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U.S. Army Handbook of COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDELINES for AREA COMMANDERS

AN ANALYSIS OF CRITERIA

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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U.S. Army Handbook
of
COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDELINES
for
AREA COMMANDERS

AN ANALYSIS OF CRITERIA

JANUARY 1966

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by
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FOREWORD

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TASK TACO

SUBTASK

Nonmateriel Factors in Counterguerrilla Operations

PREFACE

Insurgency probably dates back to the beginning of organized society and certainly to the advent of the city-state form of government. The strategies and tactics of counterinsurgency are many and have varied widely. Measures have ranged from political reforms to harsh military action, from relocation to civic action and from friendly, persuasive appeals to coercive block warden systems. In some cases the policies and programs have been effective, and in others they have failed. Surprisingly, lessons learned from one counterinsurgency have not always been effective in the next. In order to better understand this complex phenomenon, standards or criteria for evaluating the selection of counterinsurgery plans and criteria for evaluating the implementation of various counterinsurgency programs must be devised.

Within this context there is need for a systematic treatment of criterion methodology which deals with criteria for insurgency/counterinsurgency. Until appropriate sets of criteria can be formulated and evaluated there is no systematic way to evaluate the progress, success or failure of a counterinsurgency plan, program, project or task.

This report describes the exploratory efforts to develop basic concepts for formulating and interpreting criteria pertinent to the counterinsurgency at the operational area level. It elaborates the role of the area commander with emphasis on decision-making functions, alternatives and guidelines for his evaluation. Although a great deal of work remains to be done in counterinsurgency criteria development, this report is a first step, one which specifies immediate problems as well as directions for future effort.

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PART I

SUMMARY

Part I is a condensation of Part II, which is a detailed report prepared by Human Sciences Research, Inc., for the Special Operations Research Office under sub-contract SORO-2 HSR-1 under SORO's prime contract DA 49-092 ARO-7.

INTRODUCTION

The problem is to determine the feasibility of developing qualitative and quantitative criteria in order to evaluate the military, political, psychological and economic effects of various counterguerrilla operations upon the guerrilla force, the underground, and civilian support and assistance.

Since World War II an ideological contest for control of emerging (usually former colonial) areas of the world has evolved.

In many areas, especially in Asia, this contest has taken the form of grassroots political rebellions sponsored and abetted by a Communist power.

This type of warfare, which has come to be known as "insurgency," is basically an attack by insurgents on government and the people who stand for and support government. Popular sympathy is channeled into support of terrorism and guerrilla tactics in the early phases of the struggle and/or insurgents take advantage of the population's passive acquiescence to their thrust. Terroristic and guerrilla tactics may be sufficient to allow Communist takeover of government, or guerrilla war may develop into more or less conventional war as the insurgents gain victory.

The United States Army has been asked on several occasions to assist governments threatened by insurgency with advice, logistical support and active intervention in combat.

It may be assumed that this form of warfare will continue in the foreseeable future.

The U.S. Army will continue to be asked for assistance.

The Army's task will be rendered less costly and more effectively by the fullest possible understanding of insurgency methods and the effects of various means undertaken to counterinsurgency strategy and tactics on insurgents and indigenous populations.

Summary

In undertaking a solution of the problem stated, four general avenues of approach were adopted:

To develop basic concepts for formulating and interpreting pertinent criteria at the operational area level.

To apply these concepts to criteria for insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, the military interactions, and the interactions between the opposing sides and the people.

To ascertain and indicate how a Communist-inspired insurgency begins and develops in its early phases.

To test these criteria by applying them to the counterinsurgency decision-making function.

Pursuit of these four avenues of approach required that relevant criteria be identified, their interpretation and use be delineated and their validity and pertinence verified. First, concepts of the struggle were developed and the criteria derived from them were identified and developed on the basis of the facts stated above. These criteria were then classified in relation to their applicability to the various management and operational requirements derived from a study of literature and from interviews with people experienced in insurgency/counterinsurgency operations.

The sources of information available to this study provided only generalized guidance for development of criteria. The insurgency/counterinsurgency struggle was considered a duel in which both sides take actions concurrently in psychological, political, military and economic fields. In a general sense, criteria can be applied to each of these aspects of the struggle. Criteria were developed to evaluate the effects of military actions, moves designed to win popular sympathy, the degree of control of the economy held by one side or the other and the extent to which insurgents or counterinsurgents control the actions of middle and lower echelon political leaders. Such criteria can be justified from the logic of the duel. Scattered data and reports obtained from insurgencies show such criteria to be meaningful. The criterion problem is made more complex by the fact that it is especially difficult to interpret criteria that deal exclusively with military confrontation, for they have an effect upon the psychological and political struggle. Specifically, criteria such as casualties, contacts and incidents are meaningful and useful, but they can only be interpreted validly when compared with information about other factors that define the situation. Such criteria, if taken out of context, can lead to gross misinterpretations. Struggles in the psychological, political and economic fields may be occurring along with guerrilla warfare. If so, the outcome of each of these struggles can have impact on the contest in other areas. Hence, an adequate criterion system must provide for criteria applicable to all major aspects of the culture and society.

This does not mean that the struggle *must* take place concurrently in all facets of society. However, many different areas may become centers of conflict and if so, criteria will be needed to evaluate the progress of the conflict in those areas. Differences in culture will probably not require changes in criterion concepts nor in the general criterion applicable to the struggle. They will very likely play a considerable part in determining the effectiveness of tactics and counter-tactics of each side.

Finally, an attempt was made to test the relevance and applicability of these criteria to counterinsurgency operations. An insurgency situation scenario was submitted to 21 individuals of varying backgrounds with a requirement for solution in the form of an operations plan which included application of the developed criteria. Plans of the 21 subjects would hopefully provide guidelines to assist area commanders in decision-making.

A typical pattern of Communist-dominated insurgencies is to develop followers and a cadre, usually in the national capital, then to expand influence in rural areas. This penetration takes the form of propaganda attacks on national government and functionaries; popular appeals tailored to local complaints, real or assumed; and erosion and takeover of political power at the village level. Tactics involve winning the sympathy of local chiefs and police if possible; or, if this is not possible, persuading them to ignore organizing and regimentation activities of insurgents. If neither tactic works, threats and murders are used to gain political power and to prevent government bodies from obtaining information necessary to defeat the threat. Criteria are developed to reflect the success of insurgents in these activities. Details of insurgency development in rural areas are described in Appendix A of the report.

These insurgency strategies, tactics and criteria applicable to the duel in the operational area provide the backdrop for study of the performance of counterinsurgency area commands. The second part of the report is a study of area command decision-making with the objective of developing decision-making guides for area commanders. To obtain information, a scenario was prepared which provided information that indicated the outbreak of an insurgency movement in a developing country. This scenario was presented to 21 military and civilian personnel with experience in insurgency to elicit their solutions and the reasons for those solutions. Many solutions and specific responses were advocated. The following grounds were proposed for evaluation of solutions: management principles based upon cost/effectiveness; the extent to which solutions utilize, and are consistent with, attitudes and values of their implementers and the people; and the extent to which they find support in historical studies of developing

countries and insurgency/counterinsurgency operations in these countries. There are two major conclusions drawn from this part of the study: The interview technique can be used to obtain solutions to counterinsurgency command problems. These solutions can be compared in terms of the criteria established above to narrow counterinsurgency decision alternatives, hence to provide guidance for counterinsurgency area commands.

CONCLUSIONS

A set of criteria is presented for evaluation of insurgency status in operational areas. Specific criterion values that describe the military confrontation between insurgency and counterinsurgency forces can be extremely misleading when pulled out of the specific context of facts from which criteria were drawn. Research is needed, with access to highly detailed data, to identify criteria of this type which are most stable, and to develop any additional information needed to interpret such criteria with assured validity.

A study is needed of the cross influences of military, economic, psychological and social factors on one another. The description of some 11 criteria appropriate in the area level and the underlying rationale will provide the basis of such a study. It is designed to permit commanders to better forecast the effectiveness of programs, projects, and acts on the outcome of the duel.

At the individual level, the feasibility of developing reliable indices of individual behavior which reflect the probable effectiveness of counterinsurgency programs on the population should be studied.

The criterion problem is basic to all operations. Until valid criteria can be developed, tested and applied, and rules can be established for their interpretation, no systematic way is available to evaluate alternative plans and actions of counterinsurgency commands. This exploratory effort needs to be expanded to further develop criterion concepts and specific criteria for application to evaluation of government-sponsored programs in developing countries where U.S. forces are, or may be, committed in the future.

The interview technique for developing guides for commands has proven successful and should be applied to specific problems faced by counterinsurgents. Among these are problems of maximally utilizing personnel and materiel resources that are far from optimal for the job at hand. Study of this area should have training implications also. Responses of interviewees suggest rather strongly that U.S. personnel, provided with the material trappings and personnel specialists of an affluent society, are not accustomed to thinking in terms

of use of the crude materiel resources and untrained manpower common to developing countries.

At a broader level, interviews with personnel having experience in insurgency/counterinsurgency operations and the four guides for evaluation of responses can be used to clarify and refine counterinsurgency doctrine. Further studies in these areas are recommended.

CRITERIA APPLIED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

GENERAL

Criteria are standards by which the effectiveness of things, actions, outputs or processes are compared or judged, in terms of quality, speed, output and cost. These standards can be used to evaluate organizations with respect to function allocation, performance, and efficiency and to evaluate equipment items, training and selection procedures, acts of individuals working alone or in concert, decision-making, and the resultant of antagonistic actions by individuals or groups in conflict.

An explicit statement of an objective or a set of objectives which the organization, item of equipment or person is attempting to meet is a base from which to define a set of categories to be used in evaluating the quality of process or output and guidelines by which the thing or action is to be evaluated. A list of relevant objectives, criterion measures and rules for evaluation of the organization, function, or performance is established. The entire set can be designated as a criterion system with which to evaluate the efforts of an interaction between the two sides in insurgency/counterinsurgency.

There are usually many alternative organizations, tactics, methods, equipments, and personnel assignments which may be used to accomplish a given objective. Several levels of effort may be contemplated. Criteria help determine which alternative is best and what level of effort will most efficiently achieve the objective. For a given objective, a criterion system helps evaluate alternatives in terms of degrees of effectiveness and increments of cost.

Criteria must be formulated in terms of the phenomenon to be evaluated. Insurgency/counterinsurgency is both a duel and a social process. The mix varies from country to country and the duel aspects tend to take on more prominence in time. To the extent that insurgency is a social process, spontaneous, just beginning, and loosely organized, the criterion frame to be described is inapplicable.

Treated here are those aspects of insurrections reflecting the purposeful duel between two antagonists, each with the overall objective of defeating his opponent. Each side recognizes some randomness in

the social process and attempts to capture public sentiment and to gain greater control over the behavior of the people. Each side has a hierarchy of objectives, sub-objectives, and organizations created to perform the functions necessary to attain these objectives. Personnel of each organization perform tasks calculated to achieve their sub-objectives and thus to contribute to victory. It is not necessary to assume that objectives have been formally established or that the dueling organizations and functionaries are efficient; these matters are themselves subject to evaluation. One need only assume that objectives of each side can be formulated and that organizations and functionaries will strive to achieve them. The objectives and sub-objectives of each side, the nature of the duel, and the operations that ensue when each side attempts to attain its objectives provide the bases for criteria.

CRITERION SETS: GROSS CLASSIFICATION

The relationships between the two forces considered here, insurgent and counterinsurgent, and the people provide a basis for ordering criteria into four sets. Within each set are, in concept, all relevant criteria and the organizations, functions, tactics, and so forth to which they pertain. The four sets are: (A) Insurgent Reflexive: criteria that bear on force, size, internal organization, staffing, training and plans of operations of the insurgent forces; that is, attempts by these forces to improve and increase their own capabilities; (B) Counterinsurgent Reflexive: the same type of criteria as applied to the insurgent; (C) Direct Confrontation: use of military or police force by either side against the other and attempts by either to penetrate the organization of the other; and (D) Indirect Confrontation: confrontation using the people as a medium, each side attempting to gain sympathy and control of elements of society.

Reflexive criteria are management-oriented and should be cost-referenced, since the managerial problem is to produce results at acceptable costs. Interactive criteria indicate how the total struggle or any of its facets is going. These sets may be elaborated as follows.

CRITERION SETS DEFINED

Reflexive Criteria for Insurgents

From the viewpoint of management rather than strategy, reflexive functions and actions and associated criteria for the insurgent and the counterinsurgent are similar in many respects. Criteria for the insurgent must place emphasis on his ability to develop and strengthen an organization in spite of presumed attacks by counterinsurgency forces. To be evaluated are the size of military, political and underground

insurgency organizations; the balance among military, political and civil functions; coordination of activities; capabilities of its functionaries; and selection and training of functionaries and underground. The evaluation can proceed down to the most minute act of a member of the insurgent underground or soldier, as long as this act affects winning or losing the duel.

The concepts underlying management criteria and what they evaluate can be extended to generate hierarchies of objectives, organizations and sub-organizations, functions and tasks, and tactics and techniques. Parallel to each hierarchy is a hierarchy of criteria which can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of each. Assumed organizations and functions of key insurgency cadre members can be related to and evaluated by appropriate criteria as can those of counterinsurgents.

Reflexive Criteria for Counterinsurgents

Reflexive criteria are applicable to all government organizations and the acts of their functionaries. The designations "government organizations" and "functionaries" are to be defined broadly to include all organizations; political, military, and civil; and all functionaries from the chief of state down to the part-time hamlet policeman. Legislative organization and machinery, military organization and forces, departments of taxation and forestry, legal machinery, intelligence and social welfare systems—all are potential candidates for evaluation. Within this government system, organization, allocation of duties and resources to carry out these duties, selection and training may all be evaluated by reflexive criteria for counterinsurgent forces.

Direct Interaction Between Antagonists

Criteria of this class assess the resultant when the two sides join in battle. There appear to be five major categories of strife: military skirmishes and battles; attempts by either side to penetrate the other with agents, and counteractions against penetration; attempts to threaten, kill, or kidnap opposing functionaries; attempts to bring about defections by members of the other camp; and attempts by either side to destroy property, organization, or programs of the other in ways not covered above. Most of the criteria that have been used to evaluate success or failure in insurgency/counterinsurgency can be assigned to these categories.

Interactions Between Insurgent and Counterinsurgent and the People

The criterion sets above are referenced to the two organizations; they concern efforts to build effective and efficient organizations and to direct encounters between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Criteria of set D are oriented toward the relations between government (or

insurgency) policies, acts, and functionaries and the populace. The extent to which all acts by either side, such as civic actions, propaganda, population control, and terrorism, modify existing preceptions, judgments, and behavior would be measured by these people-oriented criteria.

In general, criteria oriented toward attitudes would need to take account of relevant cultural values as they relate to attitudes about insurgents and counterinsurgents. Measures of values and attitudes would be needed. Specific policies, attitudes, and acts could be evaluated in terms of their effects on basic attitudes. Of particular concern would be the number of people whose attitudes have changed and the amount, direction, and duration of change brought about by actions of either side. Next, criteria need to be devised to measure the behavior of members of the population relevant to the duel: their willingness to support one side or the other, and the extent to which attitudes and behavior correlate. Such criteria would be related to specific tactics and acts.

Taken together, the four criterion sets make up a criterion system. The requirement that categories be mutually exclusive for definitional purposes is not entirely met. It is necessary to consider the four classes of criteria as four different perspectives, each serving a somewhat different function.

OPERATIONAL AREA CRITERIA AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION

Another set of important relationships among criteria are those that obtain between criteria that would measure the status of the duel in the operational area and those which evaluate counterinsurgent decision-making. The criteria that measure the status of insurgency cover all relevant aspects of the struggle—the struggle for public support, military superiority, political and economic control, and so forth—in short, all interactive criteria. They could be applied whether an area command exists or not.

The counterinsurgency area command must influence the situation in ways compatible with counterinsurgency objectives. Area forces are the command instrumentality. Tasks of area command are continuous and to some extent cyclic: interpretation of objectives, evaluation of area resources including resources required for a particular situation, planning and initiation, building an organization, allocation of forces, supervision, and re-evaluation of the progress of programs, projects and tasks. Each such task is designed to have some measurable impact on the area situation. Criteria for the counterinsurgency area command would evaluate performance of the above management

functions as well as the impact of programs, projects and tasks performed under command direction.

In summary, criterion classes are designed to subdivide the problem of evaluating the action of each side, and the resultant of actions and counteractions, so that the facets of the duel can be considered, one aspect at a time. It must be possible to relate the four perspectives so that actions of either side, measured as management criteria, can be considered in terms of the effects that these actions produce as measured by interactive criteria.

CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF CRITERIA

Many aspects of the insurgency/counterinsurgency struggle have special bearing on the formulation and use of criteria. Insurgency cannot, as can a conventional war, be decided by a few battles. The insurgency tactic, like the guerrilla tactic of defeat, is to revert to smaller units and begin anew. The struggle is a series of interrelated small skirmishes in different societal domains; political, psychological, and economic. A number of criteria, covering not only military operations but all relevant aspects of the social system, is required.

PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURGENCY MOVEMENT

The status of the insurgency movement is measured by insurgency activity, objectives, skill of leadership, and opposition by counterinsurgency forces. Insurgency organization of villages and the proportion of villages controlled is a prime factor for analysis. The status and extent of control provide the basis for a rough summation of reflexive and interaction criteria for a given area.

To identify insurgency as being in a certain phase yields only a gross criterion. What happens when insurgents are being thrown back is not precisely the obverse of what happens when insurgents are winning. Furthermore, within a country or an operational area, insurgents may be winning in certain areas while counterinsurgents are making progress in others. Hence, phases as criteria provide a weighted average of many gains and losses occurring concurrently within the area in which insurgency is said to be in a particular phase.

CHANGES IN CRITERION MEASURES WITH REGARD TO TIME AND INTENSITY

As a logical corollary to the previous section, for any valid criterion measure, its *changes* in value through time are especially significant.

Summary

For the insurgent, changes through time represent the rate of progress of the movement and the speed with which his own organization develops. From the counterinsurgent's perspective, the size of the insurgent force is a measure of the task that lies ahead.

Similarly, changes through time are highly significant for interactive criteria. A change in the number of people who favor one side or the other, and the strength of their opinions, becomes an important criterion measure. Thus, the amount of change in any significant criterion value through time is itself a significant criterion.

A further corollary to the material dealing with phases of development of the insurgency movement as criteria is that for any given phase of the struggle there may be variations in the intensity of actual fighting, of terrorist activities, or of any other aspect. For a given period, each side may exert an all-out effort or a more modest effort. Policy changes by either side may affect criteria. A reduction or increase in the number of incidents, casualties, or both, may indicate only a change in intensity, not a turn in the tide. There is no necessary relationship between intensity of battle and determination of which side is winning, except when one side can achieve a prolonged intensity which the other cannot match.

DELAYED EFFECTS OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIONS

The operation of either side may vary from short-term, immediately realizable objectives to long-term programs. It is desirable to know, as a minimum, when the impact of medium and long-term programs may be expected to occur. Long-term programs are extremely difficult to evaluate because of the diffusion of their effect over time and contamination of this effect by the operation of other factors. Such programs are based primarily on assumptions within the context of which long-term programs, when discernible, can be evaluated. Because of timelags and diffusion of effect, it is often difficult to bridge the gap between measures of the success of a specific program and more general criterion measures.

ASSUMED RECIPROCITY OF GAINS AND LOSSES

Examination of criteria within each set suggests rather strongly a considerable degree of reciprocity among criteria that would evaluate the gains and losses by either side. The argument is strongest, obviously, for the interactive criteria. If one side wins the skirmish, the other loses; to the extent that one side wins the sympathy of the people, the other loses in some amount.

The same principle seems to apply to reflexive criteria, although in a much looser fashion. That is, as the insurgent elaborates his orga-

nization and improves his training and tactical moves, the counter-insurgent loses.

Thus, by this reasoning, the reciprocity principle holds for all criterion classes, stronger for interactive criteria, weaker for reflexive criteria wherein the total sum is not fixed but depends on the ability of each side to mobilize the potential of the area. This conclusion has important implications for the formulation of criteria: any criterion which can be shown to be relevant becomes a criterion for both antagonists. All valid criteria are reciprocal.

CASCADING AND AMPLIFICATION OF CERTAIN ACTIONS

One of the more interesting aspects of insurgency/counterinsurgency is the cascading effect of certain actions through the populace and the effects of these actions on relationships between antagonists and the people. This effect can be amplified, distorted, or contested by the propaganda apparatus of either side. In a violent social process in which people's lives are in danger and they have little control over events, events which do not (yet) affect them directly may become immensely significant by taking on symbolic meaning.

The cycle of insurgency action dictating, in turn, counterinsurgency response, counterinsurgency propaganda activity, reaction from the people and both sides, provides criteria in all categories. The possible permutations of various possible actions by the two sides toward one another and the people and the cascading effects of these actions are quite complex. It is manifestly evident that in many instances the effects of an action cannot be fully evaluated within the immediate confines in which the action takes place.

Naturally, the evaluator wants a few simple, valid, easily measured criteria. If the further additional requirement is imposed that the criterion set be comprehensive, it is rather doubtful that the nature of the struggle would permit this outcome. The validity of criteria and the manner in which they are interpreted must necessarily vary from phase to phase and from one situation to the next. Many criteria are valid only when certain situational variables assume certain values.

One counterinsurgency problem is to clear the roadways; much of guerrilla warfare is fought along roadways. Assume that many insurgent ambushes have been reported along roadways, but the number has recently declined. How would such data be interpreted? At least three interpretations are possible:

Convoys are so well armed that insurgents dare not attack them, insurgents are too short of ammunition to attack, and so forth.

Summary

Counterinsurgents have gained control of major roadways and land next to them; hence, insurgents cannot attack successfully.

Counterinsurgents use air for transportation; they have stopped using roads for convoys.

The criterion "number of attacks on convoys" is ambiguous and difficult to interpret unless the relevant situational contingencies are known. We do not yet know clearly what contingencies need to be specified for a given criterion measure. Effects of contingencies on interpretation of criteria are related to a similar problem, that of assigning weights to multiple criteria.

Depending on the purpose of the evaluator and the thing or act to be evaluated, one criterion may be sufficient. For example, the criterion for the rope that supports the window washer is its weight-holding capability. In counterinsurgency, one criterion is seldom sufficient. The same thing, act, or administrative decision may need to be considered from several points of view: military, political, and economic. For each point of view there is, by implication at least, an evaluative criterion concept. For any given phenomenon, then, one needs to (a) identify the appropriate evaluative criteria and (b) assign relative weights to the criteria when two or more criteria are found appropriate. The fact that two or more criteria are selected indicates that two identifiably different considerations are important. The weighting process orders criteria in terms of the importance of these considerations.

There is always a requirement for cost criteria. Practically it is, of course, difficult to invoke cost criteria in many situations. For example, when planning an operation, one cannot know in advance how strongly the enemy will contest an objective. In World War II the cost to both the United States and Japan during the Solomon Islands campaign was undoubtedly higher than either side had intended to pay initially. Furthermore, performance and costs are usually measured in quite different units, which are not easily equated. In spite of these difficulties, however, cost considerations are ever present and cost criteria need to be invoked.

CRITERIA RELIABILITY AND REQUIREMENT FOR SETS

There are several requirements for a criterion system which are more or less conventional. These include: definitional reliability, sufficient reliability over time, statistical reliability, measurability of criteria, freedom from bias, covariation between criterion and independent variables, and criterion compatibility.

Closely related to the requirements for criterion compatibility are the requirements for sets of criteria. With regard to management

criteria: at a given level of organization, from the top down, all criteria taken together should provide a sufficient set; that is, they should be critically applied to all functions, organizations, programs, and acts believed important. Similarly, criteria designed to measure the interplay between the two sides in conflict should cover all major aspects of the confrontation. Criteria within sets should not be redundant.

Criterion sets should be so constructed that, for any organization or function, criteria can be formulated that can be delineated to any desirable level of detail.

FORMULATION AND EVALUATION OF CRITERIA

REFLEXIVE CRITERIA FOR INSURGENTS

Gross criteria can be developed from historical background and assessment of needs in a given situation. A number of gross criteria can measure insurgency capacity. Some examples are: total strength of forces and active underground; strength of insurgency sub-units—national army, area army, or village militia, and the strength of each; size of military forces that can be mustered for a single engagement; equipment—number, type, appropriateness, operability, state of repair; and personnel—training, skill, level, motivation.

Criteria for cadre leadership and key functions can be developed on the assumption that leadership, propaganda and internal education, communications, intelligence collection, terrorism, elimination of spies, military operations, and supply are insurgency force major functions, each of which can be subdivided into subfunctions, and that for each function and subfunction the criterion considerations relevant to its performance can be defined as criterion parameters.

CRITERIA MEASURING DIRECT INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SIDES

Several forms of direct confrontation between sides were listed in chapter 1. For each type of clash, interactive criteria can be applied to assess the result. Casualties, incidents and contacts presented in various forms are criteria which measure the immediate result of clashes. Casualties are perhaps the most frequently used criteria in orthodox warfare. In guerrilla warfare, incidents measure the frequency and direction of insurgency initiative; contacts measure the moves of the counterinsurgent. All such criteria represent the resultant of interplays between forces of each side, but their interpretation is apt to be ambiguous.

Summary

Casualty statistics have been used in all insurgency operations, but the definition varies from country to country; collection of data has not always been systematic and reports have not always been complete. Casualty measures are apt to be misleading, because of the tendencies to underestimate one's own and overestimate the enemy's, the inability to identify insurgents, and insurgents' practice of removing dead and wounded from the battlefield. Casualty measures are meaningful and useful, but a number of situational factors must be known to provide some insurance that their interpretation is valid.

CRITERION MEASURES FOR EVALUATION OF EFFECTS OF ACTS ON PEOPLE

One set of interactive criteria measures the impact of acts by both sides on the thinking, emotions and behavior of the people—most particularly on the uncommitted.

Insurgency/counterinsurgency is basically a contest for public support ("winning the hearts and minds"). If support can be won, people will withhold information and material support from insurgents, refuse to do their bidding, give information about insurgents to government functionaries, support public programs, and volunteer assistance so that the war will be won. No quarrel is made with the proposition; the trick is to do it. The emphasis is on the measurement of sentiments and behavior rather than on acts by either side designed to change them.

Formulation of criteria for measurement of attitudes can be based on the assumption that the concept of a generalized attitude toward concepts of government and government functionaries is meaningful and that such an attitude can be measured by a scale that would measure its strength. It is further assumed that a similar generalized set of attitudes can be formulated for the insurgency cause and its advocates. It is assumed that the greater the affinity for the government, the less is the liking for the insurgent, and vice versa. The general consensus of authorities on underdeveloped countries is that the great majority of people are neutral or even antagonistic toward government. To the extent that this is the case, the insurgent holds an advantage.

Since experience and cultural values exercise a strong stabilizing influence, it is doubtful that any counterinsurgency action, however well conceived, can change attitudes in great amount. However, minor shifts in attitudes favorable to government would certainly be in the government's interest, for some correlation between attitudes and active support of the government is to be expected.

The degree of relationship between attitudes and action would depend on factors such as the extent to which the desired action is clearly

indicated to the citizens, and the additional influences that might be brought to bear to stimulate people to take actions favorable to the government, willingly and without fear, or constrain them from helping the insurgents.

CRITERIA FOR THE OPERATIONAL AREA

The ultimate objective of the insurgency movement is to gain complete control of the political apparatus of the nation. This is to be accomplished by eroding the attitudinal support and power base of government, replacing these with the insurgent philosophy of government and power. Political control is the central issue. Complete political control makes possible military control, as well as the control of the economy, information flow, laws, judicial system, educational system, and other societal services. A prime target of the insurgent grassroots movement is the administrative gap, common to developing countries, between national and provincial political functionaries and chiefs and councils of towns and villages. Control of a rural operational area can be evaluated largely in terms of control of its towns and villages. The counterinsurgent must oppose insurgent attempts to gain control.

Although the meaning of control will vary with the domain over which it is exercised, several types of control may be identified, and several levels distinguished. *Dominance* means that the controller has the unilateral power to exercise as much control as desired. Instances of rebellion or failure to behave as specified by the controller are isolated. *Superiority* indicates that the controller faces opposition, but that he is able to exercise control most of the time at most places, or with regard to most of the subfunctions subsumed by the type of control in question. *Control parity* is obtained when two sides struggle for control, but neither has marked superiority. In the case of *influence*, one side holds a superior position. The other, however, maintains a significant residual ability to modify behavior. This residual ability is designated as *influence*, roughly the obverse of superiority.

If political and military domination or superiority exist, other forms of control can be brought to bear on all aspects of societal life. Economic controls, control of formal and informal intelligence systems, and control of public information media can be applied. These forms of control make it easy to control educational institutions, the content of their instructions, community services and civic action programs, transportation and communications facilities, and the recruiting of personnel to the side in power.

Criteria for evaluation of control with reference to kind and degree may be applied to the following areas: (1) political control, (2) con-

trol of the legal system, (3) military control, (4) economic control, (5) control of formal and informal intelligence, (6) influence on attitudes, (7) control of propaganda and public information, (8) control of educational institutions, (9) community services and civic action, (10) transportation and communications, (11) recruiting.

Because of the interrelatedness of all aspects of society, it may be desirable to regard each of the above areas as representing a particular perspective. The duel and the society within which it occurs may be viewed from each perspective in turn, much as an air observer would like to examine a target area. Each provides additional information about the struggle between antagonists. Taken together, criteria generated to describe the eleven areas indicated above should provide a comprehensive picture of the status of the duel in an operational area.

COUNTERINSURGENCY AREA COMMAND DECISION OUTLINES

As part of the examination of criteria, an attempt was made to develop decision guidelines for the counterinsurgency area command by: defining its decision domain, developing scenarios which pose different decision problems to area command, and submitting these to personnel knowledgeable in counterinsurgency, in order to obtain alternative decisions and decision bases.

Broad objectives were developed from a description of the process of insurgency and the overall aim of the government in power in an insurgency area. To attain these objectives, the area command makes certain types of decisions: situation diagnosis, selection of objectives, production of solutions, implementation of solutions and evaluation of solutions. For each of these types of decisions, there may be two or more alternative solutions and means of implementation. Decision guidelines from prior knowledge and experience may be applied to facilitate selection of alternatives. The reason behind a particular decision choice derives from a potential guideline designed to enhance the effective performance of each type of decision or function, thus reducing uncertainty and leading to the selection of the most desirable of the alternatives available. Guidelines range from broad general propositions to specific suggestions.

While command guidelines in conventional small-scale military operations are rather well established by tactics and techniques, they are far less well established in insurgency/counterinsurgency operations which may involve almost any facet of societal life in an important way. Existing handbooks provide the best distillation now available of past experiences in insurgency, but there are many aspects of insurgency operations which they do not cover in depth. Often the state

of the art in social sciences is not sufficiently well advanced to provide definitive answers.

There is not enough information in currently available literature to provide guidelines for area commanders. This part of the study was oriented toward the development of these guidelines.

INTERVIEWEES

Area command decision problems were examined by developing a scenario which depicted an insurgency development in early Phase II which would require the decision-maker to make decisions in three major functional areas: selection of objectives, development of solutions, and application of resources. Twenty-one individuals, all with experience in counterinsurgency operations but with different backgrounds, served as interviewees who acted in the capacity of area commander. They were asked for solutions to scenario problems and to specify reasons for their solutions. The reasons could be used as guidelines for area commanders. Chart 1 summarizes the salient background characteristics of each of the interviewees. See page 24.

CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW

Interviewees had one day for review of background materials before the interview. In the interview, procedure questions posed by the interviewees were classified. The interviewee, acting as area commander, then developed solutions to the situation presented and gave reasons for the decision alternatives selected.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The interview technique proved to be an efficient means of systematically and rapidly collecting large numbers of situationally referenced decisions. The majority of responses are germane to the overall objective of developing area command decision guidelines. The technique has proved effective in uncovering decision criteria as well as the critical decisions and provides a promising tool for counterinsurgency decision criteria. The responses may be evaluated in terms of current counterinsurgency doctrine (historical consensus) and management principles. The method shows promise as a training aid.

The operational objectives selected by the interviewees showed high consensus. Objectives concerned with protection of functionaries and population, persuasion of the population, intelligence about the insurgency, and improvement of government capabilities ranked highest.

Among content findings of interest are:

At the broad planning level there was considerable agreement among the respondents. There was a high degree of agreement as to general

objectives. Protection of government functionaries and the area's population, persuasion of the population to support the government, discovery of the insurgent organization, and improvement of counterinsurgent capabilities were the most commonly selected objectives. In addition, most respondents advocated combined psychological and military/civil control operations to achieve these objectives, with operations of a social, economic or political nature being utilized almost wholly to achieve psychological objectives rather than for their expected direct benefits. However, respondents displayed much diversity in their proposals of specific solutions to achieve these general objectives. This diversity is traceable to variations in situation diagnosis, different opinions as to which ethnic group constituted the key target, the utility value of the resources they had available, the relative importance of the population attitudes, and their assumptions as to the relationships and responsibilities of area and national leaders and sources of authority.

Perhaps the greatest source of disagreement among interviewee solutions centered around the tactics to be employed in treatment of an antagonistic, and a more or less neutral ethnic group and, what personnel and materiel resources should be requested from the national government, (1) solutions selected did not vary markedly as between military and civilian interviewees, (2) personnel and material resources were depicted by the scenario as inadequate in amount and not of the optimal type. This is often characteristic of underdeveloped countries. A large number of interviewees did not, however, attempt to make use of resources available, (3) some solution concepts (for example, "call out troops to seal the border") would have been expensive to implement. Evaluation of solutions was not a part of this study. However, it is felt that management principles, cost considerations and knowledge about foreign cultures, cultural values, and prior experiences in counterinsurgency could be used jointly to greatly reduce the total "solution space" theoretically possible to those types of solutions that show greatest promise.

The decision model for the area command has demonstrated itself to be a useful aid in organizing and portraying interviewee decisions, which vary in type as well as in levels of abstraction. A preliminary analysis of the situation diagnoses indicates the existence of decision-making frames of reference which, for most interviewees, guide the sequential performance of each decision function: that is, selection of objectives, solutions, and techniques. Use of interviewees with different backgrounds operating within the same simulated counterinsurgency situation is a promising method for evolving a balanced set of decision guidelines for each common decision: that is, guidelines which

reflect military, political, social, economic, and psychological considerations. These guidelines are found at all levels of generality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Investigate more thoroughly the different solutions proposed for meeting the same situation. This focus of effort may help uncover situational parameters that can be used to classify and identify features of proposed solutions which make them more or less effective. The ultimate objective is to develop guidelines for selecting solutions which best meet particular situations.

Research further the question of attitudes as a factor in minimizing counterinsurgency resource requirements. Particular emphasis should be placed on development of a model which could be used to determine possible equivalents between resource requirements and attitude intensities. Later efforts to validate the model (through the literature and the use of simulated situations) should indicate its utility as an operational planning guide.

Develop new and different solutions which use less than ideal resources. In other words, explore the possibility of developing tactics and approaches to counterinsurgency which better match the kinds of resources found in resource-poor developing countries.

PART II

Part II is a detailed report prepared by Human Sciences Research, Inc., for the Special Operations Research Office under subcontract SORO–2 HSR–1 under SORO's prime contract DA 49–092 ARO–7. Part I is a condensation of Part II.

SECTION I

CRITERIA OF INSURGENT/COUNTER-INSURGENT OPERATIONS AT THE OPERATIONAL AREA LEVEL

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT

This report on insurgency/counterinsurgency operations at the operational area level was prepared by Human Sciences Research, Inc., under subcontract to the Special Operations Research Office for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Special Warfare, Department of the Army. Part II has two major sections: Section I deals with the problem of criterion development for counter-insurgency; Section II uses these criterion concepts to develop decision guidelines for operational area command.

Section I has three major objectives. The first is to develop basic concepts for formulating and interpreting criteria pertinent to the insurgency duel at the operational area level. The second objective is to apply these concepts to criteria for the development and management of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent operations, for the interaction between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces, and for the interaction between opposing sides and the people. The third objective is to indicate how a grass roots Communist-dominated insurrection begins and develops through Phases II and III, here called the terrorist and guerrilla warfare phases (see appendix A).

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

Proceeding from this material, part II elaborates the role of the counterinsurgent area command, with emphasis on decision-making functions and the generation of decision alternatives and guidelines for their evaluation. Standardized means are developed for obtaining information from cognizant personnel which can be used to evaluate available strategies, tactics, and techniques.

COUNTERINSURGENCY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFRONTATIONS

To facilitate study of the operational area command, the international and national context will be surveyed briefly. Considered in order are insurgency as a tool of Communist penetration; objectives of the United States in developing countries and problems in attaining these objectives; key characteristics of Communist-dominated insurrections; and definition of operational areas and area commands and the reasons for studying them.

Archeological research and written history testify that man has continuously been both the perpetrator and the victim of wars and conflicts.[1] While conflict continues, the existence of thermonuclear weapons has undoubtedly had a sobering effect on thoughtful national leaders. There is evidence that leaders of certain larger nations have consciously avoided placing their adversaries in the position of having to choose between firing their nuclear arsenal and facing international humiliation.[2] The specter of thermonuclear war as the ultimate end of escalation encourages tacit agreement to keep conflict manageable.

The continuing confrontation of Communist expansive efforts with non-Communist resistance certainly offers little hope that conflict will disappear. The contest will simply take on different forms and shadings: cold war, limited war, psychological operations, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare. None of these is really new; the term "guerrilla" is 150 years old. In the early 13th century, Genghis Khan demonstrated great skill in coordinating psychological operations with his military advances. Such wars were seldom regarded as decisive since they were often only preliminaries to wars in which each side amassed and applied its physical force to the utmost and which ended only when one side was totally disarmed. Because major adversaries now recognize the need to keep war limited, yesterday's preliminary contests and side shows have become today's main events.

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[1] Richardson (31) has identified 92 wars of greater magnitude than 3.5 between 1820 and 1929. 3.5 is the Briggsian logarithm of summed casualties for both sides.

[2] The actions of both sides in the Cuban missile crisis provide support for this view (Pachter, passim).

WAR BY PROXY

Today's conflict between major nations holding opposed ideologies is often indirect and has been termed "war by proxy," the proxies being the antagonist insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. In much of the developing world, Communist powers have chosen to support revolutionary warfare waged for the most part by native Communists (often trained in Communist nations) as a means of gaining political control, while the United States has supported the threatened indigenous governments.

The broad domain within which conflict occurs is depicted in Chart 1. The box at the left contains the United States and its allies; the box at the right indicates Communist bloc nations. Lines A/A–1 indicate the international thrust, counterthrust and blocking actions by each in international conflict. The lines B/B–1 join the United States and the counterinsurgent government it supports on the one hand and the Communist country and the insurgent forces on the other.[3] Insurgency within any country is represented within the inner rectangle, C/C–1. The letters D/D–1 represent the insurgent/population and counterinsurgent/population interfaces.


Objectives of the United States are to help developing countries to preserve their independence, protect their people and build a better life through economic growth (Department of State Publication 7724:2). To accomplish these objectives, American representatives advise, train and support counterinsurgent government organizations and functionaries assisting in political, economic, military, police and civic action areas. The Communist countries and/or allies support the insurgents to varying degrees by providing an ideology, a doctrine of operations, usually financial assistance, and native cadres trained in the U.S.S.R., North Vietnam or, more recently, China and Cuba. Safe havens may be provided to insurgent forces. That this approach has been successful both in achieving its end goal of expanded Communist influence and in avoiding direct United States-Communist bloc confrontation is attested by a number of victorious Communist insurgencies or by a tremendous drain on western treasuries even when insurgents have eventually been defeated.

UNITED STATES-INDIGENOUS COUNTERINSURGENT RELATIONS

Only brief mention is made here of some of the more troublesome problems of war by proxy: direct relations between the United States

[3] In 32 limited wars in the last two decades, the United States has provided arms and/or military assistance to a belligerent in 14 instances. In at least 11 of these 14 instances, the U.S.S.R. or Communist China has provided support in some form to the other belligerent (Deitchman : 24–26, Table 1.3).

Chart 1. Insurgency/Counterinsurgency as "War by Proxy"



A/A^1 = International duel. U. S. and allies versus U. S. S. R., Communist China, and allies

B/B^1 = International support

C/C^1 = Insurgent/counterinsurgent duel in indigenous nation

D/D^1 = Insurgent/population and counterinsurgent/population interfaces

and the indigenous counterinsurgent. These "interface" problems may occur at every level of the politico-military hierarchies of the two nations. Contributing difficulties are, or may be, lack of identity between the national objectives of the United States and those of the indigenous government, differing national concepts of government and public service, and cultural and linguistic differences between U.S. advisors and indigenous personnel. Interface problems can seriously interfere with full implementation of desirable counterinsurgency programs. They are not treated further in this study which deals with the duel between insurgents and counterinsurgents.

DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNIST-DOMINATED INSURGENCIES

There are almost as many definitions of insurgency as there are writers on the subject.[4] In this report, insurgency is defined as a violent attempt to transfer political power having the following characteristics: the attempted transfer is illegitimate, rather than legally sanctioned or institutionalized; it is sustained by a more or less coherent ideology; it is effected by a mass-based movement rather than by an elite; and power is both acquired and exercised in terms of long-range planning.

Communist-dominated insurgency has several distinguishing features.[5] Insurgent organization consists of parallel political and military command hierarchies insuring that the Communist Party can maintain control over the military arm of the movement. The Communist nature of the insurgency is always covert; to the population as a whole, the movement must seem a popular front against the government. Mass support is developed through infiltration of all types of social groups which are then utilized to achieve the goals of the Communist Party, and the insurgents receive moral and materiel support from foreign Communist sources.

INSURGENT DEVELOPMENT BY PHASE

An insurgency develops sequentially in a fashion similar to the growth of a biological organism. Three, four or more stages of growth have been assumed by various writers (Mao, Giap, Galula, Lybrand). Any such classification has the same sort of arbitrariness as the classification of human growth into phases; insurrectionary schedules vary

[4] See Eckstein (1963 : passim) for an extensive review of the major classification schemes for internal war/insurgency.

[5] The success of Communist insurgent methods has led to their adoption as a pattern by non-Communist insurgents, e.g., the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria. As it is likely that similar organizational patterns will recur in further insurgencies, the study of the Communist prototype is of considerable predictive value.

considerably. Communists gear their expansionist tactics to their diagnoses of specific national and local conditions and vulnerabilities which vary from country to country and from area to area within a country. Hence, within a nation, the stage of insurgent development will change markedly from one operational area to another. In spite of these qualifications, a description of insurgent development at the national level helps to lay the background for a parallel development at the lower echelon operational area. Summarized below are four phases of insurgent development for the nation as a whole.

For those accustomed to working within the JCS definition of three phases of insurgency/counterinsurgency (JCS Pub. 2, C4, pages 110 and 110.1), Phase I as defined in this JCS document is subdivided into two phases in this report. Phase II as defined by the referenced JCS document is similar to our Phase III, and Phase III of the JCS document is very similar to Phase IV as described here. Our classification of insurgency into four phases rather than three is predicated upon substantial evidence to the effect that Communist-dominated insurgencies are very difficult and costly to defeat once they have attained the guerrilla warfare phase. Our separation of the JCS-defined Phase I into two phases permits more detailed examination of the birth and early development of this type of ideological movement.

PHASE I

This phase may last for decades and has several important features. Unenlightened political leadership has allowed social, economic and political conditions to deteriorate to the point where the populace is largely disaffected from the government. Graft and corruption, tremendous inequalities in wealth and land ownership, lack of upward mobility for intelligent youth, and the lack of communication between governors and governed are symptomatic, although in the absence of such issues the Communists will find other social frictions to exploit. A militant and disciplined Communist Party is developed and its influence is spread by infiltrating existing institutions and creating numerous front groups. These groups will become nuclei for underground activities in subsequent phases. Once the party is organized and has secured a mass base, two tactics to seize power may be followed. There may first be an attempt to place Communist representatives in office by election or appointment. If this effort fails—the usual case on a nation-wide basis—Communists resort to the armed struggle. By our model, this phase ends when the Communist leadership, after sifting survey information, decides that the time is propitious for armed insurrection.

PHASE II

In this phase,[6] insurgent leadership generally remains in the urban sector and activity continues there, but the rural areas now become a major target. The insurgent must consolidate his pre-insurrectionary organization for the struggle to come. Many party members may go into hiding, establishing underground cells—the backbone of the movement—which are encouraged to proliferate (Molnar: chapter 4). Agitators and front-controlled news media spread anti-government propaganda. Front groups recruit sympathizers. Weapons are collected and underground communications and supply lines are established. Government planning and operations groups are infiltrated at all levels. The technological and psychological gap between national administration as represented at the area level and the village governing bodies reveals the vulnerability of villages. Mob and riot actions discredit the government and demonstrate to sympathetic but passive followers that resistance to the government is possible. The objective is to gain control of towns and villages, often taking advantage of already existing disaffection toward national government and poor technical communications facilities. Persuasion is tried on local political officials and police to convert them to the insurgent cause or at least to get them to look the other way in the face of subversive organizational activities. If persuasion fails, threats follow. If both threats and persuasion fail, officials are murdered. Control of villages is then consolidated, since "shadow governments" can operate without betrayal to the counterinsurgents. Small armed groups spring up. All these moves serve to develop insurgent channels of information about national government plans and activities and to draw the curtain on the activities of the insurgents, thus assuring that no information will reach the national government.

PHASE III

With control established in the villages, Phase III[7] begins. The insurgent now builds up his military forces which draw their support from a well-organized underground. Squads and platoons available by the end of Phase II become cadres for the organization and training of company- and perhaps battalion-size military units. Intelligence from village posts and from warning nets along roadways insures that training areas are relatively safe. Arms must be procured in great numbers; larger military units must be trained to operate in unison and the staff and technical facilities necessary to such operations must be developed. Authoritarian political control

[6] [7] Elaborated in appendix A at the operational area level.

is brought to local government in the cleared areas, political heads are nominated, and civic services are provided along with legal and taxation systems. On the bounds of controlled areas, insurgents continue to extend control, using Phase II tactics. By the end of Phase III, insurgents attain political and military control of some 80 percent to 95 percent of the land mass of the country, with government forces bottled up in their military fortresses and around the national capital.

PHASE IV

The intra-area struggle of Phases II and III becomes the inter-area struggle of Phase IV. The war [8] is no longer confined to small areas in which local insurgent and government forces are pitted against each other in the same area. Insurgents now hold the countryside, draw freely on what it produces, maintain logistic systems, and concentrate armed forces around the last government strongholds, keeping them in a state of siege. Major government military units are engaged in orthodox battles of position and maneuver. Continuous losses, the expense of the campaign and its apparent futility weigh heavily upon the morale of government troops and military and political leaders, causing units to defect to the insurgent cause or to refuse to fight. The result may be a complete abdication by the *de jure* government or a truce wherein the insurgent writes the terms.

This thumbnail sketch describes the progression of an insurgency by insurgent plan. If the country has been the scene of international war, however, arsenals, armed forces, and knowledge gained may provide an advanced jumping-off point for the insurgents, foreshortening the early phases, as was the case in Indochina after World War II. In today's world and tomorrow's, with the constraints on direct thermonuclear conflict between major nations, occasions for wartime build-ups such as Giap's in Indochina or the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Habon (Huks) in the Philippines seem less probable. It is more likely that insurgents will have to start from Phase I and gradually build the underground, the political controls, and the military apparatus that bring victory.

The above description of a Communist-dominated insurgency is basically national in character and presumes that the insurgent presses on to victory in spite of government resistance and perhaps revisions in

[8] Insurgents may win for a number of reasons without actually completing the pattern described by Mao. The will of people and government functionaries to fight may be eroded, lost. Indigenous administrators may not be able to master the limited resources of the country which are usually far from ideally adapted to fighting insurgents. It may not be (or seem to be) possible for beleaguered incumbents to obtain the external resources and know-how needed to win. Cuba is perhaps an example. Unlike the insurrection in China in 1947–49 and in Indochina in 1951–54, there were no armed clashes typical of Phase IV. The war jumped from guerrilla warfare to insurgent victory in a matter of weeks.

time tables. If the counterinsurgent manages to turn the tide, as in Malaya, the Philippines, and Greece, the progression described above is essentially reversed. This reversal is described in chapter 3 in a discussion of the sensitivity of various criteria to the change in direction and the extent and rate of reversal. Criterion statistics at the national level are aggregates of those gathered from the operational areas which may be in varying stages of insurgent development. We now define and describe an operational area, the primary focus of the rest of this report.

DEFINITION OF THE OPERATIONAL AREA

The term "operational area" means a specific sub-national tract within which is located a counterinsurgent center. Counterinsurgent responsibilities are to govern, protect and control; the insurgent is attempting to seize control of government and all societal institutions. The operational area may be demarcated by geographic, political, military or functional boundaries, depending on the country and the stage of the insurrection. Thus, an operational area may be defined in either or all of several ways:[9]

Geographically, an area could vary roughly between 500 and 5,000 square miles.

The political subdivision designated as an operational area in the three countries studied is: in the Philippines and in the Republic of Vietnam, a province; in Malaya, an administrative district. Each of these is supervised by personnel responsible either to state or national government for implementing policy. There is an area capital. Politically, this operational area is one or two echelons below the national government.

A counterinsurgent operational area may be any area to which political functionaries and military groups are assigned to govern and control.[10] The military contingent assigned to the area may be of battalion or regiment size, with a civil liaison group and other augmentations. Other units may consist of police, civil guards, civic action teams, and so forth.

An operational area is a political and administrative subdivision to which all types of forces necessary for combating an insurgency are organic. These forces are under one area command. Command may be exercised by an individual political or military figure or by a committee.

[9] The operational area concept as here defined is of course an ideal, not a tangible reality.
[10] In this context, often referred to as a sector.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY OF AREA COMMAND

Let us consider briefly the political and social hierachical structure and functioning of a developing country at three levels of political hierarchy—national, province or area, and town and village. The capital is typically the major, and practically the sole, source of national influence and power. National leaders must necessarily formulate the political, psychological and military strategies and tactics for the struggle against the insurgents. This includes the determination of which areas are under attack or most vulnerable to Communist attack. Additional materiel and personnel resources are usually needed in these areas. Above all, the national government must set the tone and the posture to be taken toward the insurrection and the insurgents and must convey to the people a sense of the motivation and integrity of national leadership.

Area political or military leaders typically have a small administrative apparatus designed to perform a few civic services and to collect taxes. Initially, in many instances, the area political leadership, military and police are poorly prepared to fight an insurgency. The area command and the villages typically operate in different spheres, with little attitudinal compatibility and with inadequate physical means of communication. This is the gap which Communists exploit.

Villages one or more echelons below the province or operational command in what might loosely be called the political hierarchy are the focal point of rural life.[11] Typically, the chief political figure is the headman, nominated by a village council or possibly appointed by the area governor. Depending on its size, the village may have one or more policemen, usually untrained, poorly equipped and poorly paid. A few families will exercise political control. Local society has often been relatively static for decades or centuries. Most villagers have lived their entire lives in the area.

The rural citizen's geographic immobility does not necessarily dull his curiosity and desire to learn. Rather, in an area wherein knowledge horizons extend little beyond physical horizons, it concentrates what the villager and farmer "know" to detailed and intimate knowledge and awareness of his immediate surroundings. The villager knows his own kinship ties and obligations and those of his neighbors. He knows his neighbor and his neighbor's occupation, personality and habits. He is quick to detect changes in the behavior of those he knows. Any stranger in the village will be recognized as such immediately.

[11] See Valeriano and Bohannan (chapter 4) for a discussion of village life in the Philippines, Miller (passim), for Malaya.

Within this context any outsiders, such as organizers for the insurgent movement who enter the village and any villagers who advocate cooperation with them must necessarily be known. Their activities are surely known. Insurgent political meetings are known to those who attend. Attempts to subvert police and headmen will be known by a number of people, if not as widely. The existence of a shadow government must be known if it is effective. In sum, knowledge of the insurgents and their activities is bound to be available—redundantly available—throughout the village. Indeed, at any stage of insurgent development, if a village has been penetrated or if it is controlled by insurgents, that village is a reservoir of information about local insurgent activities.

It follows from these assumptions that area commands are confronted with two key problems: to bring some sort of effective administration to the village level (Too: 5), and to tap village information reservoirs for knowledge of people, their sentiments, and their behavior. Important functions that can be performed only at the area command level follow from these problems. Existing civic and political organizations must be forged into an instrument suitable to wage the fight against insurgents. Due to lack of resources, much of this organization requires use of volunteers. The area command must close the gap in communication and understanding between area policy makers and village headmen and police. Finally, penetrated villages must be identified and their stores of information about the insurgents tapped. These initial moves can be taken effectively only at the area command level.

The above requirements are primarily for organization and for initial diagnoses of an insurgency situation. With regard to implementation, broad national strategy, tactics and directives must be adapted to local conditions; for some areas, completely different policies and practices may be required. Almost every move by the counterinsurgent works to the disinterest or inconvenience of a good many people.[12] The means and techniques of winning support and gaining intelligence must be based on and implemented in terms of the local situation. Only that command whose subordinate echelons are fully aware of local conditions can be expected to perform these tasks effectively and efficiently.

SUMMARY AND PROSPECTUS

As a preface to the next chapters, it is important to note the distinction between counterinsurgency operations and antiguerrilla warfare,

[12] Miers (188) cites the impatience of plantation owners at being "kept waiting at the gates by security police and checked like nothing more than common tappers."

for the terms are frequently used synonymously. Insurgency refers to the whole phenomenon by which control of a society is seized, while guerrilla warfare is but one of the several necessary components of the whole, although perhaps the best understood.

Communist ideology presents a false picture of both modern democratic societies and Communist states. It provides the insurgents, however, with a map for political and social control using conspiratorial techniques. It specifies the clandestine tactics for the erosion and capture of political institutions starting with small political units, and for authoritarian control of social behavior through propaganda, terrorism and parallel reporting hierarchies. Clandestine cells and an underground are a sine qua non for insurgent development. The resultant control of mass information channels permits the development of guerrillas and gives guerrilla fighters a most substantial advantage over a military arm that fights according to the standard, and often implicit, rules of orthodox warfare.

Antiguerrilla warfare can be successfully prosecuted by military means. Counterinsurgency operations involve antiguerrilla warfare (assuming that the situation is far enough out of hand), but they can be successfully prosecuted only by developing a ward heeler's appreciation of societal microcosms in order to eliminate the insurgent movement at its roots. The next chapters discuss criteria by which the success or failure of counterinsurgency operations can be evaluated.

CHAPTER 2

CRITERIA APPLIED TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

INTRODUCTION

There is no systematic treatment of criterion methodology known to us which deals with criteria for insurgency/counterinsurgency. Many criteria may be found in the literature, but the authors have concentrated on the presentation of relevant information rather than on structuring the criterion field. Three sources have provided some assistance: Hitch's descriptions (1960) of the use of criteria in decision-making; and regarding force mixes and procurement of weapon systems; operations research material on two-sided military games; and discussions by psychologists of criteria designed primarily to evaluate individual performance and to measure attitudes. Concepts from these sources are useful, but considerable transposition is required to apply these to an insurgency/counterinsurgency context.

This chapter, an exploratory effort, consists of three sections.

The first defines criteria and allocates them to four classes: insurgent reflexive, counterinsurgent reflexive, direct interaction between sides, and indirect interaction via the populace. These sets and their permutations should be comprehensive.

The second is the delineation of the use and interpretation of criteria: phases as criteria, significance of time trends, intensity measures, criterion reciprocity, implications of cascading or spillover effects for criteria, contingencies, criterion weighting, and costs.

The third describes criterion requirements: criterion validity, reliability, bias, variation and covariation requirements, compatibility, and requirements for criterion sets.

Criterion requirements discussed here will be applied in chapter 3 to the generation and interpretation of criteria for insurgency/counterinsurgency. This chapter deals primarily with what needs to be measured and problems in interpretation of measures once obtained, the next with how measures may be generated. We are not yet concerned with equally important considerations as to whether and how these measures can be used to collect data in the actual insurgency situation.

MEANING OF CRITERIA

Criteria are standards by which things, actions, outputs or processes are compared or judged with respect to their effectiveness. Generally, judgments are made in terms of quality, speed, output, and cost. Criteria can be used to evaluate organizations with respect to function allocation, performance effectiveness, and efficiency and to evaluate equipment items, training and selection procedures, acts of an individual or of a group working in concert, command decision-making, and the resultant of antagonistic actions by two or more individuals or groups in conflict.

Criteria must derive from an explicit statement of an objective or a set of objectives which the organization, item of equipment, or person is attempting to meet. Using the objective(s) as an anchor, we (a) define a continuum or set of categories to be used in evaluating the quality of process or output and (b) define guidelines by which the thing or action is to be evaluated. A list of relevant objectives, criterion measures, and rules for evaluation of the organization, function, or performance are established. The entire set can be designated as a criterion system. Our concern here is to develop the logic for a criterion system with which to evaluate the efforts of an interaction between the two sides in insurgency/counterinsurgency.

These are usually many alternative organizations, tactics, methods, equipments, and personnel assignments which may be used to accomplish a given objective. Several levels of effort may be contemplated. Criteria help determine which of many alternatives is best and what level of effort will most efficiently achieve the objective. For a given objective, a criterion system helps evaluate alternatives in terms of degrees of effectiveness and increments of cost.

This chapter lays out logical bases for the formulation and evaluation of criteria for insurgents and counterinsurgents and their actions and counteractions during Phases II and III of an insurgency.

BASES FOR CRITERIA

Criteria must be formulated in terms of the phenomenon to be evaluated. Insurgency/counterinsurgency is both a duel and a social process. The mix varies from country to country and the duel aspects tend to take on more prominence in later phases. To the extent that insurgency is a social process, spontaneous, inchoate, and purposeless, the criterion frame to be described is inapplicable. We are not treating that part of the insurrection mix that represents disaffection, spontaneous acts fixed on no objectives, and random behavior that would-be-insurgent leaders do not attempt to channel or translate to their interests.

We are treating here these aspects of insurrections reflecting the purposeful duel between two antagonists, each with the overall objective of defeating his opponent. Each side recognizes some randomness in the social process and attempts to capture public sentiment and gain greater control over the behavior of the people. Each side has a hierarchy of objectives, sub-objectives and organizations created to perform the functions necessary to attain these objectives. Functionaries of each organization perform tasks calculated to achieve their sub-objectives and thus contribute to victory. It is not necessary to assume that objectives have been formally established or that the dueling organizations and functionaries are efficient; these matters are themselves subject to evaluation. One need only assume that objectives of each side can be formulated and that organizations and functionaries should strive to achieve them. The objectives and sub-objectives of each side, the nature of the duel, and the operations that ensue when each side attempts to attain its objectives provide the bases for criteria.

CRITERION SETS: GROSS CLASSIFICATION

The relationships between the two forces, insurgent and counterinsurgent, and the people as a third fundamental entity provide a basis for ordering criteria into four sets. Within each set are, in concept, all relevant criteria and the organizations, functions, tactics, and so forth to which they pertain. The four sets are: (A) Insurgent Reflexive: criteria that bear on force, size, internal organization, staffing, training, and plans of operations of the insurgent forces, that is, attempts by these forces to improve and increase their own capabilities; (B) Counterinsurgent Reflexive: the same type of criteria applied to the insurgent; (C) Direct Confrontation: use of military or police force by either side against the forces of the other and attempts by either to penetrate the organization of the other; and (D) Indirect Confrontation: confrontation via the people as a medium, each side attempting to gain sympathy and control of elements of society via appeals to the people.

Reflexive criteria are management oriented and should be cost-referenced since the managerial problem is to produce results at acceptable costs. Interactive criteria indicate how the total struggle or any of its facets is going. These sets may be elaborated as follows.

CRITERION SETS DEFINED: STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT

From a strategic viewpoint, the duel is asymmetric, at least in the beginning. Government forces must perform functions expected of

government such as taxation, protection of the people, maintenance of law and order, support of a military establishment, and maintenance of a growing and balanced economy. The insurgent, on the other hand, has one single goal, the seizure of power, and his organization and actions can be oriented toward that single end. He has no responsibility for protection of property or maintenance of law and order. On the contrary, he usually manages to profit from the destruction and civil dislocation brought about by his own actions, possibly compounded by inept administration. Thus, while both government and insurgents have finance departments, only the government forces must worry about the effects of government taxation policies on the overall economy. The insurgent collects "taxes" and lets the government face the inflationary consequences. This situation begins to change (see appendix A, "Civil Administration"), at least in rural areas, when the insurgent takes on civil functions.

REFLEXIVE CRITERIA FOR INSURGENTS

From the viewpoint of management rather than strategy, reflexive functions and actions and associated criteria for insurgent and counterinsurgent are more nearly similar. Criteria for the insurgent must place emphasis on his ability to develop and strengthen an organization in spite of presumed attacks by counterinsurgent forces. To be evaluated are the size of military, political, and underground insurgent organizations; the balance among military, political, and civil functions; coordination of activities; capabilities of its functionaries; and selection and training of functionaries and underground. The evaluation can proceed down to the most minute (internally referenced) act of a member of the insurgent underground or soldier, as long as this act can be related to winning or losing the cause.

The concepts underlying management criteria and what they evaluate can be extended to generate hierarchies of objectives, organizations and suborganizations, functions and tasks, and tactics and techniques. Parallel to each hierarchy is a hierarchy of criteria which can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the organization, performance of the function, task, tactic or technique. Assumed organizations and functions of key cadre members can be related to and evaluated by appropriate criteria as can those of counterinsurgents.

REFLEXIVE CRITERIA FOR COUNTERINSURGENTS

Reflexive criteria are applicable to all government organizations and acts of their functionaries. The designations "government organizations" and "functionaries" are to be defined broadly to include all

organizations, political, military, and civil, and all functionaries from the chief of state down to the part-time hamlet policeman.

Thus, the total fan of government hierarchies (the government system) from top to bottom and laterally across each echelon of authority defines the domain. Legislative organization and machinery, military organization and forces, departments of taxation and forestry, legal machinery, intelligence and social welfare systems—all are potential candidates for evaluation. Within this government system, organization, allocation of duties and resources to carry out these duties, selection, and training may all be evaluated by internally referenced reflexive criteria for counterinsurgent forces.

DIRECT INTERACTION BETWEEN ANTAGONISTS

Criteria of this class assess the resultant when the two sides join in battle. There appear to be five major categories of strife: military skirmishes and battles; attempts by either side to penetrate the other with agents, and counteractions against penetration; attempts to threaten, kill, or kidnap opposing functionaries; attempts to bring about defections by members of the other camp; and attempts by either side to destroy property, organization functioning, or programs of the other in ways not covered above. Most of the criteria that have been used to evaluate success or failure in insurgency/counterinsurgency can be assigned to these categories. Some such criteria are treated in chapter 3.

INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INSURGENT AND COUNTERINSURGENT AND THE PEOPLE

The criterion sets above are referenced to the two organizations; they concern internally directed efforts to build effective and efficient organizations and direct encounters between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Criteria of the last set are oriented toward the interfaces between government (or insurgent) policies, acts, and functionaries and the populace (people as individuals or groups).

Criteria of this set constitute, in effect, the popular referendum, the means by which one judges the impact of acts by either side on the perceptions, attitudes, judgment, and behavior of the populace. The extent to which all acts by either side such as civic actions, propaganda population control, and terrorism, modify existing perceptions, judgments, and behavior would be measured by these people-oriented criteria.

In general, criteria oriented toward attitudes would need to take account of relevant cultural values as they relate to attitudes about insurgents and counterinsurgents. Base-line measures of values and

attitudes would be needed. Specific policies, attitudes, and acts could be evaluated in terms of their effects on the underlying attitudinal structure. Of particular concern would be the number of people whose attitudes have changed, and the amount, direction, and duration of change brought about by actions of either side. Next, criteria need to be devised to measure the behavior of members of the population relevant to the duel: their willingness to support one side or the other and the extent to which attitudes and behavior correlate. Such criteria would be related to specific tactics and acts.

Taken together, the four criterion sets make up a criterion system.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CRITERION SYSTEMS

Two desiderata for criterion systems are worthy of note, for the criterion sets defined above do not entirely satisfy them.

Definition of Mutually Exclusive Categories. Within a criterion system we would expect that variations in data allocated to certain criterion parameters will be functionally related as indicated by correlational statistics. Otherwise, the criterion system does not represent a unifying concept. For definitional purposes, however, it should be possible to distinguish clearly between all criteria within a set so data can be assigned to criterion categories with minimal error. If the same data are assigned to two or more categories, an artificial correlation is built in by the method of definition of categories.

Functional Relationships Between Criteria. When classes of criteria are functionally related, it should be possible to specify the nature of the relationships.

The requirement that categories be mutually exclusive for definitional purposes is not entirely met. We know of no way to avoid this without introducing still other problems that would be equally troublesome. Consider the four classes of criteria rather as four different perspectives, each serving a somewhat different function. The reflexive criteria are management oriented. They reflect capabilities of either side in the definition of (the right) functions to be performed, allocation of functions, supervision, coordination and so forth.

The interactive criterion sets are designed primarily to evaluate the course of the battle with respect to the military and intelligence fronts and the success of efforts of each side to control the insurgency-related behavior of the people. One of the more troublesome problems is that of deciding, when reference is made to "the people" or to "the government," just what people are to be considered the people and what political units are to be called the government. Specifically, are government functionaries and Communist cadres and underground all to be referred to as the people, or shall the term people refer only

to the uncommitted or passive leaners? As a concession to the practical problem of identifying the underground and distinguishing between passive and active sympathizers, we here use the term people to include all people, whatever their sympathy. This definition includes government and insurgent functionaries twice, since their acts are to be evaluated under reflexive criteria for insurgents and counterinsurgents.

By the same token, is it proper to designate political chiefs and village chiefs as a part of (counterinsurgent) government? In many, even most, developing nations, village political units are functionally autonomous and relatively independent of the central government. Neither by psychological allegiance nor by any significant linkages of administrative machinery are they government in the sense that the chief of state, his staff, and designated provincial governors are government. If they are not to be regarded as government, however, in what way should town and village chiefs and police be categorized? [1] By our system, they are classified as parts of the indigenous government. Again, acts of government functionaries may be included twice in the system. These are examples of problems involved in parceling criteria into mutually exclusive sets.

As indicated above certain correlations are to be expected among criteria that measure related aspects of the criterion domain. Consider, for example, the nature of relationships between criteria that would measure the internal operations of either management and criterion measures of interaction between sides. The latter would measure success of the mutual and directly antagonistic efforts by either side to win control of the population and destroy the other side. The better the management of either side, the greater the likelihood of positive relationships between management's actions measured by reflexive criteria and impact of these acts on people and foe as measured by interactive criteria. Two examples will illustrate relationships between management and interactive criteria.

Consider one function the counterinsurgent command should establish and direct, that of generating and disseminating information/propaganda. Performance of this function can be evaluated first in terms of reflexive criteria. Does a formal psychological warfare organization or its equivalent exist? Are its missions clearly defined? Is its size appropriate to its task? Are its functionaries sufficiently skillful for their jobs? Do they need training and, if so, has training been given? Even if a formal organization does not exist, have personnel been designated to perform the function? Unless these reflexive criteria are satisfied to some degree, the government could

[1] See Lybrand's subdivisions (56).

hardly have an effective information/propaganda program. These are valid internal criteria, but taken alone they are not sufficient, since they do not evaluate the effectiveness of the propaganda itself, or that of distribution systems media and so forth.

Hence, interactive criteria are needed. Information/propaganda is directed toward population and insurgents. Assuming that the target is the population or specific groups within it, several criteria may be invoked to evaluate the impact of an information/propaganda program. What percent of the intended target population is reached? Do the appeals take advantage of local values and customs? Do they appeal to their target groups? Are they credible? To what extent do they change judgments and attitudes? To what extent do they change behavior? Interactive criteria must be used, along with management criteria, to provide a necessary and sufficient criterion set for evaluation of an information/propaganda program.

OPERATIONAL AREA CRITERIA AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF COUNTERINSURGENT AREA COMMAND

Another set of important relationships among criteria are those that obtain between criteria that would measure the status of the duel in the operational area and criteria designed to evaluate counterinsurgent command decision-making. Section II treats these latter criteria. The criteria that measure the status of insurgency cover all relevant aspects of the struggle—the struggle for public support, military superiority, political and economic control, and so forth—in short, all interactive criteria. They could be applied whether an area command exists or not.

The counterinsurgent area command must influence the situation in ways compatible with counterinsurgency objectives. Area forces are the command instrumentality. Tasks of area command are continuous and to some extent cyclic: interpretation of objectives, evaluation of area resources in general and resources required for a particular situation, planning and initiation, building an organization, allocation of forces, supervision, and re-evaluation of the progress of programs, projects and tasks. Each such task is designed to have some measurable impact on the area situation. Criteria for counterinsurgent area command would evaluate performance of the above management functions as well as the impact of programs, projects and tasks performed under command direction.

In summary, criterion classes are designed to subdivide the problem of evaluating the action of each side and the resultant of actions and counteractions so that the facets of the duel can be considered, one

aspect at a time. It must be possible to relate the four perspectives so that actions of either side measured in terms of management criteria can be considered in terms of the effects that these actions produce as measured by interactive criteria.

CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF CRITERIA TO INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY

There are a number of aspects of the insurgency/counterinsurgency struggle which have special bearing on the formulation and use of criteria.

INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY AS A MANY-SIDED WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR CRITERIA

A conventional war can be decided by one or a few battles. This is not the case with guerrilla warfare if the insurgents play a sophisticated game.[2] The insurgent tactic in the face of defeat is to revert to an organization consisting of smaller units and to begin anew. What is true of guerrilla warfare is also true of other facets of insurgency. The struggle is a series of interrelated small skirmishes in different societal domains, political, psychological, and economic. In view of this, one cannot reasonably expect that some single criterion can provide a valid and sufficient index of which side is winning or losing. A number of criteria will be required, and the criteria must cover not only military operations, but all relevant aspects of the social system.

PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT AS CRITERIA

The status of the insurgent movement is some resultant of insurgent activity, objective conditions, skill of insurgent leadership, and opposition by counterinsurgent forces. Insurgent organization of villages and the proportion of villages controlled is a necessary concomitant to the articulation of the movement. These articulations and the

[2] Greece, where the insurgents chose to fight a conventional battle in the Grammos Mountains and lost, might be thought of as an exception, but insurgent tactics of prematurely opposing a conventional army in battles of alignment is usually a losing tactic, as Giap found in Indochina in 1951. Assuming that insurgents had some advance information as to the plans of the Greek military arm, this was by no means their only alternative. Insurgents might have accepted the fact that the immediate situation was lost and, hence, that they would have to retreat to a more fragmented and less potent organization (in effect, an earlier stage of conflict) rather than take actions that would lose the cause entirely. Given sufficient civilian support, they might have been able, even though defeated, to scatter, reorganize in smaller cells, and continue the struggle. This was what happened, in effect, in both the Philippines and Malaya where, when their major units were defeated by military engagements, by decimation of their supply systems, and by loss of popular support, insurgents scattered and formed smaller units which held out for some years even after the main thrust of the insurgency had been defeated.

extent of control provide the bases for stating that the insurrectionary development is in early, mid-, or late Phase II or Phase III. The statement that the movement is at some point between the initiation of Phase II and the conclusion of Phase II amounts, in effect, to a rough summation of reflexive and interaction criteria. As the insurgent is winning, at any given time, this summation provides a measure of the status of the movement as an overall criterion.

In appendix A the status marker always moved to the right, that is, toward insurgent victory. There was no explicit description of what happens when the counterinsurgent turns the tide, when the insurgent attack is blunted and reversed. Study of insurrections that have been defeated in the Philippines, Malaya, and Greece indicates first a rise in the intensity of the action, then a reversal of the process. The number of insurgents under arms and the size of insurgent units are reduced by battle losses and defections; undergrounds die out for lack of support; active sympathizers cease to be active; and there is a decrease in the number of geopolitical units controlled and the extent of such control. Thus, the phenomenon is in many important respects analogous to a reversible chemical equation.[3]

Assuming that the reversibility analogy has minimal validity, the overall criterion measure provides a valid, if gross, index of status of the struggle, whichever way the issue is going. Thus, measurement of the articulation of the insurgent movement and control of the population provides a definable base for planning and evaluation. For either side, this base is indicative of the job yet to be done; it provides a zero point for evaluation of subsequent trends. If we visualize one or more criterion measures sensitive to stages of insurgent progress, when the insurgent is winning the criterion measure is moving from left to right. When the counterinsurgent is winning, the reverse is true. Hence, identification of the stage of the insurgency and the direction in which the marker is moving, whether right to left or left to right, provides a reasonable gross measure of the status of the struggle at a given time.

Like any other statement, this requires some qualification. Either side may be winning in one operational area, losing in another. Also,

[3] It is not analogous in all respects. We have not analyzed all facets of this reversibility phenomenon. Insurgent units are forced back further into the jungle than when their movement was flourishing (Malaya, the Philippines). Further, assuming that counterinsurgents have dossiers on insurgent top and middle management (Malaya), these functionaries cannot expect to circulate among the people with impunity. Further, casualties are apt to involve losses of morale within insurgent forces and the loss of face vis-a-vis the people. Thus, the situation after the insurgent has been pushed back to a given point in Phase II is not precisely the same as when he was at that point during the start of his ascendancy. The deleterious effects in loss of morale of forces and loss of faith should be compensated in some part by what has been learned and remembered from the growth phase prior to defeat. See also chapter 3.

within areas, the insurgent may be gaining political influence, parity, or superiority in certain villages while counterinsurgents are gaining in others. An area-wide criterion would have to be a summation of these parts of the picture.

CHANGE IN CRITERION MEASURES WITH TIME AS A CRITERION

As a logical corollary to the previous section, for any valid criterion measure, its *changes* in value through time are especially significant. For the insurgent, changes through time would represent the rate of progress of the movement and the speed with which his own organization is developing. Looked at from the counterinsurgent's perspective, a measure of the size of the insurgent force indicates the task that lies ahead. Interpretation of one's own reflexive criteria through time is somewhat different for the counterinsurgent since the build-up of his organization can only provide the potential for success. Whether this potential is realized depends upon how wisely the counterinsurgent uses his own forces. On the negative side, if the counterinsurgent has insufficient forces he cannot win. Thus, the rate of counterinsurgent build-up of various force elements as measured by changes in strength through time provides a means for evaluating the effectiveness of prior efforts and his capabilities for future actions.

Similarly, changes through time are highly significant with respect to interactive criteria. In both the Philippines and Malaya, changes in casualty ratios and number of incidents favoring counterinsurgents were associated with the general consensus that the tide had turned in favor of the government. With regard to people-oriented criteria, people must eventually choose sides, even if by passive acquiescence. A change in the number of people who favor one side or the other and the strength of the favorable opinions becomes an important criterion measure. Thus, the amount of change in any significant criterion value through time is itself a significant criterion.

NEED FOR INDEPENDENT MEASURES OF INTENSITY

A further corollary to the material dealing with phases of development of the insurgent movement as criteria is that for any given phase of the struggle there may be variations in the intensity of actual fighting, of terrorist activities or of any other aspect of the struggle (Valeriano and Bohannan: 125). For a given time period both sides may be exerting an all-out effort or a more modest effort.[4] Policy changes

[4] Data being collected from Vietnam indicate that neither side is contesting some areas. (Personal communication of Ronald B. Jones, Rand Corporation.)

by either side may affect criteria.[5] A reduction or increase in the number of incidents, casualties or both may indicate only a change in intensity, not a turn in the tide of battle. There is no necessary relationship between intensity of battle and determination of which side is winning, except when one side can achieve an intensity the other cannot match.

Valeriano and Bohannan (125) cite an instance where insurgents were organizing villages literally in sight of counterinsurgent troops stationed in the area without violent contact between sides. Each side may engage in substantial efforts to strengthen its own forces while initiating few contacts or incidents. In such instances, the significance of changes in data collected by measures of direct confrontation could be easily misread.

DELAYED EFFECTS OF PROGRAMS AND ACTIONS

The objectives of either side may vary from short-term, immediately realizable objectives to long-term programs. As a minimum, it is desirable to know when the impact of medium- and long-term programs may be expected to occur. Even so, long-term programs are extremely difficult to evaluate because of the diffusion of their effect over time and contamination of this effect by the operation of other factors. Such programs are based primarily on assumptions, for the most part assumptions as yet unproven. Within the context of these assumptions, long-term programs can be evaluated. Because of time-lags and diffusion of effect, it is often difficult to bridge the gap between measures of the success of a specific program and more global criterion measures.

ASSUMED RECIPROCITY OF GAINS AND LOSSES

Examination of criteria within each set suggests rather strongly a considerable degree of reciprocity among criteria that would evaluate the gains and losses by either side. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the resultant of the joint actions by either side can be placed along a continuum that describes the phases of the duel. The argument is strongest, obviously, for the interactive criteria. If one side wins the skirmish, the other loses; to the extent that one side wins the sympathy of the people, the other loses in some amount. In both instances, the situation is analogous to a zero sum game. With

[5] For example, under the direction of the Malayan Politburo, insurgents stopped slashing rubber trees. The number of incidents was reduced and the extent of reduction would have been dramatic except that it took some time for the word to get around to units in the jungle. And, while insurgents were being defeated, it is probable that the reduction stemmed more from a change in insurgent policy than from elimination of insurgents by the British or from any marked improvement in tree-guarding techniques.

interactive criteria, if one side wins, the other loses, and the score may be totaled, in concept at least, as soon as the skirmish is over.

The same principle seems to apply to reflexive criteria, although in a much looser fashion. This is to say that as the insurgent elaborates his organization and improves his training, selection and tactical moves, the counterinsurgent loses. Obviously, this loss will not be evident at the time the gains are made; we refer to development of a potential, an incipient strength. Realization of the potential will depend on the ability, determination and techniques needed to exploit it. Similarly, if the counterinsurgent is building strength, the future task of the insurgent is greater. Thus, by this reasoning, the reciprocity principle holds for all criterion classes, more strongly for interactive criteria which are similar to a zero sum game, less strongly for reflexive criteria wherein the total sum is not fixed but depends on the ability of each side to muster the potential of the area for its assistance.

This conclusion has important implications for the formulation of criteria: any criterion which can be shown to be relevant becomes a criterion for both antagonists. All valid criteria are reciprocal.

CASCADING AND AMPLIFICATION OF CERTAIN ACTIONS

One of the more interesting aspects of insurgency/counterinsurgency is the cascading effect of certain actions through the populace and the effects of these actions on relationships between antagonists and the people. This effect can be amplified, distorted, or contested by the propaganda apparatus of either side. In a violent social process in which people's lives are in danger and they have little control over events, events which do not (yet) affect them directly may become immensely significant by taking on symbolic meaning. The following are some examples.

Action Affecting Sides Only

The insurgent wins a skirmish with the counterinsurgent. Both sides know who won. The knowledge of loss may lower the morale of the counterinsurgent; it may raise the morale of the insurgent so that he presses the next ambush with greater ardor. The impact of battlefield victory or defeat on the confidence and morale of sides is important.

Interaction Between Sides Having Impact on the People

The outcome of the skirmish is known to the countryside. People may tend to make the judgment that the winner of the skirmish will be the winner of the struggle. If such victories are repeated, people tend to assist the winner or at least withhold assistance from the loser.

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

Interaction Between Insurgent and Government Functionary: Impact on Government Administration and on the People

A village chief loyal to the government is murdered. The killer gang is not apprehended. No member of the government administration wants to take the chief's place. If the government nominates someone for the position, he is liable to "play ball" with the insurgents, thus nullifying the efforts of the formal organization to hold the village. The formal machinery still exists, but it does not function as intended. In addition, villagers withhold information about insurgents when interrogated. Thus, the insurgent can more easily organize the village.

Impacts on Insurgent of Interaction Between Counterinsurgent and People

The wife of a Huk leader was pregnant. She was well cared for and delivered by a government doctor. Subsequently, she persuaded her husband to defect. With him came 25 of his men, a highly significant action which used kinship affiliations to undermine the insurgents (Valeriano and Bohannan: 27, 28).

Insurgent Action Affecting in Turn Counterinsurgent, Counterinsurgent Propaganda Apparatus, the People, and Both Sides

By the ground rules of guerrilla warfare, one function of insurgent forces is to kill government functionaries. Success of insurgents is in part dependent on their ability to lay effective ambushes which accomplish this purpose. In the Philippines, insurgents learned about a team of government engineers who were on their way to survey land for an Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) project.[6] Accordingly, following standard doctrine, Huks ambushed and killed the engineers without loss to their own forces. This Huk action was broadcast by counterinsurgents throughout the nation by press and radio. The argument was made that if the Huks favored land for the landless, why should they murder the engineers whose efforts were helping to provide the land? By military criteria, the Huk won the skirmish. According to Valeriano and Bohannan (224), this act raised widespread doubts about Huk motives which more than offset Huk gains evaluated by casualty ratio criteria.

The above examples are illustrative only. The possible permutations of various possible actions by the two sides toward one another and the people and the cascading effects of these actions are quite complex. These interactions mark a fertile field for development of tactic and countertactic, a field which has not been well exploited

[6] EDCOR projects provided captured landless Huks with a few acres of cleared land in answer to the propaganda theme: "Land for the landless."

with the possible exception of actions of Philippine Battalion Combat Teams (BCT's). With regard to criteria, it is manifestly evident that in many instances the effects of an action cannot be fully evaluated within the immediate confines in which the action takes place. If application of criteria be confined to the first interface, the Huk action against the engineers was a Huk victory. If the application of criteria is to stop here, however, the essence of the story is lost. Account must be taken of the possible cascading effects of actions by either side. Many actions may have a positive or negative downstream impact far greater than their immedite significance. Some of the above examples are perhaps dramatic; many actions by either side will undoubtedly not have such amplified downstream effects. Nonetheless, one must be sensitive to this possibility in the application of criteria.

ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES

We have not yet asserted—as we will in the next section—that criteria should be valid. Much of the preceding has, however, indirectly dealt with the problem of criterion validity. Naturally, the evaluator wants a few simple, valid, easily measured criteria. If the further requirement is imposed that the criterion set be comprehensive, it is rather doubtful that the nature of the struggle permits this much-to-be-desired outcome. The validity of criteria and the manner in which they are interpreted must necessarily vary from phase to phase and from one situation to the next. Many criteria are valid only when certain situational variables assume certain values. Two examples will illustrate this.

Incident counts (incidents initiated by insurgent actions) are frequently used indices of insurgent activity. The greater the number of incidents, the greater the activity, and vice versa. Once insurgents control an area, however, there will be few if any incident reports from it. This is simply because the insurgent only rarely needs to use violence in an area he controls; secondly, even if he did, in most instances there would be no report to the government.

One counterinsurgent problem is to clear the roadways; much of guerrilla warfare is fought along roadways. Let us assume that many insurgent ambushes have been reported along roadways, but the number has recently declined. How would such data be interpreted? At least three interpretations are possible:

Convoys are so well armed that insurgents dare not attack them, insurgents are too short of ammunition to attack, and so forth.

Counterinsurgents have gained control of major roadways and land to the sides; hence, insurgents cannot attack successfully.

Counterinsurgents use air for transportation; they have stopped using roads for convoys.

Of course, other interpretations are possible. The point is that the criterion "number of attacks on convoys" is ambiguous and difficult to interpret unless the relevant situational contingencies are known. We do not yet know clearly what contingencies need to be specified for a given criterion measure. This type of problem is treated further in the discussion of casualties as criteria in chapter 3. Effects of contingencies on interpretation of criteria are related to a similar problem, that of assigning weights to multiple criteria.

MULTIPLE CRITERIA AND CRITERION WEIGHTING

Depending on the purpose of the evaluator and the thing or act to be evaluated, one criterion may be sufficient. For example, the criterion for the rope that supports the window washer is its weight-holding capability. In counterinsurgency, one criterion is seldom sufficient. The same thing, act, or administrative decision may need to be considered from several points of view: military, political and economic. For each point of view there is, by implication at least, an evaluative criterion concept. For any given phenomenon, then, one needs to (a) identify the appropriate evaluative criteria and (b) when two or more criteria are found appropriate, assign relative weights to the criteria. As Hitch points out (1956:4 27), one of the more difficult problems is that of selecting appropriate criteria. The fact that two or more criteria are selected indicates that two identifiably different considerations are important. The weighting process orders criteria in terms of their importance.

We can do little more here than state that in the ideal criterion system, criteria are weighted according to their importance. Each situation appears to require its own solutions. Certain suggestions may be stated. First, almost any program, plan, or action can have impact on societal domains other than those in which the act occurs. Second, weights assigned to criteria will vary from phase to phase. An action which is highly valued in one situation may be of no value in another. Third, criterion weights may vary as a function of situational variables or contingencies. The contingencies need to be specified in order to develop a valid criterion system. Fourth, as a general rule the value of a given alternative action must be compared with its management cost. In developing plans, this is necessarily a projected or estimated value. In any management decision, values and costs are to be weighted against one another for each alternative.

REQUIREMENT FOR COST CRITERIA

The above criterion requirements are oriented toward evaluation of performance. Inasmuch as managers responsible for allocation and utilization of resources must always work with limited resources, cost becomes an especially crucial consideration and should be included in reflexive criteria. Cost may be referenced to materiel, personnel, personnel skill levels, maintenance, administrative overhead, and so forth. In planning a program, project, or task, good managers, whether insurgent or counterinsurgent, should evaluate costs in terms of the appropriate criteria. Thus, command must consider its allocation of resources so that each operation appears worthwhile in view of the total resources available. Hence, cost criteria should be introduced to evaluate resource allocation in search for an optimum allocation of forces.

Practically it is, of course, difficult to invoke cost criteria in many situations. For example, when planning an operation, one cannot know in advance how strongly the enemy will contest an objective. In World War II the costs to both Americans and Japanese during the Solomon Islands campaign was undoubtedly higher than either side had intended to pay initially. Further, performance and costs are usually measured in quite different units which are not easily equated. In spite of these difficulties, however, cost considerations are ever present and cost criteria need to be invoked.

CRITERION REQUIREMENTS

There are several requirements for a criterion system which are more or less conventional. These are cited below.

Validity or Relevance

Assuming that the objective of either side is to defeat the other, then any function, any organization which helps to perform the function, or any tactic or action by either side which gains or loses or which makes it possible to gain or lose is relevant. Visualize an hierarchical structure in which objectives and functions are stated at a general level, then in ever greater levels of detail. At each echelon of the hierarchy, objectives and functions are compatible with those listed for the next higher level. Alternative strategies, tactics, techniques and actions may be utilized to perform these functions. Assume that these alternatives vary in the extent to which they lead to accomplishment of the objectives. A criterion parameter which orders alternatives with respect to the probability that they will satisfy the objectives, or with respect to the extent to which they satisfy objectives, is assumed to be relevant. This is to say that the criterion is valid.

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

The validity of criteria may be established in two ways. In the hypothetical structure described above, a criterion can be shown to be valid if it can be shown to measure attainment of an objective or performance of a function which is compatible with higher echelon objectives and functions. This is validity by internal consistency. In this instance determination of validity is always a regress to some ultimate decision-maker. Second, if it is assumed that the entire hierarchical structure of objectives and functions designed to attain these objectives is a set of hypotheses, empirical and historical evidence can be obtained to determine whether given actions do, in fact, lead to the attainment of objectives.

Criterion Reliability

The term reliability as described here can have several meanings.

Definitional Reliability. The frame of reference should be clearly enough defined by both inclusion and exclusion that those who would use the criterion agree as to its meaning. For example, casualties and casualty exchange rates are important criteria, but there are many types of casualties and many problems in defining casualties. The problem of definition is frequently difficult.

Measurement Reliability. When two or more qualified evaluators apply the criterion to the same phenomenon, their results should be in agreement.

Sufficient Reliability Over Time. The above examples refer to the problem of measurement. These problems can be confounded by chance or rapid variations in the variable to be measured. If these changes occur faster than measurements can be made or any action can be taken with regard to such variables, such criteria would be of limited use.

Statistical Reliability. Some criterion variables may necessarily be based on such a small number of cases that random fluctuations tend to mask fluctuations that can be attributed to one or more causes. Thus, such variables do not satisfy completely criterion requirements. For example, the number of insurgent defectors per month might be a reasonable index at the national level. In one operational area, however, the number of insurgents defecting in any given month might be too small to serve as an adequate indicator.

Measurability of Criteria: Freedom from Bias

A variety of biases may be introduced into the process of evaluating real world objects or events in terms of a preestablished criterion. The bias may be personal. The man with the yardstick may not know what to look at, or how to apply the measure. Or, he may have a personal interest in having results come out in a particular way. There is also organizational bias.

It is characteristic of many, perhaps most, organizations that communications channels tend to distort information so that the directorate hears what it wants to hear rather than objective reports, pleasant or not. This tendency toward institutional bias as information moves through channels can easily occur in counterinsurgency operations, both for the host country and for the country providing support and advice for the operations. Thus, tabulations of results of operations against insurgents in South Korea indicated more insurgent casualties than the total number of insurgents estimated by intelligence (Barton, 1951: 26). According to records, United States and Republic of Korea forces killed or captured more guerrillas than existed, but still guerrillas remained. In the interpretation of criteria, any statistics must be viewed with a certain amount of skepticism. Data may fail to indicate one or more important contingencies that bear on their interpretation, they may have been collected by untutored or biased observers, or their meaning may be modified as they flow through channels.

Covariation Between Criterion and Independent Variables

In the discussion of criterion reliability it was pointed out that if the criterion variable changes too rapidly, the criterion is of limited utility. Contrariwise, the same is true if it varies not at all.

Consider first the problem of managing resources. After the fact, the criterion measures are assumed to be causally related to some logically prior policies, programs, alternative forms of organization, tactics and actions. Changes in criterion values indicate the influence of those factors presumed to be associated with alternative forms of policies, programs and organizations. A priori, criteria can help the planner to specify his objectives and to bring about change measurable in terms of the criterion. Criteria must be established so that what they measure can change as a function of alternatives which the manager can select.

Similarly, if the duel is looked at from a distance, interactive criteria must reflect the counterplay of the two sides and progress by one or the other. They must be able to vary.

Criterion Compatibility

As the overall objectives of each side are delineated into different functions (military, police, propaganda, logistics and so forth) and these functions are translated into subfunctions and specific tasks, it is important to insure that these tasks, properly performed, will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives. By the same token, the criteria applied to measure these tasks should be compatible within major functions and not incompatible between them. This

should be true for the hierarchy of organizations and functions from top to bottom. Thus, the major criterion sets should in concept consist of means for evaluating performance articulated down to the lowest level of organization. Hitch (1956: 429) has pointed to some of the difficulties involved in establishing compatible criterion sets.

Requirements for Criterion Sets

Closely related to the requirements for criterion compatibility are the requirements for sets of criteria. First with regard to management criteria: at a given level of organization, from the top down, all criteria taken together should provide a sufficient set, that is, they should apply each critical perspective to all functions, organizations, programs, and acts believed important. Similarly, criteria designed to measure the interplay between the two sides in conflict need to cover all major aspects of the confrontation. Criteria within sets should not be redundant, that is, two criteria should not measure the same thing unless one is believed to be inaccurate.

Criterion sets should be so constructed that for any organization or function criteria can be formulated that can be delineated to such level of detail as is desirable.

SUMMARY: CRITERION REQUIREMENTS

The foregoing discussion may be summarized as it applies to the establishment of requirements for criteria and criterion sets.

Criteria are derived from the general and specific purposes and objectives of each side and from the resultant of the clashes of these objectives in the duel. Criteria are thus divided into four sets: management criteria for each side, and criteria of confrontation, direct and indirect. For each side, there is thus a hierarchy of functions, organizations, and personnel requirements. Parallel hierarchies of criteria can be applied to evaluate organizations, functions and personnel performance requirements. For a given organization or function in the hierarchy, criteria at lower levels involve basically an extension of higher level criteria. Higher and lower level criteria should be compatible.

For any perspective, level of organization, or function, the criteria selected for evaluation should constitute a sufficient set. Each criterion should cover a different aspect of the thing to be evaluated, but no two criteria should measure precisely the same thing. For any level, all relevant criteria taken together should cover the critical aspects of the phenomena in question comprehensively. Thus, any set should be efficient, that is, nonredundant, and sufficient or comprehensive.

When more than one consideration bears on the evaluation of a particular organization, function or action, then multiple criteria are

invoked. Multiple criteria are (or may be) of two sorts: criteria that are self-contained, in the sense that they can be invoked concurrently for evaluation, and criteria appropriate to evaluation of downstream effects, that is, the subsequent resonance of acts at a specific locale in the society. It may be that these downstream effects, hence downstream criteria, are more critical than those that immediately surround the phenomenon to be evaluated. Multiple criteria often require differential weighting. Criterion weights reflect the relative importance of each consideration from which criteria were derived. Criterion weights must take into account situational contingencies since they frequently determine criterion weights.

Since insurgency/counterinsurgency is a duel, criteria relevant to one side are also relevant to the other; hence a win for one side is a loss for the other. This is true of all criteria, but it applies more directly to the interactive criteria than to the two sets of management criteria.

A separate measure of intensity of the struggle is necessary, along with measures of which side is winning.

For any relevant criterion measure, its change over time is highly relevant.

All criteria should be pertinent and valid as determined by (a) the perspective and the set of assumptions on which criteria are based and consistency of the structure generated from the assumptions, (b) expert consensus, and (c) historical and empirical evidence.

Criteria should be reliable with respect to their definitions, application, measurement, and interpretation, and, if possible, should be free from personal and institutional bias.

Criteria should be sensitive to variations in the phenomena under investigation, but minimally contaminated by chance statistical fluctuations of small numbers of instances.

The best set of criteria should be one that is equally applicable from area to area within the same country and across countries, that is least influenced by contingencies wherever applied, and that can be given specific and unambiguous referents regardless of phase of warfare, area or country.

These are, in a sense, the conceptual requirements established for a criterion system. Chapter 3 evaluates criteria of several sorts in terms of these requirements. There is one further qualification concerning this chapter and the next. We are not yet overly concerned with the very practical and important question, "Could these criteria really be measured in the operational situation?" The answer to this question will depend on which criterion sets we refer to, who is to do the measurement, which side he is on, and so forth. It would obviously be very difficult for the counterinsurgent to measure very pre-

cisely some of the internal management functions of a security-conscious, conspiratorial insurgent movement. Nonetheless, the first and foremost criterion problem is always that of establishing validity and relevance. Those concepts and considerations which are relevant provide the bases for definition of criteria. Until validity is established, further work is meaningless. In the practical situation, it will often be necessary to compromise and select factors believed relevant that can be measured. Here and in chapter 3 our concern is primarily with relevance.

CHAPTER 3

FORMULATION AND EVALUATION OF CRITERIA

REFLEXIVE CRITERIA FOR INSURGENTS

With chapter 2 as background, the buildup of the insurgent strength and duties of the insurgent cadre can be analyzed to develop reflexive criteria for insurgents. These criteria would measure the capabilities, efficiency, and effectiveness of the insurgent's internally directed management effort within the operational area.

By the principle of reciprocity (chapter 2), these criteria become criteria for counterinsurgents in two senses. First, the extent of the buildup of the insurgent organization and underground forecasts the task ahead for the counterinsurgent if he is to win. It indicates the intensity of the effort that lies ahead and should provide some basis for estimating the size of forces required to destroy the insurgent military forces and underground.

Second, although the counterinsurgent cannot normally be expected to have available adequate data as to the internal operations of insurgents, most insurgents plan and execute actions with which counterinsurgents must deal directly or indirectly. Thus, a great deal of information can be inferred about the insurgent plans, organization, tactics, and manner of operations from his actions (Valeriano and Bohannan: chapter 5). To the extent that information can be obtained —and this should be a high priority task—criteria for insurgents should help the counterinsurgent size up and evaluate the capabilities of his opponent.

Illustrated here are three classes of reflexive criteria for insurgents: gross criteria descriptive of the strength and organization of the movement, criteria for insurgent leadership, and criteria for subordinate but critical functions, those of propaganda and political education.

GROSS CRITERIA

A number of gross criteria can measure insurgent capabilities. The following are some examples:

Total strength of forces and active underground.

Strength of insurgent subunits: for example, for the military arm,

whether there is a national army, an area army, or a village militia, and the strength of each.

Organizations of the insurgent movement, including (a) all key functions being performed: command/coordination, propaganda, communications, intelligence collection and assimilation, terrorist and military activities, logistic support, and underground activities, and their coordination; and (b) effectiveness of assignment of responsibilities, workability and efficiency of insurgent control and discipline for all arms of the movement.

Size of military forces that can be mustered for a single engagement.

Number of active members of the movement engaged in organizational work, military operations, and training, as against those in maintenance operations, those rebuilding supply links, or those in flight due to counterinsurgent operations.

Equipment: weapons, ammunition, communications; and for each class of equipment, the number, type, appropriateness, operability, and state of repair.

Training, skill level, and motivation of personnel in all arms of the movement.

CRITERIA FOR CADRE LEADERSHIP AND KEY FUNCTIONARIES

Criteria for insurgent leadership and key functions can be derived directly from the descriptions of insurgent activities and the assumptions that underlie them. Specifically, it is assumed that leadership, propaganda and internal education, communications, intelligence collection, terrorism/elimination of spies, military operations, and supply are major functions of insurgent forces. It is further assumed that each of these functions can be subdivided into subfunctions under the major functions, which together define the effectiveness and efficiency with which the major functions are performed. It is assumed that for each function and subfunction the criterion considerations relevant to the performance of the function can be defined as criterion parameters.

Guided by these assumptions, we bring forward certain synopses of functions and subfunctions from appendix A and list parameters by which performance of these functions might be evaluated. Concern is primarily with reflexive or internally referenced criteria. Criteria that measure the resultant of these reflexive actions on the counterinsurgent and on the uncommitted members of the population can be treated under appropriate sets of interactive criteria. Specifically, reflexive criteria for the cadre apply primarily to the attempt to stimulate mass resistance and plan and introduce some degree of

coordination in the movement. Reflexive criteria take into account the success of interface operations toward which much of this management effort is directed only insofar as they check considerations such as whether leaders establish and make use of means that provide feedback on the results of people-directed and government-directed insurgent actions. Thus, while reflexive criteria cannot be used to evaluate the success of propaganda appeals, they can evaluate whether or not the apparatus institutes and uses means of checking the success of its appeals which would be measured by interactive criteria. The effectiveness of education and training of recruits can be evaluated by reflexive criteria, for this is an internally directed function. Distinctions of this type between reflexive and interactive criteria may seem somewhat artificial, but the criterion area is broad and complex, and some classification schema is needed to permit systematic treatment.

Charts 2 and 3 treat major functions of leadership and propaganda and political training. Major functions are delineated into subfunctions for Point 3 in the insurgent buildup described in appendix A. Lists of functions and criterion parameters could be established for performance of leadership and propaganda functions at Points 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the insurgent progression in the same manner as we have done here. Criterion parameters for the other major functions described in chapter 3 could be generated in the same way. A detailed review of descriptions of major functions as the insurgent buildup gains momentum will indicate in all cases a buildup of managerial responsibilities. Specific subtasks within functions and their weightings will vary considerably between Point 1 and Point 5. Examination of management functions of insurgents will show changes in management requirements by phase.

In sum, reflexive criteria serve several functions in the total criterion space. They provide a means of evaluating insurgent capabilities. By the principle of reciprocity, they become criteria for the incumbent in the sense that they indicate the scope of his task. They provide a means of distinguishing between the capability of insurgents as measured by gross criteria and the effectiveness with which these capabilities are handled as measured by criteria descriptive of functional performance. They measure functions of insurgent management which interface with counterinsurgent functions and which have an impact on the sentiments and activities of the population.

These reflexive functions serve further to define areas for evaluation by interactive criteria. As these interactive criteria are developed, they may be used in conjunction with reflexive criteria to permit evaluation of management effort in terms of its impact on population and the foe.

Chart 2. Cadre Leadership Functions
(Leader and Secretary—Point 3)

Tasks	*Criterion Parameters*
Coordination with Higher Authorities:	
Establish policy and procedures for cadre operations compatible with guidance from national and state levels.	Consistency of procedures with national and state instructions. Ability to change policies and procedures with changes in instruction from state, and to maintain motivation and good working relationships in cadre.
Make periodic reports to superiors.	Promptness of reports, coverage, ability to recognize and describe key problems.
Planning:	
Formulate plans for cadre members from higher instructions and make general plans for development of movement.	Ability to develop plans to attain objectives, subobjectives, consistent with situation and capabilities of cadre, support, underground.
Timing of Actions:	
Initiate new and expanding activities as soon as the position of insurgents vis-à-vis incumbents is appropriate.	Implementation of plan for civil administration as soon as areas are reasonably secure.
Anticipate and be prepared for moves by incumbent forces.	Ability to diagnose intention of government forces from intelligence information.
	Planning and execution of responses to government military operations such as patrols and cordon sweeps.
Maintenance of Leadership Role:	
Maintain personal status as leader, and morale of cadre.	Effectiveness with which cadre leader maintains control, respect of cadre.
	Ability to maintain morale of cadre.
	Extent to which leaders set a personal example in times of danger, maintain morale in spite of reverses.

Allocation of Responsibilities:
Allocate responsibility for functions necessary to the movement: propaganda, education, indoctrination, military operations, logistics, communications, intelligence collection, underground operations, local security, others as needed.

Extent to which all necessary functions are recognized, defined, and clearly delegated.

Adequacy of instructions and guidance from leadership to those who will perform functions.

Ability of leadership to modify detail of instructions to cadre members, depending on their abilities.

Responsibilities for Supervision:
Supervise planning and execution of duties by all cadre members.

Obtain periodic reports on how functions are being performed.

Effectiveness of supervision of cadre members.

Ability to diagnose needs for assistance by cadre members.

Ability to provide assistance to cadre members as needed.

Maintenance of periodic reporting procedures.

Personnel Selection:
Make periodic checks on quality of recruits.

Extent to which underground obtains recruits with leadership qualities.

Coordination of Crucial Tasks:
Coordinate collection of intelligence with military operations and operations of terrorists.

Pass final judgment on eliminations by killer gangs, assure that activists have plausible stories to explain why eliminations were necessary.

Coordinate propaganda to support military operations and civil administration in occupied areas.

Assure security instructions are given to all personnel; assure proper steps are taken re camp security, security of operations.

Coordinate recruitment of forces and size of force in hiding with ability of logistic system to provide supplies.

Insure coordination with underground by all major functionaries.

Coordinate efforts to procure arms, expenditure of funds for arms, with levies for recruits.

For all items of coordination:

Ability to anticipate requirements for key coordination among functions.

Ability to state clearly what coordination is required, to delegate responsibilities for and supervise coordination.

Frequency and adequacy of checks to assure that coordination is being implemented.

Periodic security checks to assure that personnel follow security requirements at all times.

Periodic checks to assure that operations are secure; that counterintelligence machinery has been established in camps, villages.

Chart 3. Propaganda and Internal Education Function

Tasks	*Criterion Parameters*
Analysis of Government Vulnerabilities: Identify vulnerabilities of society and weaknesses of government and political functionaries.	Ability to focus information collection effort on critical areas. Effectiveness with which information as to societal vulnerabilities is analyzed to pinpoint them. Precision of description of vulnerabilities.
Development of Propaganda Themes: From available information and knowledge of culture, develop themes that take advantage of vulnerabilities and that will appeal to target groups.	Effectiveness of themes derived from vulnerabilities described above. Ability to take advantage of customs, beliefs, and symbols of culture to develop propaganda themes.
Utilization of Timely Events for Propaganda: Take advantage of fortuitous events and mistakes by government functionaries for use for propaganda purposes.	Extent to which vulnerable government policies and acts of government functionaries are exploited in propaganda appeals. Speed with which mistakes are recognized and broadcast.
Direction of Propaganda to Optimal Audience: Direct propaganda to all civilians, with emphasis on personnel and groups who, if converted, can be of greatest value to the insurgent cause.	Extent to which appeals are directed to diverse target groups. In view of information available, selection of the most important target groups. In view of information available, extent to which propaganda is matched to target groups. If two or more language groups exist, extent to which appeals are directed to each in own language.
Selection of Best Media: Make best use of available media.	All media employed as appropriate to area, within the procurement capabilities of the insurgent organization.
Establishment of Front Groups and Agitators: In coordination with underground, develop plans and and instructions for agitators and front groups.	Plans and instructions provide logical arguments in favor of the cause. Plans for recruiting indicate step-by-step recruiting procedures.

Establishment of Feedback System: Establish a means of collecting information to check the extent of popular support of the movement and actions of insurgents which are popular and not popular.	Extent to which collection means cover critical parts of operational area and collect valid information. Extent to which insurgents take account of indications of popular support in propaganda and other activities.
Checks on Circulation of Propaganda: Via couriers and other functionaries, establish means to check on extent of propaganda circulation.	Effectiveness of means established to provide valid check. Actions taken promptly to correct reported deficiencies.
Utilization of Capable Writers: Employ writers with imagination and literary ability and knowledge of movement and propaganda methods to help in propaganda effort.	Capabilities of writers in preparation of propaganda. Total output of writers. Facility of writers with languages (if more than one language is used in the area).
Establishment of Printing and Reproduction: Establish printing and reproduction facilities which can satisfy area needs. Assure collection of sufficient paper, ink, materials for handouts.	Ability to anticipate and plan requirements for reproduction facilities and materials. Ability of reproduction system to provide sufficient propaganda to adequately cover the area and target groups.
Provision of Agitators: Support operations of killer gangs by assuring that explanations are given as to why dispositions of mayors, police, and spies were necessary.	Provision of credible explanations, in view of information provided. Promptness, effectiveness of instructions to agitators.
Discrediting Incumbent Government: Discredit government functionaries and government-initiated civic action programs in the eyes of the people.	Effectiveness with which incompetence in government is found and/or with which behavior or government functionaries can be made to look selfish, unpalatable. Effectiveness with which vulnerabilities of civic action programs are found, exploited.

Chart 3—Continued

Tasks	*Criterion Parameters*
Propaganda to Own Troops, Enlistees: Give and direct lectures to members of movement to provide and solidify motivation for the cause among recruits.	Extent to which lectures stimulate morale and inspire greater effort.
Emphasize need for tight discipline by active members.	Extent to which lectures are understood.
	Extent to which lectures improve discipline and social control.
Establishment of Self-Criticism Sessions: Set up and monitor criticism and self-criticism sessions.	Effectiveness with which these sessions correct deviationist tendencies, improve control.
	Effectiveness of control so that the sessions do not degenerate into ritualism.
Implementation of State and National Policies: Follow policy, instructions laid down by national and state leadership.	Ability to translate policy and instructions into propaganda for area in view of their intent and the local situation.

Obviously, reflexive criteria (in part parallel to insurgent criteria) can be developed for the counterinsurgent. Descriptions of management functions, strategy, and tactics can be provided for counterinsurgents as appendix A does for insurgents. This assumes, however, considerable consensus as to counterinsurgent strategies and functions. Part II of this study reveals some lack of consensus; it attempts to develop bases for formulation of guide rules to evaluate counterinsurgent area management alternatives. Consensus as to the weighting of alternatives would permit establishment of firmer criteria for counterinsurgents.

CRITERIA MEASURING DIRECT INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SIDES

Two sets of interactive criteria were described in chapter 2, criteria that deal with the direct confrontation between sides and criteria that measure which actions of either side designed to gain support of the people are successful. Several forms of direct confrontation between sides were listed in chapter 2. For each type of clash interactive criteria can be applied to assess the result. Casualties, incidents, and contacts presented in various forms are criteria which measure the immediate result of clashes. Casualties are perhaps the most frequently used criteria in orthodox warfare. In guerrilla warfare, incidents measure the frequency and direction of insurgent initiative; contacts, the aggressive moves of the counterinsurgent. All such criteria represent the resultant of interplays between forces of each side. Like the words of the Delphic oracle, their interpretation is apt to be ambiguous. This section treats one criterion area, casualties resulting from insurgency/counterinsurgency operations, with emphasis on interpretation of casualty statistics.

A recent magazine article cites an argument between a reporter and an officer. "The officer was pointing to the high rate of Viet Cong casualties and said this proved that the war was being won. The reporter insisted that this was a sign that the war was being lost, that the government was losing control of the people. He said that when counterinsurgency operations are successful, the casualty rate drops off." Since casualties are obviously relevant, it is important for the counterinsurgent to determine whether one or the other protagonist is right, so he can choose between a strategy that will produce more casualties and one that will produce fewer casualties. This argument typifies many disagreements over interpretation of data on interactions between sides.

CASUALTIES AND ACQUISITIONS FROM THE ENEMY

In orthodox warfare, battle casualties and land gained have been the most frequently used criteria for evaluation of success or failure of a particular encounter or campaign. In spite of the political and psychological nature of insurgency, casualties are important indicators if the insurgency has been allowed to reach the guerrilla warfare stage or even earlier. Various kinds and combinations of casualties become significant, and their interpretation is subject to many situational contingencies. Described below is a method for analyzing casualties and certain casualty statistics believed especially relevant.

General Definition

Casualties refer to the losses of or injuries to men and materiel. Broadly speaking, casualties include losses for any reason in both training and operations. Acquisitions indicate the unintended (by the supplier) flow of personnel or materiel from one side to the other. They include personnel or materiel captured, defections, and so forth. The casualty or loss ledger is discussed below with the notation that certain casualties by one side are acquisitions by the other.

Casualties by Type

Casualties may be classified in a number of ways.

Personnel. This includes personnel killed, captured, and wounded, and those who defect.[1]

Type of Personnel. Insurgent casualties may include casualties to national troops, to area or regional troops (Phases III and IV), to insurgent home guard or village defense units, and to political heads, party members, underground, and front groups. Counterinsurgent casualties may include casualties to national or local political functionaries or their employees, province chiefs, village chiefs, village councils, members of civic action teams, teachers, kin, key personnel in the economy (for example, rubber planters, merchants), military personnel, and police, civil guards, and self-defense units.

Weapons by Which Casualties are Inflicted. These include small arms, mortars and artillery, recoilless rifles, boobytraps, and so forth.

[1] There are degrees of defection. The village mayor may attempt to satisfy both sides; or, while ostensibly cooperating with incumbents, he may actually cooperate with insurgents. Defectors-in-place can be extremely significant. First, they represent a loss to one side and a gain by the other. More important, in a duel in which information about the other side is critical, the defector often represents a very valuable source. As an example, a former member of the Philippine Army was brainwashed by the Japanese and given the position of chief clerk in guerrilla headquarters in Luzon (Volckmann: 132). He offered to join Volckmann, but was instead asked to remain in place and make another copy of correspondence originated by Japanese headquarters for transmission to Volckmann. This correspondence permitted the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) to identify and eliminate spies in much of northern Luzon.

Type of Operations Wherein Casualties Occur. These may include patrol and pursuit, static defense, ambush, counterambush operations, and civil disorder and terrorist attacks.

Equipment. Any item of military equipment can be rendered inoperable, lost in battle, or destroyed by the enemy. Items frequently found in this category include small arms and ammunition (Phase II), small arms plus larger weapons (Phase III), means of transport, and so forth. Insurgent equipment casualties in Phases II and III will be predominantly small arms.

Many nonmilitary items have been targets of attacks or sabotage by insurgents. Almost any facet of the economy may be attacked, depending on insurgent strategy and the perception of counterinsurgent vulnerabilities. Major categories appear to be roads and public utilities, transport and communication facilities (reducing mobility and coordination of counterinsurgent forces), and key elements of the economy, such as rubber trees, mines, oil supply lines, etc.

Use of Casualty Statistics

Casualty statistics have been used in all insurgency operations. Definitions of casualties have varied, however, from country to country; reports are often incomplete and collection of data has not always been systematic.

Forms in Which Personnel Casualty Statistics May Be Presented

Among the more usual forms of casualty statistics are all personnel casualties for both sides summed; personnel casualties to either side; personnel casualty ratios between sides; personnel casualty ratio rates; personnel casualties to either side by category; and, casualties referenced to some other measure such as casualties per skirmish, per 1,000 man-hours on patrol, or per ton-mile over roads subject to ambush.

Expected Variations in Casualty Statistics With Changes in the Tide of Battle

By Phase When Insurgent Wins. Casualties to both sides summed would be expected to increase as the movement gains momentum.[2] Initially, by standard insurgent pattern of attack, village political functionaries and police suffer most casualties. As the counterinsurgent national forces enter the battle, casualties increase rapidly depending on the amount of resistance and the intensity of the fighting. The increase continues into Phase IV.

[2] For all summations of casualty statistics, it may be desirable to take account of the numbers of forces on each side. Casualties may be divided by estimates of force size as a better measure of intensity of fighting. Otherwise, the disparity in numbers engaged for various operational areas tends to attenuate other sources of variance (R. Jones of the Rand Corporation, personal communication).

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

Insufficient data are available to establish casualty ratios definitively when insurgents win. It is assumed here that counterinsurgent casualties are greater initially and remain greater.[3] Whichever side wins, counterinsurgent civilians (political heads, important figures in the economy such as rubber planters in Malaya) make up a substantial proportion of all counterinsurgent casualties (Malaya, *Annual Reports*, 1949 to 1956).

When Counterinsurgent Reverses the Tide of Battle and Wins. At and after the reversal, casualties to both sides summed appear to increase slightly (indicating insurgent attempts to regain control) or to remain stable. Once the struggle has definitely been reversed by the counterinsurgents, summed casualties decrease.

It appears from available data that the counterinsurgent may reverse the previously unfavorable casualty ratio against himself at about the time that consensus indicates that the tide of battle has turned.[4] Data are not completely clear on this, for civil and military casualties are often not clearly separated or civil casualties are not reported.

Examination of the *Annual Reports* from the Federation of Malaya sheds some light on trends in casualty statistics as the insurgent thrust gains momentum and as it is defeated. (See chart 4.) Some of the data presented in chart 4 are plotted on chart 5 to indicate trends in casualties of Communist terrorists (CT's) and empire security forces and civilians. The monthly average of killed, captured, and surrendered are combined for CT's as an index of CT casualties.

Monthly casualties for British security forces and civilians include soldiers, police, and civilians killed (not wounded), plus 20 percent of soldiers, police, and civilians killed. The 20 percent allows for soldiers or police missing, civilians abducted and not again accounted for, and wounded who died subsequently.[5]

Peak casualties provide an index of intensity which seems to correspond closely to accounts of intensity from other sources.

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[3] It is possible, however, that insurgents even in winning sustain more casualties. Barton (1954 : 63) reports that Huk casualties exceeded casualties to government forces, presumably even during the Huk buildup in 1949 and 1950, but civilian casualties were not counted.

[4] It is worthy of note that this appears to be true in spite of the fact that the insurgent can much more readily set up ambushes. We suspect that counterinsurgents must be quite well trained and receive good intelligence to bring about this result.

[5] Since data are not available for insurgent wounded, in comparing casualties it seems improper to add British military, police, and civilian wounded to the total casualty figures for the British. However, data on killed alone do not allow for abductions, missing, and died of wounds. Total killed plus 20 percent of killed yields figures which correspond fairly well with those given by Barton (1954 : 46), for four years (1948, 1949, 1950, and 1952) for total British casualties less British wounded for military and civilian categories as shown in chart 5.


Chart 4. Progress of the Emergency Federation of Malaya

	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	Total Number
					(monthly average)					
Terrorist-Inspired Incidents	----	----	----	506	311	97	87	65	------	
Communist Terrorist Casualties										
Killed	62	52	54	90	96	79	57	32	24	5, 892
Captured	44	28	12	10	10	6	4	5	4	1, 169
Surrendered	9	20	12	17	21	31	18	21	11	1, 742
Wounded	----	----	----	54	50	24	18	13	------	2, 611
Security Forces Casualties										
Killed	25	19	33	44	22	8	7	7	4	1, 796
Wounded	35	21	42	57	33	10	13	8	7	2, 420
Civilian Casualties										
Killed	53	28	54	44	29	7	8	5	------	2, 415
Wounded	25	16	34	30	13	1	2	2	------	1, 342
Total Number of Persons Committed to Detention under Emergency Regulations					2, 801	1, 603	1, 132	886	605	
Total Number of Persons in Detention at End of Year					3, 492	1, 994	1, 208	625	316	
Total Number of Persons Repatriated (excluding dependents) [a]										
To China					------	618	321	256	85	
To India					------	------	12	4	------	
To Indonesia					------	25	7	------	------	

[a] Figures include some persons detained in Singapore.

Source: Federation of Malaya, *Annual Reports*, 1949–1956.

Chart 5. Monthly Casualties in Malaya (Average)



Source: Federation of Malaya, *Annual Reports*, 1949–1956.

The casualty ratio, i.e., $\frac{\text{insurgent casualties}}{\text{counterinsurgent casualties}}$, favors the counterinsurgent in 1948, 1949, turns in favor of the insurgent in 1950, then shifts strongly in favor of the counterinsurgent beginning in 1952 and for all subsequent years. Full-scale implementation of the Briggs Plan starting in late 1950 is often given as a reason.


The percentage of CT surrenders to other types of CT casualties appears to be higher toward the end of the campaign, but this trend is not definite.

Contacts and Incidents as Indicators

Contacts and incidents are not analyzed in detail in this report. However, a comparison between contacts and incidents in Malaya during that part of the struggle for which we have data is of interest. As indicated earlier, contacts and incidents reflect (among other things, such as number of insurgents) the degree to which either side assumes and maintains the initiative. Chart 6 presents data for contacts and incidents for the only years for which we have these data.

It will be noted that when intensity of the battle as measured by casualties was highest there were many more incidents than contacts. It is easier for a clever, calculating insurgent to create an incident than for the counterinsurgent to make contact with him. When the issue is still hotly contested and undecided, one would expect that incidents would be substantially greater in number than contacts. However, by 1953, the number of contacts was higher than the number of inci-

Chart 6. Frequency of Contacts and Incidents Compared Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya 1951–1955




Source: Federation of Malaya, *Annual Reports*, 1949–1956.

dents, indicating that terrorists had been pushed back into the jungle, where they were being pursued and apprehended.

Based on the British data reported above and statements by Colonel Clutterbuck about later operations (personal communication), the military casualty ratio favoring the incumbent may continue to rise as the incumbent goes on to win (Malaya) or the ratio may remain about the same.[6]

These assumptions about trends in personnel casualties when insurgent and counterinsurgent win may be plotted as in chart 7.

Chart 7. Percentages of Casualties for Sides When Insurgent Wins and When Counterinsurgent Wins



[6] As in the case of the Huk versus the Philippine Government (Barton, 1954 : 2).

The absolute number of casualties to both sides has gone up prior to the reversal. The number of casualties appears to reach a plateau for some time, then begins to decline. We do not know what casualties need to be inflicted in order to turn the tide. Undoubtedly this will depend on the strength of the two sides. The ability of insurgents to regenerate sufficient forces to replace casualties is critical.

Scarcity and Lack of Comparability of Data


Insofar as the above conclusions are taken as predictors of casualty trends in future insurrections, they should be regarded as hypotheses. Data from the Philippines and Malaya are not precisely comparable (Barton, 1954: 46). Estimates of insurgent wounded, presumably a substantial number, may or may not be reported. In the Philippines (the Huk versus the Philippine Government), incumbent political casualties were not given in reports available to the writers. Substantial reasons can be adduced for the trends shown in Malaya and data for the Huk insurrections in the Philippines appear to be similar. The pattern of casualty ratios as insurgent wins described here should not be regarded as firmly established.

Other Interpretations of Casualty Statistics

Regenerative Capability of Insurgents. In a number of instances, counterinsurgents have caused more casualties to insurgents than the initial counterinsurgent estimate of the insurgent force (Barton, 1951: 2). This could be for any or all of the following reasons: (a) initial estimates of insurgent forces were low; (b) some or many casualties counted were not insurgents, or estimates of insurgent casualties were optimistically biased; (c) the capacity of insurgents to replace casualties (their regenerative capacity) exceeded estimates.

Of special interest here is the regenerative capacity of the insurgent forces. Because the number of insurgents under arms is small (until Phase IV) and because the underground and part-time helpers outnumber the fighting forces by a factor of 6 to 100 or better (Lybrand: 57; Bohannan, personal communication), insurgents can usually fill gaps created by attrition, although problems of training replacements might be substantial. The training problem might lessen in severity once insurgents have built a national army, area forces, and village militia, since lower echelon troops with some experience can be promoted. Even without this ability, insurgents have been able to accept attrition rather well. The regenerative power of the insurgent must be regarded as an important criterion for evaluation of insurgent potential and of the tasks ahead for the counterinsurgent. Counterinsurgents must destroy insurgent forces

Chart 8. Hypothetical Chart of Insurgent Casualties Versus Insurgent Regenerative Capability



faster than their regenerative rates if the counterinsurgent is to diminish insurgent military potential significantly (see chart 8).

An index of insurgent regenerative capacity might consist of the number of casualties replaced for a given time period. The number would be expected to increase rapidly as the insurgent force grows.

Personnel Casualties by Category. These indicate what categories of personnel are bearing the brunt of the battle. Categories here discussed are political and military casualties; casualties to the army versus those to auxiliary units; casualties to leaders versus those to the rank and file; and killed and wounded in battle versus surrenders and defectors.

Personnel casualties to government forces should shift from political casualties to military casualties as the struggle progresses. The number of political casualties may not decline as the insurgent movement expands to new areas, but the number of military casualties should increase. Casualties to political replacements are in part a

measure of the government's ability and inclination to replace local political heads and their determination to support the government without compromise.

A continued high rate of casualties to low level political functionaries would be cause for serious concern. Especially in emerging countries, there is already a shortage of personnel with some administrative ability. Such losses suggest a poor intelligence apparatus, lack of public sympathy or inadequate protective measures, and so forth. Paradoxically, a decline in the number of political casualties could, under certain conditions, be a cause for even greater concern. Such a decline might indicate either that protection has improved, or that mayors, seeing that they cannot be protected, have made peace with insurgents at the price of their lives. Thus, it is easy for the counterinsurgent command or advisors, removed from the grassroots duel, to draw scattered items of data out of context and arrive at erroneous conclusions. Some data practically invite misinterpretation, and personal and organizational biases can reinforce the tendency.

In comparing casualties to army with those to auxiliary units, if self-defense corps and home guards are absorbing most of the casualties and national army troops are suffering relatively few, something must be wrong with incumbent policy, intelligence collection, tactics, leadership, or all of these. It is not uncommon for the national political leadership to take counsel of its fears, to husband its military forces, and to ring the capital with masses of troops that could be better employed elsewhere (Valeriano and Bohannan: 54).

If casualties (killed, wounded and lost) are primarily to army personnel, then the battle is either in late Phase IV and has been converted into a civil war, or insurgents have been pushed far back into hiding, out of contact with village officials. The number of casualties to both sides should be far greater in the first instance.

In the category of casualties to leaders versus those to rank and file, as government forces are winning, casualties to key insurgent personnel increase as compared with casualties to rank and file (see Federation of Malaya *Annual Report* for 1953: 340).

In comparing killed and wounded in battle with surrenders and defectors, the ratio of the number of surrenders and defectors by either side to the number of that side killed and captured should be indicative of the will to fight.[7] Changes in this ratio over time may reveal increased motivation, or a loss of will to fight.

[7] This ratio may be affected temporarily by an intensive propaganda campaign directed at the other organization, or by success (or perhaps failure) of Communists in another theater (Pye, 1956: 108, 109). It is doubtful, however, that propaganda or successes or reverses elsewhere can ever, alone, lead to victory.

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

Materiel Casualties

Materiel casualties considered here are casualties to military materiel, primarily weapons and ammunition.

Materiel Casualties Summed. Materiel casualties summed should provide an index of the intensity of the struggle.

Materiel Casualty Ratios for Weapons and Ammunition; Black Market Prices. The most practical casualty ratio would seem to be weapons and ammunition lost in operations by the counterinsurgent forces as compared with weapons and ammunition captured from insurgents. Any practical measure is of necessity somewhat biased, for either side may lose weapons or ammunition that the other does not recover. All losses are not transfers.

Weapons are critical to insurgents. Historically, inability to acquire sufficient weapons and ammunition has been a major limitation to insurgent development. Weapons are usually far more valuable to insurgents than to counterinsurgents. If the insurgent has outside sources of support and clandestine shops, the counterinsurgent must keep the weapon exchange ratio well in his favor.

A shift in the rate of weapons lost or exchanged which favors the insurgent would indicate that the battle was shifting in his favor. The statistics should include captures from government warehouses and weapons surrendered as well as battle losses.

An indication of the ability of government forces to control arms (and of insurgents to obtain them) is the price of small arms on local black markets. Pomeroy (166) reports that as insurgents were losing in the Philippines, weapons prices on the black market went up fantastically. The same was probably true as the British gained control in Malaya, for they successfully established a tight weapons inventory. It is reported to the writers (April 1965) that in situations in which the insurgents appear to be winning, black market weapons prices are quite low.

Insurgent ability to remove restrictions on purchase and possession of weapons clears one critical barrier to insurgent growth. A low price for weapons suggests a deteriorated situation for counterinsurgents, not only for control of weapons but for his ability to control other societal goods as well. (When an insurgent has reached the stage of terrorism or guerrilla warfare, what control could be more important than control over weapons!) Hence, black market prices for weapons and changes therein would seem an important criterion for the effectiveness of counterinsurgent control and for his status vis-a-vis the insurgent generally. Further, this criterion is fairly readily measurable and is not subject to loss of validity because of incomplete records or reporting biases.

Insurgent Losses by Type of Weapons. The types and utility of weapons taken from the insurgent indicate the phase of the battle and the nature of the insurgent's arms. As the insurgent nears the end of Phase III, he needs weapons heavier than small arms to storm counterinsurgent positions. His ability to obtain these weapons and ammunition would be a measure of insurgent capability and hence of the difficulty of battle that the counterinsurgent may expect.

Types of weapons used by insurgents are usually related to the phase of insurgent development. In the Philippines and Malaya, insurgents' weapons were almost entirely arms. Consequently, dug-in or fortified counterinsurgent positions could not be readily attacked. In Indochina, heavy weapons were used to attack dug-in and strongly held French positions. In Vietnam, according to many current reports, insurgents in some areas have mortars, recoilless rifles, and heavy weapons. This, again, makes defense difficult and unsure; in conjunction with the larger number of troops in insurgent formations it would indicate that the battle is in Phase IV.

Ability of insurgents to utilize heavy weapons is indicative of other things. A fleeting band of insurgents cannot go to Phase IV merely by acquiring heavy weapons. Insurgents need a firm hold on the area to be able to transport and safely store heavy weapons and their ammunition.

Biases in Casualty Measures

Casualty measures are apt to be inaccurate for several reasons.

Overestimates. The tendency to underestimate one's own casualties and overestimate casualties of the enemy is well recognized. For example, Taruc (145, 149) reports casualty ratio advantages of 300:14 Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) vs. Japanese and Philippine Constabulary and 70:3 for HMB vs. Constabulary and the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Some years later, Philippine officials reported an advantage of 10:1 against the Huks (Barton, 1954: 63).

Inability to Identify Insurgents. Guerrilla units, especially area units, home guards, and members of the underground, will probably not be in uniform. It is difficult to be sure that enemy casualties are, in fact, insurgents (Barton, 1951: 25–27). This difficulty would likely be compounded when insurgents are attacked by aircraft.

Removal of Casualties. Trained guerrilla units supported by the underground remove personnel casualties and weapons so that insurgents and their families cannot be identified and to conserve scarce armaments. Removal of personnel casualties makes estimation of insurgent casualties more difficult. Removal of weapons and ammunition does not bias statistics; it indicates a chronic insurgent need and

makes the counterinsurgent problem of preserving a favorable weapons exchange ratio more difficult.

Applicability to Operational Area Level: National Compared to Area Level

Casualty rates at a national level should be more stable than casualty rates for an operational area. For the operational area, casualty statistics should be most valid when there is substantial fighting. In early Phase II and after the incumbent has reversed the trend and is cleaning up, all forms of casualty statistics described above would tend to be highly subject to change variations.

EVALUATION OF CASUALTIES AS CRITERIA IN TERMS OF CRITERION REQUIREMENTS

The preceding analyses indicate the necessity of taking a number of factors into account when attempting to interpret criteria. This may be illustrated by re-analyzing the argument between the officer and the reporter. To paraphrase slightly:

Officer: We are killing more Viet Cong; therefore, we are winning.

Reporter: You are killing more Viet Cong; therefore, you are losing.


In view of data from Malaya, from the Philippine Government campaign against the Huks, and from the preceding analysis, *no definitive conclusion follows from the above premise.* Prior to the reversal, insurgent casualties have always increased, but the fact that insurgent casualties increase does not indicate that the counterinsurgent is winning. After the counterinsurgent has blunted the insurgent attack and reversed the battle in his favor, insurgent casualties decrease. That fact that insurgent casualties are decreasing does not necessarily indicate that the insurgent is losing, for in some situations the insurgent can be winning while his casualties are decreasing.

Additional information is given in chart 9. From the initial premise that insurgents are suffering more casualties, questions that lead to more nearly definitive conclusions are traced out. These are not the only questions to be asked, nor are they necessarily more relevant than others that might be suggested. An important objective of further studies might be to determine what facts of this sort need be assembled to yield valid conclusions.

CRITERION MEASURES FOR EVALUATION OF EFFECTS OF ACTS OF SIDES ON PEOPLE

One set of interactive criteria measures the impact of acts by both sides on the thinking, emotions, and behavior of the people and most particularly on the uncommitted.

Chart 9. Flow Diagram for Interpretation of Certain Personnel Casualty Statistics



NOTE: It is assumed that the casualty ratio is initially 1, i.e., both sides are absorbing the same number of casualties.

IN = Insurgent; CI = Counterinsurgent; CR = Casualty Ratio

The assertion that the incumbent forces must win hearts and minds is not new. Like the finding in orthodox warfare that ration cans with pebbles inside may be tied to protective wire to warn against enemy patrols, it is periodically rediscovered. Even Japanese policy recognized the theme during the occupation of the Philippines in World War II. Colonel Yasuji Okada in *The Outline of the Plan for Subjugation Operations in the Philippines* states that "special attention will be given to win the heart and mind of the people."

ANALYSIS OF HEARTS AND MINDS THEME

The general import of the theme is that insurgency/counterinsurgency is basically a contest for public support. If support can be won, people will withhold information and materiel support from insurgents, refuse to do their bidding, give information about insurgents to government functionaries, support public programs, and volunteer assistance so that the war will be won. No quarrel is made with the proposition; the trick is to do it. Emphasis here is on the measurement of sentiments and behavior rather than on acts by either side designed to change them. We wish to explore the meaning of this simple phrase and requirements for defining valid measures of personal logic and sentiments that can be applied to any desired population. The exhortation to win hearts and minds introduces many complex issues that are neither fully appreciated at the working level nor well understood theoretically. The theme implicitly carries a number of connotations including the following:

The approach as stated is implicitly more psychological than sociological, that is, the approach is to people as individuals rather than as groups.

Appeal is made to both sentiment and logic. Emotions and logic do not correspond perfectly. Either might predominate; if the sympathy is won, the mind might or might not be, and vice versa. Or, either sentiment or logic might predominate, so it would be well to win both. In any case, attitude studies suggest that they are usually positively correlated.

The individual as a target may be thought of as a perceptive action system wherein both perception and action are mediated by cultural values, attitudes, and perceived self-interest. In dodging a motorist, the pedestrian's perception, judgment, and action may occur in a moment. He acts as a simple closed-loop system. But the closed-loop analogy does not apply readily to efforts designed to change behavior by changing attitudes. Cultural values and attitudes exercise a stabilizing influence. Attitudes change slowly, cultural values even more slowly.

The primary intent is less to change attitudes as such than to change attitudes and judgment so that such change will achieve desired changes in behavior. Three problems are then to be recognized:

In most instances, time and many reinforcements will be required to change basic attitudes. A change in attitude or judgment does not necessarily create a change in behavior. If behavior does change, it may not change in the respects desired.

The above are some of the complex issues which introduce significant problems for the contestant who would substantially change attitudes and behavior. Too often one hears the topic discussed as if some act of psychological legerdemain will bring significant change. The search begins for the magic trick, and for each trick incidents from the literature are cited in support. Undoubtedly such incidents have happened. Nonetheless, we suspect that many such accounts improve with the telling. In view of findings from controlled studies of attitude change, they must surely be the exception. It is likely that the cultural values and personal experiences of citizens of emerging countries exercise a stabilizing influence on attitudes and beliefs roughly as strong as our cultural values and experiences do with us.

Further, the shibboleth "win hearts and minds" does not take into account effects of actions by the Communists to produce and enhance the ever-present threat to life and limb. This threat may substantially inhibit a person from assisting the counterinsurgent even though he might favor the cause. The truly crucial task of winning public favor is very difficult, requiring much time and patience, as Communist infiltrators and good political ward workers know. The specific attitudes to be reinforced and/or changed will vary somewhat from country to country, but the domain can be fairly readily bound.

The value-attitude domain of special concern can be defined in terms of several referents as follows: concept of government at all levels and proper functions of government,[8] attitude toward chief of state, national functionaries and representatives (including armed forces, medical teams, and so forth), attitudes toward provincial or area au-

[8] These generalized concepts may be rather nebulous even in the Western democracies. Nonetheless, they are important. An editorial in The Washington Post of 7 December 1964, quotes Woodrow Wilson in his *Constitutional Government in the United States:*

"Self-government is not a mere form of institutions, to be had when desired, if only proper pains be taken. It is a form of character. It follows upon long discipline which gives a people self-possession, self-mastery, the habit of order and peace and common counsel, and a reverence for law which will not fail when they themselves become the makers of the law: the steadiness and self-control of political maturity. And these things cannot be had without long discipline . . . . Self-government is not a thing that can be 'given' to any people . . ."

Political maturity cannot simply and quickly be awarded to a people by external helpers however strong their determination to do so. Without a commonly held stabilizing set of values among politicians and the military as to the proper functions and responsibilities of government and its military arm, political stability is very difficult to realize and to maintain.

thorities, and attitudes toward mayor and village functionaries.


A similar set of referents may be set up for the cause espoused by the insurgent and for attitudes toward personnel known to be associated with the insurgent movement. Thus, the objective is to measure the perception and judgment made of the government and insurgent appeals.

Here we encounter a number of methodological problems that have had little study. The rural citizen may not associate local political functionaries with national government. Frequently, he has little concept of a national government. Can measures of his attitudes be validly combined to form a general measure of attitudes toward government? How is the affective tone of attitude toward the government to be combined with that of attitudes toward insurgents? Can the two sets of attitudes be properly regarded as mirror images, i.e., if his attitudes toward government are favorable, must attitudes toward insurgents necessarily be unfavorable? The literature on studies of attitudes and values provides no clear-cut answer to these questions, at least among citizens of an emerging country. Since answers are lacking, certain assumptions are made in order to indicate how criteria for hearts and minds might be formulated.

FORMULATION OF CRITERIA FOR MEASUREMENT OF ATTITUDES

As a first approximation (and to simplify the problem), it is assumed that the concept of a generalized attitude toward concepts of government and government functionaries is meaningful and that such an attitude can be measured by a scale that would measure its strength. It is further assumed that a similar generalized set of attitudes can be formulated for the insurgent cause and its advocates. It is assumed that these two sets of attitudes are antithetical in that the greater the affinity for the government, the less the liking for the insurgent and vice versa. Under these assumptions, the attitudes of citizens in a country under attack by insurgents may be represented by a curve perhaps approaching Gaussian form. This curve will provide a criterion measure which is a gross aggregate of attitudes of all people of a given group or nation. The attitudes of people for or against government or insurgent are represented on the abscissa, and the number of people (frequency) may be counted on the ordinate. The general consensus of authorities on developing countries is that the great majority of people are neutral or even antagonistic toward government (Valeriano and Bohannan: 229, 230). The assumption that the great majority is neutral can be represented by a leptokurtic Gaussian curve shown in chart 10 (curve A). If through various

Chart 10. Attitudes of People Toward Insurgents and Government



appeals the government were able to change the perception and thinking of (many of) the people significantly, the curve would swing to the right (curve B).


The shift indicated in the chart would be substantial indeed, for experience and cultural values exercise a strong stabilizing influence. Such a shift in attitudes would certainly be to the government's interests, for some correlation between attitudes and active support of the government is to be expected.

The degree of relationship between attitudes and action would depend on factors such as the extent to which the desired action is clearly indicated to the citizens and the additional influences that might be brought to bear to stimulate people to take actions favorable to the government or constrain them from helping the insurgents.

ATTITUDES RELATED TO ACTIVITIES

The resultant of inculcating favorable political attitudes and insurgent imposed terrorism may be illustrated. One criterion suggested as a measure of counterinsurgent support or lack thereof is the amount of intelligence voluntarily given by citizens about insurgents and their activities (Hosmer: 142). Assuming that the probability of a person providing information to the government is a function of the degree to which he is sympathetic toward the government, we may superimpose probability curves on the Gaussian curve to represent the probability that a person at a given scale value on the attitudinal continuum will willingly volunteer intelligence (see chart 11). A citizen may elect to deny information to government functionaries, either because he is unsympathetic or because he fears to do so. In Phase I, the insurgent has not yet developed his apparatus for intimidation, so the government may still obtain considerable information about insurgent activities. The probability of obtaining information is a function of the strength of progovernment attitudes. By the end of Phase

Chart 11. Relationship Between Sympathies of the People and Willingness to Volunteer Information



II, the insurgent spy network has made its presence felt among the citizenry; they also recognize the punishment meted out to anyone caught actively giving aid to government.[9] Hence, very little information about insurgents is obtained, even from government sympathizers. The perceived risk is too great. The shaded area shows the effect of terrorism on the perceptions of the people as measured by a reduced probability that they will willingly volunteer information to the incumbent.

In concept, these curves which represent aggregates of political attitudes may be used by the counterinsurgent to ask and answer a number of important questions.

The amount of information voluntarily given could serve as an index of the progress made by insurgents. It should also be possible to distinguish between shifts in sentiment toward the insurgent and the impact of threats and terroristic activities.

The amount of intelligence obtained might serve as an index by which to evaluate different methods of interrogation, the station in society of the person interrogated, the type of questions asked, the relationship between interrogator and the person interrogated, the indirect effect of local civic action programs, and numerous other hypotheses about ways of gathering intelligence.

The shift of the bell-shaped curve in either direction could provide the government with a measure of the impact of an act or set of acts of functionaries on the sympathy of the people.

CRITERIA FOR THE OPERATIONAL AREA

Prior sections have taken an analytical orientation to criteria. Techniques by which reflexive criteria may be generated and problems involved in attempting to interpret casualty criteria and measures of popular sentiment were indicated. This section is content-oriented. It develops a rationale for criteria applicable to the operational area. Twelve criterion parameters are generated for measurement of the status of the duel in the operational area. The rationale and criteria are broad in scope because insurgency/counterinsurgency operations frequently involve all major facets and subdivisions of society. This is all the more true because the insurgent selects as targets those elements of the societal fabric which he believes are most vulnerable. The rationale follows.

[9] Or alternately, a substantial number have been won to the insurgent cause. The decrease of intelligence from civilians could be due to either or both reasons.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIETAL CONTROL AT AREA AND VILLAGE LEVELS

The ultimate objective of the insurgent movement is to gain complete control of the political apparatus of the nation. This is to be accomplished by eroding the attitudinal support and power base of government, replacing these with the insurgent philosophy of government and power. Political control is the central issue. Complete political control makes possible military control, control of the economy, information flow, laws, judicial system, educational system, and other societal services as desired. A prime target of the insurgent grass roots movement is the administrative gap usual to developing countries between province command and towns and villages. Control of an operational area can be evaluated largely in terms of control of its towns and villages. The counterinsurgent must oppose insurgent attempts to gain control.

CONTROL DEFINED: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTROL

Control is here defined as both the ability to modify, regulate, restrain, or direct the behavior of people, processes, and institutions in the direction desired by the agent(s) or institution(s) that exercise control, and the manner in which control is implemented. Control of behavior, institutions, or processes is essentially a matter of degree. Absolute control is never attained, but absolute control is a meaningful concept, for it indicates that the controller has the power to determine the degree of control he will exercise and implement. Means of control include education, persuasion, coercion, reward, punishment, usually exercisable concurrently and sequentially.

Control as used here refers to control by insurgent and counterinsurgent organizations. Organizational control takes two forms: control of members and control of outsiders by an organization through its functionaries. Internal control derives from some degree of mutual self-interest and agreement as to goals and means of attaining them. Control may be tight or loose. Coordinated effort requires a mutual recognition of some form of leadership and a perceived obligation to carry out orders or suggestions. In a tightly controlled organization, leaders have more power to define and modify goals.

When the term control is applied to societal systems, it takes on broader meanings and has implications for political ideology, the structure of society and methods available to the controller. Control by Communist philosophy requires a social revolution wherein the state assumes the responsibility for the mode of production, the generation and distribution of public news, education and a great many

other prerogatives left entirely to individual or corporate initiative in a democracy. This authoritarian system is given sanction by a body of enabling laws. Centralized control is probably unlike the practice of political control in developing countries where towns and villages enjoy a good deal of political autonomy. A democratic government exercises control largely by public faith in its institutions and elected public officials. Thus, control by the two philosophies has different implications.

The term control is used throughout, for the concept is helpful, but it is used with the reservation that terms such as political control and economic control may have different meanings for the Communist-led insurgent and the counterinsurgent government of a developing country under attack.[10]

Limitation to Control Effectiveness

There are a number of limitations to effectiveness of control by a political or military system. The philosophy of the control system and custom impose limits. For example, the operation of the economy may be relatively laissez faire or constrained by numerous government controls. Legal systems and customs will usually recognize certain individual rights.

Technical limitations exist. The ability of the leadership to exercise control is always limited by time and space factors. The limitation is greater where the channels and modes of communication are limited and slow.[11] Requirements for security usually increase the limitations inherent in a communications system.

Limitations are imposed by enemy action. For a system in conflict, one of the enemy targets may be the control system itself. These attacks may take several forms: destruction of communication facilities, interception of communicators, attacks on key figures in the control system (village mayors, police), and the feeding of false information into the control system.

Limitations arise from the will of the person controlled by the organization. No organization exercises complete control over the behavior of its members. Individual will, attitudes, physical needs, and so forth also exercise a certain degree of control over individual behavior.

[10] An indigenous government—any government under attack—must recognize that tightening of controls is necessary, or at least highly desirable, to better combat enemies without or within. But when one speaks of population control, does he imply anything other than combating one authoritarian system with another? If control is to be instituted as a temporary measure, how does the government get back to a less authoritarian system? Or does it?

[11] An example of the slowness of communication networks occurred in Malaya when the Communist national leadership called for a change of strategy in 1951. It took several months for word of this change to reach all the units hiding in the jungle.

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

Any or all of the above limitations may affect the ability of insurgents and counterinsurgents alike to maintain control. Indoctrination, propaganda and training are designed, in large measure, to avoid them. However, when labels such as domination are used in the next section to describe control, we refer primarily to a certain degree of capability for control unchallenged in its exercise by the adversary. No system, however authoritarian, completely controls the workings of a society.

Criteria can be formulated by amplifying these concepts of control and applying them to critical aspects of society over which control is contested.

Kinds and Degrees of Control

Although the meaning of control will vary with the domain over which it is exercised, several types of control may be identified and several levels distinguished. Dominance means that the controller has the unilateral power to exercise as much control as desired within the limitations of control as just described. Instances of rebellion or failure to behave as specified by the controller are isolated.

Superiority indicates that the controller faces opposition, but that he is able to exercise control most of the time at most places or with regard to most of the subfunctions subsumed by the type of control in question. Control parity obtains when two sides struggle for control, but neither has marked superiority. In the case of influence, one side holds a superior position. The other, however, maintains a significant residual ability to modify behavior. This residual ability is designated as influence, roughly the obverse of superiority.

Political Control

For a given level of the political hierarchy, political control is superordinate to all other forms of control. Military control may or may not be an exception; the relationship between these two forms of control is discussed later. Political control means the power to direct or modify all forms of societal activity and to determine the ends to which group efforts will be directed. Thus, political control has implications for the direction and regulation in domains of economics, communication, civic services, education, and so forth. In sum, political control involves the ability to establish an ideology, to apply it to societal functions as desired by the controller and to regulate behavior by institutions and laws.

Political control is reinforced by a body of laws and ordinances that direct and restrain behavior and give legitimacy to the acts of the controller. It involves the ability to nullify existing laws and ordinances and establish new ones. Further, the controller can

appoint tribunals which interpret laws, determine to whom they are applicable and whether they have been violated, and mete out punishments for violations. Acts of individuals may be either investigated and followed up and prosecuted, or dropped at the controller's option. Police and courts come within the controller's purview as instruments by which control is enforced. Thus, since the controller not only establishes the law but elects or appoints the system that enforces the law, the legal system can be applied to particular citizens and groups with flexibility.

Political Dominance. The meaning of political dominance varies, depending on the degree of authoritarian component in the philosophy of the political control system and among those who exercise political control. Under an authoritarian philosophy, the controllers modify laws, appoint public officials (courts and police) for cities and villages, and assume the responsibility for control in areas such as economics, information flow and social services. The government defines rights of the state broadly. To the extent that the individual has recourse against the state, it is through the system of regulations established by the controllers and through the government-appointed personnel who interpret them.

Political dominance under a more democratic philosophy is a meaningful, if somewhat different, concept. Here it refers to universal sympathetic support of government by the people. The allegiance may be to the institution of government and its laws and procedures, to a charismatic leader, or to both.

Political Superiority. Political superiority at the village level means that, while one side exercises political power, the other also has support and can exercise some constraint over what the group with superiority can do.

Like political dominance, political superiority can occur in several forms. For example, the counterinsurgent holds political superiority where counterinsurgent appointees hold all political offices and appoint and control police, but the insurgent exercises some influence on the behavior of the people. This influence may be exercised through establishment of cells, sympathy of some economic or racial group, a weak shadow government, or through any or all of these. This type of situation was typical of the British position in Malaya. An example of insurgent political superiority would be a village whose chief and police were appointed by higher level government functionaries and who are legally responsible to them but who deliberately refrain from opposing an insurgent shadow government and, in fact, cooperate with such a government when they can do so. The insurgent has political superiority, but his actions are in some ways restricted by the fact that the counterinsurgent nominally appoints the mayor and

police. A case in point would be the political control exercise by the village chief in cooperation with Volckmann and Blackburn in the village of Holiap (Volckmann: chapter 7).

Political Parity. Political parity exists when two forces are locked in a struggle for control of the political system and neither is clearly superior. Parity may take several forms. The struggle may be within the village itself wherein both opposing forces reside. It may be between residents and the political body of the village and political figures higher in the hierarchy who are making a concerted effort to control or regain control of the village. It may be a combination of both forms. The clash between hierarchical subdivisions occurs frequently in counterinsurgency when the government attempts to exercise control through the next higher level of the political hierarchy; village sympathy supported by a shadow government is largely with the insurgents. One form would be a situation in which the mayor or village headman and members of his committee are actively supporting the national government; the police look the other way during insurgent incursions. As another alternative, parity may mean that village political leaders and police have no strong sympathy, but act to favor either side alternately when either applies force.

Political Influence. Political influence refers to the degree of influence exercised by the weaker side when the other has political superiority.

Military Control

Military Dominance. In its usual form, military control means the imposition of military force according to political decision from a higher level of government, or the unimpeded, unchallenged capability to occupy with military forces. This is one form of military control, control imposed from above. Another form can occur when a town or village, unsympathetic to government, organizes its own self-defense forces. Government forces may be too weak to break through the insurgent troops in surrounding areas or unable to send sufficient forces to retake the village. In sum, if (a) there is no opposition to military forces and if (b) they occupy an area, they can be said to be militarily dominant. In the above example, military dominance is held by insurgents. Seldom, however, until the government force is defeated entirely, does it not have the capability of occupying any area if it neglects other commitments.

Several variations of the duel can occur within the military-political domain. For example, counterinsurgents may employ their superior military force to occupy an area and appoint a civic governing body. However, the insurgent shadow government may remain strong because it receives public support facilitated by parallel control hier-

archies and by a political lattice-work through which it has penetrated local society. This insurgent may command obedience from almost all the people. Thus, the majority of citizens may still be contributing intelligence, funds and materiel support to the insurgent cause literally under the nose of the newly established local counterinsurgent government and troops. In such situations, the newly established government may not be able to survive unless strong military/police support is always present.

The above would be an example wherein counterinsurgents hold military superiority, insurgents political superiority. The counterinsurgent can win only by preventing the effective insurgent shadow government from operating and by stopping the operation of the underground. If substantially all the citizens are involved in the support of the insurgent cause, the counterinsurgent can break the insurgent organization only by regaining public sympathy.

Military Superiority. This can take several forms. One side occupies an area most of the time. It is able to resist all but the heaviest attacks against it. It may, however, be frequently attacked and harassed. An evaluation of military superiority may need to take into account the degree to which the area is contested. Government outposts hold military superiority only when they receive popular support as indicated by their belonging to the mass communications flow system. Otherwise they may be a liability.

Military Parity. Parity may be said to exist when (a) small armed units of either side cannot move openly without imminent danger of being attacked, or (b) when small armed units of both sides move openly knowing that there is substantial enemy strength in an area but infrequently make contact.

A form of parity may exist with little active fighting. The insurgent with a clandestine military force may be striving to solidify political and economic control, choosing not to attack counterinsurgent forces. Government troops, through poor intelligence, may not be able to locate insurgents, or they may lack the will to prosecute the contest.[12]

Military Influence. This is defined as the obverse of military superiority.

Economic Control, Information Control, Control of Attitudes

If either side enjoys both political and military dominance, it can institute whatever additional controls it deems necessary consistent

[12] This discussion of military control raises one point interesting from the viewpoint of criteria. When military force is pulled out of a geopolitical unit, does the civil apparatus maintain effective political, economic, and other forms of control? How long after a counterinsurgent military force is pulled out does it take an insurgent to reassert effectively his control over a village he has previously organized?

with its capabilities. However, if the struggle for military and political control is undecided, the duel may continue for other aspects of societal life, denoted here as economic control, control of the intelligence system, and attitudinal control. In a sort of chicken-and-egg effect, these forms of control, if they can be gained, can facilitate the attainment of political and military control and vice versa.

Economic Control. By the Marxist system, political heads have the responsibility for and control over the modes of production and distribution of goods. Developing countries may have no explicit philosophy of economic control. A certain degree of control of wealth may be exercised by landowners and processors of goods. However, they will not, generally, control distribution systems. Beyond their areas of influence, the economic situation may be relatively laissez faire.

This is the situation before the insurgent threat is recognized. Once the threat is met, then, whatever the former philosophy and practice, both sides attempt to gain the goods and surplus produced in the operational area. There are three parties to the division of goods, the two contestants whose demands increase, and the civil population. Specifically, in an operational area economic control is the ability to define ownership of land and goods—to determine what proportion of the goods or funds goes to the political and military arms of the government, what to the military, political, and other arms of the insurgent. With economic control either side can confiscate goods. However, if the civil population is not given sufficient food and goods to maintain production, economic control can cease to be an asset.

Economic control means the ability to allocate property to the state or individuals, to levy taxes, to determine how much each citizen is to be taxed, and to divert funds at the option of the system controllers.

Economic Dominance. Within this context, economic dominance means that only the dominant contestant can take such goods as it wishes from the community, the citizens of the community having no effective recourse. The means may consist of taxation or of levy on each person and family for funds or goods. The dominant side has the ability to deny taxes and goods to the opposition.

Economic Superiority. For the insurgent, economic superiority means that he has not yet been able to shut off all supply channels to government forces. This may be because the government forces occupy the area and insurgents lack the military force to drive them out. It may be that in spite of insurgent ambushes, strongly armed convoys of government troops come into the area and take crops and other economic goods. Thus, the insurgent gets most of the goods, but not all. In such cases, we would expect two parallel taxation and supply systems, one for the insurgent and one for the government.

The counterinsurgent may maintain economic superiority by requiring an accounting of the economic flow of goods within the village and between the village and the rest of the area. It is very difficult to completely shut off the flow of goods to insurgents in this kind of war.

Economic Parity. Parity would arise when both the insurgents and the government are drawing on the village for goods and taxes in about equal amounts. In a sense, this is the worst situation for the victim, since both sides may attempt to seize any surplus without regard for the future.

Economic Influence. Economic influence for the insurgent means that he is drawing funds, goods, or both from sympathetic individuals in the village, often via village posts, but that the amount is less than the amount collected by government forces. An example might be a strategic hamlet without sufficient guards to prevent significant amounts of goods and funds from being secreted out.

CONTROL OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL INFORMATION FLOW NETWORKS

Political and military controls are applied to recruit inhabitants, willing or not, into the informal mass information flow network (see Note 4) and to assure the sensitivity and reliability of the net. Like military, political, and economic control, the effectiveness of informal and formal communications networks can be described in terms of degrees. The degree of control over information flow is assumed to be contingent on the degree of political and military control. Also, while instruments of thought control (Barnett: 340) will be utilized to encourage and support the information flow nets, thought control and propaganda differ from the phenomena described here. Degrees of control may be described as follows:

Dominance

The side with dominance has the informal information nets working for it. Substantially all of the population functions as part of the net. Any attempt by functionaries or agents of the other side to enter are reported and the report precedes the "invaders." The informal system is not accessible to the foe. Its channels are closed to him.

A more nearly formal system is overlaid on the informal system. The formal system can reliably transmit more complex messages and respond to requests for supplementary information. When one side dominates information flow, the other can maintain no formal system, no active agents.

Criteria of Insurgent/Counterinsurgent Operations

Superiority/Influence

When either side holds superiority, the informal system operates much as described above. Information flows to friend only, not to foe. The system may operate more covertly, however, and information flow may be slowed somewhat. The side with superiority will also have some type of formal system operational. The key difference between superiority and dominance is that the foe has agents in the area who supply him with some information. Further, the position of influence by the weaker side may be highly significant. Volckmann (126, 127) reports that his progress was slow until enemy agents could be cleared out of villages in which insurgents enjoyed the preponderance of popular support.

Parity

The condition of parity must exist even if only as a transient state wherein the side with influence gains superiority or vice versa. Certain conditions of parity would appear to be relatively unstable and would tend toward greater strife which would diminish only once the issue was resolved one way or the other.

Parity could take several forms, among which are the following. (1) One side has the informal communications flow working for it, but a poor formal net or none at all. The other has an integrated agent network. (2) Both sides have formal and informal information flow networks which operate in competition. This situation would seem to be highly unstable. (3) The informal information flow net works erratically; sometimes it passes information, sometimes it does not. The information may go to either side. Neither side has a functioning formal network. This situation may occur fairly frequently when the insurrection has just started or when the area is lightly contested.

ATTITUDINAL CONTROL

Attitudes and their measurement were discussed in the prior section. Either side can manipulate attitudes to a significant degree by controlling stimuli and environment, public channels of information and propaganda, and schools. Control of attitudes and public sympathy is highly significant in that popular support facilitates all other forms of control. Behavior may be controlled by intimidation. Once the fear-provoking stimulus is removed and its target perceives that it cannot be reapplied, however, antagonistic behavior toward the one which imposed the control is to be expected.[13]

[13] In Malaya, captured Communist terrorists—kept in the insurgent movement by pressure and threat—frequently led the British back to the jungle hide-outs of former comrades. Bohannan (personal communication) says that the man who was drafted into the insurgent force was less apt to be bitter than the recruit who initially embraced the cause, became disillusioned, and felt that he had been deceived.

It is doubtful that any government maintains complete control of attitudes for a long time. In this respect, the relationship between political control and attitude control exercised by an authoritarian system is of some interest. As authoritarian leaders have learned, such control cannot be readily maintained without a second or third system of parallel control hierarchies. Such hierarchies report on each other and particularly on the attitudes and behavior of political functionaries. Such control is maintained at the expense of a rather costly overhead. Not only must the political control system and police be established, but also a second body that has the prime duty of overwatching the control system and the people. This is not to say that attitudinal control is undesirable. It might be hypothesized that the stronger the attitudinal support, the smaller the requirement for other reporting organizations to overwatch public leaders and the people.

It is for this reason that a sociopolitical system with a loose philosophy of control needs the support of the people. As it needs to move toward a more totalitarian control system, it must, ostensibly at least, violate its own tenets.

Within the above context, attitudinal control can be characterized as follows:

Dominance

Dominance can be defined in two ways: (a) the side in the dominant position receives support from the entire populace; (b) the dominant side receives sympathetic support from all the population who care. Some sources state that typically in developing countries, most people are apathetic.

Superiority/Influence

A side holds superiority when most people who take sides favor it; the side favored by a minority is said to be in a position of influence.

Parity

Both sides have about equal numbers of supporters. Note that the number of those who take sides and intensity of attitudes are also important. At one end of these continua, parity might indicate a state of complete public apathy.

OTHER FORMS OF CONTROL

Given political and military domination or superiority, other forms of control can be brought to bear on all aspects of societal life. Economic controls, control of formal and informal intelligence systems and control of public information media can be applied. These forms of control make it easy to control educational institutions, the content of their instructions, community services and civic action programs,

transportation and communications facilities, and the recruiting of personnel to the side in power.

ELEVEN CRITERIA FOR THE OPERATIONAL AREA

Charts 12 through 22 present criteria for evaluation of control in the areas described in the preceding pages and those mentioned above. An index of insurgent strength is presented first. We then indicate several discriminable degrees of control or influence by one side or the other within eleven areas: (1) political control, (2) control of the legal system, (3) military control, (4) economic control, (5) control of formal and informal intelligence, (6) attitudinal control, (7) control of propaganda and public information, (8) control of educational institutions, (9) community services and civic action, (10) transportation and communications, (11) recruiting.

Because of the interrelatedness of all aspects of society, it may be desirable to regard each of the above areas as representing a particular point of view. The duel and society within which it occurs may be viewed from each perspective in turn, much as an air observer would like to examine a target area. Each provides additional information as to the status of the antagonists.

The insurgent thrust to gain control may be plotted in terms of the above criteria as on a map. Typically, he will concentrate efforts on one or a limited number of areas first, then expand operations into other areas. The sequence of moves will not necessarily be the same for any two countries since insurgent strategy will depend not only on his doctrinal guides but on his diagnosis of counterinsurgent vulnerabilities. By the same token, counterinsurgents have a number of different response options which can call for effort in any or all of the above areas. Like a game of chess with its different openings, each opening requires certain moves on the part of the defender, but for each opening there are a number of acceptable defenses. As in a game of chess, the insurgent usually has the advantage of the first move—he is white.

Finally, several questions may be asked about this criterion scheme which have not been completely answered. Reference has already been made to the fact that concepts of control differ in Communist countries, democracies and emerging nations. For many of the areas described, the term "domination" may be too strong in connotation to reflect the random or largely uncontrolled elements in any society. This problem may be more semantic than real. If several degrees of control or influence can be operationally defined, they could be denoted by numbers. Question arises as to whether and how the points along the criterion continua relate to insurgency phases described in appendix A. There is a substantial relationship, but not a perfect one. The

major distinction—and a problem in formulating criteria—is this: if insurgents have infiltrated an area and been thrust back, statements of criterion categories should differ somewhat from situations wherein they have never occupied the area.

Thus, the most precise and relevant criterion system is dependent to some extent on the high water point of insurgent progress. If strategic towns have been established, their fortifications remain, as do most of the people relocated to them. Further, because of the expense of establishing strategic towns, criteria should cover their preparation and operation. The management structure and military/police forces brought in by the counterinsurgent will usually remain, even if the counterinsurgent is winning, for if adjacent operational areas have not yet been cleared, substantial military forces must be retained to prevent insurgents from gaining access through the area or from recapturing it with military contingents from adjacent areas as advance guards.

Underlying the criteria presented in the charts is the assumption that the insurgent has progressed well into the guerrilla warfare stage and that the counterinsurgent has developed a substantial military and political structure to oppose him. The same criterion parameters would be appropriate if the contest had not progressed so far but some of the specific rating items would require modification.

NEEDS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The above treatment has dealt with the people as a whole. A better appreciation is needed of the factors that motivate individuals and groups. We need to know the cultural values and attitudes that predispose the individual to act as he does, the nature of the mental barriers to affirmative actions that terrorism creates, and the ways in which these barriers may be broken. Blumstein, in a paper delivered to the Military Operations Research Symposium, suggests conceptual models for treating this type of problem. He treats the problem in terms of the individual's perception of the net value to be realized by supporting or withholding support from either side. Better information is needed as to values, habit patterns, thoughts and emotions of citizens of a country under attack by an insurrection. Americans conditioned by a Protestant ethic and Western European culture can make inferences as to what *we* might think. It is hard to cast away the tinted glasses which channel our perspectives—glasses formed gradually by years of experience and acculturization. More comprehensive and precise information as to foreign cultures would, we believe, be of much assistance to American advisors in the future.

Chart 12. Political Control

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Government has an active communications/control system from area command down to villages. Government dominates or holds superiority in all villages. Village chiefs and governing council loyal to government actively support government programs and encourage support from civilians. Police in sympathy with village governing body; occasional attempts to subvert police are thwarted. Insurgent agitators apprehended.		Incumbent holds area offices but is fighting to maintain control of villages. Communications links to villages not used or frequently interrupted. Government superiority in some villages, insurgent in others. In some villages both political systems are represented. Effective village chiefs and police being assassinated. Village government may be split in allegiance with mayors appointed by government. Police sympathetic to insurgent. Attempts to regain control over villages insurgents hold result in casualties to office holders, or else these men hold the position but cooperate with insurgents. Insurgent control lattice continually erodes government attempts to regain/retain political control.		Government political functionaries may hold office in the heavily guarded area capital but there is no political control elsewhere, no communications to villages. Insurgents exercise political control over towns, villages and countryside. This control is maintained by insurgent appointed political functionaries and police, reinforced by political rallies. Insurgents use political control to establish insurgent law, control over public information, channels, intelligence systems, control over economy and to build home guards. Insurgent civic action programs instituted. Government attempts to penetrate with agents thwarted.

Chart 13. Control of the Legal System

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Courts and legal processes respected and supported by the overwhelming majority of the civil population. Insurgents have great difficulty taking reprisals against government sympathizers. Government apprehends violators, controls courts and enforces laws.		Two antagonistic systems of law and enforcement exist side by side. Government is overt; insurgent covert. Government unable to destroy the covert system. Most perpetrators of political crimes are not apprehended by government. Government courts and legal systems under severe attack; they do not receive general popular support.		Insurgent establishes own laws, means of enforcement and penalties. Those who aid, support and provide sympathy to government are labeled as traitors to the people and severely treated.

Chart 14. Military Control

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Government military units are more than large enough to overcome opposition in area. Units kept informed by effective military and civil intelligence systems. Primary mission is to support police and intelligence collection and to oppose insurgent units from other areas attempting to traverse operational area or invade. Such units are reported and immediately engaged.	Government units are active in support of police and in the pursuit of small insurgent military units in area. While larger than insurgent units and better supplied, counterinsurgent forces have difficulty apprehending insurgents. Some insurgent terrorism; terrorists infrequently apprehended.	Government military units are larger, but their lack of intelligence compared with far superior insurgent intelligence is a continual handicap. The force in being is present but results of operations are disappointing. Much skirmishing along roads. Government outposts attacked frequently. A different variant of parity may exist when government military forces are no larger than insurgents, but, by effective intelligence collection, civil liaison and aggressive operations may be turning the tide from insurgent to government superiority.	Government troops remain near bases. Patrols proceed with caution. No attempt to patrol much of area. Road columns are frequently ambushed. Large government troop units are not engaged by insurgents. But fragments are continually being destroyed in well-planned ambushes, attacks on outposts. Insurgents control most of area through better intelligence, warning nets.	Government troops if remaining in area remain in fortified positions. They are continually under surveillance. Only heavily armed reconnaissance patrols are mounted. These net little. Insurgents effectively control area. Military units train and operate overtly. Insurgents fortify villages, maintain warning nets.

Chart 15. Economic Control

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Surplus goods cultivated or processed in villages and surrounding area are consumed or go to government. Taxes collected by village administration with no more than usual defaults. No evidence of insurgent taxation system. Insurgent attempts to establish systems to obtain supplies, collect taxes, are usually discovered, thwarted. Land titles secure.	Insurgent underground collects some contributions from villagers and dispatch supplies to insurgent camps. Confiscation, robbery by insurgent killer gangs. Reduction in amount of taxes collected. Government collects taxes with difficulty but most go to government. Insurgents tax foresters, isolated farmers. Government having difficulty insuring that those having legal right to land or its products receive benefits and full protection.	Most surplus goods of village are channeled to insurgents via underground posts. Confiscation, payment for the right to operate by entrepreneurs, farmers, are common. Most major landowners, industrial concerns pay blackmail. Insurgents collect taxes regularly. Government tax collections sparse; taxes can only be collected by force and insurgent usually collects first.	Surplus goods to insurgents. Government able to to collect some taxes by force only. Government cannot enforce land titles. Insurgent has a logistic and taxation system which operates relatively openly.	Insurgents define what is surplus and take it. Well established insurgent supply organization draws from villages, regular supply detail and courier systems. Government can only take goods by heavily armed convoys and confiscation. Insurgents may parcel and redistribute land; take over land of large estates. Maintain pressure on government supply systems.

Chart 16. Control of Intelligence

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Area command has effective means of collection of intelligence through agents and volunteer civilians. Occasional insurgent acts of violence are reported promptly. Dossiers kept on insurgent suspects. Insurgent attempts to organize infrastructure are reported and thwarted. Effective counterintelligence. Planning and communication groups are relatively secure, but occasional attempts at penetration. Spontaneous mass information flow system works for government. Possibly covert insurgent agents.	Government collects intelligence on most major efforts by insurgents, but not all. a. Lacks adequate coverage of area. b. Often disrupted by insurgent threats. The stalwart volunteer intelligence. Known government agents under pressure. Some insurgent attempts to reorganize/expand intelligence network apprehended. Insurgent net relatively effective in obtaining advance warning of moves of government forces, still deficient in coverage of government planning offices.	Intelligence collected by government forces is primarily military in nature. No really effective agent network. Large monetary rewards bring in some intelligence, primarily via intermediaries, to agents. Insurgents collect intelligence with little fear of apprehension. Plans and moves of government forces are known. Some insurgent penetration of government planning functions. Mass information flow system may operate either way but usually favors insurgents.	Government collects little or no societal intelligence. No effective government intelligence networks. Primary means of collection by the government consists of air observation. Plans and moves of government functionaries are known. Effective collection of intelligence by insurgent posts and warning nets, relayed more rapidly by wire or radio. Government agents doubled or used to provide false information. Only covert government agents can operate.	Only government intelligence comes from heavily armed patrols, air. Insurgent network operative with few government incursions. Part of insurgent newwork diverted to internal police functions and other duties. Government moves in area, any attempts to send in agents to villages or to penetrate insurgent cadre are detected. Mass spontaneous information flow system channeled to help insurgents. Only covert government agents can operate.

Chart 17. Sentiments and Attitudes and Their Expression

Favor government		Parity	Favor insurgent	
Substantial support for government and functionaries; very little support for insurgents. Government supporters exercise sufficient pressure through institutions and social influence to make any existing support for insurgents covert.	Some support for government and functionaries. Insurgent underground active; a number of loyal supporters of insurgent cause. Public expressions of support are guarded, however.	Either of two conditions may exist: a. Population apathetic, supports neither side strongly. b. Considerable support for each side. Insurgent support from organized underground front groups.	Government receives overt support only from government functionaries who need protection. There may be some preference for government among a substantial group of civilians but support is not provided openly. People either support insurgents openly or provide support by passive acquiescence.	No overt support for government. No government functionaries in villages. Insurgent obtains active support by all through organized monitored civilian groups. (This is control by force/persuasion.) Many people may not be sympathetic to insurgent, but he is able to exercise sufficient pressure and his intelligence is sufficient to shut off public expression of any antagonistic view.

Chart 18. Effectiveness of Propaganda and Public Information

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Government political forces back government programs via public appearances and news media such as radio, handouts; encourage support for community programs. Government propaganda/information programs are credible. General voluntary support of government position by commercial mass media. Insurgent attempts at political activity are nonexistent or infrequent. All attempts are covert. Significant attempts are reported to government. Insurgent covert propaganda is not accepted by preponderance of people.	Government programs receive backing from most political functionaries. Support from most mass media best achieved by payment, use of mild coercion by government. Most government propaganda credible but significant counter-propaganda by insurgents in covert form by rumor.	Government functionaries are more restrained. Some do not speak out, may be covertly supporting insurgent. Government political rallies tend to be perfunctory. Mass news media heavily censored, generally controlled to achieve some semblance of coordinated government support. Government propaganda not very credible to the masses. Population whipsawed between conflicting propaganda by both sides. Very active propaganda by insurgent front groups and posts. Handbills attacking government distributed freely. Some overt and many covert propaganda lectures stressing predetermined propaganda line.	Propaganda/information by government only from strongly held areas, villages and countryside not reached. Broadcasts and news handouts continue but they are not believed. Insurgent propaganda/information programs are accepted, believed.	No attempt at political action by government area command. Leaflets dropped by air are ineffective. Insurgents control all channels of public communications. Insurgent organized groups disseminate propaganda, lectures and political education.

Chart 19. Control of Educational Institutions

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Counterinsurgent local government appoints teachers. Teachers are loyal to government. Education in government, civics, supports counterinsurgent cause. School buildings secure. Full attendance. Insurgents attempt to recruit students as long as vestiges of influence remain in area.	Teachers are not fully screened. Some lean philosophically to the insurgent side. Counterinsurgents do not take advantage of schools to support cause. Some children of school age do not attend.	The school system may be nonfunctional due to terrorism, active guerrilla warfare. Large drop in school attendance. Teachers do not take sides. Attacks by insurgents on teachers loyal to government. Or, many government schools may be operating with insurgent controlled schools also operating in other parts of the area.	Insurgent may take over schools, or wait until he more fully controls area. He revises texts or substitutes own emphasizing political education. Counterinsurgent can maintain no schools except possibly in area capital and/or by consent of insurgent. Government cannot control political content of curricula.	Schools established, maintained and controlled by insurgents. Insurgent has complete control of curricula and uses this control for concerted political education.

Note. Independent of the status of insurgency, school attendance will depend on the general level of interest in education. This varies from country to country.

Chart 20. Control of Community Services and Civic Action

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Government sponsorship and direction of services required by community is generally felt to meet needs of the people. Government direction is not seriously challenged.	Government control of civic services challenged. Depending on availability of outside support, government may initiate new civic action programs.	Government programs and conduct of community action programs are under attack. However, with resources available, government may be frenziedly attempting to implement more civic action programs than administrators can effectively supervise, execute. Populace divided, uncertain as to whether government or insurgent can better provide community services. Breakdown in political control, law enforcement may make civic action very difficult.	Government civic action programs only with insurgent acceptance/permission. Insurgent is taking over community services, instituting services of its own.	Insurgent has taken over civic functions as a means of control and to maintain role as social reformer. In this case, insurgent determines recipients of civic actions.

Chart 21. Control of Transportation and Communications

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Government functionaries and all civil traffic moves freely day and night without need for protection. Government communications uninterrupted. Occasional insurgent couriers apprehended. Government maintains effective communications net from area capital to villages. Insurgents cannot establish effective warning nets.	Fairly frequent attacks on unarmed convoys by insurgents. Traffic of CI forces travels primarily by day. Occasional mining of roads (depending on sophistication of insurgents). Communication facilities needed to coordinate government forces require frequent repair. Fairly frequent interruption of communications. Insurgent establishes/fights to maintain warning nets.	Convoys of government functionaries require protection. Ambushes of unarmed and lightly armed convoys are frequent. Travel by day only. Wire communications are frequently interrupted by insurgent attacks. Insurgent communications operative with few interruptions. Warning nets operative. Insurgents use many secondary roads openly.	Roads frequently mined. Only armed convoys may be dispatched along roads. These are frequently attacked. Villages to be supplied cannot be supplied frequently enough by this system, hence government presence cannot be maintained. More frequently CI must resort to air transport. CI wire communications must constantly be repaired; cannot be maintained. Insurgents start preparing wire communication systems. Insurgents use secondary roads openly.	Only very heavily armed convoys can proceed along roads. CI largely uses air. Wire communication is impossible for CI. Insurgent troops move along road by vehicle. Insurgents take over communication system, all secondary roads, and most primary roads.

Chart 22. Control of Recruiting

Government domination	Government superiority	Parity of forces	Insurgent superiority	Insurgent domination
Government can recruit without resistance. Insurgent attempts to recruit meets little success.		Both sides recruiting from same pool; government via overt measures; insurgent via underground.		No government recruiting except by armed forces. Insurgent via authoritarian political control can recruit at will but chooses persuasion and social pressure first.

The problem addressed in this section is one of measuring sentiments rather than manipulating them. A means of representing distributions of attitudes was described above. Questions naturally arise as to whether it would be possible, feasible, and practically useful to attempt to measure attitudes and to use results to provide guidance to policy makers. In spite of the difficulties, it should be possible to obtain measures having some validity and to make use of them. Any number of references in the literature state that soldiers and politicians do sense and act on their personal diagnoses of prevailing attitudes. There are indications of how such personal diagnoses are made. It would seem possible to systematize these methods, validate them, and establish procedures for measurement which might be practically applied. Taruc, Osanka and Too indicate that Communist emissaries measure attitudes and consider it important to do so.

Perhaps the most fundamental problem of the counterinsurgent commander or his advisor is to determine how to allocate his limited resources. It is generally agreed that the need to change attitudes is extremely important. Until means can be developed and applied which are sufficiently accurate to measure the impact of alternative policies and acts on the thinking and emotions of the people, the commander is operating on intuition, often groping in the dark. The western acculturization of the commander and advisor may serve as an additional handicap. These are arguments for a more comprehensive investigation of the feasibility and techniques to be used in the measurement of attitudes in developing nations and ways in which results of such measures could be put into effect.

SECTION II

COUNTERINSURGENT AREA COMMAND DECISION GUIDELINES

INTRODUCTION TO SECTION II

The two sections of Part II use different approaches and different sources of information for development of criteria applicable to insurgency/counterinsurgency. Section I has discussed the objectives, scope, and orientation of the overall criterion development in counterinsurgency. Chapter 1 and appendix A describe the nature and development of insurgency. Most of the literature on insurgency is either focused at the national (rather than area) level or devoted primarily to guerrilla warfare. Therefore, it was necessary to examine historical insurgencies for their common elements and deduce from these the functional and organizational aspects of a developing insurgency. Here the focus is on the characteristics of an intelligently executed Communist-dominated insurgency rather than less intelligent deviations from this optimum. The product of this synthesis of commonly reported and logically deducible elements serves as the basis for organizing and examining reported and proposed criterion measures.

Section II is concerned with decision-making by the area command. First, it concentrates on decision requirements, the decision process, and the possible actions and resources of the counterinsurgent area command. Then, individuals with varying experience, knowledge, and ideas on counterinsurgency were placed in the position of the area commander and asked to diagnose the situation, select objectives, and develop solutions to a simulated insurgency situation.

Sections I and II are complementary with regard to focus of effort. Section I provides criteria for analyzing the situation of the insurgents. In appendix A, a model of insurgent development is presented that will enable the counterinsurgent command to know more fully what it confronts. In chapter 3 criteria are generated for evaluating the progress of either side at the operational area level. Although these criteria are area oriented rather than command oriented, they indicate the domain that must be covered by criteria appropriate to the area command.

In Section II ways are developed for generating and evaluating alternative counterinsurgent strategies, tactics, methods, and tech-

niques from given information on the insurgent's method of developing his line of attack and criteria by which the success or failure of either side may be evaluated. Section II is an attempt to develop and evaluate a means of generating strategy, tactics, and techniques in the context of a simulated insurgency problem. Obviously, the study of hypothetical situations cannot be substituted for historical inquiry. However, it can complement historical studies.

By historical methods cause and effect are deduced from actual cases and these causal relationships applied in a future context (Nagel: 549). However, historical studies are often compromised by biases in reporting, which cannot always be detected or evaluated with respect to direction or degree. Historical case studies are a fertile source of hypotheses for identifying causal relationships, but no two cases are exactly the same, and there is as yet no objective method for establishing limits of reliability in making inferences concerning causal relationships from a single case study. Because of the many uncontrolled variables always operating, it is usually a matter of conjecture as to whether the causative factors postulated were really the causes or not. Also, ground rules for comparing and combining case studies appear to be rather subjective. In summary, historical case studies are not conducive to replication; content is not additive; and cases are limited to what has actually occurred.

In contrast, a hypothetical situation containing a standard problem has advantages the historical method lacks. It is flexible: the scenario can be constructed to place emphasis on any desired problem area(s), and information can be obtained from observers or participants to events for which no documentation is available. It can be replicated: information can be obtained from as many sources as desired, and background information which sources bring to the problem can be varied by selection of sources. Problems can be standardized to the extent desired, and ground rules are available for comparing, combining, and evaluating responses, since the stimulus was controlled.

Thus, simulated problems and case histories are complementary, and both can be used to extend knowledge in the insurgency/counterinsurgency domain.

CHAPTER 4

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

Briefly, the reasoning supporting section II is as follows. The ultimate objective is to develop decision guidelines for the counterinsurgent area command. This can be accomplished by defining the decision domain of the counterinsurgent area command, developing simulated counterinsurgent situations (scenarios) which pose different decision problems to area command, submitting these simulated counterinsurgent situations to personnel knowledgeable in counterinsurgency to obtain alternative strategies, tactics, and techniques and reasons for particular decisions, and utilizing these reported decisions and decision bases to develop area command decision guidelines relevant to particular counterinsurgent decision problem situations. Section II is a beginning. It defines the decision area, provides a decision problem situation, and analyzes information obtained from 21 respondents.

AREAS OF EMPHASIS

This approach to area level decision-making is significant in three ways. It promises a means of closing the gap between very broadly stated propositions and specific guidance needed at the area level. It explores the problem of allocation and substitutability of resources by area command when resources are limited and often unsuited for the prescribed solutions. It indicates the extent of agreement among personnel knowledgeable in insurgency operations.

Literature and personnel sources treat principles, operations, and criteria for counterinsurgency at two different levels. On one level are broad statements of propositions. To paraphrase some examples: "Ultimate victory in counterinsurgency depends on winning the hearts and minds of the indigenous population," or "The objective in counterinsurgency is to control the people, not the ground" (Lybrand: 54; Bjelajac, 1962: 31). Somewhat more specific in its operational implications is a commonly reported objective which refers to the necessity of protecting the civil population from insurgents (Hessler: 46; Clutterbuck, 1963: 63). On the other level, detailed but not necessarily complete accounts of incidents, events, and actions are reported and

used to illustrate either the application or the existence of propositions about counterinsurgency. For example, "Troops had to wash off all hair cream before an ambush mission because the Communist terrorists could smell it" (Miers: 93), or "Troops disguised as girls rode grocery trucks and obtained very useful information about the Hukbalahaps" (Valeriano and Bohannan: 153).

Without questioning the validity or utility of either the principles or the descriptive accounts, it is apparent that a gap exists between these two levels of description, which makes it difficult to deduce from a given proposition or propositions the optimal solution from among alternatives or to reduce the number of alternatives. Additional guidance is needed at the intermediate levels. This problem is confounded by the lack of an adequate taxonomy (on insurgency) and by conflicts among experts.[1] We suspect a great many differences among different respondents in terms of what actions they would take. These differences may stem from variations in either or both professional background and types of insurgencies they have studied. The standardized interview technique permits us to compare responses for similarities and differences in approaches taken.

A different problem area for the counterinsurgent and one that receives relatively little attention in the open literature is that of resource requirements and allocation of resources as a counterinsurgent management problem. As insurgency grows, increasing demands are made on national resources. It is entirely possible that resource requirements can exceed resource availability so that the insurgent wins by default (Tanham, 1961: 97). The operational area command faces the same resource problem, but on a smaller scale. The severity of the problem becomes immediately apparent to anyone assuming the role of area commander in the simulated situational problem described in appendix B.

This study views the resource problem from three decision perspectives. A first perspective with regard to decision guidelines is concerned with the problem of maximum utilization of available and developed fixed resources, that is, reduction to a minimum of mobilized or developed resources not committed or used. A second perspective is concerned with the problem of bringing into play potential resources. Since it is assumed that resources are limited in quantity at the operational area level, that not all resources are available to the same extent, and that actual requirements for resources normally exceed available resources, it is especially important to develop guidelines which will facilitate the exploration and utilization of potential resources. Failure to draft, train, and

[1] Galula (108), and Hilsman (531) proposed keeping counterinsurgent forces mobile, whereas Trinquier (57) states that mobile patrolling exposes forces to insurgent ambushes.

supply locally available young men for counterinsurgency purposes would be an example of a potential resource not utilized. A third perspective is concerned with the thorough understanding of the cultural habits and motivations of individuals. The area command cannot control the behavior of the population in drill field fashion. Cultural values, motivations, and behavior exist and influence the direction of affairs in large measure independent of political-military control actions. It is well to diagnose what the desires and motivations of the people are and to formulate policies so that policies are not contradictory, and where possible are compatible with the self-perceived interests and motivations of the people and so that those motivations which tend to place the people on the side of the counterinsurgent are fully exploited.

This is a subtle argument but one that every politician intuitively recognizes. Its relationship to the allocation of resources lies in the fact that it is much more efficient to work with the stream of events, by attempting to channel and direct them to the interests of the counterinsurgent cause, than to attempt to operate counter to them.

These three resource allocation problems, maximum utilization of fixed resources, bringing into play potential resources, and utilization of resources so as to take advantage of and capitalize on the felt needs of the people, are further delineated in chapter 6.

ORGANIZATION OF MATERIAL

Chapter 5 concerns the decision domain of the counterinsurgent area command. Specifically, it classifies and defines major generic functions or sequential steps that constitute area command decision-making, describes in some detail these decision functions, presents a conceptual frame for examining the meaning of the decision guidelines, and discusses how these guidelines may be uncovered by use of the simulated counterinsurgency interview technique.

Chapter 6 covers the development of the simulated counterinsurgent situation and discusses hypotheses to be explored through an interview technique. Specifically, chapter 6 describes the rationale and development of the simulated counterinsurgent situation with emphasis on its implication for situational assessment by those interviewed; develops alternative operational area objectives and proposes hypotheses related to the selection of objectives by those interviewed; explores ways of classifying solutions or strategies for attaining selected objectives and discuss the hypotheses involving the possible influence of perceived population attitudes on the selection of alternative strategies; and explores the question of idle

and potential area resources as a generic decision function concerned with the allocation of resources to implement a selected solution.

Chapter 7 presents the major findings obtained through the interview and discusses their implications for both the formulation of decision guidelines described in chapter 5 and the specific hypotheses proposed in chapter 6. The reported findings are organized with reference to the generic decision functions explored through the interview technique; namely, assessment or diagnosis of the situation, selection of objectives, development of a solution, and the allocation of resources for implementing the solution.

Finally, there are appendix B and appendix C to section II. Appendix B contains a copy of the simulated insurgency situation used in this study. Appendix C presents an organized summary of the responses made by each of the people interviewed.

CHAPTER 5

THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND GUIDELINES AT THE AREA COMMAND LEVEL

INTRODUCTION

The different stages involved in decision-making on the area command level can be broken down into a five-step process beginning with the realization that a situation requires a decision and ending with an evaluation of the decision made. This chapter will discuss in detail these five steps. To facilitate this discussion, a frame of reference has been developed which requires some definition of terms.

"National level" in this report refers to the national government which is attempting to retain political, economic, and military control over the country. "Area command" includes the area commander and his staff, civilian and military. "Resources" includes human resources: political, career civil administrative, support, technical and professional personnel who work for the area government, as well as military or police forces under control or who could be brought under control; and materiel resources, both developed and potential. "Population" includes all the people of the area, both pro- and anti-insurgency, who take no major, active part in supporting the insurgents. "Insurgents" means all active members of the insurgency, from the hard-core cadre to part-time, "on call" guerrillas.

For purposes of discussing the decision-making process, we are assuming certain things to be "stored information and knowledge." It is assumed that, before a particular situation requiring decisions arises, the area commander will have a basic body of knowledge to be considered. This "stored information" would include a knowledge of the area's human and materiel resources and a familiarity with its political, social, and cultural characteristics. The area commander would also be assumed to know the counterinsurgent's goals, constraints, and capabilities, and would have information on counterinsurgent operations and organizations. All these things from the base of knowledge to which current information is contrasted in weighing decisions. Current information—referred to here as "inputs" to the decision process—would include the changeable and immediate factors, such as

the population's attitudes and behavior, the counterinsurgents' performance and status, and the insurgents' activities and status. The area commander must consider all these things together before coming up with several possible alternatives. Then he would use "guidelines"—established criteria—to select satisfactory alternatives, and finally would arrive at a satisfactory decision. See chart 23 for a schematic representation of the decision-making process.[1]

DECISION FUNCTIONS

There are five categories—here called "functions"—basic to the decision process. Each requires certain definite things of the area commander.

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

First, the area commander must properly diagnose and assess the situation. To do this, he must first obtain all possible information which would enable him to thoroughly understand the true nature and significance of the situation. Then he must consider whether, in the light of his own policies and capabilities, the situation merits action on his part.

SELECTION OF OBJECTIVES

Second, having properly assessed the situation, he must decide what the desired outcome of the situation would be. This desired outcome, or "objective," can be classified as ultimate, intermediate, instrumental, or operational.

PRODUCTION OF SOLUTIONS

Third, the commander must now arrive at specific strategies for achieving his objective. These strategies, gambits, tactics and so on are referred to here as "solutions" or "solution concepts."

IMPLEMENTATION

Fourth, having developed overall strategy, the commander must now detail specific plans and techniques and take setps necessary to implement his overall strategy and thus achieve his objective.

[1] The use of arrows pointing in both directions between categories illustrate the interplay that occurs among the process components during the entire decision-making process. This process has been noted in decisions made during the design of complex weapon systems. Krulee (2) has described these intellectual data manipulations which involve successive approximations through establishment, testing and acceptance of successive anchoring assumptions which guide the design process. This process of screening solutions is repeated until a "satisfactory" solution (decision outcome) is reached.




Chart 23. A Simplified Information Processing Decision Framework

EVALUATION

Fifth, the area commander must now evaluate his implementation. Factors to be considered here would be evaluation of individual components at different stages—plans and preparations, operational readiness, ongoing activity and behavior, and the effect of ongoing actions on individuals, objects or processes. In doing this, his evaluative standards may be qualitative—judgmental—in nature or quantitative. Further, quantitative criteria may be dichotomous (yes/no) or continuous (time, amount, etc.) in nature.

In the first function of the decision-making process, the area commander must make a realistic diagnosis and assessment of the situation confronting him. Situation diagnosis may be considered in two parts. One is concerned with the problem of obtaining a situation description which is accurate and complete. The other part is concerned with an assessment of this situation—one which adequately reflects the significance of the situation with respect to current counterinsurgent conditions and aims. In this step, the commander must consider the "inputs": information on population attitudes and behavior; counterinsurgency policy, performance and resource information; and intelligence about insurgents.

Two of the five generic decision functions are directly related to selection and evaluation of area objectives. The selection and establishment of priorities among objectives is guided by counterinsurgent policies viewed in light of the assessed situation. The specified objectives could be long range or short range, broad or narrow in scope, and pursued either concurrently or in sequence. The evaluation of implementation is ultimately concerned with the basic question of whether—and to what degree—the selected objectives are being attained. The process of evaluation may occur at different times relative to the stage at which implementation is being undertaken. Evaluation of effectiveness may be made during planning, preparation, or execution stages, and/or after the fact.

Like objectives, solution concepts may be broad or narrow in scope, long or short range in nature, and imply the need for many or only a few resources. It might be noted that situation diagnosis and selection of objectives must be completed before undertaking the selection of solution concepts.

The decision function called "implementation" implies not only selection of techniques but also the allocation of particular resources needed to implement the selected techniques. The accomplishment of this broad decision function uses both the selected solution concepts and the situation diagnosis as constraints and guides in developing and evaluating alternative techniques and resource allocations.

THE ROLE OF GUIDELINES

Decision guidelines are abstractions or generalizations formed from prior experience and knowledge. The reason behind a particular decision choice is a potential guideline. The purpose of guidelines is to enhance the effective performance of each decision function, thus reducing uncertainty and leading to the selection of the most desirable of the alternatives available. Guidelines range from broad general propositions to quite specific suggestions. They are future-oriented, drawn from past experience and used to help predict the outcomes of future actions. Guidelines may be positive—"Continuously involve the people, because in the masses lies the key of the counterinsurgency problem"—or negative—"Do not use force except as a last resort because crude force always leaves shades of cruelty no matter how discriminately utilized." (Bjelajac, 1964: 668, 665). An explicit source of guidelines is the Counterinsurgency Planning Guide prepared by the United States Army Warfare School (passim). Its guidelines are stated in many forms, including principles, objectives, and often suggestions or steps for planning and conducting a variety of counterinsurgent operations. These guidelines reflect doctrine at the broader levels of abstraction and are usually labeled "Standard Operating Procedures" when they are described at the more specific technique and procedural level. However, if general guidelines are to be of most assistance, they should (1) specify the domain of operations and situations to which they are intended to apply, and (2) help the decision-maker when progressing from the more general requirements such as specifying objectives down to the more specific requirements such as deciding which resources to allocate in order to implement some particular counterinsurgent tactic.

The simulated insurgency interview was developed as a possible means of producing guidelines to fill this gap between the abstract level and operational techniques. As stated in chapter 4, interviewees with varied backgrounds were chosen and each was presented with the same simulated insurgency situation. Acting as "area commanders," they used guidelines to resolve three of the five general decision functions: selection of objectives, production of solution concepts, and implementation of solution concepts. Their performance of the first function served primarily as a frame of reference for the second, third, and fourth functions; the fifth—evaluation of implementation—was not possible in the interview context.


The similarities and differences in responses found among the interviewees form a base for exploring the relationships that may exist between individual backgrounds and the types of decisions made. One general question of interest concerns the extent to which the nature

of the reasons given for decision choices reflects an individual's background. Combining different reasons given by interviewees for the same decision choice would serve to increase the number of guidelines which bear on a given decision. This would be of particular significance if the combined reasons represent a blend of economic, social, psychological, political and military considerations. Finally, when decision choices do differ among interviewees, what are the apparent bases for these differences within the decision-making process? Do the bases for the discrepancies lie in different assessments of the situation, different emphasis on the utilization of area resources, or perhaps quite different strategic orientations for countering an insurgency situation? The nature of these questions implies a dual approach to the data: one, of course, is concerned with uncovering as many guidelines as possible; the other is concerned with examining the nature and extent of the discrepancies found among the interviewees' responses. The purpose of discovering guidelines is to identify a range of strategy possibilities for a common situation and to evolve a balanced orientation by combining the various guideline perspectives and responses of the interviewees. The goal of exploring the discrepant responses is to answer two basic questions: What are the underlying orientations guiding the interviewees' responses? How do these responses check against certain doctrinal hypotheses presented later in chapter 6?

The answers to these questions will aid greatly in solving one of the most critical and perplexing problems of counterinsurgency doctrine development and training: bridging the gap between abstract guidelines and the more specific counterinsurgent actions. This problem is centered on the use of guidelines which tie together the five generic decision functions rather than guidelines associated with each decision function taken separately. What kinds of guidelines direct the progress of the decision-maker from the situation diagnosis phase to the selection of objectives phase, to the development of a basic solution concept, and finally, to the detailed planning performed at the specific concrete level?

Within any given situational context, the three decision functions of objectives, solutions, and techniques vary in level of abstraction. Objectives, of course, are highest in level of abstraction and specific techniques are lowest. Further, within each function, the available alternatives vary in level of abstractions: there may be overall objectives, short-range objectives, a general solution strategy and less abstract suporting tactics, etc. There are a number of potential alternatives in each function. At the objective level, there are fewer alternative objectives to select from the possible ways of achiev-

Chart 24. Guidelines as the "Bridge" Between the More Abstract Objectives and the Less Abstract Techniques



LEGEND

- Alternatives not chosen
- Alternatives chosen
- Guidelines
- Decision choices

EXAMPLES:

Objectives

1. Protect civil population (selected)
2. Improve own mobility
3. Dissuade insurgent supporters

Solutions

1. Assign forces to villages (selected)
2. Resettle population
3. Establish self-defense corps

Supporting Solutions

1. Forces engage in village activities (selected)
2. Forces construct defenses around villages
3. Forces patrol village areas


Techniques

1. Select socially adept personnel (selected)
2. Select well disciplined personnel
3. Select intelligence trained personnel.

ing these objectives, and so on down to specific operational details. Certain guidelines must be selected to aid in choosing alternatives, to direct the decision process from the objective to the technique level. Chart 24 depicts this process in a pyramid model whose usefulness as an aid to the decision-making process is later estimated by examining the responses of the interviewees. An example is presented to illustrate how the process might work in a specific situation.

The continuous and dynamic nature of the development and use of guidelines is illustrated in chart 25. "Situation diagnosis" precedes the development of "objectives," "solutions," and "techniques"; the implementation of the detailed operational plans would alter the insurgency/counterinsurgency situation, and, depending on the effectiveness of the implementation, a new situation would arise and require diagnosis. The guidelines developed as a result of the first situation diagnosis may again be used. The body of useful guidance information is thus increased each time and thus effectiveness should be increased with each new decision-making process through the use of these previously developed guidelines. Guidelines may be predictive; past information and situation diagnosis are used as "inputs" to guide selection among the alternative choices. The selected action alternative is then prepared for future execution. The guidelines are used to help make this predictive process a successful one. This combination of decision functions and decision guidelines was used to develop the simulated interview format and to provide a foundation for the formulation of specific hypotheses. These are the topics of the next chapter.

Chart 25. A "Bridge" Between Principles of Counterinsurgency and Effective Counterinsurgent Actions: Area Command Decision Context



CHAPTER 6

DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF INTERVIEWS

DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Three considerations guided the development of the simulated counterinsurgency scenario. First, the situation should be realistic and comprehensive so as to provide a meaningful context. Second, the simulated situation should be administratively practicable. Third, the scenario should be so designed as to permit the study of decision guidelines and functions, including selecting objectives, developing solutions, and applying resources and techniques to implement these solutions.[1]

In the interests of realism, information was drawn from three sources. The description of insurgent development at Points 1 and 2 of Phase II was taken from appendix A and served as one source. Next, the scenario was based on the social, political, and physical characteristics of an area on which one of the authors had made an anthropological study. The third source consisted of a description of relevant area factors taken from a Counterinsurgency Planning Guide prepared by the Special Warfare School (93–97), and from an area study developed for a field training exercise by the Special Warfare School (passim).

The material was organized into four sections. The first describes the political, ethnic, economic, and cultural background at the national level. The second describes the area level background. The third describes the area government. The fourth describes recent events indicating that an insurgency is beginning. Appendix B contains the condensed scenario with seven maps submitted to interviewees, who assumed the position of area commander.

Each interviewee was given a copy of the background material and instructions. After at least 1 day for review, the interviewee was asked to perform the first decision function, namely, diagnosis of the situation. The material gave a minimal but sufficient context in which to do this. This diagnosis provided a frame of reference for making command decisions.

[1] Satisfying these requirements necessitated some compromises. However, the suggestions and responses of the interviewees indicate that the scenario did satisfy the requirements, although some improvements and additions are needed in the interview technique.

DESIGNING THE SCENARIO

DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

One of the tasks in developing the scenario was the delineation of alternative objectives for operational areas. These were to be ranked by the interviewee in order of relative priority. This list of operational objectives served both to create a frame of thinking appropriate at the area level and to enhance the possibility of obtaining from interviewees responses similar in nature.

The point of departure for developing operational area objectives is found in chapter 1. The broad objectives of the counterinsurgent government and the nature of the insurgency/counterinsurgency conflict provide a basis for generating objectives appropriate at the area level. Since the objectives stated in chapter 1 are broad, it is important to break them down into intermediate or proximate objectives in order to provide the area command clear-cut guides to action.

Chart 26 delineates counterinsurgency objectives more specifically. The material highlights both the duel nature of the conflict and the transition from broad to specific statements of objectives. The operational objectives along with examples of various ways of implementing these objectives are contained in the interview instructions and background material in appendix B.

RESPONSES OF INTERVIEWEES

Guidance of Responses

Responses were guided in two ways. First, the interview format included the operational objectives in order to delimit the range of possible responses, although the interviewee could develop objectives not included if he considered them critical. Second, and more subtle, the scenario itself contained descriptive features which would guide the interviewee. These included the introduction of marked ethnic differences, less than ideal resources available to the area command, economic and political inequities, and marginal social conditions in the areas of education and health. The aim is to obtain a response or a series of responses which show a use of the information in performing particular decision functions. The specific response guidance roles of these scenario features are identified later in this chapter.

Areas of Special Interest

Selection and Priority of Objectives. There are two opposing hypotheses concerning the basis for selecting objectives. According to one hypothesis, operational objectives are chosen which are significant to the status of the insurgency/counterinsurgency conflict, that is,

Chart 26. Analysis of Counterinsurgency Objectives

Situational Summary	Counterinsurgent Objectives
1. The basic objective of the communist dominated insurgency is to gain effective control of the area's human and materiel resources via control of the political apparatus. 2. The primary means for gaining control are terrorism and persuasion.	**Overall Objective** To gain/maintain control of the area's human and materiel resources within the framework of a pacification oriented policy.
Conditions conducive to initiation and growth of an insurgency are: 1. Existence of an insurgent leadership, organization, forces, and support. 2. Existence of perceived social, economic inequities in the area. 3. Loss of confidence by a significant proportion of the population in the existing government as a means of correcting the inequities.	**Instrumental Objectives*** 1. To defeat the insurgents political and military apparatus and underground. 2. To strengthen the area's political, economic, and social viability. 3. To win the confidence and support of the area's population. (*These are highly interdependent.)
Success of the communist dominated insurgency depends largely upon: 1. Leadership and organization; the underground is crucial. 2. Guerrilla forces to implement political and military objectives. 3. Materiel and non-materiel support from a well developed underground and sympathetic population members. 4. Passive acceptance by a significant proportion of the population. 5. Use of propaganda and terroristic methods to control population and government functionaries who are either anti-insurgents or pro-counterinsurgents or both. 6. Non-existent, or ineffectual political, military, economic, social, and psychological practices/operations by the counterinsurgent government.	**Operational Objectives** 1. To discover the hardcore leadership, organizational apparatus and operational procedures. 2. To destroy insurgent guerrilla forces. 3. To deny resources to insurgents. 4. To dissuade insurgent forces, underground, and insurgent sympathizers. 5. To persuade passive population members to support the government and encourage active supporters. 6. To provide necessary materiel and non-materiel resources to population. 7. To protect government functionaries and population. 8. To increase quantity of human and materiel resources backing CI operations. 9. To improve quality of the government's existing human and materiel resources.

objectives are based on the situation. For example, it is important to improve the quality of intelligence when the situation indicates the need for such improvement. Or, it is important to protect the counterinsurgent functionaries when the scenario events indicate the existence of a threat or the actual occurrence of assassinations. According to the opposing hypothesis, the individual's knowledge, experience, background, or ideas about counterinsurgency constitute the prevailing influence in selecting objectives. The number and nature of the similarities and differences in the objectives selected by the interviewees provide information relevant to the exploration of this question.

Situational and individual factors influence the sequence of objectives.[2] Individuals normally rank objectives in the order that each objective will or should be attained. Interest centers in the consistency and inconsistency with which different individuals rank the same objectives and in the reasons given for the particular ranking. Some sequences may be obvious, some less so. For example, it is fairly obvious that it would be necessary to train recruits in security operations before assigning them to protect civil functionaries. It is less obvious that people must believe that they are being protected before they can be persuaded to actively support government programs. Based on this contingency, the area command would emphasize protection as the objective before establishing operations designed to favorably influence the population.

It is assumed that the character of an insurgency/counterinsurgency conflict changes in a generally predictable manner in its various stages of evolution (chapter 1 and appendix A of section I). This change is reflected in changes in the behavior of insurgents and people which place new and additional requirements on counterinsurgent leaders. If selection of objectives is based on the situation, the selection and priority of objectives will change concomitantly with changes in the intensity and character of the insurgency. Stated differently, interviewees would tend, as a group, to select different objectives, rank them differently, or both as a function of the nature and characteristics of an insurgency situation.

[2] For example, the strategic hamlet concept has seven time-sequenced phases with associated objectives for each phase. These are based primarily on experience in Malaya. (1) Clear and hold the area, a necessary first requirement. (2) Protect the people: isolate people from Viet Cong. (3) Control resources: deny resources to Viet Cong. (4) Establish security programs to insure that 2 and 3 above are effectively implemented on a daily and continuing basis. (5) Institute a defection program. Aim propaganda and psychological warfare at the Viet Cong to reduce the number of Viet Cong the Republic of Vietnam must fight. (6) Execute a war of destruction against the remaining Viet Cong. (7) Develop a stable and viable community and, ultimately, country. Include necessary political, economic, social, and psychological reform programs. (Personal communication from Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Halligan.)

Development of Solutions. A common goal in counterinsurgency is to arrive at solutions (strategies, tactics, and techniques) which can be used in many situations. A countergoal would be the generation of a large number of possible solutions for a common situation. In both cases, the ultimate goal may be the same: identification of those parameters which relate to or influence the outcome of counterinsurgent actions and the use of this knowledge in planning counterinsurgent operations. Within this context, interest is in the extent to which interviewees propose similar or diverse solutions for the same situation. If the solutions differ, are the differences related to differences in background? If the proposed solutions are the same, what are the underlying characteristics?

In developing solutions, one goal is to minimize resource requirements by basing solutions on cultural values and attitudes, that is, solutions should work with the stream of attitudes and channel and direct these attitudes to the interests of the counterinsurgent cause (chapter 4). The scenario emphasizes the attitudes of the three ethnic groups located in the operational area. The attitudes vary in direction and intensity with respect to the counterinsurgent area government, from positive (Creoles) to strongly negative (Ladinos) with a middle position (Indigenes). It was of interest to learn whether and how the interviewees proposed solutions based on these attitudes. Theoretically, it would be possible to develop a scheme which equated resource units to attitude units expressed in terms of behaviors that assist the counterinsurgent, that is, a scheme which established the equivalents between resource requirements and solutions based on attitudes. For the present, it was hoped that interviewees would give attitude/resource type of responses in order to determine whether they recognized this hypothesis and, if so, how they used it.

Application of Resources. Maximum use should be made of available (idle) resources. Personnel and materiel resources under control of the area command are listed and described in the appended scenario. In keeping with realism, available resources are somewhat less than ideal in both quality and quantity. However, resources depicted as available to the area command in the scenario are representative of what might be available in an operational area of a developing nation. The goal is to explore and develop guidelines and strategies which are compatible with less-than-ideal resources.[3]

[3] In an article on the apparent discrepancy between so-called official counterinsurgency doctrine and what in reality is being done in Vietnam, Kraft (passim) emphasizes the problem of incompatibility between resource-thinking and solution-thinking. He claims that the technological state-of-the-art and conventional military thinking about tactics involving the employment of advanced types of resources has prevailed over the more abstract but current United States doctrine of counterinsurgency.

Potential or not-as-yet-developed resources are to be used. Within the context of the interview, primary attention is given to steps taken by the interviewees to involve various population groups (personnel resources) in roles supporting the counterinsurgency effort.

To investigate guidelines for requesting resources, interviewees were asked to specify the kinds of national-level resources they would request to meet the same situation that they attempted to handle with area resources. They were asked also to specify reasons. It was hoped that some insights might be gained regarding the nature and characteristics of the factors involved in deciding resource requirements for a particular area problem.

ADMINISTRATION OF INTERVIEW

INTERVIEWEES

Twenty-one individuals with varying academic backgrounds and experience in counterinsurgency served as interview subjects. Chart 27 summarizes the salient background characteristics of each of the interviewees.[4] As can be seen, the interviewees' backgrounds are dissimilar. This is an important characteristic and one desired in this study. The knowledge and experience of the interviewees falls into three categories. The first category is operational experience within a counterinsurgency or experience obtained in relevant field exercises or in area studies. The second category is historical knowledge, obtained by participating in relatively comprehensive reviews and analyses of relevant written materials dealing with specific insurgencies. The third category is research studies concerning various aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency, a useful category in that it treats methods of approach to insurgency/counterinsurgency problems. Some subjects have had all three types of experience; most can claim two of the three types of experience.

CONDUCT OF THE INTERVIEW

As mentioned earlier, the interviewee was allowed 1 day for review of background materials before the interview. The normal procedure followed during the conduct of the interview may be summarized in four steps. The initial period of the interview was set aside in order to clarify any questions posed by the interviewee. Questions usually covered scenario materials and interview procedures. The second and major part of the interview was devoted to performance of the decision

[4] The anonymity of the interviewees is preserved with respect to which responses were made by which individuals. This was accomplished by adoption of a simple letter code procedure and use of rather general background descriptions.

Chart 27. A Summary of Interviewees' Relevant Experience

Interviewee letter code	Relevant background experience	
A	U.S. Army Officer—	Advisor in Vietnam (Intelligence).
B	Sociologist—	Research on Developing Countries.
C	Political Scientist—	State Department (Middle Eastern Specialist).
D	Social Psychologist—	Research in Psychological Operations.
E	Consultant—	Counterinsurgency Office (DOD).
F	Psychologist—	Research in Counterinsurgency.
G	Political Scientist—	Operations Research in Counterinsurgency.
H	Historian—	Intelligence Experience in Vietnam.
I	Operations Research Analyst—	Preparation of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Case Studies.
J	Psychologist—	Research in Counterinsurgency.
K	Operations Research Analyst—	Participation in Counterinsurgency Operations in Korea.
L	U.S. Army Officer—	Faculty Member, U.S. Army Special Warfare School.
M	U.S. Army Officer—	Advisor in Vietnam—Advisor Handbook Development.
N	U.S. Army Officer—	Advisor in Vietnam—Counterinsurgency Doctrine Development.
O	Historian—	Preparation of Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Case Studies.
P	U.S. Army Officer—	Unit Advisor in Vietnam.
Q	Economist—	Faculty Member, U.S. Army Special Warfare School.
R	U.S. Army Officer—	Faculty Member, U.S. Army Special Warfare School.
S	U.S. Army Officer—	Assignment in Vietnam (Civil Affairs).
T	U.S. Army Officer—	Advisor in Vietnam (Corps Level).
U	Consultant—	Agency for International Development.

functions with the interviewee in the role of the area commander. The sequential decision functions include situation diagnosis, selection of objectives, development of solutions, and application of techniques and resources to implement the proposed solutions. In addition, interviewees were asked to specify which national-level resources they would request in order to handle the insurgency situation. On completion of step 2, interviewees were requested to criticize the interview material and procedures. Many useful variations in the scenario were proposed by interviewees in order to study particular types of counterinsurgency decision problems. The last step involved obtaining relevant biographic information from the interviewees. The interviews required from 1½ to 3 hours to complete; an average of about 2 hours was taken to accomplish the above four steps.

CHAPTER 7

INTERVIEW RESPONSE PROCESSING AND FINDINGS

INTRODUCTION

Before presenting the findings, it is useful to provide an orientation for reviewing and assessing the statements made in this chapter. The research conducted and reported in section II may be characterized as both diverse in character and exploratory in nature. Questions of methodology and content were investigated simultaneously. One methodological question raised concerns the effectiveness and efficiency with which the interview technique elicits decisions as well as reasons for the stated decisions. A second methodological question deals with the utility of the decision process model as an aid in organizing and portraying the multiple decisions made and as a means for illustrating the role that decision guidelines play in assisting the selection of particular decisions. Questions of content fall into two classes: those concerned with gathering information for the purpose of developing decision guidelines and alternative decision possibilities and those concerned with the application of external standards to the information obtained from the interviewees. The former class of questions includes (1) the use of individuals with different backgrounds as a way of obtaining decision guidelines which reflect a balance of military, social, economic, political, and psychological considerations, (2) the use of these same individuals as a source for generating alternative tactics and techniques for meeting the same situation, and (3) the use of common responses by the individuals as a basis for recommending decision priorities appropriate to specific situations. The latter class of questions is concerned with investigating the use of management and historically derived counterinsurgency principles as sources for assessing the responses of the interviewees. In addition, the role that attitudes play in solutions and the relationships between an individual's background and the nature of his decisions were explored.

In view of the diversity of questions, the following material may be thought of as highlighting significant results rather than drawing definitive conclusions and probably as contributing more to methodological questions than to operationally based questions of content.

Considering the breadth of questions and the limited scope of the investigation, the many findings give information pertinent to the eventual development of guidelines for decision-making at the area level.

PROCESSING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES

Three criteria were used to guide the processing of interviewee responses. First, responses must be put into a form which would allow questions raised in chapters 5 and 6 to be explored. Second, the outcome of processing responses should reflect as closely as possible the intent, meaning, and words of the interviewee. Third, processed data should permit meaningful comparisons among responses.

Responses were processed in five steps. (1) The tape recording of each interview was completely transcribed to serve as a basic reference. (2) The original transcript was then condensed. Irrelevant and repetitious comments were eliminated. (3) Responses of each individual were summarized and organized with respect to each of the decision functions. The summary included the major descriptive and evaluative comments made by the interviewee in diagnosing the situation, an identification of the selected short and long range objectives and their order, a brief synopsis of the proposed basic solution(s), and a list of the ideas and techniques supporting the solution (see appendix C). (4) Graphic summaries were developed. The decision model (chapter 5 and chart 24) was used to depict the relationships existing between objectives, solutions, and techniques. A graphic summary of each interviewee's decision process is shown in appendix C. (5) Decision guidelines were organized. The purpose of this step was to relate decisions to reasons given for these decisions, that is, to identify decision guidelines and the particular associated decisions. This step involved two tasks. First, statements concerning who, when, where, and what an interviewee would do (objectives, solutions, and techniques) were separated from reasons given for the decisions. Second, decisions and associated reasons were selected which were representative of the decision function studied, that is, objectives, solutions, and techniques. The selected decisions and reasons for each interviewee are presented in appendix C.

FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

DECISION MODEL AND GUIDELINES

Chapter 5 discusses a highly simplified schematic representation of the decision process. This decision model was intended to serve two aims. First, it was designed to investigate relationships among the sequential and generic decision functions. It was considered that

major decisions could be categorized with respect to their level of abstraction, that is, from the more abstract statement of objectives to the more concrete decisions concerning the allocation of resources. Second, the model was designed to illustrate the manner in which decision guidelines help bridge the gap between the more abstract objectives and the less abstract decision functions concerned with techniques and resources. The guidelines themselves range from broad propositions about counterinsurgency to situationally restricted statements in the form of standard operating procedures. Exploring decision functions by using the decision model and placing cognizant individuals in area command roles within a situationally defined counterinsurgency was found to be a potentially fruitful approach to the identification of decision guidelines which reflect military, social, economic, political, and psychological considerations. Responses of the interviewees were processed to give information relevant to the utility of this approach.

Utility of Decision Model

Graphic summaries were prepared for each of the 21 interviewees which identify decisions concerning objectives, solutions, and techniques and indicate the relationship between decisions by connecting lines (see appendix C). Six of these graphic summaries were selected to point out three general observations relevant to the question of the decision model's utility (see chart 28).

The responses showed considerable differences in the number and kinds of relationships between objectives (top portion of pyramid), solutions (mid portion), and techniques (lower portion). Although wide differences are evident, the model demonstrated both flexibility and adequacy in handling these variations; that is, it included or accounted for all of the decisions made regardless of type or level of abstraction.

The responses showed differences in the levels of abstraction of the approach (see graphic summaries, appendix C). A solution for one individual may be an objective for another; a technique or resource for one interviewee may be an objective for another. For example, development of an intelligence organization may be an objective for one individual and a technique used by another as one requirement in implementing a broader (more abstract) solution. However, for the same individual, there is an apparent consistency that follows throughout the decision process, that is, consistency with regard to levels of abstraction. Because decisions varied with respect to levels of abstraction, comparisons among responses were not as easy as originally anticipated.




Chart 28. Graphic Representations of the Decision Process for Six Interviewees

Counterinsurgent Decision Guidelines

Although the simulated insurgency was the same for all interviewees, some saw different things as important. In most cases, the interviewee's perception of the problem, as evident in his situation diagnosis, shaped and guided subsequent decisions. For example, some interviewees emphasized the cultural cleavage existing among the three ethnic groups as a prime cause and formulated decisions designed to reduce or remove this cleavage. Other interviewees emphasized Montanya's (foreign country's) support as a prime cause, and their decisions focused on reducing or eliminating the external support. However, a few interviewees did not relate their situation diagnosis to their action-oriented decisions (objectives, solutions, and techniques).[1] After making a diagnosis of the situation, these interviewees adopted formalized solutions which did not relate to the situation diagnosis. It is suspected that the solutions would remain essentially the same regardless of the situation being simulated. This finding raises a number of related questions having implications for both doctrine development and training. Do the more formalized approaches indicate that a greater degree of attention is being devoted to development of solutions rather than to assessment of the situation? To what extent and under what conditions are formalized plans preferable to solutions tailored to meet specific variations in insurgency situations?

Decision Guidelines

Chapter 5 also discussed the overall rationale for using the interview technique with individuals possessing different backgrounds to obtain a balance of military, social, economic, political, and psychological considerations associated with relevant area command decisions. For each of the 21 interviewees, reported decisions and reasons given for these decisions were identified and related and are presented in appendix C. The findings may be summarized with respect to the following two questions.

Does the interview technique elicit bases for decisions as well as decisions? The data show that the bases given for decisions consist of reasons or considerations and of amplifications of the decisions themselves. In other words, the answer to this question is a qualified "Yes." It is likely that more detailed instructions to the interviewees would lead interviewees to give more reasons and fewer amplifications of the decisions.

Does the interview technique elicit diverse considerations for the same general decision? Chart 29 illustrates how different considerations may be combined for the same general decision problem. The

[1] Interviewees E, N, P, S, and T were those whose responses revealed no clear relationship between situation diagnosis and action decisions.

interviewees contributing decision bases for the selected decisions are identified by a letter code. Essentially, the answer to this question is "Yes."

OBJECTIVES, SOLUTIONS, AND TECHNIQUES

Chapter 6 indicated a number of areas of special interest concerning the performance of interviewees on the three action-oriented decision functions, namely, objectives, solutions, and techniques. Whereas the preceding section was concerned with rather general questions regarding the utility of the decision model, the nature of the decision process, and the effectiveness of the interview technique in identifying decision guidelines, this section examines the interview responses obtained with respect to more specific questions. These questions relate to the development of standards based on interviewee responses and the application of external standards to the interviewee responses. Common elements in responses are the basis for developing standards appropriate to early Phase II of an insurgency. Management concepts and

Chart 29. An Example Showing Combined Interviewees' Bases for a Particular Decision Problem

Decision Problem:	NUMBER OF TROOPS ASSIGNED TO INDIGENE VILLAGES
Interviewees Contributing Decision Bases: F, G, O	


1. Assignment of 12 men per village in 7 selected villages; in the southwestern and northeastern areas implements the basic strategy to seal off attitudinally and by force these Indigene villages against adjacent Ladino areas.
2. Size of security force in each village depends on disaffection of populace, loyal authorities (police and mayor), tactical location of village, and size of village.
3. Twelve men properly trained and with weapons can provide security for a village of 200.
4. Using 300 men for village protection, 15 man squads can protect about 20 villages.
5. These 15 man squads will force the insurgents into larger size groups of about 20 men. It will be easier to track them.
6. Allocating 300 men into 15 man squads will permit both village and boundary protection.
7. 15 men in a squad is large enough to form a defensive unit and still assert civic action in the Indigene village.
8. 15 men can be trained at the same time—including the necessity for Kekchi language training.
9. The 15 man squads can gather intelligence in the villages.

historically derived counterinsurgency principles serve as standards for evaluating responses. Finally, differences in responses among interviewees may be used as a basis for exploring alternative approaches to the same simulated insurgency.

Objectives

Chart 30 shows percentage figures expressing the number of interviewees who selected each of the operational objectives.[2] The objectives judged to be the most important, expressed in terms of frequency, include persuasion of the population, discovery of the insurgent organization and cadre, protection of functionaries and population, and improving current counterinsurgent capabilities.[3] With con-

Chart 30. Percent of Interviewees Selecting Each Operational Objective



[2] "Selection of objectives" is used in a broad sense. Whenever the interviewee made a decision which would involve subsequent actions clearly related to the attainment of an operational objective, he was considered to have selected that particular objective. Statements relevant to the selection of operational objectives occurred at all levels of abstraction and during the performance of different decision functions.

[3] The objectives "to protect functionaries" and "to protect population" were combined since a few interviewees failed to distinguish between the two target groups when discussing the objective "to protect."

sensus of opinion as a standard, the finding would indicate that the above-mentioned objectives should be given priority in those situations depicting the beginning of a Phase II insurgency.

Chart 31 graphically shows those operational objectives selected by each of the interviewees. Examination of the available biographical information revealed no apparent relationship between nature of choice and individual background. The chart shows that interviewee O selected the greatest number of objectives and interviewee J the least. The majority of interviewees made decisions which involved five of the available nine alternative objectives.

Solutions

Chart 32 presents a classification of solutions based on the nature of the activity or function involved. For example, those actions or events which involve passing laws, electing or appointing individuals to public office, collecting taxes, keeping census records, conducting civil or criminal trials, and so forth, may be classified under the category of political operations. This classification scheme offers two advantages. First, it is consistent with how events and operations are normally described or reported in relevant counterinsurgent documents. This scheme relies solely on a description of the nature of the operation or incident rather than the objective of the operation. Second, it enables classification of any activity to be subclassified by level and by amount. By level, it permits broad categories (for example, political) to be divided into subcategories (legislation, administration, and judiciary) and these into further subcategories (taxes), and even further (assessing taxes, collecting taxes, recording tax collections), and so on. By amount, with a comprehensive classification, scheme programs could be analyzed with regard to how much the activity included political, economic, or military operations. The major potential disadvantage with this scheme is the tendency to channel thinking into specific areas. For example, a situation is viewed as being primarily a political problem, requiring a political solution to attain some specified political objective. This approach tends to ignore the interdependencies that exist among the political, social, economic, and military facets of a society.

Using the above classification scheme, chart 33 presents those types of operations proposed by each of the 21 interviewees. The information contained in the chart illustrates two findings concerning the decision function "specification of solutions." First, with the exception of one interviewee, psychological and military/civil control operations were proposed as a dual approach for dealing with the beginning of a Phase II insurgency at the area level. With respect to political, economic, and social operations, the two common responses

Chart 31. Operational Objectives Selected by Each Interviewee
(Shaded areas represent objectives chosen)





Chart 32. Classification of Solution Concepts by Nature of Operations

Operation	Categories (examples)
Political	1. *Legislation:* (Laws, Regulations, and Ordinances). 2. *Administration:* (Tax Collection, Population Records). 3. *Judiciary:* (Civil/Criminal Trials).
Military/Civil Control	1. *Protection:* (Internal Security). 2. *Enforcement:* (Control Measures). 3. *Combat:* (Military Engagements).
Social	1. *Education:* (General and Technical). 2. *Health:* (Sanitation and Medical Measures). 3. *Welfare:* (Charitable Measures).
Economic	1. *Investment:* (Capital, Raw Materials, Technical Skills, Time). 2. *Process:* (Build, Grow, Manufacture). 3. *Exchange:* (Trade, Sell).
Psychological	1. *Persuasion:* (Positive Attitude Actions). 2. *Harassment:* (Intimidation, Terroristic Threats).

of interviewees were (1) a recognition of the limited resources of the area command to implement either substantial or long-range operations, implied by political, social, and economic operations, and (2) a judgment that both psychological and military/civil control operations were of immediate priority to keep the insurgency from expanding or at least to reduce its rate of growth. With consensus of opinion as a standard, the present finding indicates that a combined psychological and military/civil control operation is considered to be both appropriate and feasible as a countermeasure to the types of incidents and conditions characteristic of a beginning Phase II (terroristic) insurgency. Second, the number of proposed operations varied from a low of two (interviewee D) to the maximum of five (interviewees N and O). Most of the interviewees proposed three kinds of operations. However, the great majority of the interviewees viewed their proposed political, economic, and social operations as quite limited and primarily supportive of psychological operations and psychological objectives. Most interviewees did not believe that, given the limited resources and authority, much more than token advances could be made in the social, economic, or political spheres.

At the general descriptive level, it is true that almost all interviewees agree concerning the nature of the operations. However, relatively

Chart 33. A Classification of Types of Operations Proposed by Each Interviewee
(Shaded areas indicate types chosen)



wide differences among interviewees are found in the specific tactics and techniques adopted to implement the general counterinsurgent operations (see appendix C). Following are some examples which contrast psychological and physical control tactics: (1) Show-of-Force, a tactic selected to influence rather than control, that is, psychological control rather than physical control. (2) Seal off Ladino-operated plantations, a tactic designed to control by containing insurgents and insurgent supporters, that is, physical control. (3) Creole area as a sanctuary, a tactic judged by a few interviewees to be the only feasible approach at the area level; one involving no real attempt at either physical or psychological control of the Ladino/Indigene areas. (4) Combined attitudinal/physical, a tactic designed to build both an attitudinal force with the population as well as a military/civil controlling force; a tactic which combines both physical and psychological control. (5) Pseudoinsurgent force, a tactic designed to convince Ladinos that Creole counterinsurgent units are needed in their areas to protect the people and crush the insurgency, a variant of tactic 4, which also combines physical and psychological control. These findings have implications for developing multiple solutions (tactics) designed as alternative ways of meeting the same situation. The goal of increasing the number of tactical options to meet given situations not only provides a wider range of alternatives for area command consideration but ultimately may provide insights into the relationships between situational parameters and characteristics of tactics that make them more or less successful.

Another area of interest concerns the role played by population attitudes in the development and nature of proposed solutions. Attitudes can be used in the development of strategies in order to minimize resource requirements (chapter 4). A question was raised concerning the extent and manner that individuals would recognize and use existing attitudes in their solutions (chapter 6).

Chart 34 briefly summarizes how the interviewees used population attitudes as elements in their solutions. Review of the different strategies reveals that interviewees incorporated these attitudes to different degrees and in different forms in their solutions. Some individuals viewed the attitudes as obstacles to overcome; some viewed the attitudes as levers to achieve certain objectives; and others viewed attitudes as the foundation for developing various propaganda themes. In general, the findings show that all interviewees considered these attitudes in the development of various approaches to the insurgency situation. However, they varied in both the extent and manner they used these attitudes. Although it is not possible to relate these proposed attitude-based solutions to resource requirements in other than a general way, it is reasonable to conclude that the proposed strategies

Chart 34. Utilization of Population Attitudes as Elements in Solution Concepts

Attitude analysis	Strategy
A—U.S. Army Officer	
Recognition of the negative attitude the Ladinos and, to a lesser extent, the Indigenes have toward the Creoles.	* Hire Ladino and Indigene teachers. * Assassination of native teachers * establishes counterinsurgent theme, * "insurgents are destroying educa- * tion." These teachers also counter- * act possible insurgent theme, "Creoles * are trying to dominate us."
B—Sociologist	
Assume that Indigenes want to be left alone, i.e., they possess neutral to negative attitudes regarding both the Ladinos and Creoles.	* Employ theme, "Ladino minority is * behind these acts of terrorism" oc- * curring in the Indigene area to drive * a wedge between Ladino and Indi- * gene ethnic groups.
C—Political Scientist	
Implicit recognition of the negative feelings Ladinos and Indigenes have toward Creoles.	* Dispatch Creole forces to patrol in * Indigene, Ladino areas. Because * they are patrolling in unfriendly * area, Creoles will not defect easily.
D—Social Psychologist	
There exists a cultural cleavage between the Ladino and Creole populations.	* Increase cultural permeability be- * tween these two groups and permit * Ladinos to assume, as they become * capable, increasingly important roles * in the economics and politics of the * country.
E—Consultant (DOD)	
The Ladinos and Indigenes are negative towards Creoles, and are combining to overthrow present Creole government.	* Create a population who will con- * sider themselves Centralians rather * than Creoles, Ladinos, and Indigenes.
F—Psychologist	
Ladinos are strongly negative towards Creoles, whereas Indigene attitude is less intensely negative.	* Make the Indigene area the counter- * insurgent target. Possibility of mak- * ing headway there; little chance of making headway in the Ladino area.
G—Political Scientist	
Creoles are the only group which are, for the most part, progovernment. Ladinos are strongly negative while Indigene attitude, though negative, is not as intense.	* Emphasize utilization of Creole * police (not village police), troops * and citizens in counterinsurgent * operations. Utilize Indigenes next, * leaving utilization of Ladinos until * needed.

Chart 34.—Continued

Attitude analysis	Strategy
H—Historian	
Ladinos will not accept the occupation of Creole troops in their area.	* Use a pseudoinsurgent force to create incidents in Ladino areas, persuading Ladinos to allow Creole troops to "protect the Ladinos and stamp out the insurgency" by instituting population control measures.
I—Operations Research Analyst	
There exists a lack of sympathy between police/military and the population, hindering effective gathering of intelligence information.	* Thoroughly indoctrinate military/police in ways of winning population cooperation; take actions to protect the people and involve them in local representation organizations.
J—Psychologist	
Creoles are rather contemptuous of the Indigenes, who, in turn, are hostile towards the army.	* Immediately establish good army officer leadership; teach army to work and get along with the people.
K—Operations Research Analyst	
Because of existing attitudes between the three ethnic groups, the Creoles can't be trusted among the Indigenes without taking the chance of creating more friction.	* Remove Creole national police from Indigene area in order to keep the Indigenes somewhat neutral. Use Creoles to protect Creole area.
L—U.S. Army Officer	
Ladinos hate Creoles, causing their attraction to subversive agents. Creoles, though negative to Ladinos, need Ladino help to protect Creole livelihood, i.e., the plantations.	* Through education and social improvement program, persuade Ladinos they need Creoles and Creole capability to improve Ladino life.
M—U.S. Army Officer	
The behavior and attitudes of the Creole government and forces have created a poor image and negative attitudes among the population.	* Immediately establish an indoctrination program for Creole forces to correct this behavior; form coordinating committees at various levels to integrate government and Indigene/Ladino representatives.
N—U.S. Army Officer	
The Indigenes and Ladinos have a negative attitude toward the Creole government.	* Reduce friction and cleavage among the three ethnic groups by integrating them into a planning group to combat the common enemy.

Chart 34.—Continued

Attitude analysis	Strategy
O—Historian	
Ladinos are more negative toward the Creoles than are the Indigenes, thus making a Creole/Indigene alliance easier to form.	* Establish a broad base of support among the Indigenes and siphon off the emerging middle class Ladinos. Isolate the Ladino population by achieving Indigene support and absorbing Ladino leadership into Creole political body.
P—U.S. Army Officer	
The Ladinos and Indigenes are going to help the group who does the most for them, i.e., satisfies their needs.	* Remove the causes of dissatisfaction which are making Ladinos and Indigenes lean towards insurgents and generally improve their life.
Q—Economist	
Demonstration, in social and political life, of Creole negative attitude toward Ladinos and Indigenes has created responsive negative attitudes on the part of the Ladinos and Indigenes.	* Implement extensive psychological operations program directed toward Ladinos and Indigenes; form integrated military force to combat common enemy.
R—U.S. Army Officer	
Recognition of negative attitudes between Creoles and Ladinos making Ladinos prime targets for subversive agents.	* Persuade Creoles to change negative attitude and work with Ladinos for common goals of security and prosperity.
S—U.S. Army Officer	
The Ladinos and Indigenes fear domination by the Creoles will destroy their respective cultures and traditions.	* Bring all three ethnic groups together to clarify and coordinate efforts and prove they're all working toward the same goal.
T—U.S. Army Officer	
The Creoles display a negative attitude toward the Ladinos and Indigenes by running the government for Creole benefit.	* Create an Area Security Coordination Center having representation from all major groups in the district to work together against the insurgency.
U—Consultant (AID)	
Relationship of the military/paramilitary forces with all three ethnic groups is poor, evidencing negative feelings among population.	* Base psychological themes and actions in terms of "the good of the plantations and people" rather than for the good of the government; use limited area resources to improve living conditions.

used attitudes as a guide for selecting, or as a means of making progress toward objectives within the limited resources available.

Techniques

The third and last generic decision function is the selection of techniques and allocation of resources to implement solutions. Three forms of this allocation problem were studied (Ackoff: 38). One problem occurs when there are more requirements than available resources. The interviewees' situation diagnoses indicated that the limited resources provided in the scenario were clearly perceived as inadequate to meet needs. A second problem is determining what resources are needed when resources are available. This second problem was explored by requesting interviewees to specify what national resources they would request to meet the area level insurgency. A third problem is related to the following principle of counterinsurgency: It is essential for ultimate success to involve the population in counterinsurgent activities. This involves the planned utilization of potential resources.

Chart 35 presents the available personnel resources used by each interviewee. No individual recommended the use of all available personnel. Interviewees M and R recommended eight out of nine possible classes of personnel resources, whereas interviewee L recommended only the use of available army personnel. The average percentage of personnel resources used was 50 percent. This finding indicated a marginal attainment of the management standard of maximum use of available resources.

The recommended use of materiel resources involved an even greater discrepancy. Chart 36 shows that of the six classes of materiel resources available, interviewees C and D recommended use of five, and eight of the interviewees recommended use of none.[4] In the responses of these eight individuals, most of their decisions were at a general level; that is, they tended either to base decisions on an abstract doctrine or to view the situation as a national problem rather than an area problem. This failure to use available but limited materiel resources points to the apparent need for the development of tactics and solutions based on limited and relatively poor quality resources. This would be particularly significant and appropriate for resource-poor developing countries.

In determining what resources would be needed to meet a particular situation, each interviewee was asked to specify the national or external resources he would need to meet the same area level situation and

[4] "Other" includes any type of materiel resource mentioned by the interviewee that would probably be available in the area although not specifically mentioned in the scenario. The remaining five types of materiel resources were listed in the scenario as available to the district commissioner.

Chart 35. Personnel Types of Resources Utilized by Interviewees
(Shaded areas indicate choice)





Chart 36. Materiel Types of Resources Utilized by Interviewees (Shaded areas indicate choice)



the reasons for each request. Chart 37 lists the requests made by each interviewee.

The requests for external support were surprisingly modest, particularly in view of the nature of earlier area resource assessments. Also, the number of reasons given for the particular requests was small. Most of the requests were primarily for more of the same kinds of resources already available at the area level. In several instances, a better quality resource was requested, yet the same class of resource was normally involved. Although the interviewees were asked to specify what national level resources they would need, many requests involved international level resources. In many of these cases, the interviewees felt that national level resources would be very likely inadequate and that international support was needed to meet this insurgency problem.

At least three explanations are possible for these findings. First, the interviewees had already spent more than one hour in concentrated thinking and talking. Fatigue may explain, in part, the surprising dearth of information. Second, working with area level resources for a long time may have led the interviewee, in making requests for national level resources, to restrict the possibilities to those kinds available at the area level. The third and most likely possibility is that the decision task of determining resource requirements to meet a situation is both complex and time consuming. In addition, the interview format was probably not most efficiently designed to get useful information along these lines. This is an important area for further study, in view of its many implications for area command guidance.

The final question concerns the utilization of potential resources. Because of the significance of participation of the population in counterinsurgency activities, primary attention was given to this finding. Chart 38 shows both percentage of interviewees who recommended use of each of the three ethnic groups in counterinsurgent-related activities and the choices made by each interviewee. The findings indicate a fairly heavy planned commitment of individuals from all three ethnic groups; 17 out of 21 interviewees planned to use members of the Indigene group, 16 out of 21 involved the Ladino group in their planning, and 12 out of 21 mentioned roles for members of the Creole population. Sixteen of the 21 interviewees formulated decisions which involved the participation of at least two of the population groups. Only one interviewee did not propose use of any of the ethnic groups. This finding takes on added significance when considered in light of two other findings. First, the planned use of population resources (potential resources) was considerably greater than the planned use of the area command's own available resources.

Chart 37. List of External (National/International) Resources Requested by Each Interviewee

	Interviewee	Request
A	U.S.Army Officer	National police/British troops/Two light aircraft/Trained troops/Policy guidance.
B	Sociologist	This step was not requested of interviewee. Time had already exceeded three hours.
C	Political Scientist	OAS border observer group/Assistance to curb insurgency.
D	Social Psychologist	Force not identified with Creoles.
E	Consultant (DOD)	Transportation/L19's/Weapons/Ranger or commando units/Adoption of national objectives agreed to by United States and Great Britain so as to receive their technical assistance, military and economic aid.
F	Psychologist	Army battalion/Larger aircraft/Extension of martial law beyond 90 days.
G	Political Scientist	Three boats/Aircraft/Native troops/Money/Native Americans with Creole/Ladino ethnic backgrounds.
H	Historian	Radios/Helicopters/Build battalion up to strength/Automatic weapons/Public relations section/Money.
I	Operations Research Analyst.	British or U.S. trained military personnel/Material for rural development program/Foreign aid loan to plantations.
J	Psychologist	Radio communications/Portable field transceivers for troops in villages/NCO's to advise mayors and organize anti-insurgent sympathizers/Trained battalion for CI operations capable of getting along with Indigenes/Trained intelligence agents/Support for small civic action program/Money to pay for information.
K	Operations Research Analyst.	British or U.S. advisors to train troops for CI warfare/Better communications equipment/Aircraft/National policy on economic and political reform/British or U.S. pressure on Montanya to stop aiding insurgency.
L	U.S. Army Officer	Military troops on a short-term basis/Intelligence net/Border patrol/Health personnel.
M	U.S. Army Officer	National police/Police/Military radios/Helicopters/Medical Assistance personnel and material/Economic facilities/Assistance to develop other industries/Information services and equipment (loudspeakers and radios).
N	U.S. Army Officer	General outside assistance (without outside help we would always be behind the level of insurgency).
O	Historian	Naval reinforcements.

Chart 37.—Continued

	Interviewee	Request
P	U.S. Army Officer	Communications equipment/Boats/Public health personnel/Engineer force (equipment and technical advice).
Q	Economist	Communications/Public utilities/Technical support for education/Cooperatives for agricultural and educational improvements.
R	U.S. Army Officer	Assistance in training troops/Intelligence agencies' assistance/Increased mobility. (It's not desirable to bring outsiders in if it can be avoided.)
S	U.S. Army Officer	Personnel to seal border/Communications/Mobility/Money/Policy or program of development/Brains and technical skill.
T	U.S. Army Officer	Assistance to recruit/Automatic weapons/Helicopters/Training/Medical supplies/Engineering support and equipment (road building equipment)/Marketing and credit cooperatives/Assistance to possible foreign investors/Money/National level counterinsurgent program/Laws for reform.
U	Consultant (AID)	Communications/Increased mobility/Land transportation/Task force medical teams/Health and education advisors/Improved housing/Hand tools.

Second, application of a counterinsurgency principle to evaluate the interview data opens up the possibility of using some modification of the technique as a training aid. In summary, the great majority of the interviewees' responses in this area were consistent with the principle which emphasizes population participation as essential to the ultimate success of the overall counterinsurgency effort.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The interview technique has proved to be an efficient means of systematically collecting large numbers of situationally referenced decisions within relatively short periods. The majority of the elicited responses are germane to the overall objective of developing area command decision guidelines. The technique has proved effective in uncovering decision bases (decision criteria) as well as the decisions themselves. This has direct implications for the development of situationally referenced counterinsurgent decision criteria. The elicited responses have proved amenable to the application of current counterinsurgency doctrine (historical consensus) and management principles




Chart 38. Percentage of Interviewees Utilizing the Three Ethnic Groups
(Shaded areas indicate choice)

for evaluative purposes. This has implications regarding the potential utility of this technique as a training aid.

The decision model for the area command used in this study has demonstrated itself to be a useful aid in organizing and portraying interviewee decisions which vary in type as well as in level of abstraction. A preliminary analysis of the situation diagnoses indicates the existence of decision-making frames of reference which guided most interviewees in the sequential performance of each decision function; that is, selection of objectives, solutions, and techniques. In contrast, background differences among interviewees accounted less for differences in decision responses than did the statements in the situation diagnosis. The use of interviewees with different backgrounds operating within the same simulated counterinsurgency is a promising method for evolving a balanced set of decision guidelines for each common decision; that is, guidelines which reflect military, political, social, economic, and psychological considerations. These guidelines are found at all levels of abstraction.

The operational objectives selected by the interviewees showed an exceptionally high consensus of opinion. Objectives concerned with protection of functionaries and population, persuasion of the population, intelligence about the insurgency, and improvement of own capabilities ranked highest. The findings indicate no apparent relationship between an individual's background and his choice of objectives.

The vast majority of the solutions specified were of a dual nature, that is, both military and psychological. Proposed economic, social, and political actions were primarily designed to achieve psychological objectives. Processing of interviewees' responses indicates that all individuals included prevailing attitudes among the ethnic groups in their proposed solutions. However, the interviewees differed among themselves in terms of how significantly they viewed the attitude factor and in what way they used this force. Although there was general consensus with respect to the dual nature of the proposed operations, interviewees differed in varying degrees among themselves as to the specific tactics, primary target group, and resources involved.

The responses of interviewees showed that considerably more of the available personnel resources were proposed for use than the available materiel resources. The numbers and types of resources proposed varied widely among interviewees. The proposed use of own resources was, at best, marginal. Almost all interviewees recommended the use of one or more of the ethnic groups in combating the insurgency. This finding is in strong contrast to the one dealing with allocation of available and own resources. Some interviewees proposed exploring the feasibility of developing materiel resources in the area, for

example, lumber. Most of these individuals, however, felt that the area command had neither the authority nor the capabilities for long-term development efforts. Although interviewees were requested to identify the national level resources they would request to meet the same situation, relatively few recommendations were offered. Most of the recommendations that were made represented an increase in the quantity of already available resources, with emphasis on improvement in the quality of these resources. Some of the interviewees recommended international support. Many interviewees based their request on the assumed inadequacies at both area and national levels to handle a foreign-sponsored and -supported insurgency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are some general recommendations. Investigate area command decisions under various simulated insurgency phases at village, area, and national levels to identify decision guidelines appropriate to and used in different situations and at different levels. Continue to use interviewees with widely varying backgrounds in order to achieve a balance among economic, military, social, and psychological considerations.

Explore the feasibility of using this technique or some modification of it as a training aid. Both management principles and current counterinsurgent doctrine may be used as sources for standards of evaluation.

Examine in detail and under more controlled conditions the nature and makeup of the different frames of reference evident in the situation diagnoses. A study along these lines would have implications in two areas. First, it might lead to an effective technique for identifying how and why there are differences in the perception of the same situation by indigenous leaders and advisors. Knowledge regarding the nature and degree of differences in frames of reference would provide guidance to the advisors in recognizing and handling these differences. Second, it would be of training and operational value to determine whether and how these different frames of reference change with instruction or experience. Information in this area would have both training and operational utility.

Investigate more thoroughly different solutions proposed for meeting the same situation. This focus of effort may help uncover situational parameters that can be used to classify and identify features of proposed solutions which make them more or less effective. The ultimate objective is to develop guidelines for selecting solutions which best meet particular situations.

Research further the question of attitudes as a factor in minimizing resource requirements. Particular emphasis should be placed on development of a model which could be used to determine possible equivalents between resource requirements and attitude intensities.

Later efforts to validate the model (through the literature and the use of simulated situations) should indicate its utility as an operational planning guide.

Develop new and different solutions which use less than ideal resources. In other words, explore the possibility of developing tactics and approaches to counterinsurgency which better match the kinds of resources found in resource-poor developing countries.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED INSURGENCY THROUGH PHASES II AND III

The primary objectives of this appendix describing insurgent development are to provide a basis for generation of criteria for insurgent and counterinsurgent forces and for the confrontation between them, and to provide background information for assessment of counterinsurgent area decisions and alternatives.

Greatest emphasis was placed on World War II and postwar insurgencies in the Philippines, the Communist movement in Malaya from 1948 to 1957, the Vietminh insurgency against the French in Indochina, the present insurgency in Vietnam, and the Castro-led insurgency in Cuba. The material which follows is not a specific prediction; no two insurgent developments will be exactly alike.

This appendix indicates one way in which a Communist-dominated insurgent movement might evolve in an operational area of a developing country through Phases II and III as defined in chapter 1. It is assumed that such a movement would take advantage of information and lessons assimilated from past and present victories and losses of insurgents. Thus, we attempt to visualize a relatively sophisticated insurgent development.

A major obstacle to counterinsurgent operations has been a lack of understanding of the insurgent modus operandi. As a result, the insurgent thrust is not met directly. A comprehensively detailed depiction of the insurgent development should provide better appreciation of where the insurgent organism is vulnerable and, consequently, where it can least well resist attack by ideological, political, psychological, military, and other means.[1]

The assumptions which follow place emphasis on functions to be performed by insurgent organizations rather than on their structure.

[1] Key sources are publications by or about personnel with experience in insurgent operations or students of insurrections whose writings pertain especially to the operational area level: Blackburn (see Harkins), Fertig (see Keats), Giap, Guevara, Mao et al (see Hanrahan), Tanham, Taruc, Volckmann, Paret, and Lawrence. For more general treatment, see Bjelajac, Galula, Heilbrunn, Mao, and Pye. (See list of references.)

Appendix A

Specific organizations will vary considerably from one country to another. Even so, the following material may suggest a better articulated organization that insurgents have generally been able to achieve—or that they may desire to achieve in view of the stringent requirements for security. Our attention is focused on a deliberately organized insurgent activity rather than on random elements of the social process.

Specific responsibilities are assigned to insurgent functionaries. Some of the literature and captured charts of insurgent organizations suggest that this is true, although there is undoubltedly considerable variation from country to country. Large organizations tend to move slowly and insurgents need to operate flexibly. Orders and directives may be stated in very general terms, leaving considerable leeway to local leaders.

In spite of uncertainties, the insurgent can plan. He cannot know in advance just when the government will wake up or what actions it will take when it does. Nonetheless, the insurgent policy-makers can establish, with the assistance of past Communist experience, functions which will need to be performed by the organization, the timing with which these functions must be performed, and the organization which will be required to perform them.

Undoubtedly, the insurgent leader's developmental plan is more formal in concept than it will be in execution. This will be true unless the government forces are uninformed and determined to remain so as the insurgent movement progresses. Based on the literature, the model which follows is intended to project an effective pattern and schedule for insurgents, allowing for the likelihood that government operations will cause delays and changes. As a general backdrop, we have considered more or less typical counterinsurgent behavior, characterized by a slowness in recognizing and admitting that an insurgency is developing and delays in actively and vigorously opposing it. Insurgent development is emphasized, with only occasional references to assumed counterinsurgent actions. We have not tried to describe insurgent/counterinsurgent confrontations, for permutations of action and counteraction would rapidly become infinite.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT COUNTRY X AND AN OPERATIONAL AREA

Country X, a rural operational area which is examined here, is judged by Communists to satisfy prerequisites for an insurgency movement. Just what these prerequisites are is a matter of speculation. Undoubtedly they vary from continent to continent and country to country (Black; The United States Army Special Warfare School

Special Text Number 31–176). A description of one developing Latin American country (appendix B of part II) based on field study by one of the writers provides one interpretation.

The Communist Party and the interests it supports have a growing following. Organizational activities have been going on for some time. Both an overt and a covert party exist. Front groups have been established. Labor and peasant groups have been infiltrated by Communist activists. Some news media are sympathetic. Party members and/or sympathizers hold positions in the indigenous government. Arms have been procured and stored clandestinely.

The government has been the target of attacks by Communist and other groups. The pace and intensity of Communist-inspired attacks have been stepped up. Strikes against industry and land rent rates have been suppressed by government troops. The government has outlawed the Communist Party and taken steps to arrest or dispose of insurrectionists.

The above conditions have been reviewed by Communist Party functionaries (heads of the Communist Party country team) who considered four alternative courses of action: form a popular front with other parties of the Left and attempt to take over government by the electoral process,[2] gain control of the government by coup,[3] resort to armed struggle, or call off attacks on government and the national economy and wait for a more propitious time to select one of the first three alternatives.[4]

They select the third alternative: insurgents will resort to armed struggle. A contingent decision to the effect that the control planning apparatus of the movement will stay in the capital city remains in force.[5] Several operational areas will be established in the hinterland. Among criteria for selection of operational areas are the location of the area with respect to the national capital and population centers;[6] rugged terrain and overhead concealment; extent of animosity toward government among inhabitants; social ecology (whether mostly villages and hamlets); and the existence of an open party, a covert apparatus, and front groups in operational areas.

The operational area to be described here, a rural area that satisfies the above criteria, is one of the first to be exploited. Before the decision to strike, the party was organized as follows (also see note 1).

[2] This was tried in the 1964 Chilean election.

[3] For example, the Communist coup in Czechosolvakia.

[4] The Communist Party has done this in the Philippines since the defeat of the Huks. Judging the right time to strike is evidently a problem given much study by leaders of the movement (Giap: 82, 83).

[5] In the Philippines the Politburo remained in Manila. The head of insurgent planning in Malaya was believed to have been in Singapore.

[6] Two alternatives are available: locate near the capital and astride road nets (Huk insurrection, Republic of Vietnam (RVN)), or in the distant hinterlands (Cuba, Indochina).

There was an open party, some of whose members held or had previously held local offices and whose cadre members were leaders, the so-called "hard core" Communists; a covert apparatus, which also contained a few cadre members; and front groups among peasants and agrarian workers.

Operational areas for insurgents and counterinsurgents will likely not overlap. This is not highly material for the development to be described.

The following reorganization is in response to government moves and the requirements of the armed struggle. First, the open party closes down. Cadre members of the open party who have been trained in Communist tactics and doctrine, most of whom are natives of the area, take to the woods to direct the movement.[7] An area chief (a branch chief in Malaya), perhaps a second-in-command and functionaries assigned specific duties are appointed. The cadre is a select group; ideally, each cadre member is trained in a specialty. Second, the covert arm of the party becomes the active underground, remaining in the villages to serve as supply and intelligence sources for the leadership of the area organization, and subsequently to help gain control of populated areas. Third, front groups are maintained and are to be expanded.[8]

The members of the cadre are briefed on the decision to initiate the armed struggle by their superior counterparts at national and state levels.[9] The decision to resort to armed struggle is a signal for an intensive planning effort by all. The area cadre meets to develop specific plans for the takeover of its operational area.

CADRE PLANNING

Proceeding from the above description, the insurgent cadre sets about to plan the movement that is to envelop the area.[10] Planning sessions should cover the following interdependent steps: survey and appraisal of the situation in the area, definition of objectives, definition of strategies and tactics, and agreement as to responsibilities.

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[7] Alternatively, depending on the effectiveness of government security measures, the cadre may remain in the province capital or a secluded village until forced to move. This will facilitate communications and organizational activities.

[8] There are several variants of plans for infiltration. When the party does not have membership or contacts in an area to be penetrated, the movement may be forced to send as missionaries personnel, most or possibly all of whom are unfamiliar with the operational area. (Pomeroy: 41–43.) Because insurgent success depends so much on personal contacts, on knowledge of the people and area geography, this tactic should not work. The fact that it has been successful strongly suggests lack of popular sympathy for the government, very poor communications between capital and outlying areas, or both.

[9] The breakdown of Communist Party functionaries varies from country to country. Here we are operating at about the third level (from the top) of the national command hierarchy. See charts at end of this appendix.

[10] Information described here is implicit in many writings about insurgent tactics (Taruc: 78; Tanham, 1961: 79–83).

SURVEY OF OPERATIONAL AREA

The information summarized below will already be available through underground sources and front groups which, in preparation for the struggle, have infiltrated labor, peasant, religious, and civic groups during Phase I. The sessions may occasion updating some of this information as required. However, the primary purpose of the review is to determine how it may be used to best advantage.

Area Government Forces At All Levels

The number, type, and organization of functionaries of the national government in the area capital and in lower echelon cantons or districts (if they exist) should be determined. Special attention should be given to functionaries who might interfere with the insurgent movement (area command, national police assigned to area, area police, foresters, agricultural AID personnel, and so forth). Attention should be given to village chiefs and village police. The popularity of each chief and his probable sympathies should be reviewed on a village-by-village basis (Taruc: 134; Osanka, 1964). Effectiveness of liaison between government and police heads, and village chiefs and police will be noted. Attention should be given to the organization, staffing, and operations of local, area, and national police, and to national or area counterinsurgency planning groups if they exist. Information that government intelligence units may have about insurgent cadre members, sympathizers, and underground will be reviewed.

The Sympathies of the People

The probable sympathies of the people are taken into account. Several stratifications may be used, among which may be ethnic groups, religious groups, industrial workers, peasants, landowners, teachers, and so forth, and geopolitical units, that is, districts, towns, villages, and hamlets. The probable allegiance of personnel are noted for each method of stratification.

Exploitable Sources of Discontent

Information on these will be readily available. According to doctrine, it is these sources that weigh the decision to resort to the armed struggle. Sources will vary with the area. Land tenure practices, corruption in government, lack of free elections, a judicial system subservient to capitalists and landowners, nationalism, lack of upward mobility for youth, and unemployment are possibilities (Valeriano and Bohannan: 18). Any source, actual or fictitious, may be used. The objective is to select topics that can be dramatized to alienate people from their political leaders, topics that can be converted into salient issues.

Appendix A

Insurgent Force Capabilities

Members of the overt and covert party, the front groups, and strong sympathizers will be counted. Their distribution throughout the area will be mapped. Alternative uses of key members and sympathizers will be considered in view of their capabilities, skills, and acquaintances.

Area Economy and Sources of Supply

The area and retail sources are evaluated to determine the best supply sources for food, arms, clothing, and equipment. Potential major suppliers are noted.

Topography, Geography, Roads and Communications Networks, and Configuration of Villages

These physical characteristics of the area are evaluated along with probable sympathy of geopolitical units to determine the most favorable places for insurgent hideouts, and ways in which the area can be isolated from the national capital.

Intelligence About Government Policies and Functionaries

Provisions should have been made during Phase I for collection of intelligence as to government operations and plans by infiltration of agents. The adequacy of coverage of government operations and timeliness of intelligence is reviewed to determine whether existing agent networks and sources of intelligence are adequate and to improve them by further infiltration if they are not.

INSURGENT OBJECTIVES

The ultimate objective is to gain control over the area so that the liberated area is able to contribute its materiel surplus and people to the insurgent cause as needed. Forms of control were discussed in chapter 3. Government functionaries and the people—their attitudes, beliefs and expectations—are the targets. Control is to be gained by demoralizing the personnel who constitute and support the government until singly and collectively they admit defeat or their inability to win, hence their willingness to surrender or compromise. Propaganda, agitation, and guerrilla operations are all instrumentalities for accomplishment of this purpose (Bohannan, personal communication).

Specific instrumental objectives are to employ propaganda and terrorism to exploit and increase existing discontent in order to gain the active support of capable personnel from disaffected groups and the passive support or acquiescence of the majority of the people in the operational area; to recruit, indoctrinate, place, and train personnel

in tasks required of the insurgent development; to gain political control of village and town governments and police; to gain military control of the operational area by the buildup of military forces and an intelligence system which, operating in unison, control rural areas and demoralize government troops, and to use this force to deny area resources to the government; to develop a logistic system to support insurgent forces which will require posts in villages and means of transport; to coordinate intelligence, supply sources, recruiting operations, and propaganda outlets in villages with insurgent forces in hiding; and to coordinate the formation, operations, and growth of all organizations required to attain insurgent objectives.

Having thus laid out major objectives and surveyed the area, cadre members must allocate responsibilities and tasks to members and underground, develop and coordinate strategy, tactics, and tasks to be performed, identify high-priority tasks to be done immediately, and assign responsibilities.

The next section describes an allocation of functions, and subsequent material describes their execution. The text is supplemented by the notes to this appendix.

It is assumed that during planning meetings the insurgent cadre has moved into a camp area. As indicated earlier, the term "camp area" does not necessarily mean a secluded area in the woods, although locating camps in wooded areas has some advantages over locating them in villages (Volckmann: 127). It is assumed here that the camp is in a secluded area with overhead concealment, although, more properly, the camp is where the leaders of the movement are. Camps may be moved frequently (Guevara:19).

ORGANIZATION OF THE MOVEMENT

This section describes functions of the assumed operating arms of the insurgent organization and the development and articulation of functions from the beginning of Phase II until the conclusion of Phase III. Emphasis is on functions rather than organization. Some attention is given to organization, however, in order to visualize the extent to which functions may or may not be organized and managed.

A number of different organizations of Communist functionaries is possible, as shown on charts at the end of this appendix. The assumptions as to organization made here derive from these charts and from descriptions of insurgent movements. Most tables of organizations described in the literature are for well-articulated insurgent movements which include sizeable armed groups. There are certain

commonalities among these organizations. The "typical" Communist dominated insurgent organization consists of parallel political and military hierarchies which tie into community undergrounds for intelligence, supplies and all forms of support. The political leadership is in charge and directs propaganda and organizational activities. There will be a designated leader, generally assisted by a committee whose members are responsible for key functions or who represent the movement in key areas. A military organization is not yet formed, but armed bands may be in existence. As these bands are organized, their leader may be responsible to the political head of the area or, perhaps more likely, to the next higher military echelon at state or national level. Initially, and perhaps through Phases II and III, these armed bands appear to operate with considerable autonomy, cooperating with the area political arm more or less frequently.

Differences in detail in organizations from one country to another suggest that no table of organization would be typical of all insurgencies. The term "cadre" is used to refer to key area functionaries. We assume here a strong area political leader,[11] and a military leader who is a member of this cadre. The form of organization varies from country to country and perhaps within a country, dependent on the local conditions, personal likes and dislikes, and so forth. Many organizational forms may be adapted to perform those functions critical to the growth of the insurgent movement, as Volckmann and Fertig demonstrated independently by using the army staff concept (with G–5) as a model for their organizations in Luzon and Mindanao (Volckmann: 124).

Certain assumptions have been made with respect to operation of the insurgent forces in order to provide more specific descriptions. First, the insurgent does not attempt to invade the area as an armed force. Rather, he starts with a small cadre and few arms, and gradually builds up his strength. The assumption of an arms shortage is contrary to the situation existing in the Philippines, Malaya, and Greece after World War II when insurgents were able to collect substantial arms and ammunition that were lost, captured, or distributed to various groups during the war. It may be that in some future insurgencies, insurgents will start with arms readily available to support their buildup. It is more probable that insurgents will be required to build up their supply of arms during the insurrection.

[11] In some instances area leadership may be relatively weak. Bohannan (personal communication) says, "At least in the Huk movement the representatives of various major branches—finance, intelligence, organization, propaganda—on the area staffs were prone to submit reports directly to the branch heads operating with the politburo. At times it seemed that the area head could only guide as best he could their activities, and was frequently uninformed on their reports. This seems to me the condition likely to be prevalent in many movements."

After the insurgent has gained full control of an area and converted it into an insurgent base, he may invade adjacent areas with armed groups. This alternative is not described here.

Another choice to be made in forming an initial organization is whether two interlocked organizations, one political and one military, are to be assumed, or whether it is to be assumed that operations are directed by one head and a few select cadre members, including the military leader. We have selected the latter alternative as a basis for an initial insurgent organization for two reasons. First, it is assumed that coordination is desirable and that in spite of the possibility that the security risks are greater, coordination is more effective when assigned to one head or group. Second, cadre and supporters consist initially of a relatively small group. Local security is provided by men with arms. Initially, military and political functionaries should plan in concert.

The initial organization is mainly oriented toward political and psychological warfare functions and contains an incipient military organization. The organization's functions may be analogous to those of the *recos* in the Philippines (Pomeroy: 39). As the military arm expands to such size that it can provide security to political leaders and conduct training and operations, the military contingent and its supporting intelligence and logistic functions become a separate organization. This separation establishes the dual political and military hierarchies characteristic of Communist insurgent tables of organization (TO's).


We do not presume that the concepts of organization described here are the best or most logical. Many alternatives are possible and probable. It is usually possible to generate several TO's whose functional performance is about equally good.[12] Attention is directed to responsibilities and to functions which may be assigned to one person or many.

Depicted on chart 39 is a concept of the decision-making, planning, and directing apparatus of the Communist-led organization. Within the operational area the duel is between this organization and its supporting underground and the government forces. Major emphasis in planning and supervision is toward gaining sympathy and toward the elaboration of support organizations; that is, cells, agitators, front groups, and shadow governments in towns and villages—here referred to as the underground. Without this support the guerrilla armed forces could not exist.

[12] See *Experimental Investigation of Tables of Organization and Equipment of Infantry Rifle Squads* (Havron). There were about a score of TOE's for the U.S. Army rifle squad between the turn of the century and 1952. Several alternative TO's were about equally effective in simulated combat performance tests.

Appendix A

Chart 39. A Concept of Insurgent Functions at the Beginning of Phase II



• Indicates Covert Agents
The solid lines indicate formal heirarchical levels; the dotted lines connect covert agents, probably to the leadership at that level, who relay information up and down the chain of command.

While it is almost impossible to determine from historical records the exact number of active workers and sympathizers, these groups outnumber guerrilla bands by a factor of 10 to 1 or 100 to 1 (Lybrand: 57; Bohannan, personal communication). A sketch (chart 40) taken from Bjelajac (29) illustrates these proportions.

POINT/PHASE CORRESPONDENCE

Responsibilities of key functionaries will be described in terms of five points in time as the insurgent movement develops. These points in time are assumed to correspond to our description of phases as shown in chart 41.

LEADERSHIP

Major Responsibilities

The major responsibilities of the Communist area leader consist of directing the growth of the movement in his operational area.

Chart 40. Relationship Between Guerrilla Force and Support





Chart 41. Point/Phase Correspondence



Specific responsibilities are implementation of guidance from national or state political heads by assisting cadre members in the development of programs of action; amplification of situation diagnosis for area; establishment of political and propaganda strategies, policy and direction, and coordination of efforts of cadre members; development of organizational concepts to articulate area organization; implementation of changes in approach to fit local conditions and counter-insurgent activities; submission of reports to state and national politburos.

Functions at Five Points During Insurgent Development

Initial Point. The primary duty of the area command is to see that plans and first priority items are attended to. Plans and organization on paper must be translated into functional working

organizations. Functions are assigned to key cadre members and each elaborates his plans and starts putting them into effect. Communists or Communist sympathizers in villages become centers of underground activity. Agents who, in Phase I, penetrated government political and planning bodies, keep the command current by periodic reports. Members of front groups contact village chiefs and police to evaluate their sympathy. Front newspapers, active in Phase I, are encouraged and their activities intensified. Formal and informal systems of reporting are established. Thus, the buildup of parallel hierarchies for control and for performance of underground functions is anticipated.

During this early formative period the leadership discourages spontaneous, unplanned acts of violence. An important objective is to develop political and military organizations, undergrounds and connecting communication networks before national government and area appointees are sufficiently alerted and aroused to initiate countermeasures.

Point 2. Surveys of sympathy of class groups made during Phase I and updated and systematized once the decision was made to resort to the armed struggle are refined from reports from underground cells, agents, and sympathizers.

Primary attention is devoted to propaganda (Giap: 79, 94; Mao: vol. 2, 141), organization and recruiting in villages. Propaganda among workers and peasants is solidifying sympathy for the insurgents among population classes and in villages.

Sympathizers will be drawn into the underground to disseminate propaganda, to collect and transmit intelligence and supplies, and to recruit. After observation of their work and evaluation of their attitudes, some of the hardier personnel and those with special skills will be recruited for the insurgents in the camp area. The underground ties in with all insurgent command tasks. The cadre leader anticipates and plans with other cadre members how best to accept, process, and assign new sympathizers and recruits enlisted by agitprops and front groups with the general support of propaganda.

As soon as possible, the presence of an insurgent civil government should be impressed on the populace, whether such government exists or not. The credibility of such government is greatly enhanced by establishment of shadow governments in villages while, and even before, villages are being organized. Thus, a sort of pseudostate is created which confers an aura of legitimacy on the insurgent organization and allegedly sanctions acts of guerrillas and terrorists.

Areas suitable for military camps are selected by the military chief in view of early reconnaissance and supply availability. The cadre

leader plans the recruit intake so the supply requirements do not exceed the capabilities of the underground supply force.

There will always be recalcitrants who oppose insurgent propaganda and who may report what is going on to the government. If such citizens cannot be won over, they are eliminated. This may be accomplished by killer gangs. Better still, if someone in the village is unpopular and can be identified with government, it is well to have him accused, tried and executed, preferably by the village itself. In either case, the smell of blood shows clearly the determination and ruthlessness of the movement, and the act of commitment which villagers have been persuaded to take has branded them as criminals in the eyes of the legal government. Thus, the latter method is preferable in that it commits villagers to the side of the movement (Bohannan, personal communication). Because of the aforesaid, entry of government troops into the area in response to terrorism or intelligence must be presumed. Strikes, mob actions, and sabotage generally under the direction of underground and front groups will be used as necessary to discredit the government, encourage citizens to make acts of commitment to the cause, incite government troops to violence, and keep them occupied with tasks such as guarding power lines, estates, bridges, and so forth (Molnar: 100, 110; note 5). A communications system must be established to provide immediate information as to the location and movements of government troops (Volckmann: 110, 154–55; Guevara: 44, Pomeroy: 72).

Point 3. This point marks the end of Phase II and the beginning of Phase III. Much success has been realized in the organization of outlying villages. Attention is divided among setting up administrative controls in towns now largely controlled by the insurgent movement, continuing battle in the areas where insurgent and government forces are still in conflict, establishing undergrounds in new areas, and bringing villages under domination of the movement. In this way, the perimeter of operations is expanded. Government reinforcements in the form of armed troops and government civic action programs may be expected.

The military arm is growing. The bulk of insurgent troop strength consists of territorials living at home and appearing to carry on normal daily occupations except when called on for military missions. Recruits are trained in establishing contacts with the population and in operations such as local security, ambush methods, and raids. Warning networks become more elaborate, so that military units will not be taken by surprise or surrounded in mopup operations. The informal mass communications network supports the insurgent movement and denies knowledge to government troops. A counterintelligence system is growing so that it becomes ever more difficult for

government agents to operate. A guerrilla warfare of ambush, counterambush, and attempted mopup by government troops is in full force. Mines, booby traps, and patrolling circumscribe activities of government troops. Crudely armed home-defense groups are established. Some villages are fortified. Some will be defended lightly. Defenses may scare off small government patrols, but the defense is not serious. The act of defense commits citizens to the insurgents and may gain the additional advantage of encouraging air strikes and government reprisals against towns. These in turn provide grist for the insurgent propaganda apparatus, and adherence to the insurgent cause is strengthened.

Those towns under insurgent control will fairly frequently be occupied by government troops, for insurgent forces will not ordinarily attempt conventional military defense of towns and villages they control. However, populated areas are controlled in the political and psychological sense by shadow governments that maintain loyalty during these incursions, discourage contacts with troops, and note voluntary contact with troops by any civilians. Agents are alert for disrespect on the part of the troops toward people and property which may be used by insurgent propagandists. Calculated badgering of troops, mob actions, or both may be used to encourage troop brutality.

Buildup of the supply organization becomes critical, for requirements increase rapidly and sources of supply, the network of porters, tax collectors, and so forth, must be expanded. Military supplies are captured from troops and government warehouses where possible, but needs expand rapidly.

Sabotage continues in areas occupied by government forces so that as many troops as possible are tied down, the economic drain on the government is increased, and government forces are discredited in the eyes of the people because of their inability to prevent sabotage, protect citizens, and apprehend insurgents.

Political and economic domination is established in those areas surrendered by government forces. A chief of the area civil administration is appointed to work with town and village chiefs and police to consolidate village administration. With these controls, insurgent law, price controls, and mandatory taxation systems are put into effect, and village personnel are drafted for the insurgent cause. Civic services, such as hospitals and civic action projects, are set up. The school system is oriented to support the insurgent cause. Controlled public information programs reinforce the impact of insurgent-sponsored civic action and build legends about the bravery of insurgent troops.

Point 4. The chief of insurgent civil administration continues to consolidate control in the villages under insurgent domination.

Newly created village governments are carefully monitored by a passive insurgent underground which reports errors and deviations of thought and action by village officials to higher authority (Galula: 56). If disaffection with the insurgent cause is suspected, insurgents who pretend covertly to be government sympathizers may contact villagers to check and report any evidence of disloyalty (Molnar: 149). All controls are thus maintained.

At this stage, the nature of further development of the guerrilla military arm depends on how the national, political, and military heads intend to utilize guerrilla forces. Two perceptibly different strategies are possible although in practice they may be mixed. One strategy, like that described by Mao, and largely followed by Volckmann in Luzon, continues to build the military organization for conventional operations in Phase IV. Such a strategy may be necessary if counterinsurgents are strongly supported by external sources of funds and supplies.

If the indigenous government has only its own resources to draw from, insurgents can likely win by building up to units no larger than company or possibly battalion size. Such units are spread throughout the country. Small government patrols are swallowed up and large scale operations are avoided. No fixed defenses are planned or attempted and improved intelligence and warning networks compensate for lack of large forces.

Continued lack of success of operations and civilian hostility combine to create a defeatist attitude among government troops (see note 6). Discouraged government patrols perform their missions perfunctorily, often compromising the intent of their missions. Added areas are thus brought under insurgent domination. The population is ever aware of the guerrilla presence.

Point 5. This point represents the successful culmination of the insurgent plan for the operational area. Political and economic domination and military superiority have been gained over all the areas except the province capital, which may still be held by government forces. Elsewhere, insurgents will establish laws and courts, turn public information media and schools to their interest, and control all aspects of societal life.

If guerrillas follow the Mao pattern, guerrilla troops begin training in conventional operations in anticipation of Phase IV. Heavy weapons captured from government troops will be put to use. Battalion size units will be provided to the national liberation army for the inter-area, quasi-conventional warfare by which the liberation of the country will be completed. It is again noted that such a military buildup may not be necessary.

Appendix A

DEPUTY LEADER

Concept of Functions

The leader may have a deputy to keep up with loose ends and to act for him in his absence. If so, the leader initiates new moves and plans responses to government threats, whereas the deputy takes care of ongoing activities. The deputy's task assignments will vary, depending on his success in staffing necessary functions. They may include provisions for physical security of the cadre, training in security practices, development of intelligence and counter-intelligence systems and agents, checking on acts of disloyalty, checking on recruiting, improvement of liaison among leaders, guerrilla bands, and underground, and so forth. At point 2 and subsequently he will likely be concerned with the establishment and the functioning of political administrative hierarchies for districts, towns, and villages as they come under the control of the insurgent movement.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TACTICAL WARNING SYSTEM

Major Functions

Reference is made here to establishment of relatively formal systems which are overlaid on the information communication flow described in Note 4. Major functions to be performed are establishment of a communications and warning system between cadre and village underground posts and along roadways and major trails. As the movement grows, political functionaries and the military apparatus will develop separate networks. Equally important is the problem of preventing compromise of the system through loose talk, neglect of security measures, and infiltration by government agents. To avoid this, all personnel in the networks must be carefully selected and instructed. A further problem is to get relevant and reasonably accurate information through the net in time to be of service.

Functions at Five Points During Insurgent Development

Initial Point. The immediate problem is to develop the communication system. This requires establishment of contacts with clandestine posts of undergrounds to develop information collection points in all villages where reliable sympathizers are located (Molnar: 138). Posts are instructed as to what information is needed, security procedures, and so forth. Couriers are recruited; often these are women or children, since they are less suspect.[12a] Supply details may also serve as couriers.

The communications system serves the cadre leader through these functions: dissemination of instructions to underground, orders for

[12a] Getting women and children to carry messages is simple; getting them to keep their mouths shut afterward, much more difficult. (Bohannan, personal communication.)

food and equipment, dissemination of propaganda, relay of tactical information and certain types of intelligence, relay of inquiries, and so forth.

Point 2. This is a point for refining and elaborating the system. Time will be required to make sure the system carries relevant information. Agents and front groups may be loyal enough, but, due to their lack of training, they tend to originate information that has no pertinence to the insurgent problems (Taruc: 121). As more posts are established, more couriers are required and the task of synthesis of information is expanded.[13]

Counterinsurgent troop patrols are expected. Hence, there is much emphasis on covering roadways and major trails with warning nets. Plans are made to capture police and military radio equipment. There is a heavy demand for information of a military character in anticipation of operations by the insurgent military arm, now in the planning stage.

As political control is gained, the informal mass information flow system is channeled and directed to provide warning to the insurgent, but so that it does not operate for the government. Terrorism may be used to deal with anyone who withholds or fails to pass information through channels. Inasmuch as the more formal system is embedded in the spontaneous mass information flow network, the latter will provide warning that something is afoot. Members of the net can respond to these warnings and investigate more fully before passing on messages.

Point 3. Elaboration of the system continues. Now that military operations are under way and the military camp(s) are separate from insurgent headquarters, separate communications systems are established for political and military functionaries. As groups of villages are organized, civil administration is required and the political or civil network must connect these villages with cadre leaders.

Points 4 and 5. With substantial control over the area, insurgents can take advantage of modern technology. Radio transmitter/receivers will be incorporated into both systems. Wire communications are also established (Volckmann: 128, 129). All military camps and headquarters and villages are connected by a combined military and civil communications network. Automobiles and trucks supplement runners between camps and villages connected by roadways.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ASSIMILATION

Definition and Concept of Functions

By insurgent intelligence, we refer essentially to information about

[13] Valeriano and Bohannan (150, 152) discuss ways for counterinsurgent forces to overload guerrilla networks with information.

counterinsurgent plans, sympathies of major and minor government functionaries—non-tactical information often collected by covert means. The term is used to include counterintelligence/security—the other side of the coin.

Intelligence Apparatus at Point 4

As a conspiratorial movement a Communist-led insurgency can be assumed to have started collecting intelligence by clandestine and overt means in Phase I prior to the decision to resort to the armed struggle. Several intelligence functions would be performed by a sophisticated movement. The particular functional mix—and the order in which functions are organized—will vary from country to country and from area to area. These matters will depend on the political situation, personalities and needs and preferences of insurgent leaders. By about point 4, the intelligence apparatus might well be performing the following functions.

Espionage Service. The espionage service may not have been set up in a formal sense, but espionage will be active in Phase I prior to the decision to resort to the armed struggle. This service is responsible for planting or developing agents in government installations or among government personnel. It will normally be responsible for development of a number of courier agents to collect reports from and service the agents. By points 3 or 4 it will be a regularly constituted branch which may report to either or both political or military commands, depending on the type of information transmitted.

Civilian Intelligence Service. This service would normally be part of the underground in towns and villages. It would collect information about the village chief, council, prominent citizens and police, perhaps retail merchants, their affiliations, their attitudes toward the insurgent movement, suspected government agents, happenings in the village believed relevant and so forth. (Taruc: 134.) Government-inspired political rallies and attempts at civic action will be reported. The spontaneous mass information flow system might be directed to alert it to matters deserving inquiry.

Combat Intelligence of Military Units. Within most squads there would be a private responsible for reporting intelligence up the military chain of command to the intelligence officer of the company. Intelligence would then be reported to a battalion intelligence section and then to a specialized military intelligence service of area headquarters. This is a military reporting system.

Military Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Interrogation. Tanham (79) reports an intelligence organization used by the Viet Cong which also performs certain functions not normally assigned to intelligence. It may make reconnaissance of enemy military positions; give in-

structions in camouflage, concealment, and passive protection against air observation; check on relations between troops and civil population (a task here assigned to the chief of propaganda); make post-combat evaluation of the battlefield for insurgent errors; and interrogate prisoners.

The existence of a covert intelligence/counterintelligence system has been referred to elsewhere. It would consist primarily of passive agents spotted in villages and population centers. Its membership might be drawn from covert party members who have never been identified. It would report on insurgent functionaries, attitudes of the people toward the movement, and government attempts to implant agents. It would likely report to a member of the Communist Party at state or national level.[14]

There will be, in addition to these intelligence services or systems, the spontaneous mass information system described in note 4, a tactical warning net described earlier in this appendix, and a command system.

PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL TRAINING

Concept of Operations

It should be emphasized that the insurgent's objective is to plan operations of whatever type so they will have an impact on the emotions and thinking of the people and those who constitute government and its arms. Described here are the functions of what might be called the formal propaganda apparatus, the apparatus designed to put the insurgent *raison d'être* and cause into words that will appeal to logic and emotions.

The major propaganda themes will be established by the national secretariat. Local leaders will be allowed some flexibility in interpreting them to the area audience. Propaganda is directed toward three target groups: the civil population and subgroups within it; the insurgent forces, especially the armed forces and underground; and the government troops and functionaries.

Propaganda distributed by mass media constitutes the broad base for putting the insurgent theme before its audiences. This propaganda supplements that transmitted by face-to-face discussion and argument. National and state propaganda units may provide materials ready for reproduction in operational areas (Pomeroy: 145–146). Propaganda must be made credible. When a claim is made or, an action predicted, the movement must make sure that the prediction is verified (Meyer: 40, 93). Propaganda is action-oriented.

[14] This classification of intelligence services is suggested by Bohannan (personal communication).

Appendix A

The true purpose of the propagandist—and of the entire insurgent apparatus—is not just to create disaffection and hatred toward existing government and functionaries. If "objective conditions" are sufficiently conducive, this may be accomplished fairly readily. The larger problem is to channel this disaffection toward positive political concepts represented by a peoples' government, i.e., that of the insurgents. This government must represent causes for which people will coordinate their efforts and risk much. It has been said that "Marxism is for the cadre" and some aspects of Marxism are only for cadre leaders. But, to build a thriving insurgency, propaganda must not merely convince the people that their system of government must be overthrown; one must propose and advocate a system of government which will satisfy concepts of government that have been planted and nurtured among the people. These concepts will vary from one country to another. In a Communist-dominated insurgency, they will be drawn from the coherent Communist ideology, and they will reflect this ideology more or less accurately. They may not be labeled as Communist, but this will depend on the culture of the country, especially its religious complexion, and on the biases of insurgent leaders. In this sense and to this extent, Marxism is for the masses.[15]

Responsibilities of Propaganda Unit

The following are specific duties of the area propaganda unit: Working from the national plan for propaganda operations and with assistance of party members, it is to identify sources of discontent and the size and power of dissident groups. It is to develop propaganda appeals exploiting areas of discontent; shaking the faith of the people and government supporters in their own government and creating a hatred among the people toward specific government functionaries singled out as targets; persuading the people that as individuals they can do nothing about the wrongs of government, that wrongs can only be alleviated by overturning the system of government; and creating a faith in the insurgent cause and insurgent victory built around Communist concepts (Guevara: 12; Pye: 19).

The propaganda unit is to take advantage of fortuitous events. The battle is continuously changing, and government propaganda and appeals must be answered. It is to broadcast mistakes of government functionaries and troops (looting, harsh acts against the people) and possibly, in coordination with measures of civil disobedience, such as strikes and riots, encourage such mistakes.

Using the underground and other means as appropriate, the propaganda unit is to see that appeals are circulated to target groups by all appropriate media, and it is to successively refine appeals by tryout

[15] From notes of C. T. R. Bohannan, personal communication.

and observation of responses. It is to keep tab on the public image of the movement by periodic surveys of what people like and what they do not like about it (Taruc: 79). It is to coordinate propaganda operations with other ongoing political and military operations. Finally, as the movement succeeds, it is to provide support to local governments in areas held by insurgents (Guevara: 61).

Media

A number of media will be employed, depending on equipment available and the state of development of the country. The one medium always employed is word-of-mouth propaganda by activists, front groups, and members of Communist cells. As the movement develops, guerrilla soldiers are taught to win friends by contacts with civilians. In addition, public or clandestine meetings are held with labor groups, peasants, or members of villages and hamlets. Persuasion and force may be used at the same time (Pomeroy: 43; Osanka: 2). Clandestine radio broadcasts become possible once a locale is reasonably secure. Greater availability of inexpensive transmitters and radios will undoubtedly increase the usage of this medium in future insurrections. Periodicals and handbills will be distributed via the underground (Krause; Pomeroy: 156). In many emerging countries, low literacy rates minimize the propaganda value of newspapers.

Political Operations Within the Movement

The area chief of propaganda may be responsible for political training of members of the movement, or this task may be assigned to a political commissar. As the movement grows, it is likely that a political commissar will take over such training, at least in the military arm (Hanrahan: 125).

There are five tasks. The first is to provide members of the movement with a logical base for belief in the cause and to document for party members and sympathizers the insurgent case against the existing government. The second is to emphasize the importance of each member of the movement winning friends among the population. The third task is to develop attitudes of self-abnegation and complete acceptance of the doctrine and discipline of the movement (Meyer: 16, 45, 161). The fourth is to establish and monitor sessions for criticism and self-criticism. The fifth, performed by the political commissar, is to assure that area leadership follows national doctrine in its strategy and propaganda activities.

Functions at Five Points in Insurgent Development

Initial Point. Civil Contacts: Propaganda, recruiting, intelligence, and logistic functions are coordinated in a campaign to convert the disaffected and sympathizers into underground support organiza-

tions [16] in the villages and area capital. Village organizations will be elaborated later. At this stage, party members who have gone underground, front groups, and strong sympathizers serve as the nucleus. Members and sympathizers are likely to be teachers, semi-skilled laborers such as mechanics, and landless agricultural workers (Schneider: 44–53).

Contacts are established in villages to form support organizations. Many of the cells consisting of 3 to 12 people formed in Phase I are elaborated. Each cell has the responsibility for further enlarging the membership of the movement by articulation. This relieves cadre members of much of these responsibilities for growth. Cells, party members, and sympathizers are called on to man underground functions. Ideally, in a town of some size, the following functions are delegated: a political head for the village and a village council that will direct all activity; one or more posts which serve as collection points for intelligence and supplies and as distribution points for propaganda; perhaps a separate post for fund raising, subsequently for collection of taxes; activists responsible for organizing members of population subgroups (laborers, peasants, students), primarily by face-to-face contacts, and assisting in recruiting (see note 3); fronts which also help in distributing propaganda and in clandestine recruiting (Pye, 1965: chapter 9; Meyer: chapter 6; Guevara: 9). These functions may all be placed under the responsibility of an insurgent village government once political domination is gained.

For any village, it may not be possible or desirable to attempt to man all the above positions initially; local sympathizers may serve in two or more of the above roles. Critical to effective village organization will be instructions as to how tasks are to be performed. Since organizers must work with what is available and since conditions will vary from one part of the area to another, considerable flexibility must be allowed in establishing positions and developing operating procedures.

Emphasis is placed on security. In addition to instructing individuals, the cell-type organization serves to minimize the effects of arrest or detention of members and as a basis for regeneration of the cell if some of its members are captured.

All facets of the culture are to be penetrated. Activists, sympathizers, and front groups continually update their information on the personal habits and sympathies of village headmen, police, and

[16] Functions of local support organizations are essentially those played by the Min Yuen in Malaya, the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC's) and District Organizing Committees (DOC's) in the Philippines, and the Dan Quan in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) (Molnar: 139).

prominent villagers who may be converted to the cause. Contacts are developed with government functionaries in the area capital.

Political Training of Own Forces: Political education of the underground is the responsibility of the underground cells. When recruits report to the insurgent camp, leaders of the movement will be in charge. The chief of propaganda will provide themes. Appeals addressed to insurgent forces stress their patriotism, their noble idealism, rewards which victory will bring, and the sad fate and punishment they will endure should they waiver in their loyalty to the insurgent cause. A certain healthy fear seems always to be cardinal in Communist propaganda (Bohannan, personal communication).

Point 2. Civil Contacts: The propaganda apparatus is in high gear with the overall objective of winning the people to causes insurgents have selected. The political front newspaper is active. Pamphlets are being written, printed, and distributed via village posts and in the area capital. Activists are at work among labor groups, intellectuals, and discontented groups in society to give voice to and fan discontent. Recruits are being obtained through activists and front groups. A political commissar overwatches the generation of propaganda and the development of military forces.

The most significant move is the attack on outlying villages and hamlets. Headmen have been contacted. Mass meetings, an integral part of Communist expansion, are being held (Pomeroy: 43).[17] Villages are being organized. Villagers are being propagandized to make acts of commitment, preferably irrevocable ones, to the insurgent cause (Osanka, 1964). Attempts are made to convert any opposition, thus avoiding violence. When necessary, enforcement groups are called on to eliminate recalcitrants (see note 2). In such cases, activists are alerted to explain to the people why these dispositions were necessary. While the insurgent movement should make few enemies, occasional shows of force, along with persuasion, help instill fear which Communists put to good use.

Propaganda/Information for Own Forces: Political training is interpersed with activities such as preparation of camps, supply detail duty, camp evacuation drill, camp entertainment, and troop training. Emphasis is placed on building morale and/or responsibilities of members of the insurgent movement toward the civil population. Political training is continuous. Recruits will be instructed in

[17] Ordinarily, forced meetings do not occur until there are at least rudimentary military forces organized. These may be no more than the village guerrillas of the next village over, but ordinarily, again, they will have a principal speaker who represents the insurgent government or at least is supposedly a high official (in actuality sometimes he is no more than a speaker without rank). Persuasion and force are not infrequently used as the same time. While forces must be available, there must also be a reasonably good prima facie cause for its use (Bohannan, personal communication).

self-criticism sessions, a means of social control. Special attention will be given to any who tend to deviate, and stern disciplinary action will be enforced if required (Pye: chapter 12; Pomeroy: 60–62).

Point 3. Civil Contacts: The major functions described above for psychological operations continue, but there are some shifts in emphasis. As more villages are taken over, greater attention needs to be devoted to providing information and news to controlled villages in support of the civil administration. Political control must be maintained in spite of occasional occupation by government troops.

In the initial stage of the development of the movement, persuasion is the primary instrument for gaining sympathy (Osanka, 1964; Too: 5). This slow method is necessary for early organization, for the insurgent has few armed men (Osanka, 1964). As insurgent armed forces are built up, organization of villages may be expedited by shows of force.

Own Forces: Political training will continue much as before, but personnel to be assigned to troop units as political training deputies must be trained. The political commissar is in charge. Political pamphlets for their own forces prepared at the national level are circulated among troops (Pomeroy: 146).

Contacts with Government Programs and Functionaries: Attempts will be made to contact government troops socially and to persuade them to defect. Appeals to government forces, particularly the troops, would fall into two general classes: those seeking to arouse discontent because of real or supposed discrimination, lack of back-ups, all of the thousands of things which one can charge to the higher-ups—and secondly, appeals which strike at their fear of insurgent-caused death if they continue to fight their opportunities for a better life, advancement, wine, women, and song, if they choose a patriotic cause of solidarity with their comrades who are struggling for the welfare of the people. These appeals may be reinforced by threats to families of troops (Bohannan, personal communication). Civic action programs instituted by the government are discredited (Scigliano: 117).

Points 4 and 5. Propaganda methods and techniques for the sectors of the area still held by government forces have now become standard practice, modified only by instruction from national or state level or through periodic surveys of appeal effectiveness.

Propaganda services are being converted to facilitate control of areas now occupied, but some targets remain. Propagandists seek to take advantage of the momentum of the movement to convince functionaries of the indigenous government that their cause is lost, that they should defect or cease further resistance. Cells are expanded in towns still held by the counterinsurgents.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

It is in the insurgents' interest to convince people of the existence of an insurgent government—and, of course, its apparatus for civil administration—as early as possible. In countries where the gap between government national authorities and the rural sector is great, it may be possible to do this even in Phase I. So, a façade of government is created very early. Insurgent propaganda can always claim, without fear of definitive refutation, that insurgent government exists in other parts of the country. However, the extent to which such an administration actually begins to operate as such will depend on when the insurgents feel that they have gained sufficient political control. This control should be supplemented by a large enough military force to constrain the movement of government military forces and police. Even here, the distinction between civil administration and the influence exuded by underground and shadow government is blurred, for the latter gradually emerges into the civil apparatus. The concept of insurgent government should be broadcast at Point 1; it should take form beginning by Point 2 and be building strongly at Point 3. Growth is uneven, depending on the progress of organizing activity and guerrilla warfare. However, as more communities are taken over, a civil government superstructure is created after the Communist pattern.

Further, the image that the civil administration chooses to portray may depend in large part on the cultural patterns and forms of government existing. These will vary greatly. If an authoritarian leader and military arm is highly valued, there may be no need for an apparent subordination of military figures to the political arm. This and the respect for military power may persuade insurgents to present a civil administration in which military leaders are prominent.

Duties

The duties of civil administration are as follows: (1) To establish civil administration based on Marxist concepts of civil government and to represent these concepts as the highest organ of the area. (2) To insure that subordinate forms of government function in accordance with Marxist precepts and the the principles of democratic centralism. Political rallies and community civic action projects reinforce the concepts. (3) To insure that the village and countryside contribute to the prosecution of the insurgency with all surplus goods and means available consistent with economic survival. (4) To provide active support for military operations.

Appendix A

Functions at Points 2, 3, and 4

Institution of Communist-Controlled Civil Administration. The instruments of takeover are shadow governments, consisting of the clandestine village council and its head, supported by the underground and active sympathizers. As indicated earlier, the groundwork has been laid, and the takeover may be gradual. These personnel and a self-defense organization provide the nucleus. Parallel hierarchies of underground cells and functions report information upward, thus providing a means for cadre leaders to cross-check development of the movement.

To be consolidated early are political control and instruments of thought control and propaganda (Barnett: 340; Guevara: 54). The chief of the clandestine council is made mayor; or, if the present mayor has already been cooperating with the movement, he may be retained. Any village police will be screened to assure that they are sympathetic. A political education program will be initiated through town meetings, control of schools, and rallies. A press will turn out controlled information and instructions to the people.

The changes brought about by insurgents may be inferred from the last section in chapter 3. Among other social services, a legal system (insurgent law) is introduced and broadcast. Instruction in school is changed by both appointing new teachers and taking advantage of the sympathy of present ones. The school system provides an indirect means of control of families. A taxation system is instituted and tax collection is enforced. To help win the people, simple, inexpensive civic action programs are instituted. Among these are public health and sanitation (Guevara: 56). Medical services are established; their recipients may be determined by local leaders.

Coordination with Insurgent Forces. Villages are mustered to serve the guerrillas. Guerrilla warfare is occurring elsewhere, and government troops may reoccupy villages temporarily. In this event, villagers give no information about insurgent forces to government troops. The mass information flow system has been completely channeled to insurgent needs. No visitor can enter the town undetected. Sentries and warning nets may be checked by insurgents dressed as government troops. Village supply posts operate overtly with the support of enforced collection systems. The courier/porter system supplies the insurgent force from surrounding villages and farms.

A draft is instituted so that personnel needs of the movement can be met. Large levies are made on occasion for supply details (Harkins: 291; Keats: 302, 322).[18] Villagers are trained to provide assist-

[18] These are used in preparation for major engagements. They were frequently used in the Philippines to carry supplies from submarines.

ance in the event of clashes between armed forces or temporary occupation by government forces, such as removing weapons and ammunition from the battlefield, feeding soldiers, and caring for the wounded (Hanrahan: 31–34). People are required to commit themselves by antigovernment actions. Women are organized to make clothes for insurgents; some are sent to insurgent camps to serve as nurses and nurses' aides.

Social Control. The above measures are designed to provide effective control of all relevant aspects of society. This control is reinforced by the formation of groups based on social class, occupation, physical proximity, or kinship (see note 3). Each group has a warden responsible for all members, who reports to a subordinate of the village chief. Village chiefs are watched by the passive underground, possibly covert party members, who report directly to higher authorities. Thus, the insurgent establishes redundant systems to solidify control. Little wonder that temporary occupation by government troops does not seriously damage the latticework the insurgent has built, that once a village is "organized" a very substantial effort is required to break the tentacles of the organization (Trinquier; chapter 10; Clutterbuck).

Organization of Villages for Self-Defense. Before or after the above-described organization has occurred, the village may be organized for self-defense. Weapons are usually crude; most self-defense forces could not resist a sizable attack. Nonetheless, village defenses provide a way to build *esprit de corps* and a partially trained pool of recruits for area armed forces and the national liberation army (Tanham: 49).

Articulation of Civil Administration. As more villages are brought under insurgent control, the supervisory superstructure must necessarily be extended so that chiefs of several villages are monitored by a sector or township administrator; several sector administrators may report to a district or county administrator who in turn reports to a deputy to the insurgent leader.

FINANCE, PROCUREMENT, AND SUPPLY

Concept

Collection of taxes, development of the sources and apparatus for supply of the movement, maintenance of resource records, that is, accounting and purchasing and disbursement, are required for sustenance of the movement. Cadre leaders initiate these functions and help establish the organizations that perform them. The work is done by underground in towns and villages. When the movement consists of only a handful of cadre members and recruits and actions are almost

entirely political, supply responsibilities are not great. However, as the movement grows, responsibilities increase greatly and the above-listed subfunctions are organized.

The finance and supply organization will closely parallel in structure organizations for communications. All must tie into village population centers, and the details that carry instructions and propaganda leaflets to village posts may collect from these same posts supplies for the insurgent camps. While there appears to be some variation from country to country at the operational area level, the same couriers, porters, and village posts may perform all these functions.

Major Responsibilities

A cadre member assigned to finance, procurement, and supply is responsible for the logistic and fiscal support which makes the organization and its growth possible. The speed with which he can establish a functioning organization and the amount and type of goods that this organization can draw from the country are critical determinants of the rate of growth of the insurgent movement.

Working through the underground, sources of funds and supplies and the capabilities of villages are identified. Each source is evaluated in terms of appropriate criteria (amount, procurement effort, continuity of supplies, reliability of source security). For each need, alternative means of procurement, whether confiscation, solicitation, taxation, or production by insurgents in production bases or clandestine manufacturer, are considered. Source types are placed on a priority basis. From this information, cadre members develop plans for collection, storage, distribution, and accounting for funds and supplies, that is, for a supply system combination. The operation of the taxation, accounting, and supply systems is monitored, and the system mix is converted to a more centralized organization as the system develops.

Development of Finance, Procurement, and Supply System During Five Points in Insurgent Development

Initial Period. The finance, procurement, and supply system has these major tasks: to keep insurgent cadre and recruits supplied with necessities; to start building a supply system from a system that is necessarily largely decentralized to a more centralized major network and to repair attrition due to government actions; and to maintain the security of the system against government attempts to destroy it or use it as a means of discovering and destroying the insurgent organization.

Assuming the two-pronged military and political hierarchies which Communists usually establish, means of supply must be available to both. The demands of the military arm will be greatest, however,

and will rapidly increase as a function of the number of full-time guerrillas and the scale of operations. In the initial period, many supplies can be obtained by insurgent cadre on an individual basis from retail sources or sympathizers. Further, some funds may be made available by the national or international Communist Party or both. Liaison is established with the village and farm undergrounds which serve as collection points for taxes and supplies. A system of supply details is established.

The objective is to achieve a self-sustaining taxation and supply organization as soon as possible. Party members and sympathetic organizations are regularly contacted for funds. Targets for extortion and robbery are pinpointed. They may include wealthy landlords, "capitalists," or industries which must pay taxes for protection (Pomeroy: 163). Castro forced plantations to pay tax or he would burn cane fields (Pardo-Llada: 14, 15). Fertig raised funds by a dance band and a beauty shop, but this method might not harmonize with Communist practice (Keats: 204).

The most basic immediate requirement is food. However, in anticipation of future operations it would seem desirable to stock weapons, ammunition, medicines, printing facilities, and other items that may be hard to acquire later.

Point 2. Problems of supply may become quite difficult since requirements increase, and except for trusted sources, contributions will be largely voluntary. Activists and front groups form tax collection details. Supply chains must be built and elaborated. Supplies are hauled on the backs of porters. For security purposes, village supply details may be kept away from insurgent camps. Thus, supplies may be cached in the jungle to be picked up by camp supply details.

Where food cannot be readily procured, tillable land not in use is converted into production bases. These bases may be established in cleared isolated areas or on farms formerly held by absentee landlords.[19] Such bases will not supply all the needs of the movement. However, they do provide bulk supplies; they reduce the burden on villages; and collection of supplies from production bases does not occasion as much security risk as contacts with clandestine posts in towns.

Weapons and ammunition will be obtained from retail sources, from raids on government warehouses, or from ambush and attacks on government posts and will be issued to insurgent trainees or security details, or cached. If weapons and ammunition can be procured externally, they should be obtained early. Ammunition is chronically in short supply. Clandestine weapon shops supply home guards.

[19] Krause (32–33) says these also serve as emergency reserves.

Point 3. There is always a need for shoes, clothes, rain sheets, and so forth. Needs for medicines increase markedly as the pace of guerrilla warfare is stepped up. Medicine is often difficult to procure, and sources may be watched.

Although supply requirements are becoming ever larger, the means of supplying items such as food and clothing become somewhat more reliable since villages and hamlets being brought under insurgent control can be depended on to provide supplies within their capabilities. The taxation/extortion system grows.

The form of supply organization will vary from area to area and from country to country. It will unquestionably depend to some extent on the local culture. For example, in Vietnam the village council probably contains a finance officer responsible for the actual collection of taxes in compliance with the requirements of the council. Levies by higher organizations would be placed on the village council rather than on the individual or on the tax collector. In the Philippines, it was very common—perhaps the rule—that the tax collector came from outside. He was not a member of the village organization but a representative of higher bodies. There could also be a so-called village finance corps composed of many members of the village charged with raising voluntary contributions as contrasted with taxes. (Bohannan, personal communication.)

The ability of the movement to grow will depend in part on the amount of food, weapons, and ammunition that can be obtained and on the ability of the system of porters to transport these supplies to units that require them.

Point 4. Most of the hinterland areas, operating more or less openly, but alert to government patrols, will be under insurgent control. Organized supply systems bring supplies collected from villages to camps throughout the area. Now that villages are organized, individual contributions (funds, goods, or donated work) can be more easily collected.

A well-organized system of porters or details will have been established. Where major loads of supplies are to be carried from shipping points on the border in preparation for large-scale operations, special details of porters will be obtained (Volckmann: 162–63).

Government forces will still control major roads; hence, substantially all supply movements must be made by men on foot. Pack animals, if available, may be used in controlled areas.

Point 5. The supply system will operate as in Point 4, but some insurgent camps will be moved to positions near the last government strongholds and major supply routes, from which they can ambush government supply trains and patrols. With relatively complete control of roads and warning net, and if ground vehicles and fuel can be

procured, motor transport will be used for transportation of supplies over secondary roads, thus greatly reducing manpower requirements.

Support Functions and Functions at Camp Headquarters

A number of functions of a housekeeping nature and functions to maintain equipment and the morale of the movement need to be performed at camps. These are required for any camp, the effort depending on the size of the group, the conduciveness of the surroundings to health, and the intensity of operations.

Housekeeping functions must be performed to make camps livable. These include preparation of food, repair of clothing, camp sanitation, and so forth. Practices of personal and camp cleanliness are emphasized for each camp member. A cook is enlisted to prepare food. Firm discipline is emphasized in regard to camp sanitation practices for reasons of both health and camp security.

The writers have found no references to camp armorer-artificers, personnel who could repair and cannibalize weapons. It would seem that this function would be critical.

The need for medical supplies is ever present, along with needs for doctors and nurses. In addition to diseases resulting from exposure, malnutrition, and diet imbalance there are casualties from operations. In most insurrections, especially in Phase II and early Phase III, this has been a vulnerable point of insurgent camps. As soon as possible, women are procured to act as nurses. Shortages of medical practitioners are seldom fully overcome. As villages and districts are taken over, however, it may be possible to procure a limited number of medical practitioners for major insurgent camps. Jungle hospitals may be constructed and staffed (Harkins: 271–72).

When the movement reaches a stage at which it can build permanent installations, carpenters and helpers, who will undoubtedly include members of military forces, will erect buildings. As early as Point 3 it may be possible to organize an engineer unit to lay wire, construct bridges, and so forth. Engineer specialists will be obtained if available.

Camp work and entertainment schedules are established. These are usually supervised by the leaders of the movement. Schedules may consist of physical training, military drill, and include study, possibly readings of Marx and Lenin, Communist songs, lectures on the perfidy of Wall Street, exhortation, and so forth (Miksche: 77).

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Points of View

The actions and employment of a military arm as a tool of insurgency may be viewed in many ways. Any of these may be more or less

valid insofar as the coloration of a future insurgency in Southeast Asia, Africa, or South America is concerned.

In many countries banditry may be more or less institutionalized. Bandit groups may be absorbed by insurgents and "military operations" may take on their influence. Such groups may be both a bane and a blessing to the Marxist leader who attempts to bring them under control.

The military arm may consist in some part of youngsters with an antipathy toward law and order. They are willing to oppose any form of government for the fun of it and for self-aggrandizement. They couldn't care less about democratic centralism.

The military chief with substantial local authority who is responsible to higher military headquarters rather than the area political apparatus will likely view the guerrillas as the spearhead of the movement. Guerrilla warfare will be run as a series of exercises in strategy and tactics (see note 5). The underground is basically a supporter of his operations. It can be said for this point of view that the advent of guerrilla bands can precede political organization. Further, at any time during the insurrection, if government forces take and clear an area, elements of the insurgent military arm may reoccupy the area preceding civil and political reorganization. This is the quicker if less effective way. Finally, if the counterinsurgent resistance is strong and determined, guerrillas may be converted to conventional units for the civil war characteristic of Phase IV. Thus, substantially all surplus supplies must go to the military and social organization to serve its purposes.

The political head will view guerrillas as one of his necessary tools—the arm that represents force. In a movement that applies persuasion, reward, and punishment concurrently and sequentially, the military is to represent a symbol of the power of the movement. Hence, the political head is concerned as much with continually impressing the presence of his military arm on the people as he is with its substance. After all, propaganda can give the face of victory to an indecisive skirmish. The military arm should be active, but above all it should be preserved.

Any treatment of guerrilla development must take one or more of these viewpoints and they do not lead to exactly the same end. The description that follows is oriented largely toward the view of the military leader, with some reflection of that of the political leader. A somewhat greater liaison between military and political operations is assumed than seems to have been the case in most insurrections in the past.

Concept; Objectives

The mission of Military Operations is to gain military control of the operational area, that is, to evict counterinsurgent forces and to change the area into a military base.[20] (Hanrahan, quoting Yu-chi: 75–115). Superior intelligence, disengagement tactics, and the ability of insurgents to melt into the civil population or the bush prevent the counterinsurgent forces from seizing the initiative. Sabotage, demonstrations, and civil incidents force counterinsurgent forces to protect property and thus to deploy in passive defense positions. With the counterinsurgent military forces thus deployed, the insurgent seizes the initiative to defeat government patrols, guards, and outposts piecemeal.

Major Functions

A chief of military operations has the following major functions. He is to make reconnaissance of the area for places that offer the best physical security for insurgent training grounds and subsequent military operations and for possible sources of military supplies, recruits, and support needs. He is to evalute government military operations, forces and capabilities (whether or not presently in the area), including size, training and morale of forces; types of weapons available and location and security of government arms depots and arsenals; field habits in patrolling, placement and inspection of outposts, protection of road columns, and so forth; and effectiveness of the communications and intelligence organization of the military forces.

In view of this information, he is to develop strategic concepts and translate these concepts into a plan for military operations (see note 5). He is to establish schedules for the insurgent military buildup, indicating troop requirements and requirements for arms and ammunition by type, communications equipment, logistic support, and so forth. Functions of communications, intelligence, and logistics are to be organized to support military operations. Last, he is to develop a military training program and supervise the conduct of troop training and military operations.

Functions During Five Points in Insurgent Development

Initial Period. Having participated in joint planning meetings, the military arm now operates largely on its own. The chief of military operations can anticipate some time for planning before the actual establishment of a military training camp.[21] This time is con-

[20] A fortified counterinsurgent position may be left to be taken over in Phase IV.

[21] In some instances, military units have been formed during the initial period from personnel available from remnants of military groups which have participated in a civil war. It is not deemed advisable, however, to attempt to form units prior to the establishment of a supply and intelligence system and warning nets. However, less than optimal tactics can work with luck and a government that is not alert.

sumed in finding suitable locations for the training base, in reconnaissance of ground and government forces, and in jobs such as establishment of civil warning nets and coordination with his quartermaster in the location of supply sources. Each of the above tasks is of some magnitude. Deputies are obtained for assignment to planning the training camp and curriculum, to reconnaissance and planning of operations, and establishment of a sentry and warning system.

Point 2. A training area is selected. A work cadre has been obtained for the construction of the first military training camp. The site and shelters are being prepared. Personnel with leadership capabilities, preferably with some experience in insurgency operations, are acting as instructors. A system of camp security has been established. Housekeeping functions are being organized.

A deputy for planning of military operations has completed initial reconnaissance and is conducting more detailed reconnaissance of the ground and road net, civil communications nets, and the morale, training, equipment, habits, and capabilities of government troops. This information becomes an input to the school curriculum. A more detailed schedule of development of the military arm is prepared, and logistic requirements are inferred.

A deputy assigned to establishing intelligence collection, logistic support, and warning nets has been helping to create civil observation posts and nets. In coordination with the quartermaster, supply posts have been established in organized villages as well as in certain villages not completely controlled by insurgents. Routes have been developed for supply details. All personnel have been trained in security procedures. Home guard self-defense units are established. Their training and equipment will be upgraded as soon as practicable.

A small full time military unit of platoon size is formed. It consists largely of personnel who have been exposed by government intelligence and are in hiding, deserters from government armed forces, etc.

It is assumed that the terrorist activities in conjunction with organization of villages have brought government troops into the area. Scattered skirmishes between insurgents and government forces have occurred.

Point 3. Guerrilla warfare has been initiated, and its pace is becoming more intense. Graduates of the training camps are now operating against government vehicles, patrols, and outposts. Most operations are conducted at night. Operations are carefully planned after extensive collection and analysis of intelligence (Tanham). Activities are coordinated with the organization of villages to gain control over one district at a time.

Bridges, railways (if they exist), power plants, and so forth, are sabotaged by the underground or specially trained saboteurs. These

actions remind the people of the power of the insurgent movement and invite government forces to guard installations and estates.[22]

Input to the training camp from home guard units is increased. Organized villages now constitute the major source of recruits. The curriculum is extended to include courses in civic action, protection of organized villages, and field exercises in large-scale raids.

The supply network now draws from an increasing number of villages and farms, and possibly from production bases now in operation. The ability of supply organizations and civilian sources to meet the growing materiel requirements becomes an important factor in limiting the size of the schools.

At or about this point, insurgent national leaders have an option of placing emphasis on the buildup of full-time guerrilla fighters supported by village home defense units or concentrating on the buildup of part-time self-defense units. The latter course has the advantage of drawing less from the countryside, it requires a much less elaborate administrative and logistic buildup which is in turn less vulnerable to air attacks. If this course is followed, the military situation remains much as described above, with insurgents seeking to gain complete political domination which is used to insure economic control, control over public communications facilities, etc. The military situation may be one of insurgent parity or superiority. The insurgent waits for the counterinsurgent to concede.

If the former course—that of a strong military buildup—is taken, the issue builds up to Points 4 and 5, as described below.

Point 4. Communications and supply networks organized as early as possible are being expanded. Skirmishes are similar to those described at Point 3 except that larger forces can be committed if necessary. Patrols and ambushes are standard. Insurgent forces, assisted by agents in government organizations and by well-functioning warning nets, ambush small government patrols regularly and attack isolated outposts. Some relatively ineffective outposts of government troops are undisturbed. The insurgent may use them as examples of its tolerance toward misguided government troops. Convoys which supply these outposts are a source of insurgent supply and the arms held by the outpost constitute a reserve source of supply for insurgents if needed. Patrols by government troops and self-defense corps of outlying areas and controlled villages meet a wall of hostility and silence. They collect no information. Thus, the insurgents maintain the initiative.

[22] A small Armed Revolutionary Force (FAR) guerrilla force in Guatemala dynamited a single transformer station in 1964, causing the government to station Army sentries at every transformer in the system (personal informant).

Appendix A

Ammunition remains a problem (Guevara: 16; Keats: 199). It is obtained by ambushes and attacks on government outposts and warehouses. Heavier weapons (mortars, rocket launchers, and artillery) are being obtained in small numbers; ammunition for such weapons is always a problem. These weapons are required, however, if insurgents are to attack heavily defended strongposts.

Government forts are being ringed with civilian observers. The military intelligence apparatus is elaborated. Radios are obtained from government troops and external sources to facilitate communications. Camp areas are being established and manned in the vicinity (5 to 10 miles) of these forts. Insurgent flags are displayed near government outposts. The military arm helps gain political and economic control of undefended and lightly defended villages. The insurgent military arm need not wait for political organization as before but may go into the village along with political organizers as a strong show of force. Thus, the organization of these villages proceeds at a more rapid pace.

Home guards, now well trained at insurgent camps, hold organized villages and improve their defenses. Only large government patrols can enter and they have to fight their way into these villages. Roads frequently used by government vehicles are mined. Government troops no longer patrol distant outlying areas.

Insurgent training bases are being expanded. The curriculum is being expanded to cover topics such as ambush of motorized columns, using mines and mortars for support of small arms; recruitment and training of home guards for organized villages; defense of organized villages; active air defense measures; the role of the soldier in local civic action programs; and orthodox military tactics.

Point 5. Small- and medium-sized troop and police groups have been destroyed or driven back. Insurgent military forces now hold superiority over the entire operational area except for such strong points as government troops elect to fortify and defend in force. Government forces must be supplied by air or by strongly armored columns which are harassed by sporadic small-arms fire. Civilian traffic may be allowed to move, although a tax or toll may be demanded.

Insurgents hold government troops in a state of loose siege. Insurgent camps deploy patrols and sentries around government strongpoints and roadways to keep close watch on counterinsurgent military forces. Government troops do not emerge from remaining strongholds at night. Daytime patrols that leave the immediate vicinity are attacked. Thus, insurgents control all of the area except that which government forces in their forts can both see and control with their weapons (Harkins: 274).

SUMMARY

The preceding material has decribed a successful articulation of an insurgent organization and underground culminating in control over all elements of area society. Allowing for marked differences in geography, ethnic groups, culture, and so forth, there are many similarities among slow, violent political insurrections. The purposes of insurrectionaries are similar. Major functions that need to be performed—propaganda, intelligence collection, counterintelligence, logistics and supply, control of the population, erosion of local government, establishment of communications, and management of the effort—are similar, as are the tactics by which these purposes are accomplished. The documentation in this chapter, which could be considerably expanded, so indicates. In spite of many differences in surroundings and detail, there are many common elements among violent grassroots insurrectionary movements, common elements reinforced by Communist doctrine, tactics, and techniques.


It is this revolutionary movement and the problems of establishing successful counterforces to it which lead us to the formulation of the criterion problem in chapter 2, and to evaluation of specific criteria in chapter 3. Basically, the criterion problem addresses itself to the questions, "How does one evaluate the progress of such a revolution, and of the counterforce to it?" and "How are specific policies, tactics, and acts of either side to be evaluated in terms of their contribution to more ultimate objectives?"

INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS

Several forms of organization of insurgent movements are shown in the following charts. Most of these organizations are oriented toward national rather than area forces. The parallel political and military hierarchies of Communist organizations are evident in most instances. In some cases, charts represent goals rather than actual attainments. For example, insurgent military groups in Malaya never attained regimental size. While forms of organization differ considerably, functions performed exhibit substantial similarity. See charts 42 through 47.


Appendix A

Chart 42. Prototype Guerrilla Organizations in Three Countries



Source: Barton, 1954:78


Chart 43. Typical Inter-Province Organization of the Viet Cong



Source: Department of State Publication 7308, Appendix: 9

Appendix A

Chart 44. The Political Organization of the Viet Cong



Source: Department of State Publication 7308, Appendix: 8





Chart 45. Malayan Communist Party Organization During the Emergency

Reprinted from *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* by Lucian W. Pye with permission of the publishers, Princeton University Press. © 1956.

Appendix A


Chart 46. Military and Political Organization of Malayan Communists



Source: CID HQ Federation of Malaya Police, Nov 1950; Intelligence Division, Directorate of Operations, Malaya

Source: Barton, 1954: 40

Chart 47. Example of an Organization of an Underground Movement in Five Separate Networks



Reprinted from Miksche, F. O., *Secret Forces: The Technique of Underground Movements* with permission of the publishers, Faber and Faber, London. © 1950.

NOTE 1

INSURGENT ORGANIZATION IN A COMMUNIST-DOMINATED INSURGENCY

For insurgents, the key to waging successful revolutionary warfare is organization. The insurgent must develop an array of functionally differentiated groups interlinked into a vast network that eventually encompasses the entire society. Every social class, every village, every syndical grouping must be tied into an apparatus designed to aid the insurgent cause while denying aid to the government. Although the nomenclature for insurgent organizations often reflects local cultural factors (for example, area commands were called *recos* in the Philippines, zones in Vietnam, and fronts in Cuba), the underlying organizational pattern for the insurgents has been quite consistent. There are two basic divisions of the insurgent forces, the first between the Communist Party and the insurgent movement as a whole and the second between the civil resistance and the military components of the insurgents.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

An official Communist Party is one that accepts Marxist-Leninist doctrine and is recognized by either Moscow or Peking. Only with such recognition will the local party be likely to receive the large-scale technical and financial aid at the disposal of the existing Communist states.[1] The local party is committed to the acquisition of total political power, utilizing any means that would help achieve this goal. This is a long-range objective, however, and the speed with which it is achieved depends on both the objective and subjective conditions in the country and the needs of the international movement.[2]

[1] Under Stalin, Soviet aid was always channeled through the local party (or the non-Communist recipient movement was forced to place Communists in critical positions of control: witness the experience of the Spanish Republicans). Post-Stalinist leaders, however, have extended help to non-Communist but anti-colonial, anti-capitalist "national-liberation" movements without exacting significant concessions for the local Communist Party. This has broadened the acceptability of Soviet aid, but it may serve to increase the probability that some revolutionary movements may be non-Communist, thus presenting Soviet policymakers with some interesting dilemmas.

[2] The current state of flux in the world Communist movement makes it difficult to judge the extent of control over the revolutionary activities of local parties. In Latin America, for example, there is some evidence that the Communist Party leadership has supported armed struggle in spite of its own judgment that objective conditions were unsuitable, for fear that the party would lose much of its membership to the more militant *Castristas*.

Appendix A

The Communist Party is an elite rather than a mass organization. Membership is restricted to those individuals with confirmed belief in Marxism who are willing to accept total party discipline. These individuals tend to be drawn from the middle sectors of society, with a high frequency of intellectuals. Students, lower level civil servants, teachers, and the large group of educated but unemployed persons have proven especially good recruiting sources. In the preinsurrectionary stage, these individuals may either be recruited for the open party or for the covert apparatus, with the bulk of the membership in the former.

THE OPEN PARTY

The open or overt party may be known locally under one of several names (Communist, socialist, or workers party), but it makes no secret of its Marxist affiliations. It will have a known executive board, a party office and administrative staff in the capital and perhaps local offices in smaller communities; it will publish newspapers and journals, conduct election campaigns, and often have representation in the legislature. It may have directly affiliated labor unions. In sum, it carries out all the functions of a regular political party and as such it may have a mass membership of people who call themselves Communists.[3] However, these members of the open party should not be confused with the professional Communists (cadre) that form the nucleus of the open party and the total membership of the covert apparatus.

THE COVERT APPARATUS

Operating under direction of the open party leadership is a secret conspiratorial organization composed of individuals who do not publicize their party affiliation. They form an underground-in-being that is used to collect intelligence and to penetrate non-Communist organizations prior to the initiation of insurgency. This covert apparatus has the organizational and functional attributes common to most resistance or underground movements (Molnar: chapter 4). It has the cellular structure designed to minimize government infiltration and countermeasures, a communications system utilizing couriers, secret sources of finance, and so forth. After an insurgency begins and the government takes actions against the open party, the covert apparatus becomes the underground basis of the insurgents, while the hard-core open Communists provide the initial cadres for the full-time guerrillas.

[3] The Indonesian Communist Party was reputed in 1963 to have 2,000,000 members (Brackman: 301).

FRONT GROUPS

Although the open party often sets up its own labor unions, peasant leagues and so forth, these are vulnerable to government counteraction and are likely to be outlawed at an early stage in the insurgency. Still, they serve a valuable function in politicizing a previously apathetic population, and in rural areas where government suppression is likely to be less thorough they can be converted into support organizations for the guerrillas.[4]

The same role can be filled with less vulnerability to government suppression by the use of the front tactic in which overtly non-Communist organizations are organized or infiltrated by covert party members who utilize these groups to achieve the ends sought by the Communist Party. Labor unions, for example, can be used to paralyze a country's economy by repeated strikes, as was attempted in the tin mines of Malaya. At the same time, the funds of such "legitimate" organizations can be siphoned off to support the insurgents.[5]

Fronts can also be established to demonstrate a seemingly broad base of popular support for the insurgency. Literally hundreds of such fronts will be formed, with new ones continually replacing those that have their cover blown by the police.

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION WITHIN AN INSURGENT AREA

The Communist Party does not discard its tested organizational principles when it moves into insurgent status. Rather, the form of the earlier organization serves as the pattern for the new, just as the individuals trained and indoctrinated in the old provide the cadres for the insurgents. The open party is likely to be outlawed by the government, forcing those of its principal members who escape arrest to go into hiding or join the guerrilla force.[6] Thus, a ready-made cadre is provided the insurgents, a cadre with no alternative but to fight, since return to civilian life is closed to them because of their known affiliation with the Communist Party.

Part of the covert apparatus becomes the active underground, supporting the insurgents by collecting and transmitting intelligence and supplies to them while remnants of the peasant leagues are reconsti-

[4] The Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC) of the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Habon (Huks) was set up on the base of the pre-war socialist peasant leagues.

[5] The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) diverted extensive funds to the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) until the British rooted the covert Communist labor leaders (Molnar: 253, 254).

[6] After the military government began suppressing the Guatemalan Communist Party in April 1963, many overt members took "refuge" in the guerrilla forces then operating in Izabal Department (Rambo).

tuted as the rural underground and paramilitary support force for the full-time insurgents. As the insurgency develops, the rural underground will become an operating shadow government in the guerrilla zones and will become the de facto government in the guerrilla bases. The establishment of a Communist shadow government in the guerrilla zone does not lead to the dismemberment of the covert apparatus, however. Unknown to the now overt Communists,[7] secret cells composing the shadow government serve the dual functions of checking on the loyalties of its local representatives and providing a reserve underground if the counterinsurgents should succeed in eliminating the first-line shadow government (Galula: 56).

[7] Shadow government operatives such as mayors, propagandists, and tax collectors are overt in the sense that they are known to their fellow villagers as insurgents, even though the legal government may not know who they are. Covert Communists are individuals who are secretly members of the party, unknown to their co-villagers.

NOTE 2

KILLER GANGS OR ENFORCEMENT GROUPS

Insurgent efforts to win the people by propaganda and agitation are supplemented by the use of units engaged in terrorism. These units have received various names: in the Philippines, "enforcement groups"; in Malaya, "blood and steel corps"; in Algeria, "dispensers of justice." These groups appear to be a necessary part of the insurgent movement. While there are some variations from country to country, the functions these units have performed include:

1. Threatening or killing government functionaries (village heads, police) who resist insurgent infiltration;
2. Threatening or killing "spies," that is, citizens in contested areas or in organized villages who give information about the insurgents to the government. This terrorism, designed to silence the remaining population, is perhaps the most important function;
3. Assisting in collection of taxes by beating recalcitrant individuals or destroying or stealing their property;
4. Carrying out robberies and extortion against wealthy individuals, industries, or banks on a one-shot basis or periodically by blackmailing;
5. Engaging in sabotage operations or kidnapping prominent visitors to the country as a means of demonstrating the power of the movement and the weakness of the government.

The enforcement group is thus a multipurpose tool. When used against government functionaries, the group would be under the direction of the cadre head. The district secretary would direct counterintelligence operations. The chief of finance and procurement would be in charge of tax collection activities and the threats required to insure efficient tax collection.

Killer gangs are not normally regular members of the insurgent military forces (Taruc: 138). Insurgents often recognize that terror is a two-edged sword to be used judiciously. Hence, it is assumed that for missions which involve the murder of civilians, enforcement groups will operate directly under the command of the cadre leader, who must approve their use in each instance. Enforcement groups may be dispatched to the operational area from the state or national level or they may be organized locally.

NOTE 3

SOME TECHNIQUES FOR PENETRATING SOCIETY

Communists make use of classes of society, groups and linkages between individuals to facilitate penetration.

CLASS

The term "class" is a rough but convenient designation applied by persons outside the class. Classes consist of persons similar in important respects, holding some common beliefs and responding in similar ways to them, for example, workers, peasants, college professors, students and fishermen. Class members may or may not recognize or acknowledge class identity. As classes, some members may recognize common objectives as desirable, but class members do not usually join, as a class, in concerted effort to gain them. A class is thought of as a horizontal slice of society.

GROUP

A group consists of people with mutually recognized identities of interests and goals who make certain efforts to accomplish these goals. Group members may or may not be drawn predominantly from one class.

GEOPOLITICAL UNIT

A geopolitical unit is defined as a designated geographic area demarcated by fixed or relatively well-recognized and functionally meaningful political boundaries and the people who live in it. The unit may vary in size. It may be a hamlet, town, district, province or state. In general, members of such a unit may or may not recognize identity of interests. If they do, it will be as members of their geopolitical subdivisions.

PENETRATION TECHNIQUES VIA SOCIETAL UNITS

An understanding of class and group structure should be of significant aid in penetration of society. Classes (peasants, workers) are designated as potential sources of sympathy, supplies and recruits.

Groups may be organized from members of these classes and may be converted into cells highly sympathetic to the movement. Existing groups whose membership is predominantly from one or more target class are first infiltrated by Communists. Communist agents and sympathizers attempt to infiltrate all important groups of society to obtain information and gain support for the movement.

A typical method of penetration may be lateral, then vertical, but with the variegated makeup of society, there are many possibilities. The general strategy is as follows:

Identify classes expected to be sympathetic to the movement.

Form groups within identified classes or penetrate existing groups in classes and sell the movement to these groups. Gradually modify the direction of the existing or newly formed groups so that it is compatible with what the insurgents desire.

By using group membership and alleged commonalities of interest as an opening wedge, recruit members from geopolitical units to be organized. Use converted members of geopolitical units to gain information about units and to approach key political figures within the units.

Use the information thus obtained and pre-tested propaganda appeals to win the sympathy of key political figures.

This roughly sketches the lateral-vertical penetration schema.

ACQUAINTANCESHIP NETWORKS AS AN AID TO PENETRATION

In focusing attention on individuals, acquaintanceship networks might be depicted as in chart 48.

An enlargement of chart 49 below, depicting the links between a number of individuals, could demonstrate the associations among all members of a village.

PENETRATION BY MEANS OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Communists with the mission of penetrating a designated village would first try to acquire intelligence about villagers in positions of power and influence. Types of status positions will vary from one village to another. Generally speaking, concern centers on the local governing structure, village police, leaders and respected members of labor groups (Pye: 220), religious leaders, heads of kinship chains, teachers, and merchants. There would be special concern with the links between insurgent sympathizers and these groups.

Direct and indirect links would be used: first, to collect intelligence

Chart 48. Personal Affiliations





Chart 49. Links Between Persons A, B, C, D, N



as to personal beliefs and vulnerabilities and, second, to use this information to win allegiance. Personal values and affective feelings of individuals toward concepts and issues such as the insurgent cause, the government, and government practices are identified. This might be done by interrogation by a friend loyal to the insurgents or by a friend of that friend. Armed with this information, the insurgent is better prepared to win allegiance.

Approaches and means of winning people to the cause will vary from one contact to another. Some people may be violently anti-government and ready to ally themselves with almost any cause that expounds the same hostility. Any of the types of links noted above may be used to gain a sympathetic ear. Intravillage authority relationships may serve as a lever to assert influence. Past obligations may be utilized or new obligations established to influence thought or behavior of the target population. The promise of position or status in the movement

may be attractive to some. Grievances of village chiefs against higher level political authority (or grievances of police against village chiefs) may provide a common ground of understanding and mutual agreement from which the virtues of the movement can be conveyed to chiefs or police respectively. Several people may be lined up to influence and persuade a key member of the target population. These techniques, supplemented by the movement's propaganda, are oriented toward the same goal. If the methods succeed and more villagers are brought into the movement, it becomes easier to convince others.

In this manner, by the slow and time-consuming steps of face-to-face personal contact, sympathies of villagers and village leaders are won to the insurgent cause. Once villagers are won and while they are being won, a formal village organization is developed that provides the insurgents with control of the political apparatus of the village and its police and, with these, control of the surplus economic goods of the village.

NOTE 4
INFORMAL SPONTANEOUSLY EMITTED MASS INFORMATION FLOW SYSTEM*

It is well to distinguish between formal communications and intelligence networks as integral subsystems of formal insurgent and counterinsurgent organizations and informal information flow systems which can be made to serve some of the same purposes. The formal organization will, as a rule, allocate responsibilities and tasks to specific people who are, by definition, members of the organization. The informal network, on the other hand, is built upon existing informal communications habits of substantially the entire community. Its individual components or "members"—as receivers/transmitters—cannot, as a rule, be said to belong to any formal organization. Nonetheless, often in conjunction with a formal system, it can operate to the distinct advantage of one side and to the disadvantage of the other. Its operations and how it may be instituted, monitored, and controlled deserve more attention than we have given it here.

The operation of this informal face-to-face network might be compared with that of the neural network of the hydra which has no central ganglion or brain. When any part of the animal is strongly stimulated, excitations spread through the entire body by diverse neural nets. So it is with spontaneous mass information flow. If a populated area is controlled by the insurgent and a counterinsurgent patrol is spotted on the outskirts, any observer warns his neighbors and in a very short time the information has spread throughout the area. See chart 50. As the counterinsurgent force enters, it obtains little or no information on the location of the insurgents or the membership of the underground. If, on the other hand, the town is friendly to counterinsurgents, as they enter the town people will volunteer information about insurgents.

As a gross rule, information flows toward the force which holds the sympathy of the people, away from the unpopular side.


This system has substantial advantages. Since the entire population is involved, the warning system is perhaps more likely to detect an enemy than a formal system because it takes advantage of many more eyes and vantage points. Its operation is multi-directional.

*This concept was developed jointly by the authors and C. T. R. Bohannan.

Second, its operation involves acts of commitment which tend to unify the people. Third, once in operation, it entails little or no social overhead cost. Thus, spontaneous mass information flow stems from popular support, supplemented perhaps by general instructions.

This informal net is not sufficient in itself. The type of information it sends is not easily controlled and information other than very simple

Chart 50. Informal Village Information Flow System



messages can easily be distorted by word-of-mouth communications chains. For example, if four observers each see a patrol nearing the town, it is likely that the specific information about the patrol transmitted via this net will be ambiguous. One could hardly be sure whether each observer had seen a different patrol or whether all four observers had seen the same patrol. The receiver cannot readily interrogate the informal net for specific items of additional information. Therefore, a more formal system needs to be established which will work in conjunction with, not in place of, this spontaneous mass flow of information, which may serve as a warning to trigger operation of the formal system.

NOTE 5

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE INSURGENT AREA COMMANDER

INTRODUCTION

The sophisticated insurgent military commander draws a distinction between strategy and tactics. Guerrilla tactics are similar to conventional tactics of reconnaissance patrols, raiding parties, ambush and counter-ambush. In the microcosm referred to as an operational area, for a military chief who controls a handful of men or at most a battalion or regiment, one would not ordinarily talk of military strategy. Here, however, it is necessary to do so. The insurgent commander starts with little or no military force. He must define a strategy that will allow him to build a force equal to that of the counterinsurgents. Meanwhile, he may well be harassed and hunted. He must win a significant number of skirmishes in order to give his growing army self-confidence. Thus, he must formulate a highly unconventional military strategy to make up for his military disadvantages. Hence, his strategy must be different and asymmetrical to that of the counter-insurgent.

Before considering strategies, certain factors that give the insurgent leader an advantage or that can be converted into an advantage should be noted. First, a certain political malaise is assumed in the body politic (Valeriano and Bohannan: 229–30). It is doubtful that the insurgent could win or even get well under way without this. Apathy on the part of the people toward government or a strong anti-government sentiment is basic (Too: 4). Government troops are drawn from the people. If faith in government does not exist when men are drafted, the training program they receive must attempt to create this faith. The long-standing habit of soldiers in underdeveloped countries of foraging, compounded by a poor logistic system, must be broken. Operating under these handicaps, training falters; a sense of commitment is lacking among the troops. There is little affinity between troops and civilians. Usually, military leadership, especially at the lower levels, leaves much to be desired. The insurgent can usually safely assume that the government army is insensitive to civil intelligence, and that coordination with police will be poor

or practically non-existent. This will usually be true until government forces get organized (Valeriano and Bohannan: 124). There will probably be few if any dossiers on insurgents. Finally, inadequacies in communications facilities and in police organization and training may be expected. Knowledge of these factors certainly provides the insurgent military commander with an advantage over his opponents.

These are the assumed "objective conditions." The oft-stated contention that the insurgent translates public apathy, active support of a small group of followers and superior intelligence into military victory frequently proves to be valid. We here attempt to examine the process and mechanisms by which this is accomplished. The topic is treated in two parts: the strategic defensive, that is, how the strategy of detachment is implemented, and the strategy of seizing the initiative with inferior forces.

A first assumption is that the insurgents have superior intelligence. Techniques of gaining this intelligence have been described.

STRATEGY OF DETACHMENT

Superior intelligence is required equally in the application of the strategy of detachment and in seizing the initiative. This intelligence is of four kinds: intelligence about counterinsurgent plans, deployment of government functionaries and armed forces, movement of government troops, and superior knowledge of the ground.

Intelligence about counterinsurgent plans is obtained by planting agents in counterinsurgent planning offices, by converting workers in these offices to agents, by monitoring communications, and so forth. Knowing where, when, to what end, and with what forces the counterinsurgent intends to act is a tremendously significant equalizer (Keats: 197, 198, 203; Tanham: 76, 79–83).

Movements of government troops are reported by security posts and armed forces is acquired through information collection systems in the area capital and villages which report the presence and number of government troops as one essential element of information (EEI). These reports, once integrated, provide an accurate picture of deployment (Taruc: 134).

Movements of government troops are reported by securing posts and by tactical networks along roads and trails. These networks have proven quite effective. Meirs, for example, talks about how the British moved troops by night and jumped them off moving trucks to avoid detection by insurgent warning systems. Similarly, Valeriano and Bohannan (152) note the time and attention required to thwart intelligence networks.

Superior knowledge of ground in the area of operations is obtained by insurgent troops who live on the country and perform extensive ground reconnaissance. Training can insure that the insurgents know the ground over which they are operating far better than counterinsurgent forces. This is of obvious advantage, particularly in vegetated country.


These factors combine to compensate in large measure for the disparity in force size.

The insurgent has a definite advantage in that he is able to define his missions. He can accept or refuse battle offered by counterinsurgent forces; he does not need to hold ground. He can even break off battles that he himself has initiated if he sees that the issue is going badly. Lawrence refers to insurgent operations as a campaign of detachment (194).

When the insurgent breaks off battle, he has no need to immediately regain physical integrity of formations or units. A combination of pre-planned escape routes and the tactic of fleeing as individuals provides a significant speed advantage over government troops trained to operate always in some formation. Coordination of movement by formations requires time. Two groups of men may be equally fast afoot, but if one group must move in formation while the other can move as individuals, the latter has the advantage. The troops in formation cannot expect to catch their adversaries. See chart 51.

The shaded area indicates the insurgent advantage when he breaks formation and flees. After leaving the immediate battle area, insurgents as individuals, not in uniform, can readily fade into the civil population. The counterinsurgents cannot easily distinguish between villagers who just recently bore arms and those who have been tend-

Chart 51. Hypothetical Instant Speed of Troops in the Battle Area As Individuals Versus Formations As a Function of Numbers of Men in Formation



ing the fields all day. Pursuit of insurgents seldom meets with success.

The above assumptions about insurgents and counterinsurgents paint extremes. These extremes are not, however, uncommon. Note that under these assumptions, the counterinsurgent who attempts to seize the initiative faces an opponent who knows his battle plans and deployments in advance. His immediate moves and any changes in plan are reported by area posts and road warning nets. This insurgent intelligence advantage has been reported so frequently in all insurrections, including present operations in Vietnam, that it hardly requires documentation. The insurgent is forewarned when plans are drawn up at the planning offices. He will frequently know the details of such plans, including the area of operations and units which will participate. He can decide at this time whether he wishes to avoid the sweep by fragmenting his forces, whether to attempt to ambush some of the government forces, or whether to postpone his decision until counterinsurgent operations are initiated.

Before the counterinsurgent military forces approaching an area can draw their cordons, the insurgent has acquired timely information as to their whereabouts and numbers from road warning nets and village posts. Several alternatives are available to the insurgents:

To withdraw from the area;

To have those members of the force who are not known to be insurgents melt into the population while leaders hide in secluded spots;

To ambush parts of the cordon;

To wait until the cordon is drawn, then escape.

One would expect that the first two alternatives would normally be preferable, but this will depend on the specific situation. In any case, if counterinsurgent forces succeed in making contact, insurgent troops can decline to fight and disperse as individuals. Since the insurgents have superior speed and knowledge of terrain, the counterinsurgent can effectively pursue them only in exceptional cases.

These withdrawal counter-tactics are appropriate when the counterinsurgent approaches in superior numbers. If the insurgent has good intelligence, occasional counterinsurgent patrols can be dealt with more readily. In sum, given the above assumptions, the counterinsurgent using military means alone and lacking intelligence cannot effectively assume the initiative.[8] This conclusion is believed valid re-

[8] This is an insurgent strategy and goal. However, if the counterinsurgent has the will and some resources and ingenuity, there are available to him substantial areas within which the insurgent cannot deny him the initiative, for example, continuous and aggressive patrolling. It is never possible to shut off all intelligence that may be obtained from people (mostly civilians) from a unit that recognizes its importance and has techniques of gathering it. Aggressive, alert patrolling will uncover physical evidence such as insurgent camps and trails used for supply and travel. It can easily happen that the counterinsurgent lacking will, skill, and techniques—any or all of these—may come to believe that he has no areas of initiative left. To make him feel this is a key objective

gardless of the number of men the counterinsurgent uses or the quality of his equipment.[9] Thus runs the first half of the insurgent military leader's strategy: taking advantage of superior intelligence, he refuses engagement.

Described above is a pure strategy; in practice, slips and accidents occur, and the actual skirmish never completely follows the school solution. Nonetheless, it is this strategy that guides the insurgent military commander in handling his forces in coordination with the Communist propaganda apparatus and underground, in building intelligence nets, and in training and deploying his troops. He is able to prevent counterinsurgent forces from making contact in most instances; and he will decline all skirmishes except those of his own planning and choosing.

STRATEGY OF SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

The other half of the insurgent strategy consists of guides for seizing the initiative. Here the real asymmetry between the strategy of the sophisticated insurgent and the unimaginative counterinsurgent is evident. The insurgent commander selects the time and the place. He engages in battle only when he can concentrate and disperse his forces against an inferior counterinsurgent force.

An analogy illustrates this point. Joe, a sentry, has the mission of protecting a bridge; Ivan's mission is to destroy it. Joe must protect it at all times. Ivan can choose the most suitable time for attacking it. Joe must be ever alert. Joe's need to eat, sleep, and rest put him at a distinct disadvantage. The same analogy holds for more than one man. No group can keep itself at full strength when it must constantly be in a state of instant preparedness. Thus, the insurgent arms himself with extensive intelligence studies and rehearses for an operation (Tanham: 85), choosing the time of action. The counterinsurgent, in passive defense, must be prepared at all times. The man or unit with the initiative holds a significant advantage. Under these assumptions, several Joes are required to match one Ivan.

The insurgent supplements the advantage of initiative made possible by superior intelligence by adding yet another weight to the scale

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of insurgent strategy. This area for initiative requires of the counterinsurgent a set and approach somewhat different from that appropriate to conventional operations. The family that lives on the hillside may be a far better source of information than extensive and minute search for physical evidence to be found on the ground. For some years the French in Indochina pushed major units into insurgent territory hoping to engage in orthodox military operations. Except for mistakes (1951), insurgents refused the bait. Finally, major units were extended beyond the radius of effective support, examining in effect the full length of the spectrum. Defeat at Dien Bien Phu was a severe political and military loss; more than this, it revealed the bankruptcy of a military strategy. The full extent of the spectrum of purely conventional operations had been examined and victory was found nowhere.

[9] Except, possibly, in desert and arctic areas offering no overhead concealment.

favoring him. He can, in significant measure, control the deployment of counterinsurgent troops. This control is exercised as follows. The counterinsurgents are morally committed to protecting property, societal structures, and the material means of society. This is a key function of government. Thus, the counterinsurgent must deploy his forces to protect communications systems, roadways and means of transport which society needs to function normally. If the counterinsurgent cannot effectively protect these installations, he loses the confidence of the people.

The insurgent strategy is to sabotage communications and transport facilities and warehouses, and attack estates of large landholders. The intimate association between such landholders and the government can make the insurgent task easier. If the landholders call on the government to provide protection for their estates (Valeriano and Bohannan: 115, 116) and receive it, counterinsurgent forces are necessarily committed to passive protection of far more property than they can protect with available resources or even with reasonable supplements to their forces.[10]

Because the forces available to the counterinsurgent are limited, this piecemeal fragmentation spreads small groups over a large area, making timely mutual support impossible. Providing necessary supplies for these outposts further diminishes resources. The insurgent can select the least defensible outpost or convoys in the most vulnerable positions, and destroy them one by one. If the counterinsurgent is reluctant to disperse his troops, sabotage combined with insurgent-inspired propaganda demanding protection will force him to do so.

Thus, counterinsurgent deployment forced by planned acts of sabotage supported by propaganda allows the insurgent to concentrate his smaller force, rehearse strikes, and maintain a numerical advantage in selected skirmishes. This tactic, added to the natural advantage which the ambusher has over a moving column or supply detachment, significantly favors the insurgent.

Many elaborations of this basic insurgent strategy are possible. For example, when the insurgent forces become strong enough, they set up ambushes along roads between the area capital and villages and between the area capital and external supply sources.[11] Blockades of the first type cut communications and supply of goods between area capital and villages, thus assisting agitators who are organizing villages and denying national forces the economic surpluses (if any) of outlying communities. Cutting supply lines also reduces the

[10] Lawrence notes (189) that the Turks, in attempting to protect their railroad lines and communications, had to disperse their forces so widely that they could not concentrate them for offensive action.

[11] At the national level, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Saigon were so ringed.

capabilities of counterinsurgents and increases their requirements for convoy protection, essentially a passive (and expensive) defense. Another variant, frequently used in advanced stages of insurgency, involves an attack or a feigned attack on a town to draw garrisons of nearby towns onto the road to support the threatened town. These reinforcements may then be ambushed on the road.

A related example comes from Lawrence, whose objective was to allow the Turkish railroad to continue running, but just barely. By this strategy, outposts were weakened, but not wiped out, so that counterinsurgents were constrained to attempt to supply them. Supply chains provide a supply source for insurgents. Further, supplies that get through the ambush gauntlet are only sufficient to maintain outposts in a passive, vegetative status. The economic goods badly needed to support an aggressive counterinsurgent expansion are thus captured by insurgents or trickle away to sustain groups that no longer have functional value.

IMPACT ON MORALE: THE CRUMBLING SOCIETAL STRUCTURE

These insurgent measures combined have their impact on the morale and resolve of counterinsurgent political functionaries, leaders and soldiers. Days of patrolling without contact, sudden attacks by insurgents on isolated outposts and convoys, limited insurgent casualties, civilian hostility, and a host of incidents all indicating that the counterinsurgent is losing ground create a defeatist attitude. There is a feeling of being in a vise.[12] The institutionalized instruction and conditioned habits of counterinsurgent military forces and functionaries are weakened. Orders are followed perfunctorily if at all. Patrols proceed with less vigor. Defections become more frequent. The logic of sentiments which must serve as a driving spring for coordinated social activity and for prosecution of the battle against the insurgents loses its thrust and impetus. The effect feeds on itself. If a sufficiently strong feeling that defeat is inevitable can be brought about, the whole government superstructure, already peopled with those who simulate the trappings of government but assist insurgents, can topple very quickly, as was the case in Cuba.

To create a perception of progress and inevitable victory among insurgents, the insurgent command may plan engagements wherein the insurgent can win or at least pretend victory. Evident loss of

[12] Again, we are taking the insurgent viewpoint. Skillful counterinsurgent actions reversed this effect in the Philippines in 1951. Pomeroy (167) says, "The truth is, we have lost the initiative that we sought to take . . . There is the sensation, now, of being in a vise."

morale by government forces increases insurgent resolve so that the prophecies and expectations of both sides are self-fulfilling. The insurgent command is as much concerned with manipulation of expectations of both sides as with victory in small unit military operations.

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCENARIO

This appendix presents a technique for studying the decision process in simulated counterinsurgency situations and includes a complete copy of the instructions and background materials provided each interview subject.

A TECHNIQUE FOR STUDYING THE DECISION PROCESS IN SIMULATED COUNTERINSURGENCY SITUATIONS

The following statements include information and instructions related to the administration of the enclosed simulated insurgency situations. Your cooperation and participation in this endeavor will contribute to a better understanding of the many considerations that make up the decision process in a counterinsurgency context. It is hoped, ultimately, that the information generated by application of this technique will lead to the evolvement of operationally meaningful decision guidelines for use by individuals assigned to either advise, support, or direct counterinsurgent operations at the operational area level.

INFORMATION

1. The enclosed materials contain both graphic and written descriptions covering a hypothetical geographic area, i.e., the Toledo District, located in the country of Centralia.

2. The descriptive materials provide both background and current situational information about the Toledo District.

3. You, acting as the Operational Area Commander, are assigned the primary counterinsurgent responsibility in the Toledo District.

4. The attached information is intended to provide you with the necessary context: (1) to assign priorities to operational objectives based on your assessment of the situation, (2) to devise or select a solution concept (strategy/tactic) to attain the objective(s), and (3) to allocate necessary resources based on your selected/devised solution concept.

5. The goal of this particular effort is threefold (1) to explore the utility of this technique as a way of generating a wide variety of

alternative solution concepts for a given situation, (2) to identify considerations associated with a given operational objective, i.e., criteria used to guide the selection or development of solutions with which to meet specific objectives, and (3) to isolate some of the major situational factors which influence the relative importance of these considerations or criteria.

MATERIALS

Background materials in the package include:

A. Section I: Written description of the national level background, including the country's political history and current political situation, economic status, social structure and processes, and cultural characteristics.

B. Section II: Written and graphic descriptions of the area level background—geographic, social, economic, cultural, and political—involving similar types of information to that presented in section I, but specific to the Toledo District.

C. Section III: Written and graphic descriptions of the area level government; its responsibilities, structure, and resources.

D. Section IV: Current situational information includes:

1. Description of incidents for a one-week period of an insurgency.
2. Map showing location of the incidents.

PROCEDURE

Step 1: Review the national level background material. *Section I.*

Step 2: Review the area description and the maps graphically depicting background information. A general familiarity with the Toledo District is the goal of step 2. *Section II and Maps A–E.*

Step 3: Review the written and graphic material on the resources available to District Commissioner. *Section III and Map F.*

Step 4: Read the material and study the map which serves to describe and locate the incidents. These incidents, as far as they are reported, are accurate. *Section IV and Map G.*

(Steps 1–4 are designed for independent implementation by the informant. Steps 5–8 are to be done only in the presence of the interviewer.)

Step 5: Provide your assessment of the situation. Identify the particular factors which contribute to your situation diagnosis.

Step 6: Reference the list of attached operational objectives. Select one or more objectives which you judge require immediate attention. Discuss the reasons for this selection with respect to (1) the present situation, (2) whether the selection represents short- or long-range objective(s), and (3) the reasons/factors based on your own prior

experience, knowledge, and ideas in the area of counterinsurgency. (You may suggest objectives other than those that appear on the list.)

There are three constraints limiting your selection of operational objectives.

(1) You must select those objectives most likely to successfully counter the insurgency while leaving your government in power—surrender or defection with your forces to the insurgents is *not* an acceptable alternative.

(2) You may not employ mass counter-terror (as opposed to selective counter-terror) against the civilian population, i.e., genocide is not an alternative.

(3) You must maintain, to the greatest extent possible, production on the area's plantations, because continuation of this production is vital to Centralia's economy.

Step 7: Specify, for the objective(s) selected, the solution concept you would utilize to attain, in whole or part, the objective(s) within the assessed situation. Consider only those resources you have available. Spell out during your description of the solution, the reasons or considerations which led you to select/devise this particular solution.

Step 8: Describe the types and amount of national resources you would request to meet the *same situation* and discuss bases for requesting these particular resources.

COUNTERINSURGENT OBJECTIVES

1. To *discover* the hard-core leadership, organizational apparatus, and operational procedures.
   (Examples: infiltration, prisoner interrogation, air photographs, analysis of captured documents, area-wide registration of personnel, rewards for information.)
2. To *deny* materiel resources to insurgents.
   (Examples: food and weapon control programs, search and restrain procedures, curfews, restricted zones.)
3. To *destroy* insurgent guerrilla forces and leadership.
   (Examples: raiding operations, detention and deportation, ambushes and counter-ambushes, full-scale combat operations, disguised combat patrols.)
4. To cause *defection* from insurgent forces, underground, and insurgent sympathizers.
   (Examples: continuous patrolling operations, resettlement centers, land at low cost, encourage rivalry among insurgent leadership, execute welfare programs among insurgent relatives and sympathizers.)
5. To *protect* area government's functionaries and information concerning the personnel, their plans, and their activities.

(Examples: establish counterintelligence organization and program, relocation of government functionaries, protective custody, assigning personal bodyguards.)

6. To *increase* quantity of the area government's human and materiel resources.
   (Examples: organize civil defense units, draft personnel into armed forces, hire experienced administrative personnel, establish volunteer programs, purchase necessary materiel, increase production of materiel.)
7. To *improve* quality of the area government's human and materiel resources.
   (Examples: training programs, improved selection procedures, efficient organization and procedures, inspection and quality control regulations.)
8. To *protect* the area's population.
   (Examples: resettlement of personnel, "strategic hamlet" concepts, defense of villages.)
9. To *provide* essential materiel and non-materiel resources to the population.
   (Examples: establish new marketable crops, construct roads for transport of produce, low-interest loans, medical programs, educational and training programs.)
10. To *persuade* passive population members to support the area government and to reinforce active supporters of the area's government.
    (Examples: equitable taxation, sound welfare programs, honest government, equal justice, participation of people in shaping government policies.)

SECTION I

CENTRALIA NATIONAL LEVEL BACKGROUND

Centralia, a New Jersey-sized Latin American republic, was, until recently, a colony of Great Britain and still retains a great deal of political and economic dependence on the former mother country, although only about half of the population speaks English or identifies culturally with England. This linguistic and cultural cleavage reflects the division of Centralian society into three main ethnic groups—the Creoles, the Ladinos, and the Indigenes—a division that affects all dimensions of the country's life. These ethnic groups (which also tend to reflect racial groupings) may be described as follows:

THE CREOLES

Culturally anglicized and English-speaking Negroes account for about one-half of Centralia's population. The Creoles (who were given favored treatment by the British colonial government) are politically and culturally the dominant native ethnic group. The civil service, police and army and school teaching posts are almost entirely staffed with Creoles who have monopolized Centralia's limited higher educational facilities to the exclusion of other groups. Most industrial workers are Creole as well. Although there are distinctions between the Creole social classes, they tend to share a common fear and dislike of the Ladinos and a contempt for the Indigenes—attitudes which are often reflected in government policies toward these minority groups.

THE LADINOS

Racially related to the Indigenes, but Spanish speaking and culturally related to the Hispanic American area, the Ladinos are immigrants into Centralia from Montanya and comprise over one-fourth of the population. Both government regulation and Creole prejudice have served to keep the Ladinos in a subsidiary social, political and economic status with few Ladinos active in government service or in industrial work. The bulk of the Ladino population forms the rural proletariat which provides the labor pool for the foreign-owned plantations. This labor pool is constantly increasing with the addition

of people of Indigene origin who are (by adopting the Spanish language and western-style dress) moving into the Ladino cultural orbit. These *New Ladinos* form an extremely unstable group due to the loss of their Indian traditions and the failure to have as yet fully assimilated the Hispanic traditions.

THE INDIGENES

The aboriginal inhabitants of Centralia have been pushed back into enclaves in the hills and jungles by the encroachments of the Creole and Ladino immigrants. While the Indigenes are considered by both groups to be inferior beings, they can, by adopting new customs, pass into the Ladino group, while no such acceptance is possible for a former Indigene among the Creoles. The Indigenes live in small autonomous villages in the rain forest and have little contact with the Centralian government. Economically, they depend on subsistence agriculture, although overpopulation is forcing many Indigenes to work as day laborers on the plantations. Now less than one-fourth of Centralia's population, the Indigenes are decreasing in relative numbers (although increasing in absolute terms) both because of their high mortality rate and because large numbers of young people are going to work on the plantations and becoming Ladinoized. However, the bulk of the Indigene population remains isolated from outside contacts, speaking only their native Kekchi language and maintaining traditional customs that differentiate them from the more westernized ethnic groups.

A dependent economy with most large business in foreign hands, Centralia depends on foreign subsidies (English and American aid) to balance its budget while trying to achieve at least minimal economic advancement. British private capital controls the bulk of the country's industry and commercial agriculture. Industry is concentrated in the national capital and is of minimal importance to the economy, employing only a few thousand workers, with stevedoring on the docks providing the only other major "industrial" employment. Two unions, one democratic in orientation, the other Communist-controlled, are competing to organize the small proletariat. While government policy had been to tolerate union activity as long as it posed no threat to the position of management, recent successful strikes (in spite of which wages remain low) have led to employer pressure on the Centralian government to clamp down on organizational activity, while company propaganda has indiscriminately smeared all union activity as Communist. The effect of the anti-union campaign has been to damage the poorly organized democratic union in its battle for control of the workers with the communists which have not par-

ticularly been hurt due to their strong organization. However, Communist expansion has been limited by the fact that union affiliation generally reflects ethnic group membership, with Creoles in the democratic union and Ladinos in the Communist-controlled union.

Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy and exports of agricultural products provide the bulk of Centralia's foreign exchange, making the economy vulnerable to shifts in world market prices. Market crops are primarily grown on huge foreign-owned plantations employing Ladino and Indigene laborers who are little better than peons. The Creole-run democratic union has made no effort to organize this rural labor force (partly because of the ethnic differences involved) but the Communist Party (CCP) has set up peasant unions on many plantations and has won considerable popular support. Attempts to strike for better wages have been ruthlessly suppressed by the employers (who have an association which blacklists radical workers) increasing the bitterness of the laborers. The Government makes occasional half-hearted reform efforts but it is popularly believed that the officials entrusted with this task have been bribed by the plantation managements. The government faces a mean dilemma—it is dependent on the foreign monetary exchange produced by the plantation exports and knows that any effort to regulate the activities of the owners is likely to have them pull out their investments for more favorable areas, yet social pressure is building up for major reforms in the system. The fact that most plantations are British and American owned, puts even greater pressure on the Government to go slow against them rather than stir up criticism in the foreign press.

Centralia's international relations have been oriented toward the western bloc and Centralia's pro-American stance has led to increasing friction with the neighboring Communist-controlled country of Montanya. The latter has five times the area and ten times the population (2½ million versus 250,000) of Centralia and correspondingly greater economic and military power. Montanya has long claimed Centralia as part of its territory, citing both juridical and ethnic factors (about half of the population of Centralia, the Indigenes and the Ladinos, is culturally affiliated to the population of Montanya) in support of this stance. The Communist-dominated regime in Montanya has revived these claims to Centralia and, while deterred from direct military action by the threat of western intervention, has covertly supported insurgent activities by the CCP.

Montanyan-supported insurgency poses a real threat to the Centralian government because the ethnic divisions of Centralia are clearly reflected in the political dynamics of the country with the government dominated by a single party representing the interests of

the Creole population and ignoring the needs of the Ladinos and Indigenes. While voting for representatives is by secret ballot and there is universal adult sufferage, the party in power is known to manipulate elections to maintain its control, and there is considerable popular disillusionment (especially among the Ladinos) with democracy. In their disillusion, the Ladinos have extended support to the Centralia Communist Party (CCP), which has been kept an ethnic party almost totally Ladino in membership (a few Creole intellectuals have joined but most of its Creole members are misfits and incompetents), because of its identification with Montanya. Through its front groups—the labor union and the peasant league—the CCP has carried out a vast amount of propaganda and agitation work among the Ladinos. Its slogans have been based on calls for democratic elections, higher wages and better working conditions for the proletariat, and land redistribution to the peasants and expulsion of foreign "colonialists" (i.e., the British plantation owners) from the economy. It has tried to play down its Marxist aims and its affiliations with the Montanyans but has not been successful in this effort. The CCP has built up an underground apparatus in the union and the peasant league but its penetration of the government has been minimal and it has little or no influence in the Creole-dominated army and police.

The national level balance of forces at this point can be summarized as: The Centralian Government is supported by the majority of the Creole community and also receives the support of the foreign business community and of the British and American governments. The Communists have the support of the Ladinos, especially those organized in the labor unions and the peasant leagues, and are also covertly supported by the government of Montanya. There remains, however, a considerable block of Centralian society that supports neither side. This block includes much of the Creole middle class and the non-unionized Ladinos who, while anti-government, are not pro-Communist. The Indigenes have remained outside of the power struggle tending to take "a plague on both their houses" view of the opponents and only having an interest in their own safety and well-being.

SECTION II

AREA LEVEL BACKGROUND

Centralia is divided into six administrative districts of which Toledo is the smallest in area and population and the most backward economically. The district is roughly forty miles long by sixty miles wide, approximating a U.S. county in size. The District has a diverse and complex geography with a basic division between the coastal plain and the interior mountain-plateau zone. While the plain is either cleared for agriculture or is covered with uninhabitable swamps and scrub bush, vast areas of the uplands are so mountainous as to make extensive agriculture impossible and are still covered with virgin rain forest. Even in areas of Indigene cultivation only small tracts (the so-called milpas) are actually planted in crops at any one time with most of the land (the "wamil"), regaining a tree cover during the seven-year fallow period. The ecological differences between the plain and the plateau are reflected in the distribution of the ethnic groups within the district. These groups are the same as in Centralia as a whole, but are present in a significantly different ratio to each other than in the national average. The Indigenes comprise over 50 percent of the population (opposed to under 25 percent in the national average) and inhabit villages scattered in the uplands and the surrounding plain. The Ladinos form 30 percent (25 percent nationally) of the population and are concentrated on several large plantations located on the plains, while the Creoles comprise only 20 percent (opposed to 50 percent nationally) of the population and are concentrated in coastal towns and along the road inland from the district capital to the mountains. Creoles are the major exception to the rule that each ethnic group occupies a specific geographical region to the exclusion of other groups as there are Creole Government administrators, police, plantation foremen and guards living in what are predominantly Ladino and Indigene areas. However, these intrusive Creoles do not integrate with the groups where they are living and consequently have little communication with Ladinos or Indigenes outside of their official duties. The fact that the Creoles rarely speak any language but English, while the Ladinos generally know only Spanish, and the Indigenes are monolingual in Kekchi (when they do learn a second language it is Spanish), is a further limitation on communication between the ethnic groups.

Appendix B

The politically significant cleavage in the district population is that between ethnic groups. There is a strong hostility between the Ladinos and the Creoles, and only somewhat less animosity between the Indigenes and the Creoles. Relations between Ladinos and Indigenes are somewhat ambiguous but there is less hostility between the two groups than between either of them and the Creoles. The government is dominated by Creoles and its actions have generally favored this group at the expense of the others with the result that in the Toledo district, almost the entire Creole population is pro-government. Although some Ladinos have succeeded in local commercial activities, political and social status are denied them by the Creoles. The economic and social division between the groups is emphasized by the differences of language, culture, race and religion. Politically, this anti-Creole attitude is reflected in the general disaffection of the Ladino population from the Centralian government and the sympathy felt by them toward the Ladino home country of Montanya. Ladinos have long supported the Centralian Communist Party and form the core of its front labor and peasant unions which are active in the large plantations of Dolores and Big Falls. Even those Ladinos not organized in Communist-controlled fronts, are anti-government and support CCP activities of an insurgent nature. While most of the Indigenes are apolitical and wish only to be left alone, some of the younger men have become involved with the CCP peasant union while working as plantation laborers and will aid insurgent activity, and the Indigenes, as a whole, tend to identify more closely with the Ladinos than with the Creoles who are viewed as totally alien and representative of the repressive government.

SECTION III

AREA LEVEL GOVERNMENT

The operational area commander for the district is the District Commissioner (D.C.), an official appointed to the post by the national government. The District Commissioner has his headquarters in Punta Gorda. He functions both as the chief executive officer and as the judicial officer for the district. There is no local legislative power, as the national parliament is the only body authorized to enact laws. However, in time of a state of siege—which the District Commissioner can declare for 90 days with longer periods requiring parliament's approval—the D.C. is empowered to issue decrees with the force of law in his district.

In carrying out his plans the D.C., as operational area commander, may utilize the following forces.

MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

ARMY

Strength: one battalion on garrison duty in district capital. Its four companies are under strength—100 men each.

Morale and Training: morale low. Soldiers are urban Creoles, untrained for jungle combat or for counter-guerrilla operations.

Firepower: shortage of automatic weapons. No organic artillery. No reliable air support.

Transport: ten 2½-ton trucks, four jeeps, one L–19 observation plane based at Punta Gorda, no water craft, off-road mobility bad; comparative mobility of Army and insurgents indicated on Trafficability Chart.

Communications: headquarters set and four jeep-mounted transceivers operate on police net frequency; no back-pack sets.

Public Relations: army feared by non-Creole population because of past bad behavior, foraging for food and molesting native women.

NATIONAL POLICE

Strength: chief, five officers and non-coms and ten police constables (PC's) in Punta Gorda; single PC's stationed in San Antonio, Barranco, San Pedro Landing and Crique Sarco. All police are Creoles.

Appendix B

Trafficability Chart

	Scrub Bush	High Bush	Milpa/ Wamil	Plantation Lands	Trails	Roads	Swamp	Rivers
Soldiers on foot (Creoles)	1 mph	1 mph	2 mp. day	2 mph	2 mph	3 mph	-------	-------
Insurgents on foot (Ladinos & Indigenes).	2 mph	3 mph	4 mp. day	4 mph	4 mph	5 mph	3 mp. day	-------
Vehicles	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	30 mph	-------	-------
Boats	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	10 mp. day	10 mph

Morale and Training: morale, especially of PC's in rural posts, is low; training deficient, pay low and corruption common.

Firepower: only light armament; pistols, rifles, machine pistols.

Transport: three jeeps; one small motor patrol boat capable of transporting 20 men.

Communications: short wave radio net with sets in Punta Gorda, San Antonio, Barranco, Crique Sarco, San Pedro Landing and on patrol boat. Net unreliable due to poor equipment.

Public Relations: bad with non-Creole population, especially the Ladinos.

PLANTATION GUARDS

Strength: privately maintained police (but under government control during insurgency) on Dolores and Big Falls Plantations. Twenty men at Dolores, 10 at San Pedro Landing, 20 at Big Falls.

Morale and Training: urban Creoles; morale high as long as they receive pay and don't have to fight. No training.

Firepower: shotguns.

Transport: none.

Communications: Big Falls Plantation has radio transmitter tied into national police set.

Public Relations: guards hated by Ladino plantation laborers as guards have used violent means to break up strikes.

VILLAGE POLICE

Strength: varies from village to village (see overlay); young men chosen by mayors of Indigene villages to assist in maintaining order during fiestas and to carry out day-to-day administrative tasks of native government. These village police are not part of the district government and they are responsible to the mayors—not to the D.C.

Morale and Training: service is traditional duty for young men; no pay and no training given.

Firepower: unarmed except for night sticks.

Transport: none.

Communications: none.

Public Relations: good; police respected by co-villagers.

CIVIC ACTION CAPABILITIES

Public Works Department and *Forestry Department* combined have two bulldozers, two 2½ ton trucks, and six jeeps and personnel of two engineers, four rangers and thirty laborers.

Medical Department has a jeep-equipped anti-malaria team of four men. There are poorly trained and equipped Creole rural nurses in San Antonio and Crique Sarco. Only doctor is in Punta Gorda.

Agriculture Department has three agronomists and ten laborers at experimental station near Punta Gorda.

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES

Main lines of government communication with non-Creole population are appointed mayors and government schoolteachers (see overlay for locations). Teachers are Creoles and are pro-Government; mayors are natives of villages and reflect local sentiments and are often uncooperative when the government wants to take some action which displeases them. In Creole area, the government political party has an apparatus in contact with the population. In Ladino "compounds" on plantations, there is no local government, as the plantation managements maintain total control. Political parties are not permitted but the CCP has an underground apparatus of some strength and Communist-dominated peasant unions are well organized. In Indigene areas, there is little organized political activity or political consciousness (except in villages—Otoxha, San Pedro Columbia—close to Ladino areas where the peasant league has won sympathizers among younger Indigenes).

SECTION IV

SCENARIO A

SITUATION: A series of incidents occurring within a week's period of time has been reported to the District Commissioner. These are the first such widespread incidents to be reported for the District although there have been peasant league demonstrations and strikes of increasing severity on the plantations for the past several years.

INCIDENT 1—1 JUNE

The Creole police constable and the schoolteacher in Crique Sarco village were killed by a group of seven Ladino men who arrived in the village in a small outboard powered boat. They wore olive-green uniforms and carried submachine guns of Montanyan make. Speaking in Spanish, they informed the assembled population that they had come to liberate them from the rule of the Creole and foreign imperialist oppressors. They told the people that they must help them in the fight by supplying them with food and by not telling the government anything about them. They said anyone who informed on them would be killed. After burning the police station and the school, they crossed the Temash River and headed north into the bush. They forced four Indigene boys to go with them as guides and carriers for their supplies and the radio they stole from the police station.

INCIDENT 2—1 JUNE

A Ladino plantation laborer at Dolores was found on the main compound street with his throat slit. His wife told officials that her husband had refused to participate in peasant league activities and had been threatened several times recently for refusing to contribute money to "union" organizers (whom she could not identify). The following night, the widow was found strangled with a note pinned to her body stating that a similar fate awaited other "traitors to the people." The plantation guards were unable to obtain any information about the crime.

INCIDENT 3—1 JUNE

A young Ladino man, native to Big Falls, was captured and turned over to the police by the Creole inhabitants of Holy Trinity because he attempted to pass out to them mimeographed leaflets in English that called for an "alliance of Creole and Ladino workers and peasants against the government of the big landlords and foreign plantation owners." The Ladino had recently returned to the district after completing his secondary schooling in Montanya.

INCIDENT 4—3 JUNE

The mayor of San Lucas was assassinated by a group of uniformed, armed Ladinos accompanied by several Indigene youths from Crique Sarco. One of these Indigenes was armed. He spoke to the people in Kekchi and told them that they must help the guerrillas and they would get lots of money and not have to pay taxes when the new government took power. He said that the mayor had been shot because he helped the Creole government and that no one should do that any more or the guerrillas would come back and shoot the new mayor too.

INCIDENT 5—4 JUNE

The malaria control team was ambushed as it left the village of Santa Teresa on its way down the trail to San Lucas. (The team had been sent into the Indigene area by the D.C. as part of a campaign to eliminate malaria–one of the most troublesome diseases in the district.) One member was killed by a burst of submachine gun fire while the others fled back to the village and from there to Punta Gorda.

INCIDENT 6—5 JUNE

The Creole schoolteacher in Otoxha was murdered and the schoolhouse burned during the night. The obviously frightened people told the plantation guards from Dolores that came to investigate the next day that they hadn't seen anyone unusual in the village. The guards found a recently occupied campsite a short way along the trail to San Lucas. Empty ration tins of Montanyan make were scattered around the site.

INCIDENT 7—4 JUNE

A Punta Gorda-bound truck from San Pedro Columbia was stopped by an armed group of five Ladino men. The Creole village schoolteacher, who was among the passengers, was taken off and publicly executed and the people told that he had committed the crime of aiding the foreign imperialists to suppress the workers.

INCIDENT 8—5 JUNE

The unpopular Creole chief of the guard force from Big Falls plantation was shot from ambush as he drove his jeep down the road toward Punta Gorda. That night mimeographed leaflets appeared all over the plantation stating that a similar fate awaited anyone who collaborated with the managers or the guards. The leaflets were signed by the "chief, Ladino workers and peasants resistance league" and were printed in Spanish and English.

Map A—National Boundary of Centralia/Montanya
Map B—Topography
Map C—Political Scientist
Map D—Culture Areas
Map E—Transportation and Communications
Map F—Area Resources
Map G—Incidents

[Located in back of manual]

APPENDIX C

A SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWEES' RESPONSES

This appendix contains (1) a summary of interviewees' relevant background experience, (2) a summary of the responses made by each of the 21 interview subjects, (3) a schematic representation of the decision process of each interviewee, and (4) a summary of the major decision guidelines by each of the interviewees.

A SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWEES' RELEVANT BACKGROUND EXPERIENCE

Interviewee letter code	Relevant background experience	
A	U.S. Army Officer	Advisor in Vietnam (Intelligence).
B	Sociologist	Research on developing countries.
C	Political Scientist	State Department (Middle Eastern Specialist).
D	Social Psychologist	Research in psychological operations.
E	Consultant	Counterinsurgency office (DOD).
F	Psychologist	Research in counterinsurgency.
G	Political Scientist	Operations research in counterinsurgency.
H	Historian	Intelligence experience in Vietnam.
I	Operations Research Analyst.	Prepared insurgency/counterinsurgency case studies.
J	Psychologist	Research in counterinsurgency.
K	Operations Research Analyst.	Participated in counterinsurgency operations in Korea.
L	U.S. Army Officer	Faculty member, U.S. Army Special Warfare School.
M	U.S. Army Officer	Advisor in Vietnam—Advisor Handbook development.
N	U.S. Army Officer	Advisor in Vietnam—counterinsurgency doctrine development.
O	Historian	Prepared insurgency/counterinsurgency case studies.
P	U.S. Army Officer	Unit advisor in Vietnam.
Q	Economist	Faculty member, U.S. Army Special Warfare School.
R	U.S. Army Officer	Faculty member, U.S. Army Special Warfare School.
S	U.S. Army Officer	Assignment in Vietnam (civil affairs).
T	U.S. Army Officer	Advisor in Vietnam (corps level).
U	Consultant	Agency for International Development.

Appendix C

CHART A–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE A

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Situation is unclear. On the one hand, incidents like this are common in underdeveloped countries and the disaffected indigenous intellectual group (for insurgency leadership) is missing. On the other hand, this is the most likely district in which an insurgency would occur and these incidents could be controlled from Montanya.
2. If this is the beginning of a full-scale insurgency, will take five years to get organized. We are starting from scratch.
3. With resources now available little can be done except planning and some preliminary efforts. Troops have questionable reliability, village police are too few in number, national police are not paragons of virtue, and equipment is inadequate.

OBJECTIVES

1. Initiate development of an effective intelligence net.
2. Take actions to control the situation.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Establish a basic intelligence organization.
2. Recruit village police and request national police reinforcements.
3. Show-of-Force.
4. Propaganda theme of "insurgents are trying to destroy education".

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Organizational makeup of intelligence will extend from the district level down to the village level.
2. Operational procedure will decide where, in what numbers, and for what roles the national police reinforcements will be used.
3. Train and employ available military troops.
4. Use village police and plantation guards for Show-of-Force and security.
5. Hire Indigene and Ladino teachers for use in employing propaganda theme.

CHART A–2: OUTLINE

A INITIATE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE NET


1. Establish a basic intelligence organization.
   1a Organizational makeup will extend from the district level down to the village level.

2. Recruit village police and request additional national police.
   2a Operational procedure will decide where, in what numbers, and for what roles these police reinforcements will be used.

B TAKE ACTIONS TO CONTROL THE SITUATION

3. Use Show-of-Force concept.
   3a Train and employe available military troops.
   3b Use village police and plantation guards.
4. Propaganda theme "insurgents are trying to destroy education."
   4a Hire Indigene and Ladino teachers.

Chart A–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee A



Appendix C

CHART A-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE A

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
The long-range objective (5 years) is to establish an effective intelligence net.	Must be built from scratch. A good intelligence net could find out when incidents would occur and stop them before they happened. An intelligence net could be bought with funds. However, such a quick solution would be a compromise and the net would be quickly penetrated.
I would request national police reinforcements.	We are short-handed in the national police. I would be loath to request army reinforcements. Only add to the training problem. Civil police are capable of operating as paramilitary units while retaining their normal police function. I would make it clear that civil administration is fully capable of handling situation.
Use troops as Show-of-Force only, not for commitment to Indigene/Ladino areas.	Troops have questionable reliability; are untrained in counterguerrilla operations; are of a different ethnic group, strained relations with Ladinos and Indigenes; would be "lost" in woods, they are urban oriented. Can't protect whole district with 400 troops. Therefore, only Show-of-Force possible.
Use unarmed village police to preserve a semblance of law and order.	They can handle petty crimes. The people would probably have more confidence in the district government. The number is too small to conduct effective guerrilla operations; therefore, no sense in arming them. An untrained armed village policeman would either shoot somebody he shouldn't or be shot and have his weapon taken by an insurgent.
Recruit Ladinos and Indigenes as teachers.	This would support our theme "insurgents are trying to destroy education" if more teachers are killed. Counteract possible insurgent theme "Creoles are trying to dominate us." Teaching quality may suffer but it would possess a psychological advantage.

CHART B–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE B

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. The primary goal of the insurgency is to overturn Creole political and economic dominance of the country and subsidiary goal is to enlist the Kekchi-speaking Indigenes into the struggle.
2. Social evolution isn't far enough along to encourage much economic development and local self-government. However, long-term development efforts will be required before an adequate attack can be made on the roots of the insurgency itself.
3. Definite inadequacies exist in the district's military readiness posture, lack of engagement in meaningful civic affairs, and a failure to accept Ladino or Indigene recruits into its ranks.
4. The primary problems are: (1) to control the number of incidents occurring between Ladinos and Creoles, and (2) removing the basic causes of these incidents.

OBJECTIVES

1. The overall objective is to bring the social structure of the country under more effective control and to create a stake in the national society for the Indigene and Ladino peoples.
2. An intermediate objective is to gain control of the whole process of transition from the agrarian Indigene status into the plantation economy.
3. The immediate objectives are twofold: (1) to gain rapid intelligence about insurgent incidents; and (2) to control the number of incidents.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. To drive a wedge between Ladino insurgent and Ladino noninsurgent; and between Ladino insurgent and Kekchi Indian by use of accurate and rapid propaganda dissemination and Indigene recruitment.
2. Allocation of troops to the most sensitive areas.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Employ propaganda themes to change image of army while stressing that terrorism originates with Ladinos.
2. Recruit village police for protection and train Indigenes for health and simple teaching tasks.
3. Train troops to increase mobility, ambush capabilities, and sense of spirit.
4. Allocate troops to three most sensitive areas.
5. Recruitment and replacement of personnel.

Appendix C

Chart B–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee B.




CHART B–2: OUTLINE

A CREATE A STAKE IN NATIONAL SOCIETY FOR INDIGENES AND LADINOS

B GAIN CONTROL OF THE AGRARIAN-TO-PLANTATION TRANSITION PROCESS

1. Propaganda and recruitment to drive a wedge between insurgent and noninsurgent peoples.
   - 1a Change image of army while stressing that terrorism originates with Ladinos.
   - 1b Recruit village police for protection and train Indigenes for health and simple teaching tasks.

C GAIN INTELLIGENCE AND CONTROL INSURGENT INCIDENTS

2. Allocate troops to the most sensitive areas.
   - 2a Train troops to increase mobility, ambush capabilities, and sense of spirit.
   - 2b Allocate troops to Punta Gorda, the capital, and San Antonio, Dolores Village, and Holy Trinity.
   - 2c Recruit Ladino intelligence operatives; replace plantation guards with national troops.

CHART B-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE B

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Gain control of the agrarian to plantation transition process.	Most dangerous is the movement of Indigenes into Ladino status. This increases the possibility of recruiting Indigenes into the insurgency. It is necessary to intervene in a number of basic social processes here, both to understand these processes and to try to gain control over them.
Gain intelligence and control insurgent incidents.	This is necessary for taking steps to bring the social structure under more effective control. Effective control of the area is required since the terrorists will attempt to destroy the vehicles of national construction in this area as they emerge; whether as physical resources or as personnel able to bring skills into the area.
Recruitment of village police to increase protection capability.	This may not be feasible since it goes counter to institutional arrangements of the society in that traditionally the role of the village police has been casual in nature and would seem to resist institutionalization.
Train Indigenes and Ladinos in health and very simple teaching tasks.	It is critical to involve the Kekchi-speaking natives and Ladinos with a national effort to raise the level of society. Teachers and health personnel are key operatives. The terrorists realize this in view of the attacks they're making upon mayors, teachers, and health workers.
Allocation of troops to the three most sensitive areas: San Antonio, Dolores Village, and Holy Trinity.	To stabilize the northwest part of the district, a heavy population center of Indigenes; restrict insurgent strikes against the plantations in the area; control the two southern river systems and road system.
Recruit Ladino operatives for intelligence.	Skeptical that recruitment of Ladino operatives will be successful for some time because of (1) the basic cleavages that exist between Creoles and Ladinos and (2) the Ladinos are either under a severe state of terror or supporting (passively or actively) the insurgency; and we must control incidents to find out which is the case.

Appendix C

CHART C–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE C

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. It is potentially an insurgency situation because it fits the pattern; assisted from the outside, antigovernment in nature, incidents are widespread with most in the rain forest area, and involve a program of terror by a minority group (Ladinos).
2. There's a certain amount of Creole pro-government support. However, there is a problem because at the national level the Creoles are more or less numerically dominant yet here at the district level (Toledo) the Indigenes are 50 percent, Ladinos 30 percent and Creoles 20 percent, by distribution.
3. This is a national problem because the insurgency is Montanya-sponsored and -supported; the insurgent objective is to overthrow the government, and because the district resources are inadequate.

OBJECTIVES

1. Obtain external assistance.
2. Slow down insurgent development and reduce incidents.
3. Institute long-range programs to reduce insurgency potential among Ladinos.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Seal off plantations and border to reduce both Ladino-caused incidents and Montanyan support of insurgency.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Send evidence of insurgency to state, recommending that OAS dispatch a border observer group.
2. Declare martial law and have police who speak Ladino/Indigene languages pass the word as to the situation and how they (plantation owners and population) should behave.
3. Mobilize police and military and locate them along the border.
4. Take both persuasive and physical control actions to slow down insurgent development in peasant and labor unions primarily.

Chart C–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee C




CHART C–2: OUTLINE

A OBTAIN EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

1. Inform national government of situation and request OAS-supervised border surveillance patrols.

B SLOW DOWN INSURGENT DEVELOPMENT AND REDUCE INCIDENTS

2. Seal off border and plantations.
3. Plantation control activities.
   - 3a Dispatch Ladino-speaking police to plantations to persuade owners to encourage democratic unions
   - 3b Initiate use of rewards for information concerning insurgents
   - 3c Persuade plantation owners to slow down Communist labor activity.
4. Border control activities.
   - 4a Mobilize police and military near border
   - 4b Distribute forces with respect to transportation and communications facilities
   - 4c Institute a stiff penalty system of identification

4d Concentrate on sealing border around Pueblo Viejo and Dolores
4e Recruit a few Ladinos and Indigenes to insure effective communications with population
4f Move capital temporarily to Crique Sarco
4g Improve the roads

C INSTITUTE LONG-RANGE PROGRAMS TO REDUCE INSURGENCY POTENTIAL AMONG LADINOS

5. Establish an information program (pro-government propaganda) through Ladino schools and unions.
5a Start use of leaflets and radio programs to establish contact among Creoles, Ladinos, and Indigenes
5b Hire Ladino and Indigene teachers
5c Improve lumber industry if good prospects exist

CHART C-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE C

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
This insurgency situation requires immediate national involvement.	The insurgency is supported by a foreign power, e.g., Montanya. There is not adequate national level policy or guidance provided to the district government and there are inadequate resources at the district level.
Mobilize national police and military; locate them along the border.	Support is coming from Montanya; we want to seal off the border if possible. Mobilizing the forces would permit more effective border coverage rather than assigning forces to specific places. Base the location of troops on communications and transportation facilities. Attempt to cut off insurgent movement and communications. Use of Creoles as the force in "hostile" area would encourage a sense of self-defense. Predict a low incidence of defections among the patrols. Hope that the Show-of-Force can "scare" the Ladinos and Montanyans.
Establish national police force at plantations.	Ladinos are the active source of the insurgency. The Indigenes are passive. Provide a continuing working base for persuading plantation owners to support the Democratic Union group. Use this deployment to encourage "communications" among Creole officials and Ladinos and Indigenes. Institute a stiff penalty system of personnel identification and inform district that we're following same system the British used in Malaya. Set up a system of rewards for information on insurgents and insurgent supporters.
Move capital temporarily to Crique Sarco.	For control purposes, i.e., control of plantations. You have transportation and can use the river if necessary. You have an airstrip. It's close to a major concentration of Ladinos.

Appendix C

CHART D-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE D

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Incidents are being created by a well organized insurgent group, either Montanyan-led or -supported, seeking to disrupt Centralian government control of area.
2. The insurgency is centered in the Ladino population but seeks to mobilize Indigenes into a Ladino/Indigene front against the Creoles. Incidents have been successful in engendering terror and cooperation in target populations.
3. Geographic pattern of incidents is mostly in Indigene area and Ladino plantations which indicates careful planning as these are out of range of rapid counterinsurgent response.

OBJECTIVES

1. Long-term objective is to remove existing cleavage between the Ladino and Creole populations and to eventually absorb Indigenes.
2. Major short-term objective is to control Ladino population so they cannot be recruited to the insurgency or give aid to insurgents.
3. Secondary short-term objective is to protect all three ethnic groups from insurgents.
4. Mid-range objective is to increase popularity of area government in eyes of Ladinos.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Use army to seal off Ladino areas to prevent infiltration and exfiltration of insurgents.
2. Reduce government identification with purely Creole interests; aimed at Ladinos mainly.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Declare state of siege to legitimatize necessary counterinsurgent actions.
2. Allocation of troops to Ladino plantation areas.
3. Use troops to establish patrols and checkpoints.
4. Use boat to block Sarstoon River to infiltration.
5. Legalize unions and encourage collective bargaining on plantations.
6. Recruit Ladinos into army.
7. Prohibit government counter-terror.
8. Propagandize government's reform efforts.

Chart D–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee D




CHART D–2: OUTLINE

A REMOVE CLEAVAGE BETWEEN LADINO AND CREOLE POPULATIONS

B INCREASE AREA GOVERNMENT'S POPULARITY WITH LADINOS

1. Introduce reforms.
   - 1a Allow unions and collective bargaining on plantations
   - 1b Recruit Ladinos into army
   - 1c Prohibit counter-terror against population
   - 1d Propagandize government's role in making reforms

C CONTROL LADINO POPULATION

D PROTECT ALL ETHNIC GROUPS FROM INSURGENTS

2. Seal borders of Ladino areas.
   - 2a State of siege
   - 2b Troops to Big Falls, Dolores, San Pedro Landing
   - 2c Set up patrols and checkpoints
   - 2d Boat blocks on Sarstoon River

Appendix C

CHART D-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE D

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Increase area government's popularity with Ladinos.	Is only lasting solution to insurgency; other measures only serve to hold down magnitude of insurgency.
Control Ladino population.	Ladinos are focus of insurgency; source of recruits for insurgents. Indigenes are less likely to be organized by insurgents.
Protect all ethnic groups from insurgents.	Will enhance government's prestige. Can be best done by sealing Ladino areas off from rest of district.
Allow unions and encourage collective bargaining on plantations.	Try to persuade plantation managers that it's in their self-interest to comply. If they refuse, use army to force compliance. Prohibit nondesirable union activities, e.g., Communist control.
Recruit Ladinos into army.	Will make military representative of whole population instead of single group.
Propagandize government's role in making reforms.	Necessary to exploit maximum effectiveness of these limited measures.

CHART E-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE E

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. A series of eight incidents indicates the launching of a coordinated subversive campaign supported by terror in two areas of the district. The gravity of the situation cannot be over-emphasized. If immediate countermeasures are not taken, the subversives may win through fear.
2. Incidents appear to be the work of two small bands of Ladinos, possibly armed and trained by Montanyan agents.
3. The District Commissioner position here is a hopeless one in which he can only take short-term measures which will have no lasting effect unless a basic national program is put within the capability of the government to adopt and pursue.

OBJECTIVES

1. Land reform.
2. Establishment of a second political party.
3. Free elections.
4. Achievement of a homogeneous-tending population.
5. Containment of dissidence at insignificant level.
6. To discover and destroy the hard-core leadership, organizational apparatus, and operational procedures of the insurgents.
7. The government must do its best to protect its own officials in remote areas and demonstrate that it can protect the area population from the insurgents. This is a short-term measure to be undertaken immediately.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. The United States and Britain will provide capital for the purchase of the foreign plantations.
2. The indifferent Creole middle class and the disaffected but non-Communist rural Ladinos will unite to form the new party.
3. Create a population which will consider itself Centralian rather than Creole, Ladino or Indigences.
4. Foster and assist the Democratic Union to counteract and suppress the Communist-dominated peasant league.
5. The important thing is to set up informant nets quickly for identification and control of subversives.
6. Utilize battalion by splitting it up into four areas to train village defense units as a short-term approach to protection.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. The government will purchase the plantations, organizing a corporation to operate larger units, but much of the land will be made available for rural workers to eventually own.
2. Support and expedite passing over of Indigenes to Ladino identity.
3. Open army, civil service, and management to Ladinos and Indigenes.
4. Upgrade and broaden the educational system.
5. Teach English in primary schools to Ladinos and Indigenes.
6. Form a rural Ladino branch of the Democratic Union.
7. Utilize village police to get intelligence from peasants.
8. Use schoolteachers as go-betweens for military and national police.
9. Establish joint counterinsurgency intelligence unit.
10. Dispatch anti-guerrilla forces to hunt insurgents.

11. Send daylight patrols to outlying villages.
12. Establish curfew during hours of darkness.
13. Forward produce to market on rivers.

Chart E-2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee E




CHART E-2: OUTLINE

A LAND REFORM

1. Economic aid from United States and Great Britain.
   1a Government will purchase plantations and make them available to rural workers.

B ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECOND POLITICAL PARTY

2. Creole middle class and non-Communist Ladinos will unite.

C FREE ELECTIONS

D ACHIEVEMENT OF A HOMOGENEOUS - TENDING POPULATION

3. Create a population of Centralians.
   3a Support passing of Indigenes to Ladino identification
   3b Open army, civil service, and management to Ladinos and Indigenes
   3c Upgrade educational system and open it to all
   3d Teach English in primary schools to Ladinos and Indigenes

E CONTAINMENT OF DISSIDENCE AT INSIGNIFICANT LEVEL

4. Foster and assist Democratic Union.
   4a Authorize recruiting in plantation compounds

F DISCOVER AND DESTROY INSURGENTS

5. Establish informant nets.
   5a Utilize village police to gain intelligence from peasants
   5b Schoolteachers act as go-betweens for military
   5c Establish joint counterinsurgency intelligence unit
   5d Dispatch anti-guerrilla forces to hunt insurgents

G PROTECT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND POPULATION

6. Deploy battalion into four areas to train local village defense units.
   6a Send daylight patrols to outlying villages
   6b Establish curfew during hours of darkness and set up night security ambushes at village approaches
   6c Use river mobility

Appendix C

CHART E–3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE E

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Establishment of a second political party.	The new party will be liberal labor in outlook.
Free elections.	A British electoral mission will supervise the elections for an indefinite period.
Achievement of a homogeneous-tending population.	All Creole officials must be impressed with the need to win the respect and gratitude of the Ladinos and Indigenes.
The important thing is to set up informant nets quickly for identification and control of subversives.	Rather than trying to guard the border, it would be much better to establish this informant net and contact these infiltrators as they come into the villages. That's the place to catch them under these circumstances: where your few assets are.
Discover and destroy insurgents.	We want to prevent an insurgency of this low intensity from rising to the Viet Cong intensity because when it reaches those proportions we have no assurance of victory.
Utilize village police to make contact and pick up information from peasants.	The answer doesn't lie in the realm of the military. It lies in the realm of the village police. They are closer to the people than the military.
Utilize battalion by splitting it up into four areas to train village defense units as a short-term approach to protection.	There'd be a very grave problem with the animosity between the Ladinos and Creoles if this battalion were put out in the villages this way. It is unwise, but what else are you going to do? It's the only asset you have and you have to do something.
Use rivers to forward plantation produce to market when possible.	The guerrillas do not appear to have a sufficient capability at this time to bother a river steamer.

CHART F-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE F

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. The objectives of the insurgents appear to be twofold: (a) elimination of pro-government functionaries in the Indigene area and (b) use of terrorism to neutralize (silence) the Indigenes.
2. Doubt that we can make much headway in the Ladino area. The Indigene area is the target of the insurgents.
3. Assume that the uniformed insurgents are Montanyans, that they are hard-core cadre, that they are going to operate from a base near San Lucas, and that they count on support coming down from Big Falls and up from Dolores.

OBJECTIVE

1. Stop expansion of insurgency into Indigene area.


BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. To construct combined attitudinal and physical (security) walls between Ladino and Indigene areas.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Deny Ladino access to the San Lucas area and obtain intelligence.
2. Protect the population and win Indigene support.

Chart F-2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee F



Appendix C

CHART F-2: OUTLINE

A STOP EXPANSION OF INSURGENCY INTO INDIGENE AREA

1. Construct combined attitudinal and physical (security) walls between Ladino and Indigene areas.
2. Deny access, and obtain intelligence.
   - 2a Train 200 troops in guerrilla warfare and language recognition
   - 2b Use boats and trucks to secretly move troops to locations
   - 2c Enact operational procedures of supply and resupply, occupation of positions off access trails for stopping and searching of Ladinos only; release Indigenes
   - 2d Do all interrogation at Punta Gorda
3. Protect population and win Indigene support.
   - 3a Select 100 troops, train them in language, attitude development, and civic action
   - 3b Assign 100 troops in Indigene villages, 100 troops in Punta Gorda and troop missions
   - 3c Coordination of police/military/plantation guards for security procedures; supply and resupply of troops
   - 3d Enact educational and medical aid civic actions

CHART F-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE F

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Indigene area is the target of both insurgents and District Commissioner.	Most incidents occurred in Indigene area. Ladino area is already "controlled" pretty much by insurgents. District troops are not trained counterinsurgents and Ladino area is too well organized.
Secret movement of troops into Indigene area.	If movement of troops is known they can be easily bypassed or ambushed by insurgents. We will position troops along the trails. They are not well enough trained to be mobile.
Locate groups of 10 men each along all major trails leading to San Lucas.	Assuming that San Lucas area will be the initial base of operations for hard-core insurgent leaders. Cutting off communications (via capture of insurgent messengers) may flush cadre to find out what is wrong. Captured Ladinos may provide enough intelligence to have parliament pass a law extending the martial law period.
Provide attitudinal and language training to 100 selected troops.	In order to enable troops to live in villages with functionaries and Indigenes, to win support of Indigenes, and to facilitate protection of the population.
Assignment of 12 men per village in 7 selected villages; in the southwestern and northeastern areas.	Basic strategy is to seal off attitudinally and by force these Indigene villages against adjacent Ladino areas, to stop expansion of insurgency.

CHART G-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE G

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. These acts of violence characterize Phase 1 of an insurgency.
2. Situation is characterized by political instability, economic instability, and infiltration of Communists from Montanya with the objective of taking over through insurgency.
3. To win, I must have outside help. I may not win even then.

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OBJECTIVE

1. Avert Phase 2 and stamp out phase 1.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Involves a specification and ordering of different requirements (sub-goals) to be met. The first requirement is intelligence, next security operations, then political propaganda and finally border surveillance.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Set up intelligence and counterintelligence net; development, funding, and conduct.
2. Establish security, training, assigning, recruiting, and supplying forces.
3. Political representative; mission and assignment.
4. Establish 24-hour border surveillance: aircraft and patrols.

Chart G–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee G




CHART G–2: OUTLINE

A AVERT PHASE 2 AND STAMP OUT PHASE 1

1. Set up intelligence and counterintelligence net.
   1a Development of net; responsible personnel; senior detachment officer, police constable, and mayor

1b Funding of operation; money from government, handled by police constables
1c Reconnaissance procedure; fixed day and roving night patrols; combined military and village police
1d Prisoner interrogation; local mayors and police responsible
1e Plantation participation; coordinate intelligence efforts

2. Security operations (protection).
2a Assignment of troops; locations
2b Number of troops per assignment
2c Increase of forces; recruiting Indigenes and Creoles
2d Training of forces; training areas, types of training
2e Supplying forces; weapons to Indigenes

3. Political propaganda.
3a Mission of political representative
3b Assignment of political representative

4. Border surveillance.
4a Daylight border patrol: aircraft and operating base
4b Night surveillance units: operating bases

Appendix C

CHART G-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE G

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Set up an intelligence net.	Of first priority in providing security.
Get funds for intelligence operations.	If you haven't money, you can't get intelligence. And if you can't get intelligence, you can't win.
Plantation participation in intelligence effort.	Secure cooperation by informing plantation owners and operators that they are here at the deference of the government. Plantation owners have the money to buy intelligence information.
Deploy troops to villages.	Size of security force in each village depends on disaffection of populace, loyal authorities, (police constable and mayor), tactical location of village, and size of village.
Draft Indigenes and Creoles into military.	Would not draft only Creoles because there are not enough, and politically, people wouldn't like it if only Creole troops were involved. Must increase size of military.
Place one political representative with each security detachment.	To assure population of the government's awareness of the political difficulties and to determine what civic actions should be taken in the area. To give the people confidence in the government.

CHART H-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE H

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Assuming that these are the first terroristic acts, we are faced with a new insurgency.
2. District Commissioner needs leadership and human resources to achieve any solution.

3. Not capable of protecting the border or mounting a military operation. Only hope is to protect the townspeople.
4. Estimate that the strength of the insurgents is about one platoon.

OBJECTIVES

1. Establish a sense of nationalism among ethnic groups (long-range objective).
2. Institute educational programs (short- and long-range objectives).
3. Institute population control (immediate objective and the one given attention).

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Using a pseudo-insurgent force, the government generates incidents among the population. These incidents are used to indicate to the people the need for government-sponsored population control for protection of the villagers. By doing this the government establishes their representatives in the areas to enable destruction of the insurgent force and carrying out of the longer-range objectives.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. After each area is secured, let the people elect own mayor.
2. Selection of personnel for the pseudo-insurgent force.
3. Establishment of population control measures (flood control, registration, etc.).
4. Buildup and training of the military troops.
5. Establishment of a covert intelligence net.
6. Development of a self-defense corps.

CHART H-2: OUTLINE

A ESTABLISH A SENSE OF NATIONALISM AMONG ALL ETHNIC GROUPS

1. After each area is secured, let people elect own mayor.

B INSTITUTE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

C POPULATION CONTROL

1. Create a pseudo-insurgent force (basic to population control).
   - 1a Select 20 of best-trained Spanish-speaking men, use polygraph as aid
   - 1b Copy insurgent uniform
   - 1c Create "incidents"; start at Big Falls; vary approach
   - 1d Assign psychological warfare specialist; publicity and propaganda

Appendix C

2. Assign troops for population control.
   - 2a Build battalion up to strength
   - 2b Train troops; population control and jungle fighting
   - 2c Assign 12–20 troops per village
3. Population control aspects.
   - 3a Food control
   - 3b Registration of population
   - 3c Outlaw Communist Party
   - 3d Assign liaison individual to plantations; advise, inform, and train
   - 3e Make village mayor a member of District Advisory Committee
4. Establish self-defense corps (after population control effective).
   - 4a Recruit Ladinos; led initially by Creole officers
   - 4b Assign personnel to other than home towns
   - 4c Self-defense corps mission is to protect while troops seek out and destroy remaining insurgents
5. Establish intelligence net.
   - 5a Hire a small group of covert operators
   - 5b Establish bounties for insurgents
   - 5c Establish intelligence net concurrent with initiation of population control; one intelligence operator per town
   - 5d Convince mayor to give information

Chart H–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee H




CHART H-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE H

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Will allow people to elect mayor after area secure from Communists and insurgent supporters.	Provides a goal for the people to work toward. Encourages cooperation with the government.
Education of the people is important; emphasis on getting Ladinos, Indigenes, and Creoles to work together in the interest of the government.	It promotes nationalism and lateral cultural linking of the different ethnic groups. The promise of education has often been successful in getting support.
A pseudo-insurgent force will create "incidents" in the Ladino area.	Only way to get people to accept population control with minimum resources available. Gives the government a pretext to move in and claim that population control is necessary to (1) protect the people, and (2) "stamp out" the insurgents.
A specialist in psychological warfare (public relations) is needed to support the pseudo-insurgent force strategy.	Situation requires effective propaganda and publicity to get the people to accept population control. Incidents created by the pseudo-insurgent force are not sufficient. Need a specialist to handle possible charges by the insurgents that the government is causing the incidents.
The mayor in each area is automatically made a member of the District Advisory Council.	Provides a vehicle for identifying grievances of the people. Should encourage cooperation from the mayor since he automatically has a stake in the government.
Members of the self-defense corps (recruits) will operate in other than their home towns where their families live. Food control is an effective population control measure.	Government will support families to show appreciation. If self-defense corps individual defects, family suffers the consequences. Can be used to neutralize people; when used in conjunction with propaganda that such control is needed to stamp out the insurgency. Can help finance the operation by using some of the "controlled food" to feed the troops.
Registration of people is an effective population control measure.	A great deal of overt information can be gathered by making everybody register.

Appendix C

CHART I-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE I

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. The rapid and widespread occurrence of incidents indicates that the insurgency has advanced from just the smoldering stage to the stage of active hostility.
2. The Indigene area is closest to Montanya; most easily subject to infiltration, and five of the eight incidents have occurred there.
3. Situation reveals a lack of rapport between the various population groups and the central government.
4. With limited police force and limited resources it will be difficult to do anything substantial.

OBJECTIVES

1. To protect local officials and citizens.
2. To convince the people that the government and people are working together for the same goal.
3. To establish a good informant net.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

To combine the above three objectives into one integrated operation tailored to best meet the unique plantation problem and one operation tailored to meet the Indigene village situations.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Supplement available police with military units and indoctrinate them in way of behaving so as to win the cooperation of the people.
2. Indicate to the plantation workers the sincere desire of the government to allow a certain degree of self-government and representation in the affairs of state.
3. Organize workmen councils, town meetings, and a self-defense league. Use these as a basis for developing an intelligence net.
4. Organize a combined Indigene village defense, and a village level improvement program.

CHART I-2: OUTLINE


A PROTECT LOCAL OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS

B EMPHASIZE COMMON GOAL OF GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE AND MUTUAL PARTICIPATION

C ESTABLISH A GOOD INTELLIGENCE (INFORMANT) NET

1. Integrate the above three objectives into one operation geared specifically for plantations and one geared for Indigene villages.

Chart I–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee I



2. Plantation-oriented operation.
   - 2a Supplement available police with military units and provide indoctrination to win support of people
   - 2b Encourage participation of plantation workers by establishing such groups as workmen councils, self-defense leagues, and holding town-type meetings
   - 2c Develop intelligence (informant) net using above groups as sources for informants
   - 2d Assign bulk of available police and military to plantations until Communist agents and supporters ferreted out
3. Indigene village-oriented operation.
   - 3a Convince Creoles it is to their best interests to take a more lenient attitude toward the Indigenes
   - 3b Assign police/military units along hostile border areas in a static protection disposition
   - 3c Assign either a joint technical group (defense, intelligence, and rural development functions) or one individual who combines these skills to the Indigene village rural development effort

Appendix C

CHART I-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE I

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Organize workmen councils, town meetings, and self-defense league on the plantations.	Concentrate most of the available military and police strength on plantations until you have a chance to ferret out Communist agents and troublemakers. Indicate a sincere desire of the government to allow a certain degree of self-government. Need cooperation of plantation owners to be effective. Use these organized groups to form basis for informant net. Convince people that solutions to their problems rest partly in their hands and partly in the government's hands; encourage active participation.
Establish presence of police and military forces close to hostile borders.	Let the people see that the government is interested in trying to protect them. Must do the best we can to stop acts of violence and murders. Visualize the force being used in a static protecting role rather than as a conventional mobile force.
Thoroughly indoctrinate police and military in ways of behaving so as to win cooperation of the people.	Without cooperation of people, we will lose control of situation entirely. Indoctrination may be done successfully through lectures. Convince Creoles that it is to their best interests to take a more tolerant attitude toward the Indigenes.
Organize Indigene village defense and a village level improvement program.	Indigene area is closest to Montanya and most incidents have occurred there. The idea of local autonomy for Indigene villages would be desirable in which outside advisory help is provided and in which Creole/Indigene contact is held to a minimum and only done by carefully instructed and indoctrinated Creoles. Use either a joint technical group composed of a person skilled in defense; one skilled in intelligence; and one skilled in rural community development or one person who combines these skills.

CHART J-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE J

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Insurgency is based on Ladino population. Ladino villages are organized and insurgent leadership is there. These incidents presage similar incidents in all villages but principally in the Indigene area. The extent of insurgent penetration of the Indigenes is unclear from the scenario but it appears that this is a struggle between the Ladino and Indigene ethnic groups which should facilitate the government's winning of Indigene cooperation.

OBJECTIVES (To be simultaneously implemented)

1. To discover the insurgent leadership.
2. To protect government functionaries in the villages.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Immediately dispatch small army units to villages to protect functionaries from terrorists.
2. Set up intelligence collection system using mayors and soldiers.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Start retraining part of the army for counterinsurgency operations; develop ability to get along with Indigenes, language training, intelligence collection training.
2. Mayors given command of local army units.
3. Set up village councils of notables to help mayors with intelligence, civic action, and propaganda.
4. Supply mayors with propaganda to help win intelligence from population. Emphasize ethnic split between insurgents and Indigenes.

CHART J-2: OUTLINE

A PROTECT GOVERNMENT VILLAGE FUNCTIONARIES

1. Dispatch small army units to threatened villages.
   - 1a Give soldiers rapid indoctrination in need for better public relationship with Indigenes
   - 1b Larger units at Ladino villages as these are focus of insurgent organization

B DISCOVER INSURGENT LEADERSHIP

2. Set up intelligence net using village mayors and soldiers.
   - 2a Retrain army for counterinsurgency operations
   - 2b Give mayors command of local army units

2c Set up village councils to aid mayors in collecting intelligence
2d Supply mayors with propaganda materials to help win popular support in collecting intelligence

Chart J-2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee J




CHART J-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE J

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Protect government village functionaries.	If we fail to do this, insurgents can take over area by use of terror alone.
Set up intelligence net using mayors.	District Commissioner must learn extent of insurgent penetration of Indigenes. Mayors are familiar with local habits and patterns and can quickly detect insurgent activity.
Retrain army for counterinsurgency operations.	Teach army to behave better toward Indigenes. Teach army to speak Kekchi to aid in public relations and intelligence collection.
Supply mayors with propaganda materials to win popular support for intelligence collection.	Play up theme of Ladino/Indigene ethnic differences; Ladino terrorists are attacking Indigenes.

CHART K–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE K

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Incidents are preliminary stage of a Ladino-based, Montanyan-supported effort to overthrow Creole dominance of the economic and political affairs of Centralia in which the Ladinos currently have no stake. Insurgent plan is to achieve de facto control of the Indigene area thus isolating Creoles in narrow coastal strip.
2. The Creole population is loyal to the government and their area can be held, but otherwise the District Commissioner has insufficient resources to handle situation locally. Intelligence facilities and available troops hopelessly inadequate.

OBJECTIVES

1. Lessen vulnerability of society to insurgency.
2. Isolate insurgents from population.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Reorganize the area to give Ladinos a stake in the economic and political status quo.
2. Utilize Creole area as government activity sanctuary.
3. Deny villages to insurgents.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Expand economy, investing at 5/3 ratio in improving conditions of Creoles and Ladinos.
2. Provide government loans to village cooperatives to increase production.
3. Force landowners to change system so as to rent land to laborers and buy produce at fair prices thus creating class of small independent plantation operators.
4. Enfranchise Ladinos.
5. Arm Creole civilians as militia to patrol area and prevent Ladino infiltration (thus freeing regular army).
6. Place army garrisons in every village in Ladino and Indigene areas to isolate guerrillas from supporters.
7. Institute population control and surveillance measures.

CHART K–2: OUTLINE

A LESSEN AREA'S VULNERABILITY TO INSURGENCY

1. Reorganize area to give Ladinos stake in the economic and political status quo.
   1a Expand economy
   1b Government loans to village cooperatives

1c Create class of independent small plantation operators
1d Enfranchise Ladinos

B ISOLATE INSURGENTS FROM POPULATION

2. Utilize Creole area as government activity sanctuary.
   2a Army Creole civilian militia
3. Deny villages to insurgents.
   3a Place army garrisons in all Ladino and Indigene villages
   3b Institute population control and surveillance measures

Chart K-2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee K




CHART K–3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE K

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Lessen area's vulnerability to the insurgency.	Long range objective but the District Commissioner probably lacks authority or resources to achieve it.
Expand the economy of the district.	If you expand the economy, you can give Ladinos a share without alienating Creole supporters of government. Divide increment on 5/3 ratio = 5 shares to Creoles, 3 to Ladinos.
Enfranchise Ladinos.	This must be done carefully or insurgents will exploit move.
Utilize Creole area as government activity sanctuary.	Only feasible short-term solution but will probably play into insurgent hands by further dichotomizing the population and creating a situation for interethnic group civil war.
Deny villages to insurgents.	Since the population is village-bound, denying villages to insurgents will force them to rely on Montanya for support exposing the extent of outside intervention.

CHART L–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE L

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. The situation is one in which a small, elite group is attempting to retain control of the economic assets of the country and is faced with a two sided dilemma as to the best way in which to maintain that control: One side being the fact that their bread and butter power is based upon alliance with Great Britain and the U.S.; the other side being that the very nature of the resources they wish to retain control of are worked by people who resist the situation as it now exists. Without substantial changes in the situation there is going to result a loss of economic benefits from the plantations. The paradox being that if changes are worked this will probably result in the loss of support of Great Britain and the U.S. because their interests in the plantations are the ones at stake.

Appendix C

OBJECTIVES

The apparent mission is that I, as District Commissioner, am part of a group of people who wish to retain their position in power.

1. Our immediate objective is to protect our power base, the plantations.
2. Secondly, the protection of Creole citizens and government workers.
3. A longer range objective would be changing the attitudes of the Ladinos toward the Creoles' rightful place in the society of Centralia.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Improve plantation worker's life and give him stake in government.
2. Remove all Creoles from Kekchi areas.
3. Initiate education programs for Ladino improvement.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Focus social welfare personnel on plantation areas.
2. Obtain an analysis of insurgency movement for future plans to control and protect plantations.
3. Assimilate relocated Creoles into government facilities and activities within the Creole area.

Chart L–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee L




CHART L–3: OUTLINE

A PROTECT PLANTATIONS

1. Give plantation workers a stake in government.
   1a Focus public works personnel on plantation area
   1b Study enemy for future protection plans

B PROTECT CREOLE CITIZENS AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES

2. Pull all Creoles out of Kekchi areas.
   2a Assimilate them into government facilities and activities within Creole area

C CHANGE ATTITUDES OF LADINOS TOWARD CREOLES

3. Initiate education programs for Ladinos with Creole sponsored improvements.

CHART L–3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE L

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Our immediate objective, as a Creole, is to protect our power base, our plantations. This is the focal point.	The only government there is the Creole, and I am charged with these men. This economic base appears to be one of the sole reasons for our calling ourselves a government of Creoles. So from that point of view, the first thing I would have to do would be to protect the power base which is the economic plantation life.
The protection of Creole citizens and government functionaries.	All these activities going on over in the Kekchi area are of relatively minor importance. The one possible national interest, looking at it from the Creole point of view, might be the protection of Creole citizens.

CHART L–3—Continued

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Pull Creole citizens and government functionaries back out of Kekchi areas where they might be ambushed.	We have, right now, in many of the towns in the areas where there are Kekchis, government leaders and schoolteachers. What do we need them there for, why bother with these people at all? We Creoles don't think these people are worth anything at all and are a lower form of human life if they're life at all. We should never consider attempting to incorporate or assimilate the Kekchis into the total national society, attempt to let them mix racially or socially with the Creoles. As a Creole I don't care about these other people. They're of no concern to me, in that Creole world view is of eventual Creole extension into the entire country.
In relocating Creoles, assimilate them into government facilities and activities within the Creole area.	The facts don't indicate that there is any unrest or dissatisfaction among the Creoles themselves. They like it here and we will try to make it better. That's the long range program notwithstanding the insurgency. If I begin to get complaints now as an indirect effect of this insurgency then I'll have to attend to that in its proper light.
A longer range objective would be the changing of the attitudes of the Ladinos toward the Creoles' rightful place in the society of Centralia.	There should be a definite effort to make these people realize their proper station in life. Right now they not only hate the Creoles, but see no interdependence with the Creoles. If we're going to have a viable society they're going to have to recognize the importance of the Creoles to them.

CHART M–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE M

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. There is absolutely no policy or guidance from the national level. We do not have anything at or from national level which indicates an awareness of an insurgency in the area.
2. Based on scenario, we've got all the indicators of a difficult insurgency. We've got rallying cries, organization, terror, ambushes,

assassinations, and propaganda directed against government representation at the district level designed to separate the population from the government.

3. District resources are poorly organized, poorly equipped, poorly led, poorly trained, and insufficient to combat this situation.
4. Lack of political representation of Indigenes and Ladinos and the separation among the three ethnic groups is a major problem.

OBJECTIVES

1. Long range objective is to integrate the ethnic groups through political representation.
2. Immediate requirement is to make national level aware of situation and obtain policy, guidance, and resources necessary to control the situation.
3. Operational objectives include protection of plantations and villages, establishing an intelligence net and indoctrination and training of personnel resources.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Establishment of a representative district level committee to plan, coordinate, allocate, and control resources and direct all counterinsurgent activities.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Invoke martial law to effect integration of plantation guards, national police, and village police.
2. Indoctrinate and train own forces in role of protection, awareness of situation, civic actions, and intelligence.
3. Insure comprehensive representation of own resources, villages, and ethnic groups in the district counterinsurgent committee.

CHART M-2: OUTLINE

A MAKE NATIONAL LEVEL AWARE OF INSURGENCY

B INTEGRATE ETHNIC GROUPS THROUGH POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

C OPERATION OBJECTIVES OF PROTECTING POPULATION, DISCOVERING INSURGENTS, AND INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL RESOURCES

1. Establish a representative district level committee.
   B1 Insure comprehensive representation on the district committee.
      1a Include plantation representatives, military, village mayors, national police, public works, forestry, medical, and agricultural departments

C2 Protect plantations and villages.
- 2a Invoke martial law to integrate plantation guards, national police, and village police
- 2b Dispatch two companies to protect the two plantations
- 2c Set up an alert system with available communications equipment

C3 Indoctrinate and train own forces.
- 3a Use information program to indoctrinate
- 3b Reorganize and train military and police forces to coordinate activities and be able to protect, gather intelligence, and work effectively with civil population

C4 Establish intelligence net.
- 4a Attract some population individuals to form some sort of informant net on insurgent activities
- 4b Use intelligence net to identify personnel active in subversive organization

Chart M–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee M




CHART M-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE M

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Develop a representative district level committee.	To insure effective control and coordination of area resources. To insure maximum personal participation and to prove "we're getting together and now we're together and we're one." To establish long range objectives and develop overall counterinsurgent plan. To break down animosity between government and population groups. To involve ethnic groups in a form of political representation. To lay the basis for establishing typical political instruments in the area.
Integrate village police with national police and plantation guards.	Village police are in good standing with the villagers. Need to pool security (protection) force. All need common training and village police need weapons.
Need policy guidance, authority, and resources from national level.	Need authority to implement many of the ideas; e.g., training of plantation personnel by military, or later on instituting overall registration, food control, and other population control measures. Do not have the resources to accomplish many of the needed objectives. Need national guidance in helping to assess available resources, to integrate country-wide efforts, and to establish ways of correcting the political problem.

CHART N-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE N

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. We're in phase one insurgency, approaching phase two, right on the boundary; possibly in phase two just having left phase one. A guerrilla band has manifested itself.
2. If we were held down without any kind of government support or any recognition by the central government that the support was necessary, we would always be behind the level of insurgency.

The guerrilla would take the initiative and we would follow, match force with force, rather than applying forces en masse against his possible development to get rid of him and the causes of insurgency.

3. One of the things that bears out fairly well is external support from Montanya, because of the rations, the uniforms, and weapons.

OBJECTIVES

1. Provide internal security for the population.
2. Deny insurgents materiel and manpower support.
3. Remove causes for lawlessness and disaffection of population.
4. Maintain production within district during this insurgency.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Establish a planning group consisting of representatives of all three ethnic groups to set the policies and rules which will govern the actions and operations to counter the insurgent problem. The integration of your disaffected population into this planning group will help to engender their support for the government.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Initiate intensive training programs for military/parliamentary.
2. Redeploy forces into threatened area.
3. Recruit Ladinos and Indigenes into civil and military forces.
4. Secure intelligence information.
5. Integrate Ladinos into government positions.
6. Improve Ladino environment and educational opportunities.
7. Educate Indigene for economic development program.
8. Bring plantation guards under greater government control.

Chart N–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee N




CHART N–2: OUTLINE

A PROVIDE INTERNAL SECURITY

B DENY INSURGENTS SUPPORT

C REMOVE CAUSES FOR DISAFFECTION

D MAINTAIN PRODUCTION

1. Establish an integrated planning group.
   - A1 Training program for military/paramilitary
   - A2 Redeploy forces into threatened area
   - A3 Recruit Ladinos and Indigenes into civil/military
   - A4 Secure intelligence
   - C1 Integrate Ladinos into government
   - C2 Improve Ladino life
   - C3 Educate Indigenes
   - D1 Bring plantation guards under greater government control

Appendix C

CHART N-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE N

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Establish a planning group consisting of representatives of all three ethnic groups to set the policies and rules which will govern the actions and operations to counter the insurgent problem.	There's a significant cleavage in the population and as a result an incipient guerrilla warfare exists. The reduction of friction, cleavage between the populations is a principle that you carry through all of your organization operations. No operation, particularly in a counterinsurgency operation, can be done in sequence, one step at a time; but many of them overlap and many of them are integrated activities, one supporting the other. I would try to be selective of the leaders that I would tap to represent these particular groups and hold sessions with them, and maybe talk to them separately and then together and build a concept of togetherness.
Initiate intensive training program for police, military and civil forces.	An overall assessment of military indicates decentralized organization. No mutual support of coordinated activity. Quality of forces is poor and quantity available is inadequate to provide security in this situation.
Provide internal security for the population within the district.	Security is the most immediate need of the population and if the government is incapable of providing physical security for all the members of its population then the government loses face and is ineffective in performing one of its primary missions.
Redeploy the military forces into the threatened area.	This is a concept of a military operation that was thrust upon me by the fact that I am faced with the immensity of doing my best to provide security for the population. This will certainly diminish my capabilities to perform offensive tactics because it will water my forces down and disperse them.
Recruit Ladinos and Indigenes into civil and military forces.	The composition of my forces is inadequate. It's strictly a single ethnic group represented. Creoles are the members of the military, paramilitary, and the civil governmental forces.

CHART O–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE O

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Incidents are widespread with as few as two groups and maybe as few as ten men creating the incidents. Insurgents are well organized with an external supply source (Montanya).
2. District Commissioner has a Ladino/Creole problem with the Indigenes as the pawn. District Commissioner needs the support of the Creoles, must make friends with the Ladinos and be discreet with the Indigenes.
3. District Commissioner is limited by authority and resources to implementing short range tactical objectives. District Commissioner's emergency powers are restricted primarily to internal security and administrative rather than ability to effect any fundamental changes in a social or economic sense.

OBJECTIVES

1. To protect government functionaries and population.
2. To win support of the area's population.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Use available and volunteer forces to physically control egress and ingress between Ladino, Indigene, and Creole areas.
2. Encourage Ladino and Indigene participation in political affairs.
3. Investigate the feasibility of reclaiming unused land and providing it to Ladinos who actively support the government.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Retrain 400 Creole military forces.
2. Recruit Ladinos for army.
3. Organize Creole civil defense units.
4. Apply "seal-off" tactics.

Appendix C

Chart O–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee O




CHART O–2: OUTLINE

A PROTECT GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES AND POPULATION

1. Seal off area and control egress and ingress.
2. Improve forces; training and organization.
   - 2a Retrain 400 Creole military force
   - 2b Establish military force into 15-man units to guard village (larger villages may need 2–3 squads)
3. Increase; establish volunteer program.
   - 3a Get Ladinos for army
   - 3b Organize civil defense units with Creoles
4. Discover; apply "seal-off" tactics.
   - 4a Village and boundary "seal-off" tactics to enhance discovery of insurgents

B PERSUADE PEOPLE TO SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATE IN GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

5. Encourage political participation.
6. Investigate economic possibilities, e.g., land for Ladinos.

CHART O–3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE O

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Execute a combined village and boundary protection plan, i.e., ethnic boundaries.	Would prevent insurgents from developing a village base. If the schoolteachers, mayors, and local officials are not protected, they will be eliminated and the entire area adjacent to Montanya will become an insurgent base. Combined village and ethnic boundary protection increases the chances of "catching" the insurgents. If you show concern and interest in the interior (Indigene area) it may start a positive ground swell for the government. May be easier to start in isolated areas.
Assignment of forces.	Leave 100 troops in Punta Gorda. This is Creole area and relatively safe. Send 3 squads to San Pedro Landing. It is a problem area and has 1,000 people, also it is important economically and has had incidents already. Send 2 squads to Big Falls. This is a problem area, important economically, and has had incidents. Set up a civil guard to protect the entire Creole area. Completely volunteer in nature. Need 100 men on guard and 100 in reserve.
Persuade Ladinos and Indigenes to support and participate in the government.	Education is a prime requisite; especially for Ladinos who are anxious to climb and need a place to go. Prorate civil service jobs for Ladinos on a proportionate basis. Must involve them in political affairs. Indigenes should be politicized, taught to speak English, and provided some form of local government. It would be easier for the Creoles to form an alliance with the Indigenes than with the Ladinos.
Make squad sizes about 15 men per village.	These 15-man squads will force the insurgents into larger size groups of about 20 men. It will be easier to track them. Fifteen men in a squad is large enough to form a defensive unit and still assert civic action in the Indigene area.

Appendix C

CHART P-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE P

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. This would be the beginning of the exploitation phase of the insurgency. The insurgents are making positive moves to assert their authority or influence over the populace. Everything prior to this had been clandestine. They have just reached the stage, either through training or outside or internal support, where they can actually start exploiting or they feel they can start exploiting.

OBJECTIVES

1. Protect government personnel and interests in the district.
2. Find and destroy the insurgents and their sympathizers in order to protect government personnel and interests.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Gain the confidence and sympathy of the local population by removing the causes of dissatisfaction which are giving the population reasons for leaning toward a subversive force or the Communist Party.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Deploy the battalion throughout the district as a Show-of-Force.
2. Replace Creole village mayors with local inhabitants.
3. Integrate Ladinos into army and government.

Chart P–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee P




CHART P–2: OUTLINE

A PROTECT GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS

B IDENTIFY AND DESTROY INSURGENTS

1. Remove causes of dissatisfaction.
   - 1a Deploy battalion as Show-of-Force
   - 1b Use local inhabitants as village mayors
   - 1c Integrate Ladinos into army and government

Appendix C

CHART P-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE P

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Gain the confidence and sympathy of the local population by stopping the causes of dissatisfaction which are giving them reasons for leaning toward the insurgent force or Communist Party.	The only way that I can beat the insurgent force is to gain the confidence of the local populace. By doing this, the insurgent force will not be able to exist because the local populace knows what's going on in the area far more than would any military forces. They know who the outsiders are, when they come and when they leave and once I have the confidence of the locals I feel the insurgency will die of natural causes.
Protect the government personnel and interests throughout the district.	The insurgents are making a drive to eliminate as many of the schoolteachers and minor officials as they can; possibly as an effort to gain control of these locals through terror and prove to them that the government in power is not capable of protecting its own people much less the indigenous people in the area.
Deploy the battalion throughout the area as a Show-of-Force.	The company at the capital would be the base company and they would train all incoming personnel, plus themselves, on a rotational basis. This way I would always have an immediate ready force available at my headquarters. Within a year I should be able to rotate all the companies through and have all incoming personnel trained through a localized training center. From area bases they would patrol out and attempt to influence the local inhabitants.
Integrate Ladinos into army and government.	This would be a long-range program. It would probably help clarify some of the dissatisfaction. These people have been there for quite a while and they have no part within the government.

CHART Q–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE Q

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. I would say that this is an early stage-two insurgency situation. It appears that gangs are infiltrating from the neighboring country or there's a base in the neighboring country. It is a fairly low level intensity and some kind of counterinsurgency operation ought to be geared at this particular level.
2. Since the Creole population is very solidly behind the government, and the Indigene population is outside the political process, the focal point of the problem is the Ladinos. It appears that there is some type of organization supported quite heavily by the neighboring country of Montanya.

OBJECTIVES

1. Suppress the insurgency activities at this early stage.
2. Remove the causes of dissatisfaction among the population; mainly the Ladinos.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. Establish joint police force whose function will be the overall direction of military counterinsurgency activities.
2. Immediate short-range psychological operations program to gain time for implementation of future improvement programs.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Deploy troops to areas hit by insurgent activities.
2. Establish intelligence network in a central location.
3. Indoctrinate troops to build morale and tighten discipline.
4. Integrate Ladinos and Indigenes into political structure.
5. Establish commissions to study possible agricultural and educational reforms and improvements.
6. Establish institutions to perpetuate social and political integration, e.g., Democratic Unions.

Appendix C

Chart Q–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee Q




CHART Q–2: OUTLINE

A SUPPRESS INSURGENT ACTIVITY

1. Establish joint police force.
   - 1a Deploy troops
   - 1b Establish intelligence network
   - 1c Indoctrinate troops

B REMOVE CAUSES OF DISSATISFACTION

2. Initiate psychological operations program.
   - 2a Integrate Ladinos and Indigenes
   - 2b Study reforms and improvements
   - 2c Perpetuate integration

CHART Q-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE Q

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Establish a joint police force including all levels of military, whose function will be the overall direction of military counter-insurgency activities.	My first impulse would be to say that since this is a fairly low level situation, it should remain in the hands of the civilian. But if you're going to send a major contingent of military forces into any one area the logical situation would dictate that the military take over this particular area. At this particular point, the civilian head of the government—I believe it's a governor stationed in the provincial capital—should run the show.
Immediate short range psy ops program to gain time for implementation of future improvement programs.	Try to give these people a feeling that their grievances are recognized by the provincial government, that real steps are being worked out to integrate them and give them their political and social rights. This would be primarily a symbolic operation. This entire program would depend very heavily on a reorientation on the part of the central government. Your major resistance would lie precisely in Ladino ignorance or Creole resistance. I think a government would have to take into consideration that it might have to curtail some of the rights of the Creoles. The one long-term objective that occupies me most is the psychological aspect of it. Not in the sense of psychological operation but in the sense of the establishment of an intensive national belonging. In the past this has been permitted either to grow organically without any specific attempts to push it or handle very crudely. The Indigene people would be the major ones to be worried about. This, I think, ought to be handled by the government very early.
Integrate Ladinos and Indigenes into the district political structure.	In all realism we ought to expect that they would go to a one-party system because traditionally these people have lived under an authoritarian paternalistic system and the changeover to a diffused authority along the parliamentary system is simply too rapid to be taken quickly. The thing to do is to set very strong safeguards around the self-determining processes.

Appendix C

CHART R-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE R

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. This would appear as though it is the start of phase two; where the underground organization has developed sufficiently so guerrilla activity is occurring in an organized, reasonably periodic manner.
2. The fact that there has been a vast amount of propaganda already disseminated and that there has been agitation among the labor unions indicates outside support. Also the fact that there are already some guerrilla operations going on which are being either inspired or controlled by an outside country would indicate that probably the situation is much more serious than the limited information would indicate.

OBJECTIVES

There are two broad encompassing objective areas: military and nonmilitary.

1. The military objective is to retain control of this area.
2. The nonmilitary objective is to win the support of the population and cut their relationship with the insurgents.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

In order to implement the various solution techniques, two organizations are proposed:

1. An operations center to coordinate and unify the military efforts.
2. Civil military advisory committees to disseminate information and psychological programs to the population.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Divide the district into subsectors assigning security priorities.
2. Seal off the Montanya border.
3. Integrate and coordinate intelligence/counterintelligence.
4. Establish informal population informant nets.
5. Integrate Ladinos into Creole government.
6. Broaden the district's economic base.
7. Offer greater educational opportunity to Ladinos.
8. Increase medical and sanitation facilities.
9. Institute population control measures.

Chart R-2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee R




CHART R-2: OUTLINE

A RETAIN CONTROL OF DISTRICT

1. Establish operations center.
2. Divide district into subsectors.
   2a Seal off Montanya border
3. Coordinate intelligence/counterintelligence capabilities.
   3a Set up informant nets

B WIN SUPPORT OF LADINOS

4. Set up civil-military advisory committees.
   4a Integrate Ladinos into government
   4b Broaden economic base
   4c Offer greater educational opportunity
   4d Increase medical and sanitation facilities
   4e Institute population control

Appendix C

CHART R–3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE R

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Civil-military advisory committees should be set up to disseminate information and psychological programs to the population.	We would encourage and work very hard at having the influential personnel the opinion makers on the advisory committees. I would propose to have the religious leaders, local mayors, perhaps the doctors, school personnel, union officials, and so on. Then whenever we have civic action projects or any other opportunities we would convey this information through our regular channels to the people.
Broaden the political base by integrating Ladinos into government.	You don't have the popular support from the Ladinos and this is an area that's needed from the standpoint of removing the causes of insurgency. One of the most difficult aspects here, a purely political aspect, is an obvious attempt to maintain the *status quo*. The *status quo* is the basis for much of the problem.
Institute population control measures to cut guerrilla-population relationship.	A series of measures will be imposed, depending upon the urgency of the condition in a particular location, involving restrictions on the use of firearms, critical material, possibly even food. Should these be used, it is important that the information programs attempt to transfer the blame or responsibility for these unpleasant restrictive measures to the guerrilla. Impose no restrictions unless they can be enforced and unless they're absolutely essential and raise them as quickly as possible.

CHART S–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE S

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. The murder and terrorism on a small scale all adds up to a Phase 2 insurgency at the present time. Something has to be done and done quickly. I don't want to jump into things and act fast

but if you ever do knock off an insurgency, the time to do it is now; when it's growing and developing.

2. Undoubtedly you have your hard-core guerrilla; probably very few. You also have your labor unions which are leaning toward Communism or Communistic supporters. With your Communistic neighbor to the west, there's probably some leadership coming in for an insurgency movement.

OBJECTIVES

1. Destroy the insurgency with available military/paramilitary forces.
2. Eliminate grounds for dissatisfaction as a long-term objective.
3. Provide a secure environment.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Establishment of an Area Security Coordinating Center which would enable us to come up with a task-force-type organization to best combat this insurgency.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Develop antiguerrilla forces
2. Increase intelligence capability by using plantation guards and village police
3. Deploy the battalion to be able to react in a shorter time
4. Initiate civic action projects using civilian and military forces
5. Implement education and training programs for young
6. Reorganize military into one overall internal defense plan

Appendix C

Chart S–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee S




CHART S–2: OUTLINE

A DESTROY INSURGENTS

B ELIMINATE GROUNDS FOR DISSATISFACTION

C PROVIDE SECURE ENVIRONMENT

1. Establish Area Security Coordinating Committee.
   - A1 Develop antiguerrilla forces
   - A2 Increase intelligence capability
   - A3 Deploy battalion strategically
   - B1 Initiate civic action projects
   - B2 Educate and train young
   - C1 Reorganize military into one overall internal defense plan

CHART S-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE S

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Establishment of an Area Security Coordinating Center which would enable us to come up with a task force type organization to best combat this insurgency.	The makeup of the center would include myself, as the head military individual; mayors of key towns; government teachers; possibly one or two of the influential plantation owners; the head of the national police and other similar type leaders in the district. I believe that if we got them down together and they started to actively participate they could make the problems of their people known and we could start functioning as a team and try to straighten this mess out. The Center would want to come up with recommendations for the army, contribute to their knowledge and give them a feeling that who they represent are in this fight also. Pick their brains and centralize control so I'm just dealing with one man in the national and village police.
Use both civilian and military in initiating civic action projects.	We would almost have to use both, due to the lack of communication and the three languages spoken.
Implement an education and training program especially for the young.	Get the youth on the government side by showing them they're not growing up in a blind alley. Give them opportunity.
Augment the intelligence capability of this battalion by using the plantation guards and village police to pick up information.	I would certainly want intelligence information but we're talking about three different ethnic groups. A large number of incidents that are taking place are in the primarily Indigene area, people who have their own dialect that is unknown to me. They cannot understand me, they cannot understand my soldiers.
Get the battalion out of the city and strategically place the companies where they could act in a shorter reaction time to any event.	The battalion is evidently in the towns and you're not going to find the guerrillas or the insurgents in the towns. With the battalion located in the metropolitan area and the lack of mobility, by the time they reached one of these incidents, not counting the lag that undoubtedly occurs due to the lack of communications, they would be completely ineffective.

Appendix C

CHART T-1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE T

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. This is a country that is facing a Communist insurgency and it has reached the stage where there are active guerrilla bands roaming around in the country. We've had several instances of various activities by guerrilla bands at such a frequency that it would indicate that the government would have to act with rapidity in order to save this country from a full-blown guerrilla warfare and insurgency.
2. The political, economic, and social conditions in the country all form a natural base for insurgency.

OBJECTIVES

1. There is one main encompassing objective: Establish an overall counterinsurgency plan for the district which will include both short-range and long-range programs; the district plan being in accordance and coordinated with any national plan or national objectives for counterinsurgency.
2. Create a condition of internal security within the district.
3. Enact an environmental improvement program.
4. Identify and neutralize insurgent underground force.
5. Improve the image of the military.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPT

1. Creation of one or more Area Security Coordination Centers at the district level under the District Commissioner, which would have the overall responsibility of devising a district counterinsurgency plan and coordinating activities necessary to obtain the counterinsurgent objectives. Working with the Area Security Coordination Centers at the district level will be civilian and military advisory committees as a link to the opinion-formers in the populace.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Divide district into four subgeographical areas with the Area Security Coordination Center established at the center of influence within these areas.
2. Have representation of major groups in district on ASCC.
3. Deploy battalion by companies into the four district areas.
4. Broaden representation on the political base and eliminate corruption.
5. Broaden educational opportunities for Ladinos and Indigenes.

6. Give more government support for labor and land reform.
7. Establish information or propaganda programs.
8. Establish a counterintelligence force using informant nets.
9. Establish a nationally controlled border control force.
10. Isolate the guerrillas from the population through population and resources control.
11. Initiate community development program using military to work with and for the civilian populations.
12. Recruit local personnel into police/military and let them operate in their home areas.
13. Correct the attitude and behavior of troops toward local population.

Appendix C

Chart T-2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee T




CHART T-2 OUTLINE

A ESTABLISH OVERALL COUNTERINSURGENCY PLAN

B CREATE CONDITION OF INTERNAL SECURITY

C ENACT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

D IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE INSURGENT UNDERGROUND

E IMPROVE IMAGE OF MILITARY

1. Establishment of one or more Area Security Coordination Centers.
   - 1a Divide district into four subgeographical areas
   - 1b Represent major groups in district on ASCC
   - B1 Deploy battalion into the four subdistrict areas
   - C1 Broaden political base representation
   - C2 Broaden educational opportunities
   - C3 More government support for labor and land reforms
   - C4 Establish information or propaganda programs
   - D1 Establish counterintelligence force
   - D2 Set up border control force
   - D3 Initiate population and resources control
   - E1 Initiate community development program
   - E2 Recruit local personnel into police/military
   - E3 Correct behavior of troops

CHART T–3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE T

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
The district has to be divided into four subgeographical areas with the Area Security Coordination Center established at the center of influence within these areas.	The overall plan and guidance have to come from the District Commissioner for these Area Coordination Committees. The direction of the whole effort of the ASCC should be left to the civilians. Within each of the subdistricts the District Commissioner would be carrying out within his own area the objectives laid down by the overall counterinsurgency plan. This is one of the fundamentals of decentralized operations in an insurgency situation.
The battalion will be broken down so that each of the companies will have a territorial mission to restore and maintain law and order within each of four subgeographical areas.	We'd have to recruit or draft and bring the battalion up to strength. The army battalion should be an integrated force—Creoles, Indigenes, and Ladinos. The ideal is to get the military out where they can be effective and certainly they're not effective now, sitting down in the district capital; when in cooperation with the national and village police and plantation guards, they can make it extremely hazardous for any guerrilla band to operate in that area.
Establish government information or propaganda programs to inform people as to the objectives of the government.	To counteract the propaganda that's being used by the insurgents. An information program can give the shock impact you're looking for.
Establish a counterintelligence force using informant nets.	There's one principle that we always follow, that is the coordination at the district or national level any time you set up an informant net so you don't have people hiring or trying to approach other people's agents. This is why this counterintelligence force would be coordinated by the Area Security Coordination Center.

Appendix C

CHART U–1: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES BY INTERVIEWEE U

SITUATION DIAGNOSIS

1. Insurgency is being supported from the outside. Insurgents have freedom of movement across the border.
2. We're going to have to start from scratch. We have untrained national police, poor communications, plantation guards not under control of national police, military force in poor shape, poor relationships of military and paramilitary forces with all three ethnic groups, little mobility, Indigenes who are passive, a limited but passable land transportation system (for foot movement mostly) and three good waterways for boat transportation.
3. Without national help, we're sitting ducks.

OBJECTIVES

1. To win support of the area's peoples.
2. To establish reasonable control over the district.

BASIC SOLUTION CONCEPTS

1. To develop and implement an integrated local plan and to request necessary additional national assistance to win support of the area's population.
2. To devise (1) a mobile security force, (2) an intelligence capability and (3) a procedure for protecting the area's population.

SUPPORTING SOLUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES

1. Determine the district's social and economic needs and develop a coordinated and cooperative effort among existing military, paramilitary, and civil agencies.
2. Train troops and convert them into a mobile (fast acting) security force.
3. Request plantations to develop good housing, schools, hospitals, and provide medical service to everybody.
4. Integrate village and national police into an area protection force.
5. Utilize villages, clergy, military, mayor and civil personnel in establishing an intelligence capability.

Chart U–2: A Schematic Representation of the Decision Process of Interviewee U




CHART U–2: OUTLINE

A WIN SUPPORT OF THE AREA'S POPULATION

1. Develop a coordinated local plan.
   - 1a Conduct a series of planning conferences among civil and military district representatives; assess capabilities and needs, particularly health and economic needs
   - 1b Request plantations to develop adequate housing, schools, and medical facilities
   - 1c Use military to provide materiel support to mayors; such as money, food, or supplies for self-help

B ESTABLISH REASONABLE CONTROL OVER THE DISTRICT

2. Devise a mobile security force.
   - 2a Get available security forces in the best shape possible
   - 2b Concentrate force and provide it with available mobility for fast reaction to incidents
3. Develop a self-protection capability.
   - 3a Integrate village and national police into self-protection forces

3b Assign qualified noncommissioned officers to organize these small self-protection units

3c Send military and national police commanders to check on plans and readiness for self-protection

4. Develop intelligence capability.

4a Utilize villagers, clergy, military, mayors, and civil servants to establish intelligence capability

CHART U-3: SUMMARY OF MAJOR DECISION GUIDELINES BY INTERVIEWEE U

Objectives/solutions/techniques	Reasons/considerations/amplifications
Win support of the area's population.	Try to develop a sense of cooperation and coordination among the district and village representatives. Determine most critical health and economic requirements of the villages via mayor and request needed support of the national level.
Request plantations to provide good housing, schools, and medical facilities.	Not only good for the country but also for the plantation companies. I have observed this practice done with plantations and mines in foreign countries and it works well.
Integrate village and national police into self-protection units.	I would attempt to enlist cooperation of village police by appealing to their desire to protect their own people. I can't depend on appealing to their loyalty to the government.
Develop small integrated national and village police for self-protection.	These villages don't require very large self-protection units. Use non-commissioned officers to organize units. Send military and police commanders to check protection plans and state of readiness. Issue just enough weapons for self-protection. Exercise care in issuing weapons. Insure loyalty of personnel. Forty or fifty men are quite sufficient to protect a village even when you don't have good intelligence. Much less is needed if you have even fair intelligence.

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
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


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
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


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


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


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1 ARMY BATTALION
CENTRAL HOSPITAL
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION
POLICE PATROL BOAT


AREA RESOURCES

NATIONAL POLICE CONSTABLE	PC
HEALTH POST	H
VILLAGE MAYOR	M
VILLAGE POLICE	P
SCHOOL TEACHER	S
PLANTATION POLICE OR GUARDS	C
VILLAGE POPULATION	100-1300

1" = 4 miles

F
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