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LARGER UNITS:

Theater Army, Army Group, Field Army

U.S. Army
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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LARGER UNITS: THEATER ARMY--ARMY GROUP--FIELD ARMY

by

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PREFACE

In late 1983, the Concept Development Directorate (CDD) at the Combined Arms Center queried the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) on the subject of larger unit operations. In response, CSI agreed to prepare a three-part study on larger units of which this annotated bibliography is a part. A search of primary and secondary source material in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) produced a substantial holding of subject-related material. A follow-up search of the holdings of the Military History Institute (MHI) revealed additional primary and secondary source material. This bibliography includes holdings from both agencies.

The focus of this bibliography is on theater, army, army group, and the field army during the 20th Century. It does not represent all the available material at CARL or MHI. No classified material is listed in order to ensure widespread distribution of the bibliography.

Some of the material, such as articles in Military Review and Armor magazine, is available in public libraries in the United States. However, the majority of the listings exist only in special holdings such as CARL and/or MHI. In those instances the author has listed call numbers at the end of the bibliographic citation. The abbreviations below are provided for assistance.

CARL . . . . . Combined Arms Research Library
Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS

DTIC . . . . . Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA

MHI. . . . . Military History Institute
Carlisle Barracks, PA

BOOK AND ARTICLES

Ash, Hughes L., Col. "A Perspective of Larger Units." Military Review 38 (April 1958):51-64.

Colonel Ash, a CGSC faculty member in the Department of Larger Units and Administrative Support (DLUAS), prepared this article to expand the CGSC Commandant's series, "Keeping Pace with the Future." The article summarizes the DLUAS Program of Instruction for the 1957-58 course. (DLUAS provided instruction on the division, corps, and field army and included the logistical systems and the theater administrative zone.) The article discusses the instructional approaches used and the general content of the 1957-58 course. Although nuclear warfare considerations were voiced throughout much of the instruction, the essential functions of the field army remarked on are still valid. This article provides a quick overview, without a detailed review of the 1957-58 Program of Instruction. Joint operations and administrative functions are discussed as well.

Brown, Horace M., Lt. Col., and Lt. Col. Martin F. Massoglia. "Modern Headquarters for the Field Army." Military Review 40 (April 1960):24-37.

Brown and Massoglia address a need to reduce the size of the field army, independent corps, corps, division command posts, headquarters, and rear echelon installations based on the nuclear threat of the period. Although the article was specifically induced by the nuclear threat, the data have applicability to today's battlefield and to operating with personnel shortages.

Cate, Paul E., Maj. "Large Unit Operational Doctrine." Military Review 58 (December 1978):40-47.

This article was written shortly after the defensively oriented 1976 edition of FM 100-5 was published and discusses the doctrinal void that existed at Echelons Above Division (EAD). The article correctly points out the tactical nature of FM 100-5 and the lack of any doctrinal material for EAD. The Corps manual was scheduled for 1979 release but, in reality, the final draft was released in 1983, four years later. Field Manual 100-15 closed the gap somewhat, but a need for doctrinal material at the operational level of war still exists, i.e., the field army.

Decker, Edward T., 2d Lieut. "Retreat and Counter Stroke." Armor 72 (January-February 1963):8-12.

Decker uses the historical example of the Eastern Front battle/maneuver of January-March 1943, during which time Manstein withdrew while under

intense Soviet pressure and delivered a brilliant counterstrike, defeating a Soviet force that outnumbered his forces by a ratio of 8:1. This article is useful as an example of a field army level (operational art) defensive operation. It illustrates positioning and the defensive counterstrike which characterizes that level of war.

Dyke, Harold H., Maj. "The Armored Corps and Armored Army." Armor 62 (September-October 1953):34-36.

The article outlines organizations composed of armor-heavy forces which were used to counter initial enemy threats in Europe. Mobile armor-heavy thrusts are to be used to buy time for a buildup. Assuming that U.S. forces need to concentrate greater mass, it points out that armor is the ideal weapons system around which to build the force. The article also calls for a stripped-down, highly mobile force that is flexible, has great shock action and firepower, and is able to execute deep thrusts into the enemy's vitals.

Eckhardt, George S., Maj. Gen. Command and Control, 1950-1969. Vietnam Studies. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1974.

This is one of a series of monographs prepared during the Vietnam conflict describing U.S. military development. This work is an analytical appraisal of the command and control structure that evolved during that period. Major General Eckhardt commanded the 9th Division in combat and served in a number of higher echelon commands. His service, though interrupted, ranged from 1966 to 1971. The monograph covers, in detail, the organization and function of the military structure in Vietnam. A number of excellent charts show the organization of the Army in Vietnam at the various levels.

Greenfield, Kent R., Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. The Organization of Ground Combat Troops. The United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1947.

This entry from the Center of Military History is, for the most part, based on the AGF Studies prepared during and after World War II. This is the best single source for information on Army ground forces for that period. Initial chapters deal with early developments, such as the failure to adopt the plans of 1921 and the mobilization of ground forces to support the war. The most applicable portion of the book (for Echelons Above Corps) is Palmer's contribution. Chapter 12 discusses the army and corps and includes some of the rationale for their development. Palmer's contribution is thorough and references are listed to guide the reader to the source documents.

Hepp, Leo. "The Twelfth Army in the Balkan Campaign of 1941." Military Review 35. (February 1956):84-94. Translated and digested from an article in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau (Germany), May 1955.

This article relates, from the German viewpoint, the German Twelfth Army's campaign, under the command of Field Marshal List, to relieve pressure on the Italians by invading Yugoslavia and Greece. Of interest is Army-level operations from the viewpoint of the enemy, the army commander's involvement with political negotiations for passage of forces through "friendly countries" (Bulgaria and Romania), and the political considerations of enemy capitulation. The article focuses on a number of potential, but little considered, areas that future U.S. field army commanders may face, especially in a detached or contingency role away from a developed theater.

Herberg, Harrison H.D., Col. "12th Army Group: Plans and Operations for the Rhine Crossing and the Closing of the Ruhr Pocket." Military Review 32 (September 1951):26-34.

Herberg was a member of the 12th Army Group planning staff for the Ruhr operation. This historical example covers the planning for and conduct of the 12th AG's 1945 Rhine River crossing and campaign to invade Germany. Upon rejection of Bradley's "Blueprint for Victory" plan, which would have turned Patton's 3d Army loose, Eisenhower chose to support the British 21st Army Group as the main effort, with U.S. 12th Army Group playing a supporting role. After the 12th Army Group's crossing of the Rhine ahead of the 21st Army Group (7 March 1945), the 12th Army Group planned operations to help encircle the Ruhr, an operation in which 325,000 prisoners were taken. The article articulates the phased planning of the Rhine Crossing and many of the details for the Ruhr encirclement. This historical example provides insight into the role of the army group, as well as the interaction between army groups in a combined arena.

Hewes, James E. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration 1900-1963. Special Studies Series. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1975.

Hewes material gives the reader an insight into why many of the organizational and administrative decisions occurred that affected the U.S. Army during the 20th Century. Although concentrating at Headquarters, Department of the Army level, the fallout from decisions at that level prompted many of the changes at lower echelons. Of specific importance to the understanding of larger unit organization was the influence of George C. Marshall during the formulative years of the late 1930s and early 1940s. This is a good secondary source and the biographical notes in the back of the book present a significant listing of additional source material.

Hoff, Stuart S. "Command Organization for an Overseas Theater of Operations." Military Review 31 (August 1951):10-20.

An excellent presentation from an organizational viewpoint of our experience in World War II. This article provides a basis for thoughts on a future theater of operations.

Metcalf, George T., Col. "Trends in Organization of the Field Army." Armor 69 (September-October 1960):27-31.

This article was presented at the 6th Annual AUSA Conference a few days after the Modern Mobile Army (MOMAR) concept was announced. It is a strong statement by the CONARC Combat Development Group in support of a balanced, highly mobile army. Salient trends were: smaller units from squad up; a single, multiweaponed company with multipurpose, close support weapons that include nuclear capability; wheeled or tracked armor capability; semi-independent combined arms combat commands that would operate over the same size areas as World War II divisions; functional logistics versus the vertical basis of the past; heavy and medium division mix; increase in the number of aircraft; and a streamlined staff (two functional elements). The overall focus was a multicapacity force that could operate semi-independently over broad areas for sustained periods of time.

Millet, John D. The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces. The United States Army in World War II: The Army Service Forces. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1954.

Prepared by an excellent scholar that served on the advisory staff that organized the newly created Army Service Forces, this book presents material essential to the understanding of the procurement and supply side of World War II operations. Coverage in the text includes general information on the Pershing Reorganization and War Department developments of the 1921-1941 period. Technical Services are addressed, but this is not of immediate value to the researcher.

Palmer, Robert R., Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops. The United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1948.

Another of the U.S. Army "Green Books," this work focuses on the procurement and training of the ground forces during World War II. Detailed material is presented on procurement of enlisted and officer personnel and problems experienced in the placement and overseas movement of these personnel. Of primary interest to the larger units researcher is the material on the building and training of divisional and nondivisional units and how they fit into the overall force structure.

Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support of the Armies. Volume I: May 1941-September 1944. The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operation. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1953.

Volume I of Ruppenthal's work covers the period from May 1941 to September 1944. The focus is on the logistical support in the European Theater but includes North Africa and planning for Torch. This book contains essential data enabling the force developer to understand what transpired in the logistical arena during America's longest sustained logistical exercise. This material, especially that focusing on the Overlord preparation and execution, is essential to understanding the logistical relationships at higher echelons (larger units). Rationale for such major events as the consolidation of ETOUSA and SOS is also discussed. This secondary source provides the reader with a basic working knowledge of World War II logistics in the ETO.

Ruppenthal, Roland G. Logistical Support of the Armies. Volume II: September 1944-May 1945. The United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operation. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1959.

Volume II covers the period from September 1944 to the end of the war in May 1945. For the organizational planner, this volume is of less value, but it rounds out the World War II experience. One may find the examination of the problems resulting from the sustained operation to be of value. As this was the United States' most extensively organized and supplied theater, the organization used to cope with these problems is of interest.

Seaman, Jonathan O., Col. "Reduction of the Colmar Pocket: A 6th Army Group Operation." Military Review 31 (October 1951):37-50.

This operation was conducted in southern France and was a combined French-American operation with American forces under the French First Army, which was, in turn, commanded by the American 6th Army Group. This classic combined command operation illustrates the interworking of such command relationships during both offensive and defensive operations. The author makes a number of interesting points in his conclusion, e.g., justification of certain major maneuvers, proper use of armor, etc., most of which reflect favorably on 6th Army Group.

Stuckey, John D., Col. "Echelons Above Corps." Parameters 13 (December 1983):39-41.

This succinct article traces the evolution of Echelons Above Corps (EAC) calling for the establishment of a command echelon above the corps. Colonel Stuckey emphasizes the "joint" and "combined aspect" of EAC procedures and

the role of the unified command. He strongly supports one or more echelons above corps to enhance command and control capability of Army forces. To fill the requirement, doctrine would have to be established, an organization outlined, and JCS Pub 2 changed to reflect the new concepts.

"Sum and Substance" Armor 60 (September-October 1951):18-25.

The topic of the section in this issue was "Mobility in the Field Army" and Armor presents the views of the U.S. Army's army commanders on the subject: Crittenberger of 1st Army; Hodges of 3d Army; Lutes of 4th Army; Chamberlin of 5th Army; Swing of 6th Army; and Eddy of 7th Army (Europe). The basic thrust of the comments includes the need for mobility in order to fight future wars over widespread geographic areas. It states the need for airborne forces, as a mobility asset for the field army, and armor forces, for a mobile defensive striking force and as an exploitation force in the offense. The article provides insight for the doctrine developer as to the thoughts of leading commanders that influenced army development.

U.S. Army Almanac. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950.

A section in the 1950 Army Almanac outlines some basic data on the World War II army group and rationale for its establishment. It also discusses the establishment, composition, and operation of the field army, including an amended 26 October 1944 organizational and personnel strength chart. This is a basic information source for quick reference.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. The Independent Corps and the Corps in the Army. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1937. CARL M506 F3 A.73.

This booklet addresses the corps and provides insight on that unit as a part of the army. Each section relates how the corps functions as part of the army. This document is not particularly beneficial except for understanding independent operations and the potential deployment of a field army in such a role today.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. The Principles of Strategy for an Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1936. CARL - M501 D.73.

The service school issued a detailed consideration of the commander, offensive maneuver, and defensive maneuver that is still pertinent to the independent corps or army. The study outlines the principles which might guide the commander of a separate force on an independent mission.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School. Tactical & Strategic Studies, A Group of Armies. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1923. CARL M209 C.73 D43 7F9.

This is a historical overview with practical exercises. It also contains the basic rationale as to the establishment of the Army Group. The narrative covers the powers and limitations of army group commanders and the organization and history of the development of the army group. This work is a good overview of army group development, and the practical exercises have value in that they reveal the nature of instruction on the subject in the 1920s.

Watson, S. J., Maj. "Field Armies of the United States, Russia, and England." Military Review 30 (October 1950). Digested from an article in Army Quarterly (Great Britain), April 1950 87-89.

This is a short article by a British major that provides an organizational chart of U.S. and British field armies followed by a chart that compares British, American, and Soviet army elements, including artillery, armor, engineers, small arms, signals, and vehicles. The article reflects the status of the three nations as of mid-1950.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1967.

In this standard reference on the United States Army, published in 1967, Weigley addresses the Army as an institution, while considering its history of campaigns and battles. Of particular interest are the chapters 17, 18, and 19 that deal with the post-World War I and the World War II years.

Wilson, John B. "Army Readiness Planning, 1899-1917." Military Review 64 (July 84): 60-73.

Although this article addresses field armies, corps, and divisions, it is primarily about the evolution of the division during the 1899-1917 period. In reference to large units, this overview interestingly describes the establishment of the First Field Army in 1910 and the controversy over abolishing the corps. This was a harbinger of many future attempts at reorganization. The article provides background reading for understanding the early stages of twentieth-century military reorganization in preparation for war.

Section II.

GOVERNMENT REPORTS, MANUALS AND STUDIES

Adams, Robert Hawkins. "Army Group Operations." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1955. MHI AWC Z-A3.

This paper was prepared as background reading for a seminar to be conducted by Lieutenant General Jenkins and Brigadier General Vittrup with AWC students on 23 September 1955. In general, the paper discusses army group, and specifically 6th Army Group, operations in the ETO during World War II. Charts detail organization of the 6th Army Group as well as the organizations of a Russian and a German army group.

Allied Forces. 21st Army Group. "High Command In War." By Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, June 1945. CARL N 15515.

This is one of a number of pamphlets prepared by Field Marshal Montgomery setting forth his ideas on larger unit command and operations. In this document Montgomery provides insight on the principles of war, command and control, airborne operations, and staff operations. The significance of this document is that a senior commander, speaking from recent experience, recorded his thoughts on the subjects. The command philosophy is good, details on chief of staff and staff operation and interaction are beneficial, and his ideas on air power are still timely today. This pamphlet, along with the others by Montgomery, should be reproduced and circulated among senior commanders.

Allied Forces. Supreme Headquarters. Memorandum, Eisenhower to Bradley: "Organization of U.S. Forces on the Continent," 14 July 1944. MHI AWC Doc D769.25 A61.

This memorandum from Eisenhower to Bradley directed Bradley, as 1st Army commander, to assume responsibility for COMMZ activities pending the establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) on the Continent. In essence, Bradley assumed part of the role that he would have as an army group commander.

Allied Forces. Supreme Headquarters. "Organization and Command of U.S. Forces," 6 June 1944. MHI AWC Doc D769.25 A6.

This two-page letter outlined the three-phased establishment of SHAEF on the Continent and was the basis for the establishment of the organizational structure for the invasion of Europe. It depicts the duties of the 21st Army Group commander and places control of all ground forces during the

initial phases of Overlord under Montgomery. The letter also established the Third U.S. Army, moved First Army to the continent to command all U.S. ground forces, and established the COMMZ under the theater commander.

Almond, Edward M., Lt. Gen. (Ret.) "Command of Large Military Units." Speech at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 February 1954. MHI AWC 53/54.

Lieutenant General Almond addresses the subject of command of larger units with respect to four areas: leadership qualities, influence by commanders on the outcome of military operations, historical examples, and the principles of war. He ties these qualities together to show how they unite to produce victory on the battlefield. This is more of a "pep talk" on command than a workbook on theater operations.

"Army Group Operations." Prepared by Committee no. 19, Course II, Part 3, Study no. 5 (Operations), U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 20 February 1953. MHI AWC Log TS 53-2-18.

This study was prepared as part of a group requirement by AWC students. It provides a historical picture of the evolution of the army group with accompanying organizational charts. Specific comments include recommendations to develop an army group TOE around the field army example and for attaching elements specifically needed by the army group. In addition, the committee supports a position to keep the army group as a part of the organizational structure above corps. The study provides valuable insight into the then current interpretation of larger unit organization. Other student committees produced similar studies which are on file in the MHI Archives.

Brom, J. R. "Narrative Description of an Analytical Theater Air-Ground Warfare System." Rand research memorandum no. 1428. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 10 February 1955. MHI RAND RM 1428.

This working paper, prepared for the USAF, is the nonmathematical narrative of a computerized process outlined and published in a previous Rand study entitled Analytic Formulation of a Theater Air-Ground Warfare System (Rand study no. 1338). This early war gaming technique was to be used to study a number of hypothetical theater wars or campaigns in a short time. Study no. 1428 is divided into three parts: air operations, ground operations, and logistical network operations. Although systems are more complex today, a combination of Rand studies 1338 and 1428 may be of benefit to war gamers and doctrine writers. This study provides data based on the war gaming assumptions and conclusions.

"Command of Large Military Units." Committee reports prepared by Committees 21, 22, 23, and 24, Study no. 6, Course II, Part 3, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 20 February 1953. MHI.

These committee reports, prepared by AWC students, study the characteristics of command in large units. Report no. 21 presents a philosophical approach to the problem-statement discussing national, societal, and leadership influences on the exercise of command of larger units. In report no. 22, the students use historical examples of leaders of larger units from ancient to modern times to ascertain commonalities. No. 23 uses the organization of the Army group, theater army, and theater as the basis for examining functions of each echelon. Annex 6 contains an interesting chart reflecting the committee evaluation of the characteristics required of a commander at various echelons and the students' judgment as to what degree the characteristics are deemed necessary. This annex will be reproduced in the "Historical Perspective on Larger Units" being done by CSI. In report no. 24 the committee examines doctrine for command and leadership, then gives short vignettes on various successful and unsuccessful military leaders. One interesting characteristic listed for the leader of larger units is political acumen, a rather unique characteristic for a military leader, but nevertheless an essential one.

Dade, Lucian A. "Air Force and Army Relations in a Theater of Operations." Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 26 March 1965. MHI AWC IS.

Dade's student study addresses the relationship between Air Force and Army units in the field. Through the use of historical examples, he discusses the issue of by whom, and at what echelon, USAF assets should be controlled. Basically this study concludes that USAF assets can best be controlled by USAF personnel, and the Air Force/Army interface should take place at the highest echelon that can best exploit the assets of both. Ironically, much of Dade's arguments sound very similar to Air Force positions on the recent exchanges between Army and Air Force personnel on this same issue.

Devers, J. L., General. "Problems of Combined Planning." Conference Address, U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 10 May 1948. MHI AFSC 0-29.

Addressing the AFSC, General Dever commented on six major problems that confront a theater commander in combined operations. Summarized they are: lack of clarity and firmness of direction from the next higher combined headquarters; conflicting political, economic, and military policies of each allied power; differences in logistical capabilities, organizational doctrine, and characteristics of each armed force; armament, training, and tactical doctrine differences; personal intervention by members of the next higher command; and the personalities of the senior commanders in the allied powers. Devers discussed his personal experiences and gave a number of examples illustrating the problems named. This source presents insight based on personal experience.

Hines, John Daniel. "Petroleum Supply to a Theater." Address at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 April 1949 MHI CGSC L-45.

This document addresses national policy levels and is not directly applicable to the military force developer. Pages 25-32 of the address, however, outline the procedures used for petroleum procurement in various areas during World War II. Also, on page 28, the author begins the discussion of four basic principles of military petroleum supply that provide insight as to past wartime procedures at the theater level.

Holderness, Stephen W., Col. "Responsibilities of High Command in Combat." Individual study project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 14 March 1955. MHI AWC IS.

This forty-seven-page document discusses the responsibilities of command in larger units, including theater of operations, theater army forces, army group, field army, and the corps. Using the army group and field army commanders as a basis, Chapter 1 discusses the responsibilities of, and the methods by which, these commanders influence battles. Other chapters cover the importance of the staff, their interaction in the operational arena, and the importance of clear, concise orders based on simple plans. Nuclear aspects are briefly covered. Included in the study is a collection of quotes by famous military and civilian personalities on leadership, planning, command and control, operations, and logistics. Wiring diagrams of a typical theater, army group, field army, and corps are in the appendix.

Kapp, Ronald Augustine. "The Theater Army Personnel Replacement System in Future War." Individual study project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 25 January 1960. MHI AWC IS 59/60.

Kapp discusses personnel replacement procedures for a theater of operations. He advocates a centralized theater army replacement system and touches on the value of wartime replacement by unit, as was practiced for the peacetime Gyroscope operations (discontinued in 1957-58), in which units were rotated to Europe to replace other units. He supports the theory of a theater army replacement command as contained in the June 1955 FM 101-1 Staff Officers Field Manual, The G-1 Manual.

Moenk, Jean R. A History of Large-Scale Army Maneuvers in the United States, 1935-1964. Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Reserve Forces, U.S. Continental Army Command, December 1969. CARL N18668.125. DTIC.

CONARC initiated this study to record the Army's role in the planning, conduct, and execution of large-scale exercises. The work covers the

history of maneuvers from the initial attempts in 1935 through the 1964 Desert Strike exercises. Areas addressed include exercise scope, participating troops, exercise costs, training deficiencies, and command, staff, and troop problems. The study also contains a number of maps, charts, and tables depicting maneuver areas, organization, and structure. The final chapter draws overall conclusions and relates lessons learned. This should be read by exercise evaluators as many of the problems evident then are valid today.

Ney, Virgil. Evolution of a Theater of Operations Headquarters, 1941-1967. CORG Memorandum CORG-M-318. Fort Belvoir, VA: Prepared by Technical Operations, Inc., Combat Operations Research Group, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, December 1967. DTIC AD 675414.

This study focuses on the theater level, depicting organizational charts, background, and history. The rationale for the evolution of the theater is explained. This study does not focus in detail on the theater army's role in the overall picture. In reality, the 1963 and 1968 FM 100-15s were the first to do this adequately in a modern sense. Ney's study terminated in 1967. Assuming a two year period of development, one can understand the lack of specific data near the end years of this report.

"Operations and Intelligence Theater Command Relationship." Committee Report prepared by Committee 14, Study no. 5, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 4 March 1955. MHI AWC L.

The student committee used World War II as a backdrop for discussing how the theater operated in the past. In addition, the committee touched upon the Far East Command, relating its uniqueness as an example of a unified command that actually conducted combat operations. Part 2 is of less value, as it discusses future implications with recommendations based on committee findings. This is a good background document for command relationships.

Snyder, Otis W. "Evacuation of Casualties in a Theater of Operations." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1954. MHI AWC 1953/54 FS.

This thirty-nine page document covers medical service planning to include methods of transporting casualties (by air, motor, rail, and sea) and their bearing on evacuation policy. The bibliography is useful to Medical Service Corps planners.

U.S. Army. 3d Army. "Third Army Maneuvers, May 1940." CARL N2836.1.

This is a pre-World War II document describing the Sabine Area (Louisiana) Maneuvers that pitted the XIV Corps against the IX Corps in a

four-phase operation. The document outlines the requirements involved, but there are no orders, plans, or SOPs in the packet.

U.S. Army. 7th Army. G-4 Staff Study: Field Army Logistics. 3 June 1959. MHI.

Although focused on the atomic battlefield, this staff study provides applicable data because it stresses the importance of mobility on the battlefield--a viable concept of the 1980s and 1990s. The recommendation is for all logistical assets to be within 100 miles of the forward edge of the battlefield. Specific aspects of field army level logistical organization are addressed. Although the staff study is technically dated, many points are still valid.

U.S. Armed Forces Staff College. Medical Service in the Theater of Operations and in Joint Overseas Expeditions, 1949-1950. Norfolk, VA, n.d. MHI AFSC M.Sth OP JT 0.OP 1949/50.

Prepared for instructional purposes at the AFSC, this 79-page booklet outlines the scope and mission of medical service in a theater and includes planning procedures for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Specialized operations are also addressed, i.e., joint airborne expeditions and amphibious expeditions. Heavy emphasis is placed on planning of joint operations in the theater.

Army Combat Development Command: Institute of Combined Arms and Support. "Echelons Above Division."(u) February 1970. CARL N-11162.44.

This study, done by the Institute of Combined Arms and Support at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, developed operational and organizational concepts for implementation in FY 72. Emphasis is on reducing the number of command echelons above division and merging the theater army and the theater army support command headquarters. The proposed concept envisions elimination of the corps echelon and the design of a responsive field army organization to replace the current three large corps, 12-division type field army. The overall concept is depicted as the "current independent corps renamed a field army." It is felt that the new organization would offer a number of advantages, such as reduction in time required to pass material up and down the chain, centralized responsibility for certain common, combat service support functions, centralized responsibility for rear area protection, and elimination of duplication of effort. Problems envisioned included: added responsibility for mid-range planning and for direction of current tactical operations, coordination of tactical air support, and implementation problems.

U.S. Army Combat Development Command. Final Report: "Prisoner of War Operation in a Theater of Operations During the Period 1965-1970." Fort Gordon, GA: U.S. Army Military Police Agency, June 1964. MHI Army CDC MPA 61-2.

This document was developed for use as interim doctrine for preparation of FMs and TOEs for the 1965-70 period. Annex C specifically addresses POW operations at theater level delineating responsibilities at brigade, division, army corps, independent corps, and field army. The work appears to be the basis of the doctrine that evolved during the late 1960s and probably carried on into the 1970s. The small bibliography provides the force developer with a starting point for the examination of theater POW operations.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. "Theater Army Organization." CGSC project no. 56-7. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 July 1958. CARL N17935.56A.

At the direction of the Commanding General, Continental Army Command, this study was done by the Department of Larger Units at the Command and General Staff College. The scope of the study includes the headquarters, theater army; headquarters, army group; headquarters, theater army logistical command; air defense; replacement and training command; civil affairs; and major commands within the theater army logistical command. The field army and its subordinate elements are not included. Part 1 of the study sets forth broad concepts for theater Army forces. Part 2 discusses organization of theater army forces, including the theater army, army group, theater army logistical command, and numerous subordinate elements of each group. Part 3 discusses operations in the theater administrative zone. Letters from field agencies accompanying this document stated that many of the innovative ideas had been removed from the study and that it reflected, basically, current doctrine. Discussion of the effects of atomic weapons on administrative support operations is covered. This study provides interesting data on organizational concepts of the mid-1950s.

United States Army Europe (USAREUR), SOP U.S. Army Europe. "USAREUR Theater Army Field Standing Operating Procedures." September 1957. MHI.

Three-fourths of this two-inch thick, previously classified SOP for 7th Army operation addresses logistics. The remainder covers administrative and miscellaneous operational procedures of 7th Army. Researchers may find the logistical SOPs of benefit for specific procedural functions. This projection reflects the administrative and logistical nature of the theater army headquarters.

U.S. Army Field Forces, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Fort Monroe, VA, to Combat Development Group, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Memorandum: "Organization, G-2 Section, Field Army." 4 November 1954. CARL N 15073.19.

This 1954 memorandum was submitted to the Combat Development Group in support of the preparation of new TOEs for the field army and corps headquarters that were being prepared by CGSC. The six page memo details the functions, positions, and branches necessary for G-2 support. The MI battalion and MI Linguist Company are briefly discussed. A proposed organization chart is attached to the memo.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Study no.1: "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-1942." Prepared by Lt. Col. Kent Roberts Greenfield and Dr. Robert R. Palmer 1946. CARL N 15415-A.

This study was a postwar endeavor to record the evolution of the Army Ground Forces while under the guidance of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair. The work depicts the peacetime organization of the field forces and discusses the transition to war. The field army is depicted in an organizational chart. Much of this information is included in the Army Green Book, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Study no. 8: "Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat." Prepared by Dr. R. R. Palmer. 1946. CARL N-14792.

This study covers the formative years of 1942-1943 and specifically reflects Lieutenant General McNair's guiding philosophy on such areas as experimental divisions, army and corps troops, theory of army and corps, and the decision to abandon "Type Armies" and "Type Corps." The study also addresses the Reduction Board's work in the streamlining and pooling of army assets.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. General Board study no. 25: "Organization, Functions, and Operations of G-3 Sections in Theater Headquarters, Army Groups, Armies, Corps, and Divisions." CARL N12853.25.

Section 1 of this six section report describes the organization of G-3 sections in the ETO. Each of the additional five sections covers one of the echelons listed in the title of the report.

U.S. Forces European Theater. General Board study no. 9: "Organization and Functions of G-1 Sections in Army Groups and Armies." CARL N 13007.9.

This is another of the studies produced by the General Board commissioned immediately after World War II to record and analyze the

strategy, tactics, and administration of U.S. forces in the ETO. The study examines and reflects, via wiring diagrams, the organization of the 6th and 12th Army Groups and the G-1 sections of the 1st, 7th, 9th and 15th field armies. Analysis is presented and recommendations made.

U.S. Forces European Theater. General Board study no. 29: "Study of the Administrative Functions of the Army Group Headquarters." CARL N12861.29.

This report provides insight on the activation of the 1st, 6th, and 12th army groups and discusses the administrative functions and presents recommendations.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. Report no. 54. "Summer and Fall 1943." MHI D731.1 N51.

Part 4 of this report relates information on corps and army based on North Africa and Sicily operations. Referring to 7th Army notes on the campaigns, it relates the composition of an army in general terms, i.e., minimum of two infantry corps of three divisions each, two armor divisions to exploit breakthroughs and to stop counterattacks, horse cavalry, on a ratio of a division for each army, and artillery, based on the tailored size of the unit.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army - Tentative AGF." 28 March 1947. CARL N15413.2.

The Army Ground Force Headquarters, based on post World War II studies and AGF staff recommendations, put together a "Type Field Army" concept for planning and instructional purposes. This initial concept was circulated for comments with a March 1948 suspense date. The study contains a proposed organization with a breakdown of personnel and a basis for allocation in a field army. Detailed discussion is presented in a 33-page narrative. Organization is based on three corps of three infantry and one armor divisions each. The total force was approximately 204,000 personnel in the divisional units coupled with approximately 155,000 additional support personnel for a total structure of approximately 359,000 personnel. This work is a good straw man that relates the organizational rationale for the development of a Type Field Army.

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army AGF." 24 November 1947. CARL N15413.1.

This is an expanded version of the 28 March 1947 document. The report was submitted to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, for approval to be used as a planning and instructional aid. The narrative discussion is expanded by

about sixteen pages. Approximately 100 pages of annexes and tabs are attached. These include comments received from the various schools, service chiefs, and commanders. Tab B relates the data used in the original analysis (average organizational figures for 1st, 3d, 7th and 9th armies as of 1 April 1945). The thrust of the study is maximum support with minimum personnel. This was prompted, in all likelihood, by postwar reduction in the overall force structure. A basic question arises: how valid is World War II support data considering the new field army concept based on newly reorganized concepts for infantry and armor divisions?

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army." Office of Army Field Forces Ltr dated 6 Apr 1949. CARL N15413.3A.

This letter was sent out prior to the release of the DA approved version of the Type Field Army addressed above. Two key items in the document are, first, the revised copies of the study would be out 1 July 1949, and, second, all chiefs of technical and administrative services would not arbitrarily be designated as commanders. Exceptions were artillery and engineer chiefs who would be dual-hatted and command those elements under their control. This applied to armies, corps, and divisions. The commander of a unit that served as a staff officer on the next higher headquarters would exercise command over all units attached or assigned to his unit (i.e., a corps artillery commander would exercise command over all assigned or attached corps artillery headquarters). All other special staff officers would exercise such control over subordinates units as the commander directed and only in the name of the commander concerned (i.e., the army commander might direct the army signal officer to exercise operational control over those signal units <u>not</u> assigned or attached to subordinate units).

U.S. Army Ground Forces. "Type Field Army - Revised - 1949 AFF." 1 July 1949. CARL N15413.3.

This is the revised copy of the study released as an instructional aid for the Type Field Army. It also contains CGSC's final comments on the study. Only slight revisions appear in this copy as compared to earlier copies. Of note is an August 1950 Army Field Forces letter stating that the majority of the provisions of the study have been incorporated into the existing FMs so material on the Type Field Army 1950 would not be published.

U.S. Army Intelligence School. Instructor folder, subject: "Organization and Mission of the Army Group." Fort Holabird, MD, April 1957. MHI USAINS April 57.

This document was developed to serve as an instructional guide for teaching the army group. Compiled in 1957, it contains an excellent summary of the history of the army group. In part the data is the same as in the

1923 Command and General Staff School publication, "Tactical and Strategic Studies, A Group of Armies." This is a good source for an overview.

U.S. Army Intelligence School. Instructor folder, subject: "Organization and Mission of Theater Army." Fort Holabird, MD, April 1958. MHI AINS 25794.

This USAIS instructor manual was used for instructional purposes at the Intelligence School in 1958. It reflects the doctrinal views of FM 100-15 with Change 1 dated June 1950, the 1954 FM 100-10 with Change 1, FM 110-5 with Changes 1-6 (Joint Action Armed Forces) dated September 1951, and FM 101-5 dated November 1954. This seventeen page manual provides a general overview and includes a number of wiring diagrams depicting schematic organizations. It addresses in a general way such questions as: "When would the Theater Army combat forces be organized into Army groups?"; "How would they be commanded and administered?"; and "What units should be found in the theater army reserve?"

U.S. Army Signal School. "Signal Operations, Theater of Operations." Fort Monmouth, NJ, 1 January 1959. MHI SIGS ST 11 20-1.

This resident-course, instructional booklet states that the material is applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare and addresses organization, missions, and capabilities of signal assets at various levels. Factors that affect that planning are addressed.

U.S. Army Transportation School. Reference text no. 84: "The Transportation Service in a Theater of Operations." Fort Eustis, VA, October 1965. MHI TS RT 84 1965.

This instructional text provides data on all echelons of the transportation function in the theater, ie., theater army, communications zone, field army, corps, and combat division. Missions and functions are addressed at each of these levels. A three-page glossary of terms is also provided in Appendix II. A series of wiring diagrams clearly delineates the organizational framework as well as command lines for each level of transportation support.

U.S. War Department. Bureau of Public Relations. "The New Army of the United States, 1941." MHI AWC Doc UA25 A298 1941/42.

Although this document deals with the U.S. Army as a whole, it points out the status of forces at that time, i.e., in July 1939 a force of 188,000 officers and men was scattered over 130 locations. No large units existed, units were at 50% strength, no corps/army troops were organized, and equipment was obsolete. By July 1941, the Army had expanded to

approximately 1,400,000 personnel. As expansion occurred, corps and field army troops were brought on board from the reserve components. By August 1941, four field armies of nine corps and 29 divisions plus a four division armor force had been established. The strength of the field army was to be between 229,000 and 289,000 men. The source contains background data and provides a better understanding of conditions in the U.S. Army prior to the war and during mobilization.

U.S. War Department/Department of the Army. Field Manuals. (See notes below).

A vital source of doctrinal data exists in archival holdings in the form of U.S. Army Field Manuals (FM's). Review of these documents allows the force developer to track the evolution of doctrine over a period of time. Reflecting on this information, one can better understand the source of many actions depicted in the doctrinal manuals. The Combined Arms Research Library at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, and the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA, have copies of many of the manuals printed after 1920, and they are available to researchers.

Two early works are the 1914 Field Service Regulation with corrections to 1917 and the 1924 Fort Leavenworth translation of the French manual on Large Units. Bibliographical Sketches of these manuals are below.

U.S. War Department. Field Service Regulation, 1914. Corrected to 15 April 1917.

This FSR was the early edition of the all-encompassing "everything book." It covers organization, operation, and administration. One small section is allocated to the Field Army's organization.

France. Ministry of War. Provisional Instructions for the Tactical Employment of Large Units. Translated from the French. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1924. CARL M506 A 4.44.

After World War I, a French Army board headed by Marshal Petain developed this work. The Commandant at Fort Leavenworth had the work translated and it became the basis of future manuals on large unit operations in the U.S. Army. In this manual, divisions, corps, and field armies are depicted as large units. The manual includes a section on "how to conduct operations" as well as a short discussion of large unit training. The French version appeared in 1921.

Other field manuals available include the following editions of FM 100-5 Operations: 1939, 1941, 1949, 1954 and 1962; FM 100-10 Administration: 1940,1954,1963; FM 100-15 Larger Units: 1930, 1942, 1950, 1963, 1968, 1973,

and 1974 (test); FM 101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: 1928, 1932, 1940, 1954 and 1960; FM 101-10 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistical Data: 1941, 1943, 1944, 1945. CARL Archives.

In addition to the FM's listed above, a number of TM's exist of which two of the more applicable ones are depicted below:

U.S. War Department. TM 30-450. Handbook on German Military Forces. 17 December 1941. MHI UA712 H34 1941.

This manual was a War Department effort to provide U.S. military agencies information on the German military machine. As an example, the German World War II army group was not a fixed organization, but on the western front, it usually consisted of two to four armies of two to five corps each. Army groups were reinforced by combat troops from GHQ pools. The structure presented allows comparison of German and U.S. force structures.

U.S. War Department. TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces. 15 March 1945. MHI.

This is an updated version of the 1941 edition of TM 30-450. Of interest in this manual is the German organization of higher echelons of command. Charts depict army and staff organization. One chart shows German staff officers at various levels of higher command as compared to U.S. Army equivalents.

U.S. War Department. Office of the Chief of Field Artillery. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: "Organization of Corps and Army." Submitted by Maj. Gen. U. Birnie, U.S. Army Chief of Field Artillery. MHI AWC Doc UA25 A58.

This memo contains the Chief of Field Artillery comments on a November 1935 Chief of Staff directive on the reorganization of the division and higher units. The basic thrust was to reduce the division in size and send the residue to higher levels. The corps was also to be streamlined (limited administrative and supply functions) so as to make it capable of maneuvering with the divisions. This was probably an early manifestation of the lean-light maneuverable Army envisioned and propagated by McNair in the early 1940s. Annex E shows a diagram of a type field army of three corps--emphasizing maximum mobility. Antitank cavalry would be attached, as needed, from a General Headquarters reserve. The document has a variety of other information on the duties of the Army Chief of Artillery.

U.S. War Department, Office of the Chief of Staff, to Commanding General, Corps Areas and Departments. Subject letter: "Establishment of Field Armies." 9 August 1932. MHI File 52-55, "Comments upon Directive for 4 Army Organization (Tent)."

This action was initiated in 1932 under General MacArthur's signature. The file provides valuable insight on pre-war expansion within CONUS, establishing a framework for general mobilization. The four field armies were to be exercise and planning agencies, providing staff and commander experience to take to the field. An attached letter suggested a skeletonized army group should be established. Although MacArthur strongly supported such an army group, it did not come about, due to manpower and fiscal constraints.

Wendt, William R., Col., et al. "Organization and Command relationships during World War II." Committee study, U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, 17 December 1951. MHI AFSC OCR WWII.

This study addresses the operational and administrative aspects of interservice coordination, tracing the command lines used to effect operations in World War II. The study is limited to U.S. forces only; Allies are excluded due to the time and scope as stated at the start of the study. Written by a four member committee consisting of USMC, USAF, USN, and USA representatives, the six-chapter work addresses the Southwest Pacific Area, Pacific Ocean Area, European Theater, and the Mediterranean Theater. The scope of each chapter generally covers the mission, organization, and operations to include command and staff. A number of organizational charts are provided.