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DOCTRINE FOR ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION FORCES

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PREFACE

This manual describes the organizational structure of Army Special Operations Aviation units and serves as a doctrinal and tactical guide for employing these units in combat. It also describes command and control, combat support, and combat service support requirements for SOA units. Capabilities and limitations are included.

Appendixes A through E discuss risk management, ARSOA operations orders and aircrew mission briefings and debriefings, ARSOA aircraft characteristics and capabilities, special operations mission planning folders, and basing special operations aircraft in theater.

The operational content of this publication is based on AirLand Operations Doctrine established in FMs 100-5 and 1-100. It is directly linked to and must be used along with the doctrinal principles found in Joint Publications 3-05 and 3-05.5 and Field Manuals 100-5, 100-25, 1-100, and 31-20. Organizations that are described in the manual have unique tables of organization and equipment.

Although intended primarily for commanders and staff officers who employ ARSOA, Army Special Operation Forces ground commanders and their staffs will also use this manual.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 to Commander, US Army Aviation Center, ATTN: ATZQ-TDA, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5263.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

This publication has been reviewed for operational security considerations.

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Army special operations aviation is an integral part of special operations. The primary mission of ARSOA is to support joint and service-specific special operations across the operational continuum in any theater. ARSOA units have the capability to perform conventional aviation missions. However, because they are unique and limited assets, they should not be tasked for general aviation missions. To employ this force properly, commanders must understand the basic characteristics of SO in general and ARSOA in particular. This chapter discusses SO within the framework of the operational continuum and the SO application of the principles of war. It defines special operations and special operations forces and provides an ARSOA mission statement. It also describes the organization and essential mission tasks of ARSOA.

1-1. THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

a. As part of SO, ARSOA conducts special operations throughout the operational continuum. The SOF's special training, regional and/or language orientation, ability to deploy in small units, and low profile make it the force of choice during operations short of war. During conventional operations, special operations forces are excellent force multipliers for theater commanders. Environment may change, but special operations remain basically the same regardless of when and where they occur. Basic C4I and planning requirements for SO do not change. Whatever the operational environment, special operations require detailed mission planning and effective C4I. They also require close coordination with other forces or agencies. Committing SOF anywhere along the continuum without proper planning and C2 increases mission risk and may jeopardize limited SOF assets.

b. The competition between states along the operational continuum is not a linear progression that starts with peace and ends in war. It is cyclic. It begins with peacetime rivalry and, ideally, returns to that state. Changes along the continuum involve actions that must be predicted, both before and after hostilities. Special operations along the operational continuum




Figure 1-1. Special operations along the operational continuum

1-2. SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Special operations are high-value, high-payoff missions conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized forces. SO targets are strategic, operational, or tactical in the pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. SOF may support conventional operations, but they operate independently when conventional operations are unsuitable.

1-3. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

a. The Secretary of Defense designates special operations forces. These forces are then organized, trained, and equipped to conduct or support SO missions. Some unique characteristics of SO forces are given below. These units--

- Require a lengthy selection and qualification training process.
- Are composed of small, high-caliber units of personally and professionally mature individuals.
- Are task-organized to jointly plan and execute SO.
- Continually train personnel in advanced specialized SO skills.
- Possess state-of-the-art equipment designed for SO missions.
- Conduct independent operations within the context of the overall theater campaign plan.

b. In some cases, conventional forces may possess the capabilities to conduct a specific SO. However, designated SOF are structured and trained to be the force of choice. Forces that are designated as core SOF are the--

- **US Army**--Active and Reserve Component Special Forces, Ranger, Special Operations Aviation, and selected special mission and support units.
- **US Navy**--Active and Reserve Component sea/air/land teams, special boat units, and SEAL delivery vehicle teams.
- **US Air Force**--Active and Reserve Component forces that include fixed-wing and vertical-lift aircraft and aircrews. These forces also include composite special tactics teams. They are composed of combat control and pararescue forces and weather, communications, and other combat support units.

c. Some general-purpose forces may receive additional training and be specially equipped and organized to conduct SO-related missions. These forces include--

- Designated Navy surface, subsurface, and aviation elements.
- Designated Air Force airlift, strike, and tanker elements.
- Designated Fleet Marine Forces assigned as elements of embarked, forward-deployed Marine air-ground task forces.
- Designated Army Active and Reserve Component forces, including psychological operations and civil affairs forces.

d. Special operations are either primary missions or collateral activities (Figure 1-2). The primary SO missions are direct action, special reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and counter-terrorism. The inherent capabilities of SO forces also make them suitable for collateral activities. These capabilities include security and humanitarian assistance and antiterrorism, counter-drug, personnel recovery, and special operations activities directed by Presidential authority. Because of their special training and capabilities, SOF are often given nonstandard missions that have been modified from standard mission profiles.

Figure 1-2. Special operations missions designated by the Secretary of Defense

e. The Secretary of Defense has not classified psychological and civil affairs forces as SOF; however, the Secretary of the Army considers PSYOP and CA forces elements of SOF. He has, therefore, placed them under the command and proponency of the US Army Special Operations Command.




Figure 1-2. Special operations missions designated by the Secretary of Defense

1-4. EMPLOYMENT

a. Principles of War. The principles of war apply equally to SO. However, SOF commanders apply them from a different perspective than conventional force commanders. This perspective comes from the nature of the forces and the application methods. Normally, SOF are lightly armed and have little fire support. They maintain a high degree of mobility and remain undetected as long as possible. SOF are tasked at the theater or joint task force levels. The actions of very small units may have strategic implications. SOF commanders must know the effects of their operational environment and force capabilities on the application of the principles of war. With each principle, SOF commanders must consider the following components:

(1) Objective. Direct every operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. SOF objectives may be political, economic, or psychological, as well as military. During war, SO usually focus on enemy weaknesses upon which other forces cannot capitalize. In other situations, SOF may be assigned objectives that lead directly to achieving national or theater political, economic, or psychological objectives. As with other forces, ARSOA must have a clearly defined objective that supports the supported commander's intent.

(2) Offensive. Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. SO are inherently offensive actions. ARSOA, like all aviation, is offensive in nature and unencumbered by terrain and obstacles. It allows the supported SOF commander to conduct active operations in any direction on the battlefield, exploiting the dimensions of space and time.

(3) Mass. Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. SOF are not employed as a group in the conventional sense. Even more so than conventional forces, SOF must avoid attrition or force-on-force battles. They must subtly and indirectly concentrate their combat power at decisive times and places. ARSOA efforts must not be fragmented against attractive targets that may be operationally or strategically irrelevant. Extensive SO planning and rehearsal are required to achieve temporary superiority of force or, conversely, to avoid enemy engagement. Concentration of force relies as much on the quality and focus of tactics, timing, and weaponry as it does on numerical strength. ARSOA delivers the supported force to the precise place and time and converges on the objective from many directions.

(4) Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage using the flexible application of combat power. During SO, maneuver implies the ability to clandestinely infiltrate and exfiltrate denied areas to exploit enemy weaknesses. When employed by ARSOA, maneuver implies the ability to concentrate (infiltrate) the supported SOF

commander's elements, strike the enemy where and when it is most vulnerable, and disperse (exfiltrate) to avoid its strengths.

(5) Economy of force. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. As a part of SOF, ARSOA assets are employed strategically as an economy-of-force measure to allow the concentration of other forces elsewhere. Many SO are specially designed to divert hostile forces into secondary theaters. This prevents hostile concentration against the friendly main effort.

(6) Unity of command. Ensure unity of effort under one commander for every objective. As part of the SOF, ARSOA is organized jointly with uncluttered chains of command that reduce the need to layer headquarters elements. The ARSOA task force may be under OPCON of the theater SO command, joint SO task force, Army SO task force, or joint SO air component commander.

(7) Security. Never let the enemy gain an unexpected advantage. Security is paramount to SO and often dominates all other considerations. Typically, planning is compartmented and planning staffs are small by design. However, within a compartmented activity, individuals must share information.

(a) To enhance security and achieve surprise, intelligence, counterintelligence, EW, and cover and deception are used throughout the planning and execution of SO. Ground and air planners are placed in isolation to provide security for the plan. Isolating planners also preserves the security of other planned operations. Special operations forces are constantly exposed to capture behind enemy lines during infiltration or exfiltration missions. As a result, they must be compartmented.

(b) ARSOA crews may be required to conduct follow on missions in the same areas; however, planners should not allow them to perform these missions if possible. To enhance operational security, ground forces normally will not discuss the ground tactical plan with ARSOA crews during the planning and coordination of air operations. This practice provides mutual protection for all SOF forces in the event of capture.

(8) Surprise. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a way that it least expects. Achieving surprise is a principal tenet of SOF. Taking bold, imaginative action and making full use of SOF equipment and personnel, ARSOA surprises the enemy. It also surprises the enemy by using indirect approaches and doing the unexpected. These actions, however, must be tempered with patience, forethought, maturity, and risk management.

(9) Simplicity. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and orders. By nature, ARSOA missions normally are extremely complicated and multifaceted. Plans require and depend on precise timing and accuracy. Sophisticated and unorthodox methods and equipment are often used; therefore, the SO aviator is specifically selected and trained to conduct these missions. Although the missions are complex, detailed planning, in-depth briefings, and rehearsals help to simplify the mission and prepare the aircrews for every possible contingency.

b. Principles and Imperatives. ARSOA applies the tenets of AirLand Operations doctrine and specific SO principles and imperatives to mission planning and execution.

(1) Principles. Special operations principles are an important part of SO mission planning. The principles of SO are given below.

(a) Integrate supporting ARSOA assets from the time the mission is initially analyzed and the course of action is determined until the mission is completed.

(b) Increase ARSOA effectiveness by using the tactical and logistical capabilities of other services and nations.

(c) Use near-real-time, all-source intelligence products during mission planning, rehearsal, and execution.

(d) Suppress hostile acquisition means and weapon systems before and during the mission.

(e) Employ the element of surprise by--

- Conducting operations at night and during periods of low ambient light.
- Using deception measures.
- Using terrain-following techniques.
- Using the range capability to alter approaches.
- Controlling or reducing electronic emissions during the mission.

(f) Move SOF throughout the operational area as the tactical situation changes.

(g) Concentrate SOF at the critical time by using precision timing and navigation.

(h) Displace forward elements frequently for security.

(i) Maintain the ability to operate continuously.

(2) Imperatives. Successful SO are characterized by the application of the principles of war and SO principles. The SO imperatives discussed below prescribe key operational requirements. To use their forces effectively, SOF commanders must incorporate these imperatives into their mission planning and execution.

(a) Understand the operational environment. Although ARSOA commanders cannot dominate the environment, they can influence it. Before doing so, they must study and assess all of its political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, and military aspects. They must determine who the friendly and the hostile decision

makers are, their objectives and strategies, and how they interact. Commanders must also ensure that the friendly decision makers understand the implication of mission requirements and the impact if they do not support those requirements. ARSOA commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing situations. By expecting these changes, they can exploit fleeting opportunities.

(b) Facilitate interagency activities. When taking part in interagency or combined efforts, commanders must strive for a unified effort. In situations short of war, the country team, headed by the US ambassador, has final authority. To be successful, commanders must expect unclear missions and resolve conflicting interests and objectives. They must compartment activities and unify the command of multiagency operations. ARSOA commanders and other SOF simplify the unity effort by requesting clear mission statements and the intent of the decision makers. They must also continuously coordinate activities with all applicable agencies (US and non-US, military and nonmilitary).

(c) Engage the threat discriminately. ARSOA commanders have limited resources that are not easily replaced, and their missions often have sensitive political implications. Therefore, they must analyze the risk and advise the ground commander of the risk to the force and to the ARSOA assets. Together, the ARSOA commander and the ground commander carefully select when, where, and how to use ARSOA to achieve the desired results with the least risk.

(d) Consider long-term effects. ARSOA commanders must avoid strategic failure and achieve tactical success. To do this, they must place discrete problems in the broader political, military, and psychological context. This allows them to develop an approach to solve the problem. It also allows them to accept any legal or political constraints such as less-than-optimal rules of engagement. ARSOA commanders must not risk the success of national and theater long-term objectives for their desire for immediate or short-term effects. Polices, plans, and procedures must be consistent with the national and theater priorities and objectives they support. Inconsistency can lead to loss of legitimacy and credibility at the national level.

(e) Ensure legitimacy and credibility. Many SO have significant legal and policy considerations, particularly in situations short of war. In modern international relationships, legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining national and international support. Without legitimacy, the United States cannot sustain its foreign assistance. Without legitimacy and credibility, SO will not receive the support of the host nation, host-nation military or paramilitary forces, the US population, or the world community. Ultimately, these two aspects are the theater commander's and ambassador's responsibilities. ARSOA commanders, however, must ensure that legal advisors review all sensitive areas of SO mission planning and execution.

(f) Anticipate and control psychological effects. All SO have potential psychological effects. Some SO may be conducted specifically to produce psychological effects. ARSOA commanders must be prepared to integrate psychological operations into all of their activities.

(g) Apply capabilities indirectly. During combined operations with US special operations forces, ARSOA may assist local military and paramilitary forces. With minimum visibility, risk, and cost to the United States, these non-US forces can pursue national security objectives by serving as force multipliers. When supporting a host nation or foreign group, ARSOA commanders must not appear to be taking charge. The host nation must feel that it is primarily responsible for the success or failure of the combined effort.

(h) Develop multiple options. ARSOA commanders maintain operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and contingency plans. This may require a shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.

(i) Ensure long-term sustainment. This SOF imperative directs US advisors and trainers to supply training and equipment that can be sustained by host-nation forces after US presence and support has ceased. This imperative normally does not apply to ARSOA because it does not train or provide equipment to host-nation forces.

(j) Provide sufficient intelligence. ARSOA has neither the combat power nor the reinforcement and support of conventional forces to deal with unexpected enemy actions. The success of ARSOA in support of SO missions often depends on detailed, near-real-time, all-source intelligence that focuses on specific mission requirements. This need for national and theater intelligence at all levels is particularly important to SOF. ARSOA intelligence requirements are critical to mission success and impose great demands on the capabilities of supporting intelligence. ARSOA commanders must identify and prioritize their intelligence requirements. They must also note which are mission-essential and which are not.

(k) Balance security and synchronization. Security concerns control SO; however, excessive compartmentalization can exclude key personnel from the planning process. ARSOA commanders must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. While insufficient security can compromise a mission, excessive security jeopardizes it when plans are not coordinated effectively.

1-5. BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION

a. Background. The Army's only SO aviation regiment, formed from elements of the 101st Aviation Group, originated in the early 1980s. It was originally called Task Force 158 and was formed from elements of the 158th Aviation Battalion and attachments from the 101st, 159th, and 229th Aviation Battalions. Renamed Task Force 160, the unit entered a period of intensive night flying. It quickly became the Army's most experienced night-fighting aviation force. Presently designated the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), it is headquartered at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

b. Organization.

(1) US Army special operations aviation consists of an Army special operations aviation regiment (Figure 1-3). A headquarters and headquarters company, three aviation battalions, a selection and training detachment, and the systems integration and maintenance office make up the unit. The ARSOA regiment has special operations rotary-wing aircraft including the AH/MH-6, MH-60, and MH-47.

(a) Regimental headquarters. The regimental headquarters provides command, control, communications, and staff planning for all units organic to or attached to the SOAR. It provides logistical, administrative, and health services support for the separate, organic SOAR companies and recruits and trains Army personnel for ARSOA units. The SOAR also manages its own command operating budget and develops the program objective memorandum documents.

(b) Special operations aviation training company. The SOATC recruits, assesses, and trains Army personnel for ARSOA units. The selection and training course involves physical, psychological, and aviation skill evaluations. The course varies from 4 weeks for enlisted personnel to over 12 weeks for aviators. After they complete the course, personnel are integrated into the ARSOA units as basic mission qualified.




Figure 1-3. ARSOA organization

(c) Systems integration and maintenance office. The SIMO designs, integrates, and maintains aviation systems and support equipment in SO aircraft. Along with the regimental comptroller, the SIMO establishes a systematic budget process for the COB and the POM to ensure that program funds are properly managed and executed. The SIMO is also responsible for the regimental maintenance program and oversees both military and contracted logistical support.

(d) Battalions and companies. The primary mission of the ARSOA battalion is to provide tactical air mobility of supplies, equipment, and personnel. They provide limited aerial attack for Army and joint SOF units in an operational area. They also conduct progressive continuation training to develop fully mission-qualified and flight-lead qualified aircrews and/or aviators. Assault companies are equipped with MH-60 aircraft. The medium lift helicopter companies have MH-47 aircraft; the light attack and assault companies have AH-6 and MH-6 aircraft.

(2) Force structure limitations and contingency requirements do not allow the regiment to operate as a single unit. When they are formed, ARSOA company teams and battalion task forces are specifically organized and tailored for the assigned mission. When the mission is completed, task force units return to their parent organizations. Figure 1-4 shows an example of an ARSOA battalion task force.




Figure 1-4. Example of an ARSOA battalion task force

(3) A task force routinely operates under OPCON of the SO command, joint SO task force, joint force SO air component commander, or Army SO task force commander. It may deploy and collocate with the supported SOF unit, such as the ARSOTF, or with an Air Force SO detachment. Small ARSOA force teams (two to four aircraft) may deploy forward to launch and recovery sites for limited periods or for a specific operation. However, ARSOA operations and sustainment are not normally decentralized below platoon level.

1-6. MISSION, TASKS, AND OPERATIONAL EXAMPLES

a. Mission. ARSOA's mission is to plan, support, and conduct special air operations in any operational environment and across the operational continuum by clandestinely penetrating hostile and denied airspace.

b. Tasks. Specific ARSOA tasks are conducted in support of SO missions. These tasks are discussed below.

(1) ARSOA units conduct battle tasks--

- To insert, resupply, and extract US special operations forces and other designated personnel.
- To conduct special reconnaissance missions unilaterally or with other SOF.
- To conduct direct action using aerial firepower and terminal guidance for precision munitions (unilaterally or with other SOF).
- To conduct electronic, photographic, and visual reconnaissance.
- To recover personnel or selected materiel.
- To conduct assisted E&E when dedicated CSAR assets are not available.
- To perform emergency air evacuation of personnel.
- To support and facilitate C3.
- To provide assistance for US and allied CAS and indirect fires.
- To provide C2 of expanding Army aviation assets.
- To conduct joint maritime operations.
- To conduct strategic self-deployment of all capable helicopters.
- To conduct water insertion and recovery operations.

- To conduct EW support measures and ECM operations when configured to do so.
- To provide the joint SO air component commander, when designated.
- To conduct external load insertion and/or extraction of SOF land and maritime assault vehicles and vessels.

(2) Supporting tasks. ARSOA units conduct supporting tasks--

- To design, integrate, and maintain aviation systems and support equipment unique to SO aircraft and mission capability.
- To ensure that ARSOA program funds are properly managed and executed by establishing a systematic budget process for the development of the COB and the POM.
- To establish and maintain a program to recruit, select, and train Army personnel for assignment to ARSOA units.
- To establish and maintain LO positions to conduct liaison, planning, and coordination with other SOF.

c. Operational Examples.

(1) Flying against Cuban and Grenadan forces, the 160th SOAR's first combat operations were during Operation Urgent Fury. During this operation, the 160th SOAR rescued American students from the island of Grenada.

(2) The 160th SOAR also conducted operations in the Persian Gulf during Operation Ernest Will/Prime Chance. This operation, conducted under unusually difficult and hazardous conditions, supported a joint military task force. Using night vision devices, aircrews operated in a hostile environment at night 30 feet above the water to help keep sea lanes open. This operation was the first night combat engagement to neutralize a threat while aircrews used NVG and FLIR devices.

(3) The 160th SOAR was also involved in Operation Just Cause, the liberation of Panama. Operation Just Cause proved the 160th's ability to conduct complicated night and sustained combat operations against a determined enemy.

(4) In September 1990, elements of the 160th deployed to Saudi Arabia to support SO missions in the Kuwait theater of operations. From bases near the Iraqi border, the 160th infiltrated and exfiltrated numerous special forces teams deep within Iraq. The 160th also flew personnel recovery missions deep into Iraq. It also conducted the only successful rescue of a downed aviator using NVG. Near the end of the conflict, the 160th played a major role in clearing and securing the American embassy in Kuwait City.

CHAPTER 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Army Special Operations Aviation operates under varied command and control relationships. The mission requirements and the commander at each level of command dictate the exact relationship. This chapter discusses command and control of ARSOA from the combatant commander to the joint special operations task force. Several generic command options are provided to help the combatant commander determine the best method to meet theater requirements.

2-1. OVERVIEW

Special operations forces require an abbreviated, well-defined command structure because of mission sensitivity and significance. Operational layers above regiment are always joint, and direct coordination with other agencies and units is frequently necessary. Excessive or indirect layers reduce responsiveness and make operational security more difficult. Therefore, any command arrangement for SO must reduce changes in operational control between commanders and reduce layering as much as possible. However, direct liaison between supported and supporting organizations is standard procedure and is encouraged.

2-2. UNIFIED COMMAND

A unified command is a command with a broad continuing mission. It operates under a single commander and is composed of two or more services. The unified command is established and designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and operates on the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When a unified command is authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is established by a commander of an existing unified command.

a. Combatant Commands. The combatant command CINC communicates through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the NCA. The CINC conducts the actual military operations in his area of responsibility. Combatant commands are either unified or specified. A unified combatant command is composed of forces from two or more military services. A specified combatant command is composed of significant forces from only one military service. Unified commands may be regional or functional.

(1) Regional combatant commands have geographical areas of responsibility assigned by the unified command plan. They conduct the strategic direction of all US military operations within their designated AOR. The five regional unified commands are the--

- United States Atlantic Command.
- United States Central Command.
- United States European Command.
- United States Pacific Command.
- United States Southern Command.

(2) Functional or global commands have worldwide functional responsibilities not bound by geographical AORs. The four functional combatant commands are the--

- United States Space Command.
- United States Special Operations Command.
- United States Transportation Command.
- United States Strategic Command.

(3) Although specified combatant commands are composed of significant forces from only one military service, they may, include units and staffs from other services. A specified CINC has the same authority and responsibilities as the other CINCs, except he cannot establish subordinate unified commands. The only specified combatant command is the US Army Forces Command.

b. Command Authority.

(1) The commanders in chief of the combatant commands exercise combatant command and obtain support from other commanders in chief and the services. Combatant command is the command authority vested in the CINCs by

public law. Only the CINC has COCOM authority and this authority cannot be transferred. COCOM is the authority to perform functions of command over assigned forces. This authority involves organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, and designating objectives. It also involves giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics that are necessary to complete the mission. When exercising the authority of organizing his commands and forces, the CINC prescribes the chain of command within his command. The CINC exercises COCOM through a combination of--

- Subordinate unified commanders.
- Service component commanders.
- Functional component commanders.
- Commanders of single-service forces.
- Commanders of joint task forces.

(2) The CINC delegates an appropriate level of authority to these subordinate commanders. He concerns himself with broad operational matters. Responsibilities for administration and support remain with the service components. However, the CINC's directive authority for logistics allows him to issue directives to subordinate commanders. This includes issuing peacetime measures that are necessary to complete the mission. Figure 2-1 shows the regional combatant command structure.




Figure 2-1. Regional combatant command structure

2-3. JOINT AND THEATER COMMAND STRUCTURE

a. United States Special Operations Command. All CONUS based SOF are assigned to USSOCOM. These forces include designated Army psychological and civil affairs forces. The USCINCSOC is a functional combatant commander who exercises COCOM over the CONUS forces. Operational control of those forces is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders, service component commands, or functional component commands. As a supporting commander, the USCINCSOC usually provides forces to commanders of the regional unified command. Commanders of the regional unified commands exercise COCOM over those forces. The USCINCSOC may, however, be directed to plan and conduct an SO unilaterally or as a supported commander. In this situation, the USCINCSOC normally employs a task-organized JSOTF to plan, rehearse, and execute the operation regardless of its geographic location.

(1) The Army component of USSOCOM is the US Army Special Operations Command. As a major Army command, the USASOC commands, supports, and ensures the combat readiness of assigned and attached Army forces. USASOC exercises command of CONUS-based active Army and Army Reserve SOF (Figure 2-2).




Figure 2-2. US Army Special Operations Command

(2) When directed to do so, USASOC provides mission-ready ARSOA to the regional CINCs for employment under their COCOM. These forces are normally in the form of a task force tailored for the specific assigned mission.

b. Regional Unified Commands. Theater-based SOF are normally placed under the COCOM of the regional unified commander. The regional CINC may exercise permanent COCOM (OPCON if attached) through a subunified special operations command, other subordinate unified, joint task force, or service or functional component commands (Figure 2-3).




Figure 2-3. JSOTF command structure

c. Special Operations Command. All regional unified commands have established a subunified SOC. Normally, the SOC is assigned broad continuing missions. These commands are also assigned areas of responsibility that are suited to the capabilities of the SOF and are strategically and operationally important to the CINC.

d. Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander. JFSOCC is a generic term applied to the senior SO commander in a joint organization. At the unified command and/or JFC level, the senior SO commander is typically the SOC commander. A joint task force may have a JSOTF. Its commander also would be a JFSOCC. The JFSOCC advises the joint commander on the proper employment of SOF and plans, coordinates, and accomplishes assigned operational missions.

(1) The joint commander gives the JFSOCC the authority to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. There are significant differences between a subunified commander and a functional component commander. These differences exist mainly in the area of logistics and in the authority to establish task forces. A CINC establishes a subunified command such as a SOC. A subunified command conducts operations on a continuing basis. Its commander has functions, authority, and responsibilities similar to those of the CINC. A CINC or a subordinate unified commander can establish a functional component commander. The functional commander exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces. He also makes recommendations to the establishing commander on the proper employment of assigned forces. He is responsible for accomplishing any operational missions that may be assigned. A CINC or the commander of a subordinate unified command or an existing joint task force establishes another JTF. A joint task force's mission has specific, limited objectives.

(2) The JFSOCC normally exercises OPCON of service SOF through service or functional component commanders or some combination. Normally, the Army provides a designated Army component commander, either a single Army special operations command or one or more Army special operations task forces. Likewise, the Air Force task-organizes its elements under a single commander and provides an Air Force special operations command as the Air Force service component to the SOC.

e. Other Functional Component Commanders. Sometimes a functional organization may better fit the needs of the SOF mission. For example, several SOF service elements have similar aviation capabilities. These aviation SOF should be aligned under a single functional joint special operations air component commander. This allows the JSOACC to establish a series of aviation task organizations of various sizes. These aviation task organizations are assigned to a JSOTF or to other subordinate SO commands. To provide the best asset available, all JFSOCC

requirements for air support flow through a single point of contact. In addition, planning, coordination, and deconfliction are centralized and liaison is simplified. The JFSOCC will normally designate as the JSOACC the service that provides most of the aviation force or the service component commander who can best conduct, command, and control operations in the given environment.

f. Service Component Commanders. A CINC could exercise OPCON of assigned SOF directly through service component commanders. However, that normally is not done because of the inherent joint aspects of SO, the extensive joint training and exercises that the various services SOF accomplish in peacetime, and the varied aspects of employing SOF. A single theater SOC and a subordinate JSOACC provide a more focused and experienced command arrangement.

g. Joint Special Operations Task Force. Special operations generally require joint SOF. Operational control of the joint SOF is often exercised through a JSOTF. A JSOTF is organized like conventional JTFs. It is normally developed for a specific So mission or a campaign of limited duration. It is an organization of flexible size and composition. Depending upon the objective and task, the JSOTF may be small and temporary or larger and more enduring. FM 100-25 contains a more detailed description of possible JSOTF command relationships.

(1) An existing theater SOC component might be directed to form the core of a JSOTF when most of the force comes from that component. In such a case, the component headquarters would be augmented by appropriate forces from other services and components to form the task force headquarters. Operational control of the JSOTF could be passed to the theater service component that requires support, passed to a subunified command, or exercised by the SOC. Or, the CINC could control the JSOTF.

(2) A regional unified commander may form a JTF for a specific mission or for regional operations. A JSOTF may be formed subordinate to that JTF commander to plan and execute those special operations required to support the non-SO efforts of the JTF.

(3) In either situation, a component or task force commander could exercise operational control over SOF that are mainly from another service. Commanders at all levels must ensure that SOF are employed within existing capabilities and that support arrangements allow for SOF-peculiar requirements.

2-4. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION

a. Most ARSOA forces are assigned to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). When tasked, the regiment will form a tailored task force to accomplish the assigned mission.

b. Once formed, the ARSOA task force will deploy into the theater, then COCOM will transfer from USCINCSOC to the regional unified commander. Operational control may then be passed to either the SOC or the joint task force. The SOC or JTF may--

- Keep direct operational control of the ARSOA TF (SOC only).
- Pass operational control of the ARSOA TF to a subordinate JSOTF commander.
- Pass operational control of the ARSOA TF to a functional JSOACC.
- Pass operational control of the ARSOA TF to the supported ARSOTF commander, thereby establishing a single-service combined arms TF.
- Attach the ARSOA TF to the supported ARSOTF commander. The ARSOTF commander then exercises full command instead of operational control.

2-5. ARMY COMPONENT COMMAND

a. ARSOA will generally be a part of an ARSOTF or a JSOTF. Therefore, its relationship with the theater Army will be primarily for support through the theater Army special operations support command or other appropriate support arrangements.

b. The theater Army is normally the Army component command of a unified command. Regardless of the OPCON arrangements within the unified command, the TA remains responsible for certain service-specific functions. Those that apply to the SOA in particular include--

- Informing the CINC of support and sustainment decisions and changes that affect his operational capability or sustainability.
- Conducting joint training as directed.
- Developing programs and budget requests that comply with CINC guidance on operational requirements and priorities.

- Informing the CINC of programs and budget decisions and changes that affect operational and contingency planning.
- Providing supporting plans with the necessary force data to support missions assigned by the CINC.
- Providing administrative and UCMJ support, service training, logistical, and intelligence functions within the unified command.
- Appointing the ARSOA task force commander as the JSOACC.

2-6. AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT DURING OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

a. Airspace control during operations other than war generally centers around host-nation air traffic regulation and control of civil and host-nation military airspace users. (See Appendix C, FM 100-103.) Operations other than war include foreign internal defense, peacekeeping operations, terrorism counteraction, and peacetime contingency operations. The potential exists for AROSA to support any of these operations as part of a JSOTF or as part of an ARSOF task force. The presence and number of other US forces in theater usually determine the way that airspace is deconflicted. These factors also determine who has overall responsibility for airspace deconfliction.

b. Usually, the ARSOA unit is employed under OPCON of a JSOTF, but it could be under OPCON of the ARSOF commander in direct support of FID or peacekeeping operations. When the ARSOA unit is under OPCON of the ARSOF commander, the ARSOA commander is responsible for gaining airspace approval from the host nation and for deconflicting his element's use of host-nation airspace. Airspace deconfliction becomes more complicated when the AROSA unit is under OPCON of a JSOTF. If no other US forces are in theater, the JSOTF must be responsible for gaining airspace approval from the host nation and for deconflicting airspace between all JSOTF units.

c. Host-nation airspace used by the host nation's civil airspace users and military aircraft, artillery, and air defense must be conflicted at the joint force headquarters or JSOTF. Host-nation airspace used by US military aircraft and other JSOTF elements also must be conflicted at the joint force headquarters or JSOTF. Officials of the host nation normally approve the use of their airspace by US military aircraft based on agreements made by the state department.

d. The JSOTF should be responsible for all airspace coordination when other JSOTF units require the use of host-nation airspace. The JSOAC should not be tasked with this duty. When other JSOTF units require access to host-nation airspace, the JSOTF is the most logical place to obtain both deconfliction and airspace approval. In this case, the JSOACC passes the airspace requests to the JSOTF for coordination and host-nation approval.

e. Airspace used by other JSOTF ground forces (US military and CAS in support of SOF) and JSOACC aircraft must be deconflicted at the JSOTF level. The JSOACC will not understand the importance nor the priority of ground force airspace use and how that priority coincides with the overall campaign plan. When JSOTF priority of airspace use competes with host-nation use, the JSOTF will be in a better position to judge JSOTF priority and negotiate use of the airspace with the host nation. The JSOACC is not equipped to perform these functions.

f. When US conventional forces are in place before the JSOTF arrives, airspace deconfliction occurs at the TACP according to doctrine. The AC and LCC will be designated to accomplish the airspace management function. The JSOACC is responsible for clearing flights into and out of airspace managed by the AC through the established TACP. All host-nation airspace will be coordinated with the host nation through the conventional ACC that supports ground operations during operations other than war. In most cases, the LCC will own the airspace over his area of operation. The theater TACP will coordinate the use of this airspace through the JSOTF.

g. The number and type of airspace users will determine the best method of airspace management and should also dictate who has overall responsible for deconflicting airspace with the host nation. Conditions in the host nation and the mission of the JSOTF will also help determine where airspace deconfliction should occur. In some cases, the host nation may require days of advance notice before the airspace is used. The JSOTF, ARSOF, and ARSOA must know in advance what methods of control are in place and where and how airspace is deconflicted with the host nation.

CHAPTER 3

EMPLOYMENT

Army special operations aviation units must be prepared to support special operations across the operational continuum. These SO may be in support of US military, a host nation, other foreign nations, and/or other agencies and special activities. This chapter discusses the nature of ARSOA units and their capabilities and limitations. It also discusses ARSOA missions in support of SO and reviews the ARSOA mission planning process and considerations.

3-1. NATURE OF ARSOA UNITS

a. Special operations are inherently joint operations. ARSOA forces are commanded and tasked to conduct joint operations and are organized and trained to operate extensively in this arena. Extensive joint exercises and participation in the joint planning and execution system make ARSOA very familiar with the needs and capabilities of joint operations.

b. ARSOA units have capabilities that allow them to operate effectively throughout the operational continuum. These capabilities must be understood to properly plan and execute SO missions that involve ARSOA.

(1) Special operations can be conducted during the day or at night. ARSOA units prefer to fly at night, during periods of low ambient light, and at low-level and terrain flight altitudes to conduct or support their clandestine or deep operations. These methods permit SOF to remain in enemy territory for long periods. Day operations increase the risk to the SO mission, aircraft, and crews. Therefore, they are performed only after the factors of METT-T are thoroughly evaluated and a risk assessment is completed.

(2) The equipment that the ARSOA unit uses is usually procured, designed, or modified by the unit SIMO. This equipment allows the unit to conduct clandestine penetration missions safely and efficiently. ARSOA aircraft have navigation systems and sensors that permit and aid in terrain-masking flight at night and during adverse weather. Communications suites permit secure and rapid command and control over great distances with the mission aircraft and the supported and supporting agencies.

All aircraft have internal auxiliary fuel tanks, and many of them can be refueled in the air. This capability allows the ARSOA unit to penetrate hostile areas from long distances in support of SOF missions.

(3) The skills necessary to design, modify, maintain, and operate this equipment are not learned quickly or easily. A significant loss is not easily replaced. In addition, training a fully mission-qualified crew member can take more than 12 months, depending on the individual's experience.

(4) Discovery of an operation could result in failure. Therefore, flight profiles are selected primarily to avoid detection. Selection of routes, times, and equipment to permit undetected infiltration and exfiltration requires time and practice. ARSOA flying operations demand expert terrain flying techniques. Terrain flying frequently takes place at night or during reduced visibility. An ARSOA mission may require flight when most other aircraft would be operationally limited or restricted because of weather or terrain considerations.

(5) Operational security is crucial. The element of surprise is one of the SOF's major tactical advantages. The use of highly trained personnel in task-oriented teams allows for isolated planning and execution without significant direct support. Loss of OPSEC can cause cancellation of the mission.

c. ARSOA can self-deploy some aircraft, or it may use the US Transportation Command airlift and sealift systems. In a rapid buildup of forces for a major conflict, movement of troops, weapons, supplies, and oversized and overweight cargo will overload the ALOC and the SLOC. Some ARSOA helicopters can be rapidly configured to self-deploy to arrive in theater at the same time as the support SOF units. Mission benefits must be weighed against the risks and cost of the self-deployment flight.

(1) Self-deployment. In terms of operational airframe availability, MH-47 self-deployment is usually quicker if the distance is less than 2,000 miles. MH-60 and AH/MH-6 aircraft should not be self-deployed if strategic and tactical aircraft are available. Shipment by C5 allows for quick reassembly of smaller SOF aircraft. In addition, operational airframes will be available to the ground commander shortly after they arrive. Some ARSOA assets can deploy to central Germany in three to four days. They can also deploy to the western coast of Africa in three to four days, to Central America in one day, and to Brazil in three to four days. Once deployed OCONUS, ARSOA assets can use their self-deployment capability to position from one flank of a theater to another or to deploy to still another theater.

To self-deploy, ARSOA units will use the planning guidance contained in FM 1-109. The extensive cost of self-deployment in resources must be considered before this method of moving ARSOA into a theater is used. Planners must consider--

- The condition of the aircrew after selfdeployment.
- The condition of the aircraft and equipment and the inspections required because of the extended flight.
- The probability of self-deployment success.
- The planning time lost because aircrews deployed the aircraft.
- The reduced aircrew and aircraft availability when additional crew members are used to selfdeploy aircraft.

(2) Airlift. Airlift is the preferred method of deploying ARSOA assets. ARSOA units can rapidly configure all assigned aircraft for movement on USAF strategic aircraft. When they arrive, the aircraft can be quickly rebuilt and ready to operate.

(3) Sealift. Sealift is the slowest of all deployment methods. It requires extensive planning at both the departure and the arrival ports. During a sealift, ARSOA units require the support of depot maintenance organizations to help them prepare the aircraft for shipment.

(4) Tactical sealift. Deployment using this method provides ARSOA units with a responsive deployment capability that requires minimal aircraft preparation. Aircraft can be stored and maintained below deck, and crews can conduct detailed mission planning while en route to the area of operations. Depending on the scenario, tactical sealift facilities can serve as an intermediate staging base or a forward staging base for short periods.

d. For missions of short duration, ARSOA units deploy with the capability to perform their own AVUM and AVIM support in the field. Therefore, they require very little AVIM or AVUM support. Task forces normally deploy with enough supplies to operate independently for at least 15 days. Consumables, such as ammunition and fuel, are the most significant resupply needs. ARSOA units deployed for sustained operations normally require support from theater assets. They will use contract logistics support and other direct support for depot-level maintenance.

3-2. AIRLAND OPERATIONS

a. Special operations forces conduct operations according to the fundamentals of AirLand Operations, the Army's capstone warfighting doctrine. SOF provide commanders with utility and flexibility, including direct-action, special reconnaissance, joint and/or combined liaison, unconventional warfare, and unilateral operations. However, special operations frequently take place in situations short of war. In these situations, the SOF's ability to influence rather than dominate the operational environment is more important. This indirect application of military power requires that the fundamentals of AirLand Operations be adapted to the situation and the mission.

b. In many ways, ARSOA exemplifies the AirLand Operations tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization.

(1) Agility is the ability to act faster than the enemy and is a prerequisite for initiative. It is a physical and a mental quality. ARSOA enhances the physical ability of the SOF to choose where and when to conduct operations. The ARSOA unit's ability to rapidly enter and exit an area from a great distance keeps the enemy off balance and amplifies the impact of a small force.

(2) Initiative is setting or changing the terms of battle by actions. This requires the force to act, which compels the enemy to react. The ARSOA's ability to extend the range of the SOF to conduct SO missions gives the operational-level commander greater flexibility in setting the terms of battle. It provides the speed and flexibility to redirect actions and maintain the initiative. Properly used, aviation assets allow the conduct of misdirections, deceptions, and feints to which the enemy must respond and thus lose the initiative.

(3) Depth is the extension of operations in space, time, and resources. ARSOA provides SOF the ability to reach the depths of the theater. Depth expands the friendly commander's time available by reducing transport and deployment time and planning time. It also reduces training time and the resources necessary to move SOF from one location to another. Depth ensures that SOF elements will be positioned where and when they will be most effective. If the enemy perceives that its entire theater is vulnerable to SOF actions at any time, it may commit its forces and support to an extensive rear area security operation.

(4) Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose in a way that produces the most relative combat power at the desired point. ARSOA provides
SOF with the ability to move quickly to where their actions may enhance the effects of other forces. Additionally, it provides intelligence that clarifies the picture for the commander and creates conditions within the enemy's area of operations that allows a decisive event to occur.

(5) Versatility is the unit's ability to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently.

3-3. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

The capabilities of ARSOA are based upon a combination of skills and equipment. Its limitations revolve around the need for theater support for all classes of supply during extended operations.

a. Capabilities.

(1) ARSOA units can perform sustained operations using 50 percent of its deployed aircraft. Within the parameters of the factors of METT-T, they can also surge to 75 to 80 percent of their deployed aircraft for limited periods. This provides for aircraft maintenance and aircrew planning time.

(2) ARSOA medium lift and assault helicopters (MH-47Es and MH-60Ks) can strategically self-deploy within planning guidelines. Like all others, they can quickly and easily be configured for air transport.

(3) ARSOA units provide a unique, quick-strike capability using assault and attack aircraft which are rapidly deployed via USAF transport.

(4) ARSOA units train and qualify for NVG, overwater, and maritime operations.

(5) ARSOA units have an organic, centralized AVUM and AVIM capability for all of their assigned aircraft, armament, and avionics.

(6) ARSOA units can perform unit maintenance on all organic equipment.

b. Limitations.

(1) ARSOA depends on the theater for the manpower; special tools; and test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment to perform decentralized maintenance support during wartime and contingency operations.

(2) During sustained operations, ARSOA units will use large quantities of POL and ammunition. They will depend upon the theater to deliver, store, distribute, and protect these items. ARSOA requires theater aircraft Class IX support for those items that are aircraft-common. ARSOA-peculiar parts resupply is sustained using prepackaged contingency stocks and theater throughput items. ARSOA uses contingency stocks in the form of deployment support kits and "war" packages for both standard and nonstandard equipment.

(3) ARSOA units are not structured for nor can they conduct interior guard or perimeter surveillance during combat operations. Therefore, they should be based in a secure location for OPSEC and physical security.

(4) ARSOA units have no medical-holding capabilities.

(5) ARSOA units have limited organic CS and CSS capabilities, particularly in areas of billeting and messing. ARSOA TFs will require additional support from other units.

(6) ARSOA units require support from a higher level (normally from the JSOACC) for airspace deconfliction, tactical air support, all-source intelligence, and aviation weather data.

(7) ARSOA forces depend on theater ground and air transportation assets to move aviation maintenance and personnel assets within the theater.

(8) ARSOA forces are not easily regenerated.

(9) Although aerial refueling increases the range of the ARSOA mission, this capability is totally dependent on US or allied tanker support.

3-4. SUPPORT FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

a. Unconventional Warfare. During UW, ARSOA supports the SOF commander by conducting air movement of supported SOF teams, host-nation personnel, and supplies. These air movements require the ARSOA to conduct clandestine penetration, precision navigation, and long-range infiltration and exfiltration. During UW, ARSOA should not be used for routine administrative and logistical air movements. They can, however, extract US and allied personnel recovered by the UW escape and evasion network and provide limited aerial attacks into denied territory.

b. Foreign Internal Defense. FID operations develop political, economic, psychological, and military infrastructures of friendly governments to prevent or defeat an insurgency. ARSOA assists by providing aviation assets to host-nation SOF who require their skills and equipment. This assistance is normally limited to movement of host-nation SOF to conduct surgical operations such as precision application of fire with no collateral damage. In an FID environment, general aviation operations are not appropriate ARSOA missions.

c. Special Reconnaissance. Normal ARSOA support for SR operations is through infiltration, resupply, or exfiltration of SOF teams that perform these missions. ARSOA can also perform some SR missions independently and report strategic intelligence on enemy locations, intentions, and actions.
d. Direct Action. In this role, ARSOA's primary contribution is to infiltrate DA special operations teams directly onto the objective or into a secure landing zone from where they can move to their target. With organic armed helicopters, ARSOA units can also conduct deep, unilateral DA SO missions independently. They can support DA SO units as small as three- to fiveman teams and as large as a ranger battalion. ARSOA air assault operations support DA missions that include raids, ambushes, and seizure of key facilities. They also support interdiction of major lines of communications, deception schemes, and shows-of-force.
e. Counterterrorism. Counterterrorism involves offensive measures that civilian and military agencies of a government take to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. In this interagency activity, SOF apply specialized capabilities to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidents abroad. The US Department of Justice and the Department of State are the lead agency authorities. However, host-nation responsibilities limit ARSOA's involvement in counterterrorism. When directed by the NCA, ARSOA supports CT missions. These missions may include a hostage rescue, the recovery of sensitive material from terrorist organizations, and an attack on the terrorist infrastructure. ARSOA can insert or extract supported SOF into and from CT targets. Or, they can support the seizure of key facilities during other CT operations.
f. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs. ARSOA can support clandestine PSYOP and CA missions. ARSOA is best used when the target country or audience is landlocked by hostile nations and penetration of nonpermissive airspace is required. Overt PSYOP and CA should be supported by general aviation assets.
g. Special Activities. ARSOA can also conduct other special activities directed by the NCA.

3-5. AIRLIFT SUPPORT TECHNIQUES

a. Skills and Systems. ARSOA units use specially modified aircraft to perform their clandestine penetration and attack missions. ARSOA aviators receive extensive training on the specialized technical capabilities of their aircraft and in SO-peculiar operations. This training enables ARSOA aviators to defeat, deceive, or disrupt hostile acquisition and air defense weapon systems.
b. Flight Profiles. Clandestine penetration requires that ARSOA aircrews do more than evade hostile air defense and avoid air interception aircraft once they are detected. They must avoid detection to preserve the overall security of the SOF mission. ARSOA aircraft will depart a forward location using precision navigation techniques, terrain masking, and terrain following and avoidance equipment on the MH-60K and MH-47E aircraft. When required, aircrews will conduct aerial refueling and infiltrate, resupply, or exfiltrate supported SOF that are deep in enemy territory. They use night vision devices and terrain-following and avoidance radar under conditions of limited light and low visibility. They also rely on a comprehensive ASE suite. They may operate as single aircraft or in formations up to battalion size. In a high-threat environment, ARSOA assets may need additional combat support to enhance mission security through deception and other activities; for example, J-SEAD, fire support, and JAAT.
c. Flight Planning. Successful SO depend on detailed and coordinated premission flight planning. Early in the planning sequence, the mission aircrew must interface with the SOF team responsible for executing the ground phase of the mission. Paragraph 3-6 contains more details on SOF mission planning requirements.
d. Personnel Recovery. As with other aviation assets, ARSOA can perform personnel recovery missions of its own personnel. However, ARSOA is not organized, equipped, or trained to conduct continuing SAR or combat SAR missions. Services maintain responsibility for SAR and CSAR tasks that require operational alert procedures and dedicated C3 systems. Situations may occur, however, when ARSOA units must recover isolated personnel whose recovery is beyond the capabilities of conventional CSAR. These personnel recovery missions are direct-action operations. They require detailed planning, preparation, rehearsal, and thorough intelligence analysis. ARSOA provides the greatest support to the theater CSAR effort by assisting with evasion and recovery operations and other UW operations. This assistance is routinely coordinated with the joint force commander's joint rescue coordination center.
e. Launch and Recovery From US Navy Vessels. Air-capable Navy vessels provide excellent launch and recovery points to move supported SOF. The US Navy Shipboard Aviation Facilities Resume (NAEC-ENG-7576) provides planning criteria for launches and recoveries from Navy vessels. Published every six months, it also provides a list of all US Navy vessels that can launch and recover helicopters. Joint Publication 3-04.1 requires ARSOA pilots to undergo specific qualification training to operate to and/or from US Navy ships. This publication provides detailed guidance on shipboard operations. Facilities aboard combatant ships, such as the combat operations center and the

all-source intelligence center, permit ARSOA aircrew members and supported SOF to plan SO missions while en route to the launch point.

3-6. MISSION PLANNING

ARSOA planners and the personnel who will execute the mission must be brought into the planning process from the beginning. Political considerations and changing threats figure prominently in SO planning. Changes in political objectives or constraints may cause operational characteristics to change rapidly and significantly. Therefore, personnel who have not been involved during situation changes will not fully understand or be able to execute the plan without risking its success.

a. Planning Considerations. Detailed mission planning is vital to successful execution and to the survival of all SOF that participate in the mission. SO mission planning is distinctive in its degree of jointness, its dependence on operational intelligence, and the level of participation by mission personnel. The mission planning agent, who is normally the supported SOF commander, and his staff are responsible for all air and ground phases of a specific SO. The ground phase includes premission planning, air infiltration, resupply, ground operations, air exfiltration of the ground element, and the mission debriefing. The MPA is responsible to the SOC for the entire special operations mission planning folder and mission execution. The JSOACC is responsible to the MPA for the air phase of the mission. The JSOACC must also ensure that aircrews are available to plan the mission. These considerations for SO mission planning are neither all-inclusive nor are they given any priority.

(1) Joint mission planning requirements. Special operations planning is a joint effort from the time the target is nominated until mission execution, recovery, and debriefing. SO planning depends strongly on operational intelligence and full participation by mission personnel. During interagency or combined operations, ARSOA must ensure that all participants understand the planning requirements.

(a) Reduced layers of command. Joint SO are conducted under the premise that unnecessary layers of command detract from the operation and involve personnel who do not have a valid need to know. Therefore, missions are compartmentalized and planned in isolation.

(b) Joint special operations mission planning folder. Normally, joint SO are deliberately planned well ahead of their execution. All information about a specific target is compiled in the SOMPF, which is the document that mission personnel use to conduct a mission. The lack of a SOMPF will slow the SO mission planning process. Appendix D provides a sample format of an SOMPF.

(2) Deliberate and/or adaptive planning. Whether ARSOA missions are deliberately planned or adapted for a crisis, certain factors will determine the success of the mission. These factors are discussed below.

(a) Detailed mission planning, based on specific, detailed, comprehensive, and accurate tactical intelligence, is vital to successful SO mission execution and the survival of the operational element. Based on the SOC mission tasking package, the designated MPA provides specific guidance and is responsible for the overall coordination of mission planning. Subordinate SOF commanders conduct coordinated, deliberate mission planning. Their objective is to develop a comprehensive plan that provides flexible mission execution.

(b) Supported SOF must remain flexible; they cannot afford to tie themselves to rigid plans. ARSOA commanders, however, must weigh the benefits of a rigid versus a flexible plan. A rigid plan allows a detailed study be made to ensure that the route selected is the safest for flights over unfamiliar terrain using night vision devices. A flexible approach allows mission crews to modify plans to achieve the commander's intent when an unexpected event occurs. Balance between the two approaches is the planners' responsibility.

(c) Deliberate SOF targeting and mission planning may require days or weeks to prepare for commitment into remote or denied territory. SOF commanders that act as the MPA are directly subordinate to the SOC. They direct subordinate SOF commanders, such as ARSOA, through mission letters. These letters focus on planning and training before mission execution. The supported SOF and the supporting ARSOA elements must understand the geographic, political, social, psychological, economic, climatic, and military situations in the target area. For some missions, they also must know the culture, language, customs,
ethnic and religious affiliations, and antagonisms of the target area. This level of area orientation is achieved through intensive study before employment, previous exposure to the area, or both.

(d) Adaptive mission planning is normally associated with contingency operations and fast-changing situations during conflict. Time is a critical factor and may limit planning and mission preparation when an SOMPF is not available. This is important because a successful mission depends on the quality and detail of mission preparation. ARSOA commanders should strive for an interactive planning and rehearsal process to refine and validate the mission planning accomplished under time constraints. If a full-scale dress rehearsal is impossible, a rehearsal of all critically timed events should be done in real time. If there is not enough time for detailed preparation, the ARSOA

commander must determine the minimum essential preparation tasks and then modify the normal process to fit the time available. As shown in Figure 3-1, many SO units use 96 hours of planning time for the operational element. If the ARSOA commander cannot perform the planning tasks within the time available, he must inform the responsible commander.

(e) At theater level, SO targets are examined for appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability. The basis for this evaluation normally comes from input that liaison officers, air mission planners, operational aircrews, staffs, and commanders provide.

(3) Location of supported units. Face-to-face coordination between the supported and supporting units is the best and most preferred method of planning SO missions. However, depending on its complexity, mission planning can be accomplished without face-to-face coordination. To plan where ARSOA is positioned on the battlefield, planners must consider the factors of METT-T, the location of CS and CSS, and whether the SOC has created a JSOACC. SO commanders must consider where ARSOA assets will be located because of the added time needed to move from a rear area base to a launch site.

(a) While face-to-face planning is advantageous, dispersing aircraft and aircrews to special forces operational bases and forward operational bases reduces the ARSOA commander's flexibility to reconstitute his forces. Additionally, more crews may be required with decentralized basing. Aircraft maintenance is also a primary consideration when the decision is being made to split ARSOA forces. Limited numbers of special tools, test sets, and personnel to operate them, restrict the battalion task force's ability to support more than one maintenance location. The ARSOA commander must evaluate the intended operations tempo;
the number of teams to be infiltrated, exfiltrated, or resupplied; and the intended schedule and sequence. He must also evaluate the number of available aircraft and aircrews.




Figure 3-1. Mission planning cycle

(b) The SOF hallmark is, "Those who will execute the mission must plan it." However, ARSOA crews may not always be able to collocate with supported SOF units before the mission is executed. With a ratio of one to one and a half aircrews per aircraft, the preferred method is for aircrews to be isolated with the supported SOF from the onset of mission tasking. As a minimum, ARSOA must be integrated into the mission planning process with the ground element no later than the mission-concept phase. This will preclude changes that will delay the mission. Operations conducted at the low end of the continuum may allow collocation. In operations at the high end of the continuum, however, the number and duration of insertions, resupply
missions, and extractions will require intensive management of aircrew regeneration and long-term aircraft availability. At any level of conflict, ARSOA crews will be infiltrating, exfiltrating, resupplying SOF units, and pre-positioning aircraft for other crews. They may, however, be restricted by crew endurance while supported SOF units plan upcoming missions.

(4) Aircraft capabilities. ARSOA has a continuous operating capability. Its aircraft can penetrate hostile airspace under reduced visibility, at night, and during adverse weather. Range, payload, aerial refueling, and weapon requirements must be considered in selecting the appropriate aircraft for the mission. Aircraft capabilities are shown in Appendix C.

(5) Aircraft and aircrew availability.

(a) Planners must consider whether the SOs being planned will be of long or short duration. ARSOA has limited numbers of aircraft and aircrews. For example, an ARSOA TF normally has 80 percent of its assigned aircraft available for tasking; the other 20 percent is in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. The ARSOA commander will provide the JSOACC with the number of aircraft available for mission support. If the theater SO campaign plan calls for a sustained operation, the ARSOA commander may be able to provide only 50 percent of the available aircraft for two reasons. First, aircrews require time to plan their missions and are not available to fly during that time. Second, use of the aircraft must be programmed and managed to establish an even flow of aircraft into routine and required maintenance inspections and checks. If the SOC needs to conduct short-term surge operations, the ARSOA can meet this requirement.

(b) For mission tasking or detailed infiltration planning, however, aircraft and aircrews should not be regenerated until 48 hours after they have been recovered. Another factor that may limit aircraft and aircrew availability is the need for standby quick reaction force recovery teams to conduct emergency extractions of committed SOF teams. Additional aircraft and aircrews are also required to perform SAR and CSAR. These crews are not available for infiltration, resupply, or exfiltration missions. Another significant planning consideration deals with the advent of the MH-60K helicopter. As previously stated, planning figures for aircrew availability will be one to one and a half crews per aircraft. The aerial refueling capability of the MH-60K allows for the increase in flight hours per mission.

(6) Priorities. The ARSOA commander, along with the JSOTF commander, establishes priorities for aircrew activity. Examples of aircrew activity include crew endurance, planning
time, mission rehearsal, personnel recovery, QRF, and recovery and reconstitution. Other activities include repositioning crews and aircraft for missions and mission execution. Incorrect priorities waste time and effort. Inadequate mission planning can lead to poor execution which may result in aircraft accidents and mission failure. Risk management (Appendix A) must be applied to the priority process.

(7) Physiological considerations. Lengthy ARSOA missions are frequently flown at night, in adverse weather, and behind enemy lines. Stress is higher in this operational environment than in the normal Army aviation climate. This added stress, as well as normal aviation psychological problems, must be included in the planning factors.

(8) SOF commander's intent. ARSOA planners must fully understand the supported SOF commander's intent. Conducting an undetected infiltration of an SF team can require more coordination with combat support units than a direct action mission. Planners must also create deception operations to mask aircraft movement.

(9) Mode of employment. The mode of employment (overt or clandestine) determines the level of coordination and operational security. Therefore, it is a primary consideration in mission preparation.

(10) Sustainment. ARSOA units have little organic support. Therefore, commanders depend on other units and the TA to sustain their logistical, personnel, and other vital CS and CSS functions. During lengthy conflicts, these requirements drive the level of sustainability.

(11) Launch and recovery point. The launch and recovery point is critical to crew endurance and to the positioning of aircraft for the next mission.

(12) Rules of engagement. Depending on the nature of the conflict, ROE vary from no collateral damage during counterterrorist operations to free-fire zones during war. The regional unified commander announces the ROE.

(13) Operational security. OPSEC is a command responsibility. An essential part of every SO mission, OPSEC includes planning, rehearsal, preparation, and support activities. The commander must designate the essential elements of friendly information.

(a) Electronic and communications security. Electronic and communications security must always be observed during the planning and execution of an SO.

(b) Deception. Deception can be used to mislead enemy forces. Deception activities must be believable, and the enemy must be given enough time to react. Deception activities must appear to be what they seem, and all enemy intelligence collection capabilities must be considered. Once the SOC approves the deception plans, the JSOACC coordinates them at theater level.

(c) Compartmentalization. Compartmentalization is necessary to protect the most sensitive operations. However, commanders and planners must not allow an operation to fail because of improper coordination.

(14) Objective area. The objective area and the local threat will dictate the courses of action that best use ARSOA assets.

(15) Availability of the special operations mission planning folder. Planners should determine the need for an SOMPF. An SOMPF reduces the time required to prepare a final plan and increases the probability of its success.

b. Joint SO Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures. Theater campaign planning drives the joint SO targeting process. The joint targeting process influences how SOF commanders plan and prepare for missions (Figure 3-2). Emerging world situations increase the probability that SOF will be employed in areas that may not yet be adequately covered by the joint planning process. Many situations will not follow the doctrinal planning model; therefore, ARSOA must remain practical and flexible in dealing with these situations. Joint Publication 3-05.5 and FMs 100-25 and 31-20 contain detailed discussions of the joint SO targeting process.

(1) Along with the MPA staff and the supported SOF unit, the ARSOA commander, as a supporting or supported commander, becomes involved in the joint SO targeting process during the initial and feasibility assessments. The MPA plans officer convenes the target assessment group. This group includes the ARSOA unit liaison officer, or air mission planner. The TAG determines whether the nominated target is a valid SOF target. If it is a valid SOF target, the TAG develops courses of action for further analysis. The ARSOA commander provides the MPA with input for a feasibility assessment of the COAs. If the MPA determines that the mission can be executed with an acceptable degree of risk, the initial assessment is prepared and forwarded to the SOC.




Figure 3-2. Special operations targeting process

(2) If the SOC concurs, he forwards the assessment to the JFC joint targeting coordination board for approval. If the JTCB determines that the target is feasible, it is added to the approved target list and assigned a priority. The JTCB then directs the SOC to prepare a SOMPF for the target. At the same time, the JTCB requests that the appropriate intelligence
agencies produce a target intelligence package to support the SOMPF. The package contains detailed information on the target, the operational area, and other aspects of the mission. Concurrently, and in close coordination with the supported SOF commander or MPA, the ARSOA commander prepares his supporting plans. Mission support plans must include how the supporting unit intends to meet the requirements identified in the POE (Figure 3-2). During unilateral SR or DA missions, the ARSOA commander assumes planning duties and is the mission planning agent. Depending on the nature of the mission, mission support plans and their annexes include but are not limited to--

- Infiltration, resupply, and/or exfiltration.
- Signal, intelligence, and other combat support.
- OPSEC and deception.
- Basing and other combat service support.

c. Reverse Planning Sequence.

(1) Sequence. The basis of SO mission planning is to start at the target and plan all requirements in reverse order of execution. Typically, SO missions have a specific time-on-target, but planners must verify with the supported element that there is a specific TOT or an event-driven requirement. When backward planning begins for a specific TOT, more variables must be considered and reconciled. Some examples of variables are airspace, friendly TACAIR, refueling, and recovery of aircrews and aircraft for follow-on missions.

(2) Task organization. Depending on the tactical plan, ARSOA task organizes to simplify the air portion of the SO.
(3) Air mission briefing. The AMB is conducted as early as possible in the planning process. Ideally, the AMB will be conducted no later than 24 hours before mission execution. The ARSOA TF staff prepares the AMB in a five-paragraph OPORD format. The staff presents the AMB to all participating ARSOA TF elements and representatives from the supported SOF units. The S2 provides the intelligence information. The S3 briefs paragraphs 2 and 3 (mission and execution) of the air mission brief, and the other staff officers brief their areas. The flight lead personally briefs all aircrews, the LO, the AMC, and all others who are directly involved in the mission. No detail is considered self-explanatory. Before departure, a final update briefing is given to update intelligence, weather, and operational changes. A sample format for an air mission briefing is provided in Appendix B.

d. Key Personnel.

(1) Task force commander. The ARSOA TF commander organizes the TF and determines what assets support which missions. He must position himself where he can best influence the overall TF effort. Normally, this is where the majority of the TF assets and the operations center are located. To avoid confusion about how his assets support the SO ground forces, the commander issues clear, concise orders and guidance. Through personal contact and communication links, the commander unifies the effort required to accomplish the mission.
(2) Air mission commander. An AMC is designated for operations that involve two or more aircraft supporting the same mission. For company-sized operations, the aviation company commander or platoon leader is the AMC. When TF-sized SOs are conducted, the ARSOA TF commander designates the AMC. The AMC ensures that the air portion of the SO is conducted according to the air mission briefing and the intentions of the MPA. The AMC is responsible for air mission success and must decide on air mission execution. He places himself on the battlefield where he can most effectively influence the battle. The air mission commander is in charge of the flight before and during mission execution. The AMC coordinates all supporting operations along the flight route; for example, J-SEAD, JAAT, and EW. The AMC brings critical information to the planning table that shortens the time required to find acceptable solutions to ground tactical problems. He must be included in all aspects of mission planning. Aviation limitations and capabilities often affect the ground commander's actions on the objective. If the aviation commander is not included in the entire planning process, replanning the ground tactical plan may be necessary.
(3) Flight lead. The flight lead is subordinate to the AMC. He is responsible for route planning, navigation, and flight discipline to ensure that the flight arrives at the destination to meet mission parameters. The flight lead must be included in all aspects of the mission planning. He is the technical advisor before and during the mission. The flight lead is in the lead aircraft and makes immediate decisions created by changing situations. He navigates the aircraft or formation to remain on the planned flight route. He also adjusts the airspeed to arrive at the ACPs, meet scheduled combat support, and arrive at the LZ or PZ on time. The flight lead selects a mode of flight commensurate with the threat.
(4) Liaison officer. The LO is the ARSOA TF commander's representative. All ARSOA units require liaison with higher, lateral, subordinate, and supported units.
(a) ARSOA units are frequently tasked to supply several LOs at the same time. The ARSOA unit is not manned to support LOs; therefore, these personnel must come from mission crews. If not properly managed at all levels, this reduction in crews can adversely affect the unit's ability to plan and fly its assigned missions. A planner from each SOA task force element should review the liaison officer's support plan before execution.
(b) The importance of qualified ARSOA LOs cannot be overemphasized. At the supported unit, they may be required to conduct preliminary planning in the absence of a flight lead, select tentative LZs or PZs, and recommend combat support based on the threat. They must be rated special operations aviators with an additional skill identifier of K4.
(c) The complex ARSOA mission requires coordination to ensure success and to prevent aircraft and aircrews from being inadvertently placed in conflict with other operations. Liaison officers can provide valuable assistance to the units they support by keeping them informed of ARSOA doctrine, capabilities, limitations, and requirements. Equally, the ARSOA commander will be kept informed of the intentions of higher headquarters. He will also be kept informed of the intentions of lateral, subordinate, and supported units.
(d) Proper distribution of ARSOA LOs is critical to the success of SOF command and control and mission effectiveness. Normally, the JSOACC determines LO requirements, which are frequently extensive. The ARSOA TF commander should be prepared to provide LOs and/or air mission planners to the supported SF group or Navy special warfare task groups and the JSOTF. He must also be prepared to provide LOs and air mission planners to the SOC, TAF, TA, TNF, theater airspace manager, TASOSC, and others as appropriate. These LOs and air mission planners should have enough personnel to conduct 24-hour operations and enough communication equipment to coordinate with the appropriate agencies.

CHAPTER 4

COMBAT SUPPORT

ARSOA will require combat support from either SO or non-SO units (theater, service, joint, or combined forces). This chapter discusses ARSOA CS support requirements from non-SO CS units. It also discusses the likely use of non-SO CS by ARSOA and the CS request procedures for support of ARSOA.

4-1. FIRE SUPPORT

Fire support is often critical to mission success. The nature of the ARSOA mission makes the need for fire support extremely time- and target-critical. To achieve the support needed, fire support must be precise and timely. However, it must not prematurely reveal the objective of the mission.

a. Requests. For SOA-supported missions, the supported unit originates most fire support requests. However, the SOA commander must be provided the fire support request and status so he can include it in the SOA mission planning. The fire support coordinator for the entire SO mission, including the ARSOA portion, is the mission planning agent. Fire support requests will be passed to the JSOTF or SOC J3 as appropriate. When they work for the LCC, special operations forces coordinate with the LCC's G3 and FSE for fire and air support. When they operate as a separate component, the special operations commander, COMJSOTF, obtains air and/or fire support from the CINC's J3 or FSE in the joint operations center. Requests for fire support from non-SOF units must be requested and coordinated in advance.

b. Assets. Fire support assets that may be made available to ARSOA include field artillery, the Army tactical missile system, naval surface fire, and air support. This air support will take the form of tactical air support from the Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps. Depending upon the composition of the ARSOA task force, the ARSOA unit may have some capability for air attack. However, its air attack capability is very limited and should be used only for specific preplanned direct support of SO. It should not be used for general support of the mission.

(1) Field artillery. SOF have no organic field artillery. They may, however, have field artillery assets allocated in direct support of an operation. They may also receive field artillery fire support on a general support basis. Field artillery support will be requested from the SOC through normal channels down to the supporting field artillery unit. The nature of ARSOA missions results in most missions being flown beyond the range of friendly field artillery. That makes field artillery support most useful for covering ingress and egress and for local SEAD. This support may be dedicated to the ARSOA mission, or it may be combined with other fire missions. It may also be used as a diversion to preserve the clandestine characteristics of the ARSOA mission.

(2) Army tactical missile system. The ATACMS is addressed separately because it is normally controlled at corps or EAC. The range of the ATACMS makes it most useful as a fire support asset for ARSOA. Since ARSOA also operates as an EAC tasked unit in enemy territory, the ATACMS is a viable support asset if it is in theater and available. Its range and centralized targeting and command and control system make it the best ground-launched fire support system for ARSOA deep missions. Its response time and accuracy also make the ATACMS very useful to SOF. However, limited assets and control at corps level dictate the need for early, detailed requests to ensure that it is available when needed.

(3) Naval surface fire. When operations are conducted near a coastline, naval surface fire can support ARSOA the same as field artillery. Like field artillery, naval surface fire is requested at the joint level through the SOC J3. Coordination and use of naval surface fire is similar to field artillery and TACAIR, but it may require support from an ANGLICO. The ANGLICO, normally provided by the US Marine Corps, will request, coordinate, and control both naval air and gunfire support at the tactical level.

(4) Tactical air support. TACAIR has the range and firepower to support ARSOA missions anywhere in the theater. Requests for TACAIR support are made through the LCC or SOC J3 to the theater single air manager or ACC. The ACC satisfies all TACAIR requirements. The single air manager concept is proven and universal to all theaters. The ACC provides effective procedures, the organization, and the resources to manage aircraft in the theater. The SOC, or JSOACC, will coordinate requests for TACAIR with the theater ACC. If the theater ACC cannot support the SOC because of higher priority requests and the SOC views his needs as critical, the CINC reviews and establishes priorities. TACAIR, when available, can be used for SEAD, interdiction, or CAS. Planning for TACAIR includes detailed timing and definition of either the target or the mission requirements. Preplanned

missions should be requested 72 hours in advance for inclusion in the ATO process. However, exact target coordinates are not necessary until immediately before the mission is launched. If precision-guided munitions are the best armament for ARSOA support requirements, they should be included in the initial request. Comments should also include whether the target designation will be by TACAIR, ARSOA, other SOF, or other agencies. The controlling agency normally approves requests for immediate support if the aircraft are available and have the appropriate ordnance.

(a) Interdiction. The Air Force TACS classifies requests for TACAIR support on targets beyond the FSCL as interdiction. Therefore, close coordination with the BCE and the TACS is necessary to emphasize the nature and need of any SO request for TACAIR beyond the FSCL and to ensure that it is given the proper priority. The JTCB and the TACS deconflict timing and tasking for interdiction targets. If interdiction taskings impact on or affect ARSOA missions or requests, the JTCB must be made aware of these conflicts to prevent fratricide and multiple taskings on a single target.

(b) Close air support. TACAIR support within the FSCL is normally tasked as close air support. CAS can be preplanned or immediate. Although the exact targets and coordinates are not necessary, preplanned CAS should be requested 72 hours ahead of time. On-call CAS can be requested, which tasks aircraft to support a specific operation within a defined period with requested ordnance. However, the exact target location is normally not defined at the time of the request. If an immediate need for TACAIR becomes apparent, a call to a controlling agency such as the ASOC, the ABCCC, or AWACS will normally determine if TACAIR assets are available. These assets can be immediately diverted to support ARSOA requirements. When TACAIR is diverted for immediate CAS, the requester must control the aircraft in the target area.

(c) Reconnaissance. Although it is not normally available, immediate reconnaissance is requested in the same manner as close air support.

4-2. SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE AND JOINT SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE

SEAD and J-SEAD may be required to penetrate or to exit enemy territory. SEAD activity tends to highlight those areas in which it is conducted. Enemy reaction or increased activity in the areas where SEAD is being conducted should be expected. Ideally, SEAD support for other operations or with other activities should be the primary method of support for ARSOA. SEAD activities can also be used to distract enemy defenses from the actual planned routes or time of ARSOA operations.

a. Planning. Like TACAIR, SEAD is requested through the theater ACC. SEAD planning is conducted at the TACC level, to which all requests for this support should be made. Although local SEAD is often provided for a high-priority mission, it is normally planned on a theater or area basis rather than to support a single mission. Therefore, tasking of SEAD assets to fill the ARSOA SEAD requests will normally be included in a more general support package rather than dedicated to the ARSOA mission.

b. Coordination. Suppression of enemy air defense is temporary. It does not have long-term effects unless it is part of a major extended SEAD operation. While dedicated SEAD support for some ARSOA missions may be necessary, it must be closely timed so that it takes advantage of the initial impact but does not jeopardize the ARSOA mission. The SEAD request must state specifically when and where SEAD is needed the most. Normally, full coverage of an operation is not possible given the limited dedicated SEAD assets. SEAD support may also be split, such as between TACAIR and artillery, and be for different areas or targets or at a different time.

c. Assets and Techniques. SEAD can be accomplished with either fires or electronic means and by using either airborne or surface-based systems. For example, artillery can silence some defenses, and airborne jammers can degrade acquisition systems. Combining these assets increases the total effect of SEAD support. Normally, SEAD is part of an overall operation, which will include other TACAIR and ground activities. SEAD support may not be obvious unless the supported unit has been notified that SEAD is taking place. Limited numbers of lethal and nonlethal dedicated SEAD systems may restrict the availability of SEAD, particularly if quick reaction is required. In general, SEAD or J-SEAD should be employed on all known targets.

4-3. AIR DEFENSE

Air defense is controlled on an area basis. Coordination with the air defense sector is essential to ensure safe passage through friendly defenses. Air defense sectors may be declared weapons free; any aircraft transiting will be attacked. Sectors may also be declared weapons tight when positive identification is required or weapons hold when no firing

is authorized. Therefore, routes through borders, FLOTs, or defense zones must be coordinated with the air defense controlling agency well ahead of mission execution to prevent attack by friendly air defense units. Similarly, any dedicated air defense requirements or CAP over enemy territory must be requested well ahead of mission execution. Like SEAD, CAP will attract the attention of the enemy. It must be used judiciously to prevent compromising ARSOA activities. CAP can be used as a barrier between enemy air bases and the ARSOA mission or route area. It can also be used as a moving CAP near the route or task force or as a sweep ahead of the ARSOA aircraft. In any case, close coordination with the supporting unit is necessary so that the needs and plans of ARSOA are understood.

4-4. ATTACK HELICOPTERS

Units that are a part of or that support a force that includes attack helicopters may be attached or placed under OPCON of another commander. The accuracy and lethality of attack helicopters make them useful for supporting an egress or ingress, covering a landing zone, or conducting SEAD or J-SEAD missions.

a. Planning. The limited availability of advanced attack helicopters and their versatility place them in great demand. Therefore, the ARSOA commander must state his intent, include them in his planning, submit early requests, and specify the desired mission results. Requests for this support should be made through the JFSOCC to the Army component commander. Advanced attack helicopters are useful in supporting ARSOA, since they are flexible and have similar flight characteristics to ARSOA aircraft. For example, attack helicopters may be tasked to create a diversion, conduct SEAD, or provide escort during an ingress or egress. They may also be tasked to provide highly accurate, lethal firepower against enemy force concentrations.

b. Staging Base. Staging the ARSOA mission from the same base as the attack helicopters allows face-to-face briefings. Face-to-face briefings ensure coordination. They also ensure that ARSOA and the attack helicopter units understand the mission. Staging provides for similarity between the launch area and the initial routes of ARSOA and other aircraft. This, in turn, reduces the operational visibility of ARSOA operations.

4-5. INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

To successfully operate deep within enemy territory, ARSOA units must avoid enemy detection. Therefore, particular attention is given to avoiding enemy acquisition systems. Current intelligence on the location, status, and operating modes and frequencies of enemy acquisition and tracking systems is essential. ARSOA uses intelligence information to plan routes and determine ASE needs and settings. It also uses this information to determine what type of non-SO agency support it requires. ARSOA mission planners will use combat information and intelligence to plot infiltration and exfiltration routes and to recommend landing zones.

a. Intelligence. The SOC J2 is the primary agency for the tasking and dissemination of IEW products to support ARSOA. The MPA will be the main focus for requesting and disseminating mission intelligence requirements. The supported unit, such as an SF detachment, usually coordinates IRs for the mission and passes them to the MPA, who forwards them to the SOC J2. ARSOA specific IRs are then sent to the JSOACC. The JSOACC J2 then determines if SO, Army, or Air Force intelligence sources can best fill the need. Cross-coordination of IRs at all times and levels during mission planning is necessary. Cross-coordination ensures that the IRs are not duplicated and that essential intelligence is available to the planners.

(1) The SO IEW system is known as the Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System. ARSOA is not connected to any other intelligence net, and current TOE limitations do not allow ARSOA task forces to deploy a SOCRATES. Therefore, ARSOA must rely on either SF-, ARSOF-, or AFSOF deployed SOCRATES for access to intelligence products and reports. Collocating the ARSOA task force with the SF group, the AFSOF, or the JSOACC, allows access to a SOCRATES and to the intelligence data needed for mission planning. Standing intelligence requirements for ARSOA units should be automatically submitted to the JSOACC or the JSOC J2 for early resolution. FM 34-36 contains more details on intelligence support for SOA.

(2) While ARSOA units will gather certain operational intelligence as part of their overall mission, they have no dedicated organic intelligence-gathering capability. The ARSOA task force S2 is a throughput office only. The lack of any deployable connection to an operations and intelligence net also reduces the ability to enter mission debriefings into the intelligence nets.

(3) Route selection partially depends on known enemy air defense locations. This information is collected by a target information broadcast system or by another system. The detect and destroy radius of known enemy positions allows the system to select routes that avoid these positions. Normally, these systems are not found at AFSOC; however, access to them is necessary during the planning phase.

b. Electronic Warfare. ARSOA relies upon a combination of organic ASE and combat support systems to defeat enemy ground and air defenses. Ideally, SEAD and other activities, such as ground and airborne jammer support, decrease the need for ARSOA to use active ASE. However, the use of organic equipment to defeat enemy tracking systems and missiles is necessary. Coordination ith supporting units and intelligence agencies will provide the data necessary for mission planning. Route selection, ASE settings and equipment, and tactics should be tailored to the expected threats.

4-6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

ARSOA has no organic deployable counterintelligence assets. Coordination and support for ARSOA CI needs must be accomplished at the SOC, JSOTF, or other appropriate higher echelon.

4-7. WEATHER SUPPORT

ARSOA requires light data, sea condition data, and weather forecasts from deep within enemy territory up to 72 hours before mission execution. Accurate current and forecasted weather, including satellite weather forecasting products and interpretation, is needed for mission planning to support route selection, equipment requirements, fuel needs, and combat support. The USAF has approved attaching a staff weather team to each ARSOA task force. This permits face-to-face weather briefings for flight crews. It also gives the flight crews access to Air Weather Service products. If the weather team is not in place, ARSOA task forces normally receive weather support from the AFSOF, the SOC, or the weather team attached to an SF group.

4-8. EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT

ARSOA TFs have no deployable switchboard or mobile subscriber equipment. They require additional state-of-the-art HF equipment and peripherals to integrate with theater command and control nets. Unless the TF is augmented, message traffic is received through a collocated unit or another supporting unit or by radio facsimile. Support from either a signal battalion, an SF group, a JCSE, the SOC or JSOTF, or other units is required to establish full communications with other theater and service headquarters (see Figure 4-1 on page 4-8).

4-9. OTHER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

ARSOA has no organic CS capability for engineer, military police, base defense, or NBC support. These support requirements must be filled by other Army units, other service support, host-nation support, or other agencies.
Figure 4-1. Notionally deployed Army SOA contingent




Figure 4-1. Notionally deployed Army SOA contingent

CHAPTER 5

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

ARSOA may be supported by one or more of the other US armed services, particularly if the operation being conducted is of a joint nature. ARSOA normally receives CSS from three sources-- theater army, the SOSB, and the contractor logistics system. In addition, the TASOSC provides ARSOA, as well as all ARSOF units that deploy into the theater, a CSS planning and coordination capability. The SOA units must notify TASOSC of any CSS requirements that are above their own organizational supply and maintenance capabilities. The TASOSC determines who provides the actual supplies, maintenance, and services; for example, the SOSB or a conventional support unit, depending on the type of mission and location. The TASOSC works for the TA commander and does not have any support capability. When ARSOA deploys into an immature theater where there is no support structure or into the flanks of a developing theater, the SOSB provides CSS. Once the theater develops, SOA will continue to receive support from the SOSB until it is relieved by conventional CSS units.

5-1. LOGISTICS CAPABILITY

a. In a developed theater, the theater sustainment base has been established. Non-ARSOA-unique, pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks are in place, HNS agreements exist, and Army support arrangements are current and operational. An undeveloped theater, on the other hand, normally does not have a significant sustainment base. PWRMS, in-theater operational stocks, and HNS agreements are minimal or nonexistent. When it deploys into an undeveloped theater, an ARSOA element must bring enough resources to operate until the TA can provide the necessary support.

b. ARSOA mission planning dictates collocation with supported units. The ARSOA commander may conduct decentralized operations by placing companies and platoons at FOB or supported Air Force SO detachments. The commander may further deploy modules to advanced operational bases to form an Army SO detachment. The ARSOA maintenance company's AVUM assets perform routine services and on-aircraft maintenance. Its AVIM assets provide one-stop maintenance and repair parts supply. Specialized airframes and advanced avionics need ARSOA-peculiar AVIM support. The ARSOA element commander plans and coordinates logistical support for the ARSOA. This support may include contractor repair of ARSOA-peculiar airframes and avionics and backup AVIM support at forward locations. It may also include intratheater airlift of ARSOA maintenance contact teams and repair parts to these locations as required. ARSOA elements can provide only the most essential services. Therefore, the collocation of ARSOA assets with other SO elements reduces the problem of ARSOA sustainment. The ARSOA element's organic support capability is discussed below.

(1) In an undeveloped theater, the ARSOA commander may arrange for contracted AVIM with the host nation or third-country military or commercial aviation facilities. He may also arrange for AVIM by an interservice agreement with the Air Force or Navy.

(2) To provide ARSOA-peculiar Class IX maintenance support for specialized airframes and avionics, ARSOA has flyaway packages that accompany deploying units.

(3) ARSOA units operate their own FARE. However, other organizations must deliver, store, distribute, and protect enough bulk POL to sustain ARSOA operations. Additional arrangements also must be made to sustain ARSOA ammunition consumption.

(4) ARSOA units have limited health service support capabilities. Companies and platoons operating independently must rely on a supported unit to provide a flight surgeon and other health service support.

(5) Field services fall into two groups--essential and nonessential. Essential services include airdrop and mortuary affairs. Nonessential services include clothing exchange and bath, laundry, and baking services. Clothing issue and repair will not be initially provided.

5-2. SPECIAL OPERATIONS SUPPORT BATTALION

a. The SOSB was established to provide the ARSOF with an in-place, dedicated, direct-support capability. It was required to meet the necessary operational criteria of OPSEC and to provide flexibility and unity of command. It provides habitual support arrangements, simplicity, and the capability to support the ARSOF-peculiar, low-density

equipment. The SOSB does not use ad hoc support relationships. It provides a deployable ARSOF support system that can deliver sustainment until theater logistical support matures or until it is properly relieved.
b. The SOSB can provide limited CSS to support all ARSOF operations. These include worldwide ARSOA throughout the operational continuum for two concurrent operations (3,000 personnel for the first operation and 500 for a second.) The SOSB consists of a command structure with a coordinating staff, one headquarters and main support company, and three appropriately integrated forward support companies. Figure 5-1 shows the special operations support battalion. It can deploy rapidly in its entirety, or it can task-organize as required. Once deployed, the SOSB can provide support to multiple locations. To meet its rapid deployment mission, the SOSB has been designated as an airborne unit and is 80 percent mobile in organic vehicles. SOSB equipment and resources that are deployable on the first lift can be delivered by air transport. These resources and equipment are sized to fit into strategic deployment aircraft such as the C-141 or larger aircraft. All other equipment will be deployed by air in AMC aircraft.




Figure 5-1. Special operations support battalion

Figure 5-1. Special operations support battalion
(1) Capabilities. The SOSB simplifies the support and sustainment requirement for ARSOF. In two separate, simultaneous operations, the SOSB plans, directs, and provides supervision of direct support maintenance, supply, transportation, health services, and field services support. It also provides information and advice to the TASOSC commander and the supported ARSOF commander and staffs about support capabilities.
(a) Supply. The SOSB provides a materiel management capability for all supported ARSOF units. It operates forward distribution points for limited Class I, Class II, Class III (retail and FARP), Class V, and Class VII supplies within the area of operation.
(b) Maintenance. The SOSB provides maintenance for vehicles, weapon systems, radio systems, electronics, and SO-peculiar, low-density materiel up to the direct-support level. It also provides limited classification of materials

and limited storage. The SOSB conducts repairable exchanges and receives or issues Class IX repair parts and direct exchange items. The SOSB has no aviation-related Class IX capability.

(c) Transportation. By coordinating with TAMCA to move ARSOF personnel and materiel, the SOSB provides supported units with a movement management capability. The SOSB can also provide limited motor transport support and unload supplies and materiel from aircraft.

(d) Field services. The SOSB provides limited food service, mortuary affairs, water production and distribution, airdrop or air-delivery support, and clothing and equipment issue.

(e) Health service support. The SOSB provides Level I and limited Level II medical support. This includes advance trauma management, limited ground evacuation, and limited preventive medical support. The SOSB can also provide emergency resuscitative surgery and limited postoperative recovery and holding. The SOSB must be augmented to provide veterinary services, dental support, and humanitarian missions.

(f) Contracting. The SOSB provides local procurement using contracting officers.

(g) Engineer support. The SOSB can fabricate training facilities and targets and provide limited vertical construction.

(2) Organization. As shown in Figure 5-1. The SOSB is organized with a headquarters, a main support company, and three forward support companies. The headquarters provides the command and control function (Figure 5-2). The main support company (Figure 5-2) provides health services support, food service support, airdrop support, personnel parachute packing support, and a limited construction and combat engineering capability. It also conducts mortuary affairs and water purification. The multifunctional forward support companies can receive, store, and issue supplies; transport supplies and water; and transport troops. These companies can also manage movements and provide DS maintenance for supported ARSOF units (Figure 5-3).




Figure 5-2. Headquarters and main support company




Figure 5-3. Forward support company

Figure 5-3. Forward support company

(3) Logistics flow. Two CSS systems support deployed ARSOA units. To the extent possible, the first CSS system is provided by TA nondivisional DS and GS units through the SOSB. After coordination with DA, the theater commander determines the functional types and levels of host-nation support that can be accepted without risking the overall mission. Figure 5-4 shows the ARSOA logistics flow. The second CSS support system is based totally on the classification of the operation. This system uses a direct pipeline logistics system from the ARSOA regiment; it finds the needed part stateside and has it shipped by scheduled airlift to the user.




Figure 5-4. Logistics flow

(a) Supply. DS and AVIM units are supplied primarily through the DS system. Theater-source items that are not available from the SOSB are filled from TAMMC in-theater stocked assets. Except for Class VIII (medical) supplies, TAMMC is the principal manager for all classes of supply throughout the theater. Requests for ARSOA-unique or low-demand items are routed through the TAMMC to the NICP at Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot. The ARSOA regiment will participate in this process because it can procure ARSOA-peculiar parts.

(b) Maintenance. To the maximum extent possible, civilian specialists and technicians (US, HN, and/or third country) are used to maintain sophisticated and complex equipment. The SOSB provides DS maintenance. Aviation maintenance units will provide the needed aviation maintenance. TAACOM maintenance units that furnish support on an area basis provide maintenance, recovery, and evacuation support. Contact teams provide AVIM on an area basis.

(c) Transportation. With input from the SOSB transportation section, a wartime movements program developed by TAMCA will provide movements management for the theater. Program execution provides for the movement of supplies and equipment from support areas to forward deployed ARSOA units. Priority should be provided to ARSOA items when an aircraft becomes NMCS. Parts must be tracked through the system. Without a method to ensure its shipment from CONUS to the requesting unit, a single item can easily be lost.

APPENDIX A

RISK MANAGEMENT

Tough, realistic training conducted to standard is the cornerstone of Army warfighting skills. An intense training environment stresses both soldiers and equipment, creating a high potential for accidents. The potential for accidents increases as training realism increases. Thus realistic training can pose a serious drain on warfighting assets. Commanders must find ways to protect soldiers and equipment from accidents during realistic training to prepare for war. An accidental loss in war is no different in its effects than a combat loss; the asset is gone. Commanders must compensate for the numerical advantages of the threat by protecting their combat resources from accidental loss. How well they do this could be the decisive factor in winning or losing. Commanders and staffs can use this appendix as a guide for developing SOPs and managing risks as it applies to their organization and mission.

A-1. CONCEPT

Risk management is a tool leaders can use to make smart risk decisions in tactical operations. It allows leaders to execute more realistic training not otherwise practical because of the high probability of accidents. Risk management is a common sense way of accomplishing the mission with the least risk possible. It is a method of getting the job done by identifying the areas that present the highest risk and taking action to eliminate, reduce, or control the risk. Risk management thereby becomes a fully integrated part of mission planning and execution.

A-2. RESPONSIBILITIES

Risk management is not complex, technical, or difficult. It is a comparatively simple decision-making process--a way of thinking through a mission to balance mission demands against risks. Once understood, risk management is a way to put more realism into training without paying a price in deaths, injuries, or damaged equipment or all three. Risk management is not limited to situational training exercises. It is performed during actual combat as well as in peacetime. Leaders must learn to assess risks during training events and apply the same techniques during combat actions. During combat, risks may be taken but only after they are evaluated and weighed as they are during training.

a. Commanders. As in all other areas, commanders are responsible for the effective management of risk. To meet this responsibility, commanders--

- Seek optimum, not just adequate, performance.
- Select from risk reduction options provided by the staff.
- Accept or reject residual risk, based on the benefit to be derived.
- Train and motivate leaders at all levels to effectively use risk management concepts.

b. Staff. The staff--

- Assists the commander in assessing risks and in developing risk reduction options.
- Integrates risk controls into plans and orders.
- Eliminates unnecessary safety restrictions that diminish training effectiveness.

c. Troop Leaders. Troop leaders--

- Develop a total commitment to mission accomplishment and the welfare of subordinates.
- Consistently apply effective risk management concepts and methods to operations they lead.
- Report risk issues beyond their control or authority to their superiors for resolution.

d. Individuals. Individuals--

- Understand, accept, and implement risk reduction guidance.
- Maintain a constant awareness of the changing risks associated with the operation or mission.
- Make leaders aware immediately of any unrealistic risk reduction procedure.

A-3. INDIVIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk assessment has always been an integral part of premission planning; however, not all unit commanders have made an effort to assess the risk involved when assigning two or more individuals as members of a crew. Individual risk assessment is the first step in the three-tier approach to risk assessment. Figure A-1 shows a sample risk assessment work sheet that commanders may use to estimate the level of risk associated with an operation or a mission. Each category is assigned a risk value in the computation box; for example, crew endurance, total time, and time in the mission AO.

A-4. CREW RISK ASSESSMENT

After the individual risk assessment is completed, the next step is to assess the risk associated with the crew. Crew risk assessment is based on whether the crew is battle-rostered and, if so, how long it has been since they have flown together. In Figure A-1, each category is assigned a risk value in the computation box; for example, mission, flight mode, and adjustments.

1. SUPERVISION (RISK VALUE: MISSION)

C²	Admin	Tactical Day/Night	
Parent unit	1	1	2
Attached	2	3	4

2. PLANNING (RISK VALUE: TIME)

Guidance	In-Depth	Adequate	Minimal
Vague	3	4	5
Implied	2	3	4
Specific	1	2	3

3. CREW SEL: PC (RISK VALUE: FLT HR)

Time in Msn AO	Total Time >2000	<2000	<1000	<500
<25 hr	3	4	5	6
<50 hr	2	3	4	5
>50 hr	1	2	3	4

4. CREW SEL: PI (RISK VALUE: FLT HR)

Time in Msn AO	Total Time >2000	<2000	<1000	<500
<25 hr	3	4	5	6
<50 hr	2	3	4	5
>50 hr	1	2	3	4

5. CREW SEL: ADD* (RISK VALUE: FLT HR)

Time in Msn AO	Total Time >2000	<2000	<1000	<500
<25 hr	3	4	5	6
<50 hr	2	3	4	5
>50 hr	1	2	3	4

6. BATTLE-ROSTERED CREW

No, not battle-rostered	+2
Yes, battle-rostered	0
Yes, battle-rostered and have flown together within the last 30 days	-1

7. BATTLE-ROSTERED FLIGHT (RISK VALUE: FLT HR)

Time in Msn AO	Total Battle-Rostered Hr >50	<50	<25
<25 hr	-2	-1	0
<50 hr	-3	-2	-1
>50 hr	-4	-3	-2

8. CREW ENDURANCE (RISK VALUE: CREW REST)

Quality of Rest	>8 Hr	6-8 Hr	<6 Hr
Field	2	6	10
Garrison	1	4	10

Add 2 for missions flown during the last half of the duty day.

9. COMPLEXITY (RISK VALUE: CONDITIONS)

Type of Mission	VMC D	VMC N	NVG	IMC Hood
Multiship	2	6	4	NA
Sling load	2	3	5	NA
STABO/rappel	1	2	4	NA
Terrain flt	1	3	2	NA
Paradrop	2	2	NA	NA
Routine	1	2	2	3
NOE	2	8	4	NA
Maint test flt	3	5	NA	NA
Maint recovery	3	5	NA	NA

10. WEATHER (RISK VALUE: CEILING/ VISIBILITY)**

	<1000/3	<700/2	<500/1	>1000/3
D	3	4	6	1
N	4	6	10	2
NVG	3	4	8	1

11. ADDITIONAL RISK FACTORS (D/N)

NOTES:
*Indicates additional crew members.
**Ceiling values are given in feet; visibility, in miles.

Figure A-1. Sample format of a risk assessment work sheet

A-5. COLLECTIVE/UNIT TRAINING RISK ASSESSMENT

a. Assessing the collective/unit training risk is the final step in the three-tier approach to risk assessment. Before a major STX or CTC rotation, the commander must assess the current tactical training status of the unit. At D-120 days, the commander must determine the projected training requirements. He then develops a training strategy and focuses resources for the training event.

b. At D-30 days, the commander will conduct a final evaluation of the training status. The aviation unit commander must coordinate with the supported ground force commander to finalize the mission requirements. Commanders must avoid a "can do" attitude that may cause them to accept unrealistic requirements. The ground force commander must be part of the risk management process. He must be advised of any nonstandard procedures that will be used during the training exercise and be willing to accept the associated level of risk.

A-6. RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

a. Step 1: Identify Risks. Identify major events of the operational sequence and list them chronologically; then, if necessary, display them in a flow chart. This process will aid in the detection of specific risks associated with all specified and implied tasks. Safety can be built into an operation by first seeing the operation in its entirety. Operations invariably can be broken down into a series of phases, each with special characteristics and considerations. As soon as the commander states the mission and concept, it is usually possible to define the key events. Operations also have a time factor-- a beginning-to-ending series of events in which the timing of events is often as significant as the events themselves. The operations analysis is a useful tool in quickly defining the flow and time sequencing of events in an operation. The objective is to reflect the total operation from the preparatory actions until the operation is completed or the next phase of operations is under way. The operations analysis is a simple but highly effective tool. It ensures that risk is evaluated in every aspect of the operation. Operations safety techniques are effective to a point, but they do not detect risk with the reliability required to achieve the degree of safety needed in today's Army.

b. Step 2: Assess Risks. Determine the magnitude of risks by estimating loss probability and cost. Assess each event, determine whether it is routine, and make an initial risk assessment. Ensure that standards for routine events are adequate to provide an acceptable level of risk.

(1) Consider the value of a risk matrix or decision guide for all or part of the operation. Risk matrices provide a quick and ready method of breaking down an operation into its major operational aspects and eliminating or controlling the risks associated with it. Like other risk assessment tools, risk matrices can be used alone or with other risk analysis techniques to provide a quick overview of the risk situation. Risk matrices are simple enough to be routinely used by tactical leaders in operational planning. These matrices are nearly always more effective than intuitive methods in identifying the extent of risk. When using risk matrices, the risk assessor should--

- Review each situation to ensure that all significant areas of concern are evaluated, even if they are not included in the matrices.
- Use the matrices to analyze the risk and target areas of concern for risk-reducing action.
- Review the individual areas of concern before recommending an option. (If an area of concern is off the scale in a particular situation, a higher decision level may be required than the risk gauge suggests.)

NOTE: Figure A-1 **is a sample format and provides arbitrary weighted factors. Commanders must modify these factors to fit particular missions and units.**

(2) Consider using the METT-T format as another means to assess risks. Leaders can subjectively determine the likelihood and extent of accidental loss based on this type of analysis. When using the METT-T format, the risk assessor should--

- Determine mission complexity and difficulty.
- Assess the enemy situation and identify specific hazards.
- Consider all aspects of the terrain as well as weather and visibility.
- Determine the supervision required and evaluate the experience, training, morale, and endurance of troops. (The risk assessor should also determine the availability of equipment.)
- Determine the time available for planning and executing the mission.

c. Step 3: Make Decisions and Develop Controls. Make risk acceptance decisions by balancing risk benefits against risk assessments. Eliminate unnecessary risks. Reduce the magnitude of mission-essential risks by applying controls. Controls range from hazard awareness to detailed operational procedures. Focus on high-hazard events and events not covered by a good set of standards. Complete a preliminary hazard analysis of these events. The preliminary hazard analysis is the initial examination of the hazards of an operation and their implications. It is normally based on the mission analysis and data-base review and takes place before the details of an operation have been completely defined. The objective of the preliminary hazard analysis is to define, at the earliest possible point in the operational life cycle, the hazards that can be expected. Doing this early means that these hazards can be addressed when they are still preliminary; that is, when the operation is still being planned.

(1) Based on the preliminary risk analysis and products of analytical aids, develop a roster of options for eliminating or controlling the risks. Select or offer options for command decision. Once risks are identified and measured as accurately as possible, the leader must act to **eliminate** or **control** them. These controls must not unnecessarily interfere with training objectives. The best options often come from reviewing the doctrinal publications relevant to the operation to glean information about the proper procedures for hazard control. Merely reviewing the analysis and assessment will often suggest options. Some options will be more effective than others. AR 385-10 provides a convenient list of actions that commanders can use as an aid in ranking options. In order of priority, commanders should--

- Eliminate the hazard totally, if possible. (Engineer out the hazard or design equipment to eliminate the hazard or incorporate fail-safe devices.)
- Guard or control the hazard. (Use automatic monitoring or alarming devices. Provide containment or barriers.)
- Change operational procedures to limit exposure (number and duration) consistent with mission needs.
- Train and educate personnel in hazard recognition and avoidance.
- Provide protective clothing or equipment that will minimize injury and damage potential.
- Use color coding and signs to alert personnel to hazards and motivate personnel to use hazard avoidance actions.

(2) Leaders can detect and eliminate unnecessary safety restrictions that impede the realism or effectiveness of training. With proper controls, these restrictions can be eliminated or scaled back. Check for residual effects before implementing risk reduction options. Visualize what will happen once the option has been implemented. Sometimes reducing one risk will only introduce others.

d. Step 4: Implement Controls. Integrate specific controls into plans, OPORDs, SOPs, training performance standards, and rehearsals. Knowledge of risk controls, down to the individual soldier, is essential for the successful implementation and execution of these controls.

e. Step 5: Supervise. Determine the effectiveness of standards in controlling risk. The commander must enforce controls and standards. This is key to loss control. The commander may have approved a number of risk reduction procedures, but approval does not mean that the procedures are carried out. Leaders must monitor the situation to ensure that action is actually taken. The prudent leader then follows up to see that the doers understand and accept the guidance. Leaders should also monitor the effect of risk reduction procedures to verify that they really are good ideas. This is especially true for new and untested procedures.

(1) Leaders must always monitor the operational activities of subordinate elements. Only by seeing the character of operations can leaders fully appreciate risk implications. When monitoring operational activities, leaders should--

- Avoid administrative intrusions and not get in the way.
- Go where the risks are and spend time at the heart of the action.
- Analyze and think through issues, not just watch.
- Work with key personnel to improve operational procedures after the action and not hesitate to address imminent danger issues on the spot.
- Fix systemic problems that are hindering field effectiveness.

(2) Leaders must be able to balance the cost of the risk involved with the value of the outcome desired in an operation. They must consider and manage risks in making decisions. The three general rules listed below apply when leaders select a tactical procedure.

(a) No unnecessary risk should ever be accepted. The leader who has the authority to accept or reject a risk is responsible for protecting his soldiers from unnecessary risks. If a risk can be eliminated or reduced and the mission still be accomplished, the risk is unnecessary and must not be accepted.

(b) Risk decisions must be made at the appropriate level. The leader who will answer for an accident is the person who should make the decision to accept or reject the risk. In some cases, this will be a senior officer. In other cases, it will be the first-line leader. Small-unit commanders and firstline leaders are going to make risk decisions in combat. Therefore, they should learn to make risk decisions in training.

(c) The benefits of taking a risk must outweigh the possible cost of the risk. Leaders must understand the risk involved and have a clear picture of the benefits to be gained from taking the calculated risk.

APPENDIX B

OPERATIONS ORDERS AND AIRCREW MISSION BRIEFINGS AND DEBRIEFINGS

This appendix provides procedures and suggested formats that can be used to standardize operations orders and aircrew mission briefings and debriefings for ARSOA elements.

B-1. FUNDAMENTALS

a. The aircrew mission briefing will be presented in the standard five-paragraph OPORD format with an additional sixth paragraph on safety. To allow enough time for the aircrew to prepare individual navigation cards and maps, aircrew mission briefings will be presented before the scheduled takeoff time. A representative from the ground SOF unit should be present. A final briefing will be conducted before departure to update the weather conditions and time hack and to make any changes. Each company will hold individual flight briefings and verify that the crew understands all aspects of the mission. All crews must present brief-backs.

b. A planning cell will be designated, and its members will be exempt from other duties during the planning phase. To make the most of the available time, each cell member will have clearly defined duties. Multicompany missions will require ARSOA battalion support in selected planning areas; for example, fire, medical, PZ and/or LZ, and route deconfliction support. Briefings will be supported by the appropriate diagrams and charts. All diagrams will be as close to scale as possible and constructed as accurately as possible to prevent any misconceptions. The charts and kneeboard handouts shown in Figure B-1 are considered essential materials. Mandatory items in the figure are marked with an X.

c. When possible, the commander's representative will prepare and conduct the aircrew mission briefing. No detail will be considered self-explanatory, and all phases of the operation will be briefed. Portions of the OPORD that do not apply to a given mission need not be briefed. Figure B-2 provides a suggested format for an operations order and/or aircrew mission briefing. Figure B-3 provides a suggested format for an aircrew mission debriefing. FM 101-5 provides more information on OPORD formats and content.

	CHART	KNEEBOARD
Task organization (crew assignments)	X	X
Time schedule	X	X
Departure airhead	X	X
Forward staging base/airhead	X	X
Objective and/or actions on the objective	X	X
Signal (frequency, call signs, prowords)	X	X
En route cards		X
Holding area/hide sites/transload site	X	X
Refueling/rearming area	X	X
IMC procedures		X
Bump plan/loading plan		X
Target description		X
Master map with all photos		X

Figure B-1. Charts and kneeboard handouts

Time hack.
Classification.
Roll call. (Hold all questions until the end of the briefing.)
OPORD number/name.
References (maps, publication, inventory handout material, and NOTAMs).
Time zone used throughout the OPORD.
Task organization.
Mission statement.
Mission overview/profile.

I. Situation.
  A. Enemy Forces.
    1. Weather (current and forecast).
      a. PA.
      b. DA.
      c. Temperature.
      d. Area of operations/obj area.
      e. FSB.
      f. En route.
    2. Light data.
      a. Sunrise.
      b. Sunset.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing

      c. EENT.
      d. Moonrise.
      e. Percent of moon illumination during operation.
      f. Angle of moon during operation.
      g. Moonset.
      h. BMNT.
    3. Sea data.
      a. Sea state.
      b. Water temperature.
    4. NOTAMs.
    5. Terrain (analyze area of operations and obj area).
      a. Key terrain.
      b. Decisive terrain.
      c. Avenues of approach.
        (1) Air.
        (2) Land.
        (3) Sea.
      d. Cover and concealment.
      e. Observation and fires.
      f. Hazards.
      g. Terrain's overall effect on aviation assets.
      h. Terrain's overall effect on the mission.
    6. Enemy forces.
      a. En route.
      b. LZ/obj area.
      c. Lager sites.
      d. Other areas of interest.
      e. Identification of forces.
      f. Locations.
      g. Strength.
      h. Morale.
      i. Capabilities.
        (1) Air defense.
        (2) Electronic warfare.
        (3) Tactical air and close air support.
        (4) NBC.
        (5) Attack helicopters.
        (6) Field artillery.
        (7) Mobility.
        (8) NVG capability.
        (9) Reaction forces.
        (10) Reinforcement capability.
      j. Vulnerabilities.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

k. Activities.
(1) Current.
(2) Future.
l. Command and control.
m. Service and support.
n. Probable courses of action following mission execution.

B. Friendly Forces (chart).
1. Higher headquarters.
a. Command relationship (DTG).
b. Mission.
c. Intent.
2. Ground/assault force.
a. Command relationship (DTG).
b. Mission.
c. Intent.
3. Adjacent units.
a. Location.
b. Mission.
c. Airspace coordination.

C. Attachments and Detachments (chart).
1. Command relationship (DTG).
2. Mission.
3. Location.

D. Cover Story (PAO guidance).

E. Priority Intelligence Requirments/Information Requirements.

F. EEI/EEFI.

II. Mission (who, what, when, where, why).

III. Execution.

A. Commander's Intent.
1. Ground forces commander.
2. Air mission commander.

B. Concept of the Operation.
1. Scheme of maneuver.
a. General scheme.
b. Mission profile.
c. H-hour.
d. Event- or time-driven.
e. Phasing.
f. Main effort.
2. Plan of fire support.
a. General scheme.
b. Priority of fires.
c. Target overlay.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/airerew mission briefing (continued)

d. Types of fires.
e. Preparatory.
f. Fire support coordination measures.
g. Illumination requirements.
h. Joint suppression of enemy air defense.

3. Counterair operations.
a. Assets and plans.
b. Use of ASE.
c. Passive measures.

4. Electronic warfare.
a. Collection and jamming.
b. Type of targets.
c. Priority of jamming.

5. Deception.
a. LZs, routes, and so forth.
b. Special movement and landing instructions.
c. Deception target and intent.

C. Initial Staging Base (chart/kneeboard).
1. Marshalling area procedures and control.
2. Time sequence (chart/kneeboard).
3. Route to the area.
4. Fuel requirements.
5. Special equipment.
6. Contingencies.
a. Minimum number of aircraft.
b. Aircraft abort and cross-loadig of passengers and equipment.
c. Weather abort criteria.
7. Aircraft parking plan.
8. Aircraft loading plan on CS.
9. Security plan.

D. Forward Staging Base (chart/kneeboard).
1. Location.
2. ISB time sequence chart.
3. Marshalling procedures.
a. Aircraft load plan.
b. Seat configuration and number.
c. Straps, tiedowns, and so forth, for the aircraft.
d. Doors opened or closed (UH-60).
4. Security requirements.
5. Repositioning for departure.
6. Hazards.
7. Weapon systems loading.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

8. Takeoff.
   a. Time.
   b. Heading.
   c. Formation.
   d. Airspeed.
   e. Altitude.
   f. Hazards.
   g. Turns in excess of 60 degrees.
   h. Aircraft lighting.
   i. ASE requirements.
   j. Fuel requirements.
9. CCT instructions.
   a. Communications.
   b. Signal.
10. Contingencies.
   a. Mission abort criteria (minimum aircraft).
   b. Weather abort criteria.
   c. Bump plan.

E. Flight Route.
1. Primary/alternate.
2. Checkpoints.
3. Turns in excess of 60 degrees.
4. Airspeed/groundspeed.
5. Altitudes.
6. Aircraft lighting.
7. Formation.
8. Hazards to flight.
   a. Route reconnaissance.
   b. Airspace conflicts.
9. Rally points.
10. Aerial refueling.
11. Point of no return.
12. ASE requirements.
   a. Along route.
   b. Cross-FLOT.
13. Flight linkup procedures.
   a. Location.
   b. Communications.
   c. Safety.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

14. Weapons status.
   a. Hold--fire only in self-defense.
   b. Tight--fire only if target is identified as the enemy.
   c. Free--fire at anything not identified as friendly.
15. Contingencies.
   a. Downed aircraft.
   b. Actions on enemy contact.
   c. Communications failure.
   d. Lead disorientation.
   e. Weather abort.
   f. IIMC.

F. Landing Area Procedures (LZ, PZ, holding area, FARP) (Chart).
1. Location (primary/alternate).
2. Description.
3. Hazards.
4. Arrival procedures.
   a. Time.
   b. Formation.
   c. Direction.
   d. Airspeed.
   e. ATC/CCT procedures.
   f. Aircraft lighting.
   g. Doors opened/closed (UH-60).
   h. Door gunner instructions.
   i. Signal to execute alternate LZ.
5. PZ marking and control.
6. Aircraft positioning in PZ.
   a. Engines remain running.
   b. APU only.
   c. Complete shutdown.
   d. PZ security.
7. Load plan (include troop safety considerations).
   a. Seat configuration and number.
   b. Strap configuration.
   c. Doors opened/closed (UH-60).
   d. Seat belt waiver.
8. Linkup procedures with supporting flight units.
9. Minimum fuel required to complete the mission from the PZ.
10. FARP operations.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

11. Contingencies.
    a. Lead change.
    b. AMC aircraft change.
    c. TF commander aircraft change.
    d. Tactical bump plan.
    e. Dispersal plan/rally point.
    f. Aircraft abort criteria.
    g. Weather abort criteria.
12. Time sequencing.
    a. Load.
    b. Reposition.
    c. Takeoff.
    d. TOT/H-hour.
13. Security requirements.
14. Weapons status.
15. Departure procedures (list takeoff on FSB page).

G. En route Procedures (infiltration) (same as Flight Route).

H. Target/Assault (Landing) Plan/Actions on the Objective (Chart).
1. LZ/obj location (primary/alternate).
2. TOT/H-hour or critical event that must occur before the assault.
3. Formation at RP (assault formation).
4. Direction of flight.
5. Airspeed/groundspeed.
6. Altitude.
7. Aircraft lighting.
8. Hazards in the LZ/obj.
9. LZ marking and control.
10. ATC/CCT procedures.
11. Aircraft touchdown points.
12. Type of assault.
    a. Fast rope.
    b. Air/land.
    c. Rappel.
    d. Other.
13. ASE requirements in the LZ.
14. Air defense status and coordinating instructions.
15. Weapons status.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

16. Fires.
    a. Door gunner missions (be specific).
        (1) Priorities and sectors.
        (2) Shift/hold fire instructions.
        (3) Actions taken to prevent fratricide.
    b. Target overlay.
        (1) Artillery control.
        (2) Attack helicopter control.
    c. Preplanned fires.
    d. Rules of engagement.
    e. Laser safety.
17. Contingencies.
    a. Downed aircraft.
    b. Go-around procedures.
    c. Actions on contact.
    d. Communications failure.
    e. Rally points.
    f. Friendly KIA/WIA.
    g. Signal to execute alternate LZ/obj.
18. Departure instructions.
    a. Authorization to depart.
    b. Departure plan.
        (1) Heading.
        (2) Formation.
        (3) Airspeed.
        (4) Groundspeed.
        (5) Lighting.
    c. ATC/CCT procedures.
    d. Routes (primary/alternate).
19. Follow-on instructions and safety considerations.

I. En Route Procedures (Exfiltration) (same as Flight Route).

J. FSB (Recovery Airfield).
    1. Location.
    2. Arrival procedures.
    3. Parking/teardown.
    4. Repositioning.
    5. Marshalling.
    6. Critical times.
    7. Contingencies.
        a. Friendly KIA/WIA.
        b. Aircraft abort.
        c. Weather abort.

K. Coordinating Instructions.
    1. Maps and charts.
    2. MOPP level.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

d. FRIES.
e. Cargo hooks.
f. Weapons (aircraft/individual).
4. Billeting.
5. Finance.
6. Transportation.
7. Maintenance.
    a. Location.
    b. Equipment.
    c. Support.
8. Medical evacuation.

V. Command and Signal.

A. Command.
    1. Commander's location.
    2. AMC and location.
    3. Ground forces commander and location.
    4. Task force commander and location.
    5. Flight lead.
    6. Succession of command.
    8. Rear detachment commander and location.
    9. Task force command post location.
    10. Ground forces command post location.

B. Signal.
    1. SOI period (fill).
    2. Call signs.
    3. Frequencies/net (chart).
        a. Mission command.
        b. TF command.
        c. Helicopter command/safety.
        d. Company internal.
        e. Adjacent units.
        f. Fire control.
        g. SAR.
        h. SERE/PLS.
        i. MEDEVAC.
        j. ATC/CCT.
        k. AWACS.
        l. Vectoring.
        m. HAT/HF.
    4. Execution checklist/prowords.
    5. Light signals.
    6. Challenge and password.
    7. Running password/number combination.
    8. Secure communications requirements.
    9. Transponder (modes/codes/antennas).

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

VI. Safety.
    a. Preaccident Plan.
    b. Risk Assessment.
    c. Aircraft Safety.
    d. Individual Safety.
VII. Questions.

Figure B-2. Suggested format for an OPORD/aircrew mission briefing (continued)

```
 I.  Roll Call.
II.  Classification.
III. Mission execution.
     a.  Restated mission statement.
     b.  Restated commander's intent.
     c.  Was the mission accomplished?  To standard?
         (1)  If not, which phase resulted in failure?
         (2)  Discuss the events that contributed to the
              failure.
         (3)  If the mission was accomplished to standard,
              what was the key to success?
     d.  Mission planning.
     e.  Mission briefing(s).
     f.  Rehearsals and inspections.
     g.  Actions at the FSB.
     h.  Movement to the PZ.
     i.  Staging plan (actions at the PZ).
     j.  Air movement plan.
     k.  Assault (landing) plan (actions on the obj).
         (1)  TOT.
         (2)  Execution of the assault.
         (3)  ASE use and effect.
         (4)  Friendly WIA and/or KIA and actions taken to
              cover their extraction.
         (5)  Fire support.
              (a)  Effects of organic and nonorganic direct
                   fires.
              (b)  Effects of indirect fires.
         (6)  Actions on contact.
         (7)  Communications.
         (8)  Departure from the LZ/obj.
```

Figure B-3. Suggested format for an aircrew mission debriefing

l. Egress procedures.
m. Follow-on missions.
n. FARP operations.
o. Linkup procedures.
p. Deviations from the plan.
q. Communications throughout the operation.
r. Maintenance and communications status of aircraft.
(1) During the mission.
(2) Current.

IV. Intelligence.
a. Enemy actions upon contact.
b. Enemy BDA, KIA, WIA, and PW.
c. ECM encountered (MIJI report submitted).
d. Detailed SAM or ADA sighting.
e. NBC activities observed?
f. Mission observed by enemy?
g. Locations of potential LZs.
h. Locations of hazards that could affect future operations.
i. EEFI protected?
j. Friendly KIA, WIA, or PW.

V. Flight lead's comments and lessons learned.

VI. Safety officer's comments and lessons learned.

VII. Aircrew's comments and lessons learned.
a. Pilots.
b. Crew chiefs and gunners.
c. Observers.
d. Maintenance and armament personnel.

VIII. Platoon leaders' and sergeants' comments and lessons learned.

IX. Assault force's comments and lessons learned.

X. CSM's and ISG's comments and lessons learned.

XI. Commander's comments and lessons learned.
a. Changes to SOP.
b. Adjustments to future plans.
c. Appointment of action officers to resolve issues.
d. Next key event.

XII. Turn-in of classified material.

XIII. Debriefings with battalion and TF staff.

Figure B-3. Suggested format for an aircrew mission debriefing (continued)

APPENDIX C

CAPABILITIES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT

This appendix discusses the capabilities and characteristics of special operations aircraft. Included are the AH-6, MH-6, MH-60, UH-60, CH-47D, and MH-47E aircraft.

C-1. AX-6 CAYUSE

The AH-6 Little Bird Gun, a light attack helicopter, has been tested and proven in combat. Armed with guns, Hellfire missiles, and 2.75-inch FFAR, it provides armed helicopter support to both ground and air special operations. The unrefueled range of the AH-6 is 250 nautical miles. Figure C-1 shows the basic characteristics and the aircraft characteristics of the AH-6.

Basic Characteristics

Capable of hot-weather, high-altitude flight.
Has lowest maintenance-to-flight-hour ratio in special operations.
Can perform multimissions.
Can be deconfigured to carry personnel.
Has low radar signature.
Equipped with forward-looking infrared.
Armed with a 7- or 19-shot 2.75" rocket launcher (high-explosive, white phosphorous, illumination, flechette, M134 7.62-mm minigun [2,000 rds], and Hellfire).
Can be configured with other armament.

Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	2,600[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank)	400
Range extension fuel in pounds (65-gal aux tank)	402
Total aircraft weight in pounds	3,402
Mission cargo weight in pounds (armament)	1,548
Maximum takeoff weight in pounds (40°C/4,000 ft)	3,950
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	240[2]
Planning ground speed KIAS	80 to 90
Average ground speed KIAS	80 to 90
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	260

[1]Includes crew, weapon systems, empty range extension tanks, tool boxes, personal gear, and so forth
[2]Average fuel burn rate based on planned ground speed

NOTE: Aircraft planning characteristics are based on high-altitude and hot-weather flight (40°C and 4,000 feet above mean sea level).

Figure C-1. Characteristics of the AH-6

C-2. MH-6 CAYUSE

The MH-6 Little Bird is the only light assault helicopter in the Army inventory. It provides assault helicopter support to special operations forces and can be armed with a combination of guns and folding fin aerial rockets. It has an unrefueled range of 250 nautical miles. Figure C-2 shows the basic characteristics and the aircraft characteristics of the MH-6.

Basic Characteristics

Capable of hot-weather, high-altitude flight.
Has lowest maintenance-to-flight-hour ratio in special operations.
Can perform multimissions.
Can be configured to carry armament.
Has a low radar signature.
Capable of satellite communications.
Equipped with forward-looking infrared.
Carries four to six assault soldiers or two snipers.

Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	2,550[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank)	400
Range extension fuel in pounds (65-gal aux tank)	402
Total aircraft weight in pounds	3,352
Mission cargo weight in pounds	998
Maximum takeoff weight (40°C/4,000 ft)	3,950
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	240[2]
Planning ground speed KIAS	80
Average ground speed KIAS	80
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	280

[1]Includes crew, weapon systems, empty range extension tanks, tool boxes, personal gear, and so forth.
[2]Average fuel burn rate based on planned ground speed.

NOTE: Aircraft planning characteristics are based on high-altitude and hot-weather flight (40°C and 4,000 feet above mean sea level).

Figure C-2. Characteristics of the MH-6

C-3. MH-60 AND UH-60 BLACKHAWKS

The MH-60 Blackhawk has been specially modified to perform special operations missions. It provides assault helicopter support to special operations forces. The MH-60 direct-action penetrator can be armed with a combination of guns, precision-guided munitions, cannons, FFAR, and other armament. Depending on the version, it can be ferried 900 nautical miles unrefueled. The MH-60 Blackhawk has been tested in combat. During Operation Desert Storm, the Blackhawk was used to infiltrate SOF into Iraq. Because of its range and unique night flight and navigation capabilities, it is used to conduct CSAR for downed pilots. The three versions of the MH-60 are the MH-60 DAP, which has been modified for attack operations; the MH-60L; and the MH-60K assault aircraft. When the MH-60K is fully fielded, only the L and K models will be used in special operations. Figure C-3 shows the basic characteristics and the aircraft characteristics of the MH-60 and the UH-60 Blackhawks.

Basic Characteristics

Capable of hot-weather, high-altitude flight
Has lowest maintenance to flight-hour ratio in special operations
Can perform multimissions
Can be deconfigured to carry personnel
Capable of satellite communications
Equipped with forward-looking infrared
Equipped with a rescue hoist
Equipped with the M134 7.62-mm minigun
Has a command and control console (limited number of aircraft)
Equipped with fast rope bars
Equipped with precision navigation (global positioning system, inertial navigation system, doppler, attitude and heading reference system, and forward-looking infrared)
Carries up to 16 combat troops, depending on the range

UH-60 Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	13,262[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank and two Robertsons)	4,066
Range extension fuel in pounds	1,820
Total aircraft weight in pounds	19,214
Mission cargo weight in pounds	2,000[2]
Maximum takeoff weight in pounds (40°C/4,000 ft)	21,214
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	904
Planning ground speed KIAS	120
Average ground speed KIAS	130
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	358
Maximum wartime exfiltration radius in nautical miles	442

Figure C-3. Characteristics of the UH-60, MH-60K, and MH-60L

MH-60K Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	15,234[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank and two Robertsons)	4,410
Range extension fuel in pounds	1,490
Total aircraft weight in pounds	23,198
Mission cargo weight in pounds	2,000[2]
Maximum takeoff weight in pounds (40°C/4,000 ft)	24,500
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	1,092
Planning ground speed KIAS	120
Average ground speed KIAS	140
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	286
Maximum wartime exfiltration radius in nautical miles	367

MH-60L Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	12,178[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank and two Robertsons)	4,310
Range extension fuel in pounds	566
Total aircraft weight in pounds	18,053
Mission cargo weight in pounds	2,447[2]
Maximum takeoff weight in pounds (40°C/4,000 ft)	20,500
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	1,056[3]
Planning ground speed KIAS	120
Average ground speed KIAS	127
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	256[4]
Maximum wartime exfiltration radius in nautical miles	371[4]

[1]Includes crew, weapon systems, empty range extension tanks, tool boxes, personal gear, and so forth
[2]Includes six combat troops with 125-pound ruck sacks and equipment (maximum 2,000 pounds)
[3]Average fuel burn rate based on planned ground speed.
[4]Unrefueled.

NOTE: Aircraft planning characteristics are based on high-altitude and hot-weather flight (40°C and 4,000 feet above mean sea level)

Figure C-3. Characteristics of the UH-60, MH-60K, and MH-60L (continued)

C-4. CH-47D AND MH-47E CHINOOK

The CH-47D Chinook has been specially modified to perform the special operations mission and has been tested in combat. It provides long-range penetration, medium assault helicopter support to special operations forces.

Depending on the version, it can be ferried 1,100 to 2,000 nautical miles unrefueled. During Operation Just Cause, CH-47s conducted H-hour assaults to support other ARSOA elements who were air-landing SOF to disrupt enemy responses and seize key facilities. During Operation Desert Storm, the CH-47 conducted infiltration and exfiltration of SOF and CSAR of downed pilots. The three versions of the CH-47 in the Army inventory are the CH-47D, the MH-47D, and the MH-47E. The MH-47D and the MH-47E are air refuelable. Figure C-4 shows the basic and the aircraft characteristics of the CH-47 and the MH-47.

Basic Characteristics

Capable of hot-weather, high-altitude flight.
Can perform multimissions
Can be deconfigured to carry personnel.
Capable of dual satellite communications.
Equipped with forward-looking infrared
Equipped with a rescue hoist.
Equipped with M134 7.62-mm miniguns (door guns).
Has an onboard oxygen generation system.
Equipped with fast rope bars
Equipped with precision navigation (global positioning system, inertial navigation system, doppler, altitude and heading reference system, and forward-looking infrared).
Carries up to 50 combat troops (with a seat waiver).

CH-47D Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	28,855[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank and two aux tanks)	6,882
Range extension fuel in pounds	8,360
Total aircraft weight in pounds	45,450
Mission cargo weight in pounds	4,000[2]
Maximum takeoff weight in pounds (40°C/4,000 ft)	46,211
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	2,244[3]
Planning ground speed KIAS	120
Average ground speed KIAS	120
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	300[4]
Maximum wartime exfiltration radius in nautical miles	390[5]

Figure C-4. Characteristics of the CH-47 and the MH-47

MH-47E Aircraft Characteristics

Operating mission weight in pounds (less fuel)	30,196[1]
Basic fuel weight in pounds (main tank)	12,942
Range extension fuel in pounds (aux tank)	6,810
Total aircraft weight in pounds	50,000
Mission cargo weight in pounds	4,000[2]
Maximum takeoff weight in pounds (40°C/4,000 ft)	54,000
Average fuel burn rate in pounds per hour	2,641[3]
Planning ground speed KIAS	120
Average ground speed KIAS	140
Maximum wartime infiltration radius in nautical miles	415
Maximum wartime exfiltration radius in nautical miles	492

[1]Includes crew, weapon systems, empty range extension tanks, tools, personal equipment, and so forth.
[2]Includes 12 combat troops with 125-pound ruck sacks and equipment (maximum 4,000 pounds).
[3]Average fuel burn rate based on planned ground speed.
[4]Unrefueled.

NOTE: Aircraft planning characteristics are based on high-altitude and hot-weather flight (40°C and 4,000 feet above mean sea level).

Figure C-4. Characteristics of the CH-47 and the MH-47 (continued)

APPENDIX D

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER

This appendix provides guidance for preparing a special operations mission planning folder. Items discussed are the mission tasking letter, mission tasking package, feasibility assessment, initial assessment, target intelligence package, and direct action and special reconnaissance missions. Also discussed are the target intelligence package, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare missions, SOF plan of execution, and plan of execution for infiltrations and exfiltrations.

D-1. MISSION TASKING LETTER

The JFSOCC assigns missions to SOF commanders on the basis of the joint targeting process described in Chapter 3 of this publication and Joint Publication 3-05.5. Along with the commander who is responsible for executing the mission, the JFSOCC selects a joint special operations area. Missions may range from a specified task to a broad, continuing mission order. Figure D-1 shows the sample format for a mission tasking letter.

Addressees
1. ( ) References.
2. ( ) General.
    a. ( ) JFSOCC's concept for employment of the ARSOATF (deployment, employment, and sustainment).
    b. ( ) JFSOCC's contingency missions assigned the ASOATF.
    c. ( ) US military strategic objectives.
    d. ( ) Variables that complicate the attainment of strategic objectives.
    e. ( ) JFC's campaign plan points that accommodate the variables.
    f. ( ) Preparation and priorities for unplanned contingencies.
3. ( ) JFSOCC's concept of operations.
    a. ( ) Location and mission of the JFSOCC.
    b. ( ) ASOATF mission.

Figure D-1. Sample format for a mission tasking letter

4. ( ) Specific mission guidance.
   a. ( ) Force operating locations.
   b. ( ) Readiness standards (deployment time and time to commence operations expressed in N+).
   c. ( ) Specified operations tasks.
   d. ( ) Specified planning and preparation tasks.
   e. ( ) Specified area and mission orientation.
5. ( ) Sustainment.
6. ( ) Command and control.
7. ( ) Other responsibilities.

Figure D-1. Sample format for a mission tasking letter (continued)

D-2. MISSION TASKING PACKAGE

Each mission tasking package consists of a mission tasking letter and the transmittal documents. Figure D-2 shows the items included in the mission tasking package.

Mission Tasking Letter and Transmittal Documents

JFSOCC tasking.
Subordinate tasking from the JFSOCC.
Coordinating instructions.
Direct liaison authorized (yes or no).

Target Identification Data

A. Name.
B. Basic encyclopedia (BE) number.
C. Mission number (if applicable).
D. Mission tasks.
E. Functional classification code.
F. Country.
G. JSOA coordinates (GEOREF and UTM).
H. Geographic coordinates (GEOREF and UTM).
I. General description and target significance.

CINC Mission Guidance (Combatant Commander's Mission Statement and Objectives)

A. Mission statement.
B. Specific targeting objective.
C. Commander's guidance.
D. Command and control.

Section IV. Record of Changes

Section V. Record of Distribution

Figure D-2. Sample format for a mission tasking package

D-3. FEASIBILITY ASSESSMENT

The feasibility assessment is a basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for SOF employment. Normally, the feasibility assessment is associated with the SOF ground element. When an ASOATF is given a unilateral mission to conduct a DA or an SR mission, the feasibility

assessment should be used for target analysis. It should include an initial assessment as shown in paragraph D-4.

Section I. Mission Description

A. Target identification data (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, and map sheets).
B. Mission statement and commander's guidance.

Section II. Commander's Assessment

A. Target feasibility.
B. Probability of mission success.
C. Recommendation.

Section III. Assumptions

Section IV. Factors Affecting Courses of Action

A. Characteristics of the joint special operations area.
   1. Weather.
   2. Terrain.
   3. Other factors.
B. Friendly situation.
C. Enemy situation.
   1. Composition.
   2. Disposition.
   3. Strength.
      a. Committed forces.
      b. Location of reinforcements and estimated reaction times.
      c. Nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.
   4. Significant enemy activity, intelligence, and counterintelligence capabilities.
   5. Peculiarities and weaknesses.
   6. Vulnerability to deception.
   7. Enemy capabilities.
      a. Defensive.
      b. Offensive.
      c. Intelligence and counterintelligence.

Figure D-3. Sample format for a feasibility assessment

8. Reaction and reinforcement.
9. Security on target.

Section V. Courses of Action

A. Identify COAs.
B. Analyze COAs.
C. Compare COAs.
   1. Advantages.
   2. Disadvantages.
   3. Risks.
D. Recommended COA.

Section VI. Intelligence Requirements

Section VII. Special Requirements

A. Personnel.
B. Logistics (including combat service support).
C. Other.

Section VIII. Indigenous Support

Figure D-3. Sample format for a feasibility assessment (continued)

Section I. Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, map sheets)

Section II. Assumptions

Section III. Mission Data

A. Launch bases, intermediate staging bases, recovery bases.
B. Landing zones, drop zones, seaward launch points, beach landing sites, recovery zones, and seaward recovery points.
C. Abort and emergency divert bases.
D. Air refueling tracks and forward arming and refueling points.
E. Flight and seaward approach routes.
   1. Ingress.
   2. Egress.
   3. Orbiting and holding.
F. Range factors.
G. Time factors.
H. Route factors.
I. Refueling factors.
J. Crew factors.
K. Weather.

Section IV. Mission Assessment

A. Threat.
   1. Air defenses.
   2. Deception of air defenses.
   3. Surface and subsurface waters.
B. Probability of team infiltration.
C. Probability of team resupply.
D. Probability of team exfiltration.
E. Overall probability of mission success.
F. Other factors.

Section V. Limiting Factors


A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Terrain and hydrography.

Figure D-4. Sample format for an initial assessment

D-4. INITIAL ASSESSMENT

The initial assessment provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed SOF mission. If the mission is to support another Army or Navy SOF mission, the initial assessment will be incorporated into the feasibility assessment as needed to help establish the overall viability of that mission. The

initial assessment will be forwarded to the MPA for review and approval before it is forwarded to the JFSOCC.



D. Equipment.
E. Monitors.
F. Tactics.
G. Logistics (including combat service support).
H. Personnel.
I. Training.
J. Supporting forces.
K. Rules of engagement and legal issues.

Section VI. Supporting Data

A. Photography and imagery requested.
B. Intelligence information requested.

Section VII. Initial Assessment Board

A. Composition.
B. Recommendation.

Section VIII. Special Operations Aviation, Surface Ship and Submarine Requirements from AFSOF, ARSOF, and NAVSOF to Conduct the Initial Assessment

A. Target coordinates.
B. Maximum and minimum distances that the LZs, DZs, SLPs, BLSs, RZs, SRPs can be from the target.
C. Time frame in OPLAN and CONPLAN scenario (pre-D-Day or D+XX).
D. Desired launch and recovery bases.
E. Type of delivery and recovery required (airdrop, airland, fast rope, SEAL delivery vehicle, or combat rubber raiding craft) and platform preferred.
F. Number of personnel to be transferred and approximate weight per person.
G. Approximate size and weight of additional equipment.
H. Assumptions made during the supported commander's FA.

NOTE: Although not always readily available, information that is on-hand will normally be enough to conduct the initial assessment. However, an effort should be made to obtain and include in the initial assessment all the information in this sample.

Figure D-4. Sample format for an initial assessment (continued)

D-5. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOR DIRECT ACTION AND SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS

Figure D-5 provides a sample format for a special operations forces target intelligence package for direct action and special reconnaissance missions.

Section I. Target Identification and Description

A. Target identification data.
B. Description and significance.
C. Detailed target description.
D. Target vulnerability assessment.

Section II. Natural Environment

A. Geographic data (including terrain and hazards to movement).
B. Meteorological data (climatological overview and tables and illumination data).
C. Hydrographic data (coastal, waterways, lakes, and luminescence).

Section III. Threat

A. Ground forces (including border guards).
B. Paramilitary and indigenous forces (including intelligence and security and police services).
C. Naval forces (including coast guard and maritime border guard).
D. Air forces.
E. Air defense forces (including radars, passive detectors, C^3).
F. Electronic order of battle.
G. Space-based assets.
H. Other.

Section IV. Demographics and Cultural Features

A. Area population characteristics.
B. Languages, dialects, and ethnic composition.
C. Social conditions.
D. Religious factors.
E. Political characteristics.
F. Economic conditions.
G. Miscellaneous (currency, holidays, dress, and customs).

Figure D-5. Sample format for a target intelligence package for direct action and special reconnaissance missions

Section V. Lines of Communication and Information Systems

A. Airfields.
B. Railways.
C. Roadways.
D. Waterways.
E. Ports.
F. POL.
G. Power grid.
H. Telecommunications and media (print, radio, and TV).

Section VI. Infiltration and Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, and HLZs)

A. List potential zones.
B. Choke points between insertion points and the objective.

Section VII. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape, and Recovery Data

A. SERER and selected area for evasion areas.
B. Survival data.

Section VIII. Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above)

Section IX. Intelligence Shortfalls

Annex A. Bibliography
Annex B. Glossary
Annex C. Imagery
Annex D. Maps and Charts
Annex E. SCI (if applicable)

Figure D-5. Sample format for a target intelligence package for direct action and special reconnaissance missions (continued)

D-6. TARGET INTELLIGENCE PACKAGE FOR FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE MISSIONS

Figure D-6 shows a sample format for a target intelligence package for foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions.

C. Roadways.
D. Waterways.
E. Ports.
F. POL.
G. Power grid.
H. Telecommunications and media (print, radio, and TV).
I. Exploitable civilian transportation.
J. Primary modes of transportation.
K. US-provided materials and services.
L. Stockpiles.
M. War-sustaining industries.
N. War-sustaining resupply.
O. Movement control centers.

Section VI. Infiltration and Exfiltration (potential LZs, DZs, BLSs, HLZs)

A. List potential.
B. Choke point between insertion points and objective country. (EEI must be answered for both the objective country and opposition and resistance forces.)

Section VII. FID and Military Assistance (EEI must be answered for both objective country and opposition and resistance forces.)

A. Military assistance provided.
B. Foreign personnel (noncombatants).
C. Foreign military materiel.
D. Deployments of foreign personnel and equipment.
E. Foreign contractors services and construction.
F. US support.

Section VIII. SERER and Survival Data

A. SERER and SAFE areas.
B. Survival data.

Section IX. Unique Intelligence (mission-specific requirements not covered above.)

Section X. Intelligence Shortfalls

Annex A. Bibliography
Annex B. Glossary
Annex C. Imagery
Annex D. Maps and Charts
Annex E. SCI (if applicable)

Figure D-6. Sample format for a target intelligence package for foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions (continued)

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Day, Month, Year, Hour
Commander's (MPA's) estimate of the situation

References (maps, charts, and other pertinent documents)

Section I. Mission Description (BE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, and map sheets)

Section II. The Situation and Courses of Action

A. Considerations affecting the courses of action.
  1. Characteristics of the joint SO area.
    a. Military geography.
      (1) Topography.
      (2) Hydrography and luminescence data.
      (3) Climate, weather, and illumination data.
    b. Transportation.
    c. Telecommunications.
    d. Politics.
    e. Economics.
    f. Sociology.
    g. Science and technology.
  2. Relative combat power.
    a. Enemy.
      (1) Strength.
      (2) Composition.
      (3) Location and disposition.
      (4) Reinforcements.
      (5) Logistics.
      (6) Time and space factors.
      (7) Combat efficiency.
    b. Friendly.
      (1) Strength.
      (2) Composition.

Figure D-7. Sample format for a plan of execution

> D-7. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PLAN OF EXECUTION

The POE is a detailed plan that shows how the SOF mission will be carried out. This plan, along with the SOA POE for infiltration and exfiltration and mission rehearsals, is the result of the targeting and mission planning process. It also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan (paragraph D-8) developed by the supporting organization. Figure D-7 shows a sample format for a plan of execution.

Issuing Headquarters
Place
Day, Month, Year, Hour
Commander's (MPA's) estimate of the situation

References (maps, charts, and other pertinent documents)

Section I. Mission Description (DE number, category code, geographic coordinates, UTM coordinates, and map sheets)

Section II. The Situation and Courses of Action

A. Considerations affecting the courses of action.
   1. Characteristics of the joint SO area.
      a. Military geography.
         (1) Topography.
         (2) Hydrography and luminescence data.
         (3) Climate, weather, and illumination data.
      b. Transportation.
      c. Telecommunications.
      d. Politics.
      e. Economics.
      f. Sociology.
      g. Science and technology.
   2. Relative combat power.
      a. Enemy.
         (1) Strength.
         (2) Composition.
         (3) Location and disposition.
         (4) Reinforcements.
         (5) Logistics.
         (6) Time and space factors.
         (7) Combat efficiency.
      b. Friendly.
         (1) Strength.
         (2) Composition.

Figure D-7. Sample format for a plan of execution

(3) Location and disposition.
(4) Reinforcements.
(5) Friendly force assistance.
(6) Logistics (including CSS).
(7) Time and space factors.
(8) Combat efficiency.

3. Assumptions.

B. Analysis of enemy capabilities.

C. Comparison of friendly COAs.
1. Statement of COAs.
2. Assessment of the probability of success.
3. Comparison of COAs.

D. Decision (recommended COA) - mission profile.
1. Method and location of infiltration.
2. Movement to target area.
3. Actions at the objective.
4. Movement to the objective and the method of exfiltration.

Section III. Supporting Plans

A. Overall schedule.
1. Preparation.
2. Rehearsal.
3. Rendezvous.
4. Transit.
5. Execution.
6. Recovery.

B. Logistics (including CHH).

C. Communications and electronics procedures and equipment operating instructions.

D. Deception.

E. Indigenous force support.

F. Time and distance charts.

G. Deployment.

H. Weaponeering.

I. Target recuperability.

J. Resupply.

K. Exfiltration.

L. SERER.

M. Command relationships.

N. PSYOP and CA.

Figure D-7. Sample format for a plan of execution (continued)

D-8. PLAN OF ACTION FOR INFILTRATIONS AND EXFILTRATIONS

The POE for infiltration and exfiltration is a detailed plan that shows exactly how the SOA will carry out the mission they are assigned. This plan, along with the supported elements' POE and mission rehearsals, is the result of the targeting and mission planning process. It includes fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, surface ships, and submarines. Figure D-8 shows a sample format for a plan of execution for infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Section IV. Limiting Factors

A. Intelligence.
B. Weather.
C. Equipment.
D. Tactics.
E. Logistics (including combat service support).
F. Personnel.
G. Training.
H. Supporting forces.
I. C^3.
J. Law of war, rules of engagement, and US law and legal issues.
K. Other factors.

(Signed)
Commander

ANNEXES: As required (by letter and title).
DISTRIBUTION: (According to policies and procedures of the issuing headquarters and at the direction of the JFSOCC.)

Figure D-7. Sample format for a plan of execution (continued)

Section I. Mission

A. Target identification data.
B. Mission statement.

Section II. Mission Summary

A. Mission tasking.
B. Objective area.
C. General concept.
D. Summary of limiting factors.
E. Probability of mission success.

Section III. Assumptions

Section IV. Threat Assessment

Section V. Navigation and Overall Mission Portrayal (This section represents the entire infiltration and exfiltration route from launch to recovery on a suitable scale chart. It shows information that the planning cell deemed necessary to portray the mission. Items listed, however, are not all-inclusive.)

A. Launch bases.
B. Intermediate staging bases.
C. Landing zones, drop zones, recovery zones, seaward launch points, beach landing sites, and seaward recovery points.
D. Recovery bases.
E. Abort and emergency diversion bases.
F. Air refueling tracks and forward arming and refueling points.
G. Routes.
    1. Ingress.
    2. Egress.
    3. Orbiting and holding.
    4. Safe passage procedures.
    5. Strip charts, navigation logs, global positioning satellite receivers, and other aids (as required).

Figure D-8. Sample format for a plan of execution for infiltrations and exfiltrations

Section VI. Supporting Plans

A. Overall schedule of events.
B. Prelaunch requirements.
   1. Updates to orders of battle.
   2. Essential elements of information.
   3. Problem areas and key factors.
C. Infiltration and exfiltration platform factors and logistical considerations.
D. Command, control, and communications.
   1. Security preparations.
   2. Departure procedures (overt or deception procedures).
   3. Communication equipment requirements.
      a. Infiltration and exfiltration platforms.
      b. SOC.
   4. Specialized operational procedures and techniques.
   5. Radio silence areas.
   6. Go/no-go point.
   7. Publication of joint SOI for air mission.
   8. Deception.
E. Emergency.
   1. Engine-out capabilities.
   2. Weather.
   3. Faulty intelligence.
   4. Infiltration and exfiltration platform abort procedures.
      a. Late departure procedures.
      b. Maintenance problems.
      c. Battle damage.
      d. Platform destruction.
      e. Bump plan.
   5. Drop or other fuel-related malfunctions.
   6. Lost communications procedures.
   7. Mission abort procedures.
F. Evasion plan of action.
   1. Crew responsibilities.
   2. Immediate actions upon sinking, ditching, or bailing out.
   3. Evasion movement.
   4. SAFE area intelligence descriptions.
   5. SAFE.
   6. Evasion team communications.
   7. SAR contact procedures.

Figure D-8. Sample format for a plan of execution for infiltrations and exfiltrations (continued)

APPENDIX E

BASING SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION IN THEATER

Deploying SOA to a theater of operations requires extensive logistical planning. It also requires that the advantages of SOA base locations be weighed against mission requirements. Once SOA forces are in theater, their employment flexibility directly relates to their aircraft maintenance requirements.

E-1. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OVERVIEW

a. Each type of aircraft has individual and different maintenance requirements. Regularly scheduled inspections, retorques, and component replacement for each aircraft differ. Scheduled maintenance for each aircraft is also different, both in terms of requirements and the time it takes to complete the maintenance.

b. The MH-60L CMS-80 aircraft requires phase maintenance every 500 flight hours. The MH-47 has a 300-hour phase maintenance requirement, and the new SOA aircraft (MH-60K and MH-47E) have more stringent requirements for component overhaul and inspection. The maintenance phase for the MH-60K and CH-47E takes longer to complete because of the increase in sophisticated onboard systems.

c. Inspections, component replacements, phase maintenance, and test flights must be accomplished if SOA forces are to continue operations. Test equipment, special tools, and aircraft maintenance facilities are required for most aircraft maintenance procedures. An overhead hoist capability and specific electrical power requirements for test sets must also be provided for some maintenance procedures. Planners must consider aircraft maintenance requirements when SOA are to be used for extended operations.

E-2. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND SERVICE SUPPORT

Command, control, communications, and service support of deployed SOA must also be considered when planning for the use of SOA. The C2 link must be maintained between the theater air mission manager and the SOA chain of command and between the deployed SOA and the logistics provider. The SOA commander is normally responsible for coordinating logistical support with the TASOC well in advance of planned operations. SOA forces bring an additional 15-day supply of Class IX repair parts into theater. Deployed SOA forces also transport into theater SOF-peculiar spares. These components must often be repaired at depot facilities in CONUS. The Army theater component commander can provide only those common items of aviation Class IX repair parts that conventional Army aviation aircraft use.

a. Port-of-Entry Requirements.

(1) Special operations aviation forces usually arrive in theater by strategic air. Air Force aircraft are normally a scarce asset when US forces are also involved in other theater operations. Consequently, SOA will tailor the force to eliminate organic nonaviation maintenance support assets needed to accomplish the mission.

(2) Equipment that can be provided by the host nation or theater Army is not included on load plans. Unit vehicles are left in CONUS, allowing space for aircraft on available airlifts. When SOA must transport unit aircraft to the theater without organic support equipment, the theater must provide certain support. Without this support, SOA may not be successful in the long-term campaign. A requirement for support is normally communicated through a statement of requirements that is transmitted to the special operations command support element.

(3) Immature theaters that require SOA assets need more strategic air support to move unit support equipment, vehicles, aircraft maintenance shops and shelters, generators, and other support equipment that theater cannot provide.

b. Airfields and Theater Airports.

(1) To take advantage of employed theater air defense and instrument flight recovery operations, SOA forces normally operate from airfield or airport locations. They also operate from airfields or airports to expedite the movement of Class IX aviation repair parts and to take advantage of bulk aviation fuel storage and aircraft security.

(2) The SOA initial staging base is normally the theater port of entry. Air Force C5 aircraft normally deliver SOA to the theater; therefore, the majority of unit equipment will require theater transportation from the POE to other staging bases/sites or base locations. Sometimes, SOA forces may arrive in theater simultaneously with the assigned missions. Follow-on support base equipment will follow and should arrive at the SOA base of operation. In this case, the SOA ISB may be located on board a naval vessel or at a remote location within the range of unit aircraft. SOA forces can operate from field locations for limited periods. In all cases, however, SOA requires--

- the necessary security forces to protect its aircraft, unit assets, personnel, aircraft maintenance facilities, operations centers, and ammunition storage sites.
- facilities to conduct specialized electrical components and systems repair.
- billeting facilities that separate aircrews that work at night from soldiers and other personnel that work during the day.
- sufficiently lighted planning areas to conduct 24-hour operations.
- an area for holding and distributing large quantities of aviation fuel.
- a suitable area for parking, securing, and protecting unit aircraft.
- a location where secret, compartmented information can be processed and stored.
- a certain amount of theater-supplied, wheeled vehicle transportation.
- intratheater transportation for follow-on moves to other locations and for resupply operations from theater area supply points to SOA base locations.

E-3. SUPPORTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Special operations aviation forces may collocate with the supported SOF unit, centrally locate close to supported SOF units, or locate to protect assets, and then move forward to an ISB to perform their mission.

a. The protection of SOA aircraft, equipment, and assets must be balanced against mission requirements. Mission coordination with the supported commander must occur in face-to-face meetings, but SOA assets do not necessarily have to be positioned with the supported commander's forces. The position of SOA forces on the battlefield must be carefully planned when multiple SOF units are to be supported with limited SOA assets.

b. Logistics, aircraft maintenance and protection, mission rehearsal, and mission coordination must all be addressed. SOA forces can operate for limited periods at forward-deployed locations, as defined by aircraft maintenance and logistical requirements. Normally, aircraft maintenance is not performed at these locations. Aircraft and crews return to maintenance bases after the mission is completed and are then pushed forward before the next mission is launched. These locations can be very austere; therefore, aircraft protection from artillery and indirect fire weapons must be carefully considered. The less time SOA aircraft remain in these locations the better. Because of limited SOA assets, aircraft are usually shared within theater when they are not being used for direct support of SOF.

E-4. THEATER TACTICAL BASING OPTIONS

a. Single Location. This option gives SOA forces the ability to provide quality maintenance to all in-theater aircraft. Basing SOA in this manner permits the consolidation of all aircraft maintenance efforts and lessens command and control problems. In addition, communications networks and 24-hour work schedules are easier to maintain and pressure on personnel and equipment is reduced. Placing all theater SOA in one location is ideal when only one SOF element or unit must be supported. This is the best solution for SOA support in theater. Ideally, this location would also be the POE and have hangars, security, and operational facilities centrally located on the airfield.

b. Intermediate Staging Base at the POE (Base Location) and Multiple Forward Operating Bases.

(1) This option will require SOA forces to rotate aircraft between the FOB and the ISB or wherever base maintenance is positioned. Aircraft services, complex inspections, component overhauls, and modifications must be performed at the base maintenance location. Battle damage repairs and scheduled maintenance (phase maintenance) also must be performed at the base maintenance location. Depending on aircraft status and scheduled maintenance requirements, units may operate for a time at FOB locations. SOA aircraft have major component changes more frequently than conventional Army aircraft. Component overhauls are best performed at the base maintenance location; however, with considerably more effort, they can be performed at FOB locations. Depending on the expected duration of the operation, aircraft maintenance records are secured at the base maintenance location or at CONUS.

(2) When SOA forces are based at multiple forward locations, communications assets can be stretched to the maximum. Under these conditions, backup communications may not be possible in some FOB locations. SOA battalions can normally operate at one base location (ISB) and two FOB locations for limited periods. Aircraft may be pushed forward from the FOB to perform missions (launches) at staging bases, but they will not deploy with maintenance assets. These aircraft must return to the FOB after the mission is completed. Figure E-1 shows the relationship of special forces operational bases to the JSOA and the basing of aircraft in theater. Figure E-2 shows special operations base sites in support of SF operations.





Figure E-1. Aircraft basing in theater (relationship of SF operational bases to JSOA)



E-2. Special operations aviation base sites (in support of SF operations)

GLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABCCC

airborne battlefield command and control center

ACC

air component commander

acft

aircraft

ACL

aircraft combat load

ACP

aerial checkpoint

AD

air defense

add

additional

admin

administrative

ADA

air defense artillery

AF

Air Force

AFSOC

Air Force special operations command

AFSOD

Air Force special operations detachment

AFSOF

Air Force special operations forces

AH

attack helicopter

AHRS

altitude and heading reference system

AL

Alabama

ALOC

air lines of communications

ALSE

aviation life support equipment

AMB

air mission briefing

AMC

air mission commander

ANGLICO

air and naval gunfire liaison company

AO

aeroscout observer

AOB

advanced operational base

AOR

area of responsibility

APU

auxiliary power unit

ARNG

Army national guard

ARSOA

Army special operations aviation

ARSOATF

Army special operations aviation task force

ARSOC

Army Special Operations Command

ARSOF

Army special operations force

ARSOTF

Army special operations task force

ASE

aircraft survivability equipment

ASG

area support group

ASI

additional skill identifier

ASOC

air support operations center

ASP

ammunition supply point

ATACMS

Army tactical missile system

ATC

air traffic control

ATO

air tasking order

Attn

attention

aux

auxiliary

AVIM

aviation intermediate maintenance

avn

aviation

AVUM

aviation unit maintenance

AWACS

airborne warning and control system

BCe

battlefield coordination element

BDA

battle damage assessment

BE

basic encyclopedia

BLS

basic landing site

bn

battalion

C^2

command and control

C^3

command, control, and communications

C^4I

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence

C

Centigray

CA

civil affairs

CAFMS

computer assisted force management system

CAP

combat air patrol

CAS

close air support

CCT

combat control team

CH

cargo helicopter

CI

counterintelligence

CINC

Commander in Chief

CJCS

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CLS

contracted logistical support

cmd

command

co

company

COA

course of action

COB

command operating budget

COCOM

combatant command (command authority)

commo

communications

CONPLAN

concept plan

CONUS

continental United States

CP

command post

CS

combat support

CSAR

combat search and rescue

CSM

Command Sergeant Major

CSS

combat service support

CT

counterterrorism

CTC

combined training center

DA

direct action; Department of the Army

DAP

direct-action penetrator

DTG

date-time group

det

detachment

DCS

defense communication system

DOD

Department of Defense

D/N

day/night

DS

direct support

DZ

drop zone

E&E

evasion and escape

EAC

echelons above corps

ECM

electronic counter measures

EEFI

electronic elements of friendly information

EEI

essential elements of information

elect

electronic

ELT

emergency locator transmitter

engr

engineer

ESM

electronic warfare support measures

EW

electronic warfare

exfil

exfiltration

FA

feasibility assessment

FARE

forward area refuel equipment

FARP

forward arming and refueling point

FEBA

forward edge of the battle area

FFAR

folding fin aerial rocket

FID

foreign internal defense

FLIR

forward looking infrared

FLOT

forward line of own troops

FLQ

flight lead qualified

flt

flight

FM

frequency modulated; field manual

FMQ

fully mission qualified

FOB

forward operational base

FORSCOM

US Army Forces Command

FRIES

fast rope insertion and extraction system

FSB

forward staging base

FSC

forward support company

FSCL

fire support coordination line

FSE

fire support elemen

ft

feet

FW

fixed wing

G3

Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and Plans)

gal

gallon

GEOREF

World Geographic Reference

GPS

global position system

GS

general support

HA

humanitarian assistance

HE

high explosive

HF

high frequency

HHC

headquarters and headquarters company

HLZ

helicopter landing zone

HMS

headquarters main support

HN

host nation

HNS

host-nation support company

hr

hour

HQ

headquarters

IA

initial assessment

ID

identification

IEW

intelligence and electronic warfare

IFF

identification, friend or foe

IMC

instrument meteorological conditions

infil

infiltration

intel

intelligence

IR

intelligence requirement/infrared

ISB

intermediate staging base

ISOPREP

isolation preparation

J2

joint staff (intelligence)

J3

joint staff (operations)

J-SEAD

joint suppression of enemy air defenses

JAAT

joint air attack team

JCSE

joint communications support element

JFC

joint force commander

JFSOCC

joint force special operations component commander

JSOA

joint special operations area

JSOACC

joint force special operations air component commander

JSOC

joint special operations command

JSOTF

joint special operations task force

JTCB

joint targeting coordination board

JTF

joint task force

JTTP

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

kHz

kilohertz

KIA

killed in action

KIAS

knots indicated airspeed

LCC

land component commander

LO

liaison officer

log

logistics

LZ

landing zone

maint

maintenance

mat

materiel

MC

multichannel

med

medical

MEDEVAC

medical evacuation

METT-T

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available

mgt

management

MH

mission helicopter

mHz

megahertz

MICON

mission concept

MIJI

meaconing, intrusion jamming, and interference

mm

millimeter

MMC

materiel management center

MOB

main operating base

MOPP

mission oriented protective posture

mov

movement

MPA

mission planning agent

msn

mission

MTL

mission tasking letter

MTP

mission tasking package

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVSOF

Naval special operations forces

NBC

nuclear, biological, chemical, warfare

NCA

National Command Authorities

NICP

national inventory control point

NOE

nap-of-the-earth

NMCS

nonmission capable supply

NSWTG

naval special warfare task group

NVG

night vision goggles

obj

objective

OCONUS

outside continental United States

ODA

operational detachment alpha

OPCON

operational control

OPLAN

operation plan

OPORD

operation order

ops

operations

OPSEC

operations security

PAO

public affairs officer

PC

pilot in command

pers

personnel

PI

pilot

PIR

priority intelligence report

PLL

prescribed load list

PLS

personnel locator system

plt

platoon

POE

plan of execution

POL

petroleum, oils, lubricants

POM

program objective memorandum

PSYOP

psychological operations

pub

publication

PW

prisoner of war

PWRMS

pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks

PZ

pickup zone

QRF

quick reaction force

rd

round

recov

recovery

REMAB

remote marshalling base

ROE

rules of engagement

RP

release point

RW

rotary wing

RZ

recovery zones

S&T

selection and training

S1

Adjutant (US Army)

S2

Intelligence and Training Officer (US Army)

S3

Operations and Training Officer (US Army)

S4

Supply Officer (US Army)

SA

security assistance

SAFE

selected areas for evasion

SAM

surface-to-air missile

SAR

search and rescue

SAT

surface antenna terminal

SATCOM

satellite communications

SCI

sensitive compartmented information

SCIF

sensitive (special) compartmented information facility

SEAD

suppression of enemy air defenses

SEAL

sea-air-land

sec

section

sel

selected

sep

separate

SERE

survival, evasion, resistance, and escape

SERER

survival, evasion, resistance, escape, recovery

SF

special forces

SFG

special forces group

SFOB

special forces operation (or operational) base

SFOD

special forces operational detachments

SHF

super high frequency

SIMO

systems integration and maintenance office

SLOC

sea line of communication

SLP

seaward launch point

SO

special operations

SOA

special operations aviation

SOAR

special operation aviation regiment

SOATC

special operations aviation training company

SOC

special operations command

SOCRATES

Special Operations Command Research, Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System

SOF

special operations forces

SOI

signal operation instructions

SOMPF

special operations mission planning folder

SOP

standard operating procedures

SOSB

special operations support battalion

SOWT

special operations weather team

spt

support

SR

special reconnaissance

SRP

seaward recovery point

STABO

stability operation

strat

strategic

STT

special tactics team

STX

situational training exercise

sup

supply

svc

services

TA

theater army

TAACOM

theater army area command

TACAIR

tactical air support

TACC

tactical air control center

TACS

tactical air control system

TAF

tactical air forces

TAG

target assessment group

TAMCA

theater Army movement control agency

TAMMC

theater Army material management center

TASOC

theater Army special operations commander

TASOSC

theater Army special operations support command

TDH

time, distance, and heading

temp

temporary

TF

task force

TIP

target intelligence packet

TNF

theater naval force

TOT

time on target

TRADOC

(United States Army) Training and Doctrine Command

trans

transportation

TV

television

UH

utility helicopter

UHF

ultra high frequency

UNAAF

Unified Action Armed Forces

US

United States

USAF

United States Air Force

USASOC

US Army Special Operations Command

USSOCOM

US Special Operations Command

UTM

universal transverse mercator

UW

unconventional warfare

VHF

very high frequency

VLF

very low frequency

WIA

wounded in action

Section II. Terms

adaptive targeting and mission planning

- Targeting and mission planning methods required when circumstances prevent any command echelon from executing the deliberate targeting and mission planning cycle. (Joint Pub 3-05)

Air Force Special operations Command

- The Air Force Special Operations Component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force (also called AFSOC). (Joint Pub 3-05)

Air Force Special Operations Forces

- Those Active and Reserve component Air Force forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. (Joint Pub 3-05)

Army Special Operations Command

- The Army special operations component of a unified or subordinate unified command or joint special operations task force (also called ARSOC). (Joint Pub 3-05)

Army Special Operations Forces

- Those Active and Reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also, those Active and Reserve component Army forces designated by the Secretary of the Army that can support and sustain SOF (also called ARSOF). (Joint Pub 3-05)

clandestine operation

- Activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments and agencies in a way that assures secrecy and concealment. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine. It may focus on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (Joint Pub 3-05.3)

combatant command (command authority)

- Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10, United States Code, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant command (command authority) is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces. These functions involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. This authority is normally exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions (also called COCOM). (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant commander

- A commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President of the United States. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat search and rescue

- A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations (also called CSAR). (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterterrorism

- Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism (also called CT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

covert operations

- Operations that are planned and executed to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine. (Joint Pub 3-05.3)

deception

- Measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence which induces it to react in a manner prejudicial to its interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deliberate targeting and mission planning

- Targeting and mission planning methods used when circumstances permit execution of the deliberate targeting and mission planning cycle (normal routine for targeting and mission planning). (Joint Pub 3-05)

direct action mission

- In special operations, a specified act involving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine, or low visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power's special operations forces in hostile or denied areas (also called DA). (Joint Pub 1-02)

doppler

- A navigation system that works by sending four radar beams of constant wave energy (8800 mHz) from the aircraft to the ground and measuring the changes in the frequency of the energy returned to the aircraft. The system is completely contained within the aircraft and requires no external signal. It provides aircraft position information with respect to a particular reference point and the selected course.

drop zone

- A specific area upon which airborne troops, equipment, or supplies are airdropped (also called DZ). (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information

- Critical items of information about the enemy and the environment that the commander needs by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence to help him reach a logical decision (also called EEI). (Joint Pub 1-02)

evasion and escape

- The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals can emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

exfiltration

- The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fast rope

- Commercially developed polyester rope (2.5 inches in diameter) used with the FRIES.

fast rope bars

- The stationary fixture in the FRIES to which the fast rope is attached. When all personnel are safely on the ground, the fast rope can be released from the fast rope bar.

fast rope insertion and extraction system

- An insertion and extraction system that is suspended below helicopters for inserting and extracting SO forces. The system consists of the fast rope and fast rope bar. Using the fast rope technique, the individual slides freely down the rope. During rapelling operations, the rate of descent is controlled with a harness.

feasibility assessment

- A basic target analysis that provides an initial determination of the viability of a proposed target for SOF employment (also called FA). (Joint Pub 3-05)

foreign internal defense

- Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the other government action programs designed to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (also called FID). (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point

- A temporary facility that is organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander to provide fuel and ammunition for the employment of aviation units in combat. It is normally located in the main battle area closer to the area of operations than the aviation unit's combat service area. The FARP provides for rapid, simultaneously rearming and refueling. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward operational base

- A command, control, and support base established and operated by an SF battalion from organic and attached resources. The FOB commander and his staff train, prepare, deploy, control, and support SF teams in specified operational areas. The organization and functions of the FOB vary with its mission, duration and scope of operations, and support requirements. (FM 100-25)

functional component command

- A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services that may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

GEOREF

- A worldwide position reference system that may be applied to any map or chart graduated in latitude and longitude regardless of projection. GEOREF is a method of expressing latitude and longitude in a form suitable for rapid reporting and plotting.

immature theater

- A theater that cannot sustain the initial phase of anticipated combat operations because of limited or no forward-deployed US forces, limited transportation infrastructure, and limited host-nation support. It is further characterized by unsophisticated or poorly integrated enemy ground, air, and air defense threats. Many areas in Latin America and Africa are examples of immature theaters. Southwest Asia and the NATO flanks have many of the transportation characteristics of an immature theater yet have sophisticated enemy defense characteristics. (Joint Pub 3-05)

infiltration

- Movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either friendly or enemy troops or organizations. Movement is made by small groups or individuals at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it implies that contact is avoided. (Joint Pub 1-02)

initial assessment

- An assessment that provides a basic determination of the viability of the infiltration and exfiltration portion of a proposed SOF mission. If the mission is to support an overall Army or Navy SOF mission, the initial assessment will be incorporated into the feasibility assessment as needed to help establish the overall viability of that mission (also called IA). (Joint Pub 3-05)

joint force air component commander

- The joint force air component commander's authority comes from the joint force commander. The joint force commander has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, and redirect and

organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force commander assigns the joint force air component commander's responsibilities. These include, but are not limited to, planning,

coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision. Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander recommends to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander

- A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force (also called JFC). (Joint Pub 3-05)

joint force special operations component commander

- The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of SOF and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the majority of the SOF and the requisite command and control capabilities (also called the JFSOCC). (Joint Pub 3-05)

joint special operations air component commander

- The JSOACC's authority comes from the joint force special operations component commander. The JFSOCC has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, and redirect and organize special operations component forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of assigned special operations missions. The JFSOCC normally designates a JSOACC. The JSOACC's responsibilities are assigned by the JFSOCC. These responsibilities normally include, but are not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking). Using the JFSOCC's guidance and authority, the JSOACC deconflicts special air operations with other joint force operations. (Joint Pub 3-05)

joint special operations task force

- A joint task force is composed of special operations units from more than one Service. It is formed to carry out a specific special operation or conduct special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The JSOTF may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (Joint Pub 3-05)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

- Actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They will be put into action by the JCofS (also called JTTP). (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint targeting coordination board

- A group formed by the combatant commander or joint task force commander and tasked with targeting responsibilities and functions. Its functions include, but are not limited to, coordinating targeting information and providing targeting guidance and priorities as directed. The JTCB also monitors the effectiveness of targeting efforts, deconflicts targets, and nominates targets for the commander's approval using the joint target list(s). (Joint Pub 3-05)

joint task force

- A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or Marine Corps, the Air Force, or two or more of these Services. The JTF is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified command, a specified command, or an existing joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

K4 ASI

- The K4 additional skill identifier identifies Army aviators who have qualified as special operations aviators. To be awarded this ASI, the aviator must have undergone extensive special operations aviator qualification training and/or served in a qualifying assignment.

landing zone

- Any specified zone used for the landing of aircraft (also called LZ). (Joint Pub 1-02)

low visibility operations

- Sensitive operations wherein the political and/or military restrictions inherent in covert and clandestine operations are either not necessary or not feasible; actions are taken as required to limit exposure of those involved and/or their activities. Execution of these operations is undertaken with the knowledge that the action and/or sponsorship of the operation may preclude plausible denial by the initiating power. (Joint Pub 1-02)

main operations base

- A designated base established by a unified or subordinate command's special operations command, a JSOTF, or a component force in a friendly or neutral territory. The MOB provides sustained command and control, administration, and logistics to support operations in designated areas, including forward operations bases and forward operating locations. (Joint Pub 3-05)

mission planning agent

- Any special operations forces organization that validates, plans and, when directed, executes special operations missions (also called the MPA). (Joint Pub 3-05)

mission tasking letter

- The means by which the theater commander tasks the theater special operations command to validate and plan assigned targets (also called MPA). (Joint Pub 3-05)

mission tasking package

- The documentation and guidance that the special operations command provides to the mission planning agent which gives basic guidance for target planning. It contains the tasking and administrative framework within which a given SOF target is planned (also called an MTP). (Joint Pub 3-05)

national command authorities

- The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors (more commonly referred to as NCA). (Joint Pub 1-02)

OMEGA

- Navigation system that operates using a worldwide VLF communication network consisting of eight ground stations, two of which are located in CONUS. Each station transmits continuously on an individually assigned frequency between 14 and 24 kHz. The aircraft computer requires signals from at least two stations to determine if an aircraft has changed position during the flight.

operational control

- Transferrable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. This authority is usually exercised through the Service component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as thecommander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security

- A process of analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to--

    - Identify those actions that can be observed by adversarial intelligence systems.

- Determine which indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.

- Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation (also called OPSEC). (Joint Pub 1-02)

packages (war)

- Part support packages designed to support ARSOA operations up to thirty days. Consists of both standard and nonstandard components for repair of aircraft at AVUM, AVIM, and limited depot.

plan of execution

- A detailed plan of precisely how the assigned special operations forces will carry out the validated mission assigned to them. This plan, along with mission rehearsals, is the end result of the targeting and mission planning process. The term also describes the supporting infiltration and exfiltration plan developed by the supporting organization (also called POE). (Joint Pub 3-05)

psychological operations

- Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives (also called PSYOP). (Joint Pub 1-02)

sea/air/land team

- A group of officers and individuals specially trained and equipped to conduct unconventional and paramilitary operations. These teams also train personnel of allied nations in operations that include surveillance and reconnaissance in and from restricted waters, rivers, and coastal areas. More commonly referred to as SEAL team. (Joint Pub 1-02)

special forces

- US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. The five primary missions of SF are unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. (Joint Pub 3-05)

special forces group

- A combat arms organization that plans, conducts, and supports special operations activities in all operational environments during peace, conflict, and war. It

consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and special forces battalions. The SFG can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, SFG units can task organize to meet specific requirements. (Joint Pub 3-05)

special forces operational base

- A command, control, and support base established and operated by an SF group from organic and attached resources. The SFOB commander and his staff coordinate and synchronize subordinate FOB and AOB activities. They also command, control, and support designated SF teams performing sensitive missions under direct SFOB control. (FM 100-25)

special operations

- Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. These operations are conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be conducted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible (also called SO). (Joint Pub 1-02)

special operations command

- A subordinate unified or other joint command composed of designated SOF. The SOC is established by a unified or other JFC to prepare for, plan, and execute, as directed, joint or single-Service SO within the JFC's assigned area of operations or as directed by the NCA (also called SOC). (Joint Pub 3-05)

special operations forces

- Military units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force that are designated for special operations, as that term is defined, and are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations (also called SOF). (Joint Pub 3-05)

special reconnaissance operations

- Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy. These operations also may be conducted to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, geographic, or demographic characteristics of a particular area. These operations include target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance (also called SR). (Joint Pub 3-05)

special operations mission planning folder

- The package that contains the materials required to execute a given special

operations mission. It will include the mission tasking letter, mission tasking package, the original feasibility assessment (as desired), the initial assessment (as desired), the target intelligence package, the plan of execution, the infiltration and exfiltration plan of execution, and other documentation as required or desired (also called SOMPF). (Joint Pub 3-05.5)

sustained operations

- The capability to conduct effective and uninterrupted combat operations when the necessary resources are provided.

target intelligence package

- A product tasked and compiled to provide the intelligence support to those personnel who plan and execute a given SOF mission (also called TIP). (Joint Pub 3-05.5)

target list

- A list of targets maintained and promulgated by the senior echelon of command. The target list contains those targets that are to be engaged by supporting arms. The target list is different from a list of targets that may be maintained by any echelon as confirmed, suspect, or possible targets for information and planning purposes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

unconventional warfare

- A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be conducted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war and peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

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