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FM 31-20 SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS



FM 31-20

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS (U)

SEPTEMBER 1977

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*FM 31-20

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 30 September 1977

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS (U)

This manual was developed by the US Army Institute for Military Assistance. We are always looking for new, innovative, quality ways of improving our doctrine and welcome your comments on the material contained in this publication. Please forward your comments to:

Commandant
US Army Institute for Military Assistance
ATTN: ATSU-TD-TL
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

The use of the pronouns "he," "his," "himself," etc., in this manual includes both masculine and feminine genders. Any exception to this will be so noted.

*This manual supersedes FM 31-20, 12 February 1971, including all changes; FM 31-20A, 30 December 1965; FM 31-21, 20 December 1974; and FM 31-21A, 20 December 1974, which shall be destroyed in accordance with AR 380-5.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 11, 1962


TO THE UNITED STATES ARMY:

Another military dimension -- "guerrilla warfare" -- has necessarily been added to the American profession of arms. The literal translation of guerrilla warfare -- "a little war" -- is hardly applicable to this ancient, but at the same time, modern threat. I note that the Army has several terms which describe the various facets of the current struggle: wars of subversion, covert aggression, and, in broad professional terms, special warfare or unconventional warfare.

By whatever name, this militant challenge to freedom calls for an improvement and enlargement of our own development of techniques and tactics, communications and logistics to meet this threat. The mission of our Armed Forces -- and especially the Army today -- is to master these skills and techniques and to be able to help those who have the will to help themselves.

Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military, and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.

"The green beret" is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom. I know the United States Army will live up to its reputation for imagination, resourcefulness, and spirit as we meet this challenge.



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SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS (U)

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
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
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
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CHAPTER 1

US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES

This field manual provides basic concepts of doctrine for US Army Special Forces employment in unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense while operating in a high threat environment.

The Communist threat and control measures—total repression—especially in the Warsaw-Pact countries make our task difficult. By destroying the traditional loyalties and trusts, particularly in the family—using fear, denunciations, betrayal, insecurity—and reporting of suspicious acts by the populace, the Communist countries totally control and dominate their population.



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The Army's primary objective is to win the land battle—to fight and win battles, large or small, against any foe, in any location. US Army Special Forces is ready to meet the challenge of modern warfare, not just with new equipment, but with new doctrine and training that will insure responsiveness and accomplishment of the mission. Success will depend on our ability to develop and maintain a high state of combat effectiveness.

Special Forces is a multipurpose force specifically developed, trained, equipped, and tasked to provide the US Army the flexibility to tailor its response to various contingencies. Special Forces provides a training, advisory, or operational capability in the functional areas of:

- Command and staff
- Operations
- Intelligence
- Tactics
- Weapons
- Demolitions
- Medical
- Logistics
- Communications
- Field engineering

We will begin our discussion by taking a brief look at the Special Forces missions—to plan and conduct unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense. Next, we will discuss the Special Forces organization and its capabilities. The discussion then centers on the various command and control arrangements which confront Special Forces. Last, we will consider operations security (OPSEC).

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CHAPTER 1

SECTION I

MISSIONS

1 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW)

Responsibility for the various aspects of UW has been delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that service having primary concern. The US Army is responsible for guerrilla warfare and related ground activities. US Army Special Forces are primarily concerned with guerrilla warfare, but must be prepared to assume responsibility for the other aspects of UW—evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage—to support US national interests.

The discussion of UW, covered in chapter 2, emphasizes the Special Forces role in guerrilla warfare. Chapter 3 addresses those significant UW supporting operations which include infiltration/exfiltration; development of intelligence, internal and external logistics; medical functions and facilities; and psychological operations planning.

2 SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Chapter 4 discusses Special Forces conduct of special operations. These operations are sensitive actions of a specified nature initiated in the face of emergency or strategic contingency. Since special operations missions are so varied, the discussion is broad and limited to the general planning considerations common to most special operations.

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3 FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Special Forces may be directed to conduct foreign internal defense missions within the framework of US security assistance programs. This role is also addressed in chapter 4. Special Forces maturity, flexibility, skills, and expertise provide valuable advisory and operational assistance to friendly governments confronted with subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Thus far, unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense have been discussed as separate areas for the employment of Special Forces. These areas are related and in some situations require that two or all three be conducted at the same time. For example, Special Forces may be tasked to conduct special operations (strategic intelligence missions, strategic target missions, etc.) as an adjunct to their primary mission of unconventional warfare. Foreign internal defense operations may require Special Forces to employ unconventional warfare techniques, e.g., guerrilla warfare, to deny support to the insurgents by establishing islands of popular support for the government. At the same time, various special operations may be conducted.

Let's now turn to the discussion of the Special Forces organization and capabilities to support these missions.



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CHAPTER 1

SECTION II
ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

The Special Forces group is a multipurpose force. Its organization, flexible command arrangements, tailored logistical and fiscal procedures, and highly trained personnel enable it to accomplish a variety of missions—either in a primary role or in a role supporting other forces or agencies. Deployment for operations may involve only selected individuals or detachments with special capabilities, or it may require one or more Special Forces groups.




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1 AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

ORGANIZATION

The Airborne Special Forces Group includes a headquarters and headquarters company, three Special Forces battalions, a service company, a signal company, and a combat intelligence detachment. Each battalion consists of a battalion headquarters and three companies; each company includes a company headquarters and six operational detachments. This flexible organization is designed to enhance tailoring for specific missions. For operational purposes, the battalion headquarters becomes a C Detachment, the company headquarters a B Detachment, and the operational detachment an A Detachment. Therefore, the normal basic operational elements of an Airborne Special Forces Group are 3 C detachments, 9 B detachments, and 54 A detachments. The organization presented here represents the type Special Forces group currently in the force structure.



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MISSION

To plan for and conduct operations in the related areas of unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense as directed by the National Command Authority.

ASSIGNMENT

To a unified command or as directed by the National Command Authority.

CAPABILITIES

The Airborne Special Forces Group can:


- Function as the Army component, or as an element of a separate Army component headquarters, of a joint unconventional warfare command (JUWC), or joint unconventional warfare task force (JUWTF).
- Command, control, and support organic and attached elements.
- Establish, support, and operate a Special Forces operational base (SFOB) and one or more forward operational bases (FOB).
- Infiltrate or exfiltrate specified areas by air, land, or sea.
- Operate in remote areas and hostile environments for extended periods with minimal external direction and support.
- Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise indigenous forces to conduct guerrilla warfare.
- Train, advise, and assist US and allied forces or agencies.
- Provide, when required, Special Forces liaison parties to corps or higher headquarters.

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2 HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY

ORGANIZATION



MISSION

To provide command and control and staff planning for the Special Forces group and attached elements.

To provide personnel and administrative support for the group headquarters.

ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Airborne Special Forces Group.

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CAPABILITIES

The group headquarters can provide:

- Command and control, staff planning, and staff supervision of administration and operations for the group and attached elements.
- Command and staff personnel to establish, support, and operate a Special Forces operational base (SFOB) and one or more forward operational bases (FOB).
- Advice and coordinate the employment of Special Forces elements with a joint unconventional warfare command (JUWC), joint unconventional warfare task force (JUWTF), military assistance advisory groups, or other major headquarters.
- Operational direction for all communications.

The headquarters company can provide limited administrative and routine logistical support for the group headquarters and headquarters company.

The operational elements of the Airborne Special Forces Group are:

The battalion headquarters (C Detachment).

The company headquarters (B Detachment).

The operational detachment (A Detachment).

Although primarily organized for command and control purposes, C and B detachments can perform a variety of operational missions. The A detachment is specifically organized, trained, and equipped to provide the basic operational element for the group.


Let's now look at the organization for each of these elements.

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3 SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION

ORGANIZATION



MISSION

To provide command, control, and staff elements to the Special Forces group for employment in unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense.

To train, prepare, and provide operational elements to the group for deployment in unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense.

ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Airborne Special Forces Group.

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
CAPABILITIES

This unit can:

- Expand the command and control capabilities of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB).
- Provide command and control elements for designated unconventional warfare operational areas (UWOA).
- Advise, assist, and train counterpart indigenous forces.
- Train, prepare, and provide operational elements for deployment.
- Provide, when directed, liaison parties to corps or higher headquarters.

4 HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION (C DETACHMENT)

ORGANIZATION



MISSION

To plan and conduct unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense.

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ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Special Forces Battalion.

CAPABILITIES

This unit can:

- Command, control, and provide limited support to assigned and attached elements.
- Provide operational elements to the Special Forces group for deployment.
- Establish and operate a forward operational base (FOB) to expand the command and control capabilities of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB).
- Conduct independent operations.
- Serve as a command and control element in designated unconventional warfare operational areas (UWOA).
- Advise, assist, and train counterpart indigenous forces.
- Prepare operational elements for deployment.
- Serve as a liaison party.
- Augment the staff sections of the group.


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5 SPECIAL FORCES COMPANY

ORGANIZATION



MISSION

To conduct unconventional warfare, special operations, and foreign internal defense.

ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Special Forces Battalion.

CAPABILITIES

The company headquarters (B Detachment) can:

- Command and control assigned operational detachments (A Detachments).
- Prepare operational elements for deployment.
- Serve as a basic building block for a force designated to conduct special operations.
- Establish and operate a forward operational base (FOB) to expand the command and control capabilities of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB).
- Serve as a pilot team to assess the resistance potential in an unconventional warfare operational area (UWOA).

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- Serve as a command and control element in designated UWOA's.
- Advise, assist, and train counterpart indigenous forces.
- Serve as a liaison party.
- Augment the staff sections of the group or the battalion (C Detachment).

The operational detachment (A Detachment) can:

- Develop, organize, equip, train, and advise indigenous forces in unconventional warfare.
- Conduct special operations separately or as part of a larger force.
- Train, advise, and assist US and allied forces or agencies in the conduct of foreign internal defense.


6 SERVICE COMPANY

ORGANIZATION

The service company is organized to provide administrative, logistical, medical, rigger/aerial delivery, maintenance, mess, limited aviation, and transportation support for the group. For extensive operations, augmentation may be required. The service company provides support to the group headquarters elements from the SFOB support center. Forward support elements are deployed to FOB's as required.

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MISSION

To provide administrative, logistical, and limited aviation support for the Special Forces group.

ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Airborne Special Forces Group.

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CAPABILITIES

This unit can provide:

- Personnel and equipment to establish and operate the support center of the Special Forces operational base (SFOB).
- When required, forward support elements to forward operational bases (FOB).
- Consolidated or fragmented dispensary, preventative medicine, and veterinary support tailored to the needs of the supported elements.
- Consolidated or fragmented administrative services support tailored to the needs of the supported elements.
- Consolidated or fragmented mess support tailored to the needs of the supported elements.
- Personnel and cargo parachute packing, organizational maintenance of air delivery items, rigger support, and limited aerial delivery support.
- Logistical support by planning, monitoring, and recording the procurement, receipt, temporary storage, issue and distribution of supplies and equipment.
- Consolidated or fragmented maintenance support (except for wheeled vehicles, signal equipment, and power generators of the Signal Company) tailored to the needs of the supported elements.
- Limited transportation support.
- Limited aviation support for command, control, liaison, reconnaissance activities, and limited operational missions.
- Maintenance support to perform aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) on all organic aircraft and organizational maintenance of all avionics equipment.


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7 SIGNAL COMPANY

ORGANIZATION

The signal company is organized to provide internal communications, terminal communications facilities, signal equipment maintenance, and photographic support for the group from the SFOB signal center. Forward support elements are deployed to FOB's as required.



MISSION

To provide signal communications for the Special Forces group.

ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Airborne Special Forces Group.

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CAPABILITIES

This unit can:


- Plan, install, operate, and maintain continuous internal communications for a Special Forces operational base (SFOB) and one forward operational base (FOB) with full communications capability to include communication center services and telephone, teletypewriter, and radio communications.
- Provide AM radio, radio teletypewriter, and telephone communications, and limited direct support signal maintenance for two subordinate FOB's.
- Terminate landline telephone and teletype circuits from the theater communications system, higher and adjacent headquarters at the SFOB/FOB, and telephone circuits at the two subordinate FOB's.
- Provide radio net control stations (NCS) for the SFOB/FOB.
- Perform direct support maintenance of the group's signal equipment (less crypto) and limited general support maintenance of signal equipment peculiar to Special Forces.
- Provide limited photographic support for the group to include the development of black and white still prints.

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8 COMBAT INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

ORGANIZATION



MISSION

To provide integrated intelligence and operations security (OPSEC) support and electronic warfare (EW) advice to the Special Forces group.

To provide intelligence, OPSEC and EW mobile training teams (MTT) in support of unconventional warfare or foreign internal defense.

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ASSIGNMENT

Organic to the Airborne Special Forces Group.

CAPABILITIES

This unit can:

- Provide communications intelligence (COMINT), imagery interpretation (II), interrogation, OPSEC, tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, and integrated all-source intelligence management, analysis, production, and dissemination in support of the Special Forces group.
- Supplement Special Forces operational detachment personnel in intelligence training, advise and assistance of non-US military and/or paramilitary forces.
- Supplement the Special Forces group staff and operational elements in providing intelligence, OPSEC, and EW assistance for the conduct of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions.
- Provide tailored support operations teams to supplement Special Forces operational detachments for the conduct of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense missions.
- Provide COMINT direct support to Special Forces operational base (SFOB), forward operational base (FOB), and operational detachments.
- Provide for the analysis, production, and dissemination of integrated intelligence from all sources.
- Provide II and interface with II elements of other commands.
- Provide for the interrogation of prisoners of war, refugees, line and border crossers, and other personnel of intelligence interest.
- Provide multidiscipline OPSEC and related counterintelligence support.
- Provide expertise in the use of remotely monitored sensors (REMS) and other technical surveillance systems.
- Provide special security functions.

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- Provide for communications as follows:

  Personnel and equipment to establish a special intelligence (SI) secure land-line teletype system as the primary communications system between the SFOB/FOB and the joint unconventional warfare command (JUWC) or joint unconventional warfare task force (JUWTF).

  Personnel and equipment to establish an SI secure radio teletype (RATT) system between the mission management and dissemination and all source production (MMD/ASP) section and the subordinate Support Operations Teams B. (The RATT also provides an alternate communications system between the SFOB/FOB and the JUWC or JUWTF.)

  Equipment to establish AM/SSB/FM communications for command, control, and coordination of subordinate operational elements and intelligence reporting to supported elements of the Special Forces group. Additionally, AM/SSB will be used as an alternate means of communications, under active EW conditions and where distance precludes successful FM communications. (Internal communications and terminal communication facilities of the Special Forces group are used to the maximum extent.)

Next, let's look at the command and control arrangements which are peculiar to Special Forces operations.

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CHAPTER 1

SECTION III

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Special Forces functions under many varied command and control arrangements. The exact structure is determined by the assigned mission, tasks, and the requirements of the commander. In this section, we will discuss command and control of Special Forces from the unified command level down to the organization within the UW operational area.

These principles apply whether US Army Special Forces are operating under US, allied, or combined command and control organizations.

1 UNIFIED COMMAND


Unconventional warfare plans are prepared and updated by the unified commands. When it becomes necessary to implement UW in a theater of operations, a separate joint subordinate command and control headquarters, either a joint UW command (JUWC) or a joint UW task force (JUWTF), is established by the unified command. Its structure and title may vary according to the commander, duration and magnitude of operations, and the involvement of US UW forces and/or nonmilitary agencies.

2 JUWC/JUWTF


The JUWC is a joint headquarters with staff representations from all US UW forces and nonmilitary agencies and includes its own combat service support elements. A JUWTF may be formed to satisfy specific UW requirements. It may be subordinate to, or act as, the JUWC. The JUWTF is organized similar to a JUWC but is a semipermanent command arrangement. This command relationship is graphically shown below.

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In some situations, the unified command may organize and dispatch a joint task force to an operational area for contingency operations. Its relationship to the JUWC/JUWTF is determined by the scope of operations of each element. If the areas of interest coincide, operational control of the JUWC/JUWTF may be passed from the unified command to the commander of the joint task force, after the joint task force deploys to the operational area. This command relationship is graphically portrayed below. Where allied nations participate in UW operations, it may be necessary to organize a combined UW headquarters.



The commander of the JUWC/JUWTF exercises operational control of assigned UW forces through the appropriate component commander, e.g., operational control of Special Forces is through the commander of the JUWC/JUWTF Army component. A separate JUWC/JUWTF Army component headquarters is required when more than one Special Forces group is represented or if significant numbers of other Army elements are allocated to the JUWC/JUWTF. When one Special Forces group is represented, the group will normally function as the Army component headquarters. In some situations, the commander of the JUWC/JUWTF may exercise direct operational control of deployed UW forces.

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3 SFOB

The SFOB is a command post type arrangement formed and operated by the Special Forces group from organic and attached resources. It is the focal point for operational, administrative, logistical, and communication support functions. Ideally, the SFOB is activated and established before the start of operations, but if prior activation is not authorized, it may be established on a standby basis for long-range or intratheater/intrabase communications and contingency stocks. The SFOB is normally organized into three functional centers:

- The operations center.
- The support center.
- The signal center.

Although the Special Forces group can establish and operate an SFOB, and provide limited logistical support, it does require augmentation for sustained support operations. Theater support is provided as required. The JUWC or JUWTF commander will attach appropriate units to support physical security, counterintelligence, and base defense requirements. In designing the SFOB, the following factors must be considered:

- Mission.
- Duration and scope of operations.
- Administrative and logistical support requirements.
- Security requirements for dispersal/compartmentation of activities.
- Communication restrictions imposed by distance, terrain, or security.
- Desirable span of control.

The mission of the SFOB is to prepare operational elements for deployment and, after deployment, to direct, administer, and support these elements. Functions which may be performed at the SFOB include:

- Planning and direction of operations.
- Administrative support.
- Logistical support.
- Communications support.
- Intelligence support.
- Air support.
- Mission preparation, training, briefing, and staging.
- Coordination of infiltration and exfiltration operations.
- Liaison and coordination with higher, adjacent or subordinate headquarters.

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The JUWC or JUWTF commander in coordination with the Special Forces group commander determines the location of the SFOB. The SFOB may be tactically arranged in one location or dispersed among several small sites. Command and communication elements should not be collocated with airfields, port facilities, or other major headquarters, but locating it within a reasonable distance of employed delivery agencies simplifies tactical deployment and resupply operations. Various modifications may be necessary to meet the tactical situation. The site selected must be integrated in the rear area defense system; maximum security must be provided to prevent or minimize compromise and protect against ground or air attacks. Effective camouflage concepts and techniques must be used and strictly adhered to. Plans must also include site selection for an alternate operations center.

4 FOB

An FOB is a command, control, and support arrangement established by the SFOB:

- For specific missions requiring a separate command and control headquarters reporting directly to a JUWC or JUWTF. The SFOB provides the resources to form the FOB, but has no command and control function. The FOB coordinates with the SFOB for operational, administrative, and logistical support as required. The organization, missions, and functions of the FOB are similar to those of the SFOB, but on a reduced scale.


- To extend the span of control of the SFOB when distances involved preclude effective command or support of deployed operational elements. The organization and functions of the FOB will vary with the mission; duration and scope of operations; and security, communications, administrative, and logistical support requirements. For example, it may function as an intermediate command and control base, a forward launch/recovery site, or a radio relay site.

5 UWOA


The mission, size, and composition of resistance forces, enemy situation, and political situation are some of the factors influencing the selection of Special Forces elements deployed into a UWOA. Regardless of the number and type detachments initially deployed into a specific UWOA, infiltration of additional detachments may be necessary because of increased operations, expansion of existing resistance forces, or for political reasons. The following three illustrations depict the most common methods of employing Special Forces in a UWOA

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
A Special Forces A, B, or C Detachment may be infiltrated into a UWOA when the situation is not well known, the resistance movement is not extensive, or the guerrilla force is so well organized that minimum coordination is needed. This detachment normally coordinates directly with the SFOB (or FOB when established) on all operational, administrative, or logistical support matters.



Two or more Special Forces A, B, or C Detachments may infiltrate concurrently, each establishing a separate sector command. This arrangement may be required when the size of the UWOA, enemy situation, or problems peculiar to the resistance movement would preclude effective operations by one detachment. Each detachment normally coordinates directly with the SFOB (or FOB when established) on all operational, administrative, or logistical support matters. There is no lateral communication between detachments.

6 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

FOLDOUT



As activities in the UWOA expand, a Special Forces B or C Detachment may be deployed to command and control assigned operational elements. In this situation, subordinate sector commands coordinate all operational matters with either the B or C Detachment which in turn coordinates directly with the SFOB (or FOB when established). Each detachment may coordinate routine administrative and logistical support directly with the SFOB or FOB.

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6 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command relationships are based on the mission, duration and scope of operations, administrative and logistical support requirements, security requirements, communications capability, and desirable span of control.


Seven of the most common command relationships for Special Forces are illustrated on the following pages:

- The first five situations show the relationships when Special Forces conducts operations which support the theater or unified command, but do not impact directly on conventional combat forces.

Next, we discuss the Special Forces liaison party.

- The sixth situation depicts the relationship when a corps area of intelligence interest encompasses the UWOA and the corps is provided a Special Forces liaison party.

- The last situation describes those relationships which involve a corps closing on UW elements and conducting operations close to the UWOA; Special Forces elements being placed under operational control of the tactical commander; and linkup operations.




*JCS Pub 1

WHEN WE DISCUSS PASSAGE OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL FROM THE UNIFIED COMMAND TO A SUBORDINATE COMMAND, WE ARE REFERRING TO A CORPS. SPECIFIC MISSIONS MAY REQUIRE THAT OPERATIONAL CONTROL BE PASSED AS LOW AS DIVISION LEVEL.

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
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SITUATION 1



The most common relationship is for the SFOB to direct all operations in the UWOA. It provides command, control, administrative and logistical support for all of its detachments deployed in the UWOA, as well as those awaiting deployment at the SFOB.

SITUATION 2




In this situation, the JUWC/JUWTF exercises direct operational control over Special Forces detachments in the UWOA. This may be for sensitive missions where positive control and maximum security measures are required. Those detachments awaiting deployment remain under the command and control of the SFOB. Deployed detachments may communicate directly with the SFOB for administrative and logistical support.

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
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SITUATION 3



Theater UW missions may require the establishment of an FOB as a separate control headquarters reporting to a command other than the main SFOB. In this situation, the FOB provides direct command, control, administrative, and logistical support for all of its detachments. The FOB coordinates with the SFOB for operational, administrative, and logistical support as required.


SITUATION 4



An FOB may be established as an intermediate control headquarters to extend the span of control, support, or communications of the SFOB. The Special Forces group has the organic assets to establish two FOB's.

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In this situation the FOB may be employed using a subordinate FOB to further extend its span of control, support, or communications.

THE SPECIAL FORCES LIAISON PARTY

PURPOSE

A Special Forces liaison party or intermediate command and control element may be provided by the SFOB and attached to a corps headquarters to coordinate intelligence flow and advise the tactical commander in Special Forces employment when his:

- Area of intelligence interest encompasses the UWOA.
- Area of influence closes on the UWOA.

COMPOSITION

The Special Forces liaison party is a non-TOE element, organized by the SFOB from assets of an operational C or B detachment to meet specific mission requirements.

FUNCTIONS

The liaison party assists the tactical commander in gaining timely and continuous intelligence of interest from the UWOA and helps him to exercise

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his operational control of UW forces by coordinating operational, administrative, logistical, and communications requirements. The liaison party **must** be capable of:

- Providing expertise and staff assistance on employment of Special Forces, the guerrilla force, and all aspects of UW operations.
- Providing secure communications with UW forces in the UWOA.
- Insuring timely and continuous intelligence coverage from UW assets in the UWOA.
- Advising the tactical commander in selecting only those critical EEI requirements for collection by Special Forces elements. This insures communications and operational security within the UWOA.
- Advising the tactical commander on the psychological implications of operations in the UWOA.
- Providing liaison to division level when directed.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Special Forces communications system is used to pass traffic between the SFOB and deployed Special Forces elements in the UWOA. When the area of intelligence interest of a committed conventional force encompasses the UWOA, requests by the tactical commander for intelligence information will be passed by the Special Forces liaison party to the SFOB using the area communications system or a Special Forces radio teletypewriter link. The radio teletypewriter link is established when the area communications system cannot meet operational requirements. The SFOB will then task appropriate elements in the UWOA and receive information from those elements using the Special Forces 300wpm burst communications system. The requested intelligence information is passed back to the corps through the Special Forces liaison party over the teletype system discussed above.

When UW forces are placed under operational control of a corps, the Special Forces liaison party will be augmented by a communications element from the Special Forces Signal Company. This element is capable of receiving burst messages from deployed Special Forces detachments in the UWOA and gives the liaison party the capability to directly task operational detachments in the UWOA.


In both situations above, Special Forces operational detachments would not normally enter directly into conventional unit communications nets as these nets cannot accommodate burst transmissions. If Special Forces elements switch to the manual CW or voice mode, they become extremely vulnerable to enemy radio direction finding techniques. The physical capability for direct Special Forces communications with the conventional unit must be viewed in the light of security and survivability. The continuous communications

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capability which exists between the Special Forces liaison party and UW forces in the UWOA, prior to and during linkup operations, must be restricted to essential traffic to enhance security and survivability within the UWOA. Tactical commanders should insure that only critical EEI requirements are levied on Special Forces operational detachments.

SITUATION 6




In this situation, a corps area of intelligence interest encompasses the UWOA although UW operations are beyond the corps area of influence. US UW forces are intended primarily to support the theater or unified command, and the majority of intelligence information gathered by UW forces is of interest to and for use by these commands. The sensitive nature of UW operations requires adhering to principles of compartmentation and strict security. Intelligence flow would follow existing lines of command and control with appropriate information being passed to the corps commander by the theater or unified commander. However, a Special Forces liaison party may be provided by the SFOB and attached to the corps headquarters at this time. The liaison party's mission is to insure that intelligence of interest to the tactical commander is provided by UW assets in the UWOA through the SFOB to the liaison party at the corps headquarters. Communications and operational security are essential to the survivability of UW forces in the UWOA and, therefore, only critical EEI requirements should be selected for collection by Special Forces elements. The SFOB retains command and control and provides administrative and logistical support to the operational detachments in the UWOA.

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SITUATION 7



During this situation, a corps area of influence closes on the UWOA, and operations of either conventional ground forces or UW forces impact directly on the other. This may dictate passage of operational control of appropriate UW forces to the tactical commander. Close coordination and a rapid, timely flow of intelligence information must be maintained between UW and conventional forces. At this time, a Special Forces liaison party is normally provided by the SFOB and attached to the corps headquarters. The liaison party can provide the tactical commander with intelligence of interest, assistance in linkup planning and passage of operational control of UW forces, and advice on Special Forces employment during and after linkup.

The command relationship between unconventional and conventional forces is extremely important during passage of operational control and linkup operations.

LINKUP WITH GROUND FORCES

The initial passage of operational control of UW forces in the UWOA from the SFOB to the conventional ground force is coordinated and directed by the headquarters which controls both forces. Normally, operational control of Special Forces and guerrilla forces **is not passed below** division level. The tactical commander exercises operational control through the Special Forces liaison party; Special Forces detachments in the UWOA report directly to the Special Forces liaison party. Communications must be restricted to essential traffic to enhance detachment security and survivability.

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The SFOB continues to monitor operations and provides administrative and logistical support to the UWOA until physical linkup is made between UW and conventional forces. At this time, the conventional force normally assumes this support responsibility. The control link retained by the SFOB with the Special Forces liaison party insures immediate response to UW missions directed by the JUWC/JUWTF.

LINKUP WITH AIRBORNE FORCES

When planning and executing airborne assault operations, the command relationships discussed above must be modified. As soon as possible after approval of the ground tactical plan, the joint airborne task force commander assumes operational control of Special Forces and guerrilla forces which directly and indirectly affect the operation. Thus, UW forces have sufficient time to respond to assigned tasks in support of the joint airborne task force's mission. The time frame is not precisely defined, but depends on the mission, communications, responsiveness, and the capability of the UW forces. Correct timing of Special Forces and guerrilla operations with the airborne assault is essential. If committed prematurely, they may nullify the surprise effect of the airborne assault and, in turn, be destroyed by the enemy. Conversely, if committed too late, the desired effects of their employment may never be realized.

Operational control of UW forces which can directly influence the mission of the airborne force is passed by the joint airborne task force commander to the commander of the unit conducting the airborne operation. This passage of operational control normally occurs when the airborne assault begins.

Operational control of UW forces which indirectly affect the mission is retained by the joint airborne task force commander.

LINKUP WITH AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

When an amphibious task force commander becomes responsible for an amphibious assault objective area, Special Forces and guerrilla forces within that area are placed under his operational control. Operational control of UW forces is transferred to the landing force commander when he assumes responsibility for operations ashore. Normally, operational control of UW forces supporting amphibious operations **will not be passed below** major landing force component level.

When a planning directive for the conduct of an amphibious operation is issued, the SFOB provides a Special Forces liaison party to both the amphibious task force and landing force commanders. Early deployment of the Special Forces liaison party insures complete integration of UW activities to support the amphibious operation.

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CHAPTER 1

SECTION IV

OPERATIONS SECURITY

Operations security (OPSEC) is a command responsibility. Since the operations staff assists the commanders in overall planning and execution of operations, it also has primary supervision for the OPSEC function. Commanders must insure all staff efforts, including intelligence, communications-electronics, logistics, maintenance, and administration, consider OPSEC in providing maximum protection for an operation.

OPSEC must be considered throughout every Special Forces mission—from initial planning through post-execution stages—to conceal potentially revealing training, preparations, personnel, logistical, administrative, and other support activities. OPSEC measures in UW operations are further addressed in Section II: Intelligence, Chapter 3.


The OPSEC Concept

OPSEC includes all security measures which allow us to maintain surprise. Used successfully, it aids in keeping the enemy from learning:

How, when, where and why we will do something
—THE PLAN □

How, when, where and why we are doing it
—THE EXECUTION □

How, when, where and why we did it
—THE AFTER-ACTION □



OPSEC consists of four main categories of security measures. All are interrelated; each must be considered simultaneously for each operation.

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SIGNAL SECURITY

Signal Security (SIGSEC) protects operational information by practicing communications security (COMSEC) techniques and electronic security (ELSEC) techniques. COMSEC includes communication codes, secure voice equipment, RTO procedures. ELSEC includes radio silence and proper positioning of radars and antennas.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Physical Security is protecting operational information or activity by using security forces (listening posts, observation posts, patrols, guards), barriers (wire, ditches) and anti-intrusion devices (mines, signal flares). These means deny or limit enemy access to facilities, areas, equipment, material, documents, and personnel.

INFORMATION SECURITY

Information Security prevents disclosures of operation information through written, verbal, or graphic communications. Restrictions are placed on personnel, and the release of operational information and documents to safeguard against unintentional release of data important to the enemy.

DECEPTION

Deception misleads the enemy about our current or intended operations. Deception also includes measures which prevent the enemy from spotting a pattern or stereotyping our actions. Tactical deception plans are provided security by use of the other OPSEC measures. Deception is also used to confuse the enemy when our actions could obviously provide information of our intentions. Unless all OPSEC is practiced, deception plans are vulnerable to hostile exploitation. Likewise, deceptive techniques assist in overcoming vulnerabilities in other OPSEC measures. Examples of deceptive techniques are:

- Camouflage
- Smoke
- Ruse
- Feint
- Decoy
- Demonstration

See *(C)* AR 530-1, *Operations Security (U),* and TC 100-1, *Operations Security (OPSEC).*

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CHAPTER 2
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

SECTION I
RESISTANCE

WHAT IT IS
HOW IT DEVELOPS
- Passive Resistance
- Active Resistance

ITS ACTIVITIES
ITS ELEMENTS
- The Underground
- The Auxiliary
- The Guerrilla

INFLUENCING FACTORS
- Environment
- Motivation
- Chance for Success
- Leadership
- Support
- Political Factors
- Legal Factors

SECTION II
PRE-MISSION PREPARATION

SELECTION OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS
- Character of the Resistance Movement Within the Area
- Environment and Tactical Situations
- Tailoring

PLANNING
- The Isolation Area
- Command Relationships

ESTABLISHING CONTACT

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
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Before we begin our discussion, you must understand what is meant by the term "unconventional warfare (UW)." Unconventional warfare in the context of this field manual is defined as:

> Operations, which include but are not limited to guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage, conducted during periods of peace and war in hostile or politically sensitive territory.

Unconventional warfare is our primary mission. It may be conducted in remote, urban, or rural environments to exploit the military, political, economic, or psychological vulnerabilities of an enemy.

Before the onset of Special Forces unconventional warfare operations, a resistance potential must exist. Special Forces does not create this resistance potential; it is already present and has usually developed into a resistance movement—*an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability (JCS Pub 1).*



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When directed, Special Forces assistance is provided to support, advise, organize, train, and equip indigenous resistance forces.

We begin our discussion with a background of **resistance**—what it is, how it develops, its activities, and influencing factors. Next, we look at **pre-mission preparation**—considerations for selecting operational elements, planning, and establishing contact. **Organization and buildup** discusses the area command, the unconventional warfare operational area (UWOA), and basic organizational objectives and supporting systems. **Combat employment** is focused on guerrilla warfare; the guerrilla force, their operations and missions which support the unified command and conventional combat forces; linkup, post-linkup, defensive, and stay-behind operations; evasion and escape (E&E); and subversion and sabotage. Last, the discussion of **demobilization** considers those factors necessary to demobilize the guerrilla force and prepare them for return to established governmental control.

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CHAPTER 2

SECTION I

(C) RESISTANCE (U)

(U) To understand our doctrinal involvement with resistance movements, you must have a basic understanding of resistance. The dictionary* defines resistance as *an organized underground movement of a conquered country made up of groups of fighters engaged in sabotage and secret operations to thwart, waylay, and otherwise wear down occupation forces, and often also in punishing collaborators among fellow countrymen.*

1 (C) WHAT IT IS (U)

The fundamental cause of resistance is the real, imagined, or incited dissatisfaction of a portion of the population with prevailing political, social, or economic conditons. The factors which inspire resistance may arise internally in an area or country, or they may be created or assisted by external elements supporting and attempting to control the movement to further their own interests. Resistance may also develop in a nation where once welcomed liberators have failed to improve an intolerable political, social, or economic situation.

Normally, dissatisfaction will develop into a firm ideology early in a resistance. This ideology may have positive goals such as national independence, economic and social improvements, or securing individual rights. However, many times the goals may be expressed as relief from oppression, elimination of foreign occupation, or elimination of exploitation and corruption. Active resistance to a legally established government or to an occupying power can only be demanded from the mass of people by someone both ready and competent to organize and lead it.

**Webster's Third New International Dictionary,* 1961.

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Resistance may take many forms, passive or active:

- Intelligence networks
- Deception
- Escape and evasion channels
- Secret armies
- Secret newspapers and other forms of psychological operations
- Strikes
- Subversion, including:
  - sabotage
  - attacks on individuals/troops
  - political subversion
  - national insurrection
  - security

2 (C) HOW IT DEVELOPS (U)

Wherever authority exists, there is resistance. But the development of resistance does not follow a set pattern. Most resistance movements, however, have certain similarities in their development:

- Small groups with a common goal form the nucleus in response to a foreign invasion or to the real or imagined oppression of the people.

- Membership usually includes influential or inspiring people, political or military leaders, and people trained and experienced in clandestine work.

- They assess their chances for success, carefully select the courses of action open to them, learn how to select objectives, and adopt tactics and techniques to suit them.

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- They appoint a leader and establish a chain of command, either military or political, or both.

- They secretly organize and develop an underground and assign responsibilities for recruiting, intelligence, supplies, funds, psychological operations, and relations with other resistance groups.

- They prepare the foundation for future civil administration and establish base areas.

- They are dependent on external support or intervention for their success.

- All must have, to some extent, the mass support of the people; if not the support, at least enjoy a neutral position by the people.

- Organization is developed for a specific purpose, specific terrain, and to combat a specific enemy, and will vary in size from a few small groups to a large, complex, paramilitary organization.

- To survive, they stress compartmentation, selective recruiting, and security.

- Passive resistance is an early form, before experience is gained. As experience is gained, it develops into organized active resistance.

- Almost all result in organized, overt violent resistance—sabotage and guerrilla warfare.

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3 (C) ITS ACTIVITIES (U)

Passive and active resistance activities are designed to create opposition to the established authority. These activities cannot be segregated and labeled. However, it is important that you be familiar with some of the forms of passive and active resistance.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE (U)

Passive resistance objectives are **first,** to alienate, involve, and direct public opinion against the established authority by the use of nonviolent, physical actions; **second,** to lower the morale of government officials and security forces; and **third,** to tie down security forces. Examples of passive resistance are:

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (U) -

mass participation in unlawful acts such as nonpayment of taxes, disrupting traffic, mass meetings, protests, demonstrations and riots, unauthorized publications, wildcat strikes and walkouts, mass resignations, and minor destruction of public and private property.

BOYCOTTING (U) -

group and mass economic actions which advocate against the use of facilities or the purchase of certain products.

SOCIAL OSTRACISM (U) -

targeted at specific individuals by social segregation, isolation, contempt, embarrassment, ridicule, and slander.

OVERLOADING (U) -

meticulous attention to the law, submitting every conceivable problem to authorities by numerous denunciations and false alarms to disrupt communication facilities and security forces.

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COVERT SABOTAGE (excluding demolitions) (U) –

illnesses, misplaced efforts, intentional mistakes, medical mistakes, and feigned fatigue.

ESCAPE AND EVASION MECHANISMS (U) –

rescue of persecuted, transport of resistance members, and transfer and transport of antigovernment personnel, friendly agents, or downed aircrews.

PROPAGANDA (U) –

efforts to make symbols of happenings or events; flags, symbols, slogans, and posters; secret radio broadcasts and publications; political rumor campaigns; and letter writing campaigns to discredit the authority.

POLITICAL SUBVERSION (U) –

penetration of government agencies, military units, student organizations, and labor unions.

NONCOOPERATION (U) –

work slowdowns, strikes, production delays, falsifying documents, mechanical interference, carelessness, absenteeism, and delaying transports/shipments.

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ACTIVE RESISTANCE (U)

Active resistance attempts to alienate public opinion against authority by the use of violent, physical actions which are organized, coordinated, and executed according to a plan. Examples of these actions are:

- SABOTAGE (U) - conducted against:

  Government
  Labor unions
  Aircraft/installations
  Bridges/tunnels
  Communications systems
  Electrical systems
  Foreign property
  Individuals/officials
  Industrial installations
  Marine/auxiliary services
  Military units/installations
  Police units/installations
  POL facilities
  Railway systems/auxiliary services
  Resources
  Road networks
  Vehicles
  Waterways
  Water systems

- TERRORISM (U) - to create unrest, suspicion, and fear by:

  Assassination/execution
  Arson
  Bombing
  Blackmail
  Character assassination
  Disinformation
  Hijacking
  Interrogation
  Kidnapping/ransoms

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Raids/ambushes
Robbery
Sniping
Threats
Torture

- OVERT GUERRILLA WARFARE (U)

4 (C) ITS ELEMENTS (U)

(C) It is wrong to believe that in an area where a resistance movement is active the civilian population can be divided into those friendly to the resistance movement and those friendly to the local government or occupying power. More often the population will be neither concerned nor sympathetic to either combatant. Therefore, dealing with the population to gain and cultivate their support requires extreme care.



(C) Resistance elements can be organized successfully only among people who have the courage and stamina to endure hardships and face possible death while fighting against innumerable odds.

(C) Once a resistance movement gains sufficient strength and support, it normally expands into a covert underground element and an overt guerrilla element. Both of these elements depend on local civilian and/or external support for their operations. The local civilian support element is referred to as the auxiliary.

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(C) Each of these three resistance elements differs in organizational characteristics, degree of participation, and methods of operation (U):

THE UNDERGROUND (U)

The underground does not develop automatically nor spontaneously; careful, sophisticated, patient, and time-consuming work by highly motivated resistance leaders goes into its design. The underground makes guerrilla operations feasible and extends resistance operations into areas denied to the guerrilla and/or conducts operations not suitable for guerrillas. It is covert and compartmented; its members make every effort to conceal their participation; and its cellular structure prevents one member, if captured, from compromising the entire organization. An underground is largely self-contained and performs most of its own support functions; however, requirements beyond its capability may be provided through other resistance channels or from an external, sponsoring power.

THE AUXILIARY (U)

The auxiliary organizes both active and passive civilian support of the resistance movement to be responsive to the needs of the resistance area command. The organization and operations are clandestine in nature and members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the resistance movement. Auxiliaries are normally assigned direct support missions for a specific guerrilla unit in their area and general support missions for the resistance area command. Support activities for the guerrilla unit include security and warning, logistics, medical support, recruiting, and providing reserve or part-time guerrillas for diversionary operations or temporary reinforcement of the supported guerrilla unit.

(C) Underground and auxiliary members live and work surrounded by great danger to themselves and to their families. Their stakes—usually political—are high. Those who feel deeply that their future and the future of their country can be made better through their efforts can justify in their minds the sacrifice in serving in an organization that is endangered by population control measures, special police, and by counterintelligence agents.

(U) THE GUERRILLA FORCE

The guerrilla force is the action element of the resistance movement and conducts overt, active resistance against enemy forces and facilities. It is organized into units and subunits along military lines and may vary in size from small groups to large paramilitary units. Although it may rely on temporary assistance from part-time personnel living within the area of operations, its membership consists of individuals exclusively occupied as full-time guerrillas. Guerrillas will not necessarily appear as the first sign of a well-conceived and organized resistance movement. Their capability is normally based on a broad clandestine and covert support structure. This

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support structure is rooted in the civilian population and its strength usually numbers many times that of the guerrilla units it serves.

A GUERRILLA FORCE CANNOT EXIST AND SURVIVE WITHOUT A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

It is with this resistance element that Special Forces is primarily concerned. Special Forces contact with friendly guerrilla forces will provide a positive link between them and US, allied, or combined conventional commands.

The history of resistance movements shows conclusively that the guerrilla leadership must be indigenous—not imported from outside. This being so, US Army Special Forces must not seek command of guerrilla forces with which they have been placed in contact. Nevertheless, US interests which led to the introduction of the Special Forces must be appropriately served. The Special Forces soldier must have a clear understanding of these interests, and he must seek, with judgment, finesse, firmness, and diplomacy, to serve them in dealing with the guerrilla leaders. He can, of course, attempt to guide the indigenous guerrilla leader toward desired tactical objectives by regulating the flow of supplies and resources from US stockpiles. But this kind of persuasion, powerful as it is, may not always work.

The greatest guarantee of cooperation comes from the close personal rapport which a mature, carefully selected and trained Special Forces leader can develop with the guerrilla leader. Even when the relationship is close and a mutual respect and confidence exist, the nature of the guerrilla's commitment to his political cause and future may preclude his acceding in every respect to the US requirements voiced through the Special Forces commander.

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5 (U) INFLUENCING FACTORS

In addition to the various sources of discontent, a number of other important factors influence the resistance organization, its directions, and operations.

ENVIRONMENT

Success largely depends on the geographical characteristics and cultural environment, as well as the degree of control exercised by the local government or occupying power in the area of operations. Environmental factors include:

TERRAIN

The organization and tactics of a resistance movement are influenced by the type terrain in which it operates. Mountains, swamps, large forests or jungles are suitable for overt or guerrilla type resistance. Flat plains areas and large towns or cities are likely to have underground resistance.

CULTURAL

A peoples' cultural environment also affects a resistance movement. It determines their urge to bear arms, to escape, and to fight the enemy. People from rural or peasant environments not subjected to tight governmental control can show their hatred of the governmental or occupying power by overt and violent means such as guerrilla warfare. People from an industrialized and highly urbanized culture can use subversion, sabotage, and propaganda.

CONTROL OF POPULATION

When a government or occupying power has close and stringent control over the population, the resistance movement is conducted primarily in a covert manner. When the police and military forces are diverted or ineffective, the resistance movement may be conducted with overt guerrilla actions.

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MOTIVATION

In discussing motivation, we must consider the complexities of human beings—their ideals, temperament, and their political and religious beliefs. Members of the resistance must have, above all else, a will to resist. Strong individual motivation is essential. Some of the motives may not be idealistic and, if openly expressed, may do harm to the resistance effort. The following are examples of what some of the true motives may be:

IDEOLOGY

Some individuals develop strong ideological motives for participating in a resistance movement, tend to subordinate their own personalities to these ideologies, and work constantly and solely for the "cause."

ECONOMIC

Many individuals join resistance movements to keep from starving or to keep from losing their livelihood. An organized resistance force may exert economic influence on individuals who fail to support their movement.

PERSONAL GAIN

Personal gain is the motivating force of some volunteers. An individual, so motivated, may change sides if he believes he can gain more by fighting for the opposing force.

HATE

People who have lost loved ones due to enemy actions may fight against that enemy as a result of engendered hatred. Uncontrolled hatred can pose problems for the sponsor because it is difficult to control the actions of such individuals and properly direct their efforts.

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SECURITY

If the resistance movement is strong or gives the impression of being powerful, many individuals join out of a feeling of personal safety. Usually, this situation occurs only after the resistance movement is well organized and the enemy has been weakened. Others join in order to escape recruitment into the service of the enemy.

EGO

Personal motives such as power, pride, and adventure operate to some extent in all individuals. Depending upon the moral fibre of the individual, these motives may sustain him in times of great stress.

FEAR

Some individuals become a part of the resistance movement through no personal desire of their own. They join the movement out of coercion and fear of reprisals against themselves or their families.

CHANCE FOR SUCCESS

To develop an effective resistance movement, a population must be convinced of ultimate victory or liberation. Active participation in any resistance movement is directly influenced by its chance for success.

LEADERSHIP

Resistance movements stand or fall on the quality of their leadership and membership. Although individuals may possess the qualities needed to function as members of a guerrilla force, underground, or auxiliary, leaders must emerge to weld these elements into an organized and active force. An understanding of these individual motivating factors is important in evaluating resistance potential.

SUPPORT

A resistance movement derives its support from the local civilian population and/or external sponsor:

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INTERNAL SUPPORT

Moral and material support from the civilian population, whether voluntary, induced, or imposed, is essential. The enemy, however, may exert pressure on the local community by using punitive measures, such as reprisals, terrorism, deportation, restriction of movement, and seizure of goods and property, against supporters of resistance activities. Such countermeasures make civilian support dangerous and difficult.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

A resistance movement is most effective when external sponsorship is provided in addition to support from the local civilian population. This support may be political, logistical, or tactical. Whatever its form, external sponsorship will usually give moral and psychological support to the resistance movement.

POLITICAL FACTORS

Unconventional warfare has often been described as being more political than military in nature. It is certainly military in the tactical sense, but it is also political since a resistance movement generally stems from a local power struggle. Resistance elements usually fight for political gains. In gaining their own political objectives they may assist a sponsoring power in gaining its military obejctive.

However, the long-range political goals of a resistance movement may be in opposition to US national objectives or to those of a US-sponsored government in exile. In some instances, the true political character of a resistance movement is not apparent at the time support and sponsorship are extended. This makes it necessary for a potential sponsor to evaluate thoroughly both the effects on current operations and the postwar effects of any support rendered:

EFFECTS ON CURRENT OPERATIONS

Support of a particular faction or resistance group may alienate other rival factions and cause them to give open support to the enemy.

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POSTWAR EFFECTS

A successful resistance movement is, at the end of hostilities, the most important political power in a liberated country. Guerrillas, existing and fighting under conditions of great hardship, develop extremist attitudes and become very jealous of their prerogatives to determine the postwar complexion of their country. This may make the establishment of a government, sympathetic to US national interests, difficult or impossible. However, a nation that sponsors a successful resistance movement generally has a great political advantage in that area at the close of hostitlities.

LEGAL FACTORS

Unconventional warfare is bound, like conventional warfare, by the rules of the Geneva Conventions. International agreements outline four important factors which must be present to entitle a guerrilla to the same treatment from his captors as a regular soldier:

1. Be commanded by a person responsible for the actions of his subordinates.
2. Wear a fixed and distinctive insignia or sign recognizable at a distance.
3. Conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
4. Carry arms openly.

The underground and auxiliary do not conform to these criteria and, therefore, do not normally have the same legal status as the guerrillas. Historically, legal status has been of little concern to resistance elements and has had little effect on their operations.

This brief explanation of resistance provides the background necessary to understand the employment of Special Forces in an unconventional warfare role. In the following sections, we will discuss the activities normally required for the conduct of UW by Special Forces while engaged in supporting resistance forces.

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(U) SECTION II
PRE-MISSION PREPARATION

Unified, specified, and joint task force commanders when designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are responsible for the conduct of unconventional warfare. These commanders have the authority to establish a joint unconventional warfare task force (JUWTF) or a joint unconventional warfare command (JUWC) to plan for and to conduct unconventional warfare operations. The JUWTF/JUWC designates specific unconventional warfare operational areas to the SFOB commander.

1 SELECTION OF OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

Once the UWOA has been designated, the SFOB commander will select the operational element to be deployed based on the mission and other guidance received. Some factors influencing his selection are:

Character of the Resistance Movement Within the Area. The size and composition of the resistance movement may not be known, or it may be known to be extremely small and unorganized but with a potential for expansion under proper guidance and logistical support. In either event, the immediate infiltration of an operational element to begin the initial organization and development of the resistance movement may be necessary. Under certain circumstances, initial infiltration may be made by a small, carefully selected "pilot team," composed of individuals possessing specialized skills. The mission of this team is to assess designated areas, to determine the feasibility of developing the resistance potential, and to establish contact with indigenous leaders. Once the unified command or JUWTF has determined the feasibility of developing the area, additional Special Forces elements may be infiltrated. The pilot team may remain with the operational elements or be exfiltrated as directed.

On the other hand, the resistance movement may be highly organized and, except for logistical support and coordination of resistance force activities, will require little additional assistance from Special Forces. Situations may develop whereby a known leader of the resistance movement is of such importance or caliber that a senior Special Forces officer and a staff will be required to effect the necessary coordination and future development of the force. At this time, an appropriate command and control element may be selected for infiltration.

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Environment and Tactical Situations. The terrain, the enemy situation, complex political problems, or the ethnic groupings within the resistance movement may require that two or more Special Forces elements infiltrate simultaneously. If the UWOA is relatively large and compartmented for security, several elements may be placed initially in the area to form two independent sector commands and to organize, develop, train, equip, direct, and coordinate the efforts of scattered resistance forces. Regardless of the number of elements initially infiltrated into a specified area, additional operational elements may be required because of increased operations, expansion of existing guerrilla elements, or for political reasons.

Tailoring. The Special Forces operational detachment "A" may be subdivided into two similar teams which retain a mixture of the basic skills. This would be appropriate where the size and state of training of a guerrilla force make it desirable to split the force and subdivide an operational area into two sectors, where enemy pressure may force dispersal of the guerrilla force to areas of temporary refuge, or where an unforeseen resistance potential in an adjacent area can be exploited.

2 PLANNING

Detailed mission planning is vital to successful mission accomplishment and also to the very survival of the operational element. Upon mission tasking, the selected operational element is moved into isolation at the SFOB and receives its initial mission briefing. This briefing provides sufficient information to allow the operational element to complete detailed mission planning. It may be presented by the Special Forces operational base (SFOB)/forward operational base (FOB) commander. Staff specialists, e.g., air, naval, intelligence, weather, communications, and area specialist teams (AST) participate as required. Security is paramount throughout the isolation period.

The selected operational element must, through an extensive area study, acquire a thorough knowledge of the operational area. This includes an understanding of political, social, economic, and military information, and the ethnic groupings, customs, taboos, religions, and other essential data which could affect the organization, command and control, selection of leaders, and disciplinary measures to be enforced within the UWOA. The selected operational element is assisted in operational planning by an AST which also serves as the coordinator with the SFOB staff.

THE ISOLATION AREA

The isolation area is a maximum-security facility within the SFOB complex established to prepare selected Special Forces elements for mission deployment. Separate elements are

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compartmented to prevent mission compromise. The isolation area should provide:

- Compartmented briefing/debriefing areas.
- Adequate billeting and messing.
- Dispensary service.
- Storage and packaging of accompanying supplies.
- Limited morale services.
- Areas for special training.

During isolation, mission elements are afforded ample time to continue area studies, receive operational area intelligence briefings, plan their operations, and conduct any specialized training which may be required. When mission planning is complete, the operational element will brief the entire mission back to the initial briefing staff. This allows the staff to determine if the operational element has considered and properly used the information presented during the initial mission briefing. The briefback fulfills two major objectives:

- It allows the commander and his staff to determine if the operational element is ready for the mission.
- It allows the commander and his staff to recommend changes in the mission as required.

After infiltration, the Special Forces operational element continues to add to its background knowledge by a thorough and continuing assessment of the area, using intelligence developed within the area. Thus, armed with intelligence acquired before and after infiltration, the element is better able to weld elements of the area command into a coordinated and effective force capable of supporting theater military operations.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

In addition to Special Forces operational elements, other US military units or nonmilitary agencies may be operating within

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the UWOA. Normally, the commanders concerned know in advance that other activities are in the area. Prior to infiltration, command relationships are specified; area authority established; and necessary liaison, coordination, and cooperation effected.

3 ESTABLISHING CONTACT

Prior to infiltration, contact should be made with the resistance movement. It consists of the first contacts between the sponsoring power and the resistance force.

Normally, Special Forces will contact a special asset who has been operating clandestinely and has established himself with the resistance movement. Contact procedures must be known by all members of the operational element. The special asset will report and recommend his findings to the Special Forces commander about any, or all, of the following:

- Activity and situation of resistance or guerrilla groups.
- Potential of such groups.
- Attitude of the population.
- Political considerations.
- Enemy forces.
- The best way to deliver and receive personnel and equipment in the area.

When no advance contact has been made by the sponsor, but where there is evidence of resistance potential in an area, it may be necessary to send an element in "blind." In such cases, there is no reception party and Special Forces may have only the most general idea of where to find and contact the resistance. This method is the **least** desirable and is only used where no other alternative exists.

At times, the mission may require an asset be exfiltrated from the selected operational area to the SFOB/FOB to brief operational elements. The asset must be a person native to the area, and a member of the resistance movement specifically selected to assist the Special Forces mission. As such, the asset would have comprehensive background knowledge and current intelligence information on the objective area. If the situation warrants, he may accompany the Special Forces element on its infiltration into the UWOA to assist in contacting members of the resistance movement.

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SECTION III
(C) ORGANIZATION AND BUILDUP (U)

(C) As stated earlier, a resistance movement must exist prior to Special Forces commitment. When directed, we support and advise indigenous resistance forces by working with leaders and in-place assets. Our major effort is guerrilla warfare and the organization and support of a guerrilla force. However, we must also consider the underground and auxiliary as they impact on a guerrilla force.

(U) The organization of a UWOA involves initial area organization and buildup of the resistance force. Initial organization includes establishing the required command and administrative structure, taking necessary security precautions, and training a nucleus of guerrilla personnel. Buildup is the expansion of the original nucleus into an operational unit capable of accomplishing the assigned mission. No matter what degree of organization is encountered, in order to organize support functions and systems for the guerrilla force, the basic organizational objectives discussed in this section must exist or must be organized and implemented immediately.




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1 (U) SEVEN PHASES

Although there is no standard manner in which a guerrilla force develops, the illustration below provides a broad overview of how a typical US-sponsored guerrilla force may develop. The seven phases do not necessarily occur in the order shown, and they may overlap or occur concurrently.



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2 (U) AREA ASSESSMENT

The Special Forces commander must begin an area assessment immediately after entry into the UWOA. It is the collection of specific information and serves as the commander's estimate of the situation. The assessment is a continuous process which confirms, corrects, refutes, or adds to previous intelligence acquired before commitment. It also serves as a base for changing pre-mission operational and logistical plans.

An area assessment considers all the major factors involved, including the enemy situation and security measures, the political background of the resistance movement, and the attitude of the civilian population. There are no rigid formulas for making area assessments; each commander has to decide for himself what should be included and what conclusions may be drawn from the information he collects. The assessment is shaped by many variables including the mission, the commander's personality, and the thoroughness of the pre-infiltration study. The results of an area assessment should be transmitted to the SFOB/FOB only when there is new intelligence information which differs significantly from that received prior to commitment. The area study guide format at appendix C can be used for an area assessment.

3 (U) SPECIAL FORCES-RESISTANCE RELATIONS

Special Forces must establish a good working and command relationship with the resistance elements in the area. This helps to develop a high degree of cooperation and some degree of influence over the resistance forces. The mutual understanding of a common goal against a common enemy and acceptance of US sponsorship and operational guidance will help to improve this relationship. In addition, the following factors must be considered:

Most resistance movements are based upon political/psychological objectives. Although the military advantages of close cooperation among various resistance elements are obvious, political considerations may encourage guerrilla units to resist unification efforts by Special Forces. Opposition may stem from many causes such as personal antagonisms, religious beliefs, or ethnic differences. The Special Forces operational element must know and

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appreciate these attitudes and the personalities involved. It must also know the extent of the initial psychological preparation, including any promises made and commitments to be honored. Without official guidance, the Special Forces commander cannot make political commitments in the name of the US Government. Guidance in political matters will normally come from the unified commander through the SFOB.

Perhaps the most delicate responsibility of a Special Forces commander is insuring that competent indigenous personnel occupy key positions. If resistance leaders and staff members do not appear qualified to hold responsible positions, the Special Forces commander should try to increase their effectiveness which, in turn, may increase his influence. If all efforts fail and the future effectiveness of the resistance force is in doubt, the commander should discreetly attempt to influence the selection of new leaders. He must exercise extreme caution in this potentially explosive area lest he jeopardize his mission.

Special Forces should have a working knowledge of the local language. When an interpreter is needed, he must be carefully selected and used cautiously. The interpreter is in a very sensitive and powerful position as he is the only one who knows what both parties are saying. Also, considerable difficulty may be experienced in gaining the confidence of the guerrillas who may either dislike or distrust the interpreter.

Special Forces personnel must know and respect local traditions, customs, and courtesies. They must abide by the resistance code and, in so doing, encourage the guerrillas to display loyalty to their own nation's future.



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4 (C) AREA ORGANIZATION (U)

After infiltration, the Special Forces commander may find his areas of operation already structured according to the country's regional administrative system, or area organization may be totally lacking or incomplete. Regardless of the situation, some improvement will probably be necessary if any measure of success is to be attained.

Area organization depends more on local conditions than on any fixed set of rules. Among the ever present factors to be considered are:

- Effectiveness of resistance elements.
- Existing guerrilla force organization.
- Extent of cooperation between resistance forces and local civilians.
- Enemy activity.
- Topography.
- Desired degree of development.

The shape, size, and ultimate organization of the UWOA will be influenced, in varying degrees, by political boundaries, natural terrain features, location of enemy installations, possible targets, indigenous population density, resistance potential, and existing attitudes of the populace.

5 (C) AREA COMMAND (U)

(U) The internal command and control structure must provide unity of effort and intimate cooperation between departments of government and resistance operational elements. One such element is a guerrilla area command.

(C) The internal division of a country into guerrilla area commands is governed by political, ideological, topographical, security, communications, and other factors. Clearly defined operational boundaries must be established to facilitate coordination and control, and minimize friction between adjacent units. When a resistance movement has well organized guerrilla forces headed by locally recognized leaders, the area commands should conform to the existing spheres of influence of the established commanders.

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(C) In general, subareas having basic religions, ethnic, or political differences should not be included in the same area command. No areas should be larger than can be effectively controlled by available communications and logistical support. As communications and logistical support improve, separate areas may be consolidated into single areas.

(C) In general, a country may be divided into guerrilla area commands by:

Following established administrative divisions, counties, districts, provinces, departments, and states. This system is usually satisfactory when guerrilla operations plans include sabotage, propaganda, and espionage conducted by small cellular units.

Following natural geographical boundaries. This system is best for military reasons and for overt operations on a large scale. Each major area command should include difficult terrain or uncontrolled areas suitable for strongholds and bases of operation. Each area command and subordinate sector commands must also include food-producing areas that will support the guerrilla force in that area. This consideration can be ignored only when substantial logistical support is available from external sources.

(U) There is no rigid pattern for the organization of an area command; it is tailored to fit the mission and situation. The size and composition depend on the strength and capability of the resistance forces, the type and scope of operations to be undertaken, and the degree of US influence. An area command is compartmented to reduce the possibility of compromise. A UWOA may be subdivided into subordinate sector commands.

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A guerrilla area command is a combined command structure with representation from the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground to control, coordinate, and support all resistance activities in the UWOA. Such activities include support related to sabotage and subversive operations, intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological operations, and evasion and escape operations. After infiltration, Special Forces representation is included in an area command.

An area command headquarters must be small and mobile with decentralization of functions. This, in turn, requires the utmost latitude for lower commanders in determining the methods for carrying out their missions. Instructions to subordinate commanders are worded to permit flexibility. Deadline dates and hours are specified only when absolutely required by the situation. The greatest mutual confidence between commanders is necessary.

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(U) An area command creates an area complex to achieve dispersion, control, and flexibility. To support resistance activities, an area complex usually includes security, intelligence, and counterintelligence systems; communications systems; reception sites; supply and medical facilities; and training areas. Of paramount importance in the area complex is:

(C) GUERRILLA BASES (U)

(U) A guerrilla base is a temporary site where installations, headquarters, and units are located. There is usually more than one guerrilla base within an area complex. The bases can be large or small, elaborate or quite simple. If the guerrilla movement is strong and well developed, the bases will reflect this and be quite large. Otherwise they should be scattered, inconspicuous and well hidden. The main guerrilla base should have connecting lines of communications with other bases and the various support elements.

(C) Despite the impression of permanence, guerrilla units must be able to abandon the base rapidly when required. Guerrilla bases must have a good route of withdrawal in case of attack. Indeed, they should have several routes of escape. If possible, a base should be located in a hard-to-reach area—mountains, marsh, dense forest, uninhabited place—and have only one entrance and several emergency escape exits. With their knowledge of the

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terrain, guerrillas should be able to recommend the best areas for locating installations. Although hard-to-reach areas are the best locations for guerrilla bases, lack of such areas does not preclude guerrilla operations. The locations of guerrilla installations are disseminated on a need-to-know basis. Alternate base areas are established and used when the enemy threatens to overrun the primary base.



MISSION SUPPORT SITES (U)

(U) Mission support sites located within the area complex are planned to extend the radius of guerrilla operations. These sites are occupied for short periods of time, seldom longer than a day, prior to and/or after an operation. They enable the guerrillas to remain away from their bases for longer periods of time by providing a relatively secure place to prepare for future operations, to receive supplies, and to exchange intelligence with auxiliary contacts.

6 (U) UNIT ORGANIZATION

There are three main resistance elements—guerrilla force, auxiliary, and underground—that Special Forces will likely encounter or organize in a UWOA. The primary concern is the guerrilla force.

The ultimate organizational goal is to integrate all guerrilla elements into a unified and effective fighting force. The following factors must be considered:

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

Simplicity, flexibility, and divisibility are essential. Leaders must delegate authority to capable and loyal subordinates. Each man, from the highest to the lowest member of the unit, must know to whom he is responsible and who is responsible to him. No man should be responsible to more than one superior. No superior officer should have more subordinate units than he can effectively direct and control.

BASIC ORGANIZATION

The most important single point about guerrilla organizations is that they cannot be arbitrarily fixed according to standard, conventional TOE's. Guerrilla force missions and tactics are primary reasons. These, in turn, are influenced by available manpower and material assets. Direction and control, however, are made easier when units are organized along military lines, especially as the strength of each unit increases. At the same time, a rigid adherence to military form reduces the flexibility which guerrilla organizations must have. Generally, there are two approaches to organization:

- From the beginning, the effort is coordinated by a high command and by regional or district commands as dictated by geographic and other factors.
- The effort begins with the independent, uncoordinated activities of relatively small guerrilla units. As these separate efforts grow in size and scope, district and higher commands develop of necessity.

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In either case, a high degree of unit autonomy is necessary because of communication difficulties, rugged terrain, and security requirements of dispersion and mobility.

The Special Forces commander and the resistance leader should consider the following when organizing guerrilla units:

- Self-containment is essential. Each unit must have its own communication system, be able to obtain local supplies, conduct its own reconnaissance, and establish a means of collecting additional operational information and intelligence.
- Strong fire power and offensive armament capable of inflicting great losses within a short period of time are imperative.
- Heavy weapon units should be easily divisible into sections that can provide support to subordinate elements of the organization.
- Smaller units should have independence of action.
- The merging of small units into the larger organization should be done without causing disharmony.
- Knowledge of the location and activities of other units must be confined to persons charged with internal liaison responsibility.

SIZE OF UNIT

During early development, unit size may be fewer than 75 men, perhaps as few as 15 to 20. In the latter stages, units will rarely exceed battalion size with personnel numbering from 200 to 500. The following factors influence unit size:

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AREA. The size and physical aspects of the area of operations and the availability of suitable bases will limit the number of guerrilla units that can be deployed, as well as restrict the types of operations.

MISSIONS. A guerrilla unit should include no more men than needed to accomplish its overall mission. No more than one or two primary missions should be given to a small unit at any one time.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. Although the leader is the focal point of the resistance effort, the mission objectives of the unified commander and the Special Forces element should always be foremost. Political ambitions should never influence the leader to build up his organization beyond the point of efficiency and for the sake of sheer numbers. The Special Forces commander should make the guerrilla leader aware of the fact that his political stature is more enhanced by success in operations than by the mere number of followers.

ENEMY CONTROL. Where controls are rigid and the enemy is strong, security, mobility, and dispersion are strong factors favoring small-unit organization.

AVAILABLE PERSONNEL. Guerrilla units depend on the availability of personnel who willingly volunteer. Included in the preliminary planning phase is the identification of potential volunteers for replacement reserves as well as for immediate service. In determining the availability of men, the area command must consider the ratio of men to be recruited to the total male population of a town or village. The wholesale disappearance of the town's able-bodied men could arouse the enemy's suspicions and provoke reprisals against the remaining populace.

SUPPLY AND SUPPORT CAPABILITY. Guerrillas should not be assembled in such numbers that supplying and supporting them becomes a major problem. Sufficient food and water resources should exist within the base area itself or should be available from readily accessible sources, i.e., local auxiliary or support units. Initially, equipment must be based on what is available and not on what the guerrilla wants or needs. The enemy may be the principal source of supply until such time as the Special Forces commander can make a proper assessment of the area and establish a sound logistical system.

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SOCIAL TRADITION. Strong family or ethnic traditions may make it difficult to persuade the guerrillas that their wives and children should be left behind. Traditions may also have a bearing on the suitability of certain tactics, weapons, and disciplinary principles. These factors in turn may affect the size of the unit as well as the planning for future development, operations, and support.

7 (U) CIVILIAN SUPPORT

Resistance membership includes those whose principal function is to conduct operations against the enemy and those who support the operational elements. Here, we are primarily concerned with the auxiliary—the internal support element of the resistance movement whose organization and operation are clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the resistance movement. Its primary mission is to provide support for the guerrilla force by organizing civilian supporters of the resistance movement.

Clandestine support functions can be organized on a regional, district, or sector basis depending on the degree to which guerrilla units are organized. All functions should be compartmented from each other as well as from the guerrilla unit or group of units which they support. Clandestine or covert support functions needed by the guerrilla unit to supplement its own capabilities are:

- Air or maritime reception support.
- Systems for internal acquisition of supplies.
- Systems for the acquisition of operational information and intelligence.
- Medical facilities for "hospitalization," treatment, and rehabilitation of sick and wounded.
- Counterintelligence systems to counter enemy penetration attempts and provide external and internal security.
- Systems and procedures for recruitment of personnel.
- Compartmented communication systems for various support functions.

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MEMBERSHIP

It is possible for segments of the population to continue participating in the life of their community, to all appearance concerned only with their normal occupations, and at the same time engage in resistance operations. Such personnel are, in fact, leading double lives, and their success in guerrilla warfare depends on their ability to keep that side of their lives secret from their fellow citizens as well as from the enemy. The "farmer by day, fighter by night," commonly referred to as a "part-time guerrilla," often is the forerunner to the full-time guerrilla, who later will disappear from the public scene to live in guerrilla encampments and undertake more extensive operations.

On the other hand, some "part-time guerrillas" may remain in that status for the duration of hostilities. Functions or tasks are assigned to groups or individuals according to their capability, their dependability, and the degree to which they are willing and able to participate. Those who unwittingly furnish support, or are coerced into doing so are not considered auxiliaries. The normal daily activities of many auxiliaries can serve as a cover for their guerrilla support mission.

Functions which require travel or transportation might be accomplished by such persons as foresters, farmers, fishermen, truckers, or transportation workers. Other functions, such as security and warning, require a valid reason for remaining at a given location. Housewives and shopkeepers are examples in this category. Some members of the community may sympathize strongly with the resistance but be under such close surveillance by the enemy that they would be of little value as an auxiliary. Open contact with former political leaders or technicians employed by the enemy, for example, might prove more dangerous than profitable.

ORGANIZATION

Auxiliary forces normally organize to coincide with or parallel the existing political administrative divisions of the country. This method of organization insures that each community and the surrounding countryside is the responsibility of an auxiliary unit. It is relatively simple to initiate since auxiliary commands may be established at each administrative level, for example, regional, county, district, or local (communities and villages). This organization varies from country to country depending upon the existing political structure. Organization of auxiliary units can commence at any level or at several levels simultaneously and is either centralized or decentralized.

A command committee at each level controls and coordinates auxiliary activities within its area of responsibility. In this respect it resembles the command group and staff of a military unit. Members of a command committee are assigned specific duties such as supply, recruiting, transpor-

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tation, communications, security, intelligence, and operations. At the lowest level, one individual may perform two or three of these duties.

A command committee may organize civilian sympathizers into subordinate elements or employ them individually. When possible, these subordinate elements are organized functionally into a compartmented structure. However, because of a shortage of loyal personnel, it is often necessary for each subordinate auxiliary element to perform several functions.

METHOD OF OPERATION

Auxiliary units derive their protection in two principal ways—a compartmented structure and operating under cover. While enemy counterguerrilla activities often force the guerrillas to move temporarily away from given areas, the auxiliaries survive by remaining in place and conducting their activities so as to avoid detection. Individual auxiliary members carry on their normal, day-to-day routine, while secretly carrying out the many facets of resistance activities.

Auxiliary units frequently use passive or neutral elements of the population to provide active support to the common cause. Usually this is done on a one-time basis because of the security risks involved in repeated use of such people. The ability of auxiliary forces to manipulate large segments of the neutral population is further enhanced by the demonstrated success of friendly forces.

SUPPORT MISSIONS

The support missions discussed herein are the principal ones performed by auxiliary forces to support the area command. Some of these tasks are coordinated directly with guerrilla units while others are controlled by their own headquarters. Normally, auxiliary units are assigned direct support missions for guerrilla units in their areas.

SECURITY AND WARNING. Auxiliary units provide a physical security and warning system for guerrilla forces. They organize extensive systems of civilian sympathizers who keep enemy forces under surveillance and provide early warning of enemy movements. These civilians are selected because of their advantageous location which permits them to monitor the enemy.

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INTELLIGENCE. Auxiliary units collect information to support their own operations and those of the area command. They provide direct intelligence support to guerrilla units operating within the area of responsibility.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. The auxiliary assists the area command counterintelligence effort by maintaining watch over transitory civilians, by screening recruits for guerrilla units, and by monitoring refugees and other non-inhabitants of the area. Because of their intimate knowledge of local people, auxiliaries should be able to report attempts by enemy agents to infiltrate the area. They can also name those inhabitants whose loyalty to the resistance might be suspect.


LOGISTICS. The auxiliary supports guerrillas in all phases of logistical operations. They provide transportation and/or porters for the movement of supplies and equipment. Auxiliaries often care for the sick and wounded, provide medical supplies and arrange for doctors and other medical personnel. They collect food, clothing, and other supplies through a controlled system of levy, barter, or contribution. Sometimes auxiliaries provide essential services such as repair of clothing, shoes, and certain items of equipment. Auxiliaries also furnish personnel to assist at reception sites. They distribute supplies throughout the area. The extent of logistical support furnished by the auxiliary depends upon the resources of the area, the degree of influence it exerts on the population, and enemy activities.

RECRUITING. Guerrilla units depend upon the local population for recruits to replace operational losses and to expand their forces. Auxiliaries spot, screen, and recruit personnel for active guerrilla units. If recruits are provided from reliable auxiliary sources, the enemy's chances for placing agents in the guerrilla force are greatly reduced.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. A very important mission in which auxiliary units assist is psychological warfare. The spreading of rumors, leaflets, and posters is timed with guerrilla tactical missions to deceive the enemy. Leaflets can mislead the enemy regarding guerrilla intentions, capabilities, and location. The spreading of this propaganda is very difficult for the enemy to control.

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CIVILIAN CONTROL. To control the population and give the enemy an impression of guerrilla power, auxiliary units establish a legal control system to assist in preventing black marketing and profiteering. Collaborators may be terrorized or eliminated by the auxiliaries.

EVASION AND ESCAPE. Auxiliary units are ideally suited for the support of evasion and escape mechanisms. Their contact with and control over segments of the civilian population provide the area commander with a means of assisting evaders.

OTHER MISSIONS. Auxiliary units may be called upon to perform a number of other guerrilla support missions such as:

- Coordinated actions with the guerrillas against other targets, e.g., cutting of telephone lines between enemy installations and reserve forces prior to a guerrilla attack.
- Furnishing guides.
- Operation of courier systems.
- Conducting active guerrilla type operations on a part-time basis.
- Raising funds.

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THE KEYS TO GOOD RELATIONS AND SUPPORT

The population is your greatest friend. Without their sympathy and active support you cannot exist for extended periods of time. As a result, you cannot afford to alienate them by brutal behavior or lack of discipline.

If you have to requisition something, appeal to the common goal and patriotism; do not demand it.

Do not forget that the laws of land warfare are valid even though they do not specifically cover every possible situation.

For better or worse, you are practically dependent upon the good will of the population. You also depend upon their steady "I-do-not-know, I-have-not-heard-nor-seen-anything" replies to enemy interrogators, even though this attitude might mean their deportation or death.

Even if the population should act only half-heartedly in your behalf, you will always find some people willing to help you as observers, scouts, and messengers.

You must be extremely cautious in your contact with elements of the civilian resistance movement, even in liberated areas. You must not expose their "cover" for a temporary advantage since they will be captured and liquidated by the enemy after your departure.

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8 (C) SECURITY (U)

Security is the keynote to survival and success in unconventional warfare. The area command seeks the following security objectives:

- Develop a command organization which will minimize vulnerability to enemy penetration.
- Prevent the enemy from identifying the organizational structures, missions, and locations of guerrilla forces.
- Prevent the enemy from neutralizing or destroying the resistance support and logistical system.

Security is primarily based on discipline—that imposed by orders from the area command and that self-imposed by each guerrilla. An important part of this discipline is constant alertness to external dangers and to the dangers of lax behavior.

Guerrilla forces gain security through intelligence, counterintelligence, movement of forces, dispersion, and organization of the civilian population. As the guerrilla force expands, the problems of security become more complex. Headquarters, bases, and other installations are located in inaccessible areas. All installations are kept mobile and surrounded by elaborate guard and warning systems. Alternate locations are planned and prepared in advance so any installation threatened by enemy action can be evacuated quickly and remain operational.

(C)PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY (U)

DISPERSION (U)

Guerrilla forces must avoid concentration. Even though the tactical and logistical situations may favor concentrating the guerrilla force, security requirements dictate that it organize into smaller units and tactically disperse. A large force may be concentrated to conduct a specific operation, but upon completion of the operation, it quickly reverts to the original organizational and dispersion pattern. The principle of dispersion should be applied to command as well as to tactical and support elements.

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In the event of enemy counterguerrilla operations, the area commander may be forced to divide units into even smaller elements to achieve greater dispersion or to facilitate escape. This dispersion will reduce the effectiveness of command and control, lower the morale of the guerrilla force, and hinder the ability of the auxiliaries to render support. Accordingly, excessively dispersed units must be reassembled as quickly as possible. For such contingencies, operations plans must provide post-operation assembly areas.

MOBILITY (U)

Guerrilla units and installations must be highly mobile. Emergency evacuation plans for installations and forces should include actions which will remove all traces of activity. Mobility may be facilitated by preparing equipment in one-man loads and by caching less mobile equipment.

MOVEMENT (U)

Accurate intelligence on enemy dispositions and activities is essential to all guerrilla movements. Guerrillas can evade or engage the enemy advantageously only by knowing his location and strength. The intelligence section of the area commands provides this vital information.

Within guerrilla-controlled areas, movement is rapid and little attention is given to concealment except from aerial observation. On approaching enemy-controlled areas, greater care is exercised; standard march security techniques such as advance, rear, and flank guards are employed. Preselected bivouacs are reconnoitered by patrols and placed under surveillance prior to arrival of the main body. When feasible, local auxiliary units are contacted to obtain the latest information on enemy forces in the area. Areas frequently patrolled or observed by the enemy or in which he has superior mobility are traversed at night. Civilian clothing may be worn to conceal movement. Loads must be well camouflaged, arms well hidden, and modes of transportation inconspicuous.

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION (U)

Camouflage discipline is required to achieve surprise in tactical operations as well as to insure security of installations. All members of the guerrilla force are responsible for maintaining strict camouflage discipline.

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Deception operations are planned by the guerrilla force to conceal the nature and extent of their operations and to provide the enemy with misleading or false information. Such operations may be conducted in conjunction with other resistance operations in the area.

REACTION TO ENEMY OPERATIONS (U)

When in the area of enemy operations, the guerrilla force must avoid premature or unnecessary movement in reaction to enemy counterguerrilla operations. The enemy may be sending out routine patrols only to force the guerrillas to commit themselves. The enemy's operations may be based on meager and general information. Unnecessary moves by the guerrilla force will expose them to possible agents and informers who may be collaborating with the enemy. Enemy forces operating in strange areas must often depend on guides. Unless the guides are likely to find the location of the guerrilla installation, and an actual threat develops, the force should not move. If a move is required, it must be orderly and according to prearranged plans. When possible, these moves are made at night or over concealed routes.

SECURITY AND WARNING SYSTEMS (U)

No matter how firmly the guerrillas control their immediate area of operations, they are essentially operating in enemy-controlled territory. Their survival and operational success depend on their ability to conceal their base locations and their objectives. Therefore, tight security and functional warning systems are required.

Security is enhanced by careful selection of sites for guerrilla base camps, hospitals, supply points, and other semipermanent installations. Whenever possible, these installations should be located where the terrain conceals both the approach routes and the installations. The terrain should also obstruct rapid enemy motorized or mechanized approach into the area. Once selected, knowledge of the location of any installation is restricted to personnel who actually man or require direct contact with that installation.
Warning systems which employ all elements of the resistance force permit security in depth. In the immediate vicinity of guerrilla installations, security generally depends upon standard military techniques which include:

- Patrols.
- Outposts.
- Warning devices.
- Cover and deception.

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The auxiliary and the underground supplement the security measures of the guerrilla force by uncovering enemy acitivity and by identifying potential dangers. In addition, they establish warning systems designed to provide timely information of the approach of enemy units. They maintain surveillance over collaborators and attempt to elicit information from enemy personnel, local officials, and the police.

SECURITY MEASURES (U)

Strict security measures must be established and enforced at each level and should be coordinated with both higher and lower echelons. When establishing security measures, the following factors are considered:

- Development stage of the guerrilla movement.
- General capabilities and limitations.
- Relations with the civilian populace and external forces.
- Topography and general physical aspects of the area.
- Efficiency of the enemy's control system.
- Mission of the particular guerrilla force or unit.

Based on these factors, security measures include:

- Communication discipline and procedures.
- Camouflage discipline.
- Isolation of units from each other.
- Careful selection and rigid supervision of courier routes.
- Police of camp sites and installations.
- Movement control within and between guerrilla bases.
- Isolation of guerrilla units from the civilian population at large. Any necessary contact with civilians is accomplished through auxiliary elements.
- Thorough indoctrination of all units in resistance to interrogation. The application of this principle throughout the structure of a guerrilla force limits the amount of information that may be extracted from captured personnel.
- Strict control of all administrative, logistical, and operational records. Records must be kept to a minimum and disseminated only on a need-to-know basis. Whenever possible, references to names and places are coded and the key to the codes strictly controlled. Records which are of no further value are destroyed.

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9 (U) INTELLIGENCE

The very nature and locale of unconventional warfare operations require that Special Forces and supported resistance forces have accurate, timely intelligence to plan and conduct operations, secure bases, and prevent compromise by enemy forces. Intelligence systems in the UWOA, although primarily geared to support Special Forces and guerrilla forces, may be tasked to support the gathering of essential elements of information (EEI) for higher headquarters. The area command is frequently in a position to provide intelligence which is otherwise unavailable to forces operating outside the UWOA. In the assignment of intelligence tasks, the impact on the Special Forces element's primary mission, security, and communications limitations is considered. Intelligence is discussed in chapter 3.

10 (U) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The enemy has a hard core infrastructure organized to control the civilian population, identify, neutralize, and destroy resistance forces. A sound counterintelligence system must be established within the area command to neutralize or reduce the effectiveness of the enemy infrastructure and its intelligence-gathering capability, and to prevent penetration. Effective countermeasures must be continuously applied to assure the survival of the resistance organization and its members. Counterintelligence and OPSEC are discussed in chapter 3.

11 (C) COMMUNICATIONS (U)

Communications in the UWOA require continuous evaluation and adjustment to meet changing operational and security requirements. Until the area is reasonably secure, radio and other electronic means must be used sparingly to avoid enemy detection. Members of the resistance must be made aware of how incorrect operating procedures for both radio and other electronic equipment can not only jeopardize their mission but can ultimately make them casualties. Direct communication between all elements of the area command usually is neither desirable nor possible due to the necessity for compartmentation of one activity from another, to the physical distances between elements, and to the difference in their activities and operational environments.

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GUERRILLA FORCE(U)

Communications with and between guerrilla units normally will be by messenger or by visual and audible signals. Operational tasks are assigned and coordinated at periodic meetings or by liaison visits. Voice radio may disclose the location and presence of the guerrilla units and its use must be restricted.

AUXILIARY (U)

The auxiliary employs clandestine communications techniques even though its environment permits a greater freedom of movement than is possible by the underground or guerrilla force. The auxiliary establishes courier routes or systems for internal communications and provides courier service to the area command and its guerrilla units.

UNDERGROUND (U)

The underground must rely on clandestine communication techniques. Contact with other resistance elements is extremely limited for security reasons and may not always be possible.

As the guerrilla movement gains strength, communications within the UWOA may progress from clandestine to conventional systems. The extent and type of system depends on factors such as size of the area, the size of the guerrilla force, activities of the enemy and the guerrillas, the technical proficiency of both the enemy and the guerrilla communication organization, and the required speed of response to the orders of the area acommand. Any and all means which satisfy the requirement for communications and provide the required security are used. Certain clandestine communication systems may be used, but these should be tightly controlled by the commander. All the following are considered:

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MESSENGER (U)

Initially, messengers may be the only secure means of communication. A messenger (courier) service is organized using clandestine, nontechnical communication techniques. During the organization and development of the UWOA, communication means will be dictated by the status of training and capability of the guerrilla force. Women and children are often used as messengers. Every conceivable ruse will be used to conceal documents on messengers and to pass along information.

RADIO (U)

Radio can provide instantaneous, generally reliable communications; however, any radio transmission is vulnerable to interception and jamming by an enemy. The advantages of speed must be balanced against the probable loss of security. When considering the use of radio, the deciding factors are the nature of the message text and probable enemy reaction time if the message is intercepted. For example, enemy reaction to last-minute control instructions during a raid or ambush would not be rapid enough to affect the operation. On the other hand, the interception of plans or instructions involving future actions could result in disastrous compromise. The availability of radio equipment, maintenance, spare parts, and resupply of batteries are important considerations. The use of even the simplest radio requires training of operators and maintenance personnel.

TELEPHONE (U)

In the early stages of development of a UWOA, telephones may be used between a security outpost and a base camp, or during an ambush to warn of the approach of a convoy or train.

AUDIBLE SIGNALS (U)

Audible signals are used for short distances. Church bells, vehicle horns, musical instruments, sirens, dogs barking, or voices may be used as audible signals. Quite often, audible signals can be planned in such a way that the sound is routine and recognizable as a signal only to someone trained in the system.

VISUAL SIGNALS (U)

Visual signals are limited only by the imagination of the person planning the signals and by the equipment available. The predesignated placement of shutters, flower pots, or windows; arrangement of curtains; hanging clothes on clothesline; flags; flashlights; signal mirrors; or a variety of other visual signs which are recognizable from a distance may be used. Normal actions are the guide for developing visual signals.

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LOCAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS (U)

Many areas of the world have extensive, local communication systems. Without any special equipment, part or all of these systems may be used. When considering the use of the local communication systems, security must be paramount. The local language or dialect must be used in apparently innocent conversation.

PIGEONS OR TRAINED ANIMALS (U)

Homing pigeons may be used for rapid transmission of messages within the operational area. Since they require a few days to acquaint themselves with the home loft area, homing pigeons should be used when the guerrilla base is relatively static. Locally-procured, trained animals (usually dogs) may also be used as a means of communication; however, dogs are usually more susceptible to interception or diversion than homing pigeons.

Enemy electronic warfare activities can deny or degrade the communication links required to conduct unconventional warfare operations. The electromagnetic radiations of Special Forces communications and noncommunications equipment/systems are vulnerable to enemy detection, interception, analysis, direction-finding, and exploitation. Signal security (SIGSEC) techniques must be preplanned to enhance effective communications security (COMSEC) and electronic security (ELSEC) within the UWOA. COMSEC is primarily concerned with:

PHYSICAL SECURITY (U)

Measures must be taken to safeguard communications documents, equipment, and personnel. The Special Forces commander must use judgment and discretion in dealing with indigenous personnel in allowing them access to classified information. Information on cryptographic systems used by Special Forces is never released to indigenous personnel. Classified material is kept on the person of one of the Special Forces members or under constant guard. The physical security of the radio set is maintained by choosing good transmission and storage locations and by having a minimum number of persons know these locations. Techniques of physical security applicable to Special Forces in a UWOA are:

- Avoid easily identifiable and prominent geographical locations such as mountain tops.
- Move the radio after each transmission.
- Sterilize radio sites.
- Place surveillance on radio sites before and after transmission.
- Post guards when waiting for and during actual transmission.
- Do not carry classified material to transmission site.

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TRANSMISSION SECURITY (U)

Measures must be taken to protect transmissions from interception, traffic analysis, direction finding, and imitative deception. Many times it may be necessary in the interest of transmission security to compromise between technically favorable transmission sites and transmission sites which meet both physical and transmission security criteria. Some techniques of transmission security applicable to Special Forces operations in a UWOA are:

- Minimum time on air.
- Minimal mission essential transmissions.
- Transmitters are not tuned until exact contact time.
- Use of authorized procedures only.
- Duplex transmission.
- Change of frequencies and call signs.
- Irregular transmission schedule.
- Frequent changes of location.
- Messages are concise.
- Directional antennas are used.

CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY (U)

Cryptographic security insures proper use of technically sound cryptographic systems. Specific instructions, techniques, and methods to be used are covered in pre-mission briefings on a need-to-know basis.

Special forces must also consider ELSEC to prevent enemy interception, analysis, or exploitation of electromagnetic radiations from beacons, transponders, or other noncommunications electronic equipment.

Special Forces communications doctrine, techniques, and procedures are explained in (C) TC 31-20-5, *Special Forces Communications.* (U)

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12 (C) CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS (U)

Clandestine communications techniques are employed by all resistance elements to provide secure and efficient communications within and between organizations. The three basic considerations in operating a clandestine communications system are:

CONTROL. The area command must exercise control over the clandestine communications system.

CONTINUITY. The clandestine communications system is designed to assure continuous and responsive information flow. Ideally, there should be three channels of communications:

- **A primary channel** to serve normal or routine requirements.
- **An alternate channel** to relieve the primary channel of overload and continue operations in event of compromise of the primary channel, or portions thereof.
- **An emergency channel** to transmit urgent information expeditiously and reliably.

SECURITY. Security of the clandestine communication system is achieved through compartmentation and limiting information and knowledge of system functions to those persons having a "need-to-know."

There are two broad categories of clandestine communications.

PERSONAL MEETINGS. The personal meeting is any face-to-face contact between two or more participants of the operation, regardless of the duration of the contact.

THE CUTOUT. The cutout is a person, thing, or place interposed between two persons or groups in order to effect communications and serves to hide the relationship between these persons or groups.

Clandestine communications are discussed in (S) FM 30-18

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13 (U) LOGISTICS

There is no standard resistance force logistics system. Each system is developed to meet the specific needs and peculiarities of the situation. As resistance force requirements and the local situation change, the logistics system must be modified accordingly to insure optimum overall system effectiveness. UW logistics are discussed in chapter 3.

14 (U) MEDICAL

The goals of medical operations in unconventional warfare are to conserve the fighting strength of the guerrilla forces and to assist in securing the support of the local populace for the US and other resistance forces operating within the UWOA. Resistance medical support must be mobile, responsive, and effective in preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. For the guerrilla, there is no safe "rear" where he may take his casualties for treatment; wounded and ill personnel become a tactical rather than a logistical problem. The Special Forces commander will find that medical support is a major tactical consideration in all operations. Medical aspects of UW are discussed in chapter 3.

15 (U) TRAINING

To operate successfully against modern military forces without heavy losses, guerrilla forces must be trained and attain proficiency in those job-related skills peculiar to their operations. A major part of the Special Forces mission is to plan, organize, conduct, and evaluate training of selected guerrilla cadres to prepare them as trainers of guerrilla personnel and units.

Special Forces preparations begin during pre-mission planning with development of a tentative training plan based on area studies and intelligence. After commitment into the UWOA, the level of resistance force training must be evaluated and the initial training plan updated to permit efficient and effective accomplishment of training objectives.

The training plan outlines the manner in which Special Forces can best accomplish its training mission. It results from an estimate of the training situation reflecting the state of training of the guerrilla force, personnel available, weather and climate, and the training objective. The most important factors to consider include the:

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MISSION

Based on the operational directives from higher headquarters, Special Forces determines the specific tasks for the guerrilla force to accomplish. If the force has been assigned multiple missions, priorities for training must be established.

PERSONNEL

The capabilities of resistance personnel and their state of training must be evaluated by personal observation, inspections, and the results of limited operational missions. Characteristics of the resistance force which may present obstacles to training include:

A wide range of education and capability levels.

Divergences of motivation for joining resistance forces.

Variance in the extent of previous military experience

Possible language barriers requiring training through interpreters.

TIME

The training time available is one of the most critical factors to be considered. The shorter the training time the greater the care that must be taken in defining the training objectives. Since training time will be lost because of operational necessity, makeup training should be included as an integral part of the training program.

FACILITIES

The requirements for ranges, rehearsal areas, improvised classrooms, training aids, and other training facilities must be established. Since security is of prime importance, it may be advisable to locate range and rehearsal areas away from the guerrilla base to preclude enemy detection.

SYSTEM AND ORGANIZATION

The requirements for physical security in the UWOA generally dictate that guerrilla forces be dispersed over a wide area. Consequently, the system and organization for training is decentralized. "Hands-on" training is emphasized. While training is conducted by selected guerrilla cadres, it is planned, organized, and inspected by Special Forces personnel and their counterparts.

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Throughout the organization, development, and training phases of guerrilla activities, limited combat operations are conducted to support training and test the readiness of the force. The goals of these operations are to:

- Attract additional recruits to the resistance forces.
- Assist in gaining support of the civilian populace.
- Give the area command an opportunity to evaluate the training conducted.
- Increase the morale and esprit de corps of the resistance and guerrilla force.

The selection, planning, and execution of combat action should insure success with a minimum of casualties to the guerrillas. A combat defeat in the early stages of training has a demoralizing effect on the guerrilla force. Combat operations should be commensurate with the status of training and equipment available to the resistance force. As training is completed and units are organized, more complex and larger operations are planned and executed. Typical training operations that may be considered are:

- Reconnaissance patrols.
- Ambushes and raids.
- Surveillance of future objectives.

Training must be performance oriented—it is the key to mission accomplishment. Use FM 21-6, *How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training.*

16 (U) ADMINISTRATION

An administrative management system must be established within the UWOA. Aside from historical purposes, accurate records are valuable in settling disputes or claims during the post hostilities period.

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Tentative plans for forming an administrative system to support the UWOA are developed during pre-mission planning. The SFOB should provide guidance based on intelligence and contact made by the JUWTF/JUWC with the internal or external government, as appropriate, concerning pay scales, rank structure, and legal codes and systems. Such guidance will assist in establishing uniformity in all operational areas and prevent inflated rank structures, unrealistic pay scales, and illegal courts. The final administrative plan will be confirmed through coordination between Special Forces and resistance leaders in the UWOA.

Administrative systems should be simple and effective. Special Forces may recommend that an administrative section be established within the area command to maintain essential records. Security requirements determine the type and number of records to be maintained, and may preclude keeping any records. Extreme precautions are exercised to prevent any records from falling into the hands of the enemy. As the area develops, it may be feasible to decentralize administration to subordinate echelons. In such cases, however, duplicate information and records that can compromise the operation should be forwarded to the administrative section of the area command for disposition. As a minimum, the administrative system should provide for the following records and procedures:

- Operations journals.
- Command rosters.
- Unit personnel rosters.
- Individual personnel/medical records.
- Payroll records.
- Casualty records.
- Graves registration.
- Oath of enlistment.
- Claims.
- Awards and decorations.

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17 (U) DISCIPLINE

Far too often, the term "guerrilla" suggests a body of individuals entirely without discipline. Nothing could be more untrue. Without discipline, no force can survive, let alone operate effectively against the enemy. Minor infractions of orders, especially during the conduct of operations, have far reaching consequences for guerrillas and supporting resistance elements. For this reason, harsh but fair disciplinary measures may be imposed to insure that orders are executed without delay or question.

Normally, all members of a guerrilla force have an understanding of what is expected of them. However, a written code should be developed by resistance leaders with advice from the Special Forces element. As new recruits are gained, they should be required to know the provisions of the code as well as understand the penalties for treason, desertion, and dereliction of duty. Any code should address the necessity for personal conduct above reproach when dealing with the civilian populace, for every act which loses civilian supporters is harmful to the resistance movement.

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CHAPTER 2

SECTION IV
(C) COMBAT EMPLOYMENT (U)

(C) In our unconventional warfare role, we must consider a variety of activities ranging from simple acts of sabotage by the underground to large-scale raids conducted by guerrilla forces using conventional combat techniques. Because of the political implications, UW operations require strict control at the highest levels. Unconventional warfare operations, as directed by the National Command Authority, may be:

OVERT	No attempt is made to conceal either the operation or identity of the sponsor.
COVERT	Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.
CLANDESTINE	Operations which are so planned and executed in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. They differ from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor.

(U) US Army Special Forces, when committed to accomplish the unconventional objectives of the National Command Authority, is primarily concerned with:

1. GUERRILLA WARFARE
2. EVASION AND ESCAPE
3. SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE

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1 (C) GUERRILLA WARFARE (U)

(U) Responsibility for the various aspects of unconventional warfare has been delegated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that service having primary concern. The US Army is responsible for guerrilla warfare and related ground activities. Guerrilla warfare is defined as:

> Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.
>
> JCS Pub 1

(U) During World War II guerrilla forces were organized and used extensively. Basically, their operations behind enemy lines applied old principles and techniques to modern warfare. Nevertheless, many factors impeded the efficient organization and conduct of guerrilla operations. Military professionals generally did not understand the art of guerrilla warfare and many of them regarded it as illegal and dishonorable. The strategic and tactical relationships of guerrilla forces to conventional forces were rarely appreciated. Special operations organizations, shrouded in secrecy, were erroneously judged by many as "cloak and dagger outfits" engaged in wild exploits.

(U) Adding to the confusion that often existed, the responsibility for organizing, supplying, and exploiting guerrilla forces was often shifted from intelligence to operations staffs, or to a special agency when problems became too large for each in turn to handle. The command relationships between guerrilla forces and a theater headquarters often remained vague and caused confusion within and between guerrilla forces. The logistical support of guerrilla forces was often neglected or ill-timed with the operation plans of conventional forces. Because of these major factors, the potentials of guerrilla warfare were never fully developed and exploited.

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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CHANGE
No. 1

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 21 April 1978

(C) SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS (U)

FM 31-20, dated 30 September 1977, is changed as follows:

a. Make pen and ink changes on page 215 as follows:

Change (U) to read (C) at the beginning of the last two paragraphs on page 215.

b. The following statement is added to FM 31-20:

The information in this field manual combined with that in (C) TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations (U), and (C) TC 31-20-5, Special Forces Communications (U), reveals the mode of operation of Special Forces under any conceivable situation. Since Special Forces more than any other Army element operates in a high threat environment, the disclosure of this information would:

Provide enemy/unfriendly nations with an insight into the potential of Special Forces and give these nations a base upon which to develop effective countermeasures.

Weaken or nullify the effectiveness of a military plan or operation involving Special Forces.

Limit the effectiveness of Special Forces and weaken their ability to conduct assigned missions and/or defend themselves successfully.

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c. File this change at the front of the publication for reference purposes.

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(C) The dependence of a modern war machine upon industrial and economic production makes it extremely vulnerable to attacks on these supporting activities and vital lines of communication. A future war waged with highly mobile forces supported by scientific and mechanical means of tremendous destruction will likely have dispersion of forces, fluid battle fronts, and widespread isolated actions—an ideal setting for guerrilla warfare in its broadest aspects. Therefore, guerrilla warfare must no longer be considered as unusual or exceptional but must be accepted as a normal feature of military operations.



(C) CHARACTERISTICS OF GUERRILLA OPERATIONS (U)

(C) Guerrilla warfare strategy is to build up resistance activities throughout the occupied area, confine the enemy to the larger towns by restricting his movements and communications, and, finally, drive him out of his bases and the country. The essence of all strategy is to bring—using surprise and/or mobility—the greatest possible strength to bear at a chosen time and place.

(C) Guerrilla operations attempt to do three things: drain the enemy's manpower and resources, break down his administration, and lead the people's resistance to enemy occupation.

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(C) The success of guerrilla operations—even the fact that guerrillas exist—lowers enemy morale and prestige; disrupts the enemy, politics, and industry of the enemy or enemy-occupied areas; and maintains the morale and will to resist of the friendly civilian population.

(U) To conduct successful guerrilla operations the following factors must be considered:

- THE PEOPLE
- STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
- PLANNING
- INTELLIGENCE
- TACTICS
- MOBILITY
- SURPRISE
- AREAS OF OPERATION
- TIME AND SPACE

(C) THE PEOPLE (U)

Successful guerrilla operations involve the civilian populace. Their effectiveness in resisting the enemy and supporting the guerrillas will, in the end, be the decisive factor. It must be remembered that it is the people who will bear the brunt of the enemy's retaliatory measures. Accordingly, there should be constant contact and coordination between the guerrillas and the local populace.

(C) STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES (U)

Guerrillas must not be underestimated nor considered invincible. To efficiently exploit guerrilla forces, Special Forces advisors must constantly assess each force's strengths and weaknesses—organization, state of training, logistical support, enemy situation, and effect of assigned missions on the ability to perform subsequent missions.

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(U) PLANNING

Guerrilla operations feature centralized planning and decentralized execution. The actions of all resistance elements are directed and coordinated by the underground resistance committee through an area command. However, within the guidance furnished by the area commander, subordinate leaders are allowed the widest possible latitude in the conduct of their operations.

Planning provides for the attack of selected targets and for subsequent operations designed to exploit the advantage gained. Additionally, alternate targets are designated to allow subordinate units flexibility in taking advantage of sudden changes in the tactical situation. Once committed to an operation, the large zone of action or lack of communication equipment within a small guerrilla unit may reduce the area command's capability to rapidly divert subordinate units to other missions. Therefore, plans must be thorough and flexible to allow subordinate leaders to adopt alternate predetermined courses of action when contingencies arise.

Planning must consider the exploitation of successes by psychological operations and propaganda programs. Also, if an attack is unsuccessful, psychological operations will be required to lessen adverse effects on the resistance movement.

Once a target has been selected for attack, a plan is developed; it must be simple, understood by all, and if possible, well rehearsed. The attack must be timed with precision and it should move rapidly. There must be total surprise, thorough execution, and a planned withdrawal.

(C) INTELLIGENCE (U)

Operational planning is based on accurate, timely intelligence. An intensive intelligence collection effort by all elements of the resistance movement precedes each combat operation to determine the characteristics of the objective area, the enemy forces capable of intervening, the civilian population's attitude and support, and the terrain to be traversed to and from the objective area. This effort supplements the regular flow of intelligence.

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Surveillance of the objective area begins early and is continuous up to the time of attack. All efforts must be made to maintain operational security; activities in the objective area will conform to normal patterns to preclude alerting the enemy.



(C) TACTICS (U)

No word describes the nature of guerrilla operations better than "FLUID." The guerrilla is always on the offensive and attains maximum effectiveness through offensive operations.

To be successful the guerrilla needs surprise, mobility, exact knowledge of the enemy, determination, fire power, and shock action. All of these will be determined by his armament, training, morale, planning, coordination between higher command, and initiative of the guerrilla unit.

The guerrilla must exhaust the enemy by constant harassment. He must attack repeatedly and from all directions. Because the enemy cannot guard everything, everywhere, at all times, guerrillas conduct multiple, widely dispersed attacks, inflicting as much damage as possible, and

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then break contact and withdraw before the enemy recovers. These attacks are not piecemeal commitment on targets selected at random—they are planned attacks against specific targets or portions of a target system. They tend to deceive and keep the enemy off balance; confuse, frustrate, and demoralize him; and force him to alter his plans by dividing his reaction and reinforcement effort.

The principal offensive tactics used by the guerrillas are the raid and ambush. They may be conducted independently or combined with mining and sniping techniques.



(U) RAIDS

A raid is a surprise attack upon a fixed target characterized by clandestine movement to the objective area; brief, violent combat; rapid disengagement; and swift, deceptive withdrawal. The raid is used to:

- Destroy or damage fixed installations/facilities.
- Destroy or capture weapons, ammunition, equipment, and supplies.
- Eliminate or capture enemy personnel.
- Liberate friendly personnel.
- Harass and demoralize the enemy.
- Distract attention from other operations.
- Force the enemy to deploy additional units to protect rear areas.

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(U) AMBUSHES

An ambush is a surprise attack against moving or temporarily halted targets such as railroad trains, truck convoys, individual vehicles, and troop columns. Ambushes are used to:

- Canalize the enemy by making routes impassable.
- Destroy or capture enemy equipment/supplies.
- Eliminate or capture enemy personnel.
- Obtain information.
- Delay enemy reaction or reinforcement efforts.
- Force the enemy to deploy additional units to protect lines of communications.

The **organization** for a raid or ambush must be flexible and tailored to fit in with terrain conditions and operational requirements. The size force may vary from a few personnel to a battalion-sized element. A guerrilla unit conducting a raid or ambush is usually organized into four principal elements:

COMMAND ELEMENT—commands and controls movement to and actions at the objective.

ASSAULT ELEMENT—conducts the main assault, eliminates or captures enemy personnel; interrupts communications, sets demolition charges, recovers or destroys enemy equipment/supplies, or liberates friendly personnel.

SUPPORT ELEMENT—contains enemy forces by providing the main concentration of fire support to suppress enemy firepower and actions in the objective area.

SECURITY ELEMENT—isolates the objective, provides early warning, ambushes enemy reaction forces, seals enemy retreat, and covers the withdrawal of the raid/ambush force.

The **withdrawal** is as important as the attack itself for the guerrilla must survive to fight another day. Withdrawal routes must be well chosen. Assembly areas and/or rendezvous points must be clearly understood in case of interference with the original plan. There must be no confusion.

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A debriefing should be held by the guerrillas after each operation. Every aspect will be examined. Mistakes will be pointed out and corrective action taken for future operations. Enemy strengths and weaknesses will be assessed.

(C) MINING AND SNIPING (U)

(U) Mines, boobytraps, and snipers can be used to interdict enemy lines of communication and key areas with few personnel. They may also be used to support raids and ambushes.


(C) When used alone, standard or improvised mines and boobytraps are emplaced along lines of communication or known enemy approaches. This is done when traffic is light to prevent undue interference and to permit the guerrilla a safe exit before the mines/boobytraps are activated. Care must be taken to prevent casualties among friendly civilians using these routes.

(C) To support raids and ambushes, antipersonnel and antivehicle mines are used to prevent the escape of enemy troops from the objective area. Mines/boobytraps may also be used to cover a raid/ambush force's withdrawal by delaying the enemy's reaction/reinforcement efforts.

(U) Snipers can cause casualties among enemy troops, deny or hinder his use of certain routes, hamper repair efforts, and require him to employ a disproportionate number of forces to neutralize the snipers. When supporting raids/ambushes, snipers can prevent the escape of enemy personnel from the target area and cover the withdrawal of the raid/ambush force. Fast-moving sniper teams, employed in pairs, can alternate the duties of sniper and observer, thereby keeping their post in continuous operation.

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(U) MOBILITY

The guerrilla never affords the enemy a target. He is bold in the attack and his great advantage is mobility. Guerrilla force mobility comes from extensive area knowledge and ability to move small forces rapidly over a large area under the cloak of secrecy. He may strike and be miles away from the scene of action before the enemy can react.

(C) SURPRISE (U)

To offset an enemy's superior strength and equipment, guerrillas strike at his weak point and where least expected. The guerrillas great weapon is surprise. To achieve this, intelligence must be accurate and timely. The guerrilla must know everything about the enemy, his order of battle, strengths, weaknesses, and even his plans for counterguerrilla activities. Operations are conducted extensively during darkness and adverse weather. Surprise may also be enhanced by security and concurrent diversionary actions.


(U) AREAS OF OPERATION

The areas of operation and the type of guerrilla activity conducted in each depend primarily on the degree of guerrilla force or enemy control that exists. Control will fluctuate with the combat action, the size of the guerrilla force, enemy strength and disposition, and the attitude of the

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civilian population. Areas of operation and related activities which may be conducted include:



AREAS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE GUERRILLAS. Guerrillas can more easily achieve effective control of an area having terrain which restricts enemy observation and movement. These restrictions on the enemy reduce his capability to react quickly and effectively against guerrilla attacks and allows the guerrillas sufficient time to avoid involvement in static defensive combat. The physical characteristics of these areas enable the guerrilla to control and establish headquarters, camps, and support bases with little or no enemy interference.

AREAS EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE ENEMY. The enemy who is willing to commit sufficient forces can achieve effective control of a particular area at any time. However, because the guerrilla force is comparatively free to select the time and place of attack, it can conduct successful operations against target systems despite enemy security measures. Guerrilla offensive operations in this area are limited to raids, small ambushes, sniping, and mining. Other activities are usually restricted to the covert and clandestine operations of the underground and auxiliary.

AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY EITHER FORCE. Some areas, because of the enemy's strength and disposition, the attitude of the civilian population, or the lack of military significance, are neither controlled nor subject to permanent control by either force. To harass and degrade enemy effectiveness, the underground can assist by conducting operations against widespread targets. Guerrilla forces can attempt to bring more and more of these areas under their effective control, but cannot hold any specific area against a determined enemy attack. The enemy holds localities which he occupies in force, and the guerrillas conduct their operations in those regions where the enemy is weakest.

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(C) TIME AND SPACE (U)

To complete the discussion of characteristics, a time and space frame of reference concerning guerrilla operations must be addressed:

(C) TIME (U)

Guerrillas have proven effective during all stages of conflict from the outbreak of hostilities until the end of fighting. But to develop and survive while surrounded by strong enemy forces requires extensive and effective precautions: security is a prime concern.

Operations by guerrillas early in their development tend to be covert; activity is generally limited to information gathering, recruiting, training, organization, and small-scale operations.

When the situation changes to favor the guerrillas, either through enemy weakness or resistance-created favorable circumstances, operations become more overt making large-scale actions possible.

Improperly timed guerrilla operations may provoke enemy countermeasures for which the resistance and the friendly populace are unprepared. An unsuccessful attack often may have disastrous effects on guerrilla morale, while successful operations raise morale and increase the prestige of guerrilla forces and their leaders in the eyes of the civilians. The civilians are thus more willing to provide much needed support.

(U) SPACE

Geographic location determines the type of guerrilla warfare. In areas where complex social, ethnic, religious and economic structures make up a vast system, the system is relatively easy to disrupt. The greater the industrial development of a country, the more vulnerable it is to guerrilla operations.

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In less industrialized areas, people are less dependent on one another for goods and services, and disruption of one community does not necessarily cause extreme hardship in another. This lack of dependence on one another will make it necessary for the guerrilla force to be more active in more areas to have an impact.

MISSIONS

To gain a military decision against strong and determined enemy opposition, guerrilla forces may have to adopt the tactics of conventional forces. When guerrillas adopt these tactics, they sacrifice many of their inherent advantages, primarily their mobility.

Guerrilla forces increase their chance for success when they coordinate their activities with those of conventional forces. In an established theater of operations where significant, conventional military actions are to take place, guerrilla warfare can be implemented to complement, support, or extend conventional operations. Where conventional forces are not to be deployed, guerrilla warfare may be conducted as an economy of force measure. Guerrilla warfare missions which contribute to the land battle may be described as:

A MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND

B MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES

C LINKUP OPERATIONS

D POST LINKUP OPERATIONS

E DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS


F STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS

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A—(C) MISSIONS TO SUPPORT THE UNIFIED COMMAND (U)

(U) Special Forces-supported guerrillas give the unified commander more course-of-action options and enable him to influence activities far in advance of conventional forces and beyond the range of most Army-controlled weapons systems. These missions are strategic in nature and have both long-range and immediate effects on the enemy. Type missions include:



INTERDICTION

INTELLIGENCE

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(U) INTERDICTION

Interdiction operations are conducted against an enemy to hinder or interrupt lines of communication; to deny use of certain key areas; and to destroy industrial facilities, military installations, equipment, and resources. When properly coordinated with other unified command operations, interdiction can help destroy enemy combat power and his will to fight. Of all guerrilla operations, interdiction has the greatest impact on the enemy and, consequently, is considered the basic guerrilla warfare operational mission.

Targets are not attacked indiscriminately; they are part of an overall plan to destroy an entire system. Interdiction is based on the assigned mission which directs, as a minimum, the results desired and the priorities of attack for specific systems. Based on this mission, the area commander selects the specific targets and those elements to conduct the attack.

Target selection requires detailed intelligence, thorough planning, and is based on these factors:

Is it critical?

A target is critical when its destruction or damage will have a significant influence upon the enemy's ability to conduct or support operations. Each target is considered in relation to other elements of the particular target system designated for interdiction. The criticality of a target changes with the situation. For example, when the enemy has few locomotives, a railroad bridge is less critical; however, its safeguarding may be critical when friendly conventional force plans require its use.

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Is it accessible?	The guerrillas must have the ability to infiltrate the target area. In studying a target for accessibility, security controls, location, and means of infiltration are considered.
Is it easily restored?	The enemy's ability to restore a damaged facility to normal operating capacity will affect target selection, i.e., the enemy's repair and maintenance capability and his reserve stocks must be considered.
Is it vulnerable?	A target is vulnerable when it is open to attack by means available to guerrilla forces. Vulnerability is influenced by the nature of the target, i.e., type, size, disposition, and security, as well as by the means available to attack it, such as explosives, incendiaries, and special devices.
How will it effect the civilian population?	Enemy reaction to interdiction operations may result in reprisals against the civilian population. The possible political, economic, and sociological impact of operations on friendly civilians must always be considered. Guerrilla forces seek to destroy the core of enemy power, while at the same time conserving the energy, unity, and fighting spirit of the friendly civilian population.

A target system is a series of interrelated functions which together serve a common purpose. Specifically:

A **target** is one element, installation, or activity identified for attack such as a locomotive, a train, a bridge, or a prison.

A **target complex** is several or numerous targets in the same general area such as a railway marshalling yard, an airfield, or port/dock facilities.

A **target system** consists of an industrial system and its sources of raw materials; the rail, highway, waterway, or airway systems over which these materials are transported; the source of power and method of transmission; the factory complex itself; and the means by which the finished product is transported to the user.


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Major target systems ideal for guerrilla interdiction operations include:

RAILWAY SYSTEMS

Rail networks are one of the most profitable target systems for attack by guerrilla forces. Railroad tracks are easily interdicted because it is almost impossible to effectively guard long stretches of track. Rolling stock may be simultaneously attacked with track interdiction. Loosening tie mountings, removing fishplates, offsetting track, and using demolitions or special devices on curved sections of track or switches to cause train derailment result in captured or destroyed supplies, elimination of enemy personnel, or liberation of prisoners. Repair facilities and equipment are usually guarded and may be more difficult to attack. This difficulty can be overcome by careful planning and precise execution. Results expected from these operations are weighed against the probability of increased guerrilla casualties.



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Limited operations against railway systems and related facilities only cause harassment; therefore, widespread operations are needed to severely affect the enemy. Harassment of repair crews by snipers and ambushes reduces their morale and willingness to work. Primarily, early railway interdiction interferes with the enemy's offensive momentum by disrupting his flow of supplies, movement of troops, and industrial production. Secondary effects include:

- Disruption of daily dispatch and control procedures for rail movements; causes delays, erratic time schedules, and misrouting; and causes trains to accumulate at rail terminals, junctions, and marshalling yards. This presents lucrative targets for attack by other theater forces.
- Destruction of reserve repair materials to cause the dismantling of secondary rail lines for the repair of primary lines.
- Transfer of rail traffic to overload roads and highways, which are vulnerable to guerrilla and air attack.
- Increasing the burden upon enemy security forces and repair crews.

The primary and secondary effects of railway interdiction generally apply to the interdiction of other lines of communication, i.e., highway, waterway, and airway systems.

HIGHWAY SYSTEMS

Damaged highways are easily repaired and require less critical materials and skilled labor than railway systems. Therefore, points selected for interdiction should be in areas where the enemy cannot easily reestablish movement by making a short detour. Since highways have fewer vulnerable spots, these points will likely be heavily defended. Where highways cannot be destroyed, traffic can be disrupted by successive road blocks, real and dummy mines, boobytraps, sniping, misdirection of route signs, or by


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spreading tetrahedrons for puncturing tires. Ambushes are conducted when suitable terrain is available. Small bridges, tunnels, culverts, and levees may be lightly protected and thereby vulnerable to guerrilla attacks. As these attacks increase in frequency and effect, the enemy will be forced to commit additional reserves for control and security of the roads, occupy all important points simultaneously at all times, and at the same time conduct counterguerrilla operations.

WATERWAY SYSTEMS

The most critical facilities of waterway systems are ports, dams, canals, locks, and related repair equipment. They are usually well guarded since their destruction can disrupt water traffic for long periods. Waterway control and navigational equipment such as signal lights, beacons, microwave communication systems, and channel markers can be attacked effectively. Sinking vessels in restricted channels, dropping bridges into waterways, creating slides, and destroying levees can block waterway traffic.



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AIRWAY SYSTEMS

The enemy's military/commercial airway systems can be disrupted by interdicting airfields, parked aircraft, and related ground facilities, such as terminals, hangars, repair shops, fuel depots; radar, radio, navigation, control, lighting, telephone communications, and defense systems; and by eliminating flight and ground personnel. Also, modern weapons systems give the guerrilla force a capability to attack and destroy low flying aircraft.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

Widely dispersed communication systems present excellent targets. Cutting telephone wires, damaging telephone terminals, destroying radio antennas, or destroying the radio station usually results in a loss of communications. Alternate and emergency means of communication are usually available. However, destruction of any part of a communication system harasses an enemy and creates an overload on remaining facilities. In addition, guerrillas may temporarily interdict and occupy radio stations to broadcast announcements to the population and communicate with friendly foreign nations.

POWER SYSTEMS

Electrical power nets can be interdicted by destroying large cross-country or local high tension and distribution power lines, transmission towers or poles located in remote areas and difficult terrain which make repair/replacement difficult, or transformer substations. Substations, although critical, can be bypassed in a relatively short time by improvised wiring. Also, interdiction of power nets can be accomplished by destroying power generating stations and related equipment. These interdiction operations are carried out by individual raid techniques or using long-range weapons.

WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

Water systems supplying industry can be disrupted by attacks against reservoirs, pipelines, and purification plants. However, these attacks may impact adversely on the friendly civilian population and must be weighed against the tactical advantages to be gained.

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FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEMS

Attacks against an enemy's fuel supply system have far reaching effects on his economy as well as his ability to conduct and support military operations. Surface and underground fuel storage tanks, depots, pipelines, refueling systems for tank trucks, rail tank cars, transport vehicles, and vessels all provide profitable targets.

(C)INTELLIGENCE (U)

Proper planning for guerrilla operations depends on the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of accurate and timely intelligence for rapid response. UWOA intelligence collection efforts incidental to its primary mission may often uncover strategic information which can be of value to the unified and component commands. In addition, because of their location deep behind enemy lines, Special Forces-supported guerrilla units may be specifically tasked by the unified command to conduct special intelligence collection missions for information pertaining to:

- Enemy order of battle.
- Enemy intelligence/counterintelligence systems.
- Enemy morale, personalities, dispositions, compositions, strengths, activities, capabilities, vulnerabilities, equipment, and supply systems.
- Location of and conditions in enemy prisoner-of-war camps.
- Support of specific air, ground, or naval operations.
- Potential targets or target systems.
- Terrain and/or climatic conditions.
- Technical and/or industrial systems.
- Post-strike assessments.

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- Internal economic, political, and sociological affairs.
- Civilian attitudes and identification of known or suspect enemy collaborators.
- Evaluation of current friendly psychological operations campaigns.

When Special Forces receives such missions, they may be presented to the area command for execution by the resistance intelligence system. If security or policy considerations will not allow indigenous participation in satisfying special intelligence requirements, these operations will be conducted unilaterally by Special Forces.

The organization of special collection agencies may be required to assist the intelligence collection effort, for example:

AIR WARNING STATIONS along principal enemy air routes in the UWOA. Immediate reports of enemy air movements can be transmitted to the area command or to stations outside the UWOA designated by the SFOB/FOB.

WATCHER STATIONS near airfields, principal enemy shipping lanes, and ports and harbors. Arrivals and departures, numbers and types of traffic and their cargo, and general enemy activity can be transmitted immediately by radio.

WEATHER STATIONS distributed throughout the UWOA furnish local meteorological data. Normally, the reports are consolidated at the area command and provided to Special Forces for transmission to the SFOB/FOB.

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If the importance, magnitude, or complexity of intelligence tasks in support of the unified command exceed the intelligence management capability within the UWOA, intelligence assets from the Special Forces Combat Intelligence Company may be requested from the SFOB/FOB.

The Combat Intelligence Company normally provides a separate communications link for their personnel. However, in the interest of security, **the Special Forces commander** will control all transmissions of intelligence data.



(C) PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (U)

The ability of guerrilla forces to influence the population and elicit civilian support depends primarily upon the resistance movement's psychological impact upon the populace. When properly applied, psychological operations can create unity, maintain morale, and increase the determination of the resistance movement. In addition, sympathy for the resistance and acceptance of its methods and objectives among uncommitted segments of the civilian population can be gained.

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Psychological operations are conducted primarily to support the needs of the operational area, but Special Forces-supported resistance elements must be prepared to support the overall psychological operations objectives of the unified command.

As discussed earlier, psychological operations begin well in advance of deployment into a UWOA. Psychological operations elements at the unified command assist Special Forces in developing a tentative psychological operations plan which is consistent with unified command objectives. This plan is based on available intelligence studies on the sociological, political, economic, and military aspects of the operational area. These studies, however, although providing useful background information, rarely provide sufficient detail to permit effective planning for remote areas. Additional intelligence is necessary but often cannot be acquired until after Special Forces infiltrates the area. Acquiring this intelligence is the Special Forces' and resistance elements' major contribution to the overall psychological operations campaign.

Intelligence in support of psychological operations is used to determine the receptiveness, vulnerabilities, and actual and potential behavior of target audiences before, during, and after the campaign is directed toward them. It provides the means to:

Identify and analyze potential audiences.

Determine effective message content.

Select and employ suitable media and methods.

Assess the effectiveness of current campaigns.

By having Special Forces in the operational area, the psychological operations campaign can be tailored to the local situation while insuring that it remains consistent with unified command objectives.

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B—— (U) MISSIONS TO SUPPORT CONVENTIONAL COMBAT FORCES

Unconventional warfare operations may be ongoing before the decision to commit conventional military combat forces. Special Forces-supported guerrilla missions may be expanded, once conventional forces are committed, to assist the tactical commander's scheme of maneuver. These missions can complement, support, or extend conventional force offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations, and usually occur when the conventional force's area of interest encompasses a UWOA or when its area of influence approaches a UWOA prior to linkup.

To fight outnumbered, survive, and accomplish these missions, the Special Forces and guerrilla commander must know and understand the enemy—his usual tactics, his organization and equipment, and his capabilities and limitations.

OFFENSE

Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla units to assist conventional offensive operations are designed to:

- Destroy enemy forces or their will to fight.
- Secure key terrain.
- Deprive enemy of resources.
- Demoralize the enemy.
- Deceive the enemy.
- Divert enemy forces.
- Obtain intelligence information.
- Regain initiative.
- Seek decisive results on our terms.

Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces can enhance the tactical commander's ability to:

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SEE THE BATTLEFIELD—by conducting reconnaissance and maintaining surveillance of critical routes, areas, installations, and dispositions to provide highly accurate and timely intelligence information.

CONCENTRATE OVERWHELMING COMBAT POWER—by conducting deception operations to allow the commander to concentrate his combat power for the attack. False rumors, a sudden increase in resistance activities, or a shifting of such activities to other areas assist in deceiving the enemy as to the actual time and place of attack.

SUPPRESS THE ENEMY'S DEFENSIVE FIRES—by attacking enemy weapon systems to support the commander's fire suppression plan.

SHOCK, OVERWHELM AND DESTROY THE ENEMY—by:

1. Interdicting and blocking approaches to or sealing exit routes from an objective area.
2. Occupying and holding key terrain features for a limited time.
3. Seizing key installations, such as bridges, tunnels, dams, and power facilities, to prevent destruction by the enemy.

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Conducting supporting attacks against enemy forces and facilities.



Assisting in containing/eliminating bypassed enemy units.

ATTACK DEEP INTO THE ENEMY REAR—by attacking at every opportunity and destroying vulnerable command posts, communication centers, supply and maintenance facilities, ammunition and POL depots, and reserve elements. This aggressive, relentless destruction paralyzes the enemy and disintegrates his overall system of defense. These operations spread fear, demoralize, and achieve disproportionate results as rear echelon elements, not trained nor equipped for battle, succumb to confusion, indecision, and panic.

Guerrilla forces may also assist conventional forces conducting airborne, air assault, or amphibious raids on objectives deep in the enemy's rear.Timing for employment of guerrilla forces is extremely important. Premature commitment may alert the enemy and lead to the destruction of both the guerrilla and raid force. Conversely, late employment may not have the desired effect upon the enemy. Another factor which must be considered is the adverse effect of enemy reaction on resistance elements and the friendly civilian populace following the withdrawal of the raiding force.

DEFENSE

Tactical commanders must have prompt, accurate information to anticipate and react to an enemy attack. In the active defense, accurate, timely intelligence is essential to concentrate combat power at the critical time and place. Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces deep within enemy territory can provide this intelligence. These forces operating within enemy rear echelons may also divert enemy reserves and resources from tactical employment by interdiction, by blocking approaches to an objective area, or by direct attack.

RETROGRADE

Special Forces-supported guerrilla forces may be tasked to assist conventional force retrograde operations. The tactical commander's ability to see the battlefield is critical during delay, withdrawal, or retirement operations. The guerrilla force is uniquely situated to provide him with realtime intelligence.

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C —— (C) LINKUP OPERATIONS (U)

Many offensive operations in which guerrilla forces assist conventional combat forces may involve a physical linkup between elements of the two forces. This linkup may occur during ground, airborne, air assault, or amphibious operations.

As linkup becomes important, the success of both guerrilla and conventional force operations depends on proper coordination and positive control measures. Regardless of the conditions under which linkup is effected, the following considerations govern linkup planning:

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS (U)

When linkup is imminent, operational control of unconventional warfare forces is passed from the unified command level to the tactical command (normally a corps commander) effecting linkup. Initial passage of such control will be coordinated and directed by the headquarters exercising control over both forces. The tactical commander exercises operational control of unconventional warfare forces through a Special Forces liaison party which is provided to him by the SFOB.

LIAISON (U)

Transfer of operational control to tactical commands requires the exchange of liaison personnel. The SFOB will attach a Special Forces liaison party to the corps headquarters being assigned operational control of unconventional warfare forces. Specific missions may require that operational control be passed as low as division level. When this occurs, the Special Forces liaison party provides the necessary liaison to the division headquarters.

The SFOB may direct that a liaison party consisting of Special Forces and resistance representatives be exfiltrated from theWWOA to assist in linkup planning. This party can provide timely information concerning the latest resistance and enemy situations, and recommend linkup coordination measures and missions for guerrilla forces.

The tactical commander may infiltrate a liaison party into the UWOA. This liaison party may include representatives from the G3 section, Special Forces liaison personnel, tactical air control parties, forward observer teams, and communications personnel and equipment. This liaison party must know the scope and purpose of the linkup plan and appropriate missions for the guerrilla force.

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ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (U)

When operational control is passed from the SFOB to a conventional force commander, the SFOB continues to provide administrative and logistical support to deployed Special Forces elements and guerrilla forces until they linkup with the conventional force. At that time the conventional force normally assumes this support responsibility.

CONTACT POINTS (U)

Specific locations must be established for the two forces to effect contact. Usually these points are well-defined terrain features.

COORDINATION OF SCHEMES OF MANEUVER (U)

Tactical control measures must be established to assist linkup. Guerrilla forces are usually dispersed over a large area; consequently, linkup may take place at several widely separated points and at different times. Not all guerrilla forces may be involved in linkup with tactical units. For example, during a raid or area interdiction operation by airborne forces or when conducting operations as part of a cover and deception plan for an amphibious force, linking up all guerrilla forces is often undesirable.

FIRE COORDINATION MEASURES (U)

Fire coordination measures, such as no-fire and no-bomb lines, and fire support coordination lines (FSCL) must be established to protect both the linkup and guerrilla force. Because guerrilla forces are widely dispersed and civilian support organizations are part of the UW force, targets selected for nuclear and conventional weapon attack must be coordinated. Friendly elements of the population who may be endangered by these fires must be warned.

COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATION (U)

Normally, the guerrilla force has limited radio communication equipment, and the tactical commander must provide them with voice capability equipment which can link them to his headquarters. Visual recognition signals are selected to assist in linkup. Pyrotechnics and other required items not available to the guerrilla force should be provided by the conventional force.

EMPLOYMENT FOLLOWING LINKUP (U)

The unified commander, in coordination with US and allied officials, determines the disposition or further utilization of unconventional warfare forces following linkup. Within this guidance, the tactical commander may employ recovered guerrilla forces.

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D —— (U) POST LINKUP OPERATIONS

When the United States retains control of guerrilla forces, these forces may be further employed on missions in support of and under control of conventional combat forces. For this role, a period of retraining and reequipping is usually required prior to commitment to combat.

In addition, US Army Special Forces-advised indigenous forces may be employed to augment conventional forces conducting combat operations or to conduct operations behind friendly lines.

Until command relationships can be established with the appropriate command, Special Forces should remain with indigenous forces to help them adapt to becoming a combat unit operating in a strange environment under unknown higher commanders. Indigenous forces employed in support of conventional forces should be commanded by their own officers.

Missions which may be assigned to guerrilla, paramilitary, or irregular forces supporting conventional US units include:

CONVENTIONAL COMBAT OPERATIONS

Indigenous forces may be employed to augment, relieve, or replace conventional units in the main battle area, e.g., to contain or destroy bypassed enemy units.

The strength, organization, leadership, training, equipment, background of personnel, and extent of civilian support of indigenous forces affect their combat capability. Consequently, indigenous units may not be able to accomplish comparable missions of like-size conventional units. The tactical commander, therefore, must carefully consider their capabilities and take advantage of their light infantry characteristics and area knowledge.

Shortage of adequate voice communications equipment and transportation may severely limit the employment of indigenous forces on conventional combat operations. The tactical commander must overcome this disadvantage by providing them the necessary equipment.

RECONNAISSANCE

Familiarity with the terrain and people makes indigenous forces unique for reconnaissance missions. They may provide the principal sources of intelligence on dissident elements opposing friendly forces and can move in difficult terrain to locate enemy elements. They can detect enemy sympathizers in villages and towns and implement control measures in unfriendly areas.

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COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS

The experience and training of indigenous forces make them useful in counterguerrilla operations. They can patrol difficult terrain and gaps between tactical units, establish roadblocks and observation posts, screen flanks, and provide guides. Their knowledge of guerrilla techniques, the language, terrain, and population can be exploited by tactical commanders. When properly supported, indigenous forces may be given complete responsibility for counterguerrilla operations in selected areas.

REAR AREA SECURITY

Indigenous forces may be used as security forces within the theater army area command (TAACOM). In assigning these forces to a rear area security role, their area knowledge should be the governing factor and, whenever possible, they should be employed on an area basis. They may guard lines of communications, supply depots, airfields, pipelines, rail yards, or port facilities; patrol terrain which contains bypassed enemy units or stragglers; assist in recovery of prisoners and stragglers, and in control of civilians and refugees; and police towns and cities. When provided with appropriate transportation, indigenous forces may be used as a mobile security force reserve.

CIVIL SUPPORT

Because of their area knowledge and experience, indigenous forces may assist to restore the area to its normal state. They can perform refugee collection and control duties, civil police duties, assist psychological operation campaigns in rear areas, apprehend collaborators and spies, recruit labor, and guard key installations and public buildings.

A significant mission which may be assigned to Special Forces after completion of their involvement with resistance forces is to

RETRAIN HOST COUNTRY CONVENTIONAL MILITARY UNITS

Special Forces may be used to retrain and reconstitute host country conventional military units which have suffered reversals in combat actions. The emphasis is to rapidly train unit cadres in leadership, operations, and combat tactics and techniques.

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ADVICE TO CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMMANDERS

When employing guerrilla units following linkup:

- Know the guerrillas, their organization, concepts of operation, capabilities, and limitations.
- Insure that subordinate leaders appreciate the value of guerrilla forces and know how to use them.
- Anticipate the problems of providing administrative, logistical, and operational support to attached guerrilla units.
- Anticipate possible language and political problems in establishing liaison.
- The value of guerrilla units is limited to those operations which are conducted in areas familiar to them.
- Maintain guerrilla unit integrity as much as possible.
- Work through existing channels of guerrilla command. Imposing a new organizational structure may destroy the responsiveness of the unit.
- Respect guerrilla ranks. Except in cases where the rank of a guerrilla officer is clearly out of order, give him the same consideration given regular officers of the same rank.
- Maintain guerrilla morale by awarding decorations and letters of commendation and by expressing appreciation whenever such action is justified.
- Do not make political commitments or promises to guerrilla units unless authorized by higher headquarters.
- Recognize when the value of guerrilla units is ended and promptly return them to the control of the unified commander or host country.

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E — (C) DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS (U)

Control of any given terrain is rarely so critical to the guerrilla that he is willing to defend it at the risk of engaging counterguerrilla forces in set battle. Guerrilla units with their relatively light weapons and equipment are normally inferior to organized enemy forces in strength, firepower, mobility, and communications. They do not, therefore, undertake defensive operations unless forced to do so to prevent enemy penetration of guerrilla-controlled areas or to gain time for their forces to accomplish a specific mission. Guerrilla forces may be directed to defend key terrain or installations for a limited time in support of conventional force operations.

When the guerrilla does defend an area, he modifies the principles of conventional defensive combat to meet his specific needs and to offset his deficiencies. In planning for defensive operations, Special Forces and guerrilla commanders must consider the following factors:

(C) INDICATORS OF COUNTERGUERRILLA OPERATIONS (U)

Guerrilla intelligence measures normally provide advance warning of impending enemy counterguerrilla operations. Special Forces and guerrilla commanders must be constantly aware of the activities and conditions which indicate the possibility of enemy offensive operations in their operational area, such as:

- Weather conditions that permit extensive field operations.
- The arrival of new enemy commanders.
- Any change in the conventional battle situation which releases additional troops for counterguerrilla operations, such as enemy victories over friendly conventional forces, a lull in active operations, or a reduction in the size of the battle zone.
- An increase in the size of local garrisons or the arrival of new units, particularly those with special counterguerrilla capabilities.
- Increased enemy intelligence efforts.
- New measures employed by the enemy to control the civilian population, such as the imposition of martial law, curfews, use of hostages, reprisals, etc.
- Increased enemy psychological operations directed against the guerrilla force.

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(C) COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS (U)

To defend successfully against enemy offensive operations, Special Forces and guerrilla commanders must recognize the various counterguerrilla tactics which the enemy may employ against them. The most common counterguerrilla tactics are the encirclement, surprise attacks, and pursuit.

(C) ENCIRCLEMENT (U)

Encirclement is the greatest threat to a guerrilla force because it limits flexibility of action. Of all the possible offensive actions open to an enemy, the encirclement offers the greatest possibility for fixing a guerrilla force in position and achieving decisive results. By the same token, it is one of the most difficult operations to conduct because it requires positioning a large number of troops around the guerrilla force while at the same time maintaining maximum security for surprise.

If the enemy succeeds in encircling the guerrilla force, he will attempt capture or destruction of the guerrillas using various techniques. One technique is contraction of the encirclement by the convergence of enemy troops into the encircled area. Against small guerrilla forces, the entire encircled area may be cleared by the progressive contraction of the line of encirclement. However, against larger guerrilla forces, the contraction will probably reach a point where the guerrilla force is so concentrated that some action other than further contraction is required. At this point the enemy may employ intense indirect fire and/or attack by tactical air support to destroy the concentrated guerrilla force. Another technique which may be used by the enemy is offensive action to split the concentrated guerrilla force into successively smaller units until all units have been destroyed. The enemy may also force the guerrillas against defended or impassable terrain obstacles or into predetermined killing zones.

(C) SURPRISE ATTACKS (U)

Surprise attacks may be employed if the lack of time, inadequate counterguerrilla forces, or terrain prevent or do not favor an encirclement. In these situations, the enemy conducts surprise attacks against guerrilla bases, mission support sites, and lines of communications using raid and ambush techniques.

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(C) PURSUIT (U)

Pursuit of guerrilla forces may follow an encirclement or surprise attack. The enemy attempts to maintain contact with, and continue offensive action against, guerrilla forces withdrawing from the scene of action. A direct pressure force pursues the guerrillas and maintains constant offensive pressure on them as they withdraw. An encircling force then attempts to fix the guerrillas and destroy them.

(C) Counterguerrilla operations usually require the immediate application of combat power to engage and destroy a located guerrilla force before it disperses. The enemy may employ motorized, mechanized, heliborne, or airborne forces in an attempt to gain a mobility advantage over the guerrillas during an encirclement, surprise attack, or pursuit.

(C) Upon receiving information that indicates the enemy is planning a counterguerrilla campaign, the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders increase their intelligence effort, determine the disposition and preparedness of subordinate units, and review plans to meet the anticipated enemy action. Based on their estimate of the situation, they decide what actions to take to meet the expected offensive. These actions may include:

(U) DIVERSIONARY ACTIVITIES

A sudden increase in guerrilla activities or a shifting of such activities to other areas assists in diverting enemy attention. For example, intensified operations against enemy lines of communications and installations require him to divert troops from counterguerrilla operations to security roles. Full use of underground and auxiliary capabilities assists in creating diversions.

(U) DEFENSE OF FIXED POSITIONS

The principles for a guerrilla defense of fixed positions are the same as those applicable to conventional forces except that there are few supporting fires and counterattacks are generally not practicable. In conjunction with their position defense, elements of the guerrilla force conduct raids, ambushes, and attacks against the enemy's lines of communication, flanks, reserve units, supporting arms, and installations. Routes of approach are mined and camouflaged snipers engage appropriate enemy targets. Diversionary actions by all elements of the resistance movement are intensified in adjacent areas.

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(U) DELAY AND HARASSMENT TACTICS

The objective of delay and harassment tactics is to make the attack so expensive that the enemy eventually terminates his operations. Maximum use is made of the defensive characteristics of the terrain, mines and snipers are employed to harass the enemy, and ambushes are positioned to inflict maximum casualties and delay.

As the enemy overruns various strong points, the guerrillas withdraw to successive defensive positions to again delay and harass. When the situation permits, the guerrilla force attacks the enemy's flanks, rear, and lines of communication. If the enemy continues his offensive, the guerrilla forces should disengage and evacuate the area. Under no circumstances does the guerrilla force become so engaged that it loses its freedom of action and permits enemy forces to encircle and destroy it.

(C) WITHDRAWAL (U)

In preparing to meet enemy offensive action, the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders may decide to withdraw to another area not likely to be included in the enemy offensive. Key installations within the guerrilla base, essential records, and supplies are transferred to an alternate base while those less essential are destroyed or cached. When movement to another area is planned, an advance party is sent to that area to establish surveillance, intelligence nets, security systems, and to prepare for the reception of the main guerrilla force.

When faced with an enemy offensive of overwhelming strength, the decision may be made to disperse the guerrilla force, either in small units or as individuals to avoid destruction. The dispersal plan must include instructions covering interim conduct and ultimate reassembly. This course of action should not be taken unless absolutely necessary because it makes the guerrilla force ineffective for a considerable period of time.

As discussed earlier, encirclement by counterguerrilla forces poses the greatest threat to guerrilla forces. The Special Forces and guerrilla commanders must be constantly on the alert for indications of an encirclement. When they receive indications that an encircling movement is in progress, the guerrillas immediately maneuver to escape while enemy lines are still thin and spread out and coordination between advancing units is not yet well established. If escape is not accomplished and the enemy completes his encirclement, the guerrilla force attempts a breakout.

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If an encirclement is a difficult operation, a breakout from encirclement is equally difficult. Unless the encircled guerrilla force has explicit orders to defend in place, the decision should be made to break out and the operation executed before the enemy is able to establish an organized containment. The need for quick decisionmaking, however, should not lead to an attempted breakout without adequate planning. The plan should include consideration of the following factors:

(U) AREA FOR THE ATTACK

The main attack should be launched against enemy weakness in a direction which will insure breakthrough in the shortest possible time. The direction of attack may be indicated by designating objectives and an axis of advance. Objectives are assigned, to insure penetration of the encircling force and preservation of the gap created.

(U) TIME OF ATTACK

Since deception and secrecy are essential to a successful breakout, the Special Forces and guerrilla commanders may decide to attack during darkness or other periods of limited visibility. The effectiveness of enemy air must also be considered in selecting the time for the breakout. When the enemy has local air superiority, it may be necessary to conduct the breakout at night or when weather conditions reduce the effectiveness of his air.

(U) ORGANIZATION

An encircled guerrilla force is usually organized into four distinct tactical groups for the breakout:

A BREAKTHROUGH FORCE—which may vary in size from one-third to two-thirds of the total encircled force is assigned the mission of penetrating the enemy encirclement, widening the gap, and holding the shoulders of the gap until all other encircled forces can move through. After all other encircled forces have passed through the penetrated area, the breakthrough force may be employed as a rear guard.

A SECURITY/RESERVE FORCE—provides rear and flank security and may assist the breakthrough force by conducting diversionary attacks. When freedom of action is gained, this force may become the advance guard for further movement.

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DETACHMENTS LEFT IN CONTACT (DLIC)—cover the withdrawal of other forces from the perimeter. The DLIC withdraw on order after all other units have cleared the perimeter. After passing through the penetrated area, they rejoin their parent units.

A MAIN BODY—consisting of all guerrilla forces not assigned to one of the other three elements.

(U) DECEPTION

Effective deception may be achieved by employing feints, diversionary attacks, or demonstrations. These measures are designed to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main attack. If sufficient guerrilla forces are available, it may be effective to breakout at more than one point.

(U) CONCENTRATION OF FORCES

Prior to the breakout, there must be a gradual change of emphasis from the defense of the perimeter to the formation of a strong breakout force. As the situation permits, every element that can be spared from the perimeter must be assembled for employment in the breakout.

(U) COMMUNICATION

Since secrecy is essential to the success of breakout operations, messengers should be used within the encircled unit. Radio and wire may be used, but transmissions must be closely guarded.

(C) LOGISTICS (U)

(U) Plans must be made to relieve the guerrillas of all equipment and supplies not essential for the fighting during the breakout. Nonessential equipment and supplies will be destroyed or cached.

(C) One of the major logistical problems is the evacuation of casualties. The consideration given to casualties has a profound effect upon the morale of the guerrillas. The slightest indication that the wounded are to be left behind can be expected to reduce the morale of the force. Every possible effort must be made to bring casualties out of the encirclement.

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(U) Once the planning is completed, the breakout is executed. Since secrecy and security are essential, a strict sequence of events for the operation must be followed. Guerrilla scouts are employed to locate a weak point in the enemy's line of encirclement along an axis of movement that will benefit the guerrillas following the breakout. Elements on the defensive perimeter which are to participate in the breakout as a part of the breakthrough force, security/reserve force, or main body are released from their defense mission. These elements are assembled with their respective tactical groups at the latest practicable time before the breakout is to be initiated.

(C) If a diversionary attack is used, it must be carefully planned and vigorously executed. The deceptive measures, assault power, and supporting fires used in a diversionary attack must be adequate enough to convince the enemy that it is a genuine breakout attempt. Guerrilla units not included in the encirclement may conduct diversionary attacks against the enemy rear to lure forces away from the main breakout attempt and thereby create gaps in the enemy lines.

(U) At the scheduled time of attack, the breakthrough force, supported by indirect fires (and tactical air when available), effects the penetration, widens the gap, and holds the shoulders of the penetration. The main body and security/reserve force then pass through the gap and continue the attack to the assigned objective. The DLIC withdraw on order and follow the security/reserve force through the gap. When all encircled forces have passed through the gap, the breakthrough force withdraws, prepared to fight a rear guard action. The guerrillas attempt to break contact with the enemy as rapidly as possible and proceed to mission support sites or alternate bases where they can prepare for future operations.

(C) There may be times when a breakout attempt is unsuccessful. In this situation, the guerrilla force may be divided into small groups which then infiltrate through the enemy's line of encirclement at night or hide in the area until the enemy leaves. This action should be taken only as a last resort because it renders the force inoperative for a period of time and the morale of the unit may be adversely affected. Instructions covering interim conduct and ultimate reassembly are announced before the groups disperse.

F —— (C) STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS (U)

Special Forces employment in stay-behind operations may be considered when the enemy has the potential of overrunning friendly areas and the attitude of the civil populace will support such operations. Special Forces may be prepositioned to organize the nucleus of resistance forces or to conduct unilateral operations in:

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- Friendly controlled areas before the planned withdrawal of friendly forces.
- Border areas prior to the initiation of enemy advances through, or occupation of, the areas.

Several factors make prior organization of stay-behind operations difficult. From a military or political standpoint, it may not be desirable to admit the possibility of defeat or withdrawal. In addition, the course of enemy action cannot always be predicted well enough to permit detailed planning or advance preparation.

(C) PLANNING (U)

The key to successful stay-behind operations is advanced planning—it should be general and must allow a large measure of initiative and discretion to Special Forces commanders. Planning must provide for:

- **Organizational structure of the operational area and resistance stay-behind element.** Resistance potential must be assessed and selected personnel trained for underground and auxiliary functions. No attempt should be made to build a complex organizational structure in advance. In some cases, it may be possible to set up the framework for a guerrilla organization within an existing political party or ideological group. However, before such action is taken, the political implications and the ability to exercise subsequent control over the activities of such a group should be considered.
- **Development/prepositioning of assets.** Primary consideration should be given to initial prepositioning of personnel in rural areas. Highly trained, selected individuals may be prepositioned in built-up areas to function as intelligence agents and to establish and maintain contact/liaison with underground elements.
- **Contacts.** Contacts between various stay-behind elements must be held to a minimum; however, when required, maximum use is made of a clandestine communications system. Care must be taken when making contact with potential assets; informers may compromise the organization as a result of pre-hostility contacts.

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Security. Maximum security measures must be observed during the initial period of occupation and all subsequent phases of the operation. Locations and identities within the organization must be kept on a need-to-know basis. Local intelligence and auxiliary nets should be established as early as possible.

Psychological operations. The population must be prepared for continued resistance after enemy occupation.

Cache sites. Prepositioned caches of arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies should be well dispersed. Site locations and routes should be known only to a few persons. Supplies should be packed and preserved to withstand long storage exposure. Necessary spare parts should be included for all essential equipment items.

Targets. The development of target intelligence must be made in sufficient time to allow selection, reconnaissance, and establishment of priorities for initial interdiction/destruction.

Communications. A communications plan must be developed to establish internal and external procedures. It must provide for the prepositioning of communications facilities and equipment.

(U) ACTIVITIES

Initially, stay-behind elements may be used for intelligence missions and for demolitions which the withdrawing force was unable to execute or which are contingent upon certain courses of enemy action. Subsequent activities begin at an appropriate time when civilian or military leaders call upon the population of the occupied area to continue resistance against the enemy. These subsequent activities include all forms of guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage.

We have been discussing the employment of Special Forces in guerrilla warfare. Our main focus has been on the operations of the overt element of a resistance force—the guerrillas. Next, we will consider how Special Forces supports evasion and escape, subversion, and sabotage. These operations usually involve the clandestine and covert elements of a resistance force—the auxiliary and the underground. Our discussion will be limited since most of the material concerning these operations is classified SECRET.

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2 (C) EVASION AND ESCAPE (U)

(U) Evasion and escape (E&E) is defined as:

> The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. *JCS Pub 1*

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have delegated executive responsibility to the US Air Force for developing tactics, techniques, and equipment related to the joint aspects of evasion and escape. The US Army's responsibilities include providing appropriate support and assistance as required and developing a capability to conduct E&E activities within designated UWOA's.

(C) The E&E activities in a UWOA are coordinated by the SFOB to support overall theater plans. These activities are designed to assist personnel who are isolated in hostile territory or who escape from enemy captivity, and may involve only one person assisting an evader/escapee or an elaborate net specifically organized for that purpose.

(C) Special Forces personnel are trained to plan and conduct E&E activities, and they may advise, assist, supervise, or train resistance forces to organize and operate E&E mechanisms in the UWOA. In this capacity, Special Forces can:

- Establish contacts and contact procedures.
- Implement identity verification procedures.
- Coordinate exfiltration.
- Provide communications support.

(C) Evasion and escape nets are organized to contact, hold, identify, and, when possible, move personnel from hostile areas. Well organized and supported nets usually can be expected to provide:

- Temporary shelter, food, and equipment.
- Clothing and credentials acceptable in the area to be traveled.
- Information concerning enemy security measures along the E&E route.
- Local currency and transportation.
- Medical treatment.
- Native guides.

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(C) Within UWOA's, E&E nets are manned primarily by members of the auxiliary or underground and are compartmented to reduce the possibility of penetration or compromise. The success of a net depends almost entirely upon its security which is attained through careful organization and operation. In developing an E&E net, Special Forces elements in the UWOA must provide for the contact, holding, identification, and movement of evaders.

(C) CONTACT (U)

During combat operations, high-risk-of-capture personnel, such as aircrews, Special Forces detachments, and other units which operate deep in hostile areas, will be informed as to the general areas where E&E mechanisms have been organized and the procedures to make contact. Contact points and procedures are established by the JUWTF/JUWC based on map studies and available intelligence prior to the development of Special Forces. Once UWOA's have been designated and Special Forces elements committed, the initial contact procedures may have to be modified based on the assessment of the local situation.

A network of spotters must be organized to locate and make contact with evaders. In selecting spotters, only those individuals whose presence will not be conspicuous in the designated contact points should be selected. Members of the auxiliary or underground living or working near contact points normally act as spotters; however, guerrillas may be used in certain situations.

The SFOB notifies its deployed elements when potential evaders may be in or near their UWOA's. The spotters are alerted and they begin to search their assigned areas, making frequent visits to designated contact points. Contact is made with the evader following the procedures established and coordinated with the SFOB and higher headquarters.

(C)HOLDING (U)

Once contact has been made, the evader is taken to a preselected holding area to await positive identification before moving through the net. The holding area should be located in a relatively secure area and permit isolation of the evader from other members of the resistance and the local civilian population. Holding areas may be established in private homes, churches, hunting lodges, warehouses, or anywhere that the security of both the evader and the E&E net can be protected.

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(C) IDENTIFICATION (U)

The greatest danger to an E&E net is penetration by enemy agents pretending to be evaders or escapees. For this reason, positive verification of a person's identity is required before he is accepted as a bona fide evader. Special Forces train the operators of the net in various identification procedures and provide the communications support required to transmit the information to the SFOB for verification. Once verification is received, the evader is accepted into the E&E net and can begin movement back to friendly control.

(U) MOVEMENT

The movement of an evader through hostile areas is probably the most dangerous phase of E&E operations, and measures to reduce the danger must be implemented. The evader is provided with legitimate or counterfeit identification papers, clothing, and other personal items common to the local area. However, most evaders will not be qualified in the local language and, therefore, will not be prepared for confrontations with enemy security forces or unfriendly civilians. Ruses such as pretending to be deaf and dumb or even half-witted may be used to overcome the language problem.

The capability of E&E nets to return evaders to friendly control will vary. Some nets will be limited to assisting the movement of evaders to the boundaries of the UWOA. Other nets may be linked to larger organizations capable of coordinating the movement of evaders from net to net until they reach friendly areas. In addition, Special Forces may coordinate the exfiltration of evaders from the UWOA using air or water transportation requested from the SFOB.

(U) In this section, we have briefly discussed the general responsibilities for, and conduct of, E&E activities in the UWOA. The details for conducting E&E operations are contained in *(S)* FM 21-77A, *Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U),* and in the plans of the various unified commands.

3 (C) SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE (U)

(U) Subversion is defined as:

> Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength and morale of a regime.
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> JCS Pub 1

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(C) In the conduct of subversion, resistance elements use force and violence or penetration by a series of planned political actions to undermine, overthrow, or affect the decisions or actions of an incumbent government or occupying power. All elements of the resistance contribute to subversion in varying degrees; however, the covert or clandestine nature of the activities involved normally dictates that they be performed by members of the underground.

(C) Subversion includes not only those actions designed to influence the mind, but also those activities which capitalize on an existing state of mind. It attempts to exploit actual or perceived weaknesses such as:

- Popular grievances and dissatisfaction.
- Corrupt, oppressive, or weak governments.
- Economic underdevelopment.
- Social inequalities.
- Power vacuums.

(U) Propaganda, espionage, sabotage, and a variety of other covert and clandestine techniques are employed by resistance elements in the conduct of subversion. The major contribution of Special Forces to subversion is its support of resistance sabotage activities. Sabotage is defined as:

> An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources.
>
> JCS Pub 1

(U) Sabotage is one of the oldest and most effective forms of subversion. Its scope and application, in relation to both objectives and areas of operation, are almost unlimited. Aside from its destructive nature, sabotage is an effective psychological weapon with tremendous impact on both the civilian population and the enemy.

(U) Sabotage may be the most effective or the only means of attacking a specific target. It permits the selective destruction of enemy facilities and installations and requires a minimum of manpower and material resources. In addition, sabotage adds "reach" by permitting the destruction of targets beyond the range of conventional weapons.

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(C) Special Forces may be required to advise and assist resistance forces in the conduct of some act or acts of sabotage which contribute to both resistance and US national objectives. Planning guidance, intelligence, and logistical support are provided by the SFOB for the integration of local activities into a theaterwide sabotage campaign. Sabotage may be classified as:

(C) PASSIVE SABOTAGE (U)

Passive sabotage uses subtle, nonviolent techniques to attack the enemy's war-making potential, political objectives, and will to fight. Although generally less destructive than active sabotage, it can achieve the same desired results. For example, a machine that tears apart in a week after it has been tampered with is just as effectively denied to the enemy as one destroyed with explosives. Additional passive sabotage activities include:

- Absenteeism.
- Boycotts.
- Demonstrations, protests, riots, and strikes.
- Production delays.
- Delay of repairs and neglect of machinery.
- Organized production of poor quality and useless products.

In the early stages of subversion, passive sabotage is characterized by spontaneous, uncoordinated, individual acts against the enemy. The rise of a resistance organization provides the capability to integrate these individual acts into a coordinated sabotage plan. Although planned and directed by members of the resistance, passive sabotage is considered a psychological action of the masses, the result of a well-organized propaganda campaign. As a result, it serves as an effective gage for determining the degree of support to be expected from the civilian population and the effectiveness of their tactics.

(C) ACTIVE SABOTAGE (U)

Active sabotage uses violent techniques to destroy or interrupt the operation of elements, facilities, installations, or lines of communications. Unlike passive sabotage, the results leave no doubt in the minds of the enemy as to the objective or the cause of the action. Active sabotage operations include:

MECHANICAL SABOTAGE - The deliberate damaging or destruction of machinery/equipment by abuse, neglect, or the introduction of harmful additives into critical parts.

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INCENDIARY SABOTAGE - The damaging or destruction of elements, materials, or facilities by fire using incendiary devices.

EXPLOSIVE SABOTAGE - The damaging or destruction of elements, materials, or facilities by explosives. It is usually identified as sabotage.

ADMINISTRATIVE SABOTAGE - Includes such actions as deliberate garbling of instructions/orders; misdirection; willful destruction or deliberate loss of key documents/records; and the tie-up of communication circuits.

TERRORISM - The unilateral undertaking of a deliberate campaign of terror by any element of a resistance movement could seriously interfere with the accomplishment of assigned missions. Special Forces must understand terror techniques, their capabilities and limitations, to provide guidance to the area command concerning their use. Every effort will be made to prevent the ill-advised and pointless application of terrorism.

(U) Another difference between active and passive sabotage is that active sabotage usually requires extensive training. Special Forces operational elements possess the basic skills which make them ideally suited to conduct sabotage training of resistance forces. Selected members of the resistance force may receive training in:

- Basic reconnaissance techniques including target analysis and damage assessment.
- Demolitions and other sabotage devices.
- Special weapons.
- Enemy countersabotage methods.

For sabotage devices and techniques, see TM's 31-200-1; 31-201-1; 31-201-2; and 31-210.

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
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CHAPTER 2

(U) SECTION V
DEMOBILIZATION

When linkup operations between friendly conventional forces and US-sponsored resistance forces have been completed, the requirement for resistance support of friendly military operations is diminished. At this time consideration is given to placing guerrilla forces in combat support and combat service support roles, transferring sponsorship to the national government concerned, or demobilizing them. Demobilization procedures usually have little effect upon members of the auxiliary and the underground since most are able to maintain their civilian identity and cover throughout hostilities.

The manner in which a guerrilla force is demobilized will affect the postwar attitudes of the people toward the government sponsoring the guerrilla forces. Demobilization, therefore, should be conducted according to a carefully prepared and comprehensive plan. The task of demobilizing guerrilla units should not be delegated to conventional tactical units which have little or no knowledge of the guerrilla unit's organization and history. In any case, Special Forces elements are normally involved in demobilization procedures. To insure the disposition of guerrilla forces is in harmony with US long-range political objectives, coordination is effected between Special Forces and other appropriate military and political authorities.



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The decision to transfer guerrilla forces to the national government concerned must be resolved at the appropriate level. Problems of international relationships; attitudes of the civil population; and the political, economic, and social implications of such a transfer must be carefully considered. In the event that no recognized national government exists, the decision to disband these forces, in part or entirely, also requires careful consideration. Disbanding of guerrilla forces composed of elements foreign to the area may be extremely dangerous.

1 PLANNING

As soon as guerrilla forces are organized, long-range planning for their eventual disposition commences at theater level. Planning is continuous and is revised concurrently with operations to reflect the existing political and military situation.

2 COURSES OF ACTION

Demobilization directed by US Forces may take one or a combination of the following courses:

- The guerrilla force with all arms and equipment may be released to the recognized government.
- The guerrilla force less US-supplied arms and equipment may be released to the recognized government.
- The guerrilla force may be demobilized and relocated by US Forces.

3 SPECIAL FORCES ROLE

Special Forces commanders establish liaison with supporting civil affairs elements to assure turnover without loss of control or influence. Special Forces commanders provide civil affairs with:

- All available lists of guerrillas, their supporters, and other key inhabitants, together with any knowledge as to their political attitudes, their leadership or administrative potential, and other information that might be helpful.
- Area studies and intelligence not already available.

4 CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE

Demobilization instructions are written into civil affairs annexes to theater plans. Civil affairs teams assist in demobilization, particularly when no suitable provisional government exists to assume control. Civil affairs personnel are normally attached to Special Forces elements prior

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to release of guerrillas to civil affairs authority. Civil affairs contribute to demobilization by:

- Making recommendations concerning the use of guerrillas no longer needed for UW operations.
- Assisting in the indoctrination and retraining of demobilized personnel to prepare them for assimilation into the civilian community.
- Recommending appropriate resettlement areas and assisting in the relocation of the people in instances where deep-rooted animosities and political frictions have developed.
- Advising and assisting in administrative matters such as completing administrative processing for discharge; insuring that the sick and wounded receive proper care; and collecting weapons, munitions, and other combat related equipment.

5 PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ROLE

Though members of the resistance may have planned, worked, and fought together to achieve victory, their personal and political motives may have differed considerably. Resistance members and leaders may have included wealthy social leaders, intellectuals, merchants, peasants, laborers, bandits, and psychotic killers. Politically, every affiliation and party may have been represented with members impelled to carry on resistance by the precepts of the parties they represent. In addition, during the conflict some may have achieved a status which they would be extremely reluctant to relinquish. Others may have found a glamour in combat that they would be loath to trade for the humdrum daily existence they had before joining the conflict. Another group may have been subversively interjected—planted—by the enemy and realizing their cause was lost, may have attempted to build a post-conflict organization to carry on their subversive efforts. Psychological operations aid demobilization by:

- Explaining the reasons for demobilization and how it will be accomplished.
- Assisting the orderly transition of the guerrilla force to more normal pursuits and preparing the civilian population for their return.

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- Publicizing the contributions of the guerrilla force.
- Discouraging dissident elements of the resistance force from participating in activities counter to the objectives of the recognized government.

6 CONDUCT

Demobilization is planned and conducted to include the following:

- Assembly of the guerrilla force.
- Records.
- Pay, allowances, and benefits.
- Claims.
- Awards and decorations.
- Collection of arms and equipment.
- Medical treatment.
- Discharge.
- Rehabilitation.

ASSEMBLY OF THE GUERRILLA FORCE

The guerrilla force is gathered by units into assembly areas. All records and equipment are brought with the units. Hospitals and convalescent camps are centrally located. Reorientation training is conducted. Political activity by or among the guerrillas is closely supervised and movement is controlled to prevent desertions and absence without leave.

RECORDS

Members of the guerrilla force complete the administrative records of their units. Certificates are prepared to cover records which have been lost or destroyed. Complete payrolls are prepared and reconciled with authorized unit strength figures. Inventories and accountability are established for all arms and equipment.

PAY, ALLOWANCES, AND BENEFITS

Guerrillas are paid after previous partial payments have been deducted. Authorized benefits are paid to legal survivors of men who have died or were killed in action.

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CLAIMS

Administrative delay in the settlement of claims arising from previous activities of resistance forces is a potential source of ill will and often results in injustice. The method of settlement must eliminate the need for an elaborate claims service, make prompt payment, and minimize the possibility of fraud.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Prompt action is taken on recommendations for decorations and awards for deserving guerrillas and other resistance members. The awards are made at appropriate ceremonies attended, when practical, by the guerrilla troops, the civilian population, high ranking officers of the conventional forces and officials of the provisional government.

COLLECTION OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Arms and equipment will be collected and turned in before the settlement of pay, allowances, and benefits. Care is taken that weapons are not hidden for later and unlawful use. Public announcement is made that weapons must be turned in and that, after a specified date, unlicensed possession of weapons or military equipment will be unlawful. In the event a guerrilla force, with arms and equipment, is to be turned over to a recognized national government, inventories are conducted jointly by representatives of the local national government and US Forces.

MEDICAL TREATMENT

Special Forces guerrilla hospitals are kept operational until patients can be transferred to military hospitals or civilian institutions. Every effort is made to insure that the wounded and sick are given necessary care. Permanently disabled guerrillas may be granted pensions by the recognized government.

DISCHARGE

Personnel sworn in as members of guerrilla units will be discharged and given a testimonial of their services. The discharge provisions applicable to military personnel will be used as a guide. Current Department of Army forms appropriately modified may be used.

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REHABILITATION

Measures are taken to assist discharged guerrillas in assuming their places in civilian life. Some may be given employment by the conventional forces or by the newly constituted government. Individuals or entire units may be incorporated into the police or armed forces of the new government. Where feasible, assistance in rebuilding damaged houses or farms belonging to guerrillas may be granted.

Perhaps the greatest danger in any demobilization program is the possibility that former guerrillas will resort to dissidence, factional quarrels, or even to banditry. Others may take advantage of the prevalent unstable conditions to organize quasi-military or political groups which will conflict with the provisional government or US authorities. It is vital, therefore, that demobilization procedures be executed expeditiously and with foresight. Procedures which are instituted will be an outgrowth of decisions made by high level military and political authorities. Implementation of directives requires maximum coordination between Special Forces, civil affairs, and other appropriate elements.

To preclude troublesome situations from arising, strict control measures should be established and enforced. Persons suspected of favoring action hostile to established authority should be kept under surveillance. Every effort should be made to reorient and absorb such people into a peaceful society and to gain their acceptance of the restored governmental structure.

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CHAPTER 3
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

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
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CHAPTER 3
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

A constraint in the conduct of any operation is the ability to support it. This chapter describes those significant supporting operations which are an adjunct to UW operations. Although we stress our primary mission, these supporting operations may also be applied to our secondary missions—special operations and foreign internal defense.

In the following sections we discuss Special Forces infiltration and exfiltration of operational areas; the development of intelligence collection and techniques; logistics and medical operations; and the interrelationship between UW, psychological operations, and civil affairs activities with the indigenous civilian population.



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CHAPTER 3

(U) SECTION I
INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

Special Forces UW operations involve clandestine penetrations deep within enemy territory by air, water, or land. This section emphasizes the basic considerations of air, water, and land infiltrations/exfiltrations.

Detailed infiltration/exfiltration procedures and techniques are discussed in:

FM 31-19, Special Forces Military Free-Fall Parachuting.


TM 57-220, Technical Training of Parachutists.

TC 31-20-3, Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations (U) (C).

TC 31-20-4, Special Forces Surface Swimming.

1 INFILTRATION — GETTING THERE

2 EXFILTRATION — GETTING OUT



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FACTORS INFLUENCING INFILTRATION/EXFILTRATION

MISSION	The mission may require rapid deployment into the operational area, thereby dictating the most expeditious method of infiltration. In other cases, however, mission success may depend on maintaining secrecy with speed of secondary importance.
ENEMY SITUATION	Enemy capabilities, disposition, and security measures affect the means selected for infiltration: a heavily guarded border may preclude land infiltration; a strongly defended and patrolled coastline may eliminate infiltration by water; the enemy's air detection and defense systems may reduce air delivery potential.
TERRAIN	Land formations must be considered in selecting the method of infiltration/exfiltration. Terrain affects the selection of altitudes, approach and exit routes, and landing areas for mission aircraft. Mountains could force aircraft to fly at higher altitudes resulting in greater exposure to enemy air detection and defense systems.
WEATHER	Seasonal weather conditions affect infiltrations/exfiltrations. Factors to be considered include temperature, precipitation, visibility, clouds, and wind. High surface winds and their effect upon surf conditions or periods of reduced visibility may prohibit the use of parachutes, inflatable boats, or surface/subsurface swimming as entry/recovery techniques. These same conditions generally favor land infiltration/exfiltration. The Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) reduces the impact of weather as a limiting factor on air infiltrations.
HYDROGRAPHY	In maritime operations, hydrography is the science of describing the sea and marginal land areas and their effects on such operations. The selection of water as a means of infiltration/exfiltration is influenced by the hydrographic conditions on the foreshore and the nearshore sea approach such as the offshore water depth; beach gradients; the nature of tide, surf, currents, and sea bottom; and the location of reefs, sandbars, seaweed, or natural/manmade obstacles.

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ASTRONOMICAL CONDITIONS	Periods of twilight, sunrise and sunset, moon phase, and moonrise and moonset must be considered for infiltrations/exfiltrations.
DISTANCE	The distance to the objective area must be considered in selection of infiltration means.
TRAINING	The training given Special Forces is usually sufficient to prepare them for any means of infiltration/exfiltration. However, it is not anticipated that all members of a selected operational element will be equally proficient in a given skill or technique at any given time. Should areas be discovered in which weaknesses exist, added emphasis is placed on such areas. A properly balanced training program will produce a reasonably proficient team member. Special training programs are required to attain and maintain proficiency for: ● Surface and open water swimming. ● Self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA). ● Military free-fall (MFF) parachuting. ● Submarine operations. ● Inflatable boat handling. ● Insertion/extraction techniques. ● Survival, evasion, resistance, and escape.
ACCOMPANYING EQUIPMENT/ SUPPLIES	The quantity and types of accompanying equipment/supplies carried on initial infiltration are influenced by: ● The situation in the UWOA. ● The size of the resistance force. ● The enemy threat. ● The capabilities/limitations of the mission air/naval craft.

1 INFILTRATION—GETTING THERE

Although air, water, and land delivery means are discussed here separately, a particular mission may require combinations of these means. A successful infiltration depends on:

- Timely and accurate intelligence.
- Detailed pre-mission planning and coordination by commanders concerned.
- Preparation, training, and rehearsals.
- Security.
- Precise execution.

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Infiltration into the UWOA *is not complete* until the initial entry report is received at the SFOB/FOB. This report is transmitted as soon as practicable after infiltration regardless of whether contact has been made with the resistance.

BY AIR

Air is the most practical and rapid means of infiltration—by static line/military free-fall parachute entry or direct airlanding operations. The advantages and disadvantages are:

ADVANTAGES

- Flexibility.
- Speed and accuracy of delivery.
- Short exposure to enemy countermeasures.
- Precise navigation
- Capability of delivering supplies in excess of individual loads.

DISADVANTAGES

- Vulnerability to enemy air detection and defense systems.
- Affected by weather conditions.
- Possible injury to personnel and damage/loss of equipment.
- Requires specially trained aircrews.
- Requires sterilization of infiltration site.

Other factors which affect the planning and conduct of air operations include:

MISSION ABORTS. The decision to proceed with or abort the mission due to the absence or improper display of identification markings/authentication signals is the joint responsibility of commanders concerned and will be specified in the operation order. There are two courses of action available:

- A complete abort of the mission and return to the operational base.
- Abort the primary DZ and proceed to a preselected, alternate DZ and conduct a blind drop.

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ENROUTE E&E PLAN. A vital part of premission planning is the development of a viable en route evasion and escape (E&E) plan to enhance survivability of the aircrew and Special Forces element following emergency evacuation of the aircraft over/in hostile areas. The mission commanders concerned are jointly responsible for evaluating all factors bearing on survivability, devising an E&E plan which provides the greatest chance of survival considering the hazards involved and mission objectives, and thoroughly briefing all mission members prior to departure. Each mission will present unique, peculiar problems; however, the following are basic considerations:

Mutual E&E planning should concentrate on that portion of the mission from the initial penetration of enemy-controlled territory to the objective.

Mutual E&E plans should be based on two phases: the first, that portion of flight following entry into the hostile zone where personnel survival is the only consideration; the second, that portion of flight which is close to the objective and will permit Special Forces to pursue its mission with a reasonable chance of success.

Command of survivors during the first phase will be vested in the senior ranking survivor. He must fully use the combined experience and expertise to survive, evade, and escape in the hostile environment. In the second phase, the senior Special Forces survivor will proceed with the assigned mission, provided an adequate number of his members have survived and are able. The senior aircrew survivor must then elect a course of action for aircrew survivors which will not interfere with the assigned mission.

The aircraft crash site and course of flight before ground contact must be avoided to preclude discovery by hostile forces responding to the crash or detection reports.

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JUMP PROCEDURES.

Marked drop zones. After visual sighting of the ground release point markings, the pilot will turn on the green light when conditions are considered safe for the drop to be executed and the aircraft is at designated drop altitude and track. The jumpmaster will verify the markings and give the command to exit the aircraft over the release point.

Unmarked drop zones. Preselected, unmarked DZ's are used for blind drop parachute entry of personnel/emergency resupply for specific time periods. A reception committee is not present on the DZ, but keeps it under constant surveillance before and during the scheduled drop time. The drop is made on a computed air release point (CARP) or on a visible, preselected release point.

Blind drop infiltrations into preselected DZ's without the assistance of a reception committee are used:

- When Special Forces are required to conduct unilateral special operations against selected targets.
- When no prior contact has been established with the resistance force.
- When the ground situation prevents normal marking and recognition signals.
- When the drop on the primary DZ is aborted and is executed on an alternate/emergency DZ.

Military free-fall operations. Military free-fall parachute drops may be made on visual ground release point markings, high altitude release point (HARP), a visible preselected release point, or on electronic release methods (AWADS).

EQUIPMENT. The presence of a reception committee on the drop zone influences the amount of accompanying equipment and supplies. When assured of a reception committee, additional equipment and supplies, beyond immediate requirements, may be packed and dropped in aerial delivery containers. For a blind drop or when the availability of a reception committee is doubtful, all of the Special Forces element's equipment and supplies may be jumped as individual loads. This restricts the amount that can be dropped, but reduces the chance of loss.

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BY WATER

Up to the point of debarkation, water infiltrations are the most secure and economical means of clandestine penetration. Special Forces infiltrations into a maritime environment are supported by naval surface ships, submarines, or aircraft, or indigenous craft and employ the following techniques:

- Static line or military free-fall para-SCUBA/swimmer.
- Water landing by fixed-wing amphibious aircraft or properly prepared helicopters.
- Free drop from hovering helicopters.
- SCUBA.
- Surface swimming.
- Small boats.

Various combinations of these delivery means and techniques may be used to create deception, increase the range of the mission, or decrease the time required for transit.

The advantages and disadvantages of water infiltration are:

ADVANTAGES

- Long-range delivery capability.
- Relatively unaffected by weather up to the point of debarkation.
- Operational briefings and rehearsals can be continued en route.
- Large quantities of supplies can be transported with surface craft.

DISADVANTAGES

- Time-consuming unloading and transshipment from offshore dropoff points.
- Vulnerability to enemy shore defenses during landing operations.
- Possible loss of personnel and supplies during ship-to-shore movement.

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- Limited cargo capacity of submarines.
- Special training is necessary.
- Additional packaging is required to waterproof equipment.
- High winds which affect surf conditions.

Selected infiltration methods into a maritime environment should provide minimum time on station, the least probability of detection by the enemy, and enable a simple and rapid delivery as close to the area of operation as tactically possible. Procedures and execution will be developed by and coordinated between the naval and Special Forces elements concerned based on the tactical situation. Planning considerations should include:

INTELLIGENCE. Coordination of all objective area intelligence is required between the commanders concerned to include:

- Opposition expected during transit to the objective area.
- Opposition expected in the objective area.
- Beach obstacles and emplacements in the objective area.
- Enemy threat at the beach landing site.
- Weather and surf conditions expected in the objective area.

EQUIPMENT LOADING/ OFFLOADING. An equipment loading/offloading plan must be developed by Special Forces and coordinated with the supporting unit commander. All equipment must be waterproofed. Lowering lines should be attached to all equipment bundles to facilitate loading/offloading. A marking system must be used to identify the contents of equipment bundles and a loading/offloading priority established. When submarines are used, the configuration of the hatch as well as the 25-inch diameter hatch opening determine the physical size and length of a package.

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DEBARKATION.

Planning for debarkation is the most important consideration when using surface ships or submarines. Unfamiliarity with the procedures involved can easily jeopardize the safety of all elements and compromise the mission. The supporting unit and the embarked Special Forces element must resolve procedural variations and adopt the best procedure. In addition, surface ships and submarines may not be able to deliver operational elements within swimming/boating range of the beach landing site due to vessel limitations, the hydrographic characteristics of the offshore area, or the danger of detection. This situation requires additional planning, preparation, and coordination for intermediate transport from the point of debarkation to the dropoff point in the vicinity of the beach landing site.

BEACH LANDING SITES.

Normally, selection of the beach landing site (BLS) for the initial infiltration is a joint responsibility of the supporting naval unit and the SFOB/FOB. Once infiltration is completed, future selection of a BLS is the responsibility of the Special Forces commander. He must have a basic knowledge of hydrography to select sites which will permit close offshore and rapid landing operations.

Movement from the dropoff point to the BLS is usually made by swimming or boating. (If a transfer is to be made to an indigenous craft, the Special Forces element/equipment should be concealed en route to the BLS.) Strict noise and light discipline are maintained. Approaching the BLS, the commander signals swimmers/boat teams to hold at a position outside the surf zone. A predesignated security team then moves to the BLS to determine the enemy situation. After determining that the BLS is clear, it flashes a prearranged "all clear" signal to the remaining members to come ashore, and establishes listening/observation positions at the limit of visibility from the landing point. Once the remaining members reach the BLS, the commander signals or radios to the surface ship/submarine commander that the landing has been safely completed. Inflatable boats, if used, may then be deflated and cached for possible use in future operations.

In some situations, a reception committee may be present to assist the infiltration by marking the BLS, providing guides, and transporting accompanying equipment. The plan for initial contact with the reception committee must be coordinated prior to infiltration. Contact is made by the swimmers conducting the security reconnaissance of the BLS.

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NAVIGATION. Navigation during movement to the BLS is difficult and the course must compensate for set and drift of known currents. A combination of dead reckoning, celestial observation, infrared light, or shoreline/terrain feature silhouette can be used for navigating.

BY LAND

Under most circumstances, land infiltration is the least desirable means of clandestine penetration, but may be required where the enemy situation, geographic characteristics, or climate condition prevent air or water infiltration. The advantages and disadvantages of land infiltration are:

ADVANTAGES

- Minimum logistical support.
- Concurrent area familiarization and intelligence collection.
- Flexibility of movement and timing.
- Minimum interservice coordination.

DISADVANTAGES

- Time consuming.
- Increased vulnerability to enemy detection and interdiction.
- Limited capability for carrying supplies and equipment.

Overland movement is best accomplished under conditions of limited visibility over difficult terrain. It has the greatest chance for success when the enemy's lines are overextended, the combat zone fluid, or portions of the country's borders are inadequately secured. On the other hand, a well organized defense in depth may prohibit land infiltration.

Routes must be selected which take maximum advantage of cover and concealment and avoid known/suspected enemy locations. Generally, guides are required, but when not available, detailed route intelligence must be provided if borders are to be crossed. The location and means of contacting selected individuals who will furnish assistance are provided to the Special Forces element. These individuals may be used as local guides and sources of information, food, and shelter.

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Use FM 21-74, Patrolling, as a planning guide for land infiltration.

2 EXFILTRATION—GETTING OUT

The planning considerations, preparations, tactics, and techniques for exfiltration are basically the same as those used for infiltration; however, here we are concerned with the recovery methods. Since Special Forces operations are normally conducted deep in enemy or hostile areas, the distance involved will generally preclude an all-land exfiltration. The initial phase of the exfiltration will normally be by land, terminating in an air or water recovery. Aircraft, surface craft, and submarines, or various combinations of these three methods can be used for the recovery of:

- Seriously ill or wounded Special Forces personnel.
- Operational elements following mission completion.
- Operational elements under direct enemy pressure.
- Selected personnel, documents, or equipment, as directed by the SFOB.
- Military personnel and other selected individuals who become isolated in hostile areas or who escape from captivity.

BY AIR AND WATER

RECOVERY AREAS. The area selected for recovery should be easily identified to both the Special Forces element and the recovering unit. It should permit the secure exchange of recognition signals. The recovery area should meet these additional criteria:

- Allow the undetected approach and departure of the recovery vehicle.
- Allow the secure use of homing beacons when required.
- Allow the maneuver or landing of the recovery vehicle.
- Allow for errors in predicted drift of swimmer or boat teams.

Alternate recovery areas are selected to provide for the possibility of enemy activity in the primary area. They are selected in the same manner as the primary recovery area and usually lie along the same route to be used by the recovery vehicle.

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RECOVERY METHODS. The recovery method selected should permit a simple and rapid recovery with the least probability of detection. Recovery may be made by:

- Embarking directly aboard a surface ship or submarine.
- Aircraft landing in operational area.
- Aircraft equipped with Fulton Surface-To-Air Recovery (STAR) system.
- Water landings by fixed-wing amphibious aircraft or properly prepared helicopters.
- Helicopters equipped with winches, rope ladders, or the STABO extraction system. (The STABO system requires special personnel harnesses which may be carried into the operational area on initial infiltration, delivered during resupply, or dropped at the recovery site.)

RECOVERY TIMES. The exact recovery time selected must be late enough to permit the element to move to the recovery area under cover of darkness, but early enough to allow the recovery prior to dawn. Precise execution and good timing will insure minimum time on station.

Alternate recovery times to provide for changes in weather or surf conditions are selected in the same manner as primary times, and usually occur at approximately 24-hour intervals.

BY LAND

Special Forces may exfiltrate over predetermined land routes all the way to friendly control. This is the least desirable method and would be used only in exceptional circumstances. Here, major emphasis is placed on employing evasive tactics and techniques and patrol procedures when passing through enemy lines. Land exfiltration is favored when:

- The distance to friendly lines is relatively short.
- The terrain provides cover and concealment for movement on foot and limits the employment of enemy mobile units against the exfiltrating force.
- The exfiltrating force is lightly equipped and is not encumbered by captured personnel or materiel.
- The exfiltrating force moves through an area occupied by friendly civilians who can assist the withdrawal.


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- Areas along exfiltration routes are uninhabited.
- The enemy force:

  Is widely dispersed or is under such pressure that it is difficult for it to concentrate against the exfiltrating force.

  Has capabilities which make air or water recovery prohibitive.



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CHAPTER 3

SECTION II

(C) INTELLIGENCE (U)

(C) Intelligence requirements and activities at all command levels concerned with the conduct of unconventional warfare operations encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence.

- The JUWC/JUWTF coordinates the collection of all intelligence to support projected Special Forces operations.
- The Special Forces group requires current strategic intelligence of assigned UWOA's to conduct pre-mission planning for the employment of operational elements.
- As operations are initiated and Special Forces are deployed into enemy occupied territory, combat intelligence supplements strategic intelligence.
- Although the area command is more often the user of combat intelligence, the SFOB and the JUWTF both use combat intelligence applicable to their level.



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1 (C) PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT (U)

Special Forces requires a thorough background knowledge of the operational area prior to deployment. This background knowledge, gained from area studies, is divided into two phases:

General area study. This is the broad background knowledge of an area, region or country. (See appendix C, Area Study Guide.)

Operational area intelligence. This is the detailed intelligence of a designated UWOA, which includes information necessary to:

- Infiltrate the operational area.
- Contact resistance elements.
- Initiate operations.

2 (C) AFTER INFILTRATION (U)

The Special Forces operational element continues to add to its background knowledge by a thorough and continuing assessment of the area, using intelligence developed within the area. As operations are initiated, Special Forces will rely on internally generated combat intelligence to weld elements of the area command into a coordinated and effective force capable of supporting theater military operations.

The growing need and consumption of accurate, timely intelligence require continuous, close coordination between the SFOB and other theater intelligence agencies. Lack of this coordination, particularly regarding the penetration of operational areas with informants, agents, and other intelligence collection efforts, may result in compromising the Special Forces element.

Deployed Special Forces elements provide a capability for collecting information not available from other intelligence sources. In addition, Special Forces may be tasked to collect specific EEI for JUWC/JUWTF and theater level requirements. However, before assigning specific intelligence tasks to Special Forces elements, the impact of these tasks on their primary mission should be **carefully** considered.

(C) UWOA COLLECTION (U)

The area command has three primary agencies available for collecting and

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producing intelligence—the guerrilla force, the auxiliary, and the underground. The organization of guerrilla force intelligence nets employs conventional information-gathering techniques such as patrols and area/target reconnaissance and surveillance supplemented by information gathered by the auxiliary and underground.

Intelligence from theater collection and production agencies will be provided by the JUWC/JUWTF through the SFOB to deployed Special Forces elements. When requirements exceed the capability or degree of skill found in the UWOA, the Special Forces elements may be augmented by intelligence specialists from the Special Forces Combat Intelligence Company.

(C) SOURCES (U)

The area command uses and exploits all possible means and sources to collect information.

Civilians living near or working in enemy installations report on industrial operations, equipment, weapons, dispositions, habits and morale. Government officials sympathetic to the resistance movement supply valuable information on the enemy's political, economic, administrative, and propaganda measures. Agents and observers located ~~at~~ strategic points report on ground, air, and naval movements. Other possible sources for information are:

ENEMY: (U)

- Activity or inactivity.
- Installations.
- Military and civilian personnel.
- Prisoners of war (PW).
- Military documents (maps, photos, plans, orders).
- Materiel (discarded or captured arms, ammunition).
- Broadcasts, newspapers, leaflets.
- Defectors.

FRIENDLY: (U)

- Recovered military and civilian personnel.
- Evadees, refugees, travelers.
- Local civilians (informants, auxiliaries).
- Local maps, photos, charts, publications.
- Area resources (transportation, industry, agriculture).
- Intelligence studies and reports.
- Specialized intelligence (order of battle, technical, communications and electronic intelligence).
- Air reconnaissance (visual, photos, electronics, radar, infrared).

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(U) TRANSMISSION

When transmitting intelligence information the following should be considered:

- What means are available?
- Are they secure?
- Are they reliable?
- Will they insure responsiveness?

(C) AREA COMMAND TO THE SFOB.(U)

Intelligence information to be transmitted must be carefully prepared to insure that only pertinent details (reduced through brevity codes) are transmitted. If deemed advisable, documents, photographs, other intelligence materials and selected personnel may be physically exfiltrated from the operational area.

(C) WITHIN THE AREA COMMAND.(U)

Information transmitted between the underground, auxiliary, and the area command normally is transmitted orally, using go-betweens or through personal contact. When security prevents this, data is encoded and transmitted using clandestine communications techniques. The volume of traffic generated by auxiliary and underground intelligence activities must be held to a minimum for security.

(C) WITHIN THE GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION.(U)

Normally couriers are used for the transmission of information within the guerrilla complex. The need for coded messages depends on the means of transmission. For security, information should be relegated to oral transmission, be simple and concise, and be committed to memory. Issuance of written detailed data for transmission by couriers should be avoided. Radio or wire may be employed on a limited basis when enemy security activities do not preclude their use.

(C) THE AUXILIARY.(U)

The auxiliary normally is in direct contact with the supported guerrilla unit and is represented at the area command. Information of immediate or special interest is passed directly to the supported unit, or passed to other guerrilla units through the area command. This arrangement permits rapid dissemination of information to those with the greatest need and reduces unnecessary message duplication. All contacts between guerrilla units and their supporting auxiliaries are controlled by the next higher guerrilla unit unless the subordinate unit is operating independently.

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(U) THE UNDERGROUND.

Security requires strict compartmentation with no personal contact between the underground and other resistance forces. The underground interfaces with other resistance forces only at the area command.

3 (C) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) (U)

Counterintelligence supports OPSEC by destroying the effectiveness of enemy intelligence activities, by protecting information against espionage, agencies and individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

OPSEC measures are strictly adhered to by Special Forces when conducting operations in UWOA's. These measures take the form of counterintelligence operations to reduce or eliminate enemy penetration and knowledge of friendly forces, and to provide security for indigenous organizations, plans and actions. OPSEC is based on **passive** and **active measures.**

PASSIVE MEASURES (U)

Passive OPSEC measures are those which are implemented and enforced internally by the resistance to protect its membership.

PERSONAL SECURITY (U)

Screening of recruits is accomplished by requiring each recruit to complete a personal history questionnaire. These questionnaires are examined by reliable screeners who have personal knowledge of the recruit's area of origin. This information is supplemented by interrogation. Screening serves to detect and reduce the chances of enemy penetration efforts.

Surveillance of guerrillas is accomplished by persons in positions of command, other guerrillas through the "buddy" system, or counterintelligence personnel introduced into the guerrilla unit by higher guerrilla authority.

The "buddy" system, a team of two or three individuals, provides for the continuous surveillance of guerrillas by their own ranks. Team members are changed to prevent formation of dissident elements. This system should exist from recruitment to demobilization.

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A counterintelligence agent may be introduced with or without the knowledge of the unit commander. This is usually done only when the commander is under suspicion. Counterintelligence agents must be provided with separate clandestine communications to the controlling agency.

Surveillance of auxiliaries is done by their supported guerrillas. This helps to maintain loyalty and reduce collaboration efforts.

INSTALLATION SECURITY (U)

Camouflage and use of concealment are basic considerations in selecting and establishing installations, and during movements. Training in camouflage and concealment should be continually stressed to improve individual and unit proficiency.

Movement control prevents the unauthorized circulation of personnel. The use of search, passwords, effective surveillance and patrolling, and a "buddy" system aids in reducing subversive or other undesirable contacts.

Security discipline includes such measures as light and noise discipline, limiting access and the adherence to a strict "need-to-know" policy regarding plans, operations, and organizations. Operational information/orders are disseminated as late as possible, but allows time for preparation and execution.

Document security is attained by limiting the quantity of records, plans, and other documentation to allow for rapid evacuation and destruction.

Material security is attained by restricting access to locations and contents of supply caches and installations. Items will be accounted for and tightly controlled.

Censorship measures will be taken to insure that personal possessions of resistance members do not compromise resistance elements or activities. Personnel should be frequently inspected and especially before operations to insure compromising information is not carried from the base area.

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Communication security (COMSEC) is an essential practice applicable to all intelligence gathering elements for intelligence to be disseminated to have a useful value. COMSEC **must be practiced** to avoid detection by the enemy.

ACTIVE MEASURES (U)

The resistance employs active OPSEC measures to reduce enemy penetration efforts of its elements.

Counterreconnaissance operations are conducted to reduce the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance efforts. Counterreconnaissance elements may engage and eliminate enemy reconnaissance troops whenever such offensive action is not precluded by the guerrilla mission or situation. Counterreconnaissance provides early warning and, when directed, attempts to deceive the enemy of the true guerrilla location or activity. Within the guerrilla base area, counterreconnaissance is accomplished by outposts, outguards, and patrols. This effort is extended by security efforts of the auxiliaries.

Countersabotage efforts are directed toward preventing contamination, willful destruction, or loss of resistance equipment and materiel. Continuous surveillance limits the possibility of enemy sabotage attempts.

4 (C) TRADECRAFT (U)

As discussed earlier, most of the essential intelligence and information needed by Special Forces and the area command must be self-generated within the UWOA. Special Forces, whether the initial information gatherers or trainers of indigenous information gatherers, must know and be capable of using and teaching certain tradecraft and clandestine communications techniques. (See FM 30-18, *Intelligence Collection Operations (U) (S).)*

TRADECRAFT (U)

- Secret writing.
- Concealment devices.
- Agent documentation.
- Operational photography.

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- Caching.
- Flaps and Seals.

CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS (U)

- Cryptography (Code Systems).
- Clandestine electronic communications.
- Nontechnical communications.



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CHAPTER 3

(U) SECTION III

LOGISTICS

There is no standard resistance force logistics system. Each system is developed to meet the specific needs and peculiarities of the situation. As resistance force requirements and the local situation change, the logistics system must be modified accordingly to insure optimum overall system effectiveness.

FM 101-10-3, Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data—Classified Data (U) (S), provides guidance concerning the types and amounts of rations, arms, and equipment suitable for guerrilla warfare operations. Special Forces planners should follow this guidance in developing a resistance force logistics system.

A resistance force has two sources of logistical support:

INTERNAL—The UWOA

EXTERNAL—The sponsor

1 INTERNAL SUPPORT

The UWOA will normally provide the bulk of the required logistical support. Special Forces must convince the area command that all supplies will not be provided by the sponsor. The area command must develop an effective internal logistical system tailored to their specific needs and operations.

In dealing with the civilian population, the area command must balance its support requirements against the need to gain and maintain civilian cooperation. Imposing excessive demands on the civilian populace may adversely affect this cooperation. This will limit tactical operations and increase reliance on external supply.

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LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS

When compared to a similar sized conventional force, a resistance force has less but more basic logistical requirements. These generally consist of:

NECESSITIES OF LIFE

FOOD — Most areas suitable for guerrilla base camps will have some natural foods, such as berries, edible plants, and small game. These foods, however, are not sufficient to sustain the energy of active guerrillas, and high-calorie foods such as grains, sugar, and certain types of meats must be provided.

CLOTHING — Where radical climatic changes take place, seasonal changes of clothing are necessary. Waterproof clothing is desirable. A guerrilla depends largely on his feet for transportation; therefore, stout, well-fitting shoes are the most important clothing item that can be obtained for him.

SHELTER — Shelters, such as natural or constructed caves, offer the best protection from both the elements and enemy observation. Sturdy, weatherproof huts can be constructed from boughs and branches, but they should be built under growing foliage for protection against air observation.

EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATIONS

WEAPONS — Captured enemy weapons provide the primary source of weapons resupply and replacement parts. In addition, facilities may be established to manufacture or repair weapons. Weapons accountability by type and quantity must be established to determine the rate of ammunition consumption and resupply.

AMMUNITION — In the early stages of organization and development, a guerrilla force has minimal physical contact with the enemy, and ammunition requirements are limited. Since guerrillas rely on maximum use of automatic weapons, strict fire discipline must be imposed to conserve ammunition. Once committed to full-scale operations, ammunition consumption and resupply rates can be determined. A decentralized cache system should be used to control ammunition for tactical operations.

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DEMOLITIONS

The amount of demolitions required depends on the types of missions to be accomplished in a given period of time. The interdiction of complex target systems by multiple attacks at different locations throughout the UWOA requires vast amounts of explosives. Again, a decentralized control system of caches should be used to support these missions.

MEDICAL

Medical treatment is a strong morale factor. Basic medicines and supplies are required to treat sick and wounded guerrillas as well as the local populace. The most important medical supplies are preventive medicines such as antimalaria pills, sulfa and iodine powders, and various serums for protection against disease. In addition, at least one first-aid kit should be supplied for each platoon-sized operational unit and a first-aid packet issued to each individual.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation support of resistance forces is provided from local resources. In remote or underdeveloped areas, the primary means of transportation will be on foot or by animal. More sophisticated environments will normally have modern forms of transportation available. In most situations, transportation will be provided by the auxiliary on a mission basis; however, the guerrilla force may find it advantageous to acquire and operate its own transport system. All types and sources of available transportation should be considered.

STORAGE

The protected storage and cache of supplies and equipment play an important role in the area command logistical plan. Caches may be used to support current or future operations, or reserved for specified emergencies. Supplies in excess of current requirements are carefully packaged to prevent damage from exposure and then cached in a number of isolated locations known only to the commander and key personnel.

Caches are established and secured by both guerrilla and auxiliary units in friendly areas prior to their being overrun or in enemy held areas after hostilities have commenced. They may be located in caves, swamps, forests, cemeteries, or lakes. Dispersed cache systems permit the guerrilla force to operate throughout the UWOA independent of their base areas.

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Caches are not established haphazardly, but are the result of proper planning to support operational missions.

MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS

Initially, basic maintenance and minor repair of equipment are primarily limited to operator maintenance. Materials are obtained from the local civilian economy or through combat operations against the enemy. As the movement expands, clandestine, make-shift ordnance and repair facilities are established. Necessary maintenance and repair items such as tools, small arms repair kits, replacement parts, and oil and cleaning materials are included in sponsor-provided supply packages. Careful consideration must be given to the introduction of special or sophisticated equipment which may complicate the maintenance system and require trained technicians.

LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION

The area command plans, develops, operates, and controls the resistance force logistics system. Each element of the area command has a specific role in the logistics system.

THE GUERRILLA FORCE

The logistics system's primary purpose is to provide support to guerrilla units. Usually guerrilla units are satellited on an auxiliary region and receive direct logistical support from auxiliary units within its operational area. In addition to support from the auxiliary, the guerrilla unit may take overt actions to satisfy its logistics requirements.

THE AUXILIARY

Since members of the auxiliary live a normal life style, they are logistically self-sufficient. Normally, an auxiliary unit is assigned responsibility for providing direct logistics support to the guerrilla unit(s) operating within its area of responsibility. Common auxiliary-guerrilla areas of responsibility simplify relationships by allowing direct coordination between the auxiliary and supported guerrilla units.

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THE UNDERGROUND

The underground's logistics role is largely one of self support. This support normally provides for real or facsimile documentation such as identification and ration cards, money, safe living quarters, and special equipment or supplies. The underground may provide the area command with items not available from other sources—medicines, radios, photographic equipment and supplies, and repair items.

SOURCES OF SUPPLY

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND BATTLEFIELD RECOVERY

By conducting offensive operations against the enemy, the guerrilla force is able to satisfy many of its logistical requirements and at the same time deny the use of these supplies to the enemy. Capturing supplies from the enemy has the advantage of not alienating civilians. With adequate intelligence and proper planning, raids and ambushes are conducted against installations and convoys containing the items needed by the guerrilla force. Prior to an operation, each guerrilla is instructed to secure those priority materials required by the guerrilla force. In areas where conventional operations have been conducted, guerrillas can obtain certain quantities of supplies by collecting abandoned equipment.

PURCHASE

Currency for support of operations may be provided from external or internal sources. Currency may be the money of the area or some suitable substitute such as gold or promissory notes. Procurement through purchase is normally restricted to critical or scarce items not available through other forms of procurement. Care should be exercised to insure that the excessive injection of outside currency does not disrupt the local economy unless economic disruption is also a resistance force objective. General guidance on fiscal administration is contained in AR 37-103 and AR 37-103-1.

LEVY

To ensure an equitable system for obtaining supplies from the local population, a levy system based on the ability of each family or group of families to contribute may be organized. This system is established and

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operated by the various auxiliary units. Such a system provides a means whereby the burden of supplying the guerrilla force is distributed equitably throughout the civilian population. The population can be told that payment will eventually be made for the supplies taken. Receipts may be given to individuals, or records of the transactions may be kept by the area command supply officer. In establishing the levy system, the commander must consider a number of obstacles which might affect procurement in his operational area. Among them:

Chronic food shortages.

Enemy interference and/or competition for supplies.

Possible impact of combat actions, such as "scorched earth" policies and radioactive contamination.

Competition from rival guerrilla units.

BARTER

It may not be desirable for the area command to engage in outright barter with the civilian population because of possible adverse effects upon the levy system. However, in some cases it is mutually beneficial to exchange critical items, such as medical supplies for food, clothing, or services.

CONFISCATION

Confiscation is a method which may be used to fulfill those requirements which cannot be met by other methods of internal supply. Confiscation is often employed in cases where certain groups refuse to cooperate or are actively collaborating with the enemy. Naturally, confiscation tends to alienate the civilian population and, therefore, should be used only in emergencies or to punish collaborators. In all cases, confiscation must be strictly controlled to insure that it does not deteriorate into indiscriminate looting.

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PRODUCTION

Guerrilla forces, who may be cut off from most civilian production facilities and support, often find it necessary to improvise their own field expedients; they might actually have to plant and raise some of their own foodstuff and livestock. Based on the percentage of supplies available from external sources and those available internally, the area commander may consider the establishment of farms, or even factories, for the production and repair of unobtainable items.

As the guerrilla force develops and expands, its logistical requirements will increase to a point where the internal popular support base can no longer provide subsistence without creating hardships or lowering living standards of the populace. When this situation occurs, logistical support must be obtained from an external source.

2 EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Supply of the area command from external sources is normally limited to those essential logistical services which are not readily available within the operational area. Usually this consists of arms, ammunition, demolitions, and communications equipment—the essentials to support combat operations. Under certain conditions, sponsor logistical support is expanded to include evacuation of the sick and wounded, food, clothing, and other essential survival items unavailable in the area.

ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES

Initial introduction of supplies into the UWOA is accomplished in conjunction with the infiltration of Special Forces. The quantity and types of supplies and equipment carried by Special Forces on infiltration are dictated by the situation in the operational area. The capabilities, responsiveness to friendly control, size of resistance forces, ememy capabilities, method of infiltration (land, sea, or air), requirements for survival, and available resources in the UWOA all influence the type and amount of accompanying supplies.

RESUPPLY

Based on the above considerations, the SFOB establishes supply levels for each class of supply in an operational area and determines the sequence and method of delivery. These supply levels may be altered upon recommendation of the Special Forces commander based on his post-infiltration area assessment.

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The SFOB, or FOB when appropriate, schedules the delivery of automatic, emergency, or on-call resupply missions to deployed Special Forces elements. Preplanned automatic and emergency resupply provide the UW force with immediate supplies and equipment until routine on-call resupply procedures can be established. To facilitate handling and transportation within the UWOA, equipment and supplies are normally packed and rigged in appropriate aerial delivery containers which have a cargo capacity of 500 pounds or less. To allow rapid clearance of the DZ, the contents of each container are further packaged in man-portable units of approximately 50 pounds each.

AUTOMATIC RESUPPLY

Planned before infiltration as to delivery time, location, contents, and the identification marking system and authentication.

Delivered automatically after successful infiltration and established radio contact unless cancelled, modified, or rescheduled by the deployed Special Forces element.

Replaces lost or damaged equipment items and augments equipment which could not be carried in on the initial infiltration.

Serves to reinforce US support of the resistance movement.

EMERGENCY RESUPPLY

Planned before infiltration as to delivery time, provisional location to be confirmed, contents, and the identification marking system and authentication.

Initiated when radio contact has not been established between the deployed Special Forces element and the SFOB/FOB within a predesignated period of time after infiltration.

OR

Initiated on the loss of communications between a deployed Special Forces element and the SFOB/FOB for a predetermined, consecutive number of scheduled radio contacts. When the Special Forces element is forced into continuous movement, emergency DZ's must be selected and reported at the first opportunity. If, during this situation, a predetermined number of radio contacts are missed, the resupply is delivered on the last reported DZ.

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Contains mission-essential equipment/supplies to restore operational capability and survivability of the Special Forces element and indigenous assets. As a minimum, it should consist of communications equipment; homing beacons/devices; survival and medical supplies; and selected weapons, ammunition, and demolition items.

ON-CALL RESUPPLY

When communications have been established between the SFOB/FOB and the Special Forces element, on-call resupply missions are requested based on operational needs.

These supplies consist of major equipment items which are not consumed at a predictable rate. They are held in readiness at theater army area command (TAACOM) depots or at the SFOB/FOB for immediate delivery on a specified mission request basis.

In determining the quantity to be requested, the rate of expansion of the resistance force, anticipated tempo of operations, and the capability to receive, transport, store, and secure the incoming supplies must be considered.

DELIVERY

As a general rule, sponsor-provided supplies are delivered directly to the individual user. The situation may be such that direct delivery to the user is not desirable or possible. In this case, supplies are delivered to a designated location and their contents distributed to the various users. Although this system takes much time and effort, it permits centralized control over sponsor-provided supplies and may be the preferred method.

Initially, aerial delivery by parachute is the most common means of supply delivery to UWOA's. Free drop techniques may be used for certain hardy items. Later, as UWOA's expand and come under some degree of friendly control, air landed supply missions are used. UWOA's adjacent to sea or water surfaces may be supplied by surface ships or submarines. After linkup, supplies are delivered to resistance forces by conventional surface means, such as trucks and rail. Initial supply missions usually require secrecy of movement to protect the receiving UW force; therefore, single air or water craft missions conducted during periods of low visibility are normally the rule.

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ACCOUNTABILITY

The Special Forces commander is responsible for all supplies and equipment delivered to the UWOA. It is essential that sensitive items such as weapons, ammunition, demolitions, radios, drugs, or special equipment be controlled. A Special Forces representative should be present at all deliveries of external supplies to insure positive control and accountability. The Special Forces commander should attempt to determine the quantities and locations of sensitive items procured from other than the sponsor. This information will assist in effecting proper distribution, maintaining control, assessing the capabilities and limitations of the resistance force, and effecting demobilization or reorganization upon completion of the resistance mission. The judicious control and use of sponsor-provided supplies and equipment can strengthen the detachment commander's ability to influence resistance operations.

CATALOG SUPPLY SYSTEM

Special Forces uses a brevity code system, known as the Catalog Supply System (CSS), to expedite on-call resupply requests, insure accurate identification of equipment/supply items, and minimize radio transmission time. To permit maximum user flexibility, the CSS identifies single major equipment items or several associated items by code words. It is catalogued by class of supplies and grouped in individual packaged items or several associated unit items packed together. The CSS is:


- Based on mission requirements, contingency plans, and standing operating procedures.
- Prepared under the staff supervision of the Special Forces group S4.
- Reproduced in miniature form for operational missions and published in the CEOI by the Special Forces group C-E officer.

PACKING AND RIGGING

The preparation of supplies and equipment for delivery to a UWOA is the responsibility of the SFOB support center. The packaging system is based on man-portable packages weighing approximately 50 pounds. This facilitates transportation from the UWOA reception site by carrying parties. The following factors are also considered in preparing supplies for delivery:

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- The mission delivery method, i.e., aircraft, surface ship, or submarine, determines the physical size of the package as well as the number of packages which can be transported.
- Each package is waterproofed to permit above ground and limited underground/underwater cache.
- Each package is marked with a prearranged code to identify the contents.
- An inventory list is included in each delivery container to aid in identifying lost or damaged material.
- Man-portable packages are equipped with carrying straps or mounted on packboards.
- Clothing, blankets, or other items which are useful may be used to pad sensitive items.
- Instructions, printed in the appropriate language, are packed with all equipment.
- Morale and barter items may be included in the packages.
- Ancillary supplies should be included with individual items, e.g., ammunition and cleaning equipment with weapons, batteries with flashlights. Additional ammunition may be included as an individual package.

REQUEST PROCEDURES

The CSS is not secure by itself, but serves to reduce message length and transmission time when a variety of supplies are requested. Examples of a CSS used here are for illustrative purposes and brevity, and do not provide any degree of security. The CEOI will prescribe those code designations for actual operational missions.

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Each broad classification of supply is listed in sequence by an assigned code letter designation:

SECTION	DESIGNATION
Chemical	ALPHA ALPHA through DELTA ZULU
Demolitions and Mines	ECHO ALPHA through HOTEL ZULU
Medical	INDIA ALPHA through LIMA ZULU
Weapons and Ammunition	MIKE ALPHA through PAPA ZULU
Quartermaster	QUEBEC ALPHA through TANGO ZULU
Signal	UNIFORM ALPHA through WHISKEY ZULU
Special	XRAY ALPHA through ZULU ZULU

Some units and packages are followed by a numbered list showing the contents of the package or unit. The unit or package can be ordered complete, or any numbered item may be ordered separately. For example:

- Six radio sets AN/PRC-77 are required.
- Under Signal appears the code designation UNIFORM HOTEL.
- Item 1 under Unit Data Contents reads "Two AN/PRC-77 complete."
- Your request would read THREE UNIFORM HOTEL ONE indicating six radios are required.

Items not listed in the CSS are requested by nomenclature in sufficient detail to insure thorough understanding at the SFOB.

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EXAMPLE

CATALOG SUPPLY SYSTEM

CHEMICAL

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
ALPHA ALPHA	Chemical Grenade No. 1 (16 rds).	46 lbs	1	Sixteen grenades, hand, smoke WP, M15, packed in individual containers.
ALPHA INDIA	Water testing Kits (24)	50 lbs	1	Twenty-four water testing kits chemical agents, AN–M2.
ALPHA OSCAR	Napalm	42 lbs	1	Eight cans chemical agent thickener, five ¼ lb cans.

DEMOLITIONS AND MINES

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
ECHO ALPHA	Demolitions No. 1 (20 blocks).	50 lbs.	1	20 blocks, demolition, M5A1 (2½-lb comp C–4).
FOXTROT FOXTROT	Electric Demolition Unit No. 2.	740 lbs	14	1. One electric demolition unit No. 1. 2. 250 caps, blasting, special, electric, Type II, J2, PETN, packed 50 per box. 3. One detonating cord unit. 4. Twelve demolitions units No. 1.
GOLF ECHO	Anti-Personnel Mines, No. 3.	45 lbs	1	15 weapons, AP, M18, Claymore.

MEDICAL

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
INDIA JULIET	Narcotics Unit	20 lbs	1	1. 120 boxes morphine sulfate, 15-mg syrette, 5 per box. 2. Six boxes of nalorphine hydrochloride injection, six per box. 3. 24 bottles of codeine phosphate, 30-mg tablet, 10 per bottle. 4. Six bottles of meperidine hydrochloride, small.
JULIET OSCAR	Typhoid Immunization	18 lbs	1	50 vials of typhoid—paratyphoid vaccine, 50-cc vial.
JULIET XRAY	Gamma Globulin	10 lbs	1	Ten bottles of globulin, immune serum, 10-cc bottle.

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WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
MIKE HOTEL	Sniper Rifle (6)	165 lbs	3	1. Two rifles, cal .30, M1C, complete (23 lbs). 2. 480 rds, cartridge, AP, cal .30, 8-rd clips in bandoleers, packed in ammunition can, M–8 (2 cans, 32 lbs).
NOVEMBER CHARLIE	Rifle Ammunition No. 1 (2880 rds).	192 lbs	3	960 rds, cartridge, AP, cal .30, 20-rd cartons, packed in ammunition can, M8 (4 cans, 64 lbs).
NOVEMBER PAPA	Grenade No. 1 (50 rds)	60 lbs	1	50 grenades, hand, fragmentation, M26 (T38E1), packed in individual containers (60 lbs).

QUARTERMASTER

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
QUEBEC BRAVC	Clothing Equipment—100 personnel.	2100 lbs	50	Consists of 50 two-man units.
ROMEO BRAVO	Rations, Indigenous Personnel—500 men.	8500 lbs	170	High fat content meat or canned fish, poultry, sugar, tobacco, salt, coffee, or tea, grain, flour or rice, accessory items, and water purification tablets (50 lbs).
ROMEO ECHO	Packet, barter	500 lbs	10	50-lb packages.

SIGNAL

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
UNIFORM ECHO	Flashlights (20)	45 lbs	1	1. 20 flashlights (15 lbs). 2. 120 batteries, BA 30 (30 lbs).
UNIFORM HOTEL	Radio Set AN/PRC-77(2)	99 lbs	1	1. Two AN/PRC-77 complete (47 lbs). 2. 12 batteries, BA-4386 (52 lbs).
UNIFORM OSCAR	Telephones Sound Powered	45 lbs	1	1. 3 Reel Equipment, CE-11 (15 lbs). 2. 3 Spools, DR-8, with 3/8 mi WD-1/TT (30 lbs).

SPECIAL

Code	Unit designation	Unit wt	No. pkgs.	Unit data contents
XRAY ALPHA	River Crossing Unit No. 1	50 lbs	1	1. Five life rafts, inflatable, one-person capacity, with CO_2 cylinder and accessory kit. 2. Five life preservers, yoke with gas cylinder. 3. Five paddles, boat, 5 feet long.

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CHAPTER 3

(U) SECTION IV
MEDICAL

The goals of medical operations in unconventional warfare are to conserve the fighting strength of the guerrilla forces and to assist in securing the support of the local populace for the US and resistance forces operating within the UWOA. Resistance medical support must be mobile, responsive, and effective in preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. For the guerrilla, there is no safe "rear" area where he may take his casualties for treatment; wounded and ill personnel become a tactical rather than a logistical problem. The Special Forces commander will find that medical support is a major tactical consideration in all operations.

The initial area assessment determines the actual extent of guerrilla medical training, availability of medical supplies and facilities, and the state of sanitation and health within the UWOA. On a continuing basis, the area assessment will include consideration of the diseases and local medical customs within the area of operations. Prior to offering medical assistance or acknowledgement of a request for medical treatment, consideration should be given to the customs and taboos of the ethnic group concerned and the medical support available.

The first medical activity, after infiltration, may be the most effective means to establish rapport with resistance elements. Upon initial contact, the medic by his actions affords an almost immediate entry into the less-than-hospitable environment in which Special Forces may find itself. Each medical act can be an effective presentation of credibility. The success of all future missions of the Special Forces element will depend on the rapport initially established with the resistance force.

A broad range of medical support may be available in the UWOA. Within guerrilla base areas, treatment may initially be limited to rudimentary medical procedures such as first aid and personal hygiene. Historically, some guerrilla forces have developed highly organized and effective medical support units and installations. Their organizations have paralleled those of conventional forces and have included field hospitals located in inaccessible areas. They have recruited doctors, nurses, and technical personnel from the civilian population, and have obtained medical supplies from the local populace, from raids, and from external sources. In addition, facilities staffed by members of the auxiliary may be located where the local population is sympathetic to the resistance movement and patients may be held in a convalescent status or may be given supportive care until they can be evacuated to more advanced treatment facilities.

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1 TRAINING

Medical training is important. The Special Forces medical specialist must select and begin to train unit level medics at the earliest opportunity. He must develop training programs for all the different working skills that will be needed in the guerrilla medical system. All guerrilla members must be indoctrinated with the principles of "self help and buddy aid."

The guerrilla force must also be trained in preventive medicine procedures which include basic sanitation, personal hygiene, and individual protective measures. Specific attention will be given to the use of drugs to suppress disease, immunizations, food and water sanitation, individual methods of protection against insect and snake bites, and the sanitary disposal of human wastes.

2 INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence collection is an inherent capability of medical personnel. The activities of medical personnel in treating members of the local population and ministering to the sick and wounded, including PW's, provide many opportunities to collect combat intelligence; for example, information on the effects of the environmental improvement program, the effects of propaganda on the populace; and information on weapons, equipment, medical supply, and morale.

3 SUPPLY

Prior planning to provide the minimum essential medical supplies and equipment for current, planned, and contingent operations is mandatory. Based on the area assessment, and as the development of the resistance force medical organization



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progresses, medical supplies are phased into the UWOA by the Special Forces element. Excess medical stocks should be maintained at the SFOB to expedite prompt resupply or delivery for unexpected requirements. Medical items are ordered through use of the Catalog Supply System.

There should be minimum dependence on the local economy. Although it may be possible to purchase some medical supplies on the civilian economy, such items will probably be scarce and in great demand. The use/storage of medical supplies must be strictly controlled since they are potential black market items. Captured medical supplies should be returned to the guerrilla base for redistribution.

4 HOSPITALIZATION

As the resistance movement expands, it may be more efficient from a medical standpoint to establish a centralized system to provide advanced medical care. Small, isolated, and well hidden treatment and holding facilities should be established in relatively secure areas. These will, of necessity, impose tactical limitations on the commander. There must be alternate sites for all facilities. All facilities must be protected by a warning net. For hospital operations, the guerrilla will again depend on the auxiliary. Simple, battle-tested, basic surgical principles will be practiced.

When necessary, the auxiliary and the underground may assist in the infiltration of civilian medical personnel and equipment into guerrilla base areas. Coercion may be applied to nonsympathetic medical personnel if their services are absolutely necessary. In some instances, the auxiliary may arrange hospitalization in widely scattered private homes where periodic visits can be made by medical personnel. As the UWOA expands, the services of civilian professional medical personnel and the medical facilities located in villages and towns within the UWOA may be available during certain hours, if not for complete and continued hospitalization.

5 EVACUATION

Since evacuation within and from the UWOA is normally difficult, guerrilla commanders must rely on their own resources, as well as auxiliary and underground support in planning the evacuation of casualties. All plans must include instructions for emergency treatment and evacuation.

Every effort is made to evacuate wounded personnel from the scene of action. Evacuation to forward aid stations must be rapid, because the presence of wounded severely limits the guerrillas' ability to clear the battlefield swiftly. The condition of wounded guerrillas, however, may preclude movement with the unit to the base. In this event, the wounded are hidden in a covered location and the local auxiliary unit is notified. The local auxiliary then cares for and hides the wounded until they can be returned to their own organizations. In no case should a disabled

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patient be admitted to an evasion and escape net. For such a net to function, it requires a high degree of compartmentalization and individual agent ignorance as to its organization. A disabled man would not be able to negotiate each segment of the net by himself, and requiring assistance, he could compromise the whole net.

The evacuation of dead from the scene of action is most important for security reasons. The identification of the dead by the enemy may jeopardize the safety of their families as well as that of their units. The bodies of those killed in action are evacuated, cached until they can be recovered for proper burial, or disposed of by whatever means is consistent with the customs of the local population.

As the operational area develops and the overall situation favors the sponsor, evacuation of the sick and wounded to friendly areas may be feasible. This lightens the burden upon the meager facilities available to the area command and provides a higher standard of medical care for the patient. Whenever possible, wounded or sick Americans should be evacuated to a safe area for possible exfiltration from the UWOA. The same is true of key guerrilla and resistance leaders. Each case will have to be evaluated against the risk of compromising the overall resistance force mission. A strict system of priorities for evacuation from the UWOA will be established by the SFOB.

In some cases the local population may not be able to support the area command with qualified medical personnel. As the requirement for doctors and specialized personnel increases, the SFOB may have to provide a Special Forces medical team, over and above the operational element's organic medics, to establish and operate a Special Forces guerrilla hospital.

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6 THE SPECIAL FORCES GUERRILLA HOSPITAL

A Special Forces guerrilla hospital is a medical treatment facility, or complex of facilities, providing in-patient medical support to guerrilla troops and other members of the resistance movement. The hospital is usually located in the UWOA it supports. The guerrilla hospital will rarely, if ever, outwardly resemble a conventional hospital. The requirements for strict security, flexibility, and rapid mobility preclude visible comparison with conventional military or civilian medical facilities. Medical capabilities will vary from the primitive to the sophisticated depending on:

- Mission of the unconventional warfare forces.
- Availability of personnel, equipment and supplies, and facilities.
- Enemy counterguerrilla activities.
- Training and experience of medical officers assigned to the guerrilla hospital facility.

STAFFING

The guerrilla hospital's medical complement will vary in number and type depending on the mission and the level of desired medical sophistication. Nonmedical personnel must be attached to provide security, communications, and logistical support. Personnel are obtained in one of three ways:

- Solely from indigenous resistance forces.
- Solely from the sponsoring power.
- From both indigenous forces and the sponsoring power.

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ORGANIZATION

The organization must be tailored to meet the requirements of, and conditions within, the UWOA. However, two requirements must be met:

- The assignment of fully qualified enlisted Special Forces medical specialists. The entire guerrilla hospital concept is predicated on the multiple capabilities of the Special Forces medical specialist.
- The assignment of a minimum of two Special Forces qualified medical officers.

A guerrilla hospital consists of a number of sections. These sections are normally not all physically collocated, but may be widely dispersed. The sections include, but are not limited to:

Command and Control Section. Provides command over hospital personnel, supervision of hospital functions, possesses communications with the tactical commander exercising operational control, and provides hospital security.

Logistics Section. Provides logistical support to include transportation and graves registration.

Sorting Section. Establishes and maintains one or more sites which serve as staging areas for limited medical care and movement of patients and supplies to the treatment section. For security, these sites are the only geographic contact the guerrilla has with the guerrilla hospital.

Treatment Section. Provides medical and surgical care as well as immediate postoperative care.

Convalescent Section. Establishes sites at which care is provided to guerrillas no longer requiring the more intensive support provided by the treatment section. Such sites increase the dispersion of patients. Depending on the condition of guerrillas placed in convalescent sites, guerrilla hospital personnel may not be required to continually staff the sites.

Outstaging Section. Establishes a site or sites to which guerrillas may be transported once they have received maximum benefit from hospitalization. Such sites are basically unmanned geographic points used as drop-off locations from which patients may return to their units.

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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The senior Special Forces tactical commander in the UWOA supported by the guerrilla hospital exercises operational control over the hospital. The hospital itself is normally commanded by the senior Special Forces medical officer assigned.

The guerrilla hospital is not a Special Forces TOE organization. It is staffed by Special Forces medical personnel provided by the SFOB. Whenever possible, indigenous resistance forces must be used to augment the Special Forces staff to the maximum feasible extent.

EMPLOYMENT

The guerrilla hospital should be infiltrated early during the organization and buildup stages of a sponsored resistance movement. It must be ready for maximum operation upon the start of combat employment of guerrilla forces and continue to provide medical support until directed otherwise.

The decision to employ a guerrilla hospital is made by the SFOB based on the request and area assessment of the Special Forces commander in the UWOA. This assessment should include the availability of local medical facilities, supplies, and auxiliary forces for augmentation of the hospital staff.


After infiltration, the guerrilla hospital staff conducts a reconnaissance for possible hospital sites and coordinates the training of resistance members who will support hospital operations. The following factors must be considered:

Location. The guerrilla hospital should be located in the most secure area accessible to all guerrilla casualties in the supported UWOA. Preexisting structures may be used when feasible. Selection of locations must be made within the constraints of security, topography, distance, mobility, facilities, and enemy counterguerrilla activities. Normally, the guerrilla hospital will not be collocated with the Special Forces or guerrilla operational base camps. Use of sanctuary nation territory should be considered.

Security. Strict security measures must be implemented to protect the covert or clandestine nature of hospital operations. Adequate cover may be required for hospital personnel, especially in urban situations. Security compromises not only lead to apprehension of guerrilla hospital staff, patients, and supplies, but may compromise members of the auxiliary, the

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


underground, and the entire Special Forces operation. The hospital's treatment section is to be considered the hospital center. Individuals staffing sorting sites should not be privy to the location of the treatment center. For example, patients in the sorting site will be transported to the treatment section only by permanent staff members of that section.

Communications. To maintain adequate medical support and insure survival, rapid communications between the hospital commander and the Special Forces commander exercising operational control are essential. This facilitates the coordination of hospital movement, reception of casualties and supplies, requests for support, and dissemination of intelligence. Communication security is of utmost importance.

Supplies. Adequate medical supplies for initial hospital operation must accompany the Special Forces medical team upon infiltration. Prior plans must provide for automatic and on-call medical resupply. The maximum use of locally available supplies is advised. Coordination with indigenous resistance forces must be made to obtain rations for patients treated by the hospital.

The guerrilla hospital must be prepared to respond to any contingency. It must depend upon innovative approaches, field expedients, and local resources to accomplish its mission.



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UNCLASSIFIED

CHAPTER 3

(U) SECTION V
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are applicable to guerrilla warfare as well as all other aspects of UW, and must be integrated into all tactical planning. PSYOP is salesmanship used to develop a weak cause and make a strong cause stronger. The cause must be sold and taught to others to sell. If this is not done, chances for success are slim. When properly applied, PSYOP can:

- Create unity.
- Maintain morale.
- Add to the determination of resistance forces.
- Develop sympathy for the resistance among uncommitted segments of the population.

Special Forces must have a thorough knowledge of PSYOP fundamentals and capabilities, and the imagination to adapt to the operational environment. In the UWOA, the Special Forces element must be prepared to advise the area command on PSYOP programs, to train selected resistance members in the application of PSYOP, and to initiate its own PSYOP programs.

Intelligence is the life blood of effective psychological operations. Special Forces deployed in contact with guerrilla forces are in a position to gather the kind of intelligence that bears most intimately upon the attitudes of the people at grass-roots level. Propaganda programs which are shaped without extensive knowledge of feelings and persuasions of human target groups are not likely to succeed.

The presence of Special Forces in a UWOA has a psychological impact on the resistance and on segments of the population. Special Forces activities and individual conduct, in particular, help to offset unfavorable attitudes of neutral or superficially hostile segments of the population. The psychological effect of every action or activity on all segments of the population is an important planning consideration. Action programs include those area command operations which are designed to have a psychological effect on a specific target audience. Some combat actions may be initiated solely to raise the morale of the guerrillas or to demonstrate guerrilla support of the people.

These psychological programs must carry the backing of the United States and its allies. Having appropriate guidance emanate from US authorities at theater or higher level demonstrates this. Joint directives issued by US and indigenous guerrilla leaders or a credible government-in-exile give additional force to the

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action programs. Operations initiated primarily for their psychological effects may include:

- Ambushes and raids, sniper campaigns, and interdiction operations.
- Assisting the civilian populace by sharing medical services and supplies, and providing sanctuary to civilian supporters of the resistance.
- Warning the civilian population of impending aircraft or missile attacks in the local area. These warnings imply guerrilla control over the operation and increase the civilians' belief in the strength of the guerrilla force.
- Encouraging portions of the civilian populace to resist regulations, laws, or restrictions imposed by enemy authorities.
- Organizing supporting elements in all target groups by conducting intensive education or indoctrination programs.
- Providing manpower and skills to assist the local populace in repairing or building needed structures, harvesting crops, maintaining schools and churches, and organizing social activity groups *when the operational situation permits.*
- Special Forces personnel, when feasible, directly contacting local civilians. This will provide additional evidence that the guerrillas are supported by the United States and that all are working in the interest of the populace.
- Organizing front organizations within target groups of the populace.

An understanding of the target audience and its relation to the sequence of PSYOP activities is essential to Special Forces success in unconventional warfare operations. The message, the media, and the method employed are derived from and based on the target audience.

1 TARGET AUDIENCE

Propaganda and information efforts are directed at the target audience to maintain or change existing favorable/unfavorable attitudes and behavior. Target audiences are selected based on personal observation and discussion by Special Forces with the resistance elements. PSYOP efforts are aimed at producing specific desirable actions and attitudes. Target audiences in the UWOA are:

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ENEMY MILITARY FORCES

Enemy military forces may be of the same nationality as the population or they may represent an occupying foreign power. Psychological operations programs are directed against this group to cause its members to feel isolated, improperly supported, doubtful of the outcome of the struggle, and unsure of the morality of their cause. By focusing on the enemy soldier's frustrations, PSYOP can lower his morale, reduce his effectiveness, and create a feeling of inadequacy, insecurity, and fear. This feeling of inadequacy and fear tends to increase his susceptibility to psychological operations, and may make him more vulnerable to persuasion, surrender, malingering, disaffection, or desertion.

PERSONS SYMPATHETIC TO THE ENEMY

Enemy supporters include those civilians in an operational area who willingly collaborate with the enemy, those who collaborate with the enemy under duress, and those civilians whose actions may be passive but whose sympathies are with the occupying power. Psychological operations programs directed against this group must be carefully oriented. The broad psychological obejctives, however, are the same as for those directed against enemy military forces. A program to instill doubt and fear may be conducted in conjunction with a positive political action program. Programs are conducted to identify and discredit the collaborator, or weaken the collaborator's belief in the strength and power of the enemy military forces. Punitive action against collaborators may result in reprisals by the enemy and consequent loss of broad civilian support for psychological operations objectives; however, overreaction by the enemy can, when skillfully exploited, build popular support for the guerrilla cause. Special Forces will not take part in nor condone those punitive actions which are contrary to the rules of land warfare or US national policy.

THE UNCOMMITTED

In the initial stage of hostilities, the population may be neutral or even actively opposed to the resistance effort because of fear or uncertainty about the aims of the movement or its eventual success. Under the best of conditions, therefore, the populace is caught between the demands and controls of the enemy force and those of the guerrillas. Accordingly, the psychological operations programs must stress that the guerrillas share the political and social goals of the population, that the United States and its allies in supporting the guerrilla force support these same goals, and that the resistance movement will be successful.

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PERSONS SYMPATHETIC TO THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Resistance supporters include those civilians who are sympathetic toward the goals of the movement but who are not active members of some element of the resistance force. The object here is to provide moral support and tactical instruction on what is to be done and how to do it. PSYOP programs directed at this target audience stress appeals for the populace to support or cooperate passively with the resistance force in achieving common objectives. The members of the movement must follow a code of conduct which insures that the people and their needs are always respected; that the people can always count on the movement for help and protection from all enemies, natural and human; and that the movement is the instrument of political, social, and economic progress.

2 THE MESSAGE

When writing a message for the various target audiences, the theme of the message, as well as the objectives of the PSYOP campaign, must be carefully considered. Each message is created with a distinct purpose in mind and is skillfully designed to accomplish that purpose. In developing the message, it should be:

- Based on the social values and experiences of the specific target audience, not those of the writer.
- Directed to specific audiences within the target country rather than to the public at large.
- Designed to exploit the existing attitudes of the audience rather than attempt to effect a complete change in attitudes.
- Realistic; claims should not exceed the limits of belief of the audience.

A message can take many forms:

- Words, spoken or written.
- Music, arrangements and vocals.
- Pictures.
- Gifts.
- Theatrical performances, pantomine or dance.
- Combinations of several of these forms.

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3 THE MEDIA

In directing a message at a target audience, the communications media available and the level of literacy must first be determined. Some media which should be considered are:

RADIO

External radio broadcasts may be directed to various audiences within a target country. Within the country, the resistance may use clandestine radio to broadcast for short periods on popular channels. It may also interrupt or jam enemy radio broadcasts.

One important advantage of radio is, of course, that one does not have to be literate in order to hear and understand radio broadcasts. This medium, however, has some disadvantages. To be sure that the target group listens, the resistance must find a way to inform the audience of the time and channel on which the illicit broadcast will be made. Furthermore, broadcasts by low-power portable transmitters have limited range. Enemy radio-locating equipment can pinpoint the position of a transmitter, forcing the resistance to change the frequency and the site of the transmitter frequently.

PRINTED MATERIAL

The advantage of printed material is that it can be used and reused by passing it on from person to person. Clandestine newspapers and leaflets can be used to disseminate information concerning collaborators and traitors, techniques of sabotage, war aims and policies of the resistance, and a variety of other messages.

Written materials do present certain problems. Large quantities of paper, ink, and other supplies are required for continuing publication, and strict controls are usually imposed on printing materials and presses. Also, the distribution of printed matter requires a complex and coordinated effort if the material and the distributors are not to be intercepted. Finally, the possession of subversive literature is hazardous to readers

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as well as distributors. The most difficult problems in running an underground newspaper are staffing it with reporters, printers, and distributors, and finding a safe place to print it. In some cases, newspapers may be printed outside the country. News is often obtained from foreign broadcasts via short-wave. Where presses and printing materials are licensed or under close surveillance, chain letters have been used effectively to communicate information to a large segment of the population.

Within the UWOA, guerrilla forces may not have the facilities to produce large amounts of printed material. However, Special Forces may supply lightweight, portable printing equipment or devise field expedients which can produce a limited number of leaflets, posters, or bulletins for the guerrilla force.

SYMBOLIC DEVICES

Another way to transmit information and harass the enemy is by symbolic devices such as slogans or symbols written on walls or in public places which are convenient to the target groups. Antigovernment slogans and messages can be displayed on walls in such a way that they cannot easily be eradicated. Jokes and cartoons carry great impact and are an effective way of conveying disrespect and resistance in a socially acceptable manner.

FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATIONS

In countries where a large portion of the population is illiterate and few radio receivers are available, word-of-mouth messages are the principal means of communication. Agitators circulating in crowds, spreading rumors, and appealing for aid to the resistance can be effective. Face-to-face communications have the advantage that the message is usually spread by people who know each other, and, therefore, it gains credibility. Another advantage is the fact that the messages, though subversive in content, may not sound subversive when presented by the agent, and there are no materials to incriminate the agent. A big disadvantage, however, is that the message may be distorted or may never reach the target group.

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In effect, all members of the Special Forces operational element and the resistance force are used as active propagandists within the limits of security. Depending on the situation and the target audience, face-to-face communications can be the most effective means of communicating propaganda messages. It enables the psychological operator to design his appeals for specific targets and to judge, by direct observation, the response to, and effect of, his propaganda appeals. Thus, he can respond immediately to audience reaction.

Rumor can be an effective propaganda device, but requires extreme skill and care in its use. Although rumors are difficult to control and are virtually impossible to trace, the target audience can never be specifically isolated. Since rumors may also be used by the enemy, those which are detrimental to the guerrilla effort may be countered by leaflets or face-to-face meetings with selected members of the civilian populace.

ENTERTAINMENT

Forms of entertainment which are traditional or popular in the area of operations are excellent potential media. They usually draw full audience attention, are well received, and lend themselves to the communication of PSYOP messages. Such forms as pantomine, dance, and music employ universal sounds and symbols. When Special Forces sponsor such performances, the good will and favorable attitudes created can lead to desired actions. In this case, the target audience must identify with the host government and not Special Forces.

GIFTS

Gifts can be used to carry propaganda messages. Such items as soap, matches, salt, needles and thread, seeds, clothing, and other items of value make suitable gifts which are acceptable for general distribution. These gifts should be printed on or be wrapped in a piece of paper containing a propaganda message or symbol which conveys the meaning desired. In selecting the gifts, be sure that the gifts are useful and that the use of symbols or messages do not antagonize the receiver. For example, it may be in poor taste to have a piece of soap wrapped in a leaflet containing a copy of the recipient's national flag. The sender must be aware of countermeasures which the enemy may take, such as giving gifts of food which are poisonous and attributing the gifts to the resistance.

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The effectiveness of PSYOP must be continually assessed to provide a basis for future operations. In Special Forces operations, partial or complete estimates of PSYOP effectiveness can be based on conferences, conversations, and personal observations. The most significant indicator of an effective PSYOP effort is the degree to which the people support the resistance force. Support can be measured by the amount of intelligence, recruits, food, and materials furnished by the people.

The level of support (effectiveness) must be considered in the light of the freedom of action available to the target audience. Where PSYOP missions require a series of actions over a long period of time, the desired audience behavior normally will be extremely difficult to discern and estimate. In these instances, PSYOP intelligence requirements for assessing effectiveness are extensive and continuing. Assessments provide the basis for adjusting and improving methods, developing and revising plans, and setting new PSYOP objectives.

Lessons from past history show that resistance movements have used coercion, threats, and terrorism to obtain the support of undecided or uncommitted people when persuasion alone had failed. Special Forces must understand that these techniques are not sanctioned by the US government. In advising guerrilla forces, Special Forces must make every effort to persuade them against the use of these techniques.

For PSYOP planning, use FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations.*

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CHAPTER 3

(U) SECTION VI
CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Civil Affairs is the relationship between military commanders and civilians. UW operations depend upon the support of the people. By virtue of this dependence, UW has a need for Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs assistance provided to Special Forces UW operations consists of advising, assisting, or directing the implementation of measures to:

- Obtain increased civilian support for the resistance.
- Exploit enemy political and economic weaknesses.
- Deny popular support to the enemy.
- Provide essential goods and services to the civilian populace in areas under resistance control.
- Establish control over the civilian populace in areas under resistance control or influence.
- Prepare for establishing control over the civilian populace by friendly or civil government upon liberation.

1 TRAINING

Civil Affairs functions may be performed by Special Forces or by Civil Affairs personnel working with Special Forces in the UWOA.

CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING FOR SPECIAL FORCES

Special Forces should be trained in the application of Civil Affairs techniques and understand Civil Affairs roles and functions. Training should include:

- Techniques to gain civilian support for the resistance movement.
- Organizations for civilian administrative and logistic support of UW operations.

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
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- Guidance to establish and maintain favorable relations with the resistance movement and the local populace.
- Advice and guidance to deal with local political leaders.
- Familiarization with programs that can be implemented in the early phases of UW operations to ease transition of control of resistance forces during and after linkup.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TRAINING FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS

To support UW operations Civil Affairs should receive instruction in the following:

- UW operations and their correlation to the overall military-political objectives of the unified command.
- The interrelationship between UW and CA activities.
- Organization and functions for the conduct of UW operations.
- Special Forces training for those who are to work directly with Special Forces operational elements.



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2 SUPPORT ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE UWOA

Civil Affairs may support UW operations from areas under friendly control by:

- Locating former occupants of the UWOA to obtain information about the UWOA and to recruit these individuals for employment in UW operations.
- Identifying and assisting in the procurement of resources indigenous to the UWOA.
- Advising and assisting a friendly government indigenous to the UWOA that is operating in exile.

3 SUPPORT WITHIN THE UWOA

During the initial organization and buildup of a resistance force, civil affairs tasks within the UWOA are normally performed by the Special Forces operational element. Additional civil affairs support may be furnished from the SFOB by planning and acquiring local resources needed by the resistance force. When the scope and complexity of civil affairs operations exceed its capability, the Special Forces operational element may request augmentation of Civil Affairs specialists.

4 SUPPORT TO THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Civil Affairs supports the resistance movement by:

- Conducting analyses and providing guidance to exploit enemy political, economic, and social vulnerabilities.
  - Conduct analyses and provide advice concerning vulnerability and recuperability of enemy communications, transportation systems, public utilities, and industry for attack by guerrilla forces or for subversion and sabotage by the underground.

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- In conjunction with psychological operations, conduct analyses to identify enemy political, economic, and social shortcomings and inequities. Civil Affairs programs may be developed to demonstrate the resistance movement's resolve to correct such deficiences thereby rallying support for the resistance cause.
- Examine enemy systems, such as transportation and communications systems, to determine how these may be used to the advantage of the resistance.

- Obtaining increased support for the resistance movement.
  - Identify potential sources of supplies and coordinate their acquisition. Resistance forces should be made aware not to overexploit the local populace. If the civilian community is tasked for support beyond its reasonable capability, the populace may become disaffected with the resistance movement.
  - Develop means of financing and paying for locally procured resources.
  - Establish light industry in the resistance controlled area. Advise, assist, or direct the development and operation of facilities for the repair and manufacture of items needed by the resistance movement such as weapons, explosive devices, communications equipment, field equipment, and uniforms.

5 SUPPORT TO THE CIVILIAN POPULACE

During a resistance movement's formative stage, Civil Affairs support to the local populace is normally of a very rudimentary nature. Projects during this phase should be aimed at eliciting the support of the local populace. Consequently, short term, high impact projects with which the populace is able to identify should be selected. Public health programs and civic action projects conducted by the resistance force are ideal.

With the growth of the resistance movement and its area of control, Civil Affairs support may become more comprehensive and sophisticated. The resistance movement may develop its own governmental structure and

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become involved in providing all the commodities and services needed by a normal civilian community.

6 LINKUP

During linkup, Civil Affairs works with the resistance movement and the conventional ground force to advise, assist, or direct measures to:

- Establish law and order in the area. The guerrilla force and other resistance elements may:
  - Assist in apprehending known collaborators.
  - Secure supply and equipment depots.
  - Establish and man checkpoints and control points.
  - Perform related police and public safety duties on an interim basis.
- Meet the immediate needs of the local populace, e.g., providing essential medical treatment, food, clothing, and shelter.

When linkup operations between friendly conventional forces and US-sponsored resistance forces have been completed, consideration is given to retraining resistance forces for further employment in a combat or combat support role or to demobilizing them.

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CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS

1 COMMAND AND CONTROL
2 TYPE MISSIONS
3 INTELLIGENCE
4 EQUIPMENT
5 ORGANIZATION

SECTION II
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1 CONCEPT
2 OPERATIONS
- Intelligence Operations
- Psychological Operations
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- Operations Against Insurgent Base Areas
- Operations Against Interior Infiltration Routes
- Remote Area Operations
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- Border Operations

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CHAPTER 4

SECTION I

(C) SPECIAL OPERATIONS (U)

(C) Special operations are sensitive actions of a specified nature initiated in the face of emergency or strategic contingency. If disclosed, these actions could embarrass or discredit the sponsoring government, or if discovered, could endanger, expose, or otherwise limit the effectiveness of such operations. Special operations are normally limited in scope and duration, and may be conducted during periods of peace or hostility in urban, rural, or remote areas. Because of their sensitivity, special operations are only directed by the National Command Authority (NCA).

(U) The maturity, experience, flexibility, and multiplicity of skills inherent in Special Forces provide the National Command Authority (NCA) and the National Security Council (NSC) a **reliable** force option, available in a **minimum time** and offering **high assurance** for executing politically volatile missions which must be conducted in a highly sensitive environment.

(U) Special operations may be executed:

- Unilaterally by Special Forces.
- Jointly by Special Forces and indigenous assets.
- Unilaterally by indigenous assets—trained and directed by Special Forces.




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1 (C) COMMAND AND CONTROL (U)

Special operations command and control mechanisms are unique and will vary with each mission, according to mission requirements. Special Forces operational elements may report directly to the highest levels of authority or through a JUWTF or JTF. Possible command and control arrangements are shown in the following illustration:



2 (U) TYPE MISSIONS

Special Forces may be tasked to perform the following special operations:

INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS	• Collect strategic and tactical intelligence through reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. • Collect technical information.

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STRATEGIC TARGET MISSIONS	• Conduct electronic target acquisition/designation. • Plan and execute attacks on critical strategic targets using conventional or special munitions. • Call for and adjust air, naval, or artillery fire on observed targets. • Abduct selected personnel.
RESCUE AND RECOVERY MISSIONS	• Rescue US or allied citizens from sensitive environments. • Liberate PW's and political prisoners. • Locate, identify, and extract personnel not detained, e.g., downed aircrews, political or military leaders who have expressed a desire to be placed under US control, and other selected personnel. • Locate, identify, and recover sensitive items, e.g., nuclear weapons, satellites, classified documents, etc.
ANTI-TERROR MISSIONS	• Advise and assist in hostage rescue operations. • Assess vulnerability of installations to terrorist attacks. • Advise and assist on measures to prevent terrorist acts. • Provide advice on security for critical installations and systems.

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- Attack terrorist installations and personnel to preclude their continued threat.
- Locate, identify, and recover sensitive items stolen by terrorist groups.

3 (C) INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) The sensitivity of special operations requires current, accurate target intelligence and access to all-source intelligence to permit detailed mission planning. Once deployed, the operational element is dependent on this intelligence for making sound decisions on any contingency that could effect mission accomplishment.

(C) Operational elements will be debriefed after each special operations mission. Valuable strategic and tactical intelligence and technical information may be uncovered through these debriefings.

(U) The principles of OPSEC, discussed earlier in this manual, also apply to all phases of special operations. Strict security discipline is required to avoid compromise.

4 (C) EQUIPMENT (U)

Special operations missions may require the use of nonattributable weapons, communications, clothing, and other specialized items. When required, non-attributable equipment will be procured in sufficient quantities to insure that each operational element receives adequate training in their use and repair prior to commitment. All clothing must conform to the styles of the operational area and not be conspicuous.

Non-attributable equipment must be procured in such a manner so as not to reflect its final destination nor the unit that will be using it. All equipment which would indicate the nature or area of the operation will be transported in unmarked containers and will receive the same security classification and handling as the operation itself.


In addition to non-attributable equipment, certain missions may require the procurement and use of specialized equipment such as:

- Sensor devices.
- Beacon/transponders.

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- Wire tap equipment.
- Special weapons, including those with silencers.
- Cache containers and related equipment.
- Special demolitions.
- STANO equipment.



5 (C) ORGANIZATION (U)

The Airborne Special Forces Group (U)

(U) A provisional or composite operational element may be formed from resources within the airborne Special Forces group. Because of the probability of having to decimate several organic operational detachments to form this type unit, planners or commanders should consider this solution only after weighing all probabilities and alternatives carefully. Only the number of Special Forces personnel required to perform the mission will be deployed. This number will vary depending on the type and duration of the mission.

Special Forces Operational Detachment "D" (Airborne) (U)

(U) The concept and establishment of this unit (TOE 31-104H) within Special Forces to provide an appropriate worldwide response to highly sensitive situations including acts of international terrorism was authorized and approved by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

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(C) This organization provides a highly specialized force, rich in rank structure, built upon small teams which contain mature, professionally trained, psychologically prepared individuals capable of making on-the-spot judgments in highly sensitive situations. It has the capability to operate alone in low visibility situations or it may operate in conjunction with a larger US force when required.


(U) MISSION

To plan and conduct special operations in a highly sensitive environment as directed by the National Command Authority (NCA).

(U) ASSIGNMENT

Assigned to the Department of the Army.

(U) ORGANIZATION



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(U) CAPABILITIES

This unit can (U):

- Provide command, control, administration, and supervision of assigned and attached elements.
- Provide subordinate elements to conduct worldwide special operations in support of national interest.
- Provide a viable, standing force that offers the National Command Authority and the National Security Council a high degree of assurance for the prompt and successful execution of those missions which must be conducted in a highly sensitive environment.
- Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified areas by land, air, and sea.
- Operate in remote areas and hostile environments with minimal external support.
- Plan and conduct special operations.
- Provide an organic training base for selection and training of operational personnel.
- Provide limited communications support to operational elements.

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Special operations are so varied and complex that they could only be discussed in broad, general terms. Because they are politically sensitive and require low visibility, detailed operational planning guidance will be provided from the highest command levels for each mission. Specific organizational, logistical, and intelligence requirements as well as the tactics to be used depend on the mission, situation, and preparation time available. Special Forces must maintain readiness for these operations by intensive training.

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CHAPTER 4

(U) SECTION II
FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Foreign internal defense is defined as:

> Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
>
> JCS Pub 1

The Special Forces role in foreign internal defense is directed and undertaken within the framework of US security assistance programs under the following conditions:

- When the mission is necessary because of a threat to US national interests.
- When the threatened country is capable of using US assistance.
- When the threatened country requests US assistance.

1 CONCEPT

A Special Forces group may be augmented with highly specialized skills needed to assist a host country to develop internal defense, i.e., civil affairs, psychological operations, medical, military police, and engineer. A Special Forces group so augmented can provide mobile training teams (MTT's) to:

- Train, advise, and assist host country:

  REGULAR FORCES

  PARAMILITARY OR IRREGULAR FORCES

  GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

- Temporarily expand and complement US security assistance efforts.

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Special Forces foreign internal defense missions must support the host country's internal defense and internal development (IDAD) plans. Internal defense and internal development are defined as:

INTERNAL DEFENSE

The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

JCS Pub 1

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society.

JCS Pub 1

2 OPERATIONS

US Army Special Forces, in conjunction with host country forces, can conduct:

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Military intelligence operations, in coordination with other host country government agencies, must be started as early as possible during an expected or actual insurgency. Intelligence provides the basis for all military operations. Of particular importance are intelligence operations devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Since both government forces and insurgent forces need the support of the people to accomplish their programs, psychological operations are a major factor in IDAD operations. Military units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national level guidance.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

Civil affairs operations include every activity of command concerned with relationships between the military, civil authorities, and the population. They range from the informal, day-to-day, community relations activities of individuals to the planned and organized operations of entire units. Military forces may perform specified functions of government or may exercise certain authority which is normally the responsibility of the local government.

One aspect of civil affairs is military civic action. To improve the image of the military with the civilian population, indigenous military forces can contribute to economic and social development by undertaking projects such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. US Army Special Forces may, at times, advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS

Essential populace and resources control measures that conform to legal codes must be established and enforced justly and firmly. Basically police-type operations, they are designed to protect the populace and deny resources to the insurgent. Included are measures to deny infiltration of arms and equipment into the country. These operations may include population control measures such as documentation of individuals and families, curfews, and movement control. Resources may be controlled through rationing and price controls and also movement controls such as licensing and checkpoint operations. Controls should be limited to critical items and closely supervised and enforced in a way that does not alienate the populace.

OPERATIONS AGAINST INSURGENT BASE AREAS

These operations are designed to separate the insurgent force from its support, destroy facilities and forces, and to interrupt training, rest, and reequipping. Operations against insurgent base areas are frequently conducted in conjunction with combat operations by regular forces.



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OPERATIONS AGAINST INTERIOR INFILTRATION ROUTES

Operations are conducted to deny or limit insurgent movement. Detection of enemy movement or the location of infiltration routes, crossing sites, and support facilities is followed by attack, ambush, or destruction, as appropriate.

REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS

Operations may be undertaken in contested areas, or areas under insurgent control, populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. The purpose of operations in these areas is to establish islands of popular support for the government. When government strength and authority are present, security and governmental services can be provided for the population. These areas are expanded into larger areas where the people can defend themselves and deny support to the insurgents.

Operations may also be conducted in unpopulated areas where insurgent forces have established training bases, mission support sites, rest areas, arms factories, sources of food, or major infiltration routes. The purpose of operations in these areas is to interdict the insurgent movement and destroy its support facilities.

URBAN OPERATIONS

One of the primary functions of Special Forces in urban areas is to assist the local government in neutralizing the insurgent political leadership and infrastructure. Intelligence and rapid response are keys in identifying, locating, and then apprehending the hardcore insurgent leaders. This is the first step in neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure and eliminates its centralized direction and control, creates disunity, and eventually destroys the insurgent underground apparatus.

BORDER OPERATIONS

Border surveillance or control is usually a function of civilian-controlled police or paramilitary forces. When requirements exceed the capabilities of established border forces, paramilitary or irregular units advised by Special


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Forces may be directed to assume this responsibility or to reinforce existing border forces which are inadequate for the mission. Border operations serve to:

- Separate insurgents from external support.
- Separate insurgents from an external sanctuary.
- Separate insurgents from support of the local population.
- Destroy insurgent forces and facilities existing in areas adjacent to the border.
- Locate and establish surveillance on insurgent infiltration routes.

For a more detailed coverage of internal defense and internal development doctrine, see FM 100-20, Internal Defense and Development—US Army Doctrine.



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APPENDIX B - NATO STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAG)

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APPENDIX A REFERENCES

JOINT PUBLICATIONS

JCS Pub 1	Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
JCS Pub 2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
USREDCOM Manual 10-3	Joint UW SOP (For Official Use Only)

ARMY REGULATIONS

AR 37-103	Finance and Accounting for Installations; Disbursing Operations
AR 37-103-1	Finance and Accounting for Installations; Imprest Funds
AR 310-25	Dictionary of US Army Terms
AR 310-50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
(C) AR 530-1	Operations Security (U)

FIELD MANUALS

FM 21-6	How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training
FM 21-74	Patrolling
FM 21-76	Survival, Evasion, and Escape
(S) FM 21-77A	Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U)
FM 30-5	Combat Intelligence
FM 30-11	Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations
FM 30-17	Counterintelligence Operations
(C) FM 30-17A	Counterintelligence Special Operations (U)
(S) FM 30-18	Intelligence Collection Operations (U)
FM 30-102	Opposing Forces Europe
FM 31-16	Counterintelligence Operations
FM 31-19	Special Forces Military Free-Fall Parachuting
FM 32-30	Electronic Warfare—Tactics of Defense
FM 33-1	Psychological Operations
FM 41-10	Civil Affairs Operations
FM 90-2	Tactical Deception
FM 90-3	Desert Operations
FM 90-4	Air Assault Operations
FM 90-5	Jungle Operations
FM 90-6	Mountain Operations
FM 90-8	Counter Guerrilla Operations
FM 100-5	Operations
FM 100-20	Internal Defense and Development—US Army Doctrine
(S) FM 101-10-3	Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data—Classified Data (U)

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(C) TM 31-200-1	UW Devices and Techniques: References (U)
(C) TM 31-201-1	UW Devices and Techniques: Incendiaries (U)
(C) TM 31-201-2	UW Devices and Techniques: Series Explosives Manufacture (U)
(C) TM 31-210	Improvised Munitions Handbook (U)
TM 57-220	Technical Training of Parachutists

TRAINING CIRCULARS

TC 30-11	Army Tactical Weather
TC 30-20	Signals Intelligence
TC 31-20-1	The Role of US Army Special Forces
TC 31-20-4	Special Forces Surface Swimming
TC 100-1	Operations Security (OPSEC)

ARMY PUBLICATIONS

US Army Communications Command - Intermediate Distance Skywave Propagation Charts

DA PAMPHLETS

The Army Library, Pentagon, has prepared the following bibliographic surveys of strategic areas of the world. Copies can be requisitioned from the US Army Adjutant General Publications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. (See DA Pam 310-10.)

DA Pam 550-6-1	(1976)	USSR: Analytical Survey of Literature
DA Pam 550-7-1	(1974)	Latin America and the Caribbean
DA Pam 550-8	(1971)	Communist Eastern Europe
DA Pam 550-9	(1971)	Communist China
DA Pam 550-10	(1971)	Pacific Islands and Trust Territories
DA Pam 550-11	(1971)	Communist North Korea
DA Pam 550-12	(1972)	Insular Southeast Asia
DA Pam 550-13	(1972)	Japan, Okinawa, Republic of China (Taiwan), and Republic of Korea
DA Pam 550-14	(1972)	Peninsular Southeast Asia
DA Pam 550-15	(1973)	South Asia and the Strategic Indian Ocean
DA Pam 550-16	(1973)	Middle East: The Strategic Hub and North Africa
DA Pam 550-17	(1973)	Africa
DA Pam 550-18	(1975)	Scandinavia

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RELATED SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING CIRCULARS PLANNED FOR PUBLICATION

TC 31-20-2	The Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB)
(C) TC 31-20-3	Special Forces Air and Maritime Operations (U)
(C) TC 31-20-5	Special Forces Communications (U)
TC 31-20-6	Special Forces Underwater Operations
(C) TC 31-20-7	Special Forces Selected Operational Techniques (U)

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APPENDIX B NATO STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS (STANAG)

STANAG 1034	Allied Spotting Procedures for Naval Gunfire Support, ATP-4
STANAG 1075	Manual of Submarine Operations, ATP-18(A)
STANAG 1149	Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, ATP-8
STANAG 1178	Conduct of NATO Submarine Operations
STANAG 1180	Amphibious Operations-Ship to Shore Movement, ATP-36
STANAG 1182	Signals Underwater Sound
STANAG 2022	Intelligence Reports
STANAG 2029	Methods of Describing Ground Locations, Areas, and Boundaries
STANAG 2044	Procedures for Dealing with PW's
STANAG 2068	Emergency War Surgery
STANAG 2070	Emergency War Burial Procedures
STANAG 2084	Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents
STANAG 2099	Fire Coordination in Support of Land Forces
STANAG 2101	Principles and Procedures for Establishing Liaison
STANAG 2103	Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radio-Active Fallout and Biological and Chemical Attacks
STANAG 2104	Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning to Armed Forces Operating on Land
STANAG 2111	Target Analysis-Nuclear Weapons
STANAG 2113	Destruction of Military Technical Equipment
STANAG 2118	Intelligence Estimate
STANAG 2122	Medical Training in First Aid, Basic Hygiene and Emergency Care
STANAG 2126	Medical First Aid Equipment and Supplies
STANAG 2129	Recognition and Identification of Forces on the Battlefield
STANAG 2130	Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM)
STANAG 2132	Documentation Relative to Medical Evacuation, Treatment and Cause of Death.
STANAG 2134	Offensive Air Support Operations, ATP-27(A)
STANAG 2144	Call for Fire Procedures
STANAG 2146	Infantry and Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFV) Operations
STANAG 2149	Intelligence Request
STANAG 2253	Military Geographic Documentation (MGD) - Roads and Road Structure
STANAG 2254	MGD - Navigable Inland Waterways
STANAG 2255	MGD - On Ports
STANAG 2256	MGD - Inland Hydrography
STANAG 2257	MGD - Railways
STANAG 2259	MGD - Terrain

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STANAG 2260	MGD - Electric Power
STANAG 2263	MGD - Coastal Areas and Landing Beaches
STANAG 2269	MGD - Engineer Resources
STANAG 2271	MGD - Urban Areas
STANAG 2844	Counterintelligence Procedures
STANAG 2867	Radio Telephone Procedures for the Conduct of Artillery Fire
STANAG 2868	Land Force Tactical Doctrine, ATP-35
STANAG 2876	Planning and Coordinating Procedures for Airmobile Operations
STANAG 3156	Aircraft Paratroop Signal Lights
STANAG 3204	Aeromedical Evacuation
STANAG 3325	Supplement No. 1 to ATP-27(A) (See STANAG 2134) - Detailed Procedures and Techniques for Forward Air Controlling
STANAG 3465	Safety, Emergency and Signalling Procedures for Military Air Movement Fixed Wing Aircraft
STANAG 3570	Drop Zones and ULLA Drop Zones - Criteria and Marking
STANAG 3597	Helicopter Tactical or Nonpermanent Landing Sites
STANAG 3700	NAD-NATO Tactical Air Doctrine, ATP-33

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APPENDIX C AREA STUDY GUIDE

The purpose of the area study guide is to provide a systematic means for compiling and retaining essential information to support operations. Although the basic outline is general in nature, it is flexible enough to permit detailed coverage of a given area. As time is made available for further study, various subjects should be subdivided and assigned to selected detachment members to produce a more detailed analysis of specified areas of interest.

OUTLINE

POLITICAL

Occupying power.

Number and status of nonnational personnel.

Influence, organization, and mechanisms of control.

National government (indigenous).

Government, international political orientation, and degree of popular support.

Attitudes and probable behavior of identifiable segments of the population toward the United States, its allies, and the enemy.

National historical background.

Foreign dependence or alliances.

National capital and significant political, military, and economic concentrations.

Political parties.

If formed around individual leaders or based on established organizations.

If a single dominant party exists, is it nationalistic in origin or does it have foreign ties?

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Major legal parties with their policies and goals.

Illegal or underground parties and their motivation.

Violent opposition factions within major political organizations.

Control and restrictions.

Documentation.

Rationing.

Travel and movement restrictions.

Blackouts and curfews.

Political restrictions.

Religious restrictions.

ECONOMY

Technological standards.

Natural resources and degree of self-sufficiency.

Financial structure and dependence on foreign aid.

Current value of money, wage scales.

The extent and effect of the black market.

Agriculture and domestic food supply.

Industry and level of production.

Manufacture and demand for consumer goods.

Foreign and domestic trade and facilities.

Fuels and power.

Telecommunication and radio systems.

Transportation adequacy by U.S. standards.

Railroads.

Highways.

Waterways.

Commercial air installations.

The control and operation of industry, utilities, agriculture, and transportation.

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GEOGRAPHY

Divide the country into its various definable subdivisions and analyze each subdivision using the following outline:

Areas and dimensions.

Strategic location.

Neighboring countries and boundaries.

Natural defenses including frontiers.

Points of entry and strategic routes.

Climate. Variations from the normal and the months in which they occur. Any extremes in climate that would affect operations.

Temperature.

Rainfall and snow.

Wind and visibility.

Light data (BMNT, EENT, sunrise, sunset, moonrise, and moonset).

Seasonal effect of the weather on terrain and visibility.

Relief.

General direction of mountain ranges or ridge lines and whether hills and ridges are dissected.

General degree of slope.

Characteristics of valleys and plains.

Natural routes for, and natural obstacles to, cross-country movement.

Location of areas suitable for guerrilla bases, units, and other installations.

Potential landing and drop zones, and other reception sites.

Land use. Note any peculiarities, especially:

Former heavily forested areas subjected to widespread cutting or dissected bypaths and roads, also the reverse, and pasture or waste land which has been reforested.

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Former waste or pasture land that has been resettled and cultivated and is now being farmed, also the reverse, and former rural countryside that has been depopulated and allowed to return to waste land.

Former swamp or marsh land that has been drained; former desert or waste land now irrigated and cultivated; and lakes created by dams.

Drainage (general pattern).

Main rivers, direction of flow.

Characteristics of rivers and streams such as width, current, banks, depths, kinds of bottoms and obstacles, etc.

Seasonal variation, such as dry beds and flash floods.

Large lakes or areas of many ponds or swamps (potential LZ's for amphibious aircraft).

Coast. Examine primarily for infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply points.

Tides and waves, to include winds and current.

Beach footing and covered exit routes.

Quiet coves and shallow inlets or estuaries.

Geological Basics. Types of soil and rock formations (include areas for potential LZ's for light aircraft).

Forests and other vegetation.

Natural or cultivated.

Types, characteristics, and significant variations from the norm at different elevations.

Cover or concealment to include density; seasonal variation.

Water. Ground, surface; seasonal, potability.

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Subsistence.

Seasonal or year-round.

Cultivated (vegetables, grains, fruits, and nuts).

Natural (berries, fruits, nuts, and herbs).

Wild life (animals, fish, and fowl).

CIVILIAN POPULACE

Particular attention should be given to those areas in a country where the local inhabitants have peculiarities and are at considerable variance in one or more ways from the normal national way of life.

Total and density.

Basic racial stock and physical characteristics.

Types, features, dress, and habits.

Significant variations from the norm.

Ethnic/religious groups. These groups should be analyzed only if of sufficient size, strength, and established bonds to constitute a dissident minority of some consequence.

Location or concentration.

Basis for discontent and motivation for change.

Opposition to majority or the political regime.

Any external or foreign ties of significance.

Attitudes. Toward the:

Existing regime or occupying power.

Resistance movement.

United States and its allies.

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Division between urban, rural, or nomadic groups.

- Large cities and population centers.
- Rural settlement patterns.
- Areas and movement patterns of nomads.

Standard of living and cultural (educational) levels.

- Primarily note the extremes away from average.
- Class structure (degree of established social stratification and percentage of populace in each class).

Health and medical standards.

- General health and well-being.
- Common diseases.
- Standard of public health.
- Medical facilities and personnel.
- Potable water supply.
- Sufficiency of medical supplies and equipment.

Traditions and customs (particularly taboos). Note wherever they are sufficiently strong and established that they may influence an individual's actions or attitude even during a war situation.

ENEMY/NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Conventional military forces (army, navy, and air force) and internal security forces (including border guards). Nonnational or occupying forces as well as national (indigenous) forces are analyzed using the following outline:

- Morale, discipline, and political reliability.
- Personnel strength.

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Organization and basic deployment.

Uniforms and unit designations.

Ordinary and special insignia.

Overall control mechanism.

Chain of command and communication.

Leadership (officer corps).

Nonnational surveillance and control over indigenous security forces.

Training and doctrine.

Tactics (seasonal and terrain variations).

Equipment, transportation, and degree of mobility.

Logistics.

Effectiveness (any unusual capabilities or weaknesses).

Vulnerabilities in the internal security system.

Past and current reprisal actions.

Utilization and effectiveness of informers.

Influence on and relations with the local populace.

Psychological vulnerabilities.

Recent and current activities of the unit.

Counterguerrilla activities and capabilities with particular attention to reconnaissance units, special troops (airborne, mountain, ranger), rotary-wing or vertical-lift aviation units, counterintelligence units, and units having a mass CBR delivery capability.

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The location of all known guardposts or expected wartime security coverage for all types of installations, particularly along main lines of communication (LOC) (railroads, highways, and telecommunication lines) and along electrical power and POL lines.

Exact location and description of the physical arrangement and particularly of the security arrangements of all forced labor or concentration camps and any potential PW inclosures.

All possible details, preferably by localities, of the types and effectiveness of internal security controls, including checkpoints, identification cards, passports, and travel permits.

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Guerrillas.

Disposition, strength, and composition.

Organization, armament, and equipment.

Status of training, morale, and combat effectiveness.

Operations to date.

Cooperation and coordination between various existing groups.

General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various elements of the civilian populace.

Motivation of the various groups and their receptivity.

Caliber of senior and subordinate leadership.

Health of the guerrillas.

Auxiliaries and the underground.

Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.

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General effectiveness, and type of support.

Motivation and reliability.

Responsiveness to guerrilla or resistance leaders.

General attitude toward the United States, the enemy, and various guerrilla groups.

Logistic capability.

Availability of food stocks and water to include any restrictions for reasons of health.

Agricultural capability.

Type and availability of transportation of all categories.

Types and location of civilian services available for manufacture and repair of equipment and clothing.

Supplies locally available to include type and amount.

Medical facilities to include personnel, medical supplies, and equipment.

Enemy supply sources accessible to the resistance.

TARGETS

The objective in target selection is to inflict maximum damage on the enemy with minimum expenditures of men and material. Initially, the operational capabilities of a guerrilla force may be limited in the interdiction or destruction of enemy targets. The target area and specific points of attack must be studied, carefully analyzed, and priorities established. In general, targets are listed in order of priority in accordance with mission requirements.

Railroads.

Considerations in the selection of a particular line:

Importance, both locally and generally.

Bypass possibilities.

Number of tracks and electrification.

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Location of maintenance crews, reserve repair rails, and equipment.

Type of signal and switch equipment.

Vulnerable points:

Unguarded small bridges or culverts.

Cuts, fills, overhanging cliffs, or undercutting streams.

Key junctions or switching points.

Tunnels.

Security system.

NOTE.
Targets listed below are divided into subsections generally as shown above. Differences in subsections are based on peculiarities of the particular target system.

Telecommunications.

POL.

Electric power.

Military storage and supply.

Military headquarters and installations.

Radar and electronic devices.

Highways.

Inland waterways - canals.

Seaports.

Natural and synthetic gas lines.

Industrial plants.

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APPENDIX D IMPACT OF DOCTRINAL CHANGES ON TABLES OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT (TOE)

The doctrine contained in this field manual will impact and require changes to the mission, assignment, and capabilities paragraphs of the following published Airborne Special Forces Group TOE's with the exception of TOE 30-137H.

TOE 31-101H	Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-102H	Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-105H	Special Forces Battalion, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-106H	Headquarters Special Forces Battalion (C Detachment), Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-107H	Special Forces Company, Special Forces Battalion, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 31-127H	Service Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 11-257H	Signal Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.
TOE 30-137H	Combat Intelligence Company, Airborne Special Forces Group.

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FM 31-20

30 SEPTEMBER 1977

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

BERNARD W. ROGERS
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

J. C. PENNINGTON
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

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