MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY

The Modern Volunteer Army Program: The Benning Experiment, 1970-1972



THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY PROGRAM: THE BENNING EXPERIMENT, 1970–1972

by

Brigadier General Willard Latham

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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Foreword

The expiration of authority to draft young men for military service in mid-1973 placed the United States Army on a volunteer footing for the first time since 1948. In preparation for this challenge, the Army had initiated the Modern Volunteer Army Program two and a half years earlier to attract and increase the enlistment of able men and women, raise the quality of Army life, and improve professionalism throughout the rank and file. An important part of the program was Project VOLAR, a field experiment conducted at selected Army installations from 1970 to 1972 to develop methods and procedures for achieving the program's objectives. The methods and procedures that survived this extensive testing and critical evaluation are now being applied Army-wide with significant benefit as the Army makes its transition to a volunteer force.

In the continuing task of maintaining and improving a thoroughly professional, highly motivated volunteer force, the Army stands to profit from knowledge of the VOLAR experiment, its failures as well as its successes. To record the experience, the Army has prepared a series of monographs, each an objective and comprehensive account of a particular phase of the experiment, and each prepared by a senior officer who played an important VOLAR role. These studies should contribute to the historical record of the Army and provide the American public with a performance report on an institution it has so long and so well supported.

Brigadier General Willard Latham is eminently qualified to write the account of the VOLAR service school experiment at Fort Benning, Georgia. Stationed there from 1 January 1971 to 30 June 1972, he first commanded the 197th Infantry Brigade, and later served as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Infantry Center. Under his command, the 197th Infantry Brigade carried out an intensive personnel procurement program with such success that it became the first Regular Army brigade in recent history to be fully manned by volunteers. In earlier assignments, General Latham during the Korean War served as a platoon leader in the 8th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division. He also has been a company commander in the 31st Infantry Division and 2d Armored Division, and has commanded battalions of the Berlin Brigade, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam. At present, General Latham is the Assistant Division Commander of the 3d Infantry Division in Germany.

Washington, D.C.
20 December 1973

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Preface

This is the story of the U.S. Army Infantry Center's participation in Project VOLAR, the field experiment undertaken at selected Army posts between January 1, 1971, and June 30, 1972, to develop, test, evaluate, and refine new concepts and initiatives in support of Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) Program goals of reduced reliance upon the draft, increased professionalism, enhancement of Army life, and the development of a modern personnel accession system.

Unfortunately, the experiment to create an environment conducive to raising a volunteer Army was misunderstood; in the minds of many, the term "VOLAR" conjured up images of undisciplined, unkempt, long-haired soldiers riding motorcycles emblazoned with peace symbols and swilling beer in the barracks. Obviously these images did not mirror the MVA concept, which stresses the maintenance of military order, discipline, and mission capability. Neither did they typify the Infantry Center experience at Fort Benning, where VOLAR became a vehicle for progress, measured in terms of significant improvements in troop morale and discipline and military bearing and appearance and also in terms of high recruiting and re-enlistment goals that were repeatedly exceeded.

The principal elements in the Fort Benning Plan for conducting the VOLAR experiment were improvements in living and working conditions and increased job satisfaction on the part of the individual soldier. An evaluation process that used the services of the Human Resources Research Organization provided continuous monitoring of the actual implementation of the Benning Plan and served as a vital control mechanism. Scientifically conducted objective surveys of troop attitudes and reactions were fundamental in determining whether or not the plan was on target, what was succeeding and what was not, and what the soldiers, NCO's, and officers thought about each part of the program.

The VOLAR experiment brought a number of significant changes to Fort Benning. Over 70 percent of first-term re-enlistees stated that the experiment had influenced them to stay in the Army. The rating of Fort Benning by first-term soldiers as "one of the best Army posts" to which they had ever been assigned increased by 21 percent. Soldiers re-enlisting for their current duty assignments increased from 55.7 percent to 72.2 percent. Absent without leave rates dropped from twenty-five to fourteen per thousand. Furthermore, over 3,100 young men were

recruited by the 197th Infantry Brigade in a sixteen-month period, making this unit the first all-volunteer brigade in the Army.

In the preparation of this account I am deeply indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Faulkender and Captain Daniel F. Smith. My thanks also go to John W. Gause, who has kindly read and commented on these pages.

Washington, D.C.

WILLARD LATHAM
Brigadier General, U.S. Army

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Illustrations are from Department of the Army files. Cartoons are by Charlotte Londot.

THE MODERN VOLUNTEER ARMY PROGRAM: THE BENNING EXPERIMENT, 1970–1972

CHAPTER I

Anticipating the Need

The Volunteer Army program (VOLAR) of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) concept was an experiment to reach the stated national goal of a zero draft. VOLAR and MVA are two acronyms that are surrounded by misconceptions and arouse often-heated pros and cons from service personnel. Some like the concepts; others think they have damaged the military. Many do not agree with a volunteer force at all, while others believe the concepts were either too slow or too fast in appearing.

To gain an understanding of why VOLAR was conceived and how it was applied at Fort Benning, Georgia, certain events and actions of higher headquarters that contributed to the initiation of Project VOLAR must be made known. As early as September 1967 the Army stated in DA Pamphlet 600–12 that its goal was "to rely on volunteers to meet the Army's needs insofar as possible . . ." and "to induce high caliber personnel, in sufficient numbers to voluntarily pursue the military profession as a career. . . ." In the context of the times, the statement was idealistic and unrealistic; but the thought was there and it would not die out. Although movement was initially slow, the goal had been set.

Project Volunteer

Slightly over one year later, on 15 November 1968, the Defense Department inaugurated a study to develop "a comprehensive and balanced program designed to meet anticipated future quantitative and qualitative military manpower requirements, to the greatest extent possible, without reliance upon induction." The Assistant Secretary of Defense directed that particular emphasis be placed on policies and programs that were concerned with the procurement of initial volunteers; and that personnel management practices and procedures and military working conditions be reviewed "to identify those factors which may adversely affect recruitment and retention, and which are capable of management improvement without adverse impact on military effectiveness." Retention of personnel was already receiving close attention by a number of other studies at the time. The policies and programs devised by the study group were to consider both the qualitative and

the quantitative aspects of procurement and the cost of each proposed action.

The study, known as Project Volunteer, was predicated upon the assumptions that proposed programs would go into effect after a Vietnam wind-down, that the Selective Service System would be retained but not used, and that policies and programs developed would not be limited by existing statutory authorities. It recognized that no single incentive or approach would accomplish the objective of sharply reducing reliance upon the draft, but that any successful plan would necessarily include a wide range of policy and program improvements. These improvements and innovations would affect each of the five areas of personnel management: procurement, distribution, training and education, sustainment, and separation. Areas covered in the Project Volunteer Study included recruiting service operations, recruitment options and incentives, military compensation, improvement in other service benefits and living conditions, and programs to improve morale and job satisfaction. The VOLAR concept for personnel retention evolved primarily within the programs to improve morale and job satisfaction.

Project PROVIDE

Shortly after his inauguration in January 1969, President Richard M. Nixon requested Department of Defense action on an all-volunteer armed force. The President also formed the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (Gates Commission) to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating the draft.

A direct outgrowth from both Project Volunteer and the President's all-volunteer armed forces initiatives was the Army's Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (PROVIDE) study, initiated on 17 March 1969. The purpose of the study was to "determine how the Army can meet its manpower requirements under alternate force levels and conditions short of total war by means of an all-volunteer Army." Study topics included personnel management, quality, quantity, cost, and socio-economic implications. Presumably, any plan of action developed by the study would be implemented when major redeployments from Vietnam started. The PROVIDE study was to assume that there would be a continued threat of limited conflict after Vietnam and that the Selective Service System would be retained but not used except in emergencies. Various levels of assumed unemployment rates were also to be considered.

For any studies on an all-volunteer Army to be valid, the planners had to have an idea of how the American public viewed the Army. Accordingly, in June 1969, an opinion survey on the Army's image was made available to the PROVIDE group. Significantly, the survey occurred before the My Lai incident and several other events that influenced



NIXON-LAIRD CONVERSATION LED TO MVA CONCEPT

public opinion against the Army. In 1969 the over-all attitude toward the armed services was favorable. The general public tended to rate Army service as less attractive than Air Force or Navy service. The study revealed that civilians believed the Army helped develop character, gave "a sense of satisfaction in performing a patriotic duty," and provided a chance to learn a trade for civilian life. As a career, the Army was not highly rated, especially for enlisted personnel, mainly because of low salaries, lack of opportunity, and the war in Vietnam. The survey indicated that better pay and a period of peace were the two main improvements that would make an Army career more attractive in relation to a civilian job. At the time, the Vietnam conflict did not adversely influence the public's opinions of the Army. The survey also reported that the existing draft system was unpopular and that the public preferred either a lottery system or an all-volunteer Army. Not only did the survey support the view that the public wanted an all-volunteer Army, but it stated that such an Army could become a reality, if service life were made more attractive.

Continued high-level interest in attaining an all-volunteer Army was evidenced throughout 1969 by a number of briefings presented by study groups, agencies, and commissions on the status of their projects. In June 1969, Department of Defense officials briefed the Presidential

Commission (Gates Commission) on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. The Army portion of these briefings sought to "present essential information on personnel management in today's environment, as well as highlight some of the problems peculiar to the Army in the context of an all volunteer force." The briefings concerned Army organization, the role of reserve forces, and differences between the Army and other services. The differences stressed were in the areas of manpower requirements, procurement, draftees, officer sources, individual training, distribution, uniformed women, sustainment, and retention.

In August 1969, General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, was briefed on the PROVIDE study. General Westmoreland approved the concept in principle, but cautioned that cost and other related aspects had to be studied in detail. The Army position on supporting an all-volunteer service was approved, as were recommendations that draft apparatus be retained to provide a means of meeting sudden increases in manpower requirements due to emergencies. The transition to the all-volunteer force was envisioned as a three-phase movement. First, programs and policies to reduce reliance upon the draft that required neither additional direct costs nor new legislation would be developed and implemented. The next step would be to initiate policies and programs outside existing budgetary and legislative constraints that were considered essential to rapid advancement toward an all-volunteer Army. The third and final phase would be to re-examine and re-evaluate actions that had not been implemented because of legislative and monetary restrictions, should the first two phases fail to provide the quality and quantity of volunteers required. The PROVIDE study was not immediately released, as General Westmoreland wanted recommendations on reserve forces to be included. At the same time he directed that the Army Staff and appropriate commands examine the study in great detail and develop programs to implement the concepts and aspects in the study. These programs were to remain within the Army's current capability and were to concentrate on improving morale and welfare. The Chief of Staff also stated that the Army should develop a positive public relations image concerning an all-volunteer force.

That the PROVIDE study was getting down to specific details is illustrated by a briefing received by General Westmoreland in October 1969, at which a number of recommended actions that required funds but no legislation were presented. These proposals included increasing the budget of the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) by $33 million, authorizing reserve components $10 million in advertising funds, and civilianizing the mess attendant program, at an estimated cost of $136.7 million. The possible use of civilians to perform KP duty was indicative of the constant expansion of the volunteer Army concept.

These recommended actions were approved as unfunded requirements by General Westmoreland and therefore not immediately implemented.

Two weeks after the briefing General Westmoreland established a task force to plan, co-ordinate, and implement recommendations of the PROVIDE study. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel assumed responsibility for the task group. No completion date was established for Task Group PROVIDE, but it was directed to fulfill its objectives as rapidly as plans were developed and approved.

President Nixon's message to the Congress on 23 April 1970, outlining actions and proposals toward ending the draft, once again reaffirmed his decision to develop an all-volunteer Army. As stated by the President, "the objective of this Administration is to reduce draft calls to zero, subject to the overriding considerations for national security." To further this objective, he stressed the need for pay increases for all ranks, especially for enlisted members with less than two years of service. High priority was also to be given to the development of programs and actions to increase enlistments and retention rates in the services. Service life had to be improved by a combination of pay increases and enhanced benefits; neither could do the job alone. As a first step toward an all-volunteer armed force, President Nixon directed his attention toward draft reform by eliminating most deferments and by proposing a lottery system to select men for service.


Task Group PROVIDE forwarded the first proposals to increase career attractiveness in July 1970. The task group forwarded actions as they were developed, rather than inundating the Department of the Army Staff with a large number at one time. In all, some 228 actions were proposed. The list was compiled from study reports from the Gates Commission and Project Volunteer among others. The proposals concerned such subjects as eliminating reveille, adopting a five-day work and training week, eliminating the requirement to sign in and sign out when on ordinary pass, and contracting with civilian firms to have KP and post-level custodial services performed by civilian labor. The majority of the proposals could be implemented at little or no cost. As improvement actions developed, programs involving policy changes and large amounts of additional funds were proposed. Forty-two of the proposed actions had been implemented by 8 October 1970, and 154 more were being considered. The forty-two accepted proposals were mainly low impact actions that required little or no additional funds and were not concerned with statutory legislative changes. Most dealt with improving USAREC policies, procedures, and practices to increase the effectiveness of procuring volunteers. At this point, few bold changes had been carried out, and few soldiers were aware that actions had been taken, since they did not feel the effects of the changes.

Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army

General Westmoreland, in an address to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) on 13 October 1970, pointed out a number of problems that faced the Army as it moved toward a zero draft. He said that enlistments and re-enlistments had to be doubled or tripled. He noted that the Reserve Components were going to become increasingly important as the active forces decreased in size. Efforts had to be made to increase the number of volunteers in the Army Reserve and National Guard as the prime enlistment motivation, the draft, was removed. General Westmoreland cautioned that how the Army managed the transition to a smaller force would play a large role in attracting future volunteers. If it appeared that the Army was indiscriminately releasing men who had established a professional commitment and ability, the credibility of the Army as a secure career would be greatly weakened. At the same time, he noted, opportunities for advancement had to be maintained to attract and retain young talent. General Westmoreland outlined four areas that required a concerted effort in order to achieve an all-volunteer Army. He charged the officers in positions of high responsibility to generate command emphasis to the task through their own vigor, imagination, and dedication. Second, he pointed out that unnecessary irritants and unattractive features of Army life had to be eliminated, while at the same time professionalism had to be maintained and increased. The third area depended on Congress: the need for money. Funds were needed for pay and housing and for actions to increase service attractiveness. The fourth area concerned the support of the American people, both by opinion and by willingness to pay for the type of Army required. General Westmoreland committed the Army to the achievement of the first two objectives and stated that it would emphasize its educational opportunities and increase the size and quality of its recruiting effort. He concluded by charging officers throughout the Army, at all levels, "with the responsibility of increasing the retention of good people, both by improving the living standards of their men and families and by an intensive effort to capitalize on the many attractive features of Army service."

A little over two weeks later, 28 October 1970, General Westmoreland established the position of Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA) and appointed Lieutenant General George I. Forsythe to fill it. The mission given General Forsythe was to develop and manage the Modern Volunteer Army program. The MVA program was to achieve the following goals:

(1) Establish conditions which contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the Army as a fighting force while concurrently reducing as rapidly as possible prime reliance on the draft as a means for producing forces for the active Army and its reserve components. (2) Raise to the maximum extent



GENERAL WESTMORELAND ADDRESSES AUSA

possible the number and quality of enlistments and reenlistments in both the active Army and the reserve components. (3) Assist in increasing service attractiveness and career motivation for both officer and enlisted personnel. (4) Make provisions for a standby draft law to meet national emergencies.

General Forsythe was given both the authority commensurate to his mission and the direct liaison and communications channels necessary to accomplish his duties. Besides serving as the Special Assistant for the Chief of Staff, General Forsythe acted as the co-ordinator of MVA matters for the Secretary of the Army.

In the three years preceding the inception of VOLAR, extensive studies and exhaustive research had been conducted in attempting to develop programs and actions that would help create an all-volunteer Army. The basic premise that sufficient numbers would volunteer for Army service when the service afforded opportunities equal to or better than civilian life had been developed and accepted at high policy-making levels. The Nixon administration and Congress had responded by increasing military salaries. The Army now had to improve its attractiveness internally.

CHAPTER II

Developing the Requirement

Organizations do not run people. The larger the organization, however, the more difficult becomes the process of self-correction. At some point people must step outside the organization in order to achieve a major change of course. Ad hoc committees, study groups, and special assistants are means for attaining this objectivity. General Forsythe introduced his concept of the four-part Modern Volunteer Army mission at a seminar at Fort Benning on 2 November 1970. He informed post headquarters that Fort Benning was designated as one of three pilot posts to test VOLAR concepts and as such would take actions designed to enhance the attractiveness of Army service. He stated that each of the three posts would develop and implement actions pertinent to its unique mission (in Fort Benning's case, that of a school center). Any measure that might improve the service could be tried at any of the three posts and, if successful, would be employed at other installations.

Proposed actions would be categorized under three types, General Forsythe continued, those that could be carried out within Fort Benning's resources, those requiring additional funds and resources, and those necessitating a change or moratorium of existing regulations. The test period was to start on 1 January 1971 and last six months. Forsythe directed that a plan of action be drawn up by 19 November covering the test period and suggested that seminars be held at Fort Benning with representation from a cross section of post personnel as a means of identifying and developing proposed actions.

The Scene

Major General Orwin C. Talbott, Commanding General, United States Army Infantry Center, initiated a study to develop actions that would move Fort Benning toward a Modern Volunteer Army by improving the attractiveness of the service. In considering possible actions to be taken, the study group followed General Westmoreland's guidance on the volunteer Army. "Nothing is considered sacrosanct except when military order and discipline—the soul of the Army that insures success on the battlefield—are jeopardized." The planners could thus undertake their work without being inhibited by tradition or existing regulations




GENERAL FORSYTHE VISITS FORT BENNING

and procedures, and could scrutinize every facet of Army life to determine its relationship to the new concepts.

Based on General Forsythe's guidelines, the development of the Benning Plan proceeded under the assumption that $5 million would be provided in additional funds during the six-month test period and that additional military personnel and equipment would be available to support key actions. Fort Benning would also be authorized to modify or suspend Department of the Army policies and regulations not required by law which were felt to be unduly restrictive.

At this time Fort Benning was facing many of the same problems being encountered by other stateside posts, such as absences without leave (AWOL), racial disturbances, and violations of law and order. A prime example of a unit with these problems was the 197th Infantry Brigade.

The primary mission of the 197th was to support the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC), which included the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS). At the beginning of 1970, the typical soldier from the 197th was a sullen, unenthusiastic, and unhappy individual. Morale and esprit de corps were low, absences without official leave were excessive (over forty men per thousand), and there was a strong undercurrent of racial tension. Military discipline, as indicated by personal appearance, courtesy,



and response to orders, was unsatisfactory. Dissident groups were gaining popularity.

The causes of the conditions found among the troops were manifold. Ninety percent of the brigade's soldiers had recently returned from Vietnam; the great majority of them were "short-timers" having less than six months left in their Army careers. Many felt that they had done their part by going to Vietnam and looked on their present garrison duty and life as unimportant and a great waste of time. Because of the high percentage of short-timers, personnel turbulence aggravated unit integrity. Unit integrity was often destroyed by the constant personnel changes in the 197th; the ultimate effect in many cases was that squad leaders did not know the names of their men and vice versa. The nature of much of the short-timer's work also influenced his feelings about the brigade and his mission. As a member of a troop unit, he spent over eighty hours a week doing work that was often considered degrading, such as policing trash along the roads, opening ammunition boxes for officer candidates, and raking gravel around bleacher sites. Too often the soldier was required to be in position or ready to work several hours before his actual task started.

Many of these conditions had been improved over the course of the year through a vigorous course of action that included emphasis on leadership, physical fitness, athletics, social and spiritual activities, and image improvement, but the basic causes were still present in early November 1970 when the SAMVA mission came to Fort Benning. To many, the Army was often viewed as an unnecessarily restrictive, irritating organization that seemed to exist to make life miserable for the individual. This attitude was shared by young enlisted soldiers in every unit at Fort Benning, as well as by a large percentage of company grade officers. Not only was retention of these soldiers growing increasingly difficult, but under such conditions, inducing sufficient numbers of high-quality volunteers would be hard. This, then, was the situation at Fort Benning in

November 1970 when the mission to conduct the VOLAR experiment was received.

Control and Evaluation

On 3 November 1970, Colonel William B. Steele, Director, Leadership Department, was appointed as the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS) project officer for the Volunteer Army program study. That afternoon Colonel Steele briefed personnel selected as members of the planning group staff and study group leaders. The members listened to a tape recording of General Forsythe's seminar and discussed brainstorming techniques. Study groups of approximately six men each were established to represent all categories of personnel assigned to USAIS, including faculty and staff, Noncommissioned Officer Course students, and students in the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. The study groups began work on 4 November under the direction of study group leaders. The groups were assigned specific areas of interest but were not restricted to them.

The next day, in close co-ordination with and at the recommendation of the assistant commandant, Brigadier General John T. Carley, Jr., the USAIS project was assimilated into the larger USAIC program. General Talbott detailed Colonel Steele as the chairman of the Benning Plan Study Group with the responsibility of preparing the plan for the entire Fort Benning installation. The plan would "assure maximum support of the Army's effort to obtain a modern volunteer Army." Colonel Steele and the study group were charged with soliciting ideas from all segments of the Fort Benning population, selecting the feasible and useful ideas, and organizing them into projects to be accomplished. All ideas were to be categorized according to whether or not they could be accomplished without outside assistance. Actions and projects that required financial support were to be determined and approximate costs estimated. Finally, schedules of actions and realistic completion dates were to be established. In addition to the previously organized USAIS study group, the study efforts of other Fort Benning major commands and activities were consolidated under Colonel Steele's direction.

The Benning Plan Study Group consisted of a headquarters, twelve substudy groups, and six committees. (*Chart 1*) The substudy groups contained two groups from the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) and one each from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC), the Noncommissioned Officer Course, the USAIS staff and faculty, the 197th Infantry Brigade, the Headquarters Command, the Aviation Command, the Medical and Dental Command, the 931st Engineer Group, enlisted men's wives, and officers' wives. The six committees dealt with analysis and research, costing, evaluation, writing, the control plan, and the evaluation plan. Each substudy group was assigned areas of respon-




GENERAL TALBOTT GATHERS IDEAS FROM ALL LEVELS OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

sibility (for example, the IOBC groups dealt with treatment of officers and services and conveniences), but were not restricted solely to these areas.

Proposed actions derived from three sources: study groups, suggestions contributed by individuals, and ideas contained in various documents. These documents included memorandums given to General Forsythe by the senior Fort Benning representatives during the seminar reports of the Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities to the Chiefs of Staff Forum, a Franklin Institute Study on junior officer retention, and 300 suggested actions from the Department of the Army.

The analysis and research committee received the proposals, initiated appropriate staffing, identified regulations applicable to each proposed action, and determined if any changes of pertinent regulations were required. Actions which required funding were then forwarded to the costing committee, while all others went directly to the evaluation committee. The costing committee determined estimated dollar costs of proposed actions, including civilian personnel costs and military personnel requirements. The committee also prepared detailed funding justification. The evaluation committee, composed of highly skilled representatives from the evaluation division of USAIS, the Human Resources Research

CHART 1—BENNING PLAN STUDY GROUP



Organization, and the Infantry Human Research Unit and the education adviser from USAIS, received proposed actions from the analysis and research and the costing committees and determined the feasibility and applicability of the actions. Only the head of the study group could reject any proposed action.

The writing committee edited all proposed actions and also had the task of writing the actual Benning Plan. The control plan and evaluation plan committees were not initially concerned with the proposed actions, but developed plans for supervision and evaluation of the actions during the implementation phase of the Benning Plan.

Key figures in the study group which formed the Benning Plan were Colonel Steele; Lieutenant Colonels Leon R. Livingston, Donald J. Shannon, Wilbur J. Thiel, Arnold E. Tyndall, George E. Chapin, Jr., Jim I. Hunt, Thomas P. Hensler, Louis A. Harris, and Chester I. Christie; and Majors Bohdan A. Barylak, Kenneth Kaplan, James Howe, Robert T. Ariyoshi, Gordon M. Hunt, William T. Cargo, Horace M. Smith, James I. O'Brien, Donald R. Kelsey, Robert M. Herrick, Donald R. West, Robert E. Ward, III, and John T. Bowden.

Target Areas

The substudy groups considered over three hundred possible actions. The informal, small group organization proved to be highly successful in creating an atmosphere conducive to the free and uninhibited exchange of ideas. Even though the attitude prevailed that all feasible ideas and

suggestions were acceptable, members of the groups were aware that suggestions had to be within the guidelines of maintaining a professional, military organization. A total of 253 proposals were forwarded to the evaluation committee, the majority of which were concerned with eliminating irritants of service life that impinged on the dignity, personal freedom, and well-being of the individual. All study groups had a feeling of urgency about the volunteer Army program in that they felt that improvements could not wait for further study but needed immediate implementation. Each proposal was evaluated to see if it met the criteria established by the evaluation committee. To be accepted, a proposed action had to be feasible for implementation at Fort Benning and also had to enhance the volunteer Army program in a definite manner.

During the initial stages of the development of the Benning Plan, a philosophy toward the volunteer Army emerged that prevailed throughout the experiment. The planners expressed this philosophy by attempting to focus on human needs and by classifying these needs in five categories to facilitate identification, qualification, analyses, and subsequent evaluation. These categories were physiological and human maintenance, stability and security, human relations in organization and family life, self-esteem, and advancement and challenge. By implementing actions that enhanced these categories, the Army would increase its attractiveness.

Under the category of physiological and human maintenance were such basic human needs as food, clothing, and shelter. These were translated into specific actions in the Benning Plan, such as improvements in billeting arrangements and messing facilities. The category of stability and security included job security, organizational management, and the elimination of irritants such as menial tasks not related to the job. The matter of human relations in organization and family life had to do with such factors as the quality of associates, privacy, job opportunity, and family involvement. Self-esteem pertained to human dignity, individual identity, and job esteem. The final category of advancement and challenge dealt with such factors as participation in goal-setting, work methodology, and education and training. Within these categories, 146 proposed actions were suggested which made up the original Benning Plan. (*See Appendix A.*)

The final proposed actions were rearranged in four groupings according to cost and regulatory limitations. Forty-three actions supporting the VOLAR concept and already being implemented were in the first group. They were no- or low-cost actions which had been determined as fulfilling the VOLAR philosophy and were or could be implemented at General Talbott's direction. While the majority did not require approval by higher headquarters, the few actions that did need Army regulation exceptions were undertaken and carried on as far as possible pending final approval.

The second group consisted of forty-nine actions which were being

considered for immediate implementation. Many of these proposals required Army regulation changes. Like the actions which had already been started, they did not require additional funds. The proposed actions included elimination of the need to use the Armed Forces Liberty Pass for overnight passes during a normal duty week, elimination of bed check, and elimination of sign-in and sign-out requirements at company level.

The third group included actions which the study group felt required further consideration because of the need for additional personnel or relief from restrictions imposed by regulation or both. The twenty-three actions in this group covered such items as beer in the barracks, use of bank-type credit cards in the post exchange (PX) and commissary, and expansion of PX inventories to include major appliances, furniture, and a full range of sporting goods.

The final group consisted of thirty actions that could not be financed within Fort Benning's current money allocations. Most of these were considered "high impact" projects, or actions that would affect the soldier in a direct and noticeable way. They included free quarters-cleaning service for departing families, civilian KP in unit messes, civilian labor to perform menial work details, and dental care for military dependents.

A standard format was used for each group. Every proposed action was assigned a number for reference and designated to a specified unit or agency for implementation. A rationale for each action was included along with the suspense date and remarks, when applicable. All funded actions were further broken down by item and explained in detail including the problem area addressed by each specific item. This procedure later proved most useful in evaluating the Benning Plan, when the actions were implemented and conditions improved. In addition to detailing the problems, each funded action was justified in terms of the expected results. Finally, each funded action was given a consolidated cost summary estimate and personnel requirement estimate. The cost summary was broken down by the funding authority (for example, Operations and Maintenance, Army [OMA], and Military Construction, Army [MCA] and by requirement (such as personnel, equipment, and facilities). This detail was necessary to present a solid argument to approving headquarters, besides giving them the necessary data on which to base their decisions. In the relationship among human needs, costs, and objective areas for improvement, each action was designed to meet some need, directed at a target area, and grouped by fund requirements. (*Chart 2*)

The Measure of Success

The Benning Plan Study Group developed control measures that were used to monitor the implementation and execution of the plan. To


CHART 2—VOLAR ACTION MATRIX

Human Need Categories		Living Conditions	Working Conditions	Job Satisfaction
Psychological and Human Maintenance	1 2 3 4	VOLAR		
Stability and Security	1 2 3 4	Actions		
Human Relations in Organization and Family Life	1 2 3 4	and		
Self-Esteem	1 2 3 4	Items		
Advancement and Challenge	1 2 3 4			

Cost Group

1. No Cost
2. No Cost Policy Change
3. Internal Cost With Approval
4. Additional Funds

CHART 3—MVA CONTROL GROUP ORGANIZATION



facilitate the necessary supervision, the MVA Control Group, consisting of a headquarters, a control element, and an evaluation element, was established and made directly responsible to the commanding general. (*Chart 3*)

The control group headquarters monitored both the implementation of the plan and the evaluation of the results. Besides supervising the control and evaluation elements, the control group headquarters consolidated monthly reports from all commands and briefed the commanding general on the status of actions. The control group also developed and implemented co-ordinated staff liaison visits to the various commands


and agencies to determine firsthand the status of the programs. Finally, the control group headquarters had to prepare and submit the final report on Project VOLAR. The final report would cover the over-all value of each action implemented, specify actions recommended for continuation, and enumerate actions recommended to the Department of the Army for implementation at other installations. New actions recommended for implementation would also be included. Furthermore, the final report was to estimate funding requirements to support the program during fiscal year 1972.

The study group, in addition to spelling out the organization of the MVA Control Group, established procedures to be followed by all units and activities involved in the Benning Plan. Each commander or staff director was to review the plan to determine which proposed actions were his responsibility, and develop a detailed step-by-step plan for implementing each action. Actions judged to be counterproductive were to be identified and reported. After the plans of the units and activities were approved, a monthly status report would be forwarded to the MVA Control Group. Major commands and activities were required to appoint a quality control officer to monitor the execution of the actions at the unit level and to serve as the unit or activity point of contact for the control group.

The study group further established that any changes to actions included in the plan could not be made without the specific approval of the commanding general. Any request for changes or modifications were to be fully justified and submitted to him through the MVA Control Group. The control group was also permitted direct co-ordination with quality control officers and was authorized to make unannounced staff visits to all levels of command. However, no reports could be rendered until the quality control officer concerned was informed of the findings of such visits.

The evaluation plan committee of the Benning Plan Study Group developed procedures to determine whether the actions taken under the Benning Plan influenced attitudes toward Army life, career intentions, or images of the Army. These three areas could be affected by local events at Fort Benning which directly resulted from implementation of the Benning Plan; by local events at Fort Benning which were independent of the plan; and by events outside Fort Benning which were Army-wide, nationwide, or worldwide. The effect could be visualized as a series of concentric circles or spheres of influence. (*Chart 4*) Individual career intentions and the image of the Army could be influenced by the results of each separate action implemented during the Benning Plan, but as actions were taken simultaneously, the noticeable or measurable change in attitudes could be the cumulative effect of all actions. To determine ac-

CHART 4—CAREER INTENTIONS AS MEASURE OF EFFECT OF BENNING PLAN



curately how much each separate action influenced attitude shifts was not feasible. A small number of major areas were therefore to be the main focus of evaluation. Whether the combination of actions included under one area had any effect on career intentions and attitudes toward the Army and whether one area had a greater impact than another area would be stated in terms of informed human judgment. This judgment would represent a concensus among the members of the MVA Control Group and would be supported, where possible, by data produced by the evaluation procedures described below.

Evaluation Techniques

Five evaluation techniques were developed by the evaluation planning committee, for use by the evaluation element of the MVA Control Group throughout the implementation of the Benning Plan. These were questionnaire surveys, statistical trends, interviews, special activities, and the Benning Plan after action report.

The questionnaire survey was a paper-and-pencil form using multiple-choice, rating-scale, and open-end-item formats. Personnel data was obtained in order to describe the individual in terms of background and current status in the military. The individual's career intentions and general attitude toward the Army were measured. Finally, the survey determined the degree of attention given each of the major areas by the Benning Plan actions. The baseline survey was in effect a control against which all future surveys could be compared. The same survey was administered at Fort Knox, which was used initially as a comparison post. A total of some 3,500 questionnaires was administered for the baseline survey, 2,600 at Fort Benning and 900 at Fort Knox. The questionnaire was administered anonymously under group testing conditions, following a brief orientation on the questionnaire's purpose and the importance of honest and thoughtful responses. Automatic data processing (ADP) procedures were employed to obtain raw frequencies of responses to separate items, percentages, and average ratings for single items and for selected groups of items. In addition selected chi-square analyses were performed. (A chi square is the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing the square of the difference between the observed and theoretical values of a quantity by the theoretical value.) Stratified sampling techniques were used on the Fort Benning and Fort Knox population based on grade and duty assignment.

The questionnaire survey established the percentages of personnel who planned to leave the Army, those who were undecided, and those who planned to stay in the Army. (*Chart 5*) The survey also determined the percentages of those who generally were favorable toward the Army, those who were generally unfavorable, and those who were mixed in their attitudes toward the Army. The questionnaire was also designed to measure the satisfaction, irritation, or indifference toward each of the five human-need categories. Individuals responded with their views of how Army life met each category. The questionnaire survey was administered at later times during the test period to a total of some 10,000 Fort Benning servicemen and some 3,000 Fort Knox servicemen, thereby providing a comparison showing the effectiveness of the experiment.

Statistical trends provided a basis for comparison with questionnaires and interviews. Selected data already available within the installation managerial system were identified. The data included such discipline and

CHART 5—EXPRESSED CAREER INTENTIONS (BASELINE)

Group	Date	Responding Percentages				Mean Response
		1[a]	2[b]	3[c]	4[d]	
First-term enlisted	Nov 70	1.4	4.9	12.0	81.6	3.74
First-term officer	Nov 70	7.3	14.3	20.1	58.3	3.29
Extended-term enlisted	Nov 70	71.2	9.6	8.6	10.5	1.58
Extended-term officer	Nov 70	77.9	12.4	4.9	4.7	1.36

Which of the following best describes your Army career intentions?
[a]1. I will remain in the Army until retirement.
[b]2. I will remain in the Army for a while longer, but have not yet decided about staying until retirement.
[c]3. I am undecided about my Army career intentions.
[d]4. I will leave the Army upon completion of current obligation.

Note: The lower the group mean, the more favorable the response. A group mean of 1.00 would indicate that everyone within that group intends to remain in the Army until retirement.

morale factors as AWOL's, accident rates, and courts-martial; re-enlistment rates; junior officer retention rates; and resignations of commissions. These were compiled by the installation comptroller and submitted to the MVA Control Group. In order to establish trends, the data for each discipline and morale indicator available were compiled in order to facilitate comparison over a period of time. In addition to being used as a comparison with other procedures and as a trend indicator, the statistical data also served as a control procedure so that there was an accounting for events that were outside the sphere of influence of the actions being taken at Fort Benning.

The interviews of the evaluation procedure were administered by ten interviewers who were trained both in the necessary interview technique and in the evaluation method. A structured format was followed for each interview, wherein the interviewer presented each question verbatim from the form in a fixed sequence and summarized the responses to each question in writing during the interview.

The interviews generally lasted thirty minutes and were conducted from June 1971 through May 1972. Those interviewed were personnel who were on post during the months when the Benning Plan was in effect. Interviewees were randomly selected according to their social security account numbers and were divided into two primary groups, separatees and re-enlistees. The separatee group consisted of personnel pending discharge one week subsequent to their interview, while the re-enlistee group was composed of personnel who had re-enlisted during

the week immediately preceding the interview. The interviews were to add breadth and depth to the survey results and to serve as orientation material for the judgment evaluations of the impact of the five human-need areas.

Special activities, which included individual recruiting, attempts to impress favorably the attitudes of youth groups, environmental improvements off post, and miscellaneous post-community relations projects, were to be undertaken by units and agencies at Fort Benning. The designated units and agencies employed project managers and action officers to arrange, conduct, and evaluate all the special activities. Evaluation consisted of subjective interviews and special questionnaires. The evaluation element of the MVA Control Group provided assistance in the preparation of the evaluating techniques. The results from the special activity groups were used to ascertain any appreciable change in the expressed attitudes of the respondents toward the Army and were then compared with the other major elements of the evaluation methodology.

The fifth evaluation technique was the after action report developed by the study group. This report was a documented reference point which recorded the scope of activity, the specific methodology and procedures, and the means of refining the data and the concepts of further operations. The after action report also served as a means of historical documentation and as a vehicle for recording the parameters and the rationale of the Benning Plan.

The MVA Control Group placed the results of the evaluative techniques in their proper perspective and reached valid conclusions about the effectiveness of the Benning Plan actions after weighing the available information. The five human-need areas were likewise ranked in terms of their relative impact on the military community.

Initial Changes

The Fort Benning Plan for Movement Toward a Modern Volunteer Army as prepared by the Benning Plan Study Group consisted of five sections. Section I presented general information on the purpose, background, philosophy, and concepts of the plan. Sections II and III listed the 146 proposed actions and enumerated the agencies responsible for implementation and the programed data of implementation. Any pertinent remarks concerning any action were also included. Sections IV and V listed the control and evaluation procedures developed for the Benning Plan, including the control group concept and organization.

The funded portion of the plan was presented to General Talbott and his staff on 12 November 1970 and delivered to General Forsythe's staff on 15 November 1970. A briefing for the Fort Benning staff on the

remainder of the plan was conducted on 14 November 1970. General Talbott then received a final briefing on the nonfunded portion and the evaluation part of the Benning Plan. The complete plan was delivered to General Forsythe by Colonel Steele on 19 November 1970, after it was approved by General Talbott. The following day Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy was appointed chief of the MVA Control Group and given responsibility for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the actions in the Benning Plan.

Comments from Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command (CONARC), on the Benning Plan arrived at Fort Benning on 28 November 1970. CONARC concurred in the concept of the plan but had a number of comments on specific actions, all of which were funded or required additional personnel. Comments on funded actions included warnings on selling scout equipment, as such an activity might infringe on civilian economy and authority. Changes in the funding authority for free laundry service were urged. The advantages of long-term contracts for KP and labor details were noted. In addition, funding requirements and the impact on manpower of the full-time quality control officer in each major unit were mentioned as needing further evaluation. Significantly, CONARC denied an increase in personnel for the following proposed actions: creation of a student affairs division in the Office of the Secretary, USAIS; instruction on enlightened and contemporary leadership problems for all officers and noncommissioned officers; publication of a weekly one-page student news bulletin for officer students; and a manpower increase for the MVA Control Group. CONARC felt that all personnel requirements for these actions could be met within the current manpower assets and staff organization of Fort Benning. Additional data, study, and evaluation were urged on the following proposals: more senior lieutenants as OCS (Officer Candidate School) tactical officers; tactical officers for advanced and basic courses; expanded legal assistance services; more telephones at medical department activity (MEDDAC) appointment desks; and civilians for garbage and refuse collection. A number of other actions were noted as having personnel requirements that could not be determined at the time. These actions included a maintenance program, free quarters-cleaning for departing families, dependent dental care, and the establishment of a welcome center and central processing facility.

In addition to making specific comments on proposed actions, CONARC cautioned against eliminating implemented actions. CONARC pointed out that although routine annoyances might have been accepted at one time, once they were eliminated for testing and evaluation, irritation would be more pronounced if they were reinstated.

CONARC also urged General Forsythe, as Special Assistant for the MVA (SAMVA), to retain the established funding channels for actions requiring nonappropriated funds, even though direct communication between SAMVA and Fort Benning was authorized.

SAMVA and the Benning Plan

On 14 December 1970, SAMVA published a conference memorandum for the record which summarized the results of a working conference on Project VOLAR–71 that was attended by representatives from CONARC, Forts Benning, Carson, and Ord, and the Army Staff. Colonel Steele was Fort Benning's representative. In addition to considering all proposals from each of the three test posts, the committee discussed funding and personnel requirements. Military space problems that could not be resolved at CONARC would be settled by the Department of the Army. Funding was also discussed; at this point the allocation categories were still unclear, but the $5 million figure for Fort Benning remained in effect. The conference was concerned only with actions that required funds or regulatory changes.

Funded actions submitted as part of the Benning Plan that were approved included improved shuttle bus service; extension of commissary hours; extended hours at the quartermaster store; improved lounge areas in company-level dayrooms; contract for civilian KP in unit messes; and purchase of labor-saving devices. No-cost actions that were approved included eliminating the requirement at Fort Benning to wear hats in privately owned vehicles; creating a student affairs division in the Office of the Secretary of USAIS; clarifying regulations on award procedures; eliminating mandatory quotas for the suggestion awards program; eliminating sign-in and sign-out requirements at company levels; removing restrictions on travel during off-duty time; eliminating the requirement to use the Armed Forces Liberty Pass for overnight passes during the normal duty week; conducting a block of instruction on enlightened leadership and contemporary leadership problems for all commissioned and noncommissioned officers; reorganizing the 2d Student Battalion, The School Brigade, to strengthen its supervision of officer students; modifying annual general and command maintenance management inspections to obtain a more realistic measure of unit capability; permitting soldiers to have beer in barracks; changing policy to eliminate the requirement to salute when either one or both persons were riding in a vehicle or when either one or both persons were wearing civilian clothes; publishing weekly one-page student news bulletins for officer students; instituting mandatory counseling at least once during each six-month

period and when efficiency reports were made on junior leaders through grades O–3 and E–6; improving automobile craft shop facilities on post through the addition of adequate automobile testing equipment; eliminating the scheduling of examinations on days following night instruction; providing more "open time" in the Infantry Officer Basic Course and OCS by lengthening courses or by eliminating some instruction not really essential; and increasing the number of telephones at MEDDAC appointment desks.

The following funded items were approved after the staff had considered comments or objections: the hiring of civilians to serve as a detail labor force, to maintain and police roads and grounds, and to collect refuse and garbage. All hiring was to be done by contract instead of on a civil service basis. As for hiring civilians and purchasing necessary equipment to improve preventive maintenance, the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), were to prepare construction guidance for the posts and secure legislative approval where necessary. DCSLOG did not concur in free quarters-cleaning on permanent change of station moves but was outvoted. Implementation, control, and evaluation costs for VOLAR, establishment of a welcoming and processing center, and establishment of a reception booth at the airport were all approved. Conversion of an existing building into a nightclub for E–1's through E–4's was approved as long as it did not involve conversion of existing service club facilities.

A number of funded actions were approved at the SAMVA conference that were eventually eliminated as being low-priority, low-impact items relative to cost. These included construction of a cocktail lounge on the porch of the Officers' Supper Club, construction of a nursery adjacent to the commissary, and free transportation from the Columbus Airport to the base.

One no-cost action that was approved after consideration was the elimination of the requirement that OBV–2 (obligated volunteer) officers purchase the Army blue uniform and that those below the rank of captain wear it at social functions. Approval was only for Fort Benning and specifically for the test period.

The following proposals were approved as modified: the reduction of the work load of table of organization and equipment (TOE) units to enable them to move toward a forty-hour week, and the expansion of services offered by the Legal Assistance Office to include representation in civil courts, review of legal documents, and tax return assistance. The first proposal was modified to read "5-day week" instead of forty-hour week. This change guaranteed two days off as determined by mission requirements. The second proposal was approved with the under-

standing that the Office of the Judge Advocate General would incorporate all three Project VOLAR posts in these legal assistance tests.

The following actions were approved in concept, but implementation was deferred until the necessary statutory or regulatory authorization was obtained: contracting transportation to selected recreation areas; providing partitions in barracks; contracting for local motel facilities; changing AR 210–65 limiting class VI package stores' discount of local prices; expanding PX inventory to include major appliances, furniture, and a full range of sporting goods; authorizing the PX to sell Boy Scout and Girl Scout uniforms and accessories; adding a fabric shop at the PX; and adding nine holes to the special service golf course.

A number of proposed actions were not approved. Free laundry for all enlisted men was turned down on the grounds that this proposal had been made to Congress several times in the past and had always been refused. The use of PX credit card purchases or the use of bank-type credit cards in the PX and commissary was also rejected as congressional disapproval was certain. Congress had recently opposed a similar proposal, because it felt that interest paid by the individual and the service charges paid by the PX and commissary would discount advantages of the PX and commissary system.

The final category of decisions covered proposed actions that were deferred for further study. The proposed rewarding of outstanding soldiers was deferred since the rewards could not be paid by using appropriated funds and more time was needed to determine the availability of non-appropriated funds. The construction of a thirty-unit guest house was likewise deferred as it could not be completed during the test period. Leasing of facilities during the test period was approved however.

The idea of assigning more senior lieutenants as OCS tactical officers was withdrawn by Fort Benning. The ninety-day notification period for personnel involved in a permanent change of station was dropped since it was already an Army Department policy that would be re-emphasized.

A number of proposals were not discussed at the 2 December working conference but were believed to have sufficient merit and to deserve further study. The SAMVA office was to incorporate these actions in its "idea bank" and to act on the most appropriate ones at a later date. These actions included reimbursement for use of privately owned vehicles to meet military transportation requirements; issuance of a multipurpose identification card; organization of a recruiting team for the 197th Infantry Brigade; expanded dental care for dependents; invitation to 1,000 college ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) cadets to tour Fort Benning for one week during the summer; and the authority to provide summer training with pay for 200 high school ROTC cadets and to

provide a summer program for low-income high school youths of the local community.

The Benning Plan was accepted, therefore, virtually in toto by SAMVA and by the Department of the Army. At this point the major hindrance to implementation of the VOLAR actions was obviously going to be the availability of funds. CONARC and the Department of the Army were indeed willing to follow General Westmoreland's guidance, as evidenced by the rapid change of long-standing regulations and traditions, such as the elimination of reveille, of travel restrictions while on pass, and of signing in and signing out at company level. In less than twenty-one days a good plan had been developed; Fort Benning now had to insure its success.


CHAPTER III

Execution

VOLAR did not suddenly appear on the morning of 20 November 1970, the day after the Benning Plan was published. Just as the development of MVA principles and concepts had gradually been determined over a period of time, so the implementation of VOLAR at Fort Benning had vague antecedents and a gradual but steady growth, interspersed with spurts of activity. While a good portion of the Benning Plan was initiated during November and December of 1970, many of the actions had been in effect at Fort Benning for some time. Commanders of various units had previously defined problem areas and had attempted to alleviate them as much as their resources and authority allowed. These innovations had been discussed and evaluated by the study group during the development of the Benning Plan, and many of them were incorporated into the plan in order to make implementation uniform throughout the post. The Infantry School was attempting to improve its image by updating and modernizing equipment and techniques. The 197th Infantry Brigade had already initiated a Totally Involved Leadership Program which supported the VOLAR concept. What happened on 20 November was, in fact, a mobilization of piecemeal efforts and consolidation of various philosophies into a single concept. Now vigorous efforts would be required to surmount the obstacles that still remained.

The greatest barrier was resistance to change. There were many reasons for this resistance, not the least of which were misconceptions about the MVA concept, especially the VOLAR phase. These misconceptions were held by both career soldiers, who thought discipline would become nonexistent, and by first-tour enlistees and draftees, who did not believe VOLAR existed except on paper at higher headquarters. They were sure that it was a temporary measure and that soon the Army would revert to its previous policies. A situation developed, by no means unique to Fort Benning, in which a number of career soldiers were actively "holding the line" against further "damaging" changes and a group of first-tour soldiers were generally apathetic toward VOLAR. Overcoming these attitudes became a monumental task.

Another factor which made the acceptance of VOLAR difficult was the difference of opinion between career and first-tour soldiers over subjects which were actually extremely minor in light of the total problem.



Even length of hair became an exaggerated issue for both sides. This distortion and conflict clouded and disrupted the VOLAR movement, by creating unfavorable publicity and spreading misconceptions. The reactions of the opposing groups were symptomatic of the prevalent feelings among career soldiers that discipline was weakening and among first-tour soldiers that promises were not being kept.

Added to these problems was the over-all apathy. The Fort Benning population was not too excited about anything "Army" during the initial stages of the Benning Plan. Most of the young soldiers had recently returned from Vietnam feeling they had done all that was required of them. They had less than six months remaining in the service and were not too concerned about improvements in a life they would soon be leaving forever.

Overcoming Obstacles

General Talbott recognized these obstacles and involved his major unit commanders in a series of critical first steps designed to gain the attention of every individual, civilian and military. Measures were taken to establish direct, responsive internal lines of communication and at the same time embark on an information program capable of rapid, creditable publicity for VOLAR progress. In swift succession to these steps came realignments of priorities and definite policies on the resources to be used by VOLAR programs.

Communications from the commander at each echelon directly to the soldiers were established simply by implementing the MVA Control Group concept. The Quality Control Organization consisted of the MVA Control Group, headed by Colonel Kennedy, and the quality control offi-

cers of the major units and agencies. Each agency and major command appointed a quality control officer to serve as the main link between the MVA Control Group and the soldiers. Their mission of monitoring the fulfillment of VOLAR actions entailed a multitude of tasks. These officers maintained close and continuous liaison with the MVA Control Group. They were responsible for surveying the soldiers on the effects of the actions and participating in other surveys by the MVA Control Group. The quality control officers often conducted daily visits and interviews. They were a prime source of information for the soldiers concerning VOLAR actions, past, present, and future, and were also available to assist in correcting grievances and problems. The expertise developed while on the job enabled them to settle quickly and effectively many questions concerning VOLAR.

Some commands established an S–5 office to handle the quality control duties. As time went on and other related programs grew out of the VOLAR concept, such as race relations, drug abuse, and unit-of-choice recruiting, they were often incorporated in this office. The 931st Engineer Group even developed an S–6 in response to the need to deal with "people problems."

A close working relationship was maintained throughout the experiment between the postwide MVA Control Group and individual control officers, and the organization was retained in a modified form when the actual VOLAR trial period ended. At that time the control group was reduced to a special staff, but the unit quality control officer continued in the same capacity.

As the MVA Control Group was the eyes and ears of the commanding general in VOLAR matters, the respective quality control officers performed a similar service for each major unit command throughout the post. Contrary to some concern that this system might be a spy network, the Quality Control Organization proved to be an effective technique for dissemination of accurate and timely information up and down the chain of command and came to be strongly supported by all the commanders.

Publicity

From the beginning, planners recognized the vital role played by civilians in the daily operation of an Army installation, and thus realized that they would also have a key role in the success or failure of the plan. Indeed, almost every facet of the plan was concerned in some way with the civilians who worked at Fort Benning and lived in adjacent communities. Civilians were included as members of the original study group and also in the control group. Most of the high-impact funded actions, such as KP and refuse pickup, involved civilians to the extent that significant numbers were offered employment opportunities. Civilians em-

ployed in most of the services at an installation come into daily contact with large numbers of servicemen and their families and, therefore, influence attitudes on the post as a whole. Unco-operative, uncaring service personnel can have a definite debilitating effect on troop morale when such attitudes are encountered on a continuous basis. Because the views of a soldier's wife are often critical in his decision to remain in the Army, the civilian must be helpful and understanding in dealing with dependents. General Westmoreland stated, "Their (DA Civilians) cooperation is absolutely necessary to our success in the (MVA) program." General Talbott emphasized that civilians working at Fort Benning were extremely important to the Benning Plan by personally conducting a series of briefings for all civilian employees in early December 1970. These briefings explained the Modern Volunteer Army concept and the objectives of the plan. His intention was "to have every civilian employee understand VOLAR and identify his own interest with the objectives of the Benning Plan." In addition to making personal appearances, he also distributed television tapes of these briefings which further publicized the MVA program. The effect was gratifying as outstanding general support was apparent from civilian employees throughout the post.

Special emphasis was placed on a continuing information program, to keep military and civilian employees and the public abreast of VOLAR actions. Not only were details of the actions disseminated, but efforts were made to publicize the goals to be achieved by these actions. This information program played an important role in closing credibility gaps that arose when various measures failed to affect everyone simultaneously or affected people differently or simply took some time to complete fully.

Fort Benning's command information program was presented in many different forms. Incoming personnel were immediately made aware of VOLAR upon their arrival at the processing center. In addition to receiving a briefing on the project, they were also presented with a wallet-size introductory VOLAR card that explained the experiment concisely. A postwide VOLAR information program was instituted down to company level. This program specified that VOLAR be the subject of "commander's call" at least once monthly, that units maintain bulletin boards displaying pertinent information on VOLAR, and that the commander make maximum effort to include his noncommissioned officers in support of the VOLAR program. All students of the Infantry School were supplied with progress pamphlets that dealt with the carrying out of various Benning Plan actions. Furthermore, all students in the leadership courses were given detailed briefings on VOLAR so that the spirit and intent of the entire program would be conveyed directly to other Army units throughout the world upon reassignment. A vigorous poster project was also initiated. Colorful, contemporary posters were displayed throughout the post, highlighting VOLAR achievements already accomplished and



INFORMATION PROGRAM PRESENTS FACTS ABOUT VOLAR

advertising the responsibilities of the individual as well as forthcoming changes proposed in the Benning Plan. The weekly post newspaper featured extensive articles and pictures of completed actions under the VOLAR program. In addition, an eye-catching column consisting of a box score of information on the Benning Plan progress was made a regular feature.

Although no formal public information office was set up, General Bruce C. Clarke (retired), during a visit, emphasized the importance of the civilian news media. General Clarke also suggested innovative



VOLAR Is Advertised in a Variety of Ways

and highly effective ways to demonstrate the Army's living and working conditions to the public, such as allowing platoons to operate in or near civilian communities. His expert advice was especially effective in rallying civilian support for the recruiting effort. This effort continued to expand throughout the experiment.

The adjacent civilian communities were informed on the actions being undertaken to attract responsible soldiers. The local newspapers and radio and television stations all displayed the greatest co-operation in informing the public about the VOLAR program. In the first several

months of the experiment, more than two hours of television time and seven hours of radio time were devoted to VOLAR, directed at both the public and the soldier. Additionally, articles appeared almost daily in the local newspapers. National attention was focused on the Benning Plan by both *Army Magazine* and *Army Times*.

In the area of community relations, efforts were made to improve the life of the soldier in the community and to promote harmonious living between the local citizen and the soldier in order to achieve a better community. In addition to the public information which reached the local citizens through the mass media, Fort Benning leaders actively sought speaking engagements in order to explain the Modern Volunteer Army concepts and the specifics of the Benning Plan to the public and to informed opinion leaders. These engagements took place at various chambers of commerce and at many civic and service clubs, such as the YMCA, Rotary, and Lions.

In addition to information programs designed to educate all post personnel on the factual aspects of the MVA project and the Benning Plan, a seven-hour block of instruction entitled "Enlightened Leadership" was developed. All permanent party personnel in the grade of E–5 and above received the course, which was also incorporated into the leadership programs that were given to all Infantry School students. The enlightened leadership course did not present new material but reviewed proven tenets of leadership and re-emphasized their importance in the movement toward a Modern Volunteer Army.


Another means of advertising VOLAR actions was the construction of 3′ x 5′ blue and white VOLAR project signs. These signs identified various projects under construction and gave the title of the project and the estimated completion date. They served as constant reminders to the soldier that positive and tangible efforts were being made for his benefit. Whatever means were used to inform the military and civilian communities, the best publicity came from satisfied soldiers. The advertising about accomplishments had to be truthful, and care was taken not to exaggerate the effects of future actions.

Personal Development

Although the thrust of command emphasis and publicity was made initially toward improving working conditions, certain immediate policy changes were required to insure that work priorities were promoting job satisfaction. Credibility gaps in this area would, in the final analysis, undermine all the accomplishments in the areas of living and working conditions, especially if the individual believed that his work was boring, at best, or useless, at worst. Learning how to do a job, unlearning counterproductive social attitudes, and being committed to the exercise of

new skills had to be as real an objective as police calls, maintenance, and ammo details. The approach to job satisfaction was to teach soldiers the skills and attitudes necessary for professional performance and to provide a regular opportunity to apply them. Therefore, the commanders had to be sure that training and educational programs were operating fully and were receiving an appropriate share of manpower participating in them. One particular management policy in the 197th Infantry Brigade, known at the time as the 20–20–60 concept, had perhaps the greatest impact on preventing imbalance in the distribution of manpower. Simply stated, the policy required that in a given work period 20 percent of the available work force would always be engaged in some form of training or education, for example, race or drug seminars, field exercises, and military occupational speciality applications. Billet or equipment maintenance would receive 20 percent of the available manpower for the same period, and the remaining 60 percent would be committed to mission requirements of the moment. This innovative policy was used primarily by the 197th Infantry Brigade; however, it affected the entire post. The school and center could no longer cause the overutilization of the 6,000 men in the brigade. Job satisfaction, which came rather easily to the school and center agencies, had now been introduced to the support elements. Even more important, however, this policy emphasized to every level of command that priorities were not a simple matter of first projects first, but a matter of all projects functioning according to weighted effort. The concept of 20–20–60 had established the weight. Within the brigade, training programs took on new importance. Education seminars on drug abuse and race relations became viable programs. Unproductive social attitudes could be exposed and treated continually in a way that no longer was competing with the day-to-day demand of heavy support commitments. With the proper management of resources, the whole man could now receive serious attention.

One program that had been in use at Fort Benning some time before the Benning Plan was the concept of "adventure training." Even though it had not been considered in the plan, adventure training supported the VOLAR concept in a number of ways. It supported the Benning Plan philosophy by providing challenge, appealed to the type of soldier the Army wanted to recruit and retain, and improved morale and unit integrity among small units who participated in the training. As envisioned in the 197th Brigade, adventure training periodically removed the soldier from the humdrum monotony of repetitive, unexciting tasks which afforded slight chance for job satisfaction. By providing training that was different, exciting, demanding, and potentially dangerous, the soldier had the opportunity to do something new and challenging. The soldier had fun, his knowledge and military proficiency were increased,



ADVENTURE TRAINING SUPPORTS VOLAR CONCEPT

and his morale improved. By emphasizing small unit adventure training projects, teamwork and camaraderie were developed.

Adventure training had been initiated in 1970 by the 197th Brigade and had proven useful in alleviating some of the many attitude problems at the time. With the advent of VOLAR, the concept gained fresh impetus and spread to other major units on post. The training was as good as the commander's imagination and ranged from a week-long platoon float trip down the Chattahoochee River to an exercise in which mortar men worked with artillery. In addition to reaping immediate



BENNING PLAN DIRECTS ATTENTION TO DRUG PROBLEM

benefits from the commanders, it became a very salable feature in the VOLAR experiment and helped attract new recruits.

Another program furthering total involvement developed around the drug abuse program. The original Benning Plan proposed a program for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug users, based on the rationale that assistance with drug problems could encourage the retention of soldiers who wanted help and, when cured, would be productive members of the military community. As a result of this idea, existing efforts in drug rehabilitation were expanded. The "Benning House," as the program was named, further expanded in scope to include alcohol abuse.



BENNING HOUSE PROVIDES GROUP THERAPY

The Benning House was based on the well-known "half-way house" concept, whereby personnel undergoing treatment continued at their jobs and received professional treatment and counseling after work and at other specially scheduled times. Persons requiring intensive help remained at the Benning House overnight. When VOLAR funds became available, three buildings were converted from two-story, 32-man sleeping barracks into necessary treatment facilities. The modifications provided for a total of twenty-four two-man sleeping cubicles on the second floor and twelve soundproof therapy units on the first floor.

Besides returning soldiers to useful jobs, the Benning House progam added credibility to the concept of developing and caring for the "whole man." The program affected the entire military structure by concerning itself not only with drug users but with alcohol abusers, who tended to be older and were often career soldiers. In this particular area, the Army was well ahead of private industry in helping personnel who suffered from these problems.

Continuing in the area of social involvement, extensive thought and time had already been put into the development of a comprehensive race relations program. The Benning Plan neutralized a major obstacle to the program in that manpower could now be committed to the program without competing with troop labor needs. Seminars, which were the prime vehicle of the race relations program, could now be regularly filled. However, the seminar was only one facet of a four-point program which began with the orientation of all new arrivals at Fort Benning.



SEMINARS SUPPORT RACE RELATIONS PROGRAM

The orientation eplicitly outlined command support of equal opportunity policies and emphatically established that discrimination against any minority group would not be tolerated. Points two and three of the program were education and indoctrination, with seminars as the main instrument for presenting new material, such as black studies and case studies. The seminar also presented a forum for exposing human attitudes as well as real or imagined grievances. The fourth point was the rehabilitation of individuals who became ineffective due to attitudes incompatible with the program. Rehabilitation consisted of firm counseling, occasional job reassignment, and disciplinary measures if appropriate. A Race Relations Co-ordinating Group monitored unit programs and taught moderators how to manage seminars, which were run twice monthly in companies, at least monthly in battalions, and quarterly in brigades. The co-ordinating group was organized and functioned in a manner similar to the MVA Control Group.

The race relations program, like adventure training and drug abuse, was not an explicit part of the Benning Plan, but as the plan began to affect every part of the soldiers' lives, they, through co-ordination with VOLAR programs, became in the minds of all a part of the MVA concept.


197th Infantry Brigade

Implementing the Benning Plan was a continuous process in which a number of actions were taking place concurrently, with each action in a varying state of completion. In order to provide an accurate and understandable account of what occurred during the first months of 1971 when six major commands were each trying to put over one hundred projects into effect, representative actions and units have been selected to illustrate the entire process. While factors such as type of unit or agency, mission, and personalities all played a role, each unit generally went through the same basic problems and trials and errors as the other unit with much the same success. The 197th Infantry Brigade served as an excellent example of a unit in which VOLAR benefits were implemented primarily for the young single enlisted soldier and the young officer.

The first actions to be carried out generally were concerned with removing irritants and easing regulatory policies that did not involve additional costs. USAIC Circular 600–67, 4 December 1970, was the primary document in the initial weeks of Project VOLAR. The effects of this circular were felt immediately throughout Fort Benning. The soldier's military life was further improved throughout the month of December as additional directives and policy changes were received.

By the beginning of the new year the typical soldier every morning could look forward to a day that was considerably changed from a month before. From the time he arose to the time he retired in the evening, every facet of his life was affected by the Benning Plan. He no longer had to stand reveille but just had to be present at the later work call. Soldiers who were off-duty on that day were not awakened for the morning cleanup, but were allowed to sleep. The married soldier who lived off post spent less time traveling to work because of the improvements in the traffic flow. While in his often low-roofed automobile, he did not have to wear his hat; he was thus spared the possibility of receiving a reprimand and allowed to drive in greater comfort and often with increased visibility. Simply being treated as a responsible adult created more free time for the soldier who met that responsibility.

Even though there was no change in the 197th Brigade's primary missions, the soldier's job conditions were markedly improved during December 1970. He could look forward to a five-day week; even though he might still have to work long and hard hours, he was assured of getting time off periodically. Furthermore, compensatory time was given for those soldiers who were required to work on weekends or on holidays. When it did not interfere with his mission, the soldier could wear civilian clothes while performing duty on Saturdays. A soldier who worked out-of-doors found that he was no longer arriving hours before the start of



a detail and then standing around. Elimination of wasted time cut down on his over-all hourly workweek and helped him feel his time was better spent. These actions required more planning and greater co-ordination in order to maintain effectiveness. The problem was to accomplish all assigned tasks and still maintain the five-day week. The 20–20–60 concept was a major factor in this respect and the workweek developed into a five-day average over a monthly period. When the soldier understood the problems involved, he willingly worked seven or eight days in succession knowing he would receive compensatory time as soon as possible.

The soldier also found changes in uniform policies. He was no longer required to have all badges and awards on his fatigues or field jacket. Even though only the name tape, the U.S. Army tape, rank, insignia, and present unit patch were required, most soldiers continued to wear all authorized patches and badges. They were proud of their accomplishments and wanted to display them. There was no loss of discipline, and work efficiency increased. A clerk-typist found that he no longer had to type and retype correspondence now that legible and neat pen-and-ink changes were acceptable. This change was especially helpful at company and battalion level where competent typists are always at a premium.

When the 197th soldier went to the mess hall for his noon meal, he was able to buy 3.2 beer with his meals and obtain free soda. No problems arose with beer drinking. In the two years of allowing beer in the mess hall and barracks, not one instance of misuse was reported at Fort Benning. However, contracting companies eventually removed most of the beer vending machines from the mess halls because they were losing money. The soldier preferred a soft drink with his meal; when




MVA Mess Hall Accommodates the Soldier

he drank beer, it was a casual affair with a group or in his room and usually purchased from the dayroom vending machines. Longer mess hours were available to the soldier on weekends and holidays, allowing him to do with his free time as he wished and at the same time to save money. Instead of sleeping late on Sunday and then having to buy breakfast at a snack bar, he could sleep late and eat in the mess hall.

After duty hours the soldier noticed the largest number of changes. He no longer had to sign in and sign out at the company for overnight, weekend, or three-day passes. He no longer had to have an Armed Forces Liberty Pass for overnight passes during a normal workweek. Additionally, he was no longer bound by travel restrictions. The maps with circles denoting travel limitations were removed from bulletin boards and the responsibility placed upon the individual soldier for returning on time. The policy of conducting the nightly bed check was eliminated, except when a soldier was undergoing punishment. The Army was in effect telling the soldier that after doing a day's work, his time was free without qualifications. For the soldier who had visitors and no place to put them up overnight, the guest house was available. Information on free military airlift command flights was widely disseminated as an additional service to the soldier.

Mechanical Problems

January 1971 saw a continuation of efforts to initiate VOLAR activities, including some very high cost projects. These were much more




CIVILIAN KP REDUCES SOLDIERS' MENIAL CHORES

complicated than the no-cost projects in December, often for the simple reason that they could not be accomplished overnight and that the results were not shared simultaneously by the soldiers. However, during January 1971 the typical soldier did see his life further improved by the VOLAR experiment.

The highest impact item was elimination of kitchen police (KP) duties. To the young soldier this improvement was the most important VOLAR action. Turning duties over to civilians was closely followed by securing a civilian labor force to perform work details that did not relate to soldier missions. Civilians were hired and equipment purchased for maintaining and policing roads and grounds, including collecting garbage and refuse throughout the post.

The benefits to the average soldier from these innovations were numerous and sometimes complex. He no longer believed that much of his time was spent doing tasks he considered demeaning without contributing toward mission accomplishment. His morale improved and the Army gained valuable selling points for recruiting. By freeing soldiers from menial tasks, more man-hours of mission support and training were obtained. Not only were more men available to fulfill commitments, thus lessening the work load for all, but the soldiers were better trained and motivated while performing their jobs.



SEMIPRIVATE ROOMS APPROACH COLLEGE LIVING CONDITIONS

A number of improvements were also made in the soldiers' living conditions, as a better preventive maintenance program for troop billets got under way. Troop barracks were partitioned into smaller semiprivate rooms; and furniture for these rooms, such as scatter rugs, lamps, and refinished desks and chairs, were procured. In addition, soldiers were granted permission, on an individual basis, to purchase small items of furniture and then to decorate their individual living areas according to their own tastes. This practice allowed the soldier to live more in the life-style of his contemporaries in college or in civilian jobs.

Unforeseen problems did arise from the partitioning of rooms. Issuing keys was vital and took much planning and co-ordination. Moving soldiers from platoon to platoon or causing them to switch rooms could rapidly destroy any decorating incentive, which they then saw as wasted effort. Security of valuables such as TV's, radios, and stereos was another problem. All of these difficulties had to be worked out by unit commanders and they illustrated the complexity of what on the surface appeared to be a simple action.

The 931st Engineer Group was responsible for the actual construction of all temporary partitions. In spite of myriad problems, such as funding, requisitioning materials, and developing specifications, the Engineers completed the project with skill and enthusiasm.

Most of these projects took time to complete since many involved hiring hundreds of additional personnel for low-salary, low-skill jobs and

completing expensive contract agreements. Moreover, when construction was involved, such as in the barracks partitions, months passed before it was completed. Delays in such visible actions tended to cause doubts among the men, notwithstanding the information program and command emphasis.

Change Is Progress


Up to this point the effect of VOLAR on the young single enlisted soldier who lived in the barracks has been emphasized. The married soldier was likewise the benefactor of these actions as there were numerous projects that affected his life-style by affecting his dependents. All dependents benefited from VOLAR, but special attention here was given to the dependents of a major target group, the young first-termers, in an effort to induce more of them to remain in the Army.

Great emphasis was placed on the Army community services (ACS) program. The ACS program started conducting orientations for all incoming student classes. Army wives were actively recruited to serve as ACS volunteers and more staff and facilities were supplied by the Infantry Center. The Army Emergency Relief (AER) area was made more pleasant and the processing of AER loans was greatly expedited. Wives' organizations received formal orientations, and each wives' group appointed liaison representatives with the ACS.

Soldiers and their dependents found the post commissary and the PX more pleasant and convenient. All civilian employees whose work brought them in contact with the military community attended customer relations courses. The Civilian Personnel Division integrated a two-hour block of instruction on customer relations into the quarterly Basic Supervisor's Course and the Middle Managers Course. Enlisted men were no longer referred to as "EM's," but were addressed as "soldiers." The longstanding policy of priority checkout lines for persons in uniform was retained and expanded. Newcomers to Fort Benning received an information packet that provided them with the locations and hours of operation of each service-oriented facility on post. In order to insure that service facilities were abiding by the new changes, a part-time quality control group conducted unannounced visits at least twice a month.

For the soldier unable to get to the PX during the day, the closing time was extended to 2100 hours once a week. The married soldier especially appreciated this action, because he now had a chance to go shopping with his family. In late January 1971, a fabric shop and sewing center addition to the PX was opened. Congressional approval to sell material by the yard or bolt was well received by the wives.

Commissary hours, however, were not extended until later because of funding complications involved in salaries for additional personnel. The need for the extension was recognized, however, and to explain why only the PX hours were lengthened was difficult. Credibility suffered slightly



PX Hours Are Extended



Fabric Shop Provides New Service



PX Keeps Pace With Life-Styles

from this lag, which pointed up the problems that arose when anticipated improvements were delayed, no matter what the reason.

In addition to funded improvements that took place in January, no-cost actions continued to be initiated. Payday activities now included a half-day off to attend to personal affairs. The work load in units was more evenly distributed by eliminating the "exempt from duty" status from the duty roster. The feeling was that no soldier was so indispensible that he could not pull his fair share of extra duties. (Appendix D discusses problems and changes in one unit at Fort Benning.)

Improved Medical Care

Great strides were also made in medical care. The commander of Fort Benning's Martin Army Hospital, Colonel H. Haskell Ziperman, supervised VOLAR programs in medical services. A program called We Care was initiated by the medical department activity (MEDDAC) in the early months of 1971 and was a comprehensive action to improve the services offered at the hospital and the several clinics located throughout Fort Benning.

Professional medical care was not the object of the We Care program, since the quality of medicine practiced by MEDDAC was already recognized as outstanding. We Care was instead directed toward the service aspects of MEDDAC. By minimizing numerous irritants and problems associated with serving large numbers of patients, over-all service attractiveness was improved.

Emphasis was placed on the individual as a person, not merely as a case. Attempts were made to establish mutual respect between medical service personnel and the patients. The multifaceted program was designed to convince patients that not only were they receiving good medical care, but also that they were receiving it in a way that did not depersonalize or degrade them.

Medical service personnel from doctors to janitors became involved in orientations, briefings, and meetings to indoctrinate medical personnel with the feelings expressed in the "Ten Commandments of a Good Hospital." This set of guidelines stressed the concept that a hospital existed only to make sick people well, and that, therefore, the patient was the most important person in the hospital, deserving of the best service and attention possible. Efforts were made to convince ancillary personnel that most patients were emotionally upset by their iliness and were not there because they wanted to be but because they had to be. They therefore required and deserved more sympathetic handling than healthy people.

Besides improving the general attitude of the staff toward the patients, a number of tangible improvements were made. Additional personnel were assigned to the various clinics to reduce the patients' waiting time. Increased emphasis was put on appointments, rather than the first-

come, first-served waiting room concept. To accomplish this shift, the number of phones at Martin Army Hospital was increased and a unique phone system devised. Under this system any one of six numbers could be dialed. If a particular number was busy, the call would automatically be shunted to another number until an open line was reached; in the event all lines were busy, the busy signal was given. Qualified personnel were assigned to circulate through the waiting rooms, explaining reasons for delays, giving assurances to distraught patients, and by their physical presence demonstrating the We Care philosophy.

Numerous minor physical improvements were also undertaken. Waiting rooms were redecorated to create a more pleasant atmosphere. Increased and improved directional signs were installed, which did much to alleviate problems caused by a confusing multitude of doors, corridors, sections, clinics, and rooms in outpatient areas. Security lighting and generally improved night lighting were installed. All of these rather simple improvements increased the convenience and comfort of the patients.

Open sick calls were established at troop clinics, allowing a soldier to report to the clinic when he was ill rather than at predesignated times. Senior officers and noncommissioned officers were allowed to make appointments at troop clinics during the afternoon hours, in addition to the regular walk-in patients. Brochures detailing medical services were widely distributed. Opinion samplings of patients were conducted to determine what additional improvements were desired. Patients found the quality of food improved, and a popular short-order menu became available. Not only was the We Care program directed at the medical services personnel, but the military community was also encouraged to co-operate in making it a success. The advantages of an appointment over a long wait were pointed out, along with the use of the emergency room for emergencies only.

As time progressed and VOLAR funds became available, large-scale innovations, such as dependent dental care and a family doctor concept, were initiated. The Family Ambulatory Care System was an effort to improve medical care by establishing a program in which all members of a soldier's family would always be treated by the same physician. Part of the medical staff was grouped into teams which paralleled the major command organization. For example, the 197th Brigade had five doctors who treated all members of the brigade and their dependents. In effect, the arrangement was similar to a clinic composed of five family doctors, and the physicians thus became more familiar with their patients' medical histories and problems. One doctor was also available after duty hours for telephone consultation, which took a big load off the emergency room and afforded the patient a quick response. This family care program was extremely well received, especially by dependent wives.



Two Dilemmas

During the development and execution of the Fort Benning Plan, participation by noncommissioned officers was highly sensitive and required careful monitoring. The noncommissioned officer at platoon level was soon confronted with a very real dilemma. What he had believed to be correct procedure for years had now been cast aside. The reveille formation which was an inherent part of his daily routine was now unnecessary. Years of conditioning had ingrained in him that short hair was good grooming. To inform him that longer hair could also be good grooming was sometimes upsetting. Thus, a degree of uncertainty touched his daily decisions. Reinforcing his uncertainty was the impression that permissiveness was now the order of the day. Factually untrue, the loss of discipline was a popular illusion. Irritating control devices had been removed from the system and greater individual freedom awarded to soldiers as a right. The traditional tools of NCO authority were modified. The platoon sergeant no longer was the recommender of class A passes, and thus his disapproval was no longer a threat to the platoon members. Many platoon NCO's thought themselves without leverage for correcting minor infractions of discipline. Other than nonjudicial punishment, there seemed to be little left but counseling as a tool for correcting substandard appearance, punctuality, or responsiveness. In short, the NCO had the feeling that the rug had been pulled out from under him. While this situation was by no means an explicit negative reaction on the part of all NCO's, it nonetheless described a general dilemma in which the small-unit leader found himself during the early months of VOLAR implementation.



By the end of the first nine months, most NCO's discovered that their position was not untenable. They learned that the need for and application of counseling was real and effective. The leader whose practice had been to stand on the corner and shout four-letter words continued to have problems, but for the most part small-unit leaders adjusted and devised techniques to fit the new scheme. While highly favorable results had been achieved on a practical basis, the early prejudices remained a subject requiring periodic attention on the part of commanders. Ultimate resolution of the dilemma would not occur until the all-volunteer Army became an established fact and substandard leaders were eliminated.

Gradual implementation, especially of the more expensive funded actions, caused another serious dilemma during the initial months of the experiment. The problem of establishing and maintaining credibility for the entire project became very real and required a concerted effort from all levels of command. Before the initiation of the Benning experiment, planners realized that unkept promises would deal a serious blow to the entire MVA concept. Great care had to be taken to prevent premature publicity of proposed actions in case unforeseen circumstances prevented their execution. In spite of the concerted information program, some misconceptions about VOLAR programs developed. Soldiers often anticipated broader changes than were actually warranted. When the actual programs fell short of what was expected, a feeling of having been misled developed, and a credibility gap resulted.

The action that contributed most to the credibility gap was the construction of barracks partitions. This large-scale project was so exten-



sive that it took many months to complete. The individual soldier, involved in the immediate and daily problems associated with living in an open barracks bay, was not interested in construction schedules, requisition of material, and other similar matters. He was concerned that his buddies in the building across the street had semiprivate rooms while he did not. The time lag involved in completing this very visible, high-impact project caused many soldiers to become cynical about the entire MVA effort. The extensive information program was able to counteract a good deal of the credibility gap. The problem was finally resolved by continuing to complete the partitions as fast as possible and letting the results speak for themselves.

The two dilemmas were indicative of the long-term problems that the MVA project would continue to face. Another such long-range problem area likely to develop might best be expressed as the "what-have-you-done-for-me-lately" syndrome. The soldier coming into the service and not knowing what improvements had been achieved would not be appreciative of the VOLAR actions. He would not be concerned with how much better things were, since he would be unable to relate to the old program. Whether or not this syndrome needed correction would depend on how well the MVA kept living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction in tune with the social standards of the society from which the recruits were drawn.

Settling Down

On 14 January 1971, Fort Benning forwarded the first "Bi-Monthly Status Report on the Modern Volunteer Army" to the Third United

States Army and Continental Army Command, setting forth VOLAR measures that had been taken, the results thereof, and future plans that would enhance the MVA concept. The report consisted basically of actions already implemented, with brief remarks on each; it also pointed out that Project VOLAR was still too new to be evaluated in a meaningful manner and that no results would be submitted at the time.

The actions that had been carried out were treated in five separate sections. Items designated by General Westmoreland as high impact items composed the first section. They had been included in the 15 December 1970 "Modern Volunteer Army Directive Number 1." These fifteen items were mainly concerned with reduction and elimination of irritating Army policies. The second section dealt with Continental Army Command directions and dealt for the most part with recruiting and reenlistment policies and community relations programs. Third Army's seven directives were in the third section. The last two sections listed actions that had been started by Fort Benning, both funded and nonfunded. A number of requests for policy changes on promotions and reenlistments were also submitted, along with detailed justifications for these proposals.

The bimonthly report concluded by saying that the Benning Plan as originally submitted was considered a starting point. Constant revision and modification of actions would be necessary to the success of the VOLAR experiment. Capitalizing on the experience gained as the project progressed would be an excellent means of developing new or modified actions.

CHAPTER IV

Expansion and Revision

Once the proposals of the original Benning Plan were well under way, the post turned inward in its search for additional innovations. From this point on, most of the MVA items were actually an expansion of ideas and projects whose value had previously been recognized but whose implementation had been prevented by lack of funds. From the time the original Benning Plan was published in November 1970 until August 1972, ten revisions were forwarded for approval. These revisions ranged from those concerned with four or five proposed actions to those which provided an annual updating of the plan. In all cases the revisions were accepted virtually intact; the few actions turned down by the Department of the Army were due to funding restrictions rather than to opposition on regulatory grounds.

On 1 December 1970, less than two weeks after the MVA Control Group was established, the first revision to the Benning Plan was forwarded to SAMVA, followed on 24 December 1970 by the second revision. Both of these revisions dealt with funded actions and allocation of funds. As an illustration of the type of change found in the two revisions, $200,000 was redistributed from the original proposal to purchase labor-saving devices, to provide tuition assistance for college entrance fees, and to increase the funds available for collection of refuse and garbage.

SAMVA approved all actions with several very minor modifications on 8 January 1971. The approval was not authorization for additional personnel, however; all the actions had to be implemented within existing personnel limitations.

The first revision that contained policy changes for the center was published on 15 January 1971 in the form of the New Actions Addendum to the Benning Plan. These actions were all unfunded and were carried out either by changes to USAIC directives or by DA messages. Some of the actions contained in this addendum were the elimination to the maximum extent possible of exemption from duty status of junior soldiers on the duty rosters, and a policy that the maximum number of military personnel be given a half-day off on payday to attend to personal matters. This first policy revision was the continuation of the

processes started by the study group and carried forward by the MVA Control Group. It did not contain actions that indicated a change of direction from the VOLAR philosophy or any actions that were considered to be high-impact items.

Educational Projects

Up to this point the emphasis had been on living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction that affected the life-style and professionalism of the post as a whole. While students were already affected by most of these actions, the belief was that the VOLAR concept should be applied directly to the Infantry School. Not only would improvements be made in the classroom, but these changes would also eventually affect all soldiers, as the students spread the concept throughout the Army.

The mission of the United States Army Infantry School (USAIS) was to train and educate young combat leaders, both officers and noncommissioned officers, to carry out effectively whatever mission they might be given. A number of courses were offered by USAIS, including Officer Candidate School (OCS), Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC), Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC), Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), and the Ranger and Airborne courses. USAIS and Fort Benning had a great influence on infantry officers since usually twice in a career a young officer would be assigned to Fort Benning, in probably the most formative periods of his military life. Not only was the knowledge gained while at Fort Benning vital to the officer, but the attitudes and views developed during his tenure at the Infantry School would influence his entire attitude toward the Army and his role in it.

The professionalism and motivation of officer students attending the Infantry School was a matter of concern before the initiation of VOLAR late in 1970. The staff and faculty felt that the atmosphere at USAIS and Fort Benning did not promote proper student motivation. The desire to gain professionally from the academic experience and to be professional while doing so was lacking. There was a general feeling, on the other hand, among the officer students that assignment to Fort Benning was undesirable and that the instruction was not up to the standards they expected and needed. The end result of these impressions, whether warranted or not, was constant petty griping about real and imagined problems. This practice of continually complaining was passed from class to class and tended to undermine the professional and academic atmosphere. Most officers were hard-pressed to avoid being adversely influenced to some degree by this negative thinking.

In order to create better student motivation and a more professional

atmosphere, a number of improvements were made, using advanced teaching techniques which updated programs of instruction and introduced material in more meaningful ways. Some representative improvements made before VOLAR included the electives program for officer courses, peer instruction when applicable, the introduction of computer-assisted instruction (CAI) and fully automated multimedia instruction systems, and the development of blocks of instruction on contemporary problems faced by young leaders. No studies had been done to determine the value of the improvements in the eyes of the students, and the lack of statistical data made later findings during the evaluation of VOLAR difficult to interpret.

The Infantry School became a full-fledged participant in the VOLAR experiment with the publication of the first major revision to the original Benning Plan—the Education and Training Addendum of 18 February 1971. This was USAIS's unique contribution to the MVA effort, not only at Fort Benning but at the other pilot posts as well. All pilot posts would naturally have large areas of duplication as they applied the VOLAR concept, but only Fort Benning and, more specifically, USAIS would be concerned with the service school aspects of VOLAR. As such, USAIS's actions in the VOLAR experiment were an important part of the over-all efforts to contribute to the continued growth and development of the soldier leader, professionally and educationally, as he progressed through the system. VOLAR implementation in the school was a natural and necessary part of the Benning Plan.

Modern Educational Techniques

The Education and Training Addendum maintained that education and training in today's Army must be directed toward producing individuals qualified in military occupational specialties (MOS). This training must be carried out in an educational environment conducive to producing soldiers who not only were qualified but also fitted in the organization. The educational effort must keep student goals in line with those of the Army. Inherent in this training and education concept was the need to move directly toward individual and self-paced instruction. To attain this kind of personal instruction, which had gradually emerged at leading civilian institutions, a completely new philosophy and administrative framework for Army education had to be developed. Traditional types of classrooms, procedures, instruction, evaluation methods, and general configurations of facilities and equipment required drastic change. This approach also involved a realistic reappraisal of the need for additional resources in funds, personnel, facilities, and equipment. Furthermore, Army policy for the classification and reassignment of per-

sonnel had to be adjusted in order to follow up properly on exceptional performers revealed by this self-paced learning.

The Education and Training Addendum contained fifty-nine actions, divided into three sections. The first had twenty programs of instruction, advanced instructional techniques, and specialized procedures already in use which supported the VOLAR concept. A total of thirty actions, programs of instruction, and techniques approved for enhancement of the VOLAR concept were in the second section. The final section consisted of actions to provide assistance to VOLAR tests at Fort Ord and Fort Carson. Of these fifty-nine actions, forty-six were retained for monitoring or evaluation or both during the VOLAR 1972 test period. The thirteen items not carried into fiscal year 1972 were either completed or incorporated into other projects, considered one-time actions, or absorbed into the operation of the Infantry School.

The addendum proposed to use terrain models as training devices to teach command and control of airmobile operations, since the planners felt that this would be a tremendous improvement over more conventional instruction techniques. A rudimentary model had been developed in March 1969 for a special Vietnam officers orientation course and was presented to selected IOAC students on a test basis the following year. However, real progress was achieved during the initial VOLAR test period when VOLAR funds were used to upgrade the program, now known as the combined arms tactical training simulator (CATTS). A fifty-man classroom was divided into five student training sections, four of which contained terrain models and platform-mounted mock-ups of a UH–1 equipped with locally fabricated simulations of an AN/ASC–15 command and control communications console. Each terrain model presented different battle ground environments. The fifth station was used to familiarize students with the simulators and the terrain model and employed a combination tape, slide, and color TV setup for conducting a premission briefing. The program was offered as an elective in which qualified students could develop scenarios for presentation to their contemporaries. A distinct advantage of the simulator as a training device was its adaptability to peer instruction. This technique reduced the ratio of students to instructors and eased the strain caused by instructor limitations.

The CATTS proved superior to the more conventional means of instruction, since it effectively reduced the degree to which a student must imagine or simulate the situation and the environment. Equally important, active student participation generated by the CATTS increased motivation, interest, and proficiency in executing tactical operations. Results of studies conducted by the MVA Control Group showed a significant increase in the student's confidence to command and control airmobile operations. CATTS also promoted greater personal involvement in



Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator

the training experience than any other method of instruction at USAIS. It was a prime example of an educational innovation that enhanced the professional excellence of the Infantry School, as validated by opinion surveys in which both the IOAC students and the USAIS staff and faculty favorably rated this item as contributing to increasing professionalism and creating a more favorable attitude toward the Army.

An electives program in IOAC was another innovation in effect before the VOLAR test period. This program was expanded during the test period and modified to provide graduate studies for IOAC students with a baccalaureate degree. The electives program, administered in conjunction with the diagnostic testing program, eliminated unnecessary repetition. It gave students an opportunity to enhance their individual education during duty hours and also to meet USAIS and branch goals by offering seven undergraduate- and three graduate-level college credit courses, nine noncollege credit courses, and five independent study programs each term.

Surveys confirmed that this program was favorably received by the students and USAIS staff and faculty and was viewed as contributing to the VOLAR objectives. An advanced-instruction electives program in IOBC was also favorably received, although the short nine-week course presented administrative and scheduling problems. A similar elective studies program for OCS students did not turn out as well due to extensive changes in the entire OCS program just as the elective program was initiated. This caused erratic student participation, and the elective program had to be reviewed.

In addition, the Infantry School significantly expanded its program on the contemporary problems facing today's leaders. Instruction on race relations, drug abuse, and prevention of AWOL was given to all leadership students. Although race relations instruction had been implemented before VOLAR, it was expanded during the test period. The original program had been keyed to black-white relationships, but during the test period it was upgraded and expanded to include the views of other minority groups. Drug abuse instruction increased from one to four hours. In both this program and the one concerning prevention of AWOL, a continual effort was made to present the most up-to-date and useful information possible. All three courses were favorably received by students and faculty as contributing to the objectives of increasing professionalism and creating a more positive attitude toward the Army.


Another course that supported the VOLAR objectives was the management instruction presented to IOAC students. This block of instruction, also implemented before VOLAR, was more than doubled during the test period, from twenty to forty-two hours. The expanded program emphasized general management procedures and used the case

study method to stress the functions of management and the techniques of solving management problems. Management Practices in TOE Units was added to the program to teach the students to relate industrial management techniques, work flow, distribution, and other similar practices to Army units.

Two programs, although desirable, had to be eliminated when constraints on programs of instruction caused a cutback in the experimental IOBC course from twelve to nine weeks in May 1971. One was a peer evaluation program designed to provide each student with a leadership profile and enable him to capitalize on strengths and correct weaknesses. The other was a four-hour instructional program on the subject of relevant problems encountered by the newly commissioned officer.

Under the broad category of other actions, the Infantry School curtailed certain practices which did not contribute significantly to its objectives and which were often considered to be unnecessary irritants by the students. The elimination of the requirement for students to stand at attention at the beginning of each class until a status report was given and to remain standing until commanded to "take seats" was one example. This action did not sacrifice discipline or courtesy and did improve student morale. Instructors were not permitted to make derogatory remarks about classes or to compare one class with another, as students desired to be treated as professionals. Examinations were not scheduled on days following night instruction, and classes did not begin before 0900 on days following night training that ended after 2200 hours. These two actions were rated by students as among the most important innovations of the VOLAR test period. The actions did not merely grant compensatory time; they allowed a more professional academic atmosphere by affording the students an opportunity to be adequately prepared and alert for morning classes and for examinations. Another action that reduced student irritation was the order that all personnel refer to officers as "officer students" rather than "student officers." The IOBC students felt that the term "student officers" was derogatory as it implied that they were not yet commissioned. All of the above actions were implemented during the VOLAR test period and, through subsequent evaluation, were found to support the MVA concept without lessening or eroding discipline.

By far the most expensive VOLAR action undertaken by the Infantry School was the construction and refinement of a test model learning center. Over $280,000 was spent developing a facility that offered a variety of instruction through the use of various electronic teaching machines. After its inception in March 1971, the Individual Learning Center (ILC) steadily increased its capacity (from 50 carrels to 135) and capability. The ILC used syncronized cassette tapes with 35-mm. slides,



USAIS Learning Center

movie projectors, question-response systems, responders which provided a student with the necessary response capability, and color TV monitors, all in various combinations, according to the program. The program inventory consisted of 184 programs for a total of 200 hours of instruction. The four subject matter categories included military subjects that reinforced classroom instruction; enrichment subjects that complemented classroom instruction; decision problems that tested the student's ability to apply techniques and principles learned; and selected guest speaker presentations.

The learning center met the criteria established by VOLAR's education and training philosophy in that it allowed active student participation while reducing student anxiety and increasing motivation. Furthermore, the instructional pace was geared to the individual, with the subject matter logically developed and performance oriented. This program was particularly appropriate for students with lower than desired levels of knowledge; it also provided students with a facility in which to explore areas of interest not covered in courses they were attending. Students have responded well to the learning center and it served both to improve their professional knowledge and to contribute to the VOLAR concept.

An important section in the Education and Training Addendum dealt with actions providing assistance to VOLAR tests at Fort Ord and Fort Carson. In this way USAIS provided an important link between the three VOLAR pilot posts. Training liaison teams were dispatched to Fort Ord and Fort Carson on a periodic basis; USAIS provided advisory assistance to Fort Ord in its basic combat training (BCT) and infantry advanced individual training (AIT). Command response to these visits indicated that they were useful in providing assistance to Fort Ord personnel involved in the Experimental Volunteer Army Training Program. As part of its continuing mission, USAIS gave Fort Ord assistance in updating the Army subject schedules included in the revised BCT program and sent to the field for review. USAIS also assisted Fort Ord and Fort Carson by providing additional training to USAIS graduates en route to these posts. The additional training consisted of distribution of information packets, VOLAR briefings, and additional maintenance training for selected students assigned to Fort Carson. Initially a special leadership class on contemporary problems was also given. The program was well received; however, as Fort Ord and Fort Carson began VOLAR programs, much of the information was duplicated. Because of this duplication, plus the inclusion of contemporary leadership problems in the regular program of instruction, the additional training was discontinued. Several other programs were originally envisioned which were not implemented due to unnecessary duplication or because the anticipated need did not develop.

Although the VOLAR test period was only a short segment in the Infantry School's continuing attempts to improve, it was important for a number of reasons. Not only were additional funds provided and a definite co-ordinated impetus given to major revisions but, for the first time, detailed evaluations of attitudes, opinions, existing practices, and implemented actions were accomplished. The consensus of the evaluators, validated by opinion surveys, was that the collective actions implemented by the Infantry School in support of the Benning Plan did in fact accomplish their stated objectives of upgrading the excellence of the Infantry School as an educational institution, of enhancing the professionalism of the staff and faculty, and of providing specific measures which better trained, motivated, and influenced young combat leaders to choose the Army as a career.

Working Conditions

Four days after the emergence of the Education and Training Addendum, a list of fiscal year 1971 VOLAR projects was forwarded to Third Army in response to a CONARC message of 3 February 1971 giving funding guidance to the three VOLAR pilot posts. The list contained thirty funded items with a total cost of $1,297,870, ranging from $2,000 for a clerk-typist to process re-enlistment and reassignment orders expeditiously, to nearly $408,000 to improve and upgrade television facilities available at USAIS. According to instructions from CONARC, all the projects were to be funded under Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA).

Department of the Army approved completely twenty-one of the thirty proposed additional VOLAR projects; seven were approved with slight modification; and two were disapproved. The modifications served to bring the proposed expenditures within the legal guidelines established for OMA funds without countering the rationale behind the proposals. The proposal to spend $15,000 to purchase equipment necessary to make a classroom capable of presenting fully automated instructional programs was turned down until the automated system under consideration proved to be cost effective. The other disapproved action called for an expenditure of $100,000 to conduct field training exercises and operational readiness training by the 43d Engineer Battalion and 568th Engineer Company and was turned down as not being an appropriate expenditure of VOLAR funds.

A complete update of the Benning Plan's action was provided on 9 March 1971 when Change Number 1 to the Benning Plan was published. The change was concerned only with the sections that contained proposed actions; the sections on general information and control and evaluation procedures and the numerous inclosures remained intact.

The format remained the same, as did the rationale behind the action, suspense dates, and action agencies. The update provided by Change Number 1 was necessary in order to provide all units and key personnel engaged in the MVA movement with a relevant and workable document. Parts of the original plan became outdated due to the rapid progress in the first three and one-half months; the change represented an effort to correct this situation.

The plan was revamped with the realization that funding was critical. Reaction from the Department of the Army indicated that there was no problem in changing regulations and policies to carry out actions, but that lack of funds could and would prevent implementation. As a result, all the actions were reorganized into two cost groupings—those that could be enacted within resources available to Fort Benning and those which still require additional funds. (*See Chart 2.*)

The number of proposed actions in the Benning Plan was greatly reduced as a result of progress already made. The MVA Control Group was able to combine several of the original proposals into more meaningful and broader actions. Other actions contained in the Benning Plan were removed by Change Number 1 for a variety of reasons. Actions that had been either disapproved or deferred by the SAMVA conference of 14 December 1970 were deleted. Some were eliminated because of low priority and lack of funds. Other proposals taken out were those which had been one-time actions and no longer required monitoring and evaluation. The sum total of the changes from these actions reduced the original 146 proposed actions to 100. (*See Appendix A.*)

Besides updating the Benning Plan, Change Number 1 was a reaction to the realization that Fort Benning's role as a pilot post was not going to end after six months but would continue for at least another full year. A revised plan of action based on experience factors was vital to the continuing success of the VOLAR experiment. Change Number 1 was a major step in developing such a plan.

Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan

Nearly three weeks after Change Number 1 was published, "The Fort Benning Plan for Movement Toward a Modern Volunteer Army, Fiscal Year 72," was presented for approval to higher headquarters. The Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan was considerably changed in format from the original plan, but actions contained in it showed definite progress. No mention was made of background information or control and evaluation procedures, but the Fiscal Year 72 plan was much more complex and detailed than the previous version. The working portion of the plan was divided into two major sections. The first was composed of the unfunded part of Change Number 1 and the Education and Training Addendum.

These two documents were included without change or additional comments, due to the short length of time since they had been originally published. The second was concerned entirely with funded programs and actions and included detailed cost projections, recapitulations by funding authority, and explicit justification of each funded action.

The Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan was a realistic portrayal of what would be accomplished during the first six months of the VOLAR experiment and what could be done in the following twelve months. The plan was based on a perspective developed during approximately four months of work toward the VOLAR objectives, and contained only actions and programs that would further the MVA concepts. The plan, with its detailed justification and funding requirements, gave Third Army and SAMVA a realistic picture of what was to take place at Fort Benning. The emphasis on funded actions was a clear indication that they were the key to the continued success of VOLAR. The initial emphasis had been on removing unnecessary irritants; now the emphasis was on constructive improvement of the soldier's life-style. These improvements were invariably costly, and the funds required for fiscal year 1972 totaled nearly $12 million for sixty-three proposals.

In order that the status of the funded actions could be easily discerned, they were broken down into sections based on priority of implementation and funding authority. The first section contained twenty-five items approved for implementation in fiscal year 1971 which could be continued in fiscal year 1972 within VOLAR funding guidelines. All of these items were OMA financed and totaled $7.5 million. Such projects as civilian KP, USAIS maintenance of the learning center, and the civilian preventive maintenance program were contained in this high priority category. (*Chart 6*) The second section consisted of thirteen OMA-financed items that had been started under the original Benning Plan but could not be continued in fiscal year 1972 unless $1.3 million was provided. These items included personnel benefits and supplies for civilians hired in support of the VOLAR program and the 197th Infantry Brigade's unit-of-choice recruiting plan. Items that had been approved for implementation in fiscal year 1971 but had not been started due to lack of OMA funds composed the third section. These seven projects included payment of the cost of operating bachelor officers' quarters (BOQ) and of maintaining two coffee houses. The last section involving OMA funds contained eleven new VOLAR actions, costing an estimated $500,000, for which approval was sought from higher headquarters.

The fifth section covered one project that was funded by the family housing management account (FHMA). Refuse collection and disposal, which had been implemented under the Benning Plan, required $628,000 for fiscal year 1972. Three nonappropriated fund (NAF) activities which had also been initiated but required more money made up the sixth

CHART 6—FUNDING: FISCAL YEAR 1972

Priorities	Sufficient Funds for 1972	Insufficient Funds for 1972			New Actions Requiring Funds in 1972		Unfunded in 1971 and 1972
Agent	OMA	OMA	NAF	FHMA	MCA	OMA	OMA
Millions of dollars	7.5	1.3	0.3	0.6	.25	0.5	0.1
Principal action	Kitchen police and preventive maintenance program	UOC in 197th Infantry Brigade	Free bus service	Refuse collection	Craft shops	Construct learning center and renovate library	BOQ maintenance and coffee houses

section. The seventh and final category contained three projects funded by Military Construction, Army (MCA). Construction of an automotive craft shop on main post was in this group.

Each of the sixty-three proposed actions was then presented in detail. The current status of each implemented item was given along with its justification and the number of personnel, both military and civilian, required to support it. Included was a breakdown of the estimated cost under such categories as personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, temporary duty, and contracts. The detailed presentation of each action provided a ready reference for all pertinent information on the action and allowed for more meaningful evaluation at higher headquarters. It also provided commanders at all levels at Fort Benning with an excellent status report of the VOLAR experiment and the direction in which the concept was headed.

Third U.S. Army (TUSA) comments on the Fiscal Year 72 plan arrived at Fort Benning on 15 April 1971. All but six of the sixty-three funded actions proposed were approved. The six disapproved proposals were new actions for fiscal year 1972 and were turned down as not being appropriate for expenditure of VOLAR funds, even though the need for such actions was recognized.

CONARC was more critical of the plan than Third Army, mainly in the area of fund allocations. In addition to concurring with all of TUSA's disapprovals, CONARC turned down two more new actions. Only five out of eleven new proposals were accepted, an indication of tightening purse strings. CONARC approval of the Fiscal Year 72 plan was for planning purposes only; it did not constitute authorization to obligate or expend funds; neither did it relieve Fort Benning of the requirements to follow established channels in seeking technical review and approval. A final caution added that detailed justification of additional personnel was required before final approval.

SAMVA concurred with all of CONARC's recommendations, raised several legal questions which precluded immediate implementation of certain projects, such as contracting an off-post motel as a guest house, commented on fund allocations for several actions, and made suggestions on how other proposed allocations might prove more acceptable. SAMVA informed Fort Benning that specific funding instructions would be received in late June 1971 for all VOLAR projects, and that the Department of the Army would provide requested family housing management account (FHMA) funds to continue ongoing projects falling under this category. SAMVA also reiterated the requirement to wait for specific approval before spending funds or filling additional personnel slots, even though the actions had been approved.

The Fiscal Year 72 Benning Plan was revised in August 1971, based on guidance received from higher headquarters. Whereas the Fiscal Year

72 plan had been concerned with justifying VOLAR actions, the revision was a chronicle of what was to be done. It mentioned neither specific funds nor justifications of funded actions. The section on no-cost VOLAR actions that had already been implemented was updated and shortened by consolidating a number of related items and eliminating those that were by then standard Fort Benning policy and required no further monitoring. Several new actions recommended by the Department of the Army were also added. The list of cost actions submitted in the Fiscal Year 1972 plan was included, with each action annotated to indicate whether higher headquarters had approved, disapproved, or modified it. The revision noted that actual implementation of funded items would be determined by future release of funds. Which actions would receive money and in what amounts was not fully known at that time. A shortened version of the Education and Training Addendum was also included in the fiscal year 1972 revision.

Eventually Fort Benning was able to carry out thirty-four of the sixty-six proposed funded actions contained in the Fiscal Year 72 plan, based on the funds and instructions received from the Department of the Army. Only OMA and FHMA funds were provided, nearly $3 million less than was requested. The thirty top-priority OMA-funded actions were implemented in fiscal year 1972, thus allowing Project VOLAR to continue to expand and make its improvements felt.

Unit-of-Choice Recruiting

The Fiscal Year 72 plan specifically mentioned, for the first time, unit-of-choice (UOC) recruiting. This was an enlistment option developed to support MVA whereby an enlistee was guaranteed an assignment to a unit of his choice.

Recruitment by Major Units, as the program was initially called, came to Fort Benning's attention on 22 December 1970, when notification was received that the 197th Infantry Brigade had been selected to participate in a test of the program. The initial concept designated major units to conduct recruiting programs for combat arms soldiers in their local areas. The recruiting efforts would be co-ordinated with the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). Enlistees under this option would be guaranteed assignment to the selected unit for a specified period of time, after completing basic combat training and advanced individual training. Initially the guarantee was for twelve months but was soon extended to sixteen months after which the enlistee was subject to an overseas tour.

The guidance included a suspense date of 1 February 1971 for implementation of the program and required each selected unit to prepare a synopsis of its activities and history in order to make the unit more attrac-

tive to prospective enlistees. Possible target groups, such as high schools, were enumerated. Direct co-ordination and liaison between the units and USAREC was authorized, with information copies of all correspondence to be provided to the appropriate intermediate headquarters.

Two days later, 24 December 1970, CONARC reported that General Westmoreland had approved the concept of UOC recruiting. Additional authorization and guidance on direct co-ordination between the units, recruiting districts, and main stations were received. Primary management responsibility for the UOC program was assigned to the USAREC commanding general. In anticipation of detailed instructions to be issued no later than 10 January 1971, the recruiting districts concerned were to establish and maintain effective liaison with the 197th Brigade and to assist with technical advice as well as with publicity and information concepts relevant to recruiting operations.

Detailed instructions from the Department of the Army arrived on 6 January 1971 setting forth a six-month test period, effective 1 February 1971. Each unit was required to designate a project officer whose mission was to co-ordinate all the activities related to the UOC program. Screening and selection of the soldiers who were to be the recruiting representatives had to be completed before 10 January. In order that the unit re-enlistment program would not be adversely affected by the UOC program, the suggestion was made not to use career counselors at this time. The Army Recruiting Command was to fulfill the administrative and funding requirements, leaving the units free to get out and sell themselves. Itineraries for training team orientations and liaison visits were set up. The area of recruitment for each unit was within a radius of 125 to 150 miles of the home base. The message concluded by informing the participants that there would be no additional funds for the duration of the trial period. Provisions for reporting results of the test program were also included.

The final guidance from the Department of the Army before the start of the test program arrived on 11 January 1971. This message modified the UOC concept by stipulating that while an enlistee was promised an assignment to the unit of his choice, he was not guaranteed that the assignment would immediately follow completion of basic combat training and advanced individual training. The assignment might not be available until completion of an overseas tour. The message also noted that the radius of recruiting was to be considered only as a guide, leaving the decision on an area of operation for the commands to make according to productivity and funds. Once again the lack of specific funds for the program was reiterated, leaving the 197th Brigade in the position of initiating a vigorous and imaginative program on an austere budget.

The 197th Brigade had no previous experience in recruiting, but in




UNIT-OF-CHOICE RECRUITING AREAS

accord with instructions from higher headquarters, contact was made with the recruiting command and a close working relationship was soon established. Participation in the UOC program became a high priority mission of the 197th Brigade. A workable and successful concept of operation was implemented, as derived from advice of the recruiters and from brainstorming sessions held in the brigade. The recruiting area was originally determined as consisting of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida; South Carolina was added later. Monthly meetings of the recruiting district and main station commanders were held with the brigade. In addition, USAREC personnel were on duty full time at the 197th Brigade Headquarters, and 197th personnel were assigned to each main station in the recruiting area.

Battalion areas of operation were established in the four-state area. Recruiting emphasis was placed on high school seniors. A recruiting approach was developed wherein young soldiers in the ranks of E–5 and below and company grade officers were used as active recruiting agents. By capitalizing on youth-to-youth credibility, the prevalent distrust of the older generation was neutralized. This concept was incorporated into a recruiting cycle which worked well.

The first step was to get the attention of the prospective recruit



LOCAL RECRUITER MARKETS UOC OPTION


through appearances in his home town, in school, at youth activities, at fairs, or at any place where young people congregate. A number of attention-getting devices were used, complemented by the presence of selected young soldiers who were from the local area. Equipment displays, speaking engagements, and domestic actions were used to convey the message that the 197th Brigade was an excellent assignment and that such an assignment was guaranteed under the UOC program. A big selling point to thc high school student was the fact that he would serve close to home and would be able to return often on weekends or on three-day passes. Credibility was added by the presence of the young soldiers who had no recruiting quotas to meet and no mission other than to "tell it like it is."

Follow-up action was a combination of efforts by the local recruiter and contact teams. As the recruiter completed processing each new man, the contact teams personally filled the prospective soldier in on the brigade and answered fully and accurately any questions he had. Prospective recruits who showed interest were invited to visit Fort Benning and see for themselves. The recruiter then enlisted the volunteers and sent them to receive basic combat training. For a large number, even advanced individual training was given by the 197th Brigade at Fort Benning. The



The Product Sells Itself

CHART 7—197TH INFANTRY BRIGADE RECRUITING CYCLE



recruiting cycle was completed when selected young soldiers recruited under UOC returned to their home towns to act as canvassers or public speakers. (*Chart 7*)

As with any new concept, implementation of UOC recruiting was at first slow and seemingly unsuccessful and excessively expensive. The first two months of the UOC test period saw only twenty-nine volunteers using this option, at a cost to Fort Benning of nearly $1,000 per man. April and May 1971 were not much better, but the necessary groundwork had been laid and success was just around the corner. From June to December of 1971 UOC recruiting provided the 197th Brigade with almost a full quota of combat soldiers. At this point, recruitment to fill vacancies in all authorized positions, E–4 and below, was begun. From this time on, UOC recruiting filled the brigade's personnel requirements at a cost per recruit of less than $85.

A similar program adopted by the 931st Engineer Group on 1 May 1971 was well received. Following much the same approach as the 197th, the 931st Engineer Group was also able to fulfill its personnel requirements.

Feelings expressed by commanders who had UOC soldiers in their

units indicate that the leaders were well satisfied with the product. The UOC soldiers appeared to be as good as their leadership and therefore were not significantly better or worse than draftees or regular enlistees in job performance. The UOC soldiers were generally pleased to be at Fort Benning. They did not feel they had been "sold a bill of goods" by the recruiters, and the majority indicated they would follow the same course if they could do it over again. They willingly recommended Fort Benning to their friends at home.

Civic Adventures

UOC recruiting became a major impetus behind the development of two related VOLAR improvements, the domestic actions program and adventure training. Domestic actions were a means of presenting the Army in a favorable light before the public's eyes. These joint civilian and military projects demonstrated that in addition to protecting the country, units can help their civilian neighbors to help themselves by building parks and recreational areas and engaging in other worthwhile projects. The impact on the self-image of the young soldier was as productive as the impact on the public image. Home town news releases were stressed and for the first time in a long while, soldiers felt the pride of "Johnny-comes-marching-home."

Adventure training was conceived to make service life more satisfying. In addition to relieving the monotony of daily Army life by presenting training that was different, challenging, and enjoyable, it became a useful contribution to the total community. At the same time, adventure training was regularly used to depict the Army as a desirable way of life. Advanced individual training platoons performed their end-of-course field exercises near the civilian communities from which they were recruited. At the completion of the exercise, soldiers would be allowed to go into the community for limited recreation, usually provided by some civic group or local reserve unit. Such actions accomplished four objectives in one operation. Although training was the primary objective, by operating in the civilian areas, favorable publicity was generated which contributed to job satisfaction, recruiting credibility was reinforced, and recreation was made available to round out the operation.

Civic actions specifically designed to contribute to a community became real examples of the adventure training concept. Projects were carefully selected in order to prevent the program from becoming an extension of government welfare. The criteria for accepting a project was the degree of civic involvement which could be generated by the troop's commitment. Greenville, South Carolina, was an illustration. The city was about to lose a federal grant because it was unable to match government funds for playground projects in an underprivileged area of the city.



MEMBERS OF 1ST BATTALION, 29TH INFANTRY, ASSIST CITIZENS

By committing a platoon for ten days to the construction of these small parks, an entire urban community became mobilized. The downtown merchant's association paid the hotel bills for all the soldiers; local restaurants fed the soldiers two free meals a day; the local reserve unit (engineer company) performed all operations requiring heavy equipment; and the local ROTC and high school students sent out volunteer groups to assist the final grooming of the playground areas. The catalytic action of the platoon of soldiers enabled the city to earn the federal grant at an actual cost of little more than $6,000. The climate of co-operation was so strong during this period that every soldier, by his own choice, wore a uniform with pride both on and off duty.

Fiscal Year 73 Benning Plan

In January 1972, the process for fund requisition was again initiated, this time for fiscal year 1973. In addition to requesting that all fiscal year 1972 VOLAR projects be continued, eight additions to Project VOLAR were recommended, at a total cost of $10.4 million. The Fiscal Year 73 plan, which was published in August 1972, followed much the same format as the 1972 revision. It contained fifty-two no-



Civic Adventure Improves Army's Image

or low-cost actions which had been implemented but required continued monitoring and evaluation. Forty-two funded actions, including both financed and unfinanced projects, were contained in the funded actions section. As with the 1972 revised plan, funding authorization was to come under separate correspondence as the Department of the Army received funding instructions from Congress.

The eighteen months from January 1971 to June 1972 saw Fort Benning settle down into a sustained effort to accomplish those actions which had been formulated during the first half-year of Project VOLAR. By carefully establishing priorities, the momentum generated by the initial trial period was maintained in the face of lessening financial support. The considered ordering of priorities was made possible only by constant evaluations conducted throughout Project VOLAR which identified the high-impact actions.

CHAPTER V

More Than the Sum of the Parts

The combat power of armored infantry is greater than the simple sum of infantry firepower plus mechanized mobility plus tank firepower. The additional power beyond the sum is known as the synergistic effect. Much the same effect can be attributed to the items contained in the Benning Plan.

Throughout the entire VOLAR trial period an evaluation process was conducted that paralleled the implementation of the Benning Plan actions. The continuous evaluation of Project VOLAR filled a number of important requirements. Scientific credibility was gained for the experiment by the reduction of subjective analysis based on emotional responses. Objective interpretation of data gathered by accepted evaluative techniques provided a factual framework upon which the entire project was based. The evaluative process provided continuous monitoring of the actual implementation of the Benning Plan and served as a vital control mechanism. The relative impact of actions was identified, thus enabling the MVA Control Group to established funding priorities. Another basic contribution of the evaluation was the gathering of raw statistical data. This data was necessary to establish trends, measure attitude shifts, determine how the human need categories were affected by Project VOLAR, and counter any misconceptions which arose during the period of the experiment. Finally, the collection of the data provided important historical documents, which were of sufficient detail to be useful and valid to an interested reader or agency.

Methodology

Under the original concept for an evaluation plan, the Benning group planned five methods of evaluation, including an after action report. While personal interviews, performance statistics, and special actions were used extensively, surveys were the primary measuring techniques used to determine how the Benning Plan was affecting personal career intentions.

The evaluation of Project VOLAR was based on criteria at two levels. At the more general level, there was a need to make the military service interesting, challenging, and rewarding to the widest possible

number of military personnel. To reach the objective of reduced dependence upon the draft, living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction had to be sufficiently improved to make military service more desirable, both for short-term involvement and long-term careers; this had to be done, however, without sacrificing mission capability. At a specific level, the criteria for evaluation of VOLAR would be actions or combinations of actions which produced improvement, in order that future resources could be allocated in areas having the greatest impact on military personnel. Opinion surveys therefore became particularly critical.

After the initial November 1970 survey of soldier attitudes, follow-up surveys were administered in June 1971, August 1971, November 1971, February 1972, and May 1972. While the first two were identical, the later ones were modified to delete actions which were not implemented initially or which were discontinued at the end of fiscal year 1971. Personnel surveyed represented a random sample of the post populations, stratified within broad limits of rank and tour status. The sampling procedure used the last four digits of each potential subject's social security number. Quotas and sampling procedures, based on the percentage of the total post population represented in each of the broad categories of personnel, were given to the quality control officer in each of Fort Benning's major commands. The quality control officers were responsible for administering the surveys within their organizations according to detailed instructions provided by the VOLAR evaluation element. The surveys were carried out under strictly enforced control conditions and supervised by post VOLAR control and evaluation elements.

Objectivity was the main emphasis throughout the entire evaluation process. Many conclusions drawn from Project VOLAR were expected to be controversial and would require extensive supporting documentation to gain acceptance. The supporting documentation had to be valid to be worthwhile. A number of proven evaluation techniques were employed to gain the required objectivity. A control post was used to provide a standard against which the impact of VOLAR could be measured. All surveys, samples, and measurements were conducted objectively using random selection and insuring the anonymity of the subjects. All raw data were made available. There was never any attempt to make data fit preconceived conclusions; rather, conclusions were drawn from the facts. The knowledge that the VOLAR experiment was being critically examined by others caused the evaluation element to bend over backwards in insuring that conclusions were substantiated and objective.

Progress in Perspective

A total of six evaluative reports were made by Fort Benning personnel during the twenty-month VOLAR experiment. The first such report,

the 14 January 1971 First Status Report, contained very little interpretation because of the short time since the inception of the Benning Plan. As its name implies, it was more a report on the status of implemented actions than an evaluation of them.

The Second Status Report, rendered on 12 March 1971, continued in the same vein. General Talbott's cover letter detailed a number of problems faced by Fort Benning in March 1971, such as the hesitancy of potential civilian employees to accept VOLAR-based jobs due to the uncertainty of continued employment. He stressed the predominant attitude toward VOLAR, which at the time was one of wait and see. The development of a receptive atmosphere was more important for the Benning Plan, as the open-minded acceptance of changes was critical. General Talbott pointed out that there were a number of irritants and unsatisfied needs that were outside the scope of the plan. At this early point, although no single action of the Benning Plan might be important enough to influence a career decision, the cumulative tendency of the innovations to overcome the resistance factor was recognized and expressed.

In March 1971 the frequency of the MVA reports was changed from bimonthly to quarterly. The third report was therefore given in July 1971 and continued the trend established by the previous reports. It devoted considerable effort to a summary and progress analysis of Benning Plan actions and presented statistical indicators, including interpretation of developing trends.

The report provided insight into a number of new problems facing Project VOLAR, such as the fact that the VOLAR audience then found at Fort Benning was not an ideal test group. It was mainly composed of Vietnam returnees with less than six months of their service obligation remaining. Unit-of-choice recruiting eventually solved this situation. Another problem area encountered was the wide discrepancy between attitudes and statistical indicators pertaining to discipline. A strong feeling that discipline had deteriorated because of VOLAR was discovered, especially among senior noncommissioned officers. A thorough investigation into discipline was initiated at this time.

The report also mentioned Fort Knox as a comparison post; however, few conclusions could be drawn between posts due to limitations in data collected at the Armor School. Observed differences did suggest that soldiers at Fort Benning felt the Army was becoming more concerned with the individual. This view in turn improved their receptiveness toward Project VOLAR. Nevertheless, although the Benning Plan was felt to be a step in the right direction, at this point the degree of success still could not be accurately determined nor could valid projections be made on the effect of an expanding and continuing program.

Trends

The MVA Quarterly Command Report was closely followed by an Installation Evaluation Report, which contained a more detailed discussion and evaluation of Project VOLAR during the first six months of 1971. The stated objective of the evaluation was to assess the following three areas: expressed career intentions and attitudes toward Fort Benning; general attitudes toward the Army and military service; and attitudes toward the specific VOLAR actions implemented at Fort Benning. A questionnaire survey had been administered to a large sample of enlisted and officer personnel at Fort Benning and Fort Knox before the start of Project VOLAR and again in June 1971. Differences found in the responses between the two surveys aided in assessing the impact of VOLAR on attitudes. However, the data to distinguish between attitude changes attributable to local VOLAR actions and those attributable to extraneous factors at Fort Knox became confused as Fort Knox began to incorporate its own VOLAR actions. Fortunately the trends established at Fort Benning continued throughout the experiment, and the control post comparison was not really necessary.

When attitudes toward specific VOLAR actions were assessed, the finding was that the VOLAR program had a very distinct impact on the attitudes of all military personnel at Fort Benning, both enlisted and officer. (*Chart 8*) The experimental actions with the highest impact were generally found to be those which reduced the amount of menial work that was not a part of a soldier's military occupational specialty, provided more privacy and freedom in troop barracks, decreased the amount of control exercised over the soldier during nonduty time, and produced evidence that the Army was concerned with equitable treatment of the soldier.

Analysis of attitudes toward the Army and military service indicated that in general there were favorable changes, though slight, in the attitudes of officers and enlisted men at both Fort Benning and Fort Knox; thus, these changes could not be attributed to the Benning Plan. Evaluators felt that Army-wide VOLAR actions had influenced these attitude changes to varying degrees. Analysis of career intentions revealed that Fort Benning presented a somewhat more favorable picture than Fort Knox, but as yet there was not a corresponding increase in actual re-enlistments.

The evaluation concluded that the Benning Plan was headed in the right direction and, within the constraints imposed by authority and funds, had done well considering the short period of the experiment. Feelings regarding basic inequities among younger enlisted soldiers had changed favorably; the soldiers were cognizant and appreciative of these changes. The most important factor affecting re-enlistment, however, was

CHART 8—EXPRESSED CAREER INTENTIONS (FINAL)

Group	Date	Percentage Responding				Mean response
		1[a]	2[b]	3[c]	4[d]	
First-term enlisted	Nov 70	1.4	4.9	12.0	81.6	3.74
	Jun 71	2.1	7.5	13.3	77.1	3.66
	Nov 71	3.6	10.7	17.7	68.0	3.50
	May 72	3.8	16.1	28.2	52.0	3.28
	Nov 72	8.2	16.3	22.0	53.5	(c) 3.21
First-term officer	Nov 70	7.3	14.3	20.1	58.3	3.29
	Jun 71	10.1	12.9	14.3	62.7	3.29
	Nov 71	12.1	20.9	16.5	50.5	3.05
	May 72	9.5	16.7	21.4	52.4	3.17
	Nov 72	11.4	27.1	19.8	41.7	(c) 2.92
Extended-term enlisted	Nov 70	71.2	9.6	8.6	10.5	1.58
	Jun 71	64.5	12.5	10.3	12.7	1.71
	Nov 71	65.9	12.7	7.5	14.0	1.69
	May 72	64.0	13.0	8.7	14.3	1.73
	Nov 72	64.2	12.6	9.4	13.8	(c) 1.73
Extended-term officer	Nov 70	77.9	12.4	4.9	4.7	1.36
	Jun 71	78.8	11.8	3.9	5.4	1.36
	Nov 71	76.6	15.1	4.4	3.9	1.36
	May 72	78.4	10.8	7.4	3.4	1.36
	Nov 72	73.3	17.5	6.3	2.9	(c) 1.39

Which of the following best describes your Army career intentions?
[a] 1. I will remain in the Army until retirement.
[b] 2. I will remain in the Army for a while longer, but have not yet decided about staying until retirement.
[c] 3. I am undecided about my Army career intentions.
[d] 4. I will leave the Army upon completion of current obligation.

Note: The lower the group mean, the more favorable the response. A group mean of 1.00 would indicate that everyone within that group intends to remain in the Army until retirement.

a need for security. This need was translated by the report into pay concerns and was cited as one of those extraneous factors beyond the scope of the Benning Plan.

Effect on Discipline

In contrast with the initial period of the VOLAR experiment which saw a flurry of reports and evaluations, the next six months had only one evaluation. The Semi-Annual VOLAR Evaluation Report was published in January 1972 and, notwithstanding the title, covered the full twelve months of the Benning Plan. The report was over five hundred pages long and was divided into two basic sections. Approximately one-fifth of the January 1972 evaluation was devoted to a subjective sum-



mary and progress analysis of Fort Benning MVA projects, while the rest of the report concentrated on an assessment of the USAIS education and training innovations, statistical indicators of morale and discipline, and an over-all evaluation of the program.

The evaluation concluded that during the period of the VOLAR experiment at Fort Benning, there were massive positive changes in the attitudes of first-tour personnel, who were the primary targets of VOLAR actions. These positive changes occurred in respect to specific VOLAR actions, basic attitudes toward the Army, and expressed career intentions. There was no evidence that these highly significant changes had been accompanied by either decreased military discipline or reduced mission capability. Conversely, there were objective indications that discipline either remained stable or improved during the experiment.

Because Fort Knox had become a fiscal year 1972 experimental post and ceased being Fort Benning's control post, evaluators could not say conclusively that any specific action or group of VOLAR actions caused these positive changes. Although there were indications, evaluators could not determine if these attitude changes were in part responsible for the rising re-enlistment rates. The report did conclude that, based on the available evidence, VOLAR actions, both at Fort Benning and at Department of the Army level, had within the space of a year achieved a major success, that great progress had been made toward the attainment of VOLAR goals, and that the promise of continued progress toward these goals was a reasonable expectation.

As with all the evaluative reports, the semiannual report presented statistical evidence which substantiated its conclusions, including morale

and discipline indicators. Attitudes of various rank groupings concerning discipline were also well documented by a special investigation.

Results of Analysis

The Final Evaluation Report of July 1972 was the culmination of the previous twenty months' evaluative efforts. This 737-page report dealt with the entire period of Project VOLAR at Fort Benning. It included a detailed discussion of the findings and conclusions of the MVA Control Group on all aspects of the experiment. All collected raw data were presented, thus providing the source material upon which the findings and conclusions were based. A detailed report on military discipline was included as were a number of other specific areas of interest, such as attitudes of dependents. Evaluation of actions undertaken by USAIS received considerable attention, as did a summary and progress analysis of funded and nonfunded MVA projects. The Final Evaluation Report provided the entire picture of Project VOLAR from the evaluative standpoint.

Findings concerning the impact of VOLAR actions seemed to conflict at some points. When data from November 1970 were compared with data from May 1972, the attitudes of both officers and soldiers (particularly first-tour) toward specific VOLAR actions showed considerable positive impact. On the other hand, comparisons from November 1971 to May 1972 showed fewer significant changes, and even some significant negative changes. Furthermore, if the four general attitude areas (need for security, pride in service, understanding leadership, and equitable returns from military service) were considered, the impact appeared measurably lower. While the comparisons for first-tour enlisted personnel were positive and significant in all four areas from November 1970 to May 1972, similar significant gains were not made even among these personnel from November 1971 to May 1972. Further, extended-tour personnel, both enlisted and commissioned, showed at least some important negative changes in these four need areas in all comparisons. Finally, in comparison from November 1971 to November 1972, commissioned personnel uniformly showed negative change in all areas though these changes were not significant.

Contradictions were found in the data regarding expressed career intentions and actual career decisions. Among first-tour enlisted personnel, there were substantial gains in expressed career intentions, especially during the last evaluation period. There was also evidence of increases in actual re-enlistments in this group. However, obligated volunteer officer rates of request for retention and for voluntary indefinite status were lower in calendar year 1972 than in either 1970 or 1971,

and there were higher rates of voluntary indefinite officers requesting release from active duty. But again, there was a contrast. Rates per thousand of voluntary indefinite and obligated volunteer officers requesting regular Army appointments were larger in calendar year 1972 than in 1970 for obligated volunteer officers and in 1971 for voluntary indefinite officers.

There were many possible explanations for these apparently conflicting results. For example, most of the positive attitude changes toward specific actions seemed to occur primarily during the first six months of the VOLAR experiment, with little additional change in the following twelve months. On the other hand, the possibility existed that the beneficial effect of some VOLAR actions had eroded. Moreover, a substantial number of the personnel surveyed in May 1972 might simply have lacked the necessary experience with the pre-VOLAR life at Fort Benning to be able to provide a valid comparison.

There was little concrete basis in the data for choosing among these several possibilities. There were, however, many clues in the data, particularly in some of the supplementary material, such as that obtained in the structured interviews with re-enlisting and separating enlisted personnel. These clues were used to construct a frame of reference to help interpret the results of both the over-all evaluation and the interim reports preceding it.

One of the most important observations was that the level of satisfaction changed rapidly and significantly. The first semiannual survey following implementation of the VOLAR experiment found that these changes had already occurred. However, the change found in general attitudes toward the Army (pride in service, security, leadership, and inequities) was not dramatic and, in fact, was very small. Furthermore, changes in career intentions were not statistically significant, even for first-tour enlisted personnel, though a positive trend was apparent in the data. Finally, the change in actual re-enlistment was not significant, though a positive trend was also apparent.

In subsequent evaluations, general attitude changes for first-tour enlisted personnel became significant and large. Career intentions underwent slower change, with the improvement noted in the May 1972 evaluation being the most dramatic single change to have occurred for first-tour enlisted personnel. Actual career behavior was also moving in a positive direction, with some data from the re-enlisting and separating study suggesting that the actual level of VOLAR impact on re-enlistments might have been accelerating. Thus, the general picture was that of rapid impact on attitudes toward specific VOLAR actions, a somewhat slow change in general attitudes, an even slower change in expressed career intentions, and the slowest change in actual re-enlistment behavior. This

phenomenon was logical and paralleled other findings in attitudinal and behavioral studies.

Interpreting the Results

Given these findings concerning first-tour enlisted personnel, an explanation for some of the apparent contradictions mentioned earlier could be deduced. A change in the level of satisfaction caused by a concrete VOLAR action could be expected to occur rapidly. For example, if a soldier were working a seven-day week and then suddenly began to work a five-day week, he could reasonably be expected to immediately report greater satisfaction with the length of his workweek. However, this change would not necessarily increase his satisfaction with the Army or his intention to re-enlist. Satisfaction with the Army, a more general kind of attitude, was undoubtedly the result of the soldier's balancing many factors against one another, the length of his workweek being only one. A balance among many factors would require that he reassess his experience with all of them; therefore, more time would be needed than for the assessment of a single area. Similarly, the decision to re-enlist, as evidenced in either career intentions or actual behavior, would surely involve even more factors, requiring an even longer time to achieve a clear-cut balance.

The apparent contradictions in the data, at least insofar as first-tour personnel were concerned, could therefore be explained at least in part by the probability that different kinds of attitudes changed at different rates. The more concrete and simple the attitude was, the more rapidly it could change as a result of a VOLAR action. The more complex and the greater the number of factors on which it depended, the more slowly it was likely to change. Decisions concerning re-enlistment behavior were clearly among the most complex measured in these evaluations and probably the slowest to change. From this point of view, the change found in data on first-tour enlisted personnel was all the more encouraging. The strong implication was that VOLAR at Fort Benning could be expected to produce even greater future change than was already noted, if the level of VOLAR support continued.

Insofar as first-tour personnel were concerned, a second process was also occurring which explained at least a part of the lag in intentions and actual re-enlistments. In all likelihood, most soldiers viewed the onset of VOLAR with some skepticism. A typical attitude might have been, "It sounds good, but will it last?" Soldiers perceived that programs such as VOLAR can become perishable when key senior officers change, but the re-enlistment term was permanent, once it was undertaken. Many soldiers most likely had a wait-and-see approach during the early months of VOLAR.

Of course, these explanations did not satisfactorily deal with the results found for extended-tour personnel or even for first-tour officers in the May 1972 survey. (*See Chart 8.*) Regarding first-tour officers, two factors had probably worked simultaneously to produce the results. The first factor was the increasing percentage of active-duty-for-training officers in the surveyed first-tour officer group during the latter three surveys. In the May 1972 data, the percentage was very substantial. Not surprisingly, surveys including these officers would show an intention to leave the Army since their plans to return to civilian life were fairly well established from the outset of their current tour of active duty. Examination of the answers by officers in this category, as opposed to all other first-tour officers in each survey, showed that this subgroup had been largely responsible for the negative changes in expressed career intentions among first-tour officers, and probably the negative changes in general attitudes toward the Army. In other words, attitudes toward the Army and career intentions had probably not changed negatively. Rather, the proportion of first-tour officers who had negative attitudes and negative career intentions had most likely increased.

However, this explanation was probably not the only one. There was, at the same time, an increase in obligated volunteer officer requests for release from active duty. Quite likely this activity was a result of the reduction in force that occurred earlier in fiscal year 1972, and it suggested that young officers were willing to sign up for a career provided they could be sure that their careers would not be prematurely terminated. In this light, the findings on first-tour officers reflected factors which were relatively independent of the VOLAR experiment.

The patterns of change among extended-tour personnel were also attributed to factors outside VOLAR. For extended-tour personnel, pride in Army service decreased along with feelings that Army service brought security and along with confidence in Army leadership competence and understanding. (These are November 1970 to May 1972 comparisons.) That these changes were significant, while changes from November 1971 to May 1972 were not, suggests that the largest part of these negative changes occurred before the data was collected in November 1971. At this time a reduction in force had taken place and more stringent reenlistment requirements for senior noncommissioned officers had been initiated. Changes in general attitudes were considered to be a reflection of these factors and were not directly related to VOLAR.

Specific Findings

Some principal conclusions were reached from the results of the overall evaluation and from their explanations. First, the VOLAR program at Fort Benning had clearly had a massive positive impact on first-tour

enlisted personnel in all of the target areas. Improvements were seen in attitudes toward specific VOLAR actions, general attitudes toward the Army, expressed career intentions, and actual re-enlistments. There was also evidence that these last two categories, although slow to mature, would have even greater impact in the future if VOLAR support were maintained.

A second finding was that VOLAR either had not influenced the other groups studied (first-tour officers, extended-tour officers, and extended-tour enlisted personnel) or had inadequate influence to counteract other factors, such as the reduction in force and the more stringent re-enlistment requirements. This finding was not surprising since VOLAR actions were mainly targeted toward first-tour enlisted men. (Many actions of the U.S. Army Infantry School had been highly acceptable to officer students however.)

Third, among the four general attitude areas (pride, security, inequities, and leadership), security and pride were more strongly related to expressed career intentions than were inequity and leadership. Findings in the re-enlisting and separation interviews identified the strong relationship between security and career intentions. This relationship explains the substantial number of re-enlisting married soldiers with dependents. The study further showed that a feeling of pride in one's service was important for both married and unmarried soldiers.

Fourth, all data, including interviews with enlisting and separating personnel, suggested areas in which further beneficial actions could be taken. Since the re-enlisting soldier was likely to be married with family responsibilities, action to enhance the quality of his family life would probably make the Army more appealing to him. For both the first-tour officer and the unmarried soldier, a feeling of satisfaction and pride in daily activities was a necessity. Without the compelling pressures of family responsibilities which led to a desire for financial security, the unmarried soldier had to enjoy what he did, or he would seek more desirable career pursuits. Inequities, therefore, seemed to have been well addressed by VOLAR, although leadership development and pride in service required additional effort.

Before leaving the specific conclusions of the experiment, a note of caution might be appropriate. Two general reasons were explored to explain the relatively slow development of positive career-oriented behavior among first-tour enlisted soldiers. The first was the very logical delay in changing complex attitudes. The second was the likelihood that soldiers might have been engaging in wait-and-see behavior. In this regard the dramatic improvement in expressed career intentions and the accelerating re-enlistment behavior reflected a closing credibility gap. More soldiers were believing that VOLAR was "for real." In the con-

text of these interpretations, any lessening of support for VOLAR would be viewed by soldiers as the long-suspected program de-emphasis; the reaction might well produce a real credibility gap that could require a very long time to bridge.

General Conclusions

The general findings were that Fort Benning was successful in achieving the stated objectives of Project VOLAR. The general human need categories explicitly designed into the experiment supported these findings, but complementing activities, such as adventure training and recruiting efforts, contributed to success. Graphic portrayal of specific findings showed a significant, favorable change in expressed career intentions of first-term enlisted personnel at Fort Benning over the period of the experiment. (*Chart 9*) First-term re-enlistment performance was also very encouraging, especially in later months. Except for a short period of time when re-enlistment procedures were being revised under the Qualitative Management Program, Fort Benning consistently exceeded first-term re-enlistment objectives. (*Chart 10*) Surveys of first-term re-enlistees conducted to determine what influence the VOLAR experiment had on their decision to re-enlist revealed that the experiment had influenced over 70 percent of them to stay in the Army. (*Chart 11*)

Perhaps the most persuasive indicator available, which reflected the success that Fort Benning achieved during Project VOLAR, was the number of soldiers who re-enlisted for their present duty assignment. For example, a significant percentage of soldiers in the grades of E–6 or below with less than nine years' service who re-enlisted did so to remain in their present duty assignment. (*Chart 12*) In other words, these soldiers liked Fort Benning, their units, and their jobs enough that they elected upon re-enlistment to remain at Benning, in their specific unit, and in their current job. During the first six months of the experiment (January–June 1971), an approximate monthly average of some 55.7 percent elected this option; during July–December 1971, this approximate monthly average increased to 71.8 percent; and during the final six months of the experiment, the soldiers re-enlisting to stay at Fort Benning increased again to 72.2 percent. This percentage was near optimum in order to provide both stability and promotion flow. Over 80 percent, for example, would be too stable and would not provide for Army-wide manpower requirements.

The first-term soldiers' rating of Fort Benning as a military post was also significant. (*Chart 13*) The observable 21 percent increase in this group's expressed opinions that Fort Benning was "one of the best Army posts" to which they had ever been assigned further clarified the attitudes and feelings of Fort Benning soldiers.

CHART 9—EXPRESSED CAREER INTENTIONS: FIRST-TERM ENLISTED




CHART 10—RE-ENLISTMENTS: FIRST-TERM ENLISTED MEN (JANUARY 1971–JUNE 1972)




CHART 11 —RE-ENLISTING AND SEPARATING INTERVIEWS




CHART 12—RE-ENLISTMENTS: PRESENT DUTY ASSIGNMENT OPTION (JANUARY 1971–JUNE 1972)





CHART 13—FIRST-TERM ENLISTED



The supporting programs all contributed to these results. The decentralized training policy had been enthusiastically supported at all levels of command. This policy reaffirmed confidence in the dedication, judgment, and professionalism of the officer corps by placing the responsibility for training at a level where it could be most efficient. Through the vehicles of adventure training and civic action, the personnel at the lower echelons were challenged. They were eager to participate in training that focused sharply on key mission requirements, which in turn provided greater job satisfaction. This approach not only developed junior leaders but also provided the latitude, challenge, and satisfaction required to retain young men of quality in the Army.

Considerable progress was made at Fort Benning in the unit-of-


choice recruiting program. The real test bed for the recruiting experiment was the 197th Infantry Brigade, a TOE (table of organization and equipment) combat arms unit. The brigade became an all-volunteer unit as a direct result of the MVA program. Over two thousand young men enlisted for this unit during a sixteen-month period, and the brigade also recruited eleven hundred soldiers for other units or other enlistment options. Without question, the biggest recruiting success was the young soldiers of the 197th Brigade. They liked what they were doing. They liked the way they were being treated and they liked the challenge of their duties sufficiently well to talk to and enlist their buddies and contemporaries in large numbers. Early results of the 931st Engineer Group unit-of-choice program, which began on 1 May 1972, indicated comparable success for this unit's recruiting program. Nearly six hundred and fifty men, over half of the group's vacancies, were recruited for the 931st Engineer Group in a sixty-day period.

These changes were accomplished with no losses in either military discipline and order or mission capability. On the other hand, troop morale rose to a high degree. The experimental period proved to be exciting and interesting. By no means had all of the answers been found to the problems inherent in converting the Army into a truly professional all-volunteer force. The actions taken during Project VOLAR, however, represented a major step in the right direction and were well-received, particularly by the first-term enlisted soldier. On the other hand, studies contained in the Final Evaluation Report pointed out a continuing need to further improve leadership, job satisfaction, and pride in service.


Delayed Successes

The full impact of eighteen months under the MVA concept has not yet been completely realized. Projects and programs initiated during the experimental year of VOLAR were still generating successful secondary reactions and impacts on the military community. Areas worthy of particular note were the expansion of unit-of-choice (UOC) recruiting to station-of-choice recruiting, the impact of UOC on Reserve and National Guard enlistments, the contribution of improvements to family environment, and the effects of NCO leadership development programs.

Expansion of the recruiting effort to station of choice would allow the entire post to enjoy the benefits of positively oriented soldiers, who, with correct guidance, would be responsive to the needs of the community as well as the mission. Their arrival alone would contribute to good discipline and morale simply by the stability they represented and the motivation that brought them to the post. Furthermore the Army-wide influence of these UOC personnel is just beginning to be realized as initial participants leave post units after their stabilized tour.




Benning Mall Under Construction



Artist Concept of Benning Mall

CHART 14—THE MVA CYCLE



The Fort Benning mall shopping center, midway in construction at the end of the experiment, would make an impact on the domestic needs of the military family. The shopping facility would lessen negative home pressures which often drove out the undecided. Finally the full impact of new leadership development courses had not yet been fully realized within the commands. The products of co-ordinated NCO development programs held great potential for maintaining the momentum of the MVA concept even as enthusiasm and newness wore off. The junior leader who had "made it" would be the closing segment in the cycle of events that made up the all-volunteer concept. Many factors contributed to the success of the cycle, but the satisfied customer was the best salesman for the product and was most likely to perpetuate its continuance since he was the prime recipient of its benefits. (*Chart 14*)

Fort Benning was fortunate to have been designated by the Department of Army as one of the initial VOLAR posts. As an early starter, Fort Benning was able to develop ideas and principles which helped change the Army's public image for the better. These changes paralleled new and innovative approaches to recruiting. The population at Fort Benning not only reflected the success of unit-of-choice recruiting but, by virtue of its success, developed into an audience receptive to further change. The impact on career intentions had been clearly demonstrated by increased re-enlistments and by positive trends toward reserve forces

recruiting. In the final analysis the total value of Project VOLAR was more than the sum of successful experiments in the Benning Plan. The areas of living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction were greatly improved and re-enlistments and enlistments had significantly increased. The MVA concept was more than this, however; it was the synergistic effect of total involvement.

CHAPTER VI

The Overview

Fort Benning with the rest of the Army faced significant problems in the late 1960s. Vigorous programs and leadership solved most of those problems concerning mission fulfillment and day-to-day personnel management. However, to arrive at more than improvised solutions was beyond Fort Benning's scope. Project VOLAR increased authority and resources to the extent that Fort Benning was able to go directly to the roots of problems and achieve broader solutions. As a result, the situation at Fort Benning became healthier. Soldiers enjoyed being assigned there, and this happy condition was a direct result of the post's involvement in the MVA concept.

The Fort Benning VOLAR plan was an experiment. The purpose of the experiment was to produce an environment which would contribute to raising a volunteer Army. At the same time discipline, military order, and mission capability could not be weakened. The Benning Plan accomplished its goal. With emphasis on fundamental military principles, imagination, and innovation, the Benning Plan strengthened professionalism, enhanced Army life, and revitalized the accession system. The vast majority of the actions initiated during the experimental phase proved to be extremely valuable and became an integrated part of Fort Benning's continuing program to build a volunteer force.

An over-all analysis of the Benning Plan shows that the most significant actions were those which reduced the time spent on relatively menial chores that were not part of the soldier's professional job, made no obvious contribution to training, or did not promote the accomplishment of the unit's mission. Actions to improve the life-style of the soldier by providing more privacy and comfort in his living area were also significant. Taken collectively, the improvements by the Infantry School in support of the Fort Benning Plan accomplished the intended objectives of upgrading education, enhancing the professionalism of the school's staff and faculty, and providing specific measures which better train, motivate, and influence young leaders to choose a career in the Army.

Verification of Success

Perhaps the most persuasive indicators available which reflected the success that Fort Benning achieved during the MVA experience were

the number of first-term re-enlistments, the number of soldiers who re-enlisted for their present duty assignment, and the number of enlistees attributable to the unit-of-choice recruiting program. The soldiers enjoyed their jobs, their units, and Fort Benning enough to elect as their re-enlistment option to remain at Fort Benning, in their specific units, and in their current jobs. Furthermore, they were willing to go out and encourage their contemporaries to enlist.

The actions taken at Fort Benning were clearly a major step in the right direction. Both the Army and the public realized that to increase enlistments and re-enlistments, two steps had to be taken: increase pay and improve the attractiveness of service life. The three-pronged emphasis in improving living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction was directed at the root of many distasteful and unnecessary, irritating elements of service life, and it did improve the attractiveness of Army life.

The apprehension that increased enlistments and re-enlistments would compromise quality for quantity proved to be unfounded. Commanders at Fort Benning viewed the unit-of-choice soldier most favorably. Some typical comments included: "performance of unit of choice soldiers is better than that of non-UOC soldiers" and "generally, I have found the average Unit of Choice soldier to be highly interested and easily motivated." The unit-of-choice program was easily able to fulfill its goals even when the enlistment standards for this option were raised.

High standards were also maintained for re-enlistment. Re-enlistment quotas were continually exceeded during the VOLAR experiment, indicating that sufficient quantities of qualified soldiers would continue to re-enlist without having to lower these high standards.

The sum total of information on military discipline during the period of the MVA experiment showed that military order and discipline were not jeopardized by MVA innovations. Generally all morale and discipline indicators remained relatively stable or improved during the experiment, and for the last six months of the experiment the number of reported crimes declined. The abrupt reversal in crime trends at Fort Benning was accomplished without modification of MVA policies and procedures.

The successful completion of the experimental phase did not mean, however, that all the answers to problems inherent in converting the Army into a professional volunteer force had been found. The results indicated that the steps were in the right direction but, at the same time, pointed out areas which still needed much thought and action. Most of these areas would have to be dealt with at a higher level than an Army post, as money was usually critical for these future projects. Areas that deserved close scrutiny as future action areas included the modernization of personnel management services and techniques. Army finance—an

automated system—was still extremely sensitive to human error. The administrative processes for providing input to finance machinery should be soldier-proofed and administratively safeguarded so that human mistakes would not have a devastating effect on pay envelopes. "No pay due" might be correct accounting, but it was not particularly good management at either the soldier, administrator, or commander level. Resource management would also become increasingly important in a smaller Army. Mess management deserved thorough study and improvement. A basic need that required continuing study and action was leadership and the programing of its development. A quicker means of eliminating nonproductive soldiers and officers was necessary. There were other basic areas needing improvement, and they all had one thing in common—they were costly. The Benning Plan showed that such areas were important to the soldier and if improvements were made, he would respond favorably, namely, by re-enlisting or getting others to enlist.

Lessons Learned

One of the most basic and fundamental lessons learned from the entire experiment was that the commanders must become personally involved to have a successful program. General Talbott's personal and continuing involvement in the experiment set the tone for the entire post chain of command and clearly demonstrated that Project VOLAR was not a lip-service commitment. Acceptance of MVA as a major mission allowed the amount of time and expertise necessary for success to be devoted to the program. High priority status precluded the possibility of the program's fading away due to the diversion of resources to other missions judged more important. The success of the Quality Control Organization in implementing and controlling the Benning Plan was a further indication of the importance of the commander's involvement. The arrangement whereby the MVA Control Group worked directly with the commander and his staff provided a powerful means of carrying out projects and innovations. At the lower command levels, the unit quality control officer provided a direct link between his commander, the soldiers, and the MVA Control Group. In fact, the quality control concept proved to be so worthwhile that it was retained after the experiment ended in June 1972. The unit quality control officers worked in conjunction with the MVA office to insure that continuing projects were not interrupted and that there was no subtle return to pre-VOLAR policies.

Another lesson learned was that the Benning Plan was much more than a list of actions; it was the embodiment of a concept. The success enjoyed by Fort Benning cannot be attributed to selected specific actions developed during the course of the experiment. Even the most popular

innovations, such as civilianization of KP, had to be supported by numerous other less dramatic, lower impact innovations in order to cause attitude changes. Only when the broad areas of living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction were noticeably improved by a combination of actions did the Benning Plan start to get results. Even though the inclusion of any one action into the plan defied analysis, the exclusion of some actions had a definite impact. This effect was especially noticeable when the target group felt such an action had been promised, or when an action was discontinued after implementation. In this case it was comparable with salt in a stew. No one could distinguish the salt when it was present, but its absence was discernible to all.

Once a program was announced, it had to be carried out or problems of credibility would develop. Soldiers were not interested in promises; what they believed in were actual results. When the expected results did not appear, cynicism rapidly set in and an attitude developed that dismissed the program as merely another whitewash project to fool the soldier. Fort Benning generally was able to avoid this problem. Simply keeping the soldiers honestly informed did much to prevent disillusionment. However, individual actions did not cause extensive problems of credibility; the problem was that at first the entire MVA concept was viewed with disbelief by the soldiers. How could disillusionment exist over something like the slowness involved in building partitions in barracks, when nobody believed the project would happen at all? Whenever the future of established MVA projects was in doubt, such as civilianization of KP, the soldiers at Fort Benning developed an attitude that the end of MVA was near and soon everything would be back to where it was in 1970. Thus the major problem of credibility was to instill a sense of permanency about the MVA concept. Even after two years there was some feeling that the whole MVA program, as exemplified by Project VOLAR and the Benning Plan, would eventually erode away.

Informed involvement of the noncommissioned officer was needed early in programs such as the Benning Plan. Lack of knowledge about the project contributed to the development of misconceptions about what was happening to the Army. The impact of the elimination of traditional NCO control devices, such as the granting of a pass, created an undesirable emotional reaction against Project VOLAR. Fort Benning's efforts to involve the NCO in the experiment and to make him aware of what was actually happening did much to aid in the success of the Benning Plan. Even with the realization that problems existed in this area, solutions required continuing emphasis.

Views of the Future

In light of the success of the Benning Plan in favorably influencing attitudes toward the Army and Fort Benning in terms of increasing

enlistment and re-enlistment rates, future success can be expected if the momentum continues. Attitudes will undoubtedly fluctuate depending on the immediate circumstances, but a vigorous application of the MVA concept will continue to increase enlistment and re-enlistment rates. As with all programs whose main concern is change, progress and improvements must be continued when the need and opportunity appear. To become static while society and the MVA target group continue to change will spell disaster to the MVA program. The Army must keep pace with changes in society in order to attract qualified volunteers and at the same time maintain good military order and discipline.

Another view for the future is that the unit-of-choice recruiting program is quite possibly the key to the MVA program. The unit-of-choice program embodies the flavor and meaning of the MVA concept more than any other action, and its progress can be graphically presented. As the enlistment option is disseminated throughout the Army, units discover that their most credible and effective advertising comes from satisfied soldiers who enjoy their jobs and assignments. On the other hand, disgruntled soldiers will effectively hinder unit-of-choice recruiting as a means of procuring volunteers. However, taken in conjunction with the entire MVA program, the already-demonstrated success of the unit-of-choice program indicates it may become the single most influential success indicator that a post or unit can have.

In the final analysis one fact stands out above all else—the MVA concept at Fort Benning worked. It worked to such an extent that, while the Modern Volunteer Army is still a sought-after goal, it is no longer a wispy mirage on a distant horizon but rather a distinct possibility, it has been created at least at one post, and it is within the entire Army's grasp.

Appendix A

Proposed Actions of Benning Plan, November 1970

Appendix A–1—Actions for Which Immediate Implementation Has Been Directed

1. Establish a quality control system with a full-time quality control officer in each major unit reporting to the unit commander.

2. Take appropriate action to slow down work pace. Establish realistic suspense dates and eliminate Saturday, Sunday, and holiday duty.

3. Establish junior enlisted men's council (similar to Junior Officers' Council) under the control of the post's command sergeant major and the Chief of Staff, USAIC.

4. Insure pressure is not put on military wives to join wives' clubs, attend coffees, or participate in other similar activities. This practice could be explained in initial arrival orientation.

5. Permit pen-and-ink changes to be made on typewritten paperwork if the corrections are understandable (on paperwork not going outside installation headquarters).

6. Eliminate reveille. Establish first daily formation to be work call. Allow soldier to report to work under his own responsibility. Command muster as required.

7. Establish a policy to prohibit inspections during weekends or on days immediately following weekends or holidays.

8. Do not require those on KP or other details to arrive for duty earlier than they are needed. Whenever military personnel are required, commanders must insure that appropriate schedules are established and followed.

9. Establish policies and procedures that eliminate the practice of waking soldiers for morning cleanup when they are off duty. (This policy applies to soldiers who are on pass, on compensatory time, or on other similar status.)

10. Prevent commanders from requiring individuals to buy two sets of personal items, one for display and one for use. Make items of interest on annual general inspections and inspector general inspections.

11. Refer to enlisted men as "soldiers" rather than "EM's."

12. Encourage maximum use of the "open door" hours scheduled during off-duty time.

13. Grant permission, on an individual basis, for soldiers to purchase small items of furniture and decorate individual areas according to their own tastes (when partitions or rooms are provided).

14. Re-emphasize to commanders that individuals should not be discriminated against for visiting the inspector general.

15. Eliminate the requirement for officers to sign statements certifying an action has been completed (as feasible and where Army regulations permit).

16. Make optional the wearing of badges on the fatigue uniform; require only rank, branch insignia, "US Army" tape, name tape, and unit patch. Make wearing of such items optional to the individual.

17. Permit shirt to be worn without blouse in administrative areas of all buildings.

18. Eliminate the requirement at Fort Benning to wear hats in privately owned vehicles.

19. Give officer-student class leaders more representation in post policy-making and planning groups and on USAIS academic review boards.

20. Provide an area where officer students may eat lunches brought from home. Use a classroom if necessary.

21. Initiate an optional civilian dress policy for personnel who work on Saturday (except where duties require the wearing of the uniform).

22. Eliminate requirement for students to stand at attention at the beginning of each class until a report is rendered and they are given the command "take seats."

23. Consolidate at brigade and battalion level as many company-level additional duties to officers as possible.

24. Direct that unit weekend and holiday detail rosters for soldiers be published at least three days in advance.

25. Establish program for treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers. Provide treatment locally, with assurance that volunteers will not be prosecuted. CONARC Fact Sheet 4–70 (May 1970) and AR 360–81 apply (AR 600–32 to be published 1 December 1970).

26. Allow soldiers to take refreshments into all areas of the service club.

27. Change unit mess hall meal hours on weekends and holidays to allow soldiers to sleep late and still be able to eat breakfast. Adjust style and

hours of serving lunch and supper to provide wider flexibility of time and selection of food (for example, hamburgers, sandwiches, and french fries, if desired). Expand master menu to provide greater variety of food whenever necessary and feasible.

28. Conduct a customer relations course for all PX employees and Department of the Army civilians who deal in services.

29. Provide wall lockers or coat racks in physical examination areas.

30. Initiate a part-time quality control group to conduct unannounced visits to service facilities, such as the PX, commissary, laundries, bank, and housing officer, to insure that courteous, quality service is being given to customers, and to report deficiencies.

31. Expand PX inventory to include major appliances, furniture, and a full range of sporting goods. Publicize and promote customer service and publish a mail order catalog. Stock athletic uniforms (as feasible, get Army regulation exception).

32. Authorize the post exchange to sell Boy Scout and Girl Scout uniforms and accessories (as feasible, get AR exception).

33. Add a fabric shop and sewing center at the PX.

34. Authorize construction of an additional nine holes for the Sand Hill golf course. (Have DFAE get site and prepare paperwork).

35. Attempt to schedule Ranger, Airborne, and Infantry Officer Basic courses so as to reduce time lags between courses.

36. Eliminate scheduling of classes before 0900 on days following night training which terminates after 2200.

37. Insure that support troops are not moved into the field too far ahead of time during training programs, and insure that these troops are informed as to the nature of the training.

38. Review USAIS weapons instruction (practical work) to insure that work groups are small enough to allow ample hands-on training by all students.

39. Insure that instructors do not make derogatory remarks about classes or compare one class with another. Instructors who violate prescribed standards should be immediately reassigned.

40. Refer to officers attending USAIS courses as "officer students" instead of "student officers."

41. Conduct some joint classes including students from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Officer Candi-

date School, and Noncommissioned Officer Course. IOAC students should conduct informal panel sessions for IOBC and OCS students.

42. Insure that all students coming to USAIS receive up-to-date information packets before they report to Fort Benning.

43. Incorporate an NCO panel discussion into IOBC on NCO-officer relations.

APPENDIX A-2—ACTIONS CONSIDERED FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE

(Subsequent to Directed Action 20 November 1970)

1. Establish and publish short- and long-term goals for the Infantry Center and show how they relate to the individual goals of each soldier.

2. Create a student affairs division in the Office of the Secretary, USAIS. The mission of this division is to watch over actions and procedures affecting student motivation, assist staff and faculty co-ordination of actions involving students' recommendations to the assistant commandant, and publish a weekly student news bulletin.

3. Review and revise regulations to clarify guidance on awards to make sure that subordinates know that an individual does not have to be above a certain grade to be eligible for an award.

4. Eliminate coercion in fund drives, savings bond campaigns, and similar activities by establishing campaign organizations which do not parallel existing chains of command.

5. Eliminate mandatory quotas for the suggestion awards program.

6. Establish a "Follow Me" team to recognize outstanding soldiers at Fort Benning. Five selected soldiers will spend one day with either the commanding general, assistant commandant, or other senior staff or department head.

7. Eliminate policy for both the commandant and assistant commandant to close IOAC and IOBC classes (either assistant commandant or commandant could close).

8. Schedule post athletic teams to play against local amateur civilian teams.

9. Use command newspapers and local television to increase coverage of the accomplishments of lower ranking soldiers.

10. Establish a more viable program of communications between civilian and military police.

11. Provide detailed information on policies, pay, and benefits to all military personnel on a regular basis.

12. Eliminate hurry-up-and-wait situation. Commanders at all levels must make a constant effort to plan ahead. Avoid overreacting to VIP's.

13. Eliminate bed-check for all units, mission permitting.

14. Eliminate sign-in, sign-out requirements at company level (except for those required for morning report entries).

15. Permit the wearing of duty uniform off-post during nonduty time. For example, other blue collar workers are free to shop and to visit local bars and other establishments in work clothes.

16. Establish sponsor program with IOAC students sponsoring IOBC students.

17. Insure that orientation for all newly commissioned officers attending IOBC includes sufficient information on customs of the service and standards of dress.

18. Insure that students are issued all manuals and other study materials they are required to use.

19. Establish a policy within IOBC to rotate the student chain of command, except for student company commanders, on a periodic basis.

20. Eliminate the requirement for IOBC officer students to march to and from classes on the main post.

21. Initiate informal, small-group discussions of unit activities at all levels.

22. Remove restrictions on travel during off-duty time.

23. Eliminate the requirement for use of the Armed Forces Liberty pass for overnight passes during normal duty week.

24. Give each soldier the day off on payday, mission permitting.

25. Provide compensatory time off during the week for personnel required to perform weekend details.

26. Establish an equitable work schedule in motor pools for military and civilian personnel.

27. Emphasize use of accelerated promotions as an incentive for enlisted men. Publicize these promotions.

28. Allow personnel to pick up their paychecks in the company area any time during the day on payday (or provide pay by mail to those who desire it).

29. Provide training for unit administrative personnel in order to expedite processing of hardship discharge and compassionate reassignment requests.

30. Assign more senior lieutenants as OCS tactical officers.

31. Insure distribution of information packets on location and hours of operation of post facilities to all incoming personnel.

32. Staff personnel service officers during the lunch period. (This action will be necessary if resident courses cannot be rescheduled to permit more free time.)

33. Conduct additional dances and other activities for unmarried enlisted men in service clubs and invite high school seniors and college-age girls to attend.

34. Insure that soldiers are informed of procedures for lodging complaints with the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board and the Better Business Bureau (against local businesses).

35. Brief all newly assigned personnel and their wives on services available at Martin Army Hospital. This briefing should be accomplished on a weekly basis in conjunction with an orientation by the Army Community Services Offices. (See Item 81.)

36. Assignment by MEDDAC of a doctor or Medical Service Corps officer on a duty roster basis at Martin Army Hospital and the annex to make continuous checks on outpatient waiting areas.

37. Review the current system for issuing certificates of nonavailability of quarters, with the goal of equitable opportunity for off-post living to all bachelor students.

38. Organize a Fort Benning Enlisted Men's Wives' Club similar to the Officers' and NCO Wives' Clubs.

39. Initiate a general orientation program for wives of military personnel, to include briefing on service activities, distribution of an information pamphlet, and explanation of post organization and missions and attendance at selected USAIS presentations. (See Item 75.)

40. Contract with a civilian taxi service to provide on-post transportation for a flat rate.

41. Provide information to personnel pertaining to all Military Airlift Command flights leaving Fort Benning and nearby Army and Air Force bases (telephone service).

42. Permit sponsors to take more than one dependent on hunting trips at Fort Benning.

43. Study existing traffic patterns with the goal of allowing traffic direct access to exit the post during early morning hours.

44. Have PX remain open until 2100 at least one or two nights a week.

45. Establish PX-operated coin washer-dryer facilities in troop areas.

46. Provide an Officers' Club facility geared toward the single IOBC student and other unmarried junior officers.

47. Permit use of guest house facilities by invited guests of servicemen, as space permits.

48. Schedule class input to eliminate the situation which requires an IOBC cadre company to process a new class in and process an old class out simultaneously.

49. Establish small discussion group classes (seminars) and increase use of peer instruction technique on a subject case-by-case basis.

APPENDIX A–3—ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY, ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL, OR RELIEF FROM RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY REGULATION

1. Reduce the work load of TOE units to enable them to move toward a forty-hour workweek. This action will require more detailed study to determine

a. minimum USAIC and USAIS personnel support requirements to achieve the desired quality standards;

b. those requirements which can only be filled by soldiers trained in their military operational specialties;

c. those requirements which can be filled by additional civilian staffing;

d. troop strength increases needed;

e. additional civilian labor strength needed and the cost involved.

2. Conduct a block of instruction on enlightened leadership and contemporary leadership problems for all commissioned and noncommissioned officers assigned and incoming.

3. Reorganize the 2d Student Battalion, The School Brigade, to strengthen its ability to supervise officer students. The concept for reorganization includes direct supervision of IOAC and IOBC classes through separate detachment chains of command. IOAC and IOBC detachment commanders (lieutenant colonels or majors) will be directly responsible to the battalion commander and will supervise cadre company commanders and tactical officers (majors or captains). There will be one tactical officer for every three IOAC classes and one tactical officer for each IOBC class. Tactical officers will be responsible for direct supervision of students.

4. Modify annual general and command maintenance management inspections to obtain a more realistic measure of unit capability.

5. Change existing policy which requires unrealistic submission dates for awards.

6. Permit soldiers to have beer in barracks.

7. Change Army Regulation 210–65 limiting class VI package stores' discount of local prices. Allow discount to be keyed to good financial management at the installation level.

8. Change saluting requirements to eliminate the salute when either or both persons are riding in a vehicle or when either or both persons are wearing civilian clothes.

9. Eliminate requirement for OBV–2 (obligated volunteer) officers to purchase the Army blue uniform as well as the requirement for it to be worn at social functions by officers under grade of captain. Permit the Army green uniform or civilian clothes to be worn as a substitute. (Study possibility of eliminating Army blue uniform completely.)

10. Publish weekly one-page student news bulletin for officer students.

11. Obtain from the Department of the Army an assured ninety-day notification period for personnel involved in permanent change of station.

12. Institute mandatory counseling at least once during each six-month period and when efficiency reports are rendered for junior leaders through grades O–3 and E–6.

13. Permit use of bank-type credit cards in the PX and commissary.

14. Expand services offered by the Legal Assistance Office to include representation in civil courts, review of legal documents, and tax return assistance.

15. Improve automotive craft facilities on post through the addition of adequate automotive testing equipment. Install heating and air-conditioning systems.

16. Eliminate scheduling of examinations on days following night instruction.

17. Provide more "open time" in IOBC and OCS by lengthening courses or by eliminating some instruction not really essential.

18. Expand PX inventory to include major appliances, furniture, and a full range of sporting goods. Publicize and promote customer service and publish a mail order catalog.

19. Authorize the post exchange to sell Boy Scout and Girl Scout uniforms and accessories.

20. Add a fabric shop and sewing center at the PX.

21. Authorize construction of an additional nine holes for the Sand Hill golf course.

22. Increase the number of telephones at MEDDAC appointment desks.

23. Authorize construction of a new cocktail lounge on existing porch of Fort Benning Open Officers' Mess and Supper Club.

24. Authorize construction of a service bar addition to Fort Benning Open Officers' Mess and Custer Terrace Annex.

Appendix A–4—Actions Requiring Additional Resources

1. Establish a rewards program to recognize outstanding soldiers at Fort Benning. (Involves free trips to regional attractions.)

2. Organize recruiting teams for the 197th Infantry Brigade to recruit in their home towns.

3. Provide funds for implementation, control, and evaluation of the Modern Volunteer Army Program.

4. Contract for civilian KP in unit messes postwide.

5. Hire civilian detail labor force to perform menial work details that do not relate to soldier missions.

6. Authorize civilian hiring and purchase of equipment for maintaining and policing roads and grounds.

7. Authorize hiring of civilians and purchase of equipment for collecting refuse and garbage.

8. Enhance preventive maintenance program for troop billets and family quarters.

9. Provide partitions in troop barracks postwide.

10. Provided free laundry service for all enlisted men postwide.

11. Provide free quarters-cleaning service for departing families.

12. Contract charter bus service free of charge for enlisted men to and from Columbus, Georgia.

13. Extend commissary hours on main post and Custer Terrace.

14. Purchase labor-saving devices.

15. Expand dental care available to military dependents.

16. Issue multipurpose embossed identification cards to servicemen and their wives.

17. Contract transportation between Fort Benning and selected recreation areas on weekends.

18. Reimburse use of privately owned vehicles to meet military transportation requirements.

19. Extend operating hours of the Quartermaster Clothing Sales Store.

20. Improve post shuttle bus service.

21. Provide a program for low-income local high school youths to spend a short summer camp period at Fort Benning.

22. Authorize summer training with pay for local high school ROTC cadets.

23. Invite 1,000 college ROTC cadets to tour Fort Benning for one week during the summer.

24. Establish a welcome center and central processing facility.

25. Establish a reception booth at the local airport and provide transportation to the post.

26. Improve lounge areas in company-level dayrooms throughout the post; include beer vending machines.

27. Convert an existing building into a nightclub facility exclusively for enlisted men E–1 through E–4.

28. Convert a building near the main commissary for use as a nursery for commissary and PX patrons.

29. Construct a thirty-unit guest house for the use of families arriving at or leaving the post.

30. Contract for local civilian facilities to provide guest house accommodations while a similar facility is being constructed on post.

Appendix B

Key Events of Project VOLAR, 1970–1972

November 1970	Fort Benning is designated as a VOLAR control post.
December 1970	Implementation of numerous no-cost actions is begun.
January 1971	Project VOLAR is initiated; civilian KP is started; construction of partitions is begun.
February 1971	Unit-of-choice recruiting is started in 197th Infantry Brigade.
March 1971	Up-or-out criteria is established for all grades re-enlisting.
May 1971	Adventure training is formalized by the Combined Arms Training Board.
June 1971	Money and authority are granted for continuation of Project VOLAR.
July 1971	Data returns establish initial positive trends.
August 1971	MOS test scores and high school education become criteria for re-enlistment.
November 1971	Advanced individual training at Fort Benning is begun for UOC volunteers.
December 1971	Fort Benning's honor guard marches in Orange Bowl.
January 1972	First all-UOC volunteer company is formed.
February 1972	Civic action operation takes place in Greenville, South Carolina.
May 1972	Unit of choice is expanded to include 931st Engineer Group.
June 1972	Ground is broken for Benning Mall; Project VOLAR is terminated.


Appendix C

Organization and Manning

APPENDIX C–1—PRINCIPAL COMMAND AND STAFF DURING THE MVA EXPERIMENT

Position	*1 November 1970*	*1 November 1971*	*30 June 1972*
Commanding General Commandant	Maj. Gen. Orwin C. Talbott	Maj. Gen. Orwin C. Talbott	Maj. Gen. Orwin C. Talbott
Assistant Commandant	Brig. Gen. John T. Carley	Brig. Gen. Paul F. Gorman	Brig. Gen. Paul F. Gorman
Deputy Commanding General–Chief of Staff	Col. Jim D. Keirsey	Col. Jim D. Keirsey	Col. Willard Latham
MVA Control Group	Col. Edwin L. Kennedy	Col. Edwin L. Kennedy	Lt. Col. Henry Doctor, Jr.
197th Infantry Brigade	Col. Willard Latham	Col. Willard Latham	Col. Edwin L. Kennedy
931st Engineer Group	Col. Robert J. Standley	Col. Robert J. Standley	Col. Robert J. Standley
MEDDAC	Col. H. Haskell Ziperman	Col. H. Haskell Ziperman	Col. H. Haskell Ziperman
USAIC Aviation Command	Col. Robert M. Grow	Col. Robert M. Grow	Col. Robert M. Grow
The School Brigade	Col. Frank L. Garrison	Col. Aubrey G. Norris	Col. Aubrey G. Norris
Human Resources Research Office	Dr. Thomas Jacobs	Dr. Thomas Jacobs	Dr. Thomas Jacobs

Appendix C–2—The Infantry Center



Appendix D

A CONUS Command in the Seventies

A Report by Colonel Latham to General Talbott

General

The purpose of this paper is to report observations and experiences gleaned from command of a CONUS brigade from February 1970 to November 1971. These observations are presented in the hope that they will be helpful for other leaders as a reference in preparing for command of CONUS units, especially at battalion and brigade level. Although there are a multitude of things to do well if a command is to succeed, emphasis in this paper is on concepts and techniques which were the most important in producing successful results in the current environment.

The organization of the 197th Infantry Brigade varied throughout the period from seven battalions, three separate companies, and a large scout dog training detachment to four battalions and three separate companies. The strength varied from 7500 to 3700 men. During most of the time, 90 percent of the enlisted personnel in the brigade were Vietnam returnees, with 80 percent having less than six months before their term of service expired. The units of the brigade were stationed in three separate locations throughout Fort Benning, some five to ten miles apart. There was an assumption that the brigade existed only for the purpose of supporting the Infantry School and all operational concepts were oriented on that premise; however, there were other important missions.

Leadership is still the key to successful command. There is very little, if anything, new in the art of command or leadership. Commanding the 197th Infantry Brigade provided me with an opportunity to apply lessons learned from twenty-two years of observation, education, and experience. Factors which worked and influenced each situation were simply the age-old principles that have been taught for years. The application of these principles is what counts.

There was no single course of action to solve the myriad problems in this large command. The successful solution of the many complexities which existed invariably involved a mosaic of actions, concepts, and programs. There were, of course, many conflicting pressures and designs from higher headquarters, adjacent commands, and subordinates, each with its own interest to serve. Despite these conflicts, the commander can successfully proceed if he does so in the following manner: first, under-

stand the guidance and mission of his higher commander; second, determine what he wants to do himself and insure that his goal is attainable and desirable; and third, make sure that everyone concerned knows what is to be done, and then relentlessly move toward the goal.

The Challenge

I assumed command of the 197th Infantry Brigade on 7 February 1970 and immediately proceeded to analyze the condition of the command. The following emerged as the significant problems of the brigade.

Morale. Over-all morale and esprit de corps of the brigade was low. The brigade and its personnel were spoken of in derogatory terms generally by other personnel on post, and brigade personnel had a low opinion of themselves, their jobs, and their unit. Chapel attendance was virtually nonexistent. Unit participation in brigade and post activities was lackadaisical. There was a sullen, unenthusiastic attitude prevalent throughout the brigade.

Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL). The incidence of AWOL was excessively high, at a rate of 42.5 per thousand.

Racial tension. During the months of February, March, and April 1970 there were twenty-one incidents which seemed to stem directly from racial disharmony. For white soldiers to move about in the brigade area after dark was considered unsafe. All incidents of robbery and assault in the brigade area during the months of February, March, and April were by groups of black soldiers against one or two white soldiers. There were three instances of white soldiers being dragged from their bunks during the night and beaten.

Military discipline. Military discipline, courtesy, and bearing were below acceptable standards. Soldiers did not willingly salute, wear their uniforms properly, or maintain minimum acceptable standards of appearance, particularly in haircuts. When corrected, the soldier's response was slow, insolent, and bordered on insubordination. Orders by junior and noncommissioned officers were routinely ignored, and this condition was accepted by these leaders.

Vehicle maintenance. The status of vehicle maintenance was also in need of improvement. The deadline rate for track vehicles was 23 percent, and for wheeled vehicles 17 percent, both excessively high. Most of the more than one thousand vehicles in the brigade did not have an assigned driver on a full-time basis, although the brigade at the time had personnel assigned commensurate with its authorized strength. The backlog of third-echelon deadline wheeled vehicles was ninety-four. An acceptable rate would have been ten to fifteen vehicles.

Manpower utilization. The brigade was making a massive effort to meet all troop requirements; however, requirements routinely exceeded

the available-for-support capabilities of the brigade. A detailed study of the work load of brigade personnel revealed that the average committed brigade soldier at Fort Benning worked an 84-hour workweek. The 84-hour workweek did not include the workweek averages of the approximately four hundred soldiers who were routinely away from Fort Benning for three weeks at a time in support of the Infantry School at the ranger camps in Dahlonega, Georgia, and Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. If these daily averages had been included, the over-all workweek would have been somewhat higher than eighty-four hours.

Dissident activities. There was a pronounced attempt by local dissident groups to discredit the military establishment and especially the post and brigade command structure. The principal tool was a local underground newspaper called RAP. The technique was to emphasize any unfavorable local conditions and to dramatize any and all conditions of soldier dissent, using both half-truths and prevarications. Although dissident activity was not in itself especially disruptive, it contributed to and highlighted a general picture of discontent.

These several areas were the major problems to be resolved. The brigade staff was set to a crash program of analyzing these conditions, with a view toward developing a comprehensive program of corrective action.

The Problem

As might be expected, there was no single condition or factor which alone was responsible for the conditions previously described. The causes were multiple, indicating that the solution should embrace a total approach to command. There were some principal conditions that required immediate correction or understanding.

Unit integrity. The brigade staff found that in order to meet the requirements of the various commitments placed upon the brigade, effective unit integrity, which had disappeared, had to be restored. Battalions and companies functioned as personnel and equipment pools. If a force of twenty-five men was required, twenty-five "bodies" were gathered and sent out. Squad leaders often did not know the names of men in their squads, and squad members did not know the names of their leaders.

Personnel turbulence. The breakdown of unit integrity was aggravated by tremendous personnel turbulence. Ninety percent of the brigade's soldiers were Vietnam returnees, with 85 percent having less than six months of Army service left. In 1970–1971 with an average strength of 4,520, 29,000 men passed through the 197th Brigade. This turnover could not be prevented but did require consideration in other actions.

"Vietnam syndrome." The 90 percent of assigned personnel who were Vietnam returnees exhibited a pronounced attitude of "I've done my part," reflecting their belief that they had spent the year in Vietnam

for which they had been drafted. They had done the important job, and they were unwilling to endure garrison life doing work they considered unimportant.

Leadership impact. The Vietnam syndrome was also manifest in the attitude of soldiers toward their leaders. Lieutenants and junior noncommissioned officers who had not been to Vietnam were held in especially low esteem because they did not know "where it's at" and were considered, at best, as "peers." Battalion and brigade commanders from Vietnam were frequently remembered as the "SOB 2,000 feet up in a helicopter telling me to hurry." To find an assigned leader actually leading was uncommon. Squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders were infrequently in their units in a leadership role. The leadership of the brigade was not totally involved in its direction. To quote a young soldier's description, "After 1700 hours the brigade was turned over to the SP5's while NCO's went to their moonlighting jobs and officers went to their off-duty education classes or just went home."

Working conditions. The soldier's attitude toward the brigade and his mission was heavily influenced by the nature of the work. As previously described, the brigade-committed soldier spent approximately eighty-four hours a week on the job; much of his work he considered degrading, such as policing trash along the roads, opening ammunition boxes for OCS candidates, raking gravel around bleacher sites, and filling sandbags for revetments. These conditions were aggravated by the requirement to be in position often several hours in advance of the time he was actually needed for support.

Lenient disciplinary policy. There was a general atmosphere prevalent among both leaders and soldiers that instances of indiscipline were not promptly, effectively, and fairly punished. There was dissatisfaction with the military justice program of the brigade and with the decisions of military courts. Interestingly enough, the effectiveness of the military courts was distrusted by both leaders and soldiers. Leaders believed that the courts were lenient and that military judges did not understand the problems of command, and soldiers believed that military court justice, with few exceptions, was administered by young, inexperienced judges.

Corrective Action

After considering the problems and their apparent causes, the brigade staff determined that the first thing to be done was to restore order in the brigade area and confidence in the chain of command. A major effort was required to make personnel of the brigade feel important and needed. A number of steps were taken.

Mission statement. In order to determine what the brigade was supposed to do and to establish priorities, a comprehensive mission state-

ment was developed and announced. The assigned missions of the brigade were to support the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School, prepare to commit troops in support of contingency missions, and train assigned units to the highest possible degree. Later, three other missions were deduced and added to the lists: participate in the Volunteer Army project, conduct unit-of-choice recruiting, and conduct advanced individual training.

Brigade objectives. In order to focus talent and emphasis, brigade objectives were established in relative order of priority for the subordinate commands as follows: reduce AWOL; improve race relations; improve morale, esprit, and efficiency of the brigade; insure a high level of troop support to the Infantry School and the Infantry Center; and eliminate crime and dissident activities. Later, as conditions improved, three other objectives were added: recruit 4,500 soldiers by June 1973; re-enlist a maximum number of first-term Regular Army and AUS personnel; and eliminate drug abuse.

Leadership standards. The next step in implementing the corrective program was to re-establish discipline—the prompt, intelligent, and willing obedience to leaders. This step was begun by requiring, without exception, the total involvement of every leader in the task. Minimum but essential leadership standards were announced. Commanders and leaders who did not meet these standards would be unacceptable in positions of authority. These principles are summarized below.

Each leader at his appropriate echelon will lead in person at all times unless excused by proper authority, and this exception will be used very sparingly. This statement meant that the squad leader or the platoon leader, for example, was always expected to be with his unit. Unit integrity was mandatory.

Each leader will set a proper example. There were three principal areas in which the brigade commander paid close and continuous attention to the example set by the subordinate commanders, who, in turn, were expected to pay the same attention to leaders and commanders subordinate to them. Each commander and leader was expected to epitomize dedication to the brigade's mission and objectives. Commanders and leaders of the brigade were expected to attain the highest degree of physical fitness, and their example was to be reflected in the fitness and confidence of their men. This physical fitness must lend itself to active demonstration before and with the troops. The commanders and leaders must exemplify reverence, respect, and participation in programs for development of moral and spiritual attributes. The high plane of moral and spiritual fitness of commanders and leaders is to be reflected in their language, bearing, and conduct at all times.

Commanders and leaders at the company level and below were

expected to be personally acquainted with all their personnel in such a way as to be effective counselors. Commanders and leaders had to be present at all times when leadership, counseling, or example might be effective; such availability was difficult and demanding but fully expected. Commanders and leaders must make sure that leaders with the ability and wisdom to act decisively are available and on the scene at all times when a crisis could conceivably occur.

Commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the brigade were expected to know more about individual tasks of their subordinates than any of the subordinates; and until that knowledge was achieved, no other outside influence, other than family and religion, had a legitimate call on the leader's time.

Leadership programs. In order to encompass every aspect of the brigade's problems and challenges, the following programs were developed as the means by which the leadership standards announced for the brigade would be exercised: leadership improvement, physical fitness, athletics, social activities, spiritual activities, and image improvement. Subordinate commands were needed to develop courses of action directly related to achieving dynamic effect and improvement in each program area. Subordinate commanders were allowed and expected to take maximum initiative in developing their individual unit program subject to the following guidance.

The leadership improvement program was to include, as a minimum, a constant leadership evaluation and counseling technique concerning the effectiveness of unit leaders. Although the range of techniques among battalions varied, the most effective was the continuous counseling programs developed for officers and noncommissioned officers. A major contribution was also made to the brigade's leadership program by the initiation of the Enlightened Leadership Course of Instruction developed by the Infantry School and conducted at Fort Benning. This course consisted of a week of concentrated instruction concerning several areas of special importance, particularly race relations.

In the area of physical fitness, each subordinate unit was required to have a program designed to raise the physical capabilities of each individual to the highest possible level. There were to be dynamic programs for all age groups as well as for the overweight and personnel with physical limitations. There were numerous activities inspired at brigade level, such as semiannual officer physical combat proficiency tests in which demanding standards of achievement were required, and frequent prescribed feats, such as taking the brigade on long runs of more than five miles and forced marches of twelve miles or more. All these activities were conducted in a competitive atmosphere. With this approach, senior officers and NCO's were required to meet physical

standards, or they were removed from their positions of responsibility. This program gave leaders an opportunity to develop a spirit of competition and to justify their status as leaders in the eyes of men who measured them daily by their ability to lead physically.

In the athletics program, each subordinate unit was expected to have maximum participation in all athletic programs authorized at the post. The athletic program was designed to be part of and complement the physical training. The program was aimed at developing the will to win.

In the social activities program, commanders were expected to develop an active, pleasant, and rewarding social atmosphere for all members of their units, including families. Social activities were closely monitored, first, to insure that there was an active program, and second, to insure that the activities were appropriate and enjoyable. Emphasis was placed on activities that brought all ranks together.

The spiritual activities of the brigade were at a virtual zero, so this program had to start with basics. Accordingly, the approach was to incorporate the expectations of high leadership qualities and the need for an active community life in a positive way into the spiritual program developed by the brigade. Actions include chapel choirs, social hours, a children's church program, and a midweek folk-type religious program aimed primarily at young soldiers. All these measures were combined with the expectation that leaders are to provide appropriate spiritual example and chaplains are expected to exemplify the highest standards of leadership, including dynamic participation in troop activities such as physical training and all arduous types of duty. This program met with considerable resistance and awkwardness at first; however, over a period of months it became a productive element in the total community picture, especially for families.

The image improvement program was designed to change both the brigade's and the public's minds concerning the image of the soldier. The soldier must be seen as a positive, competent protector of the public and a constructive participant in the community. The public must be convinced that the soldier is not only a fighter but also a good neighbor. This program was required to have, as a minimum, an active schedule of domestic action projects, which meant participation in local affairs by assisting in worthwhile community projects, such as repair or construction of playgrounds in underprivileged areas. There was also a program for constant identification of substandard soldiers and leaders, with positive programs of rehabilitation or elimination for those who could not be corrected.

All of these programs were designed to touch every major area of brigade life and to create conditions conducive to the development of an enthusiastic, progressive unit and community spirit. The brigade mem-

bers were all to "sweat together in one puddle." There was to be an appropriate ratio of work and play. The leader's genuine concern for the soldier's welfare was to be self-evident.

Subordinate Units

Commanders of battalions and separate companies were given a letter of instruction which stated the objectives to be achieved and outlined the broad programs to be followed. This guidance provided a framework and, at the same time, allowed subordinate commanders maximum flexibility in implementing the programs. Although all commanders included the prescribed programs as a minimum, details of the programs varied greatly among battalions, each reflecting the different battalion's situation and the personality of the commander. All programs were required to be oriented toward achieving the announced objectives. However, they could be and often were expanded at the discretion of the subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders briefed the brigade commander monthly on the progress of programs under way in their battalions.

The Staff

The key to successful supervision of the brigade was the operation of the staff. The staff was subject to the same turbulence prevalent throughout the brigade. Accordingly, a strong executive officer had to train and supervise the staff in its duties. The staff had the routine functions organic to any staff. However, there were other critical areas which, assuming reasonable efficiency in the routine areas, made the difference between success and failure of the major programs of the brigade. In order to insure dynamic staff supervision of these key areas, some of the traditional staff alignments had to be bypassed. This situation was particularly true in the intelligence and S–5 (domestic affairs and VOLAR activities) areas.

In the S–1 (Personnel) office, the adjutant was required to develop imaginative concepts to enhance morale and community spirit. Of particular importance were projects designed to bring brigade personnel and their families together in an enjoyable atmosphere. To this end, brigade and battalion picnics, parties, and field days were encouraged and supported. These affairs were imaginatively conceived in such a way as to encourage maximum participation by all ranks and their families, including children. The S–1 was to be especially attentive to the soldier club system in the brigade area. A club sponsorship concept was developed which encouraged soldiers to spend more of their entertainment time in the brigade area. Another critical area of S–1 concern was the streamlining of military justice and elimination procedures to insure

swift and sure justice for the guilty while retaining the necessary element of comparison.

Although all staff sections were important, the section in charge of the areas most likely to result in disastrous consequences if not properly handled was S–2 (Intelligence). In addition to his routine duties of security, the S–2 officer in charge was directly responsible for programs to combat drug abuse, monitor dissident behavior, improve weapons security, and monitor the brigade area in anticipation of racial unrest and violations of law and order. Furthermore, he was directly in charge of the brigade's correctional custody facility. In these areas, the S–2 was expected to provide an effective information network which would allow the brigade commander to take prudent action in advance of real trouble. The encouraging progress of these programs was largely due to the success of the intelligence effort. The corrective custody facility was always a sensitive area requiring the highest degree of skill and professionalism on the part of all people concerned in order to obtain the desired result—rehabilitation of errant soldiers. Its major contribution was its responsiveness to military justice requirements of speedy punishment for minor offenses.

The S–3 (Operations and Training) developed and was charged with the supervision of six major areas of emphasis in addition to his routine functions. They were the 20–20–60 concept, a technique of establishing a ratio of time and effort to be spent in maintenance, training, and troop support for the Infantry Center and the Infantry School; the five-day workweek; the personnel accountability system; work and effort equalization between subordinate units and between other units at Fort Benning; adventure training, a concept for providing stimulating and exciting training, to be conducted in connection with the 20–20–60 concept; and energetic supervision of the brigade's physical training program. The supervision in all of these areas had to be carried out with the right amount of energy and discretion so as not to restrict the command prerogatives and flexibility of subordinate commanders but yet to insure that the programs and desires of the brigade commander were followed.

The major challenge of the S–4 (Maintenance and Logistics) was to create a system which would allow for the development and continuation of a high state of maintenance in a period of changing inspection concepts. The command maintenance management inspection (CMMI) system was thankfully discontinued, which released the command from the convulsive periodic efforts to become ready for inspections. An alternative was required that would achieve a high state of maintenance without the debilitating impact of the CMMI system. The result was the development of the "maintenance meter" approach, a concept of con-

tinuous evaluation and inspection in an announced number of commodity areas such as shop operations, motor stables, and roadside spot checks. The inspections were designed to be corrective and helpful. When a unit had difficulty, the brigade inspection team remained with the unit until the necessary standard was reached. A further refinement of this system was the imposition of a type of operational readiness test for each unit. As the units routinely announced their own maintenance status—which was a part of the maintenance meter approach—they were subject to deployment in the field on an unannounced basis to operate for a period of approximately one week. Whatever the subordinate commander had announced as his maintenance capability was expected to be demonstrated in the operational readiness test.

The S–5 (VOLAR and Unit-of-Choice Activities) was a staff section created with the implementation of the Volunteer Army concept (VOLAR) at Fort Benning. This section's responsibilities cut across many former activities of the other primary staff sections. It was especially responsible for actions designed to make dynamic improvement in the quality of Army life, for the attitude of the civilian community concerning the Army, and for the over-all evaluation of the Volunteer Army projects in the brigade as a part of the Fort Benning VOLAR program. It was the primary staff section for domestic action projects which were designed to influence favorably public opinion toward the Army and to co-ordinate the unit-of-choice recruiting activities of the several battalions.

Although a special section under the supervision of the S–1 staff, the religious program received direct guidance from the brigade commander due to the total absence of an effective religious program at first. This program was considered necessary to the development of a complete community atmosphere. It was an extremely delicate area which was slow to respond. The obstacles ranged from apathy to resistance. The chaplains were charged not only with developing inspirational and stimulating spiritual programs but also with functioning as effective staff officers to their supported units. They were expected to be particularly informative and helpful to the commander in the resolution of AWOL and race relations problems. They were required to maintain attitude surveys and continuous estimates of morale. In order to make their programs effective and responsive to the over-all military environment, chaplains had to follow the same standards as commanders in presenting examples of personal qualities in nonspiritual areas.

Control: Organization and Evaluation

The brigade initially consisted of an organization of seven battalions and four separate companies with an authorized strength of 7,500 men

and an assigned strength which was frequently more. Accordingly, in order to create effective control to maintain direction and supervision of the leadership standards and programs, modifications had to be made to the standard table of organization for the brigade. The brigade was authorized a lieutenant colonel as the S–3 officer and a lieutenant colonel as the brigade executive officer. These two grade authorizations were converted into deputy commander positions, and two task forces were created within the brigade. Task Force Alpha consisted of the tank battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, and an artillery battalion with two separate companies attached. Task Force Bravo consisted of two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a support battalion with two separate companies and a scout dog detachment attached. The deputy commanders were given a letter of instruction which gave them responsibilities amounting to command of a task force. They were charged with the direction, supervision, and implementation of the various programs of the brigade and the achievement of the brigade's announced objectives. The arrangement allowed the brigade commander to control effectively the organizations whose composition of companies exceeded forty-five. The plan of control carefully delineated responsibilities to the deputy commanders, while at the same time brigade command policy, guidance, and decisions were passed through the brigade staff. Staff supervision continued to be exercised by the brigade staff. The staff would be responsive to the needs of the deputies but responded directly to the brigade commander. In other words, the deputy commanders could not insert themselves between the staff and the brigade commander.

An equally important facet of controlling an organization the size of the 197th Infantry Brigade is the ability to evaluate progress or the lack of it toward achievement of announced objectives. To perform this evaluation, a technique of analysis had to be developed that was specifically directed toward the achievement of the brigade's major objectives and programs. Developing such a technique was a particularly delicate operation in view of much of the current criticism in today's military environment concerning statistical evaluation. The key here is to have enough objective evaluation to be able to spot adverse and favorable trends in time to take appropriate action and, at the same time, convince subordinates that they are not being judged solely on a statistical basis. They must be convinced that they are more than numerical ciphers. The objective evaluation must be supplemented with a subjective feel for the situation, especially in matters of morale and esprit. The deputy commanders were invaluable in this subjective evaluation. The evaluation program was especially helpful in counseling subordinate commanders regarding the effectiveness of their organizations. However, in the final analysis, there is no substitute for a personal observation of the commander, who should see for himself—and be seen—as often as he can.

Areas of Special Emphasis

There were five areas whose influence cut across all programs and objectives of the brigade. Their impact was such that their status had to be uppermost in the mind of the commander at all times. These five areas were dedication and motivation of leaders, development of pride in the individual and his unit, race relations, orientation of new personnel into the brigade, and the volunteer army project.

Dedication and motivation. The dedication and high motivation of all leaders is vital to the success of a dynamic program, but such leadership can by no means always be assumed. The brigade staff quickly found that the total involvement of leaders in their roles left much to be desired. Many noncommissioned officers routinely expected to be able to take outside jobs. Many officers and noncommissioned officers also expected as a matter of course to be able to participate in off-duty education, either as teachers or students. Other outside influences, such as civilian community activities if the leader lived off-post, all had a debilitating effect. These influences often quickly began to exert an overriding influence on the dedication of the leader. All distractions of this type tended to create an environment which militated against the leader who saw his unit, and the soldiers whom he led, as first priority. The lax attitude was summed up by a young lieutenant who announced that since he was a college graduate, he was too well educated and his time was too valuable to have to look after substandard people. Outside influences must be vigorously resisted by the commander. Concurrent with the development of a complete community environment within the military unit, the outside involvement of key personnel should be restricted, if necessary, or personnel unwilling to make the total involvement should be removed from positions of responsibility.

Development of pride. Individuals and units must be made to feel special pride in themselves because of who they are and what they do. Special means must be developed to promote this feeling. A dynamic physical fitness program was an ideal first step within the brigade. When a man begins to feel vigorous and healthy, he eventually perceives a difference between himself and other men not so involved. The program must be both aggressive and progressive so that the man clearly recognizes he is advancing his own abilities and welfare. The idea of wholesome competition can be introduced into almost any field of military endeavor and should be. Training must be tough, demanding, exciting, and enjoyable. Routine operations must be approached with the idea of accomplishing something worthwhile. The worthiness of these endeavors must be a matter of constant indoctrination to the individual and to units. In the 197th Brigade, domestic action projects and adventure training added just the right degree of stimulation, excitement, and

interest required in training at the time. The increasing awareness and expressions of appreciation by the Infantry School and the Infantry Center for well-performed support missions continually brought to the individual soldiers and units the realization that the work they were doing in support of the school and center was appreciated and necessary.

Race relations. In the current social environment of the United States today, the existence of good race relations cannot be assumed. Good race relations can, however, be achieved. The development of good race relations begins with a hard assessment of the racial situation to determine the local problem. The key rests in the credibility of leaders. The leader's approach must be open and honest. He must be prepared and indeed he should seek out opportunities to involve himself. In short, he must demonstrate his fitness as an individual sensitive to racial matters. He must announce his policy in terms understood by the average soldier. He must live up to his terms and standards. In the 197th Brigade, the announced policy was that all individuals were to be treated equally. Each man was required and expected to do his best; any incident between two people of different ethnic backgrounds, even a traffic accident, would be treated as a racial incident until it had been thoroughly investigated, conclusions had been drawn, and a decision had been made by the responsible commander concerning the racial aspects of the incident. This procedure had been occasionally considered as overreaction; however, it was extremely effective in achieving the confidence of both black and white soldiers and convincing them that their interests were being looked after at the highest echelon.

An active program of orientation, indoctrination, and education in race relations must have continuing priority. This program has been especially important with newly assigned personnel. Accordingly, in addition to regular race relations seminars, all new personnel received a series of race relations orientations and a seminar during their first week in the brigade area. The purpose of these orientations was not so much to convince the men, as it was to alert them to the concern of the commander and to the extent of the race relations program, so that they would recognize the full program as it came their way. Soldiers were advised that they were expected not only to participate in but to contribute to the over-all race relations improvement program.

Orientation, indoctrination, education. Because of a high degree of personnel turbulence, the attitude of newly arrived personnel toward the brigade and Fort Benning was influenced early. Accordingly, an aggressive program of orientation, indoctrination, and education was implemented which finally resulted in the development of the Central Training Command. This command had the task of orienting all new personnel coming into the brigade in such vital matters as race relations,

drug abuse, the Volunteer Army program, security, and physical fitness training. Administrative processing of new personnel into the brigade was also accomplished by the Central Training Command.

All leaders at the grade of captain or below attended a one-week orientation and education course at the training command in such matters as those previously mentioned plus intensive consideration of leadership case studies concerning problems they could expect to encounter in the brigade. This instruction was conducted by the brigade commander, deputy commanders, battalion commanders, and the key brigade staff officers only. The training command also conducted special leadership courses for selected noncommissioned officers of the grade E–5 who were being moved into leadership positions that were higher than their grade called for. The instruction for this course was provided by the command sergeants major of the brigade and the battalions. Emphasis during these courses of instruction was on the practical aspects of leadership—the hands-on, this-is-how-you-handle-it instruction.

In addition, the Central Training Command had subunits responsible for training specific leaders in drug abuse matters and for conducting the rehabilitation of drug users. The approach here was to find a technique for the leader to use in handling personnel who have a drug problem. The training command also conducted refresher training for soldiers found deficient in military ability or attitude. The refresher training consisted of activities associated with the Expert Infantry Badge qualification. Soldiers selected for this training were required to stay until they successfully graduated. The training command was also primarily responsible for the development and principal conduct of advanced individual training for personnel recruited for the brigade under the unit-of-choice recruiting program.

VOLAR. In December 1970, the 197th Brigade was notified of its selection to participate in the Volunteer Army project (VOLAR). The brigade plan, developed as a part of the over-all Fort Benning program called the Benning Plan, envisioned major improvements in three main areas of Army life: living conditions, working conditions, and job satisfaction. The idea was to create an environment that would sell itself to aggressive, intelligent young people. Comprehensive improvements made in each one of the areas included semiprivate living accommodations; relaxed sign-in, sign-out, and reveille policies; five-day workweeks; and more meaningful work assignments. Additionally, a positive division of available manpower was developed. Of the personnel available for support and unit training, 20 percent were always involved in maintenance, 20 percent in adventure and MOS (military occupational specialty) satisfaction training, and 60 percent in support missions for the Infantry Center and the Infantry School.

The implementation of this over-all program was important because it had a decisive impact on the morale of the soldiers as well as on the missions of other units at the Infantry Center, particularly the Infantry School. In the mission priorities of the brigade, the policy was to treat the VOLAR mission as first among equals. Thus the VOLAR program was to receive first consideration in the allocation of resources, although there were times when exceptions had to be made in order to support priority projects of the Infantry Center and the Infantry School. Such exemptions were made on a case-by-case basis, always with careful attention to the condition of announced VOLAR projects. The VOLAR program tended to exert a decisive influence on all other brigade missions and on most of its announced objectives. As VOLAR began to succeed, dramatic improvement and progress were reflected in such indicators as re-enlistments, unit-of-choice recruiting, AWOL, race relations, and disciplinary posture.

Results

The preceding discussion has been an attempt to specify concepts, programs, and techniques that produced successful results in the brigade. However, some of the concepts and statements perhaps emerge as somewhat lofty, and, although true, they may not be explicit enough to make the point intended. What happens at the nitty-gritty level of leadership determines final success or failure. In order to change the environment of the brigade, questions such as the following had to be answered: "I'm 40 years old—do you really expect me to run five miles?" "Am I expected to shine the buttons on my uniform and all of my insignia?" "Do you really expect me to come in to my company at 0200 in the morning to meet a newly arrived soldier?" "Am I expected to go to church?" "Am I expected to attend social functions?" In order to create a successful command environment, the answer to such questions has to be "yes." The trick is to find the right way to say it, that is, to get the point across and explain the reasons why. In the final analysis, the key words are "example" and "inspiration." Personnel who cannot be inspired by instruction and example and are thus unable or unwilling to meet leadership standards must be asked to lay down the burden of their responsibilities and make room for leaders who are responsive.

As the environment changed, improvement began to be evident. The AWOL rate went from 42.5 per thousand to a rate of 12 per thousand and generally remained at this level to the present time. Personnel who continued to have AWOL leanings usually had multiple instances of misbehavior on their record, generally indicating their unsuitability for further military service.

As the credibility of the command was established as being sensitive to race relations, incidents involving racial tension were dramatically

reduced. Black and white soldiers lived together in harmony; they felt free to bring up matters of racial concern which troubled them, and often did. Although there were racial problems in the surrounding civilian communities, the brigade remained relatively undisturbed.

Incidents of violations of law and order were reduced. Occasions of robbery and theft were sharply curtailed. There was a change in the attitude concerning drug abuse. Whereas soldiers formerly would not assist in the apprehension of drug users and pushers, they now began to identify both. Dissident activity virtually disappeared. Re-enlistment status improved from a point where previously 80 percent of re-enlistees had wanted to leave the brigade, now 80 percent wanted to stay.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by creating a desirable and productive environment that would sell itself, the brigade was able to make dramatic progress in the Volunteer Army program of recruiting its soldiers from the civilian community. In less than twelve months' time the brigade recruited all the combat arms soldiers that its authorized strength would permit. If the program continues at the same rate, the brigade will have a complete all-volunteer force within the next six months.

Creating a Successful Command Environment

The following are the decisive factors in a successful command program in the CONUS at this time. They are the factors a commander must influence, because they establish the environment in which a total command program can grow and flourish.

Mission. The Infantry Center commander clearly established that the mission of the commander of the 197th Brigade was to develop the finest unit of the U.S. Army and to establish objectives and set the necessary priorities to accomplish this mission. Action was immediately taken to inform all levels of command within the brigade of the mission and to assign them their roles in its accomplishment.

The leadership principle. An initial prime consideration in commanding the 197th Brigade was the general adverse attitude of soldiers of all ranks toward leadership. The soldier's attitude toward his leaders must be favorably influenced by leaders at all echelons who provide inspiration. Leaders who cannot or will not provide this kind of leadership should be replaced. Success of the leadership endeavor requires the development of a program whereby the leadership abilities of subordinates can be directly observed and evaluated.

Total involvement. The principle of leadership by example requires complete dedication of all leaders to the mission. Such dedication means total involvement in all phases of the brigade's community life. In areas where a complete community environment in the brigade does not exist,

one must be created; total participation of all leaders in this community is required. Half-hearted participation is a major obstacle and one that must be constantly emphasized.

Unit integrity. In order to develop the military community spirit, the absolute integrity of units must be observed. All units, from fire teams through battalions, must be committed as integral units. Violation of this principle should require personal approval by the brigade commander. All leaders should routinely be with their units. The importance of this factor is demonstrated by the observation that in all cases where a 197th unit had major problems of morale and discipline, the unit integrity principle had been violated.

Personnel accountability. In order to make the unit integrity principle work, all personnel must be continuously accounted for. Thus squad leaders, platoon leaders, and company commanders must know at all times the whereabouts and activities of their personnel during duty hours. This knowledge requires dynamic and constant supervision in order to account for everyone without jeopardizing leadership flexibility in the management of personnel. For example, soldiers must be allowed to attend to personal business, at the PX or snack bar for example, but the supervisor must know about it.

Leadership and management. In thinking back over my command experience of the past twenty-two years, and the last twenty-two months in particular, certain aspects of command and leadership have reached a critical point. For some years, there has been a dialogue going on in the Army concerning the relationship of leadership to management. The military leader has been characterized as the charismatic man on horseback, whereas the manager has been typified as the cool, efficient, emotionless man of statistics. The Army has generally taken the position that a good commander must be a good manager. However, over the past few years, particularly with the advent of the systems analysis technique, there has been an ever-growing acceptance and respectability for the manager image in military affairs.

The increasing admiration for the cost effective analysis in dealing with problems and concurrently the managerial approach put less stress on the shoulder-to-shoulder, eyeball-to-eyeball contact by the leader-manager. This situation, combined with the use of highly efficient communication and transportation resources such as the helicopter, has allowed commanders to directly influence operations without being personally involved. This trend started a chain reaction, for as brigade and battalion commanders tended to operate from helicopters and charts and thus to see less of their troops, company commanders, platoon leaders, first sergeants, and even platoon sergeants—taking their cue from this example—also began to see less and less reason to be personally involved. Avoidance of personal contact became fashionable.

As evidenced by the current major personnel problems, the Army is now reaping the whirlwind of this condition. As leaders no longer felt obliged to involve themselves personally with their troops, soldiers soon began to feel that they were unimportant cogs in the "great green machine." By definition, there is little inspiration in management, but the necessity to inspire is an organic part of leadership.

The whole command-manager relationship needs to be clarified officially for the Army's leadership structure. The Army should accept and emphasize the three stages of military supervision described by General Bruce C. Clarke in his writings, "The Army supervises by leadership, commandership and generalship," with management being implicit in all three but clearly requiring responsibility for inspiration from the leader.

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