By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
02655

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, requirements for FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization (Qty rqr block no. 5216)

☆ **U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1996 406-421 62006**

Field Manual
100-17

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 28 October 1992

MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, DEMOBILIZATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE ____ iii

INTRODUCTION ____ iv

CHAPTER 1 FACING THE FUTURE ____ 1-0

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION ____ 1-0
THE FUTURE ARMY ____ 1-1
THE THREAT ____ 1-2
FORCE CONFIGURATION ____ 1-3
CONTINGENCY FORCE PACKAGES ____ 1-4
ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR CRISIS RESPONSE ____ 1-5
SUPPORT TO CAMPAIGN PLANS ____ 1-6
SUMMARY ____ 1-8

CHAPTER 2 COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS AND PLANNING SYSTEMS ____ 2-1

EXECUTING ORGANIZATIONS ____ 2-1
STRATEGIC PLANNING ____ 2-10
SUMMARY ____ 2-12

CHAPTER 3 MOBILIZATION ____ 3-0

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY ____ 3-0
MOBILIZATION LEVELS ____ 3-1
MOBILIZATION PHASES ____ 3-3
FORCE REQUIREMENTS ____ 3-12
INDIVIDUAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ____ 3-13
PERSONNEL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT ____ 3-16
ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS ____ 3-17
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS ____ 3-18
FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS ____ 3-19
ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS ____ 3-20
OTHER MOBILIZATION CONSIDERATIONS ____ 3-20
SUMMARY ____ 3-22

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

TABLE OF CONTENTS


	Page
CHAPTER 4 DEPLOYMENT	**4-1**
DEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS	4-1
DEPLOYMENT PHASES	4-9
LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS	4-15
SUMMARY	4-19
CHAPTER 5 REDEPLOYMENT	**5-0**
REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING	5-0
REDEPLOYMENT PHASES	5-1
OTHER REDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS	5-5
SUMMARY	5-9
CHAPTER 6 DEMOBILIZATION	**6-0**
DEMOBILIZATION IN PAST CONFLICTS	6-0
DEMOBILIZATION PHASES	6-0
DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS	6-2
SUMMARY	6-5
APPENDIX A DELIBERATE AND CRISIS-ACTION PLANNING PROCESSES AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS	**A-1**
APPENDIX B TOTAL MOVEMENTS CONTINUUM	**B-1**
APPENDIX C AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING PROGRAMS	**C-1**
APPENDIX D ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, AND DEMOBILIZATION	**D-1**
GLOSSARY	**Glossary - 1**
REFERENCES	**References - 1**
INDEX	**Index - 1**

FOREWORD

The transformation from a forward-deployed Army to a power-projection total force presents many challenges and changes to the way we prepare for the battlefield. Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm have shown that successful force projection operations often depend on mobilization and deployment sequencing. Additionally, Operations Promote Liberty and Provide Comfort have shown that postconflict operations will influence redeployment and demobilization as well.

Future force projection missions, like those throughout history, will demand well-developed operational and logistical planning, force mix, appropriate sequencing into and out of a theater, and a constant requirement for soldier and unit versatility. Such missions will also require leaders and units that can operate in ambiguity and have the agility to adapt and adjust. Set piece-thinking does not fit force projection. All of these requirements will occur in a joint or combined environment.

This manual—our Army's capstone document for mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization—shares the lessons from history and provides the doctrine for a Total Army as we prepare for future force projection operations.



FREDERICK M. FRANKS, JR.
General, USA
Commanding

INTRODUCTION

The world's strategic environment has changed in dramatic ways. Uncertainty and the growing world complexity cast a large shadow over any attempt by military planners to prepare for or predict the types of contingencies our forces may face in support of national objectives.

The national military strategy reflects the complexity of the changing world strategic environment and addresses appropriate planning required to meet varied contingencies. The strategy is built upon the four key foundations of the national defense strategy: *strategic deterrence and defense*, *forward presence*, *crisis response*, and *reconstitution*. While still founded on deterring aggression and on defending the nation's vital interests against any potential foe, the national military strategy requires major revisions in the makeup of our forward-presence forces, our ability to project power to respond to crises, and our capacity to reconstitute the force.

The shift in focus is toward adaptive regional planning to provide more options for decision makers. The role of the combatant commanders continues to expand in driving the planning process. More than ever the strategy is based on developing forces that are ready to move either from the continental United States (CONUS) or forward-deployed locations to the scene of a crisis. Successful execution gives the combatant commander the strategic ability to mass overwhelming force to terminate the crisis swiftly and decisively.

History shows that the United States has been reluctant to maintain a large active or reserve military organization during peacetime. Before the Korean War, the mobilization of civilians continued to be used as the primary means to meet contingencies and crises. Put simply, when a war broke out, the United States hurried to mobilize and build up its forces only to dismantle its wartime organization immediately upon cessation of hostilities.

It was not until after World War II that the United States realized the risk of being unprepared could no longer be dismissed because of availability of time and "a benevolent geography." Responding to this realization, the US Congress passed the National Security Act in 1947. Through this legislation, the United States attempted to institutionalize governmentwide mobilization planning, linking it to support the national strategy. But these efforts fell short, as the strategic needs continued to be revised and real world requirements tended to exceed the means.

This unpreparedness exacted a toll when Task Force Smith failed to stop the aggression of a better trained and armed North Korean force. Emphasis on massive retaliation reinitiated the growth of neglect in the active and reserve forces.

In the early 1960s, the national strategy was revised from *massive retaliation* to *flexible response*. During this period considerable improvements were experienced as the Army, in response to the Berlin crisis, mobilized some 60,000 Army reservists in what the Department of Defense, in its 1962 report, categorized as the most efficient mobilization to date. This mobilization helped deter Soviet action.

The ensuing years have seen many changes in the mobilization posture of the United States. The ups and downs in the priority placed on mobilization planning can be explained best as driven by economic factors. In combination, exercises such as Nifty Nugget in 1978, Proud Spirit in 1980, and Proud Saber in 1982, together with the 1980 Defense Board studies, pointed to the unsatisfactory state of the nation's mobilization preparedness and deployment posture.

The US Government, using the lessons learned from the studies and exercises, took action to increase the ability of the United States to mobilize its resources and to enhance its capability to respond with military measures to wide-ranging geographical contingencies. These efforts were thwarted at times by the long-war/short-war debate; however, improvements continued, culminating with the successful mobilization of forces to meet the demands of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The long-war/short-war debate is now defunct in light of the events in Eastern Europe and the demise of the former Soviet Union. Now, although it is prudent to prepare for a long war, come-as-you-are crisis-response operations are the most likely actions the military will be required to undertake.

These operations are envisioned to be joint service actions. They will most likely be combined operations with allied or coalition forces that project the power to end the crisis quickly and decisively. More than ever the massing of such power will have to rely on the Army's ability to mobilize and deploy. Upon cessation of hostilities or when directed by the National Command Authorities, the Army must redeploy and demobilize its force in a state of preparation to respond rapidly to any subsequent requirements.

PREFACE

This manual is a guide for Army commanders and planners. It provides capstone doctrine for the development of Army policy for planning and executing mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization (MDRD) operations.

This manual describes the process by which Army elements are mobilized and deployed to support the implementation of the national military strategy and subsequently redeployed and demobilized. Through implementation of this definitive process, the required assets (forces [units], manpower [individuals], and logistics) are provided to effectively and efficiently implement operational plans in support of the national military strategy.

The proponent of this manual is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATTN: ATCD-A, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

CHAPTER 1

FACING THE FUTURE

"We cannot face the future simply by walking into the past backwards."
(President Dwight Eisenhower)

The world's strategic security environment has changed dramatically in the last decade and will continue to change in the future. In order to respond to these changes, our national military strategy is built upon the four key foundations of *strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response,* and *reconstitution.* The essence of our strategy is to deter aggression and defend the nations's vital interests against any potential foe.

"Today we again find ourselves in the wake of great successes on the battlefield. We are at peak effectiveness. Victories in the Cold War, Panama, and the Gulf War demonstrate that the Army holds a warfighting ***edge—an effectiveness*** *advantage—over* ***our opponents.****"*
(Gen Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff, Army)

NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The end of the Cold War has resulted in a reworking of the national security and military strategies, the essential foundations of which are —

- ***Strategic Deterrence and Defense.*** Deterring a nuclear attack remains the number one defense priority of the United States. A growing priority is to provide a defense system against limited nuclear attacks, a mission in which the Army will have a major role.
- ***Forward Presence.*** Multiple forms of forward deployments, pre-positioning/rigged equipment and supplies, governmental and military visits, shows of force, multinational training exercises, and military-to-military relations/exchanges are required to maintain a positive influence in distant regions of the world.
- ***Crisis Response.*** If our best efforts at deterrence fail, the Army must be able to respond quickly and effectively to meet a wide variety of potential adversaries who may possess a full range of modem weapons.
- ***Reconstitution.*** Beyond the crisis-response capabilities provided by active and reserve forces, we must have the ability to generate additional forces should a global threat reemerge. The Army must be able to reconstitute a credible defense by generating required forces and equipment faster than any potential opponent can generate an overwhelming offense. We must pay particular attention to the ability to activate the industrial base on a large scale.

POWER PROJECTION

The Army performs its missions within the context of the national security and military strategies. One of the key strategic principles of the national security and military strategy is crisis response through power projection. *Power projection* is the ability of the United States to apply all or some of the elements of national

power (political, economic, informational, and military).

Credible power projection rests, among other things, on our ability to deploy rapidly forces to perform missions spanning the continuum of military operations. *Force projection,* therefore, is the capability to —

- Mobilize, deploy, and sustain the employed force.
- Redeploy and demobilize military forces from or back to the continental United States (CONUS) or other locations for missions across the continuum of military operations.

Force projection is specifically the military component of power projection. A highly credible Army force projection capability will contribute significantly to deterrence and the overall national military strategy.

ADAPTIVE JOINT PLANNING

Adaptive joint planning significantly influences the Army's planning for mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. To counter future threats to vital US interests, a smaller total force requires flexibility and adaptability in planning, training, deploying, employing, redeploying, and recovering.

The military must develop multiple regional response options for various scenarios, ranging from a slowly developing crisis, through a rapidly deteriorating situation that threatens to erupt into armed conflict, to a no-warning attack. These options must be planned and gauged to meet a wide range of crises. Plans to meet various scenarios must be flexible enough to give decision makers the ability to redirect resources from one planned response to another and to react to unforeseen circumstances.

Combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) must provide a range of planned military response options that integrate the military element with the other elements of national power to demonstrate the United States' resolve, to deter threats, and, if necessary, to project a viable joint force to fight and win decisively against an aggressor. Force projection is, therefore, the military crisis-response option.

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

To respond to a slowly building crisis, CINCs will develop a range of options short of engaging in combat. These are called flexible deterrent options. Flexible deterrent options are activities that send a clear signal to a potential aggressor of the United States' intent to defend a threatened vital interest.

A key characteristic of flexible deterrent options is that they do not put US forces at risk until the political decision has been made to apply decisive military force. In a no-warning scenario, when the decision has been made to deploy US forces, the CINC's response should call for projecting sufficient force to win quickly, decisively, and with minimal friendly casualties.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM

At the national level, military planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The JSPS establishes the administrative framework for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to advise the National Command Authorities (NCA) and to provide strategic direction to the combatant commanders. JSPS also considers the projected force contributions of our allies.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged by the National Security Act of 1947 with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The JSPS provides the framework for strategic planning and direction of the armed forces.

Joint strategic planning begins the process which creates the forces whose capabilities form the basis for theater operation plans. It ends with planning guidance for the CINC to develop strategic and contingency plans. JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which each document, program, or plan is an outgrowth of preceding cycles and of documents formulated earlier and in which development proceeds concurrently.

The Army staff supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in his role as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by performing analyses and providing input to the JSPS. Furthermore, the Army fully participates in the planning phase of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, through the Secretary of the Army, by planning efforts that support development of the defense guidance.

THE FUTURE ARMY

The Army is required to provide forces capable of executing a wide range of missions across the continuum of military operations. These forces must be in carefully tailored combinations of active units, reserve components (RC), civilians, and industry. The forces

must maintain agility, lethality, mobility, and versatility not only during the conduct of combat operations but also during peacetime training, mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. The future Army will be smaller and primarily CONUS-based. More than ever, the massing of Army combat power will rely on the Army's ability to mobilize, deploy, and sustain a crisis-response force and reinforcing forces, if required.

Force projection operations will be conducted from CONUS or forward-presence locations in response to requirements from the NCA. Forces will be provided to supported CINCs and theater joint force commanders (JFCs) who are responsible for planning and executing campaigns or operations within their theaters. These forces, most likely in conjunction with allied forces or coalition partners, must have the strategic agility to mass decisive force to end the crisis swiftly on terms favorable to US interests.

The role of the Army in these operations will be as the strategic land force. The Army must be configured and trained to take full advantage of advancements in strategic airlift, fast sealift ships, and pre-positioned materiel. Increased strategic lift capability provides the CINC greater access to additional resources required to respond to crises within his theater.

Army units, active and reserve components, deployed for training or in response to a crisis must be prepared for any contingency operation and follow-on combat deployment.

The 1138th Military Police Detachment (EPW), Missouri Army National Guard, was in Panama during December 1989 conducting annual training. Upon initiation of Operation Just Cause, the company was retained in active duty status and operated an enemy-prisoner-of-war camp for the duration of the operation.

Being prepared implies that a unit's mission load, to include ammunition, should accompany or be available to the unit during all deployments (including training missions—CONUS or OCONUS). Where this is not feasible, commanders must have access to prestaged materiel or have predesignated procedures for obtaining their unit mission load. Further, logistical automated systems designated to provide peacetime management and control must also parallel or easily transition to wartime configuration/use.

Upon cessation of training activities or hostilities (as directed by the NCA), the Army normally redeploys and begins to demobilize forces as necessary. However, the forces must be continually prepared for immediate redeployment in response to a follow-on contingency mission. This preparedness requires a heretofore unprecedented level of planning for all elements of the Army of the future.

THE THREAT

"Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to changing circumstances."
(President George Bush)

The world has changed to include multiple centers of military, political, and economic power. The continuing and expanding conditions of radical nationalism, religious and cultural rivalries, boundary disputes, sophisticated weapons proliferation, and competition for scarce resources makes the world less predictable and less stable. The net effect is a dangerous world—a world no longer constrained by the bipolar competition under the nuclear shadow of the cold war.

The regional contingencies the Army could face are many and varied. They require a wide range of capabilities to operate across the continuum of military operations. The Army must prepare for differences in terrain, climate, and the nature of threatening forces, as

well as for differing levels of support from host nations or other nations. The Army must also be able to respond quickly and effectively to adversaries who may have missiles; modem air defenses; chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons; and large army, sea, or air forces.

FORCE CONFIGURATION

Active Army and reserve component forces must be configured for force projection missions across the continuum of military operations. This configuration may include Army civilians and contract personnel who provide combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS). On short notice, the Army must be prepared to deploy a mix of forces rapidly as part of a joint or combined force to a wide range of major and lesser regional contingencies.

This requirement is based upon an international arena that changes constantly. To respond to these major and lesser regional contingencies, all units in the Army must be in an appropriate deployment posture. Units must maintain the capability to deploy rapidly in accordance with assigned contingency plans, OPLANs, and so forth, in a *ready-to-fight* posture that projects power to end crises quickly and decisively.

Force projection missions for a tailored Total Army force place a premium on planning, speed, and precision. This premium demands that the Army streamline the mobilization and deployment processes and develop the capability to respond swiftly and return in an orderly manner from any crisis.

The total force must be configured for force projection missions. This configuration includes—

- Preparing doctrinally-based force packages to meet the needs of combatant CINCs.
- Maintaining rapidly deployable AC and RC crisis-response forces.
- Establishing Armywide readiness standards and cycles that will enable the Army to tailor a force rapidly to respond to the needs of a CINC or JTF commander.
- Ensuring that the force can expand quickly, based on the circumstances of a particular contingency.

Force projections will usually begin as a contingency operation—a rapid response to a crisis. Contingency operations may be required for combat or noncombat situations and may be opposed or unopposed. Contingency operations may involve forcible entry with simultaneous deployment and employment in depth of joint and/or combined forces in combat operations.

A rapidly deploying contingency force may be capable of resolving the situation and achieving the combatant commander's desired end state for the operation. If not, the operation may evolve into a major force projection requiring additional mobilization of reserves, extensive deployments of active and reserve component elements, and establishment of capabilities for prolonged operations of a campaign. The size of the contingency force may range from as small as a single psychological operations team to as large as a theater army.

To effectively conduct combined arms combat operations, brigade task forces are the basic building blocks for force projection missions. Brigade task forces may initially deploy independently; however, they must be able to —

- Reassemble rapidly into a division-size force, even if they originally came from different divisions or were separate brigades.
- Establish the basic command and control (C^2) and liaison functions of the highest headquarters expected to establish itself in theater.

The lead brigade of such a force projected for combat operations will be capable of being on the ground by C+4[1] (airlift), the lead division by C+12 (airlift), and two heavy divisions deployed from CONUS or OCONUS by C+30 (air/sealift). By C+75, the full corps (remaining two divisions), with its corps support command (COSCOM) and appropriate echelons above corps (EAC) logistics support, will be on the ground. These forces, depending on the mission of the required force, will require use of RC, civilian support elements, and possibly coalition forces for success. Early deployment of CS and CSS units may

[1] C-day is the unnamed day on which the first strategic movement from any origin begins or is to begin in support of a specific operation plan or operation order.

be required to maintain flexibility, survivability, and lethality of the committed forces.

The deploying units must have sufficient supplies that are either pre-positioned afloat/ashore, purchased locally, or deployed with the force. Follow-on logistics are properly sequenced to arrive and support deployed forces until lines of communication (LOCs) are established. When applicable, the commander must also consider the status of the coalition force (equipment, supplies, forces). See Figure 1-1.

CONTINGENCY FORCE PACKAGES

Relative combat power is the crucial consideration in power projection operations. Rarely will our actions be unopposed. Our opponents will attempt to increase all aspects of their combat power for the same reasons that we will; therefore, relative combat power ratios will change continuously.

STABILITY

A l-to-l ratio will normally ensure that the Army does not lose, but this ratio will barely give the Army the capability to stabilize the crisis situation. Moreover, as the enemy generates its in-theater combat power over time, Army force requirements will increase correspondingly.

Analytical data suggests that a 1.4-to-1 ratio throughout the theater is sufficient to ensure the Army has enough force available to stabilize a crisis comfortably. However, this ratio will not give the Army enough of an edge to create conditions for attaining the end state-namely conditions favorable to US interests.

The time available to reach a suitable force ratio is critical. The longer a crisis exists, the less favorable the chances are to successfully end it on US terms. The Army must stabilize a crisis early in order to win.

FLEXIBILITY

In order to stabilize, the Army must have flexible contingency force packages available to deploy on short notice. Therefore, the design of the contingency force—force packaging—is a key consideration to preparing the Army for the power projection era.

In designing the task organization of a contingency force, the Army must consider how the force is being phased into the theater—often a function of available strategic lift. The Army must consider, to the maximum extent possible, linking standard packages of support forces, in reasonable groupings, to major combat




Figure 1-1. Strategic Mobility Objectives for the Army

forces. *Reasonable* means that World War II and Korean War era doctrinal formulas may no longer apply to computing required numbers and types of units at echelons above division and corps. The Army must also consider the capabilities and requirements of other services and fellow alliance or coalition members, as the Army will not respond to contingencies in isolation.

Flexibility in the design of the force will allow for the early availability of those critical capabilities in theater that are required to carry out the CINC's campaign plan once the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) conditions have been defined. The operational concept, the support concept, and the logistics concept of the campaign plan determine how well the contingency force package can follow the critical path to achieve a favorable relative combat power ratio.

BALANCE

A key to the design of the contingency force packages is balance. Joint capabilities must be balanced to maximize complementary effects of the actions of other services. CS and CSS capabilities must be in balance with combat capabilities, maintaining flexible, effective, and efficient support to the fight.

Capabilities, however, generate costs. The benefits of additional capabilities must be balanced against the costs of additional sustainment requirements to support those capabilities. Capabilities shortfalls must be balanced by substitutes and alternative arrangements.

Balancing the relative trade-offs of competing capabilities, and mentally updating his METT-T analysis is a key responsibility of a service component commander when defining, for supporting CINCs or commanders, the force needed for rapid deployment to a crisis situation.

EXPEDIENT DESIGN

Expedient design of contingency forces must include a METT-T analysis, the attendant campaign plan, and a detailed capabilities assessment of functions, constraints, and balance. During deployment, the contingency planners will continually revise these analyses.

The joint and combined aspects of warfare, coupled with the uncertain world environment, will influence every level of military operation to an unprecedented extent. The resulting demands placed on a force projection army will thus fundamentally alter our assumptions and processes for warfighting.

Fundamental changes must occur in the Army's doctrinal focus in this era of contingencies. In the past, the focus was on combat in a mature theater—10 divisions to Europe in 10 days—with the METT-T reasonably defined. Additionally, the support mechanisms and C^2 facilities were in place and functioning. Today, the focus must be on —

- Power projection to theaters of varying maturity, either from CONUS or other forward-deployed unit locations.
- The incumbent difficulties associated with such a requirement.

ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR CRISIS RESPONSE

The Army designs its force structure to achieve the agility and versatility necessary to execute a variety of operations plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs), to include campaigns. That is, the Army responds to the requirements of the JSCP as voiced by the CINC and approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

All forces are considered contingency forces.

Army units are configured to allow force expansion through designation as *forward-presence, crisis-response, early reinforcement, follow-on reinforcement,* and *reconstitution forces.*

FORWARD-PRESENCE UNITS

Forward-presence units are those US active component forces and reserve forces assigned or deployed overseas in a specific theater. These forces display the resolve of the US in supporting its national interests around the world. They are the initial forces available to an OCONUS CINC to counter potential threats. The reduced size of the US Army dictates that forward-presence units, including CS and CSS units, be trained and prepared to deploy to other regional areas in support of our national defense policies.

CRISIS-RESPONSE FORCES

Crisis-response forces (CRFs) are AC and RC, CONUS-based units, but also include forward-presence units. They are trained and configured to deploy anywhere in the world, based on the unit's deployability posture. All AC units, including combat, CS, and CSS

units, must be prepared to deploy and support a combatant unit that has a mission to respond to a crisis.

Units conducting Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and subsequent stand-downs must maintain the capability to deploy when required. Reserve component CS and CSS units must be prepared to support all deployment operations.

EARLY REINFORCEMENT FORCES

Early reinforcement forces (ERFs) consist primarily of AC divisions (CONUS-and OCONUS-based) and associated echelons above division (EAD) and EAC support elements (both AC and RC). RC round-out and round-up brigades are available to add combat power to AC divisions designated as ERFs. Additional reserve component CS and CSS units will provide support to ERFs. ERF units may be required to respond to a second major regional contingency in another theater.

FOLLOW-ON REINFORCEMENT FORCES

Follow-on reinforcement forces (FRFs), primarily National Guard divisions, brigades, and associated EAD and EAC support elements, are trained and deployed for protracted operations. These forces include units that replace or augment forward-presence units that have deployed to other regions for protracted operations.

RECONSTITUTION FORCES

Reconstitution is the ability to maintain continuously, in sufficient measure, the capability to create additional forces beyond those in the active and reserve units retained in the base force. Reconstitution is also the process of creating additional forces to deter an emerging global threat from competing militarily with the United States, and, should such deterrence fail, to provide a global warfighting capability. Reconstitution forces may be comprised of regeneration assets, industrial/technology base assets, and manpower assets.

SUPPORT TO CAMPAIGN PLANS

The Army's response to the requirements based upon the CINC's campaign plans is provided through mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization.

The campaign plan establishes the end state-strategic aims such as control of geographical area, reestablishment of political boundaries, or the defeat of an enemy force in the theater of operations-and the CINC's vision of how this end state is reached. Accordingly, the campaign plan normally provides both a general concept of operations for the entire campaign and a specific plan for the campaign's first phase.

The development of the supporting deployment plan is based on METT-T and is updated continuously as METT-T evolves. Forces deployed to the theater in support of a campaign plan will normally be joint; therefore, commanders and staffs of other services will be involved in the development of the deployment plan.

Throughout the deployment phase of a campaign, host nation support may augment a base of operations. Additionally, the increased likelihood of combined operations requires the Army to be ready to integrate commanders and staffs of other nationalities in the planning process. Although all phases are critical to the combatant commander's campaign plan, this manual concentrates on mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization.

MOBILIZATION

The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and/or the Congress. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), with the advice and recommendation of the service secretaries and JCS, recommends to the President and the Congress the required mobilization to support a given OPLAN, CONPLAN, or national emergency.

Joint Publication 1-0[2] defines mobilization as follows:

> **1.** The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. **2.** The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

Crisis response will initially be met with Active Army units. Developing METT-T may require the mobilization of resources to handle unique situations and requirements. This mobilization may include activating all or part of the RC as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel.

[2] *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,* 1 December 1989.

Ready manpower includes both retired soldiers who have completed 20 years of active service and members of the individual ready reserve (IRR). Retirees are subject to recall to active duty at any time with Secretary of the Army approval. These individuals and volunteer reservists are available under all levels of premobilization or mobilization. Volunteers from troop program units (TPUs) must be accepted very judiciously so they do not degrade follow-on units.

The President, invoking Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) authority, may order to active duty 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve (Reserve/National Guard unit members, individual mobilization augmenters [IMAs], and active guard/reserve members [AGR]) for 90 days with authority to extend an additional 90 days.

In addition to the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up, four other levels for augmenting the active forces by mobilization of the RC are *selective*, *partial*, *full*, and *total*. A selective mobilization is normally in response to a peacetime domestic crisis that is not the result of an enemy attack and should not be considered for military operations in response to external threats. The other three levels of mobilization are in response to external threat.

National conscription (the draft) may be invoked at any point in the mobilization sequence to support the expanding force structure, as determined by the Congress and the President.

Ready supplies are limited to stocks of critical supplies for issue as the industrial base expands to support anticipated sustainment requirements.

A critical element of mobilization is the acceleration of the industrial base mobilization. As the Army moves closer to being a force projection army, future conflicts will require unprecedented logistical support from CONUS.

With crisis (come-as-you-are) response the most likely scenario, the Army can no longer depend on bringing up cold production lines to manufacture ammunition or end items. The Army must depend on warm production lines to produce consumables and reparable and on war reserves and other on-hand stocks to provide those items that cannot be supplied by the industrial base.

Joint Publication 1-02 defines industrial mobilization as follows:

> The transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to supporitmilitary operations.

Industrial mobilization includes the mobilization of materials, labor, capital, production facilities, and contributory items and services essential to the industrial program.

DEPLOYMENT

Deployment comprises those activities required to prepare and move the force and its sustainment equipment and supplies to the area of operations (AO) in response to a crisis or natural disaster. Deployments may be from CONUS, OCONUS, or both and may take the form of an opposed or unopposed entry. In either event, deployments arc conducted in five phases: predeployment activities, movement to the ports of embarkation (POE), strategic lift, reception at the ports of debarkation (POD), and onward movement.

REDEPLOYMENT

Redeployment is preparation for and movement of the force and its materiel deployed from a theater to its follow-on designated CONUS or OCONUS base or to another location within the area. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that optimizes readiness of redeploying forces and materiel to meet new contingencies or crises. The phases of redeployment are —

- Reconstitution for strategic movement.
- Movement to the redeployment assembly areas.
- Movement to the POE.
- Strategic lift.
- Reception at the POD.
- Onward movement.

DEMOBILIZATION

Demobilization is the act of returning the force and materiel to a premobilization posture or to some other approved posture. It also involves returning the mobilized portion of the industrial base to peacetime conditions.

Demobilization is executed to assure rapid reconstitution and subsequent mobilization to meet other contangencies that may arise. Demobilization is conducted in the following phases:

- Demobilization planning actions.
- Demobilization actions in the AO.
- POE-to-demobilization station or POE-to-CONUS demobilization center actions.
- Demobilization station/CONUS demobilization center actions.
- Home-station or home-of-record actions.

SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the changing environment and the resultant national military strategy. It addressed the importance of planning and executing mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization to support the combatant commander's campaign plan.

CHAPTER 2

COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS AND PLANNING SYSTEMS

"Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found after receipt of this order will be hanged."

(Haile Selassie, 1935 Mobilization Order)

This chapter describes the major organizations with responsibility for—

- Marshaling active duty forces.
- Mobilizing the reserve and civilian forces.
- Deploying forces required by the commander.
- Redeploying forces either to CONUS, to the overseas area from which the forces were drawn, or to another OCONUS area in response to another crisis.
- Demobilizing elements of the expanded force, if required.

In addition to the discussion on organizations, the chapter briefly describes the Joint Strategic Planning System.

EXECUTING ORGANIZATIONS

Several civil and military organizations share the responsibilities for conducting mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization (MDRD) operations. Beginning with the President in his role as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and concluding with the commanders of individual military units, the MDRD process is a complex undertaking that requires constant and precise coordination among the executing commands and organizations. In addition to organizations addressed here, Appendix D describes additional commands and organizations that perform key roles in the MDRD process.

NATIONAL-LEVEL AUTHORITIES

Authorities on the national level include the National Command Authorities and the United States Congress.

National Command Authorities

The NCA consists of the President and SECDEF or their duly deputized alternates or successors. The term *National Command Authorities*is used to signify constitutional authority to direct the armed forces to execute military action. Both movement of troops and execution of military action must be authorized by the NCA. By law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action.

Congress

Congress, exercising its constitutional authority of advise and consent to the executive branch of government, may authorize partial mobilization. However, Congress must authorize full and total mobilization by either declaring war or a national emergency. Congress also has the authority to enact legislation to reinstate conscription under the Selective Service Act and provide for other emergency authorities.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The element of the Federal bureaucracy most directly involved with conducting the national security affairs of the United States is the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD was established as an executive department of the government in 1949, with the Secretary of Defense as the head. DOD includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the CJCS, the joint staff, the military departments and the military services within those departments, the unified and specified commands, and other agencies established to meet specific requirements.

Secretary of Defense

The SECDEF provides leadership for DOD and, as such, is the principal assistant to the President on all matters relating to the maintenance and employment of the Armed Forces. The SECDEF directs mobilization of reserve component units and manpower through the military departments. The SECDEF directs demobilization of the Army and oversees the Army in compliance with existing laws, policies, and directives.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The collective body, headed by the Chairman (CJCS), was formally established as the principal military advisors to the President, the SECDEF, and the National Security Council by the National Security Act of 1947. Confusion on the role of each service and the authority of the JCS led to the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. This act prescribes the operational chain of command, which runs from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant commanders. It also establishes the CJCS as the principal military advisor to the NCA and authorizes the President to place the CJCS in the communications chain of command. All communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders pass through the CJCS unless otherwise directed by the NCA. The CJCS has no executive authority to command combatant forces. However, the CJCS approves OPLANs and recommends the assignment of forces to combatant commands.

Combatant Commands

The combatant commands consist of unified commands (a command consisting of two or more military service forces with broad, continuing missions) and specified commands (a command consisting of one military service force with broad, continuing missions) that are either planning for or engaged in military operations.

In peacetime, the responsibilities of CINCs are consistent with legislation, military department and service policy, budgetary considerations, and local conditions. During crisis or war, the CINC's authority expands to include use of facilities and supplies of all forces under his command. CINCs are designated as supported (the theater CINC who is responsible for regional responsibilities within the theater) or supporting combatant CINCs (the CINC with global responsibilities who provides forces and logistics). (Supported and supporting CINC differences are discussed later in this chapter.)

Based on the approved Unified Command Plan (UCP), theater combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities known as theaters-Atlantic, European, Central, Pacific, and Southern Commands. Other global CINCs have worldwide functional responsibilities not bounded by any single theater—US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), US Space Command (USSPACECOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The only Army specified command is Forces Command (FORSCOM).

United States Transportation Command

USTRANSCOM, a unified command, is directly involved with supporting the Army's MDRD process. USTRANSCOM, as the DOD single manager for transportation, provides air, land, and sea transportation to meet national security objectives. USCINCTRANS has combatant command (COCOM) of Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), and Military Sealift Command (MSC), collectively known as the transportation component commands (TCCs).

The commanders of these components have operational control (OPCON) of strategic lift forces. USTRANSCOM orchestrates all transportation aspects of the deliberate planning process, and, in conjunction with the joint staff, continues to develop the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). See Appendix A.

Military Traffic Management Command

MTMC is a USTRANSCOM Army component command and also a major Army command (MACOM). MTMC provides traffic management, CONUS-based surface transportation, strategic seaports or common-user ocean terminals, intermodal moves, and transportation engineering.

MTMC administers the Contingency Response (CORE) Program, which aligns agreements with the

leaders of the commercial transportation industry to coordinate support for emergency conditions that will require their assistance and assets. MTMC uses the CORE Program to provide direction, control, and supervision of all functions incident to the effective use and traffic management of commercial freight and passenger entities.

MTMC manages the strategic seaports, designates the sea port of embarkation (SPOE) for all CONUS ocean terminals (commercial and military), and mandates unit cargo arrival times at SPOEs. Additionally, MTMC serves as the point of contact for obtaining and contracting commercial containers.

MTMC assists installation transportation offices (ITOs) as required to move unit personnel and equipment and nonunit cargo within CONUS. Where possible, MTMC acts as the ITO at CONUS SPODs. MTMC also coordinates with HQDA and FORSCOM for the call-up and release of allocated USAR personnel and units.

Air Mobility Command

Air Mobility Command, formerly the Military Airlift Command (MAC), as the USTRANSCOM Air Force component command, provides worldwide airlift and aerial refueling support to DOD components. Air Mobility Command's mission includes—

- Aerial deployment, employment, and redeployment of combat forces and their support equipment.
- Aerial logistical resupply and sustainment of these forces.
- Aeromedical evacuation.
- Aerial search, rescue, and recovery.
- Aerial refueling.
- Participation in special operations.
- Weather reconnaissance and atmospheric sampling.
- Contracts for long-term commercial airlift for DOD.

Air Mobility Command selects CONUS and OCONUS aerial ports of embarkation/debarkation (APOE/APOD) for airlift in conjunction with other unified commands as appropriate.

Military Sealift Command

Military Sealift Command, as the USTRANSCOM naval component command, provides sealift transportation assets in support of DOD components. MSC's mission includes negotiating contracts with operators of commercial-scheduled container liner services that provide port-to-port delivery of military and/or containerized cargo. In a crisis, strategic sealift divides into two categories—

- Surge shipping to deploy warfighting units.
- Resupply or sustainment shipping to move support and follow-on units and supplies.

Surge shipping must be capable of handling outsized, bulky, military vehicles and unit equipment such as tanks, trucks, and helicopters. Most resupply/sustainment shipping is for cargo that is needed for daily requirements. It is configured for containerized movement. Commercial sealift configuration trends favor a heavy emphasis on the use of containers. US liner companies should be able to provide an abundance of assets to meet sustainment requirements.

MSC also administers support of pre-positioned shipping. The Army's afloat pre-position force has selected equipment and materiel uploaded on ships to support immediate needs in an AO.

United States Special Operations Command

USSOCOM is a supporting CINC principally responsible for providing special operations forces (SOF) to the combatant commander. SOF include Army (active and reserve) civil affairs, psychological operations, Special Forces, rangers, and special operations aviation.

The US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is the MACOM and subordinate command of USSOCOM. SOF also includes US Air Force and Navy special operations assets as well. The US Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) exercises COCOM authority over CONUS-based active and reserve SOF.

USSOCOM is responsible for providing support to the supported combatant commander's OPLANs/operations orders (OPORDs). USSOCOM coordinates with HQDA and FORSCOM to call up and release assigned personnel and units.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The Department of the Army (DA) is responsible for the assignment, preparation, and support of land forces necessary for employment across the operational

continuum. Specifically, DA is responsible for recruiting, structuring, stationing, manning, equipping, supplying, training, mobilizing, modernizing, administering, organizing, and demobilizing Army forces; constructing buildings; and repairing equipment. These functions are executed under the supervision of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army and are consistent with the authority of the CINCs over their assigned forces. DA also establishes policy and procedures for reconstitution of the Army. Figure 2-1 displays the Army command channels for MDRD.

Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Army is responsible for all affairs of the Department of the Army. In addition to heading the Army, the Secretary is a member of the SECDEF's Armed Forces Policy Council. The majority of the functions of the Secretary of the Army are those statutory functions performed without further delegation to the Chief of Staff, Army. The majority of this role is in such matters as procurement, civil law, and civil -works. Specifically, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the civilian supervision of the administration, management, and policy formulation aspects of the missions of the Department of the Army.

Headquarters Department of the Army Staff

Department of the Army Staff (ARSTAF), under the direction of the Chief of Staff, is an executive component of the Department of the Army. It exists to assist the Secretary of the Army in his responsibilities. The principal elements of the ARSTAF are the Army general staff, the special staff, the personal staff, and other staff agencies required by HQDA. For brevity, we address only the Army general staff.

The primary elements of the Army general staff are

- Chief of staff.
- Deputy chief of staff for operations and plans **(DCSOPS).**
- Deputy chief of staff for logistics (DCSLOG).
- Deputy chief of staff for personnel (DCSPER).
- Deputy chief of staff for intelligence (DCSINT).

Each ARSTAF element performs specific, critical roles in support of mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. However, DCSOPS is designated as the Army's executive agent for MDRD.

Office of the Chief of Army Reserve

The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) advises the Chief of Staff, Army, on all matters pertaining to the development, training, mobilization, readiness and maintenance of the Army Reserve and participates with other Army staff agencies to formulate and develop DA policies for the Army Reserve. During crisis operations, Office of the Chief of Army Reserve (OCAR) representatives serve on the HQDA Crisis-Action Team and provide the rest of the DA staff with advice and assistance on issues pertaining to mobilization and use of Army Reserve units and individuals. The CAR also serves as the commander, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) and as the deputy commanding general (Reserve Components), Forces Command (FORSCOM).

The Army Reserve Personnel Center

The Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), a field operating agency (FOA) of the Chief, Army Reserve, commands all soldiers in the individual ready reserve, standby reserve, and retired reserve. ARPERCEN manages and funds training for IRR soldiers. ARPERCEN maintains/distributes mobilization data on all individuals and issues mobilization orders in coordination with DA DCSPER and **DCSOPS.**

United States Army Reserve

USARC is a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. USARC commands, controls, supports, and ensures wartime readiness of USAR forces in the United States, less units assigned to the Special Operations Command. USARC organizes and prepares its USAR units for mobilization, commitment for wartime, and other missions as required by the supporting CINC and as directed by FORSCOM. During mobilization, USARC prepares and cross-levels personnel and equipment within USARC until transfer of command authority. See Figure 2-2.

The National Guard Bureau

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is both a staff and an operating agency. As a staff agency, NGB participates with Army and Air Force staffs in the development and coordination of programs pertaining to or affecting the National Guard. As an operating agency, the NGB formulates and administers the programs for the training, development, and maintenance of the Army and Air National Guard. NGB is the channel of communications between the departments concerned




Figure 2-1. Army Command Channels for Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, and Demobilization




Figure 2-2. The Army Reserve Command Structure

and the States as provided in 10 United States Code (USC), 3040.

Chief, National Guard Bureau

The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) is the advisor to the Army Chief of Staff and Air Force Chief of Staff on National Guard matters. CNGB is responsible for matters pertaining to the development of program budget, equipment, training, readiness, maintenance, security, and mobilization of the National Guard.

CNGB is also responsible for coordination of the establishment of state military headquarters and for assistance in planning and conducting operations in support of civil defense and civil disturbances. CNGB assists in developing DA and Department of the Air Force (DAF) policies affecting Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) matters in conjunction with DA and DAF staffs. Although the CNGB does not command the National Guard, his position is equivalent to that of a MACOM commander.

Director, Army National Guard

The Director, Army National Guard (DARNG) participates with the DA staff in the development of programs, policies, concepts, and plans pertaining to the ARNG. The DARNG develops and administers the detailed programs required for operations of ARNG. He participates with and assists the states in organizing, maintaining, and operating trained ARNG units capable of service in time of war or emergency.

The DARNG assists the office of the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans (ODCSOPS) in alerting ARNG units for federalization or mobilization. During crisis-response scenarios, DARNG assists HQDA and FORSCOM in identifying ARNG units capable of meeting the combatant commanders' requirements. Identification is based on current readiness data.

Army National Guard

ARNG units are commanded by the governor of their particular state or territory and respond to state/territorial missions and emergencies at the governor's direction. ARNG units may be federalized and mobilized at the order of the President or Congress in case of a national emergency.

The National Guard Bureau is the conduit through which funding, equipment, and guidance flow from DOD to ensure ARNG units are provided resources to perform their federal mission when called upon. The CONUSAs and OCONUS MACOMs provide planning guidance and assistance concerning training, military operations, mobilization, and deployment. Refer to Figure 2-3.

MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS

The army in the field is divided into organizations called major Army commands. Each MACOM has the task of providing combat-ready land forces-the primary focus of the Army. Each has developed an organizational structure reflecting its environment, mission, and functions.

Forces Command

FORSCOM is a specified command and a MACOM. As a MACOM, FORSCOM is the Army CONUS executing agent for MDRD within the Army Mobilization Operation Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). As the executing agent, FORSCOM provides guidance and verifies planning, development, training, mobilization, maintenance, and readiness. FORSCOM issues directives on MDRD to other MACOMs and their installations, Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs), FORSCOM installations, major troop units, NGB, state adjutants general, United States Army Reserve Command (USARC), and the Major United States Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs). The FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) provides detailed guidance to the forces to accomplish the MDRD mission.

Training and Doctrine Command

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) supports the execution of MDRD by developing MDRD doctrine, directing MDRD training, expanding the mobilization training base as required by augmenting existing reception battalions and Army training centers (ATCs), and establishing additional training centers. TRADOC establishes and operates CONUS replacement centers (CRCs) and/or CONUS demobilization centers (CDCs) for nonunit soldiers (individuals). TRADOC also provides selected battle roster personnel to operational units, with backfill to TRADOC coming from the RC. TRADOC coordinates with HQDA and FORSCOM for the call-up and release of assigned personnel and units.

United States Army Special Operations Command

USASOC is both a component command of USSOCOM and a MACOM. USASOC commands, organizes, trains, and ensures combat readiness of both




Figure 2-3. National Guard Management Structure

active and reserve CONUS-based Army special operations forces (ARSOF). ARSOF include Special Forces, Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces. When directed by USSOCOM, USASOC coordinates with other MACOMs to support the mobilization, training, equipping, deployment validation, and subsequent deployment of CONUS-based ARSOF.

Reserve component Army SOF units are mobilized and attached to their mobilization station by USASOC and remain attached to the mobilization station commander until their deployment to the AO or reassignment in CONUS on orders from USASOC. USASOC coordinates with HQDA and FORSCOM to call up and release assigned personnel and units.

Army Materiel Command

Army Materiel Command (USAMC) complements the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) by providing Army-specific logistics support services and contract administration. USAMC supports the MDRD mission by augmenting its commodity commands and depot system to a level capable to support the force that is being mobilized and deployed.

The logistics mission requires a flexible, early deploying organization that is tailorable to meet the logistics requirements. USAMC will support the combatant commanders by providing a logistics support group (LSG) in theater. The LSG accompanies deploying forces and is comprised of contractor support and deploying military and Army civilians to perform a variety of functions focused on materiel readiness in theater.

COMMANDERS

Leadership and command is the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve desired results. A commander is the person within a military organization who is assigned responsibility for that organization. Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment and is the primary means of imparting vision to the organization. Commanders are assigned for each organization from the highest levels (commanders-in-chief) down to the lowest levels (unit commanders).

Commanders-In-Chief

Combatant commanders (CINCs) of unified and specified commands develop OPLANs, CONPLANs, operations orders (OPORDs), and force requirements to address the spectrum of military operations that may occur within their respective areas. CINCs are designated as supported or supporting.

Supported Commanders-in-Chief

A supported CINC has primary responsibility for all aspects of tasks assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides JCS guidance to the CINCs and the military services. The JSCP, a short-range, capabilities-based plan prepared by the JCS, serves as the primary basis for global and regional war plan development.

The supported CINC develops OPLANs, CONPLANs, OPORDs, and redeployment plans in response to requirements of the JCS. As required, the supported CINC coordinates with participating allied/coalition forces to ensure adequacy of support and arranges for mutual assistance and support. Upon cessation of hostilities and on order, the supported CINC initiates the redeployment of forces and demobilization actions for reserve units that are deployed within his AOR.

Supporting Commanders-in-Chief

Supporting CINCs conduct MDRD training, provide augmentation forces or other support to a supported CINC, and develop supporting plans. They also ensure that redeployment and demobilization plans and activities are completed expeditiously in anticipation of future crises.

Army Service Component Commanders

Army service component commanders (ASCCs) of a unified command or joint task force develop detailed lists of combat and support forces (especially below-the-line forces) employed to accomplish assigned tasks. These lists include the required closure time of forces (as specified in the supported commanders' concept of deployment within the campaign plan) to be deployed to the AO.

ASCCs also provide the support of Army units within the command. They coordinate as required with participating allied/coalition forces to ensure adequacy of support and arrange necessary mutual assistance and support. They participate in the development of supporting plans consistent with the combatant commander's OPLAN. They also participate in the development of supported commanders' time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The ASCC must plan for the total process of MDRD.

Unit Commanders

Unit commanders plan, train, and execute MDRD. To accomplish MDRD effectively, unit commanders must be knowledgeable of the DOD and DA systems that are in place to support MDRD. Examples of those systems are—

- JOPES.
- Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).
- Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC ACCIS).

OTHER COMMANDS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES

All federal agencies must be prepared to respond to national crises. The agencies discussed below have a direct impact on DA's response to a national emergency, crisis, or contingency operation.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates the execution of emergency preparedness actions of all federal agencies. FEMA identifies those industrial products and facilities essential to industrial mobilization readiness, national defense, or postattack survival and recovery. The FEMA director serves as an advisor to the National Security Council (NSC) on issues of national security emergency preparedness, including mobilization readiness, civil defense, continuity of government, technological disasters, postattack survival and recovery, and other issues.

FEMA provides guidance to the leaders of federal departments, to include DOD and other agencies. FEMA's guidance on the use of defense production authorities, including resource claims, in order to improve the capability of industry, facilities, and infrastructure systems to meet national security emergency needs is in accordance with graduated mobilization response (GMR). Figure 2-4 displays the coordinating responsibilities of FEMA.

Department of Commerce

The Department of Commerce (DOC) is the lead federal agency responsible for industrial mobilization planning. The Office of Industrial Resource Administration (OIRA) is the focal point within DOC for developing, promoting, and implementing policies which ensure a strong and technologically superior defense industrial base. OIRA is a key contributor to the development and implementation of the GMR planning process.

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Health and Human Services develops plans for mobilizing the health care industry to support medical casualty requirements for mobilizing the civilian health care industry to support medical casualty requirements under the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). It must assist the State Department with overseas noncombatant evacuation operations.

Department of Transportation

In coordination with DOD agencies and commands, the Department of Transportation (DOT) —

- Develops systems for control of priorities and allocations for moving passengers and materiel by civil transportation.
- Provides clearance authority for moving outsized, oversized, and hazardous military cargo.
- Preallocates militarily planned/required civil transportation resources.
- Through the US Coast Guard, ensures the safety, security, and control of US ports.

DOT also manages, through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Wartime Air Service Program (WASP).

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary means by which the CJCS, in consultation with other members of the JCS, the CINCs, departments, and other services, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and SECDEF in providing strategic direction of the armed forces. The CJCS —

- Requires development of and reviews strategic plans.
- Prepares and reviews contingency plans.
- Advises the President and SECDEF on requirements, programs, and budgets.
- Provides net assessments on the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies relative to potential adversaries.




Figure 2-4. Coordinating Responsibilities of Federal Emergency Management Agency

JSPS is a flexible and interactive system intended to provide supporting military advice to the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) and strategic direction for use in JOPES. Through the JSPS, the JCS and the CINCs —

- Review the national security environment and US national security objectives.
- Evaluate the threat.
- Assess current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets.
- Propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives in a resource-limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and SECDEF.

Although all JSPS documents are prepared in consultation with other members of the JCS and the CINCs, the final approval authority for all JSPS documents is the CJCS. Most JSPS documents are published biennially; however, all documents are subject to annual review and may be changed as required. The product of JSPS that gives direction to operational planning is the JSCP. Appendix A gives a summary of JSPS documents and key relationships.

JOPES provides the procedural foundation for an integrated and coordinated approach to developing, approving, and publishing OPLANs and CONPLANs. This operational planning process concerns the employment of current forces and not identification of requirements. The latter is part of the force planning process.

The objective of JOPES is the timely development of effective OPLANs throughout the unified and specified combatant commands. Through the use of uniform planning procedures and formats, JOPES facilitates JCS review of OPLANs, incorporates automatic data processing techniques and interchange of data, minimizes the number of OPLANs, and provides for reporting any force shortfalls and limiting factors identified during the planning process.

JOPES establishes a comprehensive set of procedures to be used in both deliberate and time-sensitive planning of joint military operations and, to the extent possible, in combined operations.

The Army system to support JOPES is the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System. AMOPES provides the structure and process for Army participation in JOPES, as well as serving other purposes. AMOPES provides the interface between unified command plans for deployment and use of forces and Army plans for providing mobilized forces and resources. AMOPES consolidates policies and procedures, defines responsibilities, and provides operational planning guidance related to mobilization and the strategic employment of Army forces. AMOPES is not part of the DOD PPBS process. Figure 2-5 shows the players in the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) deliberate planning process.

SUMMARY

Several civil and military organizations share the responsibilities for conducting MDRD operations. The MDRD process is a complex undertaking that requires constant and precise coordination (prior to, during, and after crisis response) among the executing and supporting organizations. This chapter described the major command and control organizations for MDRD. It defined the specific roles of each organization and its interrelationships with other organizations. Additionally, it described the planning systems used to coordinate activities.




Figure 2-5 Players in the Deliberate Planning Process

CHAPTER 3

MOBILIZATION

"It was a period of colonial expansion and conflict of interest among the great powers. War raged practically all over the world, except in the British Isles and in the Scandinavian Peninsula. But the expert juggling of British diplomacy, self-interested in the maintenance of the balance of power, went far to prevent the numerous minor conflicts from spreading international conflagrations, such as those of the periods immediately preceding and following. Queen Victoria's reign would go down in history as that of the Pax Britannica."
(R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History)

The military strategy places an enormous premium on the ability of the United States to generate forces. For the US Army, mobilization is the process by which it provides the supported combatant commander with three basic components required for mission accomplishment: forces (units), manpower (individuals), and logistics support. Mobilization is a phased process designed to be concurrent and continuous, rather than sequential. It is designed to rapidly expand and enhance the response capability of the Army in support of a military response to a crisis or natural disaster.

Although mobilization pertains to both the active and reserve component (AC and RC) structure, the primary emphasis is directed to the Army Reserve structure. To achieve mobilization, the NCA has the option to exercise, with the concurrence of the US Congress, one or more of the five authorized levels of mobilization. This chapter addresses the authority and levels of mobilization, the five-phased mobilization process, requirements determination (forces, manpower, and logistics), resources available to mobilize, and premobilization planning.

MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY

Mobilization authority is cited under applicable sections of United States Code (USC), Title 10. Law and policies are designed to differentiate between premobilization options and mobilization force expansion options.

Certain policies and programs which instantly increase unit resources and readiness are available only when the President authorizes the mobilization of the reserve components of the military service or alerts the AC concurrent with a declaration of national emergency or war.

The levels of mobilization are not necessarily sequential. Prior to the authorization of any mobilization level, the active Army can be augmented by retirees and RC volunteers to perform any operational mission.

Five ARNG personnel of the 228th Signal Brigade (South Carolina Army National Guard) were the first volunteers deployed to Operation Desert Shield.

On the third day of Operation Just Cause, the US Army Reserve was tasked to form a joint staff civil-military operations task force (CMOTF). Since the NCA had not authorized any call-up or mobilization of reserve units, this organization had to be filled with volunteers from USAR civil affairs units and the Individual Ready Reserve. From over 700 volunteers, 311 reservists were selected for this mission and deployed to Panama.

Retired members with 20 years or more active duty service can be recalled involuntarily under 10 USC 688(a) by direction of the Secretary of the Army at any time. Any reserve member may also volunteer under 10 USC 672(d) to augment the active Army. Budgetary constraints, length of tour, and, in the case of retired members, end-strength ceilings also impact on this decision process. Figure 3-1 provides a summation of various mobilization authorities.

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

During a crisis situation, starting with the PSRC and/or partial mobilization, those authorities maintained at HQDA and MACOM level for emergency actions need to be provided to installations to increase the installations' abilities to provide mission support consistent with the situation and current directives. To assist in this action, installations maintain a list of those authorities which could provide more flexibility in supporting the mission.

FUNDING AUTHORITY

When RC units are ordered to active duty, funding authority remains in formal AC channels and is accounted for under normal procedures unless otherwise directed. RC appropriations will fund all actions between the time of alert and the time the units enter active duty. Following entry on active duty, Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) or Military Personnel Appropriations (MPA) funds will fund RC units while they are on federal active service.

The appropriate supporting installation (IAW AR 5-9[1]) will provide OMA funding from the effective date of the mobilization order until the RC units depart for their mobilization stations. Thereafter, the mobilization stations provide funding primarily from OMA and MPA funds. The reserve appropriation (Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve [OMAR]; Operation and Maintenance, National Guard [OMNG]; and RPA/National Guard Personnel Army [NGPA]) will resume funding of RC units once they are released from active duty service.

MOBILIZATION LEVELS

A key aspect of the mobilization level concept is the graduated mobilization response. GMR is a flexible decision making process. It triggers five levels of response options which can be adjusted to the degree of severity and ambiguity of warning indicators or an event. These options allow the government to take small or large, often reversible, steps to increase our national security emergency preparedness posture.

GMR actions enhance deterrence, mitigate the impact of an event or crisis, and significantly reduce the lead time associated with a mobilization if the crisis intensifies. When planning, commanders should understand that a lower level of mobilization does not necessarily precede a higher level of mobilization.

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALL-UP

By executive order, the President may augment the active duty forces for an operational mission with up to **200,000** members of the Selected Reserve of the armed forces for 90 days, with an extension of up to 90 additional days. Units and individuals of the Selected Reserve may be involuntarily called up under provisions of 10 USC 673(b). The President may also consider using volunteers under 10 USC 672(d) and/or activating retirees under 10 USC 688.

A PSRC does not require a declaration of national emergency; however, the President must report to Congress within 24 hours on the current situation and anticipated use of the forces called.

[1] *Intraservice Support Installation Area Coordinator,* 1 March 1984.

SITUATION	ACTION REQUIRED	AUTHORITY	PERSONNEL INVOLVED	REMARKS
1. Any requirement	Operation order	Commander-in-chief	Active duty force.	Used for any military purpose
2. Any level of emergency	Publish order to active duty.	10 USC 672 (d) 10 USC 688 (a)	Volunteers from National Guard and Reserves. Retired members of the Regular Army and Army Reserve with 20 years of active service. May be ordered to active service involuntarily.	May be used for any lawful purpose. Consent of the governor is required for ARNG members serving under 10 USC 672 (d).
3. Operational mission requiring augmentation of active force (Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up)	Presidential Executive Order	10 USC 673 (b)	Units and individuals of Selected Reserve (NG & USAR); limited to 200,000 (all services) for up to 90 days and extendable for another 90 days.	President must report to Congress within 24 hours of circumstances and anticipated use of forces. May not be used in lieu of a call-up (10 USC 331 et seq, 3500, 8500) or for disaster relief.
4. Contingency operation, war plan, national emergency (partial mobilization)	Presidential proclamation of a national emergency and executive order	10 USC 637	Ready Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve (NG and USAR); limited to 1,000,000 (all services) for up to 2 years.	President may extend appointments, enlistments and periods of service when Congress is not in session. 10 USC 671 (b).
5. War or national emergency (full or total mobilization)	Passage of a public law or joint resolution by the Congress declaring war or national emergency	10 USC 671 (a) 10 USC 672 10 USC 674 10 USC 675	National Guard and Reserve units, Individual Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, members of Retired Reserve. No numerical or time limitation unless established by Congress	May extend enlistments in Regular and Reserve forces and extend period of active service for duration of the war plus 6 months
6. Domestic emergency. 10 (Selective mobilization)	Presidential proclaimation to disperse under 10 USC 334 and executive order under 10 USC appropriate to purpose of the call	10 USC 3500 10 USC 8500 10 USC 331 10 USC 332 10 USC 333	National Guard and Reserves	May be used for Federal aid to states in case of insurrection (10 USC 331); to enforce federal authority (10 USC 332); to suppress interference with state and federal law (10 USC 333).

Figure 3-1. Mobilization Authorities

PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

Partial mobilization requires a presidential or congressional declaration of a state of national emergency. A partial mobilization may occur without a PSRC. Under a presidential declaration of national emergency (10 USC 673), up to one million members of the Ready Reserve may be mobilized/recalled for up to 24 months. A congressional declaration of national emergency and subsequent reserve mobilization under 10 USC 672(a) is not limited to a specific number of reservists or length of tour unless specified in a congressional resolution.

FULL MOBILIZATION

Full mobilization authorizes the call-up of all forces in the current force structure to active duty, fully equipped, manned, and sustained. Planners for full mobilization assume that actions for PSRC and/or partial mobilization have been completed and that Congress has declared that either a state of national emergency or war exists (10 USC 672(a)).

DOD and other federal agencies will initiate industrial mobilization and support to allies as required. All RC units and individuals of the IRR, Standby, and Retired Reserve may be ordered to active duty. The length of service is for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter (10 USC 671(a), 672(a), 675, and 688).

TOTAL MOBILIZATION

Total mobilization expands the active armed forces by organizing and activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop structure when responding to requirements exceeding the current troop structure. All additional resources needed, including production facilities, may be mobilized to support and sustain the armed forces.

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

Selective mobilization is an expansion of active duty forces in response to a peacetime domestic crisis. The President, or Congress, upon special action, may order expansion of the active duty forces by mobilizing units and individuals of the Selected Reserve to protect life, federal property, and functions or to prevent disruption of federal activities. An example of this authority was in early 1970 when RC units were mobilized as part of Operation Graphic Hand.

Operation Graphic Hand was an execution of an augmentation plan designed to augment the US Post Office in response to postal strikes. The National Guard was called into federal service to suppress insurrection, unlawful obstruction or rebellion, conspiracy, and infringements of civil rights and to repel invasion or execute the laws under the legal authorities of 10 USC 331, 332, 333, 3500, and 8500.

In May 1992 elements of the California National Guard were federalized in response to the Los Angeles riots as part *of Operation Garden Plot. Federalization, in this case, provided unity of command for active components and ARNG units deployed to Los Angeles.*

MOBILIZATION PHASES

The five phases of mobilization are planning, alert, home station (HS), mobilization station, and port of embarkation (POE). See Figure 3-2.

PHASE I - PLANNING

This phase concerns all AC and RC efforts during peacetime to plan, train, and prepare to accomplish assigned mobilization and deployment tasks. Force planning is a process designed to identify combat, CS, and CSS forces and to identify logistics requirements to support the combatant commander's OPLAN.

During Operation Desert Storm, the most significant expansion of a major subordinate command in VII Corps was in the 2d COSCOM. The austerity of the Southwest Asia theater and the corps tactical mission presented challenges that 2d COSCOM did not have in Europe. Major organizational adjustments, formation of provisional organizations, and recruitment and placement of key personnel allowed the COSCOM to expand in Southwest Asia to an operating level of over 25,000 soldiers.

Other corps forces, including military police, engineer, signal and military intelligence units, expanded to more than double their USAREUR size.

Force structure requirements must also include identification of resources (forces [units], manpower [individuals], and logistics) to allow supporting commanders to meet their mission, that is, for units to expand the training base (USAR training divisions and reception battalions); operate the CONUS CRCs, ports, and Army medical treatment facilities; and perform installation backfill and expansion.

Commanders, joint and service planners on the Army staff, MACOMs, and planners down to battalion and installation levels are responsible for planning and executing mobilization and deployment. This responsibility includes —

- Maintaining and improving combat readiness posture.
- Preparing mobilization plans and files as directed by higher headquarters.
- Providing required data to the mobilization station (MS).
- Ensuring unit movement data (UMD) accuracy.
- Conducting mobilization and deployment training as required.

Advance preparation that addresses the total spectrum of possible military operations will ensure effective and efficient mobilization of units, individuals, and logistics.

Support Planning

During the concept development phase of the deliberate planning process, the combatant commander provides his OPLAN concept of support planning guidance, which defines the project length of operation, force requirements, strategic lift requirements, supply buildup requirements, and anticipated supply priorities.

The OPLAN identifies key factors such as transportation priorities, available common- and cross-servicing command agreements, formalized bilateral and multilateral support agreements, personnel attrition factors, and ports of debarkation for planning strategic lift of forces and sustainment. Annex B of the JSCP provides logistics planning guidance for the CINC and identifies expected critical items.


Mobilization of Forces (Units)

Planning for mobilization of units must take into account the operational requirements, training requirements, equipment status, readiness of the units to be mobilized, and the impact of mobilization on soldiers, their families, and the community. Annex N of the JSCP provides mobilization planning guidance for synchronizing planning activities. Units will experience different levels of readiness due to structural changes, personnel posture, equipment transition, and training status. Units may have a number of untrained soldiers awaiting initial entry training, split-option trainees, and other nonmilitary occupational specialty (MOS)-qualified soldiers. Planning must include replacements for nondeployables whose condition cannot be corrected prior to unit deployment.

Logistically, units may lack all authorized equipment and supplies. They may be deficient in prescribed load lists (PLLs) or have a shortage of authorized equipment and supplies. These are inherent problems that unit commanders must contend with, and planners and installation commanders should understand as much. Commanders must plan for filling units that have some nondeployable soldiers and determine the disposition of nondeployable soldiers prior to their departure from the mobilization station.

Installations must plan for equipment transition and training and the additional resources required to conduct training. MACOM directives should detail all administrative, logistics, and training actions required to manage units in peacetime and to transition RC units to active duty. Installations should plan to effectively use nondeployables in CONUS/OCONUS sustaining positions. Effective planning and preparation will ensure rapid mobilization and subsequent rapid deployment.

The 265th Engineer Group (Georgia Army National Guard) and the 212th Engineer Company (Tennessee Army National Guard) were federalized on 21 November 1990. They completed validation, deployed, and closed into the Southwest Asia theater of operations in support of Operation Desert Shield on 12 December 1990. This process took a total of only three weeks as compared to the typical minimum of six weeks.



1 Available-to-load date.

2 Mobilization, deployment, and employment training.

3 POE Activities: port support (limited maintenance and UE preparation, staging, loading, strategic lift. Select mobilizing units conduct missions incident to Phase V deployments of other units (TTUs, DCUs, USAR schools, and so on).

Figure 3-2. Mobilization Process

Units without heavy equipment can be ready even quicker. The first US Army Reserve Civil Affairs companies needed in Southwest Asia were deployed less than a week after their activation. The average time between activation and deployment for Army Reserve units was 29 days.

During the planning phase, each unit completes as many administrative and personnel processing actions as possible before being ordered to active duty, for example, completion of all medical, dental, financial, and legal requirements. Family support activities and plans are also a major consideration. Specifically, for RC units, plans for follow-on phases must include —

- Completion of administrative actions necessary to incorporate reserve units into the active Army.
- Unit movement planning that provides ready movement to MS with associated ADP products to support strategic deployment of the unit.

Mobilization of Individuals

Based on the mobilization authorities expected, manpower planners assess the projected availability of pretrained and untrained military manpower as the military operation escalates through the various GMR options. Some categories of manpower are available without additional mobilization authority and can be planned for in the early stages of a crisis or operation. These categories include —

- Active duty soldiers in the trainee, transient, holdee, and student (TTHS) account.
- Volunteers from AC or RC units or activities.
- Volunteers and involuntarily recalled retirees.
- Volunteers from the IRR and Army civilians.

As a general rule, members of the IRR will be mobilized at installations that have the capability to provide them with required clothing issues and the training necessary to recertify them in their MOS and common soldier skills. Once certified (or trained), these soldiers are available for assignment. Other individuals, such as IMAs, civilians, and retirees recalled to active duty, report directly to their mobilization station and duty assignment.

Planners who plan for use of these soldiers must consider the manpower ceiling limits that may be in place in the early stages of a crisis or operation. Other categories of manpower require action of a presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency or war.

Logistics

Commanders and planners must look beyond mobilization. They must project the unit's theater requirements and provide the required support. In many cases a deploying unit should be able to sustain itself for a period of time after arrival within the theater. However, planners must consider those units deployed without all their authorized equipment and supplies.

Planners may include pre-positioned war reserve stock (PWRS) in the theater, at POEs, or afloat, thereby reducing logistical requirements and providing earlier force closure for stabilization operations. Planners should consider host nation support as a resource if appropriate.

Deploying task forces must carry some capability for self-sustainment. Armywide standards for consumable stocks for deploying units are based on doctrine and CINC OPLANs. Pre-positioned logistics may augment the supplies and equipment that accompany deploying units.

Initially deploying task forces may be confronted with virtually no logistics support in the AO. As the infrastructure and supply levels in the AO improve, the level of unit-based logistics effort may be eased as air and sea LOCs close for specific classes of supply. Total asset visibility and in-transit visibility of equipment and supplies is required to efficiently support this process.

Planners must consider the possibility of units being mobilized without an authorized stockage list/prescribed load list.

The 1072d Combat Service Support Company (Maintenance Nondivisional, Direct Support), Michigan ARNG, was called into federal service on 7 January 1991 and deployed to Germany on 22 January 1991. The unit was originally assigned on orders to the 2d Corps Support Command (COSCOM), VII Corps. In that most of VII Corps deployed to Southwest Asia, HQ VII Corps maintained that the 1072d belonged to V Corps, while V Corps maintained that it was a VII Corps unit. In an effort to resolve the confusion, 3d COSCOM, V Corps, purchased the 1072d's authorized stockage list (ASL) from the 2d COSCOM, VII Corps.

Using service planning guidelines and service doctrine, support planners determine the quantities of supplies and services identified by a broad category to support a major regional contingency (MRC) or a lesser regional contingency (LRC). When strategical y deploying supplies, one must remember that sustainment supplies do not necessarily originate or follow the same LOCs that units and personnel use. Some supplies (POL and ammunition) require special facilities and cannot be off-loaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activity.

Additionally, the expected intensity of conflict and regional peculiarities may affect levels of certain commodities, services, or closures of supply. Before OPLAN completion and definitely before OPORD execution, logistics and personnel planners attempt to refine these requirements for strategic lift. This refinement is an iterative process that continues to ensure that the commander's intent and priorities are met.

Support requirements include supplies, equipment, materiel, and replacement personnel for the forces. Requirements include civil engineerring, medical, special, and enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) materials and civil affairs supplies and equipment. (These requirements include support for displaced civilians and refugees.) Support planning is complete when all significant supplies, equipment, and personnel requirements have been determined, consolidated by the joint force command (JFC), and entered into the TPFDD.

Though host nation and contract support (sustainment support, facilities, labor, and services) reduce strategic lift requirements for CSS units, they demand the JPEC community to program early deploying personnel who are authorized to purchase goods and services, let contracts, and render payments. When strategically deploying supplies, one must remember that sustainment supplies do not necessarily originate or follow the same LOCs since some supplies (POL and ammunition) require special facilities and cannot be off-loaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activity. The JFC competes with time in having available and sustainable the appropriate mix and quantity of forces.

Planners must identify joint and/or combined logistics requirements as quickly as possible so that scarce resources can be distributed throughout the force. The supported CINC can establish an executive agency to meet the demands of joint and/or combined operations. The logistics structure and service component logistics C^2 headquarters is essential for operational and tactical planning and execution.

Theater logistics planners must establish a theater distribution plan as soon as possible. Establishing priorities helps reduce competition for strategic lift and defines TPFDD sustainment requirements. Planners must include Army operational level logistics and support units in deployment plans to ensure logistics support ashore.

Many Army logistics and support units will likely have joint and possibly combined logistics responsibilities. Command, control, and composition of EAC logistics units are tailored for the situation. At the EAC level, commanders and planners must take maximum advantage of available host nation infrastructure and contracted logistics support. In noncombat, nation assistance missions, elements from COSCOMs may be the predominant mobilized and deployed forces.

Maximum advantage must be taken of available host nation infrastructure and contracted logistics support.

In that a "known" host nation support infrastructure existed within South west Asia, that is, ports and airfields, the early mobilization of some types of support units was not required.

Family Support

A critical component in planning for mobilization is the requirement to provide family support activities. Installation or unit commanders should implement, reevaluate, or adjust, as necessary, family care plans to provide adequate care for dependent family members of single parents and dual military service couples. Continued family support is required not only for families of soldiers assigned to the installation but also for families of RC soldiers, DA civilians, and other service members' families. Active installations or family assistance centers established by other commands may assist these families.

Installation commanders are required to provide family support for families of active component soldiers assigned to the installation and for families of reserve component soldiers, DA civilians, and other service members' families.

With the significant influx of mobilized soldiers at Fort Bragg, NC, the installation was required to significantly expand family support services to support family members of recently mobilized soldiers.

PHASE II - ALERT

This phase of mobilization begins when a unit re-receives notice of a pending order. To ease the burden on mobilization stations after partial mobilization is declared, state area commands (STARCs) and Army Reserve commands (ARCOMs), after approval by DA DCSOPS, cross-level individuals and equipment from within their state or region to bring alerted units to minimum deployability criteria. When these commands initiate cross-leveling, they must notify the appropriate chain of command, to include DA DCSOPS. Figure 3-3 shows the mobilization notification process.

Actions to complete the administrative and personnel processing actions begun in Phase I are implemented. Completion of these actions, which include final screening, are essential during the alert phase. This phase ends with the RC unit's entry on active duty at the home station or in the case of an AC unit, preparation for deployment. DA, through PERSCOM and ARPERCEN, will plan to fill individual requirements from the IRR and Retired Reserve.

PHASE III - HOME STATION

This phase begins with the RC unit's entry on active federal duty and/or the AC preparation for deployment. In some cases the HS may serve as an appropriate mobilization station, thereby permitting direct movement to the POE. Inventory of unit property, dispatch of an advance party to the MS, and loading out-either on organic equipment or on designated movement vehicles-are provided through coordination with the STARC defense movement coordinator (DMC), unit movement coordinator (UMC), ITOs, and MTMC.

Units with early deployment missions may be required to go directly from their home station to the POE. Therefore, home stations may serve as appropriate mobilization stations.

The advance party of the 1185th Transportation Terminal Unit (TTU) was already on its way to annual training (AT) at Wilmington, NC, when the unit got word that they were being diverted to Savannah, GA, to outload the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) for duty in the Persian Gulf. The USAR unit from Lancaster, PA, immediately departed for Savannah and began loading military equipment and cargo. As their two-week AT drew to a close, the President had not yet invoked the authority to recall the Selected Reserve. Based on MTMC's concern that it could not meet the 24th Division's deployment schedule without the continued support of the 1185th, the unit's AT period was extended 30 days. Finally, on 27 August, the unit was recalled to active duty under the PSRC, and the outload of the 24th Division was completed several days ahead of schedule. It then operated several other gulf and east coast ports until it deployed to Rotterdam to load out one-third of VII Corps for Saudi Arabia. Finally, eleven months after leaving home for a two-week training period, the 1185th TTU was returned home and demobilized.

During this phase, units take actions to speed transition to active duty status. Units required to convoy to the mobilization station request convoy approval from the state movement control center, which provides an approved convoy movement order using mobilization movement control. This phase ends when the unit arrives at the MS or is deployed.

Identification of shortages of critical personnel and equipment must be completed at the home station to ensure an efficient transition to active duty.

In the case of the Army Reserve's 138th Aviation Company (EW) from Orlando, FL, it was not the shortage of equipment that caused a problem, but the required changeover of equipment. The unit's combat intelligence systems had been replaced with systems more appropriate to the counterdrug missions they had been performing for Joint Task Force 6. Within 30 days of its activation, the 138th disengaged from the drug war, reinstalled its modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) electronic warfare gear, self-deployed to Saudi Arabia, and initiated signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations against Iraq.

The 199th Medical Company (Air Ambulance), Florida Army National Guard, was mobilized on 1 February 1991 to support Operation Desert Storm. The unit's mission was to provide aeromedical evacuation site support from Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart, Fort Pickett, Charleston Air Force Base, and Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station. However, the company had limited experience for this medical evacuation mission. Only three months prior to this assignment, the company had been converted from a combat assault company to an air ambulance company. The company found itself short in qualified flight medics and flight operations specialists. Additionally, it did not have the required medical equipment sets and was short 3 aircraft, 12 rescue hoists, and a wrecker. The company was augmented by a detachment from the Kentucky Army National Guard in order to perform its assigned mission.

PHASE IV - MOBILIZATION STATION

This phase begins when the unit arrives at the mobilization station or mobilization site and encompasses all actions required to meet deployment criteria or other unit validation criteria, resulting in assurance of the unit's mission capability. Depending on the situation, units may or may not move through a fully established mobilization station.

Upon arrival of an RC unit, command of the unit passes, with the exception of ARSOF units, from the CONUSA to the installation of appropriate authority. Actions include processing personnel and equipment. Necessary individual and collective training are conducted and may vary as evaluations and circumstances dictate. To ensure sufficient time to accomplish all tasks, MS commanders should verify any training and/or processing completed at the HS to preclude repeating such training and/or processing at the MS. Additional training may vary as evaluation dictates. The goal of the unit during this phase is to achieve mission capability in the shortest possible time consistent with its planned deployment.

The primary objective of all actions at the mobilization station is to achieve mission-capable status in the shortest possible time.

Within 18 days of its activation, the 3d Battalion, 87th Infantry, an Army Reserve unit headquartered at Fort Collins, CO, was validated and deployed to Europe to replace VII Corps elements departing for Southwest Asia. This was the only reserve component combat maneuver unit mobilized during Operation Desert Storm.

By 15 December 1990 (within 24 days after activation), the 142d Field Artillery Brigade (Arkansas National Guard), had all of its equipment at the port of embarkation (Galveston, TX). At the mobilization station, the unit borrowed equipment to conduct training and validation efforts. On 16 January 1992, the brigade deployed to Southwest Asia.

All units must conduct and continually update preparation for overseas movement (POM) and Soldier Readiness Program activities. Unit preparation includes using the TC ACCIS to maintain and update unit movement data based on equipment/personnel deployment preparation activities.

This phase terminates when the unit arrives at the POE. Nondeployers report directly to their mobilization stations or mobilization sites and are assigned to their gaining MACOM for mission assignment. Unit members at mobilization sites are accessioned to active duty through coordination with the unit's supporting installation.

To expedite deployment, all units must be prepared to successfully complete soldier readiness and POM activities at the mobilization station.

The 217th Maintenance Battalion (DS/GS), Arkansas National Guard, mobilized for Operation Desert Storm and experienced significant problems at the mobilization station. Upon arrival, the unit was identified as being "short" many critical items of equipment. These items had to be procured from both the active military and reserve units from other states. Additionally, personnel screening was not conducted prior to arrival at the mobilization station, which resulted in some personnel not being able to deploy. Wills and powers of




Figure 3-3. Mobilization Notification Process

attorney were also *not created at the HS and required significant effort at the mobilization station. Incompatible automated personnel systems between active and reserve forces also caused duplication of records and efforts.*

PHASE V - PORT OF EMBARKATION

This phase begins with arrival of the unit at its POE. Actions at the SPOE or APOE include preparing and loading equipment, as well as manifesting and loading personnel. The POE phase ends with departure of personnel and equipment from the POE.

FORCE REQUIREMENTS

Force requirements to support specific OPLANs are identified through the joint planning process. The JSCP apportions the notional major combat unit types (above-the-line forces) available to the combatant commander. The services/forces specify the actual units which will be provided to the combatant commander, as well as the required CS/CSS units (below-the-line forces).

CAPSTONE ALIGNMENT

The Army CAPSTONE Program organizes and integrates active and reserve units to meet Total Army wartime requirements. CAPSTONE alignments are a direct result of the deliberate planning process and support the execution of the approved OPLANs. CAPSTONE aligns units based on HQDA guidance and combatant commander stated requirements and priorities for resourcing as listed on the approved OPLAN TPFDD.

Of the 145,000 soldiers assigned to VII Corps at peak strength during Operation Desert Storm, less than one third deployed under VII Corps control. Nearly half of the Corps strength, including critical combat support and combat service support (CSS) units deployed from CONUS and OCONUS locations.

The CONUS sustaining base units are those units identified as necessary to run the CONUS sustaining base and support the mobilization concept. During contingency operations, the combatant commander's operational requirements will determine the forces allocated for a specific operation.

ROUNDOUT UNITS

Roundout is a program where a unit from one Army component is organizationally aligned to a unit from another Army component to complete the organic structure of that parent unit. A roundout unit brings understructured units in another component to a designated MTOE organizational structure.

Roundout units are assigned a priority for allocation of resources through the DAMPL. DAMPL priority is consistent with the unit's strategic force package as published in The Army Plan (TAP).

Roundout units are organized and equipped the same as the parent unit. According to the supported CINC priorities, CONUS units programmed as roundouts for CONUS-based parent units will deploy with the parent unit or as soon as possible. CONUS units programmed as roundouts for OCONUS-based parent units will deploy according to supported CINC priorities.

RC units designated as roundout to CONUS AC units will receive Directed Training Association (DTA) sponsorship from the parent AC unit. FORSCOM prescribes DTA sponsorship for RC units roundout to another RC unit or roundout to an OCONUS AC parent unit.

ROUNDUP UNITS

Roundup is a program wherein an RC unit is organizationally aligned to a fully structured AC unit to provide the parent unit robustness and increased employment flexibility.

Roundup units are assigned a priority for allocation of resources through the DAMPL. DAMPL priority will be consistent with the unit's strategic force package as published in the TAP. Roundup units receive DTA sponsorship from the parent AC unit.

Roundup units may be employed as a separate unit; however, they are aligned as a doctrinal fourth maneuver brigade to an active Army division.

Although extraordinary measures were taken to ensure the combat readiness of the three roundout brigades, they were able to reach deployable status much quicker than any previous mobilization.

INDIVIDUAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

The requirement for individual manpower falls into the following four categories:

- Military manpower requirements to bring an active Army or mobilized RC unit to the approved authorized levels of manning (ALO).
- Military manpower requirements for unit filler and casualty replacements to allow forward-presence units to achieve wartime requirements and to replace anticipated casualties.
- Civilian manpower requirements to meet expanded missions within the sustaining base and to support requirements of the supported combatant commander.
- Military and/or civilian manpower requirements for Army activities to meet sustaining base requirements for the expanded and deployed forces.

Plans for contingencies arc continuously updated and sources of individual manpower to support these contingencies must be continually identified. The following are sources of individual manpower to meet requirements.

TRAINEES, TRANSIENTS, HOLDEES, AND STUDENTS

The most readily available source of personnel is the TTHS account. Soldiers in the TTHS account may be assigned by the PERSCOM commander to meet worldwide requirements at any level of mobilization.

Trainees

Trainees include all soldiers in initial-entry training (IET) or MOS-reclassification training. They are not available until graduation from their MOS-producing school and, by law, may not be deployed OCONUS in other than peacetime until they have completed at least twelve weeks of military training.

Transients

Transients are soldiers who have departed their previous permanent duty station en route to a new assignment but who have not yet reported to their new assignment.

Holdees

Holdees are soldiers assigned to medical holding detachments or to confinement facilities or who are assigned to separation facilities while awaiting discharge.

Students

Students are soldiers undergoing either military or civilian courses of instruction other than IET. Included in this category are —

- Officer active duty obligors (OADO) enrolled in officer basic courses, advanced courses, or higher level military schooling.
- Cadets at the United States Military Academy (USMA).
- Cadets enrolled in officer candidate school (OCS).

USMA cadets and officer candidates are not available for assignment until after completion of branch qualification. AMOPES provides details as to which trainee or student courses are discontinued at the various levels of GMR.

INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTERS

Individual mobilization augmenters (IMAs) are members of the Selected Reserve who are preassigned to active component positions which must be filled on or shortly after mobilization. IMAs are available for call-up as part of the PSRC or any other level of

mobilization. IMAs may volunteer for active duty at any time.

VOLUNTEERS

As a general rule, RC soldiers, regardless of affiliation, may volunteer for active duty at any time under 10 USC 672(d). Appropriate commands must approve members of reserve units (ARNG and USAR) and IMAs by verifying that loss of the soldiers will not impact on the unit's capability to perform its mobilization mission. Retirees and IRR members must coordinate with the ARPERCEN commander in order to volunteer. End strengths and funding ceilings in place will restrict the number of volunteers approved in each category.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is composed of trained nonunit reserve personnel who are liable for involuntary active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or by the President. In peacetime, the IRR is commanded by the ARPERCEN commander.

Upon declaration of partial mobilization or full mobilization, IRR members are ordered to active duty as individual fillers or replacements in accordance with priorities set by DA. IRRs may volunteer for active duty at any time.

INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD

Inactive National Guard (ING) are members of the ARNG in an inactive status. Although attached to a specific unit for administrative purposes, they are not part of the Selected Reserve and do not participate in unit activities. They are available for involuntary active duty with the declaration of partial mobilization or a higher level of mobilization. Whereas IRR soldiers are ordered to active duty as individuals, ING soldiers are ordered to active duty as members of the ARNG units to which they are attached.

RETIRED RESERVE

Retired soldiers who have completed 20 years of active duty are subject to recall to active duty at any time the Secretary of the Army determines a need. These retirees are a valuable source of trained manpower. They are available for most military assignments and deployments subject to physical or other restrictions dictated by Department of the Army, as well as the replenishment of critical civilian positions. All other retirees are also available at the discretion of the SECDEF, but only after Congress has declared war or a national emergency.

Retirees may volunteer for active duty to meet specific operational requirements at any time; however, recall to active duty is subject to approval on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary of the Army.

STANDBY RESERVE

The Standby Reserve consists of officer and enlisted soldiers with or without a remaining military service obligation (MSO) but who have no statutory requirements for peacetime training. Members of the Standby Reserve cannot be involuntarily ordered to active duty under less than a full mobilization.

TEMPORARY APPOINTEES

Temporary appointments as commissioned officers may be proffered by the service secretaries to highly qualified civilians who have entered active duty involuntarily through conscription or who volunteer for such duty. Such temporary appointments are normally reserved for individuals possessing unique educational, scientific, or other skills which cannot otherwise be obtained by the military. While not restricted for use at an initial level of GMR, temporary appointments are not normally offered at levels of less than full mobilization. Temporary appointees are not deployable OCONUS during war unless they have completed a minimum of 12 weeks of military training.

CONSCRIPTS

The SECDEF recommends to the President and to Congress the institution of involuntary conscription of civilians for training and use as military personnel. A request for conscription authority is based on overall manpower requirements and is not tied to a particular level of mobilization. The decision to return to filling military manpower requirements with conscripts may be made at any level of GMR or may be made for other reasons.

If conscription is authorized, its equitable instatement is the responsibility of the Selective Service System, which maintains current data on all males who are US citizens or resident aliens who have reached their eighteenth birthday. Civilians eligible for induction (involuntary entry on active duty) are males between 18 ½ and 26 years of age who have completed fewer than 24 months prior active duty or Selected Reserve service. Based on requirements of the DOD, the age of eligibility may be expanded, or selected conscription of civilians possessing specific skills could be authorized by Congress.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Planning for requirements supported by DA civilians and contractors includes identification of requirements and qualified personnel to fill requirements. Civilian planning is incorporated into the Total Army and must take into account the use of civilians, who provide essential CS and CSS roles in a theater. Civilians require the same considerations for training, individual readiness, equipping, deploying, sustaining, and redeploying as the military. DOD 1404.10(D)[2] gives instructions for deploying civilians. Appropriate proponents must accomplish deliberate or structured planning for civilian involvement in order to have identified civilian requirements filled in a timely manner. Categories of civilian manpower available include—

- Department of Defense civilians.
- Department of the Army civilians.
- Employees of the American Red Cross.
- Employees of vendors and contractors.

This civilian work force includes CONUS expansion and OCONUS requirements in support of military operations. In the event of full or total mobilization, civilians from the private sector mobilized in support of US government objectives are also considered a part of the civilian work force, although not necessarily employed directly by DOD or its elements. At any level of GMR, appropriated fund and nonappropriated fund retirees may be invited to return to active service, as long as established manpower ceilings and budget constraints are not exceeded.

CONTRACTORS

Contractors have served the Army well, both during peacetime and during crises, and will be available for future operations. The most common use of civilian contractors is their employment as technical representatives and maintainers of sophisticated, high-dollar equipment. However, contractors' use is limited only by the requirement for services which can best be provided by contractors.

A successful program for using contractors is the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP uses civilian contractors for transportation, construction, and a variety of other services. Using LOGCAP releases military units for other missions or resolves Army capability shortfalls. LOGCAP applies during CONUS mobilization to assist the CONUS support base and units in their readiness preparation.

FILLER REQUIREMENTS FOR ACTIVE ARMY AND MOBILIZED RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS

Manpower requirements to fill active Army and mobilized RC units to the appropriate wartime requirements is derived from personnel reports and update reports from units at home stations and mobilization stations prior to movement. The installation commander is responsible for determining the fill requirements for assigned units and reporting shortages that cannot be filled internally.

FILLER AND CASUALTY REPLACEMENTS

The ASCC of the supported combatant command is responsible for determining the number of filler personnel required for forward-presence units to bring them to required ALO. The ASCC determines this by comparing the wartime required strengths of all units in the AO with their peacetime authorized strengths.

The ASCC reports the difference between wartime required and peacetime authorized in the AO to the PERSCOM commander as the filler requirement. Experience shows that units deployed to an AO at less than required strength require additional fillers to be mission-capable. The ASCC of the supporting combatant command or CONUS MACOM reports the actual strength of deploying units to PERSCOM so that filler requirements can be met by increasing the number of individuals identified for movement.

SUSTAINING BASE MANPOWER

Planners identify sustaining base manpower requirements in the deliberate planning process by constructing comprehensive mobilization tables of distribution and allowances (MOBTDAs).

AR 310-49[3] provides detailed guidance for preparing a MOBTDA. Requirements for IMA positions and military and civilian augmenters are all reflected on the MOBTDA. Military positions are considered suitable for fill by retirees unless coded to the contrary. Properly prepared MOBTDAs support both the assignment of IMAs, sustaining manpower requirements, and preassignment of retirees.

[2] *Emergency Essential DOD US Citizen Employees Overseas,* 6 April 1990.

[3] *The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS),* 15 December 1980.

The activity mobilization planner reviews the document and identifies separately those positions which are required at each level of GMR. This review allows for the rapid generation of requests for overstrength manning with RC volunteers and retirees at the lowest level of GMR. It also allows for requesting augmentation with RC volunteers and retirees beyond assigned IMAs.

PERSONNEL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

Requirements for soldier and DA civilian support vary considerably, depending on the nature and scope of the operation or conflict. Requirements include the functions of soldier readiness, medical and dental support, postal support, MWR support, public affairs, legal support, family assistance support, and finance support.

SOLDIER READINESS

Commanders are responsible for ensuring all soldiers meet soldier readiness requirements and standards. This process includes meeting specified legal, medical, and administrative standards.

MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPORT

Mobilized RC soldiers and recalled retirees may report to the MS requiring additional medical or dental support to bring them to deployable standards. Medical and dental facilities at the MS must be prepared to provide extensive optical, dental, and other care to correct medical disorders of the mobilized force. Medical and dental facilities also prepare to meet the increased requirement of providing support to the families of mobilized soldiers. This heavy workload comes at the same time Professional Officer Filler System (PROFIS) personnel are taken from the installation hospitals to deploy with units.

LEGAL SUPPORT

Commanders and their staff judge advocates (SJAs) position legal personnel throughout their AOR to provide responsive legal service when and where needed. To help support mobilization, commanders must identify legal support personnel requirements on the MOBTDA. Reserve component judge advocate general (JAG) service legal assistance teams are also available for this mission.

As an example, many soldiers deployed to Operation Desert Storm required specific updates to legal documentation, that is, wills, powers of attorney, and so forth. The majority of this support was provided by reserve SJA units such as the Army Reserve's 218th JAG Detachment from Bismarck, ND, which served at Fort Sill, OK.

POSTAL SERVICES

Postal services, to include postal finance (stamps, money orders, and registered, insured, and certified mail) are provided as far forward as possible, usually to brigade level. The extent of service depends on the theater postal policy, the tactical situation, the number of DS postal units, and the size of the area served.

Adequate postal structure must be established early in the theater before the volume of mail reaches unmanageable proportions. The postal network provides mail service to sister services and allied forces, as required. The network arranges transfer of mail to and through allied country postal systems to international locations.

MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION

The mission of MWR activities is to assist the commanders in maintaining morale, esprit de corps, health, and the mental and physical fitness of their soldiers and civilians. Success in this effort will, in turn, contribute to combat readiness.

The JTF command, in coordination with the Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), plans for and supports exchange operations. These plans may include a combination of direct retail operations in the communications zone (COMMZ), tactical field exchanges operated by dedicated Army personnel, or AAFES imprest fund activities operated by unit personnel.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Today's instantaneous communications ensure that the probability of combat operations will generate a demand for immediate information from soldiers, DA civilians, their families, and the media. DOD makes policy decisions pertaining to media activities.

Commanders must have plans to increase Public Affairs (PA) staffs to meet the increased Command Information (CI) needs. The PA staff must have contingency plans to expand the CI program and to respond to media demands for assistance in covering military operations. A credible and timely CI program increases individual morale and readiness.

The media's right and obligation to report on military operations, and the individual's need to know, must be balanced with security concerns. See FM 46-1[4] for additional information on PA operations.

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

Religious support is provided for all assigned soldiers, family members, and authorized DA civilians by unit ministry teams (UMT). Early deployment of the senior chaplain staff is essential for coordination and execution of the commander's theater religious support plan. UMTs assist in alleviating stress and enhance the soldier's religious faith during all phases of an operation, including preparation for redeployment. Early coordination with local community churches provides additional help in providing support to families.

Providing religious support to families of deploying and deployed soldiers is a critical mobilization mission of garrison table of distribution and allowances (TDA) UMTs. Sufficient installation postmobilization staffing must be provided. This staffing ensures an adequate number of trained UMTs filling MOBTDAs to provide family support after deployment. STARC and MUSARC chaplains must be activated as soon as possible to manage family religious support programs where active installations are not immediately available.

FINANCE SUPPORT

Timely and accurate finance support during mobilization is critical to overall unit and individual soldier success. Unit commanders and finance personnel —

- Coordinate with ARPERCEN to ensure essential pay information is included in individual mobilization orders.
- Promptly convert soldiers from RC status to AC status on JUMPS/JSS.
- Start new entitlements, pay options, and allotments.
- Assist in establishing soldiers' SURE-PAY accounts, support allotments and, where appropriate, powers of attorney.

Timely, accurate finance support to the soldier and the unit, as well as families and communities at home, is critical to successful operations.

FAMILY ASSISTANCE

Family assistance centers must be created early and remain in operation during the entire MDRD process. Maximum emphasis must be placed on communication with families, resolution of problems experienced by families, and, as much as possible, involvement of families in the Total Army community. Family support for active components, reserve components, and civilians is a total community effort.

Commanders must stress the importance of family care planning and the requirement to initiate a family care plan in accordance with AR 600-20.[5] Agencies such as family assistance centers, family support groups, rear detachments, and Army Community Services are available to assist soldiers, Army civilians, and their families.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS

Logistical requirements for mobilization include all those requirements for materiel, supplies, services, and soldier support activities to accomplish the mobilization process. Additionally, the requirement for logistical support extends on a continuous basis throughout mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization.

Army units will maintain automated unit equipment lists (AUELs) containing mobilization movement requirements data in accordance with appropriate command guidance. Units will maintain accurate unit movement data at all times during deliberate planning to reflect home-station-to-mobilization-station movement requirements. Units will update data as significant transportation changes occur to the unit's equipment list.

The TC ACCIS supports the collection of detailed movements data and allows for electronic submission of the information to USTRANSCOM for scheduling

[4] *Public Affairs,* 11 April 1986.
[5] *Army Command Policy,* 30 March 1988.

strategic transportation and to MACOMs for planning force movements.

Materiel requirements encompass equipment and supplies, generally end items, required by units for mobilization and deployment. Planners must recognize that RC units may not possess unit ASLs/PLLs. Mobilization materiel plans address these requirements and how to meet them. When OPLANs specify the support relationship, the USAMC Materiel Readiness Support Activity (MRSA) computes the ASL for the direct support unit and provides a copy to the unit and the theater. USAMC retains responsibility for computing RC nondivisional ASLs for units not assigned to a specific theater.

Commanders and planners at all levels must ensure that requirements are accurately stated and documented. The most immediate requirement is installation support to early deploying units/troops. This support includes immediate repair or replacement of equipment and provision of basic loads and other accompanying supplies. The installation requisitions or cross-levels from other installations or organizations items that it cannot provide immediately. Planners need to plan for host nation support but not rely upon it totally.

Logistics policies and procedures should be in place prior to mobilization to ensure that all supply and equipment requirements can be met.

Many National Guard and Army Reserve transportation units were short of trucks when mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. Where possible, the Army redistributed equipment in nonmobilized units to bring mobilized units up to full authorization. When shortages persisted, DA assigned vehicles from assembly lines. The 1461st Light Truck Company (Michigan National Guard) and the 253d Light/ Medium Truck Company (New Jersey National Guard) were sent to the factory to pick up 96 new M939A2 and M923A2 trucks and deliver them to various RC units.

As RC units and individuals are mobilized with existing authorization levels, and while funding levels are adjusted, the use of priority codes may be authorized. Mass cancellation of open requisitions must be avoided as it increases paperwork. Units should simply upgrade the priority and change the delivery location. Commanders must ensure that equipment is available and operationally ready and that basic loads of all classes of supply are available for issue. Mobilization stations should be prepared to modify equipment, as determined by materiel developers and materiel change regulatory guidance.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

HQDA, TRADOC, USASOC, and US Army Health Services Command (HSC) publish plans, policies, and procedures for conducting individual training and expanding the training base during each level of mobilization. Training base courses are expanded to meet Total Army trained manpower requirements for a JCS conflict scenario. This expansion is in accordance with the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training developed for that scenario.

This program identifies all courses to be conducted. It provides data showing the projected, programmed requirements to meet the time-phased incremental training base output requirements determined for each scenario.

HQDA, TRADOC, and USASOC determine training base output requirements by comparing Total Army trained personnel requirements for the scenario against total personnel assets available. The training base may also provide mobile training teams and new equipment training teams to support special training requirements of deployed or deploying forces.

UNIT TRAINING

Unit training at the MS will be restricted by the time, equipment, facilities, and personnel available. The unit commander, in conjunction with the mobilization assistance team (MAT), determines his training priorities based on such factors as table of organization

and equipment (TOE) mission, capstone guidance, recommendations of the MAT, and Soldier Readiness Program requirements.

UNIT VALIDATION

The mobilization station commander is responsible for validating mobilized units. Unit validation is the process required to bring mobilized units to a required level of readiness prior to deployment. It includes assessments of each readiness area (personnel, materiel, and training). Generally, the validation standard is competency to perform mission-essential tasks. The commander completes unit validation in accordance with AMOPES and other appropriate guidance. The MS commander will validate ARSOF units and individuals based on recommendations and concurrence of the validation team representing the USASOC commander.

FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS

Facilities requirements for mobilization include all those requirements for existing facilities, space management, and expansion of the installation. These requirements may include the use of off-post facilities to support installation requirements, new construction, and inactivation or disposal of facilities in peacetime to support MDRD.

EXPANSION OF SEAPORTS

Transportation terminal units under command of USTRANSCOM/MTMC become responsible for military cargo loading documentation at ports which are not normally used by the military during peacetime. Other TTUs augment existing military ports, Rapid expansion of seaport operations is critical to deployment of equipment and supplies. These responsibilities include reception and staging of equipment, planning of loads, contracting of commercial support, supervision of the actual loading, documentation, and manifesting of cargo.

Systems are being developed to support ocean terminal operations cargo documentation and accountability. These systems will significantly streamline and enhance operations at these ports. All TTUs, along with supporting deployment control units and port security detachments, reside in the Army Reserve. Because of the crucial mission of these units, they must be brought onto active duty early to begin deploying forces rapidly.

In support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army mobilized, from the Army Reserve component, ten TTUs, three port security detachments, two deployment control units, one railway service unit, and other movement control elements. These units supported the entire east mast and gulf coast deployment from Bayonne, Wilmington, Savannah, Jacksonville, Houston/Beaumont, Charleston, Newport News, and Sunny Point. Several of these units were also deployed to Europe and Southwest Asia.

POWER PROJECTION PLATFORMS

The Army installations that support mobilization and deployment activities must be seen as power projection platforms. Included are the facilities and infrastructure to support MDRD. Mobilization stations deploy specified units and equipment; process, validate, and deploy mobilized units; and process and move individuals designated as nonunit-related personnel to CRCs. They may perform additional missions such as—

- Regional marshaling area support for deploying forces,
- POE/POD (port of debarkation) processing support (arrival/departure airfield control group [A/DACG] and port support activity [PSA]) at USTRANSCOM-directed POEs and PODs.

All installations that have either active Army units, RC individuals, or individual units mobilizing and deploying through are considered power projection platforms. These installations must have the required facilities in place to house, feed, train, and deploy the units.

These facilities include training, maintenance, supply, administration, billeting, and transportation. Prime examples of these facilities are —

- Airfields, railroads and railheads.
- Warehousing to support basic loads and additional requirements at staging areas.

- Facilities to support actual deployments, as A/DACG operations, ammunition holding areas, staging areas, and port facilities to support installation SPOE missions.

EXISTING FACILITIES

The immediate nature of force projection dictates that the facilities available to support the operation are those existing at the time the operation commences. Maximum use of all facilities is a must. Deploying units must vacate all barracks, administrative, and related facilities to provide space for mobilizing individuals and/or follow-on units.

During peacetime unit deployments as emergency deployment readiness exercises, units practice procedures wherein they clean the barracks, inventory and store personal items in a portion of the facility, and prepare for the next potential occupants. For actual deployment situations, additional existing facilities, such as service clubs or gymnasiums where latrine and shower facilities are located, are converted to barracks and provided to incoming units.

EXPANSION OF FACILITIES ON THE INSTALLATION

Expansion of facilities on the installation can be made through the use of pre-engineered building systems or other rapidly erectable light mobilization structures (RELMS). Another means of expansion is to lease buildings identified through the nonindustrial facilities (NIF) program.

When the real estate action cannot meet the required dates, the installation procurement office, for a limited period, can obtain the facility until the real estate action can be accomplished. The use of reduced space authorizations for unaccompanied enlisted housing can also provide additional barracks space.

ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

During mobilization, general environmental requirements and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements apply.

GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

During mobilization, all environmental requirements covered in AR 200-16 remain in effect unless waived by higher command. In some instances, environmental laws contain specific procedures for waivers of all or specific parts of the law under emergency conditions. Installations attempting to obtain waivers of this nature shall ensure the appropriate level of command is involved.

In lieu of waivers, commanders must adhere to local, state, and federal environmental requirements associated with routine and repetitive procedures such as fueling, maintaining, cleaning, and deploying forces to the MS and POE. These requirements include refueling stops en route, oil and lubricants associated with motor parks and maintenance shops, wash racks, and open-burning/open-detonation (OB/OD) at the MS training areas.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REQUIREMENTS

Mobilization plans may require a NEPA analysis prior to final approval of the plan. The NEPA analysis shall look at limitations during mobilization and include contingency plans where needed to meet environmental standards. Contingency plans shall be specific and include prenegotiated waivers with regulatory authorities, if waivers are deemed necessary. Waivers should be considered as a last resort; changes in processes and/or materiel shall be considered first.

OTHER MOBILIZATION CONSIDERATIONS

Other considerations during mobilization include industrial base expansion, financial management, contracting, and host nation support

INDUSTRIAL BASE EXPANSION

In accordance with HQDA guidance, USAMC, in coordination with DLA, plans industrial preparedness measures (IPMs) to satisfy mobilization requirements. Advance planning and early activation of the industrial base may be required for long lead time supplies and materiel, consumables, repairable, and replenishment troop support items.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

HQDA issues resource management guidance to MACOM commanders. This guidance defines how MACOMs and mobilizations stations should capture and cover costs. When guidance is issued, MACOM

[6] *Environmental Protection and Enhancement,* 23 April 1990.

commanders should receive reprogramming authority. Currency support for both the procurement process and organizational support in the AO are strongly tied to host nation support (HNS). Finance units are responsible for central funding operations. These operations include supplying US currency, treasury checks, foreign currency, military payment certificates, and precious metals (if necessary) for all ground forces in the AO.

Funding is necessary not only to support the procurement process but also to support combat payments, other activities (field exchanges, commissaries, APOs), and other services. Early liaison with the host nation banking industry is essential to accomplishing the central funding mission. Finance units create an OMA open allotment fund cite to fund the travel and per diem of mobilized IRR soldiers. Once they are loaded onto the Joint Uniform Military Pay System-Active Army (JUMPS-AA), IRR soldiers' pay and allowances are paid from MPA appropriations.

While other areas may receive considerable attention, for example, military pay and travel, procurement support is considered the most critical wartime finance mission. This function is divided into two areas-contracting operations and commercial vendor services (CVS) operations.

Contracting operations are normally conducted by both finance groups and theater finance commands. They involve the payment of commercial accounts for goods and services obtained through formal contracting procedures and may include all classes of supply, laundry and bath operations, transportation, real estate, and maintenance.

CONTRACTING

Contracting plays a vital role in mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization. Contracting can bridge the gap at the installation level for increased support during mobilization for the following type of requirements:

- Billeting
- Food Service
- Transportation
- Consumable Supplies
- Miscellaneous Services
- Medical Supplies
- Repair Parts
- Construction
- Maintenance

Additionally, contracting can provide the same type of support during the deployment phase by filling the gap until LOGCAP and HNS become fully integrated into the support plan. During the redeployment phase, contracts for transportation of materiel and maintenance will be used extensively to reconstitute the force. The key to obtaining optimum support from contracting is early and thorough planning.

Planning for the use of contracts should be based on the needs of the supported combatant commander and the applicable OPLAN.

During Operation Just Cause, there was no shortage of trucks or drivers in Panama. Designated purchasing order officers were prepared to negotiate contracts, and vendors were prepared to provide services. Every battalion in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) had both a designated order officer and a Class A agent with cash.

The installation directorates of contracting provide contracting support during the mobilization phase. Mobilization plans should fully integrate contracting support, and the installation directorates of contracting should be included early in the planning process.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

Planners should consider host nation capabilities but not depend on them. Host nation support should be coordinated for and documented in peacetime, if possible. Based on the logistical preparation of the theater, HNS could play a large role in the provision of procurement needs (supplies and services) to deployed soldiers.

SUMMARY

Mobilization requires detailed planning, crossing numerous functional areas and departments. Non-DOD agencies, as well as DOD organizations, must fully participate in the creation and execution of mobilization plans. Advance preparation addressing the total spectrum of possible military operations will ensure effective and efficient mobilization of units, individuals, and logistics.

CHAPTER 4

DEPLOYMENT

"Mobility, both strategic and tactical, is the partner of flexible organization. We must be able to shift combat strength rapidly to any threatened point in the world. Strategic airlift of troops by the Air Force is the answer to the requirement of speed. . . . While airlift adds to our strategic mobility, it does not supplant Navy transport for maintaining the lines of heavy supply and reinforcement to overseas theaters. The Navy has provided this support for the Army throughout our history; we cannot foresee the day when it will not be needed."
(General Barksdale Hamlett)

Strategic deployment is the strategic relocation and concentration of forces and their support base (manpower and logistics) from CONUS into a theater, from CONUS to CONUS, from OCONUS to OCONUS, or from OCONUS to CONUS in response to a military need or crisis. Deployments may take the form of a forcible entry for crisis response or unopposed entry for natural disasters or humanitarian assistance.

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The particular procedures used in planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, deliberate planning is used. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment or employment of armed forces, the planner uses crisis-action procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis-action planning. For more information refer to Appendix A.

As the national security strategy states, the ability to project our power will underpin our strategy more than ever. We must, through strategic mobility, be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where pre-positioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available, or where a poorly developed industrial base and infrastructure exists. Our mobility strategy demands that we be able to move personnel and materiel to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to achieve quick, decisive mission success. See Figure 4-1.

Deployment from one overseas theater to another was a monumental and previously uncharted undertaking for VII Corps. In support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, VII Corps, assembling on the move, expanded from a European base of 42,000 soldiers to 145,000 soldiers in Southwest Asia. This expansion was accomplished concurrent with initial combat training activities and operational missions. The deployment, from alert to closure in the tactical assembly areas in Southwest Asia, of more than 109,000 VII Corp personnel and 48,600 vehicles was completed in only 97 days.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY OPTIONS

Planners will be continuously challenged to quickly project the proper balance of combat, CS, and CSS forces during the critical time periods. A lack of strategic mobility options may also increase our vulnerability to the enemy and jeopardize operations.

Mobility options to meet regional scenario requirements are dependent on a balance of US Government assets, requisitioned US commercial ships, the stages of the civil reserve aircraft fleet (CRAF), and the varying degrees of allied transport reliance. Several variables quantify the size of the strategic mobility assets necessary to deploy and sustain the force. Certain variables affect the concept of operation. The concept of operations integrates these variables, which include—

- Forces employed (may include reserve forces and sustainment).
- Forces to counter (size and training level of enemy).
- Delivery schedules and distances (includes strategic assets and pre-positioned materiel).
- Warning time (pre-C-Day to C-Day).
- Mobilization level to C-Day or D-Day.
- Options for host nation support, assistance, or relief.
- Combined operations.
- National will and political risk.

In a theater where CINCs and MTMC have operational agreements, MTMC arranges for the operation or use of commercial ocean terminals to support worldwide DOD requirements. MTMC establishes such terminal units as necessary to administer pent operations. MTMC and the shippers/consignees (OCONUS) follow the same basic concepts as the ocean cargo clearance authority (OCCA) relationship in CONUS; theater inland traffic management remains with the theater commander.




Figure 4-1. Strategic Mobility Objectives for the Army

MTMC selects SPOEs, in conjunction with unified commands, as appropriate. MTMC provides port call to deploying units, operates SPOEs, places sealift requirements on MSC, and conducts continuing analyses of port capabilities and land transportation assets. MTMC depends on a port support activity provided by the deploying service to perform critical functions such as maintenance, assembly of equipment security, and other activities beyond the capabilities of the MTMC terminals. See Figure 4-2.

Strategic Lift

Force projection and sustainment success is based on the *strategic mobility triad* (airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning). Regardless of the abilities of the force and its training, the following determines the success of our force projection capability: the balance of pre-positioning sealift and airlift, coupled with those interconnecting LOCs. Annex J of the JSCP provides planning guidance and apportions transportation assets for CINC movement planning. Deploying forces can improve the impact of airlift and sealift capabilities by preparing unitized loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment.




Figure 4-2. Strategic Mobility Options Anticipated Activation Sequence

The JOPES time-phased force and deployment data lists movement priorities for air and sea moves. Upon execution, commanders adjust TC ACCIS information to reflect the unit's actual cargo weights and configuration. MTMC uses TC ACCIS information to plan and load ships.

Sealift

The US strategic sealift capability is made up of a combination of ships from various sources and is managed by the Navy's MSC. Sealift assets currently available to the deploying forces include fast sealift ships (FSS), ready reserve force (RRF) ships, afloat pre-positioning force ships (APF), and chartered ships which divide into two categories:

- Existing US flag cargo ships under long-term charter to the Navy.
- Augmenting sealift assets available through US flag and foreign flag commercial sources.

These assets are expected to move unit equipment (UE) from day 1 and throughout the contingency.

These surge sealift capabilities are the most difficult to maintain because of the decreasing number of roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships available in the commercial sector. Military use of containership assets during the surge period is constrained by the fact that in many cases U/E is not compatible with containers. Standardized containers permit rapid distribution and minimal handling.

Airlift

The US strategic airlift capability includes organic aircraft primarily in the Air Force's Air Mobility Command and selected commercial aircraft with military useful compartments. Air Mobility Command assets may be augmented by commercial charter contracts or CRAF aircraft. The CRAF program is administered by CINC USTRANSCOM in coordination with the Department of Transportation. Types and quantities of CRAF aircraft change monthly based on service, maintenance, and ownership.

Deploying forces can improve the impact of airlift and sealift capabilities by preparing unitized loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment to the maximum extent possible.

One of the major findings during Operation Just Cause was that the Container Delivery System (CDS), which rapidly drops multiple bundles from C-130 or C-141 aircraft, is a viable means for resupply when convoys and Army aviation are limited.

Airflow and seaflow need to be coordinated to ensure effective reception of units into the theater, that is, arrival of soldiers must match the arrival of equipment. The transition to an emphasis on regional contingency response has placed a premium on earlier availability of CRAF. Equipment pre-positioning places additional demands on CRAF to deliver the associated personnel.

CRAF has limiting factors such as loading/unloading times and requirements for specialized equipment. Because of increased ground time for unloading CRAF aircraft and their unique materials handling equipment requirement, CRAF cargo assets may reduce organic airlift effectiveness and constrain cargo delivery and off-load. Of special note is that planning currently indicates that CRAF will normally not be used in the LRC scenarios.

Ground Movement

Rail is the preferred method for moving all wheeled vehicles (over one day's driving distance from the port) and all tracked vehicles. The commercial railroad industry normally requires up to seven days to position rail cars at installations to support deployments. To overcome this time lag, the commercial railroad industry coordinates with FORSCOM and MTMC to position military-owned and military-managed strategic port rail cars. To support rail movements and staging requirements, installations will maintain rail tracks, adequate loading ramps, facilities, and staging areas for their deployment missions. Installation and deploying commanders must precoordinate the procurement, use, control, and return or recycling of blocking, bracing, and tie-down equipment throughout the deployment.

Other Methods

Military convoy is the preferred method of moving wheeled vehicles to ports and other facilities that are within one day's driving distance. The accepted deployment method for rotary wing aircraft is by self-deployment to the POE. In most cases, rotary wing aircraft are transported from the POE to the theater by strategic airlift and/or sealift. Fixed wing aircraft are normally self deployable to the theater.

SEAPORTS OF EMBARKATION

MTMC, at commercial port terminals—

- Provides liaison to civil port authorities at strategic seaports.
- Operates port staging area.
- Coordinates activities of deploying unit personnel within port areas.
- Utilizes contractual support to load equipment with unit assistance, if required.
- Documents cargo.
- Prepares ship manifests.
- Coordinates support with PSA personnel.

UNIT MOVEMENTS

Planning for strategic deployment or unit movement by air and/or sea is influenced by existing AUELs, OPORDs, the commander's intent, pre-positioned equipment, available lift, and mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). Units that are moving in response to an OPORD are programmed for movement via the JOPES, as modified by the supported commander's updated plan of operations.

Units responding to short-notice contingencies without pre-existing plans must be prepared to quickly assess their unit status/movement requirements. They must provide the necessary Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) transactions (unit status report and mobilization or change report). They must use TC ACCIS to update their unit movement data. These actions assist USTRANSCOM in computing lift requirements and times of embarkation.

DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT

Our forward-presence forces speed our ability to respond to MRC threats in areas such as the Pacific or Southwest Asia, where the US military responds to conventional contingency situations requiring a mix of air and sea assets for force deployment.

There are other regions or LRCs where the US military responds to less formidable, though no less urgent, contingency situations that require immediate response. The combatant commander's pretreated OPLANs, based upon detailed analysis, permits the determinations of possible responses and mobility requirements. See Figure 4-3.

The Army's ability to project a mix of armored, light, and SOF, with the proper mix of CS and CSS is central to the Army's role as the nation's strategic land force with missions ranging from peacetime competition, to conflict, to war. As a prelude to counterattack responses, the Army must execute its deploy-to-fight response with the focus of building up a credible combat capability to deter any threat.

Responding to the request of the Kuwaiti government-in-exile to the President, DOD tasked the Army to provide elements of the 352d Civil Affairs Command (USAR) from Maryland to advise and assist Kuwaiti government counterparts in planning for the emergency recovery and rebuilding phases following Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait. A planning cell was created and a majority of the unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia by early January 1991. The Army provided elements of the 353d Civil Affairs Command (USAR) from New York to coordinate civil affairs actions supporting humanitarian relief assistance to Kurdish refugees during Operation Provide Comfort.

The Army's contribution to a joint and/or combined force commander may be as small as a civil affairs element or a maneuver brigade task force, as large as an entire corps, or even an EAC organization capable of larger operations. Depending on the size of the required force, the duration, and the mission, RC forces may be called up to participate. Whatever the force size or category, Army units must be prepared for rapid task-organizing, echeloning, and tailoring for deployment.

TASK-ORGANIZING PROCESS

For deployment purposes, task-organizing is the process of forming combined arms task forces with limited self-sustainment capabilities for rapid deployment. Task-organizing, centered primarily around maneuver brigades, is a predeployment activity. Task-organized units will develop close training relationships during normal training activities to facilitate deployment and tactical employment. Training at maneuver-brigade level and above should include preparation for a variety of employment environments.

ECHELONING

Echeloning is organizing units for movement. Like task-organizing, echeloning is a predeployment standard operation procedure that establishes a priority for movement within the task force to accommodate available lift. Echelons may be divided, for example, into advance parties, main body, and trail force.

Within each echelon, there must be appropriate combat, CS, and CSS elements. Planning for each echelon must include numbers of vehicles and personnel, consumable supply requirements, and updated UMD/AUEL. Essential, habitual support relationships between combat and CSS units be established during the planning stages. In principle, CSS units must be adaptable, flexible, and capable of supporting a wide variety of equipment and units.

TAILORING

Tailoring occurs after initial strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, and host nation/contract services or assets have been identified. Whereas task-organizing and echeloning are preplanned, tailoring is situationally dependent. Units and UMD may be added to or subtracted from a planned task organization, based on the mission and available lift. Additionally, availability of pre-positioned equipment near the AO, host nation/contract services, or other infrastructure assets are combat multipliers that allow for multiple requirements to move simultaneously to the operational area.




Figure 4-3. Mobility Requirements

TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA

The TPFDD is the supported CINC's statement of his requirements by unit type, time period, and priority for arrival. Further, TPFDD defines the support CINC's nonunit-related cargo and personnel requirements to include Army civilians to sustain his forces. The validation and sourcing of below-the-line units (CS and CSS) for TPFDD is the responsibility of the supporting CINCs.

Supporting CINCs are also responsible for assigning the subsequent capstone alignments derived from the OPLAN TPFDDs. The priorities for unit sourcing are derived from each theater commander's concept of operations: the broad narrative statement of how the supported CINC expects to allocate, deploy, employ, and support his forces. See Figure 4-4.

The TPFDD is both a force requirements document and a prioritized transportation movement document. The supported commander and the designated supporting commanders identify force shortfalls to JCS. The ultimate objective of deployment is the arrival of the force at the right place and at the right time. The supported commander and the supporting combatant commander routinely validate TPFDD.

TPFDD is a dynamic document that the supported combatant commander refines. He also ensures that its objectives are achieved. Some of the factors that may require TPFDD adjustments include—

- Nonvalidated forces/sustainment added to the flow.
- Validated forces that have a new latest arrival date (LAD).
- UMD adjustments to deployment equipment lists (DEL) necessitating changes in strategic lift type/quantity.
- Available-to-load date (ALD)/ready-to-load date (RLD) adjustments to deploying forces.
- Delayed POE/POD arrivals and departures that affect subsequent strategic lift.
- Strategic lift reroutings and delays resulting from natural or man-made disasters.
- Emergency needs for forces or sustainment in the theater.

The TPFDD is the CINC's requirements statement; the LAD is a capabilities statement.

The supported commander's required date (CRD) to have forces at their destinations is the end goal from which all common-user transportation must be planned. The supporting combatant commander establishes milestones for loading and transporting units and their accompanying supplies to the POE, embarking them aboard strategic lift, and transiting them to the POD.

The following must be resolved by the supported combatant commander as early as possible the sequence in which Army units deploy in relation to the movement of forces of the other services and alliance and/or coalition forces. Efficient and timely use of limited amounts of available strategic lift is the key to successful deployment operations.

Following their evaluation of the supported combatant commander's plan, ASCCs and others must clearly and quickly articulate their lift requirements. Early resolution of the sequencing of forces into the theater will solidify the TPFDD, determine the time required to deploy the forces, and provide the basis to initiate the theater distribution plan. The supported CINC performs the ultimate phasing, prioritization, and validation of all requirements. See Figure 4-5.

Proper sequencing of forces, to include participating alliance and/or coalition forces, into the AO will contribute significantly to the stabilization of the situation. It will also allow for rapid buildup of capabilities that permit the supported combatant commander to seize the initiative and conduct successful decisive operations as early as possible.

Simultaneous deployment of tactical and operational level headquarters early in the operation is essential for conducting current operations, facilitating future planning, and coordinating with host nation or allied forces. Additionally, simultaneous deployment allows for the




Figure 4-4. Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development

rapid employment of follow-on reinforcing units. Appropriate CS/CSS headquarters must deploy with the initial force. Throughout the deployment, Army forces must maintain the flexibility to reconfigure units and adjust deployments should the supported commander's needs change while the deployment is in progress.

The needs of the joint force commander and the requirement for rapid deployment will initially take priority over maximizing the efficiency of lift. Even if the strategic intent is to attempt to deter an opponent, the operational focus must be on seizing the initiative and creating an offensive capability to fight and win should deterrence fail.

DEPLOYMENT PHASES

The five deployment phases include predeployment activities, movement to the POE, strategic lift, theater reception, and theater onward movement. Concurrent with, and resulting from, the deployment of the forces and logistics, the combatant commander conducts lodgement, stabilization, and restoration of conditions amicable to US interest.

PHASE I - PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

During normal peacetime operations the Army prepares its units for crisis-action and force-projection missions. Based on the operational requirements of the supported CINC, Army organizations are designated, equipped, trained, and led with force projection capabilities in mind. Commanders must adhere to Armywide standards for task-organizing, echeloning, and tailoring units. Units must conduct routine collective deployment training to ensure the Army deploys the balance of forces, individual manpower, and materiel to meet the combatant commander's missions. See Figure 4-6.

Forces

Commanders of individual units revise their unit movement plans to reflect the exact equipment being deployed and perform the following predeployment activities:

- Active Army units conduct necessary deployment and individual and collective training to attain the desired mission capability in the shortest possible time consistent with the planned deployment. In addition, they conduct soldier readiness checks and prepare for overseas movement, to include proper documentation of containerized unit equipment.
- RC units complete Mobilization Phases II, III, IV, and V.

Numerous military intelligence units were mobilized and deployed in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The 446th and 480th Military Intelligence Detachments (MID) (Army Reserve, Bloomington, IN), and the 484th MID (Boston, MA) augmented the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Installations assigned a mobilization mission (CRC, regional marshalling area, PSA, and A/DACG responsibilities) must identity nondeploying units and/or individual manpower and units to conduct Phase I (Redeployment Activities) and Phase II (Movement to POE) requirements.

Units required to support mobilization and deployment activities must be identified early in the expansion of the force.

The 3397th US Army Garrison (Army Reserve, Chattanooga, TN) filled the installation support gap at Fort Campbell, KY. The 3397th was reorganized into a deployment support organization to assist the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division. This initiative proved so successful that the unit was locally redesignated as the 3397th Deployment Command and used in this capacity for deployment and redeployment operations at Fort Campbell.

Individual Manpower

The theater PERSCOM G1, in coordination with PERSCOM, conducts nonunit-related personnel (NRP) (individual fillers and casualty replacements deploying to the theater) deployment planning functions and determines requirements.

This planning is based on unit filler and casualty replacement shelf requirements. These requirements are integrated into transportation and reception plans and incorporated into the TPFDD by the Army commander. These requirements are also used to determine the number and locations of CONUS CRCs and APOEs required to support the OPLAN. The DCSPER has final approval on the CRCs required to support the OPLAN, based on input from PERSCOM, TRADOC, and ODCSLOG. PERSCOM coordinates with USTRANSCOM on the APOEs required to support the CRCs.

Upon receipt of the OPLAN warning order, PERSCOM conducts an analysis of fill capability. PERSCOM analyzes the capability by comparing available personnel against the supported CINC's pre-positioned shelf requirements to adjust the NRP flow in the TPFDD. Additional critical filler requirements identified by the theater ASCC, not in the pre-position shelf, are included in this analysis.

Casualty replacement normally remains the same unless the planned threat changes significantly. CRCs and theater area replacement operations (TAROs) initiate procedures to start up or expand current capabilities in preparation for processing fillers and casualty replacements. Figure 4-7.

All NRP deploying to a combatant theater, whether military or civilian, process through a designated CRC. Installations designated as CRCs verify the readiness of soldiers and civilians to deploy OCONUS to theaters. The verification of soldier readiness includes personal affairs, medical and dental, and finance readiness. In addition, CRCs coordinate with their respective installation support activity for issuance of—

- Organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE).
- Individual weapon.
- Chemical defense equipment for deploying soldiers.

CRCs perform very limited training, focused mainly on weapons zero/qualification, protective mask fitting, and cultural awareness. The use of a CRC does not absolve the losing installation of ensuring that departing soldiers and civilians meet all deployability prerequisites.[1]

TRADOC identifies CRC replacement battalions and replacement companies for early order to active duty in each call-up list of units developed to support execution of specific CJCS-approved OPLANs. These units must be called up early in the process in order to process OCONUS individual replacements. For planning purposes, activation of a CRC requires approximately 30 days. This includes calling forward equipment stocks and their preparation for issue.

Expansion of the CRC operation may require the early assignment of additional assets.

The 360th Personnel Replacement Battalion (CRC) (Army Reserve, Myrtle Beach, SC) was called to active duty in December 1990 to support the execution of the CRC operation at Fort Jackson, SC. The 360th executed the CRC operation and established a CONUS demobilization center after cessation of hostilities.

Logistics

DLA and AMC receive and fill high-priority requisitions from both forward-presence and planned deploying forces. Forward-presence and early deploying force requisitions receive priority of support. Deployable nondivisional units designated for a crisis response force may have a wartime support mission that differs

[1] With supported CINC approval, DLA and AMC technicians/civilians may process for movement with a deploying force as part of its tailored force package.

from their peacetime support mission. These units will ensure adequate repair parts, based on projected equipment density or type, are on hand to support their wartime mission. A predeployment baseline of ASL stockage requirements is the key to providing the proper support to the deployed units.

All supply support activities (divisions, separate brigades, nondivisional direct support units) should track and retain predeployment, deployment, and postdeployment inventory data (on-hand inventory dollar value, excess dollar value, dollar value of excess turn-ins during a quarter) in order to provide a funding baseline to aid in tracking funds expended on ASL during a crisis. To aid and assist in the total accounting effort, requests and identification of project codes for wartime requisitions must be initiated early and according to current procedures.

DLA and AMC review anticipated supply requirements and initiate actions (increase production lines, obtain additional vendors, begin industrial base expansion) to overcome forecasted shortages. Deploying units must preplan and properly document containerized sustainment. Phase I ends when the MS validates the unit for deployment and/or employment according to specified deployability criteria.

PHASE II - MOVEMENT TO THE PORT OF EMBARKATION

Based on the mobilization process and/or Phase I (Redeployment Activities), units have completed POM and have been validated. Units update AUELs to deployment equipment lists (DELs) and submit them to the appropriate authority. Whether deploying for training or in response to a crisis, unit loads are configured for combat contingencies. This configuration provides the capability of redeployment while en route to training or other activities.




Figure 4-5. Army Requirement

Resupply and follow-on logistics may be configured for administrative loading. For NRP, upon verification of deployability and issue of equipment, the CRC will coordinate the movement to designated APOEs under direction of the PERSCOM commander. See Figure 4-8.

All forces must be capable of redeploying for contingency operations from any location.

The 20th Special Forces Group (Alabama National Guard) was alerted for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and moved to Fort Bragg, NC. Ultimately, members of the units were redeployed to support Operation Provide Comfort as a part of the 10th Special Forces Group.

When required, all ports must immediately receive necessary direction to permit the rapid movement and loading of live ammunition onto aircraft and ships.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, elements of the 101st Air Assault Division arrived in Jacksonville, FL, with their ammunition basic load. No prior plan had been established for moving ammunition through a commercial port. As a result, there was a strategic deployment pause since waivers had to be obtained before the ammunition could be processed for loading.

Installations must have in place individual manpower and forces (A/DACG, PSA, and so on) to deploy and sustain units designated by the OPORD to the AO.

Volunteers from the 650th Transportation Company (Army Reserve, Wilmington, NC) operated the XVIII Airborne Corps Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group. Prior to the 650th's mobilization and deployment to Southwest Asia, the volunteers had processed almost 30,000 personnel, over 5,000 pieces of equipment, and over 20,000 short tons of cargo.

Based on information provided to JOPES on the readiness of units and individual manpower for movement (RLD), USTRANSCOM provides movement guidance for movement to the POE.

Units must be configured and positioned for prompt deployment. Advances in strategic lift capability—new fast sealift ships; large, medium-speed RO/RO (LMSR) ships; and C-17 aircraft—will make this even more critical.

In support of Operation Just Cause, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) faced significant constraints on its deployment. The local Monterey Airport (California) could not handle the size and amount of aircraft required. Accordingly, soldiers were bussed to Travis Air Force Base, and supplies went out of the Monterey Airport. This change in plans, combined with the constricted local road net and civilian traffic, slowed the deployment.

Forces

Units receive movement instructions from the transportation component commands (TCCs). MTMC specifies, by movement directive, when unit equipment is required to be at the POE for loading aboard strategic lift (ALD). Based on the movement directive, units backward-plan their installation departure and POE processing to meet ALD. During the deliberate planning process, planners should identify strategic seaports for berthing of sealift assets to facilitate rapid deployment of forces.

The Air Mobility Command specifies, through an air tasking order, using the Airlift Deployment Analysis System (ADANS), when unit equipment is required to be at the APOE for loading aboard aircraft. Based on the ADANS directive, units backward-plan their installation departure.

At the POE, forces are inspected for compliance with strategic lift requirements. With acceptance by the A/DACG or PSA, responsibility for forces, if not directed by the OPORD, is automatically transferred from the unit to the transportation community.

The A/DACG (air) and PSA (sea), in conjunction with USAMC and MTMC, respectively, process the forces and aid in loading them aboard strategic lift for departure. Proper logistics marking system (LOGMARS) labels and container documentation are critical to accounting for cargo and making proper manifests to be used at the POD. Establishment of an effective PSA, to expedite actions at ports, is key to rapid deployment and integrity/accountability of forces and readiness. Deployment control units (DCUs) have teams available to assist ITOs and units in completing the proper documentation for deployment. These assets should be used to the maximum.

Individuals

Nonunit-related personnel (NRP) are normally moved via commercial transportation from the losing installations to the designated CRC. The PERSCOM commander coordinates strategic lift requirements with USTRANSCOM for movement of the NRP from the APOE to the theater. The PERSCOM commander coordinates all NRP personnel actions at the APOE through the personnel assistance point (PAP).

Logistics

Supply items that require containerization are sent to the designated container consolidation point (CCP) for processing and shipment. The US Army Logistics Control Activity (LCA) prescribes the priority for shipment out of the CCP. The ASCC of the supported CINC provides the appropriate priority guidance. The vendor sends other items directly to the theater via regular commercial carriers. In all cases, the deploying materiel is properly documented with requisite packing lists, placarding, and LOGMARS labeling attached at the origin to facilitate POE throughput and subsequent theater processing.

Phase II concludes with the departure of the strategic lift at the POE:

- Wheels up for aircraft.
- Passage of the last buoy marking the channel to the SPOE for vessels.

If not specified by the OPORD, command of the departing forces and NRP is automatically transferred from the supporting combatant commander to the supported combatant commander.

PHASE III - STRATEGIC LIFT

This phase begins with strategic lift departure from the POE. It ends with arrival in the theater. The appropriate TCCs are responsible for strategic transportation of forces and their support. USTRANSCOM will ensure intransit visibility (ITV) of forces, to include NRP, and supplies. ITV data, coupled with unit movement coordinators, can combine to provide force tracking details required by the supported combatant commander. See Figure 4-9.

PHASE IV - THEATER BASE RECEPTION

This phase begins with the arrival of forces and sustainment at the POD in the theater and ends with the departure of the forces/sustainment from the POD. Therefore, port clearance is a theater responsibility. The supported combatant commander is responsible for developing a theater reception and onward movement plan for arriving forces and sustainment. Except in the case of forcible entry, CS and CSS forces may either precede or arrive concurrently with combat forces to process them through the POD and establish theater distribution infrastructure.

The replacement battalion receives NRP and coordinates onward assignments, transportation, and life support. To facilitate management of NRP and unit flow into the theater, the supported ASCC must ensure that communications support and ADP connectivity are provided to theater replacement battalions. The theater replacement battalion is under command of the theater PERSCOM.

A/DACG (air) and military or military-contracted port commands (sea), augmented with PSA organizations, must be established to process forces and sustainment equipment and supplies through the POD. Commands send advance parties to coordinate the orderly processing of deploying forces. Additionally, advance ship manifests are used for POD planning for ship off-loading.

Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations provide a unique capability for offloading transport/supply ships in areas having limited or no adequate port facilities or augment limited capacity in damaged ports. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have LOTS capability.

One of the primary requirements during this phase is coordinating the onward movement of deploying forces to their destination. This requires personnel who are knowledgeable about the unit, its movement configuration, the receipt of PWRS, and the ultimate destination. These personnel work with the combatant commander's designated representatives for sustainment (support command) and movement (movement control agency) in completing the required documents for moving and sustaining the forces. ITV and force tracking




Figure 4-6. Predeployment Activities - Forces

(FT) are verified at reception to ensure continuous identification of force projection efforts.

PHASE V - THEATER ONWARD MOVEMENT

This phase begins with the personnel and equipment linkup, the reconfiguration of forces, sustainment, and receipt of PWRS at designated marshaling areas. This phase concludes with arrival at the gaining command's staging areas where combat preparation occurs. In this phase, ITV and FT are the responsibility of the supported commander.

The supported combatant commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and support of forces and assisting with their onward movement. In this capacity, the supported combatant commander sustains the NRP of the forces until the NRP arrive at their prescribed theater. Through the theater army movement control agency (TAMCA), units obtain assistance for intratheater movement. In joint and/or combined operations, the OPLAN must delineate the reception and onward movement responsibilities of participating nations.

The 318th Transportation Agency (TAMCA) (Army Reserve, Jamaica, NY) managed all intratheater movements in the CENTCOM theater from October 1990 until its redeployment in June 1991. Never before had a single movement control unit managed the movement of a theater army, while at the same time controlling the movement of thousands of trucks, tracks, and trains to sustain a force of over a half-a-million personnel.

LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS

All sustainment requirements are shipped to theaters based on the priorities of the supported combatant commander. The Army is responsible for providing people and materiel.




Figure 4-7. CONUS Replacement Centers

CONTAINERIZATION POLICY FOR STRATEGIC SEAPORTS

Major combat units and their early deploying support elements routinely use RO/RO shipping to the maximum extent possible. Containers used to carry a given unit's equipment are transported aboard the same ships if possible. Follow-on units and sustainment equipment and supplies may use containers and container shipping.

Increased containerization of unit equipment parallels the commercial transportation industry's use of container shipping. However, this use is tempered by the command's need for ITV and a sufficient theater capability to readily move to the tactical assembly area (TAA), unload, and return to the transportation system for further use. A tendency of receiving units and the services to retain containers causes exorbitant costs. To avoid such costs, commanders at all levels must vigorously enforce the container return policy.

SUPPLIES AND MATERIEL

Supplies must flow prior to or concurrently with the arrival of units. Increased forces result in increased supply requirements. Supporting commanders, in coordination with the supported commander's senior logistics




Figure 4-8. Deployment Process for Phases I through III

command, must estimate supply requirements and initiate shipments of supplies to the theater. This is known as a push system.

As time allows, the supported commander submits demand-based requisitions to initiate a pull system for resupply. A potential problem is that nondemand-shipped supplies may exceed theater reception, onward movement, and storage capabilities at PODs, POEs, and supply bases. If a shipment arrives at an APOE and waits for several days until diverted to surface movement, valuable time is lost and effective support is jeopardized. Therefore, compliance with air clearance authority approval, based on ASCC priorities, is critical.

Sustainment supplies do not always follow the prescribed LOCs. Some supplies (POL and ammunition) require special facilities and cannot be off-loaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activities.

The supply and support requirements of deploying forces consist of two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment and nonunit-related supplies and equipment. Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unit's organic equipment, basic load, and accompanying supplies.

Nonunit-related supplies and equipment include all supply sustainment support requirements that are not




Figure 4-9. Deployment Process for Phases III through V PHASE IV

identified for a specific unit. Nonunit-related supplies and equipment support the force until air, land, and sea LOCs are open. These include PWRS, sustaining supplies, and resupply.

SECURITY

In coordination with other DOD activities, services develop and administer a DOD transportation security program to provide standardized transportation security measures and procedures, overall monitorship, and central direction. Commanders plan security for their units and equipment to the POE in CONUS, while MTMC coordinates security within the port.

Commanders plan and use operation security for movement of organizational equipment and personnel and assist in providing security. The transportation community assists and coordinates physical security enroute and within OCONUS port/terminal areas.

AMMUNITION

MTMC provides routing instructions for movement of all classes of ammunition entering the Defense Transportation System. In a contingency operation, select units will be designated to deploy through commercial ports with their ammunition basic load.

Supporting commanders, via TPFDD, provide unit names and other pertinent data to MTMC; MTMC coordinates with the USCG to obtain permits to allow ammunition to be loaded at the ports required. MTMC provides copies of the permits to the Coast Guard and supporting commander for file and provides units with packing and configuration instructions that meet the Coast Guard safety requirements for sea movements. At execution, MTMC area commands notify the Coast Guard and the captain of the port of the unit's deployment and request activation of the permits for ammunition basic load. As required, USTRANSCOM will coordinate exceptions to airlift of unit ammunition.

RECEPTION

The supported combatant commander designates responsibility for port operations according to Joint Publication 4-01.5.[2] In all theaters, reinforcing units must be received and prepared for further deployment and employment. This is particularly true in those areas in which forward-presence forces are stationed during peacetime. The ASCC is responsible for receiving, equipping, and assisting deploying units and NRP.

Normally, crisis-response and reinforcing units deploy personnel by air and equipment by sea. Planners must synchronize these arrivals to accommodate the supported commander's intent. Once unit personnel and equipment arrive, they must be consolidated and prepared for onward movement to their parent organizations. Typically, though not always, arrival sites are located in the COMMZ. Thus, the CSS requirements for supporting these operations normally are assigned to the ASCC.

The ASCC, through the senior logistics element, directs forces and sustainment movements. Individual logistics units are responsible for the full range of logistics support to arriving units. They coordinate life support and provide essential supplies, recovery, and evacuation services.

Based on supported command movement directives—

- TAMCA elements coordinate port clearance and inland theater movements.
- Theater TRANSCOM elements assist with port clearance and transportation from the POD or PWRS to marshaling sites.
- Medical elements that provide area support assist with medical problems and may provide most medical support to the arriving units.
- PERSCOM elements assist with personnel service support, including filler and casualty personnel flowing through the PRB, and personnel accountability.

CONTRACTING

Contracting can provide the same type of support during the deployment phase by filling the gap until LOGCAP and HNS become fully integrated into the support plan. Once deployed, units will receive contracting support from the theater army contracting activity.

Units should plan to fill low-dollar-value requirements (less than $2500) through the use of ordering officers appointed from within the unit. The selection and training of these ordering officers must be accomplished prior to deployment. Installation directorates of contracting can provide the necessary training and appointments.

[2] *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Water Terminal Operations,* (Initial Draft), 15 February 1991.

SUMMARY

Deployment is the planning, preparation, and movement of forces and their support base from any location to an area of operations in response to a military need or crisis. Deployments may take the form of a forcible (tactical) or peaceful (nontactical) entry. Deployments are conducted in five phases. Concurrent with, and resulting from, the deployment of the forces and logistics, the combatant commander conducts the major operations of lodgement, stabilization, and restoration of conditions amicable to US interests.

CHAPTER 5

REDEPLOYMENT

"Once hostilities are over, Americans are spontaneous and headlong in their eagerness to return to civilian life. No people on earth have been known to disengage so quickiy from the ways of war."

(President Harry Truman)

Redeployment is the preparation for and movement of forces (units), manpower (individuals), and materiel from an AO to follow-on designated CONUS or OCONUS bases, usually after the combatant commander has achieved conditions favorable to US interests or as directed by the NCA. The key to redeployment is that it should not be considered as retrograde movement, but in fact as a new deployment. Redeployment must involve force integrity so that units maybe diverted anywhere, ready to fight.

REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and sustainment equipment and supplies to meet new crises. Movement is, in most cases, nontactical. It returns Army forces to home stations and mobilized reserve forces/individuals through demobilization stations (DMSs) or CDCs. The FORSCOM redeployment after-action report for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm opens with the following statement:

"The redeployment of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces and the subsequent demobilization of RC forces were much more difficult than we expected."

(Official FORSCOM Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm Redeployment After-Action Report)

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

While the cease-fire agreements may take effect at a point in time, the process is rarely instantaneous. Either as part of the cease-fire or as a result of political negotiations, certain key decisions are made concerning —

- The time and distance required to separate the belligerents.
- The timetable to withdraw from the AO.
- What residual forces and reserve stocks will remain.

These decisions and many others shape the pace and nature of the redeployment.

The 416th Engineer Command (Army Reserve, Chicago, IL) spent 11 months in Southwest Asia and conducted large-scale engineer battlefield operations. Upon the cessation of hostilities, the 416th focused on restoration and humanitarian efforts throughout Kuwait, support of refugees, and support to Operation Provide Comfort in north west Iraq.

The immediate postcease-fire period is one of great danger and requires that all US forces maintain a high state of readiness and security. Necessary reconstitution of combat forces should have an immediate priority.

Upon completion of the tactical and political process, the combatant commander builds a TPFDD data base to be implemented upon cessation of hostilities. Concurrently, supporting CINCs initiate planning to support the combatant commander's redeployment OPLAN.

This plan includes responsibilities, priorities, and guidance for recovery activities and the efficient movement of units, individuals, and materiel in coordination with the supporting CINCs. Based on the CINC's plan, the ASCC issues a redeployment warning order that conveys the CINC's redeployment guidance to subordinate commanders, while preparing a detailed and coordinated operations order that covers the first four phases of redeployment. (Supporting CINCs review plans for the final three phases.)

PREPARATION FOR REDEPLOYMENT

In preparation for redeployment, a decision process occurs that influences *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *how* the operation will proceed. These decision factors may include —

- A JCS residual force mission statement.
- JCS requirements to reconstitute a response capability.
- Other theater needs.
- Occupation, nation-building, and humanitarian missions.
- Establishment of PWRS in the AO.
- Security of the force.
- Constraints of RC forces and individuals in theater.
- Alliance/coalition force considerations (when applicable).
- Availability of strategic lift.
- Political pressures.

Redeployment entails forces (units), manpower (individuals), and materiel. The supported CINC uses the above considerations to develop a redeployment plan, to include sequencing movement in coordination with the supporting commander. During redeployment, timely and accurate command and public information are critical to the morale of the soldier and public support.

Unit integrity should be maintained to the maximum extent possible. Operational requirements may require some changes to units after they arrive in the AO. To facilitate demobilization, these units must reorganize prior to redeployment. DA must coordinate and approve RC units' theater residual equipment prior to its being retained.

REDEPLOYMENT PHASES

During redeployment, contracts for transportation of materiel and maintenance are used extensively to reconstitute the force. Redeployment is con- ducted in six phases:

- Reconstitution for strategic movement.
- Movement to the redeployment assembly areas (RAA).
- Movement to port of embarkation.
- Strategic lift.
- Reception at port of debarkation.
- Onward movement from port of debarkation.

PHASE I - RECONSTITUTION FOR STRATEGIC MOVEMENT

After completion of operational requirements, forces move back to designated TAAs. A major focus should be unit integrity and accountability to the maximum extent possible for units, individuals, materiel, supplies, and equipment. Operational requirements may necessitate some changes to units after they arrive in the AO. These units should be reunited prior to redeployment to facilitate return to peacetime activities. Unit commanders' actions at the TAA include —

- Reconstitution and/or initial cross-leveling.
- Repacking and loading containers under US Customs and US Department of Agriculture supervision.
- Reconciling UMD through documentation, accountability of inventory, and coordination of movement instructions from the controlling movement control agency (TAMCA) representatives.

Individuals may be returned directly to the theater replacement battalion for redeployment. Commanders report excess materiel to the senior MMC for recovery (palletizinting/ rewarehousing) and redistribution. Commanders initiate personnel actions, to include the following, during this state:

- Processing decorations and awards.
- Processing officer evaluation reports (OERs) and noncommissioned officer evaluation reports (NCOERs).
- Completing records and finance updates.

The unit or its parent command is responsible for actions at the TAA and support of the TAA. Actions required include —

- Identify and separate excess stockage according to guidance provided by the supported commander and executed by the theater army materiel management center (TAMMC).
- Complete reconstitution and cross-leveling for movement and coordinate with TAMCA representatives to begin updating the AUEL.
- Determine the mode selection of unit impedimenta. Containerization should be done as far forward as US Customs and Department of Agriculture support is available.

PHASE II - MOVEMENT TO REDEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY AREAS

Upon receipt of movement instructions, forces, individuals, and materiel are moved to the RAAs. At the RAA, the commander completes activities that he could not accomplish at the TAA. These activities include —

- Washing major end items.
- Affixing placards.
- Obtaining US Customs and Department of Agriculture inspections on all unit equipment.
- Finalizing unit movement data.

Because of the size of the redeploying force and AOR capabilities, an intermediate staging site and final staging area may be required prior to outloading at the POE. At the final staging area, all remaining prerequisites for strategic lift are performed, to include —

- Continued supply accountability and maintenance actions.
- US Customs and Department of Agriculture inspections for all personnel and equipment.
- Palletization of equipment.
- Completion of labeling.

The accountable unit officer must ensure the property book and all related documentation, such as the document register returned with the main body of unit equipment, is loaded immediately.

If equipment is staged for shipment after main body departure, then the property book and related documents will be left with the OIC of the units' rear detachments and will return with them. This will expedite the reconstitution process at the home station.

The commander of the senior logistics support organization in the theater is responsible for the movement of forces from the TAA and actions at and support of the RAA. Responsibilities include—

- All actions not completed at the TAA up to, but not including, final actions conducted at the POE processing center.
- Cleaning and consolidating cargo to US Customs and Department of Agriculture standards.
- Final changes to the AUEL to complete actual identification of UMD.

The assigned units coordinate movement of individuals not redeploying under a TPFDD unit line number (ULN) coordinated by their assigned unit through the senior movement control agency (TAMCA) representative and in concert with guidance from the supported combatant commander and USTRANSCOM. Personnel redeploying as individuals will remain under the administrative control of their assigned unit or the theater PERSCOM until POE-processed for redeployment.

The TAA and RAA may be combined, depending on the size of the theater and combatant commander's guidance. The redeployment sequence is based on theater constraints and combatant commander guidance. Intermediate steps and actions may be required to supplement TAA and RAA movement, to include further defining RAA activities by establishing a final staging area.

In all cases, the primary method of redeployment is based upon the TPFDD process and identified by ULN. Other methods of redeploying cargo and personnel not scheduled for redeployment with the main body should

be accomplished through established USTRANSCOM procedures. These procedures include requesting additional ULN allocations. Commanders may request allocations through the JPEC representative under the JOPES process. Commanders may also request allocations on an exception basis. With supported CINC concurrence, commanders may request allocations by signing over cargo to designated authorities for later strategic lift with units moving to the same destination.

During the final phase of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, VII corps again displayed the ability to adjust force structure quickly and efficiently. Initially, the corps was required to redeploy units, maintain a force presence in Iraq and Kuwait, continue with humanitarian operations, and execute *a large number of force modernization actions. Detailed management of these actions was important, but the fact that soldiers were kept informed by their chain of command during this demanding period was the key.*

PHASE III - MOVEMENT TO PORT OF EMBARKATION

Based on senior movement control agency movement instructions, forces, individuals, and materiel are moved to the POE where they are processed for strategic movement. If unit equipment is loaded immediately, an accountable unit officer must ensure that the property book and all related documentation, such as the document register, returns with the main body. If the equipment reaches the POE after the main body departs, the copies of the property book and related documents will be left with the officer in charge of the unit's rear detachment. This action will expedite the operational recovery process at the home station. Part of that processing may require a separate and distinct sterile area. The sterile area should be located close to the loading dock to reduce or eliminate possible compromise of agricultural clearances. This sterile area is a temporary holding area where cleaned equipment that has passed US Customs and Department of Agriculture inspections is held and controlled awaiting transport to the POE.

The CINC is responsible for establishing a military customs inspection program (MCIP) to perform US Customs preclearance and US Department of Agriculture inspection and wash-down on all personnel and cargo retrograde to the US in accordance with DOD Directive 5030.49-R[1]. An approved MCIP must be in place prior to redeployment to preclear not only redeployment personnel and cargo but also the shipment of battle damage equipment back to the US for repair.

At all bases, unit rear detachments maintain security, supply, maintenance, and accountability of equipment in preparation for strategic lift. With acceptance by the A/DACG at the airfield or sea PSA, departing forces, individuals, and materiel are quarantined and loaded aboard strategic lift for movement. Establishment of an effective PSA to expedite actions at the POE is the key to rapid redeployment and integrity/accountability of forces and readiness. See Figure 5-1.

Actions at the Port of Embarkation Processing Center

Designated TAACOM elements are responsible for the following actions at the POE processing centers:

- Processing baggage and accompanying cargo according to US Customs inspection regulations.
- Configuring and inspecting cargo and passenger loads according to TCC standards.
- Verifying the final manifest and documentation.

Delayed equipment departures may require establishing a temporary sterile area in an area close to the POE to await final POE processing and available strategic lift. An information copy of actions that were accomplished at the POD processing center, that is, verified manifests, must be expedited to the gaining POD.

Movement Scheduling

Follow-on locations are reported through JPEC representatives to CINC USTRANSCOM and the supported commander, who develops and maintains the redeployment TPFDD. USTRANSCOM coordinates both intra-CONUS or intertheater movement.

PHASE IV - STRATEGIC LIFT

This phase begins with the wheels up for aircraft or passage of the last buoy marking the channel for

[1] *Customs Inspection, 27* May 1977.

vessels to the SPOE. At this point, command is transferred from the supported CINC to the supporting CINC, while control is temporarily exercised by USTRANSCOM until arrival at destination. Efficient strategic lift is characterized by accurate movement schedules and manifests of cargo being carried. This phase ends with arrival at the POD where reception occurs. Redeployment via sealift is considered an




Figure 5-1. Redeployment Process for Phases I through IV

administrative movement in order to maximize use of available ships within TPFDD priorities.

PHASE V - RECEPTION AT PORT OF DEBARKATION

This phase begins with the arrival of forces (units and personnel) and their sustainment equipment and supplies at the POD. It ends with the departure of the forces (units and personnel) and their sustainment equipment and supplies from the POD after receiving Department of Agriculture and US Customs clearance.

The commander receiving the forces (units and personnel) and sustainment equipment and supplies develops a reception and onward-movement plan for all arriving forces and sustainment equipment and supplies. This includes providing the necessary port support structure to manage the effort.

The 218th Adjutant General Company (Personnel Service Administration), South Carolina Army National Guard, was called into federal service on 22 January 1991 and was assigned to Fort Benning, GA. The unit administratively processed thousands of RC soldiers redeploying from Operation Desert Storm. The unit was released from active duty on 30 June 1991.

When possible, commanders send advance parties to coordinate the orderly processing of redeploying forces. One of the primary requirements during this phase is coordinating the onward movement of deploying forces to their follow-on destination. This coordination requires personnel who know the unit, its organic personnel, its movement configurations, and its ultimate destination. These personnel work with MTMC's representatives, supporting ITOs, or TAMCAs in completing the required documents for moving the forces and sustainment equipment and supplies to the final destination. The receiving MACOM designates a liaison officer to assist the port commander, the MTMC representative, and the returning unit in resolving conflicts. The preferred methods for onward movement mirror those prescribed for deployment.

PHASE VI - ONWARD MOVEMENT FROM PORT OF DEBARKATION

This phase begins with the reconfiguration of forces and sustainment equipment and supplies at a designated marshaling area outside the processing area. It concludes with their arrival at their destination. MACOM representatives conduct a visual inspection of convoying equipment while it is in the marshaling area having required repairs done. The MACOM representative will divert equipment not meeting movement and/or maintenance standards to a designated location for repair prior to onward movement to destination.

The supporting installation's commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and support of arriving forces and for assisting with their onward movement. In this capacity, he sustains the forces and individuals until they arrive at their prescribed destination. This may require assisting them in obtaining intratheater airlift, commercial and military highway, military convoy, rail, or other modes for moving forces and individual manpower to their destinations.

Follow-on locations for active component units may be either former (home station) or another location for employment. RC units return to demobilization stations, to home station, or to another location for employment.

Follow-on locations for individuals returning separately from units must be clearly established. These locations may be demobilization stations, CDCs, follow-on assignments, or transition separation points. Supporting commanders must be prepared to support individual soldiers carrying sensitive items (weapons, classified material, and so forth).

Follow-on locations for civilians are normally the locations from which they originated. They redeploy using the same support structure used by soldiers redeploying as individuals.

Follow-on locations for materiel being returned to CONUS or being redistributed elsewhere are determined through the automated redistribution process or through management decisions. The US Army Materiel Command, HQDA (DCSLOG), and DLA develop this information. See Figure 5-2.

OTHER REDEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Other considerations during redeployment are support, cargo, supplies and materiel, customs regulations, and logistics requisitions.

IDENTIFYING SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

In order to conduct an effective and efficient redeployment operation, specific units, individuals, and equipment and supplies must be identified and allocated to the operation. Early in the process, the CINC must identify a structure to support the redeployment operation. Medical care, life support, and other services, as well as supplies and materiel, must be provided.

As units prepare for and actually move during redeployment, installation commanders should plan and prepare for reunion. This planning helps prepare a soldier and his family for the soldier's reintroduction into the peacetime environment and into family unit relationships.

Units redeploy in increments—advance party, main body, and trail force. The size of the unit, the requirement to support sustainment operations, the requirement for equipment movement support actions, and transportation assets impact on the number of increments. The advance party prepares for its arrival at POD, DMS, and destination. The main body is where the bulk of the personnel and designated equipment redeploy back to the home station or DMS.

The rear detachment-usually not to exceed 25 percent of the unit's authorized personnel (preferably volunteers)—remains in the theater to —

- Maintain property accountability.
- Perform unit maintenance.
- Oversee supply support.
- Interface with the movement control agency as the balance of its equipment is processed for strategic sealift.

Once the equipment has been processed, the senior logistics support agency in the theater (TAACOM) directs redeployment by strategic airlift.

Redeployments during Vietnam, Operation Just Cause, and numerous training exercises featured C^2 organizations provided by the corps, whose charter was to assist the logistics organization (TAACOM, COSCOM) and get units home. During Operation Desert Storm, corps centralized control did not occur until after units had already begun to redeploy. The VII Corps did not provide a redeployment command until the May-June 1991 time frame. The redeployment command uses ad hoc port support teams provided by the moving units to finalize the preparation and loading of vehicles and equipment for shipment.

DOCUMENTING CARGO

Commanders must ensure that documentation, accountability, and accuracy is as thorough as it was for deployment. The rush to return to the home station will bring about severe problems unless command emphasis is placed on accurately marking and documenting equipment. Unit movement data provided to MTMC must be correct in order to properly document cargo to prepare the ship manifest for redeployment.

Maintaining unit integrity during redeployment is as critical to readiness as it is during deployment. Therefore, the same standard in ensuring marry-up of containerized unit equipment with noncontainerized unit equipment applies. That is, when possible, containerized unit equipment will be shipped with the noncontainerized cargo. If that is not practical, containerized unit equipment will be scheduled (and managed) to arrive at the POD or final destination on the same required delivery date as the noncontainerized equipment. In the latter case, in-transit visibility of the cargo must be substantiated to facilitate diversion en route, if required.

MTMC prioritizes nonunit equipment containers in accordance with OPLANS or directives. Units must redeploy using TC ACCIS and other deployment procedures to account for unit equipment and sustainment supplies.

> *The 1st Cavalry Division After-Action Report for Operation Desert Storm highlighted the fact that the division moved 10,300 pieces of equipment from Southwest Asia. This equated to 16 vessels. Additionally, the division shipped 156 commercial containers of other cargo.*

The requirement for dedicated transportation for logistics operations during periods of crisis was highlighted during the redeployment phase of Operation Desert Storm. The short duration of the war, coupled with the requirement for rapid redeployment, placed an extremely high demand on airlift and sealift resources.

Due to the lack of dedicated transportation assets and an inadequate redeployment structure, many unit equipment sets were shipped in an administrative fashion without regard to unit integrity to a number of ports.

Additionally, the shipping time from Southwest Asia to CONUS was extended from the original forecast of 45 to 60 days to 60 to 90 days. There was an impact on unit readiness due to nonreceipt of critical equipment in




Figure 5-2. Redeployment Process for Phases IV Through VI

a timely fashion. As a result, the reconstitution effort was delayed.

REDISTRIBUTING SUPPLIES AND MATERIEL

The redistribution activity is a key factor in redeploying and reconstituting supplies and materiel for future operations. Significant national resources are invested in supplies and materiel to support operations. Therefore, recovery and redistribution is a critical effort.

Nonunit redeployed equipment and supplies are redistributed according to plans developed by HQDA, with input from combatant commanders. Priority of effort is generally to Army forces committed to JCS-approved OPLANs. Other recipients may include host countries, USAMC, DLA, and GSA distribution centers. In the redistribution process, equipment may be available for HQDA Foreign Military Sales or a grant program such as Excess Defense Articles to support national interests and policies.

Following Operation Desert Storm, the European redistribution facilities operated by USAMC-Europe, in conjunction with US Army Europe, received and redistributed excess serviceable and unserviceable, economically repairable materiel, saving the Army over $150 million in requests and more than $20 million in overseas transportation charges.

Equipment may be distributed to Army commands in a serviceable or unserviceable condition. In the latter case, the receiving command is normally responsible for returning the equipment to a serviceable condition. HQDA establishes distribution, funding, project codes, and priorities for the maintenance of supplies to maintain and repair the returning equipment.

Materiel for redistribution can essentially be divided into two categories—that which is subject to automated disposition and that which requires a management decision. DA DCSOPS must authorize Class VII major end items to fill worldwide shortages; therefore, major equipment transactions will be handled manually.

The automated redistribution system may be used to redistribute Class II, III(P), IV, and IX items and may apply to other classes. Each type of materiel has certain unique requirements such as some Class III(P) and V items which need a hazardous materiel (HAZMAT) certification before shipping.

COMPLYING WITH CUSTOMS REGULATIONS

All materiel returned to CONUS, either unit equipment or stocks of materiel, must comply with both US Customs and US Department of Agriculture regulations. Essentially this means that contraband items such as certain war trophies, items manufactured in excluded countries, or live plant materiel must be removed from any CONUS-bound shipments. Normally, US Customs, US Department of Agriculture, and Military Customs inspectors inspect all cargo in the AO before it is shipped to the US. The TAACOM commander coordinates with the theater provost marshal for custom clearance of all DOD materiel.

Unit equipment that has cleared the US Customs and Department of Agriculture inspections is placed in a sterile area, awaiting loading on ship. Port support teams, usually provided by the division, are required to help finalize the preparation and loading of the unit's vehicles and cargo for shipping.

CANCELLING LOGISTICS REQUISITIONS

At the conclusion of an operation, materiel is both on requisition and en route in the distribution system. Units continue to require supplies, but some categories will not be required in the quantity requisitioned. Units should consume theater stocks and materiel management centers cease requisitioning from the CONUS base. The senior MMC, in coordination with the corps MMCs, DLA, and USAMC, determines when the supply pipeline can be shut down. The senior MMC changes DODAAC "ship-to" addresses for selected classes of supply and unit requests.

SUMMARY

Commanders and planners must plan and execute redeployment in an efficient manner that facilitates the use of redeploying units, individuals, and materiel to meet new crises. The key to redeployment of units is that it not be considered as simply a retrograde movement but as a potential follow-on deployment. Unit integrity is a critical factor of redeployment and ensures that units can be diverted anywhere, ready to fight. The focus of individual manpower and materiel redeployment is total accountability and efficient handling. The desired end state after redeployment is the restoration of the Army's capability to conduct future operations.

CHAPTER 6

DEMOBILIZATION

"Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed to discharge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the stores at West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers; no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain."
(Resolution of the Continental Congress Disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784)

This chapter assigns responsibilities and provides guidance for the demobilization of those reserve component units and individuals called up for federal military service. Additionally, it addresses actions and considerations for the recovery and reconsititution of supplies, equipment, and services.

"It wasn't demobilization, it was a rout."
(George C. Marshall — speaking of demobilization at the end of World War II)

DEMOBILIZATION IN PAST CONFLICTS

Demobilization of the Army in past conflicts has generated some basic, simple truths that have been consistent with all modem conflicts. The Army, at the cessation of hostilities, rapidly experiences great pressure from Congress, families of mobilized soldiers, and the American public at large to return mobilized reservists to their premobilization status.

This pressure impacts on the rate of redeployment and the pace of demobilization. In addition, experience has demonstrated that soldiers are receptive to shortcuts in processing, which can have negative long-term effects on the Total Army.

Demobilization, as with redeployment, is a public relations and troop information challenge that requires in-depth, creative planning and execution. Demobilization is more complicated than mobilization. Although procedures are standardized, the time to execute varies. Actions to account for the following individuals require intensive management by commanders at all levels:

- Individuals cross-leveled and/or deployed with other units.
- Individuals retained on active duty for medical or legal processing.
- Individuals retained as part of a rear element.

The desired end state at demobilization is complete restoration of the Army capabilities to conduct future operations in the most efficient and cost effective manner.

DEMOBILIZATION PHASES

Demobilization of some units may occur at the same time other units are being mobilized, deployed, or redeployed. Demobilization is conducted in five phases:

- Demobilization planning actions.
- AO demobilization actions.

- POE-to-DMS or POE-to-CDC actions.
- DMS-to-CDC actions.
- Home-station or home-of-record actions.

PHASE I - DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING ACTIONS

Demobilization planning starts concurrently with mobilization planning and ends with the decision to release units and individuals from active duty. Demobilization planning encompasses an analysis of the workload required to efficiently complete the demobilization process over time. This planning may include—

- Relocating units and individuals.
- Incorporating annual training for nonmobilized RC units to support demobilization.
- Temporarily hiring civilian personnel.
- Mobilizing additional RC units.
- Using individual volunteers (via temporary tours of active duty) to support critical missions within the demobilization process.

Demobilization planning in theater is based on the resources available to the ASCC. Critical resources include medical support, supplies, maintenance support, transportation support, personnel, and time. Plans must address basic equipment maintenance and disposition actions, decorations, awards, and evaluation report processing.

The entire chain of command must communicate and enforce demobilization standards in theater. Failure to adhere to maintenance standards can cause delays in requisition fills and a unit's inability to achieve mission capability upon its return to CONUS.

PHASE II - AREA OF OPERATIONS DEMOBILIZATION ACTIONS

This phase starts with reconstitution actions in theater and ends when the units and/or individual soldiers report to the POE for onward movement. The theater initiates administrative and logistics actions to ensure soldiers are cared for. Processing must include awards and decorations, performance reports, line-of-duty investigations, supply records, and equipment accountability.

Medical and dental actions should be started in theater when resources are available. Units, to include filler personnel, should be programmed for movement to the DMS where the unit was initially mobilized. Individuals should be processed for movement to a designated CDC.

PHASE **III - PORT OF EMBARKATION-TO-DEMOBILIZATION STATION/CONUS DEMOBILIZATION CENTER ACTIONS**

This phase overlaps with redeployment phases to move soldiers to the DMS and/or CDC. An example of a demobilization process that may occur during this stage is a welcome ceremony for returning soldiers at the CONUS POD prior to arrival at the DMS/CDC.

PHASE IV - DEMOBILIZATION STATION/CONUS DEMOBILIZATION CENTER ACTIONS

This phase starts with arrival at the DMS and/or CDC and ends with the unit's and/or individual's departure to home station/home-of-record. Installations must house, feed, and provide on-site transportation to the units/individuals during this stage.

Installation commanders ensure that all medical and dental actions, finance records, legal and entitlement briefings, personnel records updates, and logistics files are current before a soldier is released. Completion of required medical examinations, line-of-duty determinations, and finance actions to complete final pay are completed before issuing DD Forms 214.

The rapid redeployment and demobilization of Operation Desert Storm resulted in numerous problems with reservists receiving incorrect DD Forms 214 and missing OERs/NCOERs. These problems resulted in additional resources being called up to screen all records at ARPERCEN and make necessary corrections. This action caused unnecessary confusion on the part of soldiers, units, employers, and federal agencies responsible for providing benefits.

Installations must be prepared for expanded family support and media coverage of welcoming ceremonies during this stage. Welcome/departure ceremonies are vital components of the demobilization process that installations must plan and execute. Soldiers will remember the effort made to welcome them home. Installations should include families of soldiers as part of the ceremonies. Ceremonies should be brief but meaningful. Logistics actions include —

- Coordinating prescribed load list (PLL)/authorized stockage list accounts.
- Shipping equipment to home stations, equipment concentration sites, and mobilization and training equipment sites, as determined by the CONUSA in coordination with NGB and USARC.
- Preparing movement orders for unit members to return to their home station and individuals to their home of record.

The CONUSA also issues a unit release from active duty (REFRAD) order during this stage.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, to include the redeployment and demobilization phases, installation family assistance centers were very active. As an example, the National Guard family assistance centers served over 250,000 people and answered over 350,000 telephone inquiries in support of members of all services.

PHASE V - HOME-STATION/ HOME-OF-RECORD ACTIONS

This phase begins with departure from the DMS or CDC and ends with release of units at their home station and individuals at their home of record. The unit reverts to RC status based on a date/time established by CONUSA orders, less ARSOF units that are released by USASOC.

Unit members are not always released at the same time. Transition leave, medical hold, rear detachments, and trail party personnel require different release dates. The specific release date for unit members is noted on their movement orders from the installation. Individuals are released from active duty on their return to their home of record. The end of this stage rolls into Phase 1 of mobilization planning (strategic reconstitution).

During an extended conflict, RC units may lose their pure RC composition through extended cross-leveling, redistribution, and replacement actions. Mobilized RC units may contain USAR and/or ARNG personnel. Equipment may often be unidentifiable as being from active or RC sources.

Once demobilization is initiated, HQDA identifies the DMS for all units (personnel and equipment). Units are then directed to return to the installation from which they originated or an alternate location. Active duty personnel are reassigned according to the HQDA reconstitution plan. Reserve units (flags) are released and soldiers assigned to the unit may be released or transferred to RC status as individuals. Strategic reconstitution of the total force is initiated as part of the mobilization planning phase.

DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS

Demobilization is the process by which forces (units), individuals, and materiel are transferred from active to reserve status. Although the focus is generally on units and individuals, significant resources, such as supplies, materiel, and support activities, are dedicated to the demobilization of logistics.

Completion of equipment recovery operations and actions to reconstitute units to premobilization levels of readiness require additional resources, to include manpower support, funding, and time. Therefore, the demobilization process does not lend itself to a rigid approach and must be modified based on the situation governing the successful execution of the OPLAN/OPORD.

Generally, four options are available for commands to demobilize units and redeploy their equipment

- CONUS units return to their home stations with their equipment.
- Personnel and equipment return together by air.
- Personnel return by air and the equipment follows at a later date by surface. Unit equipment scheduled to return to CONUS, but which does not accompany personnel, remains in an active Army equipment status until returned to the unit at its home station.
- Personnel return by air and all or a portion of the unit equipment remains in the AOR. Equipment remaining in the AOR is laterally transferred to either the supported commander or the gaining unit in country.

UNITS

RC units process through the same mobilization station used in the original call-up process. For purposes of demobilization, these installations are designated as DMSs.

Deployed Units

Units are released by the supported commander. Unit personnel redeploy back to an APOD and are returned to their original MS for demobilization processing.

CONUS Support Units

RC units providing support to the CONUS base are processed for demobilization by the same installations that accessed them to active duty. Personnel who were reassigned to serve in other locations or activities are reassembled with their units prior to demobilization.

The supporting commander, in concert with the supported commander, determines the priority for equipment return, that is, recommends the transportation mode. FORSCOM, NGB, and other MACOMs, in order to maintain a readiness posture, coordinate and provide minimum essential equipment for training (MEET) sets or transfer equipment to units whose equipment was retained in the theater. Supporting installations with A/DACG or PSA responsibilities assist unit personnel and equipment during transit from the POD to the DMS.

DMSs are required to plan for support of units in all areas of supply, to include reestablishing basic load requisitions and PLL accompanying equipment and replenishing individual equipment which was retained in the AOR.

INDIVIDUALS

All RC soldiers and retirees called as individuals to serve at CONUS installations are demobilized from those locations. RC fillers returning with the unit of assignment to its installation of origin (home station for AC units or MS for RC units) are released from active duty at that location. Filler personnel do not accompany an RC unit to its home station. When appropriate, the DMS coordinates with the appropriate installation, based on the individual's original unit of assignment, to acquire records to accomplish demobilization actions.

Reassignment of civilians occurs simultaneously with demobilization of reservists. HQ DA issues specific guidance on returning civilians to their previous duty station and release of contractors.

LOGISTICS

Demobilization, as it pertains to logistics, is the process of restoring equipment and supplies to a prescribed level of readiness and placing them in the location which best supports future plans or contingencies. The desired logistics end state at demobilization is complete restoration of equipment to conduct future operations in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible.

Supplies and Materiel

Operational requirements or transportation constraints may determine that some organizational or individual equipment remain in the AO. However, recovery of all supplies and materiel should be given as high a priority as practical.

Demobilization Stations

The DMS receives and issues supplies and equipment to RC units as they return from the theater. Assets and assistance may be provided for maintenance and repair prior to issue to receiving units.

MACOMs determine when RC units supporting the redeployment and demobilization processes are released from active duty.

The 5064th US Army Garrison (Army Reserve, Livonia, MI) and the 2361st Signal Detachment (Army Reserve, Akron, OH) were mobilized in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They were deployed to Fort McCoy, WI, a mobilization station, and provided mobilization and demobilization support at the installation.

Equipment and Supply Demobilization and Storage

Redeployed equipment and supplies not returned to using units are redistributed according to plans developed by HQDA with input from combatant commanders. Priority is generally to Army forces committed to JCS-approved OPLANS. Other recipients may include USAMC, DLA, and GSA distribution centers.

In the redistribution process, equipment may be available for HQDA Foreign Military Sales or a grant program as excess defense articles to support national interests and policies. Equipment may be distributed to Army commands in a serviceable or unserviceable condition. In the latter case the receiving command is normally responsible for returning it to a serviceable condition.

HQDA establishes distribution, funding, project codes, and priorities for the maintenance and supplies to maintain and repair the returning equipment.

Outstanding Contracts

Based on logistical needs, current Army contracts will be reviewed to determine continuing applicability. Some will need to be continued to replenish stocks used during the conflict, and others may be readjusted or cancelled based on requirements. In some cases, it may be more cost effective to fulfill a contract than to cancel noncritical items.

It maybe necessary to shift funding for demilitarization projects from noncritical programs to ones with a higher priority. In all cases, the review of contracts must be viewed with the best interests of the nation and the Army in mind.

Facilities and Work Force

The demobilization of industrial facilities and the associated work force is related to initial mobilization requirements. Under contingency responses, the industrial base may be expanded only with temporary employees and leased facilities. Upon cessation of hostilities, this temporary capability would be contractually released from service and the tools stored for future use.

Large-scale mobilization might entail the construction of new government-owned facilities and the training of a skilled work force in new technologies similar to the World War II Manhattan Project for the building of the atomic bomb.

Demobilization of an effort of that size would require an integrated governmental plan that might transfer military activities to other agencies or commercial interests. Additional efforts may involve demilitarization projects to dispose of undesirable or obsolete weapon systems.

SOLDIER SUPPORT

Personnel actions to demobilize RC personnel are planned to support the transition of the soldier into civilian life. The most critical actions center on medical and finance processing and issuance of separation documents (DD Forms 214). These actions represent a legal relationship between the Army, the soldier, and the soldiers's civilian employer and must be completed to the highest standard.

Other personnel actions (awards processing, OER and NCOER processing, and records update) are completed prior to demobilization. The DMS must conduct a review of all such actions completed in the theater. This review is to ensure that all required actions are completed prior to REFRAD.

Family support focus shifts to family reintegration and crisis intervention. Impressions formed by spouses and family members during this experience have a critical impact on the soldier's continued participation as a member of the RC.

Finance support during demobilization is just as important as during mobilization and ensures a smooth soldier transition back to RC pay status. Actions by the RC commander include —

- Reviewing any pending pay actions of his soldiers.
- Ensuring that each soldier is aware of his entitlements.
- Ensuring that Class A agents reconcile their accounts.

Finance personnel outprocess demobilizing soldiers by computing and paying all final entitlements and travel claims. In addition, they convert soldiers from AC to RC status on JUMPS/JSS or separate those individuals reverting back to full time civilian status from JUMPS/JSS.

The Army's responsibilities to care for soldiers during demobilization does not end upon a soldier's release from active duty. In conjunction with the Department of Labor, the Army helps and ensures that returning soldiers receive all reemployment and other entitlements guaranteed by law.

The 541st Adjutant General Company (Personnel Services Administration), Washington ARNG, was called into federal service on 25 January 1991. At that time its mobilization station was changed from Fort Lewis, WA, to Fort Ord, CA. The unit arrived at Fort Ord on 30 January 1991 and sewed there as a CONUS support unit assigned to I Corps and attached to the 7th lnfantry Division (Light). The unit processed Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Individual Ready Reserve soldiers' records, both for mobilization and demobilization. The 541st processed the records of about 2,500 soldiers for demobilization. On 5 June 1991, the unit was released from active duty at Fort Oral.

Planning for media coverage of demobilization and reception activities must focus on a combination of local and national media.

SUMMARY

Demobilization is a critical factor in the Army's strategic reconstitution. Demobilization must be planned with the same degree of energy and detail as mobilization. Effective demobilization enhances readiness and soldier morale. The Army, through demobilization, reaffirms its long-term commitment to a viable reserve.

APPENDIX A

DELIBERATE AND CRISIS-ACTION PLANNING PROCESSES AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS

This appendix provides a brief overview of the deliberate and crisis-action planning (CAP) processes and the policies, procedures, and automatic data processing (ADP) systems of support (JOPES) that craft them. Detailed procedures for implementation are found in the Joint Publication 5-03 series.[1]

OPORDs are developed from OPLANs and CONPLANs for a contingency when no pretreated plan exists during either the deliberate or CAP processes. The descriptions provided are academic in nature. In reality, these processes must be flexible to allow phases to be completed sequentially, concurrently, or skipped, depending on the severity of the situation. See Figure A-1.

DELIBERATE PLANNING

During peacetime, commanders use the deliberate planning process to develop CONPLANS and detailed OPLANs for contingencies identified in the JSCP. From the supported commander's perspective, the deliberate planning process is never complete. See Figure A-2.

CRISIS-ACTION PLANNING

Events may occur that are assessed as significant to national security or impact national response. These time-sensitive situations generate the CAP. For contingencies already considered by the JSCP, an OPLAN/CONPLAN is the basis for beginning CAP.

As shown in Figure A-3, the product of CAP is the successful execution of a CAP-produced OPORD. NCA exercises the ultimate authority over the execution of this OPORD.

The JPEC uses system data such as type unit characteristics files (TUCHF), geographic locations files (GEOFILES), and other standard reference files to develop or refine TPFDDs.

STEP 1. ESTABLISHES TPFDD FORCES

- Force Requirements Generator (FRG). Creates a forcer requirements data file.
- Force Module Subsystem (FMS). Links force, nonunit cargo, and personnel within a TPFDD and summary reference file (SRF).

STEP 2. LINKS TPFDD FORCES WITH SUPPLIES

- Logistics Sustainability Analysis Feasibility Estimator (LOGSAFE). Calculates resupply requirements by comparing requirements with available supplies and reports the shortfall.
- Nonunit Personnel Generator (NPG). Places NRP requirements into the TPFDD.
- Medical Planning and Execution System (MEPES). predicts patient work load, bed requirements, evacuees by operation zones, physicians needed, operating rooms, blood, and resupply requirements.

[1] *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System.*

- Joint Engineering Planning and Execution System (JEPES). Predicts facilities construction and war damage repair requirements.

STEP 3. DETERMINES TRANSPORTATION FEASIBILITY ESTIMATE

TFE determines feasibility of flowing forces and supplies to meet OPLAN and OPORD requirements.




Figure A-1. Joint Planning Summary

ORIGIN	PHASE	ACTIONS	OUTCOMES
JSCP	I - Initiation	UCP/CJCS assigns tasks	Planning guidance
Implied Missions	II - Concept Development	Analyze mission Review COAs	Concept of operations
CONPLAN	III - Plan Development	Select/phase forces Plan support Program strategic lift	OPLAN [1]
OPLAN	IV - Plan Review	Obtain JCS review/approval	CJCS-approved OPLAN
Approved OPLAN	V - Supporting Plans	Develop supporting plans	CJCS-approved supporting plans

[1] OPLANS are dynamic, requiring periodic review/update. Goal is to complete in as little as 45 days.

Figure A-2. Deliberate Planning

JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

JOPES is a system of policies, procedures, and ADP support procured to develop, maintain, and execute OPLANs. JCS and the services maintain it for commanders.

The initial development of OPLANs/CONPLANs completes five phases of deliberate planning in as little as 45 days. The six phases of CAP use JOPES processes to construct OPORDs in only 48 hours in response to impending national crises.

LEVELS OF DETAIL

JOPES categorizes information for commanders in various levels of detail.

Level I - Aggregated Level

The aggregated level is the total number of passengers and short tons/measurement tons by ULN, CIN, and PIN.

- ULN identifies each force requirement.
- CIN describes a nonunit cargo entry.
- PIN describes a nonunit personnel entry.

Level II - Summary Level

The summary level is the total number of passengers by ULN and PIN with short tons/measurement tons of bulk, oversized, outsized, and nonair-transportable cargo by ULN and CIN. This is the normal level of detail for most deployment planning.

Level III - Detail by Cargo Category

The detail by cargo category is the ULN and CIN and short tons/measurement tons.

Level IV- Detail by Type of Equipment

The detail by type of equipment is the quantity by type of equipment, square feet, dimensions, and tonnages.

PROCESSING OF DATA

JOPES obtains MDRD data from multiple sources in developing, maintaining, and executing the resulting product—the OPORD. JOPES supports commanders by processing complex data to enhance decision making and OPORD production. See Figure A-4.

ORIGIN	PHASE	ACTIONS	OUTCOMES
Crisis[1]	I - Situation Development	Identify problem	Submit OPREP
OPREP	II - Crisis Assessment	Obtain JCS assessment Obtain NCA/CJCS evaluation	NCA/CJCS decide to develop COA
Warning Order	III - COA Development	Develop COAs Review TPFDD	Commander's estimate w/COAs
Prioritized COAs	IV - COA Selection	Approve CJCS planning order	NCA selects COA CJCS alert order
Alert or planning order	V - Execution Planning	Refine movement Assign unit tasks Develop OPORD Update SORTS	Publish OPORD
NCA decides to execute OPORD	VI - Execution	Publish CJCS executive order Commands execute OPORD	Crisis response

[1] Crisis may require compressed, altered, or eliminated CAP phases.

Figure A-3. Crisis-Action Planning

Through a three-step process, JOPES matches forces and supplies for establishing and refining OPLANS or OPORD TPFDDs. See Figure A-5.

EXAMPLES OF REPORTS

Commanders may obtain both standard and tailored reports via JOPES. Examples of JOPES reports available upon request to assist commanders in deploying the force include —

- Movement Schedule Reports. These reports include carrier identification, itinerary, and manifest information for scheduled/actual movements. During execution, these reports are used to track carriers and cargo.
- Movement Allocation Reports. These reports include scheduled and actual arrival and departure times. These reports are part of the OPLAN executive summary.
- Channelized Requirements Report. These reports include mode/source, EAD/LAD, and channel requirements not manifested, partially manifested, or not qualified for manifesting.
- Schedule Flow Analysis Report. This report compares passenger/cargo required with what has been scheduled for shortfall identification.

- Scheduled Port Movement Work Load Report and Projected Port Movement Workload Report. These reports track carrier and organic movements to, from, or through ports.
- Deployment Summary Report. This report summarizes requirements between dates in EAD or LAD sequence. It identifies units, personnel, and cargo scheduling shortfalls.
- Force Module Movement Summary Report. Part 1 is a summary of cargo and passenger information, requirements total information, and percentage complete at POD. Part 2 details movement for each force movement requirement. E8 tracks the scheduling and movement status-of-force modules (ULNs).

SUMMARY

JOPES is structured to support commanders and staff. The system is complex and constantly evolving to improve responsiveness. The goal is to provide enhanced support to commanders by streamlining operational processes for mission success.




Figure A-4. Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Support to Commanders




Figure A-5. Time-Phased Force Development Process/Refinement

APPENDIX B

TOTAL MOVEMENTS CONTINUUM

This appendix provides an overview of the MDRD processes within the total movements continuum. The Army's ability to rapidly expand and project forces and logistics with the proper mix of combat support and combat service support is central to the Army's role as the nation's strategic land force. See Figure B-1.

THE PHASES

Commanders, in order to effectively deploy and employ their forces, must understand the total movements continuum. See Figure B-2.

The deployment process phases may overlap with unit call-up and the phases of the mobilization process. Concurrent with forces deployment, lodgement, stabilization, and restoration activities decisive engagements and/or conditions amicable to US interests may result as the force begins the redeployment process.

As forces are redeploying, select units and supplies may continue to deploy. The redeployment process phases may overlap with continuing deployments and also parallel demobilization activities. Commanders must plan for these simultaneous MDRD processes. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide general guidelines for commanders to meet MDRD requirements.

Commanders must use care in developing the TPFDD by which forces and supplies are deployed. During the deployment process, US forces are most vulnerable to significant casualties. Conversely, as closure times extend, the duration of a crisis extends, increasing the risk of casualties.

With the knowledge that extended force closure times may directly increase the domestic and coalition support risks for a particular crisis, commanders rigorously discipline their strategic lift requirements to that which is needed (deployment equipment list) for the operation.

Additionally, strategic mobility limitations require commanders to prioritize unit displacements where they are mutually supporting and capable of defending against potential threats as a prelude to decisive engagements.

Commanders, through their G3/G4 staffs prescribe, in TPFDD format, who, what, when, and where forces will be deployed. Based on these initiatives and the unit's ability to accurately identify its movement requirements (in UMD format), USTRANSCOM then identifies how the unit will move to meet national military strategy objectives.

Deployment is a command-directed, but shared, staff responsibility with a 51 percent or greater role for G3 operations and a 49 percent or lesser role for G4 logistics. This coordinated staff effort may change percentages, but deployment must remain shared to ensure the commander's intent is successfully executed.

Units will normally align the how portion of the total movements continuum to their logistics staff personnel (G4/S4), who articulate movement requirements in transportation terms for the USTRANSCOM. They also work closely with their commander and G3/S3 in developing a well-planned, practiced unit movement plan that is both responsive and flexible to the aligned OPLAN or OPORD.

SUMMARY

In summary, the total movements continuum is dynamic and requires extensive attention to detail. Commanders must clearly convey their intent. Their G3/G4 staffs must synchronize coordination to successfully complete the several processes that comprise the continuum. The most reliable plans ensure flexibility in overcoming obstacles and allow for quick adjustment to adverse events that occur during OPORD.




Figure B-1. Army Force Projection




Figure B-2. Total Movements Continuum

APPENDIX C

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING PROGRAMS

To fully appreciate the detailed processes of strategic deployment, one must have an overview of the means by which such planning and execution is accomplished. The key systems used in developing and executing strategic deployment plans are described herein.

ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SYSTEM

The Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS) supports the Army's civilian personnel manning mission in both mobilization and peacetime by providing the automated capability to meet management and administrative information needs. It supports Army civilian personnel offices by processing people into the work force, training people, moving people within the work force, and reorganizing the work force profile to support mission changes.

During mobilization, ACPERS supports the rapid expansion and buildup of these activities. ACPERS interfaces with the redesigned Standard Army Civilian Payroll System (STARCIPS-R) and provides data to HQ ACPERS for strength accounting.

ACPERS is the data base of record for Army civilian personnel data. It feeds data to the Total Army Personnel Data Base (TAPDB) and the installation level integrated data bases, which are part of the Installation Support Module (ISM) Program.

AUTOMATED AIRLOAD PLANNING SYSTEM

The Automated Airload Planning System (AALPS) is a computerized system used to produce manifests that contain all information required by the Air Mobility Command. AALPS is used to support deliberate planning and execution phases of air movement as well as force design and analysis.

ARMY MOBILIZATION OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

The Army Mobilization Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES), although not specifically an ADP system, is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of unified and specified commands.

AMOPES serves as the Army supplement to JOPES. It provides the interface between unified command plans—for deployment and use of forces-and Army plans—for providing mobilized forces and resources. AMOPES consolidates policies and procedures, defines responsibilities, and provides operational planning guidance related to mobilization and the strategic employment of Army forces. See Figure C-1.

COMPUTERIZED MOVEMENT PLANNING AND STATUS SYSTEM

The Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS) is a FORSCOM-unique computer system that maintains movement data for use in mobilization and deployment transportation planning.

CONUS FREIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The CONUS Freight Management System (CFM) supports deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations by rating and routing cargo/freight to and




Figure C-1. Functional Subsystems of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System

from ports in ONUS and generating required movement documentation.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MOVEMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM-REDESIGN

The Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign (DAMMS-R) is a portable, automated computer system. It is linked to the freight and container operations of the movement control agency and with the various movement control elements within the theater of operations.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STANDARD PORT SYSTEM-ENHANCED

The Department of the Army Standard Port System-Enhanced (DASPS-E) is a standard system which satisfies the needs of water terminal operators in overseas ports. DASPS-E simplifies cargo accounting, documentation, manifesting, and other related requirements of water terminals. DASPS-E automates selected current manual functions and improves those functions currently automated. DASPS-E will be replaced by the Worldwide Port System (WPS).

DYNAMIC ANALYSIS AND REPLANNING TOOL

The Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART) is an integrated set of automated data processing tools and a data base management system that provides joint operators and planners the ability to rapidly edit and analyze TPFDD for transportation feasibility.

DART makes it possible for planners to consider more alternatives than is possible with current capabilities. It also makes it possible to produce, in less time, potentially feasible courses of action. The DART prototype has been distributed to the combatant CINCs, USTRANSCOM, and transportation component commands (TCCs).

GLOBAL TRANSPORTATION NETWORK

The Global Transportation Network (GTN) is an information system being developed to facilitate USTRANSCOM's global transportation management mission. GTN will support transportation planning, command and control, in-transit visibility, financial management, patient regulating and movement, and other transportation information functions.

Data will be integrated into information meaningful to varying levels of transportation information customers. It will provide specific movements and aggregated views of transportation operations for high-level consumption. GTN will support transportation planning, command and control, in-transit visibility, financial management, and other transportation information functions.

GROUPS OPERATIONAL PASSENGER SYSTEM

The Groups Operational Passenger System (GOPAX) is used to support all operational functions associated with arranging commercial group movement transportation. The system aids considerably in the timely movement of troops between training bases and mobilization sites in CONUS and international aerial ports of embarkation and debarkation.

INTEGRATED BOOKING SYSTEM

The Integrated Booking System (IBS) consolidates existing automation systems (METS II and ASPUR) supporting the cargo booking function into a single architecture, providing one system for peacetime and war and automating the classified wartime booking procedures. IBS provides a centralized interface with external systems and inquiries relating to international surface cargo.

JOINT FLOW AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM FOR TRANSPORTATION

The Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST) is a PC-based analysis tool for estimating transportation flows of an overseas deployment. JFAST provides a means for performing course analysis of deliberate planning, exercise, and real-world transportation problems.

JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

The Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is a joint conventional command and control system currently being upgraded to integrate

and replace deliberate (JOPS) and crisis-action (JDS) planning systems. JOPES is a comprehensive, integrated system of people, policies, procedures, and reporting systems supported by automated systems and applications.

JOPES is being designed for the National Command Authorities, the joint staff, and theater and subordinate CINCs. When fully completed, JOPES will be used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization operations (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) during peacetime, crisis, and war.

The need for JOPES stems from the recognition that users have two separate systems (JOPS and JDS) that incorporate different system architecture, functionality, and procedures. JOPES provides both the deliberate and crisis-action planning and execution capabilities into a single, integrated system. This single, networked system ensures that all participants in all aspects of joint military planning and execution use the same vocabulary, procedures, and joint ADP support, thus facilitating the transition from training to planning to execution.

The five operational functions in JOPES (threat identification and assessment, strategy determination, course of action development, detailed planning, and implementation), together with JOPES supporting functions (simulation and analysis and monitoring), form the JOPES environment. See Figure C-2.

MOBILIZATION PERSONNEL PROCESSING SYSTEM

The Mobilization Personnel Processing System (MOBPERS) is a system used to fill identified shortfalls with individual pretraincd manpower resources. It generates an automated record on all RC soldiers and pre-positions personnel data at the mobilization stations for use in accessing these soldiers to the AC. MOBPERS also generates tapes used to produce mobilization orders for individual ready reservists and retirees ordered to active duty.

RESERVE COMPONENT AUTOMATION SYSTEM

The Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) is an automated information system, still under development, which supports decision-making needs of commanders, staffs, and functional managers responsible for RC forces. It uses state-of-the-art office automation, telecommunications, distributed data bases, and a processing capability to provide timely and accurate information to plan, prepare, and execute mobilization.

RCAS is also designed to improve the accomplishment of routine administrative tasks. It is a self-sufficient system capable of exchanging data with related information systems in the active and reserve components.

STANDARD INSTALLATION AND DIVISION PERSONNEL SYSTEM

The Standard Installation and Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) is an unclassified system which provides cyclic (daily, if required) automated personnel service support (PSS) for active Army soldiers. SIDPERS supports strength accounting, personnel management, personnel actions, and exchange of information with other automated systems.

SIDPERS is an unclassified Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS) which operates on the Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS). Also referred to as SIDPERS TACCS, it provides a standardized personnel system responsible for strength reporting and personnel administration.

SIDPERS provides commanders the ability to optimize allocation and use of personnel assets to meet peacetime, mobilization, and wartime PSS requirements. The main features of the system are data entry, ad hoc query, word processing, spread sheet, C^2SRS (battle rosters, personnel requirements reports, personnel summary reports), miscellaneous personnel functions, and preparation of SIDPERS-2 transactions.

STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM

The Strategic Deployment System (STRADS) is an MTMC planning and execution system used to plan, execute, and monitor unit mobilization, deployment, and redeployment activities during both exercises and contingencies.




Figure C-2. Interfaces with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

THEATER ARMY MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

The Theater Army Medical Management Information System (TAMMIS) supports the information management requirements of field medical units during contingency operations and war. This system aids the US Army in effectively planning transportation, treating, and tracking patients at field (TOE) medical facilities worldwide. The TAMMIS assists medical personnel on the battlefield by providing timely, accurate, and relevant information through the following subsystems:

- Medical blood products management.
- Medical patient accounting and reporting.
- Medical regulating.
- Medical supply.
- Medical maintenance.
- Medical optical fabrication and management.

TRANSPORTATION COORDINATOR AUTOMATED COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM

The Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System (TC ACCIS) is an information management and data communications system the US Army active and reserve components use to plan and execute deployments during both day-to-day operations and

crisis situations. The system maintains the UMD. provides UMD to JOPES via COMPASS, and provides movement requirements to MTMC for ship scheduling and port planning/operations.

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONAL PERSONAL PROPERTY STANDARD SYSTEM

The Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) automates and standardizes personal property movement and storage functions at transportation offices throughout DOD.

WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support for C^2 of US military forces. The system is comprised of the National Military Command System (NMCS), the C^2 systems of unified and specified commands, the service component commands, Department of Defense agencies, and the WWMCCS-related management/information systems.

The system furnishes a multipath channel of secure communications to transmit information from primary sources to those who must make decisions (including the president) and transmit their decisions (in the form of military orders) to subordinates.

WWMCCS is not a single system, nor is it a closed system. It encompasses many systems ranging from national to theater level. It interfaces with other non-WWMCCSs such as the presidential C^2 facilities, non-DOD systems, and tactical C^2 systems that support subordinate military service units. See Figure C-3.

WWMCCS has five basic elements: warning systems, communications, data collection and processing, executive aids, and facilities. Each of these permeates the various levels of C^2. The combined operations of the WWMCCS elements form a worldwide information system. See Figure C-4.

WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK

With the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network (WIN) users can communicate with other users, review and update data at other WWMCCS locations, and transfer data accurately and rapidly between computers.

WORLDWIDE PORT SYSTEM

The Worldwide Port System (WPS) is the replacement system for the MTMC Terminal Management System (TERMS), the DASPS-E, and the unit movement terminal support module. WPS is a stand-alone, transportable, cargo terminal operation and cargo documentation system designed to provide a real time management capability to the terminal commander.

WPS supports in-transit visibility for both general cargo and unit moves. It produces those reports necessary for terminal operations, plus generating the MILSTAMP ocean cargo manifest. WPS will operate at all Army ports worldwide and at Navy ports handling common-user cargo.

SUMMARY

This appendix described some of the automated systems that support MDRD. These and emerging systems will provide a greater capability. Commanders and their staffs must understand these systems to fully appreciate and implement the detailed processes by which strategic deployment is accomplished.




Figure C-3. Worldwide Military Command and Control System Relationships




Figure C-4. The Elements of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System

APPENDIX D

ORGANIZATIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, AND DEMOBILIZATION

The following organizations, in concert with those organizations listed in Chapter 2, share responsibility for mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization.

SECRETARY OF STATE

The Secretary of State is the principal assistant to the President in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. He is responsible for negotiation of host nation support agreements, status of forces agreements, basing, staging, en route refueling locations, overflight rights, and requests for establishment of US embassies in the area of operations.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

The Defense Logistics Agency is a separate agency of DOD and is controlled and directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement and Logistics. DLA functions as an integral element of the DOD military logistics system. It provides worldwide logistics support, through the major supply depots, to the military departments and combatant commands under conditions of peace and war. In this role, DLA prepares supportive plans to assure planned MDRD actions can be executed during a contingency.

DLA also provides support to other DOD components, federal agencies, and foreign governments or international organizations as assigned. DLA complements USAMC by providing logistics support in three primary areas: common item supply support, logistic services, and contract administration.

COMMUNITY FAMILY SUPPORT CENTER

The Community Family Support Center (CFSC), a field operating agency (FOA) of HQDA DCSPER, is responsible for the development and coordination of all community and family services throughout the Army. These services include such areas as Army Community Services, Red Cross, Army Emergency Relief, family orientation, assistance and sponsorship, and morale support activities.

US TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL COMMAND

The US Total Army Personnel Command, a FOA of HQDA DCSPER, is the Army's personnel system operator and is responsible for the distribution, assignment, and coordination for movement of NRP. PERSCOM provides implementing guidance for the MDRD of individuals.

US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

The US Army Corps of Engineers (COE) supports Army and Air Force installation requirements by planning for expansion of mobilization stations and training bases and logistical and transportation terminals in accordance with approved operations and contingency plans. The COE supports Army MACOMs and the Air Force in redeployment and demobilization activities.

UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

The US Army Reserve Command is a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. The USARC commands, controls, supports, and ensures wartime readiness of USAR forces.

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES ARMIES

Continental US Armies are assigned responsibility for completion of all MDRD planning for FORSCOM missions within their AOR. CONUSAs review and approve mobilization plans of STARCs, MUSARC, and installations. They also validate RC general officer commands (GOCOMs).

MAJOR UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

The Major US Army Reserve Command exercises C^2 of designated USAR troop program units and units designated as numbered Army Reserve Command units in a specified area. Upon mobilization, ARCOMs assist mobilizing units. Those MUSARCs identified as GOCOMs have C^2 of specified types of units and retain C^2 upon mobilization.

STATE ADJUTANTS GENERAL

State adjutants general (TAGs) execute premobilization responsibilities through the state area commands and, upon mobilization, command only those nonfederalized ARNG units. TAGs and STARCs are responsible for coordinating with FORSCOM, NGBs, and CONUSAs for the call-up and release of assigned personnel and units.

STATE AREA COMMANDS

State area commands organize, train, and plan for the mobilization, deployment, and employment of federalized ARNG units. STARCs are authorized to cross-level units to meet mobilization and deployment missions. Because cross-leveling may affect implementation of other OPLANs, when cross-leveling is initiated, STARCs must inform HQDA.

STARCs develop mobilization and deployment plans in accordance with the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) and CONUSA guidance. The STARC is incrementally federalized to provide support to mobilized units and Army families during periods of less than full mobilization. STARCs are also responsible for ensuring family support activities are maintained until completion of demobilization.

HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND

The US Army Health Services Command mobilizes to provide total health care and individual Army Medical Department (AMEDD) training support to the expanded Army to meet wartime or emergency requirements. HSC provides AMEDD PROFIS as directed by HQDA, and enlisted personnel fillers, as directed by PERSCOM, to the deployed and deploying forces.

As part of the mobilization training base expansion, HSC must expand the AMEDD training base in the AMEDD center and school, selected medical centers, medical department activities, and FOAs and other medical agencies to provide initial AMEDD training to new accessions and retraining of prior service personnel as appropriate. HSC is responsible for ensuring optimum use of medical assets in support of MDRD. HSC coordinates with HQDA and FORSCOM for the call-up and release of assigned medical personnel and units.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND

The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) supports MDRD and serves as a combat multiplier by assisting commanders at all levels in maintaining discipline, law, and order and by detecting, investigating, and preventing criminal acts that adversely affect the Army. This support includes, but is not limited to, conducting counterdrug operations and detecting and investigating fraudulent acts committed by private parties or corporations operating under Army contract.

A second mission, logistics security, ensures the integrity of the supply system from the manufacturer to the forward elements of the battle area and during redeployment and demobilization by protecting supplies and materials from criminal acts and illegal diversion. Upon mobilization, USACIDC coordinates with HQDA and other MACOMs to call up RC criminal investigation units and personnel. As these units and personnel are called up, USACIDC assumes C^2 of them.

USACIDC elements deploy with, accompany, and support all major Army units throughout the AO. Upon redeployment and subsequent demobilization, USACIDC coordinates with HQDA and other MACOMs for the release of assigned personnel and units.

OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES MAJOR ARMY COMMANDS

OCONUS MACOMs coordinate with HQDA and other MACOMs for the call-up and release of assigned personnel. OCONUS MACOMs use FORMDEPS as a guide for mobilization and deployment.

MAJOR ARMY COMMAND INSTALLATIONS

Installations may be designated as mobilization stations, coordinating installations (CI), supporting installations (SI), or any combination of the above. MSs, during redeployment and demobilization operations, are converted to demobilization stations. The primary responsibilities of the MSs are to receive, house, command, support, train, validate, cross-level assets, and deploy mobilizing units and individuals.

CIs are designated points of contact for off-post units and activities seeking to obtain necessary support. SIs provide the actual support to off-post units and activities. DMSs complete the outprocessing of units and individuals being separated or released from active duty and returning to reserve status.

SUMMARY

The organizations described herein perform the roles necessary for the formulation of military strategy by which the Army plans for MDRD to support national security and national military strategies. As the Army plans to support the national strategic requirements, it must consider the roles and functions that these organizations perform in providing the critical support required for a successful operation.

GLOSSARY

A/DACG	arrival/departure airfield control group
AA	assembly area
AAFES	Army/Air Force Exchange Service
AALPS	Automated Air Load Planning System
ABL	ammunition basic load
above the line	JSCP-prescribed major combat forces of brigade or larger in size and certain unique, intensively managed units.
AC	active component
ACIFS	Automated Central Issue Facility System
ACIIP	Army automated clothing initial issue point
ACPERS	Army Civilian Personnel System
AD	active duty
ADANS	Airlift Deployment Analysis System
ADP	automatic data processing
ADSW	active duty for special work
ADT	active duty for training
AEC	area equipment compound
AER	Army Emergency Relief
AF	appropriated fund
AFRES	Air Force Reserve
AGR	active guard/reserve
ALCE	airlift control element
ALD	available-to-load date
allocation	resources provided the commander-in-chief for execution planning or actual execution.
ALO	authorized level of organization
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMERS	Army Mobilization and Equipment Redistribution System
AMOPES	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
AMP	Army Mobilization Plan
AMSA	area maintenance support activities
AMC	United States Air Force Air Mobility Command
AO	area of operations
AOC	army operations center
AOR	area of responsibility
APC	accounting processing codes
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
APORTS	aerial ports capabilities file
apportionment	the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.
ARCOM	Army Reserve command
ARFOR	Army forces
ARLANT	Army Forces, US Atlantic Command
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARPERCEN	Army Reserve Personnel Center
ARPRINT	Army Program for Individual Training
ARSTAF	army staff
ASCC	army service component commander
ASIMS	Army Standard Information Management System
ASL	authorized stockage list
ASMP	Army Strategic Mobility Plan
ASSETS	transportation assets file
AT	annual training
ATRRS	Army Training Requirements and Resources System
AUEL	automated unit equipment list
AUGTDA	augmentation table of distribution and allowances
AUTODIN	automatic digital network
availability date	the date after notification or mobilization which forces will be marshaled at their home station or mobilization station and available for deployment.

available to load date	the planning date a unit would be available to out-load at a port of embarkation.
AWIS	Army Worldwide Military Command and Control System Information System
	B
BAQ	basic allowance for quarters
BAS	basic allowance for subsistence
BASOPS	base operations
BBPBES	Biennial Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
BBPCT	blocking, bracing, packaging, crating, and tiedown
BCT	basic combat training
below the line	combat service and combat service support units and all other units not on the troop program sequence number of above-the-line units.
BIP	budget increment package
	C
C^2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CAP	crisis-action procedures
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CAS	crisis-action system
CAT	crisis-action team
CBRS	Concept Based Requirements System
CBS-X	Continued Balance System-Expanded
CCP	container consolidation point
C-Day	the unnamed day deployment operations commence
CDC	continental United States demobilization centers
CESP	Civil Engineering Support Plan
CFM	Continental United States Freight Management System
CFSC	Community Family Support Center
CHSTR	characteristics of transportation resource file
CI	coordinating installation; command information
CINC	commander-in-chief
CINCFOR	Commander-in-Chief, Forces Command
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMCC	corps movement control center
CMMC	corps materiel management center
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
CNO	Chief, Naval Operations
COA	course of action
COB	command operating budget
COCOM	combatant command
CODES	computerized deployment system
COE	Corps of Engineers; Chief of Engineers
COMMZ	communications zone
COMPASS	Computerized Movement Planning and Status System
COMPES	Contingency Operations/Mobility Planning Execution System
COMPO	component
COMPO-1	active component
COMPO-2	Army National Guard component
COMPO-3	United States Army Reserve component
COMPO-4	unresourced force structure
Computerized Movement Planning and Status System	an information system and data base providing accurate and timely unit movement data to DOD, JCS, HQDA, and Army installations and units in support of employment, deployment, mobilization planning, and execution for a wide range of military operations.
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format/concept plan
contingency response	established in 1979 to assist the MTMC commander in obtaining commercial transportation resources for deploying military forces. In 1991 the scope of contingency response was expanded to include coordinating domestic transportation resources when civil emergencies affect defense readiness. Representatives of federal and regional transportation agencies and the commercial transportation industry organizations comprise the contingency response team. When activated, the team assists the Department of Defense in acquiring or coordinating domestic commercial transportation.
CONUS	continental United States
CONUS replacement center	a portion of the war-lime Army replacement system used for marshaling nonunit personnel in preparation for deployment.
CONUSA	the numbered armies in the continental United States

coordinating installation	an installation assigned to coordinate specified types of intraservice support within a prescribed geographical area.
CORE	contingency response
COSCOM	corps support command
CPA	chairman's program assessment
CPX	command post exercise
CRAF	civil reserve aircraft fleet
CRC	continental United States replacement center
CRD	commander's required date
cross-level	relocation or reassignment of personnel or the act of effecting transfer in control, use, or location of materiel at an installation, regardless of MACOM, as directed by the installation.
CS	combat support
CSA	Chief of Staff, Army
CSS	combat service support
CTA	common table of allowances
CVS	commercial vendor services

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAF	Department of the Air Force
DAMMS-R	Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign
DAMPL	Department of the Army Master Priority List
DARMS	Developmental Army Readiness and Mobilization System
DARNG	Director, Army National Guard
DASPS-E	Department of the Army Standard Port Systems-Enhanced
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DCU	deployment control unit
D-Day	The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.
DEERS	Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System
DEL	deployment equipment list
deliberate planning	operation planning tasks assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other directive and performed using procedures outlined in Joint Publications 5-02.1, .2, and .3.[1]
DEMSTAT	Deployment, Employment, Mobilization Status System
DEP	delayed entry program
deployment	the relocation of forces to the area of operation
direct deployer	a reserve component unit that moves directly from home station to a port of embarkation and deploys without postmobilization training. A modified deploying unit is a reserve component unit that moves its equipment to a sea port of embarkation and unit personnel to an MS with a subsequent move to an aerial port of embarkation.
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMC	defense movement coordinator
DMS	demobilization station
DOD	Department of Defense
DODAAC	Department of Defense activity address code
domestic emergencies	emergencies affecting public welfare and occurring within the 50 states as a result of an enemy attack, insurrection, or a civil disturbance which endangers life and property or disrupts the usual process of government.
DOT	Department of Transportation
DRL	date required to load

E

EAC	echelons above corps
EAD	Earliest arrival date at the sea port of embarkation.
earliest arrival date	a day specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit can be accepted at a port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival date, it defines a delivery window for transportation planning.
early deploying units	units deploying within the first 44 days in support of a specific OPLAN.

[1] *Joint Operation Planning System, Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures),* 6 July 1988; *Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance),* 30 March 1990; *and Volume III (Automatic Data Processing Support).*

echeloning	organizing units for movement. Like task-organizing, echeloning is a predeployment standard operation procedure that establishes a priority for movement within the task force to accommodate available lift. Echelons may be divided, for example, into advanced parties, main body, follow-on forces, and closure forces. Within each echelon, there must be appropriate combat, combat support, and combat service support elements. Planning for each echelon must include numbers of vehicles and personnel, consumable supply requirements, and updated unit movement data and automated unit equipment list. Habitual support relationships between combat and combat service supports units must be established during the planning stages. In principle, combat service support units must be adaptable, flexible, and capable of supporting a wide variety of equipment and units.
ECS	equipment concentration site
EDDA	estimated deployment date aerial port; estimated departure date air
EDDS	estimated deployment date seaport; estimated departure date sea
EDRE	emergency deployment readiness exercise
embarkation	loading of troops with their supplies and equipment into ships or aircraft.
ENCOM	engineer command
EOC	emergency operations center
estimated deployment date	estimate of the earliest date after the available-to-load date on which each movement requirement could leave the port of embarkation. Movement date to an aerial port of embarkation is labeled as EDDA and to a sea port of embarkation as EDDS.
	F
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	family assistance center
FDRP	first destination reporting point
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
F-Hour	The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the military departments of a decision to mobilize RC units.
FMP	Forces Command Mobilization Plan
FMS	force module subsystem
FOA	field operating agency
FORMDEPS	Forces Command Mobilization and Deployment Planning System
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planing System	a ten-volume set of documents that provides guidance and procedures and assigns responsibilities for planning within Forces Command, other major Army commands, subordinate commands, mobilization stations, and reserve component units.
FORSCOM Mobilization Plan	Volume I of the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System. It provides priorities, guidance, procedures, and schedules for the mobilization of reserve component units and individuals.
FRG	force requirements generator
FSG	family support groups
FSS	fast sealift ships
FTS	file transfer service
FITD	full-time training duty
GEOLOC	standard Pacific geolocation code
GEOFILES	standard specified graphic location file
	G
GMR	graduated mobilization response
GOCOM	USAR general officer command
GOPAX	Group Operational Passenger System
GTN	global transportation network
	H
HAZMAT	hazardous materiel
H-Hour	the specific hour on D-Day at which a particular operation commences. The highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning specifies the exact hour.
HNS	host nation support
home station	the permanent location of active units and ARNG and USAR units (location of armory, center, or installation).
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HS	home station
HSC	US Army Health Services Command
HSTDD	home station departure date

I

1-Day (ambiguous warning)	The unnamed day on which intelligence indicators are recognized.
IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
immediate mobilization	full mobilization in the event of attack of CONUS or a nuclear attack.
individual mobilization augmentee	individual members of a service's selected reserve who have an annual training requirement and are preassigned to a wartime required manpower authorization. In addition to filling these authorizations upon mobilization, IMAs may also be ordered to active duty under the 200,000 Presidential call-up authority.
individual ready reserve	members of the ready reserve not assigned to the selected reserve and not on active duty. The reservists may be mobilized: a. to provide filler requirements for AC units; b. to form new active force units; c. to replace combat losses.
industrial mobilization	the transformation of industry from its peacetime activity to the industrial program necessary to support the national military objectives. It includes the mobilization of materiel, labor, capital, production facilities, and contributory items and services essential to the industrial program.
ING	inactive national guard
IPP	industrial preparedness planning
IPPM	industrial preparedness planning measures
IPSP	intelligence priorities for strategic planning
IRR	individual ready reserve
ITO	installation transportation officer
ITV	intransit visibility

J

JAG	judge advocate general
JCRP	Joint Command Readiness Program
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDS	Joint Deployment System
JEPES	Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System
joint deployment community	those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. The JDC usually consists of the JCS, the services, certain service major commands, including the service wholesale logistics commands, unified and specified commands and their service component commands, transportation operating agency, maneuver training commands, and joint task forces as applicable to a given scenario.
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System	the DOD-directed, JCS-specified system used in planning and executing global and regional joint military operations. JOPES consists of personnel, procedures, directives, communication systems, and electronic data processing systems to directly support deliberate planning and time-sensitive planning and execution. a. JOPES Level One Data. Basic force information neither time-sequenced nor scenario-oriented. b. JOPES Level Two Data. All Level One data plus scenario-oriented data. c. JOPES Level Three Data. All Level One and Two data plus scheduling information from the transportation component command.
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community
JRDC	Joint Regional Defense Center
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	joint strategy review
JSS	joint service software
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JUMPS	Joint Uniform Military Pay System

L

LAD	latest arrival date at port of debarkation
LANTCOM	US Atlantic Command

latest arrival date	a day specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit can arrive and complete unloading at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations.
LCA	US Army Logistics Control Activity
L-Hour	the specific hour at which a deployment operation commences or is due to commence on C-Day.
LOC	line of communication
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LOGMARS	logistics application of automated marking and reading symbols
LOGNET	logistics data network
LOGSAFE	logistics sustainability analysis feasibility estimator
LOTS	logistics-over-the-shore
LRC	lesser regional contingency

M

MA	marshaling area
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACOM	major Army command
MAIRS	Military Airlift Integrating Reporting System
MAITS	maintenance assistance and instruction teams
marshaling area	the geographic location where a deploying unit assembles, holds, and organizes supplies and/or other equipment for onward movement.
MAT	mobilization assistance team
MATES	mobilization and training equipment site
MBODD	mobilization origin departure date
MBSAD	mobilization station arrival date
MCA	movement control agency
MCC	movement control center
MCI	military customs inspection
MCL	Mobilization Cross-Leveling System
M-Day	the day on which full mobilization is declared.
MDRD	mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization
MEDCEN	Army medical center
MEDCOM	medical command
MEET	minimum essential equipment for training
MEPES	computes time-phased requirements for hospital beds by type, Class VIIIA resupply, Class VIIIB (blood and blood products) resupply, medical personnel, and medical evacuation requirements.
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
MOBARPRINT	Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training
MOBCON	mobilization movement control
MOBERS	Mobilization Equipment Redistribution System
MOBEX	mobilization exercise
mobilization site	the designated location where a reserve component unit mobilizes or moves after mobilization for further processing, training, and employment. Differs from a mobilization station in that it is not necessarily a military installation.
mobilization and training equipment site	a site at which a portion of an ARNG unit's authorized equipment is positioned by direction of CNGB and maintained to support unit mobilization and training
mobilization station	the designated military installation (active, semiactive, or state-owned/controlled) to which a reserve component unit is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, training, an employment and from which the unit may move to a sea port of embarkation or aerial port of embarkation.
mobilization shipments configured for operational planning and execution	MOBSCOPE provides for planning and initiating mobilization movements This program uses mobilization scenario data and COMPASS-maintained unit movement data to provide MTMC commercial movement requirements for RC unit moves to the MS. MTMC also uses MOBSCOPE to issue contingency standing route orders.
mobilization equipment redistribution system	the system used by MS commanders to redistribute or ship POMCUS unit residual equipment items to fill high priority requirements.
mobilization movement control	a DA-approved program to establish a movement control center in each state area command. The movement control center collects, analyzes, and consolidates all DOD organic movements and develops a master movement plan for mobilization and deployment.

mobilization tables of distribution and allowances	an authorized document that shows the planned mobilization mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirement for table of distribution and allowance units.
Mobilization Personnel Processing System	a system that speeds the preparation and dispatch of mobilization orders for IRR personnel and pre-positions personnel accessioning data from members of RC units, IRR, and retirees at MS.
Mobilization Stationing Planning and Execution System	a FORSCOM computer subsystem supported by the Worldwide Military Command and Control System. It is designed to support mobilization stationing planning within the operation planning system and provide the base line for planning and executing mobilization operations.
MOBPERS	Mobilization Personnel Processing System
MOBSCOPE	mobilization shipments configured for operational planning an execution
MOBstation	mobilization station
MOBTAADS	Mobilization Installation/Army Authorization Document System
MOBTDA	mobilization table of distribution and allowances
MODRE	mobilization deployment readiness exercise
MOS	military occupational speciality
MPA	Military Personnel Army
MPES	Mobilization Planning and Execution System
MPMES	Medical Planning Module Execution System
MRC	major regional contingency
MS	mobilization station
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSCD	military support to civil defense
MSO	military service obligation
MTBOR	mobilization training base output requirements
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTOE	modified table of organization and equipment
MTONS	measurement tons
MUSARC	Major US Army Reserve Command
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation

N

NAF	nonappropriated fund
national security emergency	any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.
National Military Command System	a system of JCS command and control centers consisting of the national military command center (NMCC) in the Pentagon, the alternate NMCC at Site R, and the national emergency command post (NEACP)
NCA	National Command Authorities
N-Day	an unnamed day before C-day, for example, NOO2 means two days before C-Day. For planning purposes N-Day is a 24-hour period. For deliberate planning, it is the day active forces are notified by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare for deployment, employment, and redeployment. N-Day is assumed to be the same as M-Day in those tables listing forces that require mobilization. However, at execution, N-Day may be independent of the outbreak of hostilities (D-Day) or mobilization (M-Day).
NDRF	national defense reserve fleet
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NEACP	national emergency command post
NEO	noncombatant emergency operations
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGPA	National Guard Personnel Army
NIF	nonindustrial facilities
NMCC	national military command center
NMSD	national military strategy document
nonunit-related personnel	all personnel not deploying with a specific unit who require transportation to or from an area of operations; includes individuals such as filler personnel, replacements, temporary duty or temporary additional duty personnel, all categories of civilians, medical evacuees, and retrograde personnel (Joint Pub 1-02).
NPG	nonunit personnel generator
NPS	nonprior service
NRC	nonunit-related cargo
NRP	nonunit-related personnel
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council

O

OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
OCC	Office of the Corps of Chaplains
OCIE	organizational clothing and individual equipment
OCONUS	outside continental United States
ODCSPER	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
OER	office evaluation report
OMA	Operation and Maintenance, Army
OMAR	Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve
OMARNG	Operation and Maintenance, National Guard
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General

P

PA	public affairs
PBG	program budget guidance
PERSCOM	US Total Army Personnel Command
PLASSN	planning and training associations
PLL	prescribed load list
PMCS	preventive maintenance checks and services
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POM	preparation for overseas movement
POMCUS	pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (JOPS); pre-positioned overseas materiel configured to unit sets (DOD); pre-positioned organization materiel configured to unit sets (USA).
POMCUS unit residual shipment	equipment remaining after a unit deploys.
port of embarkation	an air or sea terminal at which troops, units, military-sponsored personnel, unit equipment, and materiel board and are loaded.
port of debarkation	an aerial port or sea port within the theater of operations where the strategic transportation of forces is completed. It may not be the final destination of a force.
PORTS	port characteristics file
PRB	personnel replacement battalion
PREPO	pre-positioned stocks
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up Authority	the provision of a public law that provides the President a means to activate, without a declaration of national emergency, not more than 200,000 members of the selected reserve (all services total) for not more than 90 days, which the President may extend for an additional 90 days.
PROFIS	Professional Officer Filler System
PSA	port support activity
PSD	post security detachment
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
PSYOP	psychological operations
PTSR	postmobilization training support requirements system
PWRS	pre-positioned war reserve stock

R

RAA	redeployment assembly area
RC	reserve components
RCAS	reserve component automation system
RCUCH	reserve component unit commander's handbook
R-Day	the day hostile forces are first prepared to attack
RDD	required delivery date
ready-to-load date	the date a unit is projected as capable of departing an installation (origin or mobilization station) en route to a POE.
RECBN	reception battalion
redistribution	reallocation or reassignment of personnel, or the act of effecting transfer in control, use, or location of materiel between Army installations as directed by an intermediate or MACOM headquarters.
RELMS	rapidly erectable light mobilization structures
required delivery date	the date a unit is required to arrive at a specific destination (major unit assembly area/operational area) to complete unloading in support of a specific requirement.
reserve coponents	the US Army Reserve and the Army National Guard.

retired reserve	those individuals whose names are placed on the retired reserve list. Members of the retired reserve may, if qualified, be ordered to active duty involuntarily in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law, and then only when it is determined by the Secretary of the Army that adequate numbers of qualified individuals in the required categories are not readily available in the ready reserve or in active status in the standby reserve.
RG	readiness group
RLD	ready-to-load date
RMEC	regional military emergency coordinator
ROM	reception and onward movement
RORO	roll-on/roll-off
ROS4	reduced operational status, four days
RPA	Reserve Personnel Army
RRF	ready reserve fleet

S

S-Day	the day the President authorizes the ordering of not more that 200,000 members of the selected reserve to active duty for up to *90* days with the possible extension of up to an additional 90 days. The selected reserve call-up is not a part of partial or full mobilization, but provides the foundation for further expansion of the active armed forces (such as partial mobilization).
SA	staging area
SAILS	Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SELRES	selected reserve
SI	support installation
SIDPERS	Standard Installation Division Personnel System
SJA	staff judge advocate
SMCC	state movement control center
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	special operations forces
SOMS	state-operated mobilization station
SORTS	Status **of** Resources and System
SPOD	sea port of debarkation
SPOE	sea port of embarkation
SRF	summary reference file
SRP	soldier readiness program
standard requirement code	a basic set of codes integral to each current table of organization and equipment that expresses each possible combination or variation thereof and, when associated with organization data, is the basis for personnel and supply computations.
Standard Installation Division Personnel System	an automated system controlled and maintained by DA and designed to support the personnel strength and management information needs of field commanders and their staffs.
standby reserve	those units and members of the reserve components (other than those in the ready reserve or retired reserve) who are liable for active duty only after the Secretary of the Army, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, determines there are not enough readily available units or members in the ready reserve in the required category.
STANFINS	Standard Financial System
STARC	state area command
state movement control center	the agency responsible for performing the convoy movement control responsibilities of the adjutant general in each state.
state area command	a mobilization entity within the ARNG state headquarters and headquarters detachment that may be ordered to active duty when ARNG units in that state are alerted for mobilization. The state area command provides for control of mobilization ARNG units from home station until arrival at mobilization station. It is also responsible for planning and executing military support for civil defense land defense plans under the respective area commander and military family assistance.
STON	short ton
STRADS	Strategic Analysis and Deployment System
structure strength	ALO 1, full TOE, and TDA strength
supported commander	the commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the JCSP or by other authority. This term also refers to the commander who originates the OPLAN in response to requirements by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

supporting commander	a commander deploying to or providing other support to a supported commander in an operation.
supporting installation	an installation or activity that provides specified types of support to off-post units and activities within a specific geographic area.

T

TA	theater army
TAA	tactical assembly area
TAACOM	theater army area command
TAADS	The Army Authorized Documents System
TAG	the state adjutant general
tailoring	whereas task-organizing and echeloning are preplanned, tailoring is situationally dependent. Units and unit movement data may be added to or subtracted from a planned task organization based on the mission and available lift. Additionally, availability of pre-positioned equipment near the area of operations, host nation/contract services, or other infrastructure assets are combat multipliers that allow for multiple requirements to move simultaneously to the operational area. Tailoring occurs after initial strategic lift, pro-positioned assets, and host nation/contract services or assets have been identified.
TAMCA	theater army movement control agency
TAMMC	theater army materiel management center
TAMMIS	theater army medical management information system
TARO	theater army reception office
task-organizing process	for deployment purposes, the process of forming combined arms task forces with a limited self-sustainment capability for rapid deployment; centered primarily around maneuver brigades, task-organizing is a predeployment activity during normal training activities; task-organized units develop close training relationships to facilitate deployment and tactical employment; training at maneuver brigade-level and above should include preparation for a variety of employment environments.
TC ACCIS	Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control Information System
TC-AIMS	Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movement System
TCC	transportation component command
TDA	table of distribution and allowances
T-Day	the effective day coincident with the Presidential declaration of national emergency or the day Title 10, USC 673 is invoked by the President in furtherance of an existing national emergency to mobilize (not more than 1,000,000 exclusive of the 200,000 call-up) ready reserves and the resources needed for their support for a period of not more than 24 months.
TEA	Transportation Engineering Agency
TELNET	telecommunications network
TFE	transportation feasibility estimator
time-phased force and deployment data	computer-supported date base portion of an operation plan that contains time-phased force data, nonunit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan. Information includes in-place units, prioritized arrival of units deployed to support the OPLAN, routing of forces to be deployed, movement data associated with deploying forces, estimates of nonunit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with deployment of forces, and estimates of transportation requirements.
TMOPS	TRADOC Mobilization and Operations Planning System
TOA	transportation operating agency; time of arrival; transfer of authority
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TOM-D	training, operations, mobilization, and deployment
TOPS	Transportation Operational Personal Property System
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TPU	troop program unit
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command

trainee, transient holdee, students account	the only source of personnel managed by PERSCOM for mobilization and war planning. The account is used to provide theater filler and casualty replacement personnel in support of an OPLAN. The account during peacetime contains approximately 100,000 personnel. However, the number planned for and the number actually available for support of an OPLAN is substantially reduced based on the fully trained portions of the account.
TRANSCOM	transportation command
TSG	The Surgeon General
TTAD	temporary tours of active duty
TTHS	trainee, transient, holdee, and student
TTU	transportation terminal unit
TUCHA	type unit data file
TUOET	type unit equipment detail file
	U
U/E	unit equipment
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UDF	unit data file
UIC	unit identification code
ULN	unit line number
UMC	unit movement coordinator
UMD	unit movement date
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
unit training equipment site	a consolidation of ARNG organization equipment at or in close proximity to and serving as an authorized weekend training site
USACAPOC	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAHSC	United States Army Health Services Command
USAISC	United States Army Information Systems Command
USAMC	United States Army Materiel Command
USAMEDDCS	United States Army Medical Department Center and School
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command
USARCENT	United States Army, Central Command
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Command
USAREUR	United States Army Europe
USARFS	United States Army Reserve Forces Schools
USARLANT	United States Army Forces, Atlantic
USARPAC	United States Army, Pacific Command
USARSO	United States Army South
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USATC	United States Army training center
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCCENT	United States Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
USCINCEUR	United States Commander-in Chief, European Command
USCINCLANT	United States Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command
USCINCPAC	United States Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
USCINCSOC	United States Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command
USCINCSOUTH	United States Commander-in-Chief Southern Command
USCINCSPACE	United States Commander-in-Chief, Space Command
USCINCTRANS	United States Commander-in-Chief, Transportation Command
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USPFO	United States Property and Fiscal Office
USR	unit status report
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unit type codes
	V
VHA	variable housing allowance
	W
W-Day (unambiguous strategic warning)	the day the President decides, based upon the intelligence information provided to him, that a hostile government has elected to initiate hostilities.
WES	Worldwide Military Command and Control Entry System

WESTLCF	Worldwide Military Command and Control Entry System Teleconference
WETS	weekend equipment training site
WIN	Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network
WIS	Worldwide Military Command and Control Information System
Worldwide Military Command and Control System	provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support for command and control of US military forces. WWMCCS includes the facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, data processing systems, display systems, message preparation systems, intercomputer networks, and voice, date, and record communications systems.
WPS	Worldwide Port System
WRMS	war reserve materiel stock
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

REFERENCES

Army Publications

AR 1-1. *Headquarters Department of the Army.* 9 July 1986.
AR 5-01. *Mobilization.* 15 September 1983.
AR 5-3. *Installation Management and Organization.* Coordination. 11 March 1984.
AR 10-87. *Major Army Commands in the Continental United States.* 11 March 1984.
AR 11-30. *Army Programs-CAPSTONE Programs.* 1 September 1985.
AR 27-3. *Legal/Assistance.* 10 March 1989.
AR 37-1. *Army Accounting and Fund Control.* 30 April 1991.
AR 37-101.2. *Field Organizations.* 30 June 1987.
AR 37-103. *Disbursing Operations for Finance and Accounting Operations.* 4 December 1987.
AR 37-104-3. *Military Pay and Allowance Procedures. 3 March* 1988.
AR 37-104-10. *Military Pay and Allowances Procedures for Reserve Components of the Army.* 17 November 1989.
AR 37-105. *Finance and Accounting for Installations: Civilian Pay Procedures.* 1 April 1983.
AR 37-106. *Travel.* 9 May 1958.
AR 40-3. *Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care.* 15 February 1985.
AR 40-66. *Medical Record and Quality Assurance Administration.* 31 January 1985.
AR 40-501. *Standard of Medical Fitness.* 1 July 1987.
AR 55-355. *Defense Traffic Management Regulation.* 31 July 1986.
AR 58-1. *Management Acquisition and Use of Administrative Use Motor Vehicles.* 15 December 1979.
AR 71-13. *The Department of the Army Equipment Authorization and Usage Program.* 3 June 1988.
AR 135-133. *Ready Reserve Screening, Qualification Record System, and Change of Address Reports.* 1 August 1984.
AR 135-210. *Order to Active Duty as Individuals During Peacetime.* 1 June 1990.
AR 140-1. *Army Reserve Mission, Organization and Changes.* 1 February 1985.
AR 140-145. *Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program.* 15 July 1983.
AR 190-8. *Enemy Prisoner of* War *Administration, Employment, and Compensation.* 1 June 1983.
AR 190-57. *Civilian Internees Administration, Employment, and Compensation.* 4 March 1987.
AR 220-1. *Unit Status Reporting.* 16 September 1986.
AR 220-10. *Preparation for Overseas Movement of Units (POM).* 15 June 1973
AR 310-25. *Dictionary of United States Army Terms.* 21 May 1986.
AR 310-49. *The Army Authorization Documents System.* 15 December 1980.
AR 310-49-1. *The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) Documentation Procedures and Processing.* 15 December 1978.
AR 500-5. *The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System (AMOPS).* 4 June 1986.
AMOPS I. *System Description, Responsibilities, and Procedures.*
AMOPS II. *Strategic Employment of Army Forces.*
AMOPS III. *Army Mobilization and Deployment Planning Guidance.*
AMOPS IV. *Army Crisis Action System (ACAS).*

AR 500-10. *Nonindustrial Facilities for Mobilization.* 7 November 1974.
AR 525-1. *The Department of the Army Command and Control System (DACCS).* 2 December 1985.
AR 570-4. *Manpower Management.* 25 September 1989.
AR 600-3. *The Army Personnel Proponent System.* 18 September 1989.
AR 600-8-1. *Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs and Line of Duty Investigations.* 18 September 1986.
AR 600-8-2. *Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (FLAGS)* 30 October 1987.
AR 600-8-3. *Unit Postal Operations.* 28 December 1989.
AR 600-8-101. *Personnel Processing: In- and Out- and Mobilization Processing.* 12 December 1989.
AR 600-20. *Army Command Policy.* 30 March 1988.
AR 601-10. *Mobilization of Retired Members of the Army.* 6 March 1986.
AR 601-50. *Temporary Appointments.* 8 January 1986
AR 604-10. *Military Personnel Security Program.* 21 April 1975.
AR 614-30. *Overseas Service.* 16 March 1988.
AR 624-100. *Promotion of Officers on Active Duty.* 10 July 1984.
AR 635-10. *Processing Personnel for Separation.* 1 July 1984.
AR 635-100. *Officer Personnel.* 1 May 1989.
AR 635-120. *Officer Regulations and Discharges.* 1 June 1986.
AR 635-200. *Enlisted Personnel.* 5 July 1984.
AR 640-2-1. *Personnel Qualifications Records.* 1 June 1984.
AR 640-3. *Identification Cards, Tags, and Badges.* 17 August 1984
AR 670-1. *Wear and Appearance of Military Uniform.* 20 May 1987.
AR 672-20. *Decorations, Awards, and Honors.* 1 June 1982
AR 690-11. *Mobilization Planning and Management (Civilian Personnel).* 14 September 1990.
AR 690-400. *Employee Performance and Utilization.* 15 April 1981.
AR 690-500. *Position Classification, Pay, and Allowances.* 15 December 1979.
AR 700-84. issue *and Sale of Personal Clothing.* 15 May 1983.
AR 700-137. *Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 16 December* 1985.
AR 750-1. *Army Materiel Maintenance Policy and Retail Maintenance Operations.* 20 June 1991.
DA Pamphlet. 5-9. *Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.* August 1986.
DA Pamphlet. 360-525. *Family Assistance Handbook for Mobilization.* 15 January 1984.
DA Pamphlet. 600-41. *Military Personnel Managers Mobilization Handbook.*1 January 1987.
DA Pamphlet. 600-72. *Army Manpower Mobilization. 7* July 1990.
DA Pamphlet 690-80. *Use and Administration of Local Civilians in Foreign Areas During Hostilities.* 12 February 1989.
FM 12-6. *Personnel Doctrine.* 23 August 1989.
FM 27-100. *Legal/Operations.* 30 September 1991.
FM 54-40. *Area Support Group.* 29 July 1987.
FM 55-1. *Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations.* 30 November 1984.
FM 55-9. *Unit Air Movement Planning Control in a Theater of Operations.* 31 August 1981.
FM 55-12. *Army Movement Management Units and Procedures.* 22 July 1986.
FM 55-12. *Movement of Units in Air Force Aircraft.* 10 November 1989.
FM 55-65. *Preparation of Unit Movement Overseas by Surface Transportation.* 10 May 1989.
FM 55-312. *Military Convoy Operations in the Continental United States.* 3 April 1991.
FM 63-3. Corps *Support Command.* 24 August 1983.
FM 63-4. *Combat Service Support Operations, Theater Army Area Command.* 24 September 1984.
FM 63-6. *Combat Service Support in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).* January 1992.
FM 100-5. *Operations.* 5 May 1986.
FM 100-9. *Reconstitution.* February 1992.

FM 100-10. *Combat Service Support Operations.* April 1988.
FM 101-10-112. *Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Planning Factors. Volume 2.* 7 October 1987.
The Army Plan

Department of Defense Publications

DOD Directive 1100.6. *National Defense Execution Reserve.* 7 December 1983.
DOD Directive 1100.18-H. *Mobilization Handbook for Installation Manpower Planners.* 29 October 1986.
DOD Directive 1400.31. *Mobilization Management of the DOD Civilian Work Force.* 9 September 1986.
DOD Instruction 1400.32. *Mobilization Preparedness Planning for the DOD US Citizen Civilian Work Force.* 15 January 1987.
DOD Directive 1404.10. *Retention of Emergency-Essential DOD US Citizen Employees Overseas.* 6 April 1992.
DOD 4500.36-R. *Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles.* 21 July 1981.
DOD 4525.6-M. *DOD Postal Manual, Volumes I and II.* 28 December 1986.
DOD PM. *Department of Defense Pay Manual.* 9 March 1987.

Joint and Multiservice Publications

Joint Publication 0-1. *Basic National Defense Doctrine.* (In development).
Joint Publication 0-2. *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).* 1 December 1986.
Joint Publication 1. *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces.* 11 November 1991.
Joint Publication 1-02. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.* 1 December 1989.
Joint Publication 4-04. *Mobility System Policies, Procedures, and Considerations.* 15 September 1983.
Joint Publication 4-05. *Mobilization (revision pending).*
Joint Publication 5-02.1. *Joint Operation Planning System, Volume I (Deliberate Planning Procedures).* 6 July 1988.
Joint Publications 5-02.2. *Joint Operation Planning System, Volume II (Supplementary Planning Guidance).* 30 March 1990.
Joint Publications 5-02.3. *Joint Operation Planning System, Volume III (ADP Support)* (in development)
Joint Publication 5-02.4. *Joint Operation Planning System, Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures).* 8 July 1988.
Joint Publication 6-03.3. *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS Objectives.* 10 January 1991.
Joint Publication 6-03.5. *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS Composition.* 1 June 1984.
Joint Publication 6-03.11. *Management Procedures for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Standard Automatic Data Processing System and the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Information System.* 1 May 1987.
Joint Publication 6-03.12. *Policy for Modification and Improvement of the National Military Command System.* 30 September 1981.
Joint Publication 6-03.14. *Management Procedures for the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network.* 29 January 1981
Joint Publication 6-03.15. *Data Administration in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System Information System.* 31 March 1986.
Joint Publication 6-03.16. *WWMCCS Objectives and Management Plan, WWMCCS Concept of Operations.* 1 July 1976.
Joint Publication 6-03.17. *WWMCCS ADP Concept of Operations General Requirements for Post-1985.* 25 February 1982.
JFTR Volume 1. *Joint Federal Travel Regulation: Uniformed Service Personnel.*
JFTR Volume 2. *Joint Federal Travel Regulation: Department of Defense Civilian Personnel.*

Federal Publications

FPM Chapter 230, Subchapter 4. *Agency Authority to Take Personnel Actions in a National Emergency*. 1969.
FMP Chapter 910. *Mobilization Readiness*. 1969.
FPM Supplement 910-1. *National Emergency Readiness of Federal Personnel Management*. 1971.
FPM Supplement 990-2. *Hours of Duty, Pays and Leave, Annotated*. 1969.
FPM Supplement 990-3. *National Emergency Standby Regulations*. February 1971.
Program Objective Memorandum.
Title 10 United States Code. *Armed Forces*. 1988.
Title 50 United States Code. 1988.

INDEX

AAFES. *See* Army/Air Force Exchange Service
active guard/reserve, 1-7
ADANS. *See* Airlift Deployment Analysis System
afloat pre-positioning force ships, 4-4
AGR. *See* active guard/reserve
air defense, modern, 1-3
Air Force
    Chief of Staff of, 2-7 and 2-8
    Secretary of, 2-80
Air Mobility Command, 2-2, 2-3, 4-3
airfields, 3-19
airflow, 4-4
airlift, 4-3 and 4-4
Airlift Deployment Analysis System, 4-15
AMC. *See* Air Mobility Command
ammunition, 4-18
ammunition holding areas, 3-20
AMOPES. *See* Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System
ANG. *See* National Guard
ARCOM. *See* Army Reserve
the army in the field, 2-7
Army CAPSTONE Program, 3-13
Army command channels for mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization, 2-3
Army, future of, 1-1 and 1-2
Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System, 2-5, 2-10, 2-11, 3-15, 3-20, C-1, C-2
The Army Plan, 3-12
Army Reserve
    Army Reserve Personnel Center, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4
    command structure, 2-4
    commands, 3-8
    Office of the Chief of, 2-2, 2-4
    retired reserve, 2-4
Army staff, 1-1, 2-4, 2-5
Army special operations forces, 2-5
Army training centers, 2-5
Army service component commander, 3-15, 6-1
Army/Air Force Exchange Service, 3-16
Army force projection, B-1
Army Civilian Personnel System, C-1
ARNG. *See* National Guard
ARPERCEN. *See* Army Reserve
ARSOF. *See* Army special operation forces
ARSTAF. *See* Department of the Army Staff
ASCC. *See* Army service component commanders
ASL. *See* authorized stockage list
ATC. *See* Army training centers
AUEL. *See* automated unit equipment lists
authorized stockage list, 3-6, 3-17
automated redistribution system, 5-8
automated unit equipment lists, 3-17
Automated Airload Planning System, C-1
automatic data processing program, C-1 through C-7
below-the-line forces, 2-9
blocking and bracing, 5-4
C-day, 1-3
cadets, 3-13
campaign plans, 1-6. *See also* planning
CAPSTONE. *See* Army CAPSTONE Program
CAR. *See* Army Reserve
cargo documentation and accountability, 3-19, 5-6
CDC. *See* CONUS demobilization centers
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2-2, 2-10 through 2-12
Chief, National Guard Bureau. *See* National Guard
Chief of Staff of the Army, 1-1, 2-4
Chief, Army Reserve. *See* Army Reserve
CINC. *See* commanders-in-chief
civil defense, 2-10

civil affairs forces, 2-9
civil reserve aircraft fleet, 4-3, 4-4
civilian personnel, 3-15
civilian manpower requirements, 3-12
CJCS. *See* Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
climate, 1-2
CNGB. *See* National Guard
COCOM. *See* combatant command
combat power ratios, 1-4
combatant commands, 2-2
combatant commanders, *see* commanders
combined arms combat operations, 1-3
come-as-you-are response. See crisis-response forces
command information, 3-17
commanders, 2-9 and 2-10
    Army service component commanders, 2-9, 2-10
    combatant commanders. 2-2
    commander-in-chief, 1-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-9
    commander-in-chief, supporting, 1-5, 2-9
    commanders-in-chief, supported, 2-9
    installation, 6-1
    joint force commanders, 1-2
    unit, 2-10
commercial accounts. *See* resource management
commercial vendor services, 3-21
communications zone, 3-16
Community Family Support Center, D-1
COMMZ. *See* communications zone
Computerized Movement Planning and Status System, C-1
Congress, 2-1, 2-5, 3-13
CONPLAN. *See* planning
conscription. *See* conscripts
conscripts, 3-14
consumables, 1-7
container delivery system, 4-4
containerization policy, 4-16, 5-2
continental United States armies, 2-6, 2-7 D-2
continental United States replacement center, 3-20
contingencies
    lesser regional, 1-3, 4-5
    major regional, 1-3, 4-5
contingency force packages, 1-4 and 1-5
contingency operations, 1-3
Contingency Response Program, 2-2
contract support, 3-7
contracting, 3-21, 4-18
contractors, 3-15, 3-16
contracts, review of, 6-4
CONUS demobilization centers, 2-7
CONUS replacement centers, 2-7, 4-11
CONUS support units, 6-3
CONUS Freight Management System, C-1
CONUS sustaining base units, 3-13
CONUS-based forces, 1-4
CONUSA. *See* continental United States Armies
CORE. *See* Contingency Response Program
counterdrug operations, 3-10
CRC. *See* CONUS replacement centers
CRF. *See* crisis-response forces
crisis-action planning, A-0 and A-1. *See also* planning
crisis response, iv, 1-0, 1-5, 1-6
    scenarios, 2-7
    forces, 1-5, 1-6
CSA. *See* Chief of Staff of the Army
currency support. *See* resource management
customs regulations, complying with, 5-9
CVS. *See* commercial vendor services
DA civilians. *See* civilian personnel
DAF. *See* Air Force
DAMPL. *See* Department of the Army Master Priority List
DARNG. *See* National Guard, Director of
DCSINT. *See* deputy chief of staff for intelligence
DCSLOG. *See* deputy chief of staff for logistics
DCSOPS. *See* deputy chief of staff for operations and plans
DCSPER. *See* deputy chief of staff for personnel
defense movement coordinator, 3-9
Defense Logistics Agency, 2-9, 3-21, D-1
deliberate planning, 2-13, A-0 and A-2. *See also* planning
demobilization, 1-7, 1-8, 6-1 through 6-5
    of facilities, 6-4
    family support focus, 6-5
    media coverage, 6-5
    of industrial facilities, 6-4
    of individuals, 6-3
    logistics of, 6-3
    in past conflicts, 6-0
    phases of, 1-7 and 1-8, 6-0 through 6-2

planning of, 6-1
process, 6-2 through 6-5
soldier support for, 6-4 and 6-5
and storage, 6-4
of work force, 6-4
of units, 6-3
demobilization stations, 5-1, 6-3
dental requirements, 3-6, 3-16
Department of Agriculture, 2-11
Department of Commerce, 2-10, 2-11
Department of Defense, 2-2, 2-11
Department of Education, 2-11
Department of Energy, 2-11
Department of Health and Human Services, 2-10, 2-11
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2-10
Department of Interior, 2-11
Department of Labor, 2-11
Department of the Army, 2-3 through 2-10
Department of the Army staff. *See* Army staff
Department of the Air Force. *See* Air Force
Department of Transportation, 2-10, 2-11
Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign, C-3
Department of the Army Standard Port System-Enhanced, C-3
Department of the Army Master Priority List, 3-13
deploy-to-fight response, 4-5
deployed units, 6-3
deploying task forces, 3-7
deployment, 4-1 through 4-19
concept, 4-5
early, 1-3
forces, 4-9, 4-10
individuals, 4-11, 4-12
logistics, 4-12, 4-15,
movement to ports of embarkation, 1-8
onward movement, 1-7
phases of, 1-7, 1-8, 4-9 through 4-17
planning considerations, 4-1
predeployment activities, 1-7, 4-9 through 4-13
process for Phases I through III, 4-13
process for Phases III through V, 4-16
reception at port of debarkation, 1-7
theater onward movement, 4-16, 4-17
strategic lift, 1-8
theater base reception, 4-15, 4-16
deputy chief of staff for intelligence, 2-4
deputy chief of staff for logistics, 2-4
deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, 2-4, 2-7
deputy chief of staff for personnel, 2-4
DLA. *See* Defense Logistics Agency
DMC. *See* defense movement coordinator
DOC. *See* Department of Commerce
doctrinal focus, 1-7
DOD. *See* Department of Defense
DOT. *See* Department of Transportation
Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool, C-3
early reinforcement forces, 1-5, 1-6
echeloning, 4-6
employment, 1-6
entitlements, 6-5
environmental requirements, general, 3-20
equipment, 3-7
equipment, redistribution of, 5-8
ERF. *See* early reinforcement forces
FAA. *See* Federal Aviation Administration
facilities
expansion of, 3-20
requirements for, 3-19
family assistance, 3-17
family support activities, 3-4, 3-8
fast sealift ships, 1-2, 4-2
Federal Communications Commission, 2-11
Federal Aviation Administration, 2-10, 2-11
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2-1, 2-11
FEMA. *See* Federal Emergency Management Agency
filler personnel, 3-15
finance. *See* resource management
financial requirements, 3-4
financial management. *See* resource management
flexible deterrent options, 1-1
flexible response, v
follow-on reinforcement forces, 1-5, 1-6
force projection, 1-4
force projection army, 1-5
force, combined, 1-3
force configuration
active component, 1-3
Army civilians, 1-3
contract personnel, 1-3
reserve components, 1-3

total force, 1-3
force, joint, 1-3
force packaging, 1-4
force requirements, 3-12 and 3-13
forcible entry, 1-3
foreign military sales, 5-8
FORMDEPS. *See* FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System
FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System
FORSCOM. *See* United States Forces Command
forward presence, iv, 1-0, 1-4, 1-5
FRF. *See* follow-on reinforcement forces
funding. *See also* resource management
Operation and Maintenance, Army, 3-1
Military Personnel Appropriations, 3-1
General Services Administration, 2-11
Global Transport Network, C-3
GMR. *See* graduated mobilization response
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, 2-2
graduated mobilization response, 2-10, 3-1, 3-14, 3-15
ground movement, 4-4
Groups Operational Passenger System, C-3
hazardous materiel, 5-8
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 3-19
history, iv and v
HNS. *See* host nation support
holdees, 3-13
host nation support, 3-8, 3-21,
hostilities, cessation of, 1-2, 5-0
HQDA. *See* Department of the Army
IMA. *See* individual mobilization augmentees
Inactive National Guard, 3-14
individual ready reserve, 1-7, 2-4, 2-6, 3-9
individual mobilization augmentees, 1-7, 2-6, 3-14
individual manpower requirements, 3-13 through 3-16
industrial base, 1-7, 3-20
industrial preparedness measures, 3-20
inspections
on equipment, 5-2
by US Customs and US Department of Agriculture, 5-2, 5-3
installation transportation offices, 2-3
installation commanders. *See* commanders
installations, 3-20
Integrated Booking System, C-3
intermediate staging site, 5-2
Interstate Commerce Commission, 2-11
IPM. *See* industrial preparedness measures
ITOs. *See* installation transportation offices
JFC. *See* joint force commander
joint force commanders, 1-2. *See also* commanders
joint service actions, v
joint task force command, 3-16
joint planning and execution community, 3-7
joint force command, 3-7
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1-1, 1-5, 3-18
Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation, C-3
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, 2-2, 2-10, 2-11, 4-2, 4-4, A-2 through A-5
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1-6, 2-10, 3-4, 3-12. *See also* planning
Joint Strategic Planning System, 1-1, 2-10 through 2-12 *See also* planning
Joint Uniform Military Pay System, 3-17, 6-5
Joint Uniform Military Pay System-Active Army, 3-21
JOPES. *See* Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JPEC. *See* Joint Planning and Execution Community
JSPS. *See* Joint Strategic Planning System
JUMPS. *See* Joint Uniform Military Pay System
JUMPS-AA. *See* Joint Uniform Military Pay System-Active Army
labeling, 5-2
legal requirements, 3-6
legal support, 3-16
lesser regional contingencies. *See* contingencies
lines of communication, 1-4
LOC. See lines of communication
LOGCAP. *See* Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
logistics, joint/combined requirements, 3-7
logistics marking system, 4-15
logistics support group, 2-9
logistics requirements, 3-17 and 3-18
logistics requisitions, cancellation of, 5-9
logistics policies, 3-17
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, 3-21
logistics-over-the-shore operations, 4-16
LOGMARS. *See* logistics marking system
LOTS. *See* logistics-over-the-shore operations
LSG. *See* logistics support group

responsibilities of, 2-2, 2-3, 2-7, 2-9
installations, D-3
outside CONUS, D-3
major regional contingencies. *See* contingencies
Major United States Army Reserve Commands, 2-6, 2-7, D-2
manpower requirements
military, authorized levels of manning, 3-12
military, unit filler and casualty replacements, 3-12
Maritime Administration, 2-11
massive retaliation, v
MAT. *See* mobilization assistance team
materiel
requirements for, 3-18, 4-17
return to CONUS, 5-6
redistribution of, 5-8
demobilization of, 6-2
mature theater, combat in, 1-5
MDRD. *See* mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization
medical support, 3-6, 3-15, 4-18, 6-0
METT-T. *See* mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
military convoy, 4-4
military customs inspection program, 5-3
Military Sealift Command, 2-2, 2-3, 4-2
Military Airlift Command. *See* Air Mobility Command
Military Traffic Management Command, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 3-9, 3-19
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available, 1-5, 1-6, 4-2, 4-4
mobility requirements, 4-5
mobilization, 1-6, 1-7, 3-0 through 3-22
administrative requirements for, 3-17 and 3-18
alert, 3-5, 3-8
authority for, 1-6
delegation of authority, 3-1
of forces (units), 3-4
full, 1-7, 3-4
funding authority for, 3-1
home station, 3-5
of individuals, 3-6
levels of, 3-1 and 3-3
logistics, 3-6 and 3-7
notification process, 3-11
partial, 1-7, 3-3
phases of, 3-3 through 3-12
planning, 3-3, 3-4
port of embarkations, 3-5
posture, v
readiness, 2-10
selective, 1-7, 3-3
support planning, 3-4,
support requirements, 3-7
total, 1-7, 3-4
stations, 3-5, 3-17, 3-19
mobilization assistance team, 3-19
mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, iii, 2-9
Mobilization Personnel Processing System, C-4
mobilization tables of distribution and allowances, 3-15 and 3-16
MOBTDA. *See* mobilization tables of distribution and allowances
morale, welfare, and recreation, 3-16
movement scheduling, 5-3
MPA. *See* funding, Military Personnel Appropriations
MSC. *See* Military Sealift Command
MTMC. *See* Military Traffic Management Command
MUSARC. *See* Major United States Army Reserve Commands
MWR. *See* morale, welfare, and recreation
National Command Authorities, 1-1, 2-1, 2-2
National Environmental Policy Act, 3-20
National Guard
Air National Guard, 2-4, 2-7, 2-8
Army National Guard, 2-4, 2-7, 2-8
Chief, National Guard Bureau, 2-7
director of, 2-7
management structure of, 2-8
National Guard Bureau, 2-4, 2-5, 2-7, 2-8
state adjutants general, 2-5
National Security Act of 1947, 1-1
National Security Council, 2-2, 2-10
NCA. *See* National Command Authorities
NDMS National Disaster Medical System, 2-10
NEPA. *See* National Environmental Policy Act
NGB. *See* National Guard
NIF. *See* nonindustrial facilities program
Nifty Nugget, v
no-warning scenario, 1-1
nonindustrial facilities program, 3-19
nonunit soldiers, 2-7. *See also* individuals

NSC. *See* National Security Council
nuclear attack, deterrence of, 1-0
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2-11
OADO. *See* officer active duty obligors
OCAR. *See* Army Reserve, Office of the Chief of
Office of Industrial Resource Administration, 2-10
officer active duty obligors, 3-13
OIRA. *See* Office of Industrial Resource Administration
OMA. *See* funding, Operation and Maintenance, Army
onward movement, 6-0
Operations
    Desert Shield, v, 3-1, 3-4, 3-6, 3-19, 4-9, 4-12, 5-0, 6-1, 6-2
    Desert Storm, v, 3-3, 3-10, 3-12, 3-16, 3-18, 3-19, 4-5, 4-9, 4-12, 5-0, 5-5, 5-6, 5-8, 6-1, 6-2, 6-4
    Graphic Hand, 3-3
    Just Cause, 1-2, 3-1, 3-21, 4-4, 4-14, 5-6
    Provide Comfort, 5-1
OPLAN. *See* planning
OSD. *See* Secretary of Defense
outprocessing, 6-5
palletization, 5-2
PAP. *See* personnel assistance point
pay actions, 6-5. *See also* Joint Uniform Military Pay System *and* SURE-PAY
personnel assistance point, 4-14
personnel requirements, 3-7
personnel service support, 3-16 through 3-17
planning. *See also* Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan *and* Joint Strategic Planning System
    concept plans, 1-5
    operation plans, 1-5, 2-1
    guidance, 2-7
    joint, 1-1
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 1-1, 2-9, 2-11
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, 2-10 and 2-12
PLL. *See* prescribed load list
POM. *See* preparation for overseas movement
postal services, 3-16
postattack survival and recovery, 2-10
power projection, 1-0, 1-1
power projection platforms, 3-19
powers of attorney, 3-17
PPBES. *See* Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
PPBS. *See* Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
pre-positioned materiel, 1-2
pre-positioned war reserve stock, 3-7, 4-8
predeployment activities
    logistics, 4-12
    forces, 4-10
preparation for overseas movement, 3-12
preparedness, 1-2
prescribed load list, 3-6, 3-17
President of the United States, 1-6, 2-6, 3-11, 3-13
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up, 1-7, 3-1
procurement support, 3-21
Professional Officer Filler System, 3-15
PROFIS. *See* Professional Officer Filler System
Proud Saber, v
Proud Spirit, v
PSRC. *See* Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up
psychological operations, 2-7 and 2-9
PSYOP. *See* psychological operations
public affairs, 3-16, and 3-17
PWRS. *See* pre-positioned war reserve stock
rail, 4-4, 3-19
Rangers, 2-7
rapidly erectable light mobilization structures, 3-20
ready manpower, 1-7
ready reserve force, 4-2
ready-to-fight posture, 1-4
reception, 4-17
reception activities, 6-5
reconstitution, iv, 1-0, 1-5, 1-6, 6-0
redeployment, 1-7, 5-0 through 5-9. *See also* redeployment phases
    movement to port of embarkation, 1-7, 5-3
    movement of redeployment assembly area, 1-7
    planning for, 5-0 and 5-1
    preparation for, 5-1
    reception at port of debarkation, 1-7, 5-5
    reconstitution for strategic movement, 1-7, 5-1 and 5-2
    strategic lift, 1-7, 5-3
redeployment phases, 5-1 through 5-5
    process for phases I through IV, 5-4
    process for Phases IV through VI, 5-7
redistribution, 5-8
reemployment entitlements, 6-5

regional contingencies, 1-2
religious support, 3-16
RELMS. *See* rapidly erectable light mobilization structures
reparables, 1-7
reserve components, activating, 1-6
Reserve Component Automation System, C-4
resource management, 3-16, 3-20, 3-21, 6-1
response options
    regional 1-1
    military, 1-1
retired soldiers. *See* retirees
retirees, 1-7, 3-0
    recall of, 3-1
    involuntarily recalled, 3-6
    Retired Reserve, 3-8, 3-14
roll-on/roll-off ships, 4-3
roundout units, 3-12
roundup units, 3-12
seaflow, 4-4
sealift, 4-2
seaports, expansion of, 3-19
SECDEF. *See* Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army, 2-4, 2-8
Secretary of Defense, 1-6, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 2-8
Secretary of State, D-1
security, 4-18
Selective Service Act, 2-1
Selective Service System, 2-11
shipment, of equipment, 5-2, 5-6
SOF. *See* special operation forces
soldier readiness requirements, 3-16
SORTS. *See* Status of Resources and Training System
special operations aviation forces, 2-6
special operation forces, 2-3
Special Forces, 2-7
staff judge advocate, 3-16
Standard Installation and Division Personnel System, C-4
Standby Reserve, 3-14
STARC. *See* state area commands
state area commands, 3-8, D-2
state adjutants general, D-2
Status of Resources and Training System, 4-4
sterile area, requirement for, 5-3
strategic deployment, 4-1
Strategic Deployment System, C-4
strategic deterrence and defense, iv, 1-0
strategic lift capability, 1-2, 3-7, 4-2, 4-14
strategic mobility objectives, 1-4 and 1-5
strategic mobility options, 4-1, 4-3
strategic mobility triad, 4-2
strategic sealift, 2-3
strategic seaports, 2-3
strategy
    national strategic direction, 1-0
    national military strategy, iii, iv
    national defense strategy, iv
students, 3-13
supplies, for deploying units, 1-4, 3-7, 4-17
supplies, redistribution of, 5-7 through 5-9
supplies and services, quantities of, 3-7
supplies, demobilization of, 6-2
support
    allotments, 3-18
    activities, identification of, 5-6
    requirements for, 3-7
    for regional marshalling area, 3-20
SURE-PAY, 3-18. *See also* Joint Uniform Military Pay System *and* pay actions
surge shipping, 2-3
sustaining base manpower requirements, 3-15 and 3-16
sustainment, 1-6
TAACOM. *See* theater army area command
tailoring, 4-6
TAMCA. *See* theater army movement control agency
TAP. *See* The Army Plan
TARO. *See* theater area replacement operations
Task Force Smith, v
task-organizing, 4-5 and 4-6
TC ACCIS. *See* Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control System
TCCs. *See* transportation component commands
technological disasters, 2-10
temporary appointees, 3-14
terrain, 1-2
theater combatant commanders, 2-2
theater area replacement operations, 4-12
theater army movement control agency, 4-17, 4-18
theater army area command, 5-4, 5-7
Theater Army Medical Management Information System, C-5

theaters, 2-2
threat, 1-2 and 1-3
    chemical, biological, nuclear, 1-3
    missiles. 1-3
time-phased force and deployment data, 2-9, 3-7, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 5-3, 5-4
total movements continuum, B-0 through B-2
TPFDD. *See* time-phased force and deployment data
TPUs. *See* troop program units
TRADOC. *See* United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
traffic management, 2-2
trainee, transient, holdee, and student account, 3-6
training
    cessation of, 1-2
    missions, 1-2
    requirements, 3-18 and 3-19
    unit, 3-19
Training and Doctrine Command. *See* United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
transients, 3-13
transportation component commands, 2-2
Transportation Coordinator Automated Command and Control System, 2-10, 3-10, 3-17, 4-4 , C-5
Transportation Operational Personnel Property Standard System, C-6
transportation terminal units, 3-19
Treasury Department, 2-11
troop program units, 1-7
TTHS. *See* trainee, transient, holdee and student account
TTU. *See* transportation terminal units
unit rear detachments, 5-4
unit movement data, 5-3
unit validation, 3-19
United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, 2-6
United States Army Corps of Engineers, D-1
United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, D-2
United States Army Health Services Command, 3-19, D-2
United States Army Materiel Command, 2-9
United States Army Materiel Command, Materiel Readiness Support Activity, 3-18
United States Army Pacific, 2-6
United States Army Reserve Command, 2-4, 2-5, D-1
United States Army Special Operations Command, 2-2, 2-5, 2-6, 3-18
United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2-7, 2-9, 3-18
United States Coast Guard, 2-10
United States Forces Command, 2-2, 2-3, 2-7
United States Space Command, 2-2
United States Special Operations Command, 2-2, 2-3
United States Strategic Command, 2-2
United States Total Army Personnel Command, D-1
United States Transportation Command, 2-2, 3-17, 3-18
unitized loads, 4-4
USACAPOC. *See* United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAMC. *See* United States Army Materiel Command
USARC. *See* United States Army Reserve Command
USASOC. *See* United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM. *See* United States Special Operations Command
USSPACECOM. *See* United States Space Command
USSTRATCOM. *See* United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM. *See* United States Transportation Command
Veterans Administration, 2-11
volunteers, 3-1 and 3-2
    Army civilians, 3-6
    Individual Ready Reserve, 3-6
warehousing, 3-19
Wartime Air Service Program, 2-10
WASP. *See* Wartime Air Service Program
world, changing conditions of, 1-2
Worldwide Port System, C-6
Worldwide Military Command and Control System, C-6, C-7, and C-8
Worldwide Military Command and Control System Intercomputer Network, C-6