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THE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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FOREWORD

The Special Studies Division, Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, is presently preparing a series of studies dealing with recurrent problems, such as mobilization, demobilization, replacement system, etc., which will always be of interest to the Army. The "Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army" is one of these projects. It was undertaken in keeping with the Army's policy of exploiting all historical data that may be of practical value.

The studies are being made available to the General Staff and to the Army schools and colleges as reference works. They will also prove of value to all who are interested in military affairs.

Events move swiftly and this document, which does not include replacement problems beyond the end of World War II, already is merely background for events that followed that conflict. In the field of replacements, as in other military activity, developments are continuous, and another study will be needed to determine the lessons of the Korean operations.

A. C. SMITH,
Major General, USA,
Chief, Military History.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 1954*

PREFACE

The purpose of this text is to provide the Army with a factual record of the measures taken to offset personnel losses during the various periods of American military history. It is the first comprehensive review of the replacement system to cover the entire span of the existence of the United States Army, but it does not contain any magic formula to follow, nor does it offer any secret key to unlock the door to the Nation's manpower resources. Success comes only from the hard work of staff officers who apply sound principles to whatever immediate situation is under consideration.

These chapters in providing reference material heretofore not conveniently available offer a starting point to the student who is interested in the military personnel replacement system and to staff officers seeking to solve the replacement problems that have always plagued the Army. The footnotes will guide them to an extensive field of research if they wish to carry the study further.

The chapters on the earlier periods show the foundation for the replacement system laid during the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican conflict, and the Civil War. Three preliminary drafts of portions of the study were distributed for comment. More than 100 letters received in reply were considered in the final revision. Those letters are on file, as indicated by the footnotes, and can be made available to students or interested staff officers upon request.

Lt. Col. Joseph Rockis, who started the work, was transferred to another assignment and the undersigned continued the task. First Lt. John H. Beeler wrote the Civil War chapter and contributed to other portions of the work. To all who assisted, the author acknowledges his indebtedness.

LEONARD L. LERWILL
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 1954.*

CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER I. REPLACEMENTS PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR	1
Origin and Meaning of the Term	1
The First British Regulars in America	2
The Colonial Military Forces	4
American Distrust of Standing Armies	8
The Continental Army	9
The Militia as a Source for Continental Replacements	14
Factors Affecting Replacement Requirements	19
Desertions	19
Substitutes	20
Enlistment of Negroes	20
Health and Hospitalization	21
Replacement of Officers	22
The Corps of Invalids	24
Replacements for the Light Infantry	25
Replacements for the Peace Establishment	30
The War of 1812	36
The Beginning of the General Recruiting Service	45
The Mexican War	52
Replacements for Posts in the Far West	60
II. THE CIVIL WAR	71
Depletion of the Armies	73
The Regular Army	77
The Volunteers	85
Federal Experiments in Recruiting	107
The Veteran Volunteers	108
The Veteran Reserve Corps	112
Negro Troops	113
The Militia	116
Replacement Resources Within the Army	117
Exchanged Troops	117
Recovered Sick and Wounded	118
The Use of Other Arms as Infantry	119
Utilization of Prisoners of War and Deserters	120
Replacement of Officers	121
Conclusions	123
III. UNITED STATES ARMY REPLACEMENT PRACTICES, 1865–1904	126
Indian Wars and the Occupation of the South, 1865–77	126
Readjustment After the Civil War	126
The Recruiting Services	129
Desertions	131
Proposals for Reorganizing the Army	132
Efforts To Improve Training	135
First Classification of Enlisted Men	136
Indian Scouts	137

Page

III. UNITED STATES ARMY REPLACEMENT PRACTICES, 1865–1904.—Continued
Efforts To Create a Reserve Force 138
Attempts To Economize 139
The Closing of the Recruiting Depots 140
The War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection 143
The Military Campaigns 143
The Regular Army 143
Regiments of "Immunes" 145
The Volunteers 146
The Volunteer Signal Corps 149
The Failure To Replace Loses 150
The San Francisco Depot 151
Depot Battalions for Units Serving in the Tropics 152
Volunteers for the Philippine Insurrection 153
Developments Which Affected Future Replacement Policies 154
IV. REPLACEMENT POLICIES DURING THE MEXICAN BORDER OPERATIONS 156
The Return to the Recruit Depot System 156
Experiences With Understrength Units 159
Induction of the National Guard and the Pershing Expedition 162
The National Defense Act of June 3 1916 and Its Relation to the Replacement System 166
Summary of the Period of Operations Along the Mexican Border 167
V. THE WORLD WAR I REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 169
Allied Proposals for Integration 169
The Political Factors 171
The General Staff's Replacement Plan 172
Transition From the Territorial System 174
Recruit Depots and Army Cantonments 176
The First Replacement Training Camps 179
The Effectiveness of the Replacement Camps 185
Embarkation Depots 187
Illiterates and Limited Service Men 188
Classification of Military Skills 190
The Trend Toward Specialization 193
Officers 194
VI. THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN THE AEF 199
Changes in Unit Organization 199
The General Organization Project 200
Provisional Units in France 204
Automatic and Exceptional Requisitions 205
Item Numbers 206
Replacement Depots and Regulating Stations 206
Unit Experiences in Receiving Replacements 208
Buildup of the 4th Division During a Rest Period 210
The Engineer Center at Angers 210
Replacement Shortages in Combat Units 211

Page

VII. THE USE OF DIVISIONS IN THE AEF REPLACEMENT SYSTEM 217
The 8th Division 217
The 32d Division 218
The 40th Division 218
The 41st Division 219
The 83d Division 221
The 85th Division 221
The 31st Division 222
The 34th Division 222
The 38th Division 223
The 39th Division 223
The 76th Division 223
The 84th Division 223
The 86th Division 224
The 4th, 55th, and 57th Pioneer Infantry 224
VIII. SUMMARY OF THE WORLD WAR I PERIOD 225
IX. THE PERIOD BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II 229
Army Reorganization 229
Democracy and Education 230
Regular Army Commissions 233
The Harbord Board's Study of the Replacement System 235
General Summerall's Predictions on Replacement Requirements 236
Mobilization of the Civilian Conservation Corps 237
The Replacement Plan as Outlined in 1936 239
Mobilization Plans 241
Loss Replacement Ratio Tables 244
The 1939 Study of Replacement Regulations 245
The 1940–41 Expansion of the Army 247
Replacement Tests During Maneuvers 253
The Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee 254
X. WARTIME DECENTRALIZATION 255
The War Department Reorganization of March 1942 255
Administration of Military Personnel 258
Proposals for a Personnel Control Division 262
Development of the Replacement System 265
XI. EFFORTS TO MEET REPLACEMENT SHORTAGES 269
The Manpower Problem 269
The 1943 Crisis 270
The Army Specialized Training Program 272
Overseas Shortages 274
A Disappearing Ground Combat Army 277
The Problem of Specialists 278
Overstrength of the Army 281
The April 1944 Conference 287
The Replacement Directive to the Theaters 291
The 1944 Committee on Personnel Procedures 295
The December Conferences 298
The Stilwell Replacement Plan 303
The Learned-Smith and Other Replacement Studies 304

Page

XII. FACTORS AFFECTING REPLACEMENTS 312
The Wide Range of Military Requirements 312
Classification 312
Officers 319
Rotation 328
Morale 338
Public Relations 340
Basics 342
The Women's Army Corps 344
XIII. FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 346
Armed Forces Induction Stations 346
Reception Centers 347
Replacement Training Centers 350
Early Developments 350
Organization and Operation 352
Training 355
Army Service Forces Practices 361
Health and Morale 364
Division Assignment Centers 365
Special Training Units 369
Overseas Replacement Depots 375
Processing Centers 385
Reassignment and Redistribution Stations 386
Replacement Depots, Battalions, and Companies 388
XIV. WORLD WAR II REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS OVERSEAS 392
Growth by Trial and Error 392
Commands in the Pacific 394
The Central Pacific Area 396
The South Pacific Area 399
The Southwest Pacific Area 401
Early Organization 401
Organization of USAFFE 403
Methods of Assignment 404
Activation of the Theater Replacement Command 405
Organization Prior to the Japanese Surrender 406
Depot Operations 406
Experiences of Combat Units 410
Pacific Ocean Areas and the Middle Pacific 412
Organization 412
Requisitions and Assignments 412
Support from the 6th Depot 413
Arrival of the 23d Replacement Depot 413
Preparations for the Okinawa Invasion 414
Training 415
Transfer Lists 417
Exchange Operations 417
China-Burma-India Theater 417
The North African and the Mediterranean Theaters of Operations 418
The Campaign in Tunisia 418
Inspections Early in 1944 421
Reorganizations of the Theater 422
Training 425

Page

XIV. WORLD WAR II REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS OVERSEAS—Continued

Officer Training Courses 427
Retraining 427
Conditioning Companies 429
Rotation 430
"Forced Issues" of Noncommissioned Officers 431
Information and Education 431
Reports and Estimates 432
Results 433
Final Activities 437
The European Theater of Operations 438
The First Depots 438
The Central Control Agency 439
The Field Forces Replacement System 440
The Replacement System, ETOUSA 440
Army Air Forces Depots 441
The Ground Forces Replacement Command 442
Depot Functions 444
"Package" Shipments 445
Transfer of Responsibility from MTO 446
Movement of Headquarters 447
Directive on Manpower Conservation 447
The Theater Manpower Section 450
Assignment of General Lear 451
Reports and Requisitions 452
The Movement of Replacements 452
Movements by Air 458
The Change to "Reinforcement" Command 459
Hospital Returnees 460
Inspection Reports 463
Unit Experiences 465
Overstrength for the Army of Occupation 468
Final Operations 468

XV. CONCLUSIONS 469

Page

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 478

BIBLIOGRAPHY 480

CHRONOLOGY 486

CHARTS

No.

1. Replacement Sources During the Revolutionary War, 1775–83 19
2. Sources of Military Personnel Recruited During the War of 1812 37
3. Replacement Sources During the War With Mexico, 1846–48 53
4. The Organization of the Regular and Volunteer Armies, With Schematic Representation of Replacement Sources During the Civil War, 1861–65 84
5. Schematic Representation of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau, 1863–65 96
6. Replacement Sources During the War With Spain and the Philippine Insurrection, 1898–1903 148
7. The Replacement System in World War I, 1917–18 202
8. The Personnel Replacement System Following the Reorganization of 9 March 1942 256
9. Functional Organization Chart, Overseas Theater Replacement System 293
10. Replacement Installations 353
11. Replacement Pipelines—World War II 393

TABLES

1. Troops Furnished in the Revolutionary War, by Year 18
2. Monthly Strengths and Replacements Needed in Four Regiments on the Western Frontier: 1856–60 70
3. Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army: 1 January–31 October 1864 82
4. Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army: 31 October 1864–1 October 1865 83
5. Men furnished by the Draft: 1863–65 97
6. Strength of Michigan Regiments: 1 November 1863, and 1 November 1864 101
7. Funds Appropriated for the Recruiting Services: Fiscal Years 1867–79 129
8. Strength of Regular and Volunteer Armies: May–August 1898 149
9. Proposed Corps Organization, World War I 200
10. Battle Casualties, Replacements, and Strengths of Combat Divisions in Action During World War I 228

ILLUSTRATIONS

Baron von Steuben Instructing Recruits at Washington's Headquarters, Valley Forge, 1778 27
Civil War Recruiting Required Various Expedients 81
Civil War Inspection 98
Bayonet Instruction at Camp Gordon, Ga., 1918 184
World War I Officers at Plattsburg, N. Y., Waiting to Receive Equipment 197
Jungle Training School, Central Pacific Area, 1943 397
World War II Transports 409
American Troops Departing from London Railroad Station, June 1943 455

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CHAPTER I

REPLACEMENTS PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR

Origin and Meaning of the Term

The Dictionary of United States Army Military Terms defines a replacement as an "individual assigned or destined for assignment to fill a vacancy in an organization."[1] Under the terms of this definition, everyone who enters the military service comes in as a replacement. Many become replacements several times during their military careers. Those who fill units being formed, or who go to units that have not previously received men to fill the vacancies involved, are designated "filler replacements"; those who fill places vacated by others are known as "loss replacements." The term "replacement system" is comparatively new, not having been used before World War I; but the problem is old because military forces have always required replacements.

The history of the replacement system in America goes back to the early settlements along the Atlantic coast which developed into the original 13 colonies. The earliest forces that were formed in America were modeled after the European armies of the time. The highest organized units were battalions or regiments—the two terms frequently being used interchangeably. Staff organization was simple, consisting mainly of quartermasters responsible for supply and adjutants responsible for the publication of orders.

The organization of the armies progressed as tactics changed, reforms frequently being inspired by defeat and disaster. Formations changed from the hollow square to the mass, then to the line of musketeers, and finally to an extended line of skirmishers. Infantry came to be regarded as the most useful arm in open engagements, cavalry was developed for its capabilities of shock and pursuit, and artillery became more and more essential for attacks on fortified positions. Armies were specializing, and, as they did so, staff operations, including those having to do with the procurement and assignment of men, became more complicated.

Like many other military practices, replacement procedures developed along separate lines in the standing armies of Europe and the Militia units. England's Militia companies underwent regular drills

[1] DA SR 320–5–1, Aug 50, p. 195.

and inspections but, in contrast with the Regular forces, were subject to a minimum of centralized control. Lords lieutenant in each county commanded the Militia units, and all eligible men, in succession, were required to undergo fixed terms of active service. Limitations on foreign service by Militia troops were partially removed in 1757 by a measure which empowered the King to call the Militia into his service in case of danger.[2]

Militia companies frequently came to the assistance of the King's troops, but when the people were in conflict with the king, the Militia was more likely to support the people. For this reason, monarchs often were reluctant to authorize Militia. Conflicts between Federal and State military control continued for many years. Because the Militia was close to the people, it recognized the principle of universal military service to a greater extent than prevailed in the standing armies, which sometimes were made up of mercenaries. In the United States, Militia units became State rather than Federal military organizations.

The United States Regular Army, before World War I, made no distinction between the recruiting service and the replacement system. For this reason, the early peacetime history of the Regular Army replacement practices is to be found in the records of the recruiting service. They show the gradual separation of the function of procuring men from the functions of classifying, training, and assigning them. In times of war, Regular Army practices have been modified as a result of calling State and volunteer troops into Federal service. Today the agencies that procure personnel are not the same agencies that are responsible for the replacement of personnel. Recruiting officers, selective service boards, and other agencies bring individuals into the service. After recruits are inducted, they pass through the classification centers, training camps, and embarkation depots that make up the replacement system. From the viewpoint of the soldier coming into the Army, the replacement system is merely a "placement system": the prefix neither adds nor detracts from the meaning of the word.

The First British Regulars in America

The First British Regular Troops stationed in America consisted of a mixed battalion of the First and Coldstream Guards that came to Virginia to suppress the rebellion of 1677.[3] The next unit, a company that arrived in 1686, was quartered in Boston. The demobilization of the British Army after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 created "mobs" of unemployed in England, and some 4,000 former soldiers

[2] John W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army* (London, 1899), II, p. 32.
[3] Fortescue, *op. cit.*, II, p. 251.

with their families crossed the Atlantic and founded the city of Halifax to better their economic conditions. During the French and Indian Wars, large numbers of these veterans joined Militia companies, rangers, or other irregular units. Some of these same men later were taken into the British regular forces in which they fought during the Revolutionary War.

After the government in London learned of Gen. Edward Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela in July 1755, the War Ministry appointed Jacque Prevost, a Swiss officer, to raise a four-battalion regiment of provincials in America. Prevost with 40 German officers arrived in America on 15 June 1756, and recruited the Royal Americans, many of whom were Pennsylvania Germans.[4]

A British Army experiment foreshadowed the recruit depots which were developed into important training units 100 years later. In 1760, each of the regiments on active service abroad detailed two companies of infantry and a troop of cavalry to remain at home on recruiting duty. If successful this plan would have made unnecessary the return of recruiting officers to England. The effort apparently was not successful because within a short time the depot companies returned to their regiments. Drafts on military organizations in England proved more effective in strengthening regiments abroad; during the Seven Years War, many English units served only as reservoirs from which replacements were drawn.[5]

The British formed few new regiments during the early part of the Revolutionary War. Recruits were used to bring understrength companies to war footing and to form new companies which were added to old regiments. When the first of the new regiments was formed in 1778 the King reluctantly gave permission for the prospective colonel to sell commissions, a practice known as raising men for rank, because he feared every nobleman who raised a regiment would seek commissions and other favors for unqualified relatives. George III also realized that the new regiments took men who were needed in the old regiments. He said: "An old regiment, composed of good officers and noncommissioned officers, will bear a great augmentation, and 3 months fit it for service, but a new raised corps will require at least a year to be trained for actual service." [6] The Royal Manchester, Royal Liverpool, and Royal Edinburgh regiments were formed in 1779 by the community efforts of the cities from which they took their names. The city officials nominated the officers.

Regiments too depleted to continue in service were broken up and their men transferred to other regiments, low in strength. Members

[4] J. F. C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1925), p. 99.
[5] Fortescue, *op cit.*, II, pp. 585–86.
[6] Edward E. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution* (New Haven, 1926), p. 71.

of one regiment sometimes were drafted to fill another regiment. In that event the remaining officers and noncommissioned officers usually went on recruiting duty in an attempt to reconstitute their units. Sometimes soldiers forcibly resisted transfers: a detachment of 200 men under Maj. James Johnston at Leith in 1779 fired on mutineers belonging to the 31st, 42d, and 71st Regiments to force them into the 83d Regiment, due to sail for America.[7]

Units serving in America were filled by enlisting men in the Colonies when possible. The British met with recruiting difficulties in some localities, but in other places they were successful. The commander of a Royal Battalion in America reported in 1760 that his unit was understrength, but said he could get no recruits because the local residents preferred the large bounties provincial authorities offered for service in the home militia regiments. During the Revolution, Oliver Delancey, a New York Loyalist who undertook to raise three battalions for the British, was commissioned a brigadier general. Courtland Skinner, of Jersey, received similar rank when he attempted, without much success, to raise five battalions.[8]

The Colonial Military Forces

The Militia system in America gradually became a recognized military organization with separate units in each colony, but with no central command above the colony. The American Militiaman retained his frontier independence. In Massachusetts, for instance, the right to elect officers was expressed by law in 1658, and other colonies had similar regulations.[9] Although the principal of compulsory military service was written into the law, actual service usually was voluntary, and it was often necessary to conduct recruiting drives among the enrolled Militia members to obtain filler replacements for units about to go on active service. Since the campaigns usually were short, units did not have to be kept up to strength for very long.

An influential resident who desired a military command could be assured the support of the local authorities if he could show the signatures of enough men who were willing to enlist to make up a unit. If he had exercised care in the selection of these men he could be reasonably certain they would vote for him in their company election.

Instructions issued to recruiting officers required each captain "by beat of drums or otherwise" to raise 30 men; each lieutenant to raise 18 men; and each ensign to raise 12 men.[10] Captains were required

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] John Frost, *The Book of the Army* (New York, 1845), p. 80.

[9] *Military Obligation: The American Tradition* ("Backgrounds of Selective Service," Monograph No. I, vol. II, pt. 1 [Washington, 1947]), p. 82.

[10] John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799* (Washington, 1931), I, p. 163.

to continue their recruiting until their companies were full; those who failed might lose their commissions.[11] The command of a unit often fell upon a subaltern until the commander obtained the required number of recruits. Age limits ranged from 16 to 50. Men under 5 feet 4 inches were unacceptable unless they were "well made, strong, and active." Those who had "old sores" or were "subject to fits" were rejected.[12]

Immediately after a man agreed to enlist and was accepted he was sent to a place of rendezvous where he took the oath of enlistment. It was there that he was examined and given his first instructions, but a second physical examination was given when he was mustered into his unit.

These rendezvous points had some features similar to the replacement camps of later years. Qualified noncommissioned officers taught the men the "new platoon way of exercising" and supervised practice-shooting at target,[13] After 20 or more recruits had arrived at a rendezvous point, the group was drawn up in a military formation and marched under a sergeant or an officer to the companies for which the men had enlisted. Twenty-five men were considered too many for a noncommissioned officer; when more than that number were to be moved, an officer took command.[14]

George Washington's experiences while an officer in the Virginia Colonial forces provide some of the best recorded examples of the methods used to provide replacements in American armies before the Revolution. After several weeks of recruiting, Washington assembled at Alexandria, Va., by 20 March 1754, a group of 75 fillers for the expedition into the Ohio Valley. Nearly 50 of these men had been enlisted by Washington personally, an accomplishment the Virginia House of Burgesses took into consideration when it later elevated the young officer to the grade of leutenant colonel. Two companies, totaling approximately 120 men, on 2 April 1754, started on the expedition which culminated in the capitulation of Washington and his troops at Fort Necessity on 4 July 1754.

Inducing men to enlist was not the only problem that confronted Washington. He soon received complaints which have long been familiar to officers connected with replacements. A large number of his recruits could not readily adapt themselves to military service. Many who joined his command were described as "loose, idle persons, quite destitute of house and home." [15] Home owners, who made more capable soldiers, were not attracted to the military service. Even

[11] *Ibid.*, I, p. 241.
[12] *Ibid.*, I, p. 163.
[13] *Ibid.*, I, p. 170.
[14] *Ibid.*, I, p. 199.
[15] *Ibid.*, I, p. 32.

men living farther west who were more exposed to the ravages of war disliked to take up arms. In October 1755, Washington wrote that he was unable to induce the Ohio settlers, many of whom were in flight from the intruding French, "to lodge their families in a safe place and join the militia companies." [16] The men refused to stir, choosing to die with their wives and children rather than fight alongside their neighbors for the protection of their homes.

Some of the officers on recruiting duty were admonished for having been "out 6 weeks or 2 months without getting a man; spending their time in all the gayety of pleasurable mirth." [17] Others were reprimanded for exceeding their authority by using improper methods such as "forcibly taking, confining, and torturing those who would not otherwise enlist." [18] Washington believed that laxity within the military organization aroused contempt on the part of the public, which in turn was reflected by greater insolence and laziness on the part of officers and men. He recognized public opinion as an important factor in filling vacancies in units.

The failure of the expedition to the Ohio in 1754 made necessary the immediate reconstruction of the colonial forces in Virginia and presented a new replacement problem that was all the more serious because the officers, many of who had been unable to collect expenses incurred in previous recruiting, were reluctant to engage in that duty again.[19] The difficulties were intensified by Braddock's defeat in July of the following year. On 2 August 1755, Washington called together the Virginia officers to consider what actions they should take to stimulate recruiting. Little more than a month later, Washington took command of the Virginia regiment and started a recruiting program intended to bring its strength to 1,200 men formed into 16 companies. By 9 January 1756, the full number of companies had been formed, but all were understrength and they still were understrength when the drive ended in March.

The House of Burgesses then voted a draft which was intended to bring the strength of the Virginia regiment to 1,500 men, but men were called for only 7 months' service.[20] Those who could pay £10 were exempt from the draft and the result was that few men were added to the active companies. The forfeitures were not used to stimulate enlistments because they went into the Virginia general fund rather than the recruiting fund.

Washington disapproved the section of the law which prohibited ordering drafted men outside of Virginia. He also criticized what

[16] *Ibid.*, I, p. 194.
[17] *Ibid.*, I, p. 241.
[18] *Ibid.*, I, p. 240.
[19] *Ibid.*, I, p. 102.
[20] *Ibid.*, II, p. 9.

he described as "ill-judged economy shown in the raising of men," and blamed the colony for "attempting to evade the expense until the blow is struck, then running into an expense of rushing militia into service. These, after an age, as it were, is spent in assembling them, come up, make a noise for a time, oppress the inhabitants, and then return, leaving the frontiers unguarded as before." [21]

A later Virginia law impressed vagrants, but these miscreants were found to lower the standards of discipline, increase the desertion rate, and add to the troubles of the military commanders.[22] Desertions caused many of the vacancies for which Washington was seeking replacements. Some deserters were hanged under the provisions of the mutiny bills, which were passed annually by Parliament and which prescribed death as the penalty for desertion.[23]

When preparations for operations against Fort Duquesne started in April 1758, Washington was directed to expand the companies of the Virginia regiment to 100 rank and file, thus coming face to face with a replacement problem which has appeared in nearly all wars—that of increasing the strength of peacetime units for wartime service. Washington's problem was further complicated by his inability to retain drafted men later than December of that year. The regimental commander sent all the officers he could spare on recruiting duty, engaging some of the most popular of the "country gentlemen" to help raise this force. The Virginia House of Burgesses delayed for so long the authorization of the funds (each recruit received a bounty [24] of $10) that Washington for a time feared the expense would come out of his own pocket.

Although the order to march came before the recruiting campaign was completed, nearly 1,600 men from Virginia took part in this expedition to the Ohio along with 1,200 Highlanders, 350 Royal Americans (both British military units), about 2,700 provincials from Pennsylvania, and smaller numbers from Maryland and North Carolina.

Washington realized that if he could enlist the Indians as allies he might require fewer men in the active Militia. Both the British and the French had augmented their fighting forces by using Indians as guides, scouts, or as other assistants. Washington declared that Indians were the only match for Indians, that without them his

[21] *Ibid.*, II, p. 16.
[22] *Ibid.*, II, p. 8.
[23] *Ibid.*, I, p. 265; II, p. 97.
[24] Bounties frequently were offered to spur enlistments, but the colonies generally were slow in payment. Governor Robert Dinwiddie, who hoped to substitute land grants for money payments, in 1754 had set aside 200,000 acres on the east side of the Ohio River to be divided among those men who served in the campaigns against the French. Some of this land was surveyed and patents issued in 1773, but many of the titles were in dispute long after that. *Ibid.*, III, p. 283.

men would fight on unequal terms, but he added that the French generally were able to outbid the British in dealing with the Indians.[25] On his trip to the Ohio in 1754 he had urged the Half-King, an Indian chief of the Six Nations, to support the British. When the fortune of war turned against the French, the Indians shifted their favor. Washington believed that this desertion of the Indians led the French to abandon Fort Duquesne in 1758.[26]

American Distrust of Standing Armies

The American colonists disapproved of standing armies. They remembered the British Army's lifetime enlistments, the press gangs that seized vagrants off the streets, the judges who released convicts on condition they would join the Army, and other abuses commonly practiced to obtain men for military service. An anonymous English writer expressed this sentiment in a 1697 political pamphlet that declared: "Whether our enemies shall conquer us is uncertain. But whether a standing army will enslave us, neither reason nor experience will suffer us to doubt." [27]

British officers used harsh punishments to maintain discipline among the numerous unruly outcasts in their companies. Conditions improved in popular wars, such as the Spanish conflict of 1739, when recruits were so plentiful the officers could pick their men; during other years, when the major portion of the British Army came from outcasts and criminals, no amount of flogging could reduce the desertion rate or check the insubordination.[28]

The American colonists regarded regular military service as a thing to be avoided, but, in contrast to their distrust of regular troops, they, like most Englishmen, looked upon the Militia as a bulwark of freedom. The conduct of the British Regular troops in America did not change this sentiment. The British practice of billeting troops in private homes, for instance, added to the ill feelings and brought protests from householders.

British use of mercenary troops during the Revolution was unpopular, not only in the Colonies they were fighting against, but also in England and in some of the German states which furnished the men. The first of these mercenaries arrived in Canada and New York during the summer of 1776. British treaties with the minor German states provided for 30 marks payment for each man, one-third to be paid 1 month after the execution of the treaty, the balance within 2 months. Each man wounded, captured, or otherwise made unserviceable obli-

[25] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 39–44.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *A Discourse Concerning Militias and Standing Armies* (London, 1697), p. 5.
[28] Fortescue, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 32 and 572.

gated the British for the additional payment of a similar amount. Two months' pay was advanced to each man on enlistment. The first replacements from Germany for the units in America came in August 1781 when 2,988 arrived. Another group came during the summer of 1782. During the war, approximately 30,000 Germans were sent to America: 17,000 from Hesse-Cassel, 2,000 from Hesse-Hanau, 6,000 from Brunswick, and the remainder from the smaller states. After 1782, Great Britain was unable to obtain additional troops from Germany.[29]

The Continental Congress on 26 May 1784 reaffirmed American opposition to standing armies when it resolved ". . . standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican government, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destrictive engines for establishing despotism." [30] This distrust of a standing army was an important factor in the development of the American military system because it resulted in the States retaining control over manpower to an extent which interferred with operations of the Regular Army.

The Continental Army

Although the American colonies had started some significant military preparations as early as 1745, acting independently at first but later in some unison, there was no comprehensive plan for raising men or maintaining units in the field at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. George Washington's remark to the Virginia House of Burgesses in the spring of 1774, "I will raise 1,000 men, subsist them at my own expense and march myself at their head for the relief of Boston," [31] indicates that the colonists generally underrated their enemy and had little idea of what a conflict with Britain would mean in regard to troops required, length of service, or provisions for keeping units at effective strength.

The minutemen who responded to the call to arms at Concord and Lexington were following a tradition more than 100 years old, but it was the tradition of men who fought one day and returned home the next. The Militia at Boston was not organized for extended service. New regiments had to be called out for the siege of the city.

The Second Continental Congress, after convening in Philadelphia on 19 May 1775, took over the Army and gave the command to Washington. Upon reaching Cambridge in July, the new commander

[29] J. G. Rosengarten, *The German Allied Troops in the North American War of Independence* (Albany, 1893), pp. 17 and 217.

[30] W. C. Ford and Others (eds.), *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789* (Washington, 1905–33), XXVII, p. 433.

[31] John C. Fitzpatrick, *George Washington Himself* (Indianapolis, 1933), p. 157.

found men "going and coming about as they pleased." [32] Massachusetts had sent about 1,200 troops, many boys or deserters; New Hampshire had raised 3 regiments totaling about 1,200; Connecticut had sent 6 regiments, or 2,300; and Rhode Island had contributed 3 regiments of 8 companies each. Washington estimated his force at 14,500 able-bodied men.[33] All enlistments for the troops around Boston were due to expire 31 December 1775.

A council of general officers on 8 October 1775 recommended that the Army ought to consist of not less than 20,372 men, formed into 26 regiments (exclusive of riflemen and artillery), each regiment to number 728 men, officers included. The units then in service differed in organization, some regiments having 11 companies, some 10, others 8. The authorized strength of these regiments varied from 590 to 1,000 men.

This council also suggested that men should be engaged for 1 year, or until December 1776, adding that they could be discharged sooner if the military necessity for their services ceased before that date.[34] General orders of 22 October 1775 called upon all "brave men and true patriots" willing to serve beyond their terms of enlistment to consider themselves engaged until the last day of December 1776 and called for a report of the number who would remain. At least a third of the officers indicated they would not continue. Washington declared that the attitude of these officers discouraged the men.[35]

Reenlistments were difficult to obtain because few men recognized any obligation to stay. Some left camp to work on their farms; others went to work on farms belonging to their officers or found employment elsewhere. Officers generally lived outside the camp, some in houses several miles distant.[36]

The men shifted from one company to another as suited their fancy.[37] Efforts to adjust strengths of units by reorganizations usually failed because men from different communities frequently refused to associate with one another. Soldiers who had elected their officers contended they were not bound to serve under other officers.[38]

Washington finally overcame all of these difficulties. During the winter of 1775–76, he replaced his entire Army while living under the guns of the enemy, an accomplishment which probably has never been equaled by any other commander.[39] But this recruiting of an

[32] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* III, pp. 306–331.
[33] *Ibid.,* III, p. 330.
[34] *Ibid.,* IV, p. 8 f. n.
[35] *Ibid.,* IV, p. 55; *Journals of the Continental Congress,* III, pp. 321–324.
[36] *Orderly Book,* LX (27 Apr to 9 Aug 1772), p. 76. Revolutionary War Records. National Archives.
[37] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* III, p. 363.
[38] *Ibid.,* III, p. 392.
[39] *Ibid.,* III, p. 327.

entirely new force did not end the need for replacements. Men were required for new organizations including a "train of the artillery" and cavalry.[40]

Washington's experience with some of his first cavalry troops indicates the difficulty officers were having in starting civilians on their way to become good soldiers, a task which in later years was to be a major function of replacement installations. The first cavalry units formed during the Revolution, "light dragoons," whose members were farmers mounted on rough country horses, did not meet with a very cordial reception when they arrived at the camp near Boston. The Commander in Chief had expected this group of about 500 to relieve some of his manpower shortages, but when they refused to do guard duty or fatigue, Washington, afraid they would undermine the morale of the remainder of his troops, sent them home. His action was criticized by many who believed 6 weeks of training would have brought the rough frontiersmen into shape.[41]

As recruiting for the Continental Army got under way, recruiting parties were sent from each regiment, the colonels being admonished to select "active and vigilant recruiters who stood high in the esteem of the people in the districts in which they were to solicit." [42] These officers were under State regulations while on recruiting duty.[43] Each State selected a general place of rendezvous where recruits assembled. The Commander in Chief of the Army sent officers to these points to conduct physical examinations and the States were called upon to replace all men who were rejected.[44] Each recruit, after being attested before a peace officer, a general officer, a judge advocate, or deputy judge advocate, was required to sign enlistment papers which stated length and conditions of service, the bounty, and other requirements "fairly written at length without erasure or interlineation so as to prevent all ambiguity, doubt, or dispute." [45] Recruiting officers were prohibited from exchanging or discharging men after enlistment papers had been signed. Training was supposed to start as soon as the men were enlisted, but training facilities and competent instructors seldom were available at the rendezvous points.

Names of the men who assembled in the rendezvous points were entered on muster rolls. Officers were appointed to conduct parties of recruits to the units to which they were assigned. They were instructed to send recruits to the regiments as soon as 8 or 10 men

[40] Allen French, *The First Year of the American Revolution* (Boston and New York, 1934), p. 74.

[41] Christopher L. Ward, *The Delaware Continentals* (Wilmington, 1941), p. 45; Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, V, p. 295.

[42] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, III, pp. 334–37.

[43] *Ibid.*, XXI, p. 186.

[44] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XVI, p. 249.

[45] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, XXI, p. 186.

were available.[46] These officers carried with them muster rolls for the recruits in their parties. Rendezvous points sent weekly rolls to State authorities. Recruit rolls specified, in separate columns, the name, age, size, trade or profession, place of nativity, place of residence, time of enlistment or draft, term of service, bounty, clothing, and such other information as was required by military regulations.[47]

Recruits received sixpence a day for subsistence from the time they were recruited until they marched for the camps. They were paid one penny per mile for the distance from their homes to the camps of the regiments they joined. Drummers and fifers, supposedly boys from 15 to 18 years of age, were enlisted separately until December of 1781 when it was found that many of the musicians were more able, physically, than some of the men doing heavy duty. Thereafter, drummers and fifers were selected from the ranks.

Upon their arrival in camp, the recruits frequently were permitted to select the regiment from their State in which they desired to serve, the only restriction being that they would not be assigned to regiments which had no vacancies.[48]

As 1776 drew to a close, the Continental Congress Committee on Safety, which had an important role in the control of the Army, realized that the 1-year enlistments, which had appeared so promising at the beginning of the year, would not fulfill the military requirements. The Continental Congress proposed that men be enlisted for the duration of the war. A resolution adopted 27 December 1776 stated: "that General Washington be empowered to use every endeavor, by giving bounties and otherwise, to prevail upon the troops, whose time of enlistment shall expire at the end of this month, to stay with the Army so long after that period as its situation shall render their stay necessary." [49]

A similar situation developed each year. Many men would not enlist in the Continental Army for the duration of the war while it was possible for them to enlist in the Militia for shorter periods. On 23 January 1779, the Continental Congress again urged the Commander in Chief to "enlist for the continuation of the war all Continental troops not expressly engaged for that period." [50] Washington never overcame the disadvantage arising from the continuous turnover of men in his battalions due to short enlistments.

A recommendation which Washington submitted in July of 1777 proposed that the States divide their territory into recruiting dis-

[46] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 110.
[47] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, IV, p. 63.
[48] *Orderly Book*, XXIII, (18 Apr to 21 Jul 1778), p. 11. Revolutionary War Records. National Archives.
[49] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, VI, p. 1043.
[50] *Ibid.*, XIII, p. 108.

tricts and appoint managers in each district. These district managers would have appointed civilian recruiting officers and would have supervised efforts to apprehend deserters.[51] The Continental Congress did not take favorable action on this suggestion and it was not carried out by any of the States. Had it been adopted it might have relieved the Army of many of its recruiting burdens.

The Continental Congress, lacking the executive power necessary to order either the recruiting or the drafting of men, resorted to calls on the State executives, urging them to order Militia officers on recruiting duty.[52] The Commander in Chief could detach from his force officers for recruiting duty and he frequently did so, but such details reduced his effective strength. Recruiting officers sometimes were criticized for improper conduct. The Continental Congress on 14 April 1777 asked each State to investigate all officers who were attempting to enlist men within its borders.[53] On 5 August 1777, the Continental Congress complained that several of the States had permitted interference with Washington's recruiting officers.[54]

In February of 1779, the battalions of the Continental Army were so short of men that the Continental Congress called upon the States to draft, for a 9-month period, enough men to bring the organizations up to strength. The States refused to invest Congress with the power to requisition men or provisions, retaining those powers for themselves. Consequently, each State could decide for itself the extent to which it would comply with the draft request. In 1780, Virginia passed a law to draft every fifteenth man on the militia rolls and other States adopted various measures for the drafting of men.[55]

The 1779 reorganization of the Army provided that there would be a fall reenlistment campaign which was to be completed by 1 October of each year. At the conclusion of this reenlistment drive, the Commander in Chief would notify the Continental Congress of the number of men necessary to fill the battalions from each State, listing the number who would be needed to replace estimated losses as of April, June, and September.[56] The States would then be called upon to raise, by draft or otherwise, the number of men requested. These men were to serve only until 1 January of the following year. The plan provided for an additional year-end levy to bring all units up to strength at the beginning of the year, with the men called under this levy to serve for a full year. This plan would have provided Washington with the men he needed if the States had fulfilled their parts. But the Continental Congress imposed no penalties on the States

[51] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* IX, pp. 406–407.
[52] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XIV, p. 740.
[53] *Ibid.,* VII, 261.
[54] *Ibid.,* VIII, p. 608.
[55] *Ibid.,* XVIII, p. 809.
[56] *Ibid.,* XV, p. 1358.

which failed to fill their quotas; consequently the plan never operated successfully.

On 28 October 1780, each regiment was given four supernumerary officers: a recruiting officer, an adjutant, a quartermaster, and a paymaster.[57] The assignment of permanent recruiting officers to regiments reduced the need for detaching line officers for recruiting duty.

When the scene of operations shifted to the South in 1780, many soldiers had such short periods to serve that it was not considered worth while to send them with the main body of the Army. Furloughs, lasting as long as 3 months, were offered in an effort to induce these men to reenlist, but few responded. Many who remained behind when the main Army moved into Virginia were discharged before their terms expired to save provisions.[58]

During the spring of 1781, the Continental officers placed special stress on the training of recruits. New men were instructed without arms during the first 8 days after they joined their organizations. The large proportion of recruits made it necessary for officers of all ranks to devote part of their time to training, since Baron Frederick W. A. von Steuben, The Inspector General, believed the training of recruits was a task for officers, not for sergeants or corporals. Under Steuben's orders, the captains and lieutenants of the Continental Army were kept busy giving instruction to the new arrivals in camps. During an inspection, when a colonel was observed giving instruction to a single recruit, Steuben remarked, "I thank God for that!" [59]

After the British captured most of the Virginia troops at Charleston, that State undertook to raise 5,000 men to serve for 18 months to replace the losses. Since the colonels of the 2d, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Regiments had escaped capture, recruits were assigned to those units in the order of their numerical sequence, beginning with the lowest, giving each regiment up to 504 men.

The Militia as a Source for Continental Replacements

The American Militia at the beginning of the Revolutionary War had a potential strength of about 200,000 men, plenty of arms, and some ammunition.[60] It had a few officers who had gained experience by fighting the French and the Indians. Its men knew little about drill, but they were familiar with firearms. They were dispersed throughout the country so that a considerable force could have been raised in any community, and they had determination and fortitude.

[57] *Ibid.*, XXII, p. 211.

[58] *Ibid.*, XVI, p. 42.

[59] Charles Knowles Bolton, *The Private Soldier Under Washington* (New York, 1902), p. 25; *Orderly Book* LI (26 Apr to 1 Jul 1781), p. 154. Revolutionary War Records. National Archives.

[60] Oliver L. Spaulding, *The U. S. Army in Peace and War* (New York, 1937), p. 24.

Militiamen were useful as light skirmishers, but were difficult to use in sustained attack. They could hit, then vanish. Also, they could vanish before the blow was struck, to the chagrin of their generals.

Washington was familiar with the many problems arising from the use of Militia, and when he took command at Boston he was determined to find a solution. The Continental Army, which had its roots in the shifting sands of the State forces but which promised to grow into the solid trunk of an integrated and united central force, was the answer the Commander in Chief gave to the country.

The transition was not easy. There were almost unsurmountable difficulties blocking a central army. Neither officers nor men were willing to assume obligations superseding their allegiance to their home States. Most of them regarded the Continental Congress as a very uncertain source for supplies, rations, pay, or promotions. Many feared this "new modeling" would destroy the Army.[61] Washington had to overcome this state of mind before he had any success with a unified force.

Washington recognized the Militia of the several States, constituting all the men of military age, as the manpower reservoir upon which he would have to draw. The records do not reveal any attempt to interfere with State authority over the Militia. He intervened only after the men he had asked for failed to arrive and then only to chide the authorities for their failure. The Continental Army had plenty to do without taking over the recruiting of men, then considered a State function. Nevertheless the Continentals had to do some recruiting.

The Continental Congress first called for 26 battalions for 1776, each State to furnish a given quota. On 16 September the number was raised to 88 and in December the Congress asked for 16 battalions of infantry, to be raised by the country at large,[62] bringing the year's total, with 3 other irregular battalions, to 107. The States responded to these calls by placing active Militia units on duy and sending them to Boston where they were taken into the Continental Army. Few States furnished their full quota of battalions. Many battalions left recruiting details behind to solicit volunteers from men on the Militia rolls because they had departed at little more than half strength. Volunteers for the Continental Army for 1776 generally were enlisted for 1 year; later the usual enlistment period was for 3 years or the duration of the war. The Militia of the States were engaged in continuous recruiting campaigns in their efforts to fill their units and make up for losses. Few were successful.

[61] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, IV, p. 83 f. n.
[62] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, VI, p. 1045.

The indifferent success of the States in raising their quotas confronted Washington with another problem. He indicated the solution on 23 January 1777: "The progress in raising recruits for the new army being very slow, I have applied . . . for ten regiments of Militia to continue in service until the first of next April." [63] Deficiencies in the battalions of the Continental Army were made up by calling Militia units which became a part of the Continental Army for short periods, usually 3, 6, or 9 months. During the greater part of the war, these calls were made by the Continental Congress after it received recommendations from the Army, but for a short time Washington had the power to make direct calls upon the States for Militia units.

The short-term Militia units, upon their arrival in the camp, became the targets for intensive recruiting drives by officers of the Continental Army. Bounties were offered to the soldier who extended his service and to the officer who persuaded him to do so. A general order issued from the Headquarters at Cambridge on 9 February 1776 said: "If the Militia who are ordered into camp should incline to enter the Continental Army, they are immediately to join the regiment they enlist into and are from that day to be struck from the Militia rolls." [64] Many Continental soldiers were obtained in this way. Recruiting efforts were intensified in units which had been ordered out for brief periods and in those which were nearing the end of their service. In August 1776, Washington advised his officers: "Taking men from the four or five months' Militia will not answer our present necessity, as it will not add to the number in service; but of the militia which is only ordered for a few days or weeks, you have an undoubted right to take such as have a mind to enlist with you." [65]

Practically all infantry in the Continental Army was made up of State Militia battalions taken in as units. Even the battalions recruited at large were carefully credited to State quotas. Recruiting at large caused confusion and for that reason seldom was used. Most of the newer cavalry and artillery units were raised under special authority of the Continental Congress, some not being credited to any State. This was also true of groups like Lt. Col. Henry Lee's battalion of Light Dragoons, the German battalion, the two Canadian regiments, and other irregular units. There were frequent disputes among the States over credit for these organizations.

The critical shortage of men caused Congress on 3 June 1777 to authorize a flying camp of 10,000 men commanded by Brig. Gen. Hugh Mercer.[66] The plan was to collect the armed inhabitants into a large

[63] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* IV, p. 267.
[64] *Ibid.,* IV, p. 311.
[65] *Ibid.,* V, p. 408.
[66] *Ibid.,* V, p. 87 f. n.

reserve without enrolling them by means of regular enlistments. Such a reserve was needed to protect New Jersey and Philadelphia while Washington's attention was centered on New York. The strength of the flying camp probably never exceeded 3,000; the transitory nature of its population reduced its military value. A number of regimental commanders asked permission to send recruiting parties to the flying camp but were refused by Washington who feared enlisting men from a floating population such as the camp contained would confuse State quota records. The flying camp was discontinued after the British left New York.

Washington, who was convinced of "the impracticability of raising our complement of men by voluntary enlistments," urged the States to draft men by calling on "each town . . . for a proportionate number of recruits." [67] Many of the States drafted men, the procedures differing in accordance with various Militia statutes. Generally, drafted men were permitted to hire substitutes. In some States two Militiamen could be excused if they hired one substitute. Washington also urged State authorities to prevent accumulation of recruits in rendezvous points. He directed them to combine detachments for the different regiments, sending men forward as soon as a sufficient number were available.[68]

But many Militia units did not go to the Continental Army. Instead, they functioned under State direction, some in cooperation with Washington's troops, others on independent missions. Washington protested when New Jersey raised several battalions for its own defense before it provided the Continental Army with troops that had been requested, warning that such practices jeopardized the common defense.[69]

The weakness of the Continental Army replacement system was inherent in the loose organization under which the Continental Congress recommended quotas but had no power to discipline States that failed to meet quotas. Washington wanted each State to furnish its assigned number of battalions, then send forward enough men to keep them at prescribed strength. The Militia units provided the States with the organization necessary to have carried out this plan. Insofar as it failed, the failure was due to negligence within the States and the inability of Congress to exercise central supervision. In 1780, Washington said: "Had we formed a permanent Army in the beginning, which by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline we never should have had to retreat with a handfull of

[67] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 185.
[68] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, VI, p. 1043.
[69] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, VII, p. 42.

men across the Delaware." [70] He added: "We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay, the discharged men going home, and the levies coming in." [71] Imperfect as was the execution of the Revolutionary War replacement plan, it furnished the men to keep the Continental Army in action. Washington attempted to correct the deficiencies by improving the organization and functioning, not by changing the system.

[See table 1 for the number of Continentals and Militia in service during each year of the Revolutionary War and an estimate of the number employed by the States independently. See chart 1 for replacement sources during the war.]

Table 1—Troops Furnished in the Revolutionary War, by Year [1]

Year	Quota [2]		Troops furnished				
	Battalions	Men	Total	Returns of the Army			Additional Militia [3]
				Total	In Continental pay	Militia	
1775	(2)	(2)	37, 623	27, 443	[4] 27, 443	0	10, 180
1776	(2)	(2)	89, 651	72, 951	46, 891	26, 060	16, 700
1777	107	[5] 75, 760	68, 720	44, 920	34, 820	10, 100	23, 800
1778	86	44, 892	51, 052	37, 252	32, 899	4, 353	13, 800
1779	80	41, 760	45, 184	32, 834	27, 699	5, 135	12, 350
1780	80	41, 760	42, 826	26, 826	21, 015	5, 811	16, 000
1781	58	33, 408	29, 340	20, 590	13, 292	7, 298	8, 750
1782	58	33, 408	18, 006	14, 256	(6)	(6)	3, 750
1783	58	33, 408	13, 476	13, 477	13, 477	0	0

[1] The Army in the Northern Department was discharged on 5 November 1783 and that in the Southern Department on 15 November 1783.

[2] Source data contain yearly quotas of battalions and men beginning with 1777. Battalion strengths fixed by quotas were as follows: 680 for 1777, 522 for 1778 to 1780, and 576 for 1781 to 1783.

[3] Estimates of additional Militia employed not shown on returns of the Army.

[4] Enlisted to serve to 31 December 1775.

[5] Includes 3,000 in addition to total battalion strengths fixed by quota.


[6] Not shown separately.

Source: U. S. Congress, *American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Military Affairs* (Washington, 1832—61), I Doc. No. 3, pp. 14-19,

[70] *Ibid.*, XIX, p. 136; see also John W. Wright, "Some Notes on the Continental Army," *William and Mary College Quarterly*, XI (1931), pp. 81–105, 185–209; XII (1932), pp. 79–103, 229–250; XIII (1933), pp. 85–97.

[71] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, XIX, pp. 402–413.

CHART I— REPLACEMENT SOURCES DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, 1775-1783



Factors Affecting Replacement Requirements

Desertions

The personnel replacement rate is determined by losses to the service so long as the authorized strength of an Army remains constant. An organization which loses few men needs few replacements and an efficient unit is likely to keep more men than an inefficient one. For this reason, administration may become a replacement factor.

Early in the Revolution, officers of regiments and brigades knew little about the internal administration of their organizations. Contractors who received commissions on the total cost of what they furnished had slight interest in economy. The enlisted men did not receive much more than food and clothing. The Continental Congress, which generally could supply only what it had purchased abroad with borrowed money, urged the States to supply and equip their troops. The Middle and Northern States, containing more manufacturing establishments, could provide more than the agricultural South. Lack of central control permitted some States to furnish more than others thereby engendering jealousy and discontent and increasing the desertion rate.[72]

Not all desertions were prompted by lack of supplies or camp discomforts. There were some who intended to reenlist and collect an-

[72] *Ibid.*, XV, p. 33.

other bounty. At Ticonderoga, in 1778, a man was shot after being convicted of seven desertions, each followed by a reenlistment for which he had collected a bounty. Others intended to take advantage of Lord Howe's offer, first of $16 and later of $24 to Continentals coming over to the British forces. Washington admitted to the Continental Congress on 3 May 1777 that the British offer had a bad effect on the American soldiers, especially those not born in America.[73] There were frequent changes from one army to the other, men serving wherever it appeared most profitable. Nearly all who surrendered and returned to the service were pardoned under proclamations similar to the one of 24 October 1777, which offered a full and free pardon to all who returned by the first of the following January.[74] Similar proclamations were issued on 10 March 1779 and 29 August 1780.[75] After several such offers Washington decided that little good came from them and that chronic deserters regarded amnesty proclamations as a matter of course.

British newspaper propaganda encouraged desertions from the American forces. For example, an article in the *Philadelphia Evening Post* said drafted men would be retained for the full duration of the war. This was branded by general orders published at Valley Forge Headquarters on 23 April 1778 as false and misleading and as having been inspired by the enemy in an effort to influence soldiers to desert and to keep others from entering the service.[76]

Substitutes

Washington was not opposed to substitutes; he believed it was better for a private individual to hire a soldier than for the State to collect taxes or issue new currency to pay bounties.[77] The practice became widespread with many old soldiers offering themselves and frequently waiting for high pay. Maj. Gen. John de Kalb believed it was bad for the Regular regiments because it prevented them from enlisting men. Few would join Continental battalions while the substitutes hired by rich citizens could get enormous bounties for a "two months walk" as the short enlistments in the Militia were called.[78]

Enlistment of Negroes

In May 1775, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety opposed admitting slaves to the Army. A similar position was taken by the council of general officers in October 1775. Washington, noting in a general order that a number of free Negroes desired to enlist, gave

[73] *Ibid.*, VII, p. 8.
[74] *Ibid.*, IX, p. 427.
[75] *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 222 and XIX, p. 471.
[76] *Ibid.*, XI, p. 299.
[77] *Ibid.*, XVII, p. 133 f. n.
[78] Bolton, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

recruiting officers authority to accept them, adding that he would lay the matter before Congress. In 1778, Massachusetts voted to raise a regiment of Negroes, Mulattoes, or Indians, the sergeants and all higher officers to be white. Connecticut also authorized the raising of Negro troops; New Hampshire freed slaves after they had served 3 years, but the enlistment bounties went to former owners, and a Rhode Island regiment of slaves received praise for action on 29 August 1778 against Hessian troops. The slavery system, in some instances, retarded enlistments because the slave owners feared that if they entered the military service and left their homes their slaves might revolt.[79]

Health and Hospitalization

The health of the Army, the hospitalization of the troops, and the method of return to duty after hospitalization have always had an important bearing on replacements. During the Revolution soldiers who were ill in camps which lacked medical facilities were permitted to go to their homes. After their recovery, they sometimes were slow to return. On 21 May 1781, the Commander in Chief took notice of this situation by ordering commanding officers of regiments and corps to insert advertisements in the newspapers "requiring such of their men as are sick or absent . . . to join their respective corps or give information where they are and the cause of their detention within a reasonable time on pain of being treated as deserters." [80] All absent officers not on public duty and all soldiers on furlough were ordered to join their regiments. Regimental officers were prohibited from releasing patients from the hospitals, such releases being valid only when ordered by the senior surgeon or director of the hospital.[81] Surgeons who released convalescent patients on furloughs were ordered to furnish certified copies of the furlough papers to commanding officers of the corps or brigade to which the patients belonged.

The medical committee of the Continental Congress in 1777 consulted with Washington on "causing such of the troops of the Army as have not had the smallpox to be inoculated." [82] An order on 22 April authorized Dr. James Tilton "to repair to Dumfries, in Virginia, there to take charge of all the Continental soldiers who are or should be inoculated." [83] Thus began a practice which later became an important procedure in replacement installations.

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[79] Georgiana Lockwood, "The Negro in the Revolution," *National Republic,* XXVIII (1930), pp. 22–23.

[80] *Orderly Book,* LI (26 Apr to 1 Jul 1781), p. 7. Revolutionary War Records. National Archives.

[81] *Orderly Book,* XVI (23 May 1777 to 20 Oct 1778), p. 36. Revolutionary War Records. National Archives.

[82] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* VII, p. 110; Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* V, p. 83.

[83] *Journals of the Continental Congress,* VII, p. 292.

Replacement of Officers

Many officers who came into the Continental Army at the beginning of the war expected temporary service in a short conflict, and they did not, at first, pay much attention to their compensation.[84] As the conflict dragged on they found commissioned service offered few advantages and involved many hardships. Some resigned declaring their pay did not meet their needs. But there were times when the Continental Congress was besieged by persons who wanted commissions. The Congress issued all commissions for the Continental Army, generally appointing as field officers those who previously had been selected by the States in which they resided.[85] In 1776, Congress advised the State authorities that it would be better for them to consult with the generals before appointing or promoting officers, thereby giving the military commanders some choice.

The Commander in Chief appointed a committee of officers and vested in them authority to recommend dismissal of supernumerary officers who were regarded as unqualified. Military authorities could fill vacancies so created by promotion of other officers from the same States as the officers dismissed, first notifying the State executives who usually submitted recommendations.[86] Military commissions were filled out at the War Office and attested by the Secretary after which they were presented to the President of Congress for his signature.[87] After the President signed a commission it was returned to the War Office and registered. The commission was valid as soon as the seal was affixed by the Board of War.

Promotions in the Continental Army were regimental to the grade of captain; from captain to brigadier general they were in the line of the State; above brigadier general they were in the line of the Army at large. Many resignations from officers were blamed on irregular promotions. There were complaints that promotions were not always rewards for merit. Washington noted that even when officers admitted they had gained promotion through favoritism they did not abandon their claim to the higher position.

Washington told Congress that the officers should be adequately provided for, adding that he had found that impoverished officers displayed an apathy and neglect of duty which spread to all ranks. The Continental Congress, which always found it difficult to raise money, tried to make up for inadequate pay by promising pensions of half pay for life to be supplemented with parcels of public land. Dissatisfied officers looked with longing at the fortunes which they thought were being made by merchants and tradesmen. In an effort to increase

[84] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, X, p. 126.
[85] Louis Clinton Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army* (New York, 1904), p. 41.
[86] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XIV, p. 779.
[87] *Ibid.*, XII, p. 291.

officer morale, Congress arranged to sell clothing at low prices and authorized extra rations, usually of poor quality.

Rivalry between Continental and Militia officers sometimes interfered with the filling of vacancies. On 20 May 1777, general orders were published directing battalion and brigade commanders to settle such disputes whenever possible and in each case to make full reports to higher commanders.[88] Those disputes which could not otherwise be resolved were brought before a board of officers which in November 1777 submitted recommendations to Congress specifying the relative ranks of the field officers.

A board of general officers in 1778 decided officers holding Continental commissions ranked over those having State commissions so long as the regiment of the latter continued in the State establishments; but when such regiments became Continental the officers were entitled to receive Continental commissions.[89] Promotions in the artillery and cavalry were made in the ranks at large without regard to States, but the States clung tenaciously to their rights to make appointments and promotions in the infantry.[90]

In an effort to prevent an accumulation of officers of unduly high rank, staff officers and aides-de-camp were appointed from the line except in the office of the Commander in Chief, which needed men with special qualifications and took them wherever they could be found.[91] Although there were frequent warnings against giving commissions to officers who could not obtain recruits to fill their units, Washington cautioned that "commissions in the new Army are not intended merely for those who can enlist the most men." [92] Lieutenants and junior officers sometimes were accused of lukewarm recruiting efforts because they thought failure to enlist quotas might cost the company commanders their positions, thereby opening the way for promotions.[93]

Even after the Continental Army had discarded the Militia practice whereby the men elected their company officers, many of the officers remained dependent upon the good will of their men who, if they disliked their superiors, might refuse to reenlist. Many soldiers, especially those from New England, had little acquaintance with discipline and tended to regard themselves as socially equal or superior to their officers. Officers whose commands depended upon the whims of their men were not likely to insist upon distinctions of rank. Some officers went so far as to pool their pay with their men, all taking an equal share. Militiamen sometimes recalled their officers. In one such instance, a first lieutenant had asked the members of his New Jersey

[88] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* VIII, pp. 92–94.
[89] *Ibid.*, XXI, p. 25.
[90] *Ibid.*, XXII, p. 46.
[91] *Ibid.*, X, p. 378.
[92] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 56.
[93] *Ibid.*, IV, p. 108.

platoon if they would excuse him from parade. His request was refused and a private was elected to take the lieutenant's place.[94]

Few capable artillery or engineer officers were available to the Continental Army, but replacing unqualified Americans with qualified foreigners was not easy. Washington was embarrassed by the large number of foreign officers who sought commissions, many of them giving exaggerated statements of their abilities. Not all were as valuable as Lafayette, von Steuben, or De Kalb. Some of the first Frenchmen who applied received high rank as a means of promoting the alliance with France. Those coming later expected similar treatment. Speaking of the many Frenchmen who were pressing their claims in 1788, Washington said: "Their ignorance of our language and their inability to recruit men are unsurmountable obstacles." [95] American representatives in Europe finally were instructed to make no promises of any kind regarding commissions.

The Corps of Invalids

Revolutionary authorities were anxious to make use of men who had been partially disabled while serving in the Army but were still capable of useful work. The Board of War of the Continental Congress, on 21 April 1777, reported in favor of an 8-company Corps of Invalids, and the Congress, on 16 July 1777, approved the organization and named Col. Lewis Nicola as its commander.[96] In addition to giving employment to officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men who had been wounded but could still work, the corps was to provide a "school for young gentlemen previous to their being appointed to the marching regiments." [97] This school apparently would have had some similarity to the replacement training centers of later wars, but the records do not indicate that it functioned.

Newspaper advertisements informed former soldiers released on half pay that if they were capable of garrison duty they could report to the nearest Continental field officer, join the corps, and be restored to full pay. Discharged hospital patients and others unable to do full duty were transferred from the regiments. Corps officers were selected for their ability as instructors, and subaltern instructors were required to study mathematics in off-duty periods to increase their value as teachers. Each officer was asked to donate one day's pay each month to buy military texts. Some of the officers were placed on recruiting duty. Men they enlisted were to receive instruction in military duties before going to regiments, but the records do not indicate

[94] Bolton, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
[95] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, VII, p. 170.
[96] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, VIII, p. 555.
[97] *Ibid.*, VIII, p. 485.

the recruiting part of the plan was successful. The members of the corps spent most of their time doing guard duty.

General orders of the Army dated 7 August 1779 reminded regimental commanders that it had been found prejudicial to the service to discharge soldiers who were capable of doing duty with the Invalids. All discharges for physical reasons were declared void unless they contained a military surgeon's certificate stating that not only was the discharged man incapable of performing field service, but also that he was unable to serve in the Corps of Invalids.[98]

Since the States retained a portion of the control over the Invalids, Washington complained in 1781 that he could not issue orders to some of the companies on duty in Philadelphia and Boston.[99] The Governor of Connecticut wanted control over the services of members of the corps from that State, but a committee report to Congress said the records did not show the places of enlistment for all the men. Congress objected to returning men to control of the States from which they had enlisted because it feared that to do so would break up the corps and disorganize the units to the extent that they would be unable to perform any useful service. The extent of State and Federal control over the Corps of Invalids was a subject of contention throughout the life of the corps.

Replacements for the Light Infantry

The Continental Army in 1775 contained 12 companies of riflemen, 8 from Pennsylvania and 2 each from Maryland and Virginia, which were employed as light infantry. The theory regarding the employment of light infantry had developed along with the evolution of military tactics which had brought a shift from solid battle lines to skirmisher formations.[100] Light companies had appeared in most of the armies of Europe. The British in America had learned from Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela and had formed light companies into three battalions, forming a light corps.[101]

Washington had these developments in mind when he looked upon his motley assortment of soldiers and wondered what could be done to keep his straggling battalions up to strength. Recruiting from the Militia was his principal source of replacements, but it had proved a very uncertain source. The Commander in Chief concluded that if he could not have all of his Army at full strength the next best thing would be to have a part of it at full strength. He therefore

[98] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* XVI, p. 64.

[99] *Ibid.,* XXI, p. 269 ; *Journals of the Continental Congress,* XIX, p. 265.

[100] Col. John W. Wright, "Light Infantry in the Continental Army," *The American Historical Review,* XXXI (1926), pp. 454–461.

[101] Edward E. Curtis, *The Organization of the British Army in the Revolution* (New Haven, 1926), p. 6.

decided to provide replacements for a part of his force at the expense of the remainder of his force. Each Continental Army battalion became a replacement pool for its light infantry company, which never was permitted to fall below authorized strength. The modern idea, in which a replacement company becomes a pool for a larger unit, is a reversal of Washington's practice.

On 28 August 1777, an order drafted 9 officers and 109 enlisted men, including noncommissioned officers, from each of the brigades and directed that they be formed into a light infantry corps, replacing the previous companies of riflemen broken up during the winter. This corps was placed under the command of Brig. Gen. William Maxwell. In the battle of Brandywine, 11 September 1777, the Light Infantry, retreating from the vicinity of Chester after the British turned the American flank, followed the main body of the Army and collected the wounded and stragglers. The Light Infantry was in reserve at the battle of Germantown, 4 October 1777. Soon after that engagement the corps disbanded.

During the winter of 1777, Congress appointed a committee to go to Valley Forge and discuss with Washington the future organization of the Army. Although the regiments were at such low strength that they could scarcely stand a draft of men without reducing them to mere companies, Washington had made up his mind that he would recommend the formation of a corps of light infantry to serve during the coming summer. He wanted an organization similar to the light infantry corps in the campaigns of the previous year. Officers being considered for the command included Col. Daniel Morgan, Col. Richard Butler, and Maj. Lewis Morris, Jr., all of whom had served under General Maxwell. Col. Henry Beekman Livingston, who requested a command, was promised consideration. Assignment to the Light Infantry was considered a mark of distinction.[102]

Baron von Steuben, who arrived at Valley Forge in February 1778, had had experience with light infantry in Gen. Johann von Mayr's "Free Battalion," a part of the army of Prince Henry of Prussia. When the time came to reconstitute the light infantry corps in preparation for the fighting during the summer of 1778, Washington made use of Von Steuben's knowledge.

The committee that visited Valley Forge accepted Washington's recommendation, and the Continental Congress, on 27 May 1778, decreed that each battalion of infantry "shall consist of nine companies, one of which shall be of Light Infantry; the Light Infantry to be kept complete by drafts from the battalion, and organized during the campaign into a corps of Light Infantry." [103] Colonel Morgan held the

[102] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington*, X, p. 210.
[103] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XI, p. 538.



Baron von Steuben instructing recruits at Washington's headquarters, Valley Forge, 1778.

command during the summer of 1778 and those officers who had the highest standing were assigned to serve under him.

Commanders of the battalions made periodic reports showing vacancies in the ranks. The reports, indorsed by the light infantry commander, were sent to the commanding officers of the brigades who immediately sent the number of men required to keep the light corps at its designated strength.[104]. Battalion commanders were directed to be particularly careful in their choice of men for the light infantry companies.[105] A general order pointed out, "The honor of a regiment and that of its light company are intimately connected." [106] The light companies were required to be prepared to move on the shortest notice and were excused from all duties except camp or quarters guard. During the winter, when the Army was inactive, the light infantry companies were disbanded and the men went back to their parent units, but in the spring, as soon as plans for the summer campaign started, the companies again were constituted.

At the close of the 1778 campaign, the officers and men of the light corps were returned to their respective regiments about 1 December.[107]

[104] Fitzpatrick, *Writings of Washington,* XV, p. 380.
[105] *Ibid.*, XV, p. 265.
[106] *Ibid.*
[107] *Ibid.*, XIII, p. 346.

Light infantry companies were drawn out of the Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania battalions on 12 June 1779 in preparation for the campaigns of that year, but were not taken from the Connecticut battalions until 11 July.

On 1 July 1779, Washington placed Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne in charge of the Light Infantry, and the new commander took over the four battalions which had been assembled under Colonel Butler at Fort Montgomery.[108] Colonel Morgan, disappointed because the command had been given to another, offered his resignation to Congress on 18 July 1779. It was not accepted. The corps was given the mission of opposing any move the enemy might make, and the remaining battalions were drawn together as rapidly as possible. General Wayne was directed to engage trusty persons to go within the enemy lines as spies.

The new Light Infantry commander stressed the importance of dress and appearance. Washington promised that the troops in the light companies would receive a good supply of clothing, but at the same time pointed out that morale might suffer if the light infantryman received preferential treatment in comparison with others. On 16 July 1779, two weeks after General Wayne's appointment, the Light Infantry, attacking with fixed bayonets and unloaded muskets, surprised the sentries at Stony Point, N. Y., in a night operation and captured the fort. On 30 November 1779, the members of the Light Infantry were instructed to return to their respective regiments, but to be ready to form again within one day's notice. Before all the companies had broken up, the order was countermanded—it had been decided that some of the units should remain in position while there was any threat from the British in New York. All were returned to their respective battalions by 15 December.[109]

Orders to constitute the corps of light infantry for the campaign of 1780 were issued 16 July 1780, but because it was necessary to reduce the strength of the companies they were formed with 1 captain, 1 lieutenant or ensign, 3 sergeants, 1 drum, 1 fife, and 20 rank and file.[110] The men selected were "of a middle size, active, robust and trusty." [111] The first 20 in each company were old soldiers, but recruits were added later as the companies were increased to 42 men. The corps assembled for a grand parade and was inspected by The Inspector General and his assistants, who rejected any man they considered unfit. By 1 August, Washington had determined that the corps would play an important part in the campaign against New York, and he offered the command to Maj. Gen. Marie Joseph Marquis de Lafayette, who took

[108] *Ibid.*, XV, p. 354.
[109] *Ibid.*, XVII, p. 270.
[110] *Ibid.*, XIX, p. 188.
[111] *Ibid.*

over from Brig. Gen. Arthur St. Clair on 8 August.[112] The two brigades of light infantry were formed into a division which served as the advance corps of the Army.

On 26 November 1780, the corps of light infantry was dissolved and the troops returned to their respective regiments. The Commander in Chief expressed his thanks to the Marquis de Lafayette and to the officers and men under his command for their excellent order and soldierly disposition, but he regretted there had been no opportunities that year for the marquis and his corps to make use in combat of their ardor.[113]

The order to form the light infantry companies for the campaign of 1781 was issued 1 February, in contrast to the late date of the previous year. Washington again called upon regimental commanders to exert themselves "to make a judicial choice for the formation of the companies." [114] An assistant inspector general reviewed each company and rejected all men not considered suitable, an indication of the importance which con Steuben placed on the corps. The principle of rotation generally was followed in the appointment of officers, and many new names appeared on the list of battalion and company commanders.

Each regiment with more than 225 rank and file fit for duty, including those on furlough, gave a full ninth of its total strength, instead of 25 men as had been required the previous year. By 15 February, the light infantry companies were increased to 55 men. Regiments which had been under 225 contributed their proportionate number as they were increased in strength. It was necessary to keep State lines distinct, and the Commander in Chief prohibited assignment of men belonging to one State into regiments assigned to the quota of another State.

The effectiveness of this system was demonstrated in the attack on two redoubts of the enemy line during the siege of Yorktown on the night of 14 October 1781. The American Light Infantry under the Marquis de Lafayette attacked on the right while a detachment of French Grenadiers and Chasseurs commanded by Major General the Baron Viomenil attacked on the left. The troops advanced under fire from the enemy without returning a shot and used their bayonets to capture the outer positions from which they were able to enfilade the enemy's lines.[115] The British garrisons at Yorktown and Gloucester surrendered 19 October 1781.

The achievements of Washington's Light Infantry indicate that a skillful commander, by the judicious distribution of replacements, may

[112] *Ibid.*, XIX, p. 295.
[113] *Ibid.*, XX, p. 402.
[114] *Ibid.*, XXI, p. 169.
[115] *Ibid.*, XXIII, p. 228.

strengthen that part of his force which is to carry the burden of the action. The Light Infantry formed an advance corps for the Revolutionary Army. Its position was nearest the enemy. It bore the brunt of the attack and became the rear guard when the Army was forced to retreat. It had no replacement difficulties because it could draw on the other units for the men it needed. It became a hard core which sustained the withering Continental Army and gave the Commander in Chief one organization which always was up to strength.

Replacements for the Peace Establishment

The military policy of the United States started to take form following the Revolution. The conflict between Federal and State control had its counterpart in a dispute between proponents of the Militia and supporters of the Regular Army. The opponents of a large Federal army wanted to garrison the posts and guard the magazines with as few men as possible. A Continental Congress committee consisting of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Oliver Ellsworth, James Wilson, and Samuel Hilton reported in favor of four regiments of infantry, one of artillery, and a corps of engineers, but their views met with much opposition.[116] Congress might have long delayed any decision on the controversial national defense question had not the Indians forced the issue. The attitude of the tribes in the Northwest soon indicated a need for troops.

The military forces in service on 29 January 1784 consisted of one regiment of infantry commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry Jackson and a corps of artillery containing 120 men. One company was guarding public stores at Springfield, Mass., a detachment of artillery was stationed at Albany, N. Y., and an infantry company plus a small detachment of artillery was at New York. The remainder of the Infantry and Artillery was at West Point.[117]

The Federal Government had little money to pay soldiers, a situation which gave opponents of a Regular Army a strong argument. They won a victory when the Continental Congress on 2 June 1784 ordered the commanding officer of the Army to discharge all the soldiers except 25 privates at Fort Pitt and 55 at West Point. A proportionate number of officers was retained, but none above the grade of captain.[118]

Two days after it had reduced the number of enlisted men in the Regular Army to 80, the Continental Congress was confronted with the necessity of guarding the western posts. In April, a committee had urged early occupation of military installations at Niagara, Os-

[116] *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XXV, pp. 722–729.
[117] *Ibid*, XXVI, p. 54.
[118] *Ibid*., XXVII, p. 524.

wego, Erie, and Detroit and had suggested that an early decision be reached regarding the proposed occupation of Michilmackinac with troops. The committee believed 3 battalions of infantry and 1 of artillery would be needed, and it suggested that the states be called upon to raise 896 men.[119] Congress thereupon requested that the States provide 700 Militia, but the call, opposed by New York, did not bring the desired response.

The legislative body on 12 April 1785 again issued a call for men, requesting the Northern States with exposed frontiers to furnish 700, this time for Federal service. Quotas were: Pennsylvania, 260; Connecticut, 165; New York, 165; and New Jersey, 110. The Secretary at War was instructed to designate appropriate places for rendezvous and to form 8 companies of infantry and 2 of artillery. The period of enlistment was 3 years.[120]

The power of the Continental Congress was limited to making resolutions which had no effect until the States passed legislation providing for the enlistment of the men. About 400 recruits were engaged in 1785 and about 180 in 1786, after which the Government had no more funds and enlistments were discontinued. All were sent to posts on the Ohio with the exception of 1 officer, 1 sergeant, and 15 privates who were added to the garrison at West Point.

The Continental Congress, in view of the fact that the terms of the soldiers enlisted in 1785 soon would expire, on 3 October 1787 passed additional legislation. State quotas were continued in the same proportion as in the previous call. A resolution called upon the States to reenlist as many men as possible, then to obtain recruits to fill remaining vacancies. Connecticut, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania passed legislation authorizing reenlistments and Brevet Brig. Gen. Joseph Harmar, commanding the Army, reported that by 15 June 1788 reenlistments had numbered 171. These three States then sent 250 recruits. New York failed to pass the necessary legislation.[121]

The two companies of artillery had lost heavily by desertions and were unable to get replacements. They were understrength to the extent that they could not be used on the frontier although on 1 May 1787 they had been recruited to 70 men each. The two units were combined and retained at West Point. Irregular payments and inequalities in terms of service were blamed for the high desertion rate, but a report submitted in October 1788 noted that the troops generally had

[119] *Ibid.*, XXVI, pp. 163–205.
[120] *Ibid.*, XXVIII, p. 247.
[121] *Ibid.*, XXXIV, p. 578.

been paid to the first of January 1787 and that the officers had received subsistence and forage money to April 1788. The report added that "both officers and soldiers appear well satisfied," a conclusion difficult to understand in view of the low strength.[122]

The Constitution, adopted in 1789, placed in Congress the power to "raise and maintain armies," but the Nation continued to distrust a standing military force. By that time, 5 military posts in the West were garrisoned by a force of about 600 men under General Harmar. All of these soldiers had been enlisted to serve until June 1791, except 68 in 2 companies whose services were to expire in 1792. In addition to the troops in the West, 2 companies, totaling about 76 men, were guarding supplies in the Eastern States. The entire military organization, which was authorized 840 enlisted men, needed 168 to bring it to full strength. Regimental recruiting officers were attempting to enlist these men.[123]

There was an urgent need for replacements during the conflicts with the Indians in 1790 and for several years thereafter. Hostilities with the Creek tribe in Georgia were settled temporarily by a treaty of peace on 7 August 1790, but in September General Harmar, with 320 Regular Army troops and about 1,100 Militia from Pennsylvania and Kentucky, moved against about 1,500 northern Indians, who were in open warfare against the United States. After Harmar lost in a clash with the Miami tribe, Congress authorized the President to raise 2,000 men for 6 months.[124] Few responded to this call. When Brig. Gen. Arthur St. Clair in May of 1791 arrived at Fort Washington on the Ohio he found only 85 privates fit for duty. His contemplated action was delayed as a result of this lack of men. It was the end of July before about 2,000 replacements arrived, many coming from frontier communities in Pennsylvania, Virginia, or Kentucky. Some of the difficulties encountered in raising men were blamed on St. Clair's lack of popularity in the frontier communities. After the force was organized it took the field but met disaster on the Wabash River, 4 November 1791.[125]

Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne routed the Indians near the Maumee River and gained possession of the territory in August of 1793, but the campaign left his forces understrength. The first intensive recruiting drive for the United States Army was conducted to raise men

[122] *Ibid.*, XXXIV, p. 582.

[123] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 5.

[124] Act of March 3, 1791, "Addition to the Army of the United States and Provisions for Protection of the Frontiers," 1st Cong. 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* I, ch. 28, sec. 8, p. 222.

[125] James Ripley Jacobs, *The Beginning of the U. S. Army, 1783–1812* (Princeton, 1947), p. 77; Kentucky, Federal Writers Project, *Military History of Kentucky* (Frankfort, 1939), p. 61; Frost, *op. cit.,* pp. 246–54; *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 20, 36, 39, and 41.

for this force. A report of the Secretary of War, outlining the situation, said:

> . . . this force under General Wayne is much lessened by the expiration of the service of his troops, and is inferior to the demands of the existing circumstances. Unless, therefore, he be reinforced early in the ensuing spring the advantages which he has gained in the course of the present year, which ought to be permanently secured, might be in danger of being relinquished.
>
> The experiments which have recently been made to engage men for military service, on the present inducements, evince decisively that no expectation can be indulged of completing the numbers authorized by law without further encouragement.[126]

The Militia Act of 8 May 1792 [127] was beginning to affect the Regular Army. The Revolution had demonstrated that the Militia was of great value as a source for Continental Army replacements, but 10 years after the Revolution the Nation's legislators had forgotten that lesson. The Militia Act of 8 May 1792 divorced the Militia from the Regular Army, giving control of the former to the States. It closed the door on the Militia manpower reserve and left regimental recruiting as the only means available for the Regular Army to fill its ranks. Measures introduced 2 years earlier by Secretary of War Henry Knox would have given a greater degree of Federal supervision and control, but they were lost in the long period of debate which preceded the adoption of the bill.[128] Regimental commanders were forced to assume full responsibility for the replacement system, with only occasional displays of interest from Army headquarters in the form of recruiting literature, calls for reports, and general regulations.

Regimental commanders designated recruiting parties, usually consisting of an officer, musicians, and a few other soldiers, who traveled from village to village urging the local inhabitants to enlist. Recruiting was no easy task. A soldier's life was hard, and he opposed Indians who were skillful fighters. Promised supplies and equipment often were not furnished. Recruiting parties learned that the aimless drifters were more easily attracted because their own poverty magnified the little that the Army offered. The unfortunate responded most readily to the beat of drums and the display of colors. Many of those who joined were immigrants, sailors who had missed their ships, debtors seeking to avoid jail sentences, or hangers-on around the grogshops.

On 5 June 1794, the strength of the Legion of the United States,[129] as the military forces were designated from 1792 until 1796, was 3,578,

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[126] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 68.

[127] Act of May 8, 1792, "An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense by Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States," 2d Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* I, ch. 33, p. 271.

[128] Brig. Gen. John McAulay Palmer, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson* (New York, 1930), p. 127.

[129] Act of May 30, 1796, "An Act to Ascertain and Fix the Military Establishment of the United States," 4th Cong., 1st sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* I, ch. 39, p. 483.

or 1,542 less than the authorized 5,120. A report 5 months later showed a strength of 3,629, a slight improvement but not enough to indicate that the recruiting efforts were satisfactory. The report the following year showed a net loss of 401 men.

Congress in February 1796 noted the absence of hostilities on the Indian frontiers and at the same time estimated that losses through expiration of terms of service and other causes would reduce the Army to 3,004 men by 1 July. A committee appointed to study the military establishment reported that a force of this size would be sufficient to meet the country's needs. It recommended four regiments of infantry and a corps of artillerists and engineers, with a brigadier general in command and five lieutenant colonels in charge of the regiments.[130]

The committee had scarcely completed this encouraging report when threat of trouble with France gave President John Adams a different view of the defense picture. Washington again became Commander in Chief of the Army, but actual command was delegated to two major generals, Alexander Hamilton and Charles C. Pinckney. President Adams in May of 1797 recommended an increase in the military forces.[131] Congress passed three measures intended to meet the emergency. The first,[132] approved 28 May 1798, empowered the President to raise a provisional army of 10,000 men to serve for 3 years and to accept such volunteer companies as were deemed necessary. No troops were to be raised under this act unless the President considered the situation sufficiently serious to warrant such action. The legislation remained in effect until 1802 when it was repealed. None of the troops it authorized was raised. The second measure,[133] passed 16 July 1798, gave the President authority to raise 12 regiments of infantry and 6 troops of light dragoons to serve for the duration of the trouble with France. These regiments were formed and some recruited to near their authorized strength of 600 enlisted men, The third measure [134] affecting replacements, passed 2 March 1799, provided that in the event of war the President could increase the Regular Army to 24 regiments of infantry, a regiment and a battalion of riflemen, a battery of artillery and engineers, and 3 regiments of cavalry. None of these additional Regular Army forces was formed.

Hamilton assumed direct supervision of the recruiting service during the formation of the 12 new regiments authorized in 1798. Each

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[130] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 112.

[131] "Message of the President of the United States to the Congress," May 16, 1797, in *U. S. Annals of Congress* (5th Cong., 1st Sess.), VII, p. 54.

[132] Act of May 28, 1798, "An Act Authorizing the President of the United States to Raise a Provisional Army," 5th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* I, ch. 47, p. 558.

[133] Act of July 16, 1798, "An Act to Augment the Army of the United States and for Other Purposes," 5th Cong., 2d Sess. *Ibid.,* ch. 76, p. 604.

[134] Act of March 2, 1799, "An Act Giving Eventual Authority to the President of the United States to Augment the Army," 5th Cong., 3d Sess. *Ibid.,* ch. 31, p. 725.

State was divided into as many recruiting districts as there were companies to be raised in it, and each company was allocated a district. The districts were grouped, and there was one rendezvous point in each district. Field officers were placed in charge of district groups.[135]

Hamilton's energetic measures counteracted the slowness in delivery of supplies and other recruiting difficulties. By 31 October 1799, North Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware had enlisted small detachments of recruits, who marched from Norfolk, Va., Fredericktown, Md., and West Point, N. Y., to reinforce the western posts. Reenlistments among soldiers serving in those posts were delayed because clothing and bounty money did not arrive, but these essentials eventually were provided and commanding officers reported they had lost few men.

Recruiting for the 12 new regiments continued until 1800 when it was suspended in the belief that the international situation no longer was sufficiently serious to justify additional military forces. The men in service had received their bounty money and clothing and were employed on the fortifications, on the posts, or improving the harbors. It was decided that they could be retained until their enlistments expired. Had an attempt been made to recruit all the units provided for under the legislation of 1798 it probably would have disclosed that regimental recruiting would break down in the event of an emergency. Since the augmentation of the Army was limited to the 12 new regiments, the deficiencies of the recruiting services were not made apparent until the outbreak of the War of 1812.

For the year 1802 the authorized military peace establishment[136] was fixed at approximately 5,000 officers and enlisted men, but more than 1,300 were needed to complete the establishment. The 4 regiments of infantry were reduced to 2, but in 1808 Congress approved an increase to 5 regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of riflemen, 1 regiment of light artillery and 1 regiment of light dragoons, with men enlisted for 5 years.[137] Some success was achieved in the recruiting for these regiments, and for another "additional military force" distinct from the "peace establishment," authorized at that time.

When there was a threat of trouble with Spain in 1809, most of these units were ordered to the vicinity of New Orleans, arriving there between 10 March and 20 April. From June until September, the Army encamped 15 miles below New Orleans, suffering heavy losses

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[135] Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Works of Alexander Hamilton* (New York and London, 1904), VII, p. 16.

[136] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, p. 154.

[137] "An Act to Raise for a Limited Time an Additional Military Force," 10th Cong., 1st Sess., copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, II, ch. 43, p. 481.

from disease and desertion. The troops moved upriver to Natchez for the winter. Each company ordered to New Orleans left one subaltern at its home station for recruiting duty. Men who enlisted on the east coast assembled at the principal ports on the Atlantic, while those who enlisted in the Western States assembled at points along the rivers, most of them reporting to Newport Barracks, Ky. Some of those who enlisted in the interior of Pennsylvania or Virginia moved south on the western rivers.[138]

As the Nation drifted toward war, Congress called for 100,000 Militia [139] and an indefinite number of ranger companies.[140] It passed other legislation intended to strengthen the military forces, but the army the legislation called for remained mostly on paper. The Regimental Recruiting Service, which for 20 years had supported an army of about 3,000 men, was not capable of the quick expansion necessary to carry out the augmentation Congress contemplated. On 24 December 1811, the legislative body passed "An Act for Completing the Existing Military Establishment," which was an admission that the "existing" military establishment in fact did not exist. Recruits were offered a $16 bounty for a 5-year enlistment and promised 120 acres of land upon discharge. The offer may have been liberal enough, but as the regiments moved away from their home rendezvous the only recruiting agency in existence lost contact with the centers of population from which most of the recruits must come. In 1812, the Nation had on paper a Regular Army which probably would have been sufficient for its mission, but the troops actually in service were far short of the legal authorization.

The War of 1812

The Congress of the United States on 18 June 1812 declared that a state of war existed with Great Britain [141] and the President called upon the Army to invade Canada. During the War of 1812, the main developments bearing on replacements were:

1. The Regimental Recruiting Service failed to furnish the Regular Army with enough men at the proper time. This failure was a major factor in the lack of success which attended military operations in Canada.

2. Militia and Volunteer units, which had first claim on manpower under the Militia Act of 1792, were called upon to supplement the

[138] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 249.

[139] Act of March 30, 1808, "An Act Authorizing a Detachment from the Militia," 10th Cong., 1st Sess., copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* II, ch. 39, p. 478.


[140] Act of January 11, 1812, "An Act to Raise an Additional Military Force," 12th Cong., 1st Sess. *Ibid.,* ch. 11, p. 671.

[141] Act of June 18, 1812, "An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Dependencies Thereof, and the United States of America and Their Territories," 12th Cong., 1st Sess. *Ibid.,* ch. 102, p. 755.

Regular Army. [See *chart 2.*] The organization of these Militia and Volunteer units was not suitable for them to engage in operations outside the United States.

3. The Regular Army, which did not give adequate training to its own recruits, lacked the authority, the facilities, and the initiative to properly supervise the training of the Militia and Volunteers. There was no adequate system for the classification, training, or assignment of recruits.

CHART 2- SOURCES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL RECRUITED DURING THE WAR OF 1812



4. The traditional distrust of a standing military force, a strong factor in the country and in Congress as late as 1812, along with the unpopularity of the war in some sections, blocked proposed reforms which might have given the Nation an effective Army with adequate replacements.

Congress on 11 January 1812 passed a measure to strengthen the Regular Army.[142] This act provided for 17 regular regiments of infantry, 4 of artillery, 2 of dragoons, 1 of riflemen, and a corps of engineers. Each infantry regiment at full strength was authorized 1,800 privates, each artillery regiment 1,440, and the regiments of dragoons 960 each, in addition to noncommissioned officers and musicians. The authorized strength of the Army under this act was

[142] Act of January 11, 1812, "An Act to Raise an Additional Military Force," 12th Cong., 1st Sess. *Ibid.*, ch. 14, p. 671.

more than 35,000, but at the time of the declaration of war the actual military strength was only about 6,700.

Fifteen of the new regiments, including 10 companies of rangers, were in existence by 10 June 1812, when a reorganization made the regiments uniform with 10 companies each. Surplus companies were formed into new regiments, bringing the total of infantry regiments to 25.[143]

The Regular military establishment during the War of 1812 consisted of the Corps of Engineers, a regiment of light artillery, the 1st and 2d Light Dragoons, the 1st to 3d Artillery, the 1st to 25th Infantry Regiments, and a rifle regiment. The Regular Army also included the 20 additional regiments authorized under the Act of 29 January 1813, which were designated as the 26th to 44th Regiments of Infantry. The Rangers likewise were part of the Regular Army. The United States Volunteers included a regiment from Maine and New Hampshire, 2 from New York, 1 from Virginia, 1 from Mississippi territory, 1 from Louisiana, and the Sea Fencibles. Militia units were called to duty from time to time.[144]

The understrength and poorly trained Regular Army, the only military force free from restrictions against offensive operations outside the country, not only was short of men but its disposition was defensive, with units scattered from Detroit to Lake Champlain. Seven regiments of the Infantry were guarding the frontier; most of the Artillery was on the eastern coast, and the regiment of Dragoons, doing duty as foot troops, was assigned to the western outposts. The remainder of the regiments authorized by law were in the process of organization in June of 1812. The Army could not present an effective force at any point.

Proponents of a strong Federal force contended an invasion of Canada would be the most effective defense of the frontier. This view was expressed by Representative John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. In an address to Congress, he recognized the people's aversion to an offensive war, but he declared the motive, not the location, determined the difference between offensive and defensive war. Calhoun told Congress that an invasion to repel insult, injury, or oppression was not motivated by ambition, avarice, or greed, and for that reason would be a defensive rather than an offensive move.[145] The opponents of military operations by the Regulars were not convinced. They said a force large enough to conquer Canada would, in turn, enslave the United States.[146] The conflict between these two factions exerted con-

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[143] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 383.

[144] *Ibid.,* I, p. 384.

[145] U. S. Congress, *Abridgement of the Debates in Congress from 1789 to 1865* (New York, 1857–61), V, p. 149.

[146] *Ibid.,* IV, pp. 628–632.

siderable influence on the organization of the military forces, but the war group was not strong enough to reform the Army.

Regardless of this understrength and dispersion of the military forces, many Congressmen and the War Department believed the Regular Army could invade Canada, which was protected only by four British Regular regiments, a small detachment of artillery, and a few other units with total strength of about 4,500 men. This force would be augmented by such Canadian Militia units as were available.[147]

The Secretary of War, on 4 April 1813, indicated that the Regular Army was expected to furnish most of the troops that would move against Canada. He said: "When the legislature at their last session adopted the measure augmenting the Army to 52 regiments of the line, it was expressly in view of suspending the necessity of employing Militia excepting in moments of actual invasion." [148] More than a year later, on 17 October 1814, the War Department still believed the Regular Army could furnish troops for operations in Canada. Acting Secretary of War James Monroe said: "It will be necessary to bring into the field next campaign not less than 100,000 Regular troops. Such a force, aided in extraordinary emergencies by Volunteers and the Militia, will place us above all inquietude as to final results." [149]

The United States was divided into 10 military departments, each of which became a Regular Army recruiting unit containing one principal rendezvous and such minor depots as higher commanders prescribed.[150] Each department commander was responsible for the recruiting service within his department. Weekly reports by recruiting officers showed the strength of their parties and the names and descriptions of recruits. Regiments conducted their recruiting within assigned areas and the men who had been enlisted by the officers of one regiment could not be transferred to another regiment without the written consent of both commanding officers, unless the transfer was ordered by the War Department. Bounties were increased from $16 and 100 acres of land at the beginning of the war to $125 and 320 acres of land at the close of the war. Local communities frequently paid bounties or contributed funds and equipment in addition to what was paid by the Federal Government.

Regimental recruiting required the distribution of public money

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[147] William James, *Military Occurrences of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United States* (London, 1818), I, p. 55.

[148] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 453; Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1917), p. 107. Upton calls this a change of policy; actually it was an attempt to follow a policy which had to be abandoned when Regular troops were not available.

[149] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 515.

[150] *Ibid.,* I, p. 432.

to a large number of recruiting officers. But it was difficult to account for all the sums advanced. In an effort to simplify accounting and more clearly define the chain of responsibility, one recruiting officer was appointed in each regiment and the former practice of dividing this duty among all the officers was discontinued. Department commanders also appointed field grade officers to supervise regimental recruiting activities within the departments.[151]

In January 1814, commanders of regiments and corps received large sums to be used in reenlisting men whose terms of service were about to expire and in recruiting new men. This money was further distributed among company commanders. Some members of Congress believed the recruiting service received sufficient money to pay the authorized bounties and premiums, but doubted that the geographical distribution had produced the maximum number of enlistments. Recruiting was more productive where there were large numbers of men of military age and where the war was popular. Many persons believed most of the money should have been spent in communities which met both of these requirements. Regular Army regiments generally were not so located as to provide effective distribution of recruiting funds.

On 28 March 1812, The Inspector General ordered commanding officers of recruiting departments to report monthly, but during April Department No. 5 (New York and Connecticut) made the only response. In May, 9 of the 48 districts within the 10 military departments made incomplete returns. By 5 June, The Inspector General still did not have sufficient information to satisfy Congress, which was becoming impatient for the figures. Therefore, on 8 June, Secretary of War Eustis ventured a guess. He told Congress 5,000 of the 25,000 men authorized by law had been recruited. The next day letters arrived from Generals Dearborn and Bloomfield giving some favorable but very general remarks about recruiting. These letters gave the Secretary added confidence and he sent a second message further supporting his guess of the previous day.[152]

President James Madison, in his message to Congress on 5 November 1812, called attention to the "insufficiency of existing provisions for filling up the military establishment." He speculated on the reason for the failure to get recruits, saying:

> Such is the happy condition of our country, arising from the facility of the subsistence and the high wages for every species of occupation that notwithstanding the augmented inducements provided at the last session, a partial success only has attended the recruiting service. The deficiency has been necessarily supplied during the campaign by other than regular troops, with all the inconveniences and expense incident to them. The remedy lies in estab-

[151] *Abridgement of the Debates in Congress,* IV, p. 612.
[152] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 320.

lishing more favorably for the private soldier, the proportion between his recompense and the terms of his enlistment.[153]

Commanders in the field realized that Militia and Volunteer units would have to make up Regular Army recruiting shortages. On 10 April 1812, the President was authorized to call upon the States and Territories for their respective proportions of a detachment of 100,000 Militia.[154] The Ohio and Kentucky Militia, experienced Indian fighters, were the principal available trained forces of any size. These troops, with the 4th U.S. Infantry, and a few units detached from other organizations, were under the leadership of the governor of Michigan Territory, William Hull, who had been appointed a brigadier general in the Regular Army. After cutting a road through 200 miles of wilderness, they reached Detroit 5 July 1812. From there they advanced into Canada, only to retreat again and surrender at Detroit 16 August 1812. In Ohio and Kentucky this defeat was followed by a rush of men to volunteer, so many turning out that they could not all be accepted by Maj. Gen. W. H. Harrison, who was given the command succeeding Hull.[155] Brig. Gen. Stephen van Rensselaer collected 2,500 New York Militia and 450 Regulars at Lewiston. In the Northern Department, Maj. Gen. Henry Dearborn's force included a large number of Militia.[156]

Under the Militia Law as it existed at the beginning of the war men who joined the Regular Army, or any Federal force, could have been charged with desertion from the Militia, a situation corrected by a law passed 20 January 1813.[157] Massachusetts and Connecticut were so firm in their belief that the Militia could not be used except to repel invasion that they refused to honor General Dearborn's first requisition for Militiamen to replace the Regular Army units being withdrawn to make up the invasion army.[158] This problem was not solved during the war. The Hartford Convention, in January 1815, demanded that Congress empower each State to raise and direct armies independent of Federal authority, a demand which reflected the state of public opinion although the proposal did not receive serious consideration in Congress. The right of the President to call Militia troops on his own decision that an emergency existed was not fully established until upheld by a Supreme Court decision in 1827.[159]

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[153] *Abridgement of the Debates in Congress,* IV, p. 568.

[154] Act of April 8, 1812, "An Act in Addition to the Act entitled 'An Act to Raise an Additional Military Force' passed January the Eleventh, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twelve," 12th Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* II, ch. 54, p. 704.

[155] Frost, *op. cit.,* p. 260.

[156] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 439–488.

[157] Act of January 20, 1813, "An Act Supplementary to the Act entitled 'An Act for the More Perfect Organization of the Army of the United States,' " 12th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* II, ch. 12, sec. 6, p. 791 ; Upton, *op. cit.,* p. 107.

[158] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 319–26.

[159] Upton, *op. cit.,* p. 97.

When a Militia call failed to bring out enough volunteers, state officials could order a draft, but drafted men with enough money could hire substitutes, who sometimes received large sums for short terms of service. Regular Army recruiting officers met competition they could not overcome in the high pay given to Militia substitutes. Secretary Monroe believed:

> . . . the failure of the recruiting service has been owing, in most of the States, principally to the high bounty given for substitutes in the detached Militia.
>
> Many of the Militia detached for 6 months have given a greater sum for substitutes than the bounty allowed by the United States for a recruit to serve for the war.[160]

Under an act approved 6 February 1812, the President was authorized to accept artillery, cavalry, or infantry companies for volunteer Federal service.[161] These companies were subject to call at any time within 2 years and were obligated to remain in service for 12 months. Volunteers were subject to the Articles of War and to Army Regulations, but as the act was first passed officers were selected as provided by the regulations of the several States. In July of 1812, Congress provided for the Federal appointment of officers.[162]

There were times when the Government was unable to accept all the volunteers who offered their services. General Jackson called for 1,500 at Nashville, 10 December 1812, and 2,500 responded.[163] American settlers, anxious for revenge after the British had aroused the Indians north of the Ohio, volunteered and hurried to rendezvous points where, for more than a fortnight, they were without tents and other essential equipment.[164] Their enthusiasm did not help the Regular Army, which was unable to spare its officers and men for recruiting parties.

The Volunteer Act of 1812 was not successful. One of its defects was the failure to provide for the appointment of field officers until after sufficient companies had been formed for a regiment. The companies of a regiment, frequently from different States, had little combined training before entering operations. One year of service out of a 2-year enlistment was unsatisfactory. Those who wanted military service disliked the inactivity. Farmers, merchants, or artisans, anxious to sacrifice the minimum time, preferred to take the field immediately.[165]

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[160] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 518.

[161] Act of February 6, 1812, "An Act Authorizing the President of the United States to Accept and Organize Certain Volunteer Military Corps," 12th Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* II, ch. 21, p. 676.

[162] Act of July 6, 1812, "An Act Supplementary to the Act entitled 'An Act Authorizing the President of the United States to Organize Certain Volunteer Military Corps,' " 12th Cong., 1st sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* II, ch. 38, p. 785.

[163] Marquis James, *The Life of Andrew Jackson* (Indianapolis, 1933), p. 146.

[164] Benson J. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812* (New York, 1896), p. 96.

[165] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 515.

The Army's deficiencies were not limited to the Volunteers. Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott complained that many of the officers were "generally sunk in either sloth, ignorance, or habits of intemperate drinking." [166] A British historian blamed incompetent officers for failure to make good soldiers out of American frontiersmen who could have been "grand fighting men." [167] Inspection reports indicated that the men lacked training, the company officers were inexperienced, and that in many instances there was a "spirit of mutiny" in camps. Desertions were frequent.[168] Few men would reenlist, one of the reasons being dissatisfaction due to delays in receiving pay; a paymaster arrived at Niagara in December 1813 with only 1 month's pay for Militia troops who had not been paid for 3 months.[169]

Early in 1814, the Secretary of War considered a plan to divide the Militia into as many classes as there were soldiers to be raised; each class to be responsible for furnishing a soldier during the remainder of the war. This proposal, had it been adopted, might have provided the replacements which the regimental recruiting service could not provide, but it failed to survive the opposition of those members of Congress who feared any increase in Federal control.[170]

Acting Secretary of War James Monroe on 17 October 1814 outlined for the Senate Committee on Military Affairs a further refinement of this proposal.[171] The Secretary suggested that the military establishment, then authorized 62,448 men, be continued and that efforts be made to fill all organizations. He also wanted an additional permanent force of 40,000 men to defend the cities and the frontiers, an enlargement of the Corps of Engineers, and minor changes in the Ordnance service. If these proposals had been carried out, about 100,000 Regular troops would have been brought into the coming campaign, with additional Volunteers and Militia available in case of an emergency.

Secretary Monroe suggested four alternative plans for obtaining men:

I. The free male population, 18 to 45 years, was to be formed into classes of 100 men, each class to furnish 4 soldiers within 30 days and to replace casualties as they occurred. The assignment to classes was to be made so as to obtain an even distribution of property. Each member was to be assessed according to the value of his property and the money used for bounties, both cash and land, to be paid to recruits from that class. Classes which failed to provide the required men within the time specified would be subject

[166] David Saville Muzzy, *The United States of America, Through the Civil War* (New York, 1922), p. 257.
[167] Fortescue, *op. cit.*, IX, p. 349.
[168] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 490–510.
[169] *Ibid.*, I, p. 486.
[170] *Abridgement of the Debates in Congress*, V, p. 163.
[171] *American Military State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, pp. 514–519.

to draft, but those drafted could furnish substitutes at their own expense. Recruits were to be delivered to the recruiting officers in each of the nine military departments and marched to general rendezvous designated by the War Department. County courts, Militia officers, or special officials were to administer the plan in each county.

II. The members of the Militia were to be classified and made subject to longer terms of service.

III. Five men could provide another man to serve for the war and thus gain their own exemption from active service. (The comments of the Secretary of War indicated that he considered this plan likely to result in such high bounties that recruiting would be difficult.)

IV. The system of recruiting and the calls on the Militia already in operation were to be continued and additional bounties in cash and land offered to those who served.[172]

The Secretary of War preferred the first plan, which he said was designed to engage the unmarried and the youthful in the defense of the State, giving them adequate compensation from the voluntary contributions of the more wealthy. The fourth proposal, however, was the one adopted.[173] The result was that the responsibility for raising men remained with the regiments. This decision marked the end of the War Department's efforts to improve the personnel system during the War of 1812.

Increased bounties and intensive recruiting brought 13,898 men into the service between 27 January and 26 October 1814.[174] The drive came too late. Had these recruits been available 2 years earlier to fill the 17 infantry regiments then forming, the course of the war might have been changed.

There were several efforts to improve recruit training, some initiated by members of Congress. Representative Thomas R. Gold of New York on 29 December 1812 said: " . . . a soldier is not the creature of an hour; he must be seasoned to the hardships of war. . . ." [175] A number of the officers in the field attempted to meet this need. Brig. Gen. George McClure in December 1813 reported to the Secretary of War: "I have collected from the different recruiting rendezvous about 120 soldiers and put them under the command of Lt. David Riddle, 15th United States Infantry, an excellent and deserving officer." [176] This appears to have been the first replacement training camp in American history. Incidental training previously given at rendezvous points could scarcely be regarded as replacement training.

General Scott established a camp of instruction at Buffalo in April 1814 which trained recruits as well as units. Officers were formed into squads and were taught the formations and movements of the

[172] *Ibid.*
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, pp. 521–522.
[175] *Abridgements of the Debates in Congress,* IV, p. 615.
[176] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* I, p. 487.

soldier, squad, company, and battalion. Instruction included military courtesy, field hygiene, and camp sanitation. After the officers had gained the required proficiency, they passed the training on to the soldiers. Within 3 months, not only the recruits but the entire regiments had improved. These camps were credited for much of the increased efficiency displayed by the troops during the latter part of the war.[177]

General Scott was chairman of a board which, in 1815, prepared regulations placing greater stress on training of recruits. The manual prepared by this board divided the "School of the Soldier" into three parts. The first part, including the positions, facings, and marching without arms, was especially prepared for recruit instruction. Beginners were trained singly or in groups of four or less, depending on the number of instructors. Regimental commanders were responsible for conducting the training.[178]

In summary, the American forces during 1812 and 1813 suffered from inadequate staff organization, from the failure of the Regular Army to fill its ranks, and from the inability of Militia and Volunteer units to conduct operations distant from their homes. An effective recruiting system might have enabled the Regular Army to fulfill its mission, making it unnecessary to rely upon inadequately trained and improperly organized Militia units. The War of 1812 demonstrated that regimental recruiting would not furnish the men needed by the military forces for action in a distant theater; that a better recruiting system was needed.

The Beginning of the General Recruiting Service

Regimental recruiting, regardless of high bounties and intensive solicitation, failed by half to fill the ranks of the Regular Army during the War of 1812. That conflict came to a close with the regiments more than 30,000 under their authorized strength.[179] The strength of the peace establishment was fixed at 10,000 men by the act of 3 March 1815.[180] By the close of 1817, the Army was down to about 8,000. Peacetime regimental recruiting was not proving much more effective than had wartime regimental recruiting.

There were several attempts to improve the efficiency of the recruiting service. Revised regulations required the commanding officer of

[177] Charles Winslow Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), p. 146.

[178] *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercises and Maneuvers of Infantry* (New York, 1815), p. 12.

[179] *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1842,* p. 203 (30 Apr 1842). Records of Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives.

[180] Act of March 3, 1815, "An Act Fixing the Military Peace Establishment of the United States," 13th Cong., 3d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* III, ch. 79, p. 224.

each regiment or corps to select a field officer or captain to superintend the platoon officers, noncommissioned officers, and musicians on recruiting duty. Each regimental superintendent reported directly to The Adjutant and Inspector General in Washington, D. C. Many of the recruits accepted were below the desired physical standards, although medical officers were cautioned to be more thorough in conducting examinations.

There was a greater effort to make reforms after John C. Calhoun became Secretary of War in December 1817. Few men in public life at that time better understood the defects of the military service. Calhoun's reforms played an important part in the later development of the replacement system. Congress in 1818 and again in 1820 asked for reports on the most effective and least painful method for reducing the Army, and Calhoun proposed an "expansible standing army" capable of expansion in wartime without major changes in organization. Congress did not adopt all of Calhoun's suggestions, but the "expansible army" theory was an important factor in subsequent military history.

There was a reduction of the Army in 1821, and within a year the military force was cut to an authorized 6,126, the low point for the period between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War.[181] More Regular Army companies were moving to the western territory, far from the centers of population. These organizations lost men rapidly and their only source for replacements was through their own recruiting efforts. From 1 January to 12 November 1822, the 3d Infantry in Michigan, the 4th Infantry in Florida, the 5th Infantry on the upper Mississippi, and the 7th Infantry in Louisiana all failed to enlist any recruits; the 6th Infantry in Iowa obtained only 10. The artillery regiments serving in New England and along the east coast did better, their enlistments being: 1st Artillery, 134; 2d Artillery, 78; 3d Artillery, 24; and the 4th Artillery, in a more remote location in Georgia, 3. The infantry regiments near the larger centers of population did not have impressive recruiting records. Most successful was the 1st Infantry, in the vicinity of New Orleans, with 35 men, 9 more than the 2d Infantry, which was recruiting in the populous New York region.[182]

In view of the serious shortage of men, Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown, the commanding general, in July of 1822, directed General Scott, then commanding the Eastern Department, to open recruiting rendezvous in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore. Lt. Col. W. M. MacRea was detailed to superintend these stations and was instructed to operate them independently rather than in conjunction with regimental re-

[181] Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army* (Washington, 1903), pp. 580–81.

[182] *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, II, p. 457.

cruiting.[183] The men who were enlisted were distributed to the regiments upon orders from the War Department. Within 6 months, the new stations had obtained 641 men, more than twice the number enlisted by regimental recruiting during the previous year.[184]

Additional general recruiting rendezvous were opened at Boston, Providence, and Albany in 1823. The 6 stations in operation that year obtained 1,908 recruits, compared with 823 enlisted by the regiments. General recruiting was extended to the Western Department in 1824, with rendezvous opened in Louisville, Natchez, and Cincinnati. A renewal of interest in the Army that year stimulated all recruiting, the regiments enlisting 1,225, which was much better than in previous years but still behind the 1,333 enlisted through the General Recruiting Service.

From 1 October 1824 until 30 September 1825, the regiments recruited 572 men. During this period the General Recruiting depots in the Eastern Department enlisted 746, those in the Western Department 403. By 1825, the General Recruiting Service was firmly established and was providing the regiments with the replacements they had been unable to obtain through their own efforts.

The General Recruiting Service was recognized as an important military activity and regulations were published governing its operation. The superintendents, usually either lieutenant colonels or majors, were appointed by the War Department, one being named for the Eastern and another for the Western Department. Each regimental commander normally selected two officers, usually a captain and a first lieutenant, whose names were sent to the Adjutant General's office for War Department approval, after which orders were issued placing the officers on general recruiting duty for service under the superintendent.

The principal purpose of the General Recruiting Service was to supply recruits for the frontier posts. Units serving near centers of population were expected to employ regimental recruiting parties to obtain the men they needed. After the service had been in operation for a few years, it became the practice to select 1 or 2 additional recruiting officers from regiments on the western frontier. Two years of recruiting detail sometimes was the only break in a long period of isolated service for officers assigned to regiments in the West.

Men who were accepted at the recruiting stations and who passed the physical examinations were issued uniforms and were given some training before they reached their regiments.[185] Recruiting officers

[183] WD GO 34, 1822.

[184] *American State Papers, Military Affairs,* II, p. 457.

[185] *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1844* (18 Jul 1844). Records of Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives.

could not promise specific assignments: men were required to go wherever the War Department sent them.

The superintendents were responsible for keeping capable recruiting parties at the recruiting stations and rendezvous points. They also could appoint noncommissioned officers, their authority being similar to that of regimental commanders except that they could make promotions only when vacancies could be diverted from the regiments. Reductions sometimes were necessary when the regiments used up all their vacancies. Depot and rendezvous commanders could designate acting noncommissioned officers who drew no additional pay, but such appointments terminated upon the transfer of the men.

The War Department seldom approved the detachment of noncommissioned officers from regiments for General Recruiting duty, a policy which made it difficult to obtain capable instructors. Consequently, some depot commanders trained men for promotions; others recruited civilians, promising they would be promoted to the grade of sergeant and retained on recruiting duty. Men no longer required in the recruiting service but not trained to perform duties appropriate to their grades in line units were permitted to request discharges. The Adjutant General generally disapproved the practice of enlisting men whose services were limited to recruiting duty, and it was gradually discontinued.[186]

By 1829, nine General Recruiting stations were enlisting about 150 recruits each month. These men were being assembled at specified points for instruction preparatory to assignment to units. Infantrymen who enlisted in the East usually went to Fort Monroe, Va.; a depot for the mounted service was established at Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; recruits going to the upper Mississippi and Missouri Rivers reported to centrally located Jefferson Barracks, Mo. Bedloe's Island, in New York Harbor, became an important depot point for recruits moving by water. The efforts of the General Recruiting Service were so productive that by the close of 1829 the Army was near its authorized strength and recruiting officers were instructed to accept only the better applicants.[187]

It soon developed that recruiting in the sparsely settled West was more expensive and less productive; so the General Recruiting Service in the Western Department was discontinued 7 May 1829. It was not resumed until 14 June 1833, when headquarters was reestablished at Louisville.[188] Almost 4 years later, on 11 April 1837, the General Re-

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[186] *Ibid., 1855* (20 Nov 1855).

[187] *Ibid., 1829*, p. 166 (17 Jun 1829).

[188] WD GO 33, 7 May 1829; *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1829*, p. 155 (7 May 1829); WD GO 21, 11 Apr 1837; *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1837*, p. 448. Records of Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives.

cruiting Service in the Western Department again was suspended. The station at Newport, Ky., however, continued in operation under the direction of the superintendent of the Eastern Department. Later in the year another station was opened at Louisville, Ky.

Recruits were detailed to military posts or stations by orders issued from the General Headquarters of the Army. Detachments were forwarded as often as possible because the regiments usually were short of men. Officers under orders for change of station were placed in command of traveling recruit detachments whenever possible. Separate muster rolls, listing the names in alphabetical order, were prepared for each detachment. The officer who conducted the recruits delivered the rolls to the commander of the post to which the men were assigned, a practice which made it difficult for intermediate commanders to divert men. Recruit detachments at depots were made up to include all the troops of a particular arm which the reports received by The Adjutant General indicated were needed to fill vacancies. The post commanding officer was responsible for equitable distribution to organizations of his command and he could make any adjustments which might be necessary because of casualties en route or changes in the strength situation at the post.

The Adjutant General desired each regiment to have its share of the more capable men, but a fair distribution was difficult in the absence of classification methods.[189] Artisans were distributed equally among the regiments. Approximately a year was necessary to recruit a man, give him preliminary training, and transport him to a post. Experience disclosed that the majority of desertions and a large portion of the disabilities and deaths occurred during the first year of service.[190]

The physical examination at the depot was not the final one. Regulations required the recruit to appear before a regimental board of inspection and there were few detachments, however small, in which there were no rejections.[191] The Adjutant General, believing that the regulations were full and explicit, urged physicians to exercise more care. The large number of rejections by units caused the officers connected with the Adjutant General's Office to suggest a longer period of observation in the depots.

Frontier posts, regardless of their isolation, usually were well organized and maintained strict discipline.[192] The recruit's introduction to his organization started in the regiment with an interview by the regimental commander and was continued in the company where the company commander, after another interview, assigned the man to a squad. The corporal of the squad assumed the major responsibility for the

[189] *Ibid., 1851,* p. 8.
[190] *Ibid.*
[191] *Ibid., 1845,* p. 392.
[192] George A. Forsyth, *The Story of the Soldier* (New York, 1900), p. 88.

development of the recruit into a soldier, but the new arrival's progress was closely observed by the other officers and noncommissioned officers. The novice did his share of extra duty. He also learned to defend himself against the pranks of the "company bully." After 2 or 3 months of daily drill, a man was detailed as a supernumerary of the guard and soon thereafter his name was on the full guard roster. This first guard detail marked the end of the "raw recruit" stage.

Reports from organizations in the field indicate that the General Recruiting Service, although an improvement over the earlier method of raising men, did not solve all the problems, especially for those units in remote locations. Line companies, frequently called upon to provide staff officers, seldom had more than two officers present, and special details such as driving trains, repairing roads, or building bridges took many of the enlisted men. Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb, Commander in Chief of the Army, declared in 1832 that a company's enlisted strength frequently was reduced one-third within 1 month after arrival in the field. He proposed changes in tables to provide additional staff officers and suggested that from 80 to 100 laborers be assigned to each company, but his requests were not approved.

Some enlisted men accused recruiting officers of making false promises. A member of a regiment of mounted dragoons who served during 1833 published an account of his experiences in which he said: "Many were told . . . they would have nothing to do but to ride on horseback over the country, to explore the western prairies and forests, and indeed, spend their time continually in delightful and inspiring occupations." When this recruit reached his unit he found he was "nothing above the other portions of the army." Confronted with what they regarded as broken promises, many of the men deserted, according to this soldier's statement.[193]

In campaigns against the Indians, such as the Black Hawk War of 1832, the Florida War which began in 1835, and other operations, Regular troops were aided by Militia and Volunteers usually called out for short periods. When the Volunteer companies or battalions dropped so far below strength their services no longer were effective, new organizations were called to take their places. Many of the Volunteers and Militiamen were engaged for periods so short that their services were inefficient and expensive. Mounted men, who drew additional pay for the use of their horses, were extremely costly, and about half of the 10,000 employed in the Florida campaign of 1836 served as cavalry. One regiment paid in rentals almost the full market value for horses it used for 6 months. The Government also was required to pay for many animals that died for want of forage.[194]

[193] *Dragoon Campaigns to the Rocky Mountains* (New York, 1836), pp. 44–46.

[194] "Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1837," *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, VII, p. 572.

General Scott, in a report submitted 30 April 1836 in connection with the Seminole War, pointed out the advantage of increasing the strength of companies already in service. "New regiments, or regiments of recruits, would be worth little or nothing in this war," he wrote. "I will therefore earnestly recommend that the companies of the old regiments be extended to 80 or 90 privates each. Recruits mixed up with the old soldiers in June or July would become effective by the 1st of December." [195]

The 1st Regiment of Artillery returned from Florida in 1838 and was assigned to patrol a portion of the Canadian border. Since the regiment was at low strength and recruiting efforts were unproductive, in April 1839 all men except the commanding officer, 2 sergeants, and 4 privates were transferred from Battery D to Battery H. The captain and the six enlisted men remaining in Battery D established a recruiting rendezvous at Portsmouth, N. H., and a branch rendezvous at Augusta, Me., in order to secure the men who were not available from the General Recruiting Service. A short time later the men remaining in Battery E were transferred to Batteries C and F, and the commanding officer of Battery E recruited replacements at Bangor, Me. This procedure was repeated in July when all but 12 of the enlisted men of Battery I were transferred to Battery K, whereupon the commander and men remaining in Battery I went on recruiting duty.[196]

The annual report of the Secretary of War for 1838 noted that a large number of the officers physically disqualified for field service remained on active duty. It was suggested that such officers retire and draw base pay without additional emoluments for rations, forage, or quarters, the vacancies so created to be filled by promoting the officers next in rank who would serve without the additional pay of the higher grade during the lifetime of the officers they replaced. The Secretary of War declared the plan would cost nothing and would place capable and vigorous officers in places of responsibility.[197] Although this problem was brought to the attention of Congress a number of times, both by General Macomb and by General Scott, who became Commanding General of the Army in 1841, no corrective legislation was passed.

The attitude of some communities toward recruiting parties is indicated by newspaper reports. Some extended wishes for success which were not exactly beneficial to the Army. As an example, the Burlington, Vt., *Free Press* was quoted as having said: "We had

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[195] Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

[196] William L. Haskin, *The History of the First Regiment of Artillery* (Portland, Me., 1897), p. 71.

[197] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 25th Cong., 3d Sess., "Annual Report of the Secretary of War," November 28, 1838, p. 120.

a recruiting sergeant from Plattsburg parading our streets yesterday, with a band of music, beating up for recruits. We hope he has been successful, for we could spare a goodly number of loafers, who, if they would serve their country as faithfully as they do the devil, would be a great acquisition to the Army." [198]

Congress, after the close of the Florida War, reduced the Regular Army from 12,539 to 8,613. As a result of this reduction, the General Recuiting Service was discontinued on 23 August 1842 and was not resumed until 1 May 1844. From 1 October 1844 until 30 September 1845, the 18 General Recruiting stations enlisted 1,365 men.[199] What General Scott described as "an unsuccessful experiment with 3-year enlistments" terminated with the Mexican War when 5-year enlistments were resumed.[200] A number of regiments serving on the frontier sent one or two of their companies to eastern posts to serve as recruit depots and training centers, but most of the regiments could not spare companies for this purpose. The *Soldier's Book*, published to inform new men what the Army was like, was distributed to recruits before they joined their regiments and the 20 cents it cost was deducted from the first muster roll.[201] The first comprehensive manual for the training of recruits was a booklet entitled *Recruit*, written by Capt. John T. Cairns, which appeared in 1845 and marked an important forward step in the work of the recruit depots. This volume became the schoolbook of the soldier throughout the United States, covering all military drill and routine. Five editions were printed within 10 years after its first publication.[202]

During 1845, the General Recruiting Service and the regiments enlisted 3,577 men, bringing all units in the Army close to their authorized strength. This was in marked contrast to the condition prior to the War of 1812 when the Regular Army was at less than one-fifth of its authorized strength. The significance of this improved condition, due principally to the General Recruiting Service, was soon to become apparent at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, Vera Cruz, and Chapultepec.

The Mexican War

The Regular Army entered the Mexican War in May 1846 with 6,562 men of an authorized 8,613. Units were operating under the reduction of 1842 [203] which had cut enlisted strength of companies to

[198] *Army and Navy Chronicle*, VIII (25 Apr 1839), p. 270.

[199] *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1842*, p. 254 (15 Oct 1842). Records of Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives.

[200] WD GO 21, 1847; S. Doc. No. 1, 28th Cong., 1st Sess., "Annual Report of the Major General Commanding the Army, 1843," p. 62.


[201] WD GO 26, 1839.

[202] S. Wallace Cone, *Biographical Sketch of Capt. John T. Cairns* (New York, 1855), p. 13.

[203] Act of August 23, 1842, "An Act Respecting the Organization of the Army and for Other Purposes," 27th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, V, ch. 186, p. 512.

42 or 50 men. This act weakened the Army more than did any difficulty in obtaining recruits. General Service recruiting stations in 18 of the principal centers of population during 1846 enlisted nearly 6,000 men for the 15 old Regular Army regiments; the following year they enlisted nearly 8,000. The General Recruiting Service, in the opinion of the Secretary of War, could have supplied a sufficient number of men to have maintained companies at 100 men each, had such strength been authorized.[204] The General Recruiting Service was most effective during the early part of the war; in the later months the volunteers, who offered short enlistments and preserved home ties to a greater extent than the Regular Army, provided serious competition. [See chart 3.] Pension laws favored the Volunteers.

CHART 3—REPLACEMENT SOURCES DURING THE WAR WITH MEXICO, 1846-1848



Regular Army line units at the beginning of the war were the 1st to the 8th Infantry Regiments, the 1st and 2d Dragoons, and a regiment of mounted riflemen that had been added to guard the immigrant routes to Oregon.[205] About 4,000 soldiers who could be spared from garrison duty were concentrated under Brig. Gen. Zachary Taylor in Texas where they were trained and equipped.[206] Many of General Taylor's officers were West Point graduates, but they had been scattered among the frontier posts and few had had experience with units as large as regiments. Most of the artillerymen had been serving with the infantry and were poorly prepared in their own field. These defects generally were corrected during the border concentration.

[204] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," December 2, 1847, p. 63.

[205] Act of May 19, 1846, "An Act to Provide for the Raising of a Regiment of Mounted Riflemen and for Establishing Military Stations on the Route to Oregon," 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, ch. 22, p. 13.

[206] H. Ex. Doc. 4, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," December 5, 1846, p. 46.

While the Army was training in Texas, Congress increased the companies to 100 men.[207] Thereupon most of the regiments sent officers to rendezvous in Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and a few other cities in an attempt to recruit enough men to bring their organizations to the higher figure, but few of the companies were increased to more than 80 men by this method. Some companies were filled by consolidations, the officers who gave up their men undertaking to recruit new units. Units that had been reduced by combat also were consolidated in some instances. An example is provided by the 9th Infantry, which after the Battle of Chapultepec was at about half strength and had consolidated its companies, reducing the number from 10 to 5. Its first group of recruits to arrive in Mexico was formed into a sixth company, which underwent intensive drill during the 6 months the regiment was in quarters at Pachuca.[208] In October 1847, there was another consolidation of units when Maj. Gen. John A. Quitman's division of Volunteers was broken up and the regiments were temporarily assigned to the 1st and 2d Divisions.[209]

In 1846, the principal depots of instruction were located at Fort Columbus, N. Y., Newport Barracks, Ky., Carlisle, Pa., and Jefferson Barracks, Mo. All of the recruits received some instruction before going to their units; those enlisted for the Infantry were trained in close order drill, those for mounted organizations in stable duties and horsemanship.[210] The efficiency of the recruit depots suffered somewhat because the demand from the regiments for men caused the training periods to be reduced to speed up shipments.[211]

Recruits were organized into detachments under officers who themselves were on the way to the front. Many detachments never reached their destinations; some that did arrive suffered heavy losses en route. An indication of the extent of these losses is given in a letter written by Lt. Isaac I. Stevens, an engineer officer, who said that out of one group of 900 recruits at Perote and Jalapa on 3 June 1847 there were at least 200 sick who were left behind.[212] Some men were killed in skirmishes soon after they arrived in Mexico but before they joined their units. Others became ill and were left along the route. Some never were accounted for. Several hundred recruits who arrived at

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[207] Act of May 13, 1946, "An Act to Authorize an Increase in the Rank and File of the Army of the United States," 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, ch. 17, p. 11.

[208] Capt. Fred R. Brown, *History of the 9th U. S. Infantry* (Chicago, 1909), p. 43.

[209] R. S. Ripley, *The War With Mexico* (New York, 1849), II, p. 536.

[210] H. Ex. Doc. 4, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., "Annual Report of the Secretary of War," December 5, 1946, p. 53; John A. Logan, *The Volunteer Soldier of America* (Chicago and New York, 1887), pp. 478–549.

[211] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., "Report of the Adjutant General," November 30, 1847, p. 81.

[212] Hazard Stevens, *The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens* (Boston and New York, 1900), I, p. 146.

Vera Cruz and other concentration points were placed in separate companies instead of being assigned to regiments. The Adjutant General was unable to account for a number of these organizations because reports were only fragmentary or were entirely lacking.[213] All in all, the system seldom functioned smoothly, but it did get replacements to the regiments in Mexico.

The Act of 11 February 1847 [214] created 10 new Regular Army regiments—the 3d Dragoons, the Voltigeurs, and the 9th to the 16th Infantry Regiments, inclusive. It was August before officers could be appointed, recruits enlisted, and the regiments equipped and transported to General Scott, who was waiting for them. Officers assigned to these regiments recruited many of their men. When available, General Service recruits were assigned to fill those vacancies which could not be filled by regimental recruiting.

Another act,[215] passed 3 March 1847, authorized 8 additional companies of artillery to be added to the 4 regiments already in service. As an example of the way in which the artillery regiments were augmeted, Companies L and M, 1st Artillery, formed under this act, were mustered at Governor's Island, N. Y., 1 October 1847, from the General Service recruits at that post. On 12 October 1847, they were ordered to Vera Cruz but did not arrive until 7 January 1848, having been delayed by a shipwreck. At the time the two new companies joined the regiment the old companies had an average strength of 54 men. The two weakest companies were broken up and the men distributed to other units, leaving the regiment with the same number of companies it had before the reinforcements arrived.[216] By the end of 1847, the additional artillery companies had been recruited to an average strength of 95 men each, and all were on their way to Mexico.

From 1 May 1846 to 5 July 1848, enlistments in the Regular Army numbered 35,009. There were 32,190 (including 548 in a Marine battalion) who left concentration or rendezvous points for Mexico, but only 27,470 were reported as having joined units in Mexico after the commencement of hostilities. During this same period, the Regular Army lost in deaths from all causes 6,112 men, while the wounded numbered 2,745. Discharges for disability totaled 2,544. There were 1,582 discharges for expiration of term of service, 410 as a result of other military orders, and 487 released upon orders from civil au-

[213] H. Ex. Doc. 62, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., "Regulars and Volunteers Engaged in the Mexican War," p. 14.

[214] Act of February 11, 1847, "An Act to Raise for a Limited Time an Additional Military Force and for Other Purposes," 29th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, ch. 8, p. 123.

[215] Act of March 3, 1847, "An Act Making Provision for an Additional Number of General Officers, and for Other Purposes," 29th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, ch. 61, sec. 18, p. 186.

[216] Haskin, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

thorities. The Adjutant General on 30 November 1847 estimated not more than 20,033 Regular Army effectives.[217]

The organization of the Volunteer regiments formed during the Mexican War involved most of the difficulties that had been encountered during the War of 1812. At the beginning of the Mexican conflict, General Scott proposed that Volunteers be placed in camps of instruction close to their homes until supplies and equipment were available.[218] He believed that the troops would not be ready before 1 September 1846. Officials in Washington were anxious for early action, and the Volunteers themselves were impatient although they had little conception of the preparations necessary for a campaign. The soldiers and the public criticized the Government and the Army for what was regarded as unnecessary delay, but criticism for lack of preparation probably would have been more appropriate. Many officers believed the Government was guilty of sending men to Mexico without adequate transportation or subsistence.[219]

At Matamoros in May 1846, General Taylor feared he would have so many Volunteers he would be unable to keep them busy.[220] He maintained that Volunteers never were intended to carry on a war outside the limits of their own country. About 18,000 arrived at Brazos Island without adequate supplies, camp equipment, or transportation. Some 4,000 had volunteered in Louisiana, believing they were needed to save the Army of the Rio Grande, but when they arrived no enemy was within 300 miles. These men were unsuited to camp life and disease soon took its toll. When they asked to fight or go home, General Taylor could not produce a battle immediately and they were sent home.

Large numbers of men who might have served as replacements but who were called up for short periods failed to perform any useful service. Three-month volunteers were mustered from Louisiana and Texas. Fourteen regiments and seven companies from Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, Texas, and California were called for 6 months but were held for only 3 months when it was decided there was no legislation authorizing 6-month enlistments. The 3- and the 6-month men, 2 regiments of 12-month men from Ohio and Missouri, and 1 company from Iowa, totaling 14,480, might have been used as replacements had it not been that their period of service was so short they

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[217] Heitman, *op. cit.*, II, p. 282. See also H. Ex. Doc. 24, 31st Cong. 1st Sess., "Military Forces Employed in the Mexican War," January 3, 1850, especially table on p. 8*a*. Heitman's figures are believed to be a later revision and are followed when they differ from the earlier source.

[218] Appendix to *Congressional Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st Sess., "Letters of General Scott to the Secretary of War," 1845–46, p. 650.

[219] George Meade, *The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade* (New York, 1913), I, pp. 110–22.

[220] Zachary Taylor, *Letters From the Battlefields of the Mexican War* (Rochester, N. Y., 1908), pp. 4, 51, 176.

could not reach the scene of operations. More than 2,000 men were discharged within a few days after they were mustered. All had been called by department commanders without authority of Congress or the War Department, but Congress appropriated money for their pay.

The legal tangle growing out of the enlistment of the 6-month volunteers confronted General Taylor with an unexpected need for replacements in June 1846, when the Government notified all commanders that 8,000 of the men then in service could not be held for more than 3 months. These men, upon learning that they were entitled to their discharges, refused to reenlist for an additional 9 months and thus place themselves in the 12-month category. They decided instead to go home and were sent to the rear with wagons and teams which should have been used to move troops forward.

The act of 13 May 1846,[221] which authorized the President to call for 50,000 Volunteers for 12 months or for the duration of the war, created confusion when "12 months" was interpreted as the maximum period of service, making a new call necessary at the end of the year. Congress provided for State organization of the volunteer troops and requisitions were sent to the Governors of Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Texas for a total of 26 regiments; Maryland and the District of Columbia provided a battalion. Thirty regiments and 3 companies were mustered under the call for 12-month men, but 12 companies at Cincinnati, Ohio, were mustered in and out of the service on the same day, that State having exceeded its quota. Reports to The Adjutant General of the War Department indicated that 288 companies of 12-month volunteers, with an aggregate strength of 24,770, lost 4,100 men, only 97 of whom were killed in battle. The 12-month regiments, with 27,063 men assigned, were mustered out with a strength of 18,210 indicating losses of 8,853. There had been 4,530 discharges, of which 4,064 were for disability; 2,298 deaths, including 439 killed in battle or dead from wounds; and 600 desertions.[222]

By November 1846, it was apparent that the 12-month volunteers would not finish the campaign, and the President, under discretion given him by the act of 13 May 1846, called for Volunteers to serve during the war. By the end of 1847, there had been organized under this call 22 regiments, 5 battalions, and 8 separate companies of infantry; 1 regiment, 2 battalions, and 22 companies of mounted troops; and 3 companies of foot artillery—an aggregate equal to 29 regiments

[221] Act of May 13, 1846, "An Act Authorizing an Increase in the Rank and File of the Army of the United States," 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* IX, ch. 17, p. 11.

[222] H. Ex. Doc. 42, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., "The Adjutant General's Report on Volunteers Received into the Service of the United States," January 16, 1947, p. 2.

and 16 companies.[223] Several other regiments were mustered later, making a total of 32 plus 16 companies. At a strength of 100 per company the war regiments would have required 34,171 men, but they were mustered with 6,961 vacancies. Losses were so high on the march into Mexico that by December 1847 The Adjutant General estimated the shortages in the war regiments at 12,530.[224] Five of the war regiments were formed in Mexico.

Legislation which was passed 12 January 1847 authorized enlistment of replacements for the Volunteer regiments but did not provide any recruiting agency.[225] The War Department made available Regular Army recruiting funds and the colonels of the regiments selected 15 captains and 33 lieutenants for recruiting duty, but their efforts obtained only 821 recruits before 1 January 1848, and many of those who enlisted never reached their regiments. The war regiments had a total enrolled strength of 33,596, but at the time they were mustered out of the service they contained 21,474 men, indicating a loss of 12,122. There had been 3,732 discharges, of which 2,763 were for disability; deaths numbered 4,572, including 152 killed in battle or dead from wounds; desertions numbered 2,730.[226]

Replacements who entered Volunteer units received their most effective training at schools of instruction along the Border or in Mexico. There were frequent complaints against recruiting officers. A member of the New York 1st Regiment of Volunteers, raised in November of 1846 to serve for the war, complained in a published book that recruits were obtained by deceit, some coming in answer to advertisements for laborers. This writer accused city officials of misappropriating money intended for soldiers.[227] Many recruits were unable to make the adjustment to Army life. At Matamoros in May 1846, some 2,000 plantation owners and "gentlemen" who at home had their own servants but who had joined the Army as private soldiers mutinied at the prospect of having to draw water and cut wood, chores they thought the Regulars should do for them.[228] Members of Volunteer regiments sometimes overloaded their wagons with personal baggage and sutler's goods; by leaving Government property behind they expected to trick supply officers into giving them extra provisions and transportation.

Brig. Gen. John E. Wool arrived in Cincinnati on 6 June 1846 and mustered into service Volunteers from Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio,

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[223] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., "Report of the Adjutant General," November 30, 1848, p. 74.

[224] *Ibid.*

[225] WD GO.

[226] H. Ex. Doc. 24, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., "Military Forces Employed in the Mexican War," January 3, 1850, p. 4.

[227] *The High Private* (New York, 1848).

[228] Meade, *op. cit.*, I, p. 94.

Indiana, Illinois, and Mississippi. Enthusiasm for the war was so great that many more men than could be accepted reported to the rendezvous points. The impatient Volunteers wanted to be on their way at once, but General Wool restrained them until supplies were received from the War Department. In less than 6 weeks, General Wool mustered more than 12,000 Volunteers, most of whom soon departed to join General Taylor on the Rio Grande, although about 1,700 gathered at San Antonio de Bexar in Texas where they were organized as part of the column which General Wool commanded in the invasion of Chihuahua.[229] Wool's troops, including 622 men of the Regular Army and 2,339 Volunteers, received several weeks of training at Camp Crockett, 3 miles above the Alamo, remaining there until 11 October when the column crossed the Rio Grande. Reporting to General Taylor 1 November 1846, General Wool described his troops as "in fine condition." He declared the Volunteers could undergo hunger and fatigue better than disciplinary restraint, that when they were not under the eye of the Regular commanders they were likely to neglect precautions necessary for their own safety.[230] Most of Wool's troops were engaged in the battle of Buena Vista, 22–23 February 1847. Not all of the regiments were above reproach, but General Taylor observed that "the brilliant success achieved by their arms releases me from the painful necessity of specifying many cases of bad conduct before the enemy." [231]

The 4th Regiment of Indiana Volunteers, made up of nearly 900 men who were mustered into service 15 June 1847 at Jeffersonville, Ind., provides another example of the methods used in training. Field officers were elected on the day following the muster, and on 17 June the first formation was held at Fort Clark near Louisville, Ky. During the 10 days the regiment remained at Fort Clark there was little effort to maintain discipline, the men roaming at will to Louisville, New Albany, or Jeffersonville. On 27 June, the regiment boarded a steamer, sailed down the Ohio and Mississippi, arriving on 3 July at New Orleans. There it remained for several days during which its members were involved in several disorders. From New Orleans, the unit boarded transports and sailed to Brazos de Santiago, remaining there until 24 July, with the men doing little except wandering around Brazos Island. The Indiana Volunteers then marched to a camp of instruction 3 miles from Mier, a town of about 5,000 inhabitants on the Rio Alcantro about 3 miles above the confluence with the Rio Grande, where the 10th, 13th, and 16th Regular Regiments

[229] Francis Bayliss, *A Narrative of General Wool's Campaign in Mexico* (Albany, N. Y., 1845), p. 9.

[230] *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 25.

[231] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 30th Cong., 1st Sess., "General Taylor's Report on the Battle of Buena Vista," March 6, 1847, p. 138.

already were encamped. Under the supervision of the Regular Army instructors, the officers of the Volunteer regiment soon became familiar with Scott's *Tactics* and passed their knowledge on to their men through intensive daily drills. The mornings started with 2 hours of company drill and the day was closed with a dress parade at 6 o'clock. This camp was broken up 24 August upon orders for the troops to join General Taylor. By that time, the officers believed the men were ready for action in the field.[232]

In summary, the fact that the Regular Army entered the Mexican War at a respectable strength enabled it to overcome many of the obstacles of the campaign. It recognized its responsibility for the training of Volunteers, and the later units improved under better supervision. Militia units did not have an important part in the Mexican conflict. General Grant, a few years after the Mexican War, summarized the condition of the Regular Army at the start of that conflict:

> At the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, General Taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of Regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession—not at West Point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in the Indian wars. The rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. A better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two engagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise.[233]

Although there were many deficiencies, the military forces in the Mexican War received sufficient men to accomplish their mission. Reforms which started with the establishment of the General Recruiting Service in 1822 paid off in the test of combat.

Replacements for Posts in the Far West

Before the Mexican War, the military posts on the western frontier were located generally along the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi River, and the Great Lakes. Most stations were accessible by water and large numbers of recruits passed through the depots in New York Harbor where they embarked to join their regiments. After the release of the Volunteers at the close of the Mexican War, the Regu-

[232] Albert G. Brackett, *General Lane's Brigade in Central Mexico* (Cincinnati and New York, 1854), pp. 11–31.

[233] U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs* (New York, 1885), I, pp. 167–168.

lar Army again sent most of its units to the Far West, the dispersion being greater because of the additional territory acquired as a result of the war. The new posts on the Pacific coast and in Texas and New Mexico were remote from navigable streams; consequently new routes were established, by way of the Isthmus of Panama or over the immigrant trails.

The 2d Infantry and the 3d Artillery, assigned to California after the war, occupied posts at San Francisco, Monterey, San Gabriel, San Diego, San Luis Rey, Warner's ranch, and on the junction of the Gila and Sonoma Rivers. The first troops to serve in Oregon Territory demonstrated the difficulty of supplying personnel to units in the Pacific Northwest. Two batteries of the 1st Artillery embarked on the Government transport *Massachusetts* at Fort Hamilton, N. Y., 10 November 1848, and after sailing around South America arrived at the mouth of the Columbia River, 9 May 1849. Battery L established a post at Fort Vancouver, while Battery M on 28 August landed at Steilacoom, on Puget Sound, where a log-hut post was erected. These two batteries were reduced by discharges, desertions, and other losses, and they received no replacements. In February 1853, they were at such reduced strength they no longer could function and the enlisted men remaining, with the exception of a few noncommissioned officers, were transferred to other organizations. The officers of the two batteries and those noncommissioned officers who had not been transferred were ordered to Fort Monroe, Va. Both batteries were inactive until January and February of 1854, when the General Recruiting Service assigned enough men to reorganize the units and they were placed on duty in the East.[234]

Eight companies of the regiment of mounted riflemen marched from Fort Leavenworth in May 1849 for service in Oregon; in 1850, Battery I of the 1st Artillery arrived in San Diego; and by 1854 the 4th Infantry and the 1st Dragoons also were on the west coast. To prevent these organizations from dwindling away as did the two batteries of the 1st Artillery, additional recruiting facilities were provided in the East and the Department of the Pacific established a depot at San Francisco.

The nature of the service in the West made it desirable to keep military units as near authorized strength as possible. Posts were widely separated to cover the vast distances of the frontier. Hostile Indians frequently infiltrated these scattered positions, attacking settled communities and making roads unsafe for travelers without military escort. Many soldiers were required to protect parties of immigrants, military

[234] Haskin, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–44; James B. Fry, *Army Sacrifices* (New York, 1879), pp. 70–95; S. Ex. Doc. 1, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Quartermaster General," November 20, 1850, pp. 128–300.

supply trains, working parties, and other groups. Maj. Gen. George M. Brooke, commanding headquarters of the Department of Texas, on 28 July 1850 reported that so many men from the two companies of the 8th Infantry at San Antonio were absent on scouting duty or escorting supply trains that there were not enough men at that post to mount a guard.[235]

Escort duty sometimes was performed by detachments of recruits on their way to the West. One such detail was furnished by Brevet Capt. G. Sykes, who commanded a detachment of 3d Infantry recruits organized at Jefferson Barracks during the summer of 1852. This detachment escorted 1,340 head of cattle from Fort Leavenworth to New Mexico for an Army contractor.[236] Military detachments were constantly on the alert to prevent Indian attacks from interrupting farming, stock raising, and other pioneer enterprises upon which the settlers relied for food. Infantry was at a disadvantage against mounted Indians who almost always were skilled riders, but there never was enough cavalry to cover the frontier. Mounted infantry, which was tried in a number of experiments, proved unsatisfactory because few infantrymen were capable horsemen.[237]

Congress, recognizing the additional burdens on posts in the Far West, on 17 June 1850 authorized 74 men for each frontier company.[238] The President directed increased strength for the companies serving in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, and Washington, as well as those stationed at Forts Snelling and Ripley on the upper Mississippi, Fort Ridgely, Minn., Fort Riley, Kans., Fort Arbuckle, Ark., Fort Kearny, Calif., and Fort Laramie, Wyo., those engaged in the Utah expedition, and those serving in Kansas.[239] The light artillery companies, including 2 in the 1st Artillery Regiment and 1 in each of the other artillery regiments, remained at 64, which had been their strength before the act of 17 June 1850. By 1857, there were 178 companies at or en route to the western stations, making an increase of 5,112 privates and bringing the authorized strength of the Army to 17,875. If all 198 companies had been in remote posts, the Army would have been authorized 18,440 men.

The Adjutant General, in 1852, examined the records relating to enlistment premiums in an attempt to determine their effectiveness as a

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[235] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," November 30, 1850, pt. 2, p. 52.

[236] *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1852*, p. 321 (9 June 1852). Records of the Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives.

[237] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," November 30, 1850, p. 4.

[238] Act of June 17, 1850, "An Act to Increase the Rank and File of the Army and to Encourage Enlistments," 31st Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, ch. 20, p. 438.

[239] S. Ex. Doc. 11, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., "Report of the Adjutant General," November 27, 1857, pt. II, p. 63.

recruiting stimulant. The $2 premium, payable to a person bringing in a recruit, was first established in 1792, but was paid only to commissioned officers. The regulation was abolished 2 March 1833. Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb, Commanding the Army, on 12 May 1837 recommended to J. R. Poinsett, Secretary of War, that $1 be offered to persons in the Army who brought applicants to recruiting officers. His recommendation was adopted and published as an Army regulation, but an amendment on 1 July 1837 increased the payments to $2 to speed up enlistments for the Seminole War. Soon thereafter there was an increase in the number of minors asking for discharges. This convinced officials that persons who sought to collect the premiums were inducing underage youths to enlist fraudulently. J. M. Porter, Secretary of War in 1843–44, rescinded the regulation in 1843, and no premiums were paid until 3 November 1846, when W. L. Marcy, who had become Secretary of War in 1845, offered $2 premiums to stimulate Mexican War enlistments. The Adjutant General's office, by a separate examination of recruiting accounts for 2 years prior to 1852, determined that premiums usually were paid to recruiting sergeants, but seldom to private citizens. This investigation also disclosed that sergeants who sought to collect the fees sometimes misrepresented the ages of applicants. The regulation was again rescinded 2 August 1852. Records thereafter indicated that fewer men were applying for enlistment, and for that reason payments were resumed 14 April 1854 and continued until the Civil War,[240] when they were discontinued.

Congress in 1850 granted an additional $2 a day to officers serving in California and Oregon to meet higher living costs in the Far West. The pay of enlisted men in the lowest grade was increased $4 in 1854, making $11 per month. Under the 1850 legislation, soldiers serving in the West were entitled to double pay, the Government retaining half of the increase until honorable discharges were issued. Veterans of the Mexican War received $2 per month additional. Each 5-year enlistment was rewarded with a bonus of $1 a month.[241]

From 1826 until the War with Mexico, the legal strength of the Army had averaged about 18 percent greater than the actual strength. Records of The Adjutant General indicate that before the Mexican War the Army lost annually an average of about 12½ percent of its strength by desertion, about 7 percent by discharges, and 4 percent by deaths, making an average annual loss of 23½ percent. From the

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[240] *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1852,* p. 333 (26 July 1852). Records of Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives; *Ibid., 1854,* p. 501 (5 June 1854); "An Act Providing for the Better Organization of the Military Establishment," August 3, 1861, in WD GO 54, 10 Aug. 1861.

[241] Act of September 28, 1950, "An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Year Ending the Thirtieth of June, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty One," 31st Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* IX, ch. 78, p. 504.

Mexican War until 1853, the average annual loss increased to 28 percent, with approximately 16 percent desertions, 8 percent discharges for disability and other causes, and 4 percent deaths. This increase in losses increased the requirements for replacements.

As more men were sent westward, the operation of the depots gradually became more efficient. Facilities at Carlisle and Jefferson Barracks included rectangular wooden buildings with neat and comfortable quarters for officers and men. The depot for instruction at Fort Wood, on Bedloe's Island in the harbor of New York, was moved to Fort Columbus, also in New York Harbor, on 26 November 1852. The depot for the collection and instruction of recruits for the mounted service was moved, in October 1853, from Carlisle Barracks, Pa., to Jefferson Barracks, Mo. All of the men employed in enlisting and drilling recruits were deducted from the number the law allowed the regiments.

Two field officers, 14 captains, and 10 subalterns were employed on the General Recruiting Service during 1850, an average number for recruiting details from that date until the Civil War. Recruiting officers intensified their efforts to keep companies at the increased strengths authorized by law, but losses were heavy along the long line of communications, and the frontier posts frequently were down to 30 or 40 percent of their authorization.

Enlistments in 1850 numbered 3,695, with 2,884 obtained through the General Recruiting Service. When the strength of the Regular Army was between 10,000 and 12,000 men, it was necessary to recruit about 4,000 each year. There were about 1,300 discharges for expiration of terms of service, 700 for disability, and 300 deaths annually; about 1,700 deserted each year. It was necessary during the course of a year to recruit and transport from the depots to the frontier posts almost one-fourth of the Army, at an approximate cost of $121 per man.[242]

A medical officer's account of a trip, in July 1850, with a detachment of recruits from Carlisle Barracks to Fort Leavenworth by way of Jefferson Barracks, indicates the methods used in the distribution of men to the frontier companies.[243] Five commissioned officers were in charge of this group of 50 men when it was organized at Carlisle Barracks. The first stop was at New Post Barracks, Pa., where an additional 130 men were added. From Harrisburg the railway and the canal boats transported the men to Pittsburgh; from there the steamer *Asia* took them to Newport Barracks, Ky., where 130 more recruits joined. The boat from Newport Barracks to Louisville was so old and

[242] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," December 1, 1853, pt. II, pp. 7–9.

[243] Rodney Glisan, *Journal of Army Life* (San Francisco, 1847), pp. 8–27.

dirty the men had little appetite for their meals, but at Louisville the contrast was pleasant when they boarded the *Fashion*, described as one of the "most superb boats on the western rivers." [244] The prevalence of cholera caused the commanding general at Jefferson Barracks to divide the recruits into small groups, sending only 200 on the *Fashion*. The disease appeared among the men on the first day out and spread with fearful rapidity. The panic-stricken recruits asked to get off the boat and march the rest of the way, but the medical officers believed such exertion in the hot July sun would prove fatal. During stops for supplies or fuel, officers with drawn pistols stood guard to keep the men on the boat. Upon arrival at Fort Leavenworth, 4 days after leaving Jefferson Barracks, nearly every man was ill and several soon died.

Although the depots attempted to provide capable soldiers, regimental commanders sometimes were dissatisfied. Maj. Gen. Persifor F. Smith, commanding the Pacific Division, on 25 May 1850 urged that more care be exercised in selecting men for the mounted regiment. He preferred Americans from the West. He wrote, "The refuse of all the depots has been assigned to the regiments, sometimes to save transportation costs." [245] The letter called attention to one instance in which more than 100 recruits had deserted in a body while on the overland march to Oregon. These deserters made for the newly discovered gold mines of northern California. About 70 later were recaptured after a chase of "one thousand miles." Many of the deserters who were not captured perished, but a few hundred reached the northern mines. General Smith recommended against sending recruits to the West. He wanted men who were serving the final 2 years of their 5-year enlistment, and he suggested that they be selected for good conduct.[246]

Some regiments in the West returned one or two of their companies to the East to establish depots for recruiting, to train replacements, and to occupy military posts which could be manned by small garrisons. The limited strength of the units in the West prevented the regimental depot system from coming into general use. The Commanding General of the Army in 1853 called attention to the advantages of regimental depots, pointing out that officers and men on depot duty would enjoy a break in the monotony of long service at remote stations.[247]

In 1855, the War Department and Congress realized that the increase in the size of companies serving in the West, authorized in

[244] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[245] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 31st Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," November 30, 1850, pt. II, p. 76.

[246] *Ibid.*,

[247] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., "Annual Report of the Commanding General of the Army," November 16, 1853, pt. II, p. 96.

1850, had not fulfilled all of the military requirements. An act approved 3 March 1855 [248] provided for the reactivation of the 1st and 2d Cavalry and the 9th and 10th Infantry Regiments.[249] This increase in the Regular Army called for a large number of replacements and placed an extra burden on the recruiting service. Officers assigned to the new regiments were placed on recruiting duty. Higher headquarters prevented overlapping of recruiting efforts by assigning areas to each company. Whenever possible, officers were sent to places where they were acquainted. Each regiment appointed a field officer to inspect rendezvous and stations. The cavalry regiments established a school of instruction at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., and recruiting officers for the mounted service sought men largely in the rural areas where the population was familiar with horses.

A captain, upon obtaining 40 men, marched them to regimental headquarters where the organization of a company was completed and the men were mustered into the service. Meantime the subalterns continued to recruit until the authorized 86 men were obtained for their companies. The War Department, recognizing the advantage of forming a regiment around a trained group of men, directed the superintendent of the General Recruiting Service to select, from the permanent party or from the best recruits at Fort Columbus and Newport Barracks, 20 men for each of the infantry regiments. No experienced men were available for the cavalry regiments.

Because the Regular Army was unable to take care of all the military needs of the West, it was necessary to form Volunteer units in many places. Western communities did not have Militia until after territorial governments were established. Regular Army officers sometimes called upon local settlers to fill vacant ranks in their companies, thus taking the replacement problem into their own hands. An example of this approach occurred during the Rogue River Indian hostilities in Oregon in 1853 when Capt. B. R. Alden of the 4th Infantry, with only 10 Regular Army soldiers, went to Jacksonville, Ore., to organize an expedition.[250] The frontier community had no civil officials with authority to enroll State troops. Captain Alden, acting upon his own authority, appointed four citizens "commissioners of military affairs." Under decrees issued by these "commissioners" the Army officer mustered into service all the men for whom he could obtain arms. Volunteers were informed that no pledge could

[248] Act of March 3, 1855, "An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Year Ending the Thirtieth of June, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Six, and for Other Purposes," 33d Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* X, ch. 169, sec. 8, p. 639.

[249] WD Circular Letter contained in *Letters Sent, Recruiting Service, 1855,* p. 76 (2 Apr 1855). Records of Recruiting Division, AGO. National Archives.

[250] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., "Report on Indian Hostilities in Oregon," October 18, 1853, pt. II, pp. 37–43.

be given that they would be paid, but they were asked to take the chance that Congress would appropriate the money. Brig. Gen. Joseph Lane, acting under a commission from the Governor of Oregon Territory, arrived at Jacksonville on 20 August 1853 and assumed command of the troops. The territorial government provided funds and later was reimbursed by Congress, a procedure which was generally followed when companies were mustered on the frontier. These troops met the Indians in the battle of Table Rock, 22–26 August 1853. A treaty of peace signed soon after ended the war and the Volunteers were disbanded.

The Oregon and Washington Indian War of 1855–58 provides an illustration of the hostility which sometimes existed between the Regular Army and the Volunteers. Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, commanding the Department of the Pacific, accused Gov. Isaac I. Stevens of Washington Territory and Gov. George L. Curry of Oregon Territory of seeking personal gain through the fomenting of unrest among the Indians, a charge the governors denied.[251] General Wool gave orders to disarm all Volunteers in central Washington, but Col. George Wright, commanding the Regular troops that were operating against the Indians along with the Volunteers, avoided what might have been an armed clash between Regulars and Volunteers when he made no attempt to disarm the latter.

In response to a requisition from the Governor of Kansas Territory, a detachment of United States troops, including the 1st Cavalry, a squadron of the 2d Dragoons, and a battalion of the 6th Infantry, assembled in the neighborhood of Lecompton, Kans., in August 1856, to repress a threatened insurrection. The General Recruiting Service depot at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., assigned men to the 6th Infantry so that its ranks were almost full at the time it arrived at Fort Leavenworth. The 2d Dragoons and the 1st Cavalry needed both men and horses. In an effort to supply the men, recruiting officers were sent to St. Louis and other western points. Horses were purchased in Missouri. The acting Governor called out the Kansas Territorial Militia, but there was considerable delay in getting the men into the field. The Cheyennes attacked an immigrant train causing the Regular troops to divide their attention between the civil disturbance and the fight with the Indians. By October, the condition of the territory was normal enough for an election, and General Smith, commanding the district, reported on 11 November that law and order had been restored.[252] A concentration of troops was retained in the territory for about a year.

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[251] S. Ex. Doc. 5, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," December 1, 1856, pt. II, p. 184.

[252] *Ibid.*, pp. 28–146.

Brig. Gen. A. S. Johnson during the winter of 1857–58 had under his command in Utah 8 companies of the 2d Dragoons, the 5th and 10th Infantry, and 2 batteries of artillery. He reported that his force suffered from exposure during the severe winter, and that most of the casualties were from frostbite rather than disease. In the spring, about 850 replacements from the Jefferson Barracks Depot marched overland with the 6th and 7th Infantry Regiments, the 1st Cavalry, and two companies of the 2d Dragoons, to reinforce the troops in Utah. The terms of service of a large number of men expired during the winter. Although they were practically marooned, few would reenlist. The officers induced most of those who were discharged to sign contracts as Ordnance Department laborers; so their services were not lost.[253]

The Adjutant General, in a study published in 1857, compared the cost of Volunteers with the cost of Regular Army troops over a period of 22 years immediately preceding the date of the report.[254] The investigation indicated that 30 million dollars might have been saved by using Regular Army rather than Volunteer troops. From 1835 until 1846, approximately 50,000 Volunteers were mustered into United States service for periods varying from 1 to 12 months, but usually for only 3 to 6 months. Nearly two-thirds of these troops were mounted and were therefore much more expensive than foot troops. During the Mexican War, there were about 18,000 mounted men among the 70,000 Volunteers. From the close of the Mexican War until 1857, there were 7,382 Volunteers in service, all except 472 being mounted. These men had served in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, Kansas, and Oregon. The number did not include Volunteers in the Rogue River, Oreg., War or the Oregon and Washington conflicts of 1855–58, for which The Adjutant General had received no rolls.

The men who enlisted in the four regiments formed in 1855 completed their terms of service and had to be replaced in 1860, the result being an unusually large demand for recruits that year. During the 12 months ending 30 June 1860, the Army lost 6,220 men, including 4,199 by discharge, 210 by death, and 1,811 by desertion. The recruiting service enlisted 4,733, giving the Army an actual strength of 16,006, compared with an authorized strength of 18,114.[255]

An important event in regard to the transportation of replacements took place in 1860 when a wagon road between Fort Benton, on the headwaters of the Missouri River, and Walla Walla, on the Columbia River, was completed. The route was opened by Maj. H. A. Blake,

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[253] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 35th Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," December 6, 1858, pp. 31–223.

[254] S. Ex. Doc. 11, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., "Report of the Adjutant General," November 28, 1857, pt. II, p. 82.

[255] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Adjutant General," November 20, 1860, pt. II, p. 189.

1st Dragoons, who left St. Louis 3 May 1860 with 13 officers and 292 recruits, making the trip by the way of Fort Union. Although delayed several times en route, the command arrived at the Coeur d'Alene Mission in Idaho by 15 September 1860, covering 3,000 miles by water and 600 by land, through an unknown wilderness, in 5 months with little more expense than would have been involved in a march of a similar distance through settled country.[256]

In summary, the recruiting service after the Mexican War continued to meet the growing demand for replacements resulting from the extension of the military posts to the west coast. After 1850, enough men were provided for those posts to operate, although usually at less than authorized strength. By 1860, the Army had developed the recruit depots and was experimenting along lines similar to the replacement training camps of World Wars I and II. The replacement system was effective for peacetime operations. As the threat of the Civil War drew nearer, miiltary leaders failed to profit by peacetime experience. They failed to heed the warning of The Adjutant General who, in 1860, asked for a thousand unassigned recruits that could be used to keep regiments full.[257] The recruiting service, which had sustained the western posts, was permitted to lapse while attention was centered on calls for volunteers, with the result that the efficiency of the Regular Army was adversely affected.

The extent to which regiments on the frontier were provided with replacements is shown by the following table [table 2], which summarizes the monthly returns from four regiments for a 5-year period. All received replacements once a year or oftener.

[256] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," December 3, 1860, pt. II, pp. 6, 191.

[257] S. Ex. Doc. 1, 36th Cong., 2d sess., "Annual Report of the Secretary of War," November 28, 1860, pt. II, p. 232.

Table 2—Monthly Strengths and Replacements Needed in Four Regiments on the Western Frontier: 1856–60

Year and month	9th Infantry		4th Infantry		1st Mounted Riflemen		3d Artillery	
	Strength	Recruits needed	Strength	Recruits needed	Strength	Recruits needed	Strength	Recruits needed
1856								
January	742	136	792	101	818	105	719	372
February	702	176	773	120	814	86	718	373
March	688	190	781	112	793	107	913	179
April	684	194	771	122	770	131	973	121
May	642	206	786	107	816	84	966	128
June	669	209	788	104	829	71	955	137
July	657	221	760	131	829	71	945	144
August	638	239	743	146	773	127	930	164
September	626	250	726	165	741	159	925	168
October	597	278	708	187	768	134	890	201
November	589	288	699	197	778	124	838	253
December	590	287	686	210	794	101	791	297

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Table 2—Monthly Strengths and Replacements Needed in Four Regiments on the Western Frontier: 1856–60—Continued

Year and month	9th Infantry		4th Infantry		1st Mounted Riflemen		3d Artillery	
	Strength	Recruits needed	Strength	Recruits needed	Strength	Recruits needed	Strength	Recruits needed
1857								
January	588	289	676	220	777	125	806	282
February	580	297	665	231	770	131	799	288
March	568	310	624	270	759	141	785	303
April	688	201	624	255	753	147	785	283
May	879	(a)	647	247	742	158	818	269
June	874	3	(a)	(a)	729	171	812	279
July	855	23	577	317	718	182	807	270
August	838	39	567	323	699	201	817	261
September	839	39	546	344	689	211	842	239
October	835	43	539	350	673	228	824	253
November	824	54	558	330	815	85	842	234
December	817	81	785	105	829	71	892	189
1858								
January	812	66	775	115	836	85	918	160
February	807	71	774	117	837	84	1, 029	50
March	798	79	749	141	823	78	1, 017	53
April	795	82	731	158	807	93	1, 002	77
May	782	95	715	174	794	106	1, 001	80
June	777	100	696	180	779	121	983	96
July	769	108	686	200	769	131	957	127
August	759	117	734	118	762	138	968	122
September	794	85	784	93	771	128	959	126
October	804	70	816	72	794	104	937	146
November	803	73	803	84	807	92	920	164
December	801	77	799	88	803	96	913	141
1859								
January	796	83	808	80	806	95	1, 008	55
February	788	91	798	90	808	93	1, 037	10
March	780	99	791	97	795	107	1, 004	52
April	771	108	775	113	789	113	975	80
May	762	119	763	125	777	125	979	44
June	760	119	759	118	767	135	969	54
July	759	120	756	121	754	148	948	75
August	754	126	747	130	749	152	960	59
September	749	130	747	133	816	89	973	51
October	741	138	740	139	842	59	955	68
November	737	142	755	123	836	64	941	82
December	812	67	851	31	827	73	934	89
1860								
January	815	64	846	32	812	88	920	102
February	813	66	815	62	799	101	921	101
March	810	69	756	121	774	125	891	110
April	812	64	670	209	763	137	915	107
May	710	169	657	220	743	156	915	106
June	619	260	642	235	706	194	914	106
July	565	314	637	240	691	210	895	126
August	550	329	636	244	672	228	938	84
September	538	342	623	257	(a)	(a)	934	90
October	748	132	619	261	690	210	932	91
November	739	141	622	243	690	210	911	113
December	749	181	635	242	686	214	857	166

[a] Returns not available.

Source: Regimental returns to the Adjutant General. AGO records. National Archives.

CHAPTER II

THE CIVIL WAR

For the months preceding the firing on Fort Sumter, it had been obvious to observers in Washington that hostilities between the Federal Government and the seceded States were but a matter of time. The inaction which characterized the months between the election of November 1860 and the inauguration of the Lincoln administration the following March may be attributed in part to the divided counsel of the Buchanan regime. South Carolina adopted an ordinance of secession in December, to be followed shortly after the beginning of the new year by other Southern States. Delegates from six of these States met at Montgomery, Ala., in February and formed a new union—the Confederate States of America. President Buchanan, while asserting that the Union was indissoluble, maintained that the central authority had no power to coerce the seceding States into remaining in that Union. In the meantime, Government arsenals and property were seized, troops were raised, and measures were taken by the southern authorities to maintain their position by force. In Washington all was confusion. Some members of the Cabinet were openly sympathetic to the cause of secession, including the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments. Members of Congress from the South continued to sit until their States had seceded, which prevented any Congressional action that might have strengthened the position of the Federal Government. No attempt was made to cooperate with the incoming administration, and on 4 March 1861 Abraham Lincoln took the oath of office as President of a nation which was already split. The Confederate Government had been in existence for a month. This political confusion explains to a great degree the astonishing lack of preparation to anticipate open hostilities.

The regiments of the Regular Army were scattered largely along the double line of Indian frontier with their companies, in many cases considerably understrength, in garrison at isolated forts and stations. Even if the Regular force had been concentrated, it would hardly have proved a deterrent to the plans of the southern statesmen who were determined to secede. On 1 January 1861, the Regular Army had a paper strength of 16,402 of all ranks and a present

strength of 14,657 officers and men.[1] But no one was prepared to make decisions and then act upon them. When Fort Sumter was fired upon in April, there was no plan of action in readiness, with the result that for almost the entire duration of the war, manpower policies were expedients devised to meet the needs of the moment with little or no thought given to those of the future.

In April 1861, the President called upon the governors of the several States for 75,000 Militia to suppress the insurrections, but only those responded who were in sympathy with the aims of the Administration. In fact, the President's call for Militia to enforce the laws drove additional States into the Confederacy, which, in turn, forced Lincoln to issue a call for 40 regiments of Volunteers for 3 years or the duration of the war, and to increase the Regular Establishment by 10 regiments.[2]

With the prospect of a material increase in the Regular Army plus the Volunteer regiments, Brevet Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott proceeded to draw up a plan of campaign which he hoped would end the conflict in the shortest possible time and with the least amount of bloodshed. This was the famous "Anaconda policy." As outlined in a letter to Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, then in command of the Ohio Militia, it was Scott's intention to use the 90-day Militia for defensive purposes only. By the time they would be ready to take the field, their term of service would have expired. For the serious fighting which he saw in store, the Regular and Volunteer regiments would undergo a period of several months' intensive training. In the meantime, a strict blockade was to be established along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts which would prevent the Confederacy from importing needed materials of war. When, and only when, the long-term regiments were fully trained, a gigantic column would be launched down the Mississippi Valley to complete the encirclement of the Confederacy and bring about its collapse. And in concluding his letter Scott wrote:

> A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan—the great danger now pressing upon us—the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences—that is, unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of the river, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this; but impress

[1] "Final Report made to the Secretary of War by the Provost Marshal General, of the Operations of the Bureau of the Provost Marshal General of the United States, from the Commencement of the Business of the Bureau, March 17, 1863 to March 17, 1866; the Bureau terminating by Law August 28, 1866," hereafter cited as "Fry's Report," *Messages and Documents, War Department, 1865–1866, pt. 3* (Washington, 1866), I, p. 6. For the history of mobilization during the Civil War, see Lt. Col. M. A. Kreidberg and Lt. M. G. Henry, "History of Military Mobilization in the United States" (Special Studies Series, OCMH), ch. IV.

[2] WD GO 15, 4 May 61; WD GO 16, 4 May 61. Copies in *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies,* hereafter referred to as *Official Records* (Washington, 1880–1901), ser. III, vol. I, pp. 380–83.

[the] right view, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men hastening to the support of their Government . . . .[3]

Unfortunately, the brave men who hastened to the support of the Government were too eager to come to grips with the enemy to pay much attention to the ideas of the aged General in Chief. In the end his plan was the one which brought the war to a close, but only after a tremendous expenditure of blood and wealth.

The President's call for 500,000 men brought out a total of 700,680 Volunteers, organized before the end of the year into 560 regiments of infantry, 82 regiments of cavalry, and 15 regiments of artillery.[4] The paper strength of the Regulary Army had risen to 22,425 by 1 January 1862 with 19,871 actually present.[5] But simply raising an army could not insure a successful outcome of the war, and from the point of view of the men who had to direct the operations in the field, two important problems were never satisfactorily solved by the political policy makers.

The first of these problems was imposed by the geographic realities of operations against the Confederacy. As the Union armies advanced down the Mississippi valley, lines of communication became longer. The conquered populations were, in almost every instance, bitterly hostile, and it become necessary to garrison or constantly patrol every mile of railroad and navigable stream to prevent, or at least control, acts of sabotage on the part of the Confederate sympathizers. This meant that increasingly large numbers of troops were tied down in what were essentially occupation duties. The expedients which were adopted to meet this situation were almost always unsatisfactory and short-term, both in conception and effect. The second problem was the rapid turnover of personnel which has come to be known as the "replacement problem." Although the peak strength of the Army scarcely exceeded 1,000,000 men, 2,778,304 were credited to the several States and Territories.

Depletion of the Armies

The Administration gambled on the early suppression of the rebellion and lost. Although the normal period of enlistment was for 3 years, regiments were sometimes accepted for a shorter period. Thus in the first call for 500,000 men, 9,000 troops from Ohio, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, and Kentucky were enlisted for 1 year, while nearly 31,000 New York men were accepted on the basis of a 2-year enlistment. In 1862 and 1863, therefore, the problem of replacing

[3] Msg, Scott to Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, 3 May 61. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. LI, pt. I, pp. 369–70.

[4] *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol V, pp. 1019–29.

[5] "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 102. This figure represents the closest approximation of actual to paper strength achieved by the Regular Army during the entire war.

these regiments would have to be faced. The situation during the summer of 1863 was further complicated by the fact that the President had called for 300,000 nine months' Militia on 4 August 1862. Less than 88,000 responded to this call, but their terms of service also began to expire that summer.[6] A manpower crisis followed which became most acute as the veteran Army of Northern Virginia forded the upper Potomac and struck north into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Regardless of the imminent danger, the troops insisted on being discharged the day their time was up.

Other commanders faced this and similar problems. Of the 56 infantry regiments in the Department of the Gulf, 22 consisted of 9 months' men whose terms began expiring in May.[7] In all, it was estimated by Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, General in Chief, that in addition to suffering ordinary casualties, disease, and sickness, the armies would lose some 75,000 to 80,000 men during June, July, and August for this reason.[8]

An even more serious situation arose as it become evident that the war was not going to be ended before the terms of the 3-year regiments of 1861 expired. Although the policies adopted in this connection were pursued with a considerable degree of success, some 300 regimental organizations containing more than 50,000 men were mustered out of the service between 1 November 1863 and 31 October 1864.[9] The end of the war in the spring of 1865 came just in time to avert a similar crisis in the case of the 3-year regiments raised in 1862.

A second continuing drain on the manpower of the armies was discharge for disability. Such discharges, totaling 224,306 to 1 August 1865,[10] derived from two sources: service-connected disabilities and those which stemmed from the lack of any proper system for examining recruits before their muster in. Considering the state of medicine and surgery in the mid-19th century, the number of discharges for disabilities incurred in the service was quite small.[11]

On the other hand, complaints were heard soon after the mass army began to be raised of the negligent manner in which physical examinations were being conducted before muster-in. A survey conducted by

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[6] The "Consolidated abstract from the returns for the U. S. Army" for 30 Apr 65 gives the aggregate, present and absent of 1,052,038. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 1265–70; 1283.

[7] Rpt, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, sub: Operations in the Department of the Gulf, 16 Dec 62–31 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXVI, pt. I, p. 7.

[8] Msg, Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck to Brig. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, 28 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXVIII, pt. II, p. 29.

[9] WDAGO, "Exhibit of Recruits (volunteers and drafted) for old and new organizations forwarded to the field, . . . 1 Nov 1863–31 Oct 1864," 17 Nov 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 813.

[10] "Fry's Report," I, pp. 78–79.

[11] Msg, Ex. Comm. U. S. Sanitary Comm. to Pres Lincoln, 21 Jul 62. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 236.

the United States Sanitary Commission estimated that as many as 25 percent of the men mustered into the service of the United States in 1861 were unfit for service. Twenty-nine percent of all regiments were mustered in with no pretense of a thorough medical inspection. The Commission recommended that hereafter "no new recruits should be accepted until they have been examined by medical officers of the United States Army, entirely without personal interest in the filling up of any regiment." [12] Surgeon Charles S. Tripler, the Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac, asserted that not only had the examining surgeons been negligent but they must have been corrupt as well.[13]

A further drain on military manpower was the astounding number of desertions. The threat of the death penalty was not enough to deter tens of thousands of soldiers from deserting, especially after it became evident that this extreme penalty was seldom enforced. Large numbers of soldiers sent home on sick leave or furlough simply neglected to come back. So prevalent had this form of absenteeism become by the summer of 1862 that letters were sent to the governors of all loyal States inviting their cooperation in tracking down the delinquent soldiers.[14]

On 31 July 1862, all officers and enlisted men on leave or furlough, capable of rejoining their commands, were ordered to do so by 11 August on pain of being considered deserters. All United States marshals, mayors, chiefs of police, sheriffs, postmasters, and justices of the peace were authorized to act as special provost marshals in apprehending fugitives.[15] The effect of this order was largely negative, however. In December, the Provost Marshal General, Col. Simeon Draper, estimated that upwards of 100,000 men were absent from their commands without leave. Three thousand deserters had been apprehended in the eastern states and Colonel Draper was hopeful that with proper organization he might be able to catch as many as one-third of those absent without proper authority.[16]

With the reorganization of the office of the Provost Marshal General and its establishment as a separate bureau of the War Department, in March 1863, the machinery for the apprehension and return of deserters was made considerably more efficient.[17] The increased activity of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau did not produce a reduction in the number of deserters from the armies, the chief bene-

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[13] Rpt, Surg C. S. Tripler, 7 Feb 63, sub: Operations of the Army of the Potomac, 12 Aug 61–17 Mar 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol V, pp. 81–82.

[14] Msg, Brig. Gen. C. P. Buckingham to the governors, 23 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 247–48.

[15] WD GO 92, 31 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, 286–87..

[16] Msg, Draper to Stanton, 6 Dec 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 939–41.

[17] Col James B. Fry estimated that nearly 22,000 deserters had been apprehended by the officers of his bureau between 1 May and 1 Nov 63. See Msg, Fry to Stanton, 17 Nov 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 1052.

fit resulting from its vigilance being that more of those who deserted were caught and returned to their commands. Indeed, the inauguration of the draft, with its provisions for substitution called into being a professional class, similar to that of revolutionary days, known as "bounty jumpers" who would enlist in one locality, collect the bounty and substitute fee, desert at the earliest opportunity, and repeat the process again in some other community.[18] It became necessary to send replacements by water from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, to the armies operating against Richmond.[19]

Even the threat of imprisonment in the Dry Tortugas (islands in the Gulf of Mexico) and loss of citizenship failed to deter desertion.[20] 198,829 enlisted men deserted during the course of the war.[21] Of these, only 75,909 were arrested by the officers of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau and returned to duty.[22] In spite of every precaution to prevent the desertion of recruits and drafted men en route to the front, such defections continued to be numerous until the very end of the war.

A continual reduction in the strength of the Army resulted from deaths due to disease and enemy action. Throughout the war, deaths from sickness always outnumbered those from battle by about 2 to 1. Sick lists were large, and at unfavorable seasons of the year might run to almost one-third of the aggregate force. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the death toll was large. Official records show that 359,528 officers and enlisted men of the Federal Army died during the war. Of these, 110,060 were killed in action or died of wounds received in action, and 224,586 died of disease.[23]

These were the problems facing the War Department in its endeavors to maintain an army capable of suppressing the rebellion. In spite of ample warning, the outbreak of actual hostilities found a new administration, experiencing its first term of national office, without any plan whatever for restoring the Union. The Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, had won his office as a political reward; the General in Chief was 75 years old; and few officers in the Union Army had commanded so much as a brigade in action. It was perhaps inevitable, therefore, that the War Department had to struggle

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[18] Lafayette C. Baker, *The Secret Service in the Late War* (Philadelphia, 1874), quoted in Henry Steele Commager (ed.), *The Blue and the Gray: The Story of the Civil War as told by Participants* (Indianapolis, 1950), II, p. 732.

[19] Msg, Halleck to Grant, 17 Sep 64. *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XLIII, pa. II, p. 96.

[20] WD GO 76, 26 Feb 64; WD GO 35, 11 Mar 65. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 137, 1229.

[21] "Fry's Report," I, pp. 78–79.

[22] Msg, Fry to Stanton, 17 Mar 66. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. V, pp. 677–78.

[23] Heitman, *op cit.*, II, p. 286, "Fry's Report," pt. I, pp. 78–79.

along from crisis to crisis, resorting to all sorts of expedients to raise and maintain the armies necessary to conquer a population which numbered scarcely more than a third that of the loyal states.

The Regular Army

General Scott was long past the age when he could perform actual field duty, but he did devise a plan of action which envisaged a slow strangulation of the Confederacy. In the execution of this plan the Regular Army was to play a leading role. The spearhead of the expeditionary force, which was to split the rebellion in two, was to be composed of an expanded force of Regulars. Scott's experience both in the War of 1812 and the conflict with Mexico had given him a contemptuous regard for any other kinds of troops. This "Anaconda policy" called for the expansion of the Regular Army to a strength of some 25,000 men.[24]

The Regular Army on 1 January 1861 consisted of 1,098 officers and 15,304 enlisted men, present and absent, which was about 4,200 officers and men short of the maximum authorized strength. Of this number there were present 727 officers and 13,930 enlisted men. During the period 1 January 1861 to 1 January 1862, more than 300 officers resigned their commissions and went over to the Confederacy.[25] The President, in a proclamation on 3 May 1861, increased the Regular Establishment by eight regiments of infantry and an additional regiment each of cavalry and artillery, thereby increasing the strength of the Army by 22,714.[26] If each regiment were recruited to maximum strength the Regular force would thus have totaled 1,570 officers and 41,819 enlisted men.[27]

But all chance of recruiting the Regular Army to its authorized strength was lost when the Administration decided to fight the war principally with Volunteer organizations. The Volunteer regiment, with its shorter term of service, the idea of serving with one's friends and neighbors, and the laxer discipline wrought by popular election of company and regimental officers, was an attraction against which the Regular recruiting service could not hope to compete. As a result, the Regular Army never attained more than five-eighths of its authorized strength and much of the time it was considerably below this figure.[28] Various expedients were adopted in a vain attempt

[24] Msg, Scott to McClellan, 3 May 61. *Official Records,* ser. I, vol. LI, pt. I, pp. 369–70.
[25] "Fry's Report," pt. I, pp. 6–7.
[26] WD GO 16 Washington, 4 May 61. Copy in *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, pp. 154–57.
[27] Msg, Brig. Gen. E. D. Townsend to SW Edwin M. Stanton, 20 Oct 65. *Ibid.,* ser. III, vol. V, pp. 127–30.
[28] "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 102.

to stimulate recruitment of the Regulars, but the results during 1861 were so disappointing that Secretary Cameron suggested that the distinction between Regulars and Volunteers be abolished for the duration of the war and that the combination of both forces should be designated the "Army of the Union." [29]

During the campaigns of 1862, the main strength of the Regular Infantry was concentrated in 2 brigades, one—consisting of the 15th, 16th, 18th, and 19th Infantry—serving with the Army of the Cumberland, and the other—consisting of the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 14th, and 17th Infantry—serving with the Army of the Potomac. The regiments of cavalry and the batteries of Regular Artillery were assigned to various divisions of the several armies. The losses sustained were heavy in the extreme. The Regular units engaged in the Peninsular Campaign suffered a total of 1,210 casualties, about 5 percent of the entire Regular Army.[30]

As a result of these losses the War Department on 9 October issued its celebrated General Orders 154, which permitted the commanding officers of all Regular units serving in the field to appoint recruiting officers to solicit enlistments from among the Volunteers by holding out special inducements.[31] The term of service was reduced to 3 years, or that portion of 3 years which the Volunteer had yet to serve if he so desired. Promotion to noncommissioned and commissioned grades was promised for "distinguished and meritorious" service. This order was supplemented on 21 October by General Orders 162, which enlarged the field of recruiting activity to include not only the Volunteer regiments on active duty, but also those which were still organizing in the loyal States.[32] In addition, a Federal bounty of $100, $25 payable in advance, plus a $2 premium was offered to all who took advantage of the opportunity to enlist as Regulars. On 24 October, however, the Army of the Potomac set 5 November as the date when such recruiting should cease, and recruiting officers were cautioned

[29] Rpt. SW Cameron to Pres Lincoln, 1 Dec 61. *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. I, p. 704.

[30] WDAGO, "Organization of Troops and Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac during the Operations before Richmond, Va., June 25–July 2, 1862, inclusive." *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XI, pt. II, pp. 24–41.

[31] General Orders
No. 154

War Department Adjutant-General's Office
Washington, October 9, 1862

The commanding officer of each regiment, battalion, and battery of the Regular Army in the field will appoint one or more recruiting officers, who are hereby authorized to enlist, with their own consent, the requisite number of volunteers to fill the ranks of their own command to the legal standard.

The enlistments will be made in the usual mode, and for three years, or the remaining portion of the three years which the volunteer has yet to serve if he so prefer.

* * * * * * *

As an inducement to volunteers to enlist in the Regular Army, it will be remembered that promotion to commissions therein is open by law to its meritorious and distinguished non-commissioned officers, and that many have already been promoted.

Source: Ibid., ser. III, vol. II, p. 654.

[32] WD GO 162, 21 Oct 62. *Ibid.*, p. 676.

not to take more than a fair proportion of men from any one regiment.[33]

Reaction from the several States set in almost immediately, and with considerable heat. The private secretary of Gov. Oliver P. Morton of Indiana wrote that General Orders 154 was "a great embarrassment to officers of volunteer corps who have spent considerable time and money in raising their regiments," and stated that "no other one thing is creating so pernicious an influence on the Army as this."[34] Gov. John A. Andrew of Massachusetts charged that the measure discouraged Volunteer officers, had a bad effect on enlistments, and was subversive of discipline. It would be better, he said, to encourage volunteering for the 9 months' regiments, then in the process of organization, whose officers would be appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts.[35] The energetic Adjutant General of Iowa, Nathaniel B. Baker, claimed that the controversial order was "discouraging in results, of no benefit to any service, but great injury," and on behalf of the Iowa regiments he asked that General Orders Nos. 154 and 162 be revoked.[36] The upshot of this storm of protest was that all recruiting for the Regular Army among Iowa Volunteers was discontinued at once, and in February 1863 General Orders Nos. 154 and 162 were rescinded.[37]

This abortive attempt to recruit the ranks of the Regular Army had apparently no success except in arousing the suspicions and hostility of the state executives. Early in December, Assistant Adjutant General E. D. Townsend wrote to Secretary Stanton that great concern was felt for the Regulars who had gained comparatively few recruits because of the length of enlistment required of them, and the greater bounties offered to the Volunteers. Townsend suggested that Congress reduce the enlistment period to 3 years during the war period.[38] Although the strength of the Regular Army on paper had risen to 25,463 by January 1863, the number of officers and men present, 19,169, was actually less by 702 than at the beginning of the year.[39]

In the meantime, the strength of the units in the field continued to dwindle. The commanding officer of the 2d Infantry in January 1863 requested permission to consolidate the companies of the regiment and reduce the number from nine to six. The average number of men present for duty including noncommissioned officers was 21 per company, and but 7 company grade officers were available for duty with the

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[33] Hq, Army of the Potomac GO 167, 24 Oct 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XIX, pt. II, pp. 476–77.
[34] Msg, Halloway to Stanton, 29 Oct 62. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 694.
[35] Ltr, Andrew to Lincoln, 4 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, p. 737.
[36] Ltr, Baker to Lincoln, 10 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, p. 760.
[37] Msg, Vincent to Hindershott, 22 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, p. 863; WD GO 38, 10 Feb 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 38.
[38] Msg, Townsend to Stanton, 3 Dec 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 1110–11.
[39] "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 102.


regiment. The request was approved by the division and corps commander and by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the commander of the Grand Division, of which the 2d formed a part. General Meade's indorsement noted that similar consolidation would also be necessary in all the Regular regiments and recommended that steps be taken to reduce each regiment to the number of companies which the number of men present would make at war standard.[40] Even those units which were not engaged with the major field armies were unable to maintain themselves at anything like full strength. Brig. Gen. George Wright, commanding the Department of the Pacific, informed The Adjutant General that all efforts to fill up the companies of the 9th Infantry and the 3d Artillery, then stationed on the Pacific coast, had been futile and that the rendezvous had been closed for lack of business. General Wright suggested that "we might enlist men in the East for the army on this coast; men who would not enlist for service East being anxious to come to California," [41] What General Wright neglected to add was that men enlisted under such conditions would more likely than not have deserted to the gold fields at the earliest opportunity.

The General Recruiting Service, which had rendered such efficient service during the 1850's, apparently sank to an unimportant role. In April 1861, Brevet Col. C. F. Smith was directed to repair to Fort Columbus, New York Harbor, and assume the duties of superintendent, and in June all functions of the General Recruiting Service were concentrated in New York with the discontinuance of the Superintendency for the Western Department.[42] But in spite of the continuing existence of the General Recruiting Service, the nine new regiments authorized in April and May were recruited under the superintendence of their own commanding officers.[43] Little mention is made of the General Recruiting Service during 1861 and 1862, although the regimental recruiting depots seem to have sent small numbers of recruits to the front. The headquarters records of a number of the Regular regiments in the Department of the East during the first 6 months of 1863 show that recruits were being enlisted, although certainly not in large enough numbers to offset losses incurred through battle, disease, and desertion.[44]

In the summer of 1863, a determined effort was made to stimulate enlistments in the Regular Army. A large bounty was offered amounting to $402, with $40 payable in advance and the balance paid in in-

[40] Ltr, March to Sellers, 31 Jan 63. *Official Records,* ser. I, vol. XXV, pt. II, p. 14.
[41] Ltr, Wright to Thomas, 1 May 63. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. L, pt. II, p. 418.
[42] WD GO 12, 27 Apr 61; WD GO 36, 24 Jun 61.
[43] WD GO 33, 18 Jun 61.
[44] WDAGO, "Abstracts from returns of the Department of the East, Maj Gen John E. Wool, U. S. Army, commanding, for month of January 1863." *Official Records,* ser. I, vol. XXV, pt. II, p. 36; WDAGO, "Abstracts . . . for June 30, 1863." *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XXVII, pt. III, pp. 456–57.

stallments until discharge.[45] But this was offset by the offer of an equal bounty to Volunteers. A month later the General Recruiting Service was overhauled, its procedures were simplified, and the superintendent was given control over the regimental recruiting services as well. General Orders No. 245 stipulated that the superintendent



Civil War recruiting required various expedients.

must be a brigadier general in the Regular Army. This order also directed that officers and enlisted men incapacitated for field duty but still capable of performing garrison service be organized into invalid companies to be stationed at the regimental depot as a permanent party.[46] In spite of simplifying the recruiting machinery, the results were not impressive. The bounty offer was extended to 1 December and then to 25 June 1864, but on 1 January 1864 the total strength of the Regular Establishment had dropped to 24,636 officers and men, of whom a record 7,399 were not available for duty.[47]

In January 1864, the favorable Federal bounty was offered to all Regulars who would reenlist at the expiration of their term of service.[48]

[45] WD GO 190, 25 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 414.
[46] WD GO 245, 28 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 582-83.
[47] WD GO 338, 16 Oct 63. *Ibid.*, p. 887; WD GO 386, 1 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, p. 1106; "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 102.
[48] WD GO 25, 18 Jan 64. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 35.

But in April the Adjutant General's Office reported that the 4th Infantry was reduced to 4 companies and 329 men; the 9th Infantry to 8 companies and 321 men, and the 4 companies of the 10th Infantry to no more than 263 men.[49] Throughout the year, various expedients were resorted to in order that the Regulars could keep the field at all. Whole units nevertheless were relieved of duty in the field and ordered north to recruit.[50]

The number of enlistments and reenlistments in the Regular Army from 1 January to 31 October 1864 [see table 3] represents an actual turnover of more than 50 percent, for in spite of the relatively large number of recruits obtained in 1864, the aggregate strength of the Regular Army continued to decline. By January 1865, the total number present and absent was 22,019, a reduction of 2,617 from the previous year's figure, while the number present was 14,661.[51]

In all, the Regular Army enlisted, or reenlisted more than 19,500 men between 31 October 1864 and 1 October 1865, but these enlistments were distributed among the regiments in an extremely irregular manner as the following table [table 4] indicates.

*Table 3—Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army: 1 Jan.—31 Oct. 1864**

Organization	Total	Enlistments					
		Total	January	February	March	April	May
Total	13, 019	12, 103	819	2, 294	1, 775	1, 021	668
General Service	4, 202	3, 997	303	636	574	307	196
Mounted Service	1, 564	1, 384	74	286	187	93	115
5th Artillery	711	674	44	114	108	83	48
11th Infantry	755	755	12	96	75	154	43
12th Infantry	481	463	31	65	91	56	24
13th Infantry	504	454	12	138	115	45	30
14th Infantry	1, 009	914	117	188	118	42	47
15th Infantry	818	689	32	264	122	106	34
16th Infantry	1, 352	1, 301	74	194	266	32	37
17th Infantry	314	314	24	61	45	41	20
18th Infantry	320	286	20	62	9	20	10
19th Infantry	618	618	27	41	37	38	63
Engineer Corps	311	224	19	149	28	4	1
Signal Corps	60	30	30	0	0	0	0

[49] Msg, Kelton to Burnside, 22 Apr 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, p. 945.

[50] Btry L, 1st Arty was relieved from duty in the Department of the Gulf in June by WD SO 200, 7 Jun 64. In October, the entire 17th Inf, then serving with the Army of the Potomac, was ordered to New York to report to the Superintendent of the Recruiting Service by Hq, Army of Potomac SO 276, 12 Oct 64. Copies of these orders in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XXIV, pt. IV, p. 256 and ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. III, p. 178, respectively.

[51] "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 102.

*Table 3.—Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army: 1 Jan.—31 Oct. 1864**—Continued

Organization	Enlistments—Continued					Reenlistments
	June	July	August	September	October	
Total	517	869	1, 463	1, 570	1, 107	916
General Service	154	354	422	568	483	205
Mounted Service	79	106	227	102	115	180
5th Artillery	22	26	48	122	59	37
11th Infantry	30	60	125	66	94	0
12th Infantry	20	25	64	60	27	18
13th Infantry	17	21	14	39	23	50
14th Infantry	35	23	160	143	41	95
15th Infantry	36	15	18	24	38	129
16th Infantry	46	55	166	309	122	51
17th Infantry	3	13	13	57	37	0
18th Infantry	16	46	59	17	27	34
19th Infantry	59	112	147	63	31	0
Engineer Corps	0	13	0	0	10	87
Signal Corps	0	0	0	0	0	30


*Source: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 812.

*Table 4—Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular Army: 31 Oct. 1864—1 Oct. 1865**

Organization	Number	Organization	Number
Total	19, 555	5th Infantry	33
		6th Infantry	140
General Service	4, 698	7th Infantry	64
Mounted Service	3, 033	8th Infantry	115
1st Cavalry	131	9th Infantry	241
2d Cavalry	16	10th Infantry	13
3d Cavalry	6	11th Infantry	953
4th Cavalry	24	12th Infantry	694
5th Cavalry	42	13th Infantry	742
6th Cavalry	37	14th Infantry	1, 752
1st Artillery	149	15th Infantry	1, 208
2d Artillery	7	16th Infantry	804
3d Artillery	357	17th Infantry	761
4th Artillery	182	18th Infantry	852
5th Artillery	155	19th Infantry	698
1st Infantry	44	Engineer Corps	237
2d Infantry	859	Ordnance Corps	209
3d Infantry	9	Military Academy	260
4th Infantry	30		

*Source: *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. V, p. 133.

CHART 4 – THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REGULAR AND VOLUNTEER ARMIES, WITH SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF REPLACEMENT SOURCES DURING THE CIVIL WAR, 1861–1865



The conclusion is inescapable that, except for furnishing many of the general officers who eventually won the war, the Regular Army, as such, had very little influence on the outcome of the struggle. The total number of men who served in this branch was estimated at 67,000, but there never were as many as 20,000 present at one time.[52] Of 448 companies authorized, 153 had not been organized by the end of the war.[53] [See chart 4 for organization of the Regular and Volunteer Armies.]

Losses from all causes among the Regulars amounted to 29,231, of which 16,365, or about 56 percent, were from desertion. Split up into minor detachments, scattered about in widely separated armies, and unable to compete successfully with the Volunteer organizations for recruits, the Regular Army was hard put to maintain its separate existence, let alone influence significantly the outcome of the war. Strangely enough, it was a group of civilians who, early in the war, correctly stated the role of the small professional army in wartime. The executive committee of the United States Sanitary Commission in a report to the President asserted:

> If we have learned anything, it has been that it was a mistake to keep the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army separate. Had the regulars been from the first intermingled with the volunteers they would have leavened the whole lump with their experience of camp police, discipline, subordination, and the

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 102.

[53] J. D. Ingersoll, *A History of the War Department of the United States* (Washington, 1880), p. 370.

sanitary conditions of military life. We should have no Bull Run panic to blush for. . . .[54]

The Volunteers

From the very first call for Volunteers in the spring of 1861 to the demobilization in the summer of 1865, political considerations and political pressures exercised as much influence in the councils of the administration as did those of a purely military nature. The President's call of 3 May 1861 for volunteers for 3 years or the duration of the war authorized the formation of 39 regiments of infantry and 1 of cavalry, organized into brigades and divisions with appropriate staffs. The maximum strength contemplated for the Volunteers was 42,034.[55] The Secretary of War was directed to fix the quotas of the various States under this call,[56] but nowhere was a limit placed on the strength of these regiments once they were organized and sent to the field. By early July, Cameron was able to report that the call for volunteers had been oversubscribed, and that to date some 200 regiments had been accepted for 3 years, more than 150 of which were then on active duty.[57]

When Congress convened in special session on 4 July, it not only approved the steps taken by the President and the Secretary of War but authorized, first, an army not to exceed half a million volunteers and, second, the employment of as many volunteers as the exigencies of the situation might direct.[58] Before the end of August, 266 regiments of infantry, 27 of cavalry, and 7 artillery regiments, besides numerous independent companies and batteries, had been accepted.[59] The call of 3 May as expanded by congressional action eventually raised 560 infantry regiments, 82 cavalry regiments, and 15 regiments of artillery, plus about 200 separate companies and batteries,[60] with a total strength of 700,680.[61]

The replacement problem, so far as War Department recognition was concerned, initially developed in connection with the disposal of troops who had been taken prisoners of war. The first decision was

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[54] Msg, Ex Comm U. S. Sanitary Comm to Pres Lincoln, 21 Jul 62. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 237. Grant suggested that the Regular Army be disbanded altogether, with the officers to receive no compensation unless they joined the Volunteers. See U. S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs* (New York, 1885), I, p. 283.

[55] WD GO 15, 4 May 61, *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 151–154.

[56] See the letters of SW Cameron to the governors of the loyal States. *Ibid.*, pp. 203–04. *Ibid.*, pp. 203–04.

[57] SW Cameron to Pres Lincoln, 1 Jul 61. *Ibid.*, pp. 303–04.

[58] WD GO 48, 31 Jul 61. *Ibid.*, pp. 372–374.

[59] Msg, Lesley to McClellan, 26 Aug. 61. *Ibid.*, pp. 455–456.

[60] Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1912), p. 267.

[61] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 1264–1270.

to discharge them from the service, and it was so ordered on 28 August 1861.[62] This applied to men released on parole as well as those still held by the Confederacy.[63] Such a prodigal use of manpower was discontinued in November when the Secretary of War directed that all officers and enlisted men "now prisoners in the hands of the enemy or reported missing in action, or that may hereafter be taken prisoners or reported missing in action," should be transferred to skeleton regiments set up for the purpose by the State governors. "The vacancies thus occasioned in the organized regiments will be filled by the Governors of the various States to which the regiments belong."[64] This attempt to deal with the losses incurred through capture by the enemy was apparently not a great success, for authority to transfer those captured to Secretary Cameron's skeleton regiments was revoked on 20 February 1862, and the men who had previously been assigned to these units were ordered to be reassigned to their original regiments on 10 May.[65]

In the meantime, McClellan had been assigned to the command of the armies on the retirement of General Scott, and under his direction the War Department radically reorganized the entire recruiting system. General Orders No. 105, which went into effect 1 January 1862, virtually transferred all recruiting authority to the War Department. It provided that no more regiments, batteries or independent companies were to be raised by the governors except on the requisition of the Department. Superintendents of the Volunteer Recruiting Service were appointed for each State, and recruiting for all regiments raised or to be raised was placed under the direction of these superintendents. The commanding officers of regiments were instructed to detail 2 officers and 4 noncommissioned officers for 6 months to report for duty to the superintendents of the Volunteer Recruiting Service in their respective States.[66]

As interpreted by Secretary Cameron, General Orders No. 105 meant that the Administration was satisfied that it had raised enough troops to finish the rebellion, and that all that was now necessary was to set up machinery to maintain the existing regiments at full strength. "As the recruiting will be done by volunteer officers," wrote Cameron, "it is believed that a sufficient number of men will be obtained from

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[62] General Orders No. 69, 28 Aug 61, was the sole provision of the War Department concerning replacements. This instructed the commanding officers of the Volunteer regiments to keep their commands up to strength by detailing recruiting parties from time to time in the districts in which the regiments were raised. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 461.

[63] Msg, McKeever to Sturgis, 10 Oct 61. *Official Records*, ser. II, vol. I, p. 134.

[64] WD GO 102, 25 Nov 61. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. III, p. 141.

[65] WD GO 17, 20 Feb 62. *Ibid.*, p. 287; WD GO 51, 10 May 62. *Ibid.*, p. 529.

[66] WD GO 105, 3 Dec 61. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, pp. 722–723, par. X and XIII.

time to time to meet the requirements of the service." [67] Cameron resigned from the Cabinet effective 14 January 1862 and was replaced by Edwin M. Stanton.

There is little evidence to show that during the early months of 1862 the new system was much of a success. Before the opening of the spring campaigns, which would have increased the need for a steady flow of replacements, Secretary Stanton abruptly discontinued the Volunteer Recruiting Service.[68] No satisfactory explanation has ever been made of Stanton's action, which turned out to be one of the major blunders of the war. The Secretary's own explanation was that all recruiting was stopped "for the purpose of compelling governors to make returns." [69]

One immediate result of Stanton's order was that by the middle of May the War Department was again appealing to the loyal governors for new regiments to be raised as quickly as possible.[70] The Volunteer Recruiting Service was also reestablished in early June,[71] and although commanding officers had been authorized in May to requisition the governors for recruits to fill up depleted regiments,[72] the machinery through which these requisitions could be filled had already been dismantled by Stanton's order and the new general orders came too late to repair the damage.

Disease and the normal losses incident to military operations combined to reduce the regiments at a fearful rate. Many regiments, even at the beginning of the spring campaigns, could not muster half the minimum authorized strength for duty. To the commanders in the field the simple and obvious remedy for a problem which was rapidly assuming the most serious proportions was not a whole army of new regiments, but replacements to bring the old regiments up to their authorized strength. Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, commanding the Army of the Ohio, stated that "some plan of recruitment for the regiments now in service is rapidly becoming a matter of vital impor-

[67] Cameron to Gov. Edwin D. Morgan, N. Y., 26 Dec 61. *Ibid.*, pp. 760–761. The implications of this order have been variously interpreted. From McClellan's later correspondence there seems good reason to believe that he intended the order to mean that it said—that the Federal Government after 1 Jan 62 would exercise strict control over all recruiting activities. The conventional theory, advocated by Upton and his successors, scoffs at the idea that the Administration ever seriously entertained an inclination to challenge State control of recruiting. This point of view is well expressed by Fred A. Shannon in *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861–1865* (Cleveland, 1928), I, p. 265: "This would seem to be a serious effort to recover national prestige by centering all initiative in recruiting in the War Department. As applied it was no such a thing. It was, in effect, a declaration that the governors had finished the work and done it well, and that now, since no more new organizations were needed, the Federal Government felt able to maintain the army at that standard."

[68] WD GO 33, 3 Apr 62. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 2–3.

[69] Msg, Stanton to Halleck, 1 May 62. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[70] Ltr, Thomas to the governors of the loyal States, 19–21 May 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 44–61.

[71] WD GO 60, 6 Jun 62. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[72] Msg, Stanton to Halleck, 1 May 62. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

tance." [73] On 14 July, General McClellan told the President that he would rather have his old regiments filled up than have new ones organized. In a letter to Governor Morgan of New York he asserted that the greatest benefit to the service would accrue from filling up the old regiments to their maximum standard. Fifty thousand recruits in the old regiments would be more valuable than 100,000 in new ones, he stated.[74]

The executive committee of the U. S. Sanitary Commission, commenting on the President's call for 300,000 men of 2 July, indicated an understanding of the situation wholly lacking in many of the Governors:

> . . . The loss of life by debility, disease, and immaturity—ten times that of our bloodiest battles—is wholly unnecessary; that of every ten men lost by the Army during the past year nine have been needlessly wasted; that by proper medical inspection of recruits the material of disease can be reduced; and then by a proper distribution of the raw recruits among the regiments already formed, . . . it would save the country sooner or later, thousands of lives and millions of dollars. We would get a far better class of men. They would have a thorough medical inspection, and every man would soon cease to be a raw recruit when absorbed into a veteran regiment. Thus all our year's costly experience would be saved, and the perils of ignorance, inexperience, and crudity be avoided. . . .[75]

The Sanitary Commission was considerably ahead of its time, and since its influence at the polls was insignificant no attention was paid to its recommendations.

The call of 2 July, to which the Sanitary Commission had reference,[76] might have provided an opportunity for the War Department to regain control of the recruiting machinery in order to keep the old regiments up to strength. It did nothing of the kind, however. On 7 July, authorization from the Department went out to the governors for an aggregate of 150 new regiments, which virtually guaranteed that any attempt to recruit for the old regiments would end in failure.[77]

Nonetheless, throughout the summer conscientious efforts were made to fill the old regiments at the same time the new ones were being raised. On 28 July, regimental commanders were directed to increase their recruiting details at once, and newly enlisted men were permitted to choose the company within the regiment for which they enlisted.[78]

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[73] Msg, Buell to McLean, 26 Apr 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. X, pt. II, p. 621.

[74] Msg, McClellan to Lincoln, 14 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. IV, p. 210; Msg, McClellan to Morgan, 15 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 225.

[75] Msg, Ex Comm U. S. Sanitary Comm, to Pres Lincoln, 21 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–238.

[76] This call was made, for morale purposes, to appear as the spontaneous call of the governors for a more vigorous prosecution of the war. See the correspondence between Stanton and the governors. *Ibid.*, pp. 188 ff.

[77] Msg, Buckingham to the governors, 7 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

[78] WD GO 88, 25 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

In the middle of August, the War Department notified each governor of the number of men required to bring the regiments of his State up to strength.[79] But the governors were not willing, in many instances, to accept the War Department's figures, nor did they evince any great enthusiasm for devoting their energies to recruiting for their old regiments. [80]

The recruiting system became quite complicated with the passage of the Militia Act of 1862. This law, approved by the President on 17 July, authorized the Executive to accept such number of Volunteers as might be offered for a period of 12 months unless sooner discharged; to order a draft of 300,000 militia for 9 months' service unless sooner discharged; and finally to order a draft from the Militia to fill any deficiency in the call of 2 July for 300,000 Volunteers for 3 years.[81] This was a makeshift plan at best and was enacted over the objections of the War Department. Assistant Adjutant General Buckingham expressed the concern of the Department in a letter to Gov. F. H. Peirpont of Virginia (or that part of the State which remained loyal). "It may be doubted," he wrote, "whether mixing 1 year's men with those of old regiments for 3 years will be judicious. Also whether 9 months is not too short a time for any," [82]

It soon became obvious that the draft was not to be utilized per se as a means of raising men, but rather as a threat to stimulate recruiting for the new 3-year regiments and for the old regiments in the field. A Presidential order of 14 August provided that no bounty or advance pay was to be given after 15 August except to Volunteers for new regiments not yet recruited up to the authorized strength, or to Volunteers for the old regiments. Advance pay and bounty for the latter were authorized until 1 September. If the old regiments were not filled up by 1 September a special draft was to be ordered to make good the deficiency.[83] The War Department also stipulated that any excess of volunteers would be credited against this draft quota, but only if the old regiments had been filled in the process.[84]

This succession of orders thoroughly confused and alarmed the governors. Immediately they demanded that recruiting for the old regiments be permitted to continue until the date set for the Militia draft.

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[79] WDAGO, "Statement showing number of men for old regiments furnished by States August 15–November 21, 1862. . . ," 21 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, p. 861.

[80] The unwillingness of the governors to cooperate wit hthe War Department is shown in the following: Msg, Noble to Stanton, 29 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, p. 485; Msg, Schouler to Buckingham, 20 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, p. 419; Msg, Yates to Stanton, 21 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, p. 429.

[81] Act of July 17, 1862, "An act to amend an act calling for the Militia to execute the laws of the Union etc.," published for the information of the Army in WD GO 91, 29 J .l 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 280–282; WD GO 94, 4 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 291–292.

[82] Msg, Buckingham to Gov. F. H. Peirpont of Va., 23 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 248–249.

[83] WD GO 109, 16 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, p. 397.

[84] Msg, Buckingham to Baker, 15 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

The War Department finally capitulated and on 4 September directed the governors to continue to accept Volunteers for the old regiments, with advance pay and bounty until further orders.[85]

The first Militia draft was ordered for Ohio on 1 October, and to the very end of the war Secretary Stanton was harassed to a greater or lesser degree by pressure from the various governors.[86] As it turned out, the whole business of the Militia draft was a miserable fiasco. Of the 300,000 whom it was proposed to draft, only 87,588 were ever mustered into the service of the United States.[87] Ten states furnished no troops at all under this order and the great preponderance of those furnished found their way not into the depleted ranks of the old regiments but into 73 new 9 months' regiments. Only Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska, which had been assigned no quota, furnished a surplus of about 21,500 men who presumably were assigned to the old regiments.[88]

The attempts to recruit the old regiments by Federal and State agencies during 1862 must be set down as a dismal failure. The call of 2 July for 300,000 men for 3 years eventually produced 421,465 men, but less than 50,000 of these were assigned to the old regiments. The Militia draft, designed to raise 300,000 nine-month men, brought in less than 90,000, of whom about 21,500 went to maintain the regiments of 1861. Thus, the regiments whose minimum needs were 233,000 on 15 August had received only about 71,000 by the end of the year. Fredericksburg and Stone's River provided terrible baptisms to the new Army, and, by the opening of the spring campaigns in 1863, the need for replacements was as great as it had been the year before.

Throughout the year, commanders in the field had resorted to various expedients in addition to maintaining recruiting details in an effort to maintain the effective strength of their commands. These efforts lay chiefly in the direction of securing recruits from among the Unionist elements in those Southern States which were occupied by the armies during 1862. Confederate authorities complained that their paroled prisoners in New Orleans were enlisting in the Northern Army, and in May, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, commanding the Department of the Gulf, directed the regiments of his command to fill up their ranks in this manner.[89] Loyal residents of northern Alabama were encouraged to enlist in Union regiments rather than

[85] Msg, Buckingham to the governors, 4 Sep 62. *Ibid.*, p. 512.

[86] See ltrs, Thomas to Stanton, 1 Nov 62, 2 Nov 62, 4 Nov 62, 7 Nov 62, 8 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 714, 716, 738, 743–744, 746.

[87] From a list showing quotas and credits of militia draft under order of 4 Aug. 62. *Ibid.*, p. 291 f. n.

[88] *Ibid.;* See also "Exhibit of the number of organizations . . . organized and mustered into the service. . . . *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. V, pp. 1019–1029.

[89] Msg, Duncan to Pickett, 13 May 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. VI, p. 535; Msg, Butler to Stanton, 16 May 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XV, p. 424.

to attempt to form their own units [90] while Grant was authorized to enlist Union sympathizers from Tennessee into his old regiments.[91] The great drawback to this method of recruitment was that, under its conscription law, the Confederacy considered every able-bodied man as a member of the military and guilty of desertion if he enlisted in the Union forces. [92] This method of recruiting the old regiments never assumed large proportions, and it is almost impossible to determine the number of replacements it obtained.

To even the most enthusiastic supporters of the Volunteer system, it had become obvious by the end of 1862 that the strength of the Army could not be maintained by voluntary enlistments alone. In spite of increasingly high bounties it became more and more difficult to obtain recruits either for new organizations or for the old regiments. Moreover, with the addition of the three-hundred-odd regiments raised under the call of 2 July 1862, there were now more than 800 regiments constantly in the need of replacements. Even though the Army had recruited 509,053 3-year and 9-month men, its strength, which had totaled, present and absent, 527,804 with an aggregate present of 477,193 on 31 December 1861, had risen on 31 December 1862 to an aggregate present and absent of 868,591 and a total present of 664,163. But these figures do not present an accurate picture. On the last day of 1861, there were 425,405 officers and men present for duty; by 31 December 1862 the number present for duty had been increased by only 130,553 to 555,958 officers and enlisted men.[93]

The only alternative to the existing system seemed to be some form of enforced military service. The Militia draft of the previous year, executed under the direction of the State executives, had proved to be a complete failure. It seemed, therefore, that any system of compulsory service must be administered under the auspices of the Federal Government. Moreover, the adoption of conscription by the Confederacy in the spring of 1862 was not without influence. The editor of the powerful New York *Tribune*, Horace Greeley, came out in support of conscription after its passage in the Confederate Congress. Greeley had opposed conscription on moral grounds, but felt that since it had been adopted in the South it was proper that the North should resort to it as well. To this end legislation designed to establish Federal conscription was introduced into Congress, a bill was passed and received Presidential approval on 3 March 1863. Entitled "An Act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes," it was, according to one of its chief congressional

[90] Msg, Fry to Streight, 10 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XVI, pt. II, p. 118.
[91] Msg, Halleck to Grant, 1 Sept. 62. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 496.
[92] Msg, Butler to Halleck, 14 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. IV, p. 708.
[93] "Consolidated abstract from returns of the U. S. Army," on or about 31 Dec 61. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 775; "Consolidated abstract from returns of the U. S. Army," on or about 31 Dec 62. *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 957.

supporters, Senator Henry Wilson (Republican, Massachusetts), designed to provide replacements for the regiments already in the field. "The Nation needs not new regiments and more officers," he said, "it needs new bayonets in the war-wasted ranks of the veteran regiments." [94]

The bill, as passed, stated that all citizens, with certain exceptions, between the ages of 20 and 45 were liable for military service for a period of 3 years at the discretion of the President. Quotas were to be assigned to enrollment districts, usually equivalent to a congressional district or such smaller geographical division as the President might direct, and the process of enrollment and conscription was to be under the direction of The Provost Marshal General, with the authorities in each district responsible to him alone. All persons drafted "shall be assigned by the President to military duties in such corps, regiments, or other branches of the service as the exigencies of the service may require." All this was to the good and might have provided a solid basis on which to bring the existing regiments up to authorized strength. But the Congress added two conditions under which men conscripted might avoid personal service, and these gave rise to abuses which all but wrecked the efficient operation of the law. It was stipulated that any person drafted might provide a substitute to serve in his stead, or that by the payment of a flat sum not to exceed $300 he would be exempt from the operation of that draft. The necessity for more than one draft was not foreseen by Congress, and the interpretation of this clause caused considerable bitterness resulting in its repeal in 1864. These two provisions furnished an argument hard to answer for those who charged that the conscription law was designed to exempt the well to do and shift the burden of service on those classes of the population who could neither afford to hire a substitute nor pay the commutation fee.[95]

The conscription bill was an omnibus affair—it provided that when the strength of a regiment had fallen below one-half the maximum authorized by law its companies were to be consolidated and all surplus officers were to be discharged. This was an ill-conceived measure which brought immediate protests from the commanders in the field, who argued rightly that they would lose large numbers of experienced and valuable officers by the operation of this enactment. The regimental returns to the end of the war indicate that this law was more honored in the breach than in the observance. This same act also set up the conditions for the reenlistment of troops whose terms should expire before the conclusion of the war.

[94] Speech of Hon. Henry Wilson, *Congressional Globe,* 37th Cong, 3d Sess, pp 976–1002. Quoted in Shannon, *op. cit.,* I, pp. 311–312.

[95] P. L. No. 54 was published for the information of the Army in WD GO 73, 24 Mar 63. *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. III, pp. 88–93.

And in accordance with the provisions of the act[96] Col. (later Brig. Gen.) James B. Fry was detailed as Provost Marshal General. The passage of the bill had been received with considerable hope by commanders in the field, who believed that it would supply the manpower necessary to maintain efficiency in their commands. Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, expressed the opinion that it would increase the power of his army by 50 percent within 2 months.[97] Sherman wrote that the President now had the powers which should have been granted at the beginning of the war. He hoped that Lincoln would call out large masses of men, mainly privates, to fill up the vacanies in the old regiments.[98] The War Department ordered a general muster of "all troops in the service of the United States, wheresoever they may be" for 10 April in order that the muster-rolls might be used by The Provost Marshal General in making drafts to bring all units up to strength.[99]

Again in June General Sherman wrote General Grant—

> . . . If the draft be made, and the men be organized into new regiments instead of filling up the old, the President may be satisfying a few aspiring men, but will prolong the war for years and allow the old regiments to die of natural exhaustion . . . But fill up our present ranks, and there is not an officer or man of this army but would feel renewed hope and courage to meet the struggles before us.
>
> . . . If adopted, it would be more important than the conquest of Vicksburg and Richmond together, as it would be a victory of common sense over the popular fallacies that have ruled and almost ruined our country.

On 19 June, Grant forwarded this letter to Lincoln with his approval expressed in the following words:

> . . . A recruit added to them [old regiments] would become an old soldier, from the very contact, before he was aware of it.
>
> . . . Taken in an economic view, one drafted man in an old regiment is worth three in a new one.[100]

By 1 July, the process of enrollment in the various districts was so far complete that The Provost Marshal General was able to commence drafting in some of them. During the process of enrollment the office of The Provost Marshal General had figured out the quota of each State and district, based upon population and the number of men previously furnished to the armed forces. From these calculations it was found that several States had exceeded their quotas on previous calls, and that it would not be necessary to order a draft. Here it was

[96] WD GO 67, 17 Mar 63. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

[97] Msg, Rosecrans to Halleck 25 Feb 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXIII, pt. II, pp. 84–85.

[98] Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman to Gov. David Tod of Ohio 12 Mar 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 65–66; Msg, Grant to Lincoln, 19 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 386–388.

[99] WD GO 82, 1 Apr 63. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[100] Ltr, Grant to Lincoln, 19 Jun 63, w/incl, ltr, Sherman to Grant, 2 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 386–388.

that the avowed intention of the conscription act first was violated. It was of absolutely no avail to the depleted regiments of Ohio or Illinois to state that previous quotas had been oversubscribed. The satisfaction derived from a knowledge that the State had done more than its duty filled no regimental vacancies. On 1 July, Colonel Fry ordered a draft in the 3d Massachusetts District, followed by similar orders for districts in Maine, Delaware, and New York, before the end of the month.[101]

This inaugurated a bitter struggle between the State authorities and The Provost Marshal General. Scarcely a governor would admit that his State had been given the proper credit for previous calls. The Democratic Governor of New York, Horatio Seymour, insisted that the heavily Democratic districts of New York City and Brooklyn had been deliberately assessed high quotas in order to insure a Republican victory at the next election and asked that the draft in those places be suspended until an investigation could be made.[102] But above all, the governors desired to use the threat of a draft to stimulate Volunteer recruiting. Governor Andrew wanted to recruit conscripts for his Massachusetts regiments so that they might qualify for the State bounty, a request peremptorily refused by the Secretary of War.[103] The governors of New Jersey and Wisconsin, professing not to be sufficiently prepared for a draft, were authorized to continue volunteer enlistments until such time as they were ready.[104] There were notable exceptions to this clamor, however. On 10 July, Gov. James Y. Smith of Rhode Island reported that the draft was progressing favorably in his State and that the people were accepting it cheerfully, and Abner Coburn, Governor of Maine, was solicitous that the conscripts raised in the State be distributed in the best interests of the service.[105]

The reluctance of the governors was not the only problem with which the Provost Marshal General had to contend. Very soon after actual drafting began it became apparent that a class of professional substitutes was springing up whose chief aim was to collect the substitute fee, and who had no intention of actually serving in the Army. Capt. W. Silvey, the Acting Assistant Provost Marshal General for Rhode Island, wrote as early as 22 July that "the class of substitutes accepted and now offering are scoundrels and thieves and cannot be kept securely." Two days later, Rep. John D. Baldwin of the 8th District

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[101] Ltr, Fry to State governors and provost marshals, 1 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 462–463.

[102] Msg, Seymour to Lincoln, 8 Aug 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 639–640.

[103] Msg, Andrew to Stanton, 18 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 537; Msg, Stanton to Andrew, 21 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 551.

[104] Msg, Fry to Salomon, 1 Aug 63. *Ibid.*, p. 611.

[105] Msg, Smith to Stanton, 10 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 482; Msg, Coburn to Fry, 15 Aug 63. *Ibid.*, p. 679.

of Massachusetts informed the Secretary of War that "most of the substitutes will desert, if possible, as soon as they get the money." [106]

The result of these and similar letters was a circular from the office of the Provost Marshal General directing the local enrollment boards not to muster in substitutes unless they were prepared either to guard them closely or send them immediately to the designated rendezvous point.[107]

In spite of delays, necessary and contrived, drafted men soon began to appear in the ranks of the regiments in the field. But the military commanders were thoroughly disillusioned by fall. The man on whom fell the duty of administering the draft [see chart 5], Colonel Fry, wrote to Senator Wilson that the conscription law as it then stood was "essentially a law not to secure military service, but to exempt men from it." [108] In a pessimistic vein Halleck informed Sherman that his ranks could not be strengthened by the current draft. "It is almost a failure, as nearly everybody is exempt. It takes more soldiers to enforce it than we get by it. A more complicated, defective, and impracticable law could scarcely have been framed." [109] In a report to the Secretary of War, Colonel Fry disclosed that in those districts for which statistics were available, 30 percent of the men examined were excused for physical disability; another 30 percent were exempted for other reasons; and 40 percent were held to service. Of these, about one-half paid the $300 commutation fee; and only 20 percent of all those examined either hired a substitute or served in person.[110] Of 107,236 men examined in 40 districts that had completed their draft by 1 November, 10,402 furnished substitutes, and and 3,922 were held to personal service.[111] If this proportion of men obtained to men examined were to hold good, The Provost Marshal General estimated that the approximately 3,000,000 men enrolled would produce a total of 426,000 soldiers. According to Colonel Fry:

> Under the circumstances, the present law may be properly called one for 'enrolling and calling out the national forces;' but if it is one calculated to raise and maintain an army I cannot see it.

He added:

> There is no sophistry which can disguise the fact that it is not in proper shape to recruit the Army.

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[106] Msg, Silvey to Fry, 22 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 558; Msg, Baldwin to Stanton, 24 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 563–564.

[107] WD Cir 56, 23 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 559.


[108] Msg, Fry to Wilson, 16 Sep 63. *Ibid.*, p. 801.

[109] Msg, Halleck to Sherman, 1 Oct 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. LII, pt. I, p. 716.

[110] Msg, Fry to Stanton, 19 Oct 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 893–895.

[111] From "Consolidation of Final Reports from all districts in which the draft was completed up to November 1, 1863." *Ibid.*, pp. 1068–1069.

CHART 5 — SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S BUREAU, 1863–1865



And:

> I don't see however, that legislation should be shaped to suit this momentary state of affairs; on the contrary in a measure of this kind, it strikes me that the object should be to create a system by which the General Government can surely and practically and promptly create and recruit an army either for the campaign of 1864 or 1874.[112]

Despite the fact that Congress repealed the obnoxious commutation clause in 1864 and the law was so interpreted as to permit a man threatened with being drafted to hire a substitute before he was drafted,[113] the operation of the law contributed a relatively small number of men to the armed forces. Beginning with the call of 17 October 1863, which embraced the draft commenced on 1 July, 1,173,522 men were called into service before the end of the war.[114] Of this number, 170,039 were furnished by the draft, as shown in the following table:

*Table 5—Men Furnished by the Draft: 1863–1865**

Draft	Total	Held to personal service	Substitutes for drafted men	Substitutes for enrolled men prior to draft
Total	170, 039	52, 037	75, 421	42, 581
Draft of 1863	35, 850	9, 848	26, 002	0
Draft Under Calls of February and March 1864	12, 321	3, 418	8, 903	0
Draft Under Call of July 1864	84, 291	26, 205	28, 502	29, 584
Draft Under Call of December 1864	37, 577	12, 566	12, 014	12, 997

* *Source: Official Records,* ser. III ,vol. IV, pp. 927–28, and vol. V ,pp. 486–87.

Insofar as the drafted men almost without exception were sent to the old regiments as replacements, the operation of the conscription law was beneficial and agreed with the purpose for which it was enacted. But it did not go far enough—it did not provide manpower in anything like the numbers necessary to maintain the field organizations at effective strength. It was the Volunteer system which furnished the bulk of the replacements during the final 2 years of the war.


The slow process of enrolling the manpower of the North and getting it into uniform, together with the urgent necessity of strength-

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[112] Msg, Fry to Hon H. S. Lane, M. C., 20 Dec 63. *Ibid.,* pp. 1175–1177.

[113] "An Act further to regulate and provide for the enrolling and calling out of the national forces, and for other purposes," published for the information of the Army in WD GO 224, 6 Jul 64. *Ibid.,* ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 473–474.

[114] "Abstract from official records showing the forces called for. . . ." *Ibid.,* pp. 1264–1270.



Civil War inspection.

ening the armies in the field, brought a return to Volunteer recruiting. Again, instead of insisting that all men so raised be assigned to existing units, the War Department authorized the governors to raise additional regiments. Beginning with permission to the Governor of Pennsylvania to recruit 10 regiments of infantry and 5 of cavalry on 29 May 1863, Stanton let the bars down progressively until 40 regiments of all arms had been authorized.[115] While this was probably the quickest method to get troops into the field, it was no solution to the problem of filling up the old regiments. Their strength continued to decline, and after the heavy losses incurred at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chickamauga, their plight was indeed serious.

The Office of The Adjutant General had computed that the several States had furnished the following number of recruits to the old regiments from 1 January to 31 October 1863:

[115] Msg, Fry to Gov of Pennsylvania, 29 May 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 240. Authorizations to other State executives are found on pp. 329, 373–374, 736, 795–796, 799. See also "Exhibit of the number of organizations . . . ," *op. cit.*

State	Recruits	State	Recruits
Total	21, 331	Missouri	3, 683
Connecticut	343	New York	2, 997
Illinois	833	New Jersey	795
Indiana	2, 728	New Hampshire	49
Iowa	364	Ohio	1, 561
Kentucky	691	Pennsylvania	1, 266
Maine	454	Rhode Island	1, 036
Maryland	741	Vermont	126
Massachusetts	1, 016	West Virginia	433
Michigan	1, 619	Wisconsin	[116] 471
Minnesota	125		

The average strength of the 33 regiments of XXI Army Corps, which participated in the battle of Chickamauga, 19–20 September 1863, was 325, more than 500 men below the minimum standard authorized by law. [117] Thus, if every one of the recruits obtained for the old regiments had been assigned to XXI Army Corps, it would still have been below the maximum strength of 1,025 officers and men per regiment authorized by law.

It was the recruiting efforts of the regiments themselves which enabled the Army to maintain itself. Without the replacements obtained by the veteran regiments, more units would have been consolidated or broken up. The armies in the field continued their efforts to obtain recruits in the occupied areas. The IX Army Corps, transferred from the Army of the Potomac to the Army of the Ohio, found itself operating in the mountains of eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina where Union sentiment was supposed to be strong. The commanding officer of the corps, Brig. Gen. R. B. Potter, attempted to capitalize on this sentiment and published an invitation to enlist which set forth the advantages to be obtained by joining an old and battle-tested organization:

Headquarters Ninth Army Corps,
Camp near Knoxville, Tenn., October 19, 1863

RECRUITS WANTED

The men of East Tennessee and North Carolina are invited to enlist in the regiments and batteries of the Ninth Army Corps, General Burnside's old command. This celebrated corps, composed of men from every loyal portion of the Union, having served in Virginia, in Maryland, in North and South Carolina, in Mississippi and Kentucky, having covered its banners with the mottoes of victory, has now brought its arms to the defense of Tennessee. By enlisting in old regiments recruits at once gain all the comforts and conveniences possible to a soldier, and are saved from the discomforts, delays, sickness, and dangers arising from ignorance and indifference to which all new organizations are subject, and which cause so much sickness and death. Men enlisting in

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[116] "Exhibit of volunteers and militia mustered into the service of the United States from the 1st day of January 1863, to the 31st day of October 1863." *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 1080.

[117] "Return of the casualties in the Twenty-First Army Corps in the engagements of September 19–20, 1863." *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXX, pt. I, pp. 615–616.

these regiments and batteries receive the same pay and bounty as all other recruits, are at once clothed and armed, accoutered, comfortably quartered and fed, and placed on the same footing with the old soldiers, and are sure, when it is merited, to win honorable distinction. They become, almost at once, useful and accomplished soldiers, and save all the inconveniences and loss of time incurred by waiting for the organization of new regiments, and are sure that their officers are brave, skillful, and deserving. Recruiting parties are established at Knoxville, Morristown, Greenville, and various other points, and all persons desirous to join the Army are requested to enlist at once.

By command of Brigadier-General R. B. Potter:

Nicolas Bowen,
Assistant Adjutant-General [118]

Other commanding officers also took matters into their own hands. Maj. Gen. David Hunter, commanding the Department of the South, found that many able-bodied men eligible for the draft had entered his department "pursuing schemes of private profit and speculation based on the necessities of the service." Hunter gave them 20 days to leave the department, after which time he proposed to draft them into those regiments from their home States serving in South Carolina. In case their State was not represented in his command, he proposed assigning them to the regiment which was numerically the weakest. [119] Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, the commander of the Department of the Gulf, sent general officers north to confer with the governors of Indiana and Ohio on ways and means to fill up the reduced regiments from those States serving in his command. [120]

Finally the President on 17 October 1863 called for 300,000 volunteers "for the various companies and regiments in the field from their respective States." [121] Reinforced by liberal Federal bounties—$402 for veterans, $302 for raw recruits—this and a subsequent call produced a steady, if inadequate and poorly distributed, stream of replacements for the remainder of the war. The older regiments consistently showed a larger percentage of increase than those of later organizations. This was due to two factors: the older regiments were largely "veteranized" in the winter of 1863–64, and thus, as will be seen, had a better chance to recruit; and, in the second place, it was the established policy of the office of The Provost Marshal General to channel replacements to the regiments enlisted in 1861.[122] The suc-

[118] *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. LII, pt. I, p. 474.

[119] Hq, Dept of the South, SO 41, 26 May 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XIV, p. 460.

[120] Hq, Dept of the Gulf, SO 309, 11 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXVI, pt. I, p. 844; Msg, Stone to Wetzel, 12 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, p. 848.

[121] Copy of call in WD GO 340, 19 Oct 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 892.

[122] Msg, Stone to Gardiner, 20 Oct 63: "The Provost-Marshal-General directs me to say that by the term 'old organizations' in his orders for raising recruits is to be understood those troops whose periods of service expire in 1864 or 1865. It is, however, the earnest desire of the Government to secure first recruits for the regiments whose time will expire in 1864; and while recruits for those whose terms expire in 1865 will be received and paid under the plan now in force, the Provost-Marshal-General desires that you do all you can to encourage the first enlistments for the first-mentioned organizations. Please call upon the State authorities, explain this, and request that they cooperate with you to this end. . . ." *Ibid.*, p. 900.

cess of the system inaugurated 17 October 1863 can be seen in the following table:

*Table 6.—Strength of Michigan Regiments: 1 Nov. 1863 and 1 Nov. 1864**

Regiment	Present and absent 1 November 1863	Present and absent 1 November 1864	Replacements during year [1]
1st Cavalry	701	1,082	251
2d Cavalry	662	910	(2)
3d Cavalry	882	1,147	613
4th Cavalry	837	1,106	572
5th Cavalry	848	969	209
6th Cavalry	905	1,097	(2)
7th Cavalry	741	906	248
8th Cavalry	772	858	(2)
9th Cavalry	897	887	(2)
1st Infantry	366	541	493
2d Infantry	503	634	576
3d Infantry	467	916	(2)
4th Infantry	438	849	(2)
5th Infantry	404	808	652
6th Infantry	599	845	643
7th Infantry	322	251	164
8th Infantry	531	536	542
9th Infantry	473	931	582
10th Infantry	659	663	190
11th Infantry	546	(3)	19
12th Infantry	510	994	693
13th Infantry	404	1,004	779
14th Infantry	648	(4)	(2)
15th Infantry	378	431	142
16th Infantry	486	554	314
17th Infantry	544	480	200
18th Infantry	758	651	240
19th Infantry	679	703	190
20th Infantry	721	496	76
21st Infantry	525	756	354
22d Infantry	481	847	378
23d Infantry	706	674	127
24th Infantry	629	510	183
25th Infantry	624	534	36
26th Infantry	699	531	97
27th Infantry	630	911	791
1st Michigan Sharp-Shooters	850	528	134

[1] Excludes reenlistments of veterans.
[2] Not furnished in source data.
[3] Mustered out 30 Sept. 1864.
[4] No returns received.

* *Source: Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Michigan, for the Year 1863* (Lansing, 1864), pp. 24–115; *op. cit., 1864* (Lansing, 1865), pp. 67–201, 204–205.

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Thus the largest numbers of recruits were assigned to the first 16 infantry regiments, which were mustered into service in 1861. In Wisconsin, the largest percentage of the recruits and almost all of the drafted men and substitutes went to the 19 regiments recruited under the call of 1861.[123]

As early as June 1862, it had been proposed, indeed ordered, that a camp of instruction be established at Annapolis, Md., with a capacity of 50,000 men of all arms under the general supervision of the venerable Maj. Gen. John E. Wool.[124] But demands for troops at the front were always so urgent that this scheme was never put into operation, and the camp at Annapolis became a depot for paroled prisoners of war arriving from Richmond.[125] In general, in spite of Congressional appropriation of large sums for "collecting, drilling, and organizing volunteers," [126] most of the Volunteer replacements as well as drafted men and substitutes were sent to their regiments with little or no training. It was the constant theme of commanding officers that men became soldiers quicker by coming in contact with the veterans than they could in a camp of instruction. Grant looked upon this method as more economical and stated that the replacements became "much more effective under tried officers and alongside disciplined men." [127] Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, wrote that ". . . recruits added to old regiments are at once under the hand of discipline, soon learn how to take care of themselves, and by mingling with their comrades who have seen service, readily learn their duties, and in a short time become almost as efficient and reliable as the old troops." [128]

On occasion, some training was provided after the recruit had joined his regiment. In April 1864, an expenditure of ammunition was authorized in the Army of the Potomac to familiarize the men with their arms, and corps commanders were directed to see that this instruction was carried out under the personal supervision of the company officers.[129] In September, the commanding officer of II Army

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[123] *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Wisconsin . . . for the Year ending December 31, 1865* (Madison, 1866), pp. 22–24. These figures contradict the assertion often made that Wisconsin had a superior system of maintaining its regiments at full strength. This legend had its origin in a statement by General Sherman in which Sherman stated that, as he remembered, the Wisconsin regiments were estimated at the equivalent of a brigade [W. T. Sherman, *Personal Memoirs* (New York, 1890), II, pp. 387–388].

[124] WD GO 59, 5 Jun 62. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 108.

[125] The first PW's were sent to Annapolis 3 weeks after the camp had been established by WD GO 72, 28 Jun 62. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. IV, p. 94.

[126] PL 19, "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending the thirtieth of June [1864] . . ." Copy in WD GO 40, 11 Feb 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 40.

[127] Msg, Grant to Stanton, 24 Dec 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. III, p. 1068.

[128] Msg, Thomas to Vincent, 25 Dec 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLV, pt. II, pp. 344–345.

[129] Hq, Army of the Potomac Cir [unnumbered], 19 Apr 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, pp. 907–908.

Corps, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, complained that so many men were detailed for special duty from his corps that there was no opportunity for drilling the large number of recruits in his 1st Division, a matter which Hancock considered of vital importance.[130] And Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, the commanding officer of V Army Corps, stated that of 4,707 men in the 1st Division, 1,247 were ignorant of the manual and 2,803 had never fired a musket; the 2d Division, 4,704 strong, contained 104 men who did not know the manual and 812 who had not fired a musket; in the 3d Division, 298 men were ignorant of the manual and the same number had never fired a musket. Some of the troops, of course, were in new regiments, but a large number were recruits in old organizations.[131]

With the inauguration of the draft in July 1863, camps were established in each State for the accommodation of the draftees and their substitutes.[132] When the time came to forward them to their regiments, details from the regiments were made and sent north to collect the men.[133] It soon developed, however, that this system was impracticable. The character of many of the draftees and a large proportion of the substitutes was such that the detail of 3 officers and 6 enlisted men from each regiment proved to be an inadequate guard. It became necessary to maintain a strong guard over these men from the time they were drafted until they reached their regiments.[134] Similar measures had also to be resorted to in the case of Volunteer recruits. The experience of Frank Wilkeson, who volunteered in the 11th New York Battery, is typical of the treatment accorded recruits from 1863 to the close of the war. Immediately upon enlisting at Albany, he was placed in the penitentiary compound with almost a thousand ruffians, most of whom he described as bounty-jumpers, surrounded by a heavy line of guards. After being confined for a month, about 600 of the men were selected to be sent forward. Many tried to hide—in the mattresses, under bunks, in the latrines, and even in the cess pits. Marched under heavy guard to the Hudson River, several tried to escape and were shot, and even after being loaded onto a river steamer a few tried to make their getaway by jumping into the icy Hudson.[135]

The opinion of the man in the ranks was abundantly shared by division, corps, and army commanders. The commanding officer of the 4th Division, V Army Corps, was "firmly convinced that not two-

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[130] Msg. Hancock to Williams, 24 Sep 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. 994.

[131] Rpt, Maj Gen G. K. Warren, 2 Nov 64 on "Operations of V Army Corps . . . October 27–28, 1864." *Ibid.*, pt. I, p. 434.

[132] WD Cir [unnumbered], 3 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 465–466.

[133] *Ibid.*

[134] Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 146.

[135] Frank Wilkeson, *Recollections of a Private Soldier in the Army of the Tennessee* (New York, 1887), pp. 1–11, quoted in Commager, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 88–91.

thirds of the conscripts and substitutes ever reach the army," and that of those who did not one-half were ever available as soldiers.[136] Brevet Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, commanding the XVII Army Corps, promised a 20-day furlough to any enlisted man who killed those "miserable wretches, bounty-jumpers," in the act of deserting.[137] Of the recruits, as opposed to drafted men, Grant estimated that 4 of every 5 deserted before they reached the Army.[138] Shortly thereafter Halleck informed him that "orders were given several days ago to send all infantry regiments and recruits in the Northern States from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to City Point by water on account of the numerous desertions."[139]

Regimental recruiting details continued active during the winter of 1863–64,[140] but a new, and generally more effective, system of forwarding the recruits to their regiments was put into operation. Instead of each regiment being held responsible for the delivery of the replacements, camps of distribution were established for each theater of operations. All recruits, drafted men, and substitutes to these camps were sent from the State rendezvous points under heavy guard, usually furnished by the Veteran Reserve Corps. From these camps the men were sent, again under guard but furnished this time by the army concerned, to the regiments to which they were assigned. Camp Distribution in Alexandria, Va., was the distributing point for replacements assigned to the Army of the Potomac.[141]

Later in the year, when the Army of the Potomac began operations against Petersburg and large-scale campaigning was going on in the Shenandoah Valley, intermediate depots were established at City Point, Va., and Harper's Ferry, W. Va.[142] Replacements arriving at City Point were temporarily under the control of the Provost Marshal General of the armies operating against Richmond. All recruits who had volunteered for a particular regiment and all drafted men and substitutes who had been assigned before reaching City Point were immediately sent to their organizations. All unassigned replacements were to be assigned to such regiments as the commanding officers of the Armies of the Potomac and the James might designate.[143]

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[136] Msg, Cutler to Lincoln, 22 Jul 64. *Official Records,* ser. I, vol. XL, pt. III, pp. 394–395.

[137] Hq, XVIII Army Corps, GO 136, 9 Nov 64. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. III, p. 580.

[138] Msg, Grant to Stanton, 10 Sep 64. *Ibid.,* ser. III, vol. IV, p. 706.

[139] Msg, Halleck to Grant, 17 Sep 64. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XLIII, pt. II, p. 96.

[140] Msg, McPherson to Grant, 22 Nov 63. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XXI, pt. III, pp. 226–227; Msg, Halleck to Grant, 14 Feb 64. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XXXII, pt. II, p. 389; Msg, Halleck to Dix (Couch, Brooks, and Heintzelman), 21 Mar 64. *Ibid.,* ser. III, vol. IV, p. 192.

[141] WD SO 20, 14 Jan 64. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XXXIII, pp. 375–376.

[142] Msg, Grant to Halleck, 22 Sep 64. *Ibid., ser.* I, vol. XLII, pt. II, p. 963; Msg, Brig Gen John D. Stevenson to Stanton, 5 Oct 64. *Ibid.,* vol. XLVIII, pt. II, p. 293.

[143] Hq, Armies of the US, SO 8, 10 Jan 64. Records of the Adjutant General. National Archives.

Troops from the Middle West destined for the Department of the Gulf or for Sherman's armies were assembled at Cairo, Ill., and then shipped by water either down the Mississippi or up the Tennessee. Replacements for the Department of the Gulf went down the Mississippi to New Orleans where a camp of distribution had been set up, and were sent to their regiments from that place. Recruits for the armies in the Military Division of the Mississippi were sent to a camp of instruction established at Nashville; roughly one-half of them were assigned to the Army of the Cumberland and one-fourth each to the Armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee. Toward the end of the war, when Sherman emerged at Goldsborough, N. C., after the successful campaigns northward from Savannah, an intermediate depot was established at Wilmington, N. C., from which replacements were sent to Sherman's corps.[144]

Although the machinery for forwarding recruits to the front had been set up by the beginning of 1864, it required considerable prodding from the commanders in the field before it began to function efficiently. Throughout the winter of 1863–64, recruiting had been left pretty much to the initiative of the regimental commanders. But it was not until the late summer and early fall of 1864 that replacements in really significant numbers began to reach the front. From August and September 1864 until the cessation of hostilities in April 1865, there is a continuous record on all operational levels from army to regiment of the steady arrival and distribution of new men. These replacements were never in sufficient quantity to raise the effective strength of the old regiments to more than a large fraction of authorized strength, but in most cases the old regiments were at least enabled to remain operational.

The case of the 2d Minnesota is illustrative of this point. At the beginning of the Atlanta campaign, 7 May 1864, this regiment numbered 451 officers and enlisted men present. Between that date and 9 September, 176 recruits were received from the depot, 65 returned from the hospital or from detached service, and 2 men returned from desertion. For the same period the regiment incurred losses amounting to 248 from all causes. Thus at the conclusion of the campaign, the 2d Minnesota had a present strength of 446 officers and men, substantially the same number as when the campaign began.[145]

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[144] Msg, Sherman to Halleck, 25 Apr 64. *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, pt. III, pp. 488–489; List showing the disposition of troops in the Dept of the Gulf, 9 Jun 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIV, pt. IV, pp. 277–278; Hq, Mil Div of the Miss., GO 10, 26 Apr 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXII, pt. III, p. 505; Sherman to Gen J. D. Webster, 10 Oct 24. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIX, pt. III, p. 175; Msg, Capt L. M. Dayton to CO, Hq, Mil Div of the Miss., 2 Apr 65. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLVII, pt. III, p. 87.

[145] Rpts, Col Judson W. Bishop, 9 Sep 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXVIII, pt. I, pp. 803–804.

Other regiments, although receiving considerable numbers of recruits, had dwindled to such an extent that the replacements outnumbered the old men. On 7 November 1864, the 76th Pennsylvania numbered 140 enlisted men for duty before the arrival of 155 recruits.[146]

There was no plan for insuring that replacements would be assigned to the regiments which were lowest in strength. Most of the recruits, and many of the drafted men and substitutes, were allowed to choose the regiment in which they preferred to serve. The result was that company and regimental commanders sometimes attempted to entice recruits, already assigned, away from the intermediate depots. General Butler reported that 300 recruits destined for the 142d New York had been tampered with at the City Point Depot.[147] At Harper's Ferry, the intermediate depot for the Army of the Shenandoah, the commanding officer reported that "certain officers of light batteries at this post have induced a portion of the German recruits of the State of Massachusetts to desert from camp for the purpose of enlisting in their batteries."[148] The alterations in strength of the 25th Massachusetts may be taken as illustrative of this system.

	Officers	*Enlisted men*
Original number in regiment	38	1,000
Gains	28	277
By civil appointment	5	0
Promotions in regiment	23	0
Recruits from depot	0	277
Losses	56	917
Killed in action	4	60
Died of wounds	3	60
Died of disease	0	70
Missing in action and prisoners of war	2	122
Resigned	27	0
Disability discharge	4	268
Discharge for promotion in regiment	0	23
Discharged for promotion in other regiments	0	38
Transferred from regiment	1	15
Mustered out at expiration of term	15	248
Desertions	0	13
Remaining in regiment, 7 Oct. 1864	10	[149] 360

These statistics point out two of the great weaknesses of the Volunteer service during the Civil War. The fact that 248 enlisted and 15 officer veterans of 3 years' service were mustered out at the conclusion of their term of enlistment illustrates the folly of permitting any

[146] Msg, Col G. Pennypacker to Capt T. E. Lord, 7 Nov 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. III, p. 554.

[147] Msg, Butler to Grant, 12 Oct 64. *Ibid.*, pt. III, p. 184.

[148] Msg, Brig Gen John D. Stevenson to Halleck, 7 Oct 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLIII, pt. II, p. 314.

[149] Rpt, Col Josiah Pickett, 16 Dec 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. I, pp. 809–810.

enlistments for a period less than the duration of the war. To offset enlisted losses aggregating 917, only 277 replacements were furnished the regiment. This is a serious indictment of the replacement system. It would have been of very little account whether it had been managed by the Federal Government or by the State if it had been successful in maintaining the regiments at something like their authorized strength. But neither Federal nor State efforts at recruiting Volunteers as replacements were conspicuously successful, and the draft laws of 1863 and 1864 were so drawn as to be ineffective for their avowed purpose of raising men. A functioning replacement system finally got into operation by the time the war was nearly over, but it never supplied enough men to overcome the manpower waste of the earlier years. Moreover, replacements were poorly distributed in a great many cases. The 3d Wisconsin received 1,177 recruits and drafted men and was mustered out at very near authorized strength—810—whereas the 24th Wisconsin received 74 replacements and numbered but 406 at muster-out.[150] Similarly, the 10th Illinois was furnished 915 recruits and was mustered out with 768 men, less than 100 below the minimum authorization; but the 74th Illinois received but 85 replacements and its strength at muster-out was 354.[151] Nevertheless, the Volunteer armies with all their shortcomings in organization and administration furnished by far the greatest element in the forces called into being during the war, and to their splendid fighting qualities was due the successful termination of the war.

Federal Experiments in Recruiting

In addition to its responsibilities for the recruiting of the Regular Army, which was conducted with something less than complete success, the War Department assumed the sole responsibility for recruiting three other categories of troops. Federal efforts in connection with the recruiting of the Veteran Volunteers, the Veteran's Reserve Corps, and the experiment with Negro troops met with a degree of success considerably higher than that attending the recruiting of the Regular Army. Moreover, these activities of the Government go far to disprove the old contention that the Administration was entirely subservient to pressure from the State capitals and tend to confirm the more reasonable view that in 1861 the incompetence of Secretary Cameron led to State control of Volunteer recruiting. It must be remembered that the relatively successful replacement system of 1864–65 was the result of direct War Department control.

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[150] *Wisconsin AG Report, 1865, op. cit.*, pp. 22–23, 108, 373.

[151] *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois, 1861–1862* (Springfield, 1863), pp. 54–56; *Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois, 1861–1865* (Rev. ed., Springfield, 1886), I, pp. 145–147, 152–154.

The Veteran Volunteers

As early as the fall of 1862, certain of the governors proposed that regiments which had been badly depleted during the summer campaigns be returned to their home States for rest and recruitment. Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania was especially insistent that the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, consisting of 13 regiments of infantry and 1 regiment each of cavalry and artillery, be returned to the State for this purpose. This request was refused by General in Chief Halleck, who disapproved withdrawing regiments in the field; he thought that the replacements should be sent to the regiments rather than the other way around.[152] This was later used to support the Governor's contention that the failure to recruit the old regiments up to strength was the fault of the Federal Government.[153] But, as Halleck stated, applications of this nature were so numerous that if granted they "would so reduce the armies in the field as not only to prevent any further operations for 3 or 4 months, but to endanger important positions held by us." [154]

The realization in the spring of 1863 that the war would very likely continue at least through the campaigning season of the next year caused the War Department to take stock of the situation. It was found that of 956 Volunteer regiments, 7 independent battalions, 61 independent companies, and 158 batteries of artillery then in service, the terms of 455 regiments, 3 battalions, 38 companies, and 81 batteries would expire before 31 December 1864. In other words, almost half the existing Army was due to be mustered out during the course of 1864.[155]

The first tentative step in the direction of inducing these thousands of veterans to remain with the Colors was taken in General Orders No. 85 of 2 April 1863,[156] which, although directed primarily at the 30 New York 2-year regiments due to be mustered out during the summer, became a basis for future action in connection with the 3-year Volunteers. This order simply provided that any soldier then in service would be granted a 30-day furlough upon reenlistment. A more comprehensive plan for reenlistment was published in General Orders No. 111 of 1 May, which, in addition to placing all Volunteer recruiting under the direction of The Provost Marshal General, stipulated the conditions under which regiments might be reenlisted en masse for a 3-year term. The regimental officers were given the chief

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[152] Curtin pointed out that this corps which had left the State in July 61 with 15,760 men did not muster 4,000 after Antietam. Ltr, Curtin to Lincoln w/ind by Halleck, 30 Sep 62. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, pp. 624–625.

[153] Msg, Russell to Williams, 18 Nov 62. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXI, pp. 771–772.

[154] 1st Ind by Halleck on ltr, Vincent to Burnside, 16 Jan 63. *Ibid.*, p. 974.

[155] "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 57.

[156] WD GO 85, 2 Apr 63. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 112.

responsibility in this plan, since it provided that officers who succeeded in reenlisting their regiments within 30-days of the date of discharge should retain their commissions.[157]

The Provost Marshal General in June and July authorized the governors to raise a total of 51 regiments for 3 years with the suggestion that this quota might be filled either by organizing new regiments or by reorganizing old ones.[158] General Orders No. 191 of 25 June 1863 made the inducements more attractive by adding a federal bounty and premium amounting to $402 to veterans who would reenlist, and at the same time angled for the support of the governors by crediting these veteran reenlistments on the quotas of the respective States.[159] The basis for veteran enlistment was further broadened in July when the War Department defined a "veteran" as an able-bodied man between 18 and 45 who had been honorably discharged from the service of the United States after not less than 9 months' active duty.[160] In September, a deadline for veteran reenlistments was set at 1 December 1863.[161] The final step was taken in General Orders No. 376 of 21 November. In addition to granting furloughs to individual reenlistees, paragraph V of this order provided that whenever three-fourths of a regiment or company should reenlist, they should be furloughed home in a body for at least 30 days to reorganize and recruit. This order applied to all organizations which had less than a year of their original term yet to serve. Individuals who did not choose to "veteranize" were to be assigned to other units during the absence of the unit.[162] On 1 December, the deadline was advanced to 5 January 1864, and by subsequent congressional and departmental action it was extended to 1 March and finally to 31 March.[163]

Serious action under these orders hardly commenced before the middle of December. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, reported on 12 December 1863 that his subordinate commanders estimated that more than half of the 77 regiments in that army whose terms expired before 1 September 1864 would remain for another 3 years if granted their 30-day furlough. This would amount to some 15,000 men, and Meade was not sure he could afford to let them go all at once.[164] The problem proved troublesome to other commanders, but each was permitted to work it out in his own way.

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[157] WD GO 111, 1 May 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 179–180.

[158] Msg. Fry to governors of N. Y., Pa., Maine, Mass., Conn., N. J., Vt., N. H., R. I., and Wisc., 29 Jun–10 Aug 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 424–425.

[159] WD GO 191, 25 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 414–416.

[160] WD GO 216, 14 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 486–487.

[161] WD GO 324, 28 Sep 63. *Ibid.*, p. 844.

[162] WD GO 376, 21 Nov 63. *Ibid.*, p. 1084.

[163] WD GO 387, 1 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, p. 1106. By joint resolution of Congress, approved 13 Jan 64, the high Federal bounties were continued until 1 Mar. See WD GO 20, 14 Jan. 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 30 and WD Cir 25, 18 Mar 64. *Ibid.*, pp. 188–190.

[164] Msg. Meade to Halleck, 12 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXIX, pt. II, pp. 556–558.

In the Department of the Ohio, 1 regiment from each brigade was permitted to be absent,[165] while, in the Department of the Gulf, only 2 regiments per army corps were allowed to be absent at any time.[166]

The War Department greatly facilitated the reenlistment of entire regiments and batteries by a liberal definition of what three-fourths of an organization should mean. This was understood to mean three-fourths of the men actually present within the limits of that army in which the organization was serving. Such a ruling was necessary, for in the vast majority of cases the number actually present did not exceed one-third to one-half those borne on the regimental rolls.[167]

By the end of the year, reports from every theater indicated that a very considerable percentage of the veterans would reenlist. The report of Brig. Gen. G. M. Dodge, commanding the left wing of the XVI Army Corps, is typical of many such:

> . . . All my old regiments have reenlisted and are going home. I have not got more than three regiments but what will reenlist three-fourths or more of their veterans. It runs through the command like wildfire. The Ohio brigade are all in and will go in a body. The Second Iowa have already gone.
>
> * * * * * * *
>
> My force for 60 days will be very small.[168]

Up to 2 January, more than 16,000 veterans in the Army of the Potomac had "veteranized," a figure in excess of the original estimates.[169] Congressional action in extending the period during which the bounty of $402 would be paid further stimulated reenlistments at a time when it was feared that few more veterans would be forthcoming without such an inducement. Through the 26th of January, some 20,000 veterans in the Army of the Cumberland had reenlisted, with some divisional reports still incomplete.[170]

Intense activity prevailed throughout the first quarter of 1864, and there was some danger that the slow return of the veteran regiments from furlough would interfere or disrupt the carefully laid plans for the spring campaigns. But although some regiments were taking belated furloughs as late as August, there is no indication that the operations of the summer were at all inconvenienced by their absence.[171] A final computation of the War Department showed that while 313 regiments, 16 independent companies, and 55 batteries, containing in all 51,174 men, had been mustered out of the service be-

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[165] Hq, Dept of the Ohio, SO 4, 4 Jan 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXII, pt. II, p. 26.

[166] Msg, Brig Gen Stone to Maj Gen W. B. Franklin, 23 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I vol. XXVI, pt. I, p. 873.

[167] WD Circ [unnumbered], 21 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 1179.

[168] Msg, Dodge to Hurlbut, 25 Dec 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXI, pt. III, p. 491.

[169] Msg, Meade to Halleck, 5 Jan 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, p. 347.

[170] Rpt, Thomas to Vincent, 28 Jan 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXII, pt. II, pp. 247–248.

[171] The 61st and 62d Illinois left the Dept of Arkansas for home in August. See msg, Steele to Canby, 14 Aug. 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLI, pt. II, pp. 702–703. Veteran furloughs for the 13th and 15th Maine and 90th N. Y. were not authorized until 4 Aug. See msg, Hunter to Halleck, 3 Aug 64, w/ind by Halleck, 4 Aug. 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, pt. II, p. 584.

tween 1 November 1863 and 31 October 1864, a total of 136,300 veteran Volunteers had been furloughed and returned to the field in the same period.[172]

The return of the veteran regiments to their homes on furlough also was instrumental in stimulating recruiting. Many regiments were relatively successful in filling their ranks during the month which they spent in the North. For example, the 10th New York Cavalry recruited 250 men during its absence from the Army of the Potomac.[173] Through 31 March, 33 regiments of infantry, 5 of cavalry, and 10 batteries of artillery returning from veteran furlough to the Army of the Cumberland brought with them a total of 5,429 recruits. If the 10 batteries of artillery are considered as a regiment, this would be an average of 139 recruits per regiment, a not inconsiderable addition to the strength of the army.[174]

A later experiment to tap the reserve of trained manpower which had been lost to the service was not attended by the success incident to the reenlistment of the veteran regiments. In October 1864, Secretary Stanton broached a plan to Grant for the recruitment of a corps to consist entirely of veterans who should have at least 2 years' prior service. These veterans were to be induced into volunteering by a $500 bounty and permission to keep their arms when mustered out. Grant gave his unqualified approval to Stanton's plan and felt that it would prove successful in its aims.[175] The plan was promulgated as General Orders No. 287 of 28 November 1864. The veteran corps was designated I Army Corps, and Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, one of the most distinguished corps commanders in the Army of the Potomac, was assigned to the command.[176] Recruiting for this corps was entirely in the hands of the War Department. Although the States might receive credit for recruits raised for it, the recruiting center was established in Washington, and anyone who wished to volunteer for I Army Corps was obliged to go to the capital city for that purpose, with transportation furnished at government expense. If accepted, the recruit was sent to Camp Cliffburne in the vicinity of Washington where the corps was in the process of organization.[177] In spite of considerable publicity and the outstanding reputation of its commanding officer, recruiting for I Army Corps lagged, and at the cessation of hostilities only five regiments had been recruited for it.[178]

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[172] "Exhibit of recruits. . . ," *op. cit.* *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 813.

[173] "Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac," 1–31 Mar 64. *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, pp. 778–786.

[174] Rpts, Maj Gen Geo. H. Thomas, 5 Apr 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXII, pt. I, p. 16.

[175] Msg, Stanton to Grant, 25 Oct 64; Msg, Grant to Stanton, 25 Oct 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. III, p. 337.

[176] WD GO 287, 28 Nov 64. *Ibid.*, p. 728.

[177] Hq, I Army Corps, Cir 2, 3 Dec 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 970–971.

[178] Msg, Halleck to Grant, 12 Apr 65. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLVIII, pt. II, p. 76.

The Federal Government proved relatively successful in its attempt to retain a large portion of the veterans who were due to be mustered out in 1864. About 72 percent of these veterans reenlisted for another 3-year term. On the other hand, because of the restrictions imposed by the War Department and the fact that the war was obviously nearing its close, the efforts to induce trained men to return to the colors was not marked by a conspicuous degree of success.

The Veteran Reserve Corps

The extremely high rate of discharge for disability that characterized the first 2 years of the war eventually led the War Department to adopt measures that would retain in service men who, although not fit for active service in the field, would be able to perform garrison and other light duty and so release for active operations an equivalent number of able-bodied soldiers. With this object, General Orders No. 105 of 28 April 1863 was issued establishing an Invalid Corps.[179] Since a certain stigma was attached to the term "Invalid," the corps was redesignated the Veteran Reserve Corps in March 1864.[180] The corps was to be recruited by the officers of the Provost Marshal General's Bureau, and it was provided with a distinctive uniform.[181] All officers and men who had been discharged from the service for disability were invited to enlist, and provision was made for those in convalescent hospitals and camps to be transferred to the Invalid Corps.[182] Organization was based on that of an infantry company at minimum strength, and the personnel was divided into two categories based upon degree of physical fitness. Those capable of light-armed duty were formed into a 1st Battalion, those capable of less activity into a 2d Battalion. A third group set up initially was soon merged with the second group.[183]

Recruiting for the Invalid Corps proceeded slowly at first. Before the end of the summer, however, references in the letters of The Provost Marshal General, especially in connection with the draft disturbances, became numerous. In many instances, the only troops the end of the summer, however, references in the letters of The Invalid Corps.[184] In October, the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel were authorized in the corps,[185] and organization into 16 regi-

[179] WD GO 105, 28 Apr 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 170–172.
[180] WD GO 111, 18 Mar 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 188.
[181] WD Cir 13, 25 May 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 221–222; WD GO 158, 29 May 63, *Ibid.*, p. 239.
[182] WD Cir 8, 22 May 63. *Ibid.*, p. 217; WD GO 173, 11 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 336–338.
[183] WD Cir 14, 26 May 63. Ibid., pp. 225–227.
[184] Msg, Fry to Bomford, 14 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 491; Msg, Diven to Fry, 15 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 496–497; msg, Townsend to Fry, 16 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 516; msg, Whipple to Fry, 23 Jul 63. *Ibid.*, p. 562.
[185] WD GO 348, 26 Oct 63. *Ibid.*, p. 924.

ments was authorized. On 31 October, the Corps numbered 491 officers and 17,764 enlisted men.[186]

The Veteran Reserve Corps, as it became early in 1864, proved to be a sound investment. In addition to small garrisons in areas where the draft was unpopular, regiments, companies, and detachments were employed as guards at important depots, at prisoner-of-war camps, and even as garrisons for important rear area installations.[187] The strength of the Corps steadily increased until the end of the war. On 1 October 1864, it consisted of 764 officers and 29,502 enlisted men organized into 24 regiments and 155 unassigned companies.[188] This strength had risen to 762 officers and 29,852 enlisted men on 31 May 1865, and more than 60,000 men had passed through the Corps' ranks during the short period of its existence.[189] This was almost as great as the number of men recruited by the Regular Army during the entire war.

From every aspect, the Veteran Reserve Corps represented one of the most successful Federal recruiting efforts. Provost Marshal General Fry stated: "During its entire existence, the corps was in the performance of duties which would otherwise have been necessarily performed by as great a number of able-bodied troops detached from the armies in the field . . . " [190] As an economic measure, it was no less beneficial. These partially disabled soldiers, performing full-time light duty, received no Federal bounty whatever.

Negro Troops

The recruiting and organization of Negro regiments as a national policy dated only from the publication of the Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January 1863, in which the President declared that "such persons [former slaves] of suitable condition, will be received into the armed forces of the United States." [191] However, earlier steps had been taken on the initiative of department commanders, notably on the North Carolina coast and in the Department of the Gulf, where as early as September 1862 General Butler had organized a regiment of free Negroes "the darkest of whom will be about the complexion of the late Mr. [Daniel] Webster." [192] In May 1863, a bureau was estab-

[186] Rpt, Rush to Fry, 6 Nov 63. *Ibid.*, pp. 999–1002.

[187] Two companies of the VRC were on duty in the defenses of New Orleans, and the 10th Regt VRC was assigned to the 3d Sep Brig, VIII Army Corps. Msg, Maj. Gen. J. J. Reynolds to Brig. Gen. Wm. Dwight, 22 Apr 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIV, pt. III, p. 254; Field Rpt of the 3d Sep Brig, VIII Army Corps for 13 Jul 64. *Ibid.*, vol XXXVII, pt. II, p. 298.

[188] Msg, Fry to Stanton, 15 Nov 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 933.

[189] "Fry's Report," I, pp. 92–93.

[190] *Ibid.*

[191] Msg, Capt J. W. DeForest to Fry, 30 Nov 65. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. V, pp. 555–556.

[192] The Emancipation Proclamation was published for the information of those concerned in Hq, Dept of the Gulf, GO 12, 29 Jan 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XV, p. 668.

lished in the Adjutant General's Office for the administration of all matters pertaining to the organization of Negro troops, and no such organizations might be raised without the express sanction of the War Department. All applications for commissions in regiments raised or to be raised had likewise to receive the approval of the Department.[193]

Throughout the remainder of the war, the problem of the Negro in uniform became something of a political football. Many of the Regular officers were opposed to the idea, much preferring to use the liberated slaves as labor in the construction of fortifications, as teamsters, and as casual labor in the quartermaster's department.[194] Under the aegis of the War Department, the governors of several Northern States were authorized to raise regiments of Negro troops, but recruiting was hampered by the fact that until July 1864 colored soldiers were regarded as so much inferior to white troops that they were not allowed equal pay and bounty. A decision of the Attorney General at that time enabled the Secretary of War to equalize matters in this respect.[195]

But the vast majority of the Negro regiments were raised in the liberated areas of the Mississippi Valley. The recruiting of the Negro population, begun by General Butler at New Orleans, was continued by his successor, Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, who, like Butler, was first a politician and then a soldier. Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, The Adjutant General, was detailed in the summer of 1863 to organize the Negroes in the Mississippi Valley,[196] and until the end of hostilities, he remained actively at work. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that much of the enthusiasm shown in the North for the work so conscientiously performed by General Thomas stemmed from the hope that his success would obviate the necessity for all-out conscription in the loyal States, rather than from the often expressed concern for the welfare of the former slave. When Congress authorized the governors to send recruiting agents into the States declared to be in rebellion, with all recruits so obtained to be credited against their draft quotas, there was a mad scramble to be first in the field. The results, how-

[193] WD GO 143, 22 May 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 215–216.

[194] This attitude is pretty well summed up by Brig Gen Lorenzo Thomas, TAG, himself a determined partisan of the Negro:

> . . . I suggested that the negroes who came within his lines [Maj Gen Canby's] should be assigned to regiments already organized to bring them up to the maximum standard. The general, however, desires them for laborers in the several departments, and he will use them in this manner. This is the view taken by most commanders, but it is not my own. I think they should be organized as troops and details made from them in proper proportion to do the necessary work of our armies. . . .

See Msg, Thomas to Stanton, 8 Apr 65. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLIX, pt. II, p. 276.

[195] Att Gen Edwin Bates to the Pres, 14 Jul 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 490–493.

[196] Msg, Lincoln to Grant, 9 Aug. 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXIV, pt. III, p. 584. The President's intentions are expressed thus: ". . . I believe it is a resource which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works doubly—weakening the enemy and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now I think at least 100,000 can and ought to be organized along its shores, relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. . . ."

ever, were insignificant. A total of 1,045 State agents recruited 2,831 men between 1 November 1863 and the same date in 1864.[197]

By Orders No. 16, issued by General Thomas at New Orleans on 4 April 1864,[198] and Orders No. 17, issued at Natchez, Miss., on the 26th,[199] a permanent designation as U. S. Colored Troops was established for all units composed of Negroes. By the end of the war, 79,638 Negroes had enlisted to the credit of the loyal States, and 99,337 had been recruited under the direct authority of the Federal Government.[200] They were organized in 120 regiments of infantry, 12 regiments of heavy artillery, 10 batteries of light artillery, and 7 regiments of cavalry.[201] Four regiments of colored infantry and two of cavalry, recruited from these Negro volunteers, were incorporated into the Regular Army in 1866.[202]

The Negro regiments in the Mississippi Valley performed, to a great extent, the functions assigned to the Veteran Reserve Corps in the Northern States. By October 1864, 11 regiments were working on the fortifications of Nashville and Chattanooga and guarding the important railroad communications from Nashville all the way to Dalton, Ga.[203] An inspection of the composition of the forces serving largely in occupation capacities shows very clearly the important contributions made by the Negro regiments. In late 1864 and the early months of 1865, it was necessary to concentrate as many as possible of the veteran white regiments for the campaigns which it was hoped would finally crush the rebellion. The fact that the garrisons of the river towns were, during these final months, largely composed of Negro troops enabled the white troops to finish the war. Of 47 regiments serving on the Mississippi in 1865, more than half, or 27, were Negro, and the proportion in the ranks was enhanced further in that, while the 20 white regiments were for the most part considerably below strength, the Negro regiments were at or near authorized strength in the majority of cases.[204]

The organization of Negro military units was a logical outcome of the Emancipation Proclamation, and of the growing strength of opinion in the North that the Negro should be given an opportunity to prove his right to freedom. Although the freedman had to face obstacles of prejudice on the one hand and exploitation on the other,

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[197] This method of recruiting was authorized by Sec. 3, PL 196, approved 4 Jul 64. Published for the information of the Army in WD GO 224, 6 Jul 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 472–474.

[198] Copy of order in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 214–215.

[199] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

[200] "Abstract from official records showing the forces called for . . ." *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 1270.

[201] Msg, C. W. Foster to E. D. Townsend, 20 Oct 65. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. V, pp. 137–140.

[202] Msg, Stanton to Lincoln, 14 Nov 66. *Ibid.*, p. 1033.

[203] Ssg, Col R. D. Mussey to Foster 10 Oct 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 762–774.

[204] "List of regiments serving on the Mississippi River, 1865." *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLVIII, pt. I, pp. 1108–1110.

he yet managed to make a significant contribution to the war effort. The enlistment of almost 180,000 Negroes freed for actual combat duty the depleted Volunteer regiments from the loyal States, which were unwilling to accept the conscription that would have made the utilization of the Negro in a military capacity unnecessary.

The Militia

During the Rebellion, a total of 304,410 soldiers were mustered into the service for terms of less than 12 months, including the 9 months' Militia already discussed.[205] Apart from the 91,816 3 months' men who answered the President's call in April 1861 for troops to restore the authority of the United States, these more than 200,000 short-term men must be considered in the nature of replacements. In most instances, they were summoned to the Colors at some time of great crisis, when the Volunteer forces proved inadequate to the double task of making headway against the enemy and garrisoning their own line of communications and rear area installations. It is scarcely necessary to state that the role of the Militia was a comparatively insignificant one, and that its chief contribution was taking over certain routine duties from the regularly constituted forces during the season of active operations.

The decision of the Government to rely on Volunteer units for the prosecution of the war permanently disrupted the old Militia organization in those few States which still maintained it. As a result, the repeated calls of the President for Militia units to tide over a dangerous period were answered most inadequately. Thus, when 100,000 Militia were summoned on 15 June 1863 for 6 months' service to meet the threat which culminated at Gettysburg, a total of 16,361 actually responded.[206] Some States, in spite of the drain upon their manpower imposed by the war, reorganized their Militia system in such a manner as to make them truly effective. A notable case was that of Ohio, which reorganized its Militia as the Ohio National Guard on 31 March 1864.[207] This step was followed up by Adjutant General Cowan of Ohio with such efficiency that Ohio was able within the space of 12 days to assemble, organize, and arm a total of 36,254 Militiamen who were called out to meet the crisis in manpower in the spring of 1864. The 41 regiments so raised were sent to man the defenses of Washington and the line of the vital Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Some of them even served with the Army of the Potomac and suffered heavy casualties.[208]

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[205] "Abstract from official records showing the forces called for . . ." *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 1264–1270.

[206] *Ibid.*; Proclamation of the President, 15 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 360–361.

[207] *Annual Report of the Adjutant* and *Inspector General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the year ending December 31, 1863* (Columbus, 1864), pp. 13–14.

[208] "Fry's Report," pt. I, p. 54.

This was the single outstanding contribution of the Militia to the war. In general, the objections to the use of short-term troops so far outweighed any advantage to be derived from their use that commanders agreed to their acceptance only with reluctance. When Gov. R. E. Fenton of New York in February 1865 offered to raise 5 or 10 regiments of 100-day Militia to be applied on his State's draft quota, Grant wrote: "I do not think favorably of Governor Fenton's proposition. The value of 100-days' men is more than absorbed in getting them to where they are wanted and in transferring men relieved by them to where they will be needed, and again in relieving them when their time expires." [209]

Replacement Resources Within the Army

Exchanged Troops

Throughout the war, an important source for maintaining the strength of the armies was the return to the ranks of exchanged troops. The conclusion in July 1862 of the Dix-Hill Cartel regulating the conduct of the belligerents with regard to prisoners of war stipulated that all troops captured by either side were subject to exchange.[210] In June 1862, parole camps were set up at Annapolis, Md., Camp Chase near Columbus, Ohio, and Jefferson Barracks, Mo.[211] In these camps were to be assembled the troops returned on parole until such time as they would be regularly exchanged. From time to time declarations of exchange were made, whereupon the commanding officers of the parole camps were directed to forward to their regiments in the field the prisoners released from parole by the exchange. All matters pertaining to the control and disposition of paroled prisoners were directed by Col. (later Brevet Brig. Gen.) William Hoffman, the Commissary General of Prisoners. In addition, military commanders exercising independent command were authorized by the Dix-Hill Cartel to exchange prisoners by direct negotiation with the opposing commander.

It is difficult to determine with any accuracy the number of exchanged prisoners who actually returned to the ranks. In some cases the regiments to which these men belonged had been mustered out of service by the time their release was effected. Desertion was the source of considerable loss. The Provost Marshal General of the Army of the Potomac complained of the haphazard manner in which exchanged troops were returned to that army. In one instance, lists containing more than 1,000 names were forwarded but less than 100 of the men could be found. On another occasion, out of a detachment

[209] Ltr, Grant to Stanton, 26 Feb 65. *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XLVI, pt. II, p. 705.
[210] WD GO 142, 25 Sep 62. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. IV, p. 555.
[211] WD GO 72, 28 Jun 62. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

of 480 men that left the parole camp at Annapolis, 50 were lost by the time it reached Washington and another 50 disappeared between Washington and army headquarters on Aquia Creek.[212]

By 26 November 1863, a total of 86,032 enlisted men and 2,536 officers had been declared exchanged,[213] by the end of the war, 134,968 enlisted men and 5,758 officers—an aggregate of 140,726.[214]

Recovered Sick and Wounded

The number of sick and wounded men who found their way into the hospitals during the Civil War was staggering by 20th century standards. At a time when the war was little more than a year old, Brig. Gen. William A. Hammond, The Surgeon General, reported that 28,383 sick and wounded men were patients in 13 army general hospitals.[215] Commanding officers were never entirely satisfied that all possible measures were taken to return these men to their commands at the earliest possible moment. But many of their complaints seem to have been exaggerated. Convalescent camps were established at an early date in all major commands, through which the recovered sick and wounded were forwarded to their regiments. The reports of the medical directors of the various armies show that by far the larger number of those who were wounded or became sick were returned to duty. Otherwise, from the very magnitude of the sick lists, it would have been impossible for the armies to keep the field.

Brevet Maj. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, who was chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac from September 1862 until the end of the Civil War, told a congressional committee in 1873 that failure to establish regimental depots to receive recruits was a major weakness of the northern armies.

He declared that the general hospitals and camps of distribution were overrun with men, many of them able-bodied and desirous of returning to their regiments, but that administrative difficulties in making assignments caused the regiments to go into battle understrength. General Hunt said:

> . . . our Medical Department performed its special duties in such a manner as to win the applause of all. . . . If the sole object of hospitals and a medical department is to care for and cure sick and wounded men, then a great, perhaps unparalleled, success was obtained. If, however, the object was to cure *and return them to their colors*, then there was a stupenduous failure, and through no fault of the Medical Department. . . . The cause of these failures is . . . substituting for a through regimental administration that of a number of specialties, without any immediate common head, and trusting to their spontaneous joint action.

[212] Msg, Brig. Gen. M. R. Patrick to Col Wm. Hoffman, 7 Jan 63. *Ibid.*, ser, II, vol. V, pp. 160–161.

[213] Msg, Hoffman to Hitchcock, 30 Nov 63. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. VI, p. 619.

[214] "Consolidated Report of exchange and paroled prisoners of war during secession rebellion," 6 Dec 65. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. VIII, pp. 830–831.

[215] Rpt, Brig. Gen. Wm. A. Hammond, SG, 15 Aug 62. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 389.

> Had our regiments been properly constituted, each with its skeleton battalion, at a fixed depot to receive and utilize all officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the regiments unfit for the field, but fit for garrison service and for training recruits; had all recruits, sick and wounded men, exchanged or paroled prisoners, &c., of the regiment, been sent at once to its depot, and thus kept at the disposal of the colonel, under its own officers, these depots, many of which might have been established at the same place, would have obviated the necessity of "general hospitals," "camps of distribution," &c., . . . Nor would it have been necessary to raise new regiments in order to replace old ones mustered out; a constant stream of recruits or drafted men would have kept up at least one or two of the battalions of each, and thus secured the benefit of regimental organization and esprit de corps, a feeling more or less wasted on the army corps to which these temporary regiments might happen, for the hour, to be attached.[216]

The Use of Other Arms as Infantry

The possibility of converting cavalrymen and artillerymen into infantrymen was first considered late in 1861. The extreme popularity of the cavalry arm in particular had resulted in the recruitment of some 80 regiments under the call for 500,000 men, which was more than could be conveniently equipped and mounted. Letters were sent to the governors of all the loyal States requesting their opinion as to the desirability of converting some of these regiments to infantry.[217] The scheme was viewed coldly by the State executives. In January 1862, General McClellan suggested that the number of cavalry regiments be reduced to 50 and that the surplus be converted to infantry.[218] The influx of new Volunteers under the calls of 1862 made it unnecessary for the remainder of that year to resort to such improvisations to strengthen the infantry arm, but the severe losses of the winter campaigns of 1862 and the campaigns of 1863 revived the problem in more acute form. In February 1864, Colonel Fry suggested that some of the regiments of heavy artillery be sent into the field as infantry,[219] and in March authority was given to commanding generals of armies and military departments to transfer to the infantry any cavalryman who was found to be neglecting the care of his horse.[220]

General Orders No. 174 of 22 April 1864 provided that cavalry organizations for which horses could not be found would be armed and employed as infantry, either as depot and railroad guards or with infantry brigades in the field. Under ordinary circumstances the proportion of dismounted cavalry was not to exceed 40 percent of that assigned to any one command "unless it be found that the remaining 60 percent cannot be kept efficiently mounted."[221] The employment of dismounted cavalry as infantry in the Army of the Potomac con-

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[216] H. R. Rpt 74, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., 2 Feb 73, "Army Staff Organization," p. 286.
[217] Ltr, Thomas to the loyal governors, 3 Dec 61. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. I, p. 724.
[218] Msg, McClellan to Stanton, 29 Jan 62. *Ibid.*, p. 873.
[219] Msg, Fry to Halleck, 29 Feb 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, p. 145.
[220] WD GO 119, 24 Mar 64. *Ibid.*, pp. 198–199.
[221] WD GO 174, 22 Apr 64. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

tinued well toward the end of 1864 when an effort was made to remount them.

The decision to utilize dismounted cavalry regiments and the heavy artillery was born of necessity, but it resulted in one of the most successful improvisations adopted during the war. This was particularly true in the case of the heavy artillery regiments, each of which was authorized a minimum strength of 1,740 officers and enlisted men. Since there seemed little likelihood at the time of their organization that they would be used for anything but garrison duty, they became quite popular, and in the spring of 1864 most of them were at or very close to full strength.[222]

From 1 May to 15 June, 55,178 reinforcements were forwarded through Washington to the Army of the Potomac. Ten regiments of heavy artillery furnished 16,095 of these, and an additional 2,314 consisted of 3 regiments of dismounted cavalry. Thus one-third of the replacements to offset the severe losses of the Wilderness were found within the Army itself.[223]

Utilization of Prisoners of War and Deserters

The first attempts to recruit among the prisoners of war came early in 1862 and were discouraged by the War Department.[224] Requests were made from time to time for permission to enlist prisoners both in the Regular Army and in the Volunteer regiments raised during that year, and in spite of a direct prohibition hundreds were recruited for the 23d and 65th Illinois Infantry.[225]

The policy of the War Department on this issue was perhaps more vacillating than on any other. After having refused permission to several ambitious colonels to fill up their ranks in this manner, Secretary Stanton authorized the United States Marshal in New York City to determine how many of the prisoners of war confined in New York Harbor would be willing to enter the military service of the Union.[226] By the beginning of 1863, the policy had changed again, and Col. Christian Thielemann was refused permission to fill up his 16th Illinois Cavalry from among the prisoners of war held at Camp Douglas near Chicago.[227] But, on 28 May, Stanton once again permitted recruiting of rebels into the Army, and the 1st Connecticut was credited with enlisting 82 prisoners from those confined in Fort

[222] For organization of the artillery regiment see WD GO 110, 29 Apr 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, pp. 175–176.

[223] Msg, Halleck to Grant, 15 Jun 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XL, pt. II, pp. 47–48.

[224] Lt. Col. George G. Lewis, "History of Prisoner of War Utilization in the U. S. Army" (Special Studies Series, OCMH), ch. V.

[225] Msg, Mayer to TAG, 24 Feb 62. *Official Records*, ser. II, vol. III, p. 318; Msg, Hoffman to Thomas, 11 Oct 62. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. IV, pp. 615–616.

[226] Msg, Stanton to Robert Murray, 10 Jul 62. *Ibid.*, pp. 162–163.

[227] Msg, Hoffman to Thielemann, 25 Feb 63. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. V, p. 297.

Delaware while 581 from the same camp were recruited for the 3d Maryland Cavalry.[228] On 20 June, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, commanding the Department of the Ohio, was authorized by the Secretary to accept prisoners of war as recruits if he was satisfied that they acted in good faith.[229] Similar discretion was granted on the 23d of June to Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commanding the Department of the Missouri.[230] These concessions were short-lived, however, for on 26 August the Secretary notified all department commanders that hereafter no prisoners of war would be enlisted without War Department sanction in each case.[231]

It is impossible to determine how many Confederate prisoners found their way into the Union Army in this fashion. No doubt individual regiments were not adverse to enlisting deserters and prisoners of war whenever the chance offered, for in December 1864 General Grant requested authority to transfer these men at his discretion. "Every day," he wrote, "I receive letters from rebel deserters, who, in the absence of employment, have enlisted and now find themselves confronting their old regiments or acquaintances." [232]

In addition to these enlistments in individual regiments, six regiments composed entirely of prisoners of war were raised for service on the Indian frontier. Since these soldiers, if recaptured by the Confederates, could expect but short shrift as deserters, it was thought best to send them for service in the West where they could release an equal number of troops for service at the front. Three regiments were raised by General Butler from among the prisoners of war confined at Point Lookout, Md. They proved so successful that three additional regiments were recruited at Alton, Ill., and at Camp Douglas for service on the western plains.

It is difficult to determine the exact number of prisoners of war and deserters who enlisted in the armies of the United States. Probably the number may be set at less than 10,000,[233] but it did represent the results of an intelligent approach by the War Department to the possibility of releasing Volunteers serving on the frontier by employing Confederate manpower in their stead.

Replacement of Officers

There is little evidence to indicate that any provision was made at the beginning of the Rebellion to replace officers who might become casualties or who might be dismissed for inefficiency or other cause.

[228] Msg, Fry to Stanton, 27 Feb 65. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 1203–1204.
[229] Msg, Hoffman to Burnside, 20 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, ser. II, vol. V, p. 31.
[230] Msg, Hoffman to Schofield, 23 Jun 63. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. III, p. 411.
[231] Msg, Hoffman to Rosecrans (Dix, Morris, and Schofield), 26 Aug 63, *Ibid.*, p. 722.
[232] Msg, Grant to Halleck, 7 Dec 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XLII, pt. III, p. 842.
[233] See Lewis, *op. cit.*

Paragraph II of General Orders No. 47 of 25 July 1861 provided that all Volunteer officers should be subject to examination by a War Department board as to their fitness, and that vacancies created by the action of this board should be filled by the appointment of persons passing the examination.[234] But the outcome seems to have been that some governors appointed unfit officers and relied on the War Department to get rid of them.[235]

A circular issued on 29 September by the new General in Chief Henry W. Halleck, decried the lack of officers among the Volunteer regiments. The governors of the several States were urged to fill existing vacancies at the earliest possible moment. Halleck also requested that these vacancies be filled by "promoting officers and non-commissioned officers and privates who have distinguished themselves in the field, or who have shown a capacity for military command." [236] These recommendations seem to have been ignored. General McClellan wrote that one of the most glaring defects in the crisis was the absence of a system for the appointment and promotion of officers,[237] and a year later General Meade was still complaining of the quality of the Volunteer officers. Meade submitted a plan to the War Department under which all persons nominated for promotion or appointment should appear before boards convened by the division concerned, and the several governors were to be advised as to the fitness of the candidates so examined. This proposal was approved by The Adjutant General's Office and by the General in Chief, but disapproved by Secretary Stanton on the grounds that before any action could be taken, the views of the governor should be obtained.[238]

As the war progressed, however, the governors became more acutely aware of the necessity of appointing and promoting men capable of exercising command. Shortly after the occupation of Atlanta, Sherman wrote that "we have good corporals and sergeants, and some good lieutenants and captains, and these are far more important than good generals." [239] The system which seems generally to have been adopted was the promotion of deserving enlisted men to fill vacancies. During the original 3-year term of the 25th Massachusetts Infantry, 5 officers were added to the regiment by civil appointment, but there were 23 promotions to commissioned rank from within the

[234] WD GO 47, 25 Jul 61.

[235] For the history of mobilization during the Civil War see: Kreidberg and Henry, *op. cit.*, ch. IV.

[236] WD Cir [unnumbered], 29 Sep 62. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. II, p. 594.

[237] Rpt, Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan to Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, 4 Aug 63. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XIX, pt. I, pp. 89–90.

[238] Msg, Meade to TAG, 11 Sep 63. w/incls. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXIX, pt. II, pp. 168.

[239] Ltr, Sherman to Halleck, 4 Sep 64. *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXVIII, pt. V, p. 792.

regiment. An additional 38 enlisted men were mustered out to accept commissions in other regiments.[240] During the year 1865, only 1 officer was appointed from civil life to a commission in Ohio regiments while 1,082 enlisted men were appointed to commissioned rank.[241]

The sole attempt to establish some sort of training plan for officers was made in connection with the recruiting of the Negro regiments and was the result of civilian enterprise. In Philadelphia, the Supervisory Committee for Recruiting Colored Regiments established a free military academy at which instruction was given to applicants for commissions in the 11 Negro regiments raised by this group.[242] The War Department cooperated in this plan by authorizing furloughs not to exceed 30 days to qualified enlisted men who desired to take this training.[243] On the army level, boards were ordered set up in each corps or independent command to examine the applicants for commissions in the Negro regiments, and those who satisfied the examiners of their fitness were granted the 30 days' furlough.[244] This system, however, was more in the nature of training men for commissions in new organizations, and at no time during the war was there any general provision for the procurement and training of replacements in the officer corps.

Conclusions

It is inevitable that the lack of planning and the confused and often contradictory policies which characterize much of the Civil War period should be judged harshly in the light of more recent experience. Military and civilian officials accustomed to dealing with hundreds were suddenly called upon to deal with hundreds of thousands. The accusation that the leaders of the 60's failed to plan for a war must be tempered by the fact that, with nothing in the past to guide them, any plans would have been inadequate. Perhaps it was best that the table was clear, or nearly so, from the very beginning. The plan of military action conceived by Scott was that which eventually brought the war to a successful conclusion, but in everything else improvisation was the rule rather than the exception. Nowhere was this characteristic more evident than in the area roughly limited by the phrase "maintaining armies."

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[240] Rpt, Col. Josiah Pickett, 16 Dec 64, on Operations, 18 Jun–16 Dec. *Ibid.*, ser I, vol. XLII, pt. I, pp. 809–810.

[241] *Ohio AG Report, 1863, op. cit.*, pp. 84–123.

[242] Ltr, Webster to Stanton, 28 Jan 64. *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. IV, p. 57; Frank H. Taylor, *Philadelphia in the Civil War, 1861–1865* (Phila., 1913), p. 188; J. R. Sypher, *History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps* (Lancaster, 1865), p. 320.

[243] WD GO 125, 29 Mar 64. *Official Records,* ser. III, vol. IV, p. 207.

[244] Hq, Army of the Potomac GO 19, 18 Apr 64. *Ibid.,* ser. I, vol. XXXIII, p. 898.

The problem was realized even by the civilian generals that the war brought forth in such great numbers. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, writing to a member of the House Military Affairs Committee, stated that the difficulty to be met was the present impossibility of keeping the field armies at a strength compatible with successful operations. Some adaptation of the French depot battalion system was the solution recommended by Butler.[245] There was nothing original about General Butler's plan, but it formed the basis for the system advocated by Emory Upton and a host of disciples for half a century after the last rebel had laid down his arms.

Whatever the merits of Butler's solution, those who had borne the responsibility of fighting the war were unanimous in their agreement that the greatest mistake in the war was the method used in recruiting the armies. "When a regiment," wrote Sherman, "became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up from the bottom . . . the habit was to raise new regiments." [246] Sherman recommended increased pay as an incentive to draw men into the Army:

> . . . . Once organized, the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomes difficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised by Congress, instead of tempting men by exaggerated bounties. I believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out the promise of three hundred or even six hundred dollars in the form of bounty. . . . [247]

The bounty was also condemned by the able Provost Marshal, General James B. Fry. He estimated that between 1 November 1863 and 31 October 1864 each Volunteer cost the Federal Government $244.69, while the men raised by the draft were raised at the average cost of $55.84. A more efficient draft law would reduce this figure to between $12 and $15 per man, Fry stated.[248]

One of the most thoughtful analyses of the defects of the recruiting system and the wartime draft is to be found in the final report of Brevet Brig. Gen. James Oakes, Acting Assistant Provost Marshal General for Illinois. He recommended the elimination of most of the policies which had tended to hamper the efficient operation of the draft as a source of replacement. In any future war, stated General Oakes, bounties should be forbidden, and, while Volunteers should not be dispensed with, all apportionment of quotas should be in the hands of the State provost marshal general. The system of enrollment must be revised, for, as the general remarked, "the collector does not go to

[245] Msg, Butler to Maj. Gen. Robt. C. Schenck, 7 Dec 64. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 982–988.
[246] Gen. W. T. Sherman, *Personal Memoirs* (3d ed., New York, 1890), II, p. 387.
[247] *Ibid.*
[248] Msg, Fry to Stanton, 14 Dec 64. *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. IV, pp. 995–996.

the taxpayer, but the taxpayer comes to the collector, and so I think it should be with a military enrollment." [249] It is significant of the importance of this report that many of its recommendations were incorporated into the selective service legislation of 1917. When the nation was again faced with a major war, the lessons of 1861–65 were not forgotten.

[249] Msg, Brevet Brig. Gen. Oakes to Fry, 9 Aug 65. *Ibid.*, ser. III, vol. V, pp. 825–835.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES ARMY REPLACEMENT PRACTICES, 1865–1904

Indian Wars and the Occupation of the South, 1865–1877

For more than a decade following the military collapse of the Confederacy the policies pursued by the dominant political faction of the North necessitated the maintainance of substantial numbers of troops in those States lately in rebellion. Beginning with the Reconstruction Act of 2 March 1867 and continuing until the withdrawal of the garrisons at Columbia, S. C. and New Orleans, La., in April 1877, a large proportion of the Regular Army was dispersed in garrisons in the Southern States.[1]

The Army and the Department of Interior shared, although not always amicably, the responsibility for administration of the affairs of approximately 300,000 Indians, most of whom had been crowded out of the Eastern States by the increase in the white population and had sought haven in the still unsettled West. The principal Indian chiefs signed treaties ceding large portions of their territory to the United States and the 90 or more tribes were distributed among reservations which totaled some 72 million acres located in 23 States.

In addition to carrying out its occupation duties, the Regular Army was almost continually engaged in hostilities on some part of the Indian frontier. This double responsibility resulted for a time in a peace establishment much larger than the Nation had customarily supported, but the end of the occupation found the Regulars reduced to a strength barely sufficient for the performance of frontier duties.

Readjustment After the Civil War

When the Confederate field armies surrendered in April and May 1865, the North had under arms more than a million men. Immediately a clamor arose for the discharge of the Volunteer regiments, and within a month after Appomattox the veteran armies of Grant, Sherman, and Thomas had begun to disintegrate. By November 1865, more than 800,000 men had been demobilized. A year later, only

[1] An excellent summary of the reconstruction period is that contained in Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (New York, 1942), vol. II.

11,043 Volunteers were still in uniform, about 10,000 of whom were Negro troops.[2]

The Regular Army, upon which fell the double burden of the occupation and frontier service, emerged from the war badly in need of reorganization. Most of the regiments were reduced to mere skeletons, units were widely scattered, and wartime legislation had destroyed uniformity of organization. As early as 1 May 1865, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, then commanding at Richmond, Va., suggested to Grant that it would be well to recruit the Regular regiments up to strength at an early date.[3] Hope was expressed that many Volunteer soldiers would soon tire of the monotony of civil life and that little difficulty would be experienced in recruiting the Regular Army up to its authorized strength.[4] To capitalize on this supposed enthusiasm for army life, the War Department authorized the opening of recruiting stations "at such points as offer reasonable prospect of enlisting good men." Volunteers honorably mustered out of the service were promised a 30-day furlough and the payment of all allowances due them as Volunteers provided they enlisted within 10 days of discharge.[5] But although the number of enlistments and reenlistments in the Regular Establishment amounted to 19,555 for the year ending 1 October 1865,[6] the distribution was uneven, and many regiments were still badly understrength. Late in October, Maj. Gen. John Pope, commanding the Department of the Missouri, reported that the 10th Infantry had an aggregate strength of 250 men, while the 3d Infantry was composed of 90 enlisted men, 80 of whom would be discharged during the course of the winter.[7] Similar complaints were received from other department commanders.

Taking into consideration the expanded responsibilities of the Army, especially in connection with the late rebel States, Grant proposed a standing army of 80,000 men, but this estimate of the needs of the country was whittled down by the Secretary of War to a force of 50,000 men capable of expansion, without the addition of new organizations, to 82,600.[8]

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[2] HR Exec. Doc. 1, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1866," *Message of the President of the United States, and Accompanying Documents, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress*, p. 1. See also Maj. John C. Sparrow, DA Pamph 20–210, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army* (Washington, 1952).

[3] Msg, Halleck to Grant, 1 May 65 in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XLVI, pt. III, p. 1055.

[4] This was the opinion of Sherman expressed in a letter to Grant: "I think many of them will soon tiré of the tedium of civil life, and be anxious to enlist in the Regular Army." Copy in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XLVIII, pt. II, p. 1050.

[5] WD GO 99, 28 May 65. Copy in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XLVI, pt. III, pp. 1227–28.

[6] *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. V, p. 133.

[7] Rpt, Pope to Grant, 28 Oct 65 in *Official Records*, ser. I, vol. XLVIII, pt. II, p. 1245.

[8] Ltr, Grant to Stanton, 20 Oct 65 in *Official Records*, ser. III, vol. V, pp. 126–127. "Annual Report of the Secretary of War," 22 Nov 65. *Ibid.*, pp. 510–511.

The following year a thorough reorganization of the Army was accomplished by an act of Congress approved 28 July 1866.[9] Under the provisions of this act, the three-battalion infantry regiments were abolished and 45 regiments of 10 companies each were authorized, 4 of which should be Negro regiments. The number of cavalry regiments was increased to 10, 2 of which were Negro, and the 5 artillery regiments of the old establishment were retained. Although a maximum of 100 men per company of all arms was authorized, giving the Army a maximum strength of 75,382 enlisted men, the peacetime strength was fixed at 64 men per company in cavalry, infantry, and dismounted artillery companies, and 122 in the light artillery batteries. This gave an aggregate enlisted strength of 54,302. On 30 September 1866, The Adjutant General announced that the actual strength of the Regular Army was 38,545, but that the full number should be reached by the middle of November.[10]

In 1867, the number of enlisted men in the Regular Army climbed to 53,962, a postwar peak. Thereafter it steadily declined. Moreover, with the gradual restoration of civil government in the South, a larger standing army no longer seemed necessary, and pressure to reduce the Armed Forces began to mount. In 1867, there were 286 military posts throughout the United States. Of these, 134 were in States which had formed the Confederacy. Troops present for duty numbered 39,847 officers and enlisted men, and, of these, 17,809 were stationed in the late rebellious States. Three years later, in 1870, the number of garrisoned posts had been reduced to 202, but only 54 of these were in the South, while only 8,951 officers and men out of the 29,902 reported for duty were stationed in the late Confederacy.[11]

In 1870, the act containing the appropriation for the support of the Army directed the President to reduce the number of enlisted men to 30,000.[12] A further reduction in enlisted strength was effected in the appropriation act of 16 June 1874 which cut the Army to 25,000 men, and though an additional force of 2,500 cavalry was authorized in 1876 to meet the emergency occasioned by the Indian wars of that year, the maximum strength was again set at 25,000 by the legislation

[9] PL 181, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., "An Act to Increase and Fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States." Published for the information of the army in WD GO 56, 1 Aug 66.

[10] "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1866," *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[11] HR Exec. Doc 1, 46th Cong., 2d Sess., "Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1867," *Message of the President of the United States, and Accompanying Documents, to the Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress,* pt. I, pp. 436–473 ; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Department for the Year 1870,* I, pp. 66–87.

[12] PL 185, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., "An Act making Appropriations for the support of the Army for the year ending June thirty, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, and for other purposes." Copy in WD GO 92, 22 Jul 70.

of 1877.[13] An attempt made in the 45th Congress to reduce the Army to 20,000 enlisted men was unsuccessful. On 30 June 1878, the Regular Army consisted of 2,153 officers and 23,254 enlisted men organized into 10 regiments of cavalry, 5 of artillery, and 25 of infantry, plus staff and service troops. This organization was maintained until the emergency brought about by the war with Spain.

The Recruiting Services

The progressive reduction of the strength of the Army enabled the recruiting services to simplify procedure, as well as to raise the standard for recruits. Indeed, the necessity of discharging men from the Army was, on occasion, greater than the necessity of getting new men into it. The activities of the recruiting services were also limited by the amount appropriated for their use by a sometimes reluctant Congress.[14] The fortunes of the recruiting service in this respect are sumarized in the following table:

*Table 7—Funds Appropriated for the Recruiting Services: Fiscal Years 1867–79**

Fiscal year	Amount	Fiscal year	Amount
1867	$300, 000	1874	$121, 000
1868	300, 000	1875	105, 000
1869	100, 000	1876	105, 000
1870	100, 000	1877	90, 000
1871	472, 000	1878	75, 000
1872	120, 580	1879	75, 000
1873	120, 580		

**Source:* WD GO 48, 19 Jul 1866; WD GO 17, 14 Mar 1867; WD GO 27, 12 Jun 1868; WD GO 15, 11 Mar 1869; WD GO 53, 30 Apr 1870; WD GO 92, 22 Jul 1870; WD GO 24, 17 Mar 1871; WD GO 46, 15 Jun 1872; WD GO 44, 22 Mar 1873; WD GO 58, 18 Jun 1874; WD GO 29, 20 Mar 1875; WD GO 70, 26 Jul 1876; WD GO 107, 27 Nov 1877; WD GO 37, 19 Jun 1878.

During the years immediately following the Civil War, the recruiting services, both general and regimental, supplied the Army with an adequate number of recruits. The total number of enlistments and reenlistments between 1 October 1865 and 1 October 1866 was 36,674; in the following year, 34,191.[15] Late in 1867, however, recruit-

[13] Act of June 16, 1874, "An Act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth eighteen hundred and seventy-five, and for other purposes," 43d Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in WD GO 58, 18 June 74; Act of August 15, 1876, "An Act to increase the cavalery force of the United States, to aid in suppressing Indian hostilities." 44th Cong., 1st sess. Copy in WD GO 88, 22 Aug 76; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1877*, I, pp. iii–iv.

[14] See "Reports of The Adjutant General, 1866–1872" in *Messages and Documents.*

[15] "Report of The Adjutant General, 1866," *Messages and Documents, 1866*, pp. 12–13; "Report of The Adjutant General, 1867," *Messages and Documents, 1867*, pt. I, p. 474.

ing activities were sharply curtailed by General Orders No. 101 of 26 November, and all but four of the rendezvous for each arm of the service were ordered closed. Simultaneously, the enlisted strength of all infantry and dismounted artillery companies was reduced to 50 men each. As a result, only slightly more than 14,000 enlistments and reenlistments, about equally divided between the General and Regimental Recruiting Services, were reported by The Adjutant General for the year ending 1 October 1868.[16] Recruiting on the former scale was not resumed until April 1869 when, by direction of the Secretary of War, both general and regimental recruiting was resumed.[17]

Although the Regimental Recruiting Service was technically under the control of The Adjutant General, the funds coming from appropriations for that office, the regimental commanders as ex officio superintendents of their own recruiting services enjoyed considerable latitude in recruiting for their individual organizations. In 1870, however, the first of a series of orders was issued which eventually all but suppressed the Regimental Recruiting Service. All irregular recruiting rendezvous were closed except those for Negro infantry, and regimental recruiting officers were directed to make no enlistments or reenlistments which would be a charge on the recruiting fund.[18]

In 1872, the recruiting service was placed under the direction of The Adjutant General, responsible only to the Secretary of War.[19] The supremacy of The Adjutant General in this field was made complete with the publication of a new edition of Army Regulations in 1881 which stated that "as a rule, recruiting funds will not be furnished for the regimental service" without special authorization.[20] Instructions for the recruiting service issued in 1873 stated that since the superintendents of that service stood to the recruiting stations in the capacity of department commanders, the commanding generals of military geographical divisions and departments could not exercise any supervision or control over the posts and stations used for recruiting purposes except in cases of extreme emergency.[21] The results of this policy of centralization can be seen in the recruiting statistics for the year ending 1 October 1873. Of 9,881 enlistments and reenlistments made during the period, 7,650 were made by the General Recruiting Service.[22]

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[16] "Annual Report of The Adjutant General, 1868," *Messages and Documents, 1868,* pt. I, p. 768.

[17] WD GO 46, 26 Apr 69.

[18] WD GO 115, 3 Oct 70, par. VII.

[19] WD GO 111, 30 Dec 72.

[20] *Regulations of the Army of the United States and General Orders in Force on the 17th of February 1881* (Washington, 1881), par. 832, p. 79.

[21] WD GO 87, 27 Aug 73.

[22] "Report of The Adjutant General 1873," *Messages and Documents, 1873,* I, p. 80.

The act of Congress limiting the enlisted strength of the Army to 25,000 men caused the War Department to discontinue recruiting altogether in June 1874. Only noncommissioned officers and meritorious soldiers might be reenlisted, and then only if they reenlisted at the post where they were stationed at the time their enlistments expired.[23] By the middle of November, the number of enlisted men in the Army having fallen below 25,000, recruiting was resumed on a restricted scale. Except for reenlistments made in companies or at posts, "all enlistments must be made by officers on the General Recruiting Service." [24] Except for a brief flurry of activity by the Mounted Recruiting Service to increase the strength of the cavalry regiments as authorized by Congress in 1876, recruiting was continued on a scale sufficient only to maintain the Army at its limit of 25,000 enlisted men. During the fiscal year ending 30 June 1878, the total losses from all causes was 5,558. There were 6,039 enlistments and 591 reenlistments. On 30 June the enlisted strength of the Army was 23,254.[25] In spite of the discontinuance of the Regimental Recruiting Service, the Army was maintained at very near authorized strength through the agency of the General Recruiting Service.

Desertions

Desertion continued to be the largest single replacement problem in the years following the war. The War Department threatened and cajoled in turn. In Februray 1866, a reward of $30 was offered to anyone who turned in a deserter; [26] in July of the same year, deserting Regulars were promised that if they returned before 15 August "they would be returned to duty without trial or punishment," the sole condition being that they made good the time lost while absent.[27] The ineffectiveness of these measures is indicated by the fact that in an Army of 53,962 men 13,608 desertions occurred between 1 October 1866 and 20 September 1867.[28]

Brevet Brig. Gen. James Totten, Inspector General of the Department of the East, reported that the 1st and 3d Regiments of Artillery, averaging 710.5 men each, suffered 261 and 205 desertions respectively during 1866.[29] In 1868, the commanding officer of the 3d Artillery wrote cynically:

> The number of desertions in the department seems to have considerably diminished during the past year; but this is owing undoubtedly to the

[23] WD GO 62, 22 Jun 74.
[24] WD GO 126, 20 Nov 74.
[25] "Report of The Adjutant General, 1878," *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1878*, I, table B, facing p. 10.
[26] WD GO 7, 1 Feb 66.
[27] WD GO 43, 3 Jul 66.
[28] "Report of The Adjutant General of the Army, 1866," *Messages and Documents, 1867*, pt. I, pp. 416, 435.
[29] Rpt, Brevet Brig Gen and Asst IG Jas. Totten, 22 Oct 67. *Ibid.*, p. 176.

> organizations not having been replenished with recruits, and to the fact that most of those of former supply, disposed to desert, had already done so rather than to any inherent improvement in the hearts of the soldiery, or to any decided removal of the cause, whatever that may be.[30]

In another instance Brevet Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, commanding the Department of California, reported that a post garrison of 86 men "had lost 54 men by desertion, and every deserter had carried off a good horse and repeating rifle." [31] And Secretary of War William W. Belknap declared the 1871 pay reduction for privates from $16 to $13 per month was another major cause for desertions. His report pointed out that each desertion not only left a vacancy in a military unit, but the United States lost $80, the cost of recruiting and transporting a new man to fill the post.[32]

By the end of the occupation period, however, not only had the number of desertions declined, but their ratio to the whole number of troops had decreased significantly. For the fiscal year ending 30 June 1873, desertions numbered 7,271, but for the year ending 30 June 1878, only 1,678 men had deserted. This improvement the Secretary of War attributed to the greater care exercised in the selection of recruits.[33]

Proposals for Reorganizing the Army

The experience of the war had made it obvious that the practices and policies which sufficed to maintain a small frontier army were entirely inadequate to cope with a full-scale conflict. Although public sentiment refused to sanction a departure from prewar policies, chiefly expressed in congressional refusal to vote funds for a thoroughgoing reform of the Army, a number of plans and proposals were submitted which indicated that military men recognized the necessity for revising radically the system by which the Regular Army should be recruited in peace and expanded in case of a national emergency.

A problem which occupied a prominent place in the minds of the military was that of providing adequately trained replacements for the regiments engaged in active duty on the frontier. Congress in 1866 attempted to meet the problem by authorizing a pool 3,000 men over and above the number required to fill to the minimum all the regiments of the Army.[34] This authorization was negated by the inability of the recruiting services to build the regiments of the Army to their minimum strengths; hence no recruits were left over to form the proposed pool. A similar proposal was made by the

[30] Rpt, Brevet Maj Gen T. W. Sherman, *Messages and Documents, 1868*, pt. I, p. 277.
[31] Rpt, Brevet Maj Gen E. O. C. Ord, 27 Oct 68. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[32] H. Ex. Doc. 1, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., "Report of the Secretary of War," Nov. 6, 1871, pt. 2, vol. I, pp. 6–7.
[33] *Report of the Secretary of War, 1878*, I, p. iii.
[34] PL 181, *op. cit.*

Secretary of War in his annual report for 1874, and again in 1877 The Adjutant General suggested the establishment of a pool of trained recruits who could be assigned where needed.[35] These later proposals came at a time when legislation severely limited the size and activity of the Army, and no attempt was made to put them into operation.

A subcommittee of the House Military Affairs Committee (the Maish Committee) in 1878 conducted hearings relating to the reorganization of the Army. The oral and written testimony contained in the report of this subcommittee is a valuable source for the opinions of most of the ranking officers of the Army.[36] Many of the colonels and lieutenant colonels of the peacetime establishment had held important commands during the Civil War, and the proposals submitted by them represent attempts to avoid the shortcomings so glaringly revealed in 1861. One suggestion advocated by a number of witnesses was to resume regimental recruiting and establish the regimental service on a territorial basis. Opposition to this proposal was voiced by Lt. Col. Edmund V. Rice of the 5th Infantry, on the practical grounds that if a disaster, such as that which befell the 7th Calvary in 1876, overtook a regiment, "the misfortune would fall upon one neighborhood, . . . and would have a demoralizing effect and interfere with further recruiting in that vicinity: . . . " Colonel Rice advocated a return to the system which Washington had used in the formation of his light infantry battalions. He recommended that regiments stationed in the east be used as replacement pools and recruit depots for those stationed on the frontier. Adoption of this system, he maintained, would provide a ready source of trained men for the regiments actually engaged in hostilities.

Various proposals were offered in the years following the close of the war as to the best method of expanding the Army in time of war. The theory of an expansible army was still prominent, and many of the suggestions were based on the premise that the existing establishment would be expanded through the simple expedient of increasing the size of companies, troops, and batteries. Typical of these was the plan submitted by Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, superintendent of the United States Military Academy, and the former commander of the Army of the Ohio:

> If a sudden emergency should require a moderate, but speedy increase of the Army, it could be raised to about 50,000 men by simply filling up the skeleton companies and increasing all the companies to one hundred men.

[35] "Report on mode of increasing the Army," *Report of the Secretary of War, 1877*, 10 Sep 77, vol. I, pp. 47–49.

[36] H. R. Misc. Doc. 56, 45th Cong., 2d Sess., *Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs relating to the reorganization of the Army* [*Maish Committee*] (Washington, 1878), See pp. 16, 24, 90, 116, 153, 243–44 for testimony quoted here.

> In case of war on a large scale the companies might be increased to two hundred or even two hundred and fifty men each. Each regiment would then become a brigade, . . . and [the entire Army] would aggregate from 96,000 to 120,000 men.

On the other hand, systems based on the formation of new regiments around cadres of trained officers and enlisted men were proposed. As early as 1868, Brevet Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman declared that the role of the Regular Artillery in wartime should be to serve as a center of instruction for "the raw and uninstructed masses of volunteer artillery, suddenly brought into the field. . . . The experience of the first years of the late war is alone sufficient to justify this remark." [37] Colonel Rice suggested that new regiments be formed by requiring each existing regiment to send one-third of its junior officers and a certain proportion of its noncommissioned officers to centrally located rendezvous where fillers could be recruited.[38] Brevet Brig. Gen. R. H. Jackson, 1st Artillery, proposed that in addition to the Regular officers of the cadre, "Second lieutenants can be appointed from the graduates of universities and institutions of learning at which officers of the Army are now stationed as instructors in military science and tactics." [39]

More comprehensive than, and differing radically in theory from, the generally accepted idea of an expansible Regular Army was the system put forward by Col. John Gibbon, 7th Infantry. "Many of those," he wrote, "who had experience in the late war soon had their minds disabused of the idea that in case of an emergency 'our volunteers' pure and simple, constitute the finest troops in the world for military operations." [40] Therefore, he continued, any system which could be devised to drill and discipline the potential Volunteer regiments on which the country would be forced to rely in time of war ought to be carefully considered. Furthermore, the Army officers rendered surplus by the last reduction in the strength of the Army should be utilized in forming a reserve corps. To accomplish this, each Regular regiment would be assigned a certain territory, usually a State, with the larger States being assigned two or more regiments of different arms. To the Regular regiments would be assigned 1 or 2 regiments of State troops, depending on the scope of the plan, and to those regiments would be assigned Regular officers who should be responsible for the training and discipline. When called to active duty by Presidential proclamation, the Reserve regiments would be brigaded with the Regulars, which would enable them to become combat ready in a minimum of time. This, and a somewhat similar plan [41]

[37] Rpt, Brevet Maj. Gen. T. W. Sherman, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
[38] *Maish Committee Report*, pp. 248–249.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 158.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 127.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 150–151.

offered by Maj. Thomas M. Anderson, 10th Infantry, were apparently never seriously considered, but in them may be found the genesis of the National Guard.

Efforts To Improve Training

Numerous and urgent calls by frontier posts upon the recruit depots resulted in detachments being sent out from the depots as frequently as the required number of men could be collected and organized. No time was allowed for instruction. In the annual report for 1873, Brig. Gen. R. B. Marcy, The Inspector General, called attention to this situation and suggested recruits should receive additional instruction.[42] There were some efforts to develop better methods. Officers and enlisted men who were specially qualified in the instruction of recruits were assigned to the depots, while new regulations placed greater stress on discipline and efficiency. Four companies of about 80 men each were formed for instruction purposes at the recruit depots, and the depot detachments supplied men who performed the permanent duties at the garrisons.[43]

New men were given some training before they joined their regiments and they would have received more, but additional funds requested from Congress were not provided. The War Department *Annual Report* for 1876 stated: ". . . the hope entertained in the previous report, that the service might be so conducted as to permit the detention of raw recruits at depots for 3 or 4 weeks, with a view to instruction in the first principles of drill and subordination previous to joining companies in the field, has owing to the demands of the service, only been partially realized."

The Adjutant General, Brig. Gen. R. C. Drum, in 1882 called attention to the slight knowledge of the service and its requirements which men possessed on first entering the Army. He proposed that recruits be retained at the depots at David's Island, Columbus Barracks, and Jefferson Barracks, for 4 months before being sent to regiments.[44] He suggested that during these 4 months recruits be given instruction that would introduce them to the duties of military life; transform raw men into well-instructed soldiers; and provide an opportunity to determine positively their fitness for active service by the application of proper tests requiring time and observation.

He further pointed out that many men enlisting in good faith developed such inaptitude for service that to retain them in the ranks proved a burden rather than a benefit. Although recruiting officers were rejecting three-fourths of the applicants, some of the unfit were

[42] H. Ex. Doc. 1, 43d Cong., 1st Sess., *Annual Report of the Secretary of War,* Nov. 24, 1873, pt. 2, vol. I, p. 88.
[43] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1885,* I, p. 76.
[44] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1882,* I, pp. 27–28.

accepted; physical requirements were exacting, but the examinations did not turn away applicants lacking in mental capacity or moral standards.[45] General Drum believed that such unfitness would become known at the depots if the men were retained there longer. Men who were found to be lacking soldierly qualifications could then be promptly discharged and the Government would be saved the expense of their transportation to remote frontier posts and return. Congress did not provide the additional funds, but the depots increased training, holding men an average of about 3 months.

In 1884, The Adjutant General declared: "Recruits should be assembled in depots and retained there 6 months if necessary. This preliminary weeding out would be cheaper than transporting worthless men to distant garrisons. Men of weak character spoil the good men."[46] Six months' training for recruits was a goal never achieved during the period of the Indian wars. The Adjutant General in 1884 did not foresee what lay ahead in the way of recruit training. Within 10 years, troops in the field were accepting men who had not even a few weeks of training.

First Classification of Enlisted Men

The Army practice of classifying men according to civilian and military skills, which in later years involved the assignment of military occupational specialty numbers (MOS), underwent a little-noticed but significant development during this period. Musicians, artificers, and wagoners had long been recognized as specialists within the Army, but the next development in the classification procedure came out of the kitchen.

Army Regulations and Federal law required the privates of a company, detailed in turn, to cook for a period of 10 days.[47] The men ordered to prepare the food seldom knew much about that art, but many decades of indigestion went by before Congress, on 29 January 1879, passed a law [48] repealing the statute for compulsory detail of cooks and giving company commanders more discretion. In 1884, The Inspector General proposed that each company enlist two professional cooks and that each post have a professional baker; [49] in 1887, The Adjutant General recommended that each company enlist one man solely as a cook and excuse him from all other military duty.[50] These recommendations did not bring immediate results. Company officers who were prohibited from going outside the Army to hire

[45] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1884,* I, p. 91.
[46] *Ibid.*
[47] *Revised U. S. Army Regulations,* 1 Mar 73, art. XXXIV, p. 41.
[48] Act of Jan 29, 1879, "An Act to Repeal Section Twelve Hundred and Thirty Three of the Revised Statutes relating to company cooks in the Army," 45th Cong., 3d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* ch. 34, p. 276.
[49] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1884,* I, p. 92.
[50] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1887,* I, p. 82.

cooks [51] generally designated a soldier as head cook, excused him from ordinary military duty except target practice, and detailed certain other members of the company as assistants. Head cooks usually held grades above that of private and sometimes received extra compensation from company funds. During the war with Spain, each company or battery was authorized one cook who was rated as a corporal.[52] Congress on 2 March 1899 authorized two enlisted cooks with sergeants' pay in each battery or company.[53] Recruiting officers selected men who appeared to be qualified, but company commanders determined whether or not the rating would be held.[54]

Indian Scouts

Troops on the western frontier employed Indians in many capacities. They were useful as guides and usually accompanied military units on patrols. The Regular Army, under an act of Congress passed 28 July 1866,[55] was authorized to enlist one thousand Indian Scouts. Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, General in Chief of the Army, had recommended that these Scouts be formed into companies or battalions, but this proposal was not adopted and the Scouts were distributed among Regular Army units already in existence.[56]

The Scouts were enlisted for 3 years and drew the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers, plus 40 cents a day if they furnished their own serviceable horses and horse equipment. Orders from the headquarters of the Army, published from time to time, announced the number allowed to military departments.

These Indians performed valuable services in many frontier military operations. The negotiations with Chief Joseph prior to his surrender in the vicinity of the Bear Paw Mountains in Montana, 5 October 1877, provide one example of the advantage of using Indian scouts. Two friendly Nez Perce, old men who had daughters in Joseph's camp, entered the lodge and persuaded the hostile chief to give up after he had rejected demands made by Army officers.[57]

A general order published in March 1891 [58] authorized the enlistment of 1 company of Indians for each of the 26 regiments of white cavalry and infantry serving west of the Mississippi River. Mili-

[51] WD GO 7, 25 Jun 99, par. 2115.

[52] WD GO 94, 12 Jul 98.

[53] Act of March 2, 1899, "An Act for Increasing the Efficiency of the Army of the United States and for other Purposes," 55th Cong., 3d sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* XXX, ch. 352, p. 977.

[54] WD Cir 18, 29 Mar 99.

[55] Act of July 28, 1866, "An Act to Increase and Fix the Military Peace Establishment of the United States," 39th Cong., 1st Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* XIV, ch. 199, sec. 6, p. 333.

[56] Rpt, Lt. Gen. W. T. Sherman, 1 Oct 67, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1867,* pp. 381–382.

[57] Rpt, Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard, 19 Nov 77, sub: Operations against Nez Perce Indians. *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1877,* I, p. 631.

[58] WD GO 28, 9 Mar 91.

tary officials hoped they would be able to divert a considerable number of the Indians belonging to the warlike tribes to legitimate activities and teach them habits of obedience, cleanliness, and punctuality.[59] During the next 6 years, 1,071 Indians were enlisted or reenlisted for service in the Indian units, but by 1897 the War Department concluded: "Notwithstanding strenuous and intelligent efforts on the part of the officers selected for the recruiting, command, and management of the several Indian troops and companies, the Indian contingent has never reached a degree of substantial success as useful soldiers." [60] On 31 May 1897, the discharge of the 53 members of Troop L, 7th Cavalry, the only remaining Indian unit, marked the end of the experiment with units made up of Indians. Indian scouts were used for many more years, however, as members of Regular Army units.

Efforts To Create a Reserve Force

The Morrill Act of 2 July 1862, which required certain land grant colleges to give instruction in military tactics, was designed to provide the United States Army with a reserve of trained men who could qualify as officers. By 1888 there were 50 Army officers and 10 Navy officers detailed as instructors at colleges. The Army also provided that certain ordnance property should be made available to those colleges which conducted training.[61]

The small Army which was operating at widely separated western posts was in no condition to conduct extended operations, should the international situation require it to do so. It was this weakness which caused a number of officers to consider the need for an enlisted reserve force. In 1886, Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, superientendent of the Division of the Missouri, in a report to The Adjutant General, observed:

> It is no longer possible in any country to improvise an effective army. . . . The great military strength of every nation lies in its men who are between twenty and thirty-five years of age, and the men who were over twenty years of age at the termination of the Civil War over forty now. . . . None of the troops of either party to that contest received the training in the use of arms that the existing conditions of war demand. . . . Trained and instructed troops perform two functions at the outbreak of war—they meet the first onset of the eenmy, and they also furnish the instructors to train newly-raised men.[62]

A report by the Inspector General stated that the average age of men who enlisted in the Cavalry was 23 years, in the Infantry and

[59] "Report of the Adjutant General," 1 Oct 1891, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1891*, I, p. 81.

[60] "Report of the Adjutant General," 19 Oct 1897, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1897*, I, p. 218.

[61] WD GO 100, 1879; *U. S. Army Regulations*, 17 Feb 81, art. VIII.

[62] Rpt, Maj Gen. A. H. Terry, 10 Sep 66, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1886*, vol. I, p. 121–122.

Artillery 24 years, and that the average age of men who reenlisted in the Cavalry was 30 years and in the Infantry and Artillery 34 years:[63] all too high. It had been found undesirable, however, to enlist minors. It was suggested that the length of service of private soldiers should be limited to three enlistments of 5 years each, retaining only noncommissioned officers until they were eligible to retire. The Inspector General believed that such a change would keep the Army at a high standard of efficiency and that the men who would be in service would be in better physical condition. He thought that returning men to civil life while they were still capable of resuming civilian occupations would be an advantage because discharged men with military experience would provide a Reserve.

The minimum recruiting age was raised from 18 (for a time it was 16) to 21, and the maximum age was reduced from 35 to 30.[64] Men over 35 who were out of the service for 3 months could reenlist only if they could show that their reenlistment would be for the best interest of the service. Otherwise they were expected to return to civilian life and become part of the Reserve. The Reserve created by these measures was only a potential force—it had neither organization nor records. Its principal importance was the evidence it gave that military men were beginning to realize the importance of a supply of trained men who could fill units in case of emergency.

Attempts To Economize

By 1884, the rapid expansion of railways and the settlement of the West had resulted in the abandonment of some of the smaller military posts and in the concentration of troops at larger permanent garrisons,[65] a tendency which continued as the population grew. Later, adverse economic conditions caused more men to enlist. By 1890, extensive economies in the operation of the Army, especially the recruiting service, appeared to be necessary. Additional stress was placed on regimental recruiting under which officers supplied recruits to their own units thereby eliminating much expense. The Adjutant General assigned each regiment recruiting territory and regimental commanders selected recruiting officers, adopting their own method of operation but keeping with the scope of general instructions.

The following quotation from a circular letter sent to regimental commanders illustrates the recruiting methods sometimes used:

> A captain or a lieutenant, to be specially detailed and announced in orders in the usual manner, may be sent with a party of say eight or ten men, including a field musician, and supplied with such suitable means of transportation as may be available at regimental headquarters, together with the necessary camp equippage, etc., for a tour of the surrounding country, to cover from

[63] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1891,* I, p. 82–83.
[64] *Revised U. S. Army Regulations,* 1895, par. 838.
[65] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1884,* I, p. 6.

> one to three weeks or more as circumstances may warrant. . . . Upon the return of one such party, another officer and party could be sent out in a different direction—or from another post of the regiment, with the approval of the department commander—this to be repeated as often as desirable, thus giving an opportunity to different officers and a number of enlisted men to share in the duty of recruiting for the regiment and of contributing toward securing for its ranks a desirable class of men, an object in which all members of the regiment should be alike interested.[66]

The 11th Infantry, which had two parties in the field in western New York in 1884, obtained 135 recruits in less than 4 months by the method described above. Not only did many regiments keep their ranks filled but they also were able to disseminate information about the Army in communities where the residents knew little concerning the military service. All regimental commanders who were willing to undertake recruiting activities were encouraged to do so. Some who tried the plan against their own judgment still produced good results. Under this system of recruiting, the regiments became more closely identified with the communities from which their men came. This was considered desirable and Col. R. P. Hughes, Inspector General, urged that regiments be localized to an even greater extent.[67]

The Closing of the Recruiting Depots

Generals commanding military geographical divisions or departments did not have control over the recruit depots which were under the superintendent of the General Recruiting Service, responsible only to The Adjutant General.[68] Critics of this arrangement contended that The Adjutant General should not exercise command; a number of officers believed that the posts where recruits were received should be under division and department commanders, rather than under a staff officer. It was pointed out that a staff officer had no legal authority to administer military justice, enforce discipline, carry on instruction, or administer a unit.[69]

The business depression of 1893 brought an increase in the number of men seeking enlistment. It also brought an added impetus for economy. By 1894, regimental recruiting was procuring about half of the men who entered the Army. The reduced importance of the recruit depots provided an additional argument for a major reorganization. The Army was so near its authorized strength that few recruits were needed and only those with outstanding qualifications were accepted. Many general recruiting stations were closed. These new recruiting conditions, along with the desire for greater economy,

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[66] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1891,* I, p. 80.
[67] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War,* 1888, I, p. 101.
[68] WD GO 87, 27 Aug 73.
[69] Misc. Doc. 56, 45th Cong., 2d sess., *Report Relating to the Reorganization of the Army;* See also the report of a court of inquiry investigating the causes for the removal of Col. John Gibbon, 7th Inf, as Superintendent of the General Recruiting Service in WD GO 109, 11 Nov 73.

were reflected in a new set of regulations governing the recruiting service.[70]

As of 1 October 1894 the superintendent of the General Recruiting Service was relieved. No successor was appointed, and matters pertaining to the office were placed under the supervision of a deputy in the Adjutant General's Office. The recruit depots at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., Columbus Barracks, Ohio, and David's Island, N. Y., were discontinued and the quarters they had occupied taken over by troops of the line, the commanding officer of each post becoming responsible for a recruit rendezvous. A fourth such rendezvous was established at Fort Sheridan, Ill. The General Recruiting Service could send recruits to the nearest of the four new rendezvous points, or directly to regiments, as directed by The Adjutant General. Actually, the rendezvous points were seldom used.

There was no recruiting detail during 1894, but recruiting stations were designated at those posts at which the recruiting rendezvous had been discontinued. Officers made surplus by the closing of the recruit depots filled vacancies in a number of units. Enlisted members of detachments, bands, and other depot personnel, except certain noncommissioned officers needed at recruit stations, were assigned to regiments. A decision of the Acting Secretary of War, announced 14 September 1894, determined in more detail the status of a recruit by stating that men who entered the Army for the first time ceased to be recruits and became privates when orders assigned them to regiments.[71] This usually happened within a few days after enlistment. Recruiting detachments at the recruiting stations or rendezvous were placed under post commanders for police and discipline, but were under the Secretary of War for all other matters. In an effort to reduce costs, one member of each recruit detachment was selected as a leader and the detachment traveled under his supervision without other escort.[72]

The Secretary of War, in his annual report for 1894, described the recruits who were enlisting in the Army at that time as men of high quality.[73] The Act of 1 August 1894 [74] confined enlistments to citizens, or those who had declared their intention to become citizens, who were not over 30 years of age and were able to speak, read, and write English. During 1895, 7,780 men were recruited, of whom 5,518 were native born and 2,262 foreign born.[75] Many served for long periods without being naturalized.[76] More than half of those who

[70] WD GO 33, 16 Aug 94.
[71] WD Cir 11, 3 Oct 94.
[72] WD Cir 3, 12 Nov 95.
[73] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1894*, p. 11–12.
[74] Act of Aug. 1, 1894, "An Act to Regulate Enlistments in the Army of the United States." Copy in WD GO 30, 8 Aug 94.
[75] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1895*, p. 5.
[76] Statement, Brig. Gen. Robert E. Wylie (Ret). HIS 330.14.

sought enlistment were rejected, either for physical deficiencies, lack of education, or for other reasons.

From 1894 until 1904, all recruits who enlisted at central recruiting stations were sent directly to units. A large proportion of those enlisting at city stations were sent to the posts without passing through a rendezvous. Those recruits who did go to rendezvous points spent little time there because assignments to regiments and posts were made every 10 days. As long as the Army had little difficulty obtaining as many men as it needed, this system appeared satisfactory.

During the fiscal year ending 30 June 1897, there were 4,762 general recruits forwarded to regiments, 3,879 going directly from recruiting stations and 883 from rendezvous.[77] The largest number of recruits at the four rendezvous at any one time was 108, the smallest number 19. The average total was 45, or 11 for each rendezvous, a number so small that any attempt at training was unprofitable. In that year, 3,581 men enlisted at the posts where they were to serve, the Government incurring no expense for their transportation.

A report by The Inspector General in 1897, depicting the two methods that units in the South Atlantic District were using in assigning men, disclosed what was happening in the regiments as a result of this change. Some units assigned recruits to companies immediately, others placed the new men under the supervision of a training officer. The Inspector General of that district declared:

> I believe that where a suitable officer is available for this duty the latter plan [assignment of recruits to training officers] should prevail at all large posts, and whenever large detachments of recruits are received at any post. Assisted by even-tempered, intelligent, and capable noncommissioned officers, the officer is able to give a thorough course of training. . . . When assigned to companies immediately upon arrival the instruction to the recruit is often interrupted, or, if not, is imparted by anyone, apt or inapt, who may be available for the purpose. As a result the instruction is not thorough and the attributes of the recruits not well understood. Again, under this system, they are the fags of the company, being called on for all kinds of fatigue.[78]

The companies, which were receiving men who had no preliminary training, were now conducting recruit instruction and were doing the work that previously had been a depot function.

The business depression of this period helped to fill the ranks of the Army, but the subsequent industrial development which brought increased demand for laboring men and sent daily wages up as high as $2.75 for skilled workers tended to dry up the stream of recruits. Slight increases in army pay, bringing the scale up to $15 per month, along with more intensive recruiting, still failed to fill the shrinking

[77] "Report of The Adjutant General," 19 Oct 97, *"Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1897,"* p. 216.

[78] "Report of the Inspector General," 18 Oct 97. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

ranks of the military units. The Army Recruiting Service was only beginning to feel this depressing influence when the War with Spain interrupted peacetime routine and brought a flood of volunteers.

The War With Spain and the Philippine Insurrection

The Military Campaigns

The major military actions in the 4 months' war against Spain took place in Cuba, in the Philippines, and in Puerto Rico. The campaign in Cuba started 14 June 1898 when Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter's command sailed from Tampa for Santiago. Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles arrived off Santiago 11 July and the Spanish commander in Cuba surrendered 17 July. Troops under Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt sailed for the Philippines 25 May and Manila fell on 13 August. Troops landed in Puerto Rico 27 July and by 12 August had participated in six engagements and occupied a large portion of the island.[79]

The United States and Spain signed a protocol on 12 August 1898 which suspended hostilities. The treaty of peace which was signed by delegations from the two nations at Paris on 10 December 1898 was ratified by the United States on 6 February 1899 and by Spain on 19 March 1899.

The Regular Army

Some increases were made in the Regular Army before the declaration of war against Spain on 25 April 1898,[80] the most important being the addition of two regiments of artillery, the 6th and the 7th, in March.[81] To accomplish this augmentation, batteries in existing artillery regiments transferred a few key men giving each new battery a nucleus of approximately 15 experienced soldiers.[82] At the beginning of the conflict, the Regular Army contained 2,134 officers and 27,351 enlisted men.[83]

The increase in the military forces took place under the authority of two acts of Congress [84] that gave the Regulars about 61,000 men and provided for a Volunteer force made up of units from the State

[79] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1898*, I, pp. 3–7.

[80] Act of April 25, 1898, "An Act Declaring that War Exists Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain," 55th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, XXX, ch. 189, p. 364.

[81] Act of March 8, 1898, "An Act to Authorize Two Additional Regiments of Artillery," 55th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, XXX, ch. 53, p. 261.

[82] "Annual Report of the Adjutant General" 1 Nov 98, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1898*, p. 253.

[83] Heitman, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[84] Act of April 22, 1898, "An Act to Provide for Temporarily Increasing the Military Establishment of the United States in Time of War, and for Other Purposes," 55th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, XXX, ch. 187, p. 361; Act of April 26, 1898. "An Act for the Better Organization of the line of the Army of the United States." *Ibid.*, ch. 191, p. 364.

militias that agreed to be mustered into Federal service, plus certain other Volunteer regiments and engineer units.

Lack of officers prevented the General Recruiting Service from significantly increasing the number of city recruiting stations, only 7 having been added by October 1898, bringing the total to 22. Some branch stations were opened. During the fiscal year ending 30 June 1898, the General Recruiting Service enlisted 19,988 men while the Special Recruiting Service enlisted 9,219, making a total of 29,207, exclusive of 314 for the staff departments.[85] During the following year, the General Recruiting Service enlisted 53,123 and the Special Recruiting Service 8,516, making a total of 61,639, exclusive of 536 for the staff departments. Not all of these went to the Regular Army inasmuch as a considerable number were assigned to Volunteer units. An attempt to obtain more recruits by reducing the minimum age from 21 to 18 years did not meet with approval of The Surgeon General, who said younger men were more susceptible to ailments common to army camps.[86]

Infantry regiments, under peace conditions, were organized with 2 battalions of 4 companies each and 2 unmanned companies. After the declaration of war, the President, under authority granted him by the laws governing the mobilization of the Army, established a third battalion of 4 companies in each infantry regiment. Regimental commanders were urged to send out recruiting parties to enlist the men needed to bring their organizations to war strength, but they frequently could not comply because most of them moved to concentration points and soon thereafter left for overseas with expeditionary forces. During May, June, and July of 1898, there were 25,500 enlistments in the Regular Army, a large number coming in through the General Recruiting Service. Many of the organizations that could not fill their ranks by their own recruiting efforts received an apportionment of the men who volunteered through the General Recruiting Service. Existing regiments selected noncommissioned officers and men capable of instructing recruits and transferred cadres to the new battalions. Infantry companies were increased to 106 men, cavalry troops to 100; batteries of heavy artillery to 200; light artillery 173; and engineers, 150.

The prewar practice of sending out recruits from recruiting stations and rendezvous points every 10 days could not be continued after a considerable number of the military units had departed from the United States for foreign service. Military authorities soon discov-

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[85] "Annual Report of the Adjutant General" 1 Nov 98, *op. cit.*, p. 276; "Annual Report of The Adjutant General" 25 Oct 99, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899*, p. 30.

[86] "Annual Report of the Surgeon General" 10 Nov 98, *Annual Report of the War Department. 1898*, p. 697–698.

ered that it would be necessary to have some convenient point where these recruits could assemble. Fort McPherson, Ga., was first selected as a collecting point for recruits enlisted for the regiments in Cuba and Puerto Rico, but that post later was transferred to the Medical Department for exclusive use as a general hospital.[87] After this transfer, recruits who had been at Fort McPherson, or who were on their way there, were distributed among several camps in Georgia where they waited, receiving only such training and administration as could be given by the few officers who were available for recruit training.

On 15 April, most of the Regular Army regiments had been ordered to concentration points in the South. Regular and Volunteer troops were formed into eight Army corps with headquarters as follows: I, III, and VI—Camp Thomas, Ga.; II—Falls Church, Va. (later Camp Meade, Pa.); IV—Mobile, Ala.; V and VII—Tampa, Fla.; VIII—San Francisco, Calif.

There never was time to test the proposal of Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commanding the Army, that "at least 22 regiments of infantry, 5 regiments of cavalry, and the light artillery be mobilized, and placed in one large camp where they can be carefully and thoroughly inspected, fully equipped, drilled, disciplined, and instructed in brigades and divisions, and prepared for war service." [88]

Regiments of "Immunes"

An attempt to reduce the heavy losses from tropical diseases by forming special units made up of men not susceptible to such illness did not prove successful. The first legal provision for regiments to be formed by enlisting men having certain specified qualifications was contained in the act of 22 April 1898, but the Secretary of War did not attempt to form any units under that measure. An act passed 11 May 1898 [89] provided for a Volunteer brigade of engineers enlisted from the Nation at large and for a Volunteer infantry force not to exceed 10,000 men possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates. It was assumed those who had recovered from such diseases would be immue. Ten infantry regiments (called "immunes") were formed under this measure, the officers obtaining most of the enlisted men by means of regimental recruiting parties. Four regiments of "immunes" were sent to Cuba in August, but medical officers who inspected the men upon their arrival reported that recruit-

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 275.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[89] Act of May 11, 1898 "An Act to Provide for a Volunteer Brigade of Engineers and an Additional Force of ten thousand Enlisted Men Specially Accustomed to Tropical Climates," 55th Cong., 2d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large,* XXX, ch. 294, p. 405.

ing officers apparently had paid little attention to the matter of immunity, there being not more than 3 or 4 men who had recovered from yellow fever in each company. The Surgeon General later reported that these regiments suffered as much from tropical diseases as other troops.[90]

The Volunteers

Two days after the declaration of war, the President called for 125,000 Volunteers and within a short time the quota was filled. A second call on 25 May for 75,000 also brought the number requested. About 251,000 volunteered for military service during the war. These, added to the 29,000 men who were in the Regular Army before its expansion started, made a total of about 280,000 men who served during the conflict.[91]

Militia units in the various States volunteered for Federal service and were mustered by Federal officers. The War Department was under pressure to recognize a large number of State units in order to provide for a larger number of commissioned officers.[92] Militia units which were mustered into Federal service included:

Cavalry: 2 regiments, 2 squadrons, and 9 troops.
Artillery: 1 regiment (heavy), 8 batteries of heavy artillery, and 16 battalions of light artillery.
Infantry: 119 regiments and 13 battalions.

Volunteer units raised from the nation at large included:

Engineers: 3 regiments.
Special Cavalry: 3 regiments.
Infantry (immunes) 10 regiments.

State Militia companies usually did not exceed 60 men. Upon muster a considerable number of these gave reasonable grounds for not volunteering and were released.[93] About 25 percent failed to pass the physical examination. The result was that only about 30 men in each company could qualify for muster and, since the Government required at least 77, it was necessary to take about 47 recruits into each militia company.

Recruiting parties were sent from the Volunteer organizations to the localities where the troops had been raised, enlistments being also made at the State camps and in the field. Slightly over 40,000 had been enlisted at the time of the signing of the protocol which suspended

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[90] "Annual Report of the Inspector General" 6 Oct 99, *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899*, I, pt. 2, p. 91.
[91] Heitman, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–289.
[92] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899*, I, pt. 2, p. 10.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

hostilities. These men, in most instances, were hastily obtained and were examined only briefly, with little inquiry into their background. Many were eliminated in more rigorous postmuster examinations. The strength of the State companies was depleted to such an extent that The Adjutant General proposed a consolidation which would have resulted in fewer regiments, but in a larger number of trained men per regiment. This proposal was not accepted, and it was necessary to assign about 40,000 general recruits to the State Militias to bring the companies to the maximum authorization of 106 men per infantry company.

The organization of the Militia within the several States was not uniform. Some regimental and battalion staffs contained officers and noncommissioned officers not provided for by any law or regulation of the Army. The elimination of these unauthorized positions resulted in reductions in rank which frequenly were difficult to make without injustice to some officers.

The report of an inspection made at Chickamauga Park in May of 1898 on the condition of 33 regiments from 18 States disclosed that 40.6 percent of the men were raw recruits, 34.4 percent were soldiers with less than 1 year of training, and 25 percent had received more than 1 year of training most of which had been gained in the National Guard.[94] As a partial result of this report the Acting Inspector General on 28 May 1898 recommended that all regimental recruits, convalescents, deserters, furloughed men, paroled prisoners, stragglers, or absentees of any other form be sent to regimental depots.[95] He said that under the system he was recommending these depots would become unfailing sources for supplying men to regiments. Here these recruits could be instructed and equipped as well as await mustering out after the conflict was over. This plan provided that commanding officers of regiments would submit requisitions whenever the strength of their units dropped 10 percent. It also called for a reserve of not less than 25 percent of the entire military force, or about 70,000 men.

This proposed recruit depot system was not adopted; brigades and regiments established their own schools of instruction for recruits which frequently were not effective. On 5 June, General Miles said that in the 14 Volunteer regiments which were being prepared for service in Cuba between 30 and 40 percent of the men were undrilled and that in 1 regiment 300 men had never fired a gun.[96]


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[94] The term "National Guard" was in use in New York as early as 1861; it was adopted in Ohio in 1864. The term came into general use after adoption of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916.

[95] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899*, I, pt. 2, p. 85.

[96] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1898*, I, pt. 1, p. 24.

CHART 6– REPLACEMENT SOURCES DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION, 1898-1903



[Table 8 shows the strength of the Regular and the Volunteer forces during each of the 4 months of the war.] [See also chart 6 for replacement sources.]

Table 8—Strength of Regular and Volunteer Armies: May–August 1898 *

End of month	Total	Officers	Enlisted men
Total Army Strength			
May	163, 592	8, 412	155, 180
June	208, 237	9, 358	198, 879
July	265, 529	10, 967	254, 562
August	272, 618	11, 218	261, 400
Regular Army Strength			
May	38, 816	2, 191	36, 625
June	47, 867	2, 198	45, 669
July	54, 048	2, 327	51, 721
August	56, 362	2, 323	54, 039
Volunteer Army Strength			
May	124, 776	6, 221	118, 555
June	160, 370	7, 160	153, 210
July	211, 481	8, 640	202, 841
August	216, 256	8, 895	207, 361

*Source; "Annual Report of The Adjutant General," *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1899*, vol. I, pt. 2, table C, facing p. 10.

The Volunteer Signal Corps

The Signal Corps of the Regular Army experienced difficulty in finding replacements. At the beginning of the war, 8 officers and 50 men, widely scattered throughout the country, were assigned to signal duty. The Regular Army was supposed to furnish a signal force of 454 officers and 1,816 enlisted men who were to be taken from line units, but only 7 officers and about 50 partially trained men were available.

This deficiency was met by a Volunteer Signal Corps which was authorized 138 officers and 1,115 enlisted men and which actually contained, at its maximum strength, approximately 115 officers and 1,000 enlisted men. Recruiting started 2 June 1898 with centers operating in most of the large eastern cities.

Field officers were appointed from the captains and lieutenants of the Regular Signal Corps, as far as their limited number permitted. Fourteen of the most capable sergeants were promoted to second lieutenants. Six Regular lieutenants were promoted to captains and two West Point graduates then in civil life were given commissions

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in the grade of captain. The National Guard furnished a number of officers.[97]

Within 30 days, the Corps was organized and partly equipped and one of the companies was already in the field with the Army in Cuba. Two-thirds of the officers and enlisted men accepted were skilled electricians or telegraphers.

The Failure To Replace Losses

Veteran Army officers with Civil War experience knew that trained replacements were needed for military units if they were to continue in action for any length of time, but 30 years of peacetime retrenchment had lost the Army most of the facilities it needed in order to furnish trained loss replacements. General recruiting stations, which normally enlisted most of the replacements, had been reduced in number because they were expensive. Regiments had been encouraged to replace their losses by sending out their own recruiting parties, a method that saved money. In 1894, the Army had discontinued recruit training in those depots which were still operating after the Civil War; the regiments gave the recruits basic training in their own companies.

Most of the rendezvous points and depots, which might have been expanded to form a replacement system, were operating at greatly reduced capacity or had been discontinued. Staff plans made no provision for enlarging or reopening any of these depots for replacement troops, and the units which took part in the Santiago and Puerto Rican campaigns sailed without any provision to replace any losses they might suffer. The same was true of the Philippine expedition, but the more extended operations in those islands made it necessary a few months later to establish a depot for recruits in San Francisco. The operations against Spain were brief and the deaths from 1 May to 31 August (totaling 2,430) were less than 1 percent of the men who served in the Army. Consequently, few loss replacements were needed.[98]

The outbreak of yellow fever and other tropical diseases among the troops in Cuba was so severe that on 14 July the Secretary of War canceled all further shipments of troops to that island, thus depriving the units there of any replacements from the United States.[99] The entire 24th Infantry Regiment was employed in operating a hospital in Cuba and nursing the sick. By 21 July, there was one or more yellow fever cases in each of the regiments. By August, the V Corps, which had been in action less than 2 months in Cuba, had comparatively light combat losses (23 officers and 237 enlisted men killed, 99

[97] "Report of the Chief Signal Officer" 10 Oct 98, *Ibid.*, pp. 878–879.
[98] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899*, I, pt. 2, table C, facing p. 10.
[99] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1898*, I, pt. 1, p. 34.

officers and 1,332 enlisted men wounded), but disease had taken such a heavy toll that the corps was judged unfit even for occupation duty.

The men who might have served as corps replacements were scattered, and the task of getting them to Cuba in time to do any good was too formidable for the War Department to undertake. The V Corps returned to the United States and eight other regiments were sent to Cuba to replace it; the corps came back to join the replacements instead of the replacements moving forward to join the corps.

The San Francisco Depot

The first expedition for Manila departed 25 May 1898, and by 29 July seven convoys from San Francisco had sailed for the Philippines. Many of the National Guard regiments, which had come to San Francisco understrength, sent recruiting officers back to their respective states to enlist additional men. These recruits generally did not arrive in the Philippine Islands until October. Thousands of recruits, many without equipment or uniforms, gathered at San Francisco making it necessary to organize a large depot where they could be housed and trained.

At first, nearly 10,000 men were encamped at Camp Merriam on the Presidio reservation near the Lombard Street entrance. When it was announced that the expeditionary force to the Philippines was to be increased to 20,000 men, a new camp was established near the northern boundary of Golden Gate Park. This was Camp Merritt, from which 18,000 troops departed for Manila, but which later was given up for another location on the Presidio reservation.[100]

The fourth convoy, which sailed from San Francisco 15 July, took with it the first group of men to sail as replacements for units taking part in the campaign. Thereafter recruit detachments were shipped at intervals, departures continuing after fighting with the insurgents broke out in February 1899.

The San Francisco depot forwarded 7,816 recruits to the Philippines between 1 March and 20 September 1899 and also filled vacancies in those units sailing for the Philippines. During this same period, 3,584 recruits were forwarded to regiments in Cuba and 1,728 to Puerto Rico.

Later the San Francisco recruit depot was closed and recruits for the Philippines passed through the recruiting rendezvous at Columbus Barracks, Ohio. The San Francisco depot was opened again 15 October 1901 and operated for about a year because of increased recruiting for the Philippines. At one time more than 4,000 men were undergoing training there while waiting to sail. The elimination of many unsuited for military service prevented the transportation of undesir-

[100] "Report of the Surgeon General" 10 Nov 98, *Ibid.*, p. 713.

able men to the islands. During 1902, when the strength of the units in the Philippines was reduced, privates in their first enlistment who had 2 years or more to serve were transferred out of those organizations scheduled to leave and placed in those remaining in the islands, with a consequent reduction in the number of recruits required.

Depot Battalions for Units Serving in the Tropics

After the War with Spain, a large portion of the United States Army was stationed overseas. The distribution of troops on 1 October 1899 was:

Country	*Troops*
Total	97,538
United States (including personnel en route)	51,536
Cuba	11,369
Puerto Rico	3,365
Philippine Islands	31,268

The Army soon discovered that the health of northerners serving in tropical climates was undermined rapidly. In 1899 each of the regiments in Cuba designated 1 of its 3 battalions as a depot battalion, to which were transferred men who were about to be discharged, those who were ill, or those who were ineffectives for other reasons.[101] These depot battalions returned to the United States for a year before they were again recruited to full strength and returned to foreign service. They were then replaced in the States by another battalion designated by the regimental commander, a practice which reduced the length of service in the tropics to 2 years for most soldiers. While the depot battalions were in the United States, they received and trained recruits who were to serve in the regiments overseas. From 1899 until 1903, the War Department directed a number of other Regular Army regiments, particularly those in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, to return depot battalions to the United States.

Locations of these depot battalions included:

1st Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
2d Infantry at Fort Thomas, Ky.
5th Infantry at Fort Sheridan, Ill.
8th Infantry at Fort Snelling, Minn.
10th Infantry at Fort Crook, Nebr.
15th Infantry at Madison Barracks, N. Y.
24th Infantry at Vancouver Barracks, Wash.
25th Infantry at Fort Sam Houston, Tex.
5th Cavalry at Fort Myer, Va.
2d Artillery in the Department of the East.

[101] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899,* I, pt. 2, p. 8; WD GO 153, 21 Aug 99.

Volunteers for the Philippine Insurrection

The Volunteer Army had been authorized only during wartime or when war was imminent; consequently, the suspension of hostilities with Spain made it necessary to muster out the volunteers, although the situation was tense in the Philippines. The Adjutant General recommended that the Regular Army be increased to a strength sufficient to take care of all overseas military duties. On 18 August 1898, it was announced that half of the Volunteers, or 100,000 men, would be released, and detailed instructions to that effect were published a few days later.[102] The mustering-out of the Volunteer regiments, except for those in the Philippines, started 5 September; the Regular Army discharged those men who had enlisted for the duration of the war. The matter of the Nation's military forces came before Congress, which passed a bill on 2 March 1899 [103] authorizing a Regular Army of only 65,000 men but supplemented by 35,000 Volunteers to be recruited from the country at large. In June of 1899, the mustering-out of the Volunteer regiments that had served in Cuba and Puerto Rico was completed and the Volunteers started returning from the Philippines. All had been released by November.

On 5 July 1899, the President authorized the organization of the first 10 infantry regiments of the new group of Volunteers. A few days later authorization was given for two more Volunteer infantry regiments and a Volunteer cavalry regiment formed in the Philippines. These units were activated in the islands and many of their men enlisted there, but they also received fillers from the United States. Ten additional Volunteer infantry regiments, recruited in the United States, were authorized in August. On 9 September, the President directed the formation of two regiments with colored enlisted men.

Recruiting stations were established in all camps where Volunteers were being demobilized so that men could return from the Philippines, go to a mustering-out center, receive their discharge, then step across to the recruiting office, reenlist, and return to the Philippines.[104] Between 10 July and 20 September, 26,442 men were enlisted for these new regiments of Volunteers which started moving to the Philippines in September. General recruiting officers increased their efforts in order to obtain men to fill the Regular Army vacancies created by the release of men who had enlisted only for the duration of the war. All Volunteers serving overseas who did not reenlist there were brought home, released, and replaced by a new group of Volunteers enlisted under the authority of the act of 2 March.

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[102] WD GO 24, 20 Aug 98.

[103] Act of March 2, 1899, "An Act for Increasing the Efficiency of the Army of the United States, and for other purposes," 55th Cong., 3d Sess. Copy in *U. S. Statutes at Large*, XXX, ch. 352, p. 979.

[104] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1899*, I, pt. 2, p. 30.

Colonels of the new Volunteer regiments were Regular Army officers, but many of the officers of lower grade were selected from the Volunteers, and appointments were distributed among the states on the basis of population. Promising noncommissioned officers who attended regimental schools were selected to fill officers positions which became vacant after the regiments were formed. A number of officer vacancies were filled from the First Class of cadets at West Point, which was graduated 15 February 1899, 4 months ahead of the usual time.[105] Officers who were appointed from civil life appeared before regimental boards which recommended those found qualified to the Adjutant General specifying the grades of the proposed appointments.[106]

Developments Which Affected Future Replacement Policies

Some of the deficiencies in the United States military establishment which were brought to light during the War with Spain and the Philippine Insurrection were carefully studied in later years. Medical boards devoted much time to the consideration of typhoid fever, which had caused serious illness in the camps in the United States, and to yellow fever and other tropical diseases which took heavy tolls overseas. The development of the vaccine used against typhoid came about as a direct outgrowth of experiments conducted after the War with Spain. Voluntary antityphoid vaccination was started in 1909 and was made compulsory in 1911.[107] Inoculations were given all replacements in subsequent military operations.

The increase in the strength of the United States Army stationed overseas following the war with Spain had much to do with the later development of the replacement system. It became necessary to rotate men on foreign service by predetermined schedules. Before 1910, the Army attempted to follow a policy of replacing units on foreign service rather than replacing individuals. In order to get ready for foreign service a unit in the United States would transfer all its members who were to serve less than the required overseas tour and who indicated they did not care to reenlist.[108] Such an extensive turnover prior to the departure of a unit was unsatisfactory. In 1910, the system was changed and only those persons who had less than 4 months to serve were transferred from regiments. This practice made it easier for a unit to prepare for foreign service but resulted in more expirations of terms of service overseas,

[105] *Ibid.*, I, pt. 1, p. 539.
[106] WD Circular Letter, 6 Jun 98.
[107] *Annual Report of the War Department, 1911,* I, p. 340.
[108] Memo, WDGS, 15 Dec 39, sub: Comparison of Individual and Unit Replacement Systems for Personnel on Foreign Service. G–1/15943. DRB, TAG.

thereby increasing the replacement problems for units on foreign service. Regiments overseas were spoken of as "Colonial Regiments."[109]

In 1912, a system of individual replacements was adopted, but unit rotation appears to have been practiced in some instances until about the time of World War I. After the system of individual rotation was placed in operation, it was found that men who arrived overseas were quickly absorbed by the units to which they were assigned, for noncommissioned officers could quickly indoctrinate new arrivals.[110]

An incident in Manila in late 1914, or early 1915, demonstrated the value of intensive recruit training. Some 800 recruits, who had been exposed to both measles and mumps on shipboard, arrived at Manila Bay. The Mariveles Quarantine Station could not handle such a number; consequently they were quarantined on the B target range at Fort William McKinley and were not released until 10 days had elapsed after the last case developed. Five officers were detailed to administration and instruction and the 6 weeks during which the men were held in the camp were used for recruit training. At the end of this period the hardened recruits were easily integrated into units.[111]

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[109] Statement, Maj. Gen. Charles H. White (Ret). HIS. 330.14.
[110] Statement, Col. C. Hildebrandt (Ret). His 350.05.
[111] Statement, Maj. Gen. Charles H. White (Ret). His 330.14.

CHAPTER IV

REPLACEMENT POLICIES DURING THE MEXICAN BORDER OPERATIONS

The Return to the Recruit Depot System

The replacement system operates in its simplest form when a recruit enlists at a military post and is assigned to duty on that post, receiving his training from the officers under whom he later will serve and costing the Government little. Small posts far removed from centers of population enlisted few men, but at the turn of the century the tendency was to rely upon them to do much of the recruiting. There were fewer central recruiting offices, although some were maintained in the larger centers of population.

Recruits received basic training within the regiments, with commanders distributing new arrivals equally among companies or skeletonizing one company and sending all recruits to it. Under this latter plan the companies of a regiment would be stripped in turn, each giving up men and receiving a new increment of recruits.

By 1904, most of the organizations of the Regular Army were understrength and organization commanders were complaining about the lower quality of the men. War Department official reports blamed recruiting officers for accepting men who were below standards in what was described as "attempts to set records for the most enlistments."[1] Stringent physical qualifications were still required on paper, but apparently these regulations were not being enforced to the extent that had prevailed a few years before. The lower quality of the men who were being enlisted was further indicated by increasing rates of desertion.[2] Regimental and company officers complained that many soldiers joined without understanding the terms of service; they believed they could quit the Army the same as they could quit any other job.

In an effort to remedy this unsatisfactory situation and stop the complaints that were coming from unit commanders, the War Department went back to the recruiting system which had been abandoned in 1894 when recruiting depots had been closed as an economy measure. In 1904, the Army reestablished recruiting depots at Fort Slocum,

[1] *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1905*, pp. 12, 403.
[2] *War Department Annual Reports, 1910.*

N. Y.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; and Columbus Barracks, Ohio.[3] Since these three depots were not sufficient to take care of all the men needed, recruit depot posts were designated and were located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Fort Bliss, Texas; Jackson Barracks, La.; Fort Logan, Colo.; Fort Snelling, Minn.; Fort McDowell, Calif.; Vancouver Barracks, Wash.; Fort Lawton, Wash.; Fort Wright, Wash.; Fort William Henry Harrison, Mont.; and Fort Douglas, Utah. The overhead personnel for the operation of these depots was drawn from the regiments of the line.[4] Applicants no longer were enlisted at recruiting stations but were merely accepted there, after which they were sent to the recruit depots or to the depot posts where they underwent final physical examinations and those found qualified were then enlisted.

In many instances, when recruits were examined at recruiting stations, the recruiting officers relied upon the advice of civilian physicians concerning the physical condition of the applicants. Frequently those physicians were not familiar with the requirements of the military service and accepted men who did not meet the standards. The employment of civilian physicians as examiners of recruits at general recruiting stations was discontinued in 1906. Thereafter, if the service of an Army medical officer was not available, recruiting officers themselves, assisted by enlisted members of the recruiting parties, examined the applicants. Those who appeared to be qualified were sent to the depots or depot posts, where Army medical officers gave them their final examinations.

The recruits were not detained at the depots for the purpose of receiving instruction; they remained there only long enough for officers to determine their physical fitness for the service. However, they were exercised daily at drill and in athletics and were given as much instruction as possible in the limited time available.

In February 1905, officials of the War Department, believing that the depots were being inefficiently operated, ordered the depot training units to be given permanent status and the depot commanders to retain recruits for longer periods, usually about 25 days. Officers from the General Recruiting Service replaced those depot officers who had been drawn from line organizations. Permanent parties composed of specially selected privates and noncommissioned officers performed garrison duties and instructed the recruits, who were organized into provisional companies.

Elimination from the military service of the undesirable recruit before he reached an organization of the line was one of the important

[3] The following publications contain regulations having to do with recruit depots: WD GO 159, 10 Oct 04; WD GO 74, 20 May 05; WD GO 135, 15 Aug 05; WD GO 143, 22 Aug 05; WD GO 154, 20 Sep 05; WD GO 194, 15 Nov 05.

[4] *Annual Reports of the War Department, 1906,* I, p. 590.

functions of the recruit depots.[5] After 1906, recruits attended courses of instruction which included daily both lectures and practical demonstrations on military subjects. Those who could not pass, or who otherwise were found to be not qualified for the service, were discharged. During the 25 days or so the men were in the depots before being assigned to organizations they acquired a fair understanding of a soldier's duty.

The officer commanding the depot had charge of the applicant from his arrival until he was sent to his permanent company, or, in case of a rejection, until he was put on the train to return home. It was at the depots that the recruits received their first, and what probably was their most lasting, impressions of the Army. When these impressions were favorable the soldiers found it easier to adjust themselves to army life.[6] Many commanders showed great personal interest in the men. An inspection report stated that the commanding officer of the Columbus Barracks Depot personally superintended the issue of clothing and toilet articles and the safe storing of the applicants' civilian clothing.[7] Applicants were kept from contact with other enlisted men except for such dealings as were necessary with the small receiving detachment. The inspection report added that the practice of keeping new men to themselves almost eliminated two grave dangers—graft and the playing of practical jokes. It was almost impossible to avoid these abuses when the applicants went directly to the companies immediately after their enlistment.

After extensive tests, depot commanders approved a 36-day course of instruction which was adopted 6 December 1910.[8] It provided for the practical instruction of each squad in the care of person, clothing, arms, and equipment, in drill and firing regulations, and in guard duty. Theoretical classwork included cleaning and care of the rifle, care of equipment, care of health, guard duty, knowledge of the articles of war, and outlines of first aid. A report from Fort McDowell Depot on the operation of this plan pointed out that no progressive schedule of instruction had been adopted for most of the classes because of frequent changes in personnel and time lost from bad weather. Medical officers had divided the instruction in hygiene and first aid among themselves on a regular schedule. There was 1 lecture each month on coast artillery at the batteries and 1 on army land transportation at a corral. Other lectures were given on such subjects as terrain features, map reading, judging distances, taking cover, scouting, and message bearing. Before the sailing of a transport, four special lectures on hygiene were given to the men who were

[5] WD GO 130, 16 Jul 06.
[6] WD Cir 41, 26 Jul 06.
[7] *War Department Annual Reports, 1908,* I, p. 411.
[8] *War Department Annual Reports, 1911,* I, p. 233.

about to embark. This type of instruction brought the recruit into more intimate association with his officers and gave him an appreciation of their interest in him. Instructors adopted informal methods, employing simple, direct, and familiar language, and giving practical illustrations. Most lectures were held in the open air, for there was no suitable covered place for large assemblies, and often the members of a class had to march as far as 5 miles.

Maj. Gen. Frederick D. Grant, commanding general of the Department of the Lakes, in his annual report for 1910, stressed the advantages which had accrued from the system of training recruits before they were assigned to organizations:

> The training of recruits before assigning them to their permanent organizations in the Army has proved not only a success, but one of very great value to the Army. The recruit now joins his company, troop, or battery feeling that he is a soldier and is able to take part in the drills and exercises of his organization without difficulty. He is self-reliant and sufficiently trained so as not to commit mistakes that bring forth remarks from his drill-master and older companions that would humiliate him. Recently I saw a battery of artillery and a squadron of cavalry, nearly all of the enlisted men being recruits of recent assignment, go through drills and exercises with a degree of efficiency that would have been a credit to any organization. Certainly the idea of training recruits at the recruiting rendezvous before assigning them to their permanent organizations was a most beneficial one. . . .[9]

In 1911, the commanding officer of the Fort Slocum Depot declared:

> The maintenance under one noncommissioned officer of the integrity of the squad to which a recruit is assigned upon his enlistment permits a dependable record of the personal characteristics and progress in instruction of the recruit to be kept from which reliable information as to his stability for the service can at any time be obtained. With this system in operation no recruit with disqualifying physical or mental defects should escape discovery within the time a recruit is expected to remain at the depot prior to his assignment to an organization. The system is so thoroughly established that it is now the basis of many of the most important features of the administration of the depot.[10]

Regulations required at least 2 hours of recreation each afternoon, but the commander of the Columbus Barracks Depot declared that this was a requirement which should have been made discretionary because there were times when "enforced recreation bored men greatly." [11]

Experiences With Understrength Units

Divisional maneuvers for training purposes that were held near San Antonio, Tex., from March until August 1911 indicated that

[9] *War Department Annual Reports, 1910,* I, p. 197.
[10] *War Department Annual Reports, 1911,* I, pp. 156–222.
[11] *Ibid.*

Regular Army units at peace strength could not be increased to war strength in a short time without serious loss of efficiency.[12] Orders issued 28 March 1911 added to the strength of the units taking part in the maneuvers, giving them all the recruits who had joined the Army between 28 March and 2 June. These additions did not bring the companies to full war strength, but they did show that the introduction of large numbers of recruits who had not been given basic instruction or who had not acquired discipline was disastrous to efficiency. (This is a striking illustration of the changing conditions in the nearly 50 years which had intervened since Appomattox, for during the Civil War commanders had requested that recruits be delivered to the front without any preliminary training.)

The officers who conducted the maneuvers decided that the peacetime strength of regiments should be increased and that there was need for a trained Reserve to bring units to war strength without great loss of time in the event of an emergency. The attitude of the General Staff in 1912 in regard to the replacement problem is shown by the following quotation from a staff study prepared that year:

> It is the experience of modern warfare that any given unit loses at least 50 percent of its strength in the first 6 months of war. If this loss is not replaced, there is a 50 percent deterioration in the power of the unit; and if it is replaced by raw men, the quality of the force as a highly trained team is destroyed.[13]

Until 1912, recruits had been assigned to line organizations of the Army in the United States on the basis of vacancies shown by the monthly returns of those organizations or by special reports received from the organization commanders. On 13 April of that year, a new method of assignment was adopted under which recruits were furnished every 6 months on a fixed schedule. Organizations thereafter were able to schedule two annual periods of instruction. To meet the special situation encountered in the Philippine Islands, unassigned recruits, the number being determined by monthly reports from the division commander, were forwarded to the islands to keep units there from falling below the statutory maximum strength, a figure which was seldom reached by units in the United States but which was maintained in the Philippines.[14]

Any man who had received training in the Army was considered a potential military asset regardless of whether he was enrolled as a Reservist or not. Many officers opposed long enlistments because short enlistments meant more enlistments and, therefore, the presence of more men in civilian life who had received military training and who were available for the potential Reserve. In 1894, the period of en-

[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *War Department Annual Reports, 1912,* I, p. 93.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 462.

listment was reduced from 5 to 3 years,[15] a move which was expected to make a larger number of former enlisted men available to the Reserve. Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, Commanding the Army, in 1895 recommended that soldiers who had 5 years of meritorious service and who desired discharges be permitted to appear before boards for examination to determine their qualifications as second lieutenants. He proposed that those qualified be commissioned before their discharge and that their names be retained on record for service in case of an emergency. While his recommendations did not result in any legislation at that time, the regulations of 1901 provided for Reserve nurses, and orders relative to a Medical Reserve Corps appeared in 1911.[16]

Efforts of understrength military units to function along the Mexican Border brought increased attention to the need for a reserve. The best source for trained men seemed to be those who had served in the Army but had been discharged and returned to civilian life. Military authorities for several years had urged that a law be passed which would authorize the organization of Reserve forces among discharged men. After considerable debate, Congress finally passed such a law and established a Regular Army Reserve 1 November 1912.[17] This Reserve consisted of soldiers furloughed for the unexpired portion of their 7-year enlistments (Class A Reservists) or those men who enlisted after discharge from the Regular Army (Class B Reservists). Its lack of popularity was shown by the fact that on 30 June 1915 it had only 19 Class B enlisted members, a figure which had increased to 27 a year later. On 30 June 1916, there were 4,621 Class A Reservists.

During 1913, the Army made tests to determine whether or not regimental recruiting could be effective under conditions which existed at that time and which were different from the conditions in earlier periods when regimental recruiting had been successful. The results were not favorable. Eight regiments stationed in populous territory sent their officers and canvassing parties, well supplied with advertising matter, into promising areas and attempted to persuade men to join the Army. Their combined efforts over a period of 10 months produced only 55 enlistments, 2 regiments obtaining no enlistments at all.[18]

In November 1913, special drafts of recruits who had had no previous experience in the Army were sent to units to determine how long it would take for details of 20 experienced noncommissioned officers to make effective organizations out of raw recruits under simulated war conditions.[19] Sixty men were sent to Troop G, 11th Cavalry, Fort

[15] WD GO 30, 8 Aug 94.
[16] WD GO 113, 22 Aug 01 ; WD GO 78, 12 Jun 11.
[17] *War Department Annual Reports, 1913,* I, p. 354.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 175.
[19] *Ibid.,* p. 176.

Oglethorpe, Ga.; 133 to Battery F, 5th Field Artillery, Fort Sill, Okla.; and 120 to Company G, 5th Infantry, Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y. The experience indicated that such units could be well-trained and ready for service within a year, which was regarded as the maximum period necessary under any conditions.

In 1914, the 11th Cavalry, stationed at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., started assigning recruits to one troop for 3 months of training before they were permanently assigned to regimental units. Experience soon indicated that this method of training was superior to any that had been tried before,[20] and would, if adopted, produce acceptable replacement material. Subsequently, its use became fairly widespread in other organizations.

Induction of the National Guard and the Pershing Expedition

Mexican border disturbances caused the United States Army to send two cavalry troops to southern Texas in November 1910. These units were augmented from time to time as United States forces patrolled along the entire boundary. Regular Army and National Guard troops were sent to the southern part of the United States for maneuvers and exercises designed to aid civil authorities to enforce the neutrality laws, protect border residents, and maintain order.

In 1912, some 30,000 men in the mobile forces of the United States Army were scattered over the country in 49 separate posts, each having an average of about 650 men.[21] The Army was organized on a plan which contemplated its expansion in time of war to more than double its peacetime strength. Units were authorized the required number of officers but only skeleton strengths of enlisted men. An infantry company of 150 men was regarded as the proper size for combat, but the prescribed minimum for peacetime was 58 men and many companies were below that figure.

Replacement problems confronted the units of the Regular Army even before they left their home stations. Most of these units were understrength to such an extent that they could not render effective field service. They depended upon the recruiting system then in operation to produce the men needed, but when recruits failed to arrive they moved into the field with only those available. Depots were unable to furnish men in sufficient numbers to maintain even the peace strength of organizations, and the privilege of purchasing discharges was suspended to eliminate losses from that source.

The experience of the 2d Division gives an example of the replacement problems that confronted the units serving along the Border.

[20] *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, p. 302.
[21] Henry L. Stimson, *What is the Matter with our Army.* (Washington, 1912).

This division was mobilized at Galveston and Texas City, Tex., in February 1913. At the time of its arrival at the points of concentration its strength was 648 officers and 10,937 enlisted men.[22] Approximately 4 months later, on 30 June 1913, the division had increased its strength by only about 200 enlisted men. Although 940 recruits had joined, there had been 941 losses and the only gain was through 207 reenlistments.

The 5th Infantry Brigade, which took part in the overseas expedition to Vera Cruz, was part of the 2d Division. After naval units had entered the harbor at Vera Cruz and landed a force of marines, the brigade, accompanied by one company of engineers and a field hospital, sailed on 24 April 1914 from Galveston, Tex., under the command of Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston. This force disembarked at Vera Cruz on 28 April, and the command of the 1st Marine Brigade, a unit which was already ashore, passed to General Funston on 30 April. Additional artillery, cavalry, and signal units arrived soon thereafter, and on 30 June 1914 the combined strength of the United States forces in Vera Cruz totaled 358 officers and 6,878 enlisted men. By 30 June 1914, the strength of the 2d Division, plus those units which had been attached to the 5th Brigade for the movement to Vera Cruz, was less than 12,000 enlisted men. The force at Vera Cruz withdrew on 23 November 1914 and returned to Galveston and Texas City.

The 6th Brigiade, also a part of the 2d Division, was sent to reinforce the troops in the Southern Department on 15 December 1914, and upon its relief from that mission on 3 February 1915 it was dispatched to Douglas, Ariz. During September and October of 1915, regiments remaining in the 2d Division were transferred to the Southern Department for duty.

On 15 March 1916, after Mexican insurrectionists had raided Columbus, N. M., Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing entered Mexico in pursuit of the bandit Villa. His force, averaging about 10,000 men, remained in Mexico until 5 February 1917. At the same time, in response to a call by the President on 9 May 1916, elements of the organized Militia from Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas assembled at Douglas, Columbus, and San Antonio respectively, and efforts were made to obtain enough recruits to bring the organizations to war strength. On 3 June 1916, Fort Sam Houston was designated as a recruit rendezvous for these units, and a general call for the Militia of the other states was issued 18 June 1916.

The National Defense Act of 3 June 1916 provided for the transition of the organized Militia into the National Guard and the subse-

[22] *War Department Annual Reports, 1913,* III, p. 116.

quent induction of units into the service of the United States upon their arrival at mobilization points. It soon became apparent that there was not time enough to recruit the National Guard units to full strength. Consequently, they were sent to the Border as soon as mustering officers reported the companies or regiments reasonably equipped for field service.

National Guard companies, averaging about 40 men at the time of the President's call on 18 June 1916, were recruited to minimum required strength by the hasty and ill-considered enlistment of all persons who were available. In one community it was reported that 36 inmates were released from a reformatory so they could join the National Guard.[23] Some National Guard units had on their rolls men referred to as a "accommodation signers," local residents who had joined to fill the quota upon condition that commanding officers excuse them from all duty. Most of these refused to muster. Recruits obtained in hurried drives frequently were underage, below physical requirements, or of undesirable character. Final physical examinations, given after organizations were mustered, resulted in many discharges, the men rejected being returned to their homes at heavy expense to the Government. Losses immediately after muster caused many units to remain in camp for long periods before they could take the field. Untrained recruits made up fully one-third of most National Guard units arriving in the Southern Department.

On 19 May 1916, the commanding general of the Texas National Guard brigade requested authority to send recruiting parties to home stations to recruit his organization to war strength.[24] The War Department could not reply to this request until it had decided whether to use State or Federal agencies, a matter then under discussion. An opinion by the Judge Advocate General said Federal agencies should not be used independent of State action until after it became apparent the States were unable to keep the ranks full, a deficiency which was obvious soon after units were mustered. The prospect of two sets of recruiting officers, one maintained by the Federal Government and the other by the States, was considered undesirable. The terms of enlistment, 3 or 4 years plus a period in the Reserve for the Regular Army and for varying periods in the States, needed to be standardized. The Adjutant General's Office, responsible for Regular Army recruiting, was prepared to recruit for the National Guard and, before publication of the Judge Advocate General's opinion, had assumed that it would do so.

[23] Ltr, CG Hq Eastern Dept, to AGO, 6 Dec 16, sub: Data relative to the Militia and National Guard called into the service of the United States. AG 325.45 Info, AG 2457329. National Archives.

[24] Telg, 1448, Funston to AGO, with accompanying papers, 19 May 16. AG 2396936. National Archives.

On 26 May 1916, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, considering that most State administrative officers were otherwise employed and that State agencies for recruiting would have to be organized anew, directed that Federal recruiting agencies be utilized in recruiting for National Guard troops in the service of the United States.[25] The next day, the commanding general of the Southern Department at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., was directed to detail such officers and enlisted men from the Texas National Guard mustered into the service of the United States as were necessary to recruit the units to full strength. Similar instructions were sent to the other departments.

Recruiting parties, generally consisting of a commissioned officer, a sergeant, a corporal, and a private, were stationed in the larger cities and visited outlying areas. The enthusiasm for National Guard service diminished when it appeared that regiments might perform monotonous patrols along the Border rather than go into Mexico for more exciting service. Recruiting efforts never were productive. The mustering officer in the State of Washington reported recruiting was almost impossible after the organizations left the State. In 3 months, 4 officers obtained only about 30 men.[26] Reports from the Central Department also showed negligible results.[27]

The War Department decided to discontinue the National Guard recruiting service and on 4 October 1916 notified commanding generals of the departments to return officers and men of the recruiting parties to their former organizations as soon as it was apparent that their efforts were not productive.[28] Efforts to recruit for the National Guard, even under Federal control, encountered the same difficulties that had defeated regimental recruiting for the Regular Army. Recruiting officers were out of touch with home communities, and distant service lacked appeal. The failure of the National Guard recruiting service left the General Recruiting Service as the only source of replacements for military units in Federal service.

After the return of the Pershing expedition, many National Guard units were sent home and mustered out, only to be called again within a few months for World War I. Other National Guard units remained in continuous service until after World War I.

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[25] Ltr, Secretary of War to Hon James E. Ferguson, Gov. of Texas, 26 May 16. AG 2396936. National Archives.

[26] Ltr, H. D. Coburn to AGO, 1 Nov 16, sub: Data relative to Militia and National Guard of the State of Washington called into the service of the United States. AG 2457329. National Archives.

[27] Ltr, CO, Recruit Depot, Fort Crook, Nebr., to CG Central Dept, 20 Sep 16, sub: Recruiting. AG 2396936. National Archives.

[28] Ltr, AGO to CGs of Departments, 4 Oct 16, sub: Recruiting, National Guard. AG 2396936. National Archives.

The National Defense Act of 3 June 1936 and Its Relation to the Replacement System

The provisions for military education contained in the act of 3 June 1916 had an important bearing on the replacement system as well as on other phases of military activities. Military education for students had received attention before 1916, but the National Defense Act gave it greater impetus. In 1913, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff, held students' military instruction camps at Monterey, Calif., and Gettysburg, Pa. About 90 colleges and high schools were represented,[29] and those students who attended received training in military maneuvers, tactics, care of troops, camp sanitation, and rifle practice. They paid for their own transportation, subsistence, and clothing, the latter two items amounting to an average of $15. Similar camps were held in 1914 and 1915.

The first businessmen's camps were held at Plattsburg, N. Y., in 1915. They followed the college student's camps, with the Regular Army personnel remaining to give instruction and using the same equipment. In 1916, camps were held in Plattsburg N. Y.; Oglethorpe, Ga.; Fort Terry, N. Y.; Fort Wadsworth, N. Y., the Presidio of San Francisco; American Lake, Wash.; and San Antonio, Tex. The scope of these 1916 camps was enlarged, and the attendance amounted to about 12,000 persons, many of whom became World War I officers. Congress appropriated money for transportation and subsistence for those attending, thus giving the camps official recognition which they had lacked before. This plan of training became generally known as the "Plattsburg plan."

On a lower level was the "Wyoming plan" which Capt. E. Z. Steever introduced in the high schools of Wyoming. Students volunteered for this training, which was designed to teach the obligations of citizenship without arousing opposition from those who feared the development of a militaristic attitude.[30] High school boys were instructed in military, moral, civic business, and educational fields, with emphasis on physical development and sports activities.[31]

Under the program of military instruction conducted in the land-grant colleges, the professors of military science and tactics reported to The Adjutant General the names of graduates who had shown special aptitude in military science.[32] Graduates so reported were encouraged to take examinations for commissions in the Volunteer

[29] *War Department Annual Reports, 1913*, I, p. 19.

[30] *War Department Annual Reports, 1916*, I, pp. 48, 172.

[31] For a more detailed discussion of the "Wyoming plan" see Kreidberg and Henry, *op. cit.*, ch. VII.

[32] WD GO 70, 18 Nov 13.

forces. As a special inducement they could be excused from taking examinations in those studies which they had covered in their college training.

The Act of 3 June 1916 also established the Reserve Officers Training Corps, which was divided into senior and junior divisions.[33] Graduates who completed courses in military science and tactics could be commissioned second lieutenants in the Organized Reserve Corps and temporary second lieutenants in the Regular Army. In their capacity as temporary second lieutenants they could be assigned to Regular Army units for 6 months' additional training with pay of $100 per month. Second lieutenants other than West Point graduates received provisional appointments in the Regular Army for 2 years. Permanent appointments were given to those who demonstrated their fitness during the 2 years of trial service. By 30 June 1917, 21,543 commissions had been issued in the Officers Reserve Corps.

Summary of the Period of Operations Along the Mexican Border

Military authorities did not recognize the replacement system in operation during the Mexican border period as anything different from the recruiting system. Recruiting officers operated the recruiting stations distributed throughout the country, and officers detailed to recruiting duty were in charge of the depots where men received their final physical examinations and where they were given some preliminary training. Every 6 months a Regular Army unit was supposed to receive the number of recruits that reports showed were needed to bring that unit to authorized peace strength. The unit gave these men training at such time as its commander saw fit, but the system had been worked out with the idea that all units would conduct recruit instruction twice a year.

Many of the problems confronting the replacement organizations during World War I and World War II had already appeared. Military units called into Federal service were understrength and needed filler replacements. After a short period in the service, losses started, principally from expiration of terms of service, desertions, or illness, and as soon as unit strength started to drop loss replacements were needed. Unit commanders frequently complained of the quality of the men they received, and it was recognized that the depot should determine the quality and value of a man before he was sent to an organization.

Immediately before World War I, recruit depots were giving up to 3 months of instruction to recruits. Normally, an officer was in charge of each group of recruits forwarded to a regiment or other organization. Upon arrival of the party at its destination this officer

[33] WD GO 32, 28 Jul 16; WD GO 49, 20 Sep 16; WD SR 43, 29 Mar 17.

forwarded a report to The Adjutant General of the Army. He also delivered the assignment cards and other records pertaining to the men in the group to the commanding officer of the organization which they were to join.

There was a growing appreciation of the need for examination, classification, training, and proper assignment of recruits. Officers serving at the recruit depots had some understanding of the physical requirements for camps, buildings, and training facilities which would be necessary in the event that a large number of men were taken into the Army. Voluntary enlistments had failed to bring either the Regular Army or the National Guard to their authorized strength, and the Army learned that military operations with understrength units were inefficient. The nucleus of a replacement system existed in the recruit depots during the Mexican border operations, but with no heavy combat losses to replace, no full-scale replacement system was developed.

CHAPTER V

THE WORLD WAR I REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Allied Proposals for Integration

In April 1917, the Allied armies fighting in Europe needed personnel replacements. The first military missions to the United States pleaded for men to be sent at once, saying that German troops were sweeping forward, that some French units had mutinied, and that Allied manpower reservoirs were about exhausted. The envoys hoped the early arrival of American soldiers would bolster Allied morale, then at a low point. The Europeans said that even green, untrained men would be better than none, for they could be integrated into veteran units already in the line. Marshal Joffre urged that the American Army adopt the "Plan de Nivelle" which was described by Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord as follows:

> Thousands of laborers, railroad and otherwise, carpenters, miners, chauffeurs, foresters, etc. but no fighting troops; such combat troops as might be sent for moral effect or to save our national face, should come as recruits to be fed into depleted Allied battalions, losing their identity as far as American control and leadership was concerned.[1]

The Allied High Command had little confidence in the ability of the United States to organize, equip, and transport to Europe an independent American Army soon enough to stop the Germans.[2] Allied officers and members of the military missions in the United States made frequent suggestions that, if outright replacements were not provided, small units of American troops should be either associated with or integrated into the British and French Armies. These appeals, at times almost demands, continued on both sides of the ocean until the tide of war turned against the Germans.

The Allied arguments did not go unheeded. Some prominent Americans supported the plan for quick integration: Admiral William S. Sims, Herbert Hoover, and Ambassador Walter Page, all of whom had had considerable experience in the war area, believed at the beginning of the war that the most effective way to get American

[1] Maj. Gen. John G. Harbord, *The American Expeditionary Forces, Its Origin and Accomplishments* (Evanston, 1929), p. 17.

[2] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 10.

troops into action at once was to send them to French or British regiments as replacements.[3] General Pershing was firm in his opposition: "I was decidedly against becoming a recruiting agency for the British or the French."[4] General Pershing's instructions regarding policy were announced by Maj. Gen. Francis J. Kernan, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, and were approved by the Secretary of War 26 May 1917.[5] The AEF commander admitted however that "the possibility of our being able to send a completely trained army within a reasonable time, even though there had been sufficient shipping, was remote because of our woeful state of unpreparedness. We had no such Army and could not have one for several months to come."[6]

The Allies did not have a unified plan for the integration of American forces into their own, a fact which weakened their plea.[7] The first desire of the missions to America was for loans, the second for men; and both the British and French agreed that their experience on the field of battle qualified them to command the Americans. Beyond that they did not agree. The British were for British control of the anticipated replacements from America, while the French were for French control. Confronted by these demands, American officials were forced to decide whether the American Army would fight as a unit or whether American military forces would become one vast replacement depot for the British and the French.

The solution was a compromise in which Americans did serve with the armies of the Allies, but the United States did not give up its military organization; small American units served as parts of British and French divisions. President Woodrow Wilson's instructions to General Pershing at the time of the latter's departure for France were to keep American forces intact, and neither the President, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, nor the Commander in Chief in Europe deviated from this purpose.[8]

By 20 October 1917, American battalions of the 1st Division, under the command of their own officers, had been attached for training purposes to French regiments in the Lunéville sector.[9] By 31 December 1917, there were 176,655 American troops in France, but no American troops other than those of the 1st Division had been in combat, a delay which was displeasing to the British and French. Prime Minister

[3] Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era, Years of War and After, 1917–23* (Chaptel Hill, 1946), p. 319.

[4] Gen. John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York, 1921), I, p. 31.

[5] Gen. Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (Garden City, 1932), p. 244.

[6] Pershing, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[7] Benedict Crowell and Robert Forrest Wilson, *The Road to France* ("How America Went to War," Book I [New Haven, 1921]), p. 16; Frederick Palmer, *Bliss Peacemaker* (New York, 1934), p. 147.

[8] Sir Frederick Maurice, *Lessons of Allied Cooperation; Naval, Military and Air, 1914–1918* (London, 1942), pp. 116–119.

[9] *Reports of Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, XIV (Washington, 1948), p. 11.

Lloyd George cautioned the President that American aid might come too late unless American units were incorporated into Allied formations. President Wilson and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker left the decision to General Pershing, who agreed that available transportation should be used to move to France the fighting units of six infantry divisions, leaving the shipment of service troops and administrative units until a later date. However, General Pershing refused the British request for an American battalion for each British infantry Brigade. He recognized that a situation might arise which would require all American troops to enter Allied units, but such a course was regarded as a last and desperate resort. The President and Secretary Baker authorized General Pershing to amalgamate units as small as companies with the British and French in the event that he considered it necessary. The War Department gave full approval to General Pershing's actions during the German spring drive when, on 28 March 1918, he made the entire American force available to the Allied commander for such use as he considered necessary.

The Political Factors

Political questions, both at home and abroad, affected the personnel replacement system. Some officials in the United States feared that large installations devoted to the avowed purpose of replacing casualties would arouse public apprehension, a fear which probably delayed the establishment of the replacement training centers. Secretary Baker discussed this aspect of the replacement situation in an address at the Army War College in 1927:

> I think the first mistake was the failure on the part of the War Department to organize replacement troops in the United States. . . . It would have been very much better if we could frankly have had two or three hundred thousand men in camps with the foreknowledge that they were to be sent wherever they were needed. . . . We had no idea about the effect of such an effort on our general public opinion. . . . Suppose the newspapers had said "Evidently the Army is preparing for tremendous losses, here are three hundred thousand men being prepared to take the places of those who will be killed or wounded." Now, we didn't know whether the public opinion would stand that or not. We had to weigh the probable reaction of public opinion, and we, perfectly conscious of what it would have been wise to do, nevertheless refrained from doing the thing we thought wise, because as we undertook to guess what the reaction of public opinion would be, we felt it was dangerous to do the wise thing.[10]

The General Staff had little in the way of prior experience to use as a guide in its estimates of the number of replacements which would be required for an operation of the magnitude of World War I. In all American history there had been no military officers who had been

[10] Newton D. Baker, Lecture, *The Political Factor in War,* before the Army War College, 22 Apr 27 (S). National War College Library, 325–37–54, pp. 5–6.

called upon to make plans for a project which required moving 100,000 or more men per month across the Atlantic to Europe.[11]

Many responsible officers in Washington considered that only a small expeditionary force could be sent overseas. There were some who did not believe that the United States could supply a large land army abroad. Others contended for a large air force, although there were in the country only 35 pilots trained to fly combat planes and the facilities for manufacturing aircraft were few. Since the shipping situation was complicated by heavy losses to enemy submarines, there was a danger that the greater part of the tonnage available would be needed for food and supplies with little left for troops.[12]

The General Staff's Replacement Plan

Most of the operations involved in the replacement system were under the administration of The Adjutant General, who had been responsible for peacetime recruiting, had organized and directed the recruit depots, and had exercised a major responsibility in regard to the assignment of personnel. During World War I, certain of The Adjutant General's responsibilities in regard to personnel were shifted to the War Department General Staff and later returned to The Adjutant General at the close of the war.

The General Staff's first task was to form an army large enough for combat. This it did under the National Defense Act of 1916, which provided that the Regular Army could be increased to 20 divisions, numbered 1 to 20; that the 17 National Guard divisions, numbered 26 to 42, could be brought to effective strength and called to Federal service; and that additional divisions, numbered from 76 upward, could be raised in the National Army. The calling of fillers for these units held first priority in General Staff thinking; the matter of loss replacements was regarded as secondary.

Of the 41 officers who were members of the General Staff in April of 1917, 19 were assigned to Washington. Nine of these were required for administrative work, leaving only 10 to plan for future operations.[13] On 12 May 1917, Congress removed the limitations on the size of the General Staff. This action was followed 6 days later by a reorganization of the War Department.[14]

Many of the officers most familiar with War Department staff work obtained commands in the field, and the jobs they left were filled by others whose lack of experience made it difficult for them to keep up with the fast-moving events.[15] The work of the War Department Gen-

[11] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, p. 254.
[12] Harbord, *op. cit.,* p. 10.
[13] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, pt. 1, p. 248.
[14] *Ibid.,* p. 292.
[15] Statement, Maj. Gen. Charles H. White (Ret). HIS 330.14.

eral Staff was made more complex by what was referred to as constant "changes of signals" from the AEF. The War Department plan underwent many revisions because of changes in reports from overseas. After the appointment of Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March as Chief of Staff there was more stability in staff operations, although the desires of the AEF still produced innumerable problems.[16] Officers who later looked back on that period believed that the efforts of the General Staff at that time entitled its members to more credit than could be obtained by a mere reading of the record.

The War College Division of the General Staff made the studies required for the mobilization, organization, instruction, training, and movement of troops. Since the small number of men who were assigned to this General Staff division had been fully employed with studies dealing with operations along the Mexican Border, the beginning of World War I made it necessary for them to shift their efforts quickly to the situation in Europe. In the War College Division, the Operations and Equipment committees were combined into a new Operations Division in an effort to form a planning group which would deal with recruiting, the draft, the movement of troops, the appointment, promotion, and detail of officers and enlisted men, and other personnel matters.[17]

On 9 February 1918, the General Staff was again reorganized.[18] Its responsibility was now divided among five main divisions including the Executive, the War Plans, the Purchase and Supply, the Storage and Traffic, and the Operations Divisions. A major portion of the planning for the replacement system fell upon the Operations Division, which after 9 February 1918 was responsible for:

(1) The organization of tactical divisions;
(2) Preparation of shipment schedules;
(3) Recruitment and mobilization of the Army;
(4) Appointment, promotion, and transfer of officers;
(5) Location of camps and cantonments;
(6) Distribution of equipment and supplies;
(7) Design, reception, storage, and maintenance of motor vehicles.[19]

The presence in the training camps and other portions of the Army of a large number of men who spoke little or no English created problems which led to the establishment of the Military Morale Section within the Intelligence Division. On 27 June 1918, the duties of this subsection were extended to include the stimulation of morale generally throughout the Army and on 18 August 1918 it became the

[16] Statement, Brig. Gen. G. R. Allin (Ret). HIS 330.14.
[17] *War Department Annual Reports, 1918,* I, p. 150.
[18] WD GO 141, 9 Feb 18.
[19] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, p. 255.

Military Morale Branch of the General Staff. Experiments in the training of foreign-speaking soldiers were carried on at Camp Gordon, Ga.[20] The development of the Military Morale Branch and the work which it supervised within the Army influenced policies for the handling of replacements.

Competition among bureaus for commissioned officers developed problems that led to the establishment of the Personnel Branch of the Operations Division on 18 September 1918.[21] Thereafter personnel activities were coordinated and administered in consideration of the service as a whole. Under the earlier system the most aggressive arms were taking the best men and in many instances not using them efficiently. There were many square pegs in round holes. Because branch and bureau chiefs had enjoyed added power by means of their control over officer personnel, many of them opposed the new organization. It was well toward the end of the war before the General Staff established a separate division to regulate the assignment and replacement of officers, a division that many believed should have been organized long before.[22]

Transition From the Territorial System

Staff officers encountered difficulties in devising a replacement system which would function equally well for the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army. The Regular Army was composed of men who enlisted for fixed terms without regard to the duration of the war. The National Guard was taken into Federal service and thereafter many of its men were secured by the draft, but its local origins had given it the traditions of State organizations. Many members of the National Army were selected by draft for the duration of the war, and, later in the war, men were assigned to these divisions without reference to the State or locality from which they were drawn.[23]

The United States Army absorbed the National Guard, except for a few units that failed to qualify, at a time when many States were using their troops for police or security purposes.[24] The States needed some military forces for home services, but the draft made it difficult to maintain such guard units as were authorized by the Act of 3 June 1916. State requirements were met through the organization of State troops or home guards, and Congress in the Act of 14 June 1917 had provided that all State units could receive certain equipment. These State guard troops were under the supervision

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 338.
[21] WD GO 86, 18 Sep 18.
[22] Statement, Maj. Gen. Percy Poe Bishop (Ret). HIS 330.14.
[23] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 55.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 3957.

of United States Army department commanders, who followed policies established by the Militia Bureau of the War Department. Officers generally had had prior military experience but were overage or physically disqualified for overseas duty. Enlisted men included volunteers outside of draft ages and drafted men physically disqualified for other military duty. The contribution of the State guard units released able-bodied men for military duty, thereby providing the Army with additional replacements.

Strong local tradition in National Guard units early became a problem in the organization of the Army and the replacement system. Many officers considered it desirable to maintain the local character of units, but requirements for specialists, some of whom could not be obtained in sufficient numbers from certain parts of the country, interposed difficulties. For example, men with mechanical skills predominated in manufacturing regions and were scarce in agricultural areas. Another difficulty was that some units might suffer higher casualties than others in combat, and there was danger of placing too heavy a burden on one community should an organization made up of men from that community be hard hit. It also became evident that retention of the local character of organizations would be extremely difficult because replacements could not be held until there was a call from their home units.

Early in the war, a military mission headed by Col. Chauncey D. Baker went to France to investigate organization problems. Its report (known as the Baker Board report) opposed a territorial replacement and stated:

> In the event of serious casualties to our Army in France, some divisions are certain to suffer very much heavier losses than others. To draw reenforcements for these divisions from the corresponding home divisional areas will result in the losses being distributed unequally throughout the country, as has been the case with both the British and the French. Should a territorial system of replacement be adopted, we should probably within a short time, abandon such a system and adopt the depot system as has been done by our Allies.[25]

The mission recommended provisional units not larger than battalions for recruits in the United States and suggested that these units give general and specialist training which would be continued after the recruits arrived at similar camps in France.

The early military policy was to form National Army divisions from troops in the vicinity of cantonments, but this was modified by the racial problem which led to an attempt to give each Army division a small percentage of Negro troops. This proposal required the transfer of large numbers of Negroes to regiments formed in the

[25] *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, I (Washington, 1948), pp. 88–89.

North and the subsequent transfer of white troops to the South to replace the Negroes. Other Negroes were assigned to the two all-colored divisions, the 92d and 93d, and National Army cantonments formed regiments of Negro troops when sufficient men of that race were available within the cantonments.[26] Negroes were assigned only to units for colored men, but these were frequently commanded by white officers. In addition, 24 Negro labor companies were organized.[27] The shortage of port labor in France caused the formation of a civilian transport workers' battalion which accompanied the first convoy. Within 5 days, the 500 Negroes who made up these units were gathered from the ports between Baltimore and New Orleans and placed under contract for a year's service. The men for subsequent units were enlisted, and the formation of these later units took much longer than 5 days.[28]

Territorial recruiting continued until August 1918,[29] with the recruits going to depot brigades in each of the 16 districts. Instead of a successive series of fresh regiments with new officers, a few organizations were formed at the start, and thereafter depot brigades furnished large numbers of men to fill gaps wherever they were needed anywhere in the Army. State and sectional lines tended to disappear within the military establishment.[30]

Recruit Depots and Army Cantonments

The replacement system was a part of the recruiting service, and as such it had proved satisfactory for a peacetime volunteer Army but had shown many weaknesses when the Army was called upon to patrol the Mexican Border.

During the summer of 1917, the work at the Columbus Barracks Recruiting Depot, Ohio, became so extensive that Fort Thomas, Ky., was made an auxiliary depot. On 7 August 1917, the latter was designated a permanent depot and provided with an independent garrison.[31] The 4 recruit depots and the 10 recruit depot posts then in operation were receiving men from the recruiting stations, examining and enlisting them, giving them preliminary training, and assigning them to Regular Army units on a schedule whereby each unit received new men every 6 months.

Drafted men received final physical examinations and inoculations to prevent smallpox and typhoid fever, and underwent a brief quarantine upon their arrival at the cantonments. Their first

[26] WD GO 109, 16 Aug 17.
[27] WD GO 125, 22 Sep 17.
[28] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, pt. 4, p. 4988.
[29] *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War* (Washington, 1919), p. 223.
[30] Robert G. Albion, *Introduction to Military History* (New York, 1929), pp. 179–180.
[31] WD GO 104, 7 Aug 17, par. III.

assignment was to the camp depot brigade to learn the manual of arms and other features of infantry drill.

The depot brigades in existence at the beginning of the war were capable of handling recruits and drafted men for the 20 contemplated Regular Army divisions, but they did not have the capacity to take care of the additional men needed for the National Guard and National Army divisions. The first draft levy, which was to bring the strength of the Armed Forces to 1,000,000 men, called for the induction of nearly 700,000. The number who could be called was limited by housing, clothing, and other supplies. Regular Army units occupying stations along the Mexican Border were moved to camps in the East and South late in the spring of 1917. Upon arrival at their new stations these units received men from the recruit depots and started to build up their ranks under the new Army organization.

National Guard units on the Mexican Border had trained about 110,000 men who, although many of them had returned to civilian life, again were called to duty and became the cadres for the new organizations that assembled in camps and armories during the summer of 1917. These National Guard units also received about 200,000 recruits through enlistments.

Since most National Guard divisions did not have adequate training facilities at their home stations, it was decided to construct temporary camps at which they could be built up to strength and could carry out their training programs. The 16 National Guard camps were: McClellan, Ala.; Kearny, Calif.; Cody, N. M.; Fremont, Calif.; Greene, N. C.; Hancock, Ga.; MacArthur, Tex.; Wadsworth, S. C.; Wheeler, Ga.; Logan, Tex.; Sevier, S. C.; Sheridan, Ala.; Doniphan, Okla.; Beauregard, La.; Shelby, Miss.; and Bowie, Tex. When the National Guard camps were completed, tent housing was available for 684,000 men but there were few permanent buildings. At the time of the armistice a project had been started to erect permanent buildings at a number of the National Guard camps in order to increase training facilities, but this project was abandoned.

The number of National Guard divisions that could be called into Federal service was limited, but the number of National Army divisions which could be formed depended only on the rate of mobilization, the number of men available from selective service, and the length of the war. Permanent National Army cantonments were constructed in which the National Army divisions were organized and their training was completed. They were then moved out and replaced by new divisions. The National Army cantonments were authorized in May 1917, and construction was carried on at the same time that the National Guard tent camps were being established. The National Army cantonments were of a more permanent nature and, unlike the Na-

tional Guard camps, were taken over by new units as soon as the old units departed.[32]

National Army cantonments were: Lewis, Wash.; Funston, Kans.; Custer, Mich.; Devens, Mass.; Dix, N. J.; Dodge, Iowa; Gordon, Ga.; Grant, Ill.; Jackson, S. C.; Lee, Va.; Meade, Md.; Pike, Ark.; Sherman, Ohio; Travis, Tex.; Taylor, Ky.; and Upton, N. Y.[33] Each of the cantonments accommodated a division, but since a division contained only about 28,000 men and the capacity of each cantonment was 40,000 or more, there was room for camp-maintenance troops, newly drafted men, and regiments of auxiliary troops or replacement troops.

The National Army cantonments were responsible for: (1) receiving all drafted men; (2) equipping, examining, and classifying all men received; (3) selecting and training specialists from the drafted men for the various organizations of the Army; (4) providing special treatment for drafted men unfit for combat but not eligible for discharge; (5) creating and maintaining the National Army divisions; (6) filling Regular Army and National Guard divisions to authorized strength; (7) organizing units or supplying selected personnel for corps and army troops, service of supply troops, and the various staffs and departments; and (8) training and forwarding replacement troops for all of these forces.[34]

All Regular Army and National Guard divisions were understrength and had to be built up with conscripted men. As the number of men called through the draft increased, it became necessary for the Army to organize additional centers where these men could be received. Depot brigades were established in each of the 16 National Army divisional cantonments,[35] first within the tactical divisions but later under camp or cantonment commanders.[36] The 12 National Guard depot brigades existed as separate units for brief periods but subsequently were absorbed by the divisions. Depot brigade units included training and development battalions or groups. Regular Army divisions did not form depot brigades but continued to receive men from recruit depots.

In an effort to prevent disorder on trains the Army discontinued its earlier practice of waiting until the drafted men reached a cantonment before taking them into the service. Local draft boards placed arm bands or brassards, which technically constituted uniforms, on the men's arms so that they came under military control from the time they started on their journeys from their homes.[37]

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[32] Crowell and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[33] WD GO 95, 18 Jul 17.
[34] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 259.
[35] WD GO 109, 16 Aug 17.
[36] *Order of Battle of the U. S. Land Forces in the World War (1917–19): Zone of the Interior* (Washington, 1919), p. 1277.
[37] Crowell and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

The first requirements of the Army in general were for facilities to accept the men from the draft, to outfit them, and to assign them to units. The recruit depots and depot posts could take care of a certain number of these men in much the same manner as they had taken care of recruits in peacetime. The extension of the recruit depot system appeared to be the obvious solution to the replacement problem that existed early in 1917. The additional depots were intended to train that portion of the draft to be used as loss replacements.

General Staff planners expected that 15,000 or 20,000 men would accumulate in the depot brigades and form a reservoir from which replacements could be drawn. This did not happen during the early part of the war because recruits and draftees were going directly to the divisions and to other units which were then being formed. When the frequent calls for men with special skills could not be met, because the depots were empty, specialists were assigned directly to units. Divisions given early overseas sailing dates could not wait for men to arrive in the empty depot brigades; it was therefore necessary to transfer men out of divisions which had later sailing dates, a practice that caused many complaints. Some division commanders were accused of using these transfers as a means of getting rid of men they did not want.[38]

The First Replacement Training Camps

The War Department had expected to train all loss replacements in the depot brigades at the National Army cantonments but it soon developed that these 16 camps were not adequate. Draft boards therefore sent many men directly to combat organizations. The depot brigades failed to provide the reservoir of manpower to fill vacancies. Since there had been no adequate provision for receiving the drafted men upon their arrival at the cantonments, the depot brigades were forced to assume this responsibility, an emergency duty which finally overshadowed what had originally been regarded as their main purpose—the training and assignment of replacements.[39]

Most of the men called during 1917 went into the divisions then being organized. Few were left over to build up a replacement pool. Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, G–3 on General Pershing's staff, voiced the opinions of many responsible officers when he declared that a "principal replacement trouble was that all of the first 500,000 drafted men were organized into divisions, and a division is a very small part of a war." [40]

[38] WD AGO, *The Personnel System of the U. S. Army* (Washington, 1919), I, p. 87.
[39] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 259.
[40] Brig. Gen. Fox Conner, Lecture before the General Staff College, 4 Feb 21. AWC Library, 184–222.

The depot brigade officials during the winter of 1917–18 were required to evolve a highly specialized receiving system to take care of the large number of men coming into the divisions. The development of this receiving system was one of the most important features of the mobilization process. Efficient distribution of recruits was important not only in the creation of new units, but also in the reorganization of old units, which was an important factor in the mobilization.

The shortage of replacements which developed made it necessary to break up some of the divisions overseas and assign the men thus made surplus to other divisions. Brig. Gen. W. P. Richardson, commander of the north Russian expedition, in commenting on his experience with the 39th Division, criticized this practice. He said:

> To my mind this system of replacements was a great mistake and one of the most unjust things of the war. It would have been better, in my judgment, to have had fewer divisions and to have trained the replacements in large central training camps instead of organizing these replacements into divisions and creating in their minds a division spirit and pride and then later scattering them for assignment, to go forth to battle under strange officers and in divisions with which they had had no previous affiliation.[41]

All arms of the service took men away from new units to fill up old units, a practice which lowered the morale of the new units and disrupted the training schedules of the old units. The calls upon divisions to furnish replacements usually came at a time when the morale of the division was at its highest point and constituted a procedure against which General Pershing protested vigorously.[42] In many instances, divisions were required to send all of their privates, leaving only skeleton organizations made up of noncommissioned officers. This stripping of a division was repeated in some instances as many as three times.

The first regiments that sailed for Europe to make up the 1st and 2d Divisions were filled with new recruits or by the transfer of enlisted men from other organizations: Department commanders used whichever method was necessary to get the men. When entraining dates arrived before units had reached prescribed strengths, requests for men to fill the shortages were sent by telegram to bureau chiefs who endeavored to have men at the stations to fill the vacant ranks. The War Department assigned all commissioned personnel.

Divisions with trained nuclei could be ready for foreign service much earlier than those made up entirely of green troops; so Regular Army and National Guard divisions were the first to go overseas. Because of the early call for divisions to go to France there was a constant drain of drafted men from the National Army cantonments;

[41] Brig. Gen. W. P. Richardson, "World War Observations," *Infantry Journal* (July 1920), p. 2.

[42] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 652.

also the maintenance of an army in Europe, at a great distance from its home base, called for a disproportionately increasing number of men for the service of supply, corps and army troops, and special personnel. The increase in the military program made evident the need for replacement centers where unassigned troops could be held and trained until called for by organizations in need of men.

The new field artillery regiments did not have enough men with more than a year's service to fill all the noncommissioned grades, but regardless of this shortage approximately 400 experienced men had to be detailed as instructors in the officers' training camps which were being formed. The Regular Army Field Artillery had a full-sized job in its own expansion, but that was not all it was called upon to do. It had the additional tasks growing out of the raising of 138 regiments of National Army Field Artillery and 51 regiments of National Guard Artillery.[43]

In the summer of 1917, three replacement battalions were established with the mission of providing replacements for the 5th, 6th, and 7th Field Artillery Regiments, but late in 1917 these battalions were sent to France where their personnel was distributed among the regiments of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade. Later calls for replacements for the overseas units were filled by drafts on the regiments in training in the United States with a resultant lowering of efficiency and interruption of training. By February 1918, when Maj. Gen. William J. Snow was detailed as Chief of Field Artillery, the situation within that arm was regarded as chaotic, and the major responsibility for training had fallen on the divisions.

The War Department had expected that the divisional schools would furnish officers for new organizations and for loss replacements, but the number of officers required greatly exceeded early estimates. The division schools, in many instances, lacked competent instructors, were not properly coordinated, and were not suited to training officer specialists. A school was broken up whenever the division of which it was a part was required to move. The training which the schools were giving was criticized as being superficial, uncoordinated, and inefficient; and it was said the courses did not turn out the required number of capable graduates. Duplication of effort in the operation of so many small schools wasted material and the time of instructors. There was no adequate plan for the training of enlisted replacements to meet the needs of units overseas. Consequently, general training of officers under the chiefs of the arms and services was instituted in an effort to correct the deficiencies that had been observed in the division schools, but the Artillery did not have the equivalent of the depot brigades which were serving the Infantry.

[43] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, pt. 4, p. 5051.

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The Chief of Field Artillery, recognizing the need for a replacement camp, on 27 March 1918 submitted a recommendation to the Chief of Staff in which he said:

> The necessity for the establishment of this camp at the earliest practicable date arises from the fact that we now have no replacement drafts of Field Artillery in this country. Furthermore, the replacement divisions of the corps in France cannot supply the same proportion of artillery replacements to their combat divisions as Infantry replacements. Three out of six regiments of Field Artillery in the two replacement divisions in each corps will be used as Corps and Army artillery. From the other three replacements must come the replacements of the Corps Artillery, as well as the replacements of the Artillery of the four combat divisions. These three regiments may also have to reinforce the line and act independently of the Infantry of their respective divisions. It therefore follows that casualties in the Artillery now in France will have to be replaced by drawing more directly on the United States than in the case with Infantry replacements. Since there are no replacement troops of Field Artillery even corresponding to the depleted depot brigades of Infantry in the United States, the Artillery replacements will have to be taken from existing Artillery brigades until the Artillery replacement camp is able to turn out men sufficiently trained to be sent overseas. . . .
>
> These replacements will probably have to be taken from those National Guard brigades not included in the first three corps to be sent overseas (since only the National Guard brigades have an average of over four-fifths authorized strength). There are nine of these brigades. These nine brigades can furnish the estimated total replacements for the months of March, April, May, and June (7,200) at the rate of 800 per brigade; in addition they may be called upon to furnish 960 more men per brigade to fill brigades ordered overseas; any further withdrawals would most seriously cripple them. It therefore follows the Artillery Replacement Camp must be organized as soon as possible so as to take over the burden of replacements after the month of June.[44]

National Guard divisions were deficient in engineer troops when they were called into Federal service. This handicap was overcome by transferring to engineer regiments organizations originally formed in other branches of the line.[45] The plan for the organization of the AEF called for the Chief of Engineers to replace the losses suffered by the Regular Army and by the rear echelon engineer troops; but it contemplated that depot divisions would take care of engineer losses which were suffered in the divisions.

In an attempt to fulfill his obligations under the replacement system, the Chief of Engineers in October 1917 requested authority to construct a replacement camp which would have a capacity of 16,000 men. Early in 1918, after the Chief of Engineers was given the additional responsibility of furnishing engineer replacements to combat divisions, the estimate of the capacity required for the engineer replacement camp was increased to 40,000. The War Department authorized 30,000.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 5171.
[45] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 3–55.

After the Regular Army and National Guard divisions had been filled from the National Army cantonments and the National Army had formed a number of divisions and started training, the special schools vigorously demanded more men. General Pershing complained that the General Staff had failed to provide men for special services and that this failure had made it necessary to take soldiers from combat divisions. The AEF Commander in Chief believed the General Staff should have anticipated such requirements from the start of the war and should have segregated these specialists and trained them as such.

General Pershing blamed the General Staff of the War Department for the shortage of replacements as well as for the slow arrival of other troops in France. He said:

> The War Department General Staff, as the superior coordinating agency, must take the greater part of the blame. . . . It has always been difficult for me to understand why our General Staff clung so long to the antiquated systems and faulty precedents which had guided its activities prior to our entry into the war.[46]

Additional functions which grew out of the war effort required the organization of many new agencies. Some of the old agencies took on new and specialized duties. The Quartermaster Corps developed into the procuring and storage agency of the Army, giving up many of its prior functions including that of construction, which went to the newly created Construction Division of the Army. The rapid expansion of the Embarkation Service caused it to become independent. The Tank Corps and the Chemical Warfare Service were established, and motor transport activities were consolidated into the Motor Transport Corps. The Bureau of Aircraft Production was divorced from the Signal Corps to become the Department of Military Aeronautics, later known as the Air Service. The Air Service had a system of camps and flying fields separate from the camps and cantonments established by other branches of the Army.

The demand for specialists in such departments as the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Engineer, Signal Corps, Medical Corps, and other service organizations increased by leaps and bounds, and all line companies in the United States were combed several times in an effort to locate skilled men and transfer them where their abilities were most needed. Commanders were so insistent in their calls for men that it became necessary for the General Staff to analyze all requests. Corps chiefs made final recommendations in the determination of requisition priorities within their own departments, and the Operations Branch of the War Department General Staff determined priorities among the other various services and agencies.

[46] Pershing, *op. cit.*, p. 278.



Bayonet instruction at Camp Gordon, Ga., 1918.

Depot brigades might have been satisfactory for training replacements for a military operation of less magnitude, but they were not adéquate for the 30-division program and were entirely inadequate for the 80-division program. Instead of parts of divisional cantonments being used for replacement training, entire camps were taken over as soon as they were made available by the departure of National Army divisions for overseas service.

By March 1918, men were accumulating in the depot brigades; they now contained more men than they could handle, with the result that a division of the work became necessary. All that the depots could accomplish was to receive draftees into the Army; separate the fit from the unfit, the literate from the illiterate; classify the men as to intelligence and vocational ability; put them in uniform and impart to them the rudiments of discipline; and, finally, group and entrain them for their units. There was little time for the training of replacements.[47]

Maj. Gen. John F. Morrison, Director of Training, recognized the need of training replacements separately and twice recommended the establishment of training depots having no other function. His second recommendation was approved by the War Department and led to the establishment of the replacement training camps.[48]

Special training camps were opened, some late in 1917, others early in 1918; and by the spring of 1918 replacement troops were being

[47] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 261.

[48] Maj. Gen. Henry Jervey, Lecture before the Staff College, 3 Jan 20. National War College Library, No. 15, 1920.

trained in designated locations. Beginning in April, 1918,[49] replacement training camps were started as follows:

Infantry: Camps Lee, Va.; Gordon, Ga.; Pike, Ark.; MacArthur, Tex.; Grant, Ill.
Machine Guns: Camp Hancock, Ga.
Field Artillery: Camps Jackson, S. C.; Taylor, Ky.
Quartermaster: Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Fla.
Engineers: Camp Humphreys, Va.
Medical Department: Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.; Fort Riley, Kan.
Signal Corps: Camp Alfred Vail, N. J.
Coast Artillery: Camp Abraham Eustis, Va.

Little was done during World War I to develop a replacement training system for chemical warfare, tank, or air service units then in the course of development. The Air Service obtained service squadrons by the transfer of supply organizations no longer needed for other purposes. Air Service officers were being supplied from graduates of flying and balloon schools.

War Department regulations issued in August 1918 announced that the term "replacement and training camp" no longer would be used. Installations known under that name were redesignated "training centers." [50] Units engaged in training replacements were referred to as "replacement battalions" in both the training centers and the depot brigades. After the National Army divisions returned from Europe at the close of the war they generally were demobilized in the same camps in which they had been organized. The replacement battalions assisted in the personnel work connected with demobilization and were discontinued soon after the divisions were broken up.

The Effectiveness of the Replacement Camps

The first replacement camps were established in April 1918, but several months were required to get them operating. There were several reasons for the delay: the cantonments which the camps were to occupy could not be made available until the divisions that had trained there were sent overseas; after the divisions moved, considerable alterations were necessary, officers and instructors had to be trained, and the recruits assembled. By early summer, the camps were functioning and their output almost equaled requirements of the combat troops, but when the Allies assumed the offensive in Europe the demand for replacements increased to such an extent that the number available in the United States was not sufficient. The influenza epidemic made

[49] WD GO 77, 21 Aug 18, par. II.
[50] WD GO 77, 21 Aug 18.

this situation even worse. Indications in the United States at the time of the armistice were that the training camps offered an effective solution to the replacement problem. General March said:

> . . . as cables began to come from the AEF requesting replacements, instead of taking them from divisions already trained as units, we simply went to the replacement camp and took these specially trained men, thus permitting our divisions to go to France intact.[51]

But the reform did not take place early enough to make itself felt in France. General Pershing said—

> . . . although the War Department eventually established a replacement system, as urgently recommended by me, it was done too late to be of material benefit even to the last division that came over in the fall of 1918.[52]

By 1 July 1918, the Americans were able to announce that the first million men had sailed. The movement of the second million required only 4 months. The American divisions in combat in France received sufficient replacements to remain in action although they were at reduced strength from that originally provided in tables of organization. A replacement system had been evolved, partly as a result of staff planning and partly as a result of developments in the field. The combat divisions, during the latter part of 1918, were able to devote their entire time and attention to combat training, with a minimum of distraction and without losses from requisitions to fill other units.[53]

The depot brigades, and later the replacement centers when they came into being, were used not only for replacements but as pools of personnel to fill up National Guard and National Army units and to form innumerable new units not even contemplated in the original requirements. Men trained as replacements for particular arms and services were often used to meet immediate needs. The first field artillery replacements sent overseas after completion of a course of training never reached field artillery units but were put to work on the railroads under the Corps of Engineers.[54]

An Army War College study conducted after the war concluded—

> With 700,000 troops instead of the 1,500,000 recommended by the General Staff the War Department proceeded to carry out its initial program of raising 42 divisions. No revision of this program was made. No pool of replacements was created and no steps were taken to obtain or earmark 313,000 troops estimated as necessary for the line of communications. In short, the War Department did not cut its suit to fit its cloth. Somebody blundered. The results were far-reaching, both in the zone of interior and the theater of operations.[55]

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[51] March, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
[52] Pershing, *op. cit.*, p. 380.
[53] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 262.
[54] Allin, statement, *op. cit.*
[55] Rpt, Committee No. 5, AWC, 31 Oct 34, sub: "Replacements." NWCL, 1–1935–5, p. 13.

Embarkation Depots

Most of the men who went to Europe during World War I passed through New York Harbor. In addition to the port of embarkation at Hoboken, N. J., other ports were at Newport News, Va.; Baltimore, Md.; Boston, Mass.; Charleston, S. C.; Philadelphia, Pa.; Brooklyn, N. Y.; Halifax, Quebec, and Montreal in Canada.[56] The operation of these ports required more than 53,000 men. A training camp for stevedores was operated at Newport News, Va.

To care for troop movements through New York, two camps of embarkation were established in the fall of 1917—Camp Merritt, at Tenafly, N. J., and Camp Mills, on Long Island. Each of these camps had a capacity of 40,000 men. Space for 20,000 more was later provided at Camp Upton on Long Island.[57]

By January 1918, it had become necessary for ports of embarkation to establish special facilities to take care of casual officers and men. The first replacements to move overseas were unorganized and without officers when they arrived at the ports. Before they could embark, sailing and passenger lists had to be prepared, service records of the replacements had to be brought up to date, and they had to be formed into units. When the casual camps first started to handle replacements, casual officers who were on their way to overseas destinations were selected and placed in command of improvised replacement units. Frequently, these officers lacked the experience necessary for such a task.

When the AEF started to demand large numbers of replacements the men who arrived at the ports were, for the most part, without formal organization, usually without officers, and sometimes without discipline. Draft boards occasionally sent men still wearing their civilian clothing directly to the ports. These men were assigned to casual camps, then sometimes were neglected for long periods. After their numbers became too great for them to move as individuals without disrupting the transportation service, they were organized into casual companies, usually of 50 men.[58] The first eight casual companies left New York for France on 5 January 1918, and before the end of the war more than 50,000 men per month were going overseas in these companies.

The Adjutant General of the War Department submitted overseas orders of casual officers to the Director of Embarkation and obtained his approval before the orders were published.[59] The Director of Em-

[56] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, pt. 4, p. 4909.
[57] *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, I, p. 30.
[58] WD GO 64, 3 Jul 18, par. VI.
[59] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 385.

barkation was in a better position to check transportation requests and prevent from going overseas those officers who lacked authority from either the Commanding General of the Expeditionary Force, the Chief of Staff of the Army, or the Director of Operations of the War Department General Staff. When the Director of Embarkation received the advance copy of the order he was able to make transportation arrangements or to advise that facilities would not be available.

The organization of casuals into companies containing troops of several arms or services caused confusion in the French ports with the result that many casuals were lost and never reached their units. This situation became so serious that the AEF abandoned attempts to forward stragglers to their former units and treated them all as replacements. Officers at the ports of debarkation first ascertained each man's training, then sent him to any organization which happened to need a man with that training. In July 1918, the War Department ordered officials in the United States to adopt this simplified system, and thereafter ports of embarkation treated all casuals as replacemens. Casual camps sorted the men according to their training and placed them in skeleton replacement companies representing the different branches of the service. Units that were short of men upon arrival at the port of embarkation were filled by taking men from the casual companies.[60]

When shipments to France had been properly regulated, nearly a fourth of those who embarked were replacement troops. Most were trained as infantrymen, artillerymen, or machinegunners, and they crossed the ocean in homogeneous units and entered the reservoir of men from which the combat divisions of the AEF filled up their vacancies.

Fewer than 4,000 replacements sailed from New York in January 1918, but by summer a peak of 50,000 per month was reached. From January to November 1918, approximately 236,000 replacements were shipped overseas, the equivalent of eight divisions.

Illiterates and Limited Service Men

Many men who were regarded as physically fit at the time they were drafted later proved unable to stand up under general military service. By May 1918, more than 100,000 men declared unfit for overseas service had accumulated in the camps, taking up much needed space, retarding the progress of the training units, and costing the Government a great deal of money.

Such men later were placed in development battalions in which they were given instruction designed to fit them to do some kind of useful work in the Army. Development battalions were authorized for Na-

[60] Crowell and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

tional Army, National Guard, and Regular Army divisional camps and in such other camps as might be designated by the Secretary of War.[61] The development battalions were intended to relieve divisions, replacement organizations, and other units of all unfit men. They were authorized to conduct intensive training with a view to developing men for duty with combatant or noncombatant forces either within the United States or for service abroad. It was expected these battalions would rid the service of all men who after trial were found to be physically, mentally, or morally incapable of performing the duties of a soldier. Boards, usually consisting of a summary court officer, could determine whether or not a man should be transferred to a development battalion. Such transfers generally were made within 1 month after the man entered the Army. Within the battalions, men were grouped into classes corresponding to their aptitude or degree of training. War Department orders were required to transfer men out of development battalions.

From May until November 1918, about 224,000 men with limited capabilities had been trained or had started training; when the armistice was signed 129,000 were performing useful tasks, largely in the supply and administrative branches where they had released men qualified for combat duty. The remainder of the 224,000 had been discharged or were still in training. Many of the illiterates and non-English-speaking men had learned to write letters or simple messages within 3 months after starting their studies.

Besides accepting into the service those men with minor defects, draft boards rejected large numbers for minor causes. Out of 3,208,446 registrants examined by the draft boards, 339,377, or 10.58 percent, were rejected as unfit for general military service although they were capable of many forms of limited service.[62] Many of these men, chagrined at being rejected, sought a chance to serve in some capacity. The General Staff, in the summer of 1918, made plans for using on limited service men such as the draft boards were rejecting. The first of these were called into the Army in June. In all, local boards drafted 108,245 classified as fit only for limited duty. Many were trained in the development battalions, but after a report from the Provost Marshal General a camp for limited service men was opened at Camp Upton, N. Y., in July. The first group at this camp numbered about 10,000, many of whom later were assigned as clerks and stenographers, placed in other office work, or given positions in administrative agencies.[63] Additional groups were trained later. The War Department adopted the policy of using limited service men to the

[61] WD GO 45, 9 May 1918, par. 1; T/O 401, Training Bn., Inf., Series D, corrected to 22 Mar 1918; *Order of Battle . . . Zone of the Interior*, p. 1309.

[62] *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General*, p. 154.

[63] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 268.

maximum extent possible in order to increase the number of physically fit men who would be available for combat duty.

The Inspector General reported that the development battalions were hampered by lack of personnel, and that their administration, discipline, and systems of training were not uniform in the several camps.[64] This report indicated that the men assigned from development battalions to units were not all sufficiently trained to be of value. At first, the development battalions were part of the depot brigades, but they later were made independent units to facilitate administration.

Classification of Military Skills

At the beginning of the mobilization there were few Regular Army officers available to perform the scores of duties connected with the procurement of new officers. As a result, personnel experts had to be recruited from commercial and industrial life. A rating scale, developed by Dr. Walter Dill Scot, was adapted to the needs of the Army and tested at the officers' training camps at Fort Myer, Va., and Plattsburg, N. Y.

The Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army, a division of The Adjutant General's Office, furnished assigning and appointing agencies information regarding the occupations and abilities of the officers and enlisted men. This committee, established by the Secretary of War 5 August 1917, developed the Army classification system.[65] It developed classification methods and forms for enlisted personnel and did pioneer work in preparing psychiatric tests for job classification of enlisted men. It also prepared a rating card for officers which later was replaced by efficiency reports prepared by the Personnel Branch, the first real efficiency reports used by the Army.

The Personnel Branch of the Operations Division of the General Staff, at the time of its organization, made a thorough survey of officers' records, classification methods, and efficiency reporting. It studied civilian practices and methods used in foreign armies, prepared a single list promotion plan, and proposed legislation which led to the class B officer classification boards. The single list promotion plan did much to remove old branch and arm jealousies and to improve morale.[66] This branch studied a plan for central control over all sources for officers of the line. After the Armistice, the procurement and appointment functions of the branch were limited to the Reserve Corps. When the Committee on Classification of Per-

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 653.
[65] *War Department Annual Reports, 1918*, I, p. 212.
[66] Bishop, statement, *op. cit.*

sonnel in the Army went out of existence, 18 September 1918, its personnel went to the Miscellaneous Section of the Personnel Branch.[67]

The Promotion and Assignment Section of the Personnel Branch undertook a study of classification methods in an effort to provide data needed to develop uniform procedures. The Procurement Section obtained commissioned personnel and made assignments to fill requisitions from all branches of the service.[68] At the time the Procurement Section was established, 1 October 1918, no commissions had been issued to civilians since 12 August and about 14,000 vacancies existed. Twelve district offices were established, and by 11 November 400 applications were being received daily. Centralized procurement offered a number of advantages over the system of procurement through the staff corps: competition among the arms and services seeking officers was eliminated, and recruiting parties, which formerly had procured officers, were no longer necessary.

The depots themselves created special organizations for each specific duty in connection with the handling of men and so achieved greater efficiency. Physical examinations were given by special medical boards; special mental tests were given by psychological boards; and trade tests, both oral and written, were administered by trade-test detachments under the personnel officers. A special committee of the American Psychological Association devised the Alpha and Beta tests, which indicated general intelligence. Alpha tests were for men who could read and write English; Beta tests were for those who could not. Between 1 May and 1 October 1918, approximately 1,300,000 men took these tests.[69]

All officers of the Army below the grade of brigadier general, on active duty and serving within the continental limits of the United States, filled out qualification cards and were rated according to a rating scale.[70] These cards accompanied the officers upon transfer, within the United States or overseas, and were delivered to the commanding officers to whom they reported. Duplicate officers' qualification cards were forwarded to The Adjutant General of the Army, except for those of officers of staff corps, the National Guard, National Army, and Officers Reserve Corps, which went to the chief of the staff corps or department concerned. These cards provided a record of both the civilian occupation and the military experience of each officer. Ratings were given on physical and personal qualities, intelligence, leadership, and general value to the service; and this infor-

[67] Brig. Gen. Percy Poe Bishop, "Army Personnel Plans," *Army and Navy Register* LXV (1919), p. 641.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 513.
[69] *The Personnel System of the U. S. Army* (CCP 400), II, p. 220.
[70] WD GO 46, 9 May 18.

mation was used in determining assignments. The cards recorded the opinions of commanders as to the ability of their officers, entries which affected promotions, demotions, and separations from the service.

The ideal sought in the depot brigades was a single receiving establishment where the recruit might enter, change to a uniform, and undergo a trade test to determine his ability and best assignment, after which he would be ready for his first training. Classification usually was accomplished during the first 10 days after a man arrived in camp. Camps were furnished sets of questions divided into groups of 10 questions each designed for apprentices, journeymen, or experts in certain occupations.[71] Before the World War I mobilization ceased, standardized tests had been prepared in 83 of the more essential trades. The Committee on Classification of Personnel had devised tables of occupational needs for various military units and published the trade specification and occupational index as well as qualification cards and a rating scale adapted to military units. Reports which were obtained from employers aided in the identification of specialists who entered the Army.

A qualification record card, showing civilian occupation and military experience, accompanied each enlisted man to each new assignment. Tables of occupational needs, specifying the proper assignment in a division for men with trade abilities, were issued to division commanders on 28 March 1918. These tables showed the requirements for skills in each unit. By using them, personnel officers could correctly place trained men who previously had not been properly assigned, thereby avoiding the delay and expense of procuring craftsmen from the Army schools.

Camp personnel adjutants kept the records not only of all the soldiers in the permanent camp service units, but also of the recruits from the time they were classified in the depot brigades until they transferred into the divisional units.[72] The Adjutant General's Department assigned personnel adjutants, who could not be replaced without approval from Washington. Schools for personnel adjutants were established to train the interviewers who questioned the men, and by the close of the 1918 fiscal year, 345 candidates had attended these schools. Interviewers, using instructions from the Trade Test Division, checked the soldiers' claims of ability in any trade and determined the degree of their skill by means of standardized questions prepared after thorough study of the trades involved. In addition to taking oral tests, soldiers had to perform the job. A soldier who claimed to be a truckdriver not only answered questions about driving but also drove a truck over a difficult test course.

[71] *The Personnel System of the U. S. Army* (CCP 399), I, p. 348.
[72] *Ibid.*, I, p. 85.

Personnel adjutants and their staffs at the camps where the men were received from civil life were responsible for interviewing and trade testing. They assumed responsibility for all the work formerly done by the mustering officers and prepared all the papers having to do with insurance and allotments. They had charge of the records of each soldier from the time he entered the camp as a civilian until he was assigned to a unit or until he was rejected and returned to civilian life.

Reports on the number of men skilled in specified lists of Army trades were sent from receiving camps to the Adjutant General's Office where they were summarized by the Central Personnel Division. This division received all requisitions for personnel from staff corps and authorized units of the Army. After considering the reports from the field and studying the vocational composition of military units, it filled the requisitions when authorized by the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff.

The Committee on Classification, under staff supervision, received all requisitions for enlisted men, analyzed the requirements of the units submitting the requisitions, and drew up the orders of assignment upon the basis of the tabulated reports and in accordance with the general program. Under this system the committee supplied 64 percent of the Signal Corps, 45 percent of the Engineers, 44 percent of the Field Artillery, 42 percent of the Coast Artillery Corps, and 41 percent of the construction troops.[73]

The War Service Exchange of the Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army, established by The Adjutant General on 9 January 1918, determined the qualifications of civilians who desired to serve the Army, either as officers, enlisted specialists, or in a civilian capacity, and advised them how to proceed. Applicants were classified on forms similar to the officers' qualification card. By the close of the fiscal year 1918, about 31,000 of these forms had been used, but this number represented only about 20 percent of the total applications received, for many who were considered did not progress far enough for their forms to be filled out.

The Trend Toward Specialization

When the camps found it necessary to specialize, most of the infantry replacements were trained at Camp Gordon, Ga.; Camp Lee, Va.; Camp Pike, Ark.; Camp MacArthur, Tex.; or Camp Grant, Ill. Machine gunners were trained at Camp Hancock, Ga.; field artillerymen at Camp Jackson, S. C., and Camp Taylor, Ky.; signal corps replacements at Camp Meade, Md., and Camp Alfred J. Vail, N. J.[74] Special-

[73] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 263.
[74] Crowell and Wilson, *op. cit.* pp. 70–71.

ized replacement training carried on at other centers included: Engineer Corps, Camp Humphreys, Va., and Camp Forrest, Ga.; Quartermaster Corps, Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Fla., and Camp Meigs, D. C.; Medical Corps, Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., and Fort Riley, Kans.; Coast Artillery, Camp Eustis, Va.; Tank Corps, Camp Polk, N. C., and a training camp at Gettysburg, Pa.; Chemical Warfare, Lakehurst, N. J. The Air Service established a number of flying fields and training camps.

The instruction in the technical and staff branches was charged to the chiefs of those branches, to be conducted by them according to their needs, but supervised by the Training and Instruction Branch of G3, War Department General Staff. The training for the infantry and machinegun replacements centered in the Training Branch and was covered by a training circular issued to all camps.

Replacement training up to the time of the Armistice was conducted on the following basis: Infantry, 60 percent; Engineers, 13 percent; Field Artillery, 8 percent; Signal Corps, 6 percent; Quartermaster, 4 percent; Medical Department, 3 percent; Coast Artillery Corps, 3 percent; Ordnance, 2 percent; and Calvary, 1 percent.

Officers

Estimates early in 1918 indicated a need for 150,000 additional officers. In order to allow for those who failed to complete their training, it appeared that about 200,000 should be enrolled in officers' training schools. Many of the cadets graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1916 were immediately commissioned first lieutenants. Provisional second lieutenants who were appointed during the latter part of 1916 were chosen from the enlisted men of the Regular Army, from among officers and enlisted men of the National Guard, and from men in civil life.[75] Some noncommissioned officers of the National Army who were regarded as outstanding were commissioned as temporary second lieutenants for the duration of the war. Graduates of the central officers' training schools conducted by the arms and services received provisional commissions. Students at the Military Academy in five classes were commissioned before completing their regular 4-year course. These classes graduated on the following schedule:

Class of 1917—20 April 1917.
Class of 1918—30 August 1917.
Class of 1919—12 June 1918.
Class of 1920—1 November 1918.
Class of 1921—1 November 1918.

[75] *War Department Annual Reports, 1918,* I, p. 1421; *1919* I, pt. 1, pp. 298, 510.

The early graduation of students at the Military Academy sometimes resulted in problems relating to promotion and assignment of officers. The 1-year course of instruction adopted in 1918 was continued until 13 May 1919 when it was increased to 3 years, and later the 4-year course was resumed.

Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, believed foremen on industrial jobs should be given direct commissions. He said that laborers would have more confidence if they went to war under the leadership of men they knew and trusted.[76] The General Staff of the War Department feared, however, that the foremen would need more than the ability they had gained in industry if they were to retain the confidence of their men in battle.

Three months' intensive training was offered to qualified civilians at summer training camps modeled after the Plattsburg idea, and in August of 1917 these camps graduated 27,341 candidates for officers' commissions, a number sufficient for the immediate needs of the Army.[77]

At the close of the first series of officers' training camps, the War Department sent to France as replacements 1,000 infantry lieutenants, 600 field artillery lieutenants, and 200 lieutenants each from the Coast Artillery, Engineers, and Signal Corps.[78] In France these officers received additional training in British and French schools. A large number were then assigned to the 1st Division, which at that time had very few lieutenants because automatic promotions had advanced most of the junior officers to the grade of captain.[79]

All together the War Department sent 6,000 junior grade casual officers to France, but the number was not sufficient. The shortage was largely filled by graduates from the Army Candidates School at Langres, which graduated 6,895 infantrymen. 3,393 artillerymen, 1,332 engineers, and 365 signalmen. Selected soldiers were commissioned second lieutenants in the Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers or Signal Corps after 3 months' training. The Heavy Artillery School, which was opened at Mailly,[80] conducted a course for enlisted candidates, but after the Artillery School at Saumur was established all candidates from both light and heavy regiments were sent to Saumur at the rate of four candidates per month from each regiment. There was some specialization, but most of the output of the school, about 800 lieutenants per month, was distributed between Light and Heavy Artillery primarily on the basis of need.[81] Officers were trained for

[76] Palmer, *op. cit.*, p. 141.
[77] *War Department Annual Reports, 1918,* I, p. 18.
[78] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, p. 309.
[79] Shipley Thomas, *The History of the AEF* (New York 1920), p. 45.
[80] Hq AEF GO 32, 18 Feb 18.
[81] Statement, Brig Gen Frank S. Clark (Ret). HIS 330.14.

staff work at the Staff College at Langres, a convenient school location because it was near GHQ at Chaumont.

A second series of officers' training camps in the United States was held during September, October, and November 1917, and a third series from January to April 1918. The men assigned to the first two camps were mostly civilians. Because officers of all grades were needed, commissions were granted up to and including the grade of colonel. The third series drew 90 percent of its candidates from the enlisted men, while the other 10 percent came from civilians of draft age who had received military training at recognized educational institutions. Those who graduated were appointed second lieutenants.

A fourth series of officers' training schools, with an initial enrollment of 13,114, was established 15 May 1918, in 24 National Guard divisions in the United States. In all, the third and fourth series of camps resulted in commissioning 28,894 officers. Schools of the first three series had been parts of the divisions to which they were attached and accompanied the divisions when they moved—moves which frequently proved fatal to further training.[82] The urgent need for the line officers caused the fourth series' schools to be separated from the divisions; five central officers' training camps accordingly were established at permanent replacement camps. Candidates from divisions scheduled for early overseas service were transferred to the central schools, which had an enrollment of about 46,000 candidates on 1 November 1918.

The United States entered World War I with an Air Service of 65 officers and 1,120 enlisted men.[83] At the time of the Armistice, the Air Service included more than 20,000 commissioned officers, 6,000 cadets, and 164,000 enlisted men. Training progressed as fast as fields could be built and equipment provided. There were about 11,000 flying officers, nearly half of whom were overseas. Approximately 17,000 cadets were graduated from ground schools; 8,602 reserve military aviators were graduated from elementary training schools; and 4,028 completed advanced training in the United States.

The central officers' training camps which were established at the permanent replacement camps in June of 1918 included those for infantrymen at Camp Pike, Ark.; Camp Gordon, Ga.; and Camp Lee, Va.; one for machine gunners at Camp Hancock, Ga.; and one for field artillerymen at Camp Taylor, Ky. The three infantry schools graduated 3,384 on 26 August 1918, the field artillery school graduated 3,690 during August and September, and the machinegun school graduated 649 on 15 September. In August 1918, there were shortages in the Infantry of 1,326 captains and 3,825 first lieutenants.

[82] *War Department Annual Reports, 1918,* I, pp. 18, 183–187.
[83] *Ibid.,* pp. 55–56.



World War I officers at Plattsburg, N. Y., waiting to receive equipment.

Offset against these was a surplus of 520 second lieutenants. Some of the Central Officers' Training School classes were graduated ahead of time to take care of the shortages.[84]

A special training school for colored officers of the line was opened at Fort Des Moines, from which 639 officers were graduated in 1917; two schools were operated in Puerto Rico, from which 433 officers were graduated; and schools were established in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama, the last named being discontinued for lack of suitable candidates.

A Committee on Education and Special Training was created within the War Department on 10 February 1918 to study the needs for skilled men and to determine whether to meet these needs by the draft, by special training at educational institutions, or by other means. This committee sought the cooperation of the educational institutions of the country in the military training program and represented the War Department in dealing with those institutions. It was made up of Army officers assisted by an advisory board of members selected from educational institutions. The chief of each staff corps or department detailed an officer to present the needs of his corps or department in consultations with the committee.[85]

[84] *Ibid., 1919*, I, p. 304.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 320.

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The French and English Governments detailed a number of officers experienced in combat to come to the United States and assist in the training of officer candidates and officers.[86]

Senior grade Reserve Officers' Training Corps units at 102 educational institutions enrolled 36,000 students during the winter of 1917–18. On 3 June 1918, three Reserve Officers' Training Corps camps opened at Plattsburg Barracks, N. Y., Fort Sheridan, Ill., and the Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. There were 6,500 students in these camps and the first commissions were granted 18 September 1918 to 3,264 lieutenants of infantry and 597 artillery officers.[87]

In the fall of 1918, ROTC units were replaced by the Student Army Training Corps, which enrolled about 158,000 but was discontinued following the Armistice. Members of the SATC were enlisted in the Army and received pay and allowances. National Army training detachments at the technical schools and colleges obtained men by voluntary induction, and by 11 November 1918 about 141,000 had received training in 141 educational institutions. Military organizations had received 102,000 of these men and 38,000 were still in training.

On 11 November 1918, the Secretary of War directed that no more candidates would be admitted to officers' training schools and candidates were given the option of taking an immediate discharge or of finishing their courses and receiving commissions. The majority accepted discharges. The officers' training schools were closed as rapidly as possible after 11 November. From the beginning of the war until 11 November 1918, there were 80,586 officers appointed from officer training schools.[88]

On 14 August 1918, the General Staff discontinued the appointment of officers from civil life. The Medical Department, which had obtained most of its officers from civil life,[89] opposed the regulations adopted in 1918 requiring that all applicants placed in Class 1 by local draft boards must be inducted as enlisted men before they could be commissioned. In October 1918, the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff assumed responsibility for all appointment of officers of all branches of the service. Critics of this policy complained that it removed all personal contact between the departments desiring an applicant's service and the applicant himself. Some members of the staff corps complained that after this order they were required to requisition on the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff for officers the same as supply officers were required to requisition soap or harness oil out of depots, and they resented what they regarded as impersonal treatment of human beings.

[86] *Ibid., 1918,* I, p. 19.
[87] *Ibid., 1919,* I, p. 322.
[88] *Ibid.,* p. 513; *Ibid., 1918,* I, p. 185.
[89] Maj. Gen. Merritte W. Ireland, Statement before Committee on Military Affairs, H. R., 3 Oct 1919. See Army Reorganization *Hearings,* 1919–20, p. 465.

CHAPTER VI

THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WITHIN THE AEF

Changes in Unit Organization

At the start of World War I the United States had no military units that could be sent overseas and immediately enter combat. Moreover, the organization of the Army that was on patrol along the Mexican Border was not suitable for service in France. The prewar Army, with regiments of 1,000 or 1,200 men and companies of about 100 men, did not fit into the European scheme. There the regiments approximated 2,800 officers and men and the companies contained as many as 264 men. General Pershing, before sailing for France, approved a new organizational plan which increased the size of units, thus calling for more replacements. The new divisions contained more than 28,000 men—practically double the French and German divisions.

The first tentative program called for sending overseas one tactical division which would serve as the nucleus for a future organization, establish a training base, and attempt to lift the morale of the British and French people.[1] On 24 May 1917, the War Department directed the organization of the 1st Expeditionary Division, which later was designated as the 1st Division, Regular Army.[2] The elements were assembled, reorganized, and brought to authorized strength by transfers and voluntary enlistments; they then started their overseas movement, the first units arriving at St. Nazaire, 26 June 1917. The last part of the division arrived 22 December.

The organization of the headquarters of both the 1st and 2d Divisions was completed in France. When the 1st Division sailed in June, the regiments were not at full strength. Four replacement battalions were formed in the United States and sent to France late in the fall of 1917, but their arrival did not fill all of the vacancies within the division, for it had suffered losses from accidents and disease even before its units went into action.[3] On 21 November 1917, the division was short 8,514 soldiers.[4]

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[1] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, p. 238.

[2] *Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, AEF, Divisions* (Washington, 1931).

[3] Shipley Thomas, *The History of the AEF* (New York, 1920), p. 47.

[4] *Reports of Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, XII (Washington, 1948), p. 150.

The General Organization Project

The Baker Board study of the British and French replacement systems disclosed that both of those countries were using two echelons, one near the combat zone where it could serve units in line and the other a base and training organization in the rear area.[5] In the British system the training echelon was near the base ports; the French maintained training units in the territorial region which levied the annual drafts. In both replacement systems the forward echelon provided the replacements for combat units. Both the British and French Armies detailed high-ranking officers with large administrative and training staffs to command replacement installations.

Reports received by American officers from the Allies regarding their previous war losses indicated that frontline divisions would need in the depots a supply of replacements equal to at least 50 percent of the division strength and that 60 percent of these replacements should be infantry.[6]

The first proposals for a replacement system to provide more recruit depots than were already operating in the United States came from overseas and were prepared by General Pershing and his staff. They were contained in the "General Organization Project" of July 1917, which was sent from the AEF Headquarters to the War Department and provided for the shipment overseas of 30 divisions during 1917. [The proposals are summarized in table 9.]

Table 9—Proposed Corps Organization, World War I *

Organization	Approximate strength	Organization	Approximate strength
Total	164, 348		
Headquarters	350	Corps replacement and school division [a]	20, 976
Divisions (6)	145, 428	Corps base and training division [b]	23, 552
Combat divisions (4)	100, 900	Corps troops [c]	18, 570
Replacement divisions (2)	44, 528		

[a] Same organization as combat divisions except for following detachments to corps troops: artillery brigade headquarters and 2 artillery regiments, 1 battalion of engineer regiment, and 2 ambulance companies and 2 field hospital companies.

[b] Same organization as combat divisions except as follows: 1 artillery regiment detached to army troops, and 2 ambulance companies and 2 field hospital companies detached to corps troops.

[c] Includes strength of replacement division units detached to corps troops.

**Source:* DA, Hist. Div., *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19 (Washington, 1948), vol. I, pp. 98–100.

[5] *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces* in U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR, 1917–19, I (Washington, 1948), pp. 87–88; Thomas G. Frothingham, *The American Reinforcement in the World War* (Garden City, 1927), p. 144.

[6] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, p. 960.

The report on organization which General Pershing submitted to the War Department on 10 July 1917 contained a section devoted to the replacement of personnel and materiel:

> The maintenance of a fighting force of 20 divisions in France will necessitate a systematic plan methodically executed for the replacement of losses. . . . Bearing in mind our long sea line of communications, it is evident and our allies advocate, that we maintain in France the two echelons of replacement employed by them but with a personnel equal to about 50 percent of replacement infantry of the fighting forces. The percent of replacement for the other arms is considerably smaller. . . . Study indicates the following replacement requirements for each corps: Two divisions complete, certain elements of artillery and other auxiliary troops being utilized as corps and army troops. After our forces are once engaged a minimum of 3,000 men per month for each army corps in France must be forwarded from the United States. . . . The replacement troops are utilized for these [training] purposes. By grouping these troops into divisions, not only a complete training unit had scheme are provided for, but, also the administration of these units is greatly simplified.[7]


The program as finally approved 26 September 1917 called for five corps of six divisions each to be in France by 31 December 1918.[8] An additional plan, a "Services of the Rear Project," was received in Washington 7 October 1917. [See chart 7.]

The American staff had set up on paper a balanced organization of 20 combat divisions, totaling about 1,000,000 men; 10 replacement divisions; and corps, army, and line of communication troops. The plan submitted in the "General Organization Project" made the army corps with its 6 divisions, 4 of which were combat and 2 replacement divisions, the unit to operate the replacement system. One replacement division was to function as a depot, the other as a training division.[9] Both of these divisions were included in the replacement system, although the advance division sometimes was designated as the replacement division and the other as the base division. Staff documents generally referred to both as replacement divisions. A proposed seventh division, which would have been a depot division in the United States, was disapproved by the War Department on the assumption that the functions proposed for it would be carried out by the formation of replacement battalions. War Department officials expected to form such battalions in the United States, give them some infantry training, and then send them overseas to be fed into the replacement divisions.[10] Infantry replacement battalions were formed only for the 1st Division.

In France, depot divisions in rear areas were to receive, classify, and give preliminary training to replacement troops arriving from

[7] *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces*, p. 94.
[8] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, pt. 1, p. 239.
[9] *Organization of the American Experitionary Forces*, pp. 94, 115, 121.
[10] *Reports of Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 142.

CHART 7- THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM IN WORLD WAR I, 1917-1918



the United States.[11] At the end of the training period, base divisions were to forward all replacements to the divisions in combat or to the corps replacement battalions.

The divisions that made up each corps were placed on a priority schedule for shipment to France—the first, second, fourth, and fifth to sail were designated as combat divisions; the third was designated

[11] AEF GO 46, 26 Mar 18, par. I, p. 4.

as the replacement and school division in the forward echelon; the last division to sail was to be the rear base and training division.[12]

Each overseas army was made up of from 3 to 5 corps. With 4 divisions fully trained, it was believed that an American corps could take over a sector with 2 divisions in line and 2 in reserve and with the depot and replacement divisions prepared to fill the gaps that might appear in the ranks from combat or other losses. The base and training divisions were to supply the first demand for replacements from their original strength, after which a minimum of 3,000 men per month for each army corps in France was to be forwarded from the United States.

It was expected that about 42 percent of the infantry, machinegun, and military police personnel of the replacement divisions would be needed for the training of troops. The remainder could be released and would become replacements for combat units or be otherwise assigned.[13] It was assumed that other arms and services would use fewer of their men for training purposes, the estimates being—Medical Corps, 19 percent; Field Artillery, 20 percent; Engineer Corps, 23 percent; Quartermaster Corps (supply and truck trains), 28 percent; and Signal Corps, 29 percent.

Soon after the depot divisions arrived in France they reorganized into training cadres, releasing surplus men who were sent as replacements to divisions in the line. The units of the 41st Division which were reorganized to form the I Corps Replacement Depot included Division Headquarters, Headquarters 82d Brigade, parts of the 163d Infantry, and certain other groups; but there were about 2,800 men who were not needed in the depot and who became available for replacements.[14] The 40th Division early in September, was reorganized as the 6th Depot Division and released about 7,500 men to divisions in combat. The 76th Division released about 7,000 men when it was reorganized as the 3d Depot Division.

The schedule of priority of shipments was forwarded to the War Department on 7 October 1917. It was intended to provide a clear-cut program that could be followed in the shipment of personnel and materiel, a program that would result in a gradual buildup of a balanced and symmetrical force.[15] Listing the order in which troops and services should arrive, it established 6 phases covering the shipment of the proposed 6 combatant corps of 6 divisions each and called for the arrival in France of approximately 1,300,000 men.

Since the replacement divisions would be the only stationary units in each corps, the officers who were in charge of training for the AEF

[12] Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander, *Memories of the World War, 1917–1919* (New York, 1931), p. 22; *Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces*, pp. 94–95.
[13] *Reports of Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 142.
[14] *Order of Battle . . . AEF, Divisions.*
[15] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 555.

established the corps schools in the vicinity of the replacement divisions.[16] Army schools coordinated the efforts of the several corps schools and sent trained instructors, while promising graduates of the corps schools frequently received additional training in the army schools. These two school groups trained many line officers.

One half of the artillery and other auxiliaries of the two replacement divisions of each corps were to be designated as corps or army troops [17] in the belief that there would remain a sufficient reservoir of personnel to maintain the fighting strength of combat units, provided the sick and wounded upon recovery were promptly returned to their former organizations. The peak of hospitalization was not reached until 7 November 1918, 4 days before the armistice, when there were 190,564 men in hospitals and convalescent camps. This number dropped to less than 100,000 within slightly more than 2 months. The bulk of replacements from the hospitals were just becoming available when the fighting ended.[18]

Provisional Units in France

The War Department authorized the AEF to form provisional replacement units.[19] Subordinate organizations in France in need of depots or special companies submitted to AEF Headquarters proposed tables of organization, which were considered in the Personnel Division. Replacement units, when approved, generally were announced in general orders, although letters of instruction sometimes granted authority for the formation of such units. The AEF General Staff issued instructions for the transfer of replacement troops who were needed to provide personnel for the organizations thus created.

The replacement system was the responsibility of G1, General Headquarters, AEF, but the depot divisions were under the command of the commanding general, Services of Supply. The Chief of the Administrative Section, General Staff, AEF, approved all calls for replacements before men could be released from the replacement depots.[20] Two officers and five clerks in the Administrative Section handled matters dealing with replacements.

Two depots were established at Blois, one of them a casual officers' depot and the other a base depot for reception and distribution of replacements for the Services of Supply units and special-type troops. Hospitalized officers and soldiers were dropped from rolls at the time

[16] Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[17] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 615.
[18] *Reports of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 147.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 209.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 151 ; AEF GO 64, 21 Nov 17, par. III, p. 2 ; AEF GO 31, 16 Feb 18, table II.

they left their organizations, but when they were sufficiently recovered they were returned to their organizations through the replacement system.[21] Corps commanders controlled the replacement divisions in the forward echelon.

The type of staff assigned to a combat division was not entirely suitable for a replacement or a casual depot; consequently, certain changes had to be made in the staff organization.[22] Since the system of training was weakened by the continual shifting of instructors, it was found advisable to assign instructors as permanent members of the training units. The organization generally followed the form of an infantry regiment but eliminated the headquarters of the battalions. Training was carried out in companies which were elastic in organization, and only those needed to train the number of men available functioned at any given time.

The American Army in France established base sections at the principal ports; intermediate sections, which included the main storage depots, were located farther inland; the advance sections extended to the combat areas.

Combat organizations submitted weekly requisitions for replacements, but units in the Services of Supply sent in requests once each month. The channel for replacement requisitions was division to corps; corps to replacement divisions; replacement division to depot division through commanding general, Services of Supply; depot division to General Headquarters, AEF.[23]

Automatic and Exceptional Requisitions

Automatic replacements were shipped by the War Department without requests from the AEF. In March 1918 these replacements, which had been 2 percent per month, were increased to 3 percent per month. Replacements furnished in excess of automatic replacements, referred to as exceptional replacements, were called for on special requisitions.

On the basis of previous Allied experience as reported by the Baker Board, replacements for the Infantry were estimated at 60 percent of the total number of replacements, and the percentages for the remaining arms were determined by estimating their losses and considering the relative proportion of the total number of each arm to the entire force in France. The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff attempted to estimate the number of replacements likely to be needed for any given month and to regulate

[21] AEF GO 111, 8 Jul 18, par. VII.

[22] Col. L. W. Cass, "History of the First Replacement Depot, AEF" (MSS in National War College Library), 27 Feb 19.

[23] AEF GO 46, 26 Mar 18.

the draft, the output of the training camps, and shipments so as to provide the required number.[24]

Under the automatic replacement plan officers in the United States did not wait for cabled requisitions from the AEF, but instead shipped a predetermined number of replacements monthly. The automatic replacement system appeared on paper to be an effective way of keeping units up to strength. AEF Headquarters in France did not find it so. By the spring of 1918, the AEF was short of replacements; many that it had received were not considered properly trained, and the United States had failed to meet the needs of the overseas forces for men with special qualifications. In May of 1918, the War Department requested that the automatic replacement system be discontinued. General Headquarters of the AEF thereafter requisitioned replacements in monthly cablegrams to the War Department, giving total numbers for each arm and service.[25]

Item Numbers

As soon as replacements in the United States were organized into units, the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff assigned item numbers by which the units were identified while on their way to France. These numbers prevented groups from being lost and helped the ports of debarkation in France to identify shipments, thereby preventing erroneous diversions. Troop units other than replacements received item numbers either after they were given a special call from France or when they were fitted into the Operations Division's shipping schedule.[26] Item numbers for replacement units were followed by the letter *R*, making recognition easier. The AEF was furnished item numbers of troops that were to reach France each month; thus headquarters was able to instruct ports of embarkation regarding the destination of each group of replacements.

Replacement Depots and Regulating Stations

The replacement system of the American Expeditionary Forces, under the organization which had been approved in March 1918, was to include the depot divisions, regional replacement depots, corps replacement battalions, and advance replacement depots in addition to a number of special replacement depots and base depots.[27] None of the regional, corps, or advance replacement depots had been formed at that time. The replacement depot for the Services of Supply and the Medical Department had been in operation at Blois since 8 Janu-

[24] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919*, I, p. 266.
[25] *Reports of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 144.
[26] Crowell and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 261.
[27] AEF GO 46, 26 Mar 18.

ary 1918. The Quartermaster withdrew its replacement operations from the other Services of Supply organizations and established its own replacement depot 15 May 1918. The Medical Department took similar action 15 July 1918. Other depots were operated for Field Artillery, Heavy Artillery, Engineers, Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Air Service, Tank Corps, Chemical Warfare, and for certain other groups including the 369th, 370th, 371st, and 372d Infantry Regiments.

The commanding general of the Services of Supply was responsible for the reception, classification, and training of replacements under the general supervision of General Headquarters, AEF, but the control of the commanding general of the Services of Supply in forwarding replacements and casuals terminated at the regulating stations. Army, corps, and division commanders assumed the responsibility for the regulating stations until the men reached frontline units.

The regulating stations were links between the armies and the services in the rear. The regulating officer, acting under special or secret instructions, declared priorities in the transportation of the things the armies needed most, both in supplies and in men. Besides being charged with the continuation of normal operations, he was responsible that emergency shipments of materials, supplies, or personnel went through to the units that needed them. It was necessary for him to be informed of conditions at both the front and at the rear. Since the evacuation of the wounded took place over the same railroad lines that carried supplies to the front, the regulating officer also had control over this movement. Regulating stations had to be close enough to all points in each zone to permit trains to leave after dark and arrive before dawn; also they had to be far enough in the rear to be reasonably safe from capture.

Between 2 October and 20 November 1918, about 173,000 replacements were forwarded to combat divisions. During this same period, First Army and Headquarters, SOS, each sent officers to the regulating station at St. Dizier to expedite the movement. The officer from the SOS received, for each train of replacements, the point and hour of departure, the name of the train commander, the number on board, and the organization to which the men were going. He then gave this information to the First Army representative at the regulating point and the latter forwarded it to First Army headquarters. First Army headquarters was then able to notify divisions in time for them to make arrangements to meet men at the railheads and forward them to proper organizations with the divisions. Replacements for divisions actually in the fighting line usually were held until the divisions came out of the line. Where this could not be done the men usually were diverted to other organizations.

In October 1918, the railroad yard and regulating station at St. Dizier were overtaxed and it became impractical to split up trains there. Replacements were therefore forwarded to divisions in trainload lots even though original assignment lists could not be followed.[28]

Replacements sometimes were incorrectly routed because many towns had the same name, the location of units was not known, or units had moved while the replacements were en route. Errors happened most frequently when casuals were being returned to their former organizations. First Army furnished railroad officers with a complete list of units being served at each railhead in an effort to eliminate such errors. Similar lists were furnished to the regulating officer at Is-sur-Tille, the commanding general of the regional replacement depot at Revigny, and G1 and G4 of the Second Army.

Unit Experiences in Receiving Replacements

Reports made by the 42d Division in March 1918 stated that the division had received a number of replacements who were unable to speak English. The report recommended that the commander of a replacement division should be held responsible that no soldier be sent to a combat division unless he was mentally and physically fit to enter the fight and had received individual training.[29]

The commanding officer of the 23d Infantry Regiment, 2d Division, in June 1918 complained that the replacements received by that unit were untrained and that the noncommissioned officers were not as capable as the privates who had been trained within the regiments.[30] The 6th Machine Gun Battalion had received a number of men who had had prior service but who came in as replacements. They lacked familiarity with machineguns, but they could be assimilated with less difficulty because of their past experience.

In 17 days of almost continuous battle in the vicinity of Chateau-Thierry, in June 1918, the 2d Division suffered losses in killed and wounded of 99 officers and 4,301 enlisted men, excluding ordinary sickness and many gas casualties. These figures were not considered excessive in view of the extent of the action.[31] The shortage of men in combat units at the front at that time was indicated by a 2d Division report which stated that 34 officers and 2,706 enlisted men, received as replacements by the division, were only partially trained and could not fill the places of that number of losses because they were unknown to their officers and noncommissioned officers. Con-

[28] *Reports of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services,* p. 162.

[29] *Training and Use of American Units with British and French* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, III (Washington, 1948), p. 684.

[30] *Early Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, IV (Washington, 1948), p. 559.

[31] *Ibid.,* p. 491.

fusion also resulted when some of the Marine replacements were sent into the firing line of a Marine brigade.

An inspection report, 9 June 1918, said replacements had joined a 2d Division battalion in the frontlines, but it had been difficult to incorporate them into platoons and squads or to use them to advantage because of combat conditions. The inspector rated them as "average men with a fair amount of training." [32]

There were instances in which replacements gave a better account of themselves than was expected. On 5 August 1918, French guides, who had been instructed to take a group of replacements to support installations of the American 6th Brigade, became confused and took the men, who were not considered sufficiently trained for frontline fighting, to an advanced trench instead of to the rear position they had been ordered to occupy. Their arrival coincided with the start of an enemy raid. The surprised replacements were subjected to an artillery barrage but they remained cool, met the attack of the raiding party, and drove their opponents back, killing 2 Germans while losing 4 of their own group—3 killed and 1 wounded.[33]

On 2 October 1918, a group of replacements for the American 370th Infantry arrived at the training center conducted by the French 59th Division, with which the American unit was serving. These men had been drafted in the United States in August and almost immediately sent to France. Not only were they without arms and equipment, but they had received very little military training.[34] The division training center, after conducting tests, divided the new arrivals into groups and sent the more capable to combat units as quickly as possible. Longer training was given to those who were graded lower in the tests.

During most of 1918 men whom AEF officers regarded as poorly trained were arriving in France in large numbers and commanders complained that untrained combat replacements threatened to weaken the divisions on the frontlines. Lack of proper training and equipment and the scarcity of instructors made it necessary to send into battle both organizations and individuals without giving them sufficient training for maximum efficiency in combat. The commanding general, Services of Supply, who commanded the training installations and the depots, recommended that all combat replacements receive "not less than 2 months training prior to their departure from the United States." [35]

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 514.

[33] *Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces, Champagne-Marne, Aisne-Marne* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, V (Washington, 1948), p. 616.

[34] *Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces, Oise-Aisne, Ypres-Lys, Vittorio-Veneto* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, VI (Washington, 1948), p. 52.

[35] Ltr, Gen J. G. Harbord to C in C, AEF, 11 Aug 18, sub: Replacements. See: *Policy-Forming Documents, American Expeditionary Forces* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, II (Washington, 1948), pp. 568–69.

Buildup of the 4th Division During a Rest Period

The experience of the 4th Division in drawing replacements to fill its vacancies and in training its new men in August 1918 indicates that by that time some improvements had been made in the handling of replacements. After the fighting in the Vesle, the 4th Division moved to the Reynel training area near Chaumont to rest.[36] Requisitions for the number of officers and men necessary to bring each of the divisional organizations to full strength were sent to the adjutant's office, where they were consolidated and forwarded to army headquarters. Replacements, upon their arrival at the railhead, were met by officers and escorted to the divisional replacement depot. There qualification cards were examined to determine former occupations or special skills. The first men assigned were specialists such as carpenters, blacksmiths, painters, cobblers, clerks, or musicians. The men who were not listed as having specialized skills were distributed according to the needs of the organizations as shown in requisitions and strength reports.

Replacements, both officers and men, arrived at the division without undue loss of time. Most of the men who were received were regarded by their officers as well trained, having received instruction at their previous installations. They lacked frontline experience but they showed keen interest in the lessons which had been learned by members of the division who already had seen combat.

Although it was expected that the division would have a month for training, events moved swiftly and orders to move were received 31 August. By that time, some of the men who had been wounded in previous engagements had returned to their units. In spite of the reduced time for training, officers of the division believed it was in good shape for service at the front.

The Engineer Center at Angers

The 116th Engineer Regiment, on 10 December 1917—two days after its arrival at St. Nazaire—was designated as a training and replacement regiment for engineer enlisted men and officers and took its station at Angers on 5 February 1918. Untrained recruits from America, upon arriving at the station, were assigned first to provisional companies and later to permanent companies for instruction, quarters, and rations. Elementary recruit instruction included interior discipline in barracks, care and nomenclature of the rifle, personal hygiene, calisthenics, general orders for sentinels, school of the soldier and of the squad, along with courtesies and customs of the serv-

[36] Christian Back and Henry Noble Hall, *The Fourth Division, Its Services and Achievements in the World War* (New York, 1920), pp. 132–133.

ice.[37] During the first stage of their training, the men became proficient with pick and shovel and learned to use the ax and the crosscut saw, to handle an oar, and to tie simple knots.[38]

After they had completed the instruction given to recruits, the men were enrolled in lettered companies, conforming to tables of organization. They then started on a course of study which was shortened or extended as conditions required. In this course, frontline conditions were simulated by the construction of trenches, dugouts, pits, and emplacements and by the use of all tools issued to the troops. Instruction was given by a permanent corps of noncommissioned officers. Other classes were held for engineer specialists. Another course of 21 lectures, extending over a 6-week period, prepared men to serve as noncommissioned officers.

The primary function of this depot was to train new recruits and to forward them to combat divisions, but it also handled casuals and men released from hospitals. Upon being sent to a base hospital a man was dropped from the rolls of his unit, and it was the duty of the Angers depot to return him to that unit or, in certain instances, to assign him elsewhere. The flow of hospital returnees sometimes exceeded 1,000 men per month. While they were in the depot they were given instruction similar to that given to new replacements, the main difference being that more stress was placed on restoring the men from the hospitals to good physical condition.

An officer, upon arrival, was assigned to a so-called "cadet" company. Selected enlisted men were trained at an officer candidate school operated at the depot, and those who completed the course were commissioned.

Replacements, both officers and men, were carefully classified as to qualifications, both at the time of their arrival and at the time of their departure. During the last 5 months of hostilities more than 5,000 men per month passed through the Angers depot, which maintained a reserve large enough that it could exercise care in filling requisitions from units in the field. By 1 January 1919, a total of 1,350 officers and 29,000 enlisted men had passed through the depot.

Replacement Shortages in Combat Units

The officers of the AEF had contemplated a constant flow of replacements to France, so timed that the men could undergo short training courses before going to the front. This policy had to be modified and newly arrived combat divisions were broken up to maintain the experienced divisions at efficient fighting strength. Thus many par-

[37] AEF GO 35, 5 Mar 18, par. IX.

[38] *Historical Report of the Chief Engineer, AEF 1917–19* (Washington, 1919), pp. 147, 151.

tially trained men were employed in combat.[39] If the original replacement system had continued in operation, 14 of the 42 divisions that arrived in France would have been assigned to replacement duty. Actually, only 11 divisions were used in the replacement system, 7 of which were skeletonized.

By February 1918, the replacement system was functioning poorly.[40] The four combat divisions of I Corps were short approximately 8,500 officers and enlisted men while the only replacement division, the 41st, was short about 4,500 officers and enlisted men. It could furnish no replacements to combat divisions because its men were untrained, many being employed as labor troops or at schools. There were no men in France at that time who were being trained to replace the losses of the frontline divisions. Men who were being received from the United States required at least 2 months' training before they could be used as replacements in combat divisions. A General Staff, AEF, memorandum submitted in December 1917 recommended that none of the 32d Division troops, scheduled to arrive next, be diverted to functions other than providing replacements. But when the 32d arrived a month or so later, instead of functioning as a replacement division as intended, most of its elements were diverted to the Services of Supply. The remainder of the division operated as a replacement depot only until the German offensive in the spring of 1918 when the elements were reassembled for combat. On 17 April 1918, the commanding general, Services of Supply, announced that there were only enough replacements in the depot division to fill those requisitions which already had been received from I Corps.[41]

The commitment of the 32d Division to combat removed from the replacement system the only division which might have served as a replacement and training division. One of General Pershing's staff officers, who opposed sending the 32d Division to the line, said:

> . . . if the 32d Division be continued in its normal functions as a replacement agency, four combat divisions can be maintained in active service at a numerical strength which will permit them to perform their function in the campaign with the maximum efficiency. The withdrawal from the 32d Division of all or a portion of its units for combat purposes will make precarious, in case of serious losses, the maintenance at proper fighting strength of the four other divisions engaged.[42]

By the time the 83d Division, which had been designated on 27 June as the 2d Depot Division, started functioning as such, there were 9 divisions of the AEF in line, 7 others complete and in training, and

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[39] *Report of the First Army, AEF, 10 Aug–15 Oct 1918,* (Fort Leavenworth, 1923), 1, p. 7.

[40] *Policy-Forming Documents, American Expeditionary Forces,* p. 198.

[41] *Reports of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services,* p. 151.

[42] Memo., Col. Upton Birnie, G3, GHQ, AEF for C/S, AEF, 24 Apr 18. See: *Training and Use of American Units with British and French,* pp. 653–54.

6 were arriving. It soon became apparent that the shifting of replacement divisions to combat would result in a serious shortage of replacements unless there were increased shipments of men from the United States.

In July 1918, there were 2 depot divisions, the 41st and 83d, to handle replacements for all troops in France.[43] The 76th Division did not arrive until August. Orders specified that troops arriving from the United States that had been designated as replacements for combat organizations were not to be diverted to Services of Supply or to any other duty except by authority from General Headquarters, AEF. The commanding general of the Services of Supply was prohibited from assigning officers or troops serving in base depots to duty outside the depots.[44]

Since replacements and training divisions were not assigned to army corps, there was a need for some substitute organization to receive replacements in the rear of the combat lines. Seven corps replacement battalions were established between June and September 1918. Corps or army commanders located these battalions as the tactical situation dictated. They were units of varying strength with as many provisional replacement companies as might be attached. The responsibility of the corps replacement battalions included the receipt and forwarding of officers and men discharged from hospitals; the receipt of casuals en route to their units; the establishment of a reserve supply of replacements for combat units; the completion of the training of those men who were received as replacements but who were not ready to go immediately into combat; and the issue of supplies and equipment to officers and men who were on their way to combat divisions.[45] These battalions continued in existence until they were absorbed by the regional replacement depots.

By August 1918, the shortage of American replacements was serious. Divisions had arrived in France below strength, and each division that had been diverted from replacement to combat duty had increased the number of divisions to be supplied and at the same time decreased the supply of manpower available to the replacement system. On 16 August, General Pershing cabled the War Department:

> Attention is especially invited to the very great shortage in arrivals of replacements heretofore requested. Situation with reference to replacements is now very acute. Until sufficient replacements are available in France to keep our proven divisions at full strength, replacements should by all means be sent in preference to new divisions.[46]

[43] AEF GO 111, 8 Jul 18, par. I, p. 3.
[44] *Ibid.*, par. II, p. 4.
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *War Department Annual Reports, 1919,* I, p. 615.

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On 26 August, General Pershing again cabled the War Department, pointing out that 5 out of 6 replacement divisions had been used for combat. The commanding general, SOS, opposed the establishment of any more depots, believing all available men should be used as replacements. The War Department on 31 August 1918 approved the omission of training divisions from subsequent corps organizations but continued 1 base division for each 6 combat divisions. The original two-echelon replacement system became a one-echelon system.[47]

At this time it become necessary to transfer 2,000 men from each of three combat divisions (7th, 36th, and 81st) to the First Army in preparation for the St. Mihiel offensive. Men were being speeded from ports to frontlines within 5 or 6 days. On 12 September, the First American Army, under the personal direction of General Pershing, launched the attack on St. Mihiel and within 24 hours had pinched off that heavily fortified salient which had stood through 4 years of war. The elimination of this salient, which had menaced eastern France, relieved the pressure on Verdun and made possible further advances north of that city.

A number of defects appeared in the operation of the corps replacement battalions. These small units frequently found it difficult to handle large detachments of replacements which were likely to arrive at divisional railheads on the eve of entry into combat. Divisions were shifted from one corps to another so often that they usually were hard to locate. Men sometimes had to march long distances across country to reach their designated units. The replacement battalions were lacking in flexibility.[48] Men with minor injuries were being sent to depot divisions far in the rear for medical treatment, and it took a long time for them to return to the front. Hospital facilities were needed nearer to the combat lines.

First Army on 8 September 1918 ordered each corps replacement battalion to designate a replacement company for each division. The replacement company was instructed to follow when the division was transferred from one corps to another. Regulating officers were informed when changes were made in unit assignment so that they could route replacements to their proper destinations. The 4th and 6th depots established regional replacement depots in the forward areas.

By the time the Meuse-Argonne offensive was initiated, late in September 1918, the replacement situation had become still more acute. The infantry and machinegun units of the 84th and 86th Divisions, then in the vicinity of Bordeaux, were utilized as replacements, leaving only a cadre of 2 officers and 25 men for each company.

[47] *Reports of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 115.
[48] Rpt, Committee No. 5, AWC, 1933–34, sub: Replacements. NWC Library 401–405. National War College.

Some 25,000 replacements were transferred through the 1st and 2d depots. This movement was particularly difficult because some of the men carrying Model 1917 rifles were going to divisions armed with the Model 1903 rifle. At the depots hot meals were served, rifles exchanged if necessary, gas masks checked, and the 18 trains were under way again within an average of an hour. The replacements arrived at the front in time to take part in vital operations.[49]

Early in October, the combat units required 80,000 men, but not more than 45,000 were in prospect before 1 November. Although efforts were made to recover the 2 divisions serving with the French and the 2 with the British, it was necessary to send the 37th and 91st Divisions to assist the French Sixth Army in Flanders, making 6 divisions assigned to Allied Armies. The II Corps reported the 27th Division as short 4,000 men, the 30th Division about 1,000 men.[50] The corps complained in October that these 2 divisions had received no replacements since they arrived in France in May. Efficient operation of the divisions was being hampered by lack of officers and, the message stated, 100 officers were needed to replace casualties and officers attending schools. Both the 27th and 30th Divisions were withdrawn from the forward areas from 1 October until 5 October. The shortage of medical personnel in the 27th Division resulted in detailing 200 litter bearers from line units.[51]

On 3 October, the following cable was sent to the War Department:

> Over 50,000 of the replacements requested for the months of July, August, and September have not yet arrived. Due to extreme seriousness of the replacement situation, it is necessary to utilize personnel of the 84th and 86th Divisions for replacement purposes. Combat divisions are short over 80,000 men. Vitally important that all replacements due, including 55,000 requested for October, be shipped early in October. If necessary some divisions in United States should be stripped of trained men and such men shipped as replacements at once.

The authorized strength of divisions was reduced in October by 4,000 men, the strength of each infantry company thus being lowered to approximately 174 men.[52] The combat divisions in France at that time needed 119,690 replacements, of which 95,303 were infantry, 8,210 machine gunners, and 9,475 field artillery, with only 66,490 infantry machine gunners who would be available as replacements within a reasonable time. Experience convinced AEF officers that the forward echelon in the replacement system would function better under army control, that it should have a fixed location, assume

[49] *Reports of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 149.

[50] *Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces, Somme Offensive* in U. S ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19, VII (Washington, 1948), p. 258.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 344.

[52] *Report of the Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, pt. 1, vol. XII, p. 149.

responsibility for a given area, be large enough to hold 15,000 to 20,000 men, and that it should approximate the size and be able to perform the functions which previously had been conceived for the then defunct forward replacement divisions.[53] By the end of October, First Army had determined that an organization to handle replacements was needed closer to the front than the regional depots or the corps replacement battalions.

The 6th Depot Division, less 2 regiments of infantry and 2 machinegun battalions, established the First Army regional replacement depot at Revigny. The division also established depots at Saleux, near Amiens, and at Chelles, near Paris. The 4th Depot Division established a regional replacement depot at Chaudenay, near Toul. These depots did not get into full operation, for work on them was stopped after the Armistice was signed. They were intended to forward hospital evacuees and stragglers to combat divisions and to eliminate some of the difficulties that had developed in the corps replacement battalions.

A cable, 2 November, inviting the attention of the War Department to the fact that a total of 140,000 replacements would be due by the end of November, closed by saying:

> To send over entire divisions, which must be broken up on their arrival in France so we may obtain replacements that have not been sent as called for, is a wasteful method, and one that makes for inefficiency; but as replacements are not otherwise available, there is no other course open to us. New and only partially trained divisions cannot take the place of older divisions that have had battle experience. The latter must be kept numerically to the point of efficiency.

That was the situation at the end of the war.

Casuals and stragglers for the occupation forces in Germany were forwarded by the Third Army Replacement Battalion, which started functioning at Treves, Germany, 5 December 1918. The 1st Replacement Depot, organized at St. Aignan-Noyers (Loir-et-Cher), 18 December 1918, assumed the functions of the 1st (41st) Depot Division, thereby enabling the 41st Division to return to the United States. The 1st Replacement Depot also served as a reservoir for casuals ordered to return to the United States.[54] As other replacement depots were discontinued, their functions were transferred to the 1st Replacement Depot.

[53] Alexander, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–28.
[54] AEF GO 242, 30 Dec 18, par. VI.

CHAPTER VII

THE USE OF DIVISIONS IN THE AEF REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

The 3d and 6th Divisions shipped for each corps were to be assigned to the replacement echelon, but only one division, the 41st, could be spared for replacement duty until the latter part of June 1918. It continued as a replacement division until after the Armistice. The 76th Division functioned as a depot division from 3 August 1918 until 7 November 1918. The 32d, 39th, 40th, 83d, 85th, and 35th Divisions operated in the replacement system for varied periods. The 31st Division was designated a depot division but never functioned as such. The 34th, 38th, 84th, and 86th Divisions and the 4th, 55th, and 57th Pioneer Infantry Regiments were broken up on arrival in France and the units reassigned through the 1st and 2d Depot Divisions. The 8th Division was never designated a replacement division, but some of its elements were used in the operation of the replacement system.

The 8th Division

The 8th Division was organized in December 1917 at Camp Fremont. The following August the division provided 100 officers and 5,000 enlisted men for the Siberian Expeditionary Force under Maj. Gen. William S. Graves, who was relieved as 8th Division commander for the assignment to this new command.[1] The 319th Engineers sailed for Europe 25 September 1918 followed by division headquarters and the headquarters of the 16th Infantry Brigade, the 8th Infantry Regiment, and the 8th Field Artillery Brigade. The other components of the division remained at Camp Mills. On 10 November 1918, the division commander took command of Base Section No. 5, SOS, at Brest. The 8th Infantry moved to the Coblenz bridgehead in July 1919 as part of the occupation army known as the "American Forces in Germany"; the other elements were returned to the States. The 8th Division was not designated as a replacement division, but the employment of some of its elements at Brest involved it in the operation of the replacement system and made possible the relief of some of the regular replacement units.

[1] *Order of Battle . . ., AEF Divisions*, p. 109.

The 32d Division

Advance elements of the 32d Division landed at Brest 24 January 1918, and on 4 February 1918 the division was designated as the Replacement Division, I Corps, thus providing for the second echelon of the replacement system. Its headquarters was located at the 10th (Prauthoy) Training Area and was under administrative control of I Corps. During March, the division selected 7,000 of its own members as replacements, including all of the 128th Infantry up to and including the grade of captain, and forwarded them to the 1st Division. Then the 32d Division temporarily went to the Services of Supply because there was a critical shortage of men in the rear areas.

In the latter part of March, steps were taken to reconstitute the division as a combat unit, and infantry and machinegun troops that had been on duty with the SOS rejoined. On 10 April, the division transferred its replacement functions to the 41st Division and ceased to exist as a replacement division. On 14 May, the division (less artillery and engineers) moved to the vicinity of Rougemont in the area of the French Seventh Army and from there went to the front.[2]

It was expected that after the emergency at the front the 32d Division would reurn to the replacement system, but the emergency never passed and the 32d remained in combat until the fighting was over.

The 40th Division

The 40th Division arrived in France in August 1918 after brief training in England and was designated as the 6th Depot Division at Le Guerche-sur-l'Aubois and vicinity. During September, the division was reduced by sending 7,500 men as replacements to the 28th, 32d, and 77th Divisions; training cadres were formed, and the first replacements, from the United States were received. On 15 October, the division established a classification camp with a capacity of 5,000 and within a month it had returned 11,000 former hospital cases to their organizations. By 23 October, a total of 16,327 replacements had been forwarded.

The 158th Infantry and the 144th Machine Gun Battalion of the 40th Division moved to Chelles on 30 October 1918 and formed the Advance Regional Replacement Depot for the First Army, absorbing the III Corps Replacement Battalion on 4 November. On 31 October, the 159th Infantry and the 143d Machine Gun Battalion formed a Regional Replacement Depot in the vicinity of Saleux for the II Corps, and this depot subsequently absorbed the II Corps Replacement Battalion. The I and V Corps Replacement Battal-

[2] *Ibid.* All information presented here regarding replacement divisions is taken from this source unless otherwise indicated.

ions joined on 7 November to form an Advance Replacement Depot at Grange-le-Comte, and on 8 November a Regional Replacement Depot at Revigny was established. The division also operated a temporary classification camp with a daily capacity of 700 men in order to return men released from hospitals and stragglers to First, Second, and Third Armies and to equip men going on leave from combat divisions. On 5 December, replacement battalions were organized for First and Third Armies at Contrisson and for Second Army at Chelles. Units at Revigny, Chelles, and Saleux were relieved in order to return to the United States on 14 December. By 6 January 1919, the units from the Revigny area had joined parts of the former depot division at Beautiran in the Bordeaux area and were assisting in the processing of 8,800 casuals who were on their way to the United States. The troops of the 40th Division started returning to the United States on 6 March 1919.

The 41st Division

The 41st Division was designated the Replacement Division, I Corps, on 8 December 1917—the first division to be so designated. Its leading elements arrived at St. Nazaire on 11 December and established a depot in the vicinity of St. Aignan and Noyers from which about 2,800 replacements were forwarded to other units. On 15 January 1918, the division was redesignated as the Base and Training Division, I Corps.[3]

The infantry brigades of the 41st Division furnished units for duty at schools and in the line of communications. Two of the regiments of artillery became corps artillery, while batteries of the other artillery regiment were placed on duty at the schools. The ammunition train was employed on remount work. The 116th Engineers went to Angers and formed an engineer replacement depot; a portion of the 66th Field Artillery Brigade went to La Courtine where it functioned from February until June as a field artillery replacement unit.

During February and March the divisional area from St. Aignan and Noyers was divided into five administrative districts. A classification camp and a salvage plant were established in the area and schools were opened for the training of specialists. Infantry training battalions were organized and a systematic training program was developed.

On 5 March 1918, the 41st Division was redesignated as the Depot Division, I Corps, and from 11 April until early in August the division, in addition to carrying on its duties as a depot division, functioned as a replacement division for the entire AEF. (The 83d Division assumed a part of these duties when it became the 2d Depot

[3] AEF, GO 9, 15 Jan 18.

Division.) The Special Training Battalion, 26th Infantry Division, which had been formed to give additional training and to rehabilitate men released from hospitals but not ready for combat, became a part of the depot in April 1918. Although hampered by lack of equipment this battalion received and reassigned several thousand men.[4]

On 13 July 1918, the 41st Division became the 1st Depot Division, AEF, and in September it was directing 4 infantry regiments, 3 machinegun battalions, 1 supply train, 1 ammunition train, 10 schools, and some troops of the Marine Corps, all engaged in training and forwarding replacements. In November, a squadron of cavalry was added, and on 8 November the division received the personnel of the 3d (76th Division) and 5th (39th Division) Depots for disposal as replacements. During its operations in France, the 41st Division organized 41 depot labor companies, 51 prisoner of war escort companies, 40 casual companies, leave area detachments, and a number of other units. It forwarded 185,811 replacements and returned 102,461 casuals to their organizations.

Because there was no recognized replacement system in operation, the 1st Replacement Depot was required to develop its own system for handling replacements, and the methods it adopted were copied in the other five depot divisions organized by the AEF.[5] The classification camp determined the qualifications of men, many of whom were arriving from the United States without sufficient records to be used as guides for their assignments. Beginning with the latter part of 1918 the installations in the United States were more efficient in the preparation of classification records and less of the burden fell on the overseas depots.

Experiences of the 1st Depot Division indicated that a replacement depot functioned more efficiently if it remained stationary and supported troops in a given area rather than remaining with a designated corps which was likely to move frequently. The regrouping to meet the expected German offensive in the spring of 1918 caused the American high command to place the 1st Replacement Depot at St. Aignan-Noyers rather than at the school center at Gondrecourt which first was selected for a location.[6]

After the Armistice was signed, the chief function of the 1st Replacement Depot was to receive men who would not return to the United States with organizations and to form them into casual companies for the trip across the ocean. On 26 December 1918, the 1st Depot Division was abolished and the 41st Division was re-created by the reassignment of the original units.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Hist Rpt, 1st Repl Depot, 13 Jun 19. WD Historical Collection, Box 458 (Repl Depots), 198–11. National Archives.

[6] *Ibid.*

The 83d Division

Troops of the 83d Division arrived in Le Havre and Cherbourg during the latter part of June 1918. On 27 June, the division was designated the 2d Depot Division serving IV Corps and was concentrated in the Le Mans area. The depot controlled administratively the areas of La Suze, Laigne-en-Belin, Econmoy, Conlie, and Mayet. The division handled 195,221 replacements, officers and men, drawn from personnel from the United States and casuals at large. These men were trained for the infantry including machinegun units, ammunition trains, and supply trains. During October of 1918, the camps reached a maximum size when there were 45,000 troops in the area. Units of the division not used at the depot were otherwise assigned and took part in a number of combat operations.

.The 85th Division

On 11 August 1918, the 85th Division, which had just arrived in France, was designated as the 4th Depot Division, and a few days later it became the Depot Division, Intermediate Section, SOS. Certain of its units were detached for the Russian expedition and for corps and army troops. It operated establishments in the vicinity of Pouilly-sur-Loire, Sancerre, and Cosne where it received, trained, equipped, and forwarded officer and enlisted replacements. Until 24 October, when it was redesignated the Regional Replacement Depot for Second Army and moved to the vicinity of Toul, it had forwarded 3,948 replacements. At Toul, it absorbed the corps replacement battalions, and its various organizations operated regional replacement subdepots for all arms and services handling casuals and men evacuated from hospitals. It was relieved by a provisional battalion on 9 December.

In April of 1920, Maj. Gen. C. W. Kennedy, who commanded the 85th Division in France, wrote to the War Department, stressing the need for a reserve of men from which replacement could be drawn.[7] In support of this proposal, General Kennedy gave the following account of the activities of the 85th Division while it was serving as a replacement division:

> . . . On arrival of the 85th Division in England, one regiment of infantry, one battalion of engineers, one field hospital and one ambulance company were detached for duty in North Russia with British troops. En route to station in France a battalion of infantry was detached for duty at a tank school. The artillery brigade and ammunition train were sent to an artillery training center and were not used for replacements. Shortly after arriving at stations in France the remainder of the engineer regiment and the Signal Corps battalion

[7] Ltr, Hq Panama Canal Dist, 2 Apr 20, sub: Collection of Historical Information. WD Historical Collection, Box 50, 7–12.3. National Archives.

were sent to the front. This left the division commander, the division headquarters troop, the military police, the supply train, the remainder of the sanitary units, one full brigade of infantry, one brigade of infantry (less one regiment and one battalion), and the machinegun battalions.

Almost immediately calls were made for large numbers of officers and men from the infantry and machinegun organizations to be sent to combat divisions which had been much depleted by the operations in the Marne salient. Instructions were received to retain in infantry and machinegun companies only three officers and fifty men per company to be used in training replacements. The organizations were billeted in a number of small towns, providing billets for from a company to a battalion each, and covering an area of about 25 miles by 10. My orders were to use the 1st Replacement Division as a model in organizing and operating. This required the accumulation of a large amount of supplies with provision for their storage, the construction of a cantonment for a classification camp capable of quartering 2,000 men, hiring ground for training, including small arms target ranges, in a thickly populated section in which nearly all the land was under cultivation. Under the circumstances these preliminary preparations took about 2 months, and the Division was just about prepared to function when the replacement policy was again changed.

The new policy contemplated the assignment of two of the replacement divisions as Regional Replacement Depots for the First and Second Armies respectively. These depots were to absorb the corps depot battalions. The 40th Division was assigned to the First Army, with station near its headquarters, and the 85th Division was first assigned to a French Cantonment about 4 miles from Toul. The Armistice came before these Regional Replacement Depots could begin to function as such and thereafter they were used for the reception and distribution of casuals.

The 31st Division

When the elements of the 31st Division, which had been designated as a depot division, started arriving in France in October 1918, six divisions were already functioning as depot divisions. The Chief of Staff did not believe that another depot division was necessary.[8] Because of the serious shortage of replacements, the infantry and machinegun units of the 31st Division, immediately upon their arrival, were sent to the depots where they received training as replacements and then were used to fill replacement requisitions.* One officer from each company or similar unit remained to care for organization records.

The 34th Division

The 34th Division was moved overseas between 20 August and 24 October 1918. Orders issued 17 October provided for the skeletonization of the division upon arrival at the Labrede training area, and by 29 October it was determined that the division would not be reconstituted. It was then ordered to reduce to a cadre which would keep

[8] *Reports of the Commanders in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services*, p. 148.

records. The units were transferred to the 2d Depot Division at Le Mans, where they were broken up and the men distributed to other organizations.

The 38th Division

Advance elements of the 38th Division arrived at Brest 28 September 1918, and by 25 October the last units had reached France. On 29 October, the division was ordered reduced to a record cadre and surplus troops were reassigned through the 2d Depot Division.

The 39th Division

The 39th Division, which arrived in France in August of 1918, functioned as the 5th Depot Division near Bourges from 3 September until 29 October. The 114th Engineers and 114th Field Signal Battalion were assigned as army and corps troops, and the infantry units were reduced to training cadres whose duties were to receive, train, equip, and forward replacements, including both officers and men. While it was operating as a depot the division forwarded 10,156 replacements. It also operated a classification camp. Artillery, engineer, machine-gun, signal, and medical units of the division, which were not used in the operation of the depot, participated in various engagements while assigned to other higher units. On 2 November, the 39th Division moved to St. Aignan-Noyers where it was skeletonized, and the men thus made surplus were used as replacements.

The 76th Division

On 3 August 1918, the 76th Division was reorganized and became the 3d Depot Division. The 7,000 men who were left over from the reorganized units were reassigned as replacements. While functioning as a depot, the 76th Division forwarded 19,971 officers and men. On 7 November, the depot organization of the division was discontinued and the re-formed division absorbed the depot personnel—the 151st Infantry Brigade, 152d Infantry Brigade, 301st Machine Gun Battalion, 301st Train Headquarters, and Military Police. The division then moved into the area of the 1st Depot Division (41st Division) at St. Aignan-Noyers where the units were skeletonized, a record cadre of 11 officers and 84 men was formed, and the surplus personnel reassigned as replacements. Detached units continued to serve with other organizations.

The 84th Division

The movement of the 84th Division overseas took place between August and October 1918. On 9 October, the division was ordered

skeletonized, and about 10,000 men from the infantry were transferred to the 1st Depot Division for use as replacements. Another group was sent to the 2d Depot Division.

The 86th Division

On 3 October, the 86th Division, which had started its movement overseas in September, was ordered skeletonized. It immediately transferred about 7,500 men from its rifle companies to the 2d Depot Division for replacement purposes and assigned the 311th Engineers to duty with the SOS. On 20 October, the division transferred 1,200 men from its machinegun units to the 2d Depot Division, and on 9 November the 311th Field Signal Battalion went to the Signal Corps Replacement Depot at Cour-Cheverny.

The 4th, 55th, and 57th Pioneer Infantry

Three regiments of white pioneer infantry, the 4th, 55th, and 57th, which had been scheduled to form parts of the 96th, 99th, and 100th Infantry Divisions respectively, were broken up, and the troops, who were untrained, passed through the 2d Depot Division.[9]

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY OF THE WORLD WAR I PERIOD

The United States entered World War I without any precedent for an organized personnel replacement system, but it was during World War I that the replacement system, as later defined in military terminology, was developed. In the Civil War, the States and later the Federal recruiting service had sent recruits directly to the regiments, but a number of depots for receiving recruits were formed shortly before the end of the war. The War with Spain did not bring about any great demand for personnel replacements from the units in combat. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for training battalions for recruits, and the Act of 18 May 1917 gave the President the power to establish such recruit-training units as he might find necessary.

Before the United States entered World War I the replacement problem had become an important factor for the armies operating in Europe. The Allied appeals for men to replace heavy battle losses impressed American military planners with the importance of replacements. The War Department General Staff attempted to provide replacements by organizing depot brigades within the National Army cantonments similar to the recruit depots which had served the peacetime Army. Since there was no definite replacement system the depot brigades offered the only possible means then in existence for receiving, training, and forwarding replacements to units.

When mobilization started it was assumed that divisions would be localized, but later it was found desirable to transfer men from the camps near their homes to Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army divisions in other parts of the country. Soon thereafter the depot brigades ceased to be identified with single divisions and tended to become permanent camp organizations. As such, they were used more as reservoirs in which transients were stored and in which men who were not ready for active service could be trained.

The depot brigades had been intended to furnish replacements to the divisions to which they were attached, a plan which might have worked had all branches of the service represented in a division maintained proportional sections in the depot brigade. When such representation was lacking, the depot brigades did not train enough men to fill all the qualifications desired by all arms and services. Devel-

opment battalions formed within the depot brigades attempted to increase the supply of replacements by training illiterates and non-English-speaking men.

Depot brigade officials soon found it necessary to devote so much time to the reception of men, the preparation of records, the administering of intelligence and trade tests, and to the performance of other tasks that they had little time for the training of recruits. The details involved in the reception, classification, immunization, and assignment of enlisted men finally became so complex that they took up all the time of the officers and men who were operating the depot brigades, with the result that those agencies took on the characteristics of reception centers rather than training establishments.

Mechanization of the Army and the development of new weapons and materiel increased the need for men with special skills. It was important that skilled men be taken into the Army with as little disruption as possible, an aim which frequently could be achieved through the calling of Reserves to duty. The experience of officers in the Transportation Corps, for instance, demonstrated that there was no need to obtain a new crew when a vessel sailing under the American flag was placed under the Army Transport Service. Members of the regular crew could be enrolled in the Army Reserve and mustered into the service along with the vessel, so that few, if any, replacements would be needed. The War Department General Staff began to give more thought to the organization of Reserve units.

The fear of foreign agents caused the Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff to form a Morale Section which was intended to assure loyalty among alien soldiers, especially those who spoke only foreign languages. Experience soon revealed that the problem of morale extended beyond the aliens and included all troops. Consequently, the morale service became a G1 staff function dealing not only with loyalty but with all the elements that might increase human effectiveness. It was the forerunner of the special services which later was to receive great emphasis in the military organization.

Inability of the Regular Army and National Guard units to provide their own fillers caused so many men to be diverted from the National Army that depot brigades were unable to train the number of replacements required. The first divisions to leave for overseas were brought to strength by transfers from divisions in training. The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff recommended that replacements be obtained by breaking up entire divisions, or at least by drawing men from as few divisions as possible. A minority report by one officer of that staff division recommended that men be drawn proportionately from all available divisions in training.[1] This recom-

[1] Note for record dtd 28 Dec 18. WD Historical Collection, Box 50, 7–12.3, 82–1473. National Archives.

mendation was approved by the Chief of Staff, with the result that all of the early divisions which went overseas contained about 25 percent recruits. The shortage of replacements became so serious that divisions in training were stripped of men or were skeletonized to obtain replacements for combat divisions. Field commanders complained that this process of stripping divisions of men resulted in inefficiency and brought discouragement to the men.

After the National Army divisions departed for overseas their camps were available for other units. It was in these camps that the first replacement training centers were formed with the mission of training men to replace combat losses. The replacement training centers superseded the depot brigades.

By August of 1918, a definite replacement system had been established in theory. Training camps were being organized in the United States and provided with the equipment they needed, although much of that equipment was in such condition that the greater part of the summer was spent in getting it ready for service. Officers who had served overseas were coming back to give instruction in the schools. Cadres were becoming more efficient, and a 12-day training program was adopted.

The automatic replacement drafts, devised by the War Department, were intended to furnish each month the equivalent of the estimated casualties for the following month. But the AEF was still drawing men from training divisions and from the Services of Supply to obtain the replacements needed for its combat units. There was a constant demand for as many men as could be sent overseas, irrespective of their state of training. The men who were called under the automatic replacement draft during July had received scarcely 2 weeks of actual training before their departure for overseas; and similar conditions continued during August and September.

Facilities established by ports of embarkation to care for casuals going overseas developed into embarkation depots and became another link in the replacement system.

Replacement divisions, two for each corps, which were intended to receive, train, and forward replacements after they arrived overseas, were either committed to combat or skeletonized, a practice that made it necessary to improvise new replacement installations to operate in Europe. The experience overseas during World War I brought out the necessity for furnishing combat units with properly trained men who could be taken into units which were not in immediate contact with the enemy. Officers in the AEF learned the importance of returning those men who had recovered from disease or injury to their units without undue loss of time.

[Table 10 shows battle casualties and replacements furnished for each division during World War I.]

*Table 10.—Battle Casualties, Replacements, and Strengths of Combat Divisions in Action During World War I**

Combat division	Battle casualties 6 Apr 1917–11 Nov 1918 [1]	Replacements 1 May–13 Nov 1918 [2]	Strengths 13 Nov 1918
Total	239, 124	305, 819	671, 276
1st	22, 320	30, 206	26, 272
2d	11, 746	35, 343	23, 099
3d	15, 401	24, 033	25, 076
4th	12, 820	19, 559	26, 033
5th	9, 116	12, 611	21, 675
6th	386	2, 784	24, 798
7th	1, 709	4, 112	25, 187
26th	13, 664	14, 411	20, 709
27th	8, 334	5, 255	19, 279
28th	14, 139	21, 717	23, 010
29th	5, 570	4, 977	20, 946
30th	8, 415	2, 384	20, 682
32d	13, 261	20, 140	24, 576
33d	6, 864	5, 415	23, 986
35th	7, 296	10, 605	23, 054
36th	2, 584	3, 397	23, 435
37th	5, 387	6, 282	23, 391
42d	14, 683	17, 253	20, 430
77th	10, 194	12, 728	24, 308
78th	7, 144	3, 190	19, 762
79th	6, 874	6, 246	22, 804
80th	6, 029	4, 495	24, 580
81st	1, 104	1, 984	23, 731
82d	8, 077	8, 402	22, 766
88th	78	734	25, 428
89th	7, 091	7, 669	22, 320
90th	7, 549	4, 437	20, 873
91st	6, 108	12, 530	22, 172
92d	1, 647	2, 920	26, 894
93d [3]	[3] 3, 534	(3)	(3)

[1] Excludes 4,962 battle casualties in depot divisions and nondivisional units.

[2] Data not available on replacements furnished before 1 May 1918. Men returned to the line from hospitals were counted as replacement troops although they usually returned to their former divisions.

[3] Incomplete as a division, lacking artillery and other units. Its headquarters ceased to function after 15 May 1918 and its 4 infantry regiments served with the French. Number of replacements received in these regiments is unknown.

**Source:* Battle casualties are from the *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1926*, pp. 193–217. Replacements and strengths are from G1, AEF, Report No. 53, "Reports of Replacements Sent Overseas," 20 Nov 18, 7-12.3, WD Historical Collection, Box 50, National Archives.

CHAPTER IX

THE PERIOD BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II

Army Reorganization

With the exception of the occupation troops in Germany, the emergency Army returned to the United States as rapidly as possible after the Armistic of 11 November 1918. The National Army and National Guard divisions prepared for demobilization and seven Regular Army divisions were concentrated in cantonments pending reorganization. It was impossible to bring together the 50,000 or so men who had been in the Regular Army before the war and who, at the close of the conflict, were thinly scattered throughout the forces. Even if these prewar soldiers could have been concentrated in the permanent units, there would not have been enough of them to fill the organizations to effective strength. The discharge of a considerable number of the temporary soldiers was contingent upon their replacement by men voluntarily enlisting in the Regular Army, but Congress did not authorize a resumption of enlistments until 28 February 1919. Both general service and regimental recruiting was resumed, with the period of enlistment either 1 or 3 years at the option of the soldier. One-year enlistments were tried as a means of reducing desertions, but subsequent experience indicated short enlistments had little value for that purpose.[1] By 30 June 1920, about 2,056,835 soldiers had been returned from Europe and demobilization was practically completed. By February 1921, the Army had established a record by enlisting 359,857 recruits.

The first plan for the postwar military organization called for a Regular Army of half a million men, a Reserve Army of a million men, and universal military training. Congress, in May 1919, decided these plans were too ambitious and too expensive.[2]

A special War Department committee in June 1920 recommended typical army, corps, and divisional organizations for both peace and war. The peacetime organization became 9 Regular Army divisions, with additional corps and army troops; 18 National Guard divisions and auxiliaries; and 27 Organized Reserve divisions.[3] The Regular

[1] *War Department Annual Reports, 1920*, I, p. 15.
[2] *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1920*, p. 18.
[3] *Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 1921*, p. 12.

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divisions with auxiliary troops were to constitute a trained and equipped field army.

The Regular Army and National Guard divisions were intended to provide the combat elements of three field armies and were expected to meet any minor emergency without seriously interfering with peacetime civilian activities. Additional troops, when needed, were to come from the Organized Reserve divisions.

The 6 territorial departments were abolished during the summer of 1920, and 9 corps areas, each containing 1 Regular Army division, 2 National Guard divisions, and the nucleus of 3 Organized Reserve divisions, were formed. Boundaries were so located that all corps areas were about equal in population available for military service. On 9 August 1932, the War Department established four field armies to provide the tactical commands lacking under the original corps area organization.[4]

Democracy and Education

The War Department was anxious to make the "New Army" democratic. On 18 February 1920, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker in a letter to Gen. Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, called attention to the need for considerate and thoughtful treatment of the enlisted men on their arrival at their first permanent stations.[5] Secretary Baker said:

> In a vast majority of cases these young men are going through their first experience away from home. Their minds are peculiarly open to impressions which may be and frequently are lasting. . . .
>
> These remarks are not made to the end that the recruit should be either coddled or petted. . . . he should be . . . subjected to the hardening and disciplining influences of Army life and his manliness and self control developed. . . .
>
> The treatment of the new soldier must be based on the human element much more than has been the case in the past. We have given our pledge that the new Army shall be a really democratic institution. . . .
>
> Recruits should invariably be met at the station, no matter what the hour, . . . preferably by a commissioned officer . . . a hot meal should be prepared and waiting for them. . . . They should then, if not assigned, be assigned as promptly as may be, and not left in the peculiarly homeless and forlorn condition of unassigned recruits at camp or regimental headquarters. They should be conducted to their own organization and be given an opportunity to dispose of their effects, settle themselves in their new quarters, and secure a good night's rest. They should then be personally interviewed, collectively, by the organization commander and given a talk which will convey to them the feeling that they have reached their military home; that though under military discipline and subject to orders, they are nevertheless among and under friends and members of the same honorable profession. They

[4] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933*, p. 12.
[5] Copy of letter appears in WD GO 12, 28 Feb 20.

must be made to feel that the organization to which they belong has an honorable past and present. . . .

No greater mistake can be made at this initial interview than to adopt an austere or unapproachable or bullying tone with threats of dire punishment for military misdemeanors as yet unknown to the recruit even by name. . . .

The chaplain should assemble all recruits as soon after their arrival as is conveniently possible. . . . An important point to be taken up at this time by the chaplain is an inquiry into home relations . . . and the encouragement of the recruit to write to his home frequently. . . . The best opportunity for such a talk occurs in the evening; and the surroundings are of importance. It should not, for instance, be given in the barracks where other men are about. . . .

The instructions of the recruit should then be placed in the hands of an officer or noncommissioned officer particularly suited to this work. The driving drillmaster, whose reputation is based on his ability to impart a maximum of military snap and finish to his drill in the minimum of time, is not always the best man for this work. Unless he has, in addition, a symphathetic understanding of the man he is working with and is possessed of patience, forbearance and kindliness he will fail. . . .[6]

In November 1920, when it appeared that in spite of heavy enlistments the number taken into the Army would not be sufficient to reach the goal of 280,000, several divisions conducted recruiting drives.[7] The 2d Division, between 17 November and 4 December 1920, enrolled 5,416. The 5th Division, from 15 December 1920 until 15 January 1921, enlisted 7,466. The 4th and 7th Divisions were engaged in recruiting drives when a joint resolution of Congress directed the Army to cease enlistments until its strength dropped below 175,000. The Regular Army later was directed to reduce its strength to 150,000 by 1 October 1921 and enlisted men serving in the United States were permitted to apply for discharge until the Army was reduced to that figure.

Economy efforts, similar to those which had affected the recruiting system 30 years earlier, caused the discontinuance, in January 1922, of general recruiting depots at Fort Slocum, N. Y.; Columbus Barracks, Ohio; Fort Thomas, Ky.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; Fort Logan, Colo.; and Fort McDowell, Calif.[8] Corps area commanders were charged with keeping all military organizations within their areas filled to authorized strength. Recruiting responsibility was decentralized and fewer men were assigned to the General Recruiting Service.

Recruit training was regarded as a regimental function. Recruit detachments trained new arrivals until they could be assigned without retarding the progress of the units they joined.[9] Regular Army organizations were to be ready to expand to war size in the minimum

[6] *Ibid.*
[7] *Report of The Adjutant General, 1921,* p. 35.
[8] WD GO 4, 20 Jan 22; WD Cir 8, 2 Feb 23.
[9] WD GO 9, 15 May 26, sec. 6.

time possible and with the least loss of efficiency or were to furnish training cadres for the creation of new organizations or were to do both. The Reserve components were trained in association with the Regular Army. In some instances, Reserve officers understudied Regular Army officers.

Normal tours of duty on foreign service were fixed as 2 years for both officers and enlisted men in 1921,[10] but in the interest of economy the 3-year period was continued, except for the Philippine Department and Alaska, until 1931.[11] Regulations governing length of overseas tour were suspended in 1942.[12] Those who desired additional time overseas could request another year. Overseas departments submitted requisitions to The Adjutant General 3 months in advance of the date for the return of the men. Generally, transfers were grade for grade, but when noncommissioned officers were not available in the United States, overseas commanders could fill vacancies by promotion.

The Army undertook an extensive educational and recreational program designed to reduce illiteracy and raise the general educational level. The functions of the wartime Committee on Training Camps and Activities were transferred, in September 1919, to the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff, which set up the Education and Recreation Branch to prepare courses, outline instruction, and issue regulations.[13] The program provided for educational and vocational training at all posts. Congress appropriated $2,000,000 for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1921 and provided $3,500,000 for the following year. This money was used to purchase equipment and employ instructors, but where qualified officers or enlisted men were available instruction was provided without added expense to the Government.

The War Department designated a special field in which each divisional camp conducted experiments in an effort to work out courses that would serve as models for the entire service. Civilian technical and educational experts were sent to these camps to study methods and cooperate in the development of courses and instruction. The educational program was designed to (1) meet the Army's needs for technicians and mechanics; (2) raise the general intelligence and increase the efficiency of soldiers; and (3) train the soldiers in occupations they could follow after their return to civilian life. Commanding officers reported that vocational and educational training threatened to overshadow military training and that many administrative duplications made the program impractical. During an economy move in 1921, most of the highly paid instructors were replaced

[10] WD Cir 25, 27 Jan 21.
[11] AR 615–210, 25 Nov 31.
[12] WD Cir 226, 11 Jul 42.
[13] WD Bul 33, 30 Sep 19, sec. V.

by specially trained military personnel, and vocational and educational training was reduced to an incidental part of military training.

Restrictions against the enlistment of illiterates were rescinded 20 July 1920, and men who could not read but who were otherwise qualified were accepted. They were placed in training centers, instructed in English, and given courses designed to improve citizenship. The Camp Upton educational center that trained illiterates during the war continued to operate under the direction of the Education and Recreation Branch of the War Department General Staff.[14]

The center at Camp Upton was transferred to Camp Dix in 1920, and additional recruit educational centers were opened at Camp Jackson, S. C., Camp Pike, Ark., Camp Grant, Ill., Camp Travis, Tex., and Camp Lewis, Wash. The 4- to 6-months' course included elementary general information, history, geography, and citizenship and was intended to give an illiterate or non-English-speaking recruit sufficient knowledge to perform his duties as a private soldier. The daily program called for 3 hours of educational work and an equal amount of time devoted to military instruction. During the fiscal year 1921, these centers admitted 9,671 recruits, graduating 4,067. Those who could not absorb the training were returned to their regiments or discharged. Experience indicated a need for better intelligence tests that would reveal whether the men had the ability to finish the training. In the fall of 1921, the reduction in the strength of the Army made the training of illiterates unnecessary because there were more literate applicants for enlistment than could be accepted.[15]

Regular Army Commissions

A number of emergency officers who had served during World War I received Regular Army commissions, granted under authority of the Army Reorganization Act of 4 June 1920.[16] This act authorized an increase in the number of Regular Army officers and provided that not less than one-half of that increase, exclusive of the Medical Department and Army Chaplains Corps, should be filled by appointing applicants who had held non-Regular commissions during the war.[17]

The candidates, many of whom applied through their immediate commanding officers before the act received final approval, were tested by preliminary examining boards. Their papers then went to a Washington board of officers that made recommendations to the chiefs of the arms and services, who also appointed boards. These

[14] Capt. Bernard Lentz, "Eradicating Illiteracy in the Army," *Infantry Journal* (Oct 1920), p. 353.
[15] *Report of the Secretary of War, 1921,* pp. 14–17.
[16] *War Department Annual Reports, 1920,* I pp. 157–267.
[17] *Report of The Adjutant General, 1921,* p. 35.

boards, in turn, sent approved names back to Washington where a board of general officers made the final selections.

The application files were closed on 23 June 1920 with 14,515 applications on hand, and the last of the 5,217 selections was made in April of 1921.[18] By 1 January 1921, all of the World War I emergency officers not undergoing hospitalization or medical treatment had been discharged from their emergency commissions.[19] Since 1890, Regular Army officers below the grade of major had qualified for promotion through examinations,[20] but these examinations were now discontinued. In their place the Army adopted a classification system which designated officers to be retained as class A; those who were subject to release were listed as class B.

The Army War College had been a functioning division of the War Department General Staff as well as an institution for training officers, but as a General Staff college it became a genuine training school which offered instruction in high command and general staff duties of corps areas, general headquarters, the groups of armies, and the Army. It prepared officers for duty on the War Department General Staff or in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Individual officers and committees investigated military and economic problems, and their reports frequently provided ideas which were used in the development of war plans. Several of these studies concerned the replacement system. Specialized instruction for the different branches of the service was offered at the special service schools.

The National Defense Act of 1920 also expanded the system of military education by establishing the General Service Schools, including the Army School of the Line and the General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in addition to the Army War College at Washington, D. C. The school at Fort Leavenworth was reorganized around the four General Staff sections of administration, military intelligence, military operations, and supply. The staff and faculty at Fort Leavenworth produced a complete series of military texts. In 1923, the name was changed to the General Service School, and it continued under that name until 1928 when it became the Command and General Staff School. The course, which was reduced to 1 year in 1923, was enlarged in 1928 and offered 2 years of instruction for Regular Army officers. In 1935, the course was again reduced to 1 year.[21]

In the early 1920's, the school added a branch to prepare extension course material for the home study of Reserve Corps officers. Start-

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Act of October 1, 1890, "An Act for the examination of certain officers of the Army and to regulate promotion therein," 51st Cong., 1st Sess.

[21] Brig. Gen. H. H. Fuller, "The Development of the Command and General Staff School. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas." *Military Review,* XXI (1942), No. 83, p. 5.

ing in 1924, National Guard and Reserve officers attended annual courses lasting from March until June. These courses continued until the expansion of the Army in 1940. The Command and General Staff School faculty studied the replacement system and prepared a number of lectures and texts dealing with that subject. A number of the policies in regard to the replacement system originated in the schools. Others were written into mobilization plans prepared by the War Department General Staff and the corps areas.

The Reserve Officers' Training Corps was an element of the replacement system. It was expected that each Reserve officer would be assigned in peacetime to the position he would fill upon mobilization,[22] a theory which did not work well in practice. The groundwork was completed in 1921 for the Citizens' Military Training Camps, which were intended to provide a reservoir of trained enlisted men and to develop potential officers who did not have the opportunity of the Reserve Officers' Training program in the colleges.

The Harbord Board's Study of the Replacement System

General Pershing became Chief of Staff 1 July 1921 and received instructions from Secretary of War John W. Weeks to reorganize the General Staff to embody World War I experience.[23] General Pershing appointed Maj. Gen. James G. Harbord head of a board of officers which considered organizational matters and gave brief attention to the replacement problem, noting that responsibility for the replacement system was not clearly delimited within the General Staff but was divided between G1 and G3. A memorandum, prepared 29 July 1921 and considered at the 5 August meeting of the board, stated that the duties which had been delegated to the War Department General Staff included "the replacement of personnel in accordance with priorities formulated by G3." The memorandum continued:

> This duty of looking after replacements is so intimately connected with the duty of the movement of troops in the Zone of the Interior, including the delivery of same at training camps and ports of embarkation, that the two functions should be placed in the same subdivision of the General Staff and not in two separate subdivisions.[24]

The board considered a number of proposed solutions, one of which was to abolish G1, but it made no such recommendation. Its deliberations did not change the plans for the replacement system then under consideration. When the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff was established a short time later, the responsibility regarding replacements was divided with the G3 Division.[25]

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[22] *Report of the Secretary of War, 1921*, p. 25.

[23] Maj. Gen. J. G. Harbord, "The American General Staff," *Saturday Evening Post* (13 Mar 26).

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] WD GO 41, 16 Aug 21.

The proposal to abolish G1 was brought up again in 1933 when Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood, who then was commanding Seventh Corps area, proposed a reorganization of the War Department into three groups—administration, supply, and tactics.[26] He contended that The Adjutant General's Department should absorb the functions of the G1 branch of the General Staff and take over general supervision of line personnel, which then was handled by the chiefs of the branches.

General Hagood further proposed that in the event of a major emergency the Regular Army should be disbanded and professional soldiers should be used to train and lead a temporary army of 10 to 15 million men. His report pointed out that the National Defense Act contemplated an army of 1 million men capable of being mobilized immediately, but he argued that such a plan was impractical, first, because men would not join an enlisted reserve corps in time of peace, and second, because reserve supplies to support such a force would be too costly. Congress did not pass any legislation based on this proposal, but the questions which General Hagood raised were prophetic of some of the staff problems which later centered around the replacement system.

General Summerall's Predictions on Replacement Requirements

An indication of the interest which was being shown in personnel replacements in 1927 is contained in the record of a meeting of Maj. Gen. C. P. Summerall, United States Army Chief of Staff, with certain members of his staff on 23 August 1927. General Summerall predicted that in the event of a future war 100 percent replacements would be needed during the first 3 months.[27] He said the Army should be able to operate even though it had only a minimum of time in which to prepare and was forced to use untrained units under untrained officers. This was what had happened to us in every war and it would happen to us again, he added.

The Chief of Staff told his assistants he wanted a plan that would trace the processing of officers and enlisted men from the induction and training pools through the theater of operations; that would show how wounded men would be returned to their units after their wounds were healed; and that would indicate units and installations in the Zone of the Interior and in the reserve divisions.

General Summerall stressed that all officers of the Regular Army, National Guard, and the Officers Reserve Corps were to be considered as a single pool to be assigned on M-day where their services were most needed. He wanted the Reserve officers informed of their places

[26] *Hearings* . . . Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives (HMAC), 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 Apr 33, p. 23.

[27] Memo, WDGS, undated. AG A–44–157. DRB, TAG.

in the mobilization plan. Pointing to the danger of limiting mobilization plans to supply and training, he declared that the plans must also show the maximum possibilities in personnel procurement irrespective of available equipment and that G1 should arrange to receive the draft in any numbers, irrespective of supply and training.

General Summerall further stated that Congress should know what the War Department expected to do with regard to the mobilization of personnel to meet an emergency and that Congress should be shown what training facilities and military supplies were needed to make that personnel effective. Then if circumstances again forced the use of that personnel, untrained and inadequately supplied, the responsibility would rest on Congress for failure to provide needed supplies and training facilities.

Mobilization of the Civilian Conservation Corps

When the Civilian Conservation Corps was mobilized in 1933, it gave the Army an opportunity to test its plans for raising men. Furthermore, Reserve officers called to duty received training in administration and command which a number of Regular Army officers believed to be of great value.[28]

The first duty of the War Department was to receive applicants certified by the Department of Labor and organize them into units. Later, however, the Army assumed control over the entire activity except for the selection of enrollees and the supervision of the men while they were engaged on the work projects. By May 1933, about 8,500 men were being enrolled daily, and the organization soon reached its authorized strength of 300,000, a figure which exceeded the number enlisted for the War with Spain. The daily average of enrollments exceeded the number recruited in the United States during World War I for both the Army and the Navy. Local welfare agencies, working under Department of Labor regulations, selected men from among those who volunteered. The Army inducted these men, immunized them, and made out individual records as they passed through reconditioning camps on their way to the work camps, where they arrived about 3 weeks after their enrollment.

Although the Regular Army was forced to curtail many of its normal activities, the Civilian Conservation Corps mobilization enabled it to test plans previously prepared for a war emergency but revised to fit the new situation. There were more efficient officers available than during 1917, and the Secretary of War reported less confusion and delay and more efficiency than during the World War I mobilization.[29]

[28] Statement, Lt. Gen. Ben Lear (Ret.), 15 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[29] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1933*, pp. 7–11, 192.

About 3,000 Regular Army officers were required for supervisory duties. Some were made available by early graduation of classes at practically all service schools, but many were taken from normal duty assignments. With few exceptions, the supervisory force at each camp of 200 enrollees included 2 Regular Army officers, 1 Reserve officer, and 4 enlisted men of the Regular Army. Reserve officers and rated enrollees of the Corps later took over most of these duties.

Many Regular Army units were stripped of personnel, a situation which was also likely to develop during a war emergency, but these depleted units were not filled up with new recruits as would have happened in a mobilization for war; consequently there was no chance for them to build up again until they had been relieved of their additional duties.[30]

The fact that men were enrolled for a 6-month term-of-service resulted in a continuous replacement problem. A considerable portion of each man's service was taken up with assignment, discharge, and travel, thus reducing the length of time he could be profitably employed.

Between 5 April 1933 and 31 December 1938, the CCC had 2,120,000 men [31] on its rolls. In the fiscal year of 1938, enrollees at over 1,500 camps included 253,776 needy, unemployed, unmarried "juniors" from 17 to 23 years of age; 17,707 war veterans, unlimited by age or marital status; 9,500 Indians on Government reservations; and 4,800 indigent territorials in Alaska, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, or the Virgin Islands. In January 1939, a bill was introduced in Congress to make the CCC a permanent institution, but it did not pass.

In the field of statistics, 66.75 percent of the junior enrollees came from relief families; another 29 percent from families below normal or average standard of living; 3 percent had no families. Three percent were completely illiterate; 38 percent had not gone through grammar school; only 11 percent had finished high school. In age, 59.47 percent were 17 or 18. Nine percent were Negroes.

The Civilian Conservation Corps gave no military training to its members and therefore did not provide the Army with an effective reserve force. Since the men enrolled were generally of military age and physically capable, it was not suitable, as a nucleus for an auxiliary labor force which the Army could have used during an emergency. Both the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration, which was established within the Works Progress Administration by Executive order on 26 June 1935, gave the Army some experience, however, with auxiliary labor units. On Army-sponsored

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Annual Report of the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, Fiscal Year 1938,* pp. 23–34.

projects, National Youth Administration workers were used to the maximum extent possible to replace enlisted men on special duty.[32] In March 1940, National Youth Administration projects had been established on more than 60 posts and about 3,100 youths were employed.

The Civilian Conservation Corps provided the Army with experience in the enrollment and speedy assignment of large numbers of men, experience which was utilized during the World War II mobilization. Reserve officers assigned to the camps and a considerable number of the enrollees received administrative experience which later proved of value to the military forces. Several proposals were made for the conversion of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps into military training camps, but none was approved. Army Service Forces in June 1942 took over some 550 Civilian Conservation Corps camps, but the locations used by the Civilian Conservation Corps in most instances were not suitable for replacement training camps and the buildings were of a temporary type. Some of the buildings were moved to nearby military posts while others were made into camps for conscientious objectors or Japanese evacuees.

The Replacement Plan as Outlined in 1936

The outline of a proposed replacement system, which was published in 1936 in the *Manual for Commanders of Large Units* (volume II, Administrative), was drawn up after careful consideration of World War I experiences. It offered a plan for the organization, training, and forwarding of personnel in sufficient numbers to maintain all troops in a theater of operations at full strength at all times.[33]

Personnel replacements were defined to include all those destined to replace losses or to bring any unit up to its prescribed strength. Several sources of replacements were listed. They were to come from the Zone of the Interior; from evacuees in the theater of operations who, it was assumed, would, as a rule, be automatically returned to their former organizations; from the personnel returned to an assignment status after being absent without leave; from prisoners upon completion of sentence; from officers upon reclassification; or from others who for any reason became available for assignment.

Estimating the number of replacements required was made a function of the Zone of the Interior. It was realized that the commander of the theater of operations was materially concerned, and it was

[32] Ltr, WD, 25 Mar 40, sub: National Youth Administration Work Projects on Military Posts and Stations. AG 600.12 (3-19-40) M-DM. DRB, TAG.

[33] Memo, WDGS, 27 May 35, sub: Initial Personnel Policies of the War Department for an Emergency. AG, G-1/12602-3. DRB, TAG. Later instructions appeared in FM 101-1, ch. 3.

expected that he would indicate his requirements. Before being forwarded to a theater of operations, replacements were to be thoroughly trained, clothed, equipped, and appropriately armed.

The replacement system in the theater of operations was to be sufficiently flexible to meet the local requirements and to assure an unfailing and timely arrival of replacements where needed. Replacements, like supplies, were to be echeloned in depth, the number of echelons in the theater of operations to depend mainly on the depth of the theater. Generally, two echelons were contemplated—the army replacement depots and the replacement depots in the communications zone.

Depots in which replacements were organized into 300-man companies with three platoons of 100 men each were considered satisfactory. Three companies were to comprise a replacement battalion. A replacement depot, generally, would consist of a headquarters and two or more replacement battalions for which tables of organization were provided.

Replacements were to move from the communications zone replacement depots in response to requisitions submitted by the armies and by units in the communications zone, as controlled by priorities established by theater commanders. Priorities were expected to be of greatest value when the supply of replacements in the communications zone was less than the demands of the units served. Commanders responsible for the maintenance of replacement installations at proper levels were to anticipate losses in accordance with tactical plans and to requisition replacements accordingly. Replacements would be requisitioned by units in the theater of operations for both officers and enisted men on the first requisition submitted following the absence of the individual.

Replacements were to be forwarded by rail, water, motor, air, or on foot. When forwarded by rail, they were to be sent by trainloads when practicable, but not normally in numbers less than a carload. Replacements were not to be sent to units engaged in combat when this could be avoided, and they were not to be sent in small increments. Railroad regulating stations were to function in the same manner as in the shipment of supplies and were to determine priority of movement to the army under instructions from theater commanders.

Experience had demonstrated the difficulty of keeping replacement training in the Zone of the Interior abreast of new developments in combat methods. It was suggested that after his arrival in the theater, but before his incorporation into a combat unit, a replacement should be given additional training. Decision as to where it was to be given was a function of the theater commander. No plan was to preclude additional training if such was deemed necessary by army and lower

unit commanders. Additional men were to be provided in theater of operation depots if training was given there. In view of their special training, replacements designated for a particular arm or service were not to be diverted from such service. It was deemed essential that specialists should have proper identification when they arrived at their organizations.

Figures then available indicated that of every 100 men hospitalized in the theater of operations approximately 78 again became fit for combat duty. The full effect of this additional source of replacements was expected only after several months of combat when it would have an important bearing upon the number of replacements required from the Zone of the Interior. Men who had reached army evacuation hospitals in the course of their treatment would be returned to duty, either directly or through the army convalescent hospitals, to the army replacement depot, their movements thereto being made on orders from army headquarters. Men belonging to communications zone units who did not have to be evacuated from station hospitals would be returned to duty direct to their units.

Mobilization Plans

Practical application of the principles governing the operation of the replacement system, as set forth in the *Manual for Commanders of Large Units*, depended upon the mobilization plan. Immediately after World War I, the War Department General Staff believed that surplus military equipment could be used during the initial phase of a mobilization. Later, as the World War I surplus gradually disappeared, it had to revise the mobilization plans, making manpower and equipment procurement rates the principal factors in determining schedules. By 1928, the voluminous plan prepared in 1924 was regarded as impractical and was simplified, decentralizing responsibilities to corps areas.[34] Four mobilization periods were provided extending respectively 60, 90, 120, and 150 days from M-day. The establishment of reception and replacement training centers was made the function of corps area commanders.

The Planning Branch of G1 of the War Department General Staff prepared the replacement plan contained in the mobilization regulations. It was assumed that in the early stages of a mobilization the procurement of equipment would tend to lag behind the procurement of manpower and that equipment would become the determining factor. For several years, planners assumed that great cantonments, such as had been used in World War I, would not be necessary again; instead they proposed to use Federal, State, county, and municipal

[34] Lecture, Brig. Gen. Andrew Moses, ACofS. G1, WDGS, at Army War College, 1 Oct 35. AG 44–157. DRB, TAG.

buildings for troop shelter, supplemented by private buildings if necessary. The determining factors were assumed to be (1) the rapidity with which personnel could be called; (2) the time required to organize and train units for combat; and (3) the rate at which munitions could be manufactured.[35] Gen. Malin Craig, who became Chief of Staff 2 October 1935, initiated the protective mobilization plan which generally was followed during the 1940–41 augmentation of the Army. Under this plan the expansion of the military forces was governed by the manpower and industrial supplies actually available.

Following a study of procurement in 1936, new regulations were written calling for the Regular Army and federalized National Guard (less those units on the outpost line to absorb the first blow) to be organized as an initial protective force to hold until mobilization could be completed.

The successive stages of this plan included:

1. An initial protective force consisting of the Regular Army and the National Guard to be ready within 30 days after the declaration of a national emergency and to have the mission of protecting the United States while larger forces were being mobilized.

2. An additional force of approximately 700,000 to be called in successive stages and on a schedule governed by the maximum production of war material of which industry was capable.

3. The addition of men at the maximum rate at which equipment could be procured until a force of 4,000,000 men was mobilized. This was to be completed in 390 days. This plan differed from previous plans in that it was intended to provide greater balance during the mobilization period.[36] However, more efficient results could be obtained by reaching a balanced force on the target date rather than by attempting to maintain balance during the entire mobilization period. Units that required longer training started first, those that could take the field after short training started later.[37]

Mobilization tests indicated inadequate planning regarding limited service personnel, which was expected to include about 14 percent of the men between 21 and 30 years of age.[38] Reports made as a result of these tests proposed extensive use of civilians in corps area service commands.

Seventh Corps Area expected to select replacements at the reception centers and send them to branch replacement centers for training.[39]

[35] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1931,* App. A.

[36] *Hearings . . . Truman Committee,* 77th Cong., pp. 186–187.

[37] Statement, Maj Gen L. C. Jaynes, 19 Nov 51. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[38] Army War College Committee Reports, 1936, on "Corps Area Mobilization Plans." Copy in Mobilization Book, G1 file. DRB, TAG.

[39] Maj J. M. Shelton before the Corps Area G1 Conference, WD, 4–16 May 36, sub: G1 Features of Seventh Corps Area Mobilization Plan. G–1/14204 (5–23–36). DRB, TAG.

Reception centers, however, would send filler replacements directly to Regular Army and National Guard units during the early stages of a mobilization. Loss replacements required for the theater of operations by M–30 were to be selected as far as practicable from men with some military training, who were to be given priority in movement to replacement centers on War Department orders. After the 1936 test, Eighth Corps Area recommended that the prohibition of the use of limited service men in recruiting and at schools, contained in paragraph 26b, section III, of the corps area mobilization plan, 1934, be removed. The test indicated there were many places in each class of activity where limited service men could release able-bodied men. Eighth Corps Area recommended less restrictive rules for employment of class B manpower in theater of operations service units, in units for fixed harbor defenses, and in other places where expenditure of great physical energy was not required.

The replacement problem received considerable attention at the conference of corps area G1's held in Washington from 4 to 15 May 1936. Since it appeared that replacements would be a heavy drain on personnel, Lt. Col. R. G. Kirkwood, who discussed the personnel needs of service commands at this meeting, urged that limited service men be used in all possible capacities.[40] He also favored using civilians who would not be eligible for the draft. He assumed that rates of pay for civilians would be higher, but thought using them would decrease postwar costs since they would not draw pensions or veterans' benefits.

The commanding general, Second Corps Area, proposed in 1937 that the corps area service command be made up of limited service officers and enlisted men.[41] The War Department announced, however, that it did not expect to use limited service personnel, other than retired Regular Army officers.[42] War Department officials thought that it was not advisable to use funds for training retired or inactive personnel when appropriations for active personnel were not all that might be desired.

Second Corps Area requested a force of United States Guards to consist of approximately 400 officers and 7,000 enlisted men, made up of limited service personnel. This request was approved by the War Department 12 November 1937,[43] but the approval was rescinded in 1939 because the War Department by that time had adopted a policy of using military police organizations for duties in connection with

[40] Ltr, Hq 5th Corps Area, 25 May 46, sub: Report on Conference of Corps Area—G1's at Washington, D. C. G–1/14204. DRB, TAG.

[41] Ltr., Hq. 2d Corps Area, 25 Oct 37, sub: Peacetime Organization of Corps Area Service Command Units. AG 381 (10–25–37). DRB, TAG.

[42] Ltr., WDAGO, 9 Dec 37, sub: Corps Area Service Commands. AG 381 (11–22–37). DRB, TAG.

[43] Ltr., WDGS, 12 Nov 37, sub: Mobilization Provisions for U. S. Guards. AG 381 (10–12–37), G3 6543–123. DRB, TAG.

internal security. Limited service men could be used only after special authorization had been received from the War Department.[44]

Recognizing that in an emergency there would be a serious manpower shortage, officials in Washington indicated a willingness to use men from the limited service lists during a mobilization if others were not available.[45] Many officers feared that acceptance of substandard enlisted men into the Regular Army and National Guard during a minor emergency might leave those units with undesirable members after the emergency was over. It was expected that the inefficient would remain on the rosters for a long time and thus keep the standards low.

By May 1940, officers in G1 of the War Department General Staff realized that, in general, inadequate provision had been made for the overhead of theaters of operations.[46] The War Department Protective Mobilization Plan was amended to provide units for replacement installations in overseas theaters of war, but there was no specific provision for theater headquarters. Some staff members noted this lack of adequate overhead and predicted that a large number of loss replacements would be used to man installations and would never reach combat units.[47]

Loss Replacement Ratio Tables

Responsibility for the computation of loss replacement rates devolved upon the Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff in 1936, at a time when there was no study available within the division covering the subject.[48] Previous computations had been made from Army Medical Bulletin, No. 24, *War Casualties*, by Col. Albert G. Love, MC, which analyzed casualties from a medical viewpoint rather than from the viewpoint of arm and service percentages of losses. The War Department wanted adequate replacement plans and regarded their preparation as vital but realized that few officers were proficient in the subject. The Personnel Division needed at least one officer who could make the computations for any particular mobilization or strategic plan on short notice. While it was realized that the solution to the replacement problem would be in the nature of an "educated guess," it was considered desirable to do as much of the educating as possible before military operations made it necessary to start guessing.

[44] Ltr, WDAGO, 14 Feb 39, sub: Limited Service Personnel. AG 381 (11–12–37), G–1/13308–167. DRB, TAG.

[45] Ltr, WDAGO, 14 Mar 38, sub: Protective Mobilization Plan. AG 381 (2–28–38) (Misc) C–M. DRB, TAG.

[46] Memo, WDGS, G1, 2 May 40. Copy in GHQ and theater file. DRB, TAG.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Memo for ACofS, G–1, WDGS, 10 Dec 38, sub: Office Memorandum for the Computation of Loss Replacements. AG G–1/15460. DRB, TAG.

In December 1938, Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Clift Andrus completed a study of loss replacements, especially as to their number and composition.[49] Colonel Andrus figured casualties by arm and service from AEF experiences from July to November 1918, using data obtained from the files of The Adjutant General and the Historical Branch of the Army War College. Loss replacements for Air Corps officers were based on rate of production of aircraft in proportion to estimated combat losses, rather than on the estimated losses alone.

Colonel Andrus concluded there would probably be a serious need for replacements early in operations because casualty rates were likely to be high among unseasoned troops, which findings agreed with General Summerall's statements in 1927. Men returning from hospitals were expected to form an important source of loss replacements, but it was realized that the return flow would start slowly. The study pointed out that changes in organization inevitably accompany war; and that new types of units were likely to take men from previously existing units. Thereafter, loss replacement ratio estimates were included in field manuals.[50]

The 1939 Study of Replacement Regulations

In 1939, there was a revision of mobilization regulations in which an effort was made to correct the deficiencies that had appeared either in the mobilization tests or in conferences and critiques. In the combat zone the army commander was expected to anticipate losses in accordance with tactical plans and was held responsible for moving sufficient replacements to divisions, corps, and army troops. The commanders of combat units, upon receipt of replacements, were responsible for integrating the new men into their organizations with the least loss of efficiency.[51]

Replacement depots were not contemplated in advance of army depots, unless the army commander so directed. Flexibility of priorities was expected to prevent delaying replacements in division and corps depots and to permit the pooling of specialists which had become necessary in a motorized and mechanized army. Efforts were made to save depot overhead.

Based on requisitions (by courier, mail, or telegraph), replacements were to be sent to the division railhead or by motor to a designated point. Distribution was to be made by divisions immediately to representatives present from regiments and similar units. If anything interferred with this distribution it was believed that the division

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] FM 101–10 contains figures taken from World War II experience.

[51] Memo, WDGS, 24 Oct 39, sub: Comments of the Chief of Staff Regarding the Infantry Situation. AG G–1/15863. DRB, TAG.

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headquarters company could hold these replacements for a short time. In a similar manner, replacements were to be sent to corps and army troops.

These revised regulations, contained in Mobilization Regulations 1–11, on 8 September 1939 were approved by Gen. George C. Marshall, who had been Acting Chief of Staff since July 1939 and who had been named Chief of Staff on 1 September. The Chief of Staff continued to study the replacement problem as he believed the plan as it was presented offered little in the way of details of organization.

On 26 September 1939, General Marshall indicated he was not fully satisfied with arrangements which had been made for handling replacements. In a memorandum in which he discussed the Infantry situation and which he sent to G3, who extracted the parts pertinent to G1 and forwarded them to that office, General Marshall said:

> My other thought on this matter suggests the necessity of more than routine arrangements to replace casualties. Just where would the replacements be just prior to a battle, under what control, and when fed to the unit? . . . I would assume that in an army of our character, at the opening of a campaign into which we have had to move without delay of a year for preparation, that our temporary sick casualties would be very heavy, and our low rifle strength, therefore, correspondingly depleted. Therefore, replacements assume a great importance to my mind.[52]

As a result of General Marshall's comments, a staff study was prepared. It pointed out that seldom if ever would a rifle unit enter combat at tabular war strength; if one did, the chances were that after a few minutes of combat the toll of casualties would begin. Trained replacements were recognized as essential—as had been shown in 1917–18.[53] It was held that the ideal replacement system would include a division infantry replacement pool wherein replacements were trained, assigned to regiments, and fed to the units during rest or relief periods or during defensive combat, but only in extreme emergencies during offensive combat. However, it was considered that the division replacement pool would prove difficult to administer during a mobile situation. A corps pool was considered more feasible.

The following principles were put forward as the basis of any replacement system: trained replacements, immediately available in close proximity to units served; the framework of replacement organization to be planned in advance and not left to chance.[54] On 24 October 1939, after considering the remarks by the Chief of Staff and the staff study, G1, WDGS, recommended that no changes be made in the regulations then in force providing for the replacement system.[55]

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[52] Memo, CofS to G3, 26 Sep 39. Copy in OCS 21097–2. DRB, TAG.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] *Ibid.*
[55] *Ibid.*

The 1940–41 Expansion of the Army

When times are normal the Army may be confronted with public indifference or actual opposition to its needs. In an emergency, the Army sometimes finds its position reversed because it has to resist public clamor for too rapid expansion. The 1940 emergency brought such a change in public opinion. A Gallup poll indicated public sentiment regarding compulsory military training had changed from 61 percent *against*, in October 1939, to 64 percent *in favor*, in July 1940. At the same time, a survey published in *Fortune Magazine* stated that more than 93 percent of the people were in favor of spending whatever amount of money was necessary to build up the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Enlistments increased but there was a more marked increase in the letters from persons who wanted to help in some way other than by enlistment. Some of these suggestions were impractical, such as the one from a woman who wanted to be a hostess on an Army bomber, but there were many that came from persons who could be useful in the defense effort. Letters from those volunteering their services reached such volume that it was necessary to establish an administrative agency to file the requests and reply to them.[56]

General Marshall foresaw the danger that might come from turning the Army into a school for hordes of raw recruits. He told the Veterans of Foreign Wars that "we must not become involved by impatience or ignorance in an ill-considered, over-night expansion which would . . . leave us in a dilemma of confused results, half baked and fatally unbalanced." [57]

The Army could only expand so fast and there were indications that there would be too many emergency officers. With 117,000 Reserve officers already commissioned, a new policy was adopted which limited new commissions to ROTC graduates and certain specially qualified persons.

The Selective Service and Training Act, approved by the President 16 September 1940, became the first peacetime conscription law in American history. The extent of the change that had come over American public opinion was indicated by the fact that although the American Legion had sponsored universal conscription as early as 1922 and several other bills had been considered, none had received approval. On 16 October 1940, about 16,000,000 men between 21 and 36 years of age were listed for military service. The Selective Service Act limited peacetime inductions to 900,000 men in any one year, but appropriations provided for only 800,000.[58]

[56] Memo, OCS, 26 Sep 39. OCS 21097–2. DRB, TAG.

[57] *Time*, 8 Jul 40, p. 19.

[58] Annual Report of the Selective Service System, "Selective Service in Peacetime," 29 Aug 42, pp. 183 and 247; WD Bul 39, 30 Nov 40.

Men 18 to 20 years of age registered 30 June 1942 and became liable for military service 13 November 1942. On 5 December 1942, the services fixed 38 as the maximum age for induction. Beginning 1 January 1943, men registered upon reaching the age of 18, thus adding about 100,000 per month to the list of registrants. Men from 45 to 65 years of age registered but did not become liable for military service.

Corps area commanders, who had received instructions concerning the procurement of selectees, on 17 October 1940 were required to state on requisitions that adequate hospitalization, shelter, and supplies were available for the men who were being called. During the first 13 months of the draft requisitions totaled 970,595, but the number actually inducted was 921,722.[59] Many volunteered before their numbers were called, and by December about 20,000 had passed through reception centers. There were no replacement training centers in operation at that time, so hastily classified and untrained fillers were sent direct to newly activated units and divisions which were being increased to approximate war strength. After 1 year's training, men were subject to 10 years in the Reserve components.

The first National Guard troops were called into Federal service 16 September 1940. During the next 2 months, approximately 100,000 Guardsmen moved into camps and started training.

Mobilization plans contemplated that personnel assigned to inactive Reserve divisions during peacetime would provide cadres in the event those divisions were called to duty, but these plans did not work out in practice. The Reserve divisions offered so few attractions for enlisted men that usually only officers were assigned. When the mobilization started, most Reserve officers were called to duty prior to the activation of their divisions; consequently, the new units needed both officers and enlisted men.

The expansion of the Army by splitting units into equal parts, one of the methods used during the World War I mobilization, was not considered suitable because it destroyed the effectiveness of the old unit. During 1940–41, Regular Army and National Guard divisions and nondivisional units transferred keymen to the activated Reserve divisions, actually new divisions in the Army of the United States. These new divisions, in turn, furnished cadres to other new units.

Usually about 3 months after activation a new division was authorized an overstrength in grades and ratings equivalent to the cadre requirements as shown in tables of organization, making possible early promotion of the cadre members. An overstrength in the lowest grade equal to the cadre, about 1,200 for a division, was authorized to take

[59] *Ibid.*

care of the loss of personnel. After about 2 months' training the members of the cadre were detached from their parent unit and reported to the headquarters of the new organization.

The selected division commander, along with several of his key staff officers, received a week's orientation at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and then attended a special new division officers' course at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. The assistant division commander normally attended the special new division officers' course, with many of the infantry officers, at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., while the division artillery commander normally attended a similar course at the Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla. Other cadre officers usually attended appropriate service schools.

Twenty-nine reception centers were established throughout the United States. The first selectees were assigned to Regular Army and National Guard units, most of which were concentrated in large posts. By June of 1941, there were 21 replacement training centers giving 13 weeks of basic training to recruits in order that regiments and divisions could carry on training for combat unburdened by giving individual instruction to new men.

Some parent units attempted to get rid of undesirables by placing them on cadres. To prevent this practice, higher commanders frequently required two lists, either of which might be selected for transfer. Not knowing which group they could keep, organization commanders were more likely to see that both were properly trained. One method used in selecting cadremen was to pick officers for new organizations after all enlisted men had been chosen. The officers, realizing they also might be on the list, made every effort to get good men.

The Armored Force, organized from the 7th Cavalry Brigade (mechanized), the 66th Infantry (light tanks), and a few scattered infantry tank units, is an example of the methods used to produce new units. From this nucleus I Armored Corps, the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, one GHQ reserve tank battalion, (70th), and the Armored Force Board were organized. I Corps, 1st Armored Division, and the Board were at Fort Knox, Ky.; 2d Armored Division at Fort Benning, Ga.; and the 70th Tank Battalion at Fort Meade, Md.

In November 1940, the Armored Force School was activated at Fort Knox. Four National Guard reserve tank battalions, the 191st at Fort Meade, Md., the 192d at Fort Knox, Ky., the 193d at Fort Benning, Ga., and the 194th at Fort Lewis, Wash., were activated between November 1940 and January 1941. In February 1941, the 1st GHQ Reserve Tank Group Headquarters was activated at Fort Knox, Ky. Early in March, the Armored Force Replacement Center at Fort Knox was activated with a capacity of 9,000 trainees and was filled before the end of the month.

The 3d Armored Division was activated at Camp Beauregard, La., and the 4th Armored Division at Pine Camp, N. Y., on 15 April. The Armored Force Headquarters and Headquarters Company was activated in May 1941 with headquarters at Fort Knox, Ky. The 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, early in June 1941, furnished cadres for 5 light and 5 medium GHQ reserve tank battalions. Fillers came from the replacement training center.[60]

The 30th Infantry Division was one of the first four National Guard divisions called into Federal service in 1940.[61] For 2 years, it trained at Fort Jackson, near Columbia, S. C. In the fall of 1941, the division lost about 6,000 men who were released at the end of 1-year enlistments or because of hardship cases. By 12 September 1942, the division had furnished several cadres and many of its men had gone to officer candidate schools or to the Air Forces; as a result its strength was down to 6,000 men—about 40 percent of normal.

It had been necessary by August 1942 to take 1,800 men from the 33d Division to fill the 2d Amphibious Brigade. Army Ground Forces was about 167,000 short, and its headquarters began studies on a proposal to bring units to full T/O strength plus 15 percent overstrength. Drains on units for cadres, cadets, and officer candidates had made such inroads that it appeared overstrengths were necessary.

From November of 1940, when it was inducted into Federal service, until December of 1943, when it was alerted for overseas, the 31st Infantry Division, with an authorized strength of 13,469, had trained 39,980 men. On two occasions, the division had reached full strength and completed training for combat, only to be stripped of officers and men for the benefit of other units. The division was playing a familiar role for it had been a training division in France during World War I.[62] In February 1941, the division, in training at Camp Blanding, received 7,143 recruits who had no previous training.[63] They were selectees from Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana, the states in which the division had originated. After 8 weeks of training in replacement companies, which had been formed in each regiment, the new men were assigned to division units.

The drain on the 30th, 31st, and 33d Divisions was so heavy that during maneuvers in September 1942 the 30th had only 2,100 men; the 31st, 7,000; and the 33d, 8,000. Later these three divisions were given No. 1 priority in the assignment of replacements so they could be filled and complete their training. In an effort to eliminate the need for stripping divisions, the 76th and 78th Divisions were given

[60] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941,* . . . pp. 18–19.

[61] Robert L. Hewitt, *The Work Horse of the Western Front, the Story of the 30th Infantry Division* (Washington, 1946), p. 6.

[62] *History of 31st Infantry Division, 1940–45* (Baton Rouge, 1946).

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

overstrengths of 33⅓ percent, and it was planned to take men needed for other units from the overstrength of these two divisions.

Selective Service trainees could be held in the Army for a period of only 12 consecutive months unless Congress declared the national interests imperiled, in which event the President could extend the period of service. Similar limitations were placed on the service of the Reserve components. Both the selective service trainees and the Reserve components could be used only in the Western Hemisphere or in the territories or possessions of the United States.

These restrictions, which were not serious in the fall of 1940 when the national service legislation was passed, became a drawback as training progressed. The 1st, 2d, 3d, and 5th Regular Army Divisions had been organized as task forces. Of the 2,628 officers in these four divisions, there were 2,006 Reserve officers.[64] Before the task forces could have been used for extended service it would have been necessary to discharge these Reserve officers and with their permission to have reordered them to active duty under the provisions of section 37*a* of the National Defense Act. If any had not accepted unlimited active duty their replacement would have been necessary, probably at a time when the task forces were preparing to move, which would have disrupted the organization. On 31 May 1941, there were only 1,388 Regular officers in the nine Regular Army divisions then activated; to provide Regular Army officers for the task force divisions was therefore impractical. Had the number been sufficient, there would not have been a proper distribution of grades.

The 1st Division, brought up to strength with fewer trainees in order that it might be available in case of an emergency, was much better off than any of the others. It was the only division which could have been moved overseas without considerable delay. The 2d Division would have had to replace approximately 3,000 men, the 3d Division about 4,600, and the 5th Division about 5,200. Approximately one-third of the strength of the latter two divisions was made up of trainees.

The main supporting units for the task forces were anti-aircraft regiments. In only two of these could selectees be replaced without serious handicap to the regiment since they outnumbered 3-year enlisted men in many of the units. It was obvious that an organization which underwent a 50 percent turnover of personnel would require several months' training before it could operate as a trained tactical unit. No part of the Army was free from these restrictions. The National Guard included 37 percent trainees, and 10 percent of its officers were from the Reserves. Except in Air Corps units, about 60 percent of the enlisted strength of the field forces of the Regular

[64] Ltrs, DCofS to Dir, Bureau of the Budget, and Speaker, House of Representatives, 17 Jun 41, w/incls. G–1/16117–78. DRB, TAG.

Army in the United States were trainees, and 78 percent of the officers were from the Organized Reserves.[65] These restrictions on service became even more serious after new Atlantic bases were occupied, and after overseas garrisons including Alaska, were augmented.

Early in 1941, the War Department realized it was confronted with a serious replacement problem in that the expiration of the terms of service of the 1-year selectees might result in the loss of approximately two-thirds of the trained men in the military forces. Although induction had spread over several months, the replacements for any particular unit or team had arrived, in many instances, within a relatively short period of time. The 26th Division had received 9,941 selectees in all, but 9,600 had joined during February and March.[66] The 7th Division had received 10,863 selectees, of whom 5,500 had arrived during January and February. Similar conditions prevailed in the other divisions. It was apparent that if these trained selectees had been replaced with untrained men upon a fixed date the combat efficiency of the division would have been destroyed.

This was the situation on 27 May 1941 when the President proclaimed "an unlimited national emergency." At a conference on 4 June, the Chief of Staff stated that he desired a draft of a joint resolution designed to permit the employment of the Reserve components in the same manner and to the same extent as the President was empowered to employ the Regular Army.[67] The proposal to extend the service of the National Guardsmen and selectees beyond the 1 year for which they had been called to duty aroused extensive debate and brought charges that the Government was about to break faith with the men.

On 17 July, General Marshall stated that he agreed that selectees with dependents should be returned home after 1 year of service.[68] The Army had placed in operation the administrative machinery necessary to determine dependency by making use of Red Cross investigations and statements from local induction boards with reference to changes regarding dependents that might have occurred after the soldier entered the service. The War Department made the final decisions in all cases after considering the evidence submitted.

President Roosevelt told Congress on 21 July 1941 that a grave national risk would be involved unless legislation made it possible to maintain the full effective strength of the Army and give training

[65] Memo., Secretary of War to the President, 25 Jun 41. Copy in G–1/16117–78. DRB, TAG.

[66] Ltr., Gen. Marshall to Hon. Geo. J. Bates, 23 Aug 41. G–1/16117–78. DRB, TAG.

[67] Memo., WDJAG, 12 Jun 41, sub: Declaration of National Emergency Joint Resolution for action of Congress declaring a National Emergency and Authorizing Use of Land Forces. JAG 011. JAGO.

[68] Ltr, WDAGO, 22 Aug 41, sub: Release of Enlisted Men during the Remainder of the Calendar Year 1941. AG 324.71 (8–16–41) EA–A. DRB, TAG.

to as many additional men as possible during 1941. Congress opened hearings which were featured by lengthy and heated discussions.

On 24 July, General Marshall told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the immediate problem of the War Department was to perfect the force of about 1,700,000 men then in training or soon to be called. He pointed out that any large increase in the training establishment, such as would be necessary to train a large number of replacements, would disrupt the military forces. The training of so many new men would have required a nucleus of old men spread so thin throughout the expanded units that the efficiency of the whole establishment would have been lowered. On the following day, Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord testified that "if selectees are released it will completely disrupt the entire Army." The situation was similar to what could be expected in war, only losses were coming from expiration of terms of service instead of casualties.

Congress provided a solution. The President was authorized to keep the men in the Army, and Executive Order No. 8862, approved 21 August 1941, extended for 18 months the period of training for selectees, National Guardsmen, and Reserves, unless sooner released or discharged. On the following day, the Army issued instructions [69] placing the normal term of Federal service for selectees, National Guard enlisted men, Reserves, and retired men recalled to duty at 12 months from date of induction or date of reporting, but listing the number who could be released during the remainder of 1941 in an inclosure. Commanders were required to submit semimonthly reports showing numbers released, numbers remaining in each priority, and listing any units out of line with the remaining units of the command. Revised requisitions for the period 1 October to 31 December were required by 10 September. The period of service for National Guard officers was extended by certificates that higher commanders attached to September pay vouchers, rather than by individual orders.[70] It was a peacetime, not a wartime, solution. Three years later, when division commanders were calling for men, the Army could not turn to Congress to legislate it out of its replacement troubles.

Replacement Tests During Maneuvers

During the maneuvers in Louisiana in September 1941, replacement procedures were tested under simulated combat conditions. Maneuver plans distributed to units during August contained instructions for each army to replace real or simulated casualties through depots.[71]

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[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Ltr, WDAGO, 30 Aug 41, sub: Release of Enlisted Men during the Remainder of the Calendar Year 1941. AG 324.71 (8-16-41) EA-A. DRB, TAG.

[71] Final Reports of the Adjutant General's Section, GHQ Directed Maneuvers, Sept 15-30, 1941. Copy of OCS 322 Repl (11 Aug 47). DRB, TAG.

Replacement battalions were on duty with the armies in the 1942 maneuvers.

As soon as the men arrived at these depots they were checked, classified, and assigned to receiving companies. Observers believed that failure to give advanced warning that casualties had been shipped was one of the weakest points of the replacement system as it was operated during the maneuvers. Motor transportation was regarded as inadequate and rail transportation was not always effectively utilized because men did not always detrain at the point nearest to the depot. Command echelons in the depots were regarded as poor and security as inadequate. Men sometimes failed to receive their individual equipment. There was a play of simulated records which observers regarded as of little value because of its lack of realism. Recommendations following the maneuvers [72] stated that depots should remain within the communication zones so long as they could serve combat units from rear locations. It was suggested that each army should have a headquarters section to operate a regulating point, but that large and unwieldy installations of the replacement system should be taken from army control and placed in more stable locations farther to the rear. There was need for better liaison between the replacement depots and the rear echelons of divisions in order to give receiving units longer advance notice of the arrival of shipments of replacements and to give them enough time to fill subordinate units with men having the desired military occupational skills.

The Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee

Knowledge gained from operating the draft in World War I was kept alive by a group of General Staff officers who were members of the Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee. This committee formed in 1926 later became the nucleus for the Selective Service organization. The group proposed legislation, kept records, and trained the officers who later supervised selective service operations. When the expansion of the Army started in 1940, there was a need for men familiar with the reception, classification, training, and assignment of recruits, but few were available. The Joint Army-Navy Selective Service Committee accepted the principle that voluntary enlistments would be discontinued under Selective Service. After the war, many officers believed that allegations of favoritism and charges of proselyting might have been avoided had this policy been followed from the beginning of the mobilization.

[72] See file OCS 322 Repl (11 Aug 47). DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER X

WARTIME DECENTRALIZATION

The War Department Reorganization of March 1942

The air arm, which emerged from World War I as an important new member of the combat team, grew in importance and received greater staff and command consideration. Air Corps officers proposed unity of command for the air forces separate from the ground and service forces. A staff study prepared by the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff in 1940 suggested that division into air, ground, and zone of interior or service forces would be the most effective military organization.[1] Several plans were proposed but there was no general agreement. On 1 December 1941, the War Plans Division asked the other General Staff divisions to study all the organization proposals then under consideration and submit recommendations.

After the beginning of the war, the General Staff had little time to study staff organization, but a committee under the chairmanship of Col. William K. Harrison of the War Plans Division kept the project alive and presented a report which convinced the Chief of Staff that some reorganization was necessary. Maj. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, who had been in England but returned to serve on the Roberts Commission investigating the Pearl Harbor attack, was named chairman of the reorganization committee.


General McNarney told the committee he wanted a plan which would free top officers from administrative details.[2] He believed that small personnel sections in the ground and air command staffs could administer personnel, but he added that G1 of the War Department General Staff must be an umpire to decide disputes. Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, G1, WDGS, wanted to take G1 out of operations, but he stressed his belief that it would be difficult for any staff section to carry on its functions without consulting other staff sections. He pointed to certain administrative matters, such as assignment and transfer of Regular Army officers, on which only G1 was in a position to take action.

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[1] Otto L. Nelson, *National Security and the General Staff* (Washington, 1946), ch. VIII.

[2] Minutes of Conference held in the office of the DCofS, 5 Feb 42. McNarney-Nelson Papers, WD Reorg 42. OCS Rec Sec.

CHART 8—THE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM FOLLOWING THE REORGANIZATION OF 9 MARCH 1942



By the end of February 1942 the committee had worked out a proposed reorganization. The recommendations it submitted to the Chief of Staff were intended to make the War Department General Staff a policymaking organization which would have less to do with minor details but would have more time to deal with general plans. The committee's recommendations were approved in turn by General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and President Roosevelt.[3]

The reorganization 9 March 1942 [see chart 8] established three separate commands, the Army Ground Forces, the Army Air Forces, and the Army Service Forces, with commanders responsible for administrative details. The War Department General Staff was reduced in numbers and its functions restricted to policymaking and supervision, along with such inspection responsibilities as might be necessary to make its other functions effective.[4] War Department Circular No. 59 ordered the changes and provided that the War Department General Staff should plan basic programs to be executed by the commanding generals of the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, Army Service Forces, defense commands, task forces, and theaters of operation. Each command was directed to operate its own replacement training centers and schools and to conduct the basic training of recruits or draftees who were not assigned to replacement training centers.

There is no evidence to indicate that the authors of this circular intended to make any changes in the replacement system, but it delegated to the Army Service Forces "the administration of all functions which are Army-wide in scope and which pertain to personnel as individuals, both military and civilian, to include preliminary training,"[5] a provision which divided the responsibility for personnel between G1, WDGS and the Service Forces. This division was more pronounced because the circular also said that G1 was responsible for those duties "relating to the personnel of the Army as individuals,"[6] a function which was normal for G1 but which conflicted with the powers the same directive had delegated to the Army Service Forces. Confusion and misunderstanding followed. Responsible officers did not all agree that the reorganization of 9 March 1942 resulted in more efficient percedure. Some regarded the staff system existing prior to that date as sound but believed that the decentralization of functions had proved unsound.[7]

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[3] EO 9082, 28 Feb 42; WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42; *Hearings . . .* SMAC, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2092, 6 Mar 42; McNarney Biographical Sketch, DA Office Public Information, 18 Jan 50; Gen. George C. Marshall, Gen. H. H. Arnold, and Adm. Ernest King, *The War Reports* (Philadelphia and New York, 1947), p. 105.

[4] Ltr, WDAGO, 18 Mar 42, sub: Allocation and Distribution of Enlisted Replacements. AG 341 (3–11–42) EC–C–M. DRB, TAG.

[5] WD Cir 59, 2 Mar 42, 7*e*(7).

[6] *Ibid.*, 3*c*.

[7] Statement, Brig. Gen. Robert C. Rogers (Ret.), 22 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

Administration of Military Personnel

The reorganization of 1942 gave the commanding general, Army Service Forces, supervision over the Adjutant General's Office, which continued to act as The Adjutant General of the War Department. Within the Adjutant General's Office, the Military Personnel Division and the Classification and Replacement Branch of the Operations and Training Division were closely connected with the replacement system. The Enlisted Replacement Branch of the Military Personnel Division, TAG, ordered men to replacement training centers and assigned the graduates, except from those centers controlled by the air and armored forces; the latter arms issued orders from their own headquarters.[8]

Outside the Adjutant General's Office, but within Headquarters, Army Service Forces, was the Military Personnel Division, which functioned under the Director of Personnel, Hq, ASF. After March 1942, certain officers from G1, WDGS, the Office of the Undersecretary of War, and the offices of the chiefs of the combat arms were reassigned to the Personnel Division, Hq, ASF. This Division, established primarily to gain better control over activation of units, designated personnel for new organizations, thereby assuming important functions in connection with replacements. Under directives of the War Department it formulated and recommended personnel policies, plans, and procedures.

The Military Personnel Division, Hq, ASF, exercised operational control over the replacement system under policies prescribed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operation, WDGS.[9] The primary purpose of the system was to deliver replacements whose records were correctly classified by occupational specialty and physical capacity, who were adequately equipped and clothed, and whose morale and mental attitudes were satisfactory.[10] Representatives of the Personnel Division, Hq, ASF, made frequent visits to Zone of Interior replacement depots, processing centers, and ports of embarkation; and in some instances visited overseas units.

The Overseas Replacement Branch of the Military Personnel Division, Hq, ASF, was activated 11 February 1943 to supervise the procedures within the United States pertaining to replacements for units overseas.[11] It became an operating agency for G1, G3, and OPD, WDGS. One of its first accomplishments was a compilation of all

[8] Memo for ACofS, G–1, WDGS, 15 Mar 45, sub: Overseas Replacement System. ASF/210.48 GEN (15 Mar 45)–40. DRB, TAG.

[9] Memo, ASF, 13 Sep 43, sub: Responsibilities With Respect to the Oversea Replacement System. ASF/210.48. DRB, TAG.

[10] Memo for ACofS, G–1, WDGS, 15 Mar 45, sub: Overseas Replacement System. ASF/210.48 Gen (15 Mar 45)–40. DRB, TAG.

[11] Ltr, WDAGO, 11 Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of Personnel Procedures. AG 200 WDGAP (1–18–43). DRB, TAG.

War Department specifications for overseas service which was published in March 1943.[12]

The Military Personnel Division, Hq, ASF, handled matters which were Army-wide in scope and pertained to individuals, and also supervised all matters relating to personnel within the Service Forces. Officers outside the Army Service Forces sometimes resented the authority of the division to take final action on their problems. Many of the officers assigned to that division believed its functions should have been on a General Staff level because it was required to issue directives to General Staff divisions.[13]

The Operations Division of the Army Ground Forces staff computed shortages and requirements of tactical units. The G1 Division, WDGS, was concerned only with filling these requirements. Insofar as possible it was the policy of the Operations Division, AGF, to furnish loss replacements from replacement training centers to those units having completed basic training. Reception centers supplied filler replacements, except cadres, for newly activated units.[14] New units scheduled for early shipment overseas were filled, when possible, from replacement training centers or from old units. Priorities for the normal assignment of men from replacement training centers were:

1st Priority—training needs.
2d Priority—existing units in a task force status with less than 3 months remaining prior to movement.
3d Priority—existing units in a task force status with more than 3 months prior to movement, or not in a task force status but having completed basic training.
4th Priority—new nondivisional units.

The Classification and Replacement Division, Adjutant General's Section, Army Ground Forces, was activated 1 March 1943 and became the Ground Forces agency dealing with requisitions for replacements and with assignments from Ground Forces replacement training centers.[15] This division was established after the War Department directed decentralization of control over the flow of enlisted replacements from replacement training centers and schools of the Ground and Service Forces. The War Department periodically allotted men

[12] WD Cir 85, 26 Mar 43. WD, *Preparation for Overseas Movement* (Short Title:POM), 1 Aug 43. AG 370.5 (12 Jul 43); WD Pamphlet, 29–2, 15 May 44 and June 45.

[13] Report of the Replacement Board, DA 1947, bk. V, ann. 15. Misc 334 Board OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

[14] Memo, WDGS, OPD to AG, 18 Apr 42, sub: Personnel Assignment Policy in Ground Force Units. AG 322.96/375–GNOPN (4–18–42). DRB, TAG.

[15] Ltr, WDAGO, 13 Feb 43, sub: Decentralization of Personnel Procedures. AG 220.31 (2–5–43) OC–E–WDGAP. DRB, TAG; History of the Classification and Replacement Division, Ground Adjutant General's Section, AGF, 1 Mar 43–31 Dec 45. 6–1 AE. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

from reception centers to each of the major commands. Distribution of these men to lower units then became the responsibility of each major command.

After 1 March 1943, subordinate commands of AGF submitted requisitions direct to Army Ground Forces headquarters. Shipments against these requisitions were made in accordance with priority lists prepared by the G3 Section in AGF headquarters. The War Department determined the general policies relating to allocation and distribution of personnel.

The Statistical Section of the Classification and Replacement Division of the Adjutant General's Office, established in New York, prepared the first loss replacement requirement rate tables during the latter part of November 1943.[16] These tables stated the numbers which would have to be produced in each primary specification serial number by the replacement training centers in order to meet predicted loss requirements.

After the War Department, in an effort to conserve manpower, directed that overhead and housekeeping agencies should release general service enlisted men to the field forces, Army Ground Forces delegated responsibility for this exchange of personnel to the Classification and Replacement Division.[17] Officers assigned to Army Ground Forces expected to receive 200,000 transferred general assignment men during 1943, but that number never was realized. By 20 April 1943, some 12,085 enlisted men had been reported to Army Ground Forces from service commands, of which number 2,311 were Negroes. Service Command percentages of Negroes were much higher than the 10 percent rate established for induction.[18] An amphibious brigade, organized during the last half of April, took practically all available general assignment men. Army Ground Forces received about 4,000 men from 1 May until 10 June, after which the flow again stopped. It was resumed about a week later and between 18 June and 1 August approximately 2,800 men were received. In August, the commanding general, Army Service Forces, declared his command could not absorb any additional limited service men, so the exchange was discontinued.

After the War Department directed on 30 June 1944 that no armored or infantry replacements under 19 years of age be shipped overseas, it was necessary to withdraw men from divisions in training to make up shortages in overseas shipments. The G3 Section of Army Ground

[16] Ltr, WDAGO, 29 Nov 43, sub: Requirement Rates. AG 220.01. DRB, TAG.

[17] Memo, WD 21 Oct 42, sub: Reassignment of General Service Enlisted men, w/ind 3 Nov 42. W615–42. DRB, TAB; Memo, AGF, 3 Mar 43, sub: General Service Men Released by Service Commands. AG 220.31 (3–16–43) OC–T (16 Mar 43). DRB, TAG.

[18] Ltr, AGF, 20 Apr 43, sub: Percentages of Negro General Service Men Available for Assignment from Service Commands. AG 322.99/358. DRB, TAG.

Forces determined the number of enlisted men to be withdrawn from designated divisions and, after approval by the Chief of Staff, the plan was carried out under directives prepared by the Classification and Replacement Division.[19]

During 1944, when there was a heavy demand for replacements, commanders were urged to train potential replacements on the job.[20] Installations reported they were having difficulty in absorbing men with low Army General Classification Test scores, especially returnees from overseas. There was much "picking and choosing" in attempts to obtain satisfactory replacements for cadremen who were due for overseas service. Army Ground Forces directives stressed the necessity for units to absorb men with low classification scores and urged that remediable defects be corrected without delay.

The Classification and Replacement Division, AG, Hq, AGF, during the period 11 June to 30 September 1944, conducted a study [21] of the quality of men received by Army Ground Forces from reception centers. This study indicated:

1. Army Ground Forces received 11,610 men, or 5.6 percent of the total, from special training units.

2. Army Ground Forces furnished 7,694 parachute volunteers, or 3.7 percent of its total receipts.

3. There were 2,770, or 1.3 percent of total receipts, who went to the Army Specialized Training Program.

4. There were 26,262 enlisted men at reception centers who were listed by AGF liaison officers as not qualified for infantry, a figure which represented 13 percent of total AGF receipts.

5. The policy which prevented reception centers from assigning to infantry and armored replacement training centers those enlisted men who were under 18½ years of age was resulting in arms and services other than infantry and armored receiving unduly high percentages of men with high physical profile ratings.

Following a conference in the War Department 22 January 1945, it was announced that men from other services retrained as infantry would not be sent overseas if they had less than 17 weeks' service.[22] Those who were in the depots and who had less than 17 weeks' service at the close of their 6 weeks of conversion training were given additional training. The Replacement and School Command adopted the policy of assigning all men who had less than 6 weeks of service to infantry replacement training centers, which had longer training

[19] Ltr, WD, 20 Jul 44, sub: Assignment of 18-year-old Infantry RTC Grads. AG 341/208 (R). DRB, TAG.

[20] Ltr, AGF, 26 Aug 44, sub: Utilization of Manpower Based on Physical Capacity. AG 220.3/552 (LD). DRB, TAG.

[21] Memo. AGF, 4 Dec 44, sub: Shipment of Reception Center Enlisted Men to Replacement Training Centers. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[22] Memo, WD, 25 Jan 45, sub: Infantry Replacements. AG 200 (WDGCT.) DRB, TAG.

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programs, rather than send them to the advanced centers.[23] This policy was followed until the last cycle of infantry conversion training was started on 21 May 1945.

Army Ground Forces studies conducted between August 1944 and February 1945 indicated that the induction of older men, taking place at that time, had lowered the percentage of men qualified for infantry training from 73.97 percent to 67.12 percent.[24] The War Department soon thereafter removed the 30-year age limit which had been placed on men assigned to infantry training.

Proposals for a Personnel Control Division

The three major commands were outside the War Department General Staff and enjoyed great freedom in the operation of all installations carrying out War Department General Staff policies.[25] This was considered necessary to relieve the General Staff of detail, but when the desires of the commanding general, Services of Supply (Army Service Forces after 12 March 1943), appeared to be in conflict with the policies of the War Department General Staff, The Adjutant General found himself in the difficult position of attempting to comply with both. The Air and Ground Forces frequently looked upon the actions of The Adjutant General with suspicion because they regarded that office as a representative of the Army Service Forces. General McNarney had proposed that the G1 Division of the War Department General Staff should be the umpire in all disputes over personnel, but the complaints that were being received indicated that the War Department reorganization had made an umpire out of the Army Service Forces, which was one of the players.

By 8 June 1942, the situation was so confused that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, War Department General Staff, asked for clarification of his responsibilities.[26] No satisfactory written clarification was ever issued; understandings were reached by oral agreements. Army Service Forces issued instructions which made clear to members of the Military Personnel Division, Hq, ASF, that they were to execute only the military responsibilities of the commanding general, Army Service Forces, and that they were not working directly for any War Department General or Special Staff division.[27] Procedures varied with changes in administrative officers.

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[23] Ltr, AGF, 29 Jan 45, sub: Infantry Replacements. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[24] Memo, AGF, 5 Mar 45, sub: Manpower Board Conference. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[25] Memo for Gen. McNarney, 29 Oct 42, sub: War Department Organization. Copy in McNarney-Nelson Papers, WD Reorg 42. OCS Records Section.

[26] Memo, G1, WDGS, 8 Jun 42, sub: War Department Reorganization, G1/020 (6–8–42). DRB, TAG.

[27] Memo, ASF, 4 Apr 45, sub: Personnel Functions Army-Wide in Scope. G–1/020 (4–4–45). DRB, TAG.

An officer who was connected with G1 of the War Department General Staff during World War II later said: "The real error in the Army reorganization of 1942 was depriving the War Department General Staff of an operating agency to handle matters Army-wide in scope." [28] He explained that the difficulties of G1 increased after those officers who had originally served in G1 were transferred out of the Military Personnel Division and were replaced by officers who had not served in G1.

As mobilization advanced there was an increased demand for personnel and the Adjutant General's Office was unable to provide many combat units with men at the required times. Army Ground Force commanders complained that too many men were going to the Service and Air Forces. In the fall of 1942, the G3 Division of the War Department General Staff became more seriously concerned over this failure to fill combat-type units [29] and concluded that more effective supervision at the War Department level was necessary for an efficient expansion of the Army.[30]

Two proposals were offered in an attempt to correct this situation. One staff study recommended a Director of War Department Services at War Department level who would control personnel policies. A personnel replacement service on the same level with Ordnance, Engineers, Signal Corps, and other services would have operated under policies approved by the divisions of the War Department General Staff dealing with both personnel and operations. Officers proposing the change sought greater efficiency by combining responsibility for replacements in the fields of planning and in those fields dealing with the execution of the plans. Another staff study proposed a Personnel Control Division which would be a part of G1.[31] It was proposed that those functions of The Adjutant General that were Army-wide in scope be placed under the control of G1, a move which it was said would eliminate the necessity for returning The Adjutant General to the War Department level. After studying the proposals, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, WDGS, brought to the attention of the Chief of Staff the "confusion, complication, inefficiency, serious lack of coordination" and other alleged defects resulting from the delegation of War Department functions to one of the three major commanders.[32] This memorandum recommended a central agency under G1 control at War Department level to administer the Army-wide personnel system. Officers in G3, WDGS, and the Operations and Plans

[28] Statement, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Berry, 26 Mar 51. HIS 330–14. OCMH.
[29] Report of the Replacement Board, *op. cit.*, bk. V, ann. 13, p. 2.
[30] Memo for Gen. McNarney, 29 Oct 42, sub: War Department Organization. Copy McNarney-Nelson Papers, WD Reorg. 42. OCS Records Section.
[31] Memo for DCofS, 13 Dec 42, sub: War Department Organization. G3 320 (12–13–42). DRB, TAG.
[31] Memo, G1, WDGS, 7 Dec 42, sub: Personnel Control G1–200.

Division, WDGS, The Inspector General, and the commanding generals of the Air and Ground Forces concurred in the proposal.

The proposed Personnel Control Division would have operated directly with the personnel agencies of the Air, Ground, and Service Forces. It would have worked with the G3 Division, WDGS, in regard to monthly procurement of enlisted men, priorities for distribution from replacement training centers or reception centers, and establishment of quotas for the three branches. It would have maintained liaison with the Selective Service System, acquainted the War Department with the manpower situation, and transmitted to Selective Service the War Department's decisions on standards of induction and other matters.

One of the responsibilities of the proposed Personnel Control Division would have been the preparation of an overseas loss replacement plan. The commanding general of the Army Service Forces would have been relieved of all responsibility for personnel matters which were Army-wide in scope, but the control of civilian personnel would have remained unchanged. The plan stated that the reorganization would not result in any increase in the number of officers or civilians on duty in Washington but could be accomplished by the reassignment of persons already on duty there.

The allotment of 78 officers to the Military Personnel Division, Services of Supply, would have been reduced to 30; those officers who had been members of G1, War Department General Staff, prior to 9 March 1942 would have been returned to that division, then to be assigned to the Personnel Control Division along with others who might volunteer, until the proposed strength of 48 was reached.

This memorandum was brought to the attention of General Somervell, and on 15 December 1942 he asked General Marshall for a full hearing, stating that the proposed move appeared to him to be a "big step backward" not justified by any convincing argument.[33] The following day General Somervell discussed the proposal with General Marshall and on 19 December 1942 the memorandum was returned "not favorably considered."

Disapproval of this memorandum by the Chief of Staff ended the first of several attempts to centralize the control of the replacement system, but criticism continued. The system had many apparent weaknesses, both in the United States and abroad, but at no time did it completely break down. It was kept going by cooperation and the mutual efforts of the officers assigned to the Military Personnel Division of the Army Service Forces and those assigned to the G1, G3, and Operations Divisions of the War Department General Staff as

[33] Memo, Somervell to Marshall, 15 Dec 42. Copy in Report of Replacement Board, *op. cit.*, bk. II, ann. 6.

well as the others dealing with replacements. Many believed these results were not due to sound methods but were achieved in spite of faulty organization.

On 6 April, General Somervell proposed a solution along other lines. He recommended that G1 and G4 of the War Department General Staff be abolished and that all the functions and personnel of these offices be transferred to the Army Service Forces. He also proposed that the Logistics Group of the Operations Divisions be divided among the Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces and that the Deputy Chief of Staff, WDGS, assisted by the General Council, should perform the function of an appeal agency.[34] General Somervell's proposal was not accepted.

This confusion was not ended until the War Department, on 29 June 1945, published instructions which definitely placed the responsibility for the overseas replacement system, along with a number of other functions, on the commanding general of the Army Service Forces, and so recognized the procedure which had been in effect since 9 March 1942.[35] For all intents and purposes the commanding general, ASF, through the Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, directed the Army replacement system from the time of the 1942 reorganization until the end of the military operations.

Development of the Replacement System

The extent of the requirements for replacements became apparent as military operations increased. It was not enough to replace men lost in battle: the replacement system must replace men absent because of sickness, furloughs, or disciplinary confinement. It had to replace those swallowed up in its own pipelines. The replacement system developed gradually: the early training centers, the schools, the personnel pools, and the staging areas were not coordinated activities at first.

By July 1941, the schools and training centers were reporting their available men to The Adjutant General and that office was using those reports to fill requisitions submitted by units and installations in need of personnel. The role of The Adjutant General as the operating agency for the replacement system became firmly established at an early date.[36]

The General Headquarters of the Field Forces was established at the War College in July 1940 to direct and supervise troop train-

[34] Memo, Somervell to Marshall, 6 Apr 43. WDCSA 020 (4-6-43). DRB, TAG.

[35] Memo, WDGS, 29 Jun 45, sub: Delegation of Personnel Functions to Military Personnel Division. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

[36] Ltr, WDAGO, 1 Jul 41, sub: Distribution and Assignment of Trainees From Special Service Schools and Replacement Training Centers to Units and Installations, fiscal year 1942. AG 341 (4-7-41) EC-C. DRB, TAG.

ing and was augmented by the addition of a portion of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. This headquarters was abolished under the 1942 reorganization and Gen. Lesley J. McNair became commanding general of the Army Ground Forces.[37] In July 1944, General McNair went to Europe on temporary duty [38] and on 25 July was killed in France. Lt. Gen. Ben Lear succeeded General McNair and headed the Army Ground Forces until December 1944 after which Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell became the commander. General Stilwell had been commander of United States Forces, China-Burma-India, and had directed military operations in China. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, who had commanded U. S. Army Forces in the North African Theater of Operations and later 6th Army Group, succeeded General Stilwell in June 1945 when General Stilwell assumed command of 10th Army after the death of Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, Jr.

Army Ground Forces interest centered in the activation and training of units, and at the time of its formation it took only a minor interest in replacements.[39] However, both the Ground and Air Forces expressed some concern when Circular 59 delegated to the commanding general of the Army Service Forces authority over Army-wide personnel functions subject only to broad War Department policies; they feared impartial administration might be difficult in those cases in which the Service Forces had an interest in the division of personnel.

The reorganization vested the functions of the chiefs of the arms in the commanding general, AGF, and those of the chiefs of the services in the commanding general, ASF.

The Adjutant General was the operating agency for the assignment of personnel to training centers, schools, and units, but the responsibility for training ground force units fell upon the newly created Ground Forces headquarters. Army Ground Forces established four subordinate commands which were primarily concerned with training and with replacements. They were the Replacement and School, the Armored, Antiaircraft Artillery, and Tank Destroyer Commands. The Replacement and School Command absorbed the replacement training centers of the Tank Destroyer Command during the summer of 1942, but armored training was not added until 1944. The Antiaircraft Replacement Training Center at Fort Bliss, Tex., operated under the Army Ground Forces headquarters and was not assigned to the Replacement and School Command until October 1945 when

[37] *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June 20, 1941. . . .* p. 13.

[38] Letter Orders, WDAGO, to McNair, 11 Jul 44, sub: Temporary Duty, 201 McNair. DPRB, TAG.

[39] Report of the Replacement Board, *op. cit.*, bk. II, p. 3.

the Antiaircraft Command was inactivated. This was a short time before the Replacement and School Command itself became inactive.

At the time of its organization, the Replacement and School Command consisted of about 166,000 officers and men, but by the end of 1942 it had grown to 226,000 and by May 1945 it reached its peak with 481,000 persons assigned and attached, including trainees.[40]

The chiefs of Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry, and Coast Artillery had activated and constructed the replacement training centers which came under control of the Replacement and School Command after the 9 March 1942 reorganization. No immediate changes were made in organization, but operations were standardized by regulations which were announced from time to time. Replacement training centers which were transferred to the Replacement and School Command included Infantry: Camp Croft, S. C.; Camp Wolters, Tex.; Camp Wheeler, Ga.; and Camp Roberts, Calif.; Field Artillery, Camp Roberts, Calif.; Fort Sill, Okla.; and Fort Bragg, N. C.: Cavalry: Fort Riley, Kans.; Branch Immaterial, Fort McClellan, Ala.; and Camp Robinson, Ark. (Both camps were converted to Infantry in January 1943 and moved to Camp Fannin, Tex., in September 1943.)

The Camp McQuade, Calif., Coast Artillery Replacement Training Center was activated 12 July 1942 under the Replacement and School Command and optrated until December 1943. The Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center at Camp Hood, Tex., was activated 3 October 1942. The Infantry Replacement Training Center at Camp Blanding, Fla., was activated 4 August 1943, and the one at Camp Hood, Tex., in March 1944. The Replacement Training Center of the Armored Command at Fort Knox, Ky., operated independent of the Replacement and School Command until 20 February 1944 when it too came under the Replacement and School Command. An Infantry Replacement Training Center was opened at Camp Rucker, Ala., on 12 February 1945. Infantry Advanced Replacement Training Centers activated were: Camps Gordon, Ga., and Maxey, Tex., 17 October 1944; Camp Howze, Tex., 18 October 1944; Camp Livingston, La., 13 November 1944; and Camp Shelby, Miss., 12 February 1945. Cadres were drawn from existing replacement training centers except at Camp Shelby and Camp Rucker where table of organization regiments were reorganized to conform to standard tables of distribution for the replacement training centers.

Replacement training centers which were operating under the chiefs of the services as of 30 June 1943 included:

[40] AGF Study No. 33, *The Replacement and School Command*, p. 11. 6–1 AE. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

Quartermaster Corps—Fort F. E. Warren, Wyo., and Camp Lee, Va.
Engineer Corps—Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.; Fort Belvoir, Va.; and Camp Abbott, Oreg.
Medical Corps—Camp Grant, Ill.; Camp Lee, Va.; Camp Barkley, Tex.; and Camp Robinson, Ark.
Signal Corps—Fort Monmouth, N. J.; Camp Kohler, Calif.; and Camp Crowder, Mo.
Ordnance Department—Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.
Chemical Warfare Service—Edgewood Arsenal, Md., and Camp Sibert, Ala.
Transportation Corps—New Orleans, La.
Finance Department—Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind.[41]

The Army Air Forces operated replacement training centers at Fresno, Calif.; Kerns, Utah; Amarillo, Tex.; Lincoln, Nebr.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; Sheppard Field, Tex.; Gulfport, La.; Keesler Field, Miss.; Miami, Fla.; Greensboro, N. C.; and Atlantic City, N. J.

The terms "replacements" "fillers," and "rotational personnel" were made official during the latter part of 1943. "Fillers" brought new units to prescribed strength for the first time (the term "filler" was also used in another sense to designate basic privates shown in tables of organization but for whom no specific jobs were listed); "replacements" sometimes called "loss replacements" replaced casualties or other losses in units; "rotational personnel" replaced persons overseas who were returning to the United States. "Rotational" and "loss" replacements were segregated in requisitions but once en route they tended to merge and frequently were not treated as separate groups overseas. Standardization in the preparation of reports, made possible by following these definitions, aided the War Department in determining if requisitions for replacements reflected actual losses and correctly stated the needs of units.[42]

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[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Ltr, WDAGO, 10 Dec 43, sub: Overseas Replacement System. AG 370.5 (10 Dec 43). DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER XI

EFFORTS TO MEET REPLACEMENT SHORTAGES

The Manpower Problem

The War Department during 1942 was more concerned with shipping units abroad than it was with the provision of loss replacements. The result was that units were sent overseas as rapidly as they could be organized and trained and the shipping facilities necessary to move them be made available. During the early mobilization period, the War Department was liberal with responsible commanders who desired to activate units.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff held the major responsibility for the division of manpower among the armed services. In the latter part of 1942, the Joint Chiefs returned studies which had been prepared for them on the subject of manpower distribution with the criticism that those studies gave the Army too large a slice of the manpower resources.[1] As a result the size of the proposed Army was cut sharply. In February 1943, a manpower study indicated that the Army could be increased to an effective strength of 10,726,000 by 31 December 1943 without reducing the civilian labor supply below that required to meet civilian needs and continue lend-lease production.[2] More conservative estimates prevailed, however, and the troop basis was established as 7,705,725 men.[3]

During 1943, the Selective Service System was under the control of the War Manpower Commission, created 18 April 1942 with Paul V. McNutt as chairman. This relationship was ended by act of Congress after 1 year. But although it no longer directly controlled Selective Service, the Commission, an executive agency directly under the President, was still charged with responsibility for an equitable distribution of manpower between industry and the armed forces. In its dealings with agriculture and industry, the Commission found it necessary to limit most of its efforts to persuasion, although it could insist on compliance by the armed forces. The Manpower Commission's problem was to make certain that both industry and the armed services used all the manpower available and exploited it to the limit of its capabilities.

[1] JCS 154/1, 24 Dec 42. DRB, TAG.
[2] Memo, WDGS for USW, 23 Feb 43. WDCSA 320.2. DRB, TAG.
[3] EO 9139, 18 Apr. 42.

During World War II, the United States Army sustained about 936,259 battle casualties. Nonbattle admissions to sick report numbered about 17,000,000. In overseas theaters about 79 percent of the admissions to sick report were for disease, 13 percent for injury, and 8 percent for combat wounds.[4] Plans were made for heavy combat losses, but the extent of noncombat losses was greater than had been expected.

There was no precedent to indicate the number of men required to fill a global pipeline such as was necessary in World War II.

In commenting on this phase of the war planning, General Marshall, on 23 June 1945, told the House Appropriations Committee:

> In the first half of the war in connection with the campaigns in Africa, New Guinea, and the major portion of the campaign in Italy, I would say the War Department miscalculated, if you choose to call it that, in not fully appreciating what it required to fill the pipeline of global warfare to keep things moving at a fast pace; which means to get the total number of men you want at the right place at the right time and in the right position. . . .
>
> In the original calculations on the strength of the Army we did not take into sufficient account how much time and men were involved in going and coming, in sickness, on furlough, and so forth. . . .
>
> Our calculations were also off in that we did not take into sufficient account the large numbers of men required to form pools behind the Army, ready to take the place of casualties the following day if possible.[5]

The 1943 Crisis

The manpower crisis during the summer of 1943 was the product of a number of causes. The total pool of available men within the age limits for military service—18 through 37—had become seriously depleted. In addition to those classified as unfit for military service for physical or mental reasons, occupational deferments in industry and agriculture removed large numbers of men from the available national manpower resources. But by far the largest single category of deferred men was that consisting of fathers not employed in agriculture. On 1 September 1943, the total number of registrants between the ages of 18 and 38 was 22,212,000.[6]

Since it was necessary to plan service calls some months in advance, it became evident in July 1943 that before the end of the year, unless

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[4] Gilbert W. Beebe and Michael E. De Bakey, *Battle Casualties, Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations* (Springfield, Ill., 1952), p. 16. This work gives detailed medical information on battle casualties in World War II; TAG, "Final Report Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II," 1 Jun 1953.

[5] *Hearings* before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on "Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1946," pp. 8–9; *Army and Navy Journal*, 23 Jun 45.

[6] Statement, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Director of Selective Service, in *Hearings* before the SMAC, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 763, "A Bill exempting certain married men who have children from liability under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 as amended," 16 Sep 43, pp. 113–42.

occupational deferments were restricted, it would become necessary to dip into the ranks of the nonagricultural fathers not otherwise deferred if quotas were to be met. The total estimated calls for the period 1 September–31 December for the Army amounted to 1,221,000 men. From the 988,000 men then classified I–A it was expected that 494,000 would qualify for induction. Men reaching their 18th birthday during the period, and reclassifications from categories II–A (necessary industry), II–B (war industry), and IV–F would produce an additional 281,000 men. Thus, Selective Service was faced with a potential shortage of 446,000 in meeting its calls by the end of the year.[7]

Accordingly the Director of Selective Service, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, issued on 31 July 1943 Local Board Memorandum 123 as amended, instructing the local Selective Service boards to begin to reclassify fathers and to be prepared for their induction on 1 October.[8] Immediately a storm of protest arose. Draft boards resigned; in Washington Sen. Burton K. Wheeler (D., Mont.) demanded that the Congress, then in summer recess, be immediately convened. Senator Wheeler's demand was not complied with, but from the reconvening of the Congress on 14 September until the beginning of December, Congress and the press debated the issue.

In February 1943, Senator Wheeler had introduced a bill in the Senate which called for the permanent deferment of all men who were married on 8 December 1941, who had children, and who had maintained a bona fide family relationship since that date. Hearings on the Wheeler bill were resumed on 15 September 1943. From the standpoint of the Army, it was not so much a point of whether the men inducted were fathers or not but that the men, whatever their marital status, be gotten into uniform on schedule. As Gen. Joseph E. McNarney stated; "The military requirements are for a certain number of men who are physically fit to carry out the duties to which they will be assigned. If the men are single or if the men are fathers is really immaterial." [9] When the Wheeler bill was reported out to the floor of the Senate, it was there amended to permit the drafting of fathers but only after the pool of single men had been exhausted. In this form it was adopted by the Senate on 6 October 1943.[10]

In the meantime the House had been debating a similar bill and on 26 October it approved a measure which would, like the Senate version, halt all drafting of fathers until there were no single men left. Differences in other provisions of the two measures made it necessary to submit the legislation to a joint conference committee, and it was not

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] *Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns: The 3d Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1943–44* (Washington, 1945), pp. 133–134.

[9] Statement, Gen. Jos. E. McNarney, 15 Sep 43, in *Hearings* on S. 763 *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[10] The *New York Times*, 7 Oct 43.

until 22 November that final agreement was reached.[11] In its final form the bill provided that, on a national basis, fathers maintaining a bona fide family relationship, if classified I–A, would not be called into service until all other persons in class I–A at that time had been called. Similarly, when quotas were assigned to the States, the same principal should apply on the State level.[12]

This long debate confused the local draft boards. On the one hand there was General Hershey's directive 31 July to commence drafting fathers on 1 October if necessary; on the other was the possibility that Congress would prohibit the drafting of fathers. It was natural, therefore, that the local boards should proceed with caution. The *New York Times* reported on 2 October that the draft of fathers had commenced in New York City, but that across the river in New Jersey the board had adopted a "wait and see" policy.

The result of this reluctance to draft fathers was that by the end of the year, instead of having inducted the 446,000 fathers estimated in August, only 90,000 had actually been put into uniform.[13] For all practical purposes the long debate over the Wheeler bill and the confusion it induced into the public mind had been just as effective in postponing the induction of fathers as a blanket deferment would have been. The effect on the planned strength of the Army can be seen in the failure of the Selective Service System to meet its quotas during the final months of 1943 and the early months of 1944. In the period 1 September 1943–30 April 1944, Selective Service failed by 443,967 to deliver for induction the requisitions made upon it by the Army.[14]

The Army Specialized Training Program

Army officers realized that the Army would always need college-trained men, but they did not consider it proper to defer men from

[11] *Ibid.*, 23 Nov 43.
[12] *Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns, op. cit.*, pp. 166–167.
[13] The *New York Times*, 9 Jan 44.
[14] Calls and inductions . . .

Month	Call [1]	Inducted [1]	Percentage of calls filled	Cumulative shortage
1943				
September	175,000	121,652	69.5	53,348
October	160,000	113,001	70.6	100,347
November	175,000	117,563	67.2	157,784
December	165,000	110,840	67.2	211,944
1944				
January	160,000	118,456	74	253,488
February	160,000	[2] 31,370	19.6	282,118
March	160,000	132,652	82.9	409,466
April	160,000	125,499	78.4	443,967

[1] Source: WDASF Monthly Progress Report, sec. 5, "Personnel," 31 July 1944, p. 6.
[2] Not comparable to prior months. Induction process changed from a 3-week furlough *after* instead of *prior to* induction.

the draft simply to enable those men to continue in college.[15] The Navy, however, was willing to sign up individuals and leave them in college. This practice placed the Army in the difficult situation of either not signing up any college students or of meeting the Navy's offer and accepting a large number, but leaving them in college on active duty.[16] Military authorities expected to take men into the Army on equal terms, give them all their basic military training, and then select those whose previous education, aptitude, and personal preferences indicated reasonable assurance that they would be successful if assigned to take courses in an extension of the Army school system, known as Army Specialized Training Program, and which utilized college facilities.

Applications for enrollment in the Army Specialized Training Corps were accepted from enlisted men under 22 years of age who had completed basic training and had an AGCT score of 110 or more. These men were trained as scientific, engineering, medical, and linguistic specialists, who might or might not be commissioned. Army Ground Forces held that too many men were being diverted from combat units and that many of the most promising young men were kept away from officer candidate schools and diverted to specialist training. The students received such military training as could be given without interfering with their college work. Those who failed in their studies were returned to their units, but the plan provided for a continuing flow of college-trained men who could meet the requirements of the Army for men with such training.

Proponents of the program claimed that if all able-bodied men were removed from the colleges the time would come when there would not be enough college-trained men to meet civilian or military needs. But critics of the Army Specialized Training Program said it pulled out of the stream of personnel those best qualified mentally who were needed by the Army Ground Forces for officer and noncommissioned officer material. As a result, the Army Ground Forces had fewer men with high AGCT scores. General Marshall finally was convinced that the program would have to be abandoned if success were to be attained in the European invasion. The matter was presented to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who also was convinced; within less than half an hour G1, WDGS, issued a directive to Army Service Forces for the breakup of the program, and all infantry personnel were withdrawn.[17]

On 18 February 1944, the War Department announced that the ASTP program would be drastically curtailed. "Because of the inability of the Selective Service System to deliver personnel according to schedule, the Army is now short 200,000 men who should have

[15] *Hearings* before SMAC, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., on S. 2748, 14–15 Oct 42, p. 85.
[16] WD General Council *Minutes*, 6 Aug 42. General Reference Office. OCMH.
[17] Statement, Col. Thomas T. Stevenson, 22 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

been in uniform before the end of 1943," stated the announcement which went on to say that the ASTP was cut from 145,000 to 35,000 men.[18] Troop units other than infantry were authorized to select ¼ of 1 percent of strength per month. The remainder of the students were reassigned by the War Department upon completion of Army Specialized Training courses.[19]

Overseas Shortages

On 25 February 1944, General Hershey told the Senate Agriculture Committee that the Nation was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel and that 10 percent of the fathers in III–A might have to be drafted to meet the goal set for 1 July.[20] On the following day, the President sent a message to the director of Selective Service and the chairman of the War Manpower Commission stating:

> The present allocation of personnel to the Armed Forces cannot further be reduced and there is a very real danger in our failure to supply trained replacements at the time and in the numbers required. Selective Service has not delivered the quantity of men who were expected . . . we are still short approximately 200,000 trained men. . . . Today as a result, we are forced to emasculate college courses and trained divisions and other units. The Army will not reach its planned January strength until sometime in April or even later, if Selective Service continues to fall behind on its quotas. The Nation's manpower has been dangerously depleted by liberal deferments and I am convinced that in this respect we have been overly lenient, particularly with regard to the younger men. Deferments for industry include over a million nonfathers of whom 380,000 are under 26 years of age. Of almost a million nonfathers deferred in agriculture, over 550,000 are under 26. Agriculture and industry should release the younger men who are physically qualified for military service. The present situation is so grave that I feel the time has come to review all occupational deferments with a view to speedily making available the personnel required for the armed forces.[21]

The director of Selective Service immediately transmitted this information to the State directors with instructions to inform all local boards to review the occupational deferments of all registrants between the ages of 18 and 37, and on 24 March all registrants under 26 were required to report for a preinduction physical examination regardless of deferment status.[22]

By April 1944, the Army had reached its planned ultimate strength of 7,700,000 but some components still had shortgaes. Therefore in May 1945 the troop basis was raised to 8,240,000 giving a troop basis authorization that covered actual strength.[23]

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[18] The *New York Times*, 19 Feb 44.
[19] WD Cir 184, 10 May 44.
[20] The *New York Times*, 26 Feb 44.
[21] *Selective Service as the Tide of War Turns*, *op. cit.*, p. 73.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76.
[23] Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops* in U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1947), p. 235.

First indications of shortages overseas came from the North African theater. Although that theater had received what the War Department considered liberal supplies of replacements, there were sudden demands for emergency shipments late in 1942 and early in 1943. The War Department, much to its embarrasment, was required to hastily assemble and ship the men to fill these emergency calls, thus throwing the regular replacement system into confusion.[24]

It was difficult for the War Department officials to understand these sudden calls, since the shipments of replacements to the North African theater had been several times the casualty figures. By 31 October 1943, the War Department had sent 340,616 men overseas to replace losses covering a period when battle casualties had totaled only 59,429.[25] There was a growing shortage of men in the United States while figures indicated that there should be overages in the theaters. As the problem was studied it appeared that North African replacements were being diverted for provisional units. These conclusions were supported in evidence later submitted by the War Department Manpower Board and other agencies.

In December 1943, the G3 Division recommended:

1. That shipment of ground replacements to the North African Theater of Operations be stopped until that theater had absorbed its overstrength;

2. That the Operations and Plans Division of the War Department General Staff set up an agency to review all requisitions for personnel;

3. That additional efforts be made to have Selective Service deliver the full calls made upon it;

4. That the Army Ground Forces recommend certain units to be skeletonized or inactivated, and the men made surplus used to bring other units up to authorized strength.

Although OPD concurred in all these recommendations except the one regarding shipments to North Africa, the Deputy Chief of Staff returned the memorandum without action. Since more drastic measures had not been approved, a directive originating with G3, WDGS, was published removing all authority for overstrengths in units in the United States which did not have specific War Department authorization, except for cadres while they were with their parent units.

The Ground Forces personnel shortage was so serious that the Deputy Chief of Staff issued orders to drain the school and overseas pipelines, to reorganize units under new tables of organization which promised more effective use of manpower, to suspend the activation

[24] Memo, G1 for DCofS, WDGS, 11 Oct 44, sub: Review of Replacement Situation in NATO. G1 322 Repl (S). DRB, TAG.

[25] Ltr, WDAGO, 20 Jun 44, sub: Replacements. AG 370.5 (11 Dec 43). DRB, TAG.

of divisions from September to December 1943, and, when necessary, to redistribute men who had already been taken into the Army.[26]

The Army gradually reduced its estimates of the number of divisions it would need. General Marshall took into consideration the success of the Soviet armies and decided that estimates for the United States forces could be reduced by half a million men.[27] He believed that economies in the use and maintenance of training forces would provide men needed for a reserve. Manpower boards, intended to bring about economy in the use of personnel, were established throughout the country following a decision reached by the Chief of Staff while on his way to the Casablanca conference in January 1943. Maj. Gen. Lorenzo D. Gasser, who had been recalled to active duty after retirement and assigned first to the Board of Civilian Protection, Office of Civil Defense, and later to Headquarters, Service of Supply, was president of the War Department Manpower Board, which surveyed practices in the use of manpower and recommended corrections to the Chief of Staff. Subordinate boards, operating under the policies of the War Department board, were established in major commands in the United States and overseas. Military units were surveyed and men considered inefficiently used were ordered transferred to combat units if qualified. New tables of organization in July 1943 reduced headquarters and overhead, thus making manpower savings of about 8 percent in infantry divisions.[28] Unnecessary decentralization was avoided in supply installations on the theory that large consolidated depots serving wide areas were more efficient than small establishments. The Army reached the end of its major expansion late in 1943, and the work of training installations was then concentrated to a greater extent on replacements.

The replacement output in July 1944 might have been adequate had it been properly distributed,[29] but overseas commanders had changed their requisitions so many times that confusion developed in the training system. During the summer of 1944, when infantry replacements were moving through the depots in the United States without delay, tank destroyer, cavalry, and antiaircraft replacements were moving hardly at all.[30] Changes in the type of units provided for in the War Department troop deployment list tended to defeat the Army procurement program.[31] By October 1944, requisitions

[26] Memo, WDGS, 3 Jul 43, sub: Recovery and Reassignment of Surplus Enlisted Personnel. G3 220 (1 Jul 43) (S). DRB, TAG.

[27] *Hearings,* House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on "Military Appropriation Bill for 1943," pp. 54–56.

[28] Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *Organization of Ground Combat Troops,* p. 318.

[29] Memo, WDGS G1 to CofS 31 Jan 44, sub: Replacements. G1 322 Repl (31 July 44). DRB, TAG.

[30] WD, General Council *Minutes,* 28 Aug 44.

[31] Memo for Record, WDGS, 6 Jun 45, sub: War Department Troop Deployment. OPD 320.2 (4 Jun 45). DRB, TAG.

from theater commanders for replacements were so excessive, so at variance with previous theater estimates, and so far beyond the capacity of the War Department to fill that officials in Washington expected early repercussions.[32]

Messages sent to all theater commanders on 15 October 1944 stressed the necessity of a retraining program in all active theaters and pointed out the need for withdrawal of physically qualified men from positions which could be filled by men in the limited assignment category.[33] The messages pointed out that the training and retraining programs in the United States were designed to provide the maximum number of combat replacements, but that the number would not be sufficient to furnish all the replacements needed to support the operations planned at that time. All theaters were called upon to accelerate their retraining programs with a view to providing the maximum number of combat replacements from their own resources. This was to be done by assigning limited assignment men to appropriate positions, thus forcing out of such positions men who were physically qualified for combat. The message contained a warning that subordinate commanders would be reluctant to replace efficient men with untrained men, but it stressed that the success of the program depended upon the personal efforts of top commanders to break down this resistance.

In the early part of the war there had been complaints that the War Department was inconsistent in directing personnel economies while at the same time permitting "traveling salesmen" to visit the theaters and urge personnel increases.[34] Reports from North Africa in 1943 said officers assigned to military government units were building an "empire"; after G1 officers on the United States and British staffs had handled more than 400,000 prisoners of war with the part-time work of one officer in each division, the War Department had directed a prisoner of war section be set up headed by a colonel and a number of assistants. The G1 of the North African theater said his office was responsible for staff policy on prisoners of war, the provost marshal was operating the camps, and military government officers were not needed.[35]

A Disappearing Ground Combat Army

Another manpower problem grew out of what Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, then commanding Army Ground Forces, described as a "disap-

[32] Ltr, WDAGO, 8 Nov 44, sub: Overseas Replacements. ADOC–E–C 320.2 (30 Oct 44). DRB, TAG.
[33] Cable, CM–OUT–47154, 15 Oct 44. Copy in G1 322 Replacements. DRB, TAG.
[34] WD, General Council *Minutes*, 2 Nov 43.
[35] *Ibid.*

pearing ground combat army." [36] Since August 1942, there had been such a marked increase in service and air troops and overhead that by April 1945 the ground assault troops constituted only 27 percent of the strength of the Army instead of 41 percent as in August 1942. Some military men contended that this reduction was a natural result of a diminishing need for assault troops due to the mechanization of the Army. They believed that armor and airplanes would prepare the way for the final assault of the foot soldier, making possible a great saving of human life.

It was argued that these machines of war reduced the actual number of assault troops needed in battle, but at the same time required a larger and more extensive line of communications. Although admitting that the assault troops were still the cornerstone of the offensive, many contended that mechanization had increased efficiency to such an extent that assault troops no longer were needed in such great numbers.

Figures submitted with an Army Ground Forces study indicated that between August and November of 1942, the period when the Army manpower ceiling was being reduced to 7,772,200 and greater emphasis was being placed on air power, the effective strength of the ground striking force dropped from 41 percent to 37.3 percent. It increased somewhat, due to economy in service units and overhead, prior to January 1943 when it stood at 40.5 percent. There was a more pronounced drop to 35.3 percent by July 1943, the result of the shift to a 90-division Army. The B–29 program and emphasis on air power from July to January of 1944 cut the percentage to 32.9; and it was further reduced during 1944 and 1945 by increases in the number of service units.

In April 1945, approximately 66 percent of the troops were in units, while 34 percent were students, on overhead, in training, in pipelines, or in other similar categories. General Stilwell feared this trend might lead to disaster in case of a tough ground fight against Japan.

The Problem of Specialists

The organization of the airborne units provided an example of the diversification of the Army Ground Forces during World War II which brought an additional heavy drain on manpower.[37] Teams of parachute officers and enlisted men were organized in 1941 from men in units or in infantry replacement training centers who voluntered for parachute duty, and in December 1941 six-man teams were sent to the infantry replacement training centers at Camps Croft, Wheeler,

[36] Memo, ACofS, OPD, for CofS, 9 May 45, sub: A Disappearing Ground Combat Army. OPD 320.2 (1 May 45). DRB, TAG.

[37] Maj James A. Huston, "Airborne Operations," MS in OCMH, General Reference Office.

and Walters to assist in the selection of volunteers. After 9 January 1942, men in the reception centers who volunteered for parachute duty were sent to infantry replacement training centers where they completed the 13 weeks' training course before being sent to the provisional parachute groups. Many of the men received at the Parachute School at Fort Benning failed to pass the course; a considerable number drew the extra pay as long as they could without jumping, finally refused to jump, and were released from the unit.[38]

The Airborne Command was activated 23 March 1942 and on 30 April 1942 was directed by Army Ground Forces to appoint a board of officers to visit the replacement training centers and interview volunteers in an effort to eliminate those who were undesirable. On 16 May 1942, the selection of men for parachute training was made a responsibility of the commandant of the Parachute School and each infantry replacement training center was directed to make available 105 volunteers weekly, a quota which was increased to 125 on 10 June 1942. On 29 July 1942, The Adjutant General disapproved a request that the quota be increased to 175; by that time the infantry replacement training centers had already furnished 6,393 men for parachute duty.

The 82d Infantry Division was redesignated airborne and the 101st Airborne Division was activated on 15 August 1942, making it necessary to procure artillery, engineer, antitank, antiaircraft, ordance, and quartermaster, as well as infantry, volunteers. A considerable number of the men needed were made available by forming cadres for the two airborne divisions from elements of the planned 72d Motorized Division which was never activated. The 11th Airborne Division was activated 25 February 1943 and the 17th Airborne Division on 15 April 1943, both at Camp Mackall, N. C.; the 13th Airborne Division was activated 13 August 1943 at Fort Bragg, N. C.

The Airborne Command was authorized to train replacements for the airborne divisions and the four separate parachute regiments (501st, 506th, 507th, and 508th). This training was conducted first by the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment and later by the 515th Parachute Infantry Regiment.[39]

Accurate estimates of parachute or airborne losses were difficult to make and there usually was either a "feast or famine." The standards for parachute duty were so high that there was always a limited supply. The deliberately inculcated cockiness of the parachutist made him very difficult to handle as an individual replacement. Replacement training center graduates were furnished the Airborne Center

[38] AGF Study No. 25, *The Airborne Command and Center, 1946*, pp. 33–45.

[39] Ltr, AGF, 30 Dec 42, sub: Activation of 513th Prcht Inf. AG 321/61 (Inf). DRB, TAG; Ltr, AGF, 9 May 43, sub: Org of 515 Prcht Inf. AG 321/94 (Inf). DRB, TAG.

where some training was given in glider operations prior to overseas shipment to airborne units.

In an effort to improve the quality of men going to airborne units, the Airborne Command, in September 1942, was authorized to reassign to the armored forces, Second and Third Armies, officers or enlisted men who were physically disqualified for general service or those in excess of normal percentages for class IV or V AGCT scores. The commanding general of the Armored Force in March 1943 reported that he could not absorb any more low-score personnel and that he had sufficient limited service men within his own command to fill all of his needs. Airborne units, on 13 March 1943, were ordered to discontinue the shipment of physically disqualified or over age men to armored organizations.[40]

In March 1943, the commanding general of the Armored Replacement Training Center reported that requisitions for armored replacements did not specify the specialists desired, nor even indicate the type of unit for which the replacements were intended.[41] He added that this failure to indicate specialists nullified efforts at the school to train men who would fit into the specific types of armored units being used in combat. Officers connected with the G1 Section of Army Ground Forces believed that it would be a mistake to make too great a refinement in the classification of replacements, but the officers in the G3 Section of that headquarters pointed to the difficulty of interchanging men from one position to another and supported the position of the commanding general of the Armored Force Replacement Training Center. A statement from the Classification and Replacement Division of Army Ground Forces declared that the solution to the problem would come through the preparation of individual theater requirement rates which would give AGF headquarters information needed to determine the appropriate type of training which would fill the demands of the organizations overseas.

Under political pressure and against the advice of many officers, the Army organized the Norwegian, Australian, and Greek battalions with the objective of using nationals who were not American citizens. In no instance was it possible to fill the units with personnel of the stated character, largely because such assignment was on a volunteer basis and these nationals did not desire to be indentified with any such unit—they preferred to serve with Regular units. After several months all three battalions were inactivated.

Two Filipino regiments were organized with Filipinos inducted on the West Coast and in Alaska. These regiments eventually were

[40] Ltr, WD, 18 Sep 42, sub: Improvement of Personnel in Airborne Divisions. AG 210.31/92 (Airborne). DRB, TAG; Ltr, AGF, 2 Mar 43, sub: Limited Service Personnel, w/1st Ind. AG 327.02. DRB, TAG; Ltr, WD 13 Mar 43, sub: Improvement of Personnel in Airborne Divs. AG 210.31/982 (9–18–42). DRB, TAG.

[41] Ltr. ARTC to G1, AGF, 1 Mar 43, sub: Requisitions for Armored Force Battle Replacements. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

filled, but their readiness dates were postponed several times. They were shipped to the Southwest Pacific, and it was expected that replacements would come from that theater.

Some time after the relocation of the West Coast Japanese-Americans, a Japanese-American Division was proposed but a study indicated that personnel would be available for not more than a regimental combat team. The 442d RCT was activated at Camp Shelby, Miss., with the cadre from the 100th Infantry Battalion of the Hawaiian National Guard and other miscellaneous sources. Very few fillers were obtained from the Japanese-American relocation centers; the bulk of the unit's personnel came from Hawaii and plans were made to furnish replacements to the unit after it moved overseas. The numbers of replacements required and the time when they would be needed could only be guessed. Before reasonable numbers could be made available the 442d RCT and the 100th Battalion had suffered such casualties in Italy that the latter was eventually inactivated in order to provide at least a minimum strength for the 442d.

Special replacement problems were encountered in the Ranger battalions, the 1st Special Service Force, and other units organized for special purposes as well as in specialized technical units. After the Chemical Warfare Service Replacement Training Center was inactivated the Army Ground Forces sent heavy mortar trainees from the infantry replacement training centers to Camp Sibert for about 4 weeks' training with the 4.2 mortar at that school. In practically all instances special units required search of Army records for qualified personnel and such searches interrupted training and administration.[42]

Overstrength of the Army

About the time of the cross-channel operation, the Army reached its ceiling strength of 7,772,200. It then became necessary to balance calls on Selective Service against expected Army losses for all causes, and a high caliber of crystal ball gazing was required if War Department officials were to look ahead 9 months and make accurate estimates of the number of men that would be needed by divisions in combat.[43]

Matters were further complicated by a new accounting system under which published orders contained effective dates for organizations to make entries of transfers in their morning reports. Thousands of men who had not previously been accounted for in strength returns were picked up, with the result that for the first time the overstrength was reflected in reports.

The troop basis did not make sufficient provision for those persons who were being held in hospitals, and there were other categories

[42] Statement, Col. Thomas T. Stevenson, USAR, 22 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[43] Statement, Brig. Gen. R. W. Berry. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

which were not properly accounted for. Although there was a distribution factor of some 76,000 men which represented a floating population, the figure was not large enough. It represented an estimate of the number in the feeder pipelines from civil life to the theater of operations and back to civil life again. It included men in reception centers, in transit, in reassignment centers, and in rotation pools. It did not include a large number who had been assigned to units in excess of authorized strength, men who had been placed in provisional units, or all of those in hospitals.[44]

Once the ceiling strength of the Army was reached the active strength was reduced in proportion to the number of men who were hospitalized, but who still remained on the Army's rolls. Not enough men could be called from Selective Service to meet the monthly replacement requirements of combat divisions. The only solution was for the Army to obtain a portion of its replacements from within its own ranks. For this reason, the retraining program was introduced.

The Army was granted authority to carry as an overstrength above the 7,705,725 ceiling those hospital patients who eventually would be discharged, as well as certain hospital employees such as physical therapy aides, dieticians, personnel working for the Veterans' Bureau, and certain others. This latter group numbered 59,482 on 31 July 1944, but since the Army was already 349,770 over its authorized strength there still remained a surplus of 290,288.[45]

The War Department constantly reviewed the troop basis and the deployment of troops in an effort to eliminate maladjustments. It also attempted to provide the theaters with the specific type units which they frequently asked for. While some adjustment of overseas strength was possible, not much could be done that would make any appreciable reduction in the overstrength of the Army as a whole.

Actual strengths and authorized strengths of the defense commands, U. S. Army Forces in the South Atlantic, and in the North Atlantic bases were practically equal, and it was expected that the only reduction likely at these installations would be in limited service personnel. Reductions were being made in Alaska and a considerable overstrength in the China-Burma-India Theater was expected to be reduced within a short time.

Authorizations were being increased for replacement depots in the Southwest Pacific Area in view of the vast distances involved and contemplated operations, increases which were expected to eliminate the overstrength in that theater. The South Pacific Theater had become inactive and replacement shipments to it had been stopped,

[44] WD General Council *Minutes*, 17 Jan. 44.

[45] Memo, OPD for CofS, 9 Sep 44, sub: Reduction of Army Overstrength. OPD 320.2. DRB, TAG.

but some new units were being activated from personnel within the theater. The commanding general, Pacific Ocean Areas, Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., was advised to absorb his overstrength as rapidly as possible and to transfer excess replacements from the South Pacific to the Central Pacific, which was understrength. The European Theater was receiving mainly infantry riflemen as replacements, but shipments of units were being accelerated. In June 1944, authority had been granted the commanding general of the North African Theater of Operations to return 25,000 limited assignment personnel without replacements. It was expected that this would eliminate some of the overstrength in that theater but the shortage of infantry made that program impractical. There were no overstrengths in the Middle East or Central Africa.

In view of the worldwide situation, the General Staff believed the overstrength could be reduced within 6 months by the discharge of men below physical standards, by reducing induction calls, and by the discharge of certain categories of men over 38 years of age.[46] The measures taken were not adequate—the strength of the Army did not drop until October 1944 and then it fell briefly, only to come up again. It finally was necessary to raise the authorized figure above 7,705,725.

Units dropped from their strength reports personnel captured by the enemy, interned in neutral countries, listed as missing in action, convicted as general prisoners, and those who were AWOL for an extended period. All of these categories, by 31 August 1944, involved about 100,000 persons. After they were dropped from unit rolls they were no longer included in the strength authorization, but they were a possible source of overstrength since they would be picked up again if recovered. Beginning in October 1944, The Adjutant General computed monthly figures covering the number of prisoners of war and interned persons, those missing in action, AWOL, and in any other status who remained under Army operational jurisdiction but were excluded from the strength tabulation.[47]

In August 1944, the theaters again were informed that the Army was overstrength and that the inductions of new men were being curtailed in an effort to reduce that overstrength.[48] The theaters were directed to make full use of retraining programs which it was assumed their replacement commands had instituted. The letter stated that limited assignment men who were released from hospitals were to be retrained as replacements and, as soon as qualified, assigned to jobs within the communications zones. The letter warned that

[46] WD Cir 39, 4 Feb 43, sec. 2; WD Cir 92, 3 Apr 43; WD Cir 112, 1 May 43, Sec. 1.
[47] WD General Council *Minutes*, 9 Oct 44.
[48] Ltrs, WDAGO, 19 Aug 44 and 30 Oct 44 sub: Overseas Replacements. AG 370.5 (10 Aug 44). DRB, TAG.

delay in starting the retraining program would result in a replacement shortage because only a part of theater requirements for replacements could be supplied from the United States after 1944.

On 12 October 1944, the Army Ground Forces were directed to submit a weekly report of estimated availability of infantry replacements covering 2 months in the future, thus providing data not included in the monthly reports previously required. This weekly report provided the main working data for the Army Ground Forces and the War Department in determining capabilities within the Zone of the Interior.[49]

It was apparent by October 1944 that the efforts to eliminate the overstrength of the Army would have to continue for a period longer than 6 months.[50] A study of the records disclosed that the soldiers listed as surplus were not necessarily the ones who could be eliminated in the first phases of a reduction, a fact which made the planning more complicated. Many of the men who at that time were in a surplus status were the ones who would be needed to maintain units in combat or for the contemplated buildup in the Pacific after the defeat of Germany.

Active theaters in computing requisitions for replacements were placing too much emphasis on combat losses and not enough on estimates of effective infantry strength. Each division engaged in combat required from 1,000 to 3,500 replacements monthly, many of which were for nonbattle losses. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, War Department General Staff, in consideration of these factors, estimated that losses in combat areas were likely to exhaust infantry replacements by early January.[51]

Some consideration was given to proposals to reduce the strength of the Army by discharging men who were returned to the United States on rotation, but overseas commanders feared such action would interfere with operations.[52]

The strange dilemma of February 1945 in which the Army, with a total actual strength of 8,070,900, failed to maintain T/O units at authorized strength when the War Department authorization was only 7,772,200 and the troop basis ceiling was 7,705,725 was due to a little-known group of men who were in miscellaneous and nonavailable categories.[53] To determine the Army's actual strength it was necessary to add to the troop basis certain noneffective categories

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[49] Ltr, AGF to AGO 12 Oct 44, sub: Report on Availability of Infantry Replacements. AG 200 (12 Oct 44). DRB, TAG.

[50] WD General Council *Minutes*, 30 Oct 44.

[51] Memo, ACofS, G1, for CofS, 18 Oct 44, sub: Troop Basis Allotments. G3 320 Troop Basis (28 Sep 44). DRB, TAG.

[52] WD General Council *Minutes*, 9 Oct. 44.

[53] Memo, CofS for Dir, Spec Trng Div, WDGS, 26 Feb 45, sub: Army Strength is Short of War Department Authorizations, 1 Feb 45. OCS 320.2, sec. 5, Cases 176–257 (S). DRB, TAG.

not included in that troop basis and also to add "off-the-record" authorizations. On 1 February 1945, noneffectives plus "off-the-record authorizations" totaled more than 957,000 men who were not immediately available for assignment to authorized units. The size of the detachment of patients, which increased as a result of action against the enemy, could not be controlled. There were other categories, such as those in reception or processing centers and those being discharged, which were not on a duty status, but a considerable number of the "off-the-record units" were made up of men who held duty assignments.[54]

To determine the Army's ability to fill authorizations already made, or to fill new authorizations outside the troop basis, it was necessary to deduct those who were in these special categories from the actual strength. Staff officers thought that wide dissemination of the information that a large number of men had been assigned "off-the-record" would lead to numerous requests for provisional authorizations. As a result, this information was restricted to certain planning agencies, but it did not prevent many provisional organizations from being formed. Instead, this secrecy actually brought more diversions. Planning and operating agencies frequently thought they were dealing with an overstrength and were liberal with personnel when actually they were dealing with an understrength and should have been economical.

Since the actual strength of the Army was about 299,000 more than the authorized strength, many commanders assumed that this apparent overstrength represented a pool which could be used for non-T/O units or other purposes. On the contrary, the men had been absorbed by the pipeline or committed "off-the-record." There was an overstrength of 5,000 in the air force type units and personnel, but the ground force type units were 39,000 understrength and the service force type were 15,000 understrength. At the same time, Army-wide types (patients, trainees, etc.) were 348,000 more than authorized.

In February 1945, the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office of the War Department pointed out that knowledge of the true status of Army strength was essential for intelligent decisions on many staff problems. Army publications generally attributed the excess figure to the large number absorbed by the pipeline to the theaters and to the detachment of patients. Those channels did contain the largest segment although many had been assigned "off-the-record" and had disappeared from view.

[54] War Department overhead in January 1944 was replaced by five groups including the JCS Gp, the SW Gp, the CofS Gp, the Misc WD Activities Gp, and the Misc Civ Activities Gp. See WD Cir 5, 4 Jan 44; WD Cir 19, 15 Jan 45, IV; WD Cir 76, 9 Mar 45, V.

Personnel not subject to immediate assignment in units, ZI replacements, and ZI operating installations on 1 February 1945 were:

Miscellaneous Units and Personnel	*Actual strength*
Army Specialized Training Program Trainees	15,295
Puerto Rican Training Program	13,023
Civil Affairs Division Training	1,193
Civil Censorship Training	41
West Point Preparatory	788
WD Detachment of Patients	370,631
Reception Centers	26,480
Special Training Units	12,515
Redistribution Centers	*21,946
Defense Commands' Overhead	1,799
Overseas Overhead	153,521
Overseas Replacement Depots and Training Centers	*207,838
Processing Centers	*3,774
Joint Chiefs of Staff Group	7,916
Secretary of War Group	319
Chief of Staff Group	4,771
Miscellaneous War Department Group	1,380
Civilian Agencies Group	787
On Duty with Veterans' Administration to Units Provisional to ASF Troop Basis	6,327
Military Police	**2,785
Ordnance	**538
Not Categorized in Troop Basis	
WAC Training	*8,036
In Process of Discharge	6,266
Industrial Furlough and Postal Assistance [55]	3,875
Casuals in Staging Areas and En Route	*51,439
Process of Reassignment	*4,986
Personnel in Process of Evacuation From Theaters	20,815
Others	8,447
Total	[56] 957,531

*These, theoretically at least, were moving to assignment to units as replacements for battle, attrition, or rotational losses.

**Thousands more were in provisional units organized by overseas commands and by the commanding generals of Air and Ground Forces but which were not shown as such in strength reports except to the commanding general, Army Service Forces.

[55] Industrial furloughs were given hard-rock miners in an effort to increase copper production. Posta assistants were provided by the Army to the New York and San Francisco postmasters to handle Christmas mails.

[56] Authorized and actual strengths, Air, Ground. and Service units·

	WD authorized	*Actual strength*	*Over or short*
Total	7,772,200	8,070,900	+298,700
Air Force type	2,302,500	2,307,500	+5,000
Ground Force type	3,194,700	3,156,200	−38,500
Service Force type	1,665,100	1,649,700	−15,400
Army-wide types	609,900	957,500	+347,600

Source: WD DCofS. SARO, "Strength Reports of the Army," I, pp. 8, 9.

During World War II there were four recognized strength yardsticks of the Army. As of 31 January 1945 these were:

1. AC of S, G-3 WDGS Troop Basis	7,705,725
2. War Department authorized	7,772,200
3. Commands authorized	7,964,710
4. Ceiling set by Congress	8,240,000

On 1 May 1945, just before the surrender of the German forces, the actual strength of the United States Army was 8,248,780, of which 5,455,076 were overseas or en route thereto and 2,793,704 were in the United States.[57] The authorized strength of the Army, under the troop basis in effect on 1 May, was 8,290,933. The detachment of patients had been increased from an authorized 270,000 to an authorized 415,000, and the latter figure was almost exactly its actual strength.

In addition to providing authorizations for new categories and increased authorizations for others, the 1 May 1945 troop basis for the first time segregated by Air, Ground, and Service categories the authorizations for pipeline personnel such as casuals en route or returning from overseas and those in reception and redistribution stations.

The April 1944 Conference

During the early part of 1944, the personnel situation was so confusing that War Department officials found it difficult to reconcile the figures submitted to them from theaters. The War Department General Staff wanted the theaters to adopt standard practices of reporting, yet hoped the system could remain so flexible that theater commanders could use their own initiative in meeting local conditions.[58] Military officials in Washington decided that a personnel accounting system must be devised which would not only keep the War Department informed of the theaters' personnel situations but also would help the theaters keep their houses in order.

Representatives of the North African and European Theaters of Operations were called to Washington to discuss the replacement situation at a conference which opened on 3 April 1944 and continued for 6 days. No representatives from the Pacific were present. The meeting was attended by representatives of the War Department General Staff, the three major commands, and by a number of officers from overseas including Maj. Gens. B. M. Sawbridge and T. B. Larkin of the North African theater and Brig. Gen. O. B. Abbott and Col. L. H. Hanley of the European theater. Two papers prepared by members of the War Department General Staff were presented. One outlined a proposed form of reporting, and the other detailed a standard operating procedure for replacement installations in the theaters. The first paper included a description of a new set of reports intended to improve methods used in requisitioning replacements and to prevent theaters from exceeding authorized strengths.

[57] WD General Council *Minutes*, 21 May 45.
[58] Record of Replacement Conference. AG 322 Repl (19 Jan 46). DRB, TAG.

War Department representatives pointed out that experience in North Africa had indicated that commanders who had the right to form provisional units would not be able to withstand the temptation to use replacements for that purpose. In the military action which had taken place up to that time service units made up of replacements had been attached to some of the armies for landings, thereafter to be lost as replacements when they were most needed in combat. As soon as the armies advanced far enough so that the Communications Zone could take over the rear areas those emergency-formed provisional units were taken over by the service force commander, who usually retained them permanently.

At other times the diversion of replacements to fill provisional units was not direct: instead, the men were taken out of T/O units which then had to send requisitions to the depots to fill their vacancies.

After the conference opened, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, explained to the delegates that their task was to set up better personnel conditions and to end "the present extravagent and inefficient personnel conditions which we can no longer afford to maintain." Two main steps were proposed: (1) To devise a more effective and accurate system of reporting theater strengths; and (2) to establish efficient and uniform operating procedures for the overseas replacement system.

General McNarney continued:

> We have now reached our authorized strength and the acquisition of new personnel will henceforth be restricted to the numbers required to maintain a strength of 7.7 million. New demands for personnel not already provided in the troop basis must be met by corresponding reductions elsewhere. . . .
>
> In the early stages of the war, the War Department made every possible effort to give the theaters everything possible within the limitations of available shipping. . . . Because troops were plentiful in the early stages of our deployment, many of our overseas planning staffs have, without doubt, acquired the habit of setting up their personnel requirements to meet every possible peak demand and then of adding some more as a factor of safety. . . . Extravagant use of personnel on one job inevitably forces some other unit to take on a job without adequate means. . . .
>
> This fact, I am sure, is not now understood in the theaters. If it were, the extravagant use of personnel that has to date characterized operations in the North African Theater would have been corrected. Now it must be corrected in all current and future operations. The diversion of men shipped as loss replacements for other purposes must stop. Provisional units created to meet sudden emergencies must be disbanded and the personnel recovered for their original purposes the instant the emergency is over. . . .
>
> From the beginning of the North African operations to date the replacement system in that Theater has, from the War Department's viewpoint, not been satisfactory. Men shipped as loss replacements have disappeared into communication zone activities, while the demand for more and more replacements continues. . . . There has been no effective removal of able-bodied men from rear area installations for utilization in the combat zone, with or

without training. Likewise, adequate progress has not been made in curtailing communication zone activities far removed from the combat area.

If the War Department is to provide you with replacements in the proper numbers and categories, we must have complete and accurate information as to the status in each theater, and we must have accurate advance estimates of requirements. This necessitates material improvement in the present system, or lack of system, of reporting theater strengths, replacement levels, and replacement requirements. A system must be devised that will be common to all theaters, that will give us the information that we must have, and that will keep your own picture constantly and accurately in front of you. . . .

Any replacement system, no matter how efficiently designed and administered, will break down unless all commanders concerned and all responsible staff officers are determined to use every available unit, including, in an emergency, combat units, to meet sudden but temporary peak demands, to ruthlessly deactivate every unit which is no longer essential for combat or combat support, and to clean up the back areas as operations progress.[59]

Discussion at the conference brought out that it was essential for theater commanders to estimate their requirements at regular intervals; that a standard form for the submission of these estimates should be provided; and that a definite procedure should be established for the consolidation, comparison, and evaluation of those figures.[60] Reports were to indicate not only actual strengths of theaters but also effectives and noneffectives. Uniformity of reporting forms was essential if data was to be evaluated and conditions in one theater compared with those in another.

It was pointed out that too frequently requisitions were initiated on a single demand of a field commander and submitted without either taking into consideration surpluses elsewhere or considering what additional demands, just as urgent, might be made the next day from other units. There was urgent need for a standard requisition form which would be submitted at regular intervals and which would give an accurate picture of all the needs of a theater.

Representatives of the Replacement Branch of the Adjutant General's Office of the War Department stated that the salient features which the War Department had determined must be uniform in all theaters included:

1. A focal point of authority and responsibility for the theater replacement system;

2. Transfer of replacement units operating in the combat zone to field force commanders concerned;

3. Complete utilization of manpower, including physically limited men;

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[59] Remarks of the Deputy Chief of Staff at G1 Conference on Replacements and Personnel Control, WDGS, 3 Apr 44. G1 Conference Papers (OPD Bulky Files). AG 370.5 #721. DRB, TAG.

[60] Memo, Mil Pers Div, ASF, for CofS, 21 Mar 44 sub: Oversea Replacement System. ASF/322 (Repls). DRB, TAG.

4. A system of credits or priorities for replacements which would assure orderly movement in required numbers and categories to major echelons;

5. Accurate data whereby both the theater commander and the War Department could know the needs of each theater which were to be weighed against the tactical plan in order to determine manpower credits and training schedules;

6. Prompt assignment to units of all categories of personnel to eliminate stagnation during long waiting periods;

7. Separation of limited assignment personnel evacuated from combat forces from general service men who were scheduled for combat duty.

Officers from the North African theater explained that in that theater replacements usually were received by the divisions while they were on the line and that requisitions had to be computed on effective strength rather than on casualty MOS. Also, requisitions were submitted to cover estimated losses 5 or 6 days in advance in an effort to get men to the divisions soon after they were needed.

Experience in North Africa indicated that a new division going into combat would lose 3,700 men in the first month, but that during the second month the net loss would drop to 2,500 because 1,200 men would return from hospitals. After the fourth month of continuous combat there would be a constant net loss of about 1,500 per month.

During the first year and a half of fighting 80 percent of the losses had been infantry, while 8 percent were in the field artillery. The theater was willing to accept loss replacements trained only as basic infantry on the theory that it was possible to retrain the basics for almost any positions except those requiring high technical skill.

The hospital population in the North African theater in April 1944 was between 40,000 and 43,000 men. General Sawbridge did not think it was possible to get accurate reports on the number of men who would be evacuated to the Zone of the Interior because the hospitals in the theater were scattered over 1,900 miles. He proposed that the entire hospital population should be carried in a detachment of patients which would take the load off the replacement system.

One drawback against the War Department setting up an allotment of replacements to cover hospital populations in the theaters was the difficulty of determining how many hospitalized men would return to duty. Unless this factor was considered the War Department would have been shipping replacements for men who already were back in their posts which in turn would have built up additional overstrengths in the theaters.

During the 16 months prior to the date of the conference, there had been 29,000 limited assignment men received in replacement pools

of the North African theater. About 20,000 had been assigned to service units but the pool continued to grow. Theater representatives at the meeting did not believe that these men should be charged against the general assignment replacement pool necessary for units in combat. Since August 1943, the Mediterranean theater had assigned all its general assignment replacements to Fifth Army.

The North African theater officials did not object to the War Department prescribing that there should be a separate commander for the replacement system, but they wanted to give responsibility for replacements to the commanding general of the Service Forces because replacement installations were a part of the base sections. War Department officials said they preferred the policy in the United States where the Replacement and School Command, which had been formed by Army Ground Forces, was under a commander rather than a staff officer, but General Larkin did not believe that a replacement system commander could speak with greater authority than a staff officer who represented the theater commander. "If he followed that line of reasoning," said General Larkin, "a Theater Commander would appoint all his staff officers as field commanders." [61]

The Replacement Directive to the Theaters

On 4 May 1944, the War Department directed all theaters to establish theater replacement and training commands which were to operate replacement installations and exercise control over casual personnel.[62] These commands were to be responsible for the receipt, classification, and retraining of all personnel in the replacement system and for their dispatch to replacement units assigned to the field forces and units and installations of the communications zones. The commands were expected to maintain pools from which trained replacements could be drawn to replace both battle and nonbattle losses. The War Department plan specified that replacement depots and battalions in sufficient numbers would be under the control of field force commanders, a requirement which was not always observed. Each field force commander was directed to designate an adjutant general from his command for service at the headquarters of the theater replacement training command and whose duty it would be to adjust the differences between estimated and actual casualties when such adjustments were necessary. Each theater adjutant general was required to establish a casualty and requirement section to maintain statistical data on replacements. [See chart 9 for proposed replacement system.]

[61] Record of Replacement Conference. AG 322 Repl (19 Jan 46). DRB, TAG.

[62] Ltr, WD, 4 May 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System. AG 320.2 (29 Apr 44) OC-E-WDGAP. DRB, TAG.

In an effort to use in combat all men physically qualified and to provide other assignments for all those unfit for combat duty, the War Department directed theaters to establish, under the theater adjutants general, personnel audit teams which were to inspect all communications zone units. Medical members were assigned to the teams to assist in determining physical classifications of the men examined. Centers were to be established where such training as was necessary prior to reassignment of the men would be conducted.

Because soldiers returning to their units from hospitals sometimes had a bad effect on the new replacements, men going to the front were required to move in separate channels from those going from front to rear. A few wounded veterans were inclined to tell hair-raising stories about their battle experiences. One story sometimes told to a replacement was that he would be taken to the front in the same ambulance that would pick up the dead or wounded man whose place in combat he was about to take. The inference was that the replacement himself would be the patient on the next trip out.[63]

Returning men directly from hospitals to their units was considered in some instances, but complete records and equipment frequently were not at hand, transportation sometimes was not available, and it was sometimes necessary to divert men to units other than their own. It was considered more satisfactory to return the wounded men through a separate channel in the replacement system.


As an example of accounting difficulties sometimes encountered, it was pointed out that many of the units that passed through North Africa on their way to China, Burma, or India were staged at Casablanca or Bizerte. When these traveling units were in the base sections their numbers showed on the latter strength reports, thereby causing confusion. The Atlantic Base Section at Casablanca, which normally had a strength of about 3,000 officers and men, sometimes showed a strength of 20,000 because of the men awaiting shipment to other theaters.

Three things were essential in reporting strength. The War Department needed to know: (1) the effective strength of T/O units, starting with the previous report and accounting for changes; (2) effective strength of overhead; and (3) the replacement level for all purposes, showing separately those in the detachment of patients. Some indication was needed as to the number likely to be lost during the coming month, including those scheduled for rotation. Men in confinement were still part of the effective strength and it was stressed that they should do useful work.

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[63] Cpl Ed Hogan, "On the Replacement System," *Stars and Stripes* (Rome Edition), 10–16 Dec 44.

CHART 9 – FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION CHART
OVERSEAS THEATER REPLACEMENT SYSTEM



Source: Letter WDAGO, 4 May 44.
Subject: Operation of Theater Replacement System, AG 320.2 (29 Apr 44) OC-E-WDGAP DRB TAG

As a first step toward standardized reporting procedures, the April conference adopted three reporting forms to be used in all theaters. Form I was for the submission of estimates by theater commanders; Form II was for reporting the status of personnel in each theater to clearly show the theater's needs; while Form III was for the requisition of replacements. Each theater submitted all three forms monthly. Form I, forecasting requirements for a 6-month period, upon arrival at the War Department was checked by G1, WDGS, after which the Operations Division used it in considering the troop basis, utilization of shipping, and projected operations. After receipt of Forms II and III and approval of requisitions by the War Department, the director of the Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces, directed the shipment of Air, Ground, and Service replacements and rotational personnel. The approved authorized replacement level, which was the strength authorized above T/O units and overhead allotments, was based on the number in the pipeline, men in hospitals unassigned to units, and on anticipated losses.

The War Department letters, prepared by a subcommittee of the conference, were placed in final form and sent to overseas theaters on 4 and 15 May.[64] The theaters were required to conduct a program of retraining and reassigning limited and general service men withdrawn from the communications zone and from the surplus in replacement depots.

To meet the objections raised by representatives of the theaters, the wording of the instructions was modified to delete the word "commander." As amended, the instructions simply stated that "all unassigned personnel in the theater will be brought under the replacement system." Although the opposition of theater commanders kept this specific requirement out of the directive, one War Department official present at the conference said: "All of us believe that some such control is essential if you are going to correct the difficulties that occurred in North Africa. That is not the opinion of one man, but of many coming back to the United States."[65] Theater commanders were informed by letter, however, that the War Department considered it advisable for one commander to have sole responsibility for the replacement system. This letter was the authority on which the theaters operated their replacement commands.

The new reporting system required a complete status report of effective personnel but its complexity reduced its effectiveness. The

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[64] Ltr, WDAGO, 4 May 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System. AG 320.2 (29 Apr 44) OC-E-WDGAP. DRB, TAG; Ltr, WDAGO, 15 May 44, sub: Overseas Replacement System—Estimates, Reports, and Requisitions. AG 300.2 (13 May 44) OC-E-SPGAR. DRB, TAG.

[65] Record of Replacement Conference. AG 322 Repl (19 Jan 46). DRB, TAG.

status report consisted of 8 sections with 72 subject entries, some of which required involved algebraic computations. Estimates of requirements covered 6-month periods.[66] By 19 February 1945, the number of strength and replacement reports required from the theaters had been reduced from 22 to 17.[67]

The plan which the War Department sent to the theaters [68] provided that replacements were not to be used for purposes other than maintaining units at authorized strengths unless prior War Department approval was obtained. It called for a continuous audit of personnel and an efficient training and assignment system. The principle that replacements were to be considered as a second line of reserves was approved. Requisitions from units were to go to theater replacement and training commands while casualty and requirements sections in the offices of the theater adjutants general were to maintain data on casualties and assignment.

The 1944 Committee on Personnel Procedures

General McNarney on 3 April 1944 told the General Council of the War Department General Staff that the troop basis must become an instrument for the control of the size of the Army and he announced the appointment of a committee to devise more effective reporting and accounting forms and procedures and to make a general study of the personnel system. This committee started where the April conference with the European and North African theaters representatives left off and was to make sure that the reforms agreed upon during that conference were carried out. The efforts of four subcommittees were directed by a steering group made up of Brig. Gen. I. Willard Irvine, Brig. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., and Mr. L. W. Hoelschor of the Bureau of the Budget.[69] The first meeting was held in the Pentagon on 8 April 1944 and a final report was submitted 29 May 1944.[70]

First, the committee found there were too many papers dealing with the personnel system and recommended that all the rules be collected into a single document. The report then said that in too many instances directives affecting the flow of replacements had not been

[66] Ltr, WDAGO, 15 May 44, sub: Overseas Replacement System—Estimates, Reports, and Requisitions. AG 320.2 (13 May 44) OC-E-SPGAR. DRB, TAG; WDAGO Forms No. 655, 656, and 657.

[67] Memo, AG to WDGS, 19 Feb 45, sub: Proposed Revision of Strength Reports and Replacement Requisitions. OCS 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[68] Ltr, WDAGO, 4 May 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System. AG 320.2 (29 Apr 44). DRB, TAG.

[69] Ltr, WDAGO, 6 Apr 44, sub: Committee of Officers to Establish Procedures for Personnel and Troop Basis Control. AG 320.2 (6 Apr. 4) PO-A. DRB, TAG.

[70] Memo for DCofS, 29 May 44, sub: Replacement System. AG 322 Repl (8 Jun 44). DRB, TAG.

cleared with G3, WDGS, and it recommended closer coordination among staff agencies. It went on to state that:

1. The War Department rotational policy then in operation was presenting administrative and training difficulties which made it advisable to restudy the plan.

2. The War Department analysis of overseas requisitions for personnel had been primarily a comparison of the requisitions against availability within the United States, and only secondarily an evaluation of the actual requirements of the theater or a comparison with the requirements of planned operations.

3. Theater requisitions frequently represented desires rather than needs.

4. There was a lack of responsibility within the G1 Division of the War Department General Staff for the checking and evaluating of theater requisitions.

5. The War Department had not been informed promptly of theater surpluses arising out of unit reorganizations, inactivations, hospital discharges, and other sources.

6. The whole system of filling overseas requisitions lacked control. The persons on the War Department General Staff who took action on requests for replacements sometimes did not have time to get the entire overseas picture before making decisions.

7. There was no uniform procedure for obtaining prompt decisions when requisitions exceeded availabilities.

8. Neither theater commanders nor the War Department had established adequate policing to prevent diversion of personnel to purposes other than those for which they were requisitioned.

9. The computation of replacement levels was not clear.

10. There had been transfers overseas from one major command to another which had not been reported to the higher commanders concerned.

11. Overseas requisitions arrived at the War Department at different times during the month and were ordinarily handled on an individual basis without proper consideration for the needs of all theaters.

12. Theaters submitted too many special requisitions.

13. There appeared to be no close tieup between theater activations and inactivations, and numerous changes in nomenclature had aggravated this problem.

14. Improper distribution of personnel apparently was causing many subordinate commands to need more personnel at a time when the Army as a whole was at full strength or overstrength.

15. There was some evidence of overclassification in the operation of the MOS system indicated by the accumulation in the pools

of men with MOS numbers not frequently called for in requisitions. (The committee submitted a list of MOS numbers which were considered surplus.)[71]

The subcommittee which considered replacement training studied a proposal for centralized control which General McNarney feared would set up a fourth major command and would be unworkable. General McNarney offered the following comments in this proposal:

> Overseas we are putting the responsibility on the theater commanders. Over here you can do the same thing in effect by placing responsibility on the three major commands. The other plan merely sets up a fourth command—A Replacement and Training Command. I doubt whether that is desirable at this time.
>
> I wish you people would work to see what better control you can set up within the three major commands before you tell me I must set up a big control in the War Department or organize a major command. Both are things I am opposed to. I would only ask the Chief of Staff to approve it in the case that you show me you can't instigate necessary controls in your present organization. I am afraid you are on the track where you will get a disapproval.[72]

The report as submitted 29 May delineated the responsibilities of the War Department General Staff divisions and the commanding generals of the major commands without making any major changes.[73] It recorded in more specific language many of the procedures already in effect in the handling of replacements. The principal result of the 3 months of study of the replacement system was the edition of War Department General Staff Circular 11–3 which appeared on 20 June 1944. It compiled into one publication the regulations governing General Staff procedures relating to the replacement system. Since War Department General Staff circulars were not directives in themselves, a specific directive was issued to Army Service Forces relative to its responsibilities.[74]

Army Service Forces was required to estimate each month for the General Staff the replacement requirements by month for at least 6 months in advance for newly activated units in the United States, for increases in overhead of installations in the United States, and for the number necessary to maintain units and installations in the United States at authorized strengths. The Service Forces also estimated available personnel by months for at least 6 months in advance showing separately numbers available for requirements in the United

[71] Memo for WDGS, 26 Apr 44, sub: System for Providing Training Individuals for Overseas Theaters. AG 322 Repl (8 Jun 44) (C). DRB, TAG.

[72] Memo for DCofS, 29 May 44, sub: Replacement System. AG 322 Repl (8 Jun 44). DRB, TAG.

[73] Memo for WDGS, 26 Apr 44, sub: System for Providing Training Individuals for Overseas Theaters. AG 322 Repl (8 Jun 44) (C). DRB, TAG.

[74] Memo, AG to ASF, not dated, sub: War Department General Staff Personnel Replacement System. AG 322 Repl. ASF Cont Div Files, Dr. G–199. DRB, TAG.

States, for overseas replacements by branch, and the numbers to be available to each major command from the detachment of patients in the United States, redistribution stations, and similar installations handling casual personnel, but excluding inductees at reception centers. The Army Service Forces also prepared for the General Staff information as to the progress of individual training including length of courses, numbers and sources of trainees, and the disposition of trained or partially trained personnel.[75]

At the General Council meeting 26 June 1944, General McNarney commented on Circular 11–3 and again expressed his belief that it was impossible to centralize responsibility for replacements within one division of the General Staff. He added that operations having to do with replacements could not be centralized because they cut across all the three major commands.

Another result of the reports of this committee was the opening on 28 May 1944 of the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, and the preparation of the troop basis by machine records.[76] Since the four major theaters submitted data for "Strength Reports of the Army" by teletype while reports from other theaters and overseas commands were received by radio, strength data which previously had not been available in less than 39 days could be distributed in 18 days. On 10 January 1946, the Strength Accounting and Reporting Office was merged with the Statistics Branch of the Office of the Chief of Staff to form the Strength Accounting and Statistics Office, Office of the Chief of Staff.

The December Conferences

War Department officials knew that replacement shipments to the European theater from the United States had been sufficient to cover reported infantry casualties, and since there had been a sizable pool of replacements on D-day they were unable to understand why the theater did not have enough men.[77] It appeared to officials in Washington that another conference to review accounting and control procedures might be of value. Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull of the SHAEF staff was in Washington 1 December 1944 and discussed the replacement situation with representatives of G1, G3, and OPD of the War Department General Staff. General Bull was informed that the War

[75] Ltr, WDAGO, 15 May 44, sub: Overseas Replacement System, Estimates, Reports and Requisitions. AG 300.2 (13 May 44) OC–E–SPGAR. DRB, TAG; WD Cir 267, 30 Jun 44; WD Cir 39, 1 Feb 45.

[76] WD General Staff Circular, 5–15, 15 Jun 44; WD General Staff Circular 5–16, 15 Jul 44; "The Strength Accounting and Reporting Office," 7 Mar 46. 2–1.1 AA. OCMH, General Reference Office.

[77] Memo, WDGS, 28 Dec 44, sub: ETO Replacement Conference. G1 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

Department, by exhausting every resource available in the Zone of the Interior, was preparing to furnish all theaters about 80,000 replacements per month during the period February to April of 1945.[78] These would include about 60,000 infantry per month of which 70 to 75 percent would be rifle-company trained. The shipments for January were estimated at about 15,000 below those figures. War Department officials pointed out that even though induction figures were immediately increased, a move which was considered improbable with the Army overstrength, the overseas shipments could not be increased during the period under consideration if men were to receive adequate training. Meanwhile the period of training for one replacement training center class in the United States was reduced from 17 to 16 weeks and another class was released after 15 weeks.

General Bull was given charts showing ETO monthly estimates and actual requisitions for replacements. It was pointed out that replacement production in the Zone of Interior was based on theater monthly estimates. Requisitions could not be met unless they closely reflected estimates made 4 months previously. A War Department analysis of theater estimates and requisitions had led to the conclusion that the estimates much more accurately reflected true theater requirements than the requisitions. The War Department wanted to know if the casualty figures it had received were correct, if infantrymen had been used for other than infantry units, and it wanted more details on the December losses. The Battle of the Bulge had caused a heavy demand for men and few were available within the United States.

Consequently, representatives of the European Theater of Operations were called to Washington for a conference which opened the last week in December.[79] The theater representatives explained that they were seeking action in the United States which would carry their armies through the December and January emergency. The delegates at the meeting hoped to present a picture of what had been done in the theater to solve the replacement problem and they hoped that the plans adopted at the conference would take care of the situation beyond the emergency which at that time had been brought upon them by the German drive into Belgium. The emergency action consisted of accelerating delivery through curtailing furloughs and training which would help meet immediate needs but might cause future trouble in that these measures would reduce future deliveries and result in men of a lower quality being sent to the theaters.

Maj. Gen. R. W. Barker, G1 of the ETO, estimated the 31 December shortages in the ETO at 24,000 infantry riflemen and said that di-

[78] Memo, G1 to Gen Bull, 2 Dec 44, sub: Replacements. G1 322 Replacements. DRB, TAG.

[79] Memo, WDGS, 28 Dec 44, sub: ETO Replacement Conference. G1 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

visions would be fighting at 78 percent of their authorized combat rifle strength. At the first meeting, on 23 December, there was a general discussion of the replacement situation. A committee was appointed which prepared conclusions and recommendations which were submitted and discussed at the second meeting on 28 December.

The calls on Selective Service had been increased from 60,000 to 80,000 per month, but it appeared that this number would not fill the needs of all the theaters. Since the only men left in the 18–26 age group were the 40,000 who became 18 years of age each month, it appeared that more of the men called would be from the older group of whom fewer would be physically fit for combat. There were few infantry riflemen remaining in units in the United States and there was little recoverable overstrength left in the continental commands.

In Europe, each of the army group G1's prepared battle casualty estimates which were consolidated at ETOUSA headquarters by Staff officers and representatives of the replacement command. Theater headquarters, in conjunction with replacement command officers, prepared estimates of nonbattle casualties. The sum of these two estimates was reduced in theater headquarters by the estimated number to become available from theater sources, including those released from hospitals, and the difference constituted the estimate of the number of replacements needed each month submitted by the theater to the War Department. Although there had been differences between theater estimates and later requisitions for the same periods, those attending the conference decided that the European Theater had been using sound methods in preparing the estimates.

The theater proposed that the War Department make an estimated advance allocation of the replacements which it expected would become available in the Zone of the Interior for overseas shipment. The War Department agreed to make such an estimate.

Theater retraining was regarded as the main source of replacements within the theaters, but progress had not been as great as the War Department believed possible. The European theater representatives said their facilities were being used to capacity, that there was a lack of instructors, training aids, and camps. The conference decided to expand the retraining program, and the War Department sent 33 officers, 52 enlisted men and 4 enlisted WAC's to the European theater from the Infantry School to establish an officer's training school in England. Another group consisting of 50 officers and 100 enlisted men was sent to assist in retraining men from other arms for infantry.

Difficulties in connection with accounting were resolved and changes were made in the contents of the weekly radio reports of strength from the theaters. Theater representatives believed that the authorized replacement pool of 80,050 for the European theater, which in-

cluded Air Force replacement, theater overstrength and noneffectives, was inadequate, but it could not be increased without exceeding the authorized strength of the Army.

At the close of the conference, it appeared there was a common understanding and general agreement on practically all phases of the replacement program. ETOUSA directed the air force in Europe to furnish 10,000 enlisted men for retraining and called upon the communications zone to provide an additional 20,000.[80] Army groups were expected to assign a certain number of noncombat troops and additional levies were to be made upon the communications zone and the air forces. The War Department was asked to send to Europe 25,000 limited assignment men as replacements for men who were being retrained. Arrangements were made to return limited assignment officers to the United States where they replaced general assignment officers who were sent to Europe. The objective was to have all units of the two army groups at T/O strength and to have as large a pool as possible in the rear of the two army groups by 1 April. By 9 May 1945, 12th Army Group, which had reported 745,114 casualties, had received 700,285 replacements.[81]

Letters to General MacArthur and General Richardson, dispatched 26 December 1944, stressed the importance of the replacement problem in the Southwest Pacific theater and in the United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas.[82] Immediate and positive action within the theaters was held necessary to avoid a situation which would jeopardize operations. The letters pointed out that requisitions from the two theaters for December and January had exceeded previous estimates and that fewer men than were asked for had been shipped. General Marshall suggested that excellent results had been obtained during the conference with G1 officials from another theater (apparently a reference to the meeting with officers from the ETO) and that it would be desirable to have G1 representatives from the Pacific theaters come to Washington for similar conference.

Col. Townsend Heard, G1, Pacific Ocean Areas, and Maj. R. P. De Camara, of the Pacific Ocean Areas Replacement Command, arrived in Washington 28 January 1945 and spent a week in conference with representatives of the War Department agencies interested in the replacement problem.[83] At this meeting an improved system of replacement accounting and reporting designed to give the

[80] Carrier Sheet, Hq, 12th Army Group, 18 Jan 45, sub: War Department Conference. Copy in "Report of Operations," II, Annex 30, pp. 137–138.

[81] 12th Army Gp "Report of Operations," II, Annex 14, p. 93.

[82] Ltrs, Marshall to MacArthur and Richardson, 26 Dec 44. OCS 320.2 (26 Dec 44). DRB, TAG.

[83] Rpt of Temporary Duty, Maj R. P. de Camara, 23 Feb 45. Copy in USAFPOA and MIDPAC, "History of the Replaement Training Command," 11 Sep 44–1 Dec 45. 8–5.6 AA, vol. 27. OCMH, General Reference Office.

War Department more essential data on replacements was worked out between the theater representatives, the War Department General Staff, and the Strength and Reporting Office. The War Department recognized that there would be temporary replacement needs greater than estimated. In view of the overall replacement situation, the theater was prepared to undertake its commitments without increased replacement allocations.

Each of the principal phases of the replacement system and its operation in the Pacific Ocean areas was analyzed. These included loss estimating, requisitioning, accounting and reporting, theater pipelines, displacement of able-bodied men in rear areas and service and garrison units, adequacy of the War Department "replacement authorizations," and "replacement allocations." The only difference of opinion between theater and War Department representatives which was not reconciled was the matter of retraining to produce a maximum number of combat replacements. This subject was covered in a letter prepared for General Richardson and delivered to him by Colonel Heard upon his return following the conference.

The letter to General Richardson stated that the War Department estimate of the number of replacements which could be furnished had proven overly optimistic; it appeared that the number of infantrymen who were to be sent during March, April, May, and June might have to be reduced. Colonel Heard had indicated that the retraining program would produce only between 300 and 400 men per month as loss replacements for combat units. The letter pointed out that: "The need for combat replacements is so critically urgent that all theater retraining programs should be given maximum acceleration. The War Department should be advised of the number of combat replacements you can produce by this means." [84]

On 23 February 1945, a new personnel reporting procedure and seven new reports were inaugurated.[85] Two other forms and reports were added in May. But the strength accounting system was still too complex. Machine prepared reports generally were not used by overseas commanders, who found them too slow and inaccurate. They preferred manually prepared reports. Machine records units in overseas commands continued to report to the War Department but theater commanders frequently based their estimates on separate figures. In the United States, overseas shipments of replacements were based more on availability of personnel than on reports from overseas commanders regarding their requirements.

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[84] Ltrs, Marshall to MacArthur and Richardson, 26 Dec 44. OCS 320.2 (26 Dec 44). DRB, TAG.

[85] Ltr, WDAGO, 23 Feb 45, sub: Uniform Strength Report. AG 320.2 AGOM-E-F. DRB, TAG; WD Cir 147, 17 May 45.

The Stilwell Replacement Plan

In February 1945, Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, in a letter to Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, suggested a revised replacement plan which the ground forces commander believed would remove some of the difficulties encountered in providing replacements for units in the Pacific.[86]

The Stilwell plan proposed that infantry replacement training centers within the United States designate units within the centers to train replacements for particular divisions then in service overseas. It was believed that these training units would be able to inspire the recruits with a considerable amount of pride in their organizations. It further proposed that men destined for any one division be trained together and move overseas together after they left the replacement training centers.

It was recognized that such a training plan might not take care of all the needs of divisions in combat in case they suffered unusually large losses; but it was believed that a system of conversion training could be continued within the United States as well as in the theaters as a means of producing the additional men who would be needed to take care of excessive losses during periods of heavy fighting.

The advantages and disadvantages of the proposed Stilwell replacement system were reviewed by the Plans Section of the Replacement Training Command, Pacific Ocean Areas. The principal difficulty which officers making the study believed would prevent the effective operation of the plan was the rigidity inherent in any method of allocation of replacements to specific divisions during the early part of their training period. Combat losses of divisions were certain to be unequal. There was no known method whereby men, upon their arrival at a replacement training center, could be divided among divisions in combat in proportion to the losses those divisions would suffer at some indefinite time 6 to 12 months in the future. It soon became apparent that the plan could only be carried out by the retention of an excessive number of casuals in the replacement installations. For that reason, the proposal did not advance beyond the planning stage.

The Plans Section officers who studied the problem believed that it would be more satisfactory to attach one replacement depot in support of each field army and to continue the method of training then being carried out within the United States.[87] It was suggested that

[86] USAFPOA and MIDPAC, "History of the Replacement Training Command," 11 Sep 44–1 Dec 45. 8–5.6 AA, vol. 27, pp. 723–751. OCMH, General Reference Office.

[87] Ltr, RTC POA, 18 Jul 45, sub: Support of a Field Army by Elements of a Theater Replacement System. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

the depot supporting a field army be composed of as many replacement battalions as there were corps in the Army, plus one battalion which would have the function of caring for "return to unit" personnel and such other persons passing through the replacement system who might be suffering from combat fatigue or other disabilities. The plan also provided that if necessary another battalion could be added to serve army overhead installations needing replacements.

This plan was prepared by the POA Replacement Training Command, after careful analysis of Pacific operations in which particular attention was given to the Okinawa campaign. The Plans Section also had available a number of detailed reports regarding the faults and virtues brought to the attention of officers who had observed the operation of the replacement systems in the Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations.

The experience of the Plans Section indicated that a uniform replacement system under one command was desirable in any theater of operations. Two major problems which were found to require continuous study were (1) the number of replacements required to support any operation; and (2) the number and type of replacement units which would be necessary to provide efficient administration.

In the Pacific, it was important to establish replacement centers upon important island objectives at an early date in any operation. After their establishment, these units could best be developed by following a prearranged plan of operations which specified all unit requirements. It was essential that elements of any theater replacement system give direct support to an army in the field.

The surrender of Japan came before any of these suggestions were incorporated into the Pacific Ocean areas replacement system. For that reason they were not subjected to practical tests.

The Learned-Smith and Other Replacement Studies

Military operations during 1944–45 had brought to light new evidence of the lack of a master personnel plan within the War Department. The Air Forces headquarters was believed to have exercised more control over its replacement system than had the other commands and had had some success in its efforts to avert shortages and overages in units.

Tentative plans for the invasion of Japan indicated there would be several replacement commands in the Pacific, a condition which officers in the War Department General Staff feared would cause confusion at a time when the replacement supply was too limited to condone any system which wasted manpower. The Army was confronted with the necessity for reducing its troop basis and at the same

time conducting a campaign against the Japanese. The shipping shortage in both the Atlantic and Pacific was serious. The War Department needed complete and accurate data, but reports from overseas frequently were incomplete, contradictory, and otherwise confusing.

An examination of the Air Forces replacement system convinced some War Department officials that experts on personnel planning who had helped put the Air Forces plan into operation might be employed to draft a plan for the ground forces. On 9 June 1945, the Chief of Staff selected Drs. E. P. Learned and Dan T. Smith to make a study of the War Department personnel replacement system and to make general recommendations in an effort to gain more efficiency in the war against Japan. The Army Air Forces loaned Drs. Learned and Smith to the office of the Chief of Staff to make this study, and they submitted a report to the Deputy Chief of Staff on 20 June 1945.[88] While they proposed that the replacement system then in operation generally be continued, they recommended a number of changes.

Their principal recommendations were:

1. That the Personnel and Administration Division (P&A), WDGS, be the only War Department General Staff agency charged with the planning and operation of personnel matters.

2. That the Operations Division, WDGS, retain responsibility for troop basis and OPD operational plans, but that P&A have final responsibility for rate tables in coordination with interested agencies in major commands and in the theaters. It was also suggested that P&A revise Army Regulations and WDGS circulars, specifically Circular 11–3.

3. That P&A maintain a master plan on personnel and, after coordination with G3 and other interested staff agencies, control the allocation of personnel among major commands and to the theaters.

4. That P&A indicate availability of manpower and make recommendations to other staff agencies.

5. That a suggestion be sent to General MacArthur that his replacement commander should be at least a lieutenant general.

6. That P&A should study the actions of the War Department Manpower Board to see if long-range personnel planning was being unduly limited.

7. That the Navy should discontinue recruiting 17-year-olds. The report likewise proposed that all planning agencies be contacted in an effort to prevent overcommitments, but that detailed planning be decentralized to major commands. It was suggested that P&A and

[88] Memo to DCofS, 7 Jul 45, sub: Review of War Department Personnel Replacement System. OCS 200.3 (7 Jul 45). DRB, TAG.

each major command should establish offices to be known as "Personnel Requirements and Resources Branches" and that these branches should be charged with the various personnel functions involved in analysis, projection, and control. The authors believed that major commands and theaters should be brought more intimately into personnel planning, but that P&A should maintain close liaison with its counterparts in the theaters.

The report suggested that maximum requirements should be requested from Selective Service but that in the event there should be overstrengths, because losses were less than estimated, enough men should be discharged to keep within troop base limits. It was further recommended that "combat replacements should be locked up in a tight pipeline." Another suggestion was that personnel divisions should have equal priority with other staff agencies in assignment of officers so that personnel work would be in capable hands.

The Learned-Smith study was approved by the Deputy Chief of Staff on 7 July 1945 and it was forwarded to P&A with suggestions that it be implemented so far as practicable. Comments from the other agencies were attached in a brief.[89]

As a result of this study, P&A Division of the War Department General Staff set up a Personnel Control Group in that office and assumed responsibility for certain personnel functions previously performed by OPD and the training divisions. Included within the Control Group were the Statistics Branch, Allocations Branch, and Requirements and Resources Branch. But by September, the experience of the P&A Division in the operation of the Control Group indicated the need for a major change in its size and composition and in the scope of its activities, if it were to produce the results which had been envisioned by the Assistant Chief of Staff. In view of this problem, efforts were made to find a solution.

New regulations in light of the Learned-Smith study and the revision of Circular No. 11–3 were under consideration when hostilities ceased in August. P&A then recommended that the Learned-Smith study be utilized by the interested agencies only where applicable to current and future personnel problems. P&A also recommended that Circular No. 11–3 be rescinded and that replacement matters be considered as covered by regulations and other WDGS circulars.

On 16 October 1945, the Deputy Chief of Staff stated that it was his understanding that the Learned-Smith study was for the purpose of developing a replacement system which would be effective at any time. He said that the study should produce, if nothing else, the most efficient personnel organization that could be developed and that the

[89] Memo, DCofS for ACofS, G–1, WDGS, 7 Jul 45, sub: Review of War Department Personnel Replacement System. OCS 200.3 (7 Jul 45). DRB, TAG.

recommended personnel control agencies should be set up in such form and size as required by current problems. However, many of the changes proposed by the Learned-Smith report tended to lapse into obscurity after the Japanese surrender, although the Manpower Control Group continued to function in the P&A Division of the War Department General Staff.

In August 1945, a board headed by Lt. Gen. A. M. Patch was appointed and assigned the mission of proposing an appropriate postwar military organization.[90] This board on 18 October 1945 submitted a report which approved most of the wartime changes including elimination of the chiefs of infantry, field artillery, cavalry, and coast artillery. A headquarters, Army Ground Forces, was favored with the provision that it should be eliminated in the event of unification of the armed forces. The report recommended that the director of Personnel and Administration have overall War Department responsibility for the procurement of personnel and its allocation in bulk to the major commands and for the demobilization of individuals from the military service.

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, on 13 November 1945 recommended that a board of officers, composed of representatives of the War Department General Staff and the major forces, be convened by the War Department to study the personnel system in conjunction with the Patch Board Report and the Learned-Smith study. AGF believed it should assume responsibility for the personnel in all ground force troop-basis type units to include all arms and services. In view of the Patch Board report and the possible consolidation of the Armed Forces, it was not considered practical to establish at that time a worldwide reporting system.

On 15 April 1947, a board of officers with Col. George S. Price as chairman and Cols. George R. Evans, Ralph Rhudy, and Charles G. Dunn and Lt. Col. John Wilson as members was appointed to study the replacement problems.[91] This board was directed to make recommendations for a worldwide replacement system so that a War Department directive could be published. Peacetime procedures were to be considered but principal stress was to be placed on possible needs in event of a future mobilization. Its conclusions and recommendations were to be based on a detailed examination and evaluation of World War II experiences and problems. The board submitted its report of six volumes on 12 December 1947. One volume was devoted to the replacement system in the Zone of the Interior, another to the over-

[90] Report of Board of Officers on Reorganization of the War Department, WDGS, 18 Oct 45. AG 334 (Patch Board) (19 Oct 45). DRB, TAG.

[91] Memo DCofS to members of board, 15 Oct 47, sub: Board of Officers to Study Replacement System, w/amendments, 19 Nov 47. G–1 322 (Repl). DRB, TAG.

seas replacement system, one to matters affecting the replacement system, and the annexes made up two volumes. Conclusions and recommendations were submitted in the first volume.

The board concluded that an effective replacement system had been lacking in World War II and that the Department of the Army should survey the Nation's human resources in an effort to develop a replacement system which, in the event of another mobilization, would provide men for units and installations in their order of priority. It believed this could be accomplished through a personnel command in the Zone of Interior responsible solely to the Chief of Staff.

The board recommended that the office of the director of Personnel and Administration be the sole General Staff agency responsible for determining personnel requirements, for the allocation of personnel, for determination of training rates, and for the operation of the personnel accounting system. It proposed that technical and field manuals be prepared. It suggested studies on personnel accounting systems, rotation of units, temporary promotions, branch immaterial status, and the integration of civilian components. The report suggested that by 1 July 1948 there be established in the Zone of the Interior a personnel command which could be expanded into an Army personnel replacement and training system, worldwide.

Army Ground Forces emphasized its belief that balance between Air, Army, and Navy, in regard to personnel, must be established at the outset of a war.[92] That headquarters proposed a nationwide survey to determine accurately what percentages of the various physical categories that existed in the United States were usable to the Services. It was proposed that such a survey become the basis of a classification and registration system which would aid Selective Service in the event of mobilization. In the operation of Reserve units during peacetime, Army Ground Forces favored common inducements for all services and a fixed ceiling on the size of the reserves of the various components. It was proposed that during a mobilization all services should commission civilians on a quota basis in an effort to prevent any unseemly scramble for talent. The Army Ground Forces wanted a plan under which in time of war the agency that handled training and supplying of replacements would have the status of a separate command answerable directly to the highest commander—the theater commander abroad or the Chief of Staff of the Department of the Army in the Zone of the Interior. Since replacement training centers in World War II failed to produce sufficient filler and loss replacements, the board said it appeared wise for these centers to produce loss

[92] Ltr, Hq AGF, 12 Nov 47, sub: Army Ground Forces Views on the Problems of Training and Supplying Replacements in Time of War. AGF 334 (Bds) (12 Nov 47). DRB, TAG.

replacements only and to send fillers direct from reception centers to units. The concept that every man in every unit was a specialist to be replaced only with a man trained for that particular MOS was held unsound. It was feared that such a plan would result in excessive stockage and overspecialization. Army Ground Forces favored an extension of the packet system of moving casuals so that the replacement would be attached to a unit from the time he left the replacement training center until he arrived in the theater of operations.

The report of the Replacement Board was a monumental work which brought together a detailed account of the replacement problems of World War II. It offered an accurate analysis of personnel procurement and replacement methods. Unlike the Learned-Smith Report, the report of the Replacement Board did not receive any formal approval by the Department of the Army. Although in many respects the Replacement Board report was identical with recommendations made to it by Army Ground Forces, there were basic differences. Army Ground Forces believed that more than a defensive attitude would be necessary to gain parity with the Air and Service Forces in the division of manpower. It proposed an aggressive attitude in an effort to gain complete parity in quality with the other services.[93] Army Ground Force officers believed that the Army's share of the manpower pool in regard to age, physical fitness, mental capacity, leadership potential, and degree of skill should be identical with that allotted to the Air Forces and the Navy. It was easy to demand equal cross-sections, but difficult to establish the yardstick with which to measure the cross-sections. It was believed that this yardstick might come out of the nationwide manpower survey proposed by the board, a survey which was expected to disclose by percentages the number of men who would fall within various military categories.

Army Ground Forces also pointed out that each Service must take its proportionate share of men in the lower-physical and higher-age brackets. The problem was first to determine a set of categories, and second to determine the percentage of the available military manpower that was available in each category. Based on such knowledge, it was believed that a concurrent interservice or joint study could determine the cross-section of manpower by category and percentage that would be common for all services. Army Ground Forces also believed that the Secretary of Defense should assume responsibility for the allocation of manpower and that the Department of the Army should present its needs to him. There was fear that more alluring conditions offered reservists by the Navy might give that service a

[93] Memo, AGF to AFF, 10 Mar 48, sub: Comments of Army Ground Forces on the Report of Replacement Board, Department of the Army, 1947. OCS 322 (11 Apr 47). DRB. TAG.

better cross-section in the event of a mobilization. Army Ground Forces proposed that surplus specialists be carried as overstrength in units as a means of maintaining their morale and skill and that they be held there until needed as loss replacements in combat units.

Army Ground Forces also pointed to the need for studies of the replacement problem which would develop in case of a "joint" overseas command involving all of the services. It was expected that unification might bring about consolidation of such facilities as transportation and housing of replacements.

The report of the Replacement Board was made available to the Command and General Staff College for study and Army educational institutions were requested to include studies of replacement problems in their schedules. The problem of centralized control of manpower was referred to the Secretary of Defense. The reforms recommended by the Replacement Board centered around a training command within the Zone of the Interior and a replacement and training system for overseas theaters.[94]

The report of the Replacement Board was studied in detail in the Personnel and Administration Division (G1) of the War Department General Staff which summarized its conclusions in a memorandum dated 12 January 1948. In its discussion of the problem, this memorandum said:

> From a study of World War II it appears incontestable that there must be centralized control of military personnel and that the Director of Personnel and Administration [ACofS, G–1] is the logical man for the job. . . .
>
> The Director of Personnel and Administration must be represented in all aspects of strategic planning in order that he may keep abreast of the possibilities as to where, when, and how the next war will be fought.
>
> His planning must reflect the degree to which casualty statistics gathered in World War II will apply to the next war. It must also reflect the rate of mobilization required to carry out the Army's part in whatever type of operations are envisaged.
>
> Once an allocation of personnel has been made between industry and the services by the National Resources Board, the Director of Personnel and Administration must be prepared to defend the Army's case to the Munitions Board or JCS for the Army's share of personnel both as to quantity and quality (mental and physical).
>
> Maximum practicable use of women must be planned.
>
> Directives outlining operation of personnel control must be prepared. These directives must define responsibility of theater G1's and provide for establishment of replacement commands within theaters.
>
> Replacement for battle and nonbattle losses must be figured in with mobilization requirements.
>
> A sound plan of rotation must be integrated into overall planning.
>
> Wartime recruiting must be eliminated for all services after selective service becomes operative.

[94] Memo, G1 to Col Fry, G1, WDGS, 15 Jun 48, sub: Report of Replacement Board. OCS 322 Repl (11 Apr 47). DRB, TAG.

Appointment of officers from civilian life for all services must be on an equitable basis, and should be restricted to those individuals possessing unusual skills or qualifications required by the services.[95]

Although the report of the Replacement Board was never officially adopted, it provided a valuable source of reference and exerted considerable influence on replacement plans.

[95] Memo, P&A Div, for Gen Trudeau, 12 Jan 48, sub: Comments on Replacement System Worldwide World War II. OCS 322 (11 Apr 47). DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER XII

FACTORS AFFECTING REPLACEMENTS

The Wide Range of Military Requirements

The replacement system did more than move men from civilian jobs to military units. It attempted to determine capabilities, assign competent instructors capable of developing talents possessed by trainees, and to deliver the men at the time they were needed by military units. The function of the replacement system was to meet the needs of the Army. In fulfilling that function it was necessary to gear the replacement output to the operations of all units making up the military team. There were many factors which brought variations in replacement requirements. The furnishing of cadres for new units added to the number of replacements needed and created a demand for the more capable men. Since trained men give their best efforts when their morale is high, it was essential that the enthusiasm of the replacements should not wane before they joined their organizations. The length of time men could remain in battle before suffering combat exhaustion was another factor used in determining the number of replacements required at the front. Other matters to be considered in the replacement problem included the time required to return to duty men released from hospitals, the utilization of men with limited physical capacities, and the employment of women.

Classification

The Adjutant General's office in the spring of 1940 established in the War Plans Section, Executive Division, a small personnel research section that prepared the early plans for the World War II classification system, designed to place men in the positions they were most capable of filling.[1] The section kept in touch with operations in the field, carried on research and experimental studies, prepared report forms, rating procedures, examinations, and other material. The continuous study of the classification problem was directed by the Research Council and by the Advisory Committee, which was appointed in 1940 at the request of The Adjutant General.

[1] Walter V. Bingham, "Army Personnel Classification System in Organizing for Total War," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CCXX (March 1942) pp. 18–28.

The first form of the Army General Classification test (AGCT) was prepared during the summer of 1940 and was in use in the field by September, when the Selective Service act was passed.[2] Publications and regulations pertaining to classification included a dictionary of occupational titles, containing over 15,000 job descriptions, and three technical manuals (TM's 12–425, –426, –427). The latter replaced the Army Regulations (AR's 615–25, –26, –28) which previously had described Army jobs and listed their civilian counterparts. All enlisted men in the Regular Army had been classified by January 1941 and all of the National Guardsmen in Federal service were interviewed before the end of the year.

Hundreds of officers who attended the Adjutant General's School received instruction in the purposes and procedures of classification. The Personnel Research Section, which in 1942 had a staff of 10 officers, 24 civilian professional workers, and 50 clerical, statistical, and administrative employees, by 1944 had grown to 21 officers, 45 civilian professional members, and about 50 part-time consultants, together with about 50 clerical workers.

Psychological examinations for draftees regarded as below normal in intelligence were adopted 1 August 1942.[3] Restrictions on the number of illiterates accepted were not removed until 1 June 1943. After extensive experimentation, the Advisory Board on Mechanical and Technical Personnel concluded that mechanical ability could be predicted more accurately by tests worked out on paper than by the so-called "practical" manipulative tests. Records of military units were checked in a "follow-up" intended to reveal the accuracy of the results obtained by the examinations given to newly inducted men. Tests were devised in an effort to determine the extent to which men could see at night or under conditions of partial darkness.

Classification was a continuing process, which frequently was necessary, and could take place at any time. The man or woman who acquired a new military skill might be reclassified, receive a new specification serial number, and then be reassigned to a different position which would make use of the newly acquired qualifications. The man or woman who was unable to perform an assigned task might be reclassified and given a less responsible position or released. It also was necessary to determine whether the individual had the physical capacity necessary for the performance of the job to which he was being assigned. The Army individual test (AIT–1) was used when group tests appeared inadequate.[4]

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[2] WD Pamph 12–8, "The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Military Personnel in the United States Army," 28 Jul 44.

[3] Walter V. Bingham, "Personnel Classification Testing in the Army," *Science* (29 Sep 44), p. 277.

[4] WD Cir 421, 26 Oct 44.

Officer candidates were given tests of about 45 minutes duration before they appeared before selection boards. It was relatively simple to measure ability to learn what was taught at the officer candidate school, but to measure ability to lead men was much more difficult.

The handling of millions of records with a minimum of personnel officers and clerks was made possible by use of machine records equipment, but errors persisted. For example, men who were listed as cooks arrived overseas at a time when there was a shortage of tank drivers. Instead of being assigned to the kitchen, these men were sent into battle as tank drivers and many were killed. The reports showed the losses as cooks and resulted in demands on the training centers for more men to be trained as cooks, not for more men to be trained as tank drivers.[5] Such inaccuracies were caused by regulations requiring 60 days on a job before the military occupational specialty number (MOS) was changed. The problem was solved by reporting the duty MOS rather than the primary MOS.

The United States Army at the beginning of World War II recognized two categories of physical capacity—general service and limited service. Officers found the term "limited service" undesirable as a description of handicapped men because it lowered the incentives of those to whom it was applied. Commanders who received men listed as "limited service" were less likely to attempt to find work the men could do.

Army Ground Forces in December 1943 asked for a more equitable distribution of ability, but the Control Division of Army Service Forces replied that the combat arms unavoidably must receive a less efficient group of men.[6] The Army Ground Forces proposed the physical classification of men into three categories at reception centers and their subsequent assignment to units in proportion to predetermined ratios. This proposal would have shelved both the AGCT distribution criteria and the occupational skill requirements which had been established. The commanding General of the Army Service Forces recommended a similar system.

The Surgeon General and those officers in The Adjutant General's Office who had been working with reception center procedure believed this proposed simple three-step classification did not go far enough They recommended a five-step classification, each step to have six divisions covering general physical stamina, lower extremities, upper extremities, hearing, vision, and psychological characteristics.

When reports indicated there was a large accumulation of unusable personnel, the usual practice was for G1, WDGS, to modify slightly its discharge directives so as to permit a reduction in this unusable

[5] Statement, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood (Ret). HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[6] Ltr, Hq ASF to AGF, 12 Jan 44, sub: Utilization of Manpower Based on Physical Capacity, AG 327.3/8. DRB, TAG.

group.[7] It took approximately 2 months before such a change could be disseminated to the field, and then 2 more months before the effect of the change could be noted in personnel reports. If the result did not conform to what was desired, an additional change took another 2 months. Usually, after opening the door a crack for discharges, the Army found out 4 months later that not only had a tremendous group been released, but that many of those who were coming from Selective Service were no better physically than those who had been discharged. Too often field commanders ignored the requirements for release and used the discharge procedure to rid their units of those persons whom they did not want.

The withdrawal of the "limited service" concept in July 1943 (except for certain restricted purposes)[8] left a large number of the physically limited in replacement training centers with no provision for their assignment. As a result, the discharge rate grew alarmingly. In an effort to stop this loss, new physical categories were established late in 1943 and a definite assignment policy based on physical capacity was announced. The War Department said that overhead and Zone of Interior activities could use those who were physically limited, but combat units were to have priority on physically able men.

In January 1944, the War Department directed that physically qualified enlisted men in overhead installations should be replaced by physically limited men, but it was a directive that met with much delay in its execution. In the Replacement and School Command it was pointed out that the number of cadremen who could be released for overseas service was small in comparison with the regular flow of trainees; many officers in the centers believed efficient training outweighed the value of adding a trickle of cadremen to the overseas flow.

The physical profile system was initiated 24 February 1944, and the War Department directed that reception centers conduct experiments for a month to perfect procedures and accumulate experience data.[9] All replacement training centers of the Army Ground Forces and training centers of the Army Service Forces conducted "branch immaterial" training during the first 6 weeks after they received men who had been inducted. The permanent establishment of the physical profile system was directed on 2 May 1944 and men were assigned to the three major commands within established quotas based on minimum profiles.[10] Army Ground Force officers were placed on duty at reception centers to assist in making assignments. Enlisted men

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[7] Statement, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Berry. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[8] WD Cir 161, 14 Jul 43, sec 3.
[9] Memo, ACofS G–1, 24 Feb 44, sub: Physical Profile Serial, G1 201.5. DRB, TAG.
[10] Memo, ACofS G–1, 2 May 44, sub: Physical Profile Plan. OCS 201.5 (25 Apr 44). DRB, TAG; WD Cir 293, 11 Nov 43; WD Cir 164, 26 Apr 44; WD Cir 196, 30 Jun 45.

could be upgraded or downgraded upon recommendation of unit commanders or by action of a medical and a line officer. Profile serial numbers were entered on soldiers' qualification cards. The commanding generals of the Ground, Air, and Service Forces determined the percentages in each profile serial bracket required for each arm and service.

Up to June 1944, assignment to training centers of the major commands had been based upon the potential use of the new soldier's civilian experience, training, and education so that the Army Air Forces received those with aviation backgrounds, men with communications backgrounds went to the Signal Corps, and others were assigned to units which it was expected could make best use of their qualifications.[11]

The change to the physical profile system came about because of greater emphasis placed on physical qualifications after the heavy losses the armies had received in combat. The necessity for keeping soldiers in the field for long periods also disclosed that living under field conditions required men with high physical qualifications. Under the physical profile system, men were grouped into four grades of physical fitness and percentage figures for each grade were established for each major command but were varied from time to time as the situation changed. Men were graded from 1 to 4 according to their functional ability under the headings of general physique, arms, legs, hearing, sight, and emotional stability. No. 1 indicated *above average ability;* No. 2 *average;* No. 3 *below average;* and No. 4 *unacceptable.* More specific information could be shown by adding code letters.

This classification system was based on a system previously rejected in Canada.[12] One of the difficulties was that even doctors, independently, would not give the same man the same physical profile. The differences sometimes were enough to change a man from a Grade I to a Grade IV rating. Men who rated Grade I in one assignment sometimes would exhibit psychoneurotic tendencies and drop to Grade IV when they were shifted to another assignment, as happened to many thousands withdrawn from the Service Forces to be retained as infantry.

The physical profile ratios were designed to give a higher percentage of physically able men to the Ground Forces. The Service Forces complained that many of the trainees deemed unsuitable for infantry training were not satisfactory for other branches. If they could not be profitably used in the other branches, they were discharged.

There were two ways to approach the problem of making the most effective use of those men who were below normal in intelligence

[11] Report of the Replacement Board, bk. VI, ann. 50, p. 2.
[12] Statement, Brig Gen Robert W. Berry. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

or in physical capabilities. One way was to train the man; the other way was to simplify the job. Military units had many jobs which did not require either great mental or physical ability and which could be adapted to persons of limited capabilities provided combat commanders were convinced of the need for conserving manpower. Many were not convinced, but believed they could get perfect physical specimens for every place in their units.

During the early part of mobilization, it was necessary to take a large percentage of the more capable men for technical and administrative assignments in new units then being formed. Extensive publicity given to the technical requirements of the Army resulted in a considerable portion of the public gaining the impression that men entering the service would receive assignments closely related to their occupational and educational experience. This often was impossible because the Army needed only a few lawyers, clerks, administrators, or accountants in comparison with a large number of riflemen, machine gunners, and other combat troops.

Military jobs closely related to civilian work were designated by numbers below 500 and all of the services had higher requirements for those specialists whose numbers were under 500 than did any of the arms. In the Transportation Corps, 788 out of each 1,000 filled jobs with civilian counterparts;[13] in the Corps of Engineers this figure was 725; in the Ordnance Department, 641; in the Signal Corps, 579; and in the Quartermaster, Medical, and Chemical Corps it was about 400. The Infantry required only 164 men per 1,000 for assignment to military duties related in any way to the civilian occupational field; the other arms had only slightly more.

When it became apparent that many men could not be placed in positions similar to those they had held in civilian life, the earlier publicity backfired and the press complained that the Army was not making proper use of the talent it had received. At the same time, friends and relatives of servicemen wrote to officials in the War Department and to congressmen making a great deal of explanation necessary.

The arms suffered because so many of their men had no established occupation in civilian life. Except where this lack of occupational experience was due to extreme youth it indicated a lack of ability which was reflected by slow progress in the training camps and probably resulted in high rates of "combat exhaustion" and in the early mental and physical breakup of men who entered combat.

Theater commanders generally submitted requisitions calling for men whose MOS numbers corresponded to the vacancies within the

[13] AR 615–26; TM 12–426, 1 Jul 44.

theaters.[14] These requisitions sometimes called for more occupational specialists than were needed because commanders hoped to get higher type personnel. Division commanders pointed out that vacancies which occurred in combat must be filled promptly and the only way to do that was to take the best qualified person available within the division, leaving a less essential job unfilled.[15]

It was not always possible to send men who had the qualifications requested. The graduation dates of the training centers frequently came at times when no ships were available. When ships were ready to sail they could not wait until men with the desired qualifications reached the ports, so transports sometimes departed with ASF-trained men when AGF-trained men were wanted. There was a pressing need for men in most overseas port areas and incoming replacements usually were put to work immediately upon arrival, a practice which sometimes interfered with their early assignment to permanent units. Specialist training was curtailed during the latter half of 1944,[16] and by the beginning of 1945 the problem of placing men in the positions for which they had been trained still had not been satisfactorily solved.

The War Department, in an effort to improve the methods of assigning specialists, issued a circular [17] which described in detail a program of broad general arm or service training for the production of the needed military occupational specialists. Previous training methods had tended to produce specialists who could be used in only one job, but the new circular was intended to produce individuals capable of developing in a number of directions. It was expected that broadly trained individuals would enter units and later earn promotions through the additional training they would receive on the job. This procedure was difficult for units in combat because they frequently received men during periods of action when there was little opportunity for on-the-job training or even for the minimum amount of battle indoctrination.

Many of those who were familiar with the situation did not believe that the new War Department regulations had solved the problem.[18] All of the arms and services continued to train their own specialists. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, WDGS, determined the rate per thousand to be trained as specialists after which the Military Training Division, ASF, apportioned the numbers of each group among ASF training centers; other specialists were trained in the schools. The monthly production of automobile mechanics, clerks, truck driv-

[14] WD Cir 149, 15 Apr 44.
[15] Statement, Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker (Ret). HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[16] WD Cir 267, 30 Jun 44, IV.
[17] WD Cir 39, 1 Feb 45.
[18] Report of the Replacement Board, bk. II, p. 49.

ers, armorers, buglers, electricians, linemen, radio mechanics, and many of the other specialists exceeded the attrition rates in the branches. At the same time there was a growing shortage of infantry riflemen and of men for other combat categories.

Officers

Those officers in the G1 Branch of the War Department General Staff who, prior to World War II, worked on plans for a replacement system took into consideration that during 1917–18 some two-thirds of the Regular Army officers remained in the Zone of the Interior.[19] However necessary this situation may have been, it was considered most unfortunate inasmuch as it denied war experience to many of the Regulars and deprived them of the prestige appropriate for dealing with the Reserve components after the close of the war.

An effort had been made to correct this situation in the event of another war and the War Department had set up requirements for about one-third of the Regular Army officers to remain in the Zone of the Interior, while two-thirds would be assigned within the theater of operations. The plan proposed that Reserve officers with specialized training were to be used as much as possible in the Communications Zone, thus freeing Regular Army officers for service in the combat zone.

During the early stages of an emergency, Reserve officers and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) seniors were expected to provide filler replacements for the expansion of units from peace to war strength, and also to provide such officer replacements as might be required overseas.[20] The plan proposed that Reserve officers would be called to duty to provide the officer loss replacements who would be needed in the theater of operations during the first 30 days after mobilization. It was expected that officer candidate schools would be able to meet requirements for replacement officers after all of the Reserve officers had been assigned.

Rotation between line and staff was considered important, as was the exchange of officers and men between well-trained and poorly trained units. Experienced war-trained personnel were considered especially valuable in the organization and in the training of new or inexperienced units. Instructors at the Army War College taught

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[19] Lecture, Lt. Col. E. B. Colladay (for Brig. Gen. Wm. E. Shedd, Jr.) "The Personnel Division of the War Department General Staff" before the Army War College, 17 Oct 39. G1 #2, 1939–40, p. 20. NWC Library.

[20] Lecture, Maj. J. M. Shelton, "G1 Features of Seventh Corps Area Mobilization Plan," at Corps Area G1 Conference, 4–16 May 36. G–1/14204 (5–23–36). DRB, TAG.

that replacement of inefficient members sometimes would improve discipline in a poorly disciplined unit and at the same time would place men transferred out of a poor unit in better surroundings where their habits might improve. The value of permitting men to remain with their units also was recognized as an aid to morale, a factor which tended to discourage numerous or ill-considered changes.[21]

The problem of limited service officers received early consideration in the pre-World War II planning for the replacement system. Mobilization plans provided that GHQ and theater headquarters were to arrange for proper use in the Communications Zone of war-experienced officers who had become limited service because of wounds or for other reasons. It was believed that if troops in the Zone of the Interior were to have the advantage of the experience gained at the front it might be necessary to send back more than those who no longer were useful in the theater. On the other side of the picture, instructors at the Army War College pointed out that it might be necessary to retain in the theater a considerable number for military police duty, for service as interpreters, for instructors, or for other services in the rear areas.

When it appeared necessary to change the classification of an officer from general service to limited service the case came before a general hospital disposition board. The War Department designated positions which limited service officers could fill. Military authorities considered that the use of all professionally trained officers to the limit of their physical capacity was necessary to meet increasing manpower demands.[22]

The 1941 maneuvers brought to light lack of energetic and efficient leadership on the part of a number of officers serving with Second and Third Armies.[23] As a result of these findings, the War Department contemplated the relief of some Regular and a large number of National Guard officers, either for overage in grade or for inefficiency. Also about half of the Reserve officers assigned to troop units of the field forces soon would complete their period of service and would be returned to civil life. Had these contemplated actions actually been carried out there would have been a serious officer replacement problem. New appointments would have come from officer candidate schools, recent graduates of ROTC units, and Reserve officers who prior to that time had not been called to extended active duty.

No plans had been made to give these Reserve officers preliminary training before they were assigned to table of organization units. The

[21] Colladay, lecture, *op. cit.*

[22] WD Cir 82, 24 Mar 43; WD Cir 109, 7 Apr 45.

[23] Memo, WDGS, 9 Oct 41, sub: Leadership deficiencies, Replacements. G-1/21177-294. DRB, TAG.

War Department General Staff was concerned over the prospect of relieving such a large group and replacing them with others who not only would be lacking in experience but also would be strangers to the men they would command. The situation eased somewhat after the replacement training centers opened, because Reserve officers newly ordered to active duty could be sent to the centers for refresher training prior to their assignment to service or combat units.

During the last 6 months of 1941, there were 196 Regular Army officers and 269 National Guard and Reserve officers removed from the active list by discharge or forced retirement.[24] The extensive replacement of officers which was contemplated early in 1941 never took place because the changes in the international situation made it inadvisable to release so large a number. The adoption of the Service Extension Act by Congress in August 1941 enabled the War Department to retain officers as long as they were needed, and by 1943 more officers had been commissioned than were required for immediate assignment.[25] During that year, the reduction of the troop basis and the inactivation of a number of units reduced the number of officers needed and at the same time increased the available supply. The pools filled rapidly.[26]

The Inspector General surveyed the officer situation in December 1943 and reported there was an excess of approximately 51,000 officers above authorized strengths in the arms and services.[27] Army Service Forces officer replacement pools, which were authorized 9,600 officers, actually contained 16,413; Army Ground Forces officer replacement pools, authorized 18,500, contained 13,184.

No specific allotment of officers had been made for the Army Air Forces officer replacement pool at Lowry Field, Colo., but most of the 1,600 officers assigned there were in hospitals or were returning from overseas for recuperation. The Army Air Forces had 3,109 officers in excess of the authorized 171,109, but The Inspector General did not consider this small excess a problem.

About half of the ASF officers had been in the pools 2 months or more; nearly a third had been there over 3 months. Some were attached unassigned and performing duty at installations, a procedure which evaded strength ceilings. A large number were attending local schools or receiving training which The Inspector General regarded as makeshift in character and of value merely as a means of keeping people busy. It was apparent that officers who lacked qualifications and ability were collecting in the pools because they were not wanted

[24] Press Release, WDPRD, 11 Dec 41.

[25] WD Cir 167, 22 Jul 43.

[26] Officer Replacement Pools were listed in WD Cir 96, 8 Apr 43. It was amended by WD Cir 119, 11 May 43, IV; WD Cir 171, 26 Jul 43; WD Cir 269, 27 Oct 43, IV; WD Cir 278, 3 Nov 43, III; and WD Cir 55, 19 Feb 45.

[27] WD General Council *Minutes*, 27 Dec 43.

in units, but almost all had efficiency reports of satisfactory or better. Many commanders preferred to reassign officers rather than separate them from the service, and those commanders who attempted to reclassify officers frequently found the procedure too cumbersome.[28]

Officers over 38 years of age for whom there were no suitable assignments available were encouraged to request relief from active duty. This change had only a minor effect on the Infantry since it received large numbers of the younger men from the officer candidate schools.[29]

The overstrength was most serious in the antiaircraft units, of which fewer were needed than had been expected. Divisions or other units that went overseas dropped their overstrength at the time of departure, the surplus officers being shifted to the pools. There had developed a tendency to keep inefficient officers on duty because it was easier to rotate them from the pools to units and back to the pools than it was to conduct reclassification proceedings. Division commanders finally were required to make permanent selections of officers early in the training periods in the belief that reclassification or release of unsatisfactory officers would be more likely if there was less discretion in the matter of transfers to pools upon departure for overseas. In another move intended to bring about the release of substandard officers, reclassification jurisdiction was delegated to subordinate commanders.

Disadvantages arising from the accumulation of officers in pools caused the War Department in March of 1943 to authorize 25 percent overstrength of officers in tactical units. Recently commissioned officers thereafter received at least 3 months' experience with T/O units in the United States before they were ordered overseas, a need which had been demonstrated during the North African campaign. Units within the United States, rather than the replacement pools, became the principal source of the 18,500 officers needed for overseas replacements. Responsible commanders followed up The Inspector General's reports to make certain that officers were removed in instances in which such action had been recommended.[30]

By the end of 1943, about 180,000 Reserve officers had been called to active duty; nearly 100,000 civilians had been commissioned directly; approximately 19,000 National Guard officers were in the Federal service; and about 300,000 officers had received officer candidate school

[28] WD Cir 280, 5 Nov 43.

[29] Memo, WDGS for TAG, 31 Dec 43, sub: Revision of AR 605-230. ASF 201.6 (30 Dec 43)-70. DRB, TAG.

[30] Memo, AAF for CofS, 12 Mar 44, sub: Disposition of Unsatisfactory Officers. DRB, TAG; Memo, AGF for CofS, 8 Mar 44, sub: Report on Progress in Elimination of Unfit Officers. AG 210.01/308 (8 Mar 44). DRB, TAG; Memo, ASF for DCofS, 9 Mar 44, sub: Report of Action taken and Progress in eliminating unsatisfactory officers. ASF/210.3 Gen (6 Mar 44)-391. DRB, TAG.

commissions. The total 600,000 from civilian life who became Army officers outnumbered the 15,000 Regular Army officers 40 to 1.[31]

More than 38,000 men entered officers' training camps under the volunteer officer candidate (VOC) plan which started in March 1942 and permitted men deferred from the draft by dependency to apply for officer training with the understanding that if they did not pass preliminary tests they could return to civilian life and resume their former draft status. This program was discontinued in 1943 after dependency no longer provided draft exemption.[32]

By 1 July 1943, the Army had almost reached the saturation point in officers of the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel.[33] Instructions were issued which required 12 months in grade of lieutenant colonel prior to promotion to colonel and 9 months in grade of major prior to promotion to lieutenant colonel except for officers who demonstrated fitness for promotion while in combat. Promotions were not to be made unless there were vacancies.

There were numerous examples of inefficient handling and assignment of officers. During the summer of 1943, five or six hundred officers were hurriedly called to Indiantown Gap to go to England immediately. There was a change of plans, the officers did not go to England but for more than 3 months were not reassigned. Some finally went to North Africa and others were placed on detached service at ports of embarkation, but not until after they had remained in idleness for a long time and their morale had deteriorated.

Officers sometimes accumulated in depots overseas as well as in the United States. In 1944, field officers were so numerous in Italy that many were assigned to positions for which they had little or no training and which should have been filled by junior officers.[34] This was true in spite of the War Department policy of sending overseas casual officers in the lowest grades. The Mediterranean theater, like other theaters, at times was short of junior officers for combat assignments. Officer replacements in the lower grades which were received in the Southwest Pacific area generally were regarded as good. Some difficulty had been experienced there in making disposition of officers in the higher grades of the various arms and services.[35]

In England shortly before D-day, 315 officers were assigned to a staff officers' pool which was intended to provide a reserve of trained and indoctrinated staff officers.[36] Later the number of officers was

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[31] Palmer, and Others, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 91.

[32] Ltr, WD, 24 Mar 42, sub: Attendance at OCS of Selective Service Registrants Deferred for Dependency Only. AG 352 (3–19–42). DRB, TAG.

[33] WD, General Council *Minutes*, 12 Jul 43.

[34] Col. Arthur G. Trudeau, ASF, Report on ASF Installations in North African Theater of Operations, 25 Mar 44. AGO 99–33.6 (2065). DRB, TAG.

[35] Report of Replacement Board, bk. III, p. 113.

[36] General Board Study No. 3, "Reinforcement System and Reinforcement Procedures in ETO," USFET, 1945, p. 45. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

reduced to 150, of whom 73 were for the field forces, while the remainder were available for assignment to higher headquarters, which already had been organized, or for assignment in the activation of new headquarters. In practice, these officers either were rapidly absorbed by expansion of existing headquarters or were attached unassigned as overstrength to units with which they served in battle. Higher headquarters usually obtained officers for staff duty by submitting requisitions which listed names of those wanted or listed special qualifications. The European Command staff officers' pool was dissolved in the spring of 1945, but not until after a considerable number of officers had remained in it unassigned for a long period of time.[37]

Although it appeared on 1 October 1943 that there would be an overall surplus of officers in the Army by the end of that year, such a general surplus did not develop.[38] Surpluses existed in certain categories, but a general surplus was prevented by curtailment of appointments from civil life, reductions in the number of officer candidates, and the elimination of many officers considered unsatisfactory. There were too many antiaircraft and field artillery officers and not enough infantry, armor, and engineer officers. Improper distribution of branch was the principal difficulty, but it was partially corrected through shifts in officer candidate school quotas and by reassigning and retraining officers from branches which had surpluses to branches which had shortages.

With but few exceptions Army Ground Forces furnished overseas officer loss replacements in the grades of first and second lieutenant. On 26 March 1944, Army Ground Forces pointed out that this practice caused a heavy drain on the supply of junior officers.[39] It recommended that in the future officer replacements should include a proportionate distribution of all grades. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, in a check on AGF replacement pools, determined that 94 percent of infantry officers awaiting assignment to overseas units were second lieutenants. The change in policy proposed by the Army Ground Forces was not favorably considered. Most of the replacement officers who went overseas during the latter part of the war served as escort officers for enlisted men who were going as replacements.

Unit commanders generally preferred to receive officer replacements in the grade of second lieutenant, but Maj. Gen. W. W. Eagles, 45th Division commander, was an exception to this rule in that he consistently asked for officers in the grade of the vacancy to be filled.[40] The reluctance of commanders in the Mediterranean theater of op-

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[38] WD General Council *Minutes*, 15 May 44; Memo, WDGS for DCofS, 18 May 44, sub: Status of Officer Replacement Pools. G1, 210.31. DRB, TAG; *Army Almanac, op. cit.*, p. 267.

[39] Memo, AGF for CofS, 26 Mar 44. AG 220.3/2075 (26 Mar 44). DRB, TAG.

[40] Ltr, Hq R and SC to CG, AGF, 25 Mar 44, sub: Replacements in ETOUSA and NATOUSA. AGF, 319.1. DRB, TAG.

erations to accept officers other than second lieutenants caused such an accumulation of officers in Personnel Depot No. 2 at Naples that the commanding general, Fifth Army, early in 1944 directed a "forced issue" of officers of higher grades.[41] Except for battlefield commissions there was no way organization commanders could advance enlisted men to commissioned grade except by sending them to officer candidate schools. There was no assurance that the men selected as officer candidates would be replaced by others who were equally competent, a situation which sometimes made commanders reluctant to part with their promising noncommissioned officers. Battalion and regimental commanders needed to be convinced that they were contributing to a pool from which they later might draw dividends. The principal demand upon the officer candidate schools in the United States was for fillers for units which were being activated.

Theater commanders offered many objections to sending men back to the United States for officer candidate training. It was feared that men once returned to the United States from a combat theater would not want to return to combat. Time would be lost in travel and the requirements for a 21-day furlough would mean additional loss of time.[42] Many of the men in units in combat did not want to be officers because they thought the difference in pay between a sergeant and a second lieutenant was not large enough to make up for the added responsibility.

During 1944, about 9,500 officers from other arms and services entered the various Ground Forces schools for conversion to infantry and armor. Approximately 1,200 of these were from technical services.[43]

The Reserve Officers Training Corps produced many peacetime Reserve officers but officials of Army Ground Forces believed that officer candidate schools, which were established in July 1941, produced more efficient officers and they opposed any expansion of the Reserve Officers Training Corps.[44] The officer candidate schools at first attempted to produce graduates, all of whom were qualified to lead ground troops in combat, but since there were some 59,000 administrative positions which did not require combat leadership ability the mission of the schools was revised in June 1942, and thereafter they produced administrators as well as combat leaders.

The sharp drop in officer candidate school graduates after 1943 was due in part to the fact that fewer units were being formed. In some

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Palmer, and Others, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, pp. 139–57.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[44] Memo, AGF, 20 Jul 42, sub: Study of Expansion of ROTC. AG 326. 6/64. DRB, TAG.

instances the cuts were too drastic and OCS schools later were expanded. The number of men commissioned at officer candidate schools in the various branches is shown in the following table:

Graduates of Officer Candidate Schools 1942–45

Year	AGF	ASF	AAF*
1942	54, 233	46, 482	12, 541
1943	58, 109	60, 590	14, 809
1944	12, 534	17, 901	5, 832
1945	9, 866	8, 365	411
Total	134, 742	133, 338	[45] 33, 593

* Exclusive of 189,000 pilots, navigators, and bombardiers commissioned at aviation cadet schools.

War Department records indicated that the percentage of medical officers being released was greater than for officers of other branches, a situation which made the medical officer replacement problem more serious. Some of these medical officers were being retired for physical disability. A report by The Inspector General, prepared in February 1944, indicated that during the last 3 months of 1943 there had been 459 medical officers so retired, many of whom had resumed their civilian practice.[46] The policy was revised in an effort to limit the number of discharges of medical officers whose services could be utilized by the Army at fixed installations. Army Service Forces designated three centers where medical officers could appear for examination for release.

By the end of 1944, the available officer material in the United States had been reduced so greatly that about the only source of canidates was the training center graduates. The cream was in the theaters.[47] In the overseas theaters, combat officers were produced by direct appointment on the battlefield, by officer candidate schools, and to some extent by retraining from other branches.

War Department officials said they did not expect General MacArthur to ask for officers from the Zone of the Interior; he had indicated he would meet his requirements by appointments in the field.[48] Some officers in the Pacific had said that an outstanding platoon sergeant with 6 weeks or so of refresher training would make a better officer than could be expected from the United States. Others did not agree stating that their experiences would not bear out such a statement.[49]

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[45] Palmer and Others, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 326; ASF Statistical Review, World War II, p. 224. History of AAF Training Command, 1 Jan 39–V-J Day, VIII, p. 1664. Filed in Air University Historical Office.

[46] WD General Council *Minutes*, 28 Feb 44.

[47] Minutes of Meeting to Discuss ETO Replacement Situation, WDGS, 23 Dec 44. Copy in AG 322 Repl (29 Sep 44). G1 files, Dr 258, DRB, TAG.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] 1st Ind, 11 Jun 52, to ltr, OCMH to Inf School, 6 May 52, sub: Hist of the U. S. Army Personnel Replacement System. Copy in HIS 330.14. OCMH.

In the European theater, by December 1944, about 1000 infantry officers were being appointed each month, but that theater was still looking to the United States to train a considerable number of the officers it needed. For planning purposes, it had been estimated that divisions could make approximately 20 combat appointments monthly, but 12th Army Group experience had indicated this figure could not be met without lowering professional standards. Casualties took a heavy tool in potential officers. There were many infantry officers assigned to headquarters and to positions other than with infantry, but in many instances they were older men. The European theater had more sources for officers than it had facilities for training them. In December 1944, representatives of that theater said that although they were retraining officers for infantry to the limit of their ability, they still were unable to meet their requirements.

In July 1944, Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, commanding the Communications Zone, had expressed a desire to establish an officers' candidate school for training of infantry officers, if the War Department found it necessary to increase quotas.[50] General Lee believed that there were plenty of outstanding men who could be withdrawn from combat and from communications zone units and that the splendid facilities of the American School Center at Warminster could be used to set up a good school under the supervision of the Replacement Command. At that time, no War Department decision had been made regarding an OCS in Europe.

The officer candidate school in the European theater was opened at the 9th Reinforcement Depot on 31 January 1945.[51] A group of 30 officers and 4 enlisted men from Fort Benning assisted in the organization and opening of the school which provided for 12 weeks of training for candidates prior to the time they received their commissions. Infantry lieutenants who had received battlefield commissions were given 3 weeks' training in another course at this depot, while those who had been shifted to infantry from other branches received 8 weeks of instruction.[52] There were 499 men who had graduated and received commissions prior to 8 May 1945, while 5,626 had been enrolled. Those commissioned after V–E Day brought the total to 4,167. Officer candidates commissioned in other overseas schools included: Australia, 3,649; Fiji Islands, 287; Mediterranean theater, 194; and New Caledonia, 367.

With regard to officers, the problem of quality was always more pressing than the problem of quantity. There seldom was any shortage in the total number of officers on duty except during the periods

[50] Ltr, G1, WDGS to CofS, 26 Jul 44, sub: Inspection of ETO Replacement System. Copy in AG 322 Replacements. G1 Files, Dr 255. DRB, TAG.
[51] Cir 13, ETOUSA, 31 Dec 45.
[52] General Board Study No. 3, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

of most rapid expansion, but there were many shortages in officers with special qualifications including company grade combat officers, medical officers, and engineers. During periods of expansion, officers were produced quickly and promoted rapidly; but when a reduction became necessary there would be too many officers and their grades would be too high. Although the unfit could be eliminated, there were many who were capable, but not needed. It was difficult to eliminate them without stigma, and once they had been eliminated equally difficult to get them back if they were needed again in another expansion of the armed services. The Officer Procurement Service was discontinued as a separate administrative agency 15 June 1945 and the functions it had performed were transferred to the Military Personnel Division, Army Service Forces.[53]

Rotation

Prior to 1908, military units preparing for foreign service transferred to other organizations those members whose remaining periods of service were less than the 2 or 3 years the unit was required to spend overseas and who did not indicate that they intended to reenlist.[54] This system was so unsatisfactory that in 1908 regiments which were preparing for foreign service started transferring to other units only those persons who had less than 4 months to serve. This practice made it necessary to replace many men after arrival at foreign stations. In 1912, the replacing of individuals in units on foreign service became general and the practice of rotating units after short periods abroad was abandoned. The Army's experience in furnishing peacetime replacements to overseas garrisons indicated that the replacement of individuals was more satisfactory than the rotation of units and probably exercised considerable influence on wartime policy.[55]

Experiments in which home regiments recruited men for regiments on foreign service did not prove successful and recommendations against this practice were submitted in 1922.[56] General recruiting was regarded as a more satisfactory means of obtaining men for overseas. By 1939, there were approximately 56,400 soldiers on foreign service and an overseas replacement pool of about 6,000 men was considered necessary.

When the United States established overseas bases in a number of key positions in 1941, it soon became apparent that a sound policy

[53] WD Cir 161, 2 Jun 45.

[54] Memo, G1 to CofS, 15 Dec 39, sub: Comparison of Individual and Unit Replacement Systems for Personnel on Foreign Service. G–1/15943. DRB, TAG.

[55] Statement, Col C. Hildebrand (Ret). HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[56] Memo, ChofInf to CofS, 21 Jun 22, sub: Replacements for Infantry Regiments in the Philippine Department. AG 322.96/5308–A. DRB, TAG.

regarding replacements and rotation for men stationed at those bases was essential for maintenance of health, morale, and efficiency. In November 1941, there were more than 150,000 men serving in these garrisons, distributed as follows:

Alaska	22,640	Greenland	673
Hawaii	42,906	Newfoundland	2,087
Panama	31,438	St. Lucia	582
Philippines	19,073	Trinidad	2,071
Puerto Rico	21,156	St. Croix	2
Bermuda	1,352	Jamaica	306
British Guiana	518	Antigua	300
Dutch Guiana	918	Iceland[57]	6,156

Policies regarding replacements for these bases were established after consultation with the Navy, which in many instances was interested from the standpoint of providing the shipping. In November 1941, it was announced that 2 years would be considered the normal tour of duty in the Department of the Philippines, Panama, Puerto Rico, Bermuda, and Alaska,[58] a period which had been accepted for a number of years in most overseas stations. Extensions for a third year were authorized. Only Regular Army enlisted men were sent to Greenland and Newfoundland where the normal tour of duty was 1 year, with an extension of another year authorized if the soldier so desired.

The attack on Pearl Harbor interrupted the War Department's prewar routine used in sending replacements to overseas garrisons. In March 1942, the Personnel Division, SOS, suggested that tours of duty outside the continental United States, except where combat operations made the policy impractical, should be for a minimum of 1 year and a maximum of 2 years, depending upon the particular station.[59] The Division believed that at overseas stations where combat was not imminent periodic relief was essential to maintain health and morale. It was suggested that not less than 4¼ nor more than 8½ percent be relieved each month. Also it was proposed that the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, should from time to time recommend the stations to which such a policy, because of strategic reasons, should not apply. It was further suggested that the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, should recommend a percentage within these limitations, which would be applied to each overseas station for relief and replacement.

The strength of overseas garrisons and bases was about 200,000 men and the Personnel Division of the War Department General

[57] WD TAG, "Strength Report of the Army," 30 Nov 41.

[58] Memo, WDGS, G1, 21 Nov 41, sub: Length of Tours of Foreign Service. G–1/16308–147. DRB, TAG.

[59] Memo, Hq SOS, for ACofS, WPD, 14 Mar 42, sub: Regular Relief of Personnel at Overseas Stations. G–1/16368–41. DRB, TAG.

Staff considered that a replacement pool of 10,000 casuals would be sufficient; but that number was not available.[60] Previously, personnel for this purpose had been carried in the War Department overhead, but the Personnel Division opposed additional transfers to this overhead which would result in the reduction of the strength of any unit or activity under the war conditions then existing. It recommended that the personnel be included in the next augmentation of the Army.

The Services of Supply pointed out that rotation would decrease the number of combat troops that could be moved overseas. In view of the limitations on transportation it was recommended that individual situations requiring special action in regard to rotation be considered on their merits. Shipping was such a bottleneck that many troops had been waiting for weeks.[61] G3 was of the opinion that, except for isolated detachments or where climatic conditions made it mandatory, no fixed policy for the relief of personnel at overseas stations should be established at that time.

The War Plans Division, WDGS, believed that a policy which would provide for rotation was desirable, but feared that its application would prove impractical due to lack of shipping and because of strategic considerations. However, the War Plans Division directed that, although the replacement plan might be subject to interruption and even suspension in some areas, it would remain in effect. When the advisability of continuing the replacement policy in any theater became questionable, a decision was to be obtained from the War Plans Division.

The conception under which the United States fought World War II was that a minimum number of divisions would be used and that these divisions would be kept continuously in combat and maintained at effective strength by a steady flow of replacements. The stark realities of combat disclosed that under such a system combat soldiers could look forward to an ultimate destiny which could be nothing other than wounds, mental or physical breakdown, or death itself. This grim prospect brought the realization that continuous combat for divisions required a rotation program.

Many Congressmen displayed keen interest in the War Department policies on rotation. In July 1943, Rep. Overton Brooks of Louisiana wrote to Secretary of War Stimson in regard to the replacement policy. Replying for Secretary Stimson, Administrative Assistant John W. Martyn said that troops abroad were being constantly watched over by men long experienced in detecting any change in health or morale. He added:

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[60] Memo, G1 to CofS, 9 Dec 41, sub: Overseas Replacement Pool. G–1/15460–5.

[61] Memo, WDGS to CG's, Overseas Stations, 14 Mar 42, sub: Regular Relief of Personnel at Overseas Stations. G–1/16368–41. DRB, TAG.

> There is no disinclination or oversight on the part of the War Department which limits the rotation or furloughing of these isolated groups. Such limitations as do exist are imposed by lack of shipping facilities and the strategical and tactical considerations.[62]

In October 1943, Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, in reporting on visits to theaters of operation, said the soldiers demanded a definite policy which would relieve men after they had served a certain time overseas. Five senators who had visited the war fronts summed up their impressions by saying, "The men who are bearing the brunt of the battle do not feel that the true picture of their hardships is being given the public." General McNair presented another angle of this situation when he said in an address over the NBC Army Hour 28 November 1943 that "the infantryman not only takes far more than half our total battle losses, but he endures the greatest hardships." On 4 December 1943, the War Department said insufficient shipping was the insurmountable obstacle to rotation.[63]

Many in the War Department realized that there were persons in the overseas forces who were not ill enough for hospitalization, but whose condition was such that there would be pressure from their friends and relatives to have them returned to the Zone of the Interior. Generally, officers in the War Department were not fully convinced that the return of a large number of men from overseas was necessary or desirable. Prior to June 1943, the return of such persons was accomplished through correspondence with overseas commanders. The first statement on an Army-wide policy was made in June 1943.[64]

Although there was no established rotation system during the early part of the war, almost a quarter of a million men had returned to the United States from overseas by January 1944 and their assignment had become an administrative problem for the War Department. By V–E Day, more than a million and a quarter had returned and about half a million had been placed on duty in the United States, the remainder being mainly those on temporary furloughs, hospitalized, or discharged.

The June 1943 directive on rotation provided theater commanders with a means for giving relief to individuals whose morale or health had deteriorated and whose effectiveness could not be restored by intratheater rotation. No minimum term of service was prescribed but the program was to conform to military requirements and available shipping. The theater commander was responsible for determining whether or not rotation would be instituted in his theater. The War Department required monthly consolidated reports listing num-

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[62] *Army and Navy Journal*, 4 Dec 43.

[63] *Ibid.*, 10 Jul, 9 Oct, and 4 Dec 43.

[64] Unnumbered WD Cir, 28 Jun 43, sub: Rotation and Return of Military Personnel as Individuals; Statement, Brig Gen A. W. Trudeau. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

bers by arm and service available for rotation, including names of field officers.

Overseas commanders took varying actions as a result of this War Department announcement on rotation. The Caribbean Defense Command announced individuals would be eligible after 24 months' service; the North African theater initially prescribed 6 months; while the commander in chief, Southwest Pacific Area, said shipping and personnel were inadequate to inaugurate the program.

The announcement of the policy brought to the War Department many letters from soldiers and their families urging rotation and charging injustice and unfairness. The War Department yielded to the public clamor and on 29 December 1943 advised the theater commanders that a rotation program on the basis of returning 1 percent per month would become effective 1 March 1944. Theater commanders determined their own methods of selection but informed the War Department of action taken. The War Department asked for reports or requirements for rotation replacements, broken down by branch or arm, grade, and rank, not less than 3 months prior to contemplated shipment of rotation replacements from the United States. The commander in chief, Southwest Pacific Area, said it was impractical to submit requested reports in the detail desired 3 months in advance and also objected to receiving replacements in the higher commissioned and noncommissioned grades because the arrival of these higher grades would deny promotions to persons who had remained in the theater. The War Department therefore authorized the first 3 months' requisitions to show only totals by arm or service but required that thereafter rotation replacements would correspond as nearly as possible in grade and branch to the personnel returned to the Zone of the Interior.[65]

Throughout the operation of the rotation program, which continued until June 1945 when the program of "readjustment" [66] was started, theater commanders were given complete freedom in the selection of personnel. The War Department apparently lacked accurate figures on the length of service of soldiers in the various theaters. In the Southwest Pacific, men were first told that rotation would not be permitted; then that the period would be 18 months, then 24 months, and later 30 months. These announcements brought a drop in morale rather than a boost. When men were selected 3 months in advance their efficiency tended to drop during the long period of waiting.

Rotational replacements to take the places of those who were being relieved in the theaters started leaving the United States in October 1944 and continued in some volume until January 1945 when the Ger-

[65] WD Cir 58, 9 Feb 44; WD Cir 8, 6 Jan 45.
[66] WD Cir 101, 4 Apr 46 in Report of the Replacement Board, bk. IV, p. 17.

man offensive caused fewer men to be returned from Europe. Shipments of replacements to permit the return of those men overseas who had adjusted service ratings above the interim score started in May 1945. Monthly departures from United States ports during the first 4 months of the rotation period were:

Type	*Total*	*October 1944*	*November 1944*	*December 1944*	*January 1945*
Officers, total	5, 538	744	1, 395	835	2, 564
Ground Forces	924	113	346	49	416
Service Forces	1, 937	398	601	413	525
Air Forces	2, 677	233	448	373	1, 623
Enlisted, total	52, 862	14, 962	15, 327	9, 477	13, 096
Ground Forces	14, 476	3, 144	5, 983	843	4, 506
Service Forces	21, 666	8, 250	3, 924	4, 117	5, 375
Air Forces	16, 720	3, 568	5, 420	4, 517	[67] 3, 215

Some officers who left the United States as rotational replacements were erroneously informed that they were being sent overseas to fill specific positions.[68] There was a considerable time lag between the departure of an officer from a theatre and the arrival of his replacements; frequently the vacancy had been filled. Overseas commands were authorized to use any personnel received either as loss replacements or as rotational replacements so long as such exchange did not effect a reduction in the total number of loss replacements.[69] All agencies were directed not to advise officers leaving the United States that they were being ordered overseas for a specific assignment in any overseas command.

Rotation presented an additional complication for the already complicated replacement system.[70] The War Department expected to provide rotational replacements on a grade-for-grade and MOS-for-MOS basis—a complicated procedure. Selections in the theaters could seldom be kept secret from the men involved and this knowledge frequently interfered with efficiency. Rotation might provide a goal that a man overseas could work for, but there was great danger that promises might be made which the fortunes of war would make impossible of fulfillment. For each broken promise, the loss of morale

[67] ASF Monthly Progress Reports, Oct 44–Jan 45.
[68] USAFFE to WD, CM–IN 19651, 20 Dec 44.
[69] WD, Memo No. W600–44, 23 May 44, sub: Implementation of Oversea Rotation Policy. ASF/210.31 SWPA (20 Dec 44). DRB, TAG.
[70] WD Cir 59, 9 Feb 44; WD Cir 8, 6 Jan 45.

more than offset the gains which might have resulted had the promise been kept. There was always the danger that those remaining behind would think they were more deserving than the ones selected to go.

In the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, the first plan was to fill vacancies created by rotation with replacements direct from the Zone of the Interior.[71] Persons proposed for rotation were returned at the discretion of major commanders. There was either a long vacancy in the position or a long wait on the part of the person being returned. Several months later it was decided to fill vacancies immediately from replacement pools which absorbed replacements sent from the Zone of the Interior, but even under this system some vacancies existed for 6 months. The War Department finally authorized the theater to fill by promotions within units those rotation vacancies which had existed as long as 6 months. Many unit commanders indicated preference for temporary duty rather than rotation as a means of rest and recuperation. While this method was almost certain to result in a vacancy for at least 3 months, it gave the unit commander a better basis for planning than did the uncertain practices under the rotation system.

Returnees who arrived in ports in the United States were taken immediately from shipside to a debarkation center where some kind of an official welcome, usually including a band, was given the men. Within 48 hours, the new arrivals usually were on their way to the reception stations nearest their homes where they were received with another ceremony, clothing was issued if needed, and pay accounts were brought up to date; and within another 24 hours, the men were on their way to their homes for furloughs that varied from 2 to 6 weeks. At the conclusion of these furloughs, the returnees went to redistribution stations or reassignment centers where they underwent another series of examinations after which they received new assignments.

Only men with the longest time overseas were eligible under the plan announced in 1944. Theater commanders distributed monthly quotas among units, the amount of service necessary for eligibility being different in different theaters. Some units selected men by lot, others sent home their least useful members. From the viewpoint of the soldier, there was never more than a trickle of men sent back to the United States. Men in the Pacific estimated it would take more than 8 years for all of them to be sent home.

Overseas commanders frequently selected for rotation men who were physically disqualified for overseas service thus cutting off any hope the physically fit men might have for an early return. A cross

[71] History of the Replacement and Training Command, MTO, Aug 45, G1 Section Activities, p. 3. 8–4 AB. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

section of rotational returnees on duty in the United States in June 1945 was interviewed and one-third reported they had been classified as physically disqualified.[72]

Leave and rest camps provided a substitute for rotation in many instances. Some divisions were able to utilize recreation facilities in their rear areas. In Europe, vacation centers such as Nice and the Bavarian Alps were made available through special service tours. Soldiers in the Pacific were given temporary duty in Australia or New Zealand, when possible.

The Service Forces frequently desired to send overseas, or to recall from overseas bases, officers who were experts with certain items of equipment, but frequently it was difficult to arrange transportation.[73] In some instances, reassignment was found more practical, with the result that the Service Forces built up a limited rotation system for the purpose of maintaining liaison. Officers from overseas were called to the United States for periods of duty of about 6 months. The War Department preferred that requests for such assignments originate with theater commanders rather than in the Zone of the Interior.[74] After 1944, officers who returned under the regular rotation program were used for liaison purposes.

The President in his 1 June 1945 message to Congress said:

> It is our plan that every physically fit soldier in the United States who has not yet served overseas be assigned to foreign duty when he completed his training, or, if he is filling an essential administrative or service job, as soon as he can be replaced by a returning veteran. This has been the Army's policy since the beginning of the war. It will be rigidly adhered to in the redeployment period.

The Secretary of War on 9 July 1945 ordered that qualified male officers and enlisted men serving in the Zone of the Interior who had not served a minimum of 6 months overseas be replaced by 1 May 1946 and given foreign assignments to the maximum extent that replacements became available through the return of overseas veterans.[75] Special emphasis was placed on sending men and officers overseas who were under 35 years of age. Enlisted men over 38 years of age were exempt unless they requested overseas assignment in writing, as were physically disqualified officers and enlisted men. Sole surviving sons were exempted under the War Department's nonhazardous duty policy.

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[72] *The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath* ("Studies in Social Psychology, World War II," II [Princeton, 1949]), p. 460.

[73] Memo, Hq ASF, 3 Jul 43, sub: Liaison between Chiefs of Technical Services and Theaters of Operations. ASF 210 (5–3–43). DRB, TAG; Ltr, WDAGO, 6 Jul 43, sub: Liaison Officers. AG 210.13. DRB, TAG.

[74] Memo for Rec, attached to 1st Ind, Ltr, Hq ASF, 26 Nov 43, sub: Request for Orders. SPOPP 210.482 (11–22–43). DRB, TAG.

[75] *Army and Navy Register*, 14 Jul 45.

In an effort to determine what lessons could be derived from battle casualties during World War II the Army Ground Forces in September 1946 conducted a casualty study which recommended that a rotation policy was necessary for the frontline soldier. It was suggested that such a system should imply relief from frontline service after 1 year, but that individual rotation was better than unit rotation. A simple system was recommended and the warning was given that once such a system was set up it must be rigorously carried out, otherwise more harm than good would result.[76] It was recommended that rotation be based on time in combat rather than on time overseas, but the report also stated that the number of days of frontline service required should not be so high as to appear unobtainable. Other findings included statements that replacements must not be thrown directly into the line; that the soldier fights primarily because of self-respect and group loyalty; and that special honors must be given frontline soldiers. It was recommended that divisional T/O&E's should include an organization of company size to assimilate replacements, condition hospital returnees, handle certain types of exhaustion cases, and operate recreation and rest centers.

The Chief of Staff designated the Plans Section of the Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, as the agency to act on the recommendations made in the AGF casualty study. On 22 July 1947, the Plans Section completed a study on rotation in which it was stated that the need for some form of rotation for the soldier who performs continuous frontline duty is beyond dispute.[77] It was pointed out that at the close of the war all but 2 of the 89 divisions organized by the United States Army had seen action. The hard usage of these divisions had been hazardous and resulted in heavy losses. It appeared that American divisions were used much harder than those of the Allies or even those of the enemy. General Devers had concluded in February 1944 that divisions should not be left in the line longer than 30 or 40 days in an active theater. The study also pointed out that in World War II the United States was fighting an enemy whose principal forces were engaged on another front and it was not likely that in another major war American troops would meet an adversary who would be inferior in ground arms.

The study urged that the concept of rotation of units be taught in schools and written into manuals so that it would become standard operating procedure. The system of individual rotation which was proposed was not to guarantee that a man would not engage in com-

[76] Ltr, Hq AGF, 23 Oct 46, sub: Study of AGF Battle Casualties. AG 704/225 (14 Oct 46). DRB, TAG.

[77] Memo, Plans Sec, AGF to CG, AGF, 23 July 47, sub: Wartime Rotation of Front Line Fighters. AG 370 (23 Jul 47). DRB, TAG.

bat again, but it was to guarantee him relief from frontline combat for a definite and uninterrupted period. It would not, however, guarantee a trip home or even out of the theater.

The fact that the Army was heavily burdened with administrative work was noted, and it was recommended that the system for rotation be kept extremely simple. Records normally kept by units were believed sufficient to determine the number of days members were in combat and to provide a basis to determine eligibility for rotation. It was concluded that a 250-day individual rotation policy would cause only a 5 to 10 percent increase in the replacement requirements of infantry units, an increase which would not start to operate until after nearly a year of combat. It was believed that this could be met by combing rear areas for men qualified for combat rather than by increasing shipments from the Zone of the Interior.

Individual rotation was considered practical only if unit rotation was practiced. Unit rotation was said to promise longer life for the frontline fighter, to assure a reserve, and to provide units with an opportunity to reequip, to assimilate replacements, to review the lessons of battle, and to carry out such reorganization as might be needed.

Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker, who commanded the 36th Division from September 1941 until June 1944, in stressing the need for individual rotation said:

> I am of the opinion that such a system should be installed for morale reasons. I do not think any one citizen of the United States should be required, merely upon the chance of his original assignment, to undergo hardship and battle throughout a war while at the same time his neighbor, upon the chance of his original assignment, is permitted to serve throughout the war in relative comfort and security in a noncombat unit.[78]

Many commanders favored individual rotation because they did not believe that relief of divisions would have been practical under World War II conditions. They pointed out that to have changed entire divisions would have been a wasteful, time-consuming process, which would have slowed up any momentum that had been gained and which would have nullified the priceless asset of using experienced combat soldiers. Some officers believed that after a considerable period of combat relief of a third or a fourth of a division at a time would have been feasible and that such a system would have permitted those division units which were in rest areas to have absorbed replacements and regained maximum efficiency.[79]

There were complaints that individual rotation broke up effective units and left them less efficient. Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, who com-

[78] Statement, Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[79] Statement, Brig. Gen. O. F. Lange. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

manded the 4th Armored Division from May 1942 until December 1944, declared:

> The best system in war is to remove divisions from action and reestablish their combat effectiveness before again committing them. The ability to judge the moment for their withdrawal is one of the marks of a real commander. Unfortunately, under the misguided conception that kept divisions continuously in combat with no play of reserves, division commanders found great difficulty in achieving any proper rotation of their own units. Individual rotation destroys unit teamplay and is about as poor a system as has been developed in thousands of years of warfare.[80]

Another officer who was familiar with the operation of the rotation policy during World War II said:

> I believe that the individual rotation policy during World War II was ineffective and that it reduced combat efficiency. The policy as announced created the impression among overseas troops that they would be relieved from combat within a reasonable time. A morale problem resulted when this relief failed to materialize. There was insufficient replacement personnel to carry out any large scale rotation policy. Also the policy of replacing rotated personnel with individuals in the same grade and MOS from the Zone of the Interior had a bad morale effect on overseas units. The Zone of the Interior replacements often lacked the experience necessary for them to fill the assignments and in addition their arrival materially reduced the chances of deserving individuals within the units to gain promotions.[81]

Morale

High morale depended upon satisfactory standards of housing, mess, clothing, recreation, and other facilities; it could not be maintained if training standards were low. Some commanders reported good results from informal "gabfests" with groups of enlisted men and young officers.[82] Close personal contact between officers and men was necessary. Reports from training center commanders indicated that morale was improved by early organization of recent arrivals into groups or units and by developing acting leaders from within these units. Emphasis on teamwork and individual initiative was also an important morale factor. Upon their arrival at a center, the men needed a logical and sensible explanation of what was expected of them, but if such orientation was overdone it would become tiresome and there would be little response.

It was apparent by June 1941 that uncertainty as to their future employment was adversely affecting the training and morale of the National Guard and Reserve components.[83] When the House of Rep-

[80] Statement, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood (Ret). HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[81] Statement, Lt. Col. William R. Moore. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[82] Statement, Maj. Gen. C. H. White. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[83] Memo, G1 to CofS, 5 Jun 41, sub: Declaration of National Emergency; Joint Resolution for action of Congress in Declaring a National Emergency and Authorizing use of Land Forces. G–1/16117–78. DRB, TAG.

resentatives by a one-vote margin in August 1941 passed the measure keeping draftees and Guardsmen in service for an additional period, the morale situation was brought to public attention. The night after the Service Extension bill was passed Secretary Stimson went on the air to broadcast a message to the Army: he appealed for patience and understanding.[84]

The reaction of the Guardsmen and selectees to the uncertain situation which existed during the summer of 1941 was similar to the reaction which later developed among the soldiers with regard to the uncertain demobilization situation that existed in 1945–46.[85]

One officer sent out to inspect the situation in the camps thought that the much reported "loss of morale" in the National Guard divisions existed mainly in the minds of newspaper reporters, feature writers, and in the opinions of the families of men in the service. He said:

> Almost all officers and men were agreed that the only period of serious discontent was during the debate on the subject of extension of service, and that the final passage of the Act made for a feeling of resignation which was crystallized to almost universal acceptance by the publishing of the 14 to 18 months' policy of the War Department.[86]

This inspector believed that one reason for the large number of AWOL's in some of the regiments was that members of families were encouraging the men to take advantage of the mild punishment given to absentees who were apprehended. A soldier could work in the coal mines for 2 or 3 weeks, collect his pay, return to his organization, and be ahead financially, even after he had paid a light fine, which was the punishment most frequently imposed.

The morale of men usually was high at the time they left the replacement training centers. While they were moving from one installation to another within the replacement system their morale deteriorated in direct proportion to the indifference of those who were in charge of the movements.[87]

One training center commander had this to say regarding morale:

> Plan training so there will be no waste of time. If a job is completed, quit. Do not fill in time. The trainee must feel that everything he does is worth while. Have a minimum of talk and a maximum of action. When the men are off duty see that they are completely off duty and do not nag them with all kinds of trifling jobs and details. Turn them loose whenever you can do so and forbid any needless, officious pestering by MP's.[88]

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[84] Henry L. Stimson, "You will Not Falter—You Cannot Fail," *Vital Speeches,* VII (1 Sep 41) p. 685.

[85] For complete discussion of demobilization in World War II, *See* DA Pam 20–210, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army,* Jul 52, ch. III.

[86] Memo, G1 to CofS, 18 Sep 41, sub: Observations Made During the Third Army Maneuvers, Aug 17–18, 1941. G–1/14201–100. DRB, TAG.

[87] Memo, G1 to CofS, 23 Jan 45, sub: Handling of Combat Replacements. AG 322 Repl (22 Feb 45). DRB, TAG.

[88] Statement, Brig. Gen. O. F. Lange (Ret.). HIS 330.14. OCMH.

Many camp commanders found they could help morale by sending letters to mothers of inductees soon after the men arrived. Mother's Day messages also were helpful. Commanding officers who talked personally with trainees about their personal problems usually received favorable response.[89]

The theaters designed orientation programs to build up and maintain the morale of the replacements after their arrival. In the European theater, which had a program similar to that in the other theaters, efforts were made to develop in each soldier the belief that he was adequately equipped and trained to play his role in combat. Immediately after his arrival at a depot the replacement attended an orientation lecture, given by the commanding officer of the depot or his representative, emphasizing the position of the American soldiers in the European Theater of Operations and discussing relations with the people of the country in which the depot was located.[90] One hour each week was devoted to orientation meetings and the soldier was brought up to date on developments in the war and instructed regarding any new policies applicable to his behavior in the theater. Radio and loudspeaking equipment was made available for news broadcasts and programs of thhe Allied Forces Network and other features. Situation maps of all war theaters, with particular emphasis on the European Theater of Operations, were displayed in each depot and kept up to date. When possible, the training film *Why We Fight* was shown to replacements during their stop in the depot. *The Stars and Stripes* and *Yank* were distributed along with such periodicals and news magazines as were available.

Public Relations

Prior to the 1941 expansion of the Army, press relations for the War Department were handled by a small section within the Military Intelligence Division.[91] The expansion focused the attention of the country on the military establishment and War Department officials believed there was a demand from newspapers, radio, and similar information media for accurate information as to what the national defense effort actually was. When requests for information became too numerous for the Military Intelligence Division Press Section to handle, the Secretary of War established the Bureau of Public Relations, which later became known as the Public Relations Division of the War Department Special Staff.

The public relations men in the field were on the staffs of the armies, corps, and divisions and at the large posts, camps, and stations. They

[89] Statement, Maj. Gen. John H. Hester (Ret.). HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[90] Ltr, Hq GFRC, ETO, to Hq AGF, 18 Aug 44, sub: Orientation Program of the Ground Force Replacement System. Copy in AG 322 Repl (10 Aug 44). DRB, TAG.

[91] *Hearings*, 76th Cong., on WD civil, military, and supplemental bills, FY 1942, I, p. 189.

had direct dealings with installations of the replacement system. These officers were not under the Bureau of Public Relations in Washington except for advice. They were directly under the command of the commanders in the field, who had sole responsibility for public relations matters pertaining to their units. Tables of organization provided for public relations officers in the G2 sections on the staffs of commanders of posts, armies, corps, and divisions.

The opening of camps, frequently in poor weather and with poor housing and living accommodations, offered problems in public relations. Generally, newspaper men were invited to the camps, as was done when the 31st Division arrived at Camp Blanding. In this instance, the newspapers were tactful in their reference to camp conditions and later they were able to point out improvements. The criticism throughout the country probably was less than it would have been had the newspaper writers had less information. Brig. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, chief of the Public Relations Division, told the House of Representatives Appropriation Committee on 2 May 1941:

> I have found in my short dealings with the press, and the other media of expression, that they are more than cooperative, they are more than willing to do the right thing, and when they do write destructive articles, it is because they have not had the proper background, they have not an education in the subject at hand. . . .
>
> We realize that in this great effort there are going to be many mistakes. There is no attempt to hide the mistakes in any sense at all; but we do think there should be proportion in presenting them so there will be no confusion in the minds of our people. . . .
>
> If we can only take a group of our best editors around to the camps, if they can see one or two camps, they have a picture of the whole thing.

During December 1944, the Rome edition of the *Stars and Stripes* carried six articles on the replacement system which were intended to clear up the misunderstandings of the men in the service.[92] The introductory note which accompanied the first article said, "Conscious of unwholesome situations frequently arising from unfounded rumor and half truths, the *Stars and Stripes* recently assigned a member of its staff to assemble the facts on the operation and functions of the Replacement Command in this theater. The task involved personal visits to the installations mentioned in the resulting series of articles." Cpl. Ed Hogan, who wrote the series, frankly admitted the defects during the early operation of the replacement system but he claimed "the much-maligned replacement depot has dug itself out of the mud and an honest effort is being made to give a new meaning to 'unassigned, once a synonym for unhappy.' " The first article presented a general

[92] Cpl Ed Hogan "On the Replacement System" *Stars and Stripes* (Rome edition) 10–16 Dec 44.

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discussion of the replacement system; the second was devoted to the previous operation of the replacement system; the third discussed the organization of the Replacement Command; the fourth described the operation of the depots; the fifth discussed the training of men who had been released from hospitals; and the sixth had to do with conversion training.

Basics

Tables of organization originally made no provision for filling vacancies caused by sickness, furloughs, or other temporary absences; instead, each individual in a unit was permanently assigned a job. Officers who reported on the 1939 and 1940 maneuvers said the demands for officer candidates, for men as trained specialists, for cadres, and for other purposes had been so heavy that many units were understrength. No statistics were available to determine the average level of noneffectives, but the best informed opinion placed it at about 10 percent.[93]

In following the provisions of the staff studies on the triangular division made in August 1940, an attempt was made to provide an overstrength of basics in the lowest grade, except in headquarters above brigade level, by giving ground and service units an additional 10 percent above normal operating strength. Tables of organization did not specify specific jobs for these added men because it was assumed they would be used to fill the places of ineffectives.[94] The arguments favoring basics stressed the wartime need for efficiency and the advantage of keeping all units at full strength. In addition, all commands were exerting pressure to form new units. The War Department General Staff did not regard this demand as compatible with the manpower and equipment available and believed that the assignment as basics of a large part of the block of numbers in the troop basis not committed to units would relieve this pressure.[95]

The assignment of basics, later termed fillers,[96] to table of organization units placed an added drain on manpower. After basics joined their units they tended to lose their identity; officers considered them available for assignment the same as other men. Once assignments were made they frequently could not be changed and emergency shortages still could not be filled.

[93] Ltr, WDAGO, 31 Mar 42, sub: Policies Governing Tables of Organization and Tables of Basic Allowances. ASF 320.2 (3–13–42), par. 4. DRB, TAG; Statement, Lt. Gen. H. R. Bull. HIS 330.14. OCMH; Statement, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Berry. HIS 330.14. OCMH; Statement, Maj. Gen. Russell B. Reynolds (Ret). HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[94] WD Memo W310–0–43, 22 Mar 43.

[95] Statement, Col. Thomas T. Stevenson, USAR. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[96] The term "filler" as used here denotes a man in excess of normal manpower requirements but provided for in tables of organization. This differs from "filler replacements," used to bring units to original strength, as defined in TM 20–205, "Dictionary of United States Army Military Terms," p. 109.

Some commanders regarded basics as an advance issue of replacements, but the War Department did not expect any reduction in replacement requirements. Increasing the number of men on the lowest rung of the ladder theoretically did not bring a corresponding increase in firepower, although it probably added to the staying power of units in combat. Organization of new units containing a corresponding number of men would have increased overhead requirements, added grades and ratings, and required more equipment. The additional opportunity for promotion incident to creation of new units might have increased the incentive for enlisted men to qualify for advancement.

The serious shortage of men in 1944 caused the War Department to turn to basics as a possible source for strengthening combat units. Service units, which required few replacements, frequently could give up their basics without serious loss of efficiency. Shortly after the G1 conference in Washington in April 1944, at which the G1's of the European and North African theaters were in attendance, it was decided to increase the detachment of patients so that casualties in the combat zone could be transferred immediately and those in the Communications Zone within 30 days. It was further decided to authorize a "replacement level" covering stockage, replacements en route to theater, and on requisition from the Zone of the Interior.

There were three methods by which the War Department could obtain spaces for the detachment of patients and the replacement level, all three of which were eventually used. These methods were (1) to exceed the troop ceiling; (2) to inactivate existing units; and (3) to reduce table of organization authorized strengths. Patients who could not return to duty were carried as excess to the troop ceiling and some inactivations were directed, but these two expedients were inadequate. The third alternative was adopted and basics were reduced in certain units.[97]

War Department Circular 201, 22 May 1944, generally reduced the number of basic privates in other than rifle and medical units to 5 percent. Instructions were further clarified in bulletins published 17 October 1947 and 22 June 1948. Under later regulations the number of basics in some units was reduced to 2 percent.[98]

Basics were not a satisfactory solution for the replacement problem. The authorization for most service type units was adequate, but the increase caused units to take on larger tasks thereby perpetuating their needs for additional personnel. Thereafter these units depended on the replacement system to supply their needs, thus creating an

[97] Statement, Col. Walter F. Ellis. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[98] WD Cir 201, 22 May 44, sec. V; DA Cir 24, 17 Oct 47; DA Cir 187, 22 Jun 48, sec. V; WD Cir 266, 29 Jun 44, sec. III.

unforeseen replacement training requirement. In the combat infantry units this 10 percent authorization for basics was inadequate to sustain action for any appreciable length of time.

Col. Howard E. Kessinger, WDGS, said of the European theater: "The European theater has been slow to release basics and most of those who were released were used to activate new units, mainly Quartermaster. . . . basics are not likely to become a lucrative source of men for combat units unless directives requiring service units to assign a certain percentage of their general service men to the replacement system are issued." [99] The attempt to draw basics out of service units for the benefit of combat units was not always successful.

The Women's Army Corps

The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), authorized 15 May 1942, placed women in military positions but did not subject them to the Articles of War or provide all of the benefits soldiers were entitled to. These conditions brought about such serious drawbacks in making assignments that additional legislation, which became effective 1 July 1943, gave members of the Women's Army Corps (WAC) full military status.[100]

This Corps, formed to replace men in certain military positions, soon was confronted with its own replacement problem. Congress did not authorize registration of women; consequently the ranks of the WAC's could be filled only by recruiting. The great interest shown when the Corps was first announced later diminished to the extent that recruiting quotas could not be filled. Women were recruited for general or special assignments in the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, or Army Service Forces. Many served overseas. At its peak strength the corps contained about 100,000 women.

WAC recruits were trained in five centers: No. 1, Des Moines, Iowa; No. 2, Daytona Beach, Fla.; No. 3, Fort Oglethorp, Ga.; No. 4, Fort Devens, Mass.; and No. 5, a center which had elements in Camps Polk and Ruston, La., and Monticello, Ark. A training command supervised the training centers. The Fifth Training Center operated about 3 months, the Fourth for 6 months, and the others for longer periods.

Many of the first women who joined were required for administrative positions within the Corps due to its rapid expansion; later the reduction of the Corps caused many to be released from administrative tasks. Some could not be immediately employed and there was an accumulation in pools of women awaiting assignments. Later,

[99] Ltr, G–1 to CofS, 26 Jun 44, sub: Inspection of the European Theater Replacement System. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

[100] M. E. Treadwell, "The Women's Army Corps" in U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, chs. VIII and IX. MS in OCMH, General Reference Office.

recruits who were qualified in civilian occupations were assigned, after completion of training, to one of the 20 occupational fields in which they could be used.[101] Many women were permitted to select their assignments and station; others were recruited for general assignments and were sent to stations where their services were needed.[102] The program was most successful in providing women for skilled jobs. The military services had few positions which could be filled by unskilled women or those with low educational qualifications, because for the most part such jobs involved heavy manual labor.

In addition, there were instances of failure to utilize WAC's to best advantage. The Army Ground Forces was required to take a certain percentage of WAC's for its overhead and to place them in all of its posts, camps, and stations. The use of WAC's involved additional cooks, orderlies, and other camp overhead. Structural changes in buildings necessary to provide quarters for these women sometimes were not worth the expense involved in view of the small number assigned. In one post where WAC's were assigned as truckdrivers to pick up rations male drivers had been loading trucks at the warehouses but, since women drivers could not perform this work, a male soldier still had to go along with each truck. At the same post men were required to accompany women drivers who traveled through areas frequented by prowlers to deliver midnight suppers to night-workers. In the Southwest Pacific WAC's were assigned to a headquarters in T/O positions contrary to War Department instructions. That headquarters was badly disrupted when it moved to New Guinea and the women had to remain behind.[103]

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[101] WD Cir 286, 8 Nov 43.
[102] WD Cir 340, 29 Dec. 43.
[103] Statement, Col. T. T. Stevenson, 22 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

CHAPTER XIII

FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

Armed Forces Induction Stations

Armed Forces induction stations were Class 1 installations operated by the Army Service Forces under the control of the commanding generals of the service commands in which they were located. The selective service process started in the local communities when the men whose draft numbers were called reported to the stations for physical and mental examinations.

State Governors determined local quotas after the Director of Selective Service announced the number of men required from each State. Efficient operation of replacement installations depended on an even flow of registrants and the State selective service headquarters assumed major responsibility for the rate at which men were called to meet the monthly quotas. Regular reports showing the daily situation at the induction centers were essential for proper regulation. Men selected for military service normally were ordered to report for induction within 90 days after their preinduction examination; if the period exceeded 90 days another examination was necessary.[1]

The mental test received by the selectee was designed to determine his learning ability. Education alone did not always correctly indicate an individual's potential value to the military service. Preinduction examinations were designed not only to admit illiterates who were intelligent enough to be trained for military duties, but also to eliminate those who could read but still were too dull to become good soldiers.

Non-high-school graduates received qualification tests involving comprehension of numbers, elementary arithmetic, and the ability to read and understand simple paragraphs. Group target tests, requiring little language proficiency, were given to those who scored low in the first qualification tests. This second test measured memory and sense of direction and was designed to reveal those men in the lower scoring group who could be made useful by a short course in a special training unit. Those who failed in the group target test received additional tests to determine their ability to follow directions,

[1] *Selective Service in Peacetime: First Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1940–41* (Washington 1942), p. 238.

to match similar diagrams, and to coordinate muscular movements.[2]

Beginning in April 1941, induction stations rejected illiterates, a practice which was continued until 1 August 1942 when the regulations were changed so as to bring illiterates into the Army, by color, up to 10 percent of the inducted strength per month. Officers at induction stations also questioned men regarding prior service and those who were found to have been previously discharged as inapt were rejected.[3]

Even after a certain percentage of illiterates were accepted, there were wide variations in the rates of rejections at induction stations in different parts of the country. At Boise, Idaho, in November 1943 the rejection rate was down to 0.6 percent, while at Oklahoma City, Okla., it was 23 percent.[4]

Efforts were made to keep a proper ratio of assignments between the Army and Navy on the basis of education. Those who were allotted to the Navy were delivered to the senior line officer of the Navy on duty at the induction station.[5] Registrants inducted into the Army were forwarded to reception centers. At those stations in which recruiting and induction was combined it was possible for applicants to join the Enlisted Reserve Corps or to enlist in the Army of the United States.

Reception Centers

After passing their preliminary examinations at induction stations the men received additional tests at reception centers, one reception center receiving men from a number of induction stations. Arrival at a reception center generally was regarded as marking the beginning of a man's military career. It was then that he entered the replacement stream in which he remained until he was assigned to and joined the unit with which he was to serve.[6] The inductee usually spent four or more days at the reception center where he received his uniform and was rated according to his physical qualifications, mental ability, civilian experience, and special aptitude, and an effort was made to find what skills he might possess which would be of value to the Army. The induction station tests were intended to determine whether or not the man could become a useful soldier; the reception

[2] WD Cir 160, 25 May 42; WD Cir 194, 17 Jun 42, sec. V; Ltr, WDSOS, 8 Jul 42, sub: Induction Station Procedures for Ascertaining Mental Capacity of Selectees and Recruits. AG 324.71 (7-8-42) UP. DRB, TAG; WD Pamphlet, 28 Jul 44, sub: The Evaluation, Classification and Assignment of Mil Pers in the U S Army; RM 12-221, 30 Nov 44, Armed Forces Induction Station Operations; AR 615-500.

[3] WD MR 1-7, as amended, Apr 41.

[4] WD General Council *Minutes*, 1 Nov 43.

[5] For an account of naval replacements see: *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II* (Washington 1947), ch. II.

[6] Memo, G-1 to CofS, 8 Sep 44, sub: PRD Release on Replacements. G1 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

center attempted to determine the military specialty in which he would be most useful.

Since the reception center provided a man's first actual contact with military life, the impressions he received upon his arrival were likely to be lasting. A welcoming band helped to put new arrivals at ease. Orientation at reception centers probably had more influence on morale and attitudes of soldiers than orientation given at any later time.[7] The response to a good, carefully prepared talk was likely to be favorable; but poorly prepared or mumbled talks which left the men bewildered about what was ahead of them merely added to their confusion. Several films, which assisted new men in their understanding of military activities, were available, and copies of the pamphlet "Army Life" generally were distributed.

Men were given the Army General Classification Test, the mechanical aptitude test, and the radio code test. The first was intended to show general ability to learn, the second to reveal ability in mechanical fields, and the third to indicate men of value in communications work. Five groups of Army grades, designated by numbers, were determined by classification scores.

After the scores on the tests were recorded, trained interviewers conducted informal but guided discussions intended to bring out background, educational interests, hobbies, desires as to Army assignments, and other facts having a bearing on future service. Good interviewers were skilled in questioning and in drawing out desired information which they recorded accurately and concisely. They would put the men at their ease and ask questions which did not suggest possible answers. Seventy-five different oral trade tests were available to determine how much a man really knew about a job in which he claimed experience. A man's main and second best civilian occupations were determined from his interview.

Information gained during the classification tests and interviews was coded and entered by punching holes around the edge of WD AGO Form No. 20, the soldier's qualification card. Entries on this form reflecting physical condition, learning ability, aptitudes, age, education, and civilian background were evaluated to determine the man's assignment to Ground, Air, or Service Forces. This record summarized personal history, schooling, work experience, leadership ability, interests, hobbies, foreign language ability, and other characteristics which might be of value to the military service. The qualification card accompanied each enlisted man throughout his Army career and provided the data for entries on his discharge certificate that were intended to be useful in his efforts to find a job after he returned to civilian life.

[7] Army Service Forces, Conference of Commanding Generals of Service Commands, Chicago, 22 Jul 43. ASF Control Div, Drawer G–138. DRB, TAG.

When the interview was over the qualification card was checked for completeness, accuracy, and legibility. It was then referred to the classifier, who checked the man's civilian occupations and, on the basis of information on the card, recommended an initial duty or training assignment, either to a replacement training center or to a unit.

Orders calling members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps to active duty were forwarded to reception centers by service commands, a procedure similar to that of inducting men through the draft. The Reservist, upon reporting to the reception center, was given a physical examination. If physically qualified he was assigned to an appropriate organization.

While one objective of initial classification was to recommend a man for duty or training in the Army job for which his civilian experience indicated he was best fitted, there were several factors which might result in his being assigned to a duty entirely foreign to his previous experience, at least to his way of thinking. These included: a surplus of civilian occupations above Army requirements; many civilian jobs having no Army counterpart; or a personal history indicating leadership potentialities. The recommended assignment was not necessarily the man's best or even second best civilian occupation, but was determined after an analysis which weighed all the pertinent facts revealed by the classification tests and the interview as well as by a consideration of the needs of the service. Reception centers made an effort to distribute men of various levels of education and mental ability equally among the arms and services, but in doing so it was necessary to follow regulations designed to assign men who had sufficient skill to meet technical requirements to certain branches of the Army.[8]

The War Department's desire to hold those recruits who had special qualifications for one arm or service in the reception centers until an appropriate assignment could be made sometimes resulted in considerable delay.[9] During the latter part of 1941, Fifth Corps Area held some men who were awaiting assignment to ordnance replacement training centers for a month and the limited clothing issues, lack of training facilities, and poor housing in the camps were detrimental to morale. The War Department ordered that whenever the delay incidental to making a proper assignment for the efficient use of civilian skills exceeded 1 month, the corps area commander was authorized direct communication with the replacement training center commander with a view to expediting the shipment.

Shipments from reception centers of about 300 men could be made more efficiently than smaller or larger shipments. Reception center

[8] WD Cir 317, 31 Jul 44; WD Cir 325, 7 Aug 44 sec. V; WD Cir 349, 26 Aug 44, sec. III; WD Cir 427, 2 Nov 44, sec. III; WD Cir 147, 17 May 45.

[9] Ltr, Hq 5th Corps Area, 14 Oct 41, sub: Disposition of Specialists and 3-Year Recruits in Reception Centers, w/1st Ind. AG 200.0/1. DRB, TAG.

officials made use of rate tables showing the number of men with certain skills needed in different type units, but shipments frequently were made up from daily teletype reports, which units made to service command headquarters and which showed MOS desired. Experience indicated that in order to select a shipment of 300 men and furnish the requested MOS distribution, a pool of about 1,200 was necessary.[10] Reception centers operated more efficiently when they had capacities of 2,000 or more and their daily arrivals were approximately 400 men. This permitted continuous processing and fully utilized the overhead [11]

The provision of train crews for the transportation of filler replacements from reception centers to newly activated divisions became a serious problem in 1942.[12] There was little trouble when the corps area of origin furnished the administrative and mess detail, but when the corps area of destination was requested to furnish the crews the burden usually fell upon the newly activated division. Army Ground Forces believed this was an unjustifiable burden on cadres which contained only 21 mess sergeants, 21 first cooks, and 21 second cooks, all of whom were needed in the camps. When divisions were being activated at established posts it sometimes was possible to borrow personnel for the train crews from the posts, but many divisions were activated at new posts where this could not be done. This was true of the 81st Division which arrived at Camp Rucker, Ala., 5 May 1942, three days after the post was activated.

In an effort to relieve newly activated divisions from furnishing these details the War Department directed in July that service commands of origin would furnish a train commander, quartermaster, and medical officer as well as mess sergeants, cooks, and kitchen police for duty on trains.[13] The service command of destination was to be requested to furnish crews only in instances where the men required could not be obtained by the service command of origin. Use of replacement training center instructor personnel on additional duty incident to the control of trainee detachments enroute to or from replacement training centers was to be restricted to that which did not interfere with operations in the center.

Replacement Training Centers

Early Developments

The War Department Operations and Training Division, G3, early in 1940 considered establishing "pseudomilitary training camps"

[10] Report of Replacement Board, bk. V, ann. 15, p. 9.
[11] Statement, Col. Lionel C. McGarr, 5 Apr 51. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[12] Ltr, Hq AGF, 1 Jul 42, sub: Train Crews Furnished by Newly Activated Divisions. AG 320.2/4638. DRB, TAG.
[13] Ltr, WDAGO, 22 Jul 42, sub: Movement of Trainees by Rail. AG 324.71 (7–1–42). DRB, TAG.

which would have combined military training with Works Progress Administration activities and the schools.[14] Another proposal was to extend the length of the course and increase the capacity of the Citizens Military Training Camps (CMTC).

The Personnel Division, G1, WDGS, could foresee a shortage of trained men in the event of an emergency, but it did not believe that either "pseudomilitary training camps" or an enlargement of the CMTC would solve the problem. The division believed that the parts of the Protective Mobilization Plan pertinent to enlisted replacement centers should be put into operation.

Figures taken from corps area plans indicated that 17 replacement centers could be opened. The personnel necessary for these centers would consist of 193 Regular Army and 2,742 Reserve officers together with a cadre of 9,486 enlisted men, 582 civilian employees, and 68,636 enlisted replacements in training. Expense for the first 30 days was estimated at $36,000,000 while the annual cost was estimated at $90,000,000.

It was expected that procurement of 60,000 trainees would require outside support obtained through a civilian volunteer effort. Each local community was to set up, under sponsorship and supervision of the governors of the states, volunteer committees of civilians to assist the recruiting service. This particular plan, strongly reminiscent of Civil War days, was never placed in operation.

The 1940 mobilization plans provided that 4 weeks of basic training be given to recruits in reception centers, but these plans soon were abandoned. Experience demonstrated that reception center facilities were inadequate for both the processing and training of selectees.[15] Processing centers discontinued their training functions and sent men directly to the units which were being filled. These units assumed the full responsibility for training until the replacement training centers (RTC) were opened in March 1941.

Prior to 30 April 1941, the service commands made assignments to reception or replacement training centers; there was no control from the War Department. Beginning the first of May 1941, The Adjutant General prepared schedules of allotment for each service command, and the War Department started to regulate the number assigned to the replacement training centers.[16]

The G1 and G3 Divisions of the War Department General Staff worked together in preparing directives governing the assignments to replacement training centers, but late in 1941 the G1 Division took over full responsibility, thereafter submitting to G3 weekly reports show-

[14] Memo, G1 to CofS, 23 May 40, sub: The Replacement Problem If an Emergency Should Occur. G1/16194. DRB, TAG.

[15] Ltrs, WDAGO, 19 Jun 40 and 22 Jul 40, sub: Recruit Reception Centers. AG 341 (5–20–40). DRB, TAG.

[16] Memo, G1 to TAG, 21 Apr 41. G–1/8645–605. DRB, TAG.

ing arrivals.[17] Early training was disrupted to a considerable extent because the camps did not receive as many men as were needed for efficient use of their facilities. It was some time before Selective Service and corps area commanders perfected draft calls, assignments, and travel schedules. The War Department coordinated the number coming from Selective Service with the needs of the units in the Army and the facilities available within the training centers.

A letter prepared by The Adjutant General in April 1941 [18] indicated that units as well as individuals would be trained at replacement training centers, but this plan was not followed. The letter was revised in July [19] and the functions of the replacement training centers were redefined. Trainees were not assigned to newly activated units but were assigned to training units of different types and upon graduation were transferred to permanent type units.

In order that unit commanders might understand that the first group of trainees, who completed the course of basic training early in 1941, were not, in many instances, finished products, a letter signed by the Secretary of War was sent to unit commanders. This letter explained some of the difficulties encountered as follows:

> Every effort has been made to convert each trainee into a well-trained soldier, notwithstanding the initial difficulties of adverse weather conditions, delays in construction, lack of certain equipment, problems of supply, and the training of cadres. The training of subsequent groups will be more complete, particularly as to specialists. Combat and administrative specialists will not receive sufficient training at replacement training centers under present conditions. Such training must be completed under the supervision of the unit commanders.[20]

Organization and Operation

Replacement training centers were functional rather than tactical organizations; each consisted of a central headquarters and a number of training units. The RTC regiment included a small headquarters which supervised and scheduled training but had few personnel or supply functions.[21] Regiments and battalions specialized on one type of training and usually all men in an RTC company were trained for similar jobs, but were given broader instruction than was the practice in training for an MOS within a unit. [See chart 10 for locations of the centers.]

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
[17] Memos, G1 to TAG, 30 Dec 41, 2 Jan 41, and 8 Jan 42, sub: Distribution of Replacements. G–1/8645–782. DRB, TAG.

[18] Ltr, WDAGO, 22 Apr 41, sub: Classification, Reclassification and Assignment at Replacement Training Centers. AG 201.6 (4–22–41)E. DRB, TAG.

[19] Ltr, WDAGO, 21 Jul 41, sub: Classification, Reclassification and Assignment at Replacement Training Centers. AG 201.6 (4–22–41)E. DRB, TAG.

[20] Ltr, WDAGO, 31 Jun 41, sub: Replacement Training Centers. AG 220.31 (5–31–41) MT–M–C. DRB, TAG.

[21] AGF Study No. 33, *The Replacement and School Command,* p. 31. OCMH, General Reference Office.


CHART 10-REPLACEMENT INSTALLATIONS
Ft. Monmouth, Sig.
Atlantic City, Air
Edgewood Arsenal, CWS
Ft. Belvoir, Eng.
Ft. Eustis, CA
Camp Lee, Med., QM
Aberdeen PRGR, Ord.
Greensboro, Air
Ft. Bragg, FA
Camp Croft, Inf.
Camp Sibert, CWS
Camp Gordon, IARTC
Ft. McClellan, BIB Inf.
Camp Wheeler, Inf.
Camp Rucker, Inf.
Camp Blanding, Inf.
Miami, Air
Ft. Benj. Harrison, Fin.
Ft. Knox, Armor
Camp Grant, Med.
Jefferson Barracks, Air
Ft. Leonard Wood, Eng.
Camp Crowder, Sig.
Camp Robinson, Med., BIB Inf.
Ft. Riley, Cav.
Lincoln, Air
Ft. Sill, FA
Camp Maxey, IARTC
Camp Howze, IARTC
Camp Fannin, Inf.
Camp Shelby, IARTC
Keesler Field, Air
Gulfport, Air
Camp Livingston, IARTC
New Orleans, Sig.
Camp Wallace, CA
Ft. F.E. Warren, QM
Amarillo, Air
Sheppard Field, Air
Camp Barkley, Med.
Camp Wolters, Inf.
Camp Hood, Inf. & TD
Kearns, Air
Camp Callan, CA
Camp Abbott, Eng.
Camp Kohler, Sig.
Camp McQuade, CA.
Fresno, Air
Camp Roberts, FA & Inf.
REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS
WORLD WAR II
1941-1945

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, WGDS, in concurrence with G1, WDGS, prescribed the capacities of replacement training centers of the Army Service Forces and the Army Ground Forces. After 9 March 1942, the Operation Division (OPD), WDGS, had a voice in establishing training center capacities. The Army Air Forces established figures for the centers under their control. Army Ground Forces desired an even flow through the replacement training centers, but at the same time wanted a maximum output of replacements. These two ideals never were achieved.

General McNarney, who appeared before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on 15 September 1943, gave the following explanation of the operation of the replacement training centers:

> We have what is known as replacement training centers. In other words, we must train men to replace casualties in the active fighting forces. Each unit, which is well trained, can accept as replacements up to 10 percent men who have received only basic training without seriously interfering with its combat efficiency. Men who have gone to replacement training centers—not all of them, but a percentage of those who have gone to replacement training centers, have after 13 weeks training, gone to the replacement pool and then shipped overseas. Some went to combat units and some did not. Some went into the supply units. We have now increased basic training time to 17 weeks, so 17 weeks after a man has been inducted and sent to a replacement training center, he might go overseas.
>
> If the division or the unit into which a man goes as a replacement has been withdrawn from the front to be re-equipped, he will get training in that unit until the time comes when it has to be used again. Every division that has been in the fight in Tunisia, in Sicily, has fought for a certain length of time until it became necessary, due to loss of equipment, due to loss of men, or to exhaustion, to pull it back, then it immediately started training again. . . .
>
> A large number of men coming out of replacement training centers do not go over as basic replacements, they get further technical training. To get a unit to the place where it is an efficient combat unit requires not only basic training, to teach an individual soldier how to shoot a rifle, how to take care of himself in the field, but it also requires that he has to know scouting, he has to know patrolling, he has to know what the company does, he has to know what the battalion does, he has to have combined training with other types of organizations found in the larger units such as the division, or the corps, until his own unit becomes a part of a well-rounded team. If you pull men out from the team after 6 months or 9 months you destroy your team training and you have to start over again. That is one reason we have had some divisions in the country now for 2 or 3 years, because we have been forced to renew the men and start team training over again.
>
> Some of the divisions, with 15,000 men, have had 6 or 8 months training. We were then forced, by not getting men rapidly enough, to denude those divisions of 2,000 or 3,000 men. That is one of the handicaps of rapid expansion. It is necessary to do it at times.[22]

[22] *Hearings* before Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 763, 15 Sep 43, p. 77.

Training

War Department policy was to train all men entering the Army during fiscal year 1942 at replacement training centers. Since capacity was limited the War Department asked commanders of corps area, chiefs of arms and services, and commanding generals of replacement training centers to furnish information regarding housing and training facilities which could be given consideration in future assignment of trainees. Every effort was being made to operate replacement training centers to full capacity and not to exceed the authorized training period for any individuals or units. The status of replacement training centers was under study with a view to giving the chiefs of arms and services more control, especially over officers.

In May 1942, capacities of replacement training centers were so far behind requirements that it was necessary for units in the United States without task force designations or priority to receive replacements direct from reception centers. These replacements were given training within their units equivalent to that which was given in replacement training centers.[23] Unit commanders were urged to requisition as many men from reception centers as their units could absorb without greatly disrupting other training. When requisitioning officers indicated they were not satisfied with men from reception centers, their requisitions could be filled by replacement training centers or special service schools provided personnel were available from these places.

While the primary mission of the replacement training centers was to furnish loss replacements, the War Department, especially during the rapid mobilization of 1942 and 1943, took many men from the centers as filler replacements for units which under the original plan should have trained their own filler replacements. The replacement training centers also provided men for non-T/O unit and for the Army Specialized Training Program.

Time and facilities were not available to train all occupational specialists authorized by tables of organization. Mobilization training programs for each arm and service prescribed the specialists to be trained in replacement training centers. When units requisitioned occupational specialists which were listed in tables of organization but were not being trained at replacement training centers, it was the policy of the War Department to furnish men with corresponding civilian experience or men who had potential qualifications for the skills desired. These men were assigned direct from reception centers.

[23] Ltr, WDAGO, 6 Nov 42, sub: Requisitions for Enlisted Replacements for Units in Continental United States. AG 341 (5-6-42) EC-M. DRB, TAG. Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *The Organization of Ground Combat Troops*, p. 235.

Replacement training centers grouped men into units, usually platoons or companies, for training purposes. Larger centers might have several specialist companies grouped into battalions. Those organized on an "echelon" basis had platoons in the several periods of training, but with all platoons pursuing the same subject. "Composite" platoons gave instruction in different subjects or categories, but all were in the same period of training.

In an effort to provide a cross section of abilities and skills, men from several service commands were sent to each training center. The War Department required daily movement reports from the service commands so that when backlogs developed in some service commands and others had shortages immediate adjustments could be made by teletype.

Theoretically annual production of the RTC's could have been computed by multiplying their capacity by the number of cycles in each year and subtracti attrition due to discharges, deaths, and transfers. There was no time during the war when this could be done accurately because the Selective Service System did not always keep the centers filled; there were many changes in lengths of training cycles; and rates of attrition never were constant but changed with the quality of recruits, with the variations in physical standards required, and with the demands for officer candidates and for students in special schools.

Officials at replacement training centers in the United States did not know where a trainee would be sent, so his basic instruction had to be designed to meet the basic requirements of all theaters.

When men arrived at replacement training centers, records of their interviews and test grades were reviewed and they were placed in the type of training in which it was believed they would do their best work, but assignments also depended upon personnel requirements and the priority which had been given to each type of training. When the experience data on a soldier's qualification card were questionable, the soldier was reinterviewed and if his ability was still undetermined he received a trade test. Typing and stenographic tests were given to all men who had been recommended for clerical duties or for clerical training. Aptitude tests were designed to detect potential ability in special lines of work. In the final matching of men and jobs, factors other than test scores and work experience were considered including leadership ability, age, previous military experience, or any other experience with predictive value. When other factors were equal, consideration was given to the personal desires and interests of the enlisted man.

There never was complete agreement on the most efficient length of the training cycle, but many officers in the War Department and in the field believed the 17-week cycle was best suited to the World War II replacement program.

Maj. Gen. Harry F. Hazlett, the commander of the Replacement and School Command, following an inspection of the ETO in February and March 1944, reported that men who had completed the 17-week replacement training center course were technically qualified and physically fit to fill vacancies in combat units. He concluded that it was to be expected that replacements arriving in an overseas theater would have deteriorated to some degree, both physically and in training effectiveness during the voyage, and that it was essential that training be promptly renewed in overseas depots or replacement units.[24]

Training programs varied from the 4 weeks originally proposed for reception centers to a maximum of 17 weeks, growing longer as the war progressed.[25] Those centers which were under the chiefs of the arms started with 13-week training cycles, although 1 or 2 additional weeks sometimes were used for administrative purposes. Those training centers under the chiefs of the services also generally followed the 13-week schedules, although some experimented with longer or shorter periods.

In June 1941, Maj. Gen. James F. Edmonds, Commanding General, Camp Lee, Va., suggested reducing the training time from 13 to 10 weeks for quartermaster and medical replacements which were being trained at Camp Lee. While he admitted that 10 weeks was not sufficient time for physical hardening, General Edmonds believed that the 13-week period had not sustained the interest of the trainees during the entire time.[26] The Quartermaster and The Surgeon General did not concur in the proposed reduction. Officials at the Camp Lee Replacement Training Centers believed that additional training aids and improved instruction which were contemplated for future courses would make it inadvisable to shorten the period. The proposed reduction was considered by officials who were revising the War Department mobilization training program, but they left the training period at 13 weeks.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, all arms and services except Armor, Infantry, and Signal Corps cut their replacement training programs from 13 to 8 weeks by reducing the time spent on the various subjects. In February 1942, field artillery and cavalry replacement training centers staggered training so as to get on a 13-week basis after 15 July 1942. The 13-week cycle was broken down into 3 weeks of basic training and 10 weeks of technical training for all specialists in infantry, field artillery, and cavalry replacement training centers.

All replacement training center courses were standardized at 13 weeks late in 1942, but as early as that summer many observers had

[24] Ltr, R & SC, AGF, to CG, AGF, 25 Mar 44, sub: Replacements in ETOUSA and NATOUSA. AGF 319.1 (S). DRB, TAG.

[25] AGF Study No. 33, *The Replacement and School Command, op. cit.*, p. 95.

[26] Ltr, Hq Camp Lee to AGF, 10 Jun 41, sub: Thirteen Weeks Training Schedule. AG 350.01. DRB, TAG.

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concluded that loss replacements needed a longer training period. The fighting in Africa sustained this belief and a 14-week cycle was approved 11 June 1943. The additional week was used for tactical training in the field.

Criticism of replacements from overseas caused Army Ground Forces to study a 6-month training proposal which was rejected because it would have made necessary the formation of many new training organizations and would have increased the overhead. Effective 8 August 1943, the training cycle was established as 17 weeks with the 3 added weeks of instruction devoted to small unit training. Most of the men from other branches who were converted to infantry in 1944 received 6 weeks of conversion training. Heavy losses in the Battle of the Bulge caused the training program to be cut from 17 to 15 weeks in December 1944, but the 17-week cycle was reestablished 19 May 1945 and remained standard until the end of the war with Japan. In June and July 1945, when 6 months of training was required for trainees 18 years of age, replacement training center graduates of the 15-week program were given 11 additional weeks, while those graduated under the 17-week program received 9 additional weeks. Replacement training center graduates normally were assigned to units on the ninth week of the training cycle, or 4 weeks prior to completion of training.

Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen, Chief of Staff, AGF, told a congressional appropriations committee on 29 May 1945 that the experience of the Ground Forces, based upon extensive reports, indicated that the replacement who had received 17 weeks of training was fully capable of entering a unit in combat. He added that replacements should not be under 18 years of age, but that the ages between 18 and 25 appeared to be the best.[27] Many commanders overseas were of the opinion that tactical training for replacements of units higher than a platoon was unnecessary. General Hazlett pointed out that subordinate units of a division in line should receive replacements when such units were not in actual contact with the enemy.[28]

General McNair defended the 17-week course for replacements in a statement before the House Appropriations Committee on 9 May 1944 as follows:

> Of course the individual man, who graduates from the RTC in 17 weeks, gets a good deal of training. He is well trained as an individual soldier. He is ready for battle, if he goes into a combat unit, particularly if his buddies are experienced soldiers. That is the system upon which it is based. We train replacements and supply them with the idea that if a company fights today

[27] *Hearings* before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1946, p. 135.

[28] Ltr, Hazlett to R & SC, AGF, 25 Mar 44, sub: Replacements in ETOUSA and NATOUSA. AGF 319.1 (S). DRB, TAG.

and loses 10 men, it gets 10 replacements that night, and the company never gets down to the point where the men are just a bunch of rookies trying to lick the enemy.[29]

There were a number of hazards inherent in such a system. Ground forces, particularly infantry, suffered severly in combat and individuals were held at the front for long periods, frequently until they broke under the strain or became casualties.

The Army Ground Forces, after the introduction of the physical profile plan, in 1944 sent to infantry replacement training centers about 3,500 men per month in excess of the capacity of the camps. At the end of 6 weeks the 3,500 poorest in physical capacity were shifted to other replacement training camps. Due to the shortage of infantry replacements in the latter part of 1944, this system was changed in October to keep all men physically able to be infantrymen in that service.[30]

Brig. Gen. T. J. J. Christian, of the Camp Roberts, Calif., Field Artillery Training Center, on 19 January 1942 wrote to Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip, at that time in G1 of the War Department General Staff, suggesting that artillery replacement training centers could produce complete batteries, battalions, regiments, or brigades which could be used as filler replacements. The letter further suggested that replacement training centers could produce the framework of cadres, with key NCO's and officers for new units.[31]

General Christian recommended delivering a "complete package" instead of scattering unsorted replacements like "beans from a sack." He wanted continuity of training and hoped to avoid misassignment of trainees, which he believed had done more than all else to defeat the classification system. He pointed out that units of the field forces, then needed for duty, had been bled white by furnishing cadres. The replacement training centers, he said, could do that job or any other. All they needed to know was what, when, and where—answers which he insisted had been hard to get.

If time did not permit all selectees to pass through replacement centers, he continued, and unfortunately some might have to be sent directly to new divisions for training, then the replacement centers could provide the key members of cadres. He believed replacement training superior to that of the field forces.

General Christian's letter was not received in the G1 Division until after General Haislip was transferred to the 4th Division. After the suggestions were discussed with the Training and Operations

[29] *Hearings* . . . House of Representatives, 78th Cong., on Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1945, pp. 62–63.

[30] WD General Council *Minutes*, 23 Oct 44.

[31] Ltr, Gen. Christian to Gen. Haislip, 10 Jan 42. Copy in OCS 15852/101–134. DRB, TAG.

Division, G3, WDGS, which was primarily interested in many of the questions raised, Brig. Gen. J. H. Hilldring prepared a reply.

The reply stated that rapid expansion of the field forces had required the adoption of the plan for furnishing cadres which had been used, but that G3 was making plans under which replacement training centers might furnish completely trained cadres. While it was considered possible that replacement training centers might furnish complete filler replacements, it was expected that this would depend upon the activation rate of new units.

Not all officers connected with training were convinced that replacement training centers were more efficient than unit training. One officer, who had experience both in an infantry replacement training center and with a separate infantry regiment which had trained inductees and retrained men assigned from other branches, said team and unit spirit was lacking in the replacement training centers.[32] He proposed that the replacement training center and division types of training be combined to keep the administrative advantages of the IRTC but to gain the advantages of unit assignment. He proposed that each infantry regiment or division in the combat zone send experienced officers and enlisted men as cadres for one or more battalions in replacement training centers. He believed that officer and noncommissioned officers who were recovered battle casualties should be sent to replacement training centers to instruct trainees, who would become a part of an organization before they actually joined it in action. This officer believed that the trainees could be housed, fed, and supervised by the centralized replacement training center, but that they could at the same time be disciplined, trained, supervised, and infused with unit spirit by the battalion officers and cadre.

One replacement training center commander who had much experience with both systems said: "Training under the replacement training centers was far superior to the system under which the divisions trained their own recruits."[33] This training center commander believed that a larger number of senior officers should have been assigned to headquarters which were supervising the centers. He said that results were unsatisfactory when lieutenant colonels or majors with little experience as heads of inspection teams inspected training centers commanded by major generals or other high ranking officers. He believed that training center commanding generals as a rule considered this practice very objectionable and that retired officers, generals, or colonels should have been used to head all inspection teams sent from headquarters of the Army Ground Forces or from the Replacement and School Command.

[32] *Infantry Journal* (Feb 46), p. 59.
[33] Statement, Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms, 30 Apr 51. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

Another said: "I sincerely believe that the replacement who had 17 weeks of training was at least the equal of the majority of privates of an infantry unit at the time of their first combat. Retired officers should have been assigned to replacement training centers as inspectors and instructors." [34]

Maj. Gen. C. L. Scott, wartime commander of the Armored Center at Fort Knox, Ky., said that deficiencies in the replacement system were due to poor estimates, poor handling, and to misassignment of personnel—not to poor training in the United States. He declared:

> Certainly this was true of armored replacements. I'm convinced that replacements should be trained and handled from receipt at training centers to issue in the front line by the arm or service requiring them. . . . I am sure, too, that five classes of animals (horses—riding, draft and pack; mules—draft and pack) were more efficiently handled in World War I than were human replacements in World War II. [35]

Army Service Forces Practices

In order to supervise the 14 replacement training centers assigned to the chiefs of the services, the Army Service Forces headquarters, after it was formed in 1942, had established a training division. Observers from the Army Service Forces attended Army Ground Forces maneuvers which started in June 1942, and upon their return Army Service Forces basic training programs were revised and the Training Division exercised closer supervision. Although much of the instruction given in Service Forces replacement training centers lent itself to specialist instructors, the Training Division favored the company method. This latter method was generally adopted, but the "committee" type of instruction was used for certain basic military subjects. By 30 June 1943, the number of replacement training centers under the Army Service Forces had been increased to 17.[36]

An investigation by the ASF Control Division in August 1943 indicated a lack of coordination in the assignment of men.[37] The Military Personnel Division and the Adjutant General's Office both were keeping strength records and the two did not always agree. As the actual and authorized strengths of the Army approached each other, the number of men in the pipeline became a factor of increasing importance, but estimates of pipeline requirements were not considered adequate. The Control Division reported that Army Service Forces units were being filled on a hand-to-mouth basis because availability

[34] Statement, Lt. Gen. Ben Lear (Ret), 15 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[35] Statement, Maj. Gen. C. L. Scott (Ret), 5 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH; Maj. Gen. C. L. Scott "The Replacement System," *Armor,* LXI, (1952) p. 50.

[36] History of the Training of Replacements and Units of the Army Service Forces, ASF, 22 Mar 45. Copy in AG 314.7 (22–3–45). DRB, TAG.

[37] Memo, Control Div, ASF, to CG, 5 Aug 43, sub: Processing Personnel To Meet Troop Unit Requirements in ASF. Copy in ASF Control Division files, Drawer G–132, AG Inactive Records. DRB, TAG.

of personnel was not being determined prior to date of activation of units. Members of cadres sometimes waited as long as 120 days, and approximately 20 percent of all ASF units waited 30 days or more for fillers.

The investigation disclosed that ASF was not making use of between 20 and 30 percent of its trained men. The report noted inefficiency in organization of units, an example of which was disclosed by orders to reactivate 4 chemical smoke-generator companies which were received within 24 hours after inactivation orders for the same units had arrived.

In April 1944, a committee which had been appointed by the Director of Personnel, ASF, about a year earlier, after visiting 50 installations including schools, induction stations, reception centers, training centers, general hospitals, officer pools, rehabilitation centers, staging areas, replacement depots, and army specialized training units, submitted a report in which it summarized many deficiencies in the training of replacements.[38] This committee found 170,000 officers and men under the ASF who were in neither an operating nor a training status including 60,000 at reception centers, 14,000 in officers' pools, 25,000 in replacement depots, 6,000 in port pools, 30,000 officers and men reported surplus, and 19,000 who had completed training but were awaiting assignment.

Although men were processed at reception centers in 4 or 5 days, only 22 percent were released in less than 5 days and almost one-third were held 10 days or more. Regardless of instructions to the effect that men were not to be held in reassignment centers more than 10 days, the average time was from 2 to 3 weeks. Arrivals in the 3 centers in operation in March 1944 numbered 13,000; departures only 3,000.

One training center commander complained that the War Department terrorized training centers with a succession of callow inspectors with narrow backgrounds.[39] This officer believed the War Department in Washington was giving undue weight to minor regulations and requiring hairsplitting adherence to specifications, a practice which caused lengthy correspondence and used up much of the short time allowed for organization, training, and preparation for overseas movement.

Army Service Forces found many instances in which unqualified cadres were assigned to form new units and it frequently happened that fillers could not absorb basic technical training.[40] Units some-

[38] Memo, Control Div, ASF, to Director of Personnel, ASF, Apr 44, sub: Report on Assignment, Transfer, and Processing of Military Personnel. ASF Control Div files, Drawer G-132. DRB, TAG.

[39] Army Service Forces, Seventh Service Command Conference, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 27 Jul 44, p. 21. ASF Control Div files, Drawer 138. DRB, TAG.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

times had sizable increments of fillers in several stages of training, a condition likely to result in inadequate supervision from commanders. So many men went to other units then being formed that the turnover of personnel in some units was as high as 300 percent within a short period after activation. Some Army Service Forces officials regarded conditions in the units which were being formed as worse than in the replacement training centers.

In 1944, Army Service Forces combined replacement training centers with unit training centers in an effort to correct observed deficiencies and raise training standards.[41] Army Service Forces headquarters established training policies but delegated to training center commanders full authority to carry out those policies. The training program consisted of 6 weeks of basic military training, 8 weeks of basic technical training, 3 weeks of team training, and 6 weeks of unit training. Critics of this arrangement foresaw loss of control over Army Service Forces replacements,[42] and objections were voiced on the grounds that the best men went to the ASF as specialists, leaving the AGF short of capable men for rotation and normal replacement demands.

At Army Service Forces headquarters, the Military Training Division was reorganized, and the Regular Training Branch and the Readiness and Requirements Branch replaced the Unit Training Branch and the Replacement Training Branch. New unit preactivation instructions were based on the weekly status report from the training centers. Training centers established leadership courses with enrollments equal to 3 percent of training center capacity. These courses were designed to develop qualified noncommissioned officers and cadremen. After completing 14 weeks of training the men selected for leadership courses were given 3 additional weeks of instruction and then received 6 weeks of practical training. Whenever possible officers who were attached but unassigned or who were in pools were used as instructors when they demonstrated leadership and administrative ability.

All trainees received the same basic military training and were then given appropriate technical training. The output of the combined training centers was used to furnish loss replacements, rotational replacements, physically limited replacements to the Zone of the Interior, and to activate new units. Men who were selected as loss or rotational replacements were given team training after the completion of basic military and technical training. Within the center, units were activated and were assigned men who had completed both basic military and technical training. Specialists were trained

[41] ASF Cir 104, 15 Apr 44; ASF Cir 121, 30 Apr 44.
[42] Statement, Col. T. T. Stevenson, USAR, 22 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

both at service schools and in specialist courses within the training centers. Key specialists who required more than 8 weeks of technical training were authorized additional time in training schedules. Some redistribution of overhead was necessary in making the change to the combined training center system.

Men were received at the combined centers from many sources including inductees from reception centers, enlisted men made surplus by inactivation or reduction of units, physically fit men who were released from station complements, men rejected from officers' candidate schools, men released from hospitals, and those returning from overseas. Some required the full 17 weeks of training; others could be reassigned without training.

Health and Morale

Recruits were more susceptible than seasoned troops to many of the respiratory diseases as well as to measles, mumps, scarlet fever, and meningococcal meningitis. In a few instances, it was necessary to discontinue the assignment of trainees to basic training camps where some of these diseases were prevalent.[43] Control measures developed during World War II included prophylactic use of sulfadiazine for the prevention of meningococcal meningitis and vaccination against influenza. Epidemic virus influenza did not appear to attack recruits any more often than it did more seasoned troops. Measures which were proposed to aid control of these diseases included (1) extending the length of the training cycle so as to reduce the rapid turnover of troops at training centers; (2) the assignment of fewer men to large training centers during winter and spring; (3) diverting men away from posts in which epidemic conditions prevailed; (4) conducting training in posts having mild climates; and (5) additional medical studies made in an effort to learn better means of controlling diseases.

Replacement training camp officers found that newly enlisted or inducted men should be received in an assembly area or room which was cheerful, attractive, and comfortable.[44] The Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff, prepared posters which were intended to make camp rooms more cheerful and at the same time provide useful information. In most camps one or two 1-hour orientation lectures were given to new men soon after their arrival. Appropriate reading matter such as the pamphlet "Army Talks" was available for use during those intervals when men were waiting for the next step in the registration procedure.

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[43] *Military Review* (May 1947), p. 60.

[44] DF, I&E Div, WDSS, 19 Mar 47, sub: Reception and Processing of Enlisted Men. AG 200 (19 Mar 47). DRB, TAG.

Division Assignment Centers

Efficient assignment of the filler replacements received by divisions depended upon careful advance preparation. A group of replacements could move most efficiently when names of the men were shown alphabetically on special orders, with at least 20 copies for each man. When it was necessary to add or delete names from the original list, copies of the amended orders were included. Qualification cards and individual records usually were packed separately, so either would be immediately available for checking by the receiving unit.

Experience demonstrated that the best way to load a train was to tag baggage with a durable material, with tags inside as well as outside each piece. Men usually were required to carry raincoats but other belongings were packed and it proved more convenient to place bags in the coaches with the men, rather than load them in separate baggage cars. Much of the work involved in making assignments was completed before the train reached the detraining point.

Three methods of assigning fillers from reception centers had been worked out. These were (1) a holding battalion or unit plan, (2) a plan for the classification team to work on the train, and (3) a courier plan. In the first plan, men were held as long as 48 hours in a holding battalion pending assignment to units. In the second plan, a classification team, headed by a classification officer, boarded a train at a rendezvous point 2 hours distant from the detraining point to sort the classification cards. Upon arrival, men could be moved from the detraining point directly to the units to which they had been assigned. The third plan provided for a convoy detail which met the train en route, obtained the qualification cards from the train commander, and took them to the division classification section where assignments were made prior to the arrival of the men at the detraining point.

Inspectors reported that either of these three plans would work if the operation was properly thought out and organized.[45] Some officers regarded the holding unit as the only effective plan, but said it operated satisfactorily only when enlisted men were interviewed prior to their assignment. The other two plans were considered effective only with small groups of about 25 men.[46] Where either the second or third plan was used it was advisable for reception center classification officers to separate the Form 20 cards and turn them over to train commanders in groups, separating the cards of men recom-

[45] Maj. H. J. Cole, AGD, Report of Inspection of 93d Division, 26 Apr 42. Copy in AG 333.1 (6–5–42). DRB, TAG.

[46] Statement, Brig. Gen. T. J. Cross, 25 Apr 51. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

mended for special assignments, men with previous military experience, and men with leadership ability.

One division, for example, appointed 4 classification and 4 reception teams, each consisting of 1 officer and 8 enlisted men. Two division headquarters officers were aided by two others assigned for temporary duty. Two of these officers with their teams met the trains; the other two worked at headquarters. Eight noncomissioned officers who had received preliminary training from the divisional classification officers were assigned for temporary duty. The statistical section maintained a master chart and prepared assignments showing the trains each team was to meet. Headquarters also arranged transportation for the classification teams and provided each with a list showing names and Army serial numbers, number of men at entraining point, probable time of arrival, and rendezvous point of the train each team was to meet. There were three assistants to the division G1 with one on duty at all hours. These officers received and recorded all information regarding troop trains and were responsible that reception teams met the trains.

Upon boarding a train, the classification team officer would contact the train commander and obtain the qualification cards and reception center or replacement training center special orders. Members of his team would set up their equipment either in two sections across the aisle from each other, or in the Pullman washroom. The qualification cards were arranged numerically by specification serial numbers for specialists and by AGCT grades for basics, with each major group divided so as to segregate cards of men with previous military experience.

When the train arrived at the detraining point, the team commander gave the papers, which the team had assembled while on board, to the representatives of the units assigned to meet the train. These papers included two carbon copies of the roster of men assigned to each regiment or separate unit and one of the packages of qualification cards along with unmarked copies of the replacement center special order. The train team commander also would report to the reception team commander the time when the men had eaten their last meal, which information would be given to the mess officers who would plan meals accordingly. The classification procedure was similar whether the team worked on the train or in the classification room at division headquarters.

When records were obtained prior to the arrival of the train and were taken to a division classification and assignment building, the mechanics of assignment frequently could be completed prior to the arrival of the train. One division had a classification and assignment room at one end of which was a blackboard chart, 20 feet long and 6 feet high, topped by the division insignia in red and white

lights. The blackboard was covered with figures used to tabulate the number of men assigned to each unit in various specialized positions.[47]

The soldier's qualification card, Form 20, was the key to the entire classification. Cards were sorted to note the men with leadership qualities and those with previous military experience. Then the cards for the military specialists were separated from the cards of the nonmilitary specialists. Cards of men rated as nonmilitary specialists who might be substituted for other needed specialists were placed in a separate group.

The officer on a classification team assigned specialists, an enlisted man assigned basics. There were two men who were available to handle charts, two to mark assignments on the reception center special orders, one to read assignments to the special order men, one to sort qualification cards by units, and one was available as a general handy man.[48]

Like the classification teams, the reception teams were on 24-hour duty with each team taking an 8-hour shift. When the officer on duty in the division G1 office learned the time of arrival of a replacement train he would pass the information on to the reception team then on duty, and when the cars stopped along the siding members of the team would be in position along the track ready to assist with the detraining.

As the troops left the train they were formed in columns of two's and marched to an assembly area. From the assembly area, the men were distributed to units immediately, if they had been previously assigned, and a guide from each unit would march them to their respective battalions for assignment to companies. If the assignment to units was delayed it was necessary to have sufficient accommodations in the assembly areas to take care of the men until they could be assigned. When men did not have their individual baggage it was necessary to have a baggage team, usually 1 officer and 4 enlisted men, which would load baggage onto trucks, take it to the assembly area, and then sort out the pieces of baggage and distribute them to their owners, using as a guide the assignment list already made. After the arrival of the train and as soon as the classification team finished its assignments Form 20's would be handed to messengers for delivery to regiments or separate units along with a roster and copies of pertinent orders from reception or replacement centers.

Divisions needed many radio operators. Consequently all men classified originally as nonmilitary specialists but who attained high

[47] *Army and Navy Register*, 26 Sep 42.

[48] WD TM 12–425, 17 Jun 44, contained detailed instructions for handling the soldier's qualification card, Form 20.

scores on the general classification test were given the radio code aptitude test.

Men were assigned to regiments, battalions, and other units in accordance with the requirements. It was essential that each organization be given a fair share of available skills and of men classified according to their abilities. The unit personnel officers, while working in the classification building, sometimes made their assignments to companies, batteries, or detachments in their units, with the exception of any specialists whom they might wish to interview later. A card file at division headquarters listed men possessing unusual skills or abilities.

Accurate classification of every soldier in the beginning was one of the primary aims. In case of error, the way was always open to reclassify a man and assign him to another type of work. Such factors as emotional stability and adaptability, or the lack of these qualities, sometimes made changes necessary.

Proper orientation was an important factor in the assignment of enlisted men. Many commanders believed the ceremony should be held as quickly as possible after the arrival of filler replacements in camp.[49] One division made a practice of reading orders announcing the formation, then of displaying national and unit colors. The senior officer present usually spoke and explained the mission and probable future employment of the division, stressing teamwork and the need for collective effort. Special stress was placed on *esprit de corps* and pride of accomplishment. All officers who spoke would develop the theme of unit excellence and success. Replacements were informed of the various phases of the training program which they were about to enter and of the parts they were to play.

In 1941, when the 9th Division was receiving a large number of 1-year selectees from the Northern States, teams consisting of 3 officers and about 25 enlisted men from the division accompanied the troop trains from their points of origin at Camp Upton, N. Y.; Fort Dix, N. J.; and Fort Devens, Mass., to their destination at Fort Bragg, N. C., where the division was in training.[50]

The 81st Division formed a receiving center and 2 subordinate receiving units which handled 11,886 men who arrived between 15 and 30 June 1942.[51] Two and a half blocks of vacant buildings at newly constructed Camp Rucker, Ala., were used for quarters. Each receiving unit could accommodate about 1,100 selectees and guides. Space equivalent to two large hotels, with equipment, was used for living accommodations. An officer, who boarded the train a mile

[49] Statement, Brig. Gen. T. J. Cross, 13 Jun 50. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[50] *Historical and Pictorial Review, Ninth Division, U. S. Army* (Baton Rouge, 1941).

[51] The 81st Wildcat Division Historical Committee, *The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II* (Washington, 1948), p. 5.

from the siding where the men were to detrain, advised the train commander as to the procedure to be followed. As soon as the men were off the train they were taken to barracks and assigned to cots already made up. If it was more than 2 hours before the next meal they went immediately to the messhall for coffee and doughnuts. The two receiving units accepted selectees on alternate days and invariably sent them to their units by 1330 hours the next day, regardless of the time of their arrival. At 1300, each guide marched his group of men around the receiving unit area, distributing the men to the units to which they had been assigned. Officers and enlisted men worked, often while the new men slept, evaluating experience and mental and physical capabilities and making assignments so these characteristics could be used to best advantage.

In June 1942, the 29th Division at Fort George G. Meade, Md., was receiving new draftees at such a rapid rate that units could not absorb the men directly. A separate center was formed which at times contained in excess of 5,000 men, all in various stages of the 13-week basic training cycle.[52]

Special Training Units

The War Department received many communications from commanders who complained that if they undertook more than incidental development training within their units the progress of their organizations would be retarded. These officers pointed out that there was need for an agency to train inapt soldiers. In compliance with the War Department policy of not discharging any man so long as he could be of useful service, regulations were issued in April 1941 authorizing special training units for the training, reassignment, or discharge of all men who were not capable of receiving training in units. Commanding officers at installations where training units were organized assigned instructors and stipulated their qualifications.[53]

The War Department, in October 1941, rejected an Air Forces request that inapt Air Forces personnel be placed in Ground Forces special training units,[54] on the grounds that the special training units in the Ground Forces were not adequate to handle additional personnel. The Air Forces, acting on a recommendation that it estab-

[52] Joseph H. Ewing, *29 Let's Go, A History of the 29th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, 1948), p. 10.

[53] Ltr, 6th Inf (Armd), 14 Mar 41, sub: Selective Service Men Unable to Read or Write, w/inds. AG 324.71 (9–19–41) (12) sec. x.6. DRB, TAG; Ltr, WDAGO, 2 Dec 42, sub: Special Training Units. AG 353 (11–23–42). DRB, TAG; Ltr, WDAGO, 28 May 43, sub: Establishment of Special Training Units. AG 353 (5–14–43). DRB, TAG; *Army & Navy Register,* 17 Oct 42; AR 615–28, 28 May 42, par. 15; WD Cir 66, 1941, par. 52b; MTP 20–1; WD Cir 255, 16 Oct 43; WD Cir 127, 1 Apr 44, II.

[54] Memo, CofS to TAG, 16 Oct 41, sub: Rehabilitation Camps—Air Corps. AG 324.71 (8–27–41). DRB, TAG; Ltr, Hq 2d Air Force, 16 Nov 42, sub: Complaint re Illiterate Filler Personnel. AG 33.1. DRB, TAG.

lish its own centers, thereafter transferred non-English-speaking enlisted men to the 18th Replacement Wing, Salt Lake City, Utah, where they received special training. The War Department contended that the training of non-English-speaking enlisted men was a command function. Proposals for the formation of separate units made up of Spanish-speaking men, who were being received through the draft in considerable numbers, were not considered feasible at that time.

In 1942, the Director of Selective Service proposed a program for mental and physical rehabilitation in an effort to increase the number of men who could qualify for military service.[55] Indications were that such a program would be of little value unless the War Department would promise to induct those illiterates who refused to subject themselves to such instruction. The War Department was willing to take those deemed capable of rehabilitation, but would not agree to take the others. Many believed that illiterates would have to be taken sooner or later and that it was necessary to start on their training as early as possible.

While the War Department recognized the desirability of an educational program for illiterates, it was the opinion of many officials that such a program should be entirely apart from anything connected with the military service and that any coercion on the part of the War Department to compel men to submit to such a program prior to induction would be inappropriate.[56]

It soon became apparent that the large number of enlisted men who had Grade V intelligence or who were not adaptable for military service or who lacked sufficient knowledge of the English language to perform their duties properly was retarding unit training programs.[57] It was believed that a majority of these enlisted men, with additional training, could be developed into soldiers fit for duty with field and service command units. Others would be of value for manual labor.

Regulations had limited the number of illiterates or non-English-speaking trainees to be forwarded to Services of Supply replacement training centers, but in December 1942 these limitations were being exceeded to such an extent as to handicap the centers in their operations.[58] There was danger that the retention of illiterates in replacement training centers in excess of established quotas might prevent these installations from accomplishing their missions. Consequently,

[55] Memo, G1 to CofS, 2 Jan 42, sub: Training of Illiterates. AG G–1/8645–731. DRB, TAG.

[56] Ltr, SW to Dir, Bureau of Budget, 2 Jan 42. AG 234.71 (12–26–41). G–1/8645–731. DRB, TAG.

[57] Memo, DCofS to G–1, 6 Jun 42, sub: Additional Training for Inapt and Illiterate Enlisted Men. ASF 8645–731 (6–6–42). DRB, TAG.

[58] Memo, WDSOS for TAG, 15 Dec 42, sub: Excess Illiterates at Services of Supply Replacement Training Centers. ASF/327 General (12–15–42) –40. DRB, TAG.

it was directed that when the percentage quotas of Services of Supply replacement training centers were filled at reception centers, the remaining illiterates and non-English-speaking individuals were to be assigned to units of the arms and services concerned so that each would receive its proportionate share. Once classified as literates, individuals could not be reclassified as illiterates at replacement training centers. Replacement training center commanders were directed not to retain illiterates in excess of quotas but to discharge those unable to perform military service and report the remainder to The Adjutant General for reassignment.

The Army Service Forces proposed that development companies be organized to which low score men might be transferred for additional training and for labor. At least 3 hours daily was to be spent in military and scholastic training with the remainder of the day devoted to labor projects. Development companies were to be located preferably at Army posts or camps where trainees could perform labor essential to the war effort. Vacant Civilian Conservation Corps housing was to be utilized, moving the buildings to Army stations when necessary. For economy of administration it was proposed that two Civilian Conservation Corps camps would be combined to make 1 development camp unit with a total strength of 500 trainees. It was expected that about 50 camps would be formed and would be distributed to Corps Areas according to need. Cadres were to consist of qualified enlisted men considered unfit for general military service or filled by temporary assignment of other men if not enough limited service men were available.

The commanding general, Army Air Forces, and the director of Selective Service concurred in the plan. The commanding general, Army Ground Forces, indicated concurrence if the development companies were authorized initially to clear inapt and illiterate men from units then existing.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, of the War Department General Staff, objected to an additional charge against the troop basis and said the relatively small number trained would not be of great benefit to the Army as a whole. He also held that soldiers capable of development could be developed within their own units. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, replied that the enlisted men in question were ineffective so long as they were untrained and that the argument regarding the troop basis was not descriptive of the real effect of the proposal.

In June 1942, when 550 CCC camps were transferred from the Federal Security Administration to the Army Service Forces, none of them was made available for the proposed development companies. The plan eventually was dropped but the special training units were continued in both the Ground and Service Forces.

All men whose scores on the Army General Classification Test indicated a low mental ability or lack of elementary schooling, or who did not speak English, received a visual classification test consisting of symbol substitution and design-pairing items and minimizing the use of language. Men who remained in a low grade after this test and men who were unschooled, non-English-speaking, emotionally unstable, or physically limited were sent to special training units.

Trained psychologists, employed as Army personnel consultants, tested individual soldiers who were regarded as inapt to determine in which of four levels they should start training. The Development and Special Training Section of the Training Branch of the Adjutant General's Office recruited and trained more than 600 teachers who were assigned to the special training units. The Training Branch of the Adjutant General's Office furnished special training unit material to approximately 300 military organizations in the United States.[59] This included the following documents:

The Army Arithmetic, TM 21–510.
The Army Reader, TM 21–500.
Teacher's Guide for Instructional Materials.
Illustrated Instructor's References to Film Strips, 12–4 and 12–5.
Manual for Teachers of Adult Elementary Students, DST–M1.
Testing Manual, DST–M2.
The Soldier's Reader.
Supplementary Reading Pamphlets.
Placement Test, DST–6: X–1.
Unit Tests, DST–9 *a*, *b*, and *c*.
Achievement Test, DST–7, X–1.
Film Strip, 12–1.
Film Strip Notebook.
Film Strips, 12–2 and 12–3 with Illustrated Instructor's References.

Special training units attempted to train soldiers to read and understand simple orders and directions and to make men sufficiently proficient in each subject so they could get along in the Army, but it was not their purpose to give formal academic training. Subjects which were taught included arithmetic, speech, and writing. The basic military training which was included in the course was intended to develop the skill of the individual to the extent that he could grasp further military instruction when he took his place in a unit alongside other men. There was no single unit in the Army in which illiterates were employed but there was a wide range of duties that illiterates could be taught to perform.

[59] Ltr, WDAGO, 28 May 43, sub: Special Training Unit Materials. AG 353 (5–10–43). DRB, TAG.

The minimum time spent in the training units was 6 weeks, the maximum 15 weeks, and the average about 10 weeks. Figures which were prepared in October 1942 indicated about 61 percent continued with regular training, about 33 percent became limited service, and the remaining 6 percent were discharged from the Army.

In December 1942, a special study was made of the special training unit at the Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Fort Bragg, N. C. Copies of this report were sent to commanding officers of other replacement training centers. Special training activities at Fort Bragg were conducted through Special Training Battery B of the 15th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Training Regiment of the Field Artillery Training Center.[60] Men who had been unsuccessful in their initial assignments to basic batteries were transferred to the special training unit. Field artillery officers of better than average qualifications were assigned to the battery as instructors, and most of them, in addition to their military qualifications, had occupational specialties which included experience in assignment and training, psychology, economics, statistics, physical education, adult primary school education, pediatrics, and neuropsychiatry.

The training program included literacy instruction and physical education and was directed toward restoring as many men as possible to basic training in tactical combat units. Special cases received consideration in staff clinics and there was a continuing program of research. Several monographs were prepared by staff members covering various phases of their work. Dr. Edgar A. Doll, expert consultant to the Secretary of War, made the inspection and recommended assignment of "interns" who might learn the methods of instruction used at Fort Bragg. He proposed that the experience of the battery be utilized in the evaluation of new procedures for salvaging men who might otherwise be lost to the services.

The War Department was following a policy of noninterference with commanders of replacement training centers where there were special training units. It had been planned to select 50 instructors from the Army Specialists Corps to train teachers for special training units. But with the abandonment of the Army Specialists Corps in November 1942 this plan was dropped.

Beginning 1 June 1943, special training units were concentrated in or near reception centers in an effort to relieve other military organizations from expending their training efforts on recruits who could not readily absorb military instruction. The Army Service Forces directed that men unable to read and write English at a

[60] Memo, Edgar A. Doll, Expert Consultant to SW to Lt. Col. Morton A. Seidenfeld, The Training School at Vineland, N. J., Department of Research, 22 Dec 42, sub: Observation on Special Training Unit, Battery B, 15th Battalion, 5th Regiment, F. A. R. T. C., Fort Bragg., N. C. AG 353. DRB, TAG.

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fourth grade level or who were unable to speak or understand simple English or who were classified in Grade V in the Army General Classification Test were to be assigned to special training units and remain there until they could take the regular course of training in a T/O unit. New tests [61] were introduced at induction stations and classification procedures were improved. Those unable to absorb training or who could not be qualified within 3 months were discharged.[62] At this time there were approximately 13,000 enlisted men in the special training units and the average length of training was about 6 weeks. Replacement training centers and T/O organizations continued to train illiterates until service commands could establish the required number of special training units in or near the reception centers.

The War Department received complaints from organization commanders who said that they were receiving illiterates who had passing AGCT grades given them in the reception center literacy tests. Illiterates who had been erroneously assigned to organizations without going through special training units could be returned to the reception centers if it could be shown that the assignments were the result of reception center errors, but there was no way to invalidate the grade on the test score even though the man obviously lacked the ability the score indicated. Some of the men who were questioned said they had taken the Army General Classification Test at the reception center so many times they finally became sufficiently familiar with it to make a score which would put them above Grade V.

On 15 July 1943, the Camp Lee Replacement Training Center complained of the quality of men it was receiving. On 23 August 1943, the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center at Camp Hood, Tex., reported it was receiving men unable to read and write at fourth grade level, but these men had not been through special training units. Records indicated they had been given repeated Army General Classification Tests, sometimes only one day apart.[63] Authority was requested to return these men to reception centers. This authority was not granted by the War Department, but efforts were made to prevent abuse of Army General Classification Tests.[64] All service commands were instructed not to release men from special training

[61] Ltr, WDAGO, 11 May 43, sub: Classification Tests. AG to all RTC's and others. AG 201.6 (4–28–43) C–D. DRB, TAG; MPT 20–1.

[62] AR 615–360, sec. VIII, par. 52*a*.

[63] Ltr, WDAGO, 28 Jul 43, sub: Establishment of Special Training Units. AG 353 (24–7–43). DRB, TAG; Ltr, Hq RTC, Camp Lee, Va., to TAG, sub: Special Training Units. AG 353. DRB, TAG; Ltr, Hq TDRTC, Camp Hood, Tex., to TAG 23 Aug 43, sub: Disposition of Enlisted Men Received From Reception Centers Who Are Unable to Read and Write the English Language at the Fourth Grade Level and Who Do Not Possess the Required Proficiency to Undertake a Regular Course in a Replacement Training Center. AG 353. DRB, TAG.

[64] WD Cir 297, 13 Nov 43.

units until there was ample evidence that their further training was justified. Men who failed to show promise within 12 weeks were discharged.

In February 1943, there were 792 illiterates and non-English-speaking men at the medical replacement training center at Camp Joseph T. Robinson, Ark. Some were in special training units. Many had been at the camp for nearly 6 months. Unless they were ordered out soon officers feared it would be necessary to reduce the quota of incoming trainees.[65] Non-English-speaking enlisted men were being distributed proportionately to all arms and services. In response to a request that these men be reassigned to other services, headquarters of the Army Service Forces pointed out that other arms and services were in no better position to accept men with limited abilities than was the Medical Department. Reassignment to another branch or service would merely have resulted in a disproportionate ratio. The Surgeon General was directed to designate medical units to which the men could be assigned. Distribution was made among a large number of units so that no one unit would receive an excessive number. Similar action was taken in connection with excess illiterates reported from the Engineer Replacement Training Center, Fort Belvoir, Va.

Policies concerning the operation of special training units were discussed at two major conferences. One was held at Camp Grant, Ill., from 1 to 12 June 1943 and was attended by officers representing special training units of the Ground, Air, and Service Forces. A similar conference was held at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., on 8 to 10 August 1945.

During the first 9 months of 1945 there were about 58,000 white draft registrants who failed in their qualification tests but who were inducted and sent to special training units. These units were continued until 3 October 1945 when they were discontinued and thereafter registrants who received a low score on the qualification tests were rejected even though they were physically qualified for military service.[66]

Overseas Replacement Depots

During 1941 and 1942, when overseas shipments were relatively small, enlisted men were transferred directly from replacement training centers to ports of embarkation on the call of port commanders.[67] Port of embarkation replacement pools were established to fill vacancies in units, groups, or detachments which were awaiting embarka-

[65] Memo, WDSOS for SG, 23 Jan 43, sub: Excess Illiterates at Services of Supply Replacement Training Centers. ASF/327 Gen (1–6–43)–75. DRB, TAG.

[66] *Selective Service and Victory, op. cit.*, p. 142.

[67] Ltr, Hq AGF to TAG, 23 May 45, sub: Medical and Administrative Processing of Replacements Transferred to Army Ground Force Replacement Depots. AG 220.3/38 (23 May 45) (R). DRB, TAG.

tion.[68] A senior noncommissioned officer generally was placed in charge when a group of men who were not assigned to a unit was moved from the replacement training center to a port of embarkation replacement pool, unless the shipment involved a large number of replacements. In the event of the latter the replacement training center usually would assign one of its officers to accompany the group.

Port commanders encountered many difficulties in organizing replacements for overseas shipment. It was desirable to have a considerable number of men in the pools in order to fill unexpected requisitions, but in many instances men were held for long periods and this delay was detrimental to morale. Regulations finally prohibited holding men longer than 30 days.

Serious problems in connection with supervision and training appeared at Camp Dix, Indiantown Gap, and Fort Ord, which were being used to augment the capacities of staging areas at the ports. Port commanders were exercising full control of these facilities but they complained they did not have sufficient members on their staffs to assign inspecting officers to determine the status of training within units preparing for overseas shipment or to supervise the training which was conducted during the staging period. In an effort to correct this situation the War Department on 26 March 1942 directed the commanding generals of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces, respectively, to supervise training at the pools and staging areas in coordination with the port commanders concerned.[69]

In April 1942, Army Service Forces conducted a detailed study of the port and staging area problems.[70] The plan which was prepared as a result of this study proposed that replacements would be furnished to the overseas forces from port of embarkation depots rather than indirectly from the replacement training centers through the staging areas. It called for a replacement system within the United States to include officer replacement pools, replacement training centers, special service schools, replacement storage and training depots, port of embarkation replacement depots, and overseas replacement depots.

It provided that overseas commanders would submit requisitions for personnel replacements to port of embarkation commanders who would assign men from the depots where prescribed levels would be maintained under allocations made by The Adjutant General. The Transportation Division was to inform The Adjutant General of

[68] Memo, WDAGO, 20 Aug 43, sub: Operation of Port of Embarkation Replacement Pools. W600–73–43. DRB, TAG.

[69] Ltr, WDAGO, 26 Mar 42, sub: Training of Units at Staging Areas. AG–353 (3–24–42). DRB, TAG.

[70] Memo, ASF for CofS, 7 Apr 42, sub: Plan for Loss Replacements for Overseas Forces. ASF/16386/159. DRB, TAG.

shipping availability so that allocations of space on vessels could be made to port commanders.

The G3 Division of the War Department General Staff complained that establishment of a large number of replacement depots would result in unnecessary duplication of effort. Comments from that Division pointed out that the uncertain length of time that the men would remain in the depots would preclude any great amount of training. G3 further recommended that the number of storage and training pools be limited to three, and that they should have capacities of between 10,000 and 20,000 men. The study said that replacement depots should be so organized that their battalions could operate as separate units which might move from place to place but would remain under the depot commander.[71]

By June 1942, men who were awaiting shipment caused congestion in the replacement training centers and required an undue amount of administrative work. Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, also was involved in much extra work in connection with the assignment of replacements to lower units.

The Secretary of War on 27 June 1942 approved an overseas loss replacement system including depots at the ports of embarkation. This plan was expected to clear up the congestion in the replacement training centers by a new method of distribution of graduates of those centers, other than those required for newly activated units, but it could not operate until the proposed depots were ready.[72]

During the latter part of 1942, the three commands designated a number of units to serve as replacement pools. By 1 January 1943, the Army Air Forces, which had not required any of its flying units to serve as pools, had released all of those other units that it had designated; by the end of January, the Army Service Forces had released all of its units except the 76th and 78th Divisions and the 46th Field Artillery Brigade which served as pools for the Army Ground Forces until after the depots were activated.

On 6 January 1943, the Army Service Forces personnel replacement depots at Shenango, Pa., and Camp Beale, Calif., became operative under the commanding generals of their respective service commands.[73] The Army Ground Forces, during the early part of the war, regarded the movement of troops as an Army Service Forces function: Ground Forces officers hoped to limit their activities to training. The Army Service Forces depots undertook the task of receiving and pre-

[71] Ltr, Hq 1st Repl Depot, Fort Ord, Cal., to G3, WDGS, 24 Jun 42, sub: Organization and Operation of Replacement Depot. ASF 32317. DRB, TAG.

[72] Memo, AG to CofS, 11 Aug 43, sub: Inspection of Shenango Personnel Replacement Depot by Col. W. C. Bennett. AG 333.1. DRB, TAG.

[73] Memo, WDAGO, 8 Jan 43, S–600–1–43; Ltr, WDAGO, 6 Jan 43, sub: Replacement Depots. AG 323.341 (1–4–43). DRB, TAG.

paring for overseas shipment replacements for the other two services, a procedure which soon proved unsatisfactory.

The Air Forces started issuing their own movement orders in April. Army Ground Forces Replacement Depot No. 1 at Fort George G. Meade, Md., and No. 2 at Fort Ord, Calif., were opened in August.[74] In November, the Army Air Forces activated depots at Kearns, Utah; Boca Raton, Fla.; Jefferson Barracks, Mo.; and Seymour-Johnson Field, N. C.[75] The Army Ground Forces established a third overseas replacement depot at Fort Riley, Kans., 5 June 1945,[76] and a fourth at Camp Adair, Oreg., on the same date. In November 1945, the depot at Fort George G. Meade was moved to Camp Pickett, Va., where it operated until 4 May 1946.[77] The Army Service Forces depot at Shenango was moved to Camp Reynolds, Pa., in September 1943 where it remained until 11 December 1944 when it was moved to Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pa.; on 15 January 1945 it was closed there and reestablished at Fort Jackson, S. C.[78] Army Air Forces opened an overseas replacement depot at Greensboro, N. C., in April 1944; one at Santa Ana Army Air Base, Calif., in December 1944; an overseas replacement depot for flight nurses at Randolph Field, Tex., in February 1945; and an overseas replacement depot at Camp Kohler, Sacramento, Calif., in May 1945.[79] All of these depots were closed early in 1946.

Port of embarkation replacement pools were discontinued 1 July 1944. After that date individuals who could not sail with their units, but who were qualified for overseas service, joined casual detachments until assigned to later shipments, within 15 days if possible.[80]

Soon after they were established, the Army Service Forces depots at Fort Meade and Fort Ord were assigned inspection roles, and officers there informed the Replacement and School Command of the Army Ground Forces of any deficiencies observed in units which were being shipped. Ground Forces units sometimes resented inspections by Service Forces officers which was one reason for discontinuing the combined depots.

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[74] Ltr, WDAGO, 30 July 43, sub: AGF Depots. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG; AGF Repl Depot No. 1, Fort George G. Meade, GO 1, 14 Aug 43. DRB, TAG; AGF Repl Depot No. 2, Fort Ord, GO 1, 30 Aug 43. DRB, TAG.

[75] Ltr, WDAGO, 8 Nov 43, sub: AAF Replacement Depots. AG 322 Repl (5 Nov 43). DRB, TAG.

[76] WD Cir 179, 16 Jun 45 and WD Cir 235, 3 Aug 45.

[77] Ltr, AGF, 26 Mar 46, sub: Personnel Replacement Depots. AG 320.2 (AGF) (RD). DRB, TAG.

[78] Hq 3d SvC, GO 88, 18 Sep 43; WD Cir 425, 31 Oct 44; ASF Cir 164, 8 May 45.

[79] Ltr, AAF, 9 May 44, sub: AAF Replacement Depots. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG; Ltr, AAF, 31 May 45, sub: AAF Replacement Depots. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG; Ltr, AAF, 8 Feb 45, sub: AAF Replacement Depots. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG; Ltr, AAF, 8 Jul 46, sub: AAF Replacement Depots. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

[80] WD Circular 248, 19 Jun 44.

The opening of the replacement depots did not mark the end of the complaints from overseas regarding the quality of replacements. Some of the unit commanders complained that they received men who lacked training or had gone stale in transit.

It was natural for the depots to give first priority to preparation for shipment and to place training in second priority, but some of the inspectors who visited the replacement depots claimed that training was a low third in priority. Reports indicated that when the depots held the men for longer periods than were required for processing, commanding officers were more likely to order road building or beautification of grounds than to prepare training schedules. Men who were held in depots for long periods of time were in danger of forgetting the military skills they had acquired in prior training.

The Military Personnel Division, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, retained "operational control" of replacements under policies prescribed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, War Department General Staff, and issued directives under which the commanding generals of the Ground, Air, and Service Forces prepared movement orders. Overseas commanders generally exercised great latitude in their requests for personnel.

Men, who had been trained for as long as 6 months in order to qualify for an MOS, sometimes would reach overseas replacement depots only to learn that the positions for which they had been requested already had been filled. In many instances, they were required to wait for long periods before there were other vacancies. Overseas requisitions were not giving the War Department sufficient information on which to base its training requirements, and the requirements and replacement rate tables, taken from figures prepared to meet the surgeon's needs, presented inaccurate estimates of losses overseas. In the fall of 1943, when the demand for replacements began to exceed the supply, the Overseas Replacement Branch charted requisitions against availabilities and presented this information to the Movements Section of the Organization and Planning Division of the General Staff, which decided on the number of replacements to be sent to each theater.

After a man finished training at a replacement training center he normally received a furlough for 10 days or 2 weeks before going to the port of embarkation depot, if he was to be shipped overseas as a replacement. Some men complained of the treatment they received saying: "We were herded like sheep," or "We were handled like so many sticks of wood." [81]

[81] Memo, WDGS G1, to DCofS, 23 Jan 45, sub: Handling of Combat Replacements. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

Installations within the United States tried to maintain high morale in men who were en route overseas by reducing the time they were in transit and by the employment of experts in educational orientation whose duty it was to keep soldiers informed. Men who knew the reason for a delay in their travel or the cause of any other unusual incident were less likely to complain than those who did not understand what was happening.

As soon as a replacement arrived at an overseas depot his records were checked by the classification and assignment section of the depot. Temporary records were made out for any of the men whose records were missing. Pay accounts were brought up to date. Trained advisers talked to the men and discussed with them their personal affairs, allotments, insurance, and the welfare of dependents and sought to learn of other matters which might require attention. Medical records were checked and additional immunizations were given if required. If the time was sufficient the men were assigned to depot training companies and received such instruction as appeared appropriate. Replacement depot commanders were responsible that men going overseas were equipped with serviceable combat clothing.[82] When it was specified that training films should be shown to troops prior to their departure for overseas, these films were shown at the depots and entries were made on the service records indicating that the men had seen the showings. The depot was required to determine whether the men had completed all training prescribed by regulations and whether the required entries had been made in the service records. Instructions were given regarding censorship and security.

Depots were responsible that persons sent overseas met War Department standards for overseas duty,[83] but in exercising this responsibility depot staffs of necessity relied to a considerable extent on personnel records, particularly the Form 20's. Errors in these forms caused unnecessary work on the part of the depot staff and sometimes resulted in men repeating training which they had already received but which did not appear on their records. Shipments sometimes were delayed due to the number of errors in records and other administrative deficiencies that had to be corrected. During the early part of the war, some of the troops who passed through the ports were brought to the transports after dark with great secrecy and with no lights permitted on board ship.[84] A few soldiers fainted on the gangway and inspectors decided something should be done to eliminate the danger of nervous shock. The later practice was to have one of the port bands at shipside

[82] WD Pamphlet 29–2, 15 May 44; Memo, MPD, ASF, for TAG, 2 Sep 44; sub: Processing of Replacements Through Personnel Replacement Depots and Ports of Embarkation Prior to Overseas Shipment. ASF 220.7 Gen (2 Sep 44)–17. DRB, TAG.

[83] WD Cir 317, 31 Jul 41.

[84] Statement, Brig Gen Robert W. Berry, 26 Mar 51. HIS-330.14. OCMH.

play while the men were going on board and to have Red Cross representatives serve coffee and doughnuts in an effort to bring relief from the strain of the occasion. The refreshments and music helped morale although some officers feared that they unnecessarily disclosed sailing dates. Others criticized what they regarded as too much "babying," saying actresses and crooners were not needed to make good soldiers.[85]

The depots encountered many difficulties, especially during the early periods of their operations. Inspectors who visited Shenango during May 1943 reported unsatisfactory conditions and complained that the Third Service Command was failing to exercise adequate supervision.[86] The inspector alleged that the depot staff was inadequate and incompetent, that facilities were lacking, and that some replacement training centers had failed to properly train the men and prepare their records, with the result that too much of this work was falling on the depots.[87] Between 19 July and 3 August, it had been necessary for 925 AGF replacements, 59 ASF replacements, and 2 AAF replacements to fire on the range at the replacement depot because their records did not indicate that they had fired the required courses at the replacement training centers. Out of 50 of these men who were interviewed, 10 claimed that they had fired the course but that the results had not been entered in their records.

Army Ground Forces heavy weapons and artillery replacements who had not fired a qualification course with any individual weapon were arriving in considerable numbers. To some extent, this was due to a difference in the interpretation of the regulations, but the Military Training Division of Army Service Forces had issued instructions that all trainees should fire the .30 caliber rifle.

The interior organization of the depots included a receiving regiment or battalion, a shipping regiment or battalion, and several training regiments. Members of the depot staffs frequently were required to work day and night in order to unscramble records, give men their back pay (sometimes several months in arrears), and get them on shipboard, at times within 72 hours after their arrival. There was a shortage of officers in the depots and many of the enlisted men who had been assigned direct from reception centers had received no basic training. There were not enough competent noncommissioned officers to prevent a bad disciplinary situation. After August 1943, when separate depots were established for the Army Ground Forces, considerable improvement was noted.

The Overseas Replacement Depots at Fort Ord and Fort Meade were organized under tables of distribution rather than under the

[85] Statement, Brig. Gen. O. F. Lange (Ret), 16 Jul 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[86] WD, General Council *Minutes*, 31 May 43.
[87] Memo, MTD to CG, ASF, 11 Aug 43, sub: Inspection of Shenango Personnel Replacement Depot by Col. W. C. Bennett. AG 333.1. DRB, TAG.

tables of organization adopted for the depots that were to serve overseas. The Fort Ord Depot started operations with two infantry regiments and a composite regiment. These two regiments received men from the Casual Battalion, provided subsistence and shelter, and did the other things necessary to get them ready for overseas shipment. When Fort Ord was functioning at its maximum capacity of 19,000 men, 7 regiments were in operation.[88]

The Special Service and Finance Sections at the Fort Ord Depot functioned under the S1 Section of the staff, but officers connected with that section recommended that in a future organization of a depot of a similar nature separate staff sections should be established. They believed that the S1 Section should continue to make policies concerning special services and finance, but should not be responsible for the functioning of those facilities.[89]

Incoming replacements reported to a marked and illuminated area designated by the commanding officer of the Casual Company or Battalion. There they were instructed where to leave their bags, were encouraged to clean up, and were furnished with processing tags. They ate in the Casual Battalion mess and were given a brief orientation talk on what was expected of them while they were in the depot. Following the orientation talk, guides directed the new arrivals to the medical building where medical officers checked them for communicable diseases, administered typhus and cholera shots, examined eyes and teeth, and arranged for future appointments when needed. After they had passed through the medical building the men were assembled in groups and guides conducted them to the Receiving Building where the Classification and Assignment Section was located. As each man reported, the date was stamped on a card, previously prepared, showing the time of his expected arrival. The man was given his records which he then took to an interviewer. After the conclusion of the interview, he went to the assignment desk where he turned in his records and was assigned to one of the depot companies, the assignment being noted on his records.

From the Receiving Building, guides took the men to the Mileage and Rations Sections, then to the Bonds, Allotments, and Insurance Section. After passing through these sections, the men again were assembled into groups and the guides directed them back to the Casual Battalion where they were separated into regimental groups in areas marked for each regiment. Regimental guides then conducted each group to the regiment to which it was assigned.

Training companies issued bedding, clothing, and equipment as needed. After experimenting with a number of training methods, the

[88] Operational Report, Repl Depot No. 2, Fort Ord, Cal., Sep 43–May 46, pp. 1–5. AG Files (Master No. 29394). DRB, TAG.

[89] *Ibid.*, an. 23, p. 3.

Fort Ord Depot, early in 1944, organized training committees which were under direct control of depot headquarters. The number of committees varied from time to time as the system was flexible and permitted wide fluctuations in numbers. The use of the committee system enabled instructors to master details of the particular subjects in which they specialized. Training for each man normally started on the third day after he arrived in the depot and continued until 3 days prior to his departure. Replacements remained in the depot at Fort Ord for an average of about 3 weeks.

The commanding generals of the Ground and Service Forces in October 1943 directed a survey of replacements who were being sent overseas, and Brig. Gen. Elliot D. Cooke, Col. Ralph C. Bing, and Lt. Col. Curtis L. Williams made a check during the period 14–23 October 1943. They reported Army Ground Forces replacements made the best showing in appearance, discipline, deportment, and preparation of records. Army Service Forces were next and Army Air Forces last.[90]

The report noted that the discipline, training, and morale of all replacements sent overseas during the previous few months had improved. Each major component was operating its own replacement depots and a spirit of competition had developed. However, the depots' staffs found it difficult to give training in the widely diversified specializations which characterized the Army Service Forces.

The report said preembarkation furloughs had reduced the number of AWOL'S and since the embarkation ceremonies, including music and refreshments, had been inaugurated there had been an improvement in the spirit, conduct, and physical appearance of the troops.

The inspectors reported that the Army Ground Forces replacement training camps apparently had given the men greater familiarity with their weapons, increased their spirit, and improved their morale. Some of the defects observed included an overbearing attitude on the part of some replacements who were said to be difficult to control and who were accused of exerting a poor influence on the morale and welfare of others.

Some men who had high spirits and good *esprit de corps*, nevertheless, constantly demanded special treatment and privileges and sometimes refused to comply with standard operating procedure. There were instances of lack of courtesy toward port personnel who were attempting to carry out War Department regulations.

The inspectors recommended that replacement training centers adhere more rigidly to War Department orders regarding preparation for overseas movement, that replacements spend less time in

[90] Memo, TAG for DCofS, 27 Oct 43, sub: Comparison of Replacements Being Sent Overseas by the Major Components of the Army. IG 333.9–Overseas Replacement System. DRB, TAG.

pools or staging areas, and that men who were due to depart for depots or staging areas be instructed regarding the need for cooperation with those agencies which were handling embarkation.

On 4 October 1943, Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen, chief of staff of Army Ground Forces, in commenting on observations made by General McNair and other officers after inspection trips to replacement training centers and port of embarkation depots, enumerated three factors to which he attributed much of the criticism which had been leveled against the replacement system.[91] These were (1) many of the replacements who went overseas were not products of the replacement training centers but were casuals who had gone AWOL or who for other reasons had failed to leave with their units; (2) many men who had been trained for certain tasks had been misassigned when they reached units; (3) there was a letdown in training after men left replacement training centers and before they reached units.

General McNair visited the replacement depot at Fort Meade in May 1944 and reported he was pleased by its efficiency in handling approximately 40,000 replacements during April with no letup of training and with no apparent drop in morale.[92] Experience at the depot indicated that men from replacement training centers had records and equipment which were in better condition than those coming from units, but the difference was not great. Most of the rejections for physical reasons that were made at the depot appeared to be the result of differences of opinion or interpretation on the part of medical officers. Men in the depot gave every indication of good morale and questionnaires indicated that most of them believed they had had proper and sufficient training for the task ahead of them.

Of the 17,500 men who were in the Fort Meade replacement depot on 6 March 1944, the greater part of those who were trained as infantry had been there less than 30 days.[93] Many of those assigned to the other arms had been there for a longer period. Of 2,200 armored forces replacements, about half had been in the depot longer than 30 days and some had been there between 50 and 60 days. Artillery and armored forces replacements moved more slowly than infantry and there was a tendency for the slower moving categories to accumulate in the depot. Out of 4,000 men being shipped on 8 March 1944, there were 3,400 who had been in the depot less than 15 days while more than 1,000 had been there less than 5 days. Normally a replacement not assigned to an overseas shipment who had been present for duty at a depot for over 30 days and for whom assignment to a shipment could not be foreseen within a total of 45 days would be reassigned.

[91] WD, General Council *Minutes*, 4 Oct 43.
[92] *Ibid.*, 8 May 44.
[93] *Ibid.*, 13 Mar 44.

Every effort was made to operate depots so as to assure a rapid turn over of personnel.[94]

The replacement system organizations were responsible for the men who were waiting in depots or other installations; training programs were essential but frequently were hampered by the fact that there were too many men in the installations for efficient operations.[95] Although it was desirable to reduce the time lag in the replacement system it was necessary to approach the problem with the objective of eliminating waste time only. Time which was spent in needed training, conditioning, and orientation could not be considered wasted even though it sometimes was expensive from the immediate point of view of manpower and troop basis. Effective training and proper orientation was likely to reduce casualties and increase effectiveness of the men once they entered combat. Usually the men would be assigned to a shipment within a week or two after their arrival in the depot. The final 2 days would be spent in a checkup of records, clothing, and individual equipment appropriate for the theater in which the man was to serve. After the completion of this checking, the men would depart for a staging area where their stay usually was brief.

When overseas shipments became larger and more numerous they usually were organized into provisional groups under replacement officers. Many of the men who arrived overseas voiced dissatisfaction with their treatment and commanders complained that they were receiving men whose morale was low.

Overseas shipments of casuals normally were accompanied by escort officers who were appointed by the depots but who came under the command of the commanding general of the port of embarkation as soon as they reached the port. The Escort Section of Replacement Depot No. 2, Fort Ord, Calif., was composed of 8 lieutenant colonels and 20 majors.[96] It operated under the S3 Section of the depot staff. After replacements were delivered to overseas destinations the escort officers returned to the depot. Following their return, they submitted reports to the depot commander and to the commanding general, Army Ground Forces, showing any replacements lost during shipment, conduct on shipboard, training given during the voyage, condition of equipment and records, health and morale, and other pertinent facts.

Processing Centers

Army Service Forces processing centers were established in July 1943 at Camp McQuade, Calif., and Camp Edwards, Mass. The names of these installations were purposely selected to give no hint of their

[94] WD Cir 427, 2 Nov 44.

[95] Memo, G3 to CofS, 11 Jan 45, sub: Observations on Replacement System in European Theater of Operations. G3 220 (5 Jan 45). DRB, TAG.

[96] Operations Report, 2d Repl Depot, Sep 43–May 46. AG Files (Master No. 29596). DRB, TAG.

function, which was to receive men absent without leave from units moved overseas. It was estimated that during the period of peak overseas shipments as many as 10,000 men were absent from organizations. Absentees apprehended east of the Mississippi River were sent to Edwards; those west of the Mississippi to McQuade.

Each case was investigated and, when circumstances warranted, referred to an appropriate court martial. The camp officers found that instructors with special qualifications were necessary to train men under restraint with any degree of success. Most of the men received were of low mentality and had little interest in learning. Orientation was stressed in an effort to improve morale, and instruction was given in weapons but under close supervision. Instructors attempted to inspire good soldierly qualities in the men.

General prisoners transferred from the processing centers were sent to rehabilitation centers or disciplinary barracks. All others were transferred to ports or staging areas for assignment to active duty, transferred to units for service within the United States only, or discharged under applicable articles of war.[97]

The processing center on the West Coast was most active in its efforts to send men overseas. Sentences usually were remitted at sea, but pink slips attached to service records informed officials of overseas depots that the men had been charged with absence without leave. Overseas depots removed the pink slips so that there would be no stigma against the man in the unit that received him, but many organizations objected to receiving former AWOL's as replacements.

Enlisted men under 19 years of age who had not received 6 months' training upon reaching the processing centers were normally transferred to the nearest personnel replacement depot of the major force concerned.[98] Some of the investigations conducted at Camps McQuade and Edwards revealed deficiencies in personnel administration at other camps and brought about corrections.

After V-J Day, when it no longer was necessary to force some men into hazardous service, there were few arrivals at the processing centers. In August 1945, only 800 were received at Camp Edwards compared with 2,000 in January of that year. The need for the centers had disappeared and they were discontinued.[99]

Reassignment and Redistribution Stations

The War Department, in January 1944, established personnel reassignment centers at Camp Butner in North Carolina, Camp White

[97] 1st SvC, History of Military Training, 1 Jan–30 Jun 45. AG 220.3. DRB, TAG.

[98] Memo, Hq ASF for TAG, 9 Jul 45, sub: Disposition instructions for AGF and AAF absentee personnel less than 19 years of age from processing centers. ASF/370.5 (29 Jun 45)–170. DRB, TAG.

[99] Memo, Hq 1st SvC for TAG, 21 Sep 45, sub: Elimination of East Coast Processing Center. ASF 323.3. DRB, TAG.

in Oregon, and at Fort Sam Houston in Texas.[100] On 15 February 1944, these centers came under the control of the respective service commands and The Adjutant General started ordering to them convalescent battle casualties, men who had returned for rotation, and other surplus personnel. Army Ground Forces transferred to the reassignment centers enlisted men who were not physically fit for service in any of the arms. AGF liaison officers were placed on duty at the centers to recommend assignments for AGF personnel.

The War Department, on 12 May 1944, directed that all men returning from overseas theaters on rotation, including those who were recovering from wounds, would pass through personnel reassignment centers. Those who returned to the United States but remained on the records of overseas theaters were sent to reception stations rather than reassignment stations, regardless of the number of days delay en route which had been granted them.

By June 1944, the increased flow of personnel through the reassignment stations caused Army Ground Forces to require liaison officers to prepare availability reports showing the number of men available for assignment in the various categories.[101] These included (1) returnees under the rotational policy; (2) convalescents released from hospitals; and (3) returnees who did not come under the rotation policy. Enlisted men were assigned physical profiles and were given assignments considered appropriate in view of their previous experience and physical conditions, a considerable number going to Army Ground Forces overhead installations. Separate reports were made covering repatriated or escaped prisoners of war. Reception stations ceased to assign men to organizations effective 12 May 1944.

In August 1944, the mission of redistribution stations was declared to be:

> . . . to obtain maximum utilization of personnel of the AGF and ASF returned to the United States from overseas stations for reassignment, by painstaking occupational and physical classification, mental and physical reconditioning, orientation, reindoctrination, and appropriate reassignment, carried on without haste in an environment characterized by physical relaxation and comfort.[102]

Physical relaxation and comfort were obtained by leasing large hotels. Redistribution stations started operating at Miami Beach, Fla., and Santa Barbara, Calif., on 24 August; at Asheville, N. C., and Hot Springs, Ark., on 5 September; at Lake Placid, N. Y., on 8 September; at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and Camp Butner, N. C., on

[100] Memo, WDAGO, 26 Jan 44, sub: Personnel Reassignment Centers. W600–44. DRB, TAG; Memo, WDAGO 24 May 44, sub: Assignment of Personnel to War Department Personnel Reassignment Centers. W600–44. DRB, TAG.

[101] Ltr, AGF, 6 Jun 44, sub: Availability Reports of EM for AGF Arms from PRC's. AG 200.01/2. DRB, TAG.

[102] WD Cirs 303 and 345, 1944.

15 November; and at Atlantic City, N. J., on 15 December. The Air Forces had been operating similar places for some time.

By June 1945, the expense involved in maintaining these establishments [103] and the fact that more men were returning than could be accommodated made it necessary to adopt some other method. Nine replacement battalions were formed to perform the services which had been the function of the redistribution stations. The hotels gradually were returned to their civilian owners, the ones used for returned prisoners of war being the last to cease operations.[104] After 25 August 1945, no more orders were issued assigning returnees to hotel-type redistribution stations. The Secretary of War ordered that all such hotels be returned to their owners by 15 November 1945. Thereafter post-type facilities were used for the convalescents and others entitled to rest and recuperation.

Replacement Depots, Battalions, and Companies

Experiments with the replacement system conducted during the Louisiana and Carolina maneuvers in 1942 indicated the need for a better procedure for the administration of personnel replacement depots and in the methods of preparing requisitions. These experiences were reflected in a number of changes in the manuals and tables of organization.[105] Depots which supported the overseas forces were organized with a headquarters and two or more replacement battalions, each battalion containing three or four companies with capacities of about three hundred replacements per company.[106] During World War II, convoys, carrying thousands of replacements, arrived at irregular intervals, sometimes making it necessary for the replacement strength of companies to be expanded to 1,500 or more. Most of the depot commanders complained of a serious shortage of transportation.

Three replacement depots and 10 replacement battalions, the first to be formed, were activated in March 1942.[107] They were located at camps widely dispersed throughout the United States, and training was conducted largely by means of instruction on the job. The Operations and Training Division of the Adjutant General's Office prepared a 13-week mobilization training program which was adopted in June 1943 and revised in November of that year to provide for 17 weeks of training.[108]

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[103] Following the war, OCE, WD, investigated the operation of 13 hotels as redistribution stations and reported that total cost including rehabilitation of property in a number of instances, amounted to $4,589,974. The capacity of these hotels was 6,424 and the report indicated the cost per man, assuming capacity operation, was about $72.

[104] Ltr, AGF, 26 Jun 45, sub: Replacement Battalions. AG 320.2/370 (R). DRB, TAG.

[105] FM 101–10.

[106] FM 101–1, Jul 51, sec. VIII, par. 73, p. 58.

[107] T/O & E 20–42–45–47, 1 May 39, 1 Apr 42, and 31 Aug 43.

[108] MTP 20–5, 30 Jun 43 and MTP 20–105, 8 Nov 43.

Some of the first depots that were organized were sent overseas within 20 days after they received their personnel. The replacement battalions and companies, which were subordinate organizations to the depots, frequently were required to engage in activities not directly connected with replacements and which, according to complaints from the organizations, interfered with training programs.[109] When there was not sufficient time to activate, train, and transport replacement organizations overseas so that they would arrive in a theater of operations by the time they were needed, theater commanders were authorized to activate units within the theaters using personnel already available to them.

The Adjutant General, 105 days prior to the date of activation of a replacement depot, published a War Department activation letter, copies of which were sent to The Surgeon General and the Chief of Chaplains who designated personnel from their respective services and issued orders so that they would arrive at the depot on D −4. The commanding officer, executive officer, adjutant, classification and assignment officer, coordinating officer, and supply officer were selected 90 days prior to the activation date of a depot and at the same time the battalion commanders and the battalion executive officers were named. The depot commander, 60 days prior to the activation of the depot he was to command, received the names of key officers who were to be assigned to him along with their records and he was invited to make such comments as he desired. Fifty days prior to the activation date, orders were issued to the depot commander and staff, to the battalion commanders, and to key enlisted men directing them to report on D −40 to a designated operating replacement depot where they remained on temporary duty for 21 days, reporting to their activation station on D −7. The remainder of the officers and the cadre arrived by D −4. Organization of the depot was expected to be completed by D +10, and by D +30 the unit was expected to be ready to move to an intensive training area or to a port of embarkation where it would work with an operating depot until such time as it was ordered overseas.

Personnel replacement depots serviced field and base units outside the United States, maintaining a reservoir of personnel from which combat and service units could draw replacements who had the qualifications needed to fill vacancies. These depots carried on all of the classification procedures used at reception centers, corrected any mistakes which appeared on qualification cards or other records, and added any pertinent information to the records which had not previ-

[109] WDAGO, Training of Units Conducted by the Adjutant General's Department (Jul 39–Jun 44), I, p. 7. 4–1 CE. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

ously been included. Depots were responsible for accurate accounting of personnel, psychological consultations, and for the maintenance of personnel records.[110]

The classification section was concerned with all persons passing through the depot except those casuals who were required to return to their former units. This section checked all records as soon as they were received in the depot, examining entries on the qualification cards, service records, locator cards, and other forms to see that they all agreed and accurately reflected the soldier's military qualifications and other facts relative to his assignment.

The Personnel Consultant was assigned to the Classification and Assignment Division of the depot, and one of his principal functions was the recommendation of appropriate assignments for limited service men. Most of his work had to do with neuropsychiatric cases. After the Registration Section turned over to the Classification Section the records of new arrivals and after the medical reports of hospital board proceedings had been added, the consultants checked through these papers, conducted interviews with the men, and then recommended assignments or further hospitalization.

General assignment men were given duties for which they had been prepared, but limited assignment men generally were those who no longer were physically or mentally able to continue to perform the duties for which they had been trained. They had to start all over again. The depots attempted to find jobs in which limited assignment men would be of maximum usefulness to the Army, but which they could do with a minimum of retraining and readjustment. Depot classification officers reinterviewed and retested all men who were due for limited assignments before preparing new qualification cards. The soldier's background and military experience were carefully considered.

An Officers' Section received and maintained the records of all officers who passed through each depot. Some officers were designated by higher headquarters for particular assignments, while the depots determined the assignments of other officers. Requisitions for officers from combat or service units usually specified the qualifications desired, specified the branch of service wanted, and stated the appropriate grade. Whenever possible, those officers selected for assignments were the ones who met the desired qualifications, who had had the longest overseas service without an assignment, and who had backgrounds which indicated they would be of value to the units receiving them.

Daily records of replacements received and shipped provided the information which was needed in the preparation of daily strength

[110] *Ibid.*, II.

reports normally distributed to base sections, theaters of operations, forward and rear army groups, and to certain officers within the depot.

From 1 March 1942 until 30 June 1944, there were 14 replacement depots organized within the United States and 9 formed overseas. In August 1943, separate tables of organization for replacement battalions were published and some of the battalions formed after that date operated separately rather than as components of replacement depots. There were 83 replacement battalions formed in the United States and 19 organized overseas prior to 30 June 1944. During this same period, 272 replacement companies were formed in the United States and 90 were formed overseas.[111]

[111] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–21.

CHAPTER XIV


WORLD WAR II REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS OVERSEAS

Growth by Trial and Error

Overseas replacement systems were established under the provisions of section II, chapter VIII, FM 100–10, which provided for a system of requisitioning within theaters of operations and from those theaters to the War Department. The War Department determined the strength of the replacement pool maintained by each overseas command and officials in Washington were responsible for forwarding from the United States sufficient replacements to keep those pools filled. During the early part of the war, the War Department failed to give overseas commanders the direction and supervision that would have resulted in the establishment and operation of uniform replacement systems. Early replacement operations, as a consequence, were worked out by trial and error.

Each theater developed its own replacement policy until the War Department directive of 4 May 1944 brought about greater uniformity in organization. Following the receipt of this directive the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) established the Replacement Command; South Pacific Area organized its Replacement Training Command which later served Pacific Ocean Areas (POA); the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater formed the Replacement Service; the North African Theater of Operations, which had already established the Replacement Command, made such changes as were necessary to comply with the directive; and the European Theater of Operations revised its organization which became known as the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command. [Chart 11 indicates the extent of the worldwide replacement pipeline that served the training commands. Replacement depots underwent frequent transfers and reorganizations which cannot be indicated. Numbers shown pertain to periods of active operations in each area.]

Complete uniformity never was achieved; it probably was impractical in areas so widely separated and operating under different conditions. Relations with the Army Air Forces differed in the various theaters. The commander of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command in Europe coordinated plans for ground and air replacements, but Air Forces replacement depots were independent of the Ground Forces. In the Mediterranean theater Army Ground Forces replace-


CHART II - REPLACEMENT PIPELINES - WORLD WAR II
Alaskan
Repl Bn
GF
Reinf Comd
ETOUSA
16 Repl Deps
Repl &
Sch Comd
Tng Camps
Overseas Deps
Repl Serv
C-B-I
5 Repl Deps
Repl Tng Comd
POA
3 Repl Deps
T Repl Comd
SWPA
5 Repl Deps
Repl & Tng Comd
NATOUSA-MTOUSA
5 Repl Deps
To C-B-I

ment battalions sent men to the Air Forces ground crews, but men for air crews were replaced through Army Air Forces channels. A replacement battalion attached administratively to the Replacement Training Command, POA, provided men for Army Air Forces ground crews; but the Air Forces headquarters issued the assignment directives and air crews passed through Army Air Forces channels. The Army Air Forces operated an independent replacement system in the Southwest Pacific Area.

Life on shipboard was likely to leave a man in need of rigorous physical conditioning which could best be accomplished in the overseas depots. The large replacement training depots in each theater were intended to take troops fresh from the United States and give them the specialized training necessary to acquaint them with the climate, the terrain, and the enemy.

Port of debarkation depots as well as stockage and training depots normally were under the control of base sections, which in turn were installations under theater Services of Supply. Depots were operated in both the Communications Zone and the combat zones, with the control exercised by the commanders of Communications Zone installations frequently reaching up to the depots in the combat zones.

The amount of training and physical conditioning that could be given to each theater was determined by the tactical situation and the need for men with particular qualifications. Men remained in the replacement depots until they were requisitioned to fill vacancies in units or installations. There were many advantages to be gained from the assignment of new arrivals to units as quickly as possible. It was not desirable to lengthen the training period at the depots. A man normally was assigned first to an army depot, after which he moved forward in the replacement system to smaller units such as corps, division, regiment, battalion, and company.

Commanders of forward combat units complained that they received too many of the poorer men and that the good ones were diverted to service units. Theater commanders denied War Department approval to activate service units sometimes were said to have used replacements to form provisional units in lieu of the ones that had been refused. Base commanders were accused of delaying the assignment of replacements because they wanted to retain them in depots and assign them to labor details.

Commands in the Pacific

There were two major echelons of command involved in the advance of United States forces across the Pacific. The first of these originated in the Hawaiian Islands and operated under the tactical direction of the naval commander of the area, Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, with Lt.

Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., commanding the military forces. The second was under General of the Army Douglas MacArthur who established headquarters in Australia and advanced through the southwest Pacific.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hawaiian Department was extended to include Christmas, Palmyra, and the Johnston Islands. On 14 August 1943, United States Army Forces in Central Pacific Area (USAFCPA) was formed, taking over many of the functions of the Hawaiian Department which thereafter became largely a "paper" organization. American forces in New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, Santa Cruz, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Cook, and the Society Islands were organized into the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA). On 1 August 1944, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA) superseded United States Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area and incorporated in addition all Army forces that had been included in the South Pacific Area. From 1 July 1945 until 1 February 1947, United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific (USAFMIDPAC), operated with administrative responsibility to the commanding general, United States Army Forces, Pacific (General MacArthur) and with logistic responsibility to commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (Admiral Nimitz).

General MacArthur commanded the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), including Australia and the waters to the south, the Philippine Islands, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, the Netherlands East Indies (except Sumatra), and the Solomon Islands, a command which operated until 2 September 1945. On 6 April 1945, United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), under General MacArthur, absorbed United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) as well as certain units of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas. This AFPAC command continued until 1 January 1947 when the Far East Command (FECOM) took over United States forces in the Pacific.

In January 1943, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, then commanding Third Army, was instructed to form an army headquarters for service in Australia. The Sixth Army, which he formed as a task force, was in operation by April 1943 and included the 41st and 32d Divisions and certain other assigned troops scattered over a wide area.

Tenth Army was organized 20 June 1944 to operate directly under the commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., it invaded Okinawa in April 1945. Units of the Tenth Army included the XXIV Corps made up of the 7th, 77th, 96th, and 27th Divisions, the III Amphibious Corps, including the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, and one RCT, 2d Marine Division.

Eighth Army Headquarters, activated 10 June 1944, arrived at Hollandia, New Guinea, 4 September 1944, and on 7 September 1944, Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, who previously had commanded I Corps, assumed command. Eighth Army landed in Leyte, Philippine Islands, in December 1944 and assumed responsibility for the completion of the Leyte operation.

The Central Pacific Area

The first replacements sent to Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor arrived in June 1942. Although the Hawaiian Department Classification and Assignment Section checked their personnel records, the men were staged and administered by the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions.[1] These two understrength divisions were so scattered throughout the Islands that they found it difficult to receive and assign large numbers of men.

The Post Casual Detachment, organized in July 1942, established a staging area, reception center, and a reassignment center. Replacements were coming from the United States in groups of about 5,000 and men who had been on task force missions were returning for reassignment.

In September 1942, after it was learned that the War Department expected to send approximately 12,500 replacements to Hawaii within a short period, the Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot and Training Center, made up of three companies, was established with its personnel coming from the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions.[2] Within this center, Company A assigned filler replacements; Company B operated an officer candidate school, assigned men to task forces, received inductees and other arrivals; while Company C was responsible for reclassification.

On 19 July 1943, Brig. Gen. Leonard R. Boyd, Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, directed that a study be made concerning a new area for the training center. Another location was selected and work was started on permanent buildings. The 13th Replacement Depot was authorized in August 1943 and was formally activated in November.[3] The 13th Replacement Depot was separated from the Army Port and Service Command and became a major echelon of the Central Pacific Area on 20 January 1944.[4] By the end of 1944, more than 3,000 men had received basic training; the depot had expanded its facilities to accommodate about 4,000 replacements; it had inducted 7,750, and had dispatched 50,000 replacements, OCS


[1] History 13th Repl Depot, 1944. AG Files REDE 13-0. (Master No. 13979). DRB, TAG.
[2] Hq Hawaiian Dept, GO 181, 19 Nov 42.
[3] CPA, GO 163, 1 Nov 43.
[4] CPA, GO 16, 15 Jan 44.

personnel, men on furlough, rotation personnel, and miscellaneous groups.

AGF and ASF replacements going to the Central Pacific Area passed through the 13th Replacement Depot under which were operating the 73d, 74th, 75th, 76th, and 77th Battalions. The buildings at the 13th Replacement Depot included barracks, messhalls, showers, latrines, training buildings, headquarters buildings, and a post exchange building, all of which were permanent type structures and superior to those in many other areas of the Pacific.

There was a shortage of transportation because regular trips to airfields about 25 miles distant and to weapons training areas 8 miles distant were necessary in addition to normal transportation demands. There were not enough drivers and some replacements were assigned to the motor pool. A provisional truck company had been recommended to fill the transportation needs of the depot but had not been provided. The efficiency of some of the companies and of the headquarters was reduced because men were required to work in the Army post office, post exchange, finance detachments, and in a number of other positions which were not provided for in the depot T/O.

Training facilities included ranges for the rifle, hand grenade, mortar and machinegun, for infiltration, and close combat, as well as obstacle courses, an amphibious training platform, a bayonet course, a



Jungle Training School, Central Pacific Area, 1943.

military sanitation area, a gas chamber, and a gas identification area. The Waimanalo and Waianae Amphibious Training Centers and the unit jungle training center at Kaaawa were used. One week of amphibious and 1 week of jungle training were prescribed for all replacements.

Liaison officers from the 13th Replacement Depot were required to be present at the dock when casuals arrived in Honolulu and it was the practice to dispatch an additional officer to the vessel for the records. The commanding general, Army Port and Service Command, was responsible for the movement of casuals from the dock, but this responsibility terminated once the men had arrived at the 13th Replacement Depot. Trucks from the 13th Replacement Depot motor pool transported hold baggage from the dock to the depot.[5]

All men inducted through Selective Service in the Territory of Hawaii during the early part of the war and who received their basic instruction in the Islands were trained in the 13th Replacement Depot which was required to perform functions handled by induction stations, reception centers, and replacement training centers in the United States. These functions had not been contemplated for a replacement depot by the War Department when it adopted T/O & E 20–42 under which the depots were organized. In order to give a 13-week basic infantry training course for inductees the depot used replacement personnel to augment its staff, but, even with these additional men, it was necessary to tie down two or more battalions which could not be used for their normal functions while they were training inductees. The depot also formed special training units to give added instruction to the illiterates, non-English-speaking and Grade V men who made up about 20 percent of those called by Selective Service in the Islands. There was a special training company under the Hawaiian Department Reserve but it could handle only about 180 men, most of whom came from units.

There was no well-planned, continuous personnel audit system, but classification teams working with division classification officers accomplished some excellent results on a small scale. A personnel utilization board, CPA, of eight officers, was established on 5 June 1944 to consider assignments of enlisted men in relation to their physical capacity.

When Army Air Forces filler replacements arrived in the Central Pacific Area they were immediately assigned to the Seventh Air Force without going through the 13th Replacement Depot. They were placed in a staging area for housing and messing and grouped by AGCT scores broken down by specification serial numbers. The practice followed in making assignments to units was not strictly in com-

[5] Ltr, Hq USAFCPA to 13th Repl Depot, 5 Apr 44, sub: Procedure in Handling of Casuals. AG 322. DRB, TAG.

pliance with War Department instructions issued on 4 May 1944: the A–1 of the Seventh Air Force Staff determined the priorities of AAF units to receive replacements and the men were assigned according to shortages indicated by the statistical control report. War Department instructions were that this function should be performed by a central command.

The South Pacific Area

The first units to arrive in the South Pacific area received replacements direct from the United States, but the need for centralized replacement establishments within the area soon was recognized.[6] The 6th Replacement Depot and five replacement battalions were formed at the New Orleans Staging Area, 10 December 1942; the 24th and 25th Battalions arrived in New Caledonia, 22 April 1943, with a strength of 18 officers, 115 enlisted men, and 900 replacements each. Camp was established about 21 miles from Noumea. The headquarters and headquarters company of the depot arrived in New Caledonia with the 26th Replacement Battalion on 13 May 1943, at which time the commanding officer, Service Command, APO 502, was relieved of depot administration and Col. J. Frank Richmond assumed command. Two weeks later, the 27th Battalion reached New Caledonia and on 20 June the 28th Battalion arrived. In September 1943, a detachment of Company A of the 28th Replacement Battalion departed for the advanced depot on Guadalcanal and was later followed by the entire 28th Battalion.

The Casual Camp, which was established nearer to Noumea than the depot, was operated by the Service Command and provided a labor pool for the port. Depot officials complained that the demand on the camp for laborers was delaying the dispatch of replacements to the field, and on 6 September 1943 it was placed under depot control, being known thereafter as the 6th Replacement Depot Staging Area. This change enabled the depot commander to exercise greater control over the assignment of men to work details.

Base commanders in the Pacific complained that they did not have enough service troops although for each division of about 15,000 men twice that number of service troops were sent to the Pacific Area.[7] Only four ports in the South Pacific Area had docking facilities. Terminals had to be constructed at all other beach points used for handling cargo and in many instances all of the work had to be performed by soldiers, sailors, or marines. Some base commanders were criticized because their establishments were considered too elaborate, but in any

[6] USAF in the South Pacific Area during World War II (30 Mar 42–1 Aug 44), ch. VIII. 8–5.7 BA. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

[7] M. Matloff and E. M. Snell, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare* in U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington 1953), ch. XV.

event combat troops had to do the work whenever service troops were not available. The most obvious place to get labor details was from the depots and staging areas. Regardless of the necessity of the labor they were performing, men diverted from replacement depots could not fill the vacant ranks in combat units.

From August until December 1943, the depot sent replacements direct to XIV Corps on Guadalcanal without requisitions, except for specialists. Men who arrived in New Caledonia passed through the depot there and were then assigned in bulk to XIV Corps which distributed them to the 25th, 37th, and 43d Infantry Divisions. After December 1943, the San Francisco Port of Embarkation shipped a number of replacements direct to Guadalcanal.

The flow of officer and enlisted replacements through the 6th Replacement Depot totaled about 10,000 monthly by March 1944. Casualties were light in the theater, and as the camps became more healthful, losses from disease were so reduced that there were more men in the depot than could be assigned. The 6th Replacement Depot housed men in tents. Bathing and swimming facilities were improvised by building a dam across a stream which ran through the camp and efforts were made to provide the quick laundry service needed by casuals.

Training was a secondary function of the depot, but by 1944 it became apparent that it should receive more stress, particularly in view of the frequent delays in forward movements caused by the lack of ships and the consequent necessity to keep men in the depot for longer periods. Also more men not physically able to return to combat units were coming out of hospitals and their placement required considerable time, a situation which further increased the depot population. In an effort to meet this training requirement, enlisted men were given practice on towed targets with antiaircraft machineguns and they also fired familiarization courses with other weapons. Officers received instruction in basic subjects, range practice with .30 caliber weapons, instruction with Japanese weapons, and physical training.

Inspectors who visited the depot in July 1944 pointed out that 13,000 men were in an installation designed to hold 5,000; that only limited facilities existed for cleanliness and recreation; that training was monotonous and poorly conducted; that range facilities were not used to capacity; and that there was a shortage of competent instructors. Following this inspection, some changes were made in the assignment of officers, and training programs were revised in an effort to correct the alleged deficiencies.

Effective 1 March 1944, the companies of the five replacement bat talions which had been designated by letters were redesignated and numbered from 412 to 426, the depot band was redesignated as the

396th ASF Band, and the depot medical detachment was inactivated and reorganized into medical detachments for each of the five battalions. The South Pacific Replacement and Training Command, organized in New Caledonia effective 20 June 1944, following its activation administered the 6th Replacement Depot and its subordinate units. Subsequent to the reorganization of USAFISPA and SOS SPA in 1945, the Replacement and Training Command was removed from the command of South Pacific Base Command and was placed under United States Army Forces in Pacific Ocean Areas. Units assigned included 6th Replacement Depot; 396th ASF Band; 1729 Engineer Utilities Detachment; 291 Army Postal Unit; Headquarters and Headquarters Company, South Pacific Replacement and Training Command; Headquarters, South Pacific Training Center; and 5101 Mess Team.

The Southwest Pacific Area

Early Organization

Headquarters, United States Forces in Australia (USFIA) was established in Melbourne 22 December 1941, immediately after the arrival of a South Pacific Task Force which had been formed in the United States. This headquarters was redesignated as United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) on 5 January 1942.[8] The United States troops who arrived in Australia in 1941 and early in 1942 assumed that their mission would be confined to the operation of ships carrying supplies to the Philippines, or that they would organize sporadic efforts to relieve the units fighting in those islands. Some thought was given to delaying actions which might be carried out in the Netherlands East Indies. There was no early indication that Australia would receive a large number of troops or become an important headquarters; this first became evident when Gen. Douglas MacArthur was appointed commander in chief of SWPA in April 1942 and preparations were made for an intensive campaign.

General MacArthur had five subordinate commands—Allied Land Forces, Allied Air Forces, Allied Naval Forces, United States Army Forces in Australia, and United States Army Forces in the Philippines. Each of the Allied nations (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia) was responsible for administration of its own troops, but the combat employment of all troops was under SWPA.

General MacArthur established his headquarters initially in Melbourne, but on 20 July 1942, as operations were starting in New Guinea, it was transferred to Brisbane and the United States Army Services

[8] Ltr, SWPA, 19 Apr 42, sub: Mission of U. S. Army Forces in Australia. AG 323.362. AG–M. DRB, TAG.

of Supply (USASOS) assumed administrative and supply functions and became in effect a Communication Zone headquarters.

The replacement system in the Southwest Pacific grew up within the theater. It was not planned by the War Department. During 1942–43, the European theater had higher priority and Southwest Pacific appeals for decisions, for experienced staff officers, and for units or equipment frequently were unfilled.

The 1st and 2d Replacement Depot Headquarters, which became the 4th and 5th Replacement Depot Headquarters in November 1942, were the first such units formed in Australia and constituted the first elements of the replacement system organized at that time. The 1st and 2d Replacement Battalions, which brought 3,000 replacements from the United States in June 1942, were assigned to the 4th Replacement Depot at Melbourne. During the first 8 months after its arrival, the 5th Replacement Depot had only a headquarters company assigned and many of its key personnel were sent to other units. In January 1943, when the 11th, 12th, 14th, and 15th Replacement Battalions arrived, two were assigned to the 5th Replacement Depot at Brisbane, which then became active, and the other two went to the 4th Replacement Depot.[9]

During the first 2 years after the organization in May 1942 of the Southwest Pacific Area replacement system, replacement depots and battalions operated under base sections of USASOS. Headquarters, USAFFE, after it was organized, exercised policy control. This placed intermediate echelons between G1, USAFFE, and the operating units, a situation which frequently resulted in charges that base section commanders, without reference to higher authority, diverted many of the best men to their units.

The G1 in Headquarters, USAFFE was, in fact, the theater G1. The nominal G1 in GHQ normally handled only such matters as were of particular interest to that headquarters, such as awards and decorations, assignments, Philippine affairs, and psychological warfare. Observers believed that had the theater G1 been established in a proper relation to the SWPA headquarters with rank adequate to his responsibilities and had there been from the very beginning a replacement command on the same level as the other major commands and commanded by a strong, aggressive individual of high rank, much could and would have been done to improve the lot of the replacements.

The theater G1 forwarded requisitions to the War Department and included in each requisition a brief explanation of the various phases of theater development and a statement which stressed personnel

[9] Report of the Replacement Board, bk. III, p. 76. Unless otherwise indicated by footnotes, all the statements in this section are taken from testimony submitted to the Replacement Board.

needs. The War Department decided, however, that such added explanations did not conform to established procedure and ordered them discontinued. The theater G1 experienced difficulty in estimating probable combat losses because he was not always informed of impending operations.

Standard tables of organization did not fit conditions in Australia or on the Islands and it was difficult for Southwest Pacific Headquarters to explain its personnel needs to the War Department. It sometimes seemed to those in Australia that the War Department assumed that the theater had available for duty its complete assigned strength, including men in the pipelines, in replacement depots, those ill in hospitals, on leave, or who otherwise were ineffectives. It was difficult for those in the Zone of the Interior to comprehend the true picture of the vast distances and wide dispersion within the Pacific area.

Organization of USAFFE

As operations advanced, it appeared that USASOS could no longer appropriately handle both administration and supply and on 26 February 1943 United States Army Forces in the Far East was organized as the commander in chief's administrative headquarters, including air. Tactical control remained with GHQ, SWPA.[10] USASOS continued to handle supply and was responsible to USAFFE.[11] The G1 Section was transferred to United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). The section lacked authority comparable to that exercised by the other staff sections. Many personnel functions were handled either by The Adjutant General or G3. It was not until the spring of 1946 that G1 became a fully recognized staff section with authority over personnel policies.

Under USAFFE, which continued until June 1945, personnel administration tended to center in that headquarters while the GHQ, SWPA, made the major decisions concerning shipping, field operations, and supply. USAFFE released replacements to major commands prior to the arrival of the replacements in the theater whenever possible. Major commanders furnished transfer orders for the replacements released to them direct to the replacement depots or battalions concerned, with copies sent to USAFFE and USASOS. Replacements designated for bulk release were held pending receipt of replacement transfer orders and were not included in weekly availability reports to USAFFE.

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[10] Hq USAF, Staff Memo No. 1, 26 Feb 43, sub: Relation of GHQ, SWPA with Hq USAFFE. Copy in Report of Replacement Board, DA, bk. III, p. 63.

[11] Ltr, Hq USAFFE, 26 Feb 43, sub: Allocation and Administrative Functions Within USAFFE. *Ibid.*

Methods of Assignment

The 17th Replacement Battalion with 1,500 replacements arrived in Sydney in February 1943. The replacements were assigned to units through the 4th Replacement depot, while the battalion itself was assigned to the 5th Replacement depot. In Australia during February 1943, requirements for replacements were heavy but there was no pool on which to draw. On 7 February 1943, the 32d Division had received less than 100 replacements out of the 6,000 it had requisitioned. One regiment had available for duty only 600 men out of 3,000 who had gone into combat. From September 1942 until March 1943, the 32d Division received less than 500 replacements.

On 1 March 1943, a group of 70 replacements, the first of a shipment of 1,000 which the 4th Replacement depot had assigned to the 32d Division, arrived at division headquarters. The procedure followed in their assignment to units was typical of the methods of most units in the theater. The depot informed the division by wire of the number of men and their probable time of arrival. They came in a truck convoy and were given a hot meal by the Casual Company while their records were being examined in the Classification and assignment section of the division Adjutant General's Office. Over 10 percent of this group of replacements were noncommissioned officers who filled vacancies which had been intended for men already in the units. This caused serious discontent among those who had just returned from combat. Members of the Classification Section compared qualifications of the men, as shown on their qualification cards, with requests which had been made by units and in some instances interviewed the men to determine their best assignments.

In July 1943, the approximate shortages of replacements in the Southwest Pacific theater were 1,088 officers, 450 warrant officers, and 7,980 enlisted men. That same month the 14th Replacement Battalion moved from Sydney to Townsville for the purpose of supporting operations in New Guinea. In addition to its mission as a replacement battalion it supervised some 600 Chinese laborers and quartered a number of merchant seamen as well as persons who came from New Guinea on leave. In August 1943 the 1st Replacement Battalion moved from Sydney to Rockhampton, Australia, where it served as the 1st Training Center under control of Sixth Army and had the additional mission of rehabilitation of malarial cases. The 15th Replacement Battalion moved from Sydney to Milne Bay, New Guinea, in November.

During the remainder of the war the depots and their battalions served in various places in Australia, New Guinea, and other parts of the theater. Most of the time they were under direct control of various base sections of USASOS. Policies and allocations were

established originally by Headquarters, USASOS, and after 26 February 1943 by Headquarters, USAFFE.

On 25 April 1944, Headquarters, USAFFE assigned the depots and battalions to itself for administration, operation, and control, except for the 91st Replacement Battalion, Army Air Forces, which remained with Fifth Air Force. USASOS retained responsibility for supply and courts-martial jurisdiction. The relationship of the base sections to the replacement depots became similar to that of service commands to exempted installations within the United States. The change was intended to provide centralized control of the replacement system and prevent diversion of replacements.

Activation of the Theater Replacement Command

The Theater Replacement Command, consisting of the 4th Replacement Depot at Milne Bay, the 5th Replacement Depot at Oro Bay, and the 17th Replacement Battalion (separate) at Brisbane was activated in July 1944. Headquarters was at Oro Bay, New Guinea, 1,500 miles from theater headquarters at Brisbane.[12] The great distance between these points provided a difficulty this command had to overcome in order to operate. Its function included accounting for replacements upon their arrival in the theater or upon their shipment from depots, the inspection and supervision of training in the various unit installations and in the 1st Training Center. The command was established as a result of the War Department directive of 4 May 1944.[13] The replacement level first was fixed at 16,000, later was increased to 20,000, and on 2 September 1944, prior to operations in the Philippines, it was increased to 35,000. The War Department in November 1944 rejected the theater's request for a replacement level of 60,000.

When the 21st Replacement Depot arrived from the Zone of the Interior, the 16th Replacement Battalion at Oro Bay was reassigned to it at Hollandia in October 1944. The 4th Replacement Depot with 500 replacements landed at Leyte on 24 October 1944 (D+4) as a part of Sixth Army Service Command. This was the first time in SWPA that a replacement depot rendered support in a combat area. In addition to its regular mission of receiving and processing replacements it accommodated recovered personnel (including Filipinos), acted as a recruiting and training depot for Filipinos desiring to join the new Philippine Army, trained a Filipino replacement unit for this army, and assisted in the establishment of a Philippine

[12] Memo, TAG to CG, USAFFE, 17 May 44, sub: Observations and Recommendations on Classification and Replacement System, USAFFE. AG 350.07 (3 Jun 44). DRB, TAG; Hq USAFFE, GO No. 63, 4 Jul 44.

[13] Ltr, TAG to CG, ETOUSA and others, 4 May 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System. AG 320.2 (29 Apr 44). DRB, TAG.

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Constabulary and the Philippine Scout Detachment. About 5,289 replacements were processed for Sixth Army from 7 November, when the first group arrived, to 25 December, the date on which Eighth Army took over. Approximately 2,000 were sent to XXIV Corps in preparation for the Okinawa invasion.

Organization Prior to the Japanese Surrender

In preparation for the contemplated invasion of South Kyushu and Honshu the Headquarters, United States Army Forces Western Pacific was formed 7 June 1945 to replace the United States Army Services of Supply. In July, the replacement system was made subordinate to the United States Army Forces Western Pacific and thus was placed under a major subordinate command in violation of War Department instructions.[14] Since the former POA replacement system was not entirely discontinued, there were two major commands dealing with replacements—the Replacement Command under AFWESPAC and the Replacement Training Command, under AFMIDPAC. The commanding general of the Replacement Training Command was also theater replacement officer and responsible through G1 to the chief of staff for estimates of replacement requirements and for allocations. There were elements of the replacement system on Oahu, New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Okinawa. There were 4 replacement depots and 17 replacement battalions compared with 3 depots and 9 battalions which had been available under the Southwest Pacific Area.

The replacement system continued to expand and to handle large numbers of replacements until V-J Day. After that date, it devoted its major efforts to readjustment and redeployment being reduced in size after a major portion of the men had been returned to the United States. During the first 6 months of the occupation of Japan one of the most serious problems for units was the frequent reassignments resulting from inactivation of units, rotation of individuals, and the return of individuals for separation.

Depot Operations

Base commanders were responsible for the replacement depots, each of which normally had two or more replacement battalions under its control. The G1 Division of General Headquarters determined priorities for the assignment of replacements. Depots in the Pacific generally performed all of the replacement system missions since the distance involved made it impractical to separate units which supported armies, zones of communications, or performed such functions as stockage, training, or port duties. The replacement depots

[14] *Ibid.*

were located at ports of debarkation and usually were several hundred miles distant from each other, making the transfer of men from one depot to another extremely difficult.

Arrival reports indicated the number of replacements received by arm or service and MOS for each shipment. The G1 Division of theater headquarters then allocated the replacements, which its records showed were available, to the major commands on the basis of most pressing needs. The major commands issued "replacement transfer orders" to lower units. Invariably the allocations fell short of meeting the requirements.

During the early part of the war there were many dispersed nondivisional ground force combat units which submitted requisitions for replacements through Communication Zone channels to theater headquarters, a situation which was relieved somewhat in October 1942 by the arrival of I Corps Headquarters. It was March 1943, when Sixth Army Headquarters arrived in Brisbane, before all ground force units had a clearly defined channel for forwarding requisitions.

Normally, replacements for Sixth Army, USASOS, and 14th Antiaircraft Command were sent to the 4th Replacement Depot, 5th Replacement Depot, or 17th Replacement Battalion (separate). Air Forces replacements were processed by the 91st Replacement Battalion (AAF) or one of its detached companies. Persons released from hospitals who were not immediately returned to their units prior to rest and recuperation went to the 91st Replacement Battalion (AAF) or the nearest detached company of this battalion. Those who arrived at a port at which no replacement unit was located went to a staging area until shipping was available.

Depot commanders frequently found it necessary to transfer enlisted men from one branch or arm of the service to another. Many of the men who arrived at depots had not been paid, some for as long as 5 months, and frequently records were not complete. Generally, the only training undertaken in the depots consisted of such hardening and conditioning as was necessary to get the men in shape after their ocean voyage. Replacement battalions, which had been trained in the United States on the theory that they would operate independently overseas, experienced some difficulty upon arrival in fitting into a depot organization.

Depots frequently could not make adequate plans for receiving shipments because of lack of information. The most efficient method of providing this information was for port of embarkation commanders to dispatch by air mail shipping lists, which had been corrected at the time of the departure of the convoy, so that the lists would reach the depot ahead of the men. In the Philippines, service records of replacements were sent by air to receiving units whenever more than 200 men were involved. The records arrived from 24 to 48 hours ahead

of the replacements thereby simplifying the work of assignment. As late as July 1946 officers at Headquarters United States Army Forces Pacific complained they were not receiving information regarding incoming replacements until the records arrived with the men. The theater requested that ports send copies of rosters and orders via airmail at time of departure of the ships and that the messages include the name of the vessel, shipment numbers, names of individuals, MOS, arm or service, color, and whether Regular Army or other category. This request was approved by the War Department effective 10 August 1946.[15]

Rail transportation, sometimes complicated by changes of gauge in the rail system, was used for the movement of replacements within Australia except where truck movement was simpler. These who went to New Guinea and other overseas points moved by water, a procedure hampered by a serious shortage of vessels. In 1944, the replacement depots were moved to New Guinea, but by that time the combat units were from 400 to 600 miles farther ahead. By the time the replacement installations had moved forward to Hollandia the troops had extended their operations 1,800 miles to Morotai and were preparing for the Leyte assault. At that time, the shortage of replacements was most acute.

Replacement units were performing many extra functions assigned to them by base commanders. During the early months of 1944, the 4th Replacement Depot, for instance, had only the 14th Battalion with 3 companies and 2 additional companies of the 15th Battalion available for replacement duties. The 2d Replacement Battalion, a part of the 4th Replacement Depot, and one company from the 15th Replacement Battalion had been assigned duties not normally contemplated for replacement system units. These extra duties included operation of staging areas, handling of personnel going on furlough, and supervision of casuals or laborers. The shortage of transportation was so acute that some persons had been under orders but awaiting transportation for 2 or 3 months. It was not uncommon for replacement companies, designed to handle 300 men, to have as many as 1,200 assigned.

Replacements frequently spent a month or more on troopships, most of the time in tropical waters under blackout conditions, with all troops below decks after dark and with ships so crowded that men could only go on deck for air in relays. Messes frequently were poor. In the replacement camps, the poor housing, unsatisfactory messing, inadequate bathing and laundry facilities, lack of organization, poor recreational facilities, and the long waiting periods without assignment to permanent organizations lowered the morale of those replacements who managed to hold up during the long sea voyages.

[15] Cable, ZX–09025, CINCAFPAC to WD for WARCOS, 19 Jul 46.



World War II transports.

It was found advisable to send trained personnel teams on each ship to check pay records, classification data, and other papers. Sometimes records were boxed and stored in inaccessible places in the hold of the ship and delay and confusion resulted when they were not available upon debarkation.

Replacement depots in the Pacific frequently found it necessary to build their own camps, construct roads, dig drainage ditches, operate utilities, and do other work normally handled by engineer or utility units. In many instances, buildings were erected from salvage material, the men working with insufficient tools. Frequent moves made additional construction necessary. War Department instructions were

that replacements should be reported as available for assignment immediately after arrival at depots, but during the early days in the theater many replacements upon arrival were required to join labor details and perform heavy work in the holds of ships or on docks before they were acclimated. Members of one group of replacements in the 4th Depot complained not only of sleeping in the mud at night but also of being required during the day to build tent floors for a base unit whose members had sufficient leisure time to stand around and watch while the work was being done.[16] Necessity demanded that every available source of manpower be used for work details. There was some resentment over work details but morale was better when the men were busy. Post exchanges and special services sections aided morale after they were established in depots and separate battalions.[17]

All units operated under adverse conditions in the Pacific. In many instances inspectors reported that replacement depots and battalions did outstanding work considering the lack of centralized control, the vast distances involved, the difficulties of transportation, the necessity for construction work, and the excessive use of replacement personnel on other labor details.[18]

Experiences of Combat Units

Pacific operations frequently were characterized by short, quick strikes which caught the enemy off guard and did not result in heavy casualties for American forces. Task forces seized their objectives, then reorganized their units to be ready for new attacks. Such replacements as were available could be absorbed by units during these periods between operations. The Papuan campaign and the invasion of the Philippines were more extensive and did not offer any opportunity for rest periods. Replacements in significant numbers were not available until July 1944. Prior strength reports had indicated there was a substantial overstrength in the theater, but it had disappeared in the pipelines.

When the Sixth Army arrived in Australia the 32d Division was assembling near Brisbane after the Buna campaign and practically all replacements that could be obtained were assigned to that division in an effort to restore its combat effectiveness; but 10 months later the division was recommitted to action still approximately 2,000 under strength. Throughout all of Sixth Army operations, there never were enough replacements available to send a task force into action at full strength. Frequently replacements were committed to action without the hardening and training that they should have received.

[16] Rpt, Maj. Arthur Y. Lloyd, AG, USAFFE, 17 May 44, sub: Observations and Recommendations on Classification and Replacement System, USAFFE. Copy in Report of the Replacement Board, bk VI, ann. 60.

[17] Rpt., Col. Charles F. Arny, 9th Inf. Div., 24 Sep 1947. *Ibid.*, ann. 67.

[18] Lloyd report, *op. cit.*, par. II.

In Eighth Army, field commanders complained they could not requisition specialists until there were vacancies in their units and the long delay before new men arrived caused serious shortages. Some unit commanders attempted to avoid this difficulty by padding their requisitions, a procedure which made accounting difficult. Almost all replacements required refresher training after their arrival but there were few instances in which combat units in the field could carry out suitable training programs. Strength reports did not correctly reflect the number present for duty until after it was decided to drop evacuees from the report at the time they left the division clearing stations. During the readjustment period in 1945–46, strength declined so rapidly that many units were skeletonized. It frequently was necessary to maintain service-type units at 75 percent of authorized strength at the expense of combat-type units which dropped considerably below that figure.

While the 27th Division was on Espiritu Santo it received 2,793 replacements between November 1944 and February 1945. The division had come from action at Saipan and was preparing for the invasion of Okinawa.[19] Under the guidance of battle-trained troops these new men were taught night-fighting, infantry-artillery cooperation, and other fundamentals of jungle combat as it was practiced against the Japanese. When the division sailed for Okinawa on 23 March 1945 it was 1,793 men understrength, with shortages of 1,305 in rifle companies. The average strength of line units within the division was 152 men, compared with an authorized strength of 193.

The 11th Airborne Division entered the Leyte campaign on 18 November 1944, but its first replacements were not received until it was engaged in mopping-up operations in May 1945. The division officers and experienced men gave the newcomers their first introduction to combat by taking them on patrols. Later glider and parachute schools were opened and trained more than a thousand men who were received in the division without this training.[20]

Over 375 officers and 3,600 enlisted men joined the 81st Infantry Division in July and August 1945 at its Leyte Gulf camp.[21] Some of the new arrivals were 18-year-old inductees who still needed several months of instruction under the regulation that required a minimum of 6 months training before entering combat. Others were from antiaircraft and tank destroyer units or from overhead installations. Special training companies were formed in which the older men in the division gave the new arrivals refresher training in basic subjects, and taught them the fundamentals of combat. As soon as tests in-

[19] Capt. Edmund G. Love, *The 27th Infantry Division in World War II* (Washington, 1949), pp. 520–524.

[20] Maj. Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., *The Angels, A History of the 11th Airborne Division* (Washington 1948), p. 136.

[21] *The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II* (Washington, 1948), p. 267.

dicated the new men were qualified they were graduated from the special training units and were integrated into squads, platoons, and companies.

Pacific Ocean Areas and the Middle Pacific

Organization

In response to the War Department directive of 4 May 1944, the Replacement Training Command was organized as a provisional unit 24 July 1944 and was formally activated 11 September 1944.[22] General Richardson appointed Brig. Gen. Herbert D. Gibson commander. This headquarters, originally formed with 30 officers and 120 enlisted men, later was expanded to include about 75 officers and approximately 200 enlisted men.

The first units assigned to the Replacement Training Command were the South Pacific Replacement and Training Command and the 13th Replacement Depot, and on 24 January 1945 the 23d Replacement Depot, comprising the 74th and 75th Replacement Battalions then situated on Saipan, was assigned. On 13 March 1945, the 120th Replacement Battalion was activated and assigned to the 13th Replacement Depot. On 29 March 1945, the 25th Replacement Depot was organized at Schofield Barracks and moved forward to the Ryukyus in June.

At the height of its activity, the Replacement Training Command supervised the 13th Replacement Depot, with five battalions, and the 120th Replacement Battalion, both on Oahu; the 23d Replacement Depot, with four battalions, on Saipan; the 25th Replacement Depot, with two battalions, on Okinawa; and various attached units including the 135th Replacement Battalion for Air Forces replacements, the 3d Machine Records Unit, the 2239th Trainer Company, along with a band and postal and engineer utility units.[23] The command was inactivated in the spring of 1946.

Requisitions and Assignments

Estimates of the replacement requirements of the field forces were computed and requisitions forwarded to the War Department 4 months prior to the date the men would be needed. Replacement units along the route from the United States maintained the men until they were accepted at the target area by the field force commander. Generally, replacements from the United States were equipped only with the mandatory allowances provided in tables of equipment, such addi-

[22] Ltr, Hq USAF, POA, to CG, RTC, POA, 13 Aug 44, sub: Command and Staff Responsibility of the Commanding General, Replacement Training Command, POA. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[23] USAFPOA and MIDPAC, "History of the Replacement Training Command," 11 Sep 44–1 Dec 45, p. 14. 8–5.6 AA V. 27. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

tional items as were authorized by the theater commander being supplied at the depots. In a little over a year the command forwarded more than 135,000 replacements.

Ports of embarkation sometimes failed to provide adequate information on incoming ships. Items most often lacking included the name of the ship, the number of replacements on board, and the estimated time of arrival. Lack of transportation retarded the work of the depot. Depot, rather than unit, supply offices issued clothing and equipment to individuals, a procedure which saved much time.

The audit section of the headquarters conducted personnel surveys throughout the Pacific Ocean Areas. These audits released many men who were qualified for combat duty from positions at base sections where they had been employed in work which could have been done by limited assignment men.

Replacements usually were 2 months in arrears in pay when they reached the depots. Since the island finance offices were sometimes unable to give adequate service, the 74th Replacement Battalion placed 10 clerks on in-job training with the island office until the 237th Finance Disbursing Section arrived on 11 May 1945. Under a policy of prompt payment for casuals, the percentage of fully paid men rose from 40 percent in February 1945 to 86 percent by August of that year. Staff policy was to assign replacements as quickly as possible and to keep no men attached unassigned for longer than 90 days.

Support from the 6th Depot

When the 81st Division landed on Angaur Island in the Palaus on 15 September 1944 it carried as overstrength 60 officers and 940 enlisted men from the 6th Replacement Depot at Noumea as a source from which to replace initial losses. The 6th Replacement Depot also sent 63 officers and 1,938 enlisted men to Leyte to replace serious losses suffered by the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. Some landed without rifles and the weapons reserve of XXIV Corps was seriously depleted in providing them with equipment. In December 1,525 men, scheduled for the 6th Replacement Depot, were diverted from harbors along the West Coast of the United States and sent directly to Leyte.

Arrival of the 23d Replacement Depot

The 23d Replacement Depot, activated at Camp Cooke, Calif., 1 June 1944,[24] arrived in Honolulu on 19 January 1945 and continued on to Saipan, arriving there 12 February. Three replacement battalions, the 75th, 118th, and 119th, were operating under the depot. The 74th Replacement Battalion, previously sent to Saipan by the 13th Replacement Depot, joined the 23d Replacement Depot upon the ar-

[24] 9th SvC, GO 144, 1 Jun 44.

rival of that organization. Attached units were left behind, a move which depot officers later regarded as a mistake because they believed a better job could have been done if the finance section, postal unit, band, and utilities platoon had arrived in Saipan at the same time as the depot headquarters.[25]

The depot provided replacements for Tenth Army for the Okinawa campaign, which started 1 April 1945, and filled requisitions for men who went to Western Pacific Base Command. About 6,000 Tenth Army casualties who had been hospitalized were reassigned to their units by the 75th Replacement Battalion, which received all men returning to duty from hospitals. Between 12 February and 20 September 1945, the depot handled 42,579 replacements.

The 74th Replacement Battalion upon its arrival on the island prepared a tent camp, later taken over by the depot. The tents were unsatisfactory in many respects and operations were much more efficient when it became possible to move into Quonset huts. There was a shortage of expendable office supplies and for a time essential circulars, orders, and memoranda were not received. Wooden filing cabinets were damaged in shipping. A considerable amount of the equipment furnished the depot was not suitable for its needs, a situation which could have been corrected had someone familiar with depot operations checked the equipment before it was shipped. Depot personnel were required to operate the communication system making necessary the use of two cadremen more than the table of organization provided for communications work.[26]

Preparation for the Okinawa Invasion

Estimates for the Okinawa operation indicated that 10,000 men would be needed during the first 45 days. On 9 April 1945, 9 days after the start of the invasion, the 74th Replacement Battalion arrived in Okinawa and landed men under fire for the 7th and 96th Divisions. When a second shipment of 3,000 men arrived a week later, the replacement battalion was organized and functioning on shore. A critical need for infantry platoon leaders and riflemen was met by emergency shipment of men from the United States by air and by diverting shipping to move men from Oahu to Okinawa.[27] A total of 13,200 replacements were delivered to units fighting on Okinawa.

All units in the Pacific Ocean Areas for a time were required to submit replacement requisitions to the Replacement Training Command,[28] but as the military forces spread out over the Pacific this pro-

[25] History, 23 Repl Depot, Feb–Sep 45. AG Files REDE 23–0.1 (Master No. 29394). DRB, TAG.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] USAFPOA, and MIDPAC, "History of the Replacement Training Command," 11 Sep 44–1 Dec 45, p. 26. 8–5.6AA V27.OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

[28] POA, Cir 55, 20 Oct 44, sub : Requisitioning of Personnel.

cedure became too cumbersome and requisitions were submitted to the nearest replacement organization. Copies of these requisitions were sent to the Replacement Training Command and the weekly reports showed the status of all requisitions, whether completed, canceled, or still pending.

Training

The Replacement Training Command, POA, provided refresher training for new arrivals, reconditioning training for men released from hospitals, special training for illiterates, conversion training, rehabilitation training of selected general prisoners, shipboard training for replacements in transit, nurse replacement training, and basic training for inductees. An 8-hour orientation program had been developed.

Replacements on their way to organizations sometimes were delayed as long as 4 months and while waiting they were instructed in the peculiarities of the Pacific theater or on basic military subjects.[29] The first week's instruction stressed methods of Pacific warfare and malaria control; the second week offered a refresher course in basic infantry weapons; the third week stressed infantry-tank-artillery teamwork, cave fighting, village fighting, and hand-to-hand combat; the fourth week was devoted to training on cargo nets and landing craft, and in procedures involved in the assault of a hostile beach.

The 23d Replacement Depot at Saipan started a full-scale training program on 27 February 1945. The prescribed course included 1 week each of weapons, combat, and amphibious training with the latter 3 weeks set aside for specialist training. The authorized depot training personnel of 5 officers and 5 enlisted men was augmented by a detachment of about 10 officers and 15 enlisted men from the Pacific Combat Training Center, Combat Training Command, who were attached to the depot for the purpose of establishing a battalion training center modeled after the Pacific Combat Training Center in Oahu. On 11 April 1945, an additional group of 15 officers and 80 men from the 2239th Trainer Company was attached. Normally, 10 officers and 90 enlisted men were selected from among the replacements present in the depot to serve as assistant instructors.

A committee system of instruction was adopted, giving battalion officers more time for administrative work. The plans and training section of the depot headquarters was responsible for the construction and maintenance of combat-training courses, ranges, and other training facilities as well as for the procurement, storage, and issue of training-aids and supplies. Efficient training depended upon building up levels in the depot to the point where replacements could be

[29] Hq RTC, POA, TM 8, 27 Nov 44.

retained long enough to receive the conditioning and training called for in the training schedule—a situation which was never achieved.

The subjects and the number of hours devoted to each, as set forth in the 6-week training schedule, were:

Subject	*Hours*	*Subject*	*Hours*
Weapons Training	40	Japanese Weapons Demonstration	2
Physical Conditioning	24	Chemical Warfare Service Demonstration	2
Specialist Training	94	Use and Preparation of Combat Rations	2
Malarial Control	4	Combat Training	53
Perimeter Defense	4	Amphibious Training	47
Precautions To Be Taken in Event of Capture	1	Wet-cold Clothing	2
Hygiene and Sanitation	4	Orientation	6
Swimming Instruction	8		
Hand Grenades	2		

Incoming troops were attached unassigned to the various replacement battalions and then for training purposes were formed into groups of 200 men each. After a man arrived at the depot the first 3 days were devoted to administrative work. The priority of training subjects in the schedule adopted for each group was determined by the length of time the group was expected to remain in the depot. Since the average replacement received only 1 week of training there was little time for specialist subjects.

Combat training courses, intended to fill the gap between basic training and actual combat, were prepared from lessons learned during the previous Pacific campaigns. These courses were revised from time to time to include instruction on the latest known tactical trends and techniques of the enemy. Those who could not be assigned to duty in their occupational specialty, due to lack of ability or lack of a vacancy, were given conversion training. Men who came from hospitals frequently were given reconversion training which included calisthenics, athletics, and recreational activities along with some military subjects. This training was continued until such time as the convalescents were adjudged ready to go back to duty. Men held in the depot because no immediate assignments were available were given refresher training, usually on an in-job status with specialized units outside the depot. It was difficult to train the few illiterates received since training aids were scarce and men did not remain in the depot long enough to learn to read and write. After this training had been tried for a brief period and appeared unprofitable it was discontinued upon authority from higher headquarters.

Officers connected with training at the 23d Replacement Depot believed that the depot should have had a training detachment of at least 40 officers and 200 enlisted men. They also believed that training should have been outside the depot to relieve the replacement battalions from conducting the instruction. It was the general opinion

that training could have been improved by closer liaison between the depot and combat units and by a higher priority for training equipment.

Transfer Lists

When large numbers of replacements were being sent to Okinawa a transfer-list method of issuing orders was adopted, each list consisting of approximately 200 names representing 1 casual company for shipment purposes. This list served as a morning report roster and a sailing list, and could be made into a special order by attaching one paragraph. Its use centralized responsibility for writing orders into one section of the headquarters.

Exchange Operations

From February through September 1945, sales volume in the depot exchange was in excess of $485,000 with inventory loss less than one-tenth of 1 percent for this period. Experience indicated that the average soldier at the 23d Replacement Depot spent 42 cents a day, or about $12.50 per month. It was possible to replenish stock weekly from the central warehouse and a maximum stock equivalent to the 10 days' sales was found to be ample. Each 1,000 troops called for about $4,000 in stock. Experience also showed that candy and fruit juices should be stocked at maximum levels and that large refrigerators should be located near the exchanges.

China-Burma-India Theater

By the end of 1942, about 17,000 American troops, of whom 10,000 were Air Forces, had reached the China-Burma-India theater or were en route there.[30] The buildup of the theater required replacement installations and by the end of 1943 there were replacement depots in operation at Camp Angus, near Calcutta, at Camp Kancheapara, and at Malir. In May 1944, a staging area and replacement depot started operating at Lake Beale, India.

These depots lacked the overhead authorized for replacement depots by T/O & E 20–42, except for the AAF replacement center at Malir. After the theater received instructions from the War Department to reorganize the replacement system,[31] a request for a headquarters and headquarters company, replacement depot, was sent to Washington but was disapproved on the grounds that the AAF depot already had such an authorization.

On 13 June 1944, the headquarters of the AAF depot was reorganized and became headquarters of the Replacement Service, United

[30] Matloff and Snell, *op. cit.*, Ch. XV.

[31] Ltr, TAG to CG, CB–I, 4 May 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System. WDAGO 320.2 (29 Apr 44). DRB, TAG.

States Forces, India-Burma theater, under the command of Col. Richard W. Hocker. Temporary headquarters were established on Talkatora Road, in New Delhi, India, and later moved to a permanent location in Canning Road Barracks in the same city.[32]

When this command was formed there were approximately 3,000 casuals, not including Air Forces, in Replacement Depot No. 2 at Camp Angus and an additional 1,000 on detached service, special duty, or temporary duty at such places as rest camps, air cargo resupply, depots, and other installations. The 5,200 replacement level established for the theater by the War Department provided a depot stockage of only 1,300.[33] For several months, while this surplus was being reduced, no replacements were requisitioned from the War Department. After recomputation of the time required for shipping, the War Department increased the theater replacement level to 6,700 and the pool level to 1,500.[34] More stringent rules were established regarding special duty, detached service, and temporary duty; and the number held without assignment to units was reduced. By 31 October 1944, there were only 490 in the replacement pool.

On 27 October 1944, the China-Burma-India Theater was divided into the India-Burma and China Theaters,[35] but the replacement service continued to furnish the replacements needed in China.

Port operations were shifted from Bombay to Calcutta early in 1945 and at the same time Replacement Depot No. 4 at Lake Beale was closed and its operating personnel distributed between Depots No. 2 and 3. Depot No. 5, originally established at Ledo and later moved to Chabua, handled the increased number of men going into China at that time.[36] The depots administered the rotation program until the close of the fighting when their activities were shifted to returning casuals to the United States.

The North African and the Mediterranean Theaters of Operation

The Campaign in Tunisia

The first large group of replacements that left the United States for overseas service during World War II sailed with the convoy for the North African invasion on 24 October 1942. These men had been selected from the 76th and 78th Divisions in accordance with the staff plan for the operation. The War Department contemplated

[32] Ltr, Hq SOS, USAF, CBI, 10 Jun 44. sub: Establishment of Theater Replacement Service. SOS 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[33] Ltr, Hq USAF, CBI, 5 Jun 44, sub: Operations of Theater Replacement Service. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[34] Cable 72828, WD to CBI, 29 Jul 44.

[35] Hq USAF, IBT, GO 1, 27 Oct 44. DRB, TAG; Hq USAF, IBT, SO 57, 26 Feb 45. DRB, TAG.

[36] History of the India-Burma Theater, 26 Feb 45–15 Nov 45, app. 23. 8–6.2 AC V. XIX, pt. II. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

the maintenance of 4 infantry divisions and 2 armored divisions in North Africa.[37] Observers later stated that the War Department had no established system whereby large numbers of replacements could have been sent to North Africa had there been heavy losses during the landing.[38]

The 1st Replacement Depot arrived in North Africa 26 December 1942, less than 2 months after the landing of Allied troops, and established headquarters at Canastel, near Oran, in Algeria. Within a short time the 2d, 7th, and 8th Replacement Depots had arrived.

Following the fall of Tunisia, in May 1943, the North African Theater of Operations, in preparation for amphibious operations against Sicily, disbanded a number of special units and organized and trained amphibious type units. Many of the new units were provisional, formed around cadres drawn from organizations which had performed similar functions. Both old and new units preparing for the invasion required men from the replacement pools. The War Department had directed that filler replacements for the new units would be requisitioned, but the 2 months' delay before men could be received from the United States made it impractical to wait for their arrival. The assault was made by the Seventh Army which included the 1st, 3d, 9th, and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions.

Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., on 27 August 1943 spoke to the 1st Division at Licata, Sicily, stressing the importance of replacements. The General's diary for that day says: "The lack of replacements in all the operations so far undertaken is nothing short of scandalous." General Patton believed G3 of Allied Force Headquarters placed too much interest in units, not enough in replacements for the casualities in the units. He told the members of the division, ". . . that divisions and armies are not animated tables of organization but have souls just as human beings have, and that in order to get the best results, they must be maintained at strength with men who have been in them long enough to acquire the unit soul." [39]

Italy was invaded 1 month after the fall of Sicily, August 1943, thereby placing a severe strain on the replacement system. Preparations for this operation had been made while the Sicilian campaign was under way, resulting in the organization of many new units. The invasion of Italy was Fifth Army's first combat assignment. The 3d, 34th, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions, the 82d Air-

[37] Lt. Col. Joseph G. Duncan, III, "Report of Development of the Overseas Replacement Branch, MPD, ASF, and the Overseas Replacement System, World Wide, During World War II," p. 25. MS on file in OCS 322 Repl (11 Apr 47). DRB, TAG.

[38] Report of the Replacement Board, vol. V, ann. 15. Unless otherwise indicated by footnotes, all statements in this section are taken from testimony submitted to the Replacement Board.

[39] Harry Semmes, "Portrait of Patton," ch. XIII, p. 2. MS in author's file.

borne Division, Rangers, the 13th Field Artillery Brigade and other field artillery units took part along with British forces.

By this time, reports to the War Department in Washington indicated that the North African theater had overdrawn War Department allotments and was using more replacements than officers in Washington considered necessary. The War Department also felt that too many were going to service force type and not enough to combat units.[40] There were indications that provisional units, formed without proper authorization, used large numbers of replacements. Although divisions were short there were instances in which replacements had been held in replacement pools for many months, becoming stale in their military skills and forgetting previous training. Authority within the theater was divided; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, NATOUSA, determined policies but the depots were under base sections or armies.

By 15 November 1943, the units of the Fifth Army in Italy were ordered to halt their attack which already had come to a standstill due to lack of supplies and replacements.[41] Combat units in the divisions were seriously understrength. In February 1944, the infantry regiments of the 36th Division were less than 25 percent of combat strength. Extra drivers, clerks, and antitank gunners were formed into provisional units to provide reserves for the infantry companies. Up to this point, the enemy, although he had suffered heavy losses, had been able to rush reinforcements forward, and some American officers believed that the German replacement system was proving more effective than the American.[42]

In April 1944, officers representing the North African Theater of Operations attended the G1 conference in Washington. In the theater there was an immediate effort to get men out of depots and into units in which they were needed. Men who were on "limited assignment" lists due to slight physical disabilities were assigned to service force type units and released able-bodied men for combat. Enlisted men and company grade officers who desired assignments to infantry were given an opportunity to transfer, a move which in many instances brought a surprising number of responses.[43] The classification system was simplified by the use of fewer specification serial numbers and assignments and reassignments were made promptly. These reforms soon were reflected in the combat divisions.

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[40] History of the Replacement Command, North African Theater of Operations. Jun–Sep. 44. HIS 8–4 AB V2, pp. 1–2. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

[41] Lt. Col. Chester G. Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps* (Washington, 1948), pp. 53, 112, 113, 161, 168, 169, 179, 202, 248, 243.

[42] *Ibid.*

[43] History of the Replacement Command, North African Theater of Operations, Jun–Sep 44, *op. cit.*, I, exhibit A; Statement, Col. Thomas T. Stevenson, USAR, 22 May 52. HIS 330.14.

The units depleted by fighting during the winter of 1943–44 were built up and all the divisions were given not only their authorized strength but also an overstrength of 750 men. The absorption of so many men with no combat experience was difficult for units almost constantly in combat and the losses among new men were high. Both at Cassino and at Anzio the replacement system was blamed, not only for undue losses among new and unseasoned men but also for the weakening of good outfits which deteriorated during long periods in the line. Regardless of these difficulties, the buildup from the replacement system was effective and Rome was taken 4 June 1944. From there the Army pushed on to the Arno River, the Gothic Line, and across the Apennines. General Marshall, on 25 May 1945, in an appearance before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, explained the effect of this infusion of replacements into the fighting units:

> We got that going by concentrating on the Italian front where the heaviest fighting was going on. . . . Its effect was electrical in the great advance which followed our breaking out of the Anzio beachhead. Our new divisions, composed almost entirely of men from Selective Service, not only forged ahead, but they were consistently led in the fighting until they had progressed about a hundred miles to the north of Rome. These divisions were kept up to strength daily by trained men from the replacement pool.[44]

Inspections Early in 1944

In January 1944, Col. George R. Evans, AGD, head of the classification branch of the Adjutant General's Office in the War Department, investigated classification practices in North Africa. Col. Arthur G. Trudeau, GSC, Deputy Director, Military Training Division, Army Service Forces, investigated training. Colonel Trudeau, with eight assistants, went to North Africa on 30 January to assist in the conversion of the 2d Cavalry Division and 11 AAA and TD battalions, totaling some 20,000 men, into a large number of service type units. General Somervell directed that a report be made on SOS installations in NATOUSA and Colonel Trudeau conducted an inspection during February.[45]

The inspectors found many flaws in the North African replacement system; both Colonel Evans and Colonel Trudeau reported that a centralized command was needed to prevent base section commanders from diverting men with special qualifications to their own or other service force units. In some of the combat and service units men had been working 7 days a week and had been given no furloughs or days off in 15 months. Men who were interviewed complained of lack of

[44] *Hearings* before the Subcommittee of the Appropriations, House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., "Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1946." p. 9.

[45] Ltr, Col. Arthur G. Trudeau, to CG, ASF, 25 Mar 44, sub: ASF Installations in North African Theater of Operations. AG file (Master No. 2065). DRB, TAG.

recognition for meritorious service and of the scarcity of promotions. At the same time, the morale was bad among the casuals who were held in personnel centers or other units of the replacement system and particularly among those who were listed as limited service. This was due somewhat to lack of useful employment.[46] In some instances, men were held in idleness so long that they lost skills acquired by long and intensive training.

Men released from hospitals sometimes found it difficult to get back to their units. The commanding officer of the 15th Engineers, 9th Division, on 27 August 1943 wrote a letter of commendation to Sgt. Ernest D. Whitehead, who had been released from the 2d Convalescent Hospital near Oran, Algeria, on 27 July 1943, and through his own initiative and perseverance made his way to Floresta, Sicily, where he joined his unit on 23 August 1943.[47] This letter apparently depicted a typical situation.

Maj. Gen. F. L. Walker pointed out that in February 1944 the 36th Division, which he commanded, had been rebuilt twice with replacements and was in the process of being rebuilt again. The 45th and 3d Divisions had each been twice depleted and refilled, without adequate rest or training periods, but both were still rated as good divisions. General Walker had no complaint on the technical training of replacements.[48] His trouble came when too many replacements were received at one time. There was less difficulty when replacements arrived sufficiently in advance of going into action so that noncommissioned officers had time to learn the names of new members of their squads.

Col. R. J. Werner, Assistant G1, Fifth Army, and a former regimental commander in the 36th Division, believed that any man trained for a rifle or heavy weapons company should be capable of functioning in any squad of that company. His unit seldom had any stock of replacements on hand and found it necessary to train riflemen behind the lines. Maj. Gen. C. W. Ryder, 34th Division, believed that instruction of recruits to include tactics of the infantry rifle squad was sufficient. Brig. Gen. D. W. Braun, G3, Fifth Army, believed service schools should teach that relief of units during combat was necessary. He had found that replacements could be taken into support and reserve battalions at any time. He approved of personnel depots in the base sections and wanted subdepots or replacement battalions close in rear of divisions, but under army control.

Reorganizations of the Theater

The North African Theater of Operations was reorganized on 24 January 1944 in an effort to simplify operations and decentralize

[46] History of the Replacement Command, North African Theater of Operations, Jun–Sep 44, *op. cit.*, I, exhibit A.

[47] Capt. Joseph B. Mittlemen, *Eight Stars to Victory* (Columbus, 1948), p. 143.

[48] Ltr, CG, 36th Div, to Hq R&SC AGF, 25 Mar 44, sub: Replacements in ETOUSA and NATOUSA. AGF 319.1 (S). DRB, TAG.

control.[49] Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers became American commander and deputy theater commander, while Maj. Gen. T. B. Larkin, head of the Service of Supply, was designated commanding general, SOS NATOUSA, a change of title which also brought added authority. Brig. Gen. Lawrence C. Jaynes, Assistant Division Commander, 13th Armored Division, then in Texas, was designated commander of the NATOUSA replacement system and went to North Africa to direct its operations, arriving at Oran, Algeria, 30 April 1944. Experienced officers from the War Department were sent to NATOUSA on temporary duty to assist him. During May, General Jaynes and the prospective members of his staff inspected replacement and training units and met with the principal commanders and their staffs.[50] The NATOUSA Replacement Command was activated on 28 May. The functions of the command were outlined in a directive published 11 June and were further clarified in instructions published 22 June and 1 July.[51]

The immediate objectives of the Replacement Command were:

1. To make orderly disposition of all personnel in the theater.
2. To conserve manpower and to deliver men properly classified to the armies as expeditiously as the need arose.
3. To locate replacement depots as close to the front as practicable.
4. To keep depots properly stocked with balanced amounts of personnel based on latest reports of the needs of the armies.

Replacements from the United States arrived at depots operated by the Replacement Command and passed through the replacement system to the forward depots which served the combat forces. The movement was at a rate designed to keep the forward installations stocked at the desired level. It was the policy of the Replacement Command to assign from the depots those individuals who had been there longest and who met the qualifications called for in requisitions. Those replacements who had military occupational specialty numbers that were much in demand by combat units remained in the replacement system only a short time, while those who had military occupational specialty numbers less frequently called for remained for longer periods.

Contrary to War Department instructions, the Replacement System, NATOUSA, when it was activated 28 May 1944, was assigned to SOS, NATOUSA, but on 20 July it was removed from the jurisdiction of the Commanding general, SOS, and made an independent

[49] Ltr, Col. Arthur G. Trudeau, to CG, ASF, 25 Mar 44, sub: ASF Installations in North African Theater of Operations. AG file (Master No. 2065) DRB. TAG.

[50] History of the Replacement Command, NATOUSA, Jun–Sep 44, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–15.

[51] NATOUSA, GO 44, 28 May 44; Ltr, NATOUSA, 11 Jun 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System, NATOUSA. AG 322.96/433; NATOUSA Cir 85, 22 Jun 44; Ltr, CG, NATOUSA, to CG, RC NATOUSA, 1 Jul 44, sub: Replacement System Operating Policies and Practices. AG 322. 96/601 A–O. All located in DRB, TAG.

command on the same level as the Fifth and Seventh Armies and SOS, NATOUSA.[52]

The first plan for the organization of the replacement system, submitted 31 May 1944, estimated a casual population of 47,000. It provided for 8 depots, of which 3 would function as training centers and 5 as reservoirs for storage of replacements. Theater headquarters disapproved this plan and directed establishment of 7 depots, 27 battalions, and 101 companies with a total capacity of 40,200.

On 1 June 1944, there were 4 replacement depots, 19 replacement battalions, and 66 replacement companies (of which 9 were provisional). To these units were assigned 642 commissioned and warrant officers and 3,758 enlisted men; 2,646 officers and 43,994 enlisted men in the replacement system were awaiting assignment to units. Personnel centers were located at Casablanca, French Morocco; Canastel, Lion Mountain, and Algiers in Algeria, Marcianise and Fagianeria, Italy; and Mandello, Sicily.

Headquarters was moved from Oran to Fagianeria, about 5 miles north of Caserta, Italy, on 19 June 1944 where it remained until 21 March 1945 when it was moved to Cecchignola, 7 miles south of Rome.[53] Replacement units remained under base sections until 1 July 1944 when they were transferred to the Replacement Command.[54] There was some improvement in the requisitioning procedure after the reorganization but the shipments received from the United States continued to include too many noncombat replacements and extensive conversion was necessary to qualify them for infantry service.

The United States Seventh Army under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch landed in southern France 15 August 1944, having made preparations for the crossing in Corsica and Italy. The Seventh Army included the United States 3d, 36th, and 45th Divisions supported by the 2d Replacement Depot. Three of the depot's units, each with 600 replacements, landed in southern France with the invasion force in an operation hampered by lack of transportation.[55] The 379th Replacement Company supported the 3d Division, the 380th Replacement Company supported the 36th Division, and the 381st Replacement Company supported the 45th Division.

The 40,200 capacity of the replacement system had proved inadequate and an additional depot, the 24th, was authorized on 24 July

[52] Memo, CofS to Brig. Gen. Lawrence C. Jaynes, WDGS, 24 Apr 44, sub: Suggested Plan of Operations—Theater Replacement System, NATOUSA. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG; Report of the Replacement Board, ann. 73; Hq NATOUSA, GO 44, 1 Jun 44. DRB, TAG: Hq RC NATOUSA, GO 1 & 2, 1 Jun 44. DRB, TAG.

[53] Hq MTOUSA, GO 9, 16 Mar 45.

[54] Ltr, Hq NATOUSA, to All Concerned, 20 July 44, sub: Replacement System. AG 319.22 A–O. DRB, TAG; NATOUSA, Cir 85, 22 Jun 44. DRB, TAG; NATOUSA, Cir 35, 1944. DRB, TAG.

[55] Unit History, 2d Replacement Depot, Aug 44. AG File (Master No. 29377). DRB, TAG.

1944.[56] This depot was established near Fagianeria, Italy, on the location which had been occupied by the 2d Replacement Depot before it moved to southern France. Within a month, the 5 battalions operating under the new depot were increased to 7, each with 4 companies. The 24th Depot received most of the replacements arriving from the United States during the period in which the 1st and 2d Depots were moving to France and Italy respectively. The 24th Depot, which had been organized to accommodate 9,000 replacements, by mid-August 1944 contained 27,000. The 1st Depot from North Africa arrived at Fagianeria in September 1944 and took over part of the load.[57] Infantry troops were allotted to the 24th Depot and general assignment men of other arms and services were assigned to the 1st Depot, thus achieving for the first time a segregation by arm and service which simplified the assignment of men to units and made training more efficient. The average strength of casuals in units of the replacement system between July and September was 65,000 and by 1 September 1944 the system which then was designed to handle 49,400 actually was handling an average of 74,000.

Training

When the Replacement Command was activated there were 10 officers and 40 enlisted men to conduct the training program for the 8 to 10 thousand replacement population in each depot. A 5-week basic training program prepared for general assignment men was supplemented by squad and platoon training where appropriate. Weapons and training aids were limited and for a considerable period lack of personnel prevented higher headquarters from exercising adequate supervision.

The 24th Depot specialized in training infantrymen; the 1st Depot contained general assignment men being trained for other arms and services; the 7th Depot's program embraced limited assignment men and convalescents being returned to their units; while the 2d and 8th Depots, primarily stockage points, offered only limited training. These last two depots were mobile and gave close support to the armies, seldom being more than 100 miles behind the battlelines. The 27th Replacement Depot, activated at Fagianeria on 25 November 1944, rehabilitated and retrained limited assignment men, received men released from hospitals and assigned them to units, and returned men to the United States.

Because there was a shortage of truckdrivers in the theater, a driver training unit was opened by the 127th QM Truck Battalion (Mobile). The Leadership and Battle Training School which opened at Chanzy, Algeria, later moved to Sant Agata Dei Goti, Italy. The Signal

[56] Hq RC NATOUSA, GO 3, 25 Jul 44. DRB, TAG.
[57] History of the Replacement Command, NATOUSA, Jun–Sep 44, *op. cit.*, I. p. 63.

School was located near Naples. The Engineer School, opened near Oran, Algeria, reopened during the first week in August 1944 at Dugenta, Italy. The Armored School at Ebali, near Salerno, Italy, provided refresher and conversion courses applying to medium and light tanks, tank destroyers, infantry-tank operations and a refresher course for armored force officers. It graduated 209 officers and 2,377 enlisted men during the year ending 1 June 1945.

General assignment replacements, during the first 2 weeks after their arrival in the theater, received physical conditioning and refresher training; during the next 3 weeks they were given additional refresher training, instruction in lessons learned from combat experience, technical training, and weapons. Any extra time available was taken up with additional physical, tactical, or specialist training.

Replacement shipments from the United States contained more noncombat specialists than were authorized by War Department rate tables, although the theater had asked for fewer of these specialists.[58] When passenger lists were received it was necessary to assign surplus specialists to conversion training, a procedure which probably would have been necessary even had there been no surplus, because many of the men listed as specialists could not meet qualification tests.

NATOUSA authorized an overstrength of 5 percent for combat divisions. This overstrength was to constitute an advance draft of replacements assigned for training purposes.[59] The Replacement Command, after its organization, found that depots were attaching to units specialist replacements who were subject to recall on 24 hours' notice. Limited assignment men could be attached to units for 60 days on-the-job training. Unit overstrengths continued to be charged to the replacement pool, the authorized strength of which, from 29 November 1944 until 15 March 1945, was 30,000. The practice of attaching replacements to units for short periods for training purposes relieved the overcrowded depots, but there were serious administrative difficulties which sometimes delayed permanent assignments. There were 660 officers and 9,600 enlisted men on detached service as of 30 September 1944 and it was difficult for depots to keep their records. Twenty armored force officers who had been placed on detached service with the French Rearmanent Commission in 1943 were not relieved from that assignment until September 1944, and by that time they needed retraining before they could return to duty with armored units. Men on detached service sometimes moved from one unit to another without proper authorization; and in some instances went into combat or returned to the Zone of the Interior unknown to officials in the depot carrying them as part of its strength. The detached service for train-

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[59] Ltr, NATOUSA, to All Concerned, 30 Jun 44, sub: Replacements. AG 322.95/601 A-O. DRB, TAG.

ing program was modified by the Replacement Command in September 1944 to provide better control by requiring depots to determine monthly the status of all personnel carried on detached service, thus correcting an inherited unsatisfactory situation.[60]

Officer Training Courses

On 12 February 1945, 79 combat-experienced noncommissioned officers from Fifth Army were assigned to the first class at the Leadership and Battle School, at Sant Agata Dei Goti. These men received training preparatory to combat appointments as second lieutenants, Infantry, and on 24 March, 74 of them were commissioned. On 26 March, 2 classes of the Officer Training School opened with more than 100 candidates in each class. Men who entered these last two courses were drawn from units throughout the theater, not from Fifth Army alone as had been the case with the first class.

Retraining

While the North African theater was new and many units were being formed the need for retraining large numbers of men did not arise. But later when units were disbanded or inactivated some classes of personnel accumulated in the replacement depots. Men arrived from the United States with MOS numbers which did not fit theater requirements; wounded men became available for limited assignments. On 29 March 1944, there were 6,400 replacements at Personnel Center No. 2 at Canastel, Algeria, and the pool was increasing, although many units were suffering from lack of manpower. At some personnel centers, field officers who were casuals passing through the replacement system were organized into platoons led by corporals who were members of the permanent party at the personnel centers.[61] At times there were too many officers in the theater and in many instances field officers who went to units were assigned to positions which should have been filled by junior officers.

Data compiled by the Statistical Section, Replacement Command, indicated that during the summer of 1944 an average of 4,800 persons were being discharged each month from hospitals in the theater. It was estimated that about 1,800 of these could be used to fill vacancies in service units occasioned by losses and rotation. In order to find assignments for the remaining 3,000 an audit was conducted in service units to locate general assignment men who were performing duties which could be performed by limited assignment men. This audit, covering service units in North Africa and Italy, was carried out during June and July. On the basis of early surveys, it appeared that

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] History of the Replacement Command, North African Theater of Operations, Jun–Sep 44. *op. cit.*, I, exhibit A.

approximately 30,000 general assignment men could be released and a similar number of limited assignment men used to fill up units in the Communications Zone. Another audit in September 1944 showed that out of 40,813 positions in 225 service units, 8,843 could be filled with limited assignment men.[62] At that time, the retraining facilities in the theater were not extensive enough to fill that number of positions.

In an effort to remove some of the overstrength in the North African replacement pool the War Department authorized the return of 23,000 limited assignment men to the United States. Experience disclosed first, that it was almost certain that pressure would be brought to bear against returning any of these men to the theater; and second, that although there might be ample space on ships returning to the United States there was always an acute shortage going to the theaters. These difficulties convinced the War Department that it would be better to retrain men in the theaters, although such training involved sending additional overhead and school establishments overseas.

About 10,000 limited assignment men, of whom many thousands were recovered battle casualties considered fit for service assignments but not for combat, were being held in the replacement system. As far as possible, general assignment men on duty with the Replacement Command were replaced by limited assignment men.[63] The theater designated Replacement Depots 7 (Naples) and 8 (Oran) for the training of these limited assignment men. On 12 March 1944, the Service of Supply directed that general assignment personnel in Service of Supply installations would be replaced with limited assignment workers. General assignment men thus released were to be assigned to units in the combat zone.[64] This policy of releasing men physically fit for combat assignments resulted in shortages of qualified instructors since the number of qualified limited service men generally was not sufficient to provide the instructors required.

From September 1944 until March 1945, the percentage of general assignment infantry replacements was increased from 36.7 to 67.8.[65] During the same period the percentage of those on detached service declined from 13.9 to 1.1. The number on limited assignment decreased from 6,574 to 2,330, of whom 1,110 were not available for immediate assignment.

The Infantry Conversion Training Center at the 1st Replacement Depot in November 1944 was giving an 8 weeks' conversion training

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 137.
[63] RC NATOUSA, Cir 1, 8 Jul 44. DRB, TAG.
[64] SOS NATOUSA, Cir 37, 12 Mar 44. DRB, TAG.
[65] History of the Replacement Command, MTOUSA, Mar 45. HIS 8–4 AB V. VIII, p. 3 OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

course to 1,700 men. On 4 December the course was lengthened to 12 weeks. It included instruction in all basic infantry weapons.[66]

Liaison with Fifth Army provided information on the peculiarities of the Italian campaign which was incorporated into instruction imparted to the 600 to 900 trainees who arrived at the center weekly. Combat-experienced officers and enlisted men were used as instructors when they were available. By 1 June 1945, this center had graduated 14,869 riflemen. Smaller numbers of men were trained at other centers for field artillery, chemical warfare, and for mountain combat. Limited assignment men were trained for service as postal clerks, clerk-typists, truckdrivers, motor mechanics, military police, and for cooks or bakers.

Conditioning Companies

During the Tunisian campaign, many unit commanders complained that they were receiving from the hospitals convalescents who were not mentally or physically rehabilitated to the extent that they were ready for combat.[67] In an effort to remedy this situation, a system of training for recovered patients was inaugurated in a North African hospital during the summer of 1943 and results were so satisfactory that the 6695th and 6706th Conditioning Companies were formed, each having an assigned strength of 7 officers and 56 enlisted men. Many of the officers assigned to these companies had had combat experience and the instruction they gave was designed to develop confidence which would remain with the men after they returned to combat. Surgeons were assigned partially on the strength of their understanding of the psychology of the combat soldier.

The 6706th Company, the first one to conduct conditioning training, arrived in Italy from North Africa in April 1944. Originally it occupied a temporary camp at Cumá, later it moved to Terme Agnano and finally to a location at Lake Averno, in the Naples area. The 6695th Company served as a headquarters unit at the Army rest center in Rome until August 1944 when it became a conditioning unit and received men discharged from hospitals in the vicinity of Rome. In December of that year, it moved to the vicinity of Pisa to serve hospitals in the Florence-Leghorn area. Both companies were assigned to the Replacement Command in July 1944.

Prefabricated huts and similar structures gradually replaced the pyramidal tents which were the only housing available when the companies were first formed. Physical hardening was attained through intensive training and marching, supplemented by organized

[66] Memo, MTOUSA, RTC, 1 Jun 45, sub: Review of the Activities of the Replacement and Training Command, MTOUSA. Copy in History of the Replacement Command, MTOUSA, *op. cit.*, XIII, p. 16.

[67] *Ibid.*, XI, ann. C.

athletics in which trainees were required to participate daily. Parades and ceremonies were held frequently in an effort to develop pride and raise morale.

Trainees remained in the conditioning units about 4 weeks. The first 3 weeks were taken up with the training program; the additional week was spent in the receiving company at the depot. A board of officers, of which the unit surgeon was a member, decided whether a man should be returned to duty, retained for another period, recommended for limited service and sent to the replacement depot, or returned to the hospital. From 1 July 1944 until 10 June 1945, the two companies returned to units 459 officers and 9,957 enlisted men. Approximately 2,000 others were designated for limited duty or returned to the detachment of patients. Both conditioning companies were inactivated on 10 June 1945.[68]

Rotation

Persons returning to the United States on rotation or for other reasons passed through the 7th Replacement Depot, located near Naples. This depot also received men returning to duty from hospitals as well as all others who were being returned to their former units. Experience soon indicated that it was desirable to separate men going to the front from those returning, rather than have them intermingle as sometimes happened in the 7th Depot.[69]

When it was necessary to fill rotation vacancies in units, the replacement depots examined the unit rosters to determine the qualifications needed and forwarded recommendations to the theater adjutant general who issued orders. Later, Fifth Army machine records units prepared rosters which were forwarded to the replacement depots serving the army. These depots filled as many vacancies as they could before forwarding the rosters, within 10 days, to the Replacement Command Headquarters, after which the lists of vacancies were sent from one depot to another until all places had been filled. Major commands other than Fifth Army sent lists to the theater adjutant general who used the facilities of machine records units to prepare rosters. These rosters were sent to the Replacement Command which then forwarded them to the 7th Replacement Depot where limited assignment personnel were assigned as they became available.

Personnel for rotation were selected on the basis of merit within minimum requirements for overseas service.[70] Time in combat, wounds received, and decorations awarded were considered in that order. Reorganization of units caused the replacement system to receive a large

[68] *Ibid.*
[69] History of Replacement Command, NATOUSA, Jun–Sep 44, *op. cit.*, I, p. 44.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

number of persons who had long periods of service, thereby extending to 24 months the minimum period of service within the Replacement Command necessary to qualify for rotation. The delay in rotating men who were held in pools and for whom the theater apparently had little need brought about a serious morale problem. Officers connected with the Replacement Command believed that a flexible quota would have enabled the Command to rotate worthy individuals who had been held in the pools for long periods.

"Forced Issues" of Noncommissioned Officers

War Department policy was not to provide more than 5 percent of replacements who were noncommissioned officers,[71] but by September 1944 the stock of replacements in North Africa and Italy contained nearly 3 percent of men in the three highest noncommissioned grades.[72] These noncommissioned officers were absorbed by requiring units to take "forced issues."

Information and Education

Information and education officers were on duty full time in the replacement depots, but in other installations the information and education program was carried out by officers who were assigned to that work in addition to their other duties.[73] Tables of organization made no provision for enlisted men for the educational program outside the depots, but in many instances casuals volunteered their assistance. Unit newspapers were published in the 1st, 8th, and 24th Replacement Depots, in the Engineer School, and in the Leadership and Battle School. Nine organizations had public address systems over which news broadcasts were made twice daily. Off-duty classes were conducted in such subjects as business, commerce, languages, science, mathematics, psychology, and sociology. Stage shows were popular where there were facilities for their presentation. Five bands provided musical entertainment.

Those company commanders who held daily discussions with their men concerning personal or other problems and who heard complaints and criticisms at regularly established periods found the practice of such value in maintaining morale that on 31 October 1944 the headquarters of the Replacement Command directed commanders of all replacement organizations to hold such conferences.[74] But many officers found that such meetings sometimes were impractical.[75]

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[71] WD Cir 317, 31 Jul 44 (*f*) (4) (*a*)

[72] History of the Replacement Command, NATOUSA, Jun–Sep 44, *op. cit.*, I, p. 135.

[73] History of the Replacement Command, MTOUSA, Nov 44 *op. cit.*, III, p. 32.

[74] History of the Replacement Command, NATOUSA, Oct 44, *op. cit.*, II, p. 34.

[75] Incl to 1st Ind to ltr, Ch, Mil His, to CG, Hq Eighth Army, 6 May 52, sub: History of the U. S. Army Personnel Replacement System. 330.14. OCMH.

Reports and Estimates

Directions for the movement of personnel between replacement units were contained in replacement transfer orders. Losses from forward echelons of the Replacement Command were replaced by shipment of 90 percent of each day's loss for 6 days a week. On the seventh day, personnel was ordered forward by MOS to bring the depots up to standard replacement rate in relation to shortages indicated on the replacement status report.

The collection of inventories from the depots was originally considered a classification and assignment function, but later was transferred to the statistics and reports section of the theater adjutant general's office. The reporting system was designed to show the status of the replacement system at any one time and to keep accurate accounting control of all attached unassigned personnel passing through the system. An MRU accounting system was installed and prepared daily depot strength returns, quarterly monthly training reports, and availability reports by arms or service broken down by MOS. For the accounting system to function efficiently it was necessary for MRU facilities to be located in the immediate vicinity of the replacement depots.

The time lag between the effective morning report date of the various reports and the date of delivery to the headquarters, Replacement Command, varied between 3 and 5 days depending on the distance between the replacement depots and the headquarters of the Replacement Command. The distance from the 1st Replacement Depot at Oran, Africa, to the Replacement Command headquarters in Italy was over a thousand miles. The personnel to operate the MRU system was taken from resources within the theater. The accounting for replacement personnel was closely allied with accounting for hospitalized personnel, and MRU units were well adapted to perform the specialized combined functions necessary.

A theater troop basis which showed arm, service, and training MOS was an important contribution to the replacement data maintained by the headquarters. When divided into the various combat groups, these data were used to modify the theater casualty estimates and produce stocking rates for the depots which served each combat group.

Information collected by a group of War Department morale service statisticians who had been placed on temporary duty with Fifth Army to collect battle casualty data was particularly helpful in determining the number of men in each arm and service to be stocked in a depot. This group also studied the rate at which Fifth Army hospitals returned convalescent men to units and the resultant figures were of assistance in determining short term net loss calculations. Another study had to do with combat unit casualties by type of action,

based on experience in the 3d Division. The function of anticipating loss replacement requirements remained with G1, NATOUSA, but the Replacement Command had a voice in the occupational distribution of replacements ordered by NATOUSA.

Results

Battle casualties in the Mediterranean theater numbered 179,403 [76] and the replacements sent to that theater far exceeded both battle and nonbattle losses. Between 1 June 1944, the date of its organization, and V-E Day, the Replacement Command handled about 320,000 replacements at the rate of about 46,000 per month. It retrained about 15,000 as riflemen and conducted conversion training for other branches including mountain troops and armored forces. It repatriated prisoners of war, conducted an experimental program of training dogs to detect mines (which was abandoned in November 1944), arranged for men to return on rotation, operated a disciplinary training center, and established the University Training Command.

A War Department inspector, after visiting the North African Theater of Operations, on 31 July 1944 reported that the Replacement Command there had accomplished the following objectives:

1. A better control of the assignment of replacements;
2. A better utilization and disposition of replacement units;
3. A greatly improved accounting system;
4. A better requisitioning system;
5. Some improvement in the refresher training of replacements within the theater.[77]

The report further stated that the Replacement Command had not achieved a fuller utilization of limited assignment personnel within the theater because:

1. Policy then in force provided for sending all limited assignment personnel to the United States;
2. There were insufficient replacement units within the theater to conduct the necessary retraining of limited assignment personnel.

The Replacement Command, according to the report, had not provided for the retraining of general assignment personnel as combat replacements because:

1. No limited assignment personnel were available for reassignment to service units;
2. The units needed to conduct retraining were not available.

The report also stated that the Replacement Command had not relieved overcrowding of replacements due to:

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[76] *The Army Almanac* (Washington, 1950) p. 665.

[77] Ltr, AG to CG, ASF, 31 Jul 44, sub: Report on Organization of Replacement Command, NATOUSA. G–1 322 Repl (15 Aug 44). DRB, TAG.

1. The large number of limited assignment and rotational personnel which had accumulated in embarkation replacement units awaiting transportation;

2. Replacements from the United States had been arriving at long intervals and in large numbers;

3. There were not sufficient replacement system units available.

The Replacement Command was not, in many instances, the report continued, able to supply replacements to the combat forces in the proper numbers and categories by arm or service and by military occupational specialty because:

1. Theater stocks of replacements were out of balance, both by arm and service and by MOS, at the time the Replacement Command assumed control. There were, for example, only 170 engineers and 146 armored force replacements in the theater replacement system at that time.

2. The theater had not adjusted orders for future shipments from the United States. July and August requests had been limited almost exclusively to infantry. Only 100 engineers were included and the needs of other arms and services, as indicated by replacement system reports and theater requirement rates, were not fulfilled.

There were times when the replacement system could not meet the needs of the units in combat, but there was a general increase in efficiency in the operation of the depots after the formation of the Replacement Command. The casualty rate was high for junior officers. By October 1944 the previous surplus had disappeared and there was a shortage which could only partially be alleviated by battlefield commissions because there was also a shortage of qualified noncommissioned officers. In some instances there were shortages of field grade officers. Some officers from other arms were transferred to infantry and along with officer candidate graduates gradually made up the shortages.

There were instances of green replacements running into disaster. On 25 October 1944, the 351st Infantry attempted to take Vedriano, but the attacking force, made up largely of fresh replacements, disintegrated in the rain and fog. A German counterattack then wiped out two companies.[78] During the winter of 1944–45, Fifth Army was able to give each of its major units intensive training behind the lines for at least 4 weeks. Thousands of replacements were integrated into these units. Many of these were used to form provisional units to meet an immediate theater need. The theater commander later asked the War Department for authority to activate these provisional units as a part of the troop basis, a practice generally frowned upon by the War Department, but, in most instances, the requests were granted

[78] Starr, *op. cit.*, pp. 359, 366, 377.

and similar units, activated and partially trained in the United States, were broken up because there no longer was any place for them in the overall troop basis. At the time when the records showed that replacements had been shipped far in excess of any losses the theater had sustained and when officials in the War Department thought North Africa had plenty of replacements, the depots in the theater actually were seriously in need of infantry riflemen.[79]

On 3 November 1944, commanders of four divisions submitted reports to Fifth Army which indicated differences of opinion regarding the replacements they had received.[80] One commander reported that his division had received no improperly trained replacements for a long time, and that all seemed to have completed basic training and to be physically fit, and that the noncommissioned officers were "not bad at all." Another commander's report said some of the replacements he had received were not sufficiently trained in the use of all weapons. This report criticized the training of men converted from other arms and services. A third division commander said men were "unable to stand under fire." The fourth report pointed out that the quality of replacements varied with each group; noncommissioned officers who had been converted to infantry were said to hold higher rank than was justified by their qualifications; some replacements needed more rifle training; their physical condition was not always satisfactory; the replacements received during the latter part of the retraining program were said to display greater resentment against having been converted to infantry.

After the invansion of North Africa, one officer of the 34th Division said that members of that division had resented what they regarded as a deliberate policy to keep their unit in the vanguard for many months with but few opportunities to rest.[81] While the division's morale and efficiency remained outstanding from a combat viewpoint he said there was a tendency toward a persecution complex which became more apparent when news from the United States disclosed that some soldiers had returned home. He thought the bitterness throughout the division was abetted by German propaganda broadcasts. Many of the men had been overseas almost 3 years and they felt more effort should have been made to replace them.

This officer further stated that many replacements who reached the 34th Division had just come from the Zone of the Interior where they had had only 6 to 13 weeks training and that they were not sufficiently prepared for combat. Many had been limited to either the 1903 or

[79] Statement, Brig. Gen. Robert W. Berry. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

[80] History of the Replacement Command, MTOUSA, Nov 44, *op. cit.*, III, p. 14.

[81] Technical Intelligence Report based on interview with Capt. John J. Rouchford, O–499724, by S. Duncan Peters, agent, Hq ASF, 8 Feb 45. Copy in AG 322 Repl (8 Feb 45). DRB, TAG.

the M–1 rifles, whereas a thorough knowledge of both was essential. Most men could care for their equipment but lacked the ability to handle weapons to the best advantage, and almost all were deficient in range and windage estimation and in rate of fire. They had been trained on stationary targets and could not hit a moving enemy.

This same officer said that veterans in the division had to devote their rare rest periods to teaching replacements how to survive. The new men needed to be taught effective handling of weapons; methods of taking advantage of the terrain; where to expect minefields and how to avoid them; coordination of movement and interchange of support with adjacent units; and cooperation with supporting branches of the Ground and Air Forces. There was rarely time enough for all this training. Men arrived at the battle zone and were pressed into action with the result that the percentage of casualties was much higher among replacements than among trained, battle-hardened veterans. The officer making these comments believed many casualties could have been avoided by more comprehensive training prior to combat.

This officer also thought that artillery or antiaircraft men who were given 3 weeks infantry training adjusted themselves to frontline combat conditions with comparative ease, but he considered more training than that necessary for men from other branches. A few men, he said, who had served overseas in rear echelons for long periods and who were anticipating return to the United States on rotation or furlough, were extremely bitter over the sudden transition from their places of comparative security.

Another view of the replacement system was presented in a series of articles in the *Stars and Stripes*. The Rome edition on 10 December 1944 contained the following description of conditions in the early-day replacement depots:

> Most GI's remember their association with the "repple depple" as the low point in their Army life, and for good reasons. It was not at all unusual to linger in one for many months awaiting assignment. Overcrowding was the rule rather than the exception. Men were dumped together, regardless of their arm or service or their military occupational specialty and everyone took the same training.
>
> Harried cadres worked long hours trying to bring some semblance of order to these conditions. The strain made many of them irritable and the irritation was passed on to the replacement.
>
> As a result the man moving into the theater, fresh from an outfit of which he had been an integral part, became a confused and hurt animal. He resented the depot; he resented the U. S. Army.
>
> But more dangerous than this resentment was the new attitude creeping into him: he was slowly beginning to feel resentment[82] toward the country whose uniform he wore.

[82] Cpl. Ed Hogan, "On the Replacement System," *Stars and Stripes* (Rome ed.) 10–16 Dec 44.

The theater made an intensive effort to improve these conditions. Cadre officers at replacement depots interviewed as many incoming replacements as possible, not as a part of the classification procedure but as the normal interview which took place when a new soldier joined a unit. The replacement was given a truthful answer when he asked: "What is it like at the front?" Company commanders designated 1 night each week to interview the men and take action on well-founded complaints. Replacements who had personal problems at home were encouraged to speak to their officers or others who could help them. But there were conditions under which such conferences were impossible. A replacement company's permanent party of 4 officers and 31 enlisted men might be assigned up to 2 thousand replacements. When capacities were exceeded, less time was available for interviews or consulations.

When the base sections and armies operated the replacement system, authority was divided, and the replacement system resembled an unfinished jig-saw puzzle. The creation of the Replacement Command with its central authority enabled the pieces to drop into place and the replacement system began to operate efficiently. Better facilities were provided for housing, feeding, training, and recreation. Efforts were made to prevent overcrowding. When there were too many men with military occupational specialties not frequently called for, retraining or reassignment was ordered. New postal units were formed in an effort to expedite the flow of mail from home—an important morale factor. Specific functions were assigned to each depot; some received new men upon their arrival in the theater; some conducted conversion training; others were responsible solely for men returning to their units; and still others became forward stockage points for frontline units.

Final Activities

On 1 November 1944, the North African Theater of Operations was redesignated as the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and on 1 February 1945 the Replacement Command in that theater was redesignated as the Replacement and Training Command.[83] During the redeployment period, the Replacement Training Command operated in reverse, preparing men for return to the United States. It now included a large number of Air Forces returnees in addition to the normal Army load.[84] The university training program was extended and the depots operated separation centers. The Replacement and Training Command, MTOUSA, was discontinued 31 August 1945.

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[83] Hq MTOUSA, GO 22, 31 Jan 45. DRB, TAG; Hq RTC, MTOUSA, GO 5, 3 Feb 45. DRB, TAG.

[84] Statement, Maj. Gen. L. C. Jaynes, 28 Nov 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH. DA Pam 20–210, *History of the Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*, Jul 52, discusses the replacement problem in connection with demobilization. See especially pp. 248–263.

The European Theater of Operations

The First Depots

The War Department General Staff in 1941 envisioned the maintenance in the United Kingdom of replacement units sufficient to support all installations which might be established there.[85] Plans indicated that men should not remain in the depots longer than 60 days. Training in replacement centers was to include air raid precautions and defense against paratroopers. Following the distribution of an outline of a replacement plan stressing the buildup phase, adopted by G1 ETOUSA on 12 March 1943, Eighth Air Force and SOS, ETOUSA, prepared plans which covered both the buildup and the operations period.[86]

Estimates indicated four replacement depots might be necessary. Advance parties were to arrive in the United Kingdom at least 2 weeks prior to the replacement units. From September until early November 1942, the nucleus of a replacement depot was being assembled at Whittington Barracks, Litchfield, England. The War Department assigned numerical designations to the headquarters and headquarters companies of the replacement depots when they were activated in the United States. Upon arrival of these units in the United Kingdom, they were assigned to replacement depots which had been given numerical designations by ETOUSA headquarters. This confusion in numbers finally was removed when the depots were designated by the War Department numbers which had been given to the headquarters companies assigned to them. First designated as Replacement Depot No. 1, SOS, the depot at Litchfield later was known as the 10th Replacement Depot.

This depot was in operation by early 1943, but its activities were limited because at that time replacements were needed only to compensate units for losses sustained from illness, transfers, deaths, injuries, and other routine causes. In August 1943, after the Quebec conference when plans were made for more extended operations, it became apparent that this depot, which then had five replacement battalions, would not have sufficient capacity to handle all the expected arrivals and that a rapid expansion of the replacement system would be necessary.[87] At this time, a large number of men were sent

[85] Memo, G1 WD to CofS, 6 Dec 41, sub: A Study of the Replacement Problem and a Suggested Basis for the Theater of Operations Replacement Plan. AG 322.96. DRB, TAG.

[86] Ltr, G1, ETOUSA, to CofS, ETOUSA, 25 Mar 43, sub: Replacement Plans. AG 322. DRB, TAG.

[87] Report of the General Board, USFET, Study No. 3, p. 9; Report of the Replacement Board, *op. cit.* Unless otherwise indicated by footnotes, all statements in this section are taken from evidence submitted to the Replacement Board.

to England from Iceland. Housing at replacement installations was limited and men who were received were assigned to units as quickly as possible. Priorities were established at First Army headquarters.

The Central Control Agency

The theater experienced difficulty justifying the requests it was making to the War Department for replacements. More comprehensive figures were needed. A Central Control Agency, with Col. Walter G. Layman as commanding officer, was established 24 October 1943 to control replacement and to prepare reports.[88] The headquarters was at Ben Hall farm, Cheltenham, England, also the location of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Replacement Depot. Colonel (later Brig. Gen.) Layman headed the replacement system in Europe until his death in September 1944.

The first procedure followed in obtaining replacements for units in the United Kingdom was for the theater to send to the War Department monthly requisitions giving shortages in each branch and listing specification serial numbers for enlisted men. It was a long time after a requisition left a unit before replacements arrived. Later the War Department furnished replacements according to occurrence rates for nonbattle casualties,[89] a procedure which somewhat reduced the time involved.

During the last 3 months of 1943, it was necessary to activate many replacement units in England and assign to them inexperienced persons already in the theater, because replacements from the United States were arriving ahead of the battalions and companies which should have processed them.[90] Seven Ground Force replacement depots were established under base section commanders in December 1943.[91] They were No. 1, Llandaff, Wales, Artillery; No. 2 Bristol, England, Staging Area; No. 3, Yeovil, England, Infantry; Nos. 6, 7, and 8, North Ireland, Infantry; and No. 9, Wiltshire, England, Armored Forces. All of the northern Ireland depots were moved to southern England prior to 10 May 1944. Of the 16 depots ultimately in operation in the European Theater only 6 were organized in the Zone of the Interior and trained prior to their departure for overseas.

When replacement units started operating in England they usually found housing facilities inadequate, and companies set up to handle 400 men frequently accommodated from 800 to 1,100 transients. Few weapons were available for training and many replacements ar-

[88] Hq SOS, ETOUSA, GO 117, 8 Oct 43.
[89] Cable 2385, AGWAR to ETOUSA, 21 Jul 45.
[90] Ltr, Hq SOS, ETOUSA, 6 Jan 44, sub: Activation of Provisional Replacement Units. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.
[91] Hq WBS, GO 86, 27 Dec 43; Hq SBS, GO 92, 24 Dec 43; Hq NIBS, GO 32, 25 Dec 43. DRB, TAG.

rived without weapons thereby making the training problem a difficult one. When it became necessary to expand the system to train a civil affairs division and other officers and men for special purposes, housing shortages made some construction necessary.

The Field Forces Replacement System

Since the Central Control Agency lacked the authority needed to regulate the flow of replacements, the commanding general of the Service of Supply was directed to establish a replacement system progressively in accordance with the arrival of replacements and units.[92] A directive described the purposes of the proposed Field Forces Replacement System and stated the objectives of the training program in the replacement pools, announced availability schedules, and established target dates. The Field Forces Replacement System started functioning 1 January 1944, operating directly under the deputy theater commander and assuming responsibility for replacements for all units other than those of the Air Forces.[93]

After undergoing a month of preparation, more than 6,000 troops who were to be used in the training of replacements were attached to depots, and then suballotted by depot commanders to the various camps. These troops included the 118th Infantry Regiment, the 115th Field Artillery Battalion, the 271st Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one company) and several other units.[94] Those replacements who had received their basic training prior to their arrival at overseas depots were classified as Group A and were instructed in subjects dealing primarily with self-preservation on the battlefield. Those who had not completed basic training were designated as group B, and remained in that classification until it was considered that they were qualified in basic subjects and could be transferred to group A.

The Replacement System, ETOUSA

Five of the 13 depots which were to support the invasion were functioning on 1 January and by 1 March 11 depots had been established with a capacity of 65,051 replacements. The War Department had not activated enough units to operate all of these installations and a number of provisional headquarters were organized. In April 1944, the name was changed to Replacement System, ETOUSA,[95] eliminating the term "Field Forces" from the title in recognition of the fact that replacements were also furnished to the SOS. In the European, as in the North African-Mediterranean Theaters of Operations, the

[92] Ltr, Hq ETOUSA, 24 Oct 43, sub: Field Force Replacement System. AG 322, DRB, TAG.

[93] SOS ETOUSA, GO 122, 24 Nov 43; Hq ETOUSA, GO 62, 10 Jun 44. DRB, TAG.

[94] Hq GFRC, History of the Ground Force Replacement System, ETO, Part 1, 24 Oct–6 Jan 44. DRB, TAG.

[95] Hq RS, GO [unnumbered], 24 Apr 44; Hq ETOUSA, GO 35, 24 Apr 44. DRB, TAG.

administration of replacements was made a responsibility of service force commanders who in turn delegated that responsibility to commanders of base sections.

Officers in charge of replacement installations frequently complained that many base section commanders and other high-ranking officers exercising supervision failed to realize the magnitude and importance of this phase of the military operations. Long hours of explanation were required before the functioning of the system and its relation to combat was made clear to all concerned. The Replacement Command was under the deputy theater commander, who also was the commanding general, SOS, ETOUSA, later Com Z, ETOUSA. The commander of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, as the system later was known, also functioned as a staff officer in his capacity as chief of the Replacement Section, under G1, Headquarters, ETOUSA.

The ground forces replacement system in Europe at the time that it was formed was equivalent to a combat corps with a full complement of division and supporting troops. It grew to an organization with a capacity for over 100,000 commissioned and enlisted replacements with a training cadre composed of all arms and services, training personnel in excess of 6,000 officers and men, and with a reinforcement unit cadre in excess of 20,000 officers and men. Before it was disbanded, the system handled more than 2,100,000 men, one-half the personnel in the theater.[96]

Army Air Forces Depots

During the latter part of 1943, the Air Forces activated a considerable number of new units in the United Kingdom, and the large number of replacements who arrived for fillers placed a heavy burden on the replacement system then in operation. By December 1943, there were 32,000 men being processed through the Air Forces replacement system at one time, and considerable reorganization and expansion of facilities was necessary to accommodate so large a number.

The 12th Reinforcement Depot was the original Air Forces depot in the European Theater. It was redesignated as the 70th Reinforcement Depot, later became the Reinforcement Command, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and still later was known as the Army Air Forces European Theater Reinforcement Command (Provisional). The Air Forces Reinforcement Command operated directly under the highest Air Forces theater headquarters and had few dealings with the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, except that the activities of both were coordinated by the Replacement Section of the G1 Division of ETOUSA Headquarters.

[96] Report of the Replacement Board, bk. III, sec. 3, p. 4.

The Ground Forces Replacement Command

At the time of the invasion, the depots in operation in England were No. 2, Bristol; No. 3, Codford; No. 9, Midsomer Norton; No. 10, Litchfield; No. 11, Whitechurch; No. 12, Haddon Hill; Nos. 14 and 17, Yeovil; No. 15, Delamere; No. 16, Warminster; No. 18, Woolacombe; No. 19, Oulton Park; No. 20, Cheltenham.[97] The commanding general, First United States Army, ordered the assignment of replacements from the depots to the units getting ready for operations as overstrength at the rate of 2,500 per division.[98]

The 41st, 86th, and 92d Replacement Battalions, which were scheduled to support the three assault corps in the invasion from D+3 until D+9 were relieved of all troop activities and assembled at Camp Houndstone, Yeovil, where they prepared for the crossing. The 92d Battalion landed on the Continent in support of VII Corps on 11 June 1944. On the following day, the 41st Battalion, in support of V Corps, and the 86th Battalion, in support of XIX Corps, began operations in France.[99] The 14th Replacement Depot, scheduled to arrive on the Continent on D+9 actually arrived on D+18, along with an advance headquarters of the Army Ground Forces replacement system, consisting of 7 officers and 12 enlisted men.

The replacement organization established shortly after the invasion consisted of two commands—the Ground Forces Replacement Command (GFRC) and the Army Air Forces Replacement Command (AAFRC). Colonel Layman, Commander of the GFRC, became chief of the Replacement Section, Headquarters, ETOUSA, and exercised staff supervision over both Ground and Air Forces replacement policies. On 16 June, First Army assumed control of all ground replacement installations on the Continent and established normal requisitioning.

Although General Dayman desired that the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command exercise control over replacements from the beginning of the invasion, this control actually was exercised by First Army until the establishment of the Army rear boundary. Thereafter, control reverted to the replacement system, even though installations sometimes were in army areas.

First Army, about 15 July, relinquished control of its depot to the Ground Forces Replacement Command and shortly afterward the forward replacement battalions in the First Army's area also were placed

[97] 29th MRU Station List of GFR units, 31 May 44.

[98] Ltr, ETOUSA, 2 Nov 43, sub: Disposition of Field Force Replacements. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG; Ltr, ETOUSA, 24 Oct 43, sub: Field Force Replacement System, ETOUSA. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG; Report of the General Board, USFET, Study No. 3, pp. 2–8; SOS, ETO, GO 122, 24 Nov 43. DRB, TAG.

[99] Hist Div, USFET, "The Procurement and Use of Manpower in the European Theater," March 1946, p. 20, in "Administrative and Logistical History of ETO," pt. IX. 8–3.1 AA9 Cl. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.

under the Ground Forces Replacement Command. Third Army's depot had been under control of the Ground Forces Replacement Command from the time that Third Army became operational, but the replacement battalions operating in Third Army area under army control were not placed under the Ground Forces Replacement Command until October 1944.[100] Officers of the 12th Army Group believed that placing both the army depots and their forward battalions under the Replacement Command resulted in more efficient operations.

Some officers contended that had the depot serving First Army remained under First Army control an army adjutant general's classification section could have been established within the depot, thereby saving from 48 to 72 hours in the time required for filling requisitions. First Army staff officer contended that the greater flexibility which would have been possible had the depots been under the army's control might have prevented the difficulty that arose during November 1944 when requisitions could be filled only for T/O shortages. This situation was not corrected until regulations were so changed that requisitions could be submitted to cover anticipated losses 48 hours in advance. The 3d Replacement Depot at times had as many as 19,000 men, although its facilities were designed for only 10,000. Much of the excess was due to accumulation of men with MOS numbers not frequently called for. First Army officers believed this situation could have been controlled more effectively had the depot been under army supervision. The replacement depot did not have adequate transportation, and it was pointed out that the transportation requirements of a depot, if it were under army control, would be an integral part of the army's transportation activities as a whole, in which event plans could be made to avoid unexpected calls for the use of trucks which frequently were otherwise employed.[101]

The GFRC never gave up control of forward replacement units to field force commanders. The theater commander desired to retain control over replacements in the pipeline on the theory that they would provide a strategical reserve. Requests from the First and Third Armies for command of replacement units were refused.

Forward depots and battalions supporting the combat forces became depositories for static personnel of sundry categories. Units of the replacement system followed armies and corps as they advanced in battle, but combat unit commanders believed the logistical difficulties involved in these movements outweighed the administrative advantages. The chain of requisitions and subsequent transfer orders necessary to move replacements proved cumbersome. Replacement depots usually contained either too few or too many men. When tactical units met heavy opposition they required many

[100] Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, II, p. 36. OCMH, Gen Ref Office.
[101] Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, ann. 1, pp. 12–13. OCMH, Gen. Ref. Office.

replacements and emptied the depots. When opposition was light, replacements tended to clog the pipelines and accumulate in depots.

Depot Functions

Replacement depots normally supported armies, replacement battalions supported corps, and replacement companies supported divisions. Except for the Normandy landings, when replacement companies were with the divisions, the companies usually were under direct control of their battalion headquarters and were located near it. The 3d Replacement Depot supported First Army, the 17th Replacement Depot supported Third Army, the 2d, Seventh Army, and the 18th, Ninth Army. The 51st Replacement Battalion supported Fifteenth Army until 11 April 1945, after which the 11th Replacement Depot was in support. The 9th Replacement Depot was engaged in training and retraining of officers while the 16th and 6960th Replacement Depots were conducting conversion training of enlisted men. Reception depots in port areas included the 12th Replacement Depot in the United Kingdom, the 15th Replacement Depot at Le Havre, and the 54th Replacement Battalion at Marseilles. The 19th Replacement Depot on the Continent and the 10th Replacement Depot in the United Kingdom received casuals released from hospitals. The 14th, 11th, and 6900th Depots were used principally to maintain replacement pools.

First and Third United States Armies had first priority on replacements until 14 July 1944, but after that date equal priority generally was given to all armies which were operational.[102] Accurate estimates of the arrival of replacements were essential at least 15 days in advance of making allocations. Battle losses in riflemen were heavier than had been estimated, although the total battle losses for all ground troops were not appreciably greater than estimates.

By July 1944, about 43,000 replacements were being sent to the European theater each month, but at that time the level of infantry replacements within the theater became so critically low that ETOUSA officials asked that their requisitions be increased from 25,000 infantrymen to 28,000. They also asked for an emergency shipment of 11,000 infantry. It was further requested that the infantry replacements include 70 percent instead of the usual 65 percent of trained riflemen. Later the theater proposed that all infantrymen be trained as riflemen. A serious shortage of replacements in Europe was averted in the fall by the arrival of more men from the United States, but the shortage again became critical in Novem

[102] Ltr, CG, ETOUSA, to CG, GFRC, 4 Jun 44, sub: Allocation Priority for Replacement Personnel. AG 220.3R. DRB, TAG; Ltr, Hq First U. S. Army Group to Army Commanders, 14 Jul 44, sub: Establishment of Personnel Replacement Priorities. AG 322 (G1). DRB, TAG.

ber. By December 1944 divisions had approximately 78 percent of authorized strength in infantry riflemen, a shortage which made it necessary for the G1 and G3 Sections of ETOUSA Headquarters to allocate replacements to the army groups.[103] Officials in the ETO were so short of infantry riflemen that they asked the War Department to waive the furlough policy in an effort to accelerate shipments. Furloughs in some instances were reduced to 5 days, but they were not eliminated. In the United States, Army Air Forces planes transported men from Replacement Training Centers to the locations called for in furlough orders, then returned them to East coast replacement depots.

"Package" Shipments

Although it had been planned that overstrength elements of divisions would remain in England until after a foothold was secured on the Continent, in actual practice most of the units took their overstrength with them on the initial crossing. The commander of the 4th Armored Division later said that this overstrength enabled the division to operate effectively for some time even though it did not receive replacements.[104] The 342d RCT, 86th Division, which was 10 percent overstrength in enlisted men and officers was another unit that found its additional men of value in combat.[105] The 2,500 overstrength given each assault division was expected to take care of replacement needs during the first 10 days, but after the campaign had been under way for a while not enough men were available to maintain units at this overstrength. Loss replacements forwarded in "package shipments" maintained combat units at approximate T/O strength during the next few weeks of the invasion.

ETOUSA had planned standardized "packages" made up from casualty experience data which had been obtained in the North African campaign, but First Army preferred "packages" containing men from only one branch, such as infantry, or certain designated combinations. These "packages" were to be sent to specified corps or divisions. Men were furnished in "packages" of 250, with each "package" subdivided into platoons and squads commanded by officers and noncommissioned officers included in the "packages." Each "package" carried service records and shipping rosters of its members, each had a code name, and traveled under a troop priority list. A scheduled order of shipment was followed during the first 4 days of the invasion but thereafter the "packages" were shipped according to needs of units as determined by casualty reports. Plans had been made for 150 "packages" but only 142 actually were formed in the first 10 days, delivering about

[103] Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, II, p. 31.
[104] Statement, Maj. Gen. John S. Wood. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[105] Statement, Col. C. Hildebrand (Ret.). HIS 330.14. OCMH.

35,500 men. About 10 percent of the replacements, mostly key specialists, were not included in "package" shipments. By 14 June, consolidated requisitions had replaced fixed estimates of losses and from then on "packages" were made up as a matter of convenience in transportation rather than as a means of estimating replacement requirements. During the first 6 months after the invasion, about 1,300 "packages" were sent to the Continent. The term "reinforcement company" was substituted for the "package" designation in November because the use of the word "package" in referring to a group of men was deemed objectionable.

In November 1944, combat units were authorized overstrengths in lieutenants; this overstrength amounted to an advance issue of officer replacements and was established primarily to give junior officers combat experience before they were called upon to exercise full command responsibility.[106] In March 1945, reinforcement companies were reduced to 200 men organized into 4 platoons, 16 squads, and 48 groups, of 4 men each.[107]

An effort was made to keep individuals in each group together from the time they left the replacement training centers until they entered combat. The War Department was concerned over reports that the lack of permanent organizations to which replacements could be assigned caused many to feel they were "orphans."

Since the so-called buddy system, an outgrowth of this plan was found to aid morale,[108] Headquarters, ETO, further extended the policy of training and shipping replacements in groups of four. Field force commanders were urged to assign members of each platoon to the same unit in as low an echelon as practicable and not to break up the four-man groups, but such assignments were optional with commanders who acted in conformity with local situations.

Transfer of Responsibility from MTO

The landing in southern France took place 15 August 1944 and MTO retained responsibility for replacements for that invasion force until November. General Devers, commanding general of 6th Army Group and of MTO, directed that a substantial stockage of replacements be built up in southern France, but this supply did not equal the demand. After the transfer of responsibility for 6th Army Group replacements to ETOUSA in November, 3,000 infantry replacements were sent to Italy by air. There were heavy losses in this movement which extended over about 3 weeks, for three of the planes crashed and several others landed at fields scattered throughout Italy. On 10

[106] Cable, EX54110, ETOUSA to Sixth Army, *et al.*, 13 Oct 44.
[107] GFRC, Cir 24, 10 Mar 45. DRB, TAG.
[108] Ltr, CG, ETOUSA, to CG, GFRC, 8 Apr 45, sub: Organization, Training, and Flow of Reinforcements. AG 322. DRB, TAG.

November, the 2d Replacement Depot from NATOUSA came under ETOUSA control,[109] and the War Department added 10 thousand replacements to ETOUSA shipments for the support of the 6th Army Group.[110]

Movement of Headquarters

At a conference in London, 15 August 1944, it was decided to transfer GFRC headquarters from England to France and to establish it at or near 12th Army Group headquarters inasmuch as General Layman would have responsibility for all replacement installations from the rear ports to the replacement battalions near the front and as he would assume the functions of estimating the requirements and of reassigning and retraining replacement personnel.[111] The headquarters, after functioning at St. Lo, La Hatainnoie, and several other points for brief periods, on 23 August moved to Le Mans where excellent highway, billeting, and training facilities were available. A number of depots were located in this area. On 6 September 1944, the headquarters moved to Paris where it remained until the end of the war.

A rear headquarters of the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command remained in England, and installations which it was supervising in February 1945 included the 10th Depot, which was concerned with hospital returnees; the 12th Depot, engaged in infantry retraining; and Ground Forces Training Center No. 1, which was retraining limited assignment men. Bases which were operating in the United Kingdom furnished supplies to these installations.

Directive on Manpower Conservation

In January 1944, General Marshall warned General Eisenhower of a manpower shortage and added that some men capable of performing useful service had been discharged.[112] On 24 January 1944, General Eisenhower directed Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee's personal attention to manpower conservation and asked that the matter be passed on to each base section commander.[113] Surveys were made to determine where limited assignment men could be used. In March 1944, Replacement Depot No. 6 was authorized 20 percent overstrength of limited assignment enlisted men to replace an equal number of men who were capable of combat; the latter were to be released after the limited

[109] Hq GFRC, GO 14, 17 Oct 44. DRB, TAG.
[110] Ltr, Hq 12th Army Gp, 8 Sep 44, sub: Priorities for Return of Hospital Returnees to the Former Units. AG 705 (G1). DRB, TAG.
[111] Ltr, WDAGO to CofS, 16 Aug 44, sub: Informal Report on Replacement Situation in the ETO. Copy in AG 322 Repl (27 Sep 44). DRB, TAG.
[112] Ltr, WD to Theater Commanders, 6 Jan 44, sub: Conservation of Manpower. AG 220.3. DRB, TAG.
[113] *Ibid.*

assignment men had demonstrated their ability to fill the positions.[114] Classification and assignment boards at each replacement depot were authorized in April 1944.[115] Depot commanders were called upon to report total personnel, by units, of all T/O organizations under their control, showing number of men classed as general or limited service.[116] Some organization commanders objected to receiving limited assignment men, but inasmuch as about 20 percent of the approximately 1,000 men released weekly from hospitals were unfit for general assignments, some service organizations had to accept men who had handicaps. In May, all Service Forces replacements were made available to the Ground Forces so far as they were required to meet operational needs.[117] Instructions issued at that time called for maximum use of limited service personnel, both in service and field force units.[118] Assignments were based on the ability of the man to perform the duties of his MOS.

Officers in Europe did not believe that the flow of replacements from the United States could be decreased, but efforts were made to use more men who were classed as limited assignment. In April 1944, the War Department called for continuous personnel audits in the theaters.[119] The War Department then ordered a reduction in the 10 percent of basic privates which had been allowed T/O organizations.[120] Physical qualifications for combat duty were relaxed.

Losses in crossing the Channel were lighter than estimated and by 15 June 1944 it was apparent that there were overages in certain categories, principally headquarters company, infantry cannon company, antitank company, and service company troops. About 3,000 of these men were retrained as infantry riflemen.

Under the command organization adopted by General Eisenhower, General Lee's staff was the operating staff as far as the administration of American personnel was concerned.[121] The commanding general of the Ground Forces Replacement System was under the G1 on General Lee's staff at Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, rather than under the SHAEF, G1. Personnel matters were consid-

[114] Ltr, Hq FFRD No. 6, 17 Mar 44, sub: Assignment of Limited Assignment Personnel. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

[115] Hq FFRS, Cir 4, 7 Apr 44, sub: Utilization of Manpower Based on Physical Capacity. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

[116] Ltr, Hq FFRS, 23 Apr 44, sub: Limited Assignment Personnel. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

[117] Ltr, Hq RS to Replacement Depot Commanders, 3 May 44, sub: Utilization of Replacements. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

[118] Hq ETOUSA, Cir 50, 11 May 44, sub: Conservation of Manpower. DRB, TAG.

[119] Ltr, WDAGO to CG, ETOUSA, and others, 29 Apr 44, sub: Operation of Theater Replacement System. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[120] Ltr, WDAGO to CG, ETOUSA, and others, 2 May 44, sub: Reduction of Basic Privates in T/O Units. AG 320.2. DRB, TAG.

[121] Ltr, G1 to CofS, 26 Jun 44, sub: Inspection of European Theater Replacement System. AG 322. Repl. DRB, TAG.

ered by the Communications Zone staff before they were presented to the American members of the staff at Supreme Allied Headquarters.

On 9 August 1944, General McNarney, then Deputy Chief of Staff, expressed concern over the replacement situation in the European Theater in a personal letter to General Lee. General McNarney said:

> I had hoped that when I was in England I had impressed upon you the necessity for the most careful administration of the replacement system in view of the overall manpower situation and the approaching battle requirements. I had also hoped that you would avoid the troubles we had experienced in North Africa, and as you know we brought three of your personnel people back here for orientation in the procedures we felt mandatory in the light of our experience.
>
> I understand that the infantry replacement situation is now acute and that in the past three weeks we have received repeated changes in what you want, when you want it, and how you want it. You must impress upon your people that major changes in the processing of replacements takes more than a short notice demand upon the part of the theater. It also takes thorough advance planning both on your part and our part. . . .[122]

For retraining and pipeline requirements the War Department estimated that the theater would not need more than 30,000. The authorized stockage varied from 68,150 to 80,050, but the actual stockage, including all categories, consistently ran about 120,000 from June to November 1944. It was decided at a London meeting on 15 August 1944 that any excess in the arms, not required beyond September, would be retrained as infantry and that any excess in the services, not required beyond December, would also be retrained. Requisitions for shipments from the States were to be reduced accordingly. In the summer of 1944, an unsuccessful effort was made to reduce the replacement pool in the European Theater of Operations by 31 December to 76,000, which was approximately the figure the War Department regarded as justified.

The replacement authorization for the ETO was published in the ETO section of the War Department Troop Deployment. The War Department considered that the theater was entitled to a replacement stockage of not more than 4 to 5 weeks supply of immediately available general assignment replacements.[123] This would have justified a replacement stockage of not more than 40,000 to 50,000 at any one time. The commanding general, SOS, submitted monthly requisitions for replacements to Headquarters, ETOUSA, covering estimated requirements for the third succeeding month. These requisitions were based on normal attrition rates plus anticipated combat losses.

Instructions for a comprehensive retraining program for infantry had been issued to the European Theater in May 1944,[124] but prior to

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[122] Ltr, McNarney to Lee, 9 Aug 44. WDCSA 322 (9 Aug 44). DRB, TAG.

[123] Summary Sheet. Col. Jordan to CofS, 27 Nov 44. AG 322. DRB, TAG.

[124] Interoffice Memo. G1. WDGS, 28 Dec 44. sub: ETO Replacement Conference. AG 322 (Repl). DRB, TAG.

1 January 1945 all conversion operated largely on an emergency basis and produced less than 40,000 men for combat units. General Lee, who as deputy theater commander received the War Department directives in regard to withdrawing general service men from service units, was also commanding general of the SOS in Europe. Had these War Department directives been strictly followed they would have weakened the service forces, the primary interest of the deputy theater commander. Evidence does not indicate that the early directives regarding the conversion program came to General Eisenhower's personal attention at the time they were received in the theater. Seven months after the directive was issued officers in G1, ETOUSA, declared they had not seen it.[125]

In December 1944, the Ground Forces Replacement Training Center No. 1 was designated at Shrivenham, England.[126] The following month the 6960th Reinforcement Depot (Provisional) was established on the Continent to retrain men from the Service Forces and the Air Forces as infantry replacements. Reports to [127] theater headquarters showed numbers eligible in noncombat units but no quotas were established; the 12th Army Group reported that no personnel were sent to the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command for retraining. Third Army had started to retrain about 65,000 men under a program of its own. In December 1944 General Patton noted that the 80th and 5th Divisions were at full strength due to a 5 percent cut in army and corps overhead. An additional 4,000 were training at Metz, enough to fill the 26th Division and leave some over for the 90th and 95th. General Patton declared, "If the Communications Zone had done the same thing, we would have had enough soldiers to win the war. All that would have been necessary to attain this result was for General Eisenhower to issue an order that the troops of Com Z be cut ten percent for the production of riflemen." [127] In December, General Patton was pleading for a program the War Department had ordered in May. Instruction had hardly reached Third Army units before they were thrown into action in the Ardennes. Seventh Army also started a retraining program. The commanding general, ETOUSA, on 17 January 1945 directed the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command to conduct all such retraining. This was done in an effort to keep the program in proper balance and to equalize the loss of men in the various services.

The Theater Manpower Section

The Theater Manpower Section, directed by Col. Lyle T. Shannon, which at first functioned under the supervision of G1 but later became

[125] Statement, Brig. Gen. R. W. Berry, 17 Apr 51. HIS 330.14. OCMH; Statement Col. T. T. Stevenson, 22 May 52. HIS 330.14. OCMH.
[126] Hq GFRC, ETO, GO 2, 31 Dec 44. DRB, TAG.
[127] George S. Patton, Jr., *War as I Knew It* (Boston 1947), p. 187.

a general staff section, was organized in February 1945.[128] Its mission was to determine the numbers and categories to be converted to infantry, allocate limited assignment men to service organizations, and estimate the number of replacements required from the Zone of the Interior.[129] Since no physical or mental qualifications were specified, service units frequently were accused of selecting undesirables for transfer to the infantry, and a considerable number of those who otherwise were qualified resented being transferred. This fact created a bad morale situation.

Assignment of General Lear

In January 1945, the War Department transferred Lt. Gen. Ben Lear, who had been commanding general of the Army Ground Forces, to Europe where he became deputy theater commander. His assignment was to some extent an outgrowth of criticism of the replacement system. He was charged with the supervision of the retraining program, with proper and economical use of personnel, and with morale and welfare. His authority did not extend to the administrative and supply sections, which, except for manpower and morale matters, remained under the Communications Zone.

In March 1945, General Marshall brought to General Lear's attention reports that officers and men were being held for long periods in replacement depots either without enough work or without the right kind of work. The War Department had received complaints that majors and captains were sent to replacement depots in order that junior officers could be promoted in unit vacanices thus created. It was further reported that approximately 600 armored replacements were held in a depot in Europe for many months because they were all cooks or truckdrivers, or specialists other than the gunners and tank crewmen, who were then being requisitioned by the units in combat.

The "buddy system," adopted about this time, was an effort to solve these problems and prevent replacements from going into battle without knowing the noncommissioned officers or other members of their squads, an alleged situation which had aroused the critics.

General Lear continued in the position of deputy theater commander until relieved at his own request so he could return to the United States in July prior to retirement on 16 October 1945.[130]

From 1 January 1945 until May 1945, there were 95,349 men in Europe who received conversion training; 129,800 others were classified as limited service during operations, given retraining in special-

[128] ETOUSA GO 25, 26 Feb 45. DRB, TAG.

[129] Memo, ETOUSA, 2 Apr 45, sub: Theater Manpower Section. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

[130] ETOUSA, GO 5, 23 Jan 45; Ltr, Gen Marshall to Gen Lear, 31 Mar 45. Copy in WDCSA 320.2 (31 Mar 45). DRB, TAG.

ist schools and later reassigned. Reports submitted by chiefs of the services convinced Brig. Gen. George E. Eyster, G3 of ETOUSA, that further withdrawal of general assignment men would impair the efficiency of service units and instructions to discontinue the program were issued effective 1 May.[131]

Reports and Requisitions

The War Department prepared long-range personnel plans for the European Theater after considering ETOUSA reports which showed the status of all excess personnel in the theater. By September 1944, the manpower situation was so critical that the War Department prohibited the use of any of this excess personnel for purposes other than replacing losses in units. ETOUSA called attention to this War Department ruling and informed subordinate units that no requests for the local activation of units or installations involving the use of any excess or replacement personnel would be approved.[132]

G1 of ETOUSA determined the replacement policies. By August 1944, statistics were available on which the GFRS could prepare its own rate tables to supersede the earlier ones based on experience in other theaters and which were out of line with actual needs in Europe. These rate tables were sent to G1 for approval, then forwarded to Washington. The ETOUSA G1 Replacement Section prepared the 6 months' estimate of replacements needed, forwarded the monthly requisitions, computed monthly rate tables, and reported shipments in and out of the replacement system to the War Department monthly. Activation of units required men from the replacement system, and the Replacement Section, when any such activation was contemplated, indicated whether or not the men were available.

Machine records units provided data on both battle and nonbattle casualties. Casualties in divisions were transferred to the detachment of patients as soon as they were cleared from the divisional clearing station. Nonbattle casualties were transferred after 5 days' absence from combat units; in the Communications Zone, transfers were not made to the detachment of patients until a man was absent from his unit for 60 days.

The Movement of Replacements

United States soldiers upon arrival in the United Kingdom usually debarked at Glasgow, Bristol, or Liverpool.[133] Frequently small

[131] Ltr, CG, ETOUSA, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 24 Apr 45, sub: Suspension of Retraining. AG 322 Repl. DRB, TAG.

[132] Memo, CG, ETOUSA, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 4 Sep 44, sub: Use of Replacements for Local Activation of Units and Installations. AG 322. DRB, TAG.

[133] Interview, Col. R. L. Gillespie, CofS, GFRS, by Capt. R. J. Greenwald, Hist Sec, ETOUSA, and Lt. Col. S. L. A. Marshall, Dep ETOUSA Historian, 8 Dec 44. AG ADM 286 (Reinforcement-Misc). DRB, TAG.

lighters took the men from the large ships to the wharves, thereby conserving dock space. The men then marched to railway stations where they boarded trains to the Midlands area around Crewe and Chester where stockage depots were located, or they went directly to the marshalling area at Southampton where they were organized into groups and boarded medium-sized troop transports for the conveyed cross-channel voyage. Immediately after the invasion, replacements disembarked on the Normandy Peninsula at either Omaha or Utah Beaches; after 10 November 1944 all replacements disembarked at Le Havre, the location of the 15th Replacement Depot. Normal procedure was for the troopships to anchor in the channel and for the troops to transfer into landing craft. In a few instances, tide and light conditions were favorable and the large ships could pass sunken craft in the breakwater and make their way to the dock. No troops were left on ships overnight because of danger from enemy operations.

The depot at Le Havre received, housed, and fed replacements disembarking at the port until such time as rail transportation was available for them. About one-third of all replacements moved directly from the beach to the train, while the remainder were housed in the depot from 6 to 36 hours. Troops returning to the United States on temporary duty for rest and recuperation also passed through this depot.

Guides directed new arrivals to one of the two camps operated by the depot.[134] Incoming men were required to march with full equipment about 4 miles to reach these camps. Soon after they arrived they received a welcoming address by an officer connected with the depot. This talk included an explanation of the local rules and regulations and stressed security and censorship as well as warnings against black market transactions. There was no time at this depot to check records or pay the men. Shelter for the night was usually provided in the building of an old French fort or in tents.

The Transportation Corps allotted one train daily to the 15th Replacement Depot and troops usually left Le Havre by rail, traveling in boxcars. During the first 5 months of 1945, 395,000 replacements passed through the depot;[135] of these 271,000 were from the United States and 121,000 were returning from hospitals in the United Kingdom. The remainder came from various other sources. Approximately 5,500 officers and enlisted men passed through the depot at Le Havre on their way back to their units after completion of temporary duty in the United States. In an effort to add some measure of comfort for those traveling away from the depot, the number of men carried in each railway car was reduced from 40 to

[134] Interview, 2d Lt. Joseph Fenster, 16th Port, Le Havre, by Capt. R. J. Greenwald, Hist Sec ETOUSA, 27 Dec 44. AG ADM 286 (Reinforcements-Misc). DRB, TAG.
[135] Hist Rept, 15 Repl Depot, 1 Jul 45. AG File (Master No. 29374). DRB, TAG.

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32. Permanent train commanders were assigned. Although one replacement officer was usually assigned to each car, the train commanders frequently complained that casual officers exercised little control over the transient soldiers placed under their direction.

In November 1944, cars with kitchen equipment were added to each train for the preparation of two hot meals daily to replace K or C rations.[136] Each kitchen crew consisted of 2 mess sergeants, 4 cooks, 1 medical NCO, and 3 kitchen police, all of whom were replacements detailed by the depot. There were frequent complaints about the quality of their work. Each pair of cook wagons were supposed to serve 1,600 men, but train commanders said that experience indicated 1,000 men was nearer the capacity of the equipment. Troop officials had difficulty arranging with train crews for stops at mealtimes, and the food could not be served while the trains were in motion. Neither the B ration nor the 10-in-1 ration was adapted to use on these trains. Best results were attained with the C ration, served hot after heating the individual ration cans. Some officers believed that cooking meals on the trains lengthened the journey, because of the necessary stops, to an extent that nullified the advantage of hot food; others proposed serving meals prepared along the route at fixed stops, but this plan was not tried.

All armored force replacements were sent from Le Havre to the 9th Depot at Fontainebleau. Most Communications Zone and service troops were sent to the 19th Depot at Etemps. Infantrymen who comprised 62 percent of all enlisted replacements, were sent to one of two "intermediate stockage depots," which in December 1944 were located at Givot, Belgium, and Neufchateau, France. The Belgium depot served the First and Ninth United States Armies through two forward depots, one to support each army. The depot in France stocked troops for the two forward depots which served the Third and Seventh United States Armies. Each of the forward depots serving an army had under it forward battalions, with one battalion supporting each corps. It was from these battalions that replacements were sent to the combat divisions.

In the intermediate depots, which received both new arrivals and hospital returnees, records were checked and pay accounts brought up to date. After another orientation lecture the men "zeroed" their rifles, even though they might have fired at other ranges along the line. The 14th Depot prepared a 12-day training program, but few men followed it for longer than 2 or 3 days. Replacements were sent from the intermediate personnel depots to the subsistence depots, from which units drew supplies in order that the men might ride on the trucks hauling rations to the units.

[136] Capt. R. J. Greenwald, Hist Sec ETOUSA, Notes on conference with eight train commanders, Le Havre, 27 Dec 44. AG ADM 286 (Reinforcements-Misc). DRB, TAG.



American troops departing from London railroad station, June 1943.

Replacement units farther forward than the depots frequently moved rapidly. For example, the 38th Replacement Battalion, on 18 August 1944, after having been ordered to go into operation with XII Corps, advanced over 200 miles in 1 move. It waited 2 days in the vicinity of Orleans and moved in rear of the 4th Armored Division during the drive for Sens. The 38th Replacement Battalion was well in front of both Third Army and XII Corps headquarters all the way across France into Nancy.

Forward replacement battalions sometimes became involved in active operations. The 79th Replacement Battalion, attached to the 17th Replacement Depot, was requested on 16 December 1944 by the commanding officer of the 109th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division, whose unit was defending Ettelbruck during the German counteroffensive, to provide roadblocks for all of the roads leading into Ettelbruck and to defend the city in order that all units of the regiment could be freed for tactical employment against the enemy.[137] Task forces from the four replacement companies and the headquarters detachment were posted on seven roadblocks at 1800, 16 December 1944. Four .50 caliber machineguns and four bazookas were placed at strategic positions on routes leading into the city. Squads were organized to connect roadblocks and control the area. A reserve force was formed and a liaison officer from the replacement battalion was

[137] Operations Report, 17th Reinf Depot, 1944. AG File (Master No. 14171). DRB, TAG.

placed on duty at regimental headquarters. On 17 December 1944, the entire reserve of the 109th Infantry Regiment had been committed, leaving the replacement battalion as the only defense of Ettelbruck against threatened enemy infiltration. The city was defended by the battalion until 1200, 18 December, when the commanding general VIII Corps, ordered a withdrawal.

The 79th Infantry Division of the Seventh United States Army operated a replacement pool for incoming men. Each infantry regiment sent 1 officer and 1 noncommissioned officer to serve on the staff of the pool, which also included 1 officer and 4 enlisted men selected from the division at large. This pool repeated most of the checking that new men had received at the forward replacement battalions, including the zeroing of rifles. The orientation talk was blunt and to the point; it made clear that too many men had been wounded as a result of their own carelessness. Additional pool camps were operated in the three regimental sections and another one was maintained in the special troops section. These camps gave new arrivals a chance to learn many lessons from old timers.

The success of this 79th Division pool caused the 44th and 100th Divisions, as well as some of the other XV Corps units, to adopt similar methods. The 12th Armored Division had its own receiving station pool. In contrast, the 45th Division sent incoming replacements directly to regiments. The 29th Division established a recuperating center for mild exhaustion cases; this center later developed into an organized school where both officers and enlisted men received 36 hours of training from veteran officers, many of whom had been wounded. Junior officers who had recently arrived spent their first 24 hours with troops other than those they were to command, a practice which saved them from a certain amount of chagrin in case they committed embarrassing errors. After this brief taste of fire, the officers usually returned to the pool for a week where they picked up more tips from the experienced men operating the pool.

The receiving station of the 100th Infantry Division was at rear headquarters and there replacements were equipped and oriented before they went to their units.[138] In addition to men reporting initially and those returning from hospitals, the station also received men who had been slightly wounded and had been treated at clearing stations. All three types required different treatment. The replacement recently from the United States needed "verbatim instructions on what to do and how to act"; the casual, usually a wounded man returning to his unit, "already knew the score, but there were certain things he should be told"; the clearing station case might be "a man who had not fully

[138] Interview, Lt. Col. John C. Byrd, 100th Inf Div, near Saarbourg, by Capt. J. R. Greenwald, Hist Sec ETOUSA, 3 Jan 45. AG ADM 285 (Reinforcement Command). DRB, TAG.

recuperated mentally and who required careful handling and treatment." [139]

Men normally arrived at the receiving station at 1500 daily. The largest number received in 1 day was 400, the average about 90. They first listened to an orientation talk, followed by physical inspection and supper. After supper, an officer spoke on combat conditions, stressing danger from trench feet. The men were informed that socks had first priority among the things they were required to carry. Ammunition was second and food third. They were informed that food was the only one of the three which could be lacking without danger of increase of battle casualties. This talk was followed by a controlled "bull session" in which an attempt was made to settle any questions remaining in the minds of the replacements. Breakfast next morning was followed by religious services, after which personnel officers interviewed individually the men assigned to their units. After all property shortages had been replaced and the records checked, dinner was served and by 1300 hours the men were ready to depart for their regiments. Receiving units picked up their own men, but usually vehicles at rear headquarters on other missions provided transportation. Upon arrival at the regiment, the men received additional instructions; they were told what their companies were doing, what type of fighting was going on, and they were given some idea of the part they would have in it.

Officers were given separate quarters in the center after which they went to the personnel officers of their units for instructions relative to their assignments. More individual attention was possible with officers since there were fewer of them.

Experience at the division center with converted troops indicated that engineers made the best infantrymen, but that all men coming from units other than infantry had difficulty in adjusting themselves.

Some officers in charge of combat units reported that most replacements had preconceived thoughts of the horrors of war and believed that they had little chance to survive.[140] Some were imbued with the idea that the German soldier was cunning and possessed exceptional fighting ability.[141] To some extent, the existence of this feeling of inferiority was blamed on improper training, but some of it also was believed to come from the "tall tales" which men returning from hospitals liked to tell the new men they encountered in replacement centers. In an effort to save the new arrivals from these stories, most depots segregated casuals from replacements. In the 3d Replacement Depot, teams made up of men who had been in combat were assigned

[139] *Ibid.*

[140] Ltr, CG, GFRS, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 10 Sep 44, sub: Training of Replacements. AG353. DRB, TAG.

[141] Ltr, First U. S. Army, 19 Oct 44, sub: Training of Replacements. AG ADM 286 (Reinforcements-Misc). DRB, TAG.

to give factual talks to newly arrived replacements. These talks pointed out that the German soldier, although usually well-trained and equipped, was far from invincible.

During August 1944, many replacements arriving from the United States carried weapons other than those which they should have received under the tables of organization and equipment. In many instances, they had not fired the weapons they were carrying. This caused much unnecessary work and readjustment.

Troops sometimes were sent forward overburdened with unnecessary personal property but not fully equipped with required articles.[142] The 2d Replacement Depot and the forward battalions serving Seventh United States Army drew supplies from army depots instead of from Communications Zone installations. The supply officer of the depot said in January 1944 that the replacement depot was using more individual equipment than all of the eight divisions making up the Seventh Army. Excessive losses of personal equipment became a difficult problem, since shortages in essential items had to be made up in the depots.[143]

Some complaints against the replacement system were due to lack of understanding on the part of the men.[144] Officers generally found that when candid explanations were given to the men they were accepted and that the men were satisfied. Faults charged to the replacement system included lack of military courtesy to replacement officers; special accommodations and privileges for the cadre; insufficient consideration for the comfort of the soldier; inadequate training, poor discipline, poor mess; and the holding of replacements, especially casuals, too long. The replacement was concerned about where he was to go and where he would be assigned, and it was desirable to give him as much of this information as was available. Depots and battalions were urged to be liberal with passes, when that was possible.

Movements by Air

Replacements sometimes were moved by air on short notice. At 1800, 15 July 1944, the 15th Replacement Depot, then at Delamere Park, Cuddington, England, received instructions to send 650 replacements by air to France on the following day.[145] The depot finance section immediately obtained sufficient French currency to

[142] Ltr, CG, GFRS, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 8 Nov 44, sub: Replacements. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

[143] Interview, 1st Lt Adolph P. Grotiot, by Capt Robert J. Greenwald, Hist Sec ETOUSA, 9 Dec 44, AG ADM 286 (Reinforcements-Misc). DRB, TAG.

[144] Ltr, CG, GFRS, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 7 Dec 44, sub: Replacements. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

[145] Historical Report, 15 Repl Depot, 16 Jul 44. AG File (Master No. 29347). DRB, TAG.

meet the conversion pay roll and the depot supply section issued all of the additional equipment which was necessary for men going directly to France. The depot classification and assignment section organized the shipping rosters into plane groups of 1 officer or noncommissioned officer and 17 enlisted men. The requisition called for 600 riflemen and in order to obtain this number the men were called from all the three camps which were being operated by the depot. Many had to be taken from replacement detachments already formed. On the morning of 16 July, each plane group was placed in a truck and the convoy traveled the 23 miles to the airfield, arriving in time for the first flight to leave at 0800. Two other flights took the remainder of the men, one leaving at 0900 and the last at 1130. None of the men had been informed of the method of transportation or the emergency nature of the call and their first knowledge of this came when the trucks turned into the airfield. The reaction was favorable and morale remained high.

The Change to "Reinforcement" Command

During World War I, military authorities had been apprehensive lest individuals designated as "replacements" and trained at "replacement establishments" in the United States might become alarmed by those words and have exaggerated ideas of casualties.[146] The term "replacement" had been used extensively in World War I and no adverse effects on the AEF had been apparent. The matter received considerable study after World War I, and it was recommended that emphasis on the term "replacements" should be avoided and instead the training feature of the installations which handled replacements should be emphasized.

Poor morale among men in the pipelines during World War II again brought the question to the attention of the War Department. Some officers were of the opinion that men classified as replacements were disturbed by the thought that they might be on their way to take the places of those killed or wounded. By the end of 1944 several divisions in Europe were composed almost entirely of men who had traveled overseas as replacements.

There were some officers who believed that the names of the units concerned with replacements should be changed. The British term "reinforcements" was regarded as more suitable, and on 28 December 1944 Headquarters, ETOUSA, changed the name "Ground Forces Replacement Command" to "Ground Forces Reinforcement Command."[147] The implementing letter[148] instructed all concerned to

[146] Memo, WDGS, 2 Apr 40, sub: Special Mobilization Procedures as to Designation of Enlistment Replacement Centers and use of the term "Replacement." Copy in AG Inactive Records Mobilization Book [no file number]. DRB, TAG.

[147] ETOUSA, GO 132, 29 Dec 44. DRB, TAG.

[148] Ltr, CG, ETOUSA, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 29 Dec. 44, sub: Indoctrination of Reinforcements. AG 353.02. DRB, TAG.

inform new men that they were combat reserves or "reinforcements"; that they were not "replacements" for men who had been killed or wounded; that they were not there just to "fill dead men's shoes." The letter went on to say that these new men were to be told that they were as essential in tactical operations as was a reserve regiment or division and that they were so considered by the theater commander.

The letter left unexplained the question of who was to fill the shoes of dead men. Any soldier in the frontlines who found himself adjacent to an empty foxhole where no one was replacing a dead buddy probably would have found the letter confusing, had he read it. The infantryman wasn't concerned with what they called the man next to him; he wanted the added firepower which would help save his life.

The commanding general of the European Theater of Operations recommended that for morale reasons the term "reinforcement" be substituted for the term "replacement" throughout the United States Army.[149] In response to a query from the War Department, commanders of the other overseas theaters generally expressed opposition to the EUCOM proposal, but the commanding general of the Army Ground Forces thought the change desirable. It was the opinion of G3 in the War Department that such a change could be ordered only by the Secretary of War and that the theater commander in the European Theater of Operations had exceeded his authority in ordering the new designation of the replacement system in the ETO. The commanding general of the European Theater of Operations was informed on 23 March 1945 that the War Department did not concur in the proposal to substitute the term "reinforcement" for "replacement" throughout the United States Army. The War Department did not raise any objections to the use of the term within the European Theater, in view of replacement difficulties which had been experienced there and because of General Eisenhower's belief that such a change would be helpful, but the War Department did direct that to avoid confusion the term "replacement" be used in all correspondence from the European Theater of Operations to the War Department or to other theaters.

Hospital Returnees

As a result of experience in North Africa, the War Department authorized units in combat areas to drop hospitalized men from the rolls at the time the men departed from their units.[150] The extent and location of combat areas was determined by theater commanders. In Europe, at the time of invasion, the Continental beachheads, the marshalling areas, and the scenes for the operations of airborne units had

[149] Memo, WDGS G3 to TAG, 23 Mar 45, sub: Redesignation of Certain Replacement units. G3 322 Repl (26 Jan 45). DRB, TAG.

[150] Ltr, CG, ETOUSA, to Replacement Depot Commanders, 2 Jun 44, sub: Definition of Combat Area. AG 200.3. DRB, TAG.

been designated as combat areas. When operations on the Continent were well underway those men who were hospitalized were dropped from unit rolls as of the time they left division clearing stations and after being released from hospitals they were returned to duty through the replacement system, not always going to their former units.[151] In November 1944, units engaged in combat were authorized to include in their daily replacement requisitions their anticipated losses 48 hours in advance of the time the requisition was made.[152]

The Reinforcement Branch of the G1 section of 12th Army Group Headquarters each month computed daily hospital admission rates by armies, analyzed casualties by divisions, and listed the number of combat days per division for the theater commander. This information was important in estimating future replacement requirements. Estimates showing the number of men expected to be released from hospitals and returned to duty with ground force units were checked against previous records to increase the accuracy of these figures which affected requests for future delivery of replacements. Estimates of combat losses generally were made for 6 months in advance, but short-range estimates were prepared when their necessity was indicated by impending operations.[153]

The Central Records Office, AGO, ETOUSA, was first located in England. The records of men evacuated from division hospitals and dropped from their units were sent to this office. Many of these men remained in hospitals in France. Experience indicated that unless a man was hospitalized for a long period his record did not catch up with him until he had returned to duty with his original or with another unit. This system complicated records for purpose of pay, awards, and administration, and it placed a great burden of classification on the replacement system.

The greatest number of battle casualties were riflemen, but many wounded infantrymen returning through the replacement system would not admit any experience as riflemen. Since records and Forms 20 of men released from hospitals were not available, classification officers in the replacement system were confronted with a problem. The Central Records Office later was moved to France, where it was in a better location to serve replacement installations.

While army group, army, and corps commanders generally agreed that for morale purposes men who had been wounded in action should be returned to their units upon release from hospitals, this policy could not be adhered to at all times if no overstrength was authorized, and ETOUSA was permitting no overstrength in units. Pressure for return of wounded and sick to their units came mainly from

[151] Cable, EX67450, ETOUSA to Sixth Army Group, 26 Nov 44.
[152] Cable, EX62284, ETOUSA to GFRC *et al*, 10 Nov 44.
[153] Report of Operations 12th Army Group, II, p. 27.

commanders of companies and battalions to corps commanders and from corps commanders to army commanders. These commanders wanted to get their keymen and specialists back and they could not understand why keymen released from hospitals should sit in replacement depots while the units were required to carry basics as overstrength. Basics had been retained in all field force units shipped to France prior to D +30, including all of First Army and about half of Third Army. Units were required to absorb basics' positions, including key specialists, as long as they were overstrength.

A man who entered the replacement system after he had been released from a hospital could be returned to his former unit only if that unit had an appropriate vacancy and had submitted a requisition.[154] The replacement system commander could exercise his judgment as to how long a man would be held while awaiting a requisition from his former unit, a decision which usually depended upon the demand for men. Beginning in September 1944, men who served longest with a unit were given higher priority for return to that unit. Veterans were sent to organizations other than their own only in the event that the replacement pool was exhausted. In January 1945, the vacancy rule was suspended and all general assignment enlisted men from the field forces were returned to their former units except men who had suffered three serious wounds and who were returned to combat only upon their own request.[155]

From 22 July 1944 to 1 August 1944, the 81st Replacement Battalion of the 17th Replacement Depot, then located in the vicinity of Le Valdecie, France, received 1,428 battle fatigue cases as they were discharged from the 618th and 622d Medical Clearing Stations. These men had lost most of their equipment and were suffering from psychiatric disorders. They were reequipped, a special training schedule was prepared, the men were transferred to relatively comfortable surroundings, and they were provided with entertainment. Each individual case was considered by a board of 3 officers which recommended 50 men for general service and the remainder for limited assignments.[156]

A policy placed in effect on 15 August 1944 permitted retention on unit rolls, without replacements, of men hospitalized from nondivisional units for 10 days or less and guaranteed return of keymen to their units. This policy resulted in slight overstrengths in nondivisional units.

It was not always practical to return wounded men to their original divisional units because excessive overstrengths developed in divisions

[154] Hq ETOUSA, Cir 66, 6 Jun 44. DRB, TAG.
[155] Hq ETOUSA, Cir 35, 29 Mar 45. DRB, TAG.
[156] Operations Report, 17th Rein Depot, 1944. AG File (Master No. 14171). DRB, TAG.

withdrawn from action. A large percentage of wounded men, who really wanted to go back to their companies after hospitalization, were disappointed because none of their old friends were there. They did not know the new captains and lieutenants, or the new sergeants and corporals, and very few of the privates. They found old outfits actually were new outfits, and they felt they were strangers. Many frankly said they believed they should be assigned to less hazardous jobs and that others should take part in frontline combat. In January 1945, theater headquarters established a policy under which all general assignment enlisted hospital returnees automatically went back to their former units. In March this policy was extended temporarily to include all general assignment company grade officers.

Inspection Reports

Col. Howard E. Kessinger of the War Department General Staff, after an inspection of the European Theater in 1944, said the theater had been slow to release basics and that most of those who were released were used to activate new units, mainly quartermaster. Figures furnished by General Layman's headquarters indicated that 13 percent of the 1,340 basics received by the replacement system as of 30 June 1944 had been limited assignment according to their records but that physical inspections had indicated that a large number of those whose records showed general assignment should have been reclassified as limited assignment. Colonel Kessinger concluded that the able-bodied basics were going to the quartermaster or other Communication Zone units and were not being sent to the replacement system. He did not believe the basics would become a copious source of men for combat units unless directives were issued requiring a certain percentage of general assignment men to be assigned to the replacement system.

The inspector did not believe the European Theater directives regarding the replacement within the Communications Zone of general assignment men with limited assignment men would accomplish the War Department's intention, because the matter was practically on a voluntary basis on the part of the units. General Layman, in advance of the theater directive, had established a program of replacing general assignment men with limited assignment men in his permanent organization and had fixed a goal of 13 percent officers and 14 percent enlisted men by 30 June with a further goal of an overall 25 percent by 30 July 1944. Colonel Kessinger had suggested that deadlines should be set for the remainder of the Communications Zone units, a move which would have required them to meet given percentages on given dates. The general attitude regarding the project was shown by the experience of the replacement system audit officer whose

sole duty was to find and pull out able-bodied men. He reported that he was the most unpopular man in the entire replacement system.

Colonel Kessinger said the theater was in need of diagnosis and treatment by the War Department Manpower Board, or by some other disinterested personnel agency. Otherwise he feared that many able-bodied men, hidden away and doing jobs that could just as well be done by limited assignment men, would remain in the seclusion of the Communications Zone posts and would never have an opportunity for combat duty.

There was a general tendency to look upon limited assignment men as of little value in any position although the great majority were capable of performing jobs in rear areas. Colonel Kessinger's report stressed that General Layman and his staff were attempting to carry out the basic War Department replacement policies of (1) single command, (2) no diversions, (3) replacement of general assignment men by limited assignment men in rear areas where possible and as soon as possible, and (4) retraining where necessary to fill requirements.

Stocks of infantry riflemen and heavy weapons men were almost depleted because estimates on types and numbers of casualties had been in error. Infantry casualties were expected to continue heavy as long as the fighting was in the close hedgerow country.

Army group and the replacement system commanders were not in agreement over the control of forward replacement depots. The army ground group commander wanted depots on the continent to be under army command with replacement battalions under corps commanders. General Layman desired to retain control himself. The headquarters of the army had pointed out that young officers from the corps replacement battalions were trained by assigning them as overstrength to frontline companies where they could gain experience and form personal attachments in the organizations. Under the flexible arrangement then in effect the replacement system commander could withdraw these officers for assignment to other units, a practice objectionable from a morale standpoint.

Colonel Kessinger reported that after talking to several hundred replacements he had concluded that men arriving overseas from the United States wanted most of all to be identified with a unit and that early assignment meant more to their morale than any other one thing. Likewise, he said, the thought uppermost in the minds of hospital returnees, upon joining the replacement stream, was the desire to return to their own outfits, a statement not fully supported by surveys among the men. He concluded that the basic policy in this matter should not be changed unless it resulted in excessive overstrength, in which case he favored restricting withdrawals to men who had not been wounded in action with their units.

Unit Experiences

Ninth Army, at times, was short of replacements and found that those who did arrive were frequently in need of refresher training and combat orientation.[157] Each Ninth Army division furnished combat-experienced officers to the 18th Reinforcement Depot, which was the Ground Forces reinforcement system agency for the Ninth Army. These instructors trained new men to live under combat conditions, to use small arms (German as well as American), and to detect and avoid booby traps and mines. Ninth Army found that instilling confidence in the recruit was as important as giving him additional training. The Army's program of training at the depot, coupled with special attention to the man upon his arrival at the division to which he was assigned, speeded up his adjustment into the ranks. Travel time from hospitals to units was reduced and in many instances unnecessary waiting was eliminated. Small stocks of clothing and equipment were placed in hospitals and replacement installations so that returnees could be properly equipped without delay.

Officers of the 30th Infantry Division reported that if replacements were received during quiet periods the problem of their assimilation was greatly reduced. During these quiet periods, there was time for rehearsal of small-unit problems and for instruction in the use of weapons. During the division's major battles, however, replacements came up to the line without opportunity for learning their duties or getting acquainted with their teammates. First sergeants, who had no chance to learn the names of the new men, could not report casualties but could give only a roster of men on hand. Company clerks, at the regimental rear echelon, had to determine who was missing by comparing rosters from the front with the complete lists of men assigned to companies.[158]

While in action in Europe between 7–12 August 1944, the 30th Division lost 1,000 men, each of its 3 infantry regiments suffering losses in about equal proportions.[159] Replacements for about a third of these losses arrived a few days later, but they needed refresher work on weapons and small-unit instruction with the squads and platoons to which they were assigned. Most of this was accomplished in 2 days, 17–18 August, while the division, pinched out of the line by the British, awaited new orders.

In May 1945, replacements were being rushed to the 96th Infantry Division to fill its shattered ranks.[160] A thousand new men arrived

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[157] Col. William J. Thompson, *Conquer, The Story of the Ninth Army* (Washington, 1947), p. 102.

[158] Robert L. Hewitt, *Work Horse of the Western Front, The Story of the 30th Infantry Division* (Washington, 1946), p. 280.

[159] *Ibid.*

[160] Capt. John C. Willems and others, *The Deadeyes, The Story of the 96th Infantry Division* (Washington, 1947), p. 131.

just before the division was relieved from the fighting and another 2,600 arrived during the rest period. Officers in charge of the division said the training the new men had received apparently had been brief, but that they were good soldiers—young, husky, and smart. They were given what additional training was possible under the circumstances, but officers in that division believed that the best indoctrination came from "bull sessions" with the few old hands in the rifle companies.

An officer who served with the 36th Replacement Battalion stated that division of command responsibility handicapped that organization. The battalion was assigned to the 18th Replacement Depot and took orders from that unit which frequently was 50 to 100 miles distant.[161] But at the same time the battalion was directly in support of XIII Corps and was exerting every effort to fill the corps' requisitions for combat replacements promptly and to supply men who were well-equipped and as well-trained as possible. This officer stated that relations with XIII Corps were ideal at all times but that relations with the 18th Replacement Depot generally were unsatisfactory. He said that all officers of the battalion believed that the battalion could have operated more efficiently had it been a separate battalion assigned to corps, merely drawing its replacement supply from the depot.

The battalion attacked the morale problem vigorously, emphasizing training and recreation and operating a consolidated battalion mess which usually was rated superior, but the number of court martial cases always was large.

There was always a shortage of cadre personnel, due to the extremely heavy load of replacements carried. Under the T/O, companies were equipped to handle 300 replacements each, but their strength usually was nearer 1,000. Equipment, particularly mess equipment and tentage, was inadequate. The T/O did not provide for signal personnel, but there was need for them, particularly when many troop movements were under way. It was necessary to take men assigned to the companies and set up a troop movement section. Motor transportation was inadequate. Observers believed that separate T/O & E's should have been drawn up for battalions and companies operating in direct support of corps, as distinguished from those units operating at replacement depots in Com Z, inasmuch as the problems and requirements were different.

Since newly commissioned and replacement officers frequently did not take seriously the responsibilities involved in the command of "packets" of enlisted men, supply discipline generally was bad. On a number of occasions, more than a ton of abandoned personal equipment, including rifles, was recovered from trains that had brought

[161] Statement, Capt. Samuel H. Oakley, 17 Jun 50. HIS 330.14. OCMH.

replacements to the railhead. Under conditions in the combat zone, it was nearly impossible to charge enlisted men for lost or abandoned equipment. Many of the replacements who arrived from the United States were inadequately trained and the battalion attempted to make up for this deficiency in the limited time available.

One unit commander observed that replacements arrived in divisional and regimental areas tired, bewildered, and disheartened, after having been shunted from one replacement depot to another, led by officers temporarily appointed for convoy or escort purposes who themselves were more or less bewildered.[162] Field train bivouacs usually were within the sound of guns and replacements were acutely and nervously aware that their entry into combat was imminent. Due to lack of time and the urgent need for their services, they frequently were thrown into combat with no orientation or advance preparation; this sometimes resulted in unnecessary casualties, because the new men did not know how to take care of themselves. This same officer recommended that replacement battalions be formed in the Zone of the Interior and each earmarked for a combat division, that divisional patches be issued, and pride in parent unit developed. He reasoned that prior to embarkation these battalions could be routed through a central depot where artillery, medical, and other personnel in addition to infantry could be added in proportion to the known or estimated percentage of losses which were likely to occur early in combat. Another system which he thought would have been better would have been the training of an additional battalion for each infantry regiment and of a composite battalion for artillery, medical, and other personnel. These extra groups would have accompanied the division to the theater of operations where a divisional training depot would have been established from which replacements could have been drawn as needed.

This unit commander stated that the replacement system during World War II would have been improved by the establishment of a divisional training depot in the rear of each division. He proposed that in these depots the assistant division commander, or other officer speaking for the division commander, should welcome the men, orient them as to the combat situation, and give them other essential information. Equipment could be checked and warm food served prior to the time the replacements were forwarded to regiments, a movement which should take place only under conditions of comparative immunity to enemy fire. He urged that replacements be assigned to battalions in reserve when possible.

He believed it would have been better to have had trained divisions for replacement purposes, moved them to the front as units,

[162] Col. T. J. Cross, ACofS, G–3, Second Army Fort George G. Meade, Md., MS "Notes on Infantry Division." Only copy retained by author.

and broken them up as required. He said that the system used in World War I, particularly during the Meuse-Argonne fight, when divisions were broken up to furnish replacements, was much more satisfactory than the replacement system used in World War II.

Overstrength for the Army of Occupation

During March 1945, between 40,000 and 50,000 limited assignment men were sent from the United States to the European theater. They were made available to the Ground Forces Reinforcement Command in ETOUSA so that an equal number of general service men could be released from combat service. This was a reversal of the procedure which had been considered normal during the early part of the war before overseas theaters were built up to required strength.

In April 1945, when it became apparent that military forces would be required for guarding large numbers of prisoners of war, for guarding captured enemy material, for control of displaced persons, and for assignment to positions in military government, theater headquarters authorized 12th Army Group an overstrength of 37,000 men. This overstrength was allocated to armies with the stipulation that requisitions would not be submitted to maintain it. Units also could be required to give up this overstrength if men were needed for operational purposes and replacements were not otherwise available. The overstrength made possible rotation of many combat-exhausted individuals to rear area jobs.[163]

Final Operations

The Ground Forces Reinforcement Command operated in Europe until 31 January 1946 when it was discontinued, and troops arriving for service in the army of occupation were assigned by the Adjutant General's Classification and Redeployment Branch, Headquarters, ETOUSA. The Ground Forces Reinforcement Coordinating Group, an advisory staff unit with no control over operations, was established at Marburg, Germany, under the command of Col. Philip S. Wood.[164] At that time, the 2d Reinforcement Depot was operating at Marburg, Germany, and the 17th Reinforcement Depot was operating in Bamberg, Germany. Later all replacements for the occupation forces entered Germany through the staging area at Bremerhaven and were assigned through the depot at Marburg.

[163] Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, II, p. 38.

[164] Ltr, USFET, 12 Jan 46, sub: Inactivation of Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, AG 322; USFET, GO 85, 27 Mar 46. DRB, TAG.

CHAPTER XV

CONCLUSIONS

Efficient use of military manpower can only be achieved when there is an effective replacement system. The Army depends upon the replacement system for proper distribution, within the military service, of the manpower resources it receives from the civilian population. The State depends upon the military replacement system to insure maximum utilization of men in the Armed Forces thereby keeping the drain on the civilian labor force at a minimum.

All of the problems of an effective system became apparent during the early military history of the United States. The Militia system of pre-Revolutionary days provided the maximum military protection that could be achieved with a minimum disruption of the labor force because it called the farmer from his plow only when danger was imminent. The colonial military system grew around this principle.

The outbreak of the Revolution presented General Washington with the difficult problem of maintaining a centralized force on the foundation of the divergent military systems of the 13 colonies. Washington accepted conditions as he found them and showed good judgment in maintaining close contact with the State military organizations. While these local military units caused many of the commander's headaches, they were also the source for all the strength of his hastily assembled Army.

The States raised the regiments for the Continental Army, and Continental control was not imposed until the men had been recruited and the units organized. Washington continually urged the States to forward the men needed to keep Continental units up to strength and it was only when this urging failed to produce results that the Continental troops sent out regimental recruiting parties. State Militias provided the Continental Army local contact with the civilian population, which was the source of its strength, but the Continental Congress and the executive officers in many instances lacked the authority necessary to make effective use of that strength. Washington did not make the mistake of trying to correct this absence of central authority by breaking the ties that bound the Continental Army to the State military systems. Whenever Continental recruiting parties sought

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enlistments they operated under State regulations and kept careful records to prevent confusion in State quotas.

War, at that time, was a seasonal operation: it was uneconomical to keep large numbers of men idle in winter camps. The Continental officers wanted men enrolled for the duration of the war, but they generally did not object to soldiers returning to their families during the inactive winter season. Washington's efforts to establish central control frequently were hampered by State jealousies, and conflicts among the States prevented the Continental Congress from exercising the authority necessary for an effective federation. Under these conditions it would have been useless for the military authorities to have interferred with State prerogatives in the matter of raising men by divorcing the Continental Army recruiting system from the Militia.

Within the Continental Army, Washington established the elite Light Infantry, kept up to strength during the campaign by levies on the Continental battalions regardless of how much these battalions themselves might be in need of men. The battalions, weakened by these levies, were then bolstered by calling short-term Militia units that supported the main Army but retained their local identity.

The Continental Army, regardless of the difficulties that confronted it, continually looked to the State Militias as the source for its manpower. The States provided, not as many men as the commander would like to have received, but enough for him to finally accomplish his mission. The Continental Army's replacement system was not perfect, but it did not fail.

The Revolutionary lesson that manpower must come from local sources was forgotten after the Constitution was adopted. The act of 8 May 1792 divorced the Regular Army from the State Militias, leaving regimental recruiting as the only means whereby the Regulars could procure men. Regimental commanders were forced to assume, along with their other duties, all responsibility for enlisting the men needed to keep their units up to strength. This task was difficult enough when a regiment was stationed in a populated area but was impossible for an organization at a remote frontier post. The outbreak of the War of 1812, when the Regular Army was authorized 35,000 men but had an actual strength of only 6,700, disclosed the perilous situation into which the military establishment had drifted. Understrength Regular Army units could not function efficiently themselves; nor could they train Militia or furnish the nucleus around which effective Volunteer units could be formed. The Militia was not effective for service outside its home States without reorganization and additional training. Some States even refused to permit their Militia troops to leave the home soil. The War of 1812 demonstrated that a more effective recruiting system was needed.

John C. Calhoun became Secretary of War in December 1817 and immediately undertook to reorganize the War Department in an attempt to eliminate the defects which had appeared in 1812. The General Recruiting Service, formed in 1822 as one of the results of Calhoun's reforms, soon became an effective agency. It assigned recruiting officers to centers of population and to likely recruiting areas, and provided the local contact which had been lost when the Regular Army was divorced from the Militia in 1792.

The value of the General Recruiting Service in a combat situation was demonstrated at the beginning of the Mexican War. The Regular Army entered that conflict only about 1,000 men understrength, a marked contrast to its condition at the beginning of the War of 1812. Regular Army units which during peacetime had had enough men to operate with a fair degree of efficiency were much more capable when it became necessary for them to train volunteers.

From the close of the Mexican War until the outbreak of the Civil War, the recruiting for the Regulars followed the pattern established by Secretary Calhoun in 1822. The problems of the General and Regimental Recruiting Services were complicated by the fact that the territory acquired from Mexico was far from the centers of population. To the credit of the recruiting service, it must be said that in large measure the regiments stationed on the western frontier and on the Pacific coast usually received a sufficient number of replacements to meet their minimum requirements. The years prior to 1861 were noteworthy in another respect. When the 9th and 10th Infantry Regiments were reactivated in 1855, the superintendent of the General Recruiting Service was directed to organize those regiments around a nucleus of trained men from the permanent party at Fort Columbus. This was the genesis of the cadre system.

The 1861 decision to use volunteers as the principal force to suppress the rebellion might have been sound had military authorities not overlooked lessons from past wars which indicated that the role of the small professional army should be to furnish cadres and supervise training in the newly mustered citizen army. The War Department, ignoring Calhoun's experience in 1822, failed to expand the General Recruiting Service to the extent necessary to give the Regular Army the men it needed to fulfill its role. The Regular Army, which numbered 14,657 officers and men present for duty 1 January 1861, had only 13,880 present for duty on 31 March 1865. The resignation of large numbers of officers to serve with the Confederacy made the officer replacement problem doubly serious. The Regular Army received an insignificant fraction of the 2,778,304 credited to the States and Territories during the war.

Local participation was essential in raising volunteer forces, but political considerations soon became an undesirable factor. Governors,

wishing to appoint as many officers as possible, wanted new regiments and until near the end of the war disregarded protests from field commanders who wanted men to fill the old regiments. As an example, in August 1862 fewer than 50,000 men were enlisted for old regiments that needed 223,000 men.

The President, broadly interpreting his powers under the Militia acts, in the fall of 1862 attempted to fill the depleted regiments by a draft of Militia for 9 months' service. Apart from the waste in recruiting men for such a short term, the Militia draft of 1862 failed to provide replacements because less than 90,000 of the proposed 300,000 were mustered into Federal service and of these only 20,000 went to the old regiments.

Early in 1863, Congress passed the draft act which was approved by the President on 3 March. Ostensibly an act to require military service of all able-bodied males between the ages of 20 and 45, this law contained so many loopholes and provided so many exemptions that the official who attempted to enforce it, Provost Marshal General James B. Fry, characterized it as "a law not to secure military service but to exempt men from it." The Government attempted Federal control of the selection of men but delegated the organization of regiments to the States. It should have delegated the selection of men to the States and assumed control over the organization of regiments. Field commanders expected great things from conscription, but of 1,173,522 men mustered into service between 1 July 1863 and the end of the war, only 170,039 came from the draft.

The conscription law did spur recruiting; thousands volunteered to escape what then was regarded as the stigma of the draft. After 1863 a larger percentage of the men inducted into the Army by the various methods went into the old regiments, but there were never enough of them to restore the military organizations to their original strength. About the best that could be done was to give the regiments enough men to keep them operational.

During the winter of 1863–64, more than 136,000 men whose terms were due to expire in 1864 were induced to reenlist for 3-year terms. Almost 30,000 limited-service men enrolled in the Invalid (later the Veterans' Reserve) Corps, thereby releasing an equivalent number of able-bodied men for service in the field. The enlistment of 179,000 Negroes, while not as successful as expected in providing combat troops, furnished men to garrison occupied areas, thereby releasing veteran white regiments for field operations. In periods of extreme emergency, the Army found replacements for depleted infantry units by taking men out of cavalry and garrison artillery regiments.

The Regular Army again garrisoned the West, and the General Recruiting Service, augmented where appropriate by regimental recruiting parties, provided enough men to keep up the ranks of the

scattered units. In fact, during much of this period, more recruits offered themselves than could be enlisted which enabled the Recruiting Service to raise its standards. But desertions continued to be a serious problem. The extent of losses from this source is indicated by the fact that between 1 December 1875 and 1 October 1876 there were 3,035 convictions for absence without leave and 347 for desertion in an Army numbering slightly more than 28,000 officers and men.[1] When a unit met with disaster such as befell the 7th Cavalry under Brevet Maj. Gen. George Armstrong Custer in 1876, other commands furnished a nucleus of trained men and the command was reconstituted by recruits from the depots.[2]

In the 4 months' war with Spain, such plans as were made for supplying personnel losses incident to operations never were put to use because they were not needed in the brief campaign. The Regular Establishment was authorized a strength of 62,000 men by the legislation of 22 April 1898 and within 3 months some 25,500 recruits enlisted. Most of these recruits went into old regiments as "fillers" to bring the organizations up to war footing. A third battalion, built around a cadre of noncommissioned officers and privates furnished by the parent unit, was added to each regiment.

In 1917–18 United States commanders successfully resisted pressure to integrate American troops within Allied divisions which would have made an American high command superfluous. The replacement problem at the outbreak of World War I involved "fillers" for the Regular Army, the National Army, and the National Guard divisions. Recruit depots, which were receiving recruits for the Regular Army, developed into the depot brigades expected to accumulate reserves for replacements. The early calls from overseas exhausted these depot brigades, leaving no reserves available. Nearly all of the first 500,000 drafted men went into divisions which were trained for combat but, upon arrival overseas, 11 of these trained divisions were broken up to supply replacements which could not be provided by the depot brigades.

On 26 March 1918, the 32d and 41st Divisions were announced as the replacement and depot divisions of I Corps,[3] but within 2 weeks the Germans launched a major drive and the 32d Division was diverted to combat. Five of the first six divisions were used for combat, leaving only one base division for the replacement system. Thereafter all new divisions were trained for the line until the arrival of the 83d Division which was designated as the 2d Depot Division on 27 June. Four combat divisions and three depot divisions were skele-

[1] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1876,* I, p. 107. Convictions on all charges totaled 11,941 for this period. About 1 court-martial conviction out of 4 had to do with absence from duty.

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 35.

[3] AEF GO 46, 26 Mar 18.

tonized and four depot divisions reduced to training cadres to meet the replacement needs of divisions on the line.

The AEF, when it converted depot and replacement divisions into combat units, was meeting an emergency by borrowing against its future supply of replacements. The War Department approved AEF recommendations to omit replacement divisions apparently without recognizing that serious consequences would follow unless replacements were provided by some other means. The result was a serious replacement shortage in August which made necessary the transfer of 6,000 men from outside divisions to First Army.[4] By 14 September it was necessary to send men to frontline divisions 5 or 6 days after they landed in France. When the Meuse-Argonne operations opened 26 September the replacement situation was so unfavorable that it was necessary to take men from the 84th and 86th Divisions. A short time later, the 34th, 38th, and 31st Divisions were sacrificed.

The AEF complained that the War Department wasn't prepared to furnish the number of replacements requested. By the end of November, 140,000 were due and had not been received. The AEF then suggested that divisions in the United States be stripped so that men could be shipped immediately—another method of borrowing against the future.

Both the AEF and the War Department failed to compensate for this borrowing. The result was a mounting replacement deficit that probably would have reached more serious proportions had the war continued longer. The replacement plan contained in the General Organization Project of July 1917 might have been workable. It never was tested, so no one knows its true value.

After it became apparent that depot brigades could not perform all the functions involved in receiving and training recruits, the first replacement training centers were formed in the United States. They might have provided men for the AEF replacement deficit, but the war ended before their efficiency had been demonstrated.

At the end of World War I the National Army and National Guard divisions were demobilized and the Nation again fell back on a small professional Army. Recruiting was resumed in 1919 and the General Recruiting Service functioned on a normal scale until 1922 when five of the recruiting depots were closed in an economy move. The authorized strength of the Regular Establishment was reduced to 125,000 men, but the average remained about 118,750 until Congress in 1936 increased the statutory list to 165,000 which was reached in 1939.

[4] *Reports of Commander in Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services* in U. S. ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–19 (Washington, 1948), XII, pp. 115.

The board of officers headed by Maj. Gen. James C. Harbord, which considered staff organization in 1921, pointed out one of the major replacement problems when it criticized the division of staff responsibility for the replacement system. But it was easier to spot the problem than to devise the solution. The 1942 reorganization of the War Department increased rather than diminished this division of responsibility. World War II success was achieved through the mutual cooperation of the persons assigned to the numerous staff agencies dealing with the replacement system rather than through a sound staff organization. Again the ailment was more apparent than the cure. Most of the solutions offered involved increases in overhead or additional commands which were luxuries that appeared too expensive for a fighting force already made poor by lavish manpower expenditures for noncombat elements.

The replacement training centers, the first of which were organized in 1941, did not meet all the needs of rapid expansion. Such a situation may be expected in any major mobilization. New divisions will never be able to shift all their basic training responsibilities to replacement training camps.

The advent of war is likely to bring numerous changes in tables of organizations, so it is unlikely that initial assignments will be made in proper proportions for the later organization. After the urgent need for manpower conservation appeared in 1943, it became necessary to divert additional general assignment men to combat forces and to find places where limited assignment men could be used to advantage. This is a situation which may be expected in any war and which is likely to become more acute as the conflict progresses.

The 1944 conferences with theater representatives indicated that the War Department, after permitting overseas replacement systems to grow by a trial and error method, was out of touch with the situation. The first red light appeared in the form of unexpected demands from the North African Theater of Operations. The divisions driving into Italy ground to a stop before vigorous action both at home and abroad brought new men into their depleted ranks and started them going again.

The World War II decision to fight the war with a minimum number of divisions precluded rotation of divisions from combat to inactive areas. It was only in theaters where action was intermittent that divisions could get any rest. The only alternative to continuous combat until men broke down was to rotate units smaller than divisions or to rotate individuals. After 30 or 40 days in combat, sick rates went up and men became exhausted and careless, with the result that casualties mounted. The longer a campaign lasted the more serious this problem became.

Wars generally have been won by men physically fit for combat, but the efforts of the over age, the infirm, and the uneducated may tip the scales to determine the winner of the next encounter. The increasing need for specialists must not take all the more capable men for jobs behind the lines. Intelligence is an essential characteristic for combat leaders as well as for mechanics and clerks. Those most capable, physically and mentally, must occupy the places that require the greatest ability. Men with lesser qualifications must fill the less demanding positions. Maximum use of skills will result in maximum effectiveness.

The invasion of Europe demonstrated the value of committing units to action with overstrengths to cushion against delays in receiving replacements. The so-called "packet" shipments solved a number of transportation and administrative problems and developed naturally into the so-called "buddy" system that was regarded as beneficial insofar as it could be applied. Replacements tended to clog the pipelines during quiet periods but depots were rapidly emptied of combat replacements during heavy fighting. Overclassification tended to create an oversupply of slow-moving specialists, making reclassification necessary in many instances.

Such experiments as were conducted in keeping men together in groups of from 5 to 9 indicated the practice was desirable from a morale standpoint. Preembarkation furloughs interferred with the organization of provisional platoons at replacement training centers, but temporary organizations usually could be formed at overseas replacement depots. A preponderance of riflemen was desirable in each infantry replacement platoon because the casualty experience indicated heaviest losses in that classification. When possible, platoons remained intact until they reached the company, although they sometimes were broken up at divisional, regimental, or battalion headquarters.

The vast distances of the Pacific were a problem in themselves. The absence throughout most of the area of adequate port and transportation facilities aggravated the tendency to divert combat replacements to labor details. The replacement depots themselves had to create their own facilities, build roads, dig drainage ditches, and perform other labor usually done by engineer and utility units. Replacement officials asked that depot tables of organizations be revised to include engineer and utility units.

Proper allocation of manpower depends upon accurate forecasts of the needs of the air, land, sea, and service forces, based upon the nature of the conflict and the priority necessary for each. Some operations may be primarily naval, others primarily air, while others may be largely fought on the ground. Each service must expect to receive men in relation to its proportion to the overall effort.

The strength and accounting system must be simple, uniform, and accurate. Any failure of the reporting system is likely to result in a failure in the replacement system.

Expansion of the Armed Forces is likely to result in more promotions than can be absorbed after a stable strength is reached. Some method similar to the brevet rank of the past might make demotions, which are made necessary by unit reductions, less discouraging to the individual.

Failure to profit from past lessons proved costly in 1812 and again in 1861. The Army has never entered a war prepared to operate a personnel system built upon the accumulated knowledge of past experience. One reason for this may have been that staff officers were not familiar with the records of previous wars. Documents essential to planning either did not exist or were not available without lengthy and tiresome research. The Army has neglected training in personnel matters. All the studies of the replacement system made after World War II have recommended that service schools offer more instruction in personnel administration and planning. Staff officers familiar with United States military history will find their work less difficult.

Commanders in all echelons must realize that personnel officers will be able to meet personnel replacement needs only to the extent that they are familiar with operational plans for several months in advance. Personnel officers should take part in staff conferences and be informed of command decisions.

With replacements, as with other factors in a military situation, a commander is dealing with checks and balances. Training can save lives, but losses will be heavier if combat units go into action understrength because the training period for replacements is unduly long. Supplies and equipment are essential to operations. An abundance at the front may increase effectiveness, but it may be necessary to take men off the fighting line to transport such an abundance. Rotation may strengthen individual morale but it also weakens units that send their best men home. Plush hotels and costly resorts may look like attractive rewards, but they do not necessarily inspire patriotism and instill men with the fire required to undertake dangerous and disagreeable missions. The solution must be found along a mean line which does not overtax human endurance on the one hand or dissipate the public resources on the other.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAF	Army Air Forces
AFPAC	United States Army Forces in the Pacific
AGCT	Army General Classification Test
AGF	Army Ground Forces
ASF	Army Service Forces
ASTP	Army Specialized Training Program
CBI	China-Burma-India
CCC	Civilian Conservation Corps
Cir	Circular
CMTC	Citizens Military Training Camps
DA	Department of the Army
DRB	Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office
EO	Executive Order
ETO	European Theater of Operations
ETOUSA	Headquarters European Theater of Operations United States Army
FECOM	Far East Command
FFRD	Field Forces Replacement Depot
FFRS	Field Forces Replacement System
GFRC	Ground Forces Reinforcement Command
I&E	Information and Education Division, War Department Special Staff
IRTC	Infantry Replacement Training Center
MOS	Military Occupational Specialist
MR	Mobilization Regulations
MTP	Master Training Program
NATO	North African Theater of Operations
NATOUSA	Headquarters North African Theater of Operations United States Army
OCMH	Office of the Chief of Military History, Special Staff, Department of the Army
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OPD	Operations Division War Department General Staff
POA	Pacific Ocean Areas
PRD	Public Relations Division, Department of the Army
R&SC	Replacement and School Command
RM	Recruiting Manual
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RTC	Replacement Training Centers
SATC	Student Army Training Corps
SMAC	Senate Military Affairs Committee
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure

SOS	Service of Supply
SPA	South Pacific Area
SR	Special Regulation
SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
TAG	The Adjutant General
TIG	The Inspector General
TM	Training Manual
USAFCPA	United States Army Forces Central Pacific Area
USAFFE	United States Army Forces in the Far East
USFIA	United States Forces in Australia
USAFISPA	United States Army Forces in South Pacific Area
USAFMIDPAC	United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific
USAFPOA	United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
WDGS	War Department General Staff

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PERTINENT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT SYSTEM, 1658–1947

1658

Colonial laws provided for compulsory military service in the British Colonies in America and recognized the rights of Militiamen to elect company officers.

1667

Political writers expressed traditional British dislike of standing armies.

1677

First British Regular troops arrived in America.

1754

Colonial Militia officers assembled recruits in rendezvous points for instruction in drill and marksmanship.

1755

General Braddock's defeat caused British Regulars to recruit more provincials.

1760

British regiments overseas detailed certain companies to remain at home on recruiting duty during unsuccessful experiment with recruit depots.

1775

George Washington assumed command of Continental Army and replaced force by end of year through calls upon colonies for Militia troops.

1776

British mercenary troops arrived in America.

Continental Army made up its shortages in men by calling Militia units to serve for short periods.

Colonies drafted men for Militia and permitted hiring of substitutes.

Continental Congress asked for enlistments for duration of war and authorized bounties for enlistments.

1777

Washington proposed organization of recruiting districts, but the colonies did not accept his suggestion.

Flying camp was established in an effort to raise fighting men for brief periods of service without formal enlistments.

Corps of Invalids was formed.

Light Infantry Corps was formed with each Continental Army battalion furnishing one light infantry company, which it kept up to strength by drafts.

Troops were inoculated against smallpox.

1779

Continental Army reorganization introduced fall reenlistment campaign designed to bring all units to full strength by 1 January each year.

1780

One recruiting officer was assigned to each Continental Army battalion.

1781

Continental Army placed advertisements in newspapers asking that men released because of illness but who had recovered return to their units.

1784

Army was reduced to 80 enlisted men, and Congress called on States for 700 Militiamen to guard western posts.

1785

Congress again called on States for 700 men to be enlisted for Federal service. About 400 enlisted before funds were exhausted.

1787

Congress passed new legislation calling on States for reenlistments and for raising additional men.

1789

Constitution gave Congress power to raise and maintain armies.

1792

Act of 8 May gave States major control over Militia.

1793

The Army attempted to enlist replacements for Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne's forces through regimental recruiting.

1798

Maj. Gen. Alexander Hamilton directed the recruiting service during formation of 12 new regiments.

1812

Regimental recruiting failed to provide Regular Army with sufficient men during second war with Great Britain.

United States was divided into nine military districts with recruiting rendezvous and depots in each district and bounties in money and land were increased. Secretary of War Monroe's plan for modified national draft was rejected.

1822

General Recruiting Service was formed and recruit depots were established.

1823 to 1846

Recruit depots became more efficient and enabled the Army to meet demands for men to serve in western posts.

1847

Experience in Mexican War demonstrated value of General Recruiting Service as a source for replacements.

1848

Military posts were extended to California and Pacific Northwest.

1853

Batteries L and M, 1st Artillery, serving in Northwest, were inactivated for want of replacements.

1854

Depot for recruits was established near San Francisco.

1861

Federal Government decided to raise Volunteer armies to combat rebellion, but operation of replacement system was left to State officials.

General Recruiting Service was not expanded to take care of needs of Regular Army, the strength of which did not exceed five-eighths of the 1,570 officers and 41,819 enlisted men authorized.

1862

Secretary of War Stanton rescinded General McClellan's order reorganizing recruiting service.

State officials organized new regiments but failed to provide enough replacements for regiments in action.

Militia drafts were authorized.

Parole and convalescent camps were established.

Morrill Act of 2 July provided for colleges to give military training.

1863

Federal conscription was established on 3 March. Commutation and substitutions were permitted.

Camps of distribution were organized to aid regimental recruiting.

Invalid (later Veteran Reserve) Corps was established.

1864

Bounties and premiums were increased.

Veteran Volunteers were formed.

Artillery and cavalry troops were converted to infantry.

1865

Recruiting stations and depots were reopened.

1866

Regular Army was reorganized for occupation duties in South and for frontier service.

Congress authorized replacement pool of 3,000 men, but it was not established because recruits were lacking for regiments. One thousand Indian scouts were authorized by act of Congress on 28 July.

1870

General Recruiting Service was expanded; regimental recruiting reduced.

1878

House of Representatives subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs considered proposals for pool of trained recruits, but no action was taken.

Officers' Reserve Corps was proposed.

1879

Congress repealed law requiring each soldier to take turn at cooking for 10-day period. Use of professional cooks were forerunner to later classification system for civilian skills.

1885

Experienced instructors were assigned to depots to train recruits.

1891

One company of Indians was authorized in each of 26 regiments serving west of Mississippi.

1894

General Recruiting Service and recruit depots were discontinued as an economy measure. Regiments were held responsible for recruiting and for instruction of recruits.

1897

Experiments with companies made up of Indians was declared unsuccessful and discontinued.

1898

Troops were raised for War with Spain by increasing Regular Army and by mustering Volunteer organizations.

Efforts to recruit men immune to tropical diseases proved unsuccessful.

Overseas replacement depot was established in San Francisco for men going to Philippines.

1899

Regiments serving overseas designated depot battalions to remain in United States and train recruits.

1904

Recruit depots were reestablished under General Recruiting Service.

1910

Recruit depot adopted 36-day course of instruction.

1912

Army adopted system of assigning recruits to organizations every 6 months.

Regular Army Reserve was established.

1913

Tests indicated regimental recruiting was no longer effective in keeping military units up to strength.

Concentration of troops along Mexican border disclosed need for better replacement system.

Military instruction camps were started.

1916

National Defense Act of 3 June provided for National Guard and their induction into service of United States, for Reserve elements, and for other details of military organization.

1917

United States entered World War I and Allies pleaded for American soldiers as replacements in their armies, but American authorities insisted on American units.
National Selective Service was adopted.
General Organization Project, containing replacement plan for two replacement divisions in each corps, was adopted.
National Army and National Guard cantonments were built and placed in operation.
First recruits for National Army were assigned through depot brigades.
Officer training camps were opened.
Camps of embarkation were established at ports.

1918

First replacement training camps were opened in April.
Alpha and Beta tests provided first method of classification of men as to occupational experience and learning ability.
Development battalions were formed.
Student Army Training Corps were established in colleges.

1919

Enlistments were resumed.

1920

Experiments were conducted with "Democratic Army" and training of illiterates.
Amendment to National Defense Act provided for operation of Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves.

1921

Normal tours of duty for foreign service were fixed at 2 years.
Harbord Board studied military organization and its report included recommendations on replacement system.

1927

Maj. Gen. C. P. Summerall, Chief of Staff, predicted Army would need 100 percent replacements during first 3 months in event of major war.

1933

Regular Army supervised organization of Civilian Conservation Corps.

1935

Protective Mobilization Plan was initiated.

1936

War Department manuals presented outline of replacement system.
Replacement rate tables were prepared.

1940

Selective Service and Training Act was approved on 16 September to provide man power for expansion of Armed Forces.
Selected National Guard troops were called into Federal service.
Personnel Research Section in Adjutant General's office prepared plans for classification of enlisted men.

1941

	Reception Centers were established and replacement training centers opened.
27 May	President proclaimed unlimited national emergency.
21 Aug	Executive order extended periods of service for men called into armed forces for 18 months.
7 Dec	Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

1942

9 Mar	War Department reorganization established Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces. Army Ground Forces replacement training camps were placed under Replacement and Training Command.
10 Mar	First replacement battalions were activated.
24 Mar	Volunteer officer candidate training began.
31 Mar	Basics were added to tables of organization.
15 May	Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was authorized.
15 Jun	First replacements were sent to Pacific Theater.
15 Dec	Special training units for illiterates were formed.
19 Dec	Chief of Staff rejected proposals for a Personnel Control Division.
23 Dec	Army Specialized Training Corps was instituted.
26 Dec	1st Replacement Depot arrived in North Africa.

1943

6 Jan	Personnel replacement depots at Shenango, Pa., and Camp Beale, Calif., became operative.
7 Jun	Port of embarkation replacement pools were established in connection with depots.
28 Jun	Army-wide rotation policy was announced.
10 Jul	Processing centers opened at Camp Edwards, Mass., and Camp McQuade, Calif.
20 Aug	Overseas commands were cautioned to conserve personnel.
1 Oct	"Preparation for Overseas Movement of Replacements" was first published.
8 Oct	Central Control Agency was established in European Theater.

1944

26 Jan	Personnel reassignment centers were opened in United States.
24 Feb	Physical profile system was initiated.
3 Apr	Representatives of North African and European Theaters of Operations attended Washington conference on replacements.
8 Apr	Committee on personnel procedures held first meeting.
4 May	War Department directed overseas theaters to form replacement commands.
15 May	War Department letter outlined system of reports, requisitions, and estimates.
22 May	Basics generally were reduced to 5 percent.
28 May	War Department Strength Accounting and Reporting Office was opened.
19 Jun	Port of embarkation pools were changed to casual detachments.
20 Jun	WDGS Circular 11–3 delineated responsibilities between General Staff agencies, The Adjutant General, and the three major commands.

1944

31 Jul	War Department Circular 317, "Overseas Replacement System," was published.
7 Aug	Proposal to establish replacement command in Army Service Forces was not favorably considered by commanding general, ASF.
23 Aug	Theaters were warned of impending shortage of replacements.
25 Aug	Replacement procurement and shipping schedule was outlined by War Department.
15 Sep	By this date, one million replacements had been shipped.
2 Nov	War Department Circular 427 established duty days a replacement might remain in a depot.
23 Dec	Second replacement conference was held in Washington with officials from MTO and ETOUSA.
28 Dec	European Theater designated replacement system as "Ground Forces Reinforcement Command."

1945

8 Jan	Replacements were given overseas theaters on allotment basis.
1 Feb	War Department Circular 39 reduced numbers of MOS in which AGF and ASF replacements might be requisitioned.
23 Feb	Replacements reports, estimates, and requisitions were consolidated in SARO report.
8 May	V-E Day.
17 May	War Department Circular 147 defined overseas replacement system
9 Jun	Learned-Smith study was started.
7 Jul	Learned-Smith report was approved by Chief of Staff.
2 Sep	V-J Day.
18 Oct	Patch Board submitted report.

1947

15 Apr	Replacement Board appointed.

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