt. Col. Lorenzo D. Gasser	17 August 1921–27 March 1925
Col. Edwin S. Hartshorn	28 March 1925–30 June 1928
Lt. Col. Joseph A. Atkins	1 July 1928–30 July 1929
Lt. Col. William B. Wallace	1 August 1929–31 May 1930
Lt. Col. Clement H. Wright	1 June 1930–14 August 1932
Col. Charles F. Severson	15 August 1932–2 July 1935
Col. Robert L. Eichelberger	3 July 1935–9 November 1938
Lt. Col. Harold R. Bull	10 November 1938–2 July 1939
Brig. Gen. Orlando Ward	3 July 1939–30 August 1941
Brig. Gen. Walter B. Smith	31 August 1941–3 February 1942
Brig. Gen. John R. Deane	4 February 1942–3 September 1942
Col. Robert N. Young	4 September 1942–13 March 1943
Col. William T. Sexton	14 March 1943–14 January 1944
Col. Frank McCarthy	15 January 1944–21 August 1945
Col. H. Merrill Pasco	22 August 1945–11 November 1945
Col. John W. Bowen	12 November 1945–11 May 1948
Brig. Gen. James E. Moore	12 May 1948–24 October 1950
Brig. Gen. Martin F. Hass	25 October 1950–3 June 1952
Brig. Gen. John C. Oakes	4 June 1952–29 August 1953
Brig. Gen. Frank W. Moorman	31 August 1953–19 July 1955
Maj. Gen. William C. Westmoreland	20 July 1955–2 March 1958
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III	3 March 1958–30 September 1960
Maj. Gen. John E. Throckmorton	1 October 1960–8 June 1962
Maj. Gen. Vernon P. Mock	10 June 1962–13 May 1965

The General Staff

1903–1917

Assistants to the Chief of Staff and Chiefs of the Mobile Army Division

Maj. Gen. William H. Carter	26 May 1911–27 August 1912
Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon	1 September 1912–20 April 1914

Brig. Gen. Hugh L. Scott	21 April 1914–15 November 1914
Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	15 February 1915–21 September 1916

The Mobile Army Division was abolished by the National Defense Act of 3 June 1916.

Assistant to the Chief of Staff

Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	22 September 1916–5 April 1917

Presidents of the Army War College

Maj. Gen. S. B. M. Young (Army War College Board)	1 July 1902–15 August 1903
Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	16 August 1903–24 June 1905
Lt. Col. William W. Wotherspoon	25 June 1905–3 December 1905
Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Barry	4 December 1905–20 February 1907
Brig. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon	21 February 1907–19 June 1909
Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	21 June 1909–30 November 1909
Brig. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon	1 December 1909–1 February 1912
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Mills	2 February 1912–31 August 1912
Brig. Gen. William Crozier	1 September 1912–30 June 1913
Brig. Gen. Hunter Liggett	1 July 1913–21 April 1914
Brig. Gen. Montgomery M. Macomb	22 April 1914–12 October 1916
Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn	1 February 1917–5 April 1917

Chiefs of Artillery

Brig. Gen. Wallace F. Randolph	27 February 1903–21 January 1904
Brig. Gen. John P. Story	22 January 1904–19 June 1905
Brig. Gen. Samuel M. Mills	20 June 1905–30 September 1906
Brig. Gen. Arthur Murray	1 October 1906–30 June 1908

Chiefs of Coast Artillery

Maj. Gen. Arthur Murray	1 July 1908–14 March 1911
Maj. Gen. Erasmus M. Weaver	15 March 1911–5 April 1917

1917–1921

Assistant to the Chief of Staff

Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss	7 April 1917–21 September 1917

Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff

Brig. Gen. William S. Graves	22 September 1917–8 July 1918
Maj. Gen. Frank McIntyre	9 July 1918–31 December 1919
Maj. Gen. William M. Wright	1 January 1920–30 June 1921

Operations Division

Maj. Gen. Henry Jervey (Director)	12 December 1917–31 August 1921

War College Division

Brig. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn	6 April 1917–24 August 1917
Col. P. D. Lochridge (Acting)	25 August 1917–10 January 1918
Col. Daniel W. Ketcham (Acting)	11 January 1918–30 April 1918
Brig. Gen. Lytle Brown (Director)	1 May 1918–13 June 1918
Maj. Gen. William G. Haan (Director)	14 June 1918–31 August 1921

After 9 February 1918 the War College Division was known as the War Plans Division.

Military Intelligence Section

Col. Ralph H. Van Deman	3 May 1917–4 June 1918
Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill	5 June 1918–19 August 1920
Brig. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan	20 August 1920–31 August 1921

After 9 February 1918 the Military Intelligence Section was known as the Military Intelligence Division.

Storage and Traffic Division

Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals	28 December 1917–15 April 1918

Purchase and Supply Division

Brig. Gen. Palmer E. Pierce	14 January 1918–15 April 1918
Brig. Gen. Hugh S. Johnson	16 April 1919–31 August 1918
Brig. Gen. Robert E. Wood	12 September 1918–12 February 1919

Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division

Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals	16 April 1918–28 February 1919

Maj. Gen. George W. Burr	1 March 1919–11 August 1920
Maj. Gen. William M. Wright	1 September 1920–30 June 1921

After 1 July 1920 the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division was known as the Supply Division.

Chiefs of Coast Artillery

Maj. Gen. Erasmus M. Weaver	7 April 1917–23 May 1918
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Coe	24 May 1918–30 June 1920

Chief of Field Artillery

Maj. Gen. William J. Snow	10 February 1918–30 June 1920

Chemical Warfare Service

Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert (Director)	28 June 1918–30 June 1920

Tank Corps

Col. Ira C. Welborn (Director)	9 March 1918–14 August 1919
Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rockenbach (Chief)	15 August 1919–30 June 1920

Tank Corps abolished by the National Defense Act amendments of 4 June 1920.

Division of Military Aeronautics

Maj. Gen. William L. Kenly (Director)	21 May 1918–27 December 1918

Bureau of Aircraft Production

John D. Ryan (Director)	29 May 1918–27 August 1918

Air Service

John D. Ryan (Director)	27 August 1918–27 December 1918
Maj. Gen. Charles T. Menoher (Chief from 29 January 1919)	2 January 1919–4 October 1920

1921–1942

Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff

Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord	1 July 1921–31 August 1921

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord	1 September 1921–4 December 1922
Maj. Gen. John L. Hines	5 December 1922–13 September 1924
Maj. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan	14 September 1924–8 March 1926
Maj. Gen. Fox Connor	9 March 1926–30 April 1927
Maj. Gen. Briant H. Wells	1 May 1927–8 March 1930
Maj. Gen. Preston Brown	10 March 1930–11 October 1930
Maj. Gen. Ewing E. Booth	12 October 1930–21 December 1930
Maj. Gen. George Van Horn Moseley	22 December 1930–22 February 1933
Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum	23 February 1933–1 February 1935
Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds	2 February 1935–28 May 1936
Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick	29 May 1936–30 September 1938
Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall	16 October 1938–30 June 1939
Brig. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser (Acting)	1 July 1939–30 May 1940
Maj. Gen. William Bryden	1 June 1940–16 March 1942
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore (Additional Deputy Chief of Staff)	22 July 1940–8 March 1942
Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold (Acting Additional Deputy Chief of Staff for Air)	11 November 1940–8 March 1942

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–1

Brig. Gen. James H. McRae	1 September 1921–18 September 1922
Brig. Gen. Charles H. Martin	19 September 1922–15 September 1924
Brig. Gen. Campbell King	29 May 1925–30 April 1929
Maj. Gen. Albert J. Bowley	1 May 1929–14 September 1931
Brig. Gen. Andrew Moses	7 October 1931–7 October 1935
Maj. Gen. Harry E. Knight	27 November 1935–31 August 1937
Brig. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser	1 September 1937–19 April 1939
Brig. Gen. William E. Shedd	1 October 1939–18 February 1941
Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip	19 February 1941–19 January 1942
Brig. Gen. John H. Hilldring	20 January 1942–8 March 1942

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–2

Brig. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman	1 September 1921–10 November 1922
Col. William K. Naylor	27 November 1922–30 June 1924
Col. James H. Reeves	1 July 1924–30 April 1927
Col. Stanley H. Ford	1 May 1927–1 September 1930
Brig. Gen. Alfred T. Smith	3 January 1931–2 January 1935

Brig. Gen. Harry E. Knight	1 February 1935–26 November 1935
Col. Francis H. Lincoln	27 November 1935–29 June 1937
Col. E. R. Warner McCabe	1 July 1937–29 February 1940
Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles	30 April 1940–31 January 1942
Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee	1 February 1942–8 March 1942

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–3

Brig. Gen. William Lassiter	1 September 1921–31 October 1923
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Drum	4 December 1923–8 April 1926
Maj. Gen. Malin Craig	9 April 1926–1 April 1927
Maj. Gen. Frank Parker	2 April 1927–2 April 1929
Maj. Gen. Edward L. King	16 July 1929–1 February 1932
Maj. Gen. Edgar T. Collins	2 February 1932–10 February 1933
Maj. Gen. John H. Hughes	6 July 1933–15 April 1937
Brig. Gen. George P. Tyner	16 April 1937–6 March 1938
Maj. Gen. Robert McC. Beck	7 March 1938–3 August 1939
Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews	4 August 1939–22 November 1940
Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle	23 November 1940–8 April 1941
Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony	9 April 1941–23 April 1941
Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle	24 April 1941–8 March 1942

Supply Division

Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord	1 July 1921–31 August 1921

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–4

Brig. Gen. William D. Connor	1 September 1921–9 November 1922
Brig. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman	10 November 1922–30 November 1923
Brig. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan	1 December 1923–13 September 1924
Maj. Gen. Fox Connor	1 December 1924–8 March 1926
Brig. Gen. Briant H. Wells	9 March 1926–30 April 1927
Brig. Gen. Ewing E. Booth	1 May 1927–11 October 1930
Brig. Gen. Robert E. Callan	19 January 1931–18 January 1935
Brig. Gen. Charles S. Lincoln	13 February 1935–31 May 1936
Brig. Gen. George R. Spalding	1 June 1936–15 April 1937
Brig. Gen. George P. Tyner	16 April 1937–20 January 1940
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Moore	21 January 1940–20 July 1940
Col. Eugene Reybold (Acting)	4 August 1940–8 September 1941
Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell	25 November 1941—8 March 1942

Chiefs of the War Plans Division

Brig. Gen. Briant H. Wells	1 September 1921–30 October 1923

Brig. Gen. Stuart Heintzelman	1 December 1923–1 July 1924
Brig. Gen. Leroy Eltinge	2 July 1924–19 April 1925
Maj. Gen. Harry A. Smith	1 July 1925–31 May 1927
Brig. Gen. George S. Simonds	1 September 1927–1 September 1931
Brig. Gen. Joseph P. Tracy	2 September 1931–31 August 1932
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne	1 September 1932–11 February 1935
Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick	12 March 1935–28 May 1936
Brig. Gen. Walter Krueger	29 May 1936–30 June 1938
Brig. Gen. George C. Marshall	6 July 1938–15 October 1938
Brig. Gen. George V. Strong	16 October 1938–14 December 1940
Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow	16 December 1940–15 February 1942
Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower	16 February 1942–8 March 1942

Air Corps

Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick	5 October 1921–13 December 1927
Maj. Gen. James E. Fechet	20 December 1927–19 December 1931
Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois	22 December 1931–21 December 1935
Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover	25 December 1935–31 September 1938
Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold	28 September 1938–8 March 1942

Until 2 July 1926 the Air Corps was designated the Air Service.

Chiefs of Coast Artillery

Maj. Gen. Frank W. Coe	1 July 1920–19 March 1926
Maj. Gen. Andrew Hero, Jr.	20 March 1926–21 March 1930
Maj. Gen. John W. Gulick	22 March 1930–21 March 1934
Maj. Gen. William F. Hase	26 March 1934–20 January 1935
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Steele	21 January 1935–31 March 1936
Maj. Gen. Archibald H. Sunderland	1 April 1936–31 March 1940
Maj. Gen. Joseph A. Green	1 April 1940–9 March 1942

The Office of the Chief of Coast Artillery was abolished 9 March 1942.

Chiefs of Field Artillery

Maj. Gen. William J. Snow	1 July 1920–19 December 1927
Maj. Gen. Fred T. Austin	20 December 1927–15 February 1930
Maj. Gen. Harry G. Bishop	10 March 1930–9 March 1934
Maj. Gen. Upton Birnie, Jr.	26 March 1934–25 March 1938
Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford	26 March 1938–9 March 1942

The Office of the Chief of Field Artillery was abolished 9 March 1942.

Chiefs of Infantry

Maj. Gen. Charles S. Farnsworth	1 July 1920–27 March 1925
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Allen	28 March 1925–27 March 1929
Maj. Gen. Stephen O. Fuqua	28 March 1929–5 May 1933
Maj. Gen. Edward Croft	6 May 1933–30 April 1937
Maj. Gen. George A. Lynch	24 May 1937–30 April 1941
Maj. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges	31 May 1941–9 March 1942

The Office of the Chief of Infantry was abolished 9 March 1942.

Chiefs of Cavalry

Maj. Gen. Willard A. Holbrook	1 July 1920–23 July 1924
Maj. Gen. Malin Craig	24 July 1924–20 March 1926
Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Crosby	21 March 1926–20 March 1930
Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry	22 March 1930–21 March 1934
Maj. Gen. Leon B. Kromer	26 March 1934–25 March 1938
Maj. Gen. John K. Herr	26 March 1938–9 March 1942

The Office of the Chief of Cavalry was abolished 9 March 1942.

1942–1946
Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney	9 March 1942–21 October 1944
Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy	22 October 1944–9 June 1946

Operations Division

Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower	9 March 1942–23 June 1942
Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy	24 June 1942–21 October 1944
Lt. Gen. John E. Hull	22 October 1944–15 June 1946

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–1

Brig. Gen. John H. Hilldring	9 March 1942–1 July 1942
Brig. Gen. Donald Wilson	2 July 1942–1 September 1942
Maj. Gen. Miller G. White	2 September 1942–18 August 1944
Maj. Gen. Stephan G. Henry	19 August 1944–22 October 1945
Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul	26 October 1945–9 June 1946

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–2

Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee	9 March 1942–4 May 1942

Maj. Gen. George V. Strong	5 May 1942–6 February 1944
Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell	7 February 1944–25 January 1946
Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg	26 January 1946–9 June 1946

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–3

Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle	9 March 1942–25 March 1942
Brig. Gen. Harold R. Bull	25 March 1942–5 May 1942
Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards	16 May 1942–15 May 1943
Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter	16 May 1943–13 February 1945
Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards	14 February 1945–9 June 1946

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–4

Brig. Gen. Raymond G. Moses	9 March 1942–1 September 1943
Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell	30 September 1943–14 March 1946
Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott (Acting)	15 March 1946–9 June 1946

1946–1948
Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy	10 June 1946–30 August 1947
Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins	1 September 1947–14 November 1948

Director of Personnel and Administration

Lt. Gen. Willard S. Paul	10 June 1946–14 November 1948

Directors of Intelligence

Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin	11 June 1946–19 October 1948
Maj. Gen. Stafford LeRoy Irwin	20 October 1948–14 November 1948

Directors of Organization and Training

Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards	11 June 1946–9 July 1946
Lt. Gen. Charles P. Hall	10 July 1946–11 November 1948

Directors of Service, Supply, and Procurement

Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes	11 June 1946–4 January 1948
Lt. Gen. Henry S. Aurand	5 January 1948–14 November 1948

The Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement was redesignated Director of Logistics on 19 February 1948.

Directors of Plans and Operations

Lt. Gen. John E. Hull	11 June 1946–15 June 1946
Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad	16 June 1946–29 October 1947
Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer	31 October 1947–14 November 1948

Research and Development Division

Lt. Gen. Henry S. Aurand	10 June 1946–1 January 1948

Agency abolished and functions transferred to Directorate of Service, Supply, and Procurement on 1 January 1948.

Comptrollers of the Army

Maj. Gen. George J. Richards	2 January 1948–15 July 1948
Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey	16 July 1948–14 November 1948

From 7 July 1943–1 January 1948 General Richards was Chief of the Budget Division of the War Department Special Staff. See below under Chiefs of Finance.

1948–1950

Vice Chiefs of Staff

Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins	15 November 1948–15 August 1949
General Wade H. Haislip	23 August 1949–28 February 1950

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Administration

Lt. Gen. Wade H. Haislip	15 November 1948–22 August 1949
Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	1 September 1949–28 February 1950

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations

Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer	15 November 1948–19 September 1949
Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther	20 September 1949–28 February 1950

Comptrollers

Maj. Gen. Edmond H. Leavey	15 November 1948–30 June 1949
Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain	1 August 1949–28 February 1950

Directors of Personnel and Administration

Lt. Gen. Willard S. Paul	15 November 1948–31 December 1948
Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks	1 January 1949–28 February 1950

Director of Intelligence

Maj. Gen. Stafford LeRoy Irwin 15 November 1948–28 February 1950

Directors of Organization and Training

Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull	15 November 1948–7 June 1949
Maj. Gen. Clift Andrus	8 June 1949–28 February 1950

Directors of Logistics

Lt. Gen. Henry S. Aurand	15 November 1948–20 March 1949
Lt. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin	21 March 1949–28 February 1950

Directors of Plans and Operations

Maj. Gen. Ray T. Maddocks	15 November 1948–15 May 1949
Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolté	16 May 1949–28 February 1950

1950–1955

Vice Chiefs of Staff

General Wade H. Haislip	1 March 1950–31 July 1951
General John E. Hull	1 August 1951–6 October 1953
General Charles L. Bolté	7 October 1953–30 April 1955
General Williston B. Palmer	1 May 1955–2 January 1956

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Administration

Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway	1 March 1950–23 December 1950
Lt. Gen. John E. Hull	1 January 1951–31 July 1951
Lt. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	1 August 1951–6 February 1953
Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe	7 February 1953–22 October 1953
Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible	23 October 1953–31 December 1955

After 1 August 1951 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration was redesignated the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans

Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther	1 March 1950–13 February 1951
Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté	15 February 1951–31 July 1952
Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer	1 August 1952–24 March 1955
Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin	25 March 1955–9 October 1955
Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman	10 October 1955–31 December 1955

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans was redesignated the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Plans and Research on 15 January 1952 and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans again on 10 October 1955.

Comptrollers

Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain	1 March 1950–30 April 1952
Lt. Gen. George H. Decker	1 May 1952–6 February 1955
Lt. Gen. Laurin L. Williams	7 February 1955–31 December 1955

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics

Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer	8 September 1954–30 April 1955
Lt. Gen. Carter B. Magruder	1 May 1955–31 December 1955

Chief of Research and Development

Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin	10 October 1955–31 December 1955

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–1, Personnel

Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks	1 March 1950–22 May 1951
Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe	1 August 1951–5 February 1953
Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young	6 February 1953–4 May 1955
Maj. Gen. Donald P. Booth	5 May 1955–31 December 1955

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–2, Intelligence

Maj. Gen. Stafford LeRoy Irwin	1 March 1950–22 August 1950
Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling	23 August 1950–10 August 1952
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge	11 August 1952–15 November 1953
Maj. Gen. Arthur C. Trudeau	16 November 1953–8 August 1955
Maj. Gen. Ridgely Gaither	9 August 1955–31 December 1955

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–3, Operations

Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolté	1 March 1950–12 February 1951
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	13 February 1951–31 July 1951
Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins	1 August 1951–4 August 1952
Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman	5 August 1952–31 March 1954
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin	1 April 1954–24 March 1955
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams	25 March 1955–24 July 1955
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins	25 July 1955–31 December 1955

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–4, Logistics

Lt. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin	1 March 1950–20 December 1952
Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer	21 December 1952–7 September 1954

1956–1963

Vice Chiefs of Staff

General Williston B. Palmer	3 January 1956–30 May 1957
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer	22 July 1957–30 June 1959
General George H. Decker	1 August 1959–30 September 1960
General Clyde D. Eddleman	1 November 1960–31 March 1962
General Barksdale Hamlett	1 April 1962–3 September 1964

Comptrollers

Lt. Gen. Laurin L. Williams	3 January 1956–30 June 1957
Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton	1 July 1957–31 May 1960
Lt. Gen. David W. Traub	1 June 1960–31 July 1962
Lt. Gen. Charles B. Duff	1 August 1962–19 August 1963

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel

Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible	3 January 1956–25 December 1956
Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth	26 December 1956–14 March 1958
Lt. Gen. James F. Collins	15 March 1958–31 March 1961
Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup	1 April 1961–31 May 1963

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations

Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman	3 January 1956–31 May 1958
Lt. Gen. James E. Moore	1 June 1958–31 October 1959
Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes	1 November 1959–19 January 1961
Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett	20 January 1961–31 March 1962
Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker	1 May 1962–30 June 1963

Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics

Lt. Gen. Carter B. Magruder	3 January 1956–16 July 1959
Lt. Gen. Robert W. Colglazier, Jr.	17 July 1959–31 July 1964

Chiefs of Research and Development

Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin	3 January 1956–31 March 1958
Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau	1 April 1958–30 June 1962
Lt. Gen. Dwight E. Beach	1 July 1962–19 August 1963

Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Reserve Components

Maj. Gen. Philip D. Ginder	1 November 1956–19 December 1957
Maj. Gen. John W. Bowen	2 January 1958–3 January 1961

Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge	16 January 1961–30 September 1961
Maj. Gen. Carl Darnell, Jr.	1 October 1961–14 February 1963
Lt. Gen. W. H. Sterling Wright	15 February 1963–30 November 1965

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components was redesignated Chief, Office of Reserve Components, on 1 June 1962.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence

Maj. Gen. Ridgely Gaither	3 January 1956–30 July 1956
Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow	3 August 1956–31 October 1958
Maj. Gen. John N. M. Willems	1 November 1958–15 October 1961
Maj. Gen. Alva R. Fitch	16 October 1961–5 January 1964

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development

Lt. Gen. Ben Harrell	15 February 1963–30 June 1965

War Department Special Staff, 1900-1963

The Inspector Generals

Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Breckinridge	27 January 1889–11 April 1903
Brig. Gen. Peter D. Vroom	12 April 1903
Brig. Gen. George H. Burton	12 April 1903–30 September 1906
Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Carlington	1 October 1906–20 February 1917
Maj. Gen. John L. Chamberlain	21 February 1917–6 November 1921
Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick	7 November 1921–27 September 1927
Maj. Gen. William C. Rivers	28 September 1927–11 January 1930
Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum	12 January 1930–30 November 1931
Maj. Gen. John F. Preston	1 December 1931–30 November 1935
Maj. Gen. Walter L. Reed	1 December 1935–23 December 1939
Maj. Gen. Virgil L. Peterson	24 December 1939–5 June 1945
Lt. Gen. Dan I. Sultan	14 July 1945–14 January 1947
Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche	30 January 1947–30 June 1948
Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig	1 July 1948–31 May 1952
Lt. Gen. Daniel Noce	1 June 1952–31 October 1954
Maj. Gen. Wayne C. Zimmerman	1 November 1954–31 January 1956
Lt. Gen. David A. D. Ogden	1 February 1956–31 October 1957
Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson	1 November 1957–31 July 1959
Maj. Gen. Edward H. McDaniel	1 August 1959–30 November 1963

The Judge Advocate Generals

Brig. Gen. G. Norman Lieber	3 January 1895–21 May 1901
Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Barr	21 May 1901
Brig. Gen. John W. Clous	22–23 May 1901
Maj. Gen. George B. Davis	24 May 1901–14 February 1911
Maj. Gen. Enoch H. Crowder	15 February 1911–14 February 1923
Maj. Gen. Walter A. Bethel	15 February 1923–15 November 1924
Maj. Gen. John A. Hull	16 November 1924–15 November 1928
Maj. Gen. Edward A. Kreger	16 November 1928–28 February 1931
Maj. Gen. Blanton Winship	1 March 1931–30 November 1933
Maj. Gen. Arthur W. Brown	1 December 1933–30 November 1937
Maj. Gen. Allen W. Gullion	1 December 1937–30 November 1941
Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer	1 December 1941–30 November 1945
Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Green	1 December 1945–30 November 1949
Maj. Gen. Ernest M. Brannon (Acting)	3 January 1950–26 January 1954
Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Caffey	27 January 1954–31 December 1956
Maj. Gen. George W. Hickman, Jr.	1 January 1957–30 December 1960
Maj. Gen. Charles L. Decker	1 January 1961–31 December 1963

National Guard Bureau

Brig. Gen. Erasmus M. Weaver	12 February 1908–14 March 1911
Brig. Gen. Robert K. Evans	15 March 1911–12 January 1912
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Mills	1 September 1912–18 September 1916
Brig. Gen. William A. Mann	26 October 1916–4 August 1917
Maj. Gen. Jesse McI. Carter	5 August 1917–14 August 1918
Brig. Gen. John H. Heavey	15 August 1918–7 February 1919
Maj. Gen. Jesse McI. Carter	8 February 1919–28 June 1921
Maj. Gen. George C. Rickards	29 June 1921–28 June 1925
Maj. Gen. Creed C. Hammond	29 June 1925–28 June 1929
Col. Ernest R. Redmond (Acting)	29 June 1929–30 September 1929
Maj. Gen. William G. Everson	1 October 1929–30 November 1931
Maj. Gen. George E. Leach	1 December 1931–30 November 1935
Col. Harold J. Weiler (Acting)	1 December 1935–16 January 1936
Col. John F. Williams	17 January 1936–30 January 1936
Maj. Gen. Albert H. Blanding	31 January 1936–30 January 1940
Maj. Gen. John F. Williams	31 January 1940–31 January 1946
Maj. Gen. Butler B. Miltonberger	1 February 1946–29 September 1947
Maj. Kenneth F. Cramer	30 September 1947–4 September 1950
Maj. Gen. Raymond H. Fleming	5 September 1950–15 February 1953

Maj. Gen. Earl T. Ricks (Acting)	16 February 1953–21 June 1953
Maj. Gen. Edgar C. Erickson	22 June 1953–31 May 1959
Maj. Gen. Winston P. Wilson (Acting)	1 June 1959–19 July 1959
Maj. Gen. Donald W. McGowan	20 July 1959–30 August 1963

The National Guard Bureau was originally established on 14 February 1908 as the Bureau of Militia Affairs. It was redesignated the Militia Bureau on 22 July 1916 and as the National Guard Bureau on 15 January 1933. During World War II from 9 March 1942 to 17 May 1945 it was a subordinate unit under the jurisdiction of ASF. It was redesignated a special staff agency on 17 May 1945.

Chiefs of the Army Reserve

Col. David L. Stone	5 March 1927–30 June 1930
Brig. Gen. Charles D. Herron	1 July 1930–30 June 1935
Brig. Gen. Edwin S. Hartshorn	1 July 1935–15 September 1938
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Thompson	16 September 1938–9 June 1940
Brig. Gen. John H. Hester	21 June 1940–23 March 1941
Brig. Gen. Frank E. Lowe	5 June 1941–10 August 1942
Brig. Gen. Edward W. Smith	16 September 1942–14 October 1945
Brig. Gen. Edward S. Bres	15 October 1945–30 November 1947
Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover	1 December 1947–14 November 1949
Maj. Gen. James B. Cress	1 January 1950–31 January 1951
Brig. Gen. Hugh M. Milton	24 February 1951–18 November 1953
Brig. Gen. Philip F. Lindeman	19 November 1953–31 July 1957
Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Palladino	1 August 1957–31 May 1959
Maj. Gen. Frederick M. Warren	1 September 1959–31 August 1963

The Chief of the Army Reserve was initially designated as Executive Officer for Reserve Affairs until 8 May 1930 when the title was changed to Executive for Reserve Officers of the War Department and on 16 June 1941 to Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs. On 10 March 1942 it became a subordinate agency under ASF and an Army special staff agency on 17 May 1945. On 7 December 1954 the title was changed to Chief, Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, and on 13 February 1963 to Chief, Army Reserve.

Chiefs of Finance

Brig. Gen. Herbert M. Lord	11 October 1918–31 June 1922

Maj. Gen. Kenzie W. Walker	1 July 1922–22 April 1928
Maj. Gen. Roderick L. Carmichael	23 April 1928–22 April 1932
Maj. Gen. Frederick W. Coleman	23 April 1932–22 April 1936
Maj. Gen. Frederick W. Boschen	23 April 1936–22 April 1940
Maj. Gen. Howard K. Loughry	23 April 1940–1 June 1945
Maj. Gen. William H. Kasten	14 July 1945–31 January 1949
Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Foster	11 February 1949–31 May 1951
Maj. Gen. Bickford E. Sawyer	28 July 1951–27 July 1955
Maj. Gen. John B. Hess	28 July 1955–31 March 1956
Maj. Gen. Harry W. Crandall	18 May 1956–31 August 1958
Maj. Gen. Paul A. Mayo	1 September 1958–23 April 1964

From 11 October 1918 to 9 March 1942 the Chief of Finance was also the Budget Officer of the War Department, see above under Comptroller.

Army Audit Agency

Brig. Gen. Robert M. Cannon	30 November 1952–30 August 1953
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Royce	31 August 1953–6 September 1955
Maj. Gen. Einar B. Gjelsteen	25 November 1955–15 June 1957
Brig. Gen. Ralph J. Butchers	16 June 1957–22 March 1959
Maj. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey	23 March 1959–31 March 1961
Maj. Gen. Stanley W. Jones	1 April 1961–23 February 1965

The Army Audit Agency was set up as a branch of the Chief of Finance on 12 November 1946, made an independent agency under the Chief of Finance on 30 August 1947, and reorganized as a separate functional activity under the Comptroller of the Army on 10 January 1949. It was made an Army special staff agency on 3 November 1952.

Office of Civil Affairs

Col. John H. F. Haskell	1 March 1943–6 April 1943
Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring	7 April 1943–19 March 1946
Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Echols	20 March 1946–20 December 1946
Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce	21 December 1946–31 July 1948
Brig. Gen. George L. Eberle	1 August 1948–21 March 1949
Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder	22 March 1949–14 July 1949
Brig. Gen. Archelaus L. Hamblen	13 April 1952–30 September 1952
Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat	1 October 1952–11 September 1955

Maj. Gen. Charles K. Gailey	14 September 1955–2 August 1959
Maj. Gen. Armistead D. Mead	3 August 1959–30 June 1961
Maj. Gen. John E. Theimer	27 July 1961–14 May 1962

The Office of Civil Affairs was organized as the Civil Affairs Division of the Army special staff on 1 March 1943. It was discontinued as a separate staff agency on 14 July 1949 and its functions transferred to the Under Secretary of the Army's Office as the Office for Occupied Affairs. It was re-established as a special staff agency on 13 April 1952 and designated the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government. On 15 May 1959 it was redesignated as the Office of Civil Affairs and on 26 April 1962 discontinued again and its functions transferred to DCSOPS.

War Department Manpower Board

Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser	9 March 1943–31 August 1945
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel II	8 September 1945–1 September 1946
Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen	2 September 1946–15 September 1947
Col. H. J. Matchett (Acting)	16 September 1947–1 January 1948

The War Department Manpower Board was established as an Army special staff agency on 9 March 1943. It was disestablished and its functions transferred to the Army Comptroller's Office on 2 January 1948.

Special Planning Division

Maj. Gen. William F. Tompkins	23 July 1943–29 June 1945
Maj. Gen. Ray E. Porter	30 June 1945–9 June 1946

The Special Planning Division was established as an Army special staff agency on 22 July 1943 and abolished on 9 June 1946.

New Developments Division

Maj. Gen. Stephen G. Henry	23 October 1943–17 August 1944
Maj. Gen. William A. Borden	18 August 1944–27 March 1946
Col. Gervais W. Trichel (Acting)	28 March 1946–9 June 1946

The New Developments Division was set up as an Army special staff agency on 23 October 1943. It was discontinued and its functions transferred to the Research and Development Division of the Army General Staff on 9 June 1946.

Office of the Chief of Military History

Maj. Gen. Edwin F. Harding	17 November 1945–12 July 1946
Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony	13 July 1946–31 March 1949
Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward	1 April 1949–31 January 1953
Maj. Gen. Albert C. Smith	1 February 1953–9 September 1955
Maj. Gen. John H. Stokes, Jr.	6 February 1956–16 October 1956
Maj. Gen. Richard W. Stephens	17 October 1956–30 June 1958
Col. Warren H. Hoover (Acting)	22 August 1958–31 July 1959
Brig. Gen. James A. Norell	1 August 1959–31 May 1961
Brig. Gen. William H. Harris	1 June 1961–25 May 1962
Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison	6 August 1962–31 July 1970

On 5 March 1918 a Historical Branch was established under the Army War College/War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. This organization remained in the Army War College until the end of World War II. On 3 August 1943 a Historical Branch was established within the G–2 Division of the General Staff. These two branches were consolidated and reorganized as a War Department Special Staff Division on 17 November 1945. First designated as the Historical Division it was renamed the Office, Chief of Military History, on 1 June 1949.

Office, Chief of Special Warfare

Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure	17 January 1951–24 March 1953
Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock	1 July 1953–16 April 1956
Maj. Gen. Orlando G. Troxel, Jr.	1 June 1956–31 May 1958

The Office, Chief of Special Warfare, was organized on 17 January 1951 as the Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare. It was redesignated the Office, Chief of Special Warfare, on 6 November 1956. The agency was abolished and its functions transferred to DCSOPS on 1 June 1958.

Administrative Services

The Adjutant Generals

Maj. Gen. Henry C. Corbin	25 February 1898–22 April 1904
Maj. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth	23 April 1904—16 February 1912
Brig. Gen. William P. Hall	17 February 1912–11 June 1912
Brig. Gen. George Andrews	5 August 1912–26 August 1914
Maj. Gen. Henry P. McCain	27 August 1914–26 August 1918

Maj. Gen. Peter C. Harris	1 September 1918–31 August 1922
Maj. Gen. Robert C. Davis	1 September 1922–1 July 1927
Maj. Gen. Lutz Wahl	2 July 1927–30 December 1928
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bridges	31 December 1928–1 February 1933
Maj. Gen. James F. McKinley	2 February 1933–31 October 1935
Maj. Gen. Edgar T. Conley	1 November 1935–30 April 1938
Maj. Gen. Emory S. Adams	1 May 1938–2 March 1942
Maj. Gen. James A. Ulio	3 March 1942–31 January 1946
Maj. Gen. Edward F. Witsell	1 February 1946–30 June 1951
Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin	1 July 1951–31 May 1954
Maj. Gen. John A. Klein	1 June 1954–31 December 1956
Maj. Gen. Herbert M. Jones	1 January 1957–31 October 1958
Maj. Gen. Robert V. Lee	1 November 1958–30 September 1961
Maj. Gen. Joe C. Lambert	1 October 1961–31 July 1966

Chiefs of Chaplains

Col. John T. Axton	15 July 1920–6 April 1928
Col. Edmund P. Easterbrook	7 April 1928–22 December 1929
Col. Julian E. Yates	23 December 1929–22 December 1933
Col. Alva Jennings Brasted	23 December 1933–22 December 1937
Maj. Gen. William R. Arnold	23 December 1937–14 February 1945
Maj. Gen. Luther D. Miller	12 April 1945–1 August 1949
Maj. Gen. Roy H. Parker	2 August 1949–27 May 1952
Maj. Gen. Ivan L. Bennett	28 March 1952–30 April 1954
Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Ryan	1 May 1954–30 October 1958
Maj. Gen. Frank A. Tobey	1 November 1958–31 October 1962
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Brown, Jr.	1 November 1962–31 July 1967

The Provost Marshal Generals

Brig. Gen. Allen W. Gullion	31 July 1941–27 April 1944
Brig. Gen. Archer L. Lerch (Acting from 16 December 1942)	21 June 1944–3 December 1945
Brig. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan	4 December 1945–9 April 1948
Brig. Gen. Edwin P. Parker, Jr.	10 April 1948–31 January 1953
Brig. Gen. William H. Naglin	1 February 1953–30 September 1957
Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner	19 November 1957–31 October 1960
Maj. Gen. Ralph J. Butchers	1 December 1960–30 June 1964

Chiefs of Special Services Division

Maj. Gen. Russell B. Reynolds	10 June 1946–30 July 1949

Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren 1 August 1949–28 February 1950

The Office, Chief of Special Services Division, was established as the Morale Branch in The Adjutant General's Office on 22 July 1940. Later it was transferred to the Chief of Staff's Office. On 14 November 1941 the office was redesignated the Chief of Special Services, and after 10 March 1942 it was a subordinate agency under ASF. It became a separate Army administrative service on 10 June 1946, and on 28 February 1950 the office was abolished.

Technical Services

Chiefs of Engineers

Brig. Gen. J. M. Wilson	1 February 1897–30 April 1901
Brig. Gen. George L. Gillespie	3 May 1901–22 January 1904
Brig. Gen. Alexander MacKenzie	23 January 1904–25 May 1908
Brig. Gen. William L. Marshall	2 July 1908–11 June 1910
Brig. Gen. William H. Bixby	12 June 1910–11 August 1913
Brig. Gen. William T. Rossell	12 August 1913–11 October 1913
Brig. Ben. Dan C. Kingman	12 October 1913–6 March 1916
Maj. Gen. William M. Black	7 March 1916–31 October 1919
Maj. Gen. Lansing H. Beach	9 January 1920–18 June 1924
Maj. Gen. Harry Taylor	19 June 1924–26 June 1926
Maj. Gen. Edgar Jadwin	27 June 1926–6 August 1929
Brig. Gen. Herbert Deakyne	7 August 1929–1 October 1929
Maj. Gen. Lytle Brown	1 October 1929–1 October 1933
Maj. Gen. Edward M. Markham	1 October 1933–17 October 1937
Maj. Gen. Julian L. Schley	18 October 1937–30 September 1941
Lt. Gen. Eugene Reybold	1 October 1941–30 September 1945
Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler	1 October 1945–28 February 1949
Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick	1 March 1949–25 January 1953
Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr.	17 March 1953–30 September 1956
Lt. Gen. Emerson C. Itschner	1 October 1956–31 March 1961
Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson	19 May 1961–30 June 1965

The Surgeon Generals

Brig. Gen. George M. Sternberg	30 May 1893–7 June 1902
Brig. Gen. William H. Forwood	8 June 1902–6 September 1902
Brig. Gen. Robert M. O'Reilly	7 September 1902–13 January 1909
Brig. Gen. George H. Torney	14 January 1909–27 December 1913
Maj. Gen. William C. Gorgas	16 January 1914–3 October 1918

Maj. Gen. Merritte W. Ireland	4 October 1918–31 May 1931
Maj. Gen. Robert U. Patterson	1 June 1931–31 May 1935
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Reynolds	1 June 1935–31 May 1939
Maj. Gen. James C. Magee	1 June 1939–31 May 1943
Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk	1 June 1943–31 May 1947
Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Bliss	1 June 1947–31 May 1951
Maj. Gen. George E. Armstrong	1 June 1951–31 May 1955
Maj. Gen. Silas B. Hays	1 June 1955–30 June 1959
Lt. Gen. Leonard D. Heaton	1 July 1959–30 September 1969

The Quartermaster Generals

Brig. Gen. Marshall I. Ludington	3 February 1898–12 April 1903
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Humphrey	13 April 1903–30 June 1907
Maj. Gen. James B. Aleshire	1 July 1907–12 September 1916
Maj. Gen. Henry G. Sharpe	13 September 1916–12 July 1918
Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals (Acting)	20 December 1917–9 May 1918
Brig. Gen. Robert E. Wood (Acting)	10 May 1918–12 February 1919
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Rogers	22 July 1918–27 August 1922
Maj. Gen. William H. Hart	28 August 1922–2 January 1926
Maj. Gen. B. Franklin Cheatham	3 January 1926–17 January 1930
Maj. Gen. John L. DeWitt	3 February 1930–2 February 1934
Maj. Gen. Louis H. Bash	3 February 1934–31 March 1936
Maj. Gen. Henry Gibbins	1 April 1936–31 March 1940
Lt. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory	1 April 1940–31 January 1946
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin	1 February 1946–20 March 1949
Maj. Gen. Herman Feldman	21 March 1949–30 September 1951
Maj. Gen. George A. Horkan	9 October 1951–31 January 1954
Maj. Gen. Kester L. Hastings	5 February 1954–31 March 1957
Maj. Gen. Andrew T. McNamara	12 June 1957–11 January 1961
Maj. Gen. Webster Anderson	12 January 1961–31 July 1962

The Office of the Quartermaster General was abolished 31 July 1962.

Chiefs of Ordnance

Brig. Gen. Adelbert R. Buffington	5 April 1899–21 November 1901

Maj. Gen. William Crozier	22 November 1901–15 July 1918
Maj. Gen. Clarence C. Williams	16 July 1918–1 April 1930
Maj. Gen. Samuel Hof	2 June 1930–1 June 1934
Maj. Gen. William H. Tschappat	2 June 1934–2 June 1938
Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson	3 June 1938–31 May 1942
Lt. Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr.	1 June 1942–31 May 1946
Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes	1 June 1946–31 October 1949
Maj. Gen. Elbert L. Ford	1 November 1949–31 October 1953
Maj. Gen. Emerson L. Cummings	2 November 1953–7 February 1958
Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs	8 February 1958–31 May 1962
Maj. Gen. Horace F. Bigelow	1 June 1962–31 July 1962

The Office of the Chief of Ordnance was abolished on 31 July 1962.

Chief Signal Officers

Brig. Gen. Adolphus W. Greely	3 March 1887–9 February 1906
Brig. Gen. James Allen	10 February 1906–13 February 1913
Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven	5 March 1913–13 February 1917
Maj. Gen. George O. Squier	14 February 1917–31 December 1923
Maj. Gen. Charles McK. Saltzman	1 January 1924–8 January 1928
Maj. Gen. George S. Gibbs	9 January 1928–30 June 1931
Maj. Gen. Irving J. Carr	1 July 1931–31 December 1934
Maj. Gen. James B. Allison	1 January 1935–30 September 1937
Maj. Gen. Joseph O. Mauborgne	1 October 1937–30 September 1941
Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead	1 October 1941–30 June 1943
Maj. Gen. Harry C. Ingles	1 July 1943–31 March 1947
Maj. Gen. Spencer B. Akin	1 April 1947–31 March 1951
Maj. Gen. George I. Back	2 May 1951–30 April 1955
Lt. Gen. James D. O'Connell	1 May 1955–30 April 1959
Maj. Gen. Ralph T. Nelson	1 May 1959–30 June 1962
Maj. Gen. Earle F. Cook	1 July 1962–30 June 1963

Chiefs of the Chemical Corps

Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert	1 July 1918–30 June 1920
Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries	1 July 1920–27 March 1929
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Gilchrist	28 March 1929–7 May 1933
Maj. Gen. Claude E. Brigham	8 May 1933–23 May 1937

Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker	24 May 1937–30 April 1941
Maj. Gen. William N. Porter	31 May 1941–28 November 1945
Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt	29 November 1945–30 September 1949
Maj. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe	1 October 1949–31 July 1951
Maj. Gen. Egbert F. Bullene	25 August 1951–31 March 1954
Maj. Gen. William M. Creasy	7 May 1954–31 August 1958
Maj. Gen. Marshall Stubbs	1 September 1958–31 July 1962

The Office of the Chief Chemical Corps was abolished 31 July 1962.

Chiefs of the Transportation Corps

Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross	31 July 1942–30 November 1945
Maj. Gen. Edmund H. Leavey	1 December 1945–10 June 1948
Maj. Gen. Frank A. Heileman	11 June 1948–31 March 1953
Maj. Gen. Paul F. Yount	1 April 1953–31 January 1958
Maj. Gen. Frank S. Besson	17 March 1958–25 March 1962
Maj. Gen. Rush B. Lincoln, Jr.	26 March 1962–23 June 1963

Major ZI Commands

Army Air Forces

General Henry H. Arnold	9 March 1942–9 February 1946
General Carl Spaatz	10 February 1946–17 September 1947

Army Service Forces

Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell	9 March 1942–31 December 1945
Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes	1 January 1946–9 June 1946

United States Continental Army Command

Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair	9 July 1940–13 July 1944
Lt. Gen. Ben Lear	14 July 1944–20 January 1945
Lt. Gen. Joseph G. Stilwell	24 January 1945–22 June 1945
Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers	23 July 1945–30 September 1949
General Mark W. Clark	1 October 1949–5 May 1952
General John R. Hodge	8 May 1952–30 June 1953
General John E. Dahlquist	24 August 1953–29 February 1956
General Willard G. Wyman	1 March 1956–31 July 1958
General Bruce C. Clarke	1 August 1958–30 September 1960
General Herbert B. Powell	1 October 1960–31 January 1963
General John K. Waters	1 February 1963–29 February 1964

The United States Continental Army Command was organized as General Headquarters on 9 July 1940 and reorganized as Army Ground Forces on 10 March 1942. It was reorganized as an Army staff agency and designated Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces on 15 March 1948 and later reorganized as a major Army command on 1 February 1955 and redesignated United States Continental Army Command.

United States Army Materiel Command

General Frank S. Besson 8 May 1962–9 March 1969

Combat Developments Command

Lt. Gen. John P. Daley 20 June 1962–21 July 1963

Office of Personnel Operations

Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Hanmer 1 July 1962–31 May 1964

Sources: Army registers for various years; the *Army Almanac* (1949 edition); *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19), Zone of the Interior;* "Eighth Annual Army Secretarial Alumni Conference, 1 May 1970," prepared by Esther Byrne; Robert W. Coakley, Secretary of the Army Report, 1955–1960 (Mr. Wilber Brucker), draft manuscript, OCMH; TAGO special orders; General Officers Assignment Branch, DCSPER; TAGO Retired General Officers files; NARS Records Center in St. Louis; Deceased General Officers files; and the agencies concerned.

Bibliographical Note

Existing accounts of the organization and administration of the War Department, later the Department of the Army, do not deal with the central theme of this study at all, except obliquely. The framework for this account came not from military historians and public administration specialists but from Alfred Dupont Chandler, Jr., in his pioneering studies on the development of modern American industrial management, principally: "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry," "The Railroads: Pioneers in Modern Corporate Management," and "Management Decentralization: An Historical Analysis," all in James P. Baughman, ed., *The History of American Management: Selections from the Business History Review* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969). Chandler's major works include *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1962) and, as coauthor with Stephen Salsbury, *Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making of a Modern Corporation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). His essay, "The Large Industrial Corporation and the Making of the Modern American Economy," in Stephen E. Ambrose, ed., *Institutions in Modern America: Innovation in Structure and Process* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), summarizes and further refines his basic thesis. Louis Galambos in "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History," *Business History Review*, XLIV, No. 3 (Autumn 1970), has summarized this trend in organizational history, as does Robert D. Cuff's incisive analysis in "American Historians and the Organizational Factor," *The Canadian Review of American Studies*, IV, No. 1 (Spring 1973). Glenn Porter's *The Rise of Big Business, 1860–1910* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973) is the largest and most concise synthesis of business institutional history over the past decade. Particularly valuable is its bibliographical essay on the

principal works in this field, including monographs and journal articles.

Professor Cyril E. Black in his stimulating study, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Contemporary History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), distinguishing between traditionalists and modernists, writes of the "consolidation of policy-making," both public and private, aided by technological advancement. He points out that the modernists have sought "to mobilize and rationalize the resources of society with a view to achieving greater control, efficiency, and production."

Robert E. Wiebe in *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), discusses the breakdown of America's rural-oriented society and its replacement by the "regulative, hierarchical" needs of urban-industrial life. "Rules with impersonal sanctions . . . sought continuity and predictability in a world of endless change," encouraging the centralization of authority. His latest book, *The Segmented Society: An Historical Preface to the Meaning of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), demonstrates how the "segmentation" of American society into competing interest groups has traditionally dominated its government and society. Rowland Berthoff in *An Unsettled People: Social Order and Disorder in American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) describes the disruptive effect rapid urban industrialization has had on American individualism and society in general.

A military historian, Russell F. Weigley, several years ago suggested that historians examine the thesis of this volume in "The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era," published in Lt. Col. William Geffen, USAF, "Command and Commanders in Modern Warfare," *Proceedings of the Second Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 2–3 May 1969* (Boulder: USAF, 1969).

The major obstacle to an understanding of rationalization or modernization in American society by historians has been, as John Braeman pointed out some time ago in "Seven Profiles: Modernists and Traditionalists," *Business History Review,* XXV, No. 4 (Winter 1961), their insistence on lumping both groups under the amorphous title "progressive." The tradi-

tionalist reformers were Jeffersonians seeking, as Theodore Roosevelt noted, to turn the clock back to a rural America with less government and less centralized authority. The modernists on the other hand were Hamiltonians, like Roosevelt, Root, and Stimson, seeking centralized authority in the interests of efficiency and order. Historians could recognize the fundamental incompatibility of traditionalists and modernists more easily if they were to drop the term progressive, but the argument among them continues, based in part upon uncritical acceptance of earlier accounts now seriously outdated.

Published and Unpublished Works

Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in several of his reports, printed in *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* vol. I (Washington, 1832) and vol. II (Washington, 1834), outlined his administrative reforms of the War Department which established the bureau system as it existed throughout the nineteenth century.

U.S. 82d Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 170, *The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation . . .* , Edwin S. Corwin, ed. (Washington, 1953), contains an authoritative discussion of the development of the role of the President as Commander in Chief as laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as well as the practices and procedures developed by individual presidents.

Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1927) is a collection of documents on the organization of the War Department from 1900 to 1923. Particularly valuable are the Congressional testimony and excerpts from the annual reports of Secretary of War Elihu Root and a "Personal Narrative of Maj. Gen. William Harding Carter on the Creation of the American General Staff." The annual reports of the Secretaries of War during this same period, together with the attached reports of the Chief of Staff and the bureau chiefs, are another invaluable source of detailed information. The best published account of the managerial crisis within the War Department

during the winter of 1917–18 is in the Annual Reports for 1918 and for 1919 of the Chief of Staff submitted by General Peyton C. March. Valuable statistical data on the War Department during World War I are contained in U.S. Army, *Order of Battle of the Land Forces in the World War (1917–19), Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1949). In the National Archives, Record Group 165, in particular the files of the General Staff: Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, contains valuable material, most of which has not been thoroughly examined, on the organization and reorganization of the Army's supply system under Generals March and Goethals. Of particular value is the history of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division prepared by Maj. W. M. Adriance and assisted by Capt. S. T. Dana and 1st Lt. J. R. Douglas about March 1919 which appeared in a much-abbreviated form in the Chief of Staff's Report for 1919. Also in these same files under 029 PS&T Div. is a proposed article by Lieutenant Douglas that was never published, The War's Lessons with Reference to the Supply System of the Army . . . . Douglas in this case is listed as an instructor in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. The 029 files contain most of the documents dealing with the reorganization of the Army's supply system employed in this study. Testimony on the postwar reorganization of the Army from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, General March, General John J. Pershing, on down to disgruntled bureau chiefs may be found in *Army Reorganization, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions* (Washington, 1920). The discussion of the origins and development of the Army General Staff by Col. John McAuley Palmer on 15 October 1919 is especially important.

The important private manuscript collections consulted for the period before World War II were the Papers of Henry L. Stimson at Yale University and the Papers of Newton D. Baker in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress. A memoir by Mr. Stimson written just after he left the War Department in 1913 contains information on his dealings with a more or less hostile Congress, and the correspondence of Secretary Baker's private secretary Ralph Hayes, included in the Baker Papers, contains useful information on the lack of

effective control over the department's operations during the early months of the war. The author used neither the Papers of Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress nor those of Bernard Baruch at Princeton University. These papers of Goethals and Baruch should be consulted as well.

The sources used for Chapter II were Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch's interviews in September 1945 with veterans of the Marshall reorganization of 1942, General Marshall, General McNarney, General Harrison, and General Nelson. They form part of the files of the Patch-Simpson Board on the reorganization of the War Department. Copies of these interviews are in OCMH files. Also consulted was a copy of an autobiographical memorandum prepared by Mr. Stimson's special assistant, Goldthwaite Dorr, entitled Memorandum—Notes on the Activities of an Informal Group in Connection With the Supply Reorganization in the War Department, Jan–Mar 42, written in early 1946, a copy of which is in OCMH files.

The principal published source for General Marshall's views on the postwar organization of the Army and on unification of the armed services is his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on unification in the fall of 1945. Among unpublished sources the Diary of Secretary Stimson at Yale University contains summaries of interviews with General Marshall on unification of armed services in April 1944 before the opening of the hearings by the Woodrum Committee referred to in Chapter IV. OCMH has a copy from Stimson's correspondence that paraphrases an interview the Secretary had with General Marshall on 24 April 1944 on unification, in which the general discussed the matter more freely than in his public testimony.

Also in OCMH files is a special collection of the various Somervell-ASF Post-War Organization proposals made from 1943 through the spring of 1948 and a draft manuscript history of the War Department Special Planning Division which includes documents and reports on the history of that unit and on the development of plans for the postwar organization of the Army before the latter's functions were taken over by the Patch-Simpson Board.

The material used in Chapter IV on the reorganization of

1946 came from the files of the Army staff, particularly files 020 and 320 on the organization and reorganization, respectively, of the Army. File 320 for 1945–46 contains the records of the so-called Patch-Simpson Board. The Patch Board's interviews in September 1945 with major War Department and Army staff officials from General Marshall down to the chiefs of the technical services and in Europe with members of General Eisenhower's headquarters staff are especially important for an understanding of the reasons behind the decision to scrap the wartime Marshall organization of the Army staff with its tight executive control over operations. Copies of the principal interviews are in OCMH files. The records of the Army staff in this period are located in RG 165 in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Also in this group are file 334 of the War Department Special Planning Division containing material on the Patch-Simpson Board from 19 August 1945 to 4 April 1946 and those of the Organization and Management Section of G–3. The latter's files contain material only from January to April 1946 and are labeled as backup material for the so-called Eberle Report.

The principal published sources for Chapter V on unification of the armed services between 1946 and 1950 are the series of hearings held between 1944 and 1947 by various committees of the House and Senate. The first unification hearings were conducted in the spring of 1944 by a Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy of the House of Representatives under the chairmanship of Congressman Clifton A. Woodrum of Virginia. Nothing came of these hearings, and the next ones held were in late 1945 by the Senate Committee on Military Affairs under Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, followed by hearings in the spring and summer of 1946 by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee under Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts. Following a reorganization of Congress, the next hearings were held by the Senate Committee on the Armed Services in the spring of 1947 under Senator Chan Gurney of South Dakota. The final hearings were conducted by the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments under Congressman Clare Hoffman of Michigan at about the same time.

Material on the reorganization of the Army staff from 1948

to 1950 was drawn from the files of the Management Division of the Office of the Comptroller of the Army located in RG 319 (Army Staff) in the National Archives and Records Service. The specific files used are referred to in the footnotes. The Chief of Staff's office file 320 on reorganization for 1949 was also used. General Lutes' files on The Pros and Cons of a Logistics Command, compiled in the spring of 1948, is in the Somervell-ASF Reorganization Proposals file, referred to above, in OCMH. The Final Report of the War Department Policies and Programs Review Board, known as the Haislip Board, of 11 August 1947, is now declassified.

The Johnston plan for realigning the Army staff on functional lines was mimeographed as Organization of the Department of the Army: A Staff Study, 15 July 1948. The files of the Management Division, OCA, contain valuable documents on events leading to the publication of the Johnston plan as well as to the publication of the Survey of the Department of the Army—Final Report by Cresap, McCormick and Paget of 15 April 1949. The Management Division also compiled and mimeographed a very valuable collection of documents to accompany the Cresap, McCormick and Paget Report entitled Tabbed Materials to Accompany a Study on Improvement of Organization and Procedures of the Department of the Army, dated 22 July 1949. Only the original copy in the Management Division files contains the formal comments in writing by the Army staff including the chiefs of the technical services. In the OCMH files is a copy of an address by Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, the Chief of Ordnance, to the Chief of Staff on 15 September 1948 on Reorganization of the Army as Viewed From the Technical Service Level.

A very helpful commentary on the Army Organization Act of 1950 was prepared by Lt. Col. George Emery Baya of the Management Division, OCA, entitled An Explanation of the Army Organization Act of 1950, dated 27 July 1950 and reproduced for distribution within the Army. A copy is in OCMH files.

The principal archival material used in preparing Chapter VI were the Chief of Staff's 320 (Reorganization) files for 1953 and 1954 in RG 319, NARS, and the Annual Historical Report of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for FY 1955. The

latter contains a sizable file of documents bearing upon the Army staff reorganization of 1955. Included are the Davies Committee Report of 18 December 1953 and the Secretary's Report on Army Reorganization of 17 July 1954, both of which were reproduced and distributed throughout the Army. General Williston B. Palmer discussed the rationale behind the 1955 changes in the organization of the Army staff in "The General Staff, United States Army," *Armed Forces Management*, IV, No. 1 (October 1957).

Karl Bendetsen's proposals in 1952 for reorganizing the Army staff appeared in the *Military Review*, XXXIII, No. 10 (January 1954), as "A Plan for Army Organization." His second plan, dated 1 June 1955, for Army Organization in Peace and War is located in the files of Group B, Army Headquarters, OSD Project 80 (the Hoelscher Committee Report), referred to below. Mr. Lovett's letter of 18 November 1952 to President Truman, suggesting a reorganization of the technical services among other things, appeared in the *Army, Navy, and Air Force Journal*, 10 January 1953. The review and analysis of the organization of the Army staff prepared by McKinsey and Company, dated March 1955, was reproduced in two volumes.

The unclassified First Army Survey Appraisal of Relationships Now Established by SR 10–500–1, October 1953, a mimeographed copy of which is in OCMH files, is the best analysis of the housekeeping problems encountered by the continental armies and the technical services after World War II.

For Chapter VII useful material on common supplies and services is contained in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Background Materials on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply, 86th Congress, 2d Session.* An ICAF lecture on the origins of the single manager concept by its chief architect, Robert C. Lanphier, Jr., entitled Single Manager Plan on 23 November 1955 was also consulted. L. Van Loan Naisawald's unpublished draft manuscript, acknowledged in the preface, The History of Army Research and Development, Organization and Programs: Part I, Organization: The Formative Years, 1961, was indispensable because of the au-

thor's intimate personal knowledge of the background and events described.

For Chapter VIII the hearings and reports on national security organization published by the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, the so-called Jackson Subcommittee, provided illuminating background material as well as criticism of the organization and management of defense policies under President Eisenhower. Particularly helpful were the statements of former Secretaries of Defense Robert S. Lovett and Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Wilfred J. McNeil, and Maurice H. Stans, Director of the Budget, under President Eisenhower, General Taylor, and Secretary McNamara.

A number of speeches, statements, and articles by Charles J. Hitch, including testimony before the Jackson Committee, were useful in tracing the development of the planning-programming-budgeting system. *The Economics of National Defense in the Nuclear Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), which he wrote with Roland N. McKean as a member of the RAND Corporation, outlined in detail its fundamental concepts. Also of value was Mr. Hitch's *Decision-Making for Defense* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).

Important documents bearing upon the creation of the Defense Supply Agency are included in the Project 100, Single Manager Activities file of Project 80's Group D files referred to below.

Material on Project 80 and the Army reorganization of 1962 came from the files of the Hoelscher Committee and its successor, the Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office (DARPO). This material was turned over to OCMH where it is presently located. These files include the published reports of the study groups as well as the final summary report and the Green Book of December 1961, the latter containing the reorganization plan finally approved by Secretary McNamara. The most important materials are in the files of Mr. Hoelscher's executive office and the backup files of the several study groups, particularly those of Group D on Army logistics. Also of much help were the formal criticisms of the Hoelscher Committee Report by General Illig and Dr. Garvin of DCSLOG in September 1961 contained in Mr. Hoelscher's personal files

and the transcript of a speech by Hoelscher before the Army Management School in March 1963, The Story of Project 80 and the Reorganization of the Army.

Unfortunately because the Hoelscher Committee was dissolved immediately after its report was presented to the Chief of Staff in mid-October 1961 a gap in documentation exists between that date and mid-February 1962 when DARPO began operations. Transcripts of the interviews with General Taylor in November and December, however, were preserved as well as the Traub Committee Report. Otherwise material for this period, when Secretary McNamara was making vital decisions affecting the reorganization, was culled from personal papers retained by a few officers who remained on duty after October, particularly Lt. Col. Lewis J. Ashley and Maxey O. Stewart.

Material dealing with the execution of Project 80 came from the files of DARPO, especially its correspondence files. On the vital issue of personnel transfers few records survived of the bitter debates between the Army staff and DARPO on transferring the former's personnel to the newly created AMC and CDC.

Secondary Works

For the nineteenth century, three volumes in the late Leonard D. White's studies in the administrative history of the federal government were of great value: *The Jeffersonians, 1801–1829* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), *The Jacksonians, 1829–1861* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), and *The Republican Era, 1869–1901* (New York: Macmillan, 1958). William B. Skelton has filled in an important gap in our knowledge by tracing the origins of the continuing feud between the Commanding General, on the one hand, and the bureau chiefs, backed by the Secretary of War, on the other, in "The Commanding General and the Problem of Command in the United States Army, 1821–1841," *Military Affairs,* XXXIV No. 4 (December 1970).

Until the publication of Graham A. Cosmas' *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971), there was no reliable or authoritative account of the role the Army and the War Department played in that conflict. The

first chapter is an excellent summary of the organization and administration of the department and the Army in the field in the years before the war. While concentrating on the Army during the war itself, Cosmas carries his account right up to the appointment of Elihu Root as Secretary of War on 1 August 1899. It is a fair, balanced account and one every student of American military history should have in his library.

Secondary works on the organization and administration of the War Department for the period 1900–45 include Otto L. Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), largely an unorganized miscellaneous collection of documents printed in full. It is more likely to mislead the reader than to inform him. Furthermore, government and War Department documents printed in full, while useful, are to some extent indigestible. Nelson's selections for the period before World War II are arbitrary, omitting many important items. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959) is much broader in scope, including European armies and their experiences and tracing the development of American military thought from the Revolution until after World War II. Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), provides a useful comparison of the experiences and problems of all three services as well as of the Department of Defense down to the end of 1958. In discussing the Secretary of War's alliance with the Chief of Staff he does not seem to realize that such an alliance existed to only a limited extent during the two terms that Henry L. Stimson was Secretary, first with Leonard Wood and later with George C. Marshall. During World War I Newton D. Baker did not align himself with the Chief of Staff until Peyton C. March took over that office. Marvin A. Kriedberg and Merton G. Henry in DA Pamphlet No. 20–212, *A History of Military Mobilization of the United States Army, 1775–1945* (Washington, 1955), cover the organization and administration of the Army in a superior fashion, although the emphasis is on mobilization procedures. Unfortunately the book lacks an index. Richard D. Challener's *Admirals, Generals and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 1973) indicates the Army had much less influence on American foreign policy than the Navy. Howard Moon is preparing a study on war plans during this period, emphasizing particularly those involving Japan and Mexico.

For the period before World War I, Mabel E. Deutrich, *Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General Fred C. Ainsworth* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), and Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), are indispensable. John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), who served on the General Staff during World War I, provides one of the best accounts of the development of the Army from 1900 to 1920, including the controversy between the Regular Army and the National Guard, the background and content of the National Defense Act of 1916, the nation's first draft law, the reorganizations of the War Department during 1918, and the Congressional hearings which led to passage of the National Defense Act amendments of June 1920. George C. Herring, Jr., published a valuable article, "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915–1916," in the *Journal of Southern History*, XXX, No. 4 (November 1964), although he did not discuss the impact of the National Defense Act of 1916 on the General Staff.

Concerning America's role in World War I, Frederick Palmer's two-volume biography *Newton D. Baker, America at War* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1931) and his *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker Howard Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934) are still commendable accounts. Daniel R. Beaver's "Newton D. Baker and the Genesis of the War Industries Board," *Journal of American History*, LII, No. 1 (June 1965) and *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1966) are the most valuable and most recent accounts of Baker as Secretary of War and of his negative attitude toward industrial mobilization. Robert D. Cuff's recent *The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations during World War I* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) is by far the most detailed, thorough, and sophisticated treatment of the WIB that has been pub-

lished. Edward M. Coffman, first in "The Battle Against Red-Tape: Business Methods of the War Department General Staff, 1917–1918," *Military Affairs,* XXVI, No. 1 (Spring 1962), and later in his authoritative *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), has written a detailed treatment of March's efforts to reorganize the General Staff in the last six months of the war. His *The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) is the best over-all treatment of our participation in the war, but it deals only summarily with the problems in the War Department's supply system. Very little has been written about the crises in industrial mobilization during World War I. Grosvenor B. Clarkson in *Industrial America in the World War, The Strategy Behind the Line, 1917–1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923) has told the story of industrial mobilization from the War Industries Board viewpoint. Benedict Crowell and Robert F. Wilson in *The Armies of Industry* and *The Road to France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) have also dealt with the problem of the disorganization caused by the independence of the bureau chiefs during the first year of the war effort. All of these accounts, however, tread very lightly on the subject of Secretary Baker's failure to recognize the need for effective control over the bureaus' operations and over war industry. Only Irving Brinton Holley, jr., in *Ideas and Weapons* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953) has dealt exhaustively with one aspect of industrial mobilization—the development of the infant aircraft industry and its efforts to produce serviceable military aircraft. His detailed treatment of the relationship between research, development, and production of aircraft and the extreme difficulties which led to at least two major investigations is a model that could well be followed by other historians dealing with this area from drawing board to battlefield.

The following volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series have valuable material on the period of the long armistice between 1919 and 1939: Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, 1950); Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington, 1951); and Stetson Conn,

Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (Washington, 1964). OCMH also has a copy of a praiseworthy Ph.D. dissertation by John W. Killigrew, The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929–1936, Indiana University, 1960. The best and most comprehensive treatment of the development of the Air Corps during the interwar years may be found in Irving Brinton Holley, jr., *Buying Aircraft: Matériel Procurement for the Army Air Forces,* UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1964). It not only covers the organization of the Air Corps but deals with the corps' attempts to secure money from Congress for aircraft and with the struggling aircraft industries' efforts to survive in those years of pacifism and isolation. It goes right up to the defeat of France and to President Roosevelt's casual decision to ask Congress for 50,000 aircraft in May 1940. The Air Force's official history and historical studies for the interwar years are more narrow in their frames of reference and understandably more biased.

The most valuable account of General Marshall's reorganization of the War Department in 1942 is Col. Frederick S. Haydon, "War Department Reorganization, August 1941–March 1942," *Military Affairs,* XVI (1952). The McNarney Committee appointed to carry out the reorganization left few documents behind. Colonel Haydon had to reconstruct events laboriously from scattered sources and from the volumes of Watson and Cline cited above. He left well-organized notes and copies of his interviews with participants. These interviews are in OCMH files. Forrest C. Pogue has an excellent account of Marshall's views on reorganization in the second volume of his biography of the general, *Ordeal and Hope, 1939–1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1966).

In addition to the volumes of Morison, Cline, and Watson, cited above, the following volumes in the UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II series were especially helpful in preparing Chapters II and III: R. Elberton Smith, *The Army and Economic Mobilization* (Washington, 1959); Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943* (Washington, 1955); Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, *Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945* (Washington, 1968); Kent Roberts Greenfield,

Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, 1947); John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces* (Washington, 1954); Constance McL. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, *The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War* (Washington, 1955); and Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, *The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States* (Washington, 1973), which the author consulted in draft form. Of the offical "Army Air Forces in World War II" series edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, *Men and Planes*, vol. VI (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), was useful, as were portions of Holley's volume on Air Force procurement.

The following unpublished official monographs, all located in OCMH files, were consulted: Kent Roberts Greenfield, A Short History of the Army Ground Forces, AGF Historical Studies No. 10, c. 1944; D. L. McCaskey, The Role of Army Ground Forces in the Development of Equipment, AGF Historical Series, No. 34, 1946; John D. Millett, Organizational Problems of the Army Ground Forces, 1942–1945, c. April 1945; Richard M. Leighton, History of the Control Division, ASF, 1942–1945, April 1946; Research and Development Division, ASF, History of the Research and Development Division, ASF, 1 July 1940–1 July 1945 with Supplement to 1 January 1946, c. 1946. Personnel Division, G–1, War Department General Staff, History of the Personnel Division, G–1, War Department General Staff, n.d.; Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, History of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, 7 December 1941–2 September 1945, n.d.; Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, c. 1953; Richard W. Armour and Others, History of the G–3 Division, War Department General Staff During World War II, c. February 1946; Supply Division, War Department General Staff, History of the Supply Division, G–4, War Department General Staff, n.d.; Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, War Department Special Staff, History of the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, n.d.; George W. Peck, History of the War Department Manpower Board, c. May 1946; Edwin L. Hayward, History of the Civil

Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, During World War II to March 1946, n.d.; New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff, History of the New Developments Division, War Department General Staff, c. April 1946.

Among monographs used that were prepared by the Army Air Forces were Chase C. Mooney, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935–1945, AAF Historical Study No. 10, Air Historical Office, April 1947, and L. V. Howard and C. C. Mooney, Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF, AAF Histories Studies No. 28 (revised), Air Historical Office, Hq., AAF, August 1946.

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Two OCMH studies on Army personnel management were valuable: R. W. Coakley, B. C. Mossman, and B. F. Cooling, Review of Deployment Procedures in World War II and in the Korean War, 1965, and R. W. Coakley, Historical Summary of Army Manpower and Personnel Management System, 1965.

In preparing Chapter IV John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*, DA Pamphlet 20–210 (Washington, 1954), and an OCMH study prepared by Robert W. Coakley, Ernest F. Fisher, Karl E. Cocke, and Daniel P. Griffin, Résumé of Army Roll-Up Following World War II (revised), 1968, were of value in analyzing the Army's proposals for universal military training.

The best published account of the battle over unification discussed briefly in Chapter V is Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

The most significant published analysis of national defense policy from World War II to 1960 is Samuel P. Huntington's *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). For the period between 1947 and 1953 Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder's *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) was invaluable. Schilling's "The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal Year 1950" brilliantly demonstrates what General Mar-

shall had warned, the futility and irresponsibility of attempting to determine the size of defense budgets without considering American military commitments and strategy. Schilling also shows how this development inevitably led to the bitter interservice rivalry that loomed so large in defense policy from 1947 to 1961.

The most useful study on the evolution of the Army's program budgets during the 1950s is Frederick C. Mosher, *Program Budgets: Theory and Practice* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1954). An article by Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform," in the December 1966 issue of the *Public Administration Review*, XVI, No. 4, provides an excellent historical background, while an OCA official, William O. Harris, in an ICAF student thesis in March 1961, An Appraisal of Military Comptrollership, Thesis No. 59, M61–92, traced the development of OCA during the fifties with emphasis on the increasing authority of Wilfred J. McNeil, the DOD Comptroller, over defense budgets.

Since much of the services' research and development was conducted on contract by outside "think tanks," the author consulted Bruce L. R. Smith's *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), a thorough account of the background and development of the first and still the foremost of these scientific advisory groups.

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Organization and Management of the Department of Defense Wholesale Supply System, U.S. Army War College Student Thesis AWCLG 61–2–41V, 10 February 1961.

The most valuable treatment of Army logistics from the creation of ASF through the Army reorganization of 1962 is an OCMH study, Three Studies on the Historical Development of Army Logistical Organization, prepared for the Board of Inquiry on Army Logistics Systems (the Brown Board), July 1966. Part B on Army logistics between World War II and 1960 was of great help in preparing Chapter VI.

Martin Blumenson's Reorganization of the Army, 1962, OCMH Monograph 37M, April 1965, was used extensively in preparing those sections dealing with Project 80.

List of Abbreviations

AAF	Army Air Forces
AEF	American Expeditionary Forces (World War I)
AFSSC	Armed Forces Supply Support Center
AFSWP	Armed Forces Special Weapons Project
AGF	Army Ground Forces
AMC	Army Materiel Command
ARO	Army Research Office
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASA (R&D)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Development)
ASAP	Army Scientific Advisory Panel
ASD (I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation & Logistics)
ASF	Army Service Forces
AWC	Army War College
BAC	Budget Advisory Committee
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CBR	Chemical, biological, radiological
CDC	Combat Developments Command
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific
CMH	Center of Military History (formerly Office, Chief of Military History)
CMP	Cresap, McCormick and Paget
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CONUS	Continental United States
DA	Department of the Army
DARPO	Department of the Army Reorganization Project Office
DASA	Defense Atomic Support Agency
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOT	Directorate of Organization and Training
DSA	Defense Supply Agency

DSM	Distinguished Service Medal
ETO	European theater of operations
FRC	Federal Records Center
GHQ	General Headquarters
GSA	General Services Administration
HumRRO	Human Resources Research Office
ICAF	Industrial College of the Armed Forces
JAGC	Judge Advocate General's Corps
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MASA	Military Automotive Supply Agency
MATS	Military Air Transport Service
MCSA	Military Construction Supply Agency
MDLC	Materiel Development and Logistics Command
MDW	Military District of Washington
MGSA	Military General Supply Agency
MIS	Military Intelligence Service
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MRP	Management Resources Planning [Branch]
MSTS	Military Sea Transportation Service
MTMA	Military Traffic Management Agency
NARS	National Archives and Records Service
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NME	National Military Establishment
NSA	National Security Agency
OACSFOR	Office, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
OAD	Operations Analysis Division
OCA	Office, Comptroller of the Army
OCMH	Office, Chief of Military History
OCRD	Office, Chief of Research and Development
OCofT	Office, Chief of Transportation
ODCSLOG	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
ODCSOPS	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
ODCSPER	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
ODOMS	Directorate of Organization and Management Systems
OPD	Operations Division
OPO	Office of Personnel Operations
ORO	Operations Research Office
OSD	Office, Secretary of Defense
OSRD	Office of Scientific Research and Development
PAC	Project Advisory Committee
PIPS	Preliminary implementation plans
PMP	Protective Mobilization Plan
PS&T	Purchase, Storage, and Traffic [Division]

RAF	Royal Air Force
RAND	Research and Development [Corporation]
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
ROTEC	Research Office Test and Experimentation Center
SARO	Strength Accounting and Reporting Office
SGS	Secretary of the General Staff
SPD	Special Planning Division
SS&P	Service, Supply, and Procurement [Directorate]
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
TACT	Third Army Territorial Command Test
TAGO	The Adjutant General's Office
UMT	Universal military training
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
WAC	Women's Army Corps
WD	War Department
WDGS	War Department General Staff
WDSS	War Department Special Staff
WIB	War Industries Board
WPD	War Plans Division
ZI	Zone of interior

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