CHAPTER 6

Tactical Intelligence

TO BE EFFECTIVE, the commander must know the battlefield. He must surprise the enemy and catch him at a disadvantage as often as possible. He must avoid the enemy's strengths and exploit his weaknesses. To do so, he must know the area of operations, the conditions, and the nature, capabilities, and activities of his enemy. He must know when and where to concentrate combat power. This information is obtained through intelligence activities. Intelligence provides the basis for tactical and operational decisions. This chapter describes the areas of interest and influence and the information-gathering resources of each level of command. It also discusses how the intelligence system links different echelons of command. Finally, it surveys how the commander uses intelligence operations and tactical counterintelligence (CI) to see the battlefield.

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SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE

Commanders normally consider the battlefield in terms of the time and space necessary to defeat an enemy force or to complete an operation before the enemy can reinforce. Commanders should view the battlefield as having two distinct areas: an area of *influence* in which commanders fight the current battle and a larger area of *interest* in which commanders carefully monitor enemy forces that might affect future operations.

Areas of influence and interest are important because they normally contain the forces and features which constitute essential elements of information (EEI). They are means of focusing a unit's collection effort on the most important terrain or enemy units during an operation. The actual dimensions of influence and interest areas vary with the factors of METT and reflect the design of each operation. Time is the primary consideration. Higher headquarters convert time to distance so that reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition resources can focus to support the concept of operations. At corps level, for example, an operation generally takes 3 to 4 days. Therefore, the corps area of influence extends for about 72 hours beyond the FLOT, covering an area within which the corps will fight enemy formations that influence the operation.

AREAS OF INFLUENCE

In an area of influence, commanders locate and monitor the progress of those enemy formations that can affect their current operations, fighting them when necessary with organic and/or supporting means. The actual area of concern will vary in size with the nature of the terrain, the mobility and dispositions of the enemy, and the capability of the friendly unit to react to enemy actions. Commanders monitor enemy forces beyond the FLOT or attack objectives according to the criteria below.

Level of Command		Time Beyond FLOT or Attack Objectives
Battalion	-	up to 3 hours
Brigade	-	up to 12 hours
Division	-	up to 24 hours
Corps	-	up to 72 hours
Echelons above corps (EAC)	-	up to 96 hours

AREAS OF INTEREST

Areas of interest extend beyond areas of influence. They include adjacent territory occupied by enemy forces capable of affecting a commander's operations in the near future. Commanders' guidelines for these limits appear below.

Level of Command		Time Beyond FLOT or Attack Objectives
Battalion	-	up to 12 hours
Brigade	-	up to 24 hours
Division	-	up to 72 hours
Corps	-	up to 96 hours
EAC	-	beyond 96 hours

Each echelon of command receives information about enemy forces in its area of interest primarily from higher and adjacent commands. This information may also come from tactical units, other services, allies, or national agencies. It is provided to operating units through the all-source intelligence center (ASIC) system.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Continuous reconnaissance is the responsibility of all commanders. With or without specific orders, every unit must be prepared to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) with every means at its disposal. RSTA obtains reliable information about the enemy and the area of operations as quickly and as completely as possible. With this information commanders estimate enemy capabilities and courses of action. Reconnaissance seeks to discover the types, strengths, organizations, and behaviors of enemy forces and their locations, directions, and speeds.

The RSTA must be directed. The commander must establish priorities for the EEI he needs. He should task each reconnaissance activity or subordinate unit to work first on the information essential for continued operations. The more rapidly the situation changes and the more far-ranging and mobile combat operations are, the more important reconnaissance becomes. Commanders routinely report essential RSTA results to subordinate and adjacent units, as well as to the next higher echelon of command.

BATTALION

The battalion needs information about the enemy forces it is fighting or may have to fight. Tank and infantry companies, scouts, ground surveillance radar (GSR) sections, patrols, and artillery fire support teams (FIST) are the organic and supporting forces that obtain most of the information in the battalion area of influence. The battalion reports such information to its companies, adjacent battalions, and the brigade. The brigade and division provide area of interest information to the battalion.

BRIGADE

A divisional brigade may have no organic reconnaissance or security forces. The brigade obtains information about the area of influence from subordinate battalions, divisional or corps intelligence units, supporting field and air defense artillery units, divisional or corps cavalry, and adjacent brigades. The brigade reports the information it collects to its battalions, adjacent brigades, and the division. The division or corps reports area of interest information to the brigade.

DIVISION

In the attack, the division interdicts echelons, reserves, and other enemy combat and combat support forces that are positioned in depth and can affect the operations of its brigades. In the defense, the division interdicts enemy follow-on forces to disrupt and delay them before they can join the battle.

Division commanders should locate enemy—

- **Regimental, divisional, and army command posts.**
- **Reserves.**
- **Cannon and rocket artillery (particularly nuclear and chemical delivery units).**
- **Air defense, radio electronic combat, aviation, airborne, and airmobile units.**
- **Service support forces in, or moving to, the division's area of influence.**

The division reports such information to subordinate units, adjacent divisions, and corps.

The division's own troops and the RSTA efforts of adjacent divisions and the corps provide area of influence information about enemy activities and terrain to the division. The primary intelligence collection assets of the division are its—

- **Subordinate brigades.**
- **Cavalry squadron.**
- **Military intelligence battalion.**
- **Divisional artillery (especially its target-acquisition units).**
- **Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance platoon.**
- **Air defense battalion.**
- **Divisional engineer and aviation units.**

Tactical air reconnaissance, corps, and echelons above corps (EAC), including national systems, may also provide necessary information about locations, strengths, and movements of enemy forces and projections on when they will enter areas of influence.

CORPS

The corps is generally the first level of command where reports from national and tactical intelligence systems come together. Analyzing this information, an attacking corps commander directs, coordinates, and supports divisions operating against enemy combat and combat support forces. In the defense, the corps interdicts follow-on enemy forces, disrupting and delaying them before they can join the battle.

Within his areas of influence, a corps commander attempts to locate the enemy's—

- **Division and army command posts.**
- **Nuclear and chemical delivery systems.**
- **Radio electronic combat units.**
- **Logistics installations.**
- **Communications centers.**
- **Frontal aviation operations centers.**

A corps gets this information from—

- **Subordinate divisions and brigades.**
- **Armored cavalry regiments.**
- **Artillery units.**
- **Military intelligence groups.**
- **Aviation groups.**
- **Engineers.**
- **Adjacent corps.**

Tactical air reconnaissance, the reports of theater air defense brigades, and the assets of


higher levels of command and allied forces also contribute to the corps intelligence effort.

A corps provides the information it collects to divisions, adjacent corps, and echelons above corps. A corps needs to know what enemy forces are in its area of interest, where they are going, and when they are expected to enter the corps area of influence. Echelons above corps, including national systems, provide this intelligence.

ECHELONS ABOVE CORPS (THEATER ARMY AND ARMY GROUP)

Division ground units and corps assigned reconnaissance and surveillance units can provide much of the information out to 150 kilometers beyond the FLOT. Military intelligence and cavalry units, which have primary responsibilities for intelligence collection, carry much of this load. Information and intelligence about the enemy and areas beyond 150 kilometers from the FLOT are provided to EAC and below by Army intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) organizations at EAC. The Army IEW structure at EAC fills US combat, support, and national requirements and provides intelligence for use by US joint and allied commands. Army IEW units at EAC interface with US Air Force and US Navy intelligence operations; they can also function with allied military forces and host nations. Army IEW units at EAC work with units from other US services and from national agencies and request collection coverage from them as required.

Army IEW units at EAC are tailored to fit specific needs of the commands at EAC. IEW at EAC supports both corps forces and Army units at EAC. The IEW organizations can also support a US unified or joint command and other US service components. IEW support to combined operations is conducted in accordance with multinational agreements, bilateral agreements, and less formal arrangements between two or more nations.



THE INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

The intelligence system coordinates the collecting means of subordinate levels of command, taps external sources and supporting assets of higher levels of command for intelligence, and analyzes the information from all sources. It links all levels of command together through ASICs which provide rapid and reliable intelligence for tactical commanders.


Intelligence, however, is not necessarily the same as combat information. Raw data that can be used for fire or maneuver as received, without interpretation or integration with other data, is combat information. Combat information is used for the rapid tactical execution of maneuvers and fire support in response to the immediate enemy situation. Once validated, integrated, compared, and analyzed, raw data may become intellience. In some cases, the same data can be both combat information and intelligence.

Systems of intelligence and electronic warfare support measures (ESM) acquire a great deal of combat information. Those systems must provide immediate information to commanders for combat action, and they must also forward the information for processing by intelligence production centers.

Combat systems operators, commanders, and staffs must exchange combat information freely to insure its timely exploitation. Intelligence officers must be trained to make immediate distribution. Higher commands can sometimes supply necessary intelligence. For example, EAC and national-level collection assets support corp requirements, and corps collecting means support division and brigade operations.

The intelligence and electronic warfare organizations at EAC, corps, and division analyze and integrate information from all sources. Brigades, battalions, and companies normally report combat information up, and receive intelligence down, their respective chains of command.

COMBAT INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE DISTINCTIONS



INTELLIGENCE

1. ALL-SOURCE/COMPLEX INFORMATION
2. DETAILED ANALYSIS DELIVERED IN HOURS
3. USED BY HIGHER COMMANDERS FOR—
   - *PLANNING*
   - *MOVEMENT/CONCENTRATION*
   - *LONG-RANGE TARGETING*

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to gather information on terrain, weather, and the enemy. Assembling an accurate picture of the battlefield requires centralized direction, simultaneous action at all levels of command, and timely distribution of information throughout the command. Intelligence operations normally begin before contact and continue as the battle develops.

NO COMMANDER CAN SUCCEED UNLESS HE DEMANDS AND RECEIVES THE INTELLIGENCE AND COMBAT INFORMATION HE NEEDS

DIRECTION

Commanders provide direction for the intelligence effort by articulating EEI and other intelligence requirements (OIR) needed in the decision-making process. To insure that intelligence provides the basis for timely tactical decisions, commanders must plan and control intelligence operations with the same level of interest and personal involvement as they normally devote to combat operations. Intelligence must respond to commanders.

The intelligence officer (G2 or S2) must inform the commander and all others concerned regarding the enemy situation and capabilities, terrain, and weather. The G2 or the S2 converts the commander's EEI and OIR into specific missions for available collection resources. He directs the evaluation and interpretation of information collected from all sources, and he directs the timely dissemination of intelligence and combat information to the concerned units.

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

Target development provides direct and correlated information which meets the commander's target selection standards. These standards support the overall tactical plan. The targeting function correlates diverse information and cues intelligence, surveillance, and target-acquisition assets to provide accurate and timely detection, identification, and location of enemy activity in sufficient detail for effective attack.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) should start well before combat operations begin. The IPB is a continuous, integrated, and comprehensive analysis of the effects of terrain, weather, and enemy capabilities on operations. Using overlays, graphic displays, and templating techniques, the IPB process increases the accuracy and timeliness of the intelligence available to the commander. Continuous IPB is a major function of the intelligence officer who—

- **Directs intelligence-collection activities.**
- **Assesses their results.**
- **Refines the requirements for further collecting efforts.**
- **Develops targets.**
- **Provides OPSEC information to the G3.**

Overlays. In the initial analysis, a series of overlays can clearly depict terrain and the effects of weather:

- **OBSTACLE OVERLAYS mark existing and reinforcing barriers or obstructions.**
- **AVENUES-OF-APPROACH OVERLAYS identify routes as good, poor, or best; and they indicate the type of traffic for the route—wheeled or tracked vehicles, foot troops, helicopters, and high-performance aircraft.**
- **TRAFFICABILITY OVERLAYS specify the type of soil and degree of slope and show which vehicles can pass under which conditions—drought, rain, snow, and freezing or melting precipitation.**
- **INTERVISIBILITY OVERLAYS indicate how vegetation, terrain, and weather interfere with visual contact.**

OVERLAYS PROVIDE INCISIVE INTELLIGENCE ABOUT TERRAIN, WEATHER, MOBILITY, AND VISIBILITY

Templates. The commander and his intelligence officer review opposing force doctrine and tactics before the battle begins. This review, together with weather and terrain information, allows the construction of doctrinal, situational, and event templates. Templates are normally prepared at corps and division level, but separate brigades conducting independent operations may also

develop them. These templates come in three general types:

- **DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES are models based on enemy tactical doctrine. They generally portray his frontages, depths, echelon spacing, and force composition, as well as his disposition of combat, combat support, and combat service support units for a given type of tactical operation.**
- **SITUATIONAL TEMPLATES are a series of projections that portray how the doctrinal templates will most probably appear when they are applied to a specific piece of terrain or an avenue of approach under specific weather conditions.**
- **EVENT TEMPLATES serve as models against which enemy activity can be recorded and compared. They represent a sequential projection of events that relate to space and time on the battlefield, and they indicate the enemy's ability to adopt a particular course of action.**


An enemy force preparing for action usually follows a procedural sequence. It may begin as he positions strongpoints in the security zone up to 30 kilometers in front of his main defense belt. Similarly, he may conduct reconnaissance and move into assembly areas before an attack. He must also pre-position supplies, POL, and ammunition; move command posts; and displace his artillery well forward. These events indicate his possible intentions. When enemy activity points to a particular course of action, the commander is alerted.

Once event templates have identified the enemy's general activities, the commander and the intelligence officer direct their attention toward specific areas or windows of interest. Comparing these windows with doctrinal templates, the commander can determine the enemy's options and possible courses of action.

Doctrinal templates postulate enemy dispositions and operations on the basis of doctrinal norms and observed activities. Thus, they are rough tools. Templates can be used in preliminary targeting and for directing surveillance or reconnaissance operations. They must, however, be considered as approximations and be used carefully since they are subject to significant error and are susceptible to the enemy's deception efforts.

EXAMPLE OF AN EVENT TEMPLATE

Event templates differ from doctrinal or situational templates. Event templates are not graphics inscribed on plastic or drawings of force dispositions. They are chronological lists of expected enemy actions that indicate his intent. This template details probable enemy maneuver during the period from seven days to one hour before attack.



TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

OPERATIONS SECURITY

Tactical CI supports OPSEC by identifying vulnerabilities and by eliminating or controlling the intelligence indicators susceptible to hostile exploitations. Intelligence support to OPSEC consists of developing and analyzing data on the enemy's intelligence-collecting capabilities and on friendly profiles. Such an analysis uncovers the sensitive aspects of a planned operation; determines essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) that, if known by the enemy, will compromise the operation; and assesses friendly susceptibilities. The G2 or the S2 assists the G3 or the S3 in making these determinations and risk assessments. Then the G3 or the S3 OPSEC staff officer uses them to propose effective countermeasures to the commander.

Tactical CI also includes a wide range of operations such as countersabotage, counterespionage, internal security investigations, personnel, and information security. All are designed to thwart hostile all-source collecting efforts in a tactical environment. The CI estimate assesses the enemy's view of friendly forces, identifies our vulnerabilities, and recommends corrective actions that should be included in the commander's OPSEC annex. Such actions might include—

- **COUNTERSURVEILLANCE—actions to protect the true status of friendly activities and operations.**
- **COUNTERMEASURES—actions to eliminate or to reduce the enemy intelligence and electronic warfare threat.**
- **DECEPTION—actions to create a false picture of friendly activities and operations.**

To deceive the enemy, the commander must first know how he collects information. The enemy collects intelligence by using three primary methods:

- **HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT). This threat can be minimized by aggressive CI and security practices assisted by territorial security forces—local military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence organizations.**
- **IMAGERY. Detection from hostile overhead platforms can be reduced by concealment and camouflage.**
- **ELECTROMAGNETICS. This threat is the primary enemy tactical intelligence capability. Communications and electronics discipline and security must be imposed to shield our intentions and actions from hostile electromagnetic observation.**

Tactical CI operations supported by intelligence data and detailed preparation of the battlefield are prerequisites to deception. The enemy's intelligence collection capability must be accurately understood before any deception operation is undertaken. For deception, damaged equipment and weapons can be realistically positioned. While dummies cannot often deceive imagery, real inoperative equipment can if it is placed in realistic, covered, and camouflaged positions. Phantom nets operated by specially trained and equipped units can deceive and mislead the enemy. Smoke can also be used in decoy and deception operations to obscure the view of real, as well as notional, positions and facilities. These operations present a fictitious order of battle and tend to overload enemy acquisition systems. Tactical CI and OPSEC require central management by the senior tactical commander and decentralized execution. Well used, CI and OPSEC can significantly enhance the relative combat power of units.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Intelligence support to electronic warfare (EW) involves intercepting signals and direction finding to provide target-acquisition data for jamming, electronic deception, or other forms of combat capability. The use of an all-source data base to support the EW function is discussed further in chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7

Conduct of Operations

FUTURE BATTLES AND CAMPAIGNS have the potential for extending over greater distances and continuing longer than any military operations of the past. Victory in such battles will demand complete unity of effort and thoroughly synchronized air and ground action. To win, our forces must use every element of combat power and keep each in operation. They must also coordinate combined arms effectively. Applying AirLand Battle doctrine, a fully synchronized small force can defeat a much larger enemy force that is poorly coordinated.

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AIRLAND BATTLE FUNDAMENTALS

AirLand Battle doctrine takes a nonlinear view of battle. It enlarges the battlefield area, stressing unified air and ground operations throughout the theater. It distinguishes the operational level of war—the conduct of campaigns and large-unit actions—from the tactical level. It recognizes the nonquantifiable elements of combat power, especially maneuver which is as important as firepower. It acknowledges the importance of nuclear and chemical weapons and of electronic warfare, and it details their effects on operations. Most important, it emphasizes the human element: *courageous, well-trained soldiers and skillful, effective leaders.*

In execution, the AirLand Battle may mean using every element of combat power from psychological operations to nuclear weapons. The battlefield includes every area and enemy unit that can affect the outcome of the immediate fight, and it extends into the area of interest where future operations will take place. An innovative approach to fighting at both the tactical and operational levels,

all arms, all services, and all means of support.

To insure success, AirLand Battle doctrine concentrates on—

- **Indirect approaches.**
- **Speed and violence.**
- **Flexibility and reliance on the initiative of junior leaders.**
- **Rapid decision-making.**
- **Clearly defined objectives and operational concepts.**
- **A clearly designated main effort.**
- **Deep attack.**

AirLand Battle offensives are rapid, violent operations that seek enemy soft spots, remain flexible in shifting the main effort, and exploit successes promptly. The attacker creates a fluid situation, maintains the initiative, and destroys the coherence of the enemy defense. Using supporting and reserve units flexibly, the attack must continue for as long as it takes to assure victory.

AirLand Battle defenses combine static and dynamic elements. Static strongpoints and battle positions and dynamic delays and counterattacks are supported by effective deep attack. This allows the defender to defeat the attacker's momentum, to present him with the unexpected, to defeat his combined arms cooperation, and to gain the initiative.

Whether attacking or defending, any US force operating anywhere in the world must secure the initiative as early as possible and exercise it aggressively. It will use every weapon, asset, and combat multiplier to gain the initiative and to throw the enemy off balance with a powerful blow from an unexpected direction. *It will follow up rapidly to prevent his recovery.* At the operational level, the force will defeat the enemy by destroying his critical units or facilities. At the tactical level, both attrition and massed fires, substituting for massed troops, will occasionally facilitate decisive maneuver at the operational level. At both the tactical and operational levels and for all levels of command, initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization are the essence of AirLand Battle doctrine.

Initiative, the ability to set the terms of battle by action, *is the greatest advantage in war.* Whether US forces are attacking or defending, they must seize and preserve the initiative to hasten the enemy's defeat and to prevent his recovery. Subordinate commanders must understand the well-defined objectives thoroughly and be aggressive. They must be able to act independently when electronic warfare, the destruction of friendly forces and headquarters, or the confusion of war disrupt command and control communications.

Depth refers to time, space, and resources. Deep attack is neither a sideshow nor an unimportant optional activity; it is an inseparable part of a unified plan of operation. Plans for the deep battle must be realistic, complete, and firmly linked to the commander's central concept for an operation.

Combat will extend throughout the operational area, and deep actions will influence the outcome of the battle between committed forces. Improved sensors, long-range weapons, and a responsive intelligence distribution system can be used to great advantage in the deep battle. Using all available assets, the commander must protect his own rear area and attack the enemy's uncommitted forces and support facilities. He must be ready to carry the battle into new areas, to fight and support for extended periods, to operate without interruption even if the enemy resorts to nuclear weapons, and to convert battlefield successes into campaign advantages.

Agility means acting faster than the enemy to exploit his weaknesses and to frustrate his plans. It implies a constant effort to pit friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Agility involves maneuver which concentrates friendly strength in vulnerable areas and tactics which exploit friendly

technical, human, or geographical advantages, while avoiding enemy strengths. Good intelligence, imaginative planning, flexible operational techniques, and responsive tactical units are indispensable in achieving superior agility. Mission orders, initiative, maneuver, and the readiness to exploit fleeting advantages rapidly all foster agility.

Synchronization combines economy of force and unity of effort so that *no effort is wasted* either initially or as operations develop. The commander's concept of operation determines the design of all supporting plans. Attaining the commander's goal usually depends on whether his maneuver plan succeeds and on whether the combat and combat support units accomplish their critical tasks. The designated main effort must be supported by every means necessary and maintained or shifted as the battle progresses or the campaign matures. In nonlinear combat, maneuver units from company to corps must support their main efforts continuously and modify them quickly if the situation changes.

The actual or potential use of nuclear weapons will significantly affect the battle. Depending on deception, surprise, target acquisition, and user boldness, nuclear strikes can change the course of a battle suddenly and decisively. Nuclear weapons give the commanders the ability to hold the enemy at risk throughout their areas of influence. When facing a nuclear-capable enemy, commanders plan and conduct their operations so they can continue synchronized operations without interruption if nuclear weapons are used. When nuclear or chemical weapons are being used, fire support may be more important than maneuver or combat support.

BATTLE COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the exercise of command, the means of planning and directing campaigns and battles. Its essence lies in applying leadership, making decisions, issuing orders, and supervising operations. At the operational level it concerns the organizations, procedures, facilities, equipment, and techniques which facilitate the exercise of command. A comprehensive discussion of all command and control elements is contained in FM 101-5.

Staffing, equipment, and organizational concerns vary among levels of command. In every case, however, the only purpose of command and control is to implement the commander's will in pursuit of the unit's objective. The system must be reliable, secure, fast, and durable. It must collect, analyze, and present information rapidly. It must communicate orders, coordinate support, and provide direction to the force in spite of enemy interference, destruction of command posts, or loss and replacement of commanders. The key measure of command and control effectiveness is whether it functions more efficiently and more quickly than the enemy's. Effective operations depend on its superiority.

Communications on the contemporary battlefield will be uncertain. Opportunities to inflict damage on the enemy and to accomplish the mission will arise and pass quickly. Command and control doctrine assumes that subordinate commanders exercise initiative within the context of the higher commander's concept. Staff assistance and coordination are indispensable to conducting sustained operations, but the mutual understanding which enables commanders to act rapidly and confidently in the crisis of battle is equally important.

COMBINED ARMS

Victory on the battlefield will hinge on fully synchronizing combat forces. Weapons and units are more effective when they operate jointly than when they function separately.

The term *combined arms* refers to two or more arms in mutual support to produce complementary and reinforcing effects that neither can obtain separately. Technically, combined arms refers to coordinating weapons of differing characteristics. For example, guns and missiles can combine in the air defense of a key installation; or mines, mortars, or grenade launchers can cover the dead space of a machine gun's field of fire. Tactically, combined arms refers to coordinating units of different arms or capabilities. For example, armor and mechanized infantry should operate together routinely. Artillery and mortars must support their maneuver, and engineers must assist it. Air defense must cover vulnerable forces and facilities. *Complementary combined arms should pose a dilemma for the enemy.* As he evades the effects of one weapon or arm, he places himself in jeopardy of attack by the other.

Combined arms also reinforce each other. The effects of one supplement the effects of another to create a cumulative effect. This massing of effects is also discernible at both technical and tactical levels. Technically, it may involve engineer preparation of fighting positions, the teamwork of observation and attack helicopters, or the massing of all antitank fires against an armored threat. Tactically, it may involve concentrating all types of maneuver forces or fires to create mass.

At the tactical level, forces maneuver to attack the enemy's flanks, rear, or supporting formations. Doing so sustains the initiative, exploits success, and reduces vulnerability. Normally supported by direct and indirect fires, tactical maneuver attempts to obtain a local position of advantage. Often part of the maneuvering force provides fire to support movements of other parts. Once it comes into contact with the enemy, the maneuvering force advances using the fire and movement technique. One element of an engaged force adds its suppressive direct fires to the supporting indirect fires of mortars, artillery, naval guns, or close air. This firepower makes movement by another element possible. A force may close with the enemy by alternating its elements between fire and movement.

At the operational level, corps and divisions maneuver to envelop, to turn, to penetrate, or to block enemy forces. Although it may not be directly tied to fire, such movement is also maneuver.

Effective use of maneuver and firepower depends on good intelligence throughout a unit's areas of interest and influence. It also requires sound staff and operational procedures that permit rapid and coordinated reaction to opportunity. Through battle drill, battalions and smaller units attain the speed and flexibility so necessary to effective operations. In larger units, contingency plans are the basis of this flexibility.

The basic combined arms maneuver element is the battalion task force. Battalion task forces are organized from infantry battalions, tank battalions, and cavalry squadrons. Field and air defense artillery, engineers, and Air Force and Army air elements provide support. Battalion task forces can be infantry-heavy, tank-heavy, or balanced. They can also be pure, depending on the brigade commander's plan. Armor and infantry, the nucleus of the combined arms team, provide flexibility during operations over varied terrain. Infantry assists the advance of tanks in difficult terrain, while armor provides protection in open terrain. They can develop both complementary and reinforcing effects. A similar synergy exists in defense or delay.

UNITS

Infantry. Light infantry can operate effectively in most terrain and weather. In mounted operations, infantry units can—

- **Occupy strongpoints as pivots for maneuver.**
- **Make initial penetrations for exploitation by armor and mechanized infantry.**
- **Attack over approaches that are not feasible for heavy forces.**

- **Capture or defend built-up areas.**
- **Control restrictive routes for use by other forces.**
- **Follow and support exploiting heavy forces.**

In dismounted operations, airborne, air-mobile, or other light infantry leads the combined arms attack, and all other arms support the infantry attack.

Mechanized Infantry. Mechanized infantry complements armor in its ability to hold ground. It provides overwatching antitank fires and suppresses enemy infantry and antitank guided missile elements. Infantrymen can dismount—

- **To patrol difficult terrain.**
- **To clear or to emplace obstacles and minefields.**
- **To infiltrate and to attack enemy positions.**
- **To protect tanks in urban and wooded areas and in limited-visibility conditions.**

Mechanized infantrymen have the same mobility as tankers but less firepower and protection. Armor and mechanized infantry must perform as a team to defeat enemy armored forces on the modern battlefield.

When equipped with infantry fighting vehicles, the mechanized infantry is significantly more capable. So equipped, it can accompany tanks in mounted assault. In the attack, such infantrymen can act as fixing forces. In the defense, they act as pivot points for maneuvering tank-heavy forces.

Armor. In mounted warfare, the tank is the primary offensive weapon. Its firepower, protection from enemy fire, and speed create the shock effect necessary to disrupt the enemy's operations and to defeat him. Tanks can destroy enemy armored vehicles and suppress enemy infantry and antitank guided missile elements. Tanks can break through suppressed defenses, exploit the success of an attack by striking into the enemy's rear areas, and boldly pursue enemy forces. Armored units can also blunt enemy attacks and rapidly counterattack in force.

Armored units also have limitations. They are vulnerable in close terrain, such as forests and cities, and under limited-visibility conditions. They cannot cross most rivers and swamps without bridging, and they cannot climb steep grades.

Armored Cavalry. The basic tasks of armored cavalry units are *reconnaissance and security.* The ability of armored cavalry units to find the enemy, to develop the situation, and to provide the commander with reaction time and security also make them ideal for economy-of-force missions. Armored cavalry forces can delay an attacking enemy as well as assist in a withdrawal. They are also capable of attacking and defending, although these are not their normal missions.

Field Artillery. The principal fire support element in fire and maneuver is the field artillery. It not only provides conventional, nuclear, or chemical fires with cannon, rocket, and missile systems; but it also integrates all means of fire support available to the commander. Field artillery is capable of suppressing enemy direct fire forces, attacking enemy artillery and mortars, and delivering scatterable mines to isolate and to interdict enemy forces or to protect friendly operations. It contributes to the deep battle by delaying or disrupting enemy forces in depth and by suppressing enemy air defense systems to facilitate Army and Air Force air operations. The artillery can also screen operations with smoke or illuminate the battlefield. Normally as mobile as the maneuver forces it supports, field artillery can provide continuous fire in support of the commander's scheme of maneuver.

Air Defense Artillery. Air defense units provide the commander with security from enemy air attack by destroying or driving off enemy close air support aircraft and helicopters. Their fires can degrade the effectiveness of enemy strike and reconnaissance aircraft by forcing them to evade friendly air

defenses. Short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems normally provide forward air defense protection for maneuver units whether they are attacking, delaying, withdrawing, or repositioning in the defense. Air defense secures critical facilities, such as command posts, logistic installations, and special ammunition supply points. It also protects convoys and lines of communication. In conjunction with US Air Force elements, Army air defense plays a significant role in protecting friendly air maneuver and in attacking enemy air maneuver units.

Combat Engineers. Combat engineers contribute to the combined arms team by performing mobility, countermobility, and survivability missions. *Mobility missions* include breaching enemy minefields and obstacles, improving existing routes or building new ones, and providing bridge and raft support for crossing major water obstacles. *Countermobility* efforts limit the maneuver of enemy forces and enhance the effectiveness of our fires. Engineers improve the *survivability* of the friendly force by hardening command and control facilities and key logistic installations and by fortifying battle positions in the defense. In addition, combat engineers are organized, equipped, and trained to fight as infantry in tactical emergencies.

Army Aviation. Three types of Army aviation units participate in combined arms operations: attack helicopter, air cavalry, and combat support aviation.

Attack Helicopter Units

These provide highly maneuverable antiarmor firepower. They use natural cover and speed to compensate for their vulnerabilities. They are ideally suited for situations in which rapid reaction time is important or terrain restricts ground forces. Attack helicopters are best suited for attacking moving enemy armor formations. Attack helicopter units—

- **Overwatch ground maneuver forces with antitank fires.**
- **Attack the flanks and rear of attacking or withdrawing enemy formations.**
- **Counterattack enemy penetrations.**
- **Conduct raids in enemy-held territory.**
- **Dominate key terrain by fires for ground maneuver forces.**

Employed alone or working with close air support aircraft and using tactics of a joint air attack team (JAAT), attack helicopters can defeat enemy armored formations. To be most effective, however, such missions require other elements of the combined arms to suppress enemy air defense.

Air Cavalry Units

These perform the same missions of reconnaissance and security as ground cavalry and are therefore complementary parts of the cavalry system. Because of its greater mobility, air cavalry can reconnoiter and maintain surveillance over a much larger area in a shorter period of time than its ground counterpart. During security operations, air cavalry reconnoiters, screens forward and to the flanks of moving ground forces, and acts as a rapid reaction force.

Combat Support Aviation

These units give dismounted infantry and ground antitank units great tactical mobility, moving them rapidly to the enemy's flanks or rear or repositioning them rapidly in the defense. Combat support aviation can quickly move towed field artillery units and other lighter elements of the combined arms team as the commander dictates. It can also provide critical supplies to forward areas in the defense and to attacking formations when ground lines of communication have been interdicted or overloaded.

Air Support. The Air Force is an equal partner in the air-land battle. It supports the battle with counterair and air interdiction operations, offensive air support (OAS), and tactical airlift operations. *Counterair* operations achieve necessary air superiority and insure that enemy air forces cannot interfere with the operations of friendly air or

ground forces. *Air interdiction* operations destroy, isolate, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can influence friendly operations. OAS is that portion of offensive airpower in direct support of ground operations and consists of tactical air reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and close air support (CAS).

Electronic Warfare Units. The military intelligence battalion (combat electronic warfare intelligence [CEWI]) detects important enemy communications nets and intercepts their traffic to provide the commander with intelligence. It also directs electronic countermeasures, primarily jamming, against enemy fire direction and command and control communications, air defense radar, and electronic guidance systems. This capability to locate the enemy, to intercept his messages, and to hamper his operations at critical periods contributes directly and indirectly to the effectiveness of combined arms operations.

BATTLE PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Assets available for an operation vary with the level of command and the type of unit, but in almost every case commanders must coordinate—

- **Maneuver.**
- **Fire support.**
- **Deep battle.**
- **Electronic warfare.**
- **Engineer support.**
- **Air defense.**
- **Signal and command control.**
- **Logistics** *(see chapter 5).*
- **Other operations** *(deception, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, ranger operations, and civil-military operations).*

MANEUVER

Maneuver is the dynamic element of battle, the means of concentrating forces in critical areas to gain the advantages of surprise, position, and momentum which enable small forces to defeat larger ones. Effective maneuver maintains or restores initiative. Using indirect approaches to avoid the enemy's greatest strength, friendly forces maneuver to positions on enemy flanks and rear. The attack strikes him where he is least prepared and exposes his critical forces to destruction. Maneuver maximizes the effectiveness of firepower by restricting the enemy's freedom to act and forcing him to react, to concentrate his force, and thus to expose himself.

US Army doctrine balances maneuver with firepower. *Maneuver and firepower are inseparable and complementary elements of combat.* Although one might dominate a phase of the battle, the coordinated use of both characterizes all operations. Their joint use makes the destruction of larger enemy forces feasible and enhances the protection of a friendly force.

Conversely, fire support helps to create opportunities for maneuver. It destroys or suppresses enemy forces and isolates areas of immediate concern through deep attack. It accomplishes the physical destruction which maneuver makes possible and adds to the shock effect of all operations. When nuclear weapons are used, maneuver may mainly exploit the effects of fire.

In most cases the plan for maneuver is the central expression of the commander's concept of operations. The maneuver plan—

- **Outlines the movements of the force.**
- **Identifies objectives or areas to be retained.**
- **Assigns responsibilities for zones, sectors, or areas.**
- **Identifies maneuver options which may develop during an operation.**

The commander's plan for maneuver determines the subsequent allocation of forces and the design of supporting plans. Fires, barriers, air defense priorities, electronic warfare, deception efforts, combat support, and combat service support arrangements are normally subordinate to and coordinated with the maneuver plan.

Commanders normally design the maneuver plan to avoid the enemy's strength and to strike at his weaknesses. Maneuver units can inflict the greatest damage on the enemy by avoiding head-on encounters with his deployed forces. Instead they should operate on his flanks and rear, where direct fire is most effective, psychological shock is greatest, and the enemy is least prepared to fight. By coordinating attacks on the enemy in depth with attacks on his forward units, the commander—

- **Preserves or secures the initiative.**
- **Upsets the enemy's plan.**
- **Disrupts his coordination.**
- **Destroys his most sensitive forces—reserves, artillery, command and control, and logistic support.**

Maneuver in defensive counterattacks on the enemy side of the FLOT in the defended sector is particularly important and must be planned in detail.

The maneuver plan should gain surprise. It should use indirect approaches and flank positions which do not attract immediate attention. As a rule, a maneuver plan should contain only the minimum necessary control measures. Subordinate commanders should have the greatest possible freedom to maneuver.

The maneuver plan should disseminate supplementary control measures. These include on-order routes, axes, objectives, and battle positions for implementation on order. They will provide the necessary flexibility for responding to changes in the situation.

The plan should designate axes of advance and routes for the commitment or movement of reserves or for the forward or rearward passage of one unit through another. It should also identify air axes for the maneuver of attack helicopter and air cavalry units or for the helicopter movement of light infantry and other assets.

Movement of supporting units is also critical to the success of the maneuver plan. Commanders must assure the uninterrupted support of field artillery, air defense, engineer, military intelligence, and logistic units. To do so they must plan multiple routes throughout the area of operations and closely control their use. Military police must be prepared to facilitate these movements, to prevent congestion, and to respond to changes in the maneuver plan.


When planning operations, the commanders must take account of the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons. Commanders must consider the troop risk area (emergency risk to unwarned exposed personnel), the sure kill area, and countermobility areas (tree blowdown and urban rubble). Vulnerability analysis templates for specific weapons, such as the one shown on the following page, display these areas.

Commanders must not create lucrative targets. They should also avoid positions which can be isolated by obstacles that nuclear weapons create.

Commanders must constantly seek to minimize the overall risk by dispersing their commands into small units that are not worthwhile targets. Yet, they must maintain sufficient concentration to accomplish the mission. The size of the unit depends on its function. The distance between units varies in accordance with their size, mobility, firepower, and the terrain.

The dilemma is dynamic; the degree of risk changes as the distance between opposing forces changes. Initially, maneuver forces will disperse to avoid presenting a battalion-size target. As the distance from the enemy decreases, maneuver units will concentrate over multiple routes at the decisive place and time and will disperse again after defeating the enemy.


USING A VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS TEMPLATE



Using nuclear and chemical weapons may reduce the required size of maneuver elements. Such weapons will sometimes allow smaller units to accomplish missions that would normally require large massed forces. The commander must determine what size force to use and when it should concentrate. If he masses too late, he risks defeat in detail. If he masses too soon, he risks nuclear destruction. This dilemma is graphed below.

In purely conventional operations, concentration increases the chance of success. In nuclear operations, on the other hand, dispersal will decrease risk of destruction. The graph does not depict one key dimension—duration. Speed in achieving the necessary concentration and rapid dispersal after the mission are essential.

RISK ANALYSIS



The maneuver plan must also control the airspace over a unit's area of responsibility. Air movements and maneuver in support of the commander's maneuver plan, including specific routes and times, must coordinate with air defense and ground maneuver units whose areas will be overflown.

FIRE SUPPORT

The fire support plan includes mortars, field artillery, naval gunfire, and air-delivered weapons. The long range and great flexibility of the fire support system make it especially effective. The commander can use it to support his maneuver plan, to mass firepower rapidly without shifting maneuver forces, and to delay, to disrupt, or to destroy enemy forces in depth.

Fire support must be integrated with the unit's maneuver plan and its surveillance and target-acquisition efforts. It must be flexible enough to supply conventional support without interruption as the tactical situation changes. It must be capable of shifting from conventional to nuclear or chemical support during the course of an operation.

The fire support system destroys, neutralizes, or suppresses surface targets, including enemy weapons, formations or facilities, and fires from the enemy's rear. It also suppresses enemy air defense and executes nuclear packages.

When nuclear weapons are available, the fire support may become the principal means of destroying enemy forces. The maneuver may then be designed specifically to exploit the effects of the fire support.

The weapons of the system are mortars, guns, cannons, rockets, guided missiles, and tactical fighter aircraft. These weapons are coordinated by a network of fire support teams, liaison parties, fire direction centers, and fire support elements that work closely with an appropriate ASIC and an artillery headquarters. This network masses fires against area targets or directs fires against point targets. The force commander exercises central control of the system.

Commanders at all levels are responsible for integrating fire support into their plans. Corps and division commanders who command their own artillery employ their artillery commanders as fire support coordinators. Air Force and Navy liaison teams at all levels down to battalion will normally coordinate fires that are available from their respective services. Supporting artillery units provide commanders below division level with fire support elements (FSE). Each cell is capable of coordinating all the fire support necessary for its commander's plans.

In integrating fire support into operations, the most important considerations are adequacy, flexibility, and continuity. In offensive operations, the main attack gets priority fire support while long-range systems strike defenses in depth, enemy reserves, or targets such as command posts, brigades, and defiles. In defense, a greater balance of fire support is necessary, but anticipated areas of the enemy's main effort are allocated stronger fire support.

When maneuver forces have missions such as advance guard, flank guard, or covering force, which take them beyond supporting distance of the main body, commanders must make special provision for their fire support. This may be provided by CAS allocation, direct support field artillery battalions, dedicated batteries, or mortar support, depending on the size of the force and its mission.

Commanders must make special provisions for foreseeable contingencies or phases of a maneuver operation. These may include—

- **Time-on-target attacks of ambush areas in coordination with direct fires and a particular obstacle.**
- **Obscuration of an open area with smoke to facilitate ground maneuver.**
- **SEAD fires in conjunction with attack helicopter, close air support, or joint air attack team operations.**

- **Final protective fires around a defensive position.**
- **Interdiction of a specific follow-on unit to complete an attack in progress.**

Commanders must also insure flexibility by—

- **Holding some of the artillery in general support.**
- **Giving artillery units on-order missions which orient them on likely contingencies.**
- **Reserving some of the allocated CAS missions for the force commander's use.**

They must also distribute liaison teams properly and plan possible road or air movements before they become necessary. Planners must recognize that long road movements, for example, are time-consuming and reduce support capability. Commanders insure continuous support by designating routes for artillery units and by planning air movement of weapons and ammunition. When rapid offensive progress occurs or defensive counterstrokes are planned beyond the FLOT, commanders must insure that artillery units are in position to support the maneuver.

The large number of targets acquired during combat may generate demands for fire support that exceeds the system's capacity. To deal with such overloads and yet satisfy the most important demands, commanders must establish priorities. They can express these priorities in allocating assets, in positioning fire support units, in constraining ammunition expenditure, or in guiding the attack to specified types of targets.

The commander will also control fires by using standard control measures such as the fire support coordination line (FSCL), the coordinated fire line (CFL), and the restrictive fire line (RFL). *Specific details of fire planning and direction are in FM 6-20.*

Offensive Air Support. OAS is an integral element of fire support in offensive and defensive operations. Corps commanders will be supported with CAS sorties, BAI, and tactical air reconnaissance missions.

Tactical air reconnaissance supplies intelligence gathered by observers and/or sensors. Reconnaissance tasks include identifying hostile forces and facilities and collecting terrain and weather information. Information acquired by tactical air reconnaissance is of special value in the conduct of the deep battle and must be disseminated rapidly.

BAI is air action against hostile surface targets nominated by the ground commander and in direct support of ground operations. It is the primary means of fighting the deep battle at extended ranges. BAI isolates enemy forces by preventing their reinforcement and resupply and by restricting their freedom of maneuver. It also destroys, delays, or disrupts follow-on enemy units before they can enter the close battle. BAI missions may be planned against targets on either side of the FSCL in the ground commander's area of influence. Missions short of the FSCL require close coordination with ground units. Although all BAI missions require joint planning and coordination, they may not require continuous coordination in the execution stage.

CAS is air action against hostile targets near friendly forces. CAS complements and reinforces ground fire. Each air mission must be integrated with the ground commander's fire and maneuver scheme. This means that aircraft are under either positive or procedural control. Inherent in the ground commander's responsibility is the need to suppress enemy air defenses. CAS can offset shortages of surface firepower during critical initial phases of airborne, airmobile, and amphibious operations.

Because each offensive air support sortie is a critical asset, its use must be planned and employed carefully. Corps and division commanders normally distribute CAS to lower levels; however, they should retain some CAS missions at their own levels to influence the conduct of operations. If BAI will be more

useful than CAS in a projected operation, corps commanders should request BAI emphasis early in the planning process.

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) increases the overall effectiveness of friendly air-land operations. The two types of J-SEAD are campaign and localized.

The Air Force component commander conducts the theaterwide J-SEAD operation against specific surface-to-air defense systems. The locations of most campaign targets will dictate this. However, Army surface-to-surface weapons will complement these efforts. More than one J-SEAD campaign may be necessary during a conflict.

Localized J-SEAD operations attack specific ground targets or support airborne, airmobile, or other air operations. Battalions and larger Army units plan localized J-SEAD operations to protect friendly aircraft and to maximize the effect of offensive air support. Such operations normally involve jammers, suppressive fires, and passive measures such as camouflage or deception to degrade the effects of enemy air defenses. Localized J-SEAD operations can use field artillery, attack helicopters, direct fire weapons, and electronic warfare.

Nuclear Weapons. When nuclear weapons are in use, the fire support plan becomes more potent and is subject to unique considerations. The authority to use nuclear weapons will be conveyed from the NCA through the operational chain of command.

Using nuclear weapons requires advanced planning, training, and logistic support. One technique is to develop preplanned *packages.* A package is a group of nuclear weapons of specific yields for use in a specific area and within a limited time to support a specific tactical goal. Each package must contain nuclear weapons sufficient to alter the tactical situation decisively and to accomplish the mission. For effective employment, it is essential to update and to refine packages continuously.

Planning must reflect the constraints and directives of higher authority, procedures for warning friendly units, and responsibilities for post-strike analysis. Careful selection of targets, yields, aimpoints, and delivery systems can limit collateral damage. *Special care must be taken not to create obstacles to friendly maneuver through the use of nuclear fire.* Aircraft may deliver some weapons. Other services must warn friendly aircraft to avoid areas scheduled for nuclear strikes. Thus, joint planning and coordination is mandatory. The echelon which controls the requested package is responsible for disseminating the warning.

In general, preferred targets are—

- **Enemy nuclear delivery systems.**
- **Key command and control elements.**
- **Support forces in the rear of committed elements.**
- **Follow-on or deep-echeloned forces.**
- **Reserves.**

This selective targeting allows friendly units in contact to defeat engaged enemy forces by conventional means.

Brigade and division commanders will develop groups of targets in their areas of influence on the basis of the above criteria or their special operational needs. They will limit collateral damage to the levels specified in their planning guidance. The corps will review its divisions' nuclear fire plans and will integrate them into its plans.

Chemical Weapons. US policy prohibits the *first use* of lethal or incapacitating chemical munitions. It also prohibits *any use* of biological weapons. However, because the United States has reserved the right to retaliate if enemies use chemical weapons, Army units must be prepared to conduct chemical operations. *Only the NCA can grant authority to employ chemical munitions.* When it does, it will also provide specific guidance governing their use.

Commanders must be prepared to integrate chemical weapons into nuclear and conventional fire plans on receipt of chemical release. Chemical weapons are individually more lethal than conventional munitions. However, the chemical expenditure rates necessary to produce a significant effect on a well-trained and well-equipped enemy may approach those of conventional fires. Thus, when they plan, commanders must carefully consider how chemical weapons will affect operations and logistics.

Modern chemical agents produce three types of toxic effect that range from mild incapacitation to high lethality depending on concentration, degree of protection, and length of exposure. Nerve agents usually cause suffocation: breathing ceases. Blister agents attack the respiratory tract, the eyes, and the skin. Skin blistering is usually delayed, but damage to the eyes and lungs occurs rapidly. Deaths from blister agent poisoning are not common. Blood agents interfere with the ability of body tissue, especially the brain, to absorb oxygen from the blood.

Chemical agents are either persistent or nonpersistent. They normally enter the body through inhalation or through the skin. Persistent agents may present hazards from both inhalation and skin contact. Chemical munitions can also have substantial blast and fragmentation effects, producing additional casualties or materiel damage.

When properly employed in mass and without warning, chemical fires can—

- **Cause high casualties among poorly trained or poorly equipped troops.**
- **Degrade the effectiveness of weapons, vehicles, and command posts by causing their operators to wear protective equipment.**
- **Restrict the use of weapons, supplies, and equipment by contamination.**
- **Disrupt rear area operations and troop movement.**
- **Enhance the effects of other fire support by slowing enemy movement.**
- **Reduce the speed, cohesion, and freedom of movement of enemy formations.**
- **Restrict or deny the use of key terrain.**
- **Force the enemy to undertake decontamination operations, thereby producing fresh targets for chemical or other fire support means.**


DEEP BATTLE

The deep battle component of the AirLand Battle doctrine supports the commander's basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. In either attack or defense, timely and well-executed deep actions against enemy forces not yet in contact are necessary for effective operations. This is not a new discovery. US, German, and Israeli campaign plans have historically made use of long-range interdiction to gain local battlefield advantages. Deep battle prevents the enemy from massing and creates windows of opportunity for offensive actions that allow us to defeat him in detail.

The deep battle is based on a thorough IPB and timely intelligence from organic and higher sources. High-value targets must be identified, and organic and support means must be synchronized in the attack.

The corps is the focal point for intelligence collection and distribution in the deep battle. However, deep battle planning and execution are just as important at division and lower levels.

Our primary strike assets for deep attack are air and artillery interdiction. Conventional and unconventional military forces can also interdict enemy movement in depth; and while tactical electronic warfare systems do not have the range to hit deep targets, they can free artillery units for the deep battle. Deception also plays a part in delaying, disrupting, and diverting an enemy and in frustrating his plans for committing follow-on forces.



When deep attack assets are limited, it is impossible to destroy such follow-on forces. However, it is possible to delay, to disrupt, or to divert selected enemy forces by attacking targets in those forces or blocking choke-points in the terrain. To obtain an actual tactical or operational advantage, these efforts must be directed towards a specific goal.

In the offense, the deep battle initially isolates, immobilizes, and weakens defenders in depth. As the attack continues, it sustains momentum by preventing the reorganization of coherent defenses, by blocking the movement of enemy reserves, and by preventing the escape of defending units. In the defense, the deep battle prevents the enemy from concentrating overwhelming combat power. Its major objectives are to separate and to disrupt attacking echelons, to protect the defender's maneuver, and to degrade the enemy's fire support, command and control, communications, combat support, and combat service support.

Deep battle opens opportunities for decisive action by reducing the enemy's closure rate and creating periods of friendly superiority in order to gain or to retain the initiative. If the enemy is prevented from reinforcing his committed forces, even temporarily, he may be defeated piecemeal.

Long-range weapons will be relatively scarce, but the choice of targets is apt to be large. Therefore, the commander must select targets of the highest possible mission value, whose loss will substantially degrade enemy capability.

Nuclear weapons are particularly effective in engaging follow-on formations or forces in depth because of their inherent power and because of reduced concerns about troop safety and collateral damage. Air maneuver units, airborne or airmobile troops, mechanized formations, and artillery can also take part in the deep battle. Battlefield air interdiction, however, is the most common means of striking at extended ranges.

To conduct a deep attack successfully, the fire support coordinator, the G3, and the G2 must cooperate fully. They must maintain proper emphasis on the deep battle during all phases of the operation.

Commanders will fight the enemy in an *area of influence* designated by the next higher level of command. This area normally contains enemy forces whose actions can affect the unit's close battle. Commanders simultaneously monitor activity beyond and adjacent to their areas of influence in what is called the *area of interest.* The area of interest contains enemy units capable of affecting future operations.

The exact dimensions of a unit's areas of interest and influence will vary with the terrain, weather, and capabilities of friendly and enemy forces. Corps will strive to maintain surveillance of an area of interest large enough to give 96 hours' notice of the approach of enemy divisions and armies. The ASIC, using all assets of the corps and obtaining support of higher echelons of command, collects this information under the direction of the G2.


The corps area of influence should extend far enough beyond the FLOT to permit a corps to engage enemy forces which can *join or support the main battle within 72 hours.* Divisions must collect intelligence on enemy forces up to 72 hours before they can reach the defended area. Further, divisions should be able to fight enemy forces up to 24 hours before they reach the FLOT.

An area of interest may be irregular in shape and may overlap the areas of adjacent and subordinate units. The area will change with the forward or rearward movement of the FLOT as new avenues uncover and as commanders assess mission, enemy, terrain,


AREAS OF INFLUENCE AND INTEREST

AREA OF INFLUENCE. The area of influence is the assigned area of operations wherein a commander is capable of acquiring and fighting enemy units with assets organic to or in support of his command. It is a geographical area, the size of which depends upon the factors of METT-T. It is assigned by higher headquarters and designated by boundaries and a forward terminating line.

AREA OF INTEREST. The area of interest extends beyond the area of influence. It includes territory which contains enemy forces capable of affecting future operations. The area of interest is usually within the next higher headquarter's and a portion of adjacent units' areas of influence.



DIVISION DEFENSE




BRIGADE DEFENSE

and troops (METT). Higher headquarters should provide intelligence on overlapping areas of interest to all concerned commanders through the ASIC system.

Named areas of interest (NAI), routes or avenues of approach, direction of enemy movement, and specific enemy units may combine to define an area of interest. They also focus intelligence collection or fires during the battle. Corps or divisions may restrict the fires of adjacent or subordinate units and Air Force operations by designating no-fire areas. Close coordination between corps and their divisions assures that their deep battle plans complement and do not duplicate each other.


The corps area of influence includes divisional areas of influence just as the division's area of influence overlaps those of its brigades. Each level of command fights its deep battle simultaneously. In many instances, enemy units will concern both superior and subordinate commanders. For example, both corps and divisions may follow the second echelon divisions of an enemy army. But divisions will fight enemy second echelon regiments. Corps commanders usually will fight the second echelon divisions. Commanders may restrict the engagement of particular forces or physical targets in a subordinate's area of influence. They do so if the overall plan of defense calls for unimpeded advance of the enemy on certain approaches. They do so if it is in their interest to defer destruction of an enemy force or facility. In some cases the corps may choose to limit its divisions' deep battle responsibilities and engage deep regiments itself. Normally, however, the corps will expect divisions to fight the defense in depth and will allocate enabling resources.

DELAY OF FORCES TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT




Deep attack takes four basic forms. The first disrupts enemy forces in depth with fire and delays their arrival in the battle area in order to isolate and to defeat the forces in contact. Deception, offensive EW, artillery fires, and BAI may all be used in this form of deep attack.

DELAY OF FORCES TO ALLOW MANEUVER COMPLETION



The second form also attacks enemy deep forces with fire. It does not merely prevent them from reinforcing committed enemy units. Rather, it prevents them from interfering with friendly counterattack against the flanks or rear of close-battle forces.

DECISIVE DEEP ATTACK



The third form is more complex and more difficult to achieve. It engages follow-on echelons with both firepower *and* maneuver forces while the close battle continues. It prevents the enemy from massing, deprives him of momentum, and subjects his whole force to destruction. Using combined arms to achieve its effects, this form of attack will require close coordination between Army air and ground maneuver forces, artillery, EW, and Air Force BAI missions.

A fourth form of deep attack destroys or neutraiizes particular enemy threats or advantages. For example, it might target a nuclear-capable weapon system within range of the friendly force. It might target bridging to prevent an enemy river crossing. All of these deep attacks use target value analysis to focus very narrowly on the purpose and on the most lucrative targets.

INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC WARFARE

EW is an effective tool of battle in a combined arms context. It can support operations by—

- **Deceiving the enemy.**
- **Locating his electronic emitters.**
- **Intercepting his transmissions.**
- **Complicating his command and control and his target-acquisition systems at decisive junctures in the battle.**

Planners should understand the relative scarcity of EW weapons, their limitations, and the transient nature of their effects.

The commander is the key to successfully integrating electronic warfare into the operational scheme. He must understand its potential impact on the battlefield and provide the continuous guidance necessary to its proper use.

When developing his concept of operation, the commander should treat EW assets much as he treats artillery assets. He should deploy EW assets to committed units in the light of their missions, the capabilities of available systems, and potential enemy actions.

The commander and staff members must understand the enemy's electronic systems. Commanders and staffs at corps and division levels must sort out thousands of enemy emitters and hundreds of communications nets by function. Then they must determine the ones that can disrupt the friendly combat plan. Each enemy net or weapon system that uses electronic emitters has a relative target value. Commanders should identify nets which have high tactical value to the enemy but little or no intelligence value. Enemy fire direction nets usually meet these criteria and should be jammed and/or destroyed per SOP.

Enemy nets may routinely pass information of intelligence value. SOP requires their identification and monitoring. Jammers and enemy radars cannot normally be jammed by ground resources, and they pass virtually no intelligence. SOP requires their destruction. Such SOPs allow the commander and his staff to focus on key emitters and nets that require decisive action. Decisions to jam, to destroy, or to exploit for intelligence require routine reevaluation.

The G2 or the S2 is responsible to the commander for intelligence, counterintelligence, and target development. Working with the G3 or the S3, he will develop the intelligence, counterintelligence, electronic warfare support measures, and target development requirements for planning and executing an operation.

For EW, the G2 or the S2 will task his collection ground and airborne systems to develop targets for interception, jamming, or destruction. His direction-finding equipment determines the approximate location of enemy emitters. These locations provide valuable information for targeting command posts, key control points, and, in the case of radars, the enemy weapon systems. Airborne direction finders available to a corps and its divisions provide the most accurate locations and do so at greater ranges than the ground vehicular systems. Ground equipment, however, provides the nucleus of locating assets. Direction finders will assist in determining enemy intentions by providing a picture of the battlefield.

The communciations-electronics officer manages the defensive electronic warfare battle. Defensive EW is discussed in chapter 4.

The G3 or the S3 has the overall responsibility for EW, but his primary focus will be offensive EW or electronic combat. He must fully implement the commander's guidance by developing plans and orders. The G3 or the S3 is responsible for jamming missions, fire missions, and deception operations.

The supporting military intelligence unit provides an electronic warfare support element (EWSE) to assist the G3 or the S3 in coordinating EW activities. The EWSE will collocate with the fire support element (FSE) to facilitate target acquisition, fire planning, and coordination.

The G3 or the S3 has staff responsibility for attacking enemy electronic emitters by

electronic means (jamming). The FSE coordinates both lethal and nonlethal means of attack for the G3. Jamming should interrupt or disrupt the enemy's command and control at the decisive moment on the battlefield. When jamming is timed to coincide with other combat actions, it can produce decisive results. Like any other combat capability, it is a scarce resource with specific applicability. Jamming may be effective only for the short periods of time the enemy needs to take evasive action or to execute countermeasures.

Jammers support other combat actions—

- **To disrupt key command and control nets, thus slowing or disorganizing the enemy in critical sections.**
- **To deny the enemy the ability to react to changes on the battlefield, for example, by committing reserves or changing direction.**
- **To reduce the effectiveness of enemy fire support and air control nets.**
- **To deny the enemy the use of his air defense fire control nets.**
- **To disrupt the enemy's flow of critical supplies, such as ammunition and POL.**

Jammers are vulnerable to direction finding and destruction by fire. They should be used judiciously and moved often enough to avoid destruction. The G3 or the S3 coordinates the initial positioning of jammers and other electronic warfare assets in the sectors or zones of action of subordinate units. Their subsequent movement must be coordinated with the units in whose areas they are located. Such units may best control any relocation of ground mobile equipment. The electronic warfare assets must be positioned on favorable terrain away from command posts and fighting positions. They must remain close enough to the FLOT to be effective, but they cannot hinder the movement of combat units.

The G3 or the S3 is also responsible for electronic deception activities. These should tie to and enhance the overall deception effort of the corps, and they should include imitative communication deception (ICD) and MED. ICD enters an enemy net, posing as a member. It can simply harass or, by passing changes in orders, disrupt the operations of the enemy unit. ICD is strictly controlled. *Applicable rules are in AR 105-86.*

MED is an effective means of deceiving the enemy that must also be carefully planned to create the desired effect. It passes a false picture of friendly unit dispositions and intentions to the enemy. It can portray a phantom unit by using the proper numbers of radios and radars normally assigned to the real unit. It can also portray a false image of a unit's intentions. Changing the number or kind of radio messages passed during a given period creates the illusion of a buildup of personnel and supplies. Eliminating normal radio traffic creates the illusion of radio silence, typical practice prior to an attack.

The enemy is well-versed in both ICD and MED and is likely to be wary of them. Our efforts must be well-planned and based on accurate data, or they will deceive no one. Furthermore, if poorly done, they will only deprive us of critical assets which could be better employed elsewhere.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

Maneuver and fires must be coordinated with a *supporting engineer plan.* The commander's decision and guidance for using engineers should control the plan. At maneuver brigade and battalion levels, the maneuver unit S3 prepares the engineer plan. At division and above, the engineer is responsible for preparing the engineer plan under the direction of the G3.

The engineer system has three basic purposes: It preserves the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces; it obstructs the maneuver of the enemy in areas where fire and maneuver can be used to destroy him; it enhances the survivability of friendly forces with protective construction. Engineer plans must be fully coordinated with the scheme of maneuver and fire support plans. They must allocate units and furnish a clear list of mission priorities.

Time, equipment, and materials may restrict the amount of engineer work accomplished before and during battle. Engineer plans must reflect these limitations realistically. They must assess the necessary trade-offs between survivability, mobility, and countermobility tasks and assign priorities. Normally, they must concentrate in vital areas in support of the main effort rather than throughout the force.

In offensive operations, engineers normally concentrate their efforts in supporting maneuver by—

- **Improving and maintaining routes.**
- **Laying bridges.**
- **Breaching and removing obstacles to movement.**
- **Installing protective obstacles to the flanks of the attacking forces.**

Some corps engineer units may be attached to, or placed under operational control of, divisions. Others will operate in direct or general support.

In the defense, engineers reinforce the terrain to anchor the defense in critical areas, to maximize the effects of the defender's fires, and to facilitate the movement of counterattack forces. They also prepare positions and roads or trails for moving reserve, artillery, logistic, and other units. Doing so enhances the survivability of forces and vital facilities.

Corps engineer units are responsible for employing atomic demolition munitions against accessible hard targets. Maneuver units will provide the required mission support.

Engineer units *must coordinate obstacle plans in detail.* They must destroy or emplace bridges at the proper time, accurately place and report gaps and flank obstacles, and close routes left open for friendly maneuver or withdrawal on time. All engineer, artillery, and aviation units are responsible for emplacing scatterable mines. Plans must provide for the timely recording of in-place obstacles, and key information must be promptly disseminated to all affected units.

Engineer operations are time and labor intensive. They must begin as early as possible in the defense. They must also be flexible enough to change as the battle develops. They must include detailed plans for emplacing scatterable mines rapidly, installing bridging on short notice, and placing or clearing obstacles in combat.

Denial plans will prevent or hinder the enemy from occupying or using areas or objects of tactical or strategic value. To the maximum extent possible, all materials of military value to the enemy will be removed or destroyed prior to retrograde movements. International agreements and national policy restrict denial operations to military objects. They prohibit destroying certain materials and facilities for humanitarian concerns. Each local commander must strictly follow the theater policy on denial.

INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE

US forces can no longer count on unchallenged air superiority. Enemy air forces will contest control of the air, and our operations are likely to be conducted under temporary or local air superiority, air parity, or even enemy domination. Enemy air capability will require us to coordinate air defenses.

Corps and divisions will often possess organic SHORAD units. High-to-medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) units may also be assigned or attached to corps when higher echelons are not providing them.

All air defense systems must be integrated to preclude the attack of friendly aircraft and to engage hostile aircraft. The Air Force component commander in a theater is normally the area air defense commander. He is responsible for integrating all air defense elements. He also establishes air defense rules of engagement and procedures for all air defense systems within the theater. HIMAD systems are integrated by automated data

link to an Air Force control and reporting center (CRC). Air defense rules and procedures pass from the CRC through the corps and division to SHORAD systems by voice communication.

The commander locates air defense battalions of corps and divisions to protect his highest priority assets. These will vary with each operation. When air attack is likely, he should be concerned about—

- **Command posts.**
- **Logistic facilities.**
- **Artillery units.**
- **Bridges or defiles.**
- **Reserves.**
- **Forward arming and refueling points.**
- **Massed maneuver forces.**

The unit air defense officer recommends air defenses based on the commander's guidance for each operation. Passive defensive measures will remain important since there will rarely be enough air defense artillery (ADA) weapons to provide complete protection.

Like field artillery, ADA must provide continuous coverage of protected units during mobile operations. Movements must be carefully planned, firing positions must be cleared with sector or zone commanders, and plans must be flexible enough to accommodate sudden changes. *FM 44-1 and Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 8 contain detailed discussions of air defense operation.*

AIRSPACE COORDINATION

Airspace coordination maximizes joint force effectiveness in the air-land battle without hindering the combat power of either service. Friendly aircraft must be able to enter, to depart, and to move within the area of operations free of undue restrictions, while artillery fires in support of the ground force continue uninterrupted. The tempo and complexity of modern combat rule out a system that requires complicated or time-consuming coordination. Also, the likelihood of poor or enemy-jammed communications dictates maximum reliance on procedural arrangement. To be simple and flexible, our airspace coordination system operates under a concept of management by exception.

Each service is free to operate its aircraft within the theater airspace. Army aircraft at low altitudes operate under the control of Army commanders. Air Force aircraft at medium and high altitudes operate under control of the tactical air control system. The boundary between low- and medium-altitude regimes is flexible and situation-dependent. Only when aircraft pass from one regime to another is traffic coordination required. Generally, Army aircraft operate without restriction below coordinating altitudes forward of the division rear boundary. Passing information about major movements or high concentrations of fire helps to avoid conflicts.

The operations officer is responsible for the airspace coordination of Army aviation. He coordinates air routes and movements with the aviation officer, the air defense officer, the fire support coordinators, and aviation unit commanders. Doing so insures the safe movement of aircraft within his area of responsibility. Routes, times of flight, and other procedures must be precisely defined and stringently observed to engage enemy aircraft effectively.

COMMUNICATIONS

Signal support plans deliberately meet the requirements of the operation. Means for transmitting information and orders range from the time-tested radio, wire, and messenger systems to high-speed data links and man-packed satellite communication terminals. Commanders and staffs at all echelons must understand the capabilities and limitations of their systems. They must be actively involved in insuring adequacy. Atmospheric conditions, terrain, enemy EW efforts, and nuclear EMP may hinder electronic signal equipment. The key to survivability is establishing command and

control procedures that—

- **Provide redundancy of communications.**
- **Eliminate unnecessary reports.**
- **Insure that subordinates know what to do during communications interruption.**
- **Do not overload communications and use them only when absolutely necessary.**
- **Minimize use of the most vulnerable means.**
- **Practice good operations security and good communications security.**

Each means of communication has its strengths and weaknesses. Carefully integrated means should give the most flexible and reliable system possible.

DECEPTION

Deception misleads the enemy regarding friendly intentions, capabilities, objectives, and locations of vulnerable units and facilities. The G3 assembles the deception plan, making use of every unit and asset available to project a plausible deception story designed to elicit a specific enemy reaction. He may use combat units; CEWI units; elements of the signal, support, command, and aviation units, as well as civil affairs staff and other forces. The deception effort may include demonstrations and ruses as part of offensive or defensive maneuver plans.

Demonstrations deceive the enemy by a show of force in an area where no battle is sought. Although forces may move as part of a demonstration, they do not intend to contact the enemy. For example, maneuver or fire support forces might be positioned to indicate an attack at a location other than that actually intended.

Ruses are single actions that *deliberately* place false information in enemy hands. They may cause the enemy to disclose his intentions, state of morale, or combat readiness. One ruse is to use a few vehicles towing chains to produce the dust clouds of a large movement. Another is to move a few tanks throughout an area at night to simulate repositioning of forces. Manipulative communications deception is a common means of placing false or misleading information in the enemy's hands. *FM 90-2 provides additional details on deception operations.*

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations (PSYOP) are an important component of the political, military, economic, and ideological actions that support both long-term and immediate objectives. Propaganda and other PSYOP techniques for changing the attitudes and behavior of target groups provide the commander with his primary means of communication with opposing military forces and civilian groups. When effectively integrated with other operations, PSYOP add to the relative combat power of the force. They manipulate the psychological dimension of the battlefield—

- **To reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy forces.**
- **To promote support for friendly forces by foreign populations and groups.**
- **To reduce the effectiveness of enemy PSYOP directed toward friendly forces and supporting civilian groups.**

PSYOP must be effectively employed from the theater to the division level. Based on levels of employment, objectives, and targeted groups, each of the following categories is part of an integrated theater PSYOP effort:

- **Strategic PSYOP, conducted to advance broad or long-term objectives and to create a psychological environment favorable to military operations.**
- **Tactical PSYOP, conducted to achieve relatively immediate and short-term objectives in support of tactical commanders.**
- **Consolidated PSYOP, conducted to facilitate military operations, to reduce interference by noncombatants, and to**

obtain the cooperation of the civilian population in the area of operations.

The G3 is responsible for integrating psychological and combat operations. The supporting PSYOP unit commander plans and executes PSYOP. He normally provides a small PSYOP staff element to the supported G3.

Effective integration of PSYOP is based on the following fundamental principles:

- **Planning should begin early, concurrently with operational planning.**
- **PSYOP must occur early in an operation.**
- **Scarce resources for conducting PSYOP should be targeted against groups most critical to success.**
- **Campaigns of strategic, tactical, and consolidation PSYOP must be thoroughly coordinated and mutually supportive.**
- **All PSYOP units are part of a PSYOP command to insure integration and consistency of campaigns.**
- **PSYOP must respond to changing requirements of the battlefield.**

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Unconventional warfare (UW), normally conducted by US Army Special Forces, operates deep in the enemy's rear area. Special Forces can disrupt the enemy's ability to prosecute the main battle by conducting either unconventional warfare or unilateral operations deep in his rear areas. Normally, the unified commander assigns missions through his Joint Unconventional Warfare Command (JUWC). Special Forces will provide support by responding to requirements from the tactical corps commander when their elements are located in the corps area of interest.

The US Army Special Forces conduct unconventional warfare in a theater. These operations concentrate on strategic goals and have long-range and immediate effects on the battle. They include interdicting enemy lines of communications and destroying military and industrial facilities. Special Forces conduct PSYOP to demoralize the enemy and to collect information in the enemy's rear areas. Special Forces organize, train, equip, and advise resistance forces in guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape (E&E), subversion, and sabotage. Their greatest value to commanders of conventional forces is in fighting the deep battle and forcing the enemy to deploy significant numbers of combat forces to counter these activities.

Guerrilla warfare combines military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Guerrilla operations are brief, violent offensive actions conducted to complement, to support, or to extend conventional military operations. Guerrilla operations in support of a corps' deep battle can assist the commander by maintaining surveillance of a critical area, by distracting enemy attention from objective areas, by attacking enemy fire support units, and by interdicting key approaches.

E&E, subversion, and sabotage activities are aspects of UW which contribute to the strategic effort of conventional forces. E&E moves military and selected civilian personnel out of enemy-held territory. Subversion undermines the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a government. Sabotage injures or obstructs the defense of a country by destroying war materiel and human or natural resources.

If the United States retains control of the guerrilla forces after linkup with the conventional forces, the guerrillas may augment conventional forces. They may participate in conventional combat operations or conduct reconnaissance in support of conventional forces. They may also relieve or replace conventional units in the main battle area, for example, to contain or to destroy bypassed enemy units and enemy guerrilla elements.

Special Forces elements can deploy unilaterally into the enemy's rear area to locate, to identify, and to destroy vital

targets. Special Forces detachments may have the following missions:

- **Intelligence collection.**
- **Target acquisition.**
- **Terminal guidance for Air Force strike aircraft and Army missile systems.**
- **Interdiction of critical transportation targets.**
- **Destruction of nuclear storage sites and command and control facilities.**
- **Personnel recovery.**

RANGER OPERATIONS

Ranger companies and battalions are specially organized, trained, and equipped to perform reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, ground interdiction, and raids in the enemy rear. Ranger battalions can deploy rapidly to any location in the world where an immediate US military presence is required. They can infiltrate the hostile area by air, land, or sea. When adequately supported, they are capable of independent operations. Ranger missions should integrate into a plan designed to destroy, to delay, and to disorganize the enemy. As an additional benefit, they cause him to divert a significant portion of his combat forces to rear area security.

Ranger operations normally take two forms: quick response and deliberate. In quick response, Ranger units accomplish missions before the enemy can react to their presence. Deliberate operations rely on—

- **Meticulous planning for every phase.**
- **Detailed reconnaissance or surveillance of a target area.**
- **Deceptive countermeasures and absolute secrecy, thorough preparation, and rehearsals.**
- **Decisive execution characterized by surprise, speed, precision, and boldness.**

In either kind, the mission should be completed and the unit extracted before the enemy can react in strength.

Command and control of the ranger battalion will normally be at a level where the unit's unique capabilities can be fully employed on a worldwide or a theaterwide basis. The command echelon to which the Ranger battalion is attached must be able to provide all resources necessary to employ it properly.

Ranger units require access to real-time, all-source tactical and strategic intelligence. The controlling headquarters must have interface with national-, theater-, and corps-level intelligence collection and production elements. It must provide timely, detailed, processed intelligence to the Ranger planning staff.

Insertion and extraction operations are crucial to Ranger employment. Ranger battalions must be provided mission-dedicated assets when air insertion and extraction are involved. Ranger units must also have effective and secure long-range communications with controlling headquarters.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Commanders must expect to fight in or near populated areas. Centers of civilian population have the potential of providing supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources that US commanders can use to support military operations. Conversely, uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians about the battlefield, hostile actions by the population, or failure to cooperate with US forces can significantly disrupt military operations. International law, including the Geneva Convention of 1949, requires all commanders to maintain a humane standard of treatment of civilians in the battle area, to preserve law and order, and to protect private property.

Civil-military operations (CMO) affect the relationship between a military command and the civilian populace. They include activities conducted to assist civil authorities and to control the population in the operational area. To obtain the cooperation of the civilian population, CMO integrate psychological operations and civil affairs operations.

OBSOLETE

The G3 supervises PYSOP, but the G5 coordinates those PYSOP directed against civilian populations. PYSOP support CMO through political, military, and economic actions planned and conducted to mold the opinions, attitudes, and behavior of foreign groups to support US national objectives. They also counter enemy PYSOP. The target audience need not be under US control.

The G5 or the S5 staff supervises civilian affairs activities. Civil affairs are those activities which involve US military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or those in a country or area occupied by US military forces. This relationship may be established prior to, during, or after military action in time of hostilities or other emergencies. In a friendly country or area, US forces coordinate activities with local agencies or persons, when possible. Normally these relationships are covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied. In occupied territory, a military government may have to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority. Civil-military activities—

- **Identify the local resources, facilities, and support available for US operations.**
- **Coordinate the use of local resources, facilities, and support such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.**
- **Minimize interference by the local populace with US military operations.**
- **Assist the commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local populace.**

PART TWO

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 8

Fundamentals of the Offense

THE OFFENSE is the decisive form of war, the commander's only means of attaining a positive goal or of completely destroying an enemy force. Since great numerical advantages are rare in war, the attacker will normally economize in large areas in order to develop local superiority at the point of the main effort. The attacker concentrates quickly and strikes hard at an unexpected place or time to throw the defender off balance. Once the attack is underway, the attacker must move fast, press every advantage aggressively, and capitalize on each opportunity to destroy either the enemy's forces or the overall coherence of his defense.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

From Yorktown in the Revolutionary War to the Yalu River in the Korean War, the US Army has a long history of successful offensive campaigns. Sherman, Jackson, MacArthur, Bradley, and Patton are names which stand out from a long list of American leaders who were expert in the attack.


General Grant also understood the essence of offensive operations. Although he could fight direct and bloody actions when necessary, he was a master of maneuver, speed, and the indirect approach. His operation south of Vicksburg, called the most brilliant campaign ever fought on American soil, exemplifies the qualities of a well-conceived, violently executed offensive plan.


Setting a pace of operations so rapid that his enemies could not follow his activities, Grant defeated the forces of Generals Johnston and Pemberton in five engagements. He covered 200 miles in 19 days, capturing Jackson and driving the defenders of Vicksburg into their trenches. Grant's 4,000 casualties were only half as great as his enemy's. Within 6 weeks the 30,000 men of the Vicksburg garrison surrendered, giving the Union uncontested control of the Mississippi and dividing the Confederacy.

The same speed, surprise, maneuver, and decisive action will be required to win battles of the future. Sensors and long-range weapons of the deep battle, maneuver of ground and air units, and effectively concentrated forces and fires will insure success.

THE BATTLE OF VICKSBURG

After 6 months of fruitless effort north of Vicksburg, Grant masked his operation with demonstrations and raids as he moved his army south of the fortress and crossed to the eastern bank of the Mississippi early in May. That turned the Confederate defenses and put the Union Army within reach of the enemy's rear area. It also separated Grant from his base of operations and placed him in enemy territory against an army of equal strength.





Nonetheless, Grant retained the initiative. Rather than moving north on the most obvious approach to his objective, he avoided the defenses south of Vicksburg and used the Big Black River to protect his flank as he maneuvered toward the city of Jackson. By threatening both Jackson and Vicksburg, Grant prevented the Confederates from uniting their forces against him. By swinging to the east of the fortress, he interdicted its main line of support. His speed of movement and his refusal to establish conventional lines of supply confused the enemy and frustrated Confederate attempts to strike at his rear.

PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE

". . . when we speak of destroying the enemy's forces . . . nothing obliges us to limit this idea to physical forces: the moral element must also be considered."
Karl von Clausewitz

Destroying the enemy's fighting force is the only sure way of winning; therefore, forces undertake offensive operations primarily to destroy enemy forces. It is not necessary to defeat every enemy combat formation to win. Attacks that avoid the enemy's main strength but shatter the will of the defending commander or reduce the fighting capability of his troops are the fastest and the cheapest way of winning.

Frontal attacks are nearly certain to be costly in lives and equipment. Therefore, they should be undertaken only when they will inflict disabling losses on the enemy, neutralize a major enemy force, or accomplish some lesser effect for a specific and important purpose. On the other hand, accomplished tacticians have consistently preferred well-conceived attacks against weakness rather than force-on-force battles of attrition. They know that destruction is most practical after the enemy has been turned out of a position or is caught in a posture vulnerable to fire.

Offensive operations also have secondary purposes, all of which contribute to destroying the enemy. Elements of large attacking forces may undertake offensive operations specifically—

- **To secure key or decisive terrain.**
- **To deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain.**
- **To gain information.**
- **To deceive and to divert the enemy.**
- **To hold the enemy in position.**

Attackers gain a decided advantage when they seize decisive terrain. The Israelis did so when they captured the Mitla Pass in 1967. From such terrain, the attacker may deliver or direct destructive fires. Seizing such terrain may also prevent the enemy's escape or reinforcement. Capturing or destroying key resources or features such as roads, railways, oil lines, politically significant cities, or communications centers denies their use to the enemy or provides a psychological advantage.

A limited-objective attack or reconnaissance in force may be the primary source of information about enemy strength, dispositions, weapons, morale, supply, and intentions. Such attacks occurred frequently in the past. With the advent of improved electronic sensors, they complement intelligence-gathering means; they will remain necessary in the future.

Supporting attacks deceive or distract the enemy and delay his recognition of the main attack. In conjunction with other deceptive measures, they cause him to shift forces from critical areas or to delay sending forces against the main effort. Spoiling attacks can disrupt enemy defensive preparations or preempt his own offensive actions.

Some attacks prevent enemy movement. Such fixing attacks keep the enemy from interfering with friendly maneuver elsewhere and normally facilitate envelopment or pentration by a friendly force.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR THE ATTACK

Surprise, concentration, and violence can give the attacker his only significant advantage—the *initiative*. If the attacker loses the initiative, even temporarily or locally, he will jeopardize the success of the entire operation. To maintain the initiative, the attacker must see opportunities, analyze courses of action, decide what to do, and act faster than the enemy—*repeatedly*. Aggressive maneuver, responsive firepower, and effective deep attack are essential to maintaining the initiative.

On today's battlefield the attacker must maneuver rapidly, penetrate deeply, survive powerful counterfires and countermeasures, and above all, maintain momentum by maintaining the initiative. If the attacker does not preserve the momentum, the enemy will recover from the shock of the first assault. He will identify the attacker's main effort and mass forces and fires against it.

METT-T, weapons, and the higher commander's concept of operations determine the conduct of an offensive operation. Whatever the plan may be, **concentration, surprise, speed, flexibility, and audacity** are fundamental.

CONCENTRATION

First, concentration of effort is essential. Successful twentieth-century attacks have usually launched from sudden concentrations and dispersed rapidly as penetrating forces moved into the depths of the defended area on divergent axes. The Third Army's attack through France, the Soviet's advance into Manchuria in 1945, the United Nations' counteroffensive in Korea, and Israel's Sinai campaign of 1967 provide the best examples for the offensive designs of the future. In all but the Soviet advance, the attackers lacked significant numerical advantage. Instead, they succeeded by massing unexpectedly where they could achieve a brief local superiority and by preserving their initial advantage through relentless exploitation. *Similar situations and tactics will occur even more rapidly on the nuclear-chemical battlefield.*

The battlefield is lethal, and the attacker must succeed early and maintain a rapid pace. Thus, division and corps commanders should concentrate for the attack and employ every combat capability available to them. They should allocate enough combat, combat support, and combat service support units to permit them to adjust missions and task organizations. Such support and flexibility will allow the attacker to exploit opportunities as they arise.

Every level of command practices concentration of effort. However, it is most effective at division level and higher, where all combat power, including logistic resources, can be coordinated in support of the plan. When

concentrating forces for the attack, commander must avoid patterns or obvious movements which indicate the attack's timing or direction. Mobility, speed, security, and deception are essential to concentrate forces successfully.

Offensive operations, especially those involving air-land operations, require arms and services to cooperate closely to achieve concentration of effort. Air-ground operations are complementary. Ground maneuver forces will be the critical elements in an attack, but their progress will depend on Army and Air Force reconnaissance, close air support, and tactical interdiction. The attacker's advance causes the defender to concentrate and to move forces. This, in turn, can create lucrative targets for air attack. Air attack on enemy reserves and defenses in depth promotes ground maneuver.

Concentration of combat and logistic support is also essential to maintaining offensive momentum. Historically, disrupted engineer assistance, air defense coverage, field artillery support, communications, and logistic support have limited the success of large offensives. These functions require integrated staff planning.

Nuclear and chemical weapons dramatically increase the possibilities for sudden alterations on the battlefield, which attacks can exploit. Troop concentrations should be brief,deception should be of the highest quality, and plans should be flexible enough to accommodate sudden changes. These imperatives, however, represent only an extension of the characteristics of a sound attack. Although risks will be greater, the attacker will gain considerable protection from nuclear fires by disrupting the defender's fire support system and by confusing him with speed.

Under nonnuclear conditions, developing schemes of maneuver and then planning fire support to achieve their objectives are normal. When nuclear weapons are available, planning such fires and then basing schemes of maneuver on their effects may be preferable.

The commander must determine the size of the maneuver forces and when they should concentrate. If they mass too late, he risks defeat in detail. If they mass too soon, he risks nuclear destruction. To minimize the overall risks, he can disperse into concentrated small units. If less than battalion-size, they are not worthwhile targets. As the distance from the enemy decreases, maneuver units will concentrate over multiple routes at the decisive place and time.

Tactical schemes for the nuclear or the chemical environment must stress rapid movement, minimum massing, alternative routes, and violent execution of simple plans even when communications are lost. Nuclear or chemical fire support may allow smaller units to accomplish missions that would require the massed forces in a conventional battle.

SURPRISE

Second, the commander must strive to surprise the enemy. Initiative allows him to choose the time, place, and means of launching his attack. This advantage must throw the enemy off balance and prevent him from recovering until the mission succeeds. The basic requirement for surprise is to strike the enemy at an unexpected place and time.

Striking at an unexpected place and time normally means avoiding the enemy's strengths and attacking his weaknesses. It creates ambiguity and elicits uncoordinated responses. Basil Liddell Hart referred to all such efforts as "the indirect approach." He further noted, "effective results have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent's unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical and always psychological." Although a direct attack against enemy strength may produce an immediate effect, that effect will seldom be lasting. Attacking forces cannot usually afford the losses that result from a direct approach.

The enemy's strength depends in part on his numbers and resources. It also depends on the morale of his troops, his dispositions, the stability of his command and control, and the effectiveness of his combat support and logistic arrangements. Attacking any of these soft underpinnings can seriously undermine his ability to fight. Divisions and corps commonly use the indirect approach, but smaller units can also apply it to their operations. In its broadest sense of gaining surprise by avoiding the obvious, the indirect approach is vital to offensive success.

SPEED

Third, the attack must move rapidly. Demonstrations, deceptions, feints, and electronic warfare are means of creating or prolonging the enemy's confusion. Speed, however, is absolutely essential to success. It promotes surprise, keeps the enemy off balance, contributes to the security of the attacking force, and degrades the defender's countermeasures which cannot keep pace. Speed can so confuse and immobilize the defender that the attack becomes unstoppable. Finally, as it compensates for lack of mass, speed can provide the momentum necessary for attacks to achieve their aims.

Attacks move fast and follow reconnaissance units or successful probes through gaps in enemy defenses. They must shift their strength quickly to widen penetrations, roll up exposed flanks, and reinforce successes. The attacker tries to carry the battle deep into the enemy rear to break down the enemy's defenses before he can react. The enemy must never be permitted to recover from the shock of the initial assault, never be given the time to identify the main effort, and above all, never be afforded the opportunity to mass his forces or supporting fire against the main offensive effort.

Speed is built into operations through careful planning. Commanders must identify the best avenues for attack, plan the battle in depth, provide for quick transitions to exploitation and pursuit, and concentrate and combine forces effectively. Speed certainly depends on the violent execution of the plan by fire and maneuver units, but it will also depend on—

- **Availability and positioning of engineers.**
- **Use of air and ground cavalry.**
- **Maintenance of effective air defense.**
- **Responsive logistic support of the force.**

FLEXIBILITY

Fourth, the attack must be flexible. The plan must foresee developments as far ahead as possible. However, it must also expect uncertainties, and it must be ready to exploit opportunities. To preserve synchronization on a fluid battlefield, initial planning must be detailed. Subordinates must understand the higher commander's aims so well that they can properly exploit battlefield opportunities even when communications fail. The corps or division must coordinate and support all arms and control operations that may cover 50 to 80 kilometers daily and change direction frequently.

The plan must use routes which permit the maximum possible opportunities for maneuver around strongpoints. A major offensive operation must provide—

- **Branches from the main approach.**
- **Plans for reversion to the defense and for exploitation.**
- **Provisions for changing the direction or location of the main effort.**
- **Provisions for combat at night or in limited visibility.**

Even if nuclear and chemical weapons do not support the attack, commanders must plan to protect the force from such enemy's strikes. Planning for maximum dispersion, using multiple routes, and having reserves assume major missions are all basic to an attack on the next battlefield.

AUDACITY

Finally, audacity has always been the keystone of successful offensives. To the overly cautious around him, General George S. Patton, Jr., once warned, "Never take counsel of your fears. The enemy is more worried than you are. Numerical superiority, while useful, is not vital to successful offensive action. The fact that you are attacking induces the enemy to believe that you are stronger than he is."

In summary, the key terms of AirLand Battle doctrine—initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization—also apply to any successful attack. Offensive operations—

- **Seize and retain the initiative throughout the operation, never allowing the enemy to recover from the shock of the initial attack.**
- **Fight the enemy throughout the depth of his formations to frustrate his decision making, his attempts to react to the attack, and his attempts to sustain a coherent defense.**
- **Maintain agility and flexibility in using fire, maneuver, and electronic warfare to set the terms of battle and to create confusion in the mind of the defender. Just as he begins to react to one threatening situation, he is faced with another. This overloads the enemy's command and control system and renders his reaction uncoordinated and indecisive. Indecision and uncoordinated actions can result in destruction of the defending force if vigorously exploited.**
- **Synchronize all available combat capability in well-coordinated combined arms actions. To create a violent overall effect, every action of every soldier, system, and unit should either complement or reinforce the actions of other soldiers, systems, and units. Violent execution of flexible plans and aggressive exploitation of enemy weaknesses can destroy a defense which is no longer synchronized.**

FORMS OF MANEUVER

Just as commanders must consider the principles of war collectively and not as a list of separate procedures, so must they view the basic forms of maneuver. In actual operations, the frontal attack, penetration, and envelopment will be used in combination. Infiltration may be a part of both penetrations and envelopments. For example, committed battalions in a divisional envelopment may have to conduct penetrations in their own sectors.


FRONTAL ATTACK

A frontal attack strikes the enemy across a broad front and over the most direct approaches. For deliberate attacks, the frontal attack is unquestionably the least preferable because it exposes the attacker to the concentrated fire of the defender over the most obvious approach.


As the quickest approach to the enemy, however, frontal maneuver is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized units. It is often the best form of manuever for a hasty attack in a meeting engagement or for exploiting the effects of nuclear or chemical strikes immediately after they occur. The frontal attack is also used in exploitation and pursuit and during envelopment by the committed subordinate formations.

PENETRATION

A pentration breaks through the defense on a narrow front, widens the gap thus created, and seizes deep objectives to destroy the coherence of the defense. Penetration will frequently precede an envelopment. Shallow penetrations by infantry may initiate armored envelopments or penetrations. Nuclear or chemical fires can also destroy enemy defensive positions and assist in making a penetration.


BASIC FORMS OF MANEUVER
FRONTAL ATTACK
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
XXX
XX
PENETRATION
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
ON ORDER
ON ORDER
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
SUPPORTING ATTACK
SUPPORTING ATTACK
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
XX
(+)
MAIN ATTACK
CORPS RESERVE
XXX
XXX

BASIC FORMS OF MANEUVER (cont)




ENVELOPMENT

Envelopment avoids the enemy's strength—his front, where the effects of his fires and obstacles are greatest. The attacker maneuvers around or over the main defenses to secure objectives on the enemy flank or rear. There the defender is less able to concentrate fire, and the attacker enjoys numerical superiority. Tacticians generally prefer envelopment because the attacking force will suffer minimum damage while gaining maximum opportunities to destroy the enemy. It also produces the greatest psychological shock.

Envelopments aim at gaps between enemy positions or at weak points in the defense. Nuclear, chemical, or concentrated conventional fire may create such gaps or weaknesses. Rapid and decisive attack can then exploit them.

OBSOLETE

BASIC FORMS OF MANEUVER (cont)



A turning movement is a variation of an envelopment. The attacking force passes around or over enemy defenses to secure objectives deep in his rear area. In doing so, it forces the enemy to abandon his positions, to divert major forces to meet the threat, and to fight in two directions simultaneously. The speed of airborne and airmobile forces makes them uniquely valuable for turning movements. Because they will normally attack beyond the range of other forces, they need special support.

Infiltration is sometimes used in conjunction with penetration or envelopment. Infiltrating units or parts of units move to favorable positions beyond enemy lines. The prime consideration during the movement is to avoid detection and engagement. Ideally, infiltrations occur during reduced visibility, over rough or difficult terrain, or through areas the enemy has not occupied or covered by surveillance.

While infiltration may also be conducted during defensive operations, it is primarily an offensive maneuver. The commander may order an infiltration through gaps in the enemy's defenses—

- **To attack lightly held positions.**
- **To attack strongpoints from the flank or rear.**
- **To occupy positions from which the main effort can be supported.**
- **To secure key terrain.**
- **To conduct operations in the enemy rear area.**