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# INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE
# ORGANIZATION AND MAINTENANCE
OF THE
# COUNTER ESPIONAGE SERVICE
WITHIN
# MILITARY UNITS

SUPERCEDING PROVISIONAL
COUNTER ESPIONAGE INSTRUCTIONS
FEBUARY 1916

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War Department,
August 31, 1918.

The following "Instructions for the Organization and Maintenance of the Counter Espionage Service within Military Units," prepared in the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, are printed for the information and government of the Army of the United States.

Approved by the Order of the Secretary of War.

M. Churchill

*Brigadier General, General Staff,*
*Director of Military Intelligence,*
*Assistant Chief of Staff.*

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# INTRODUCTION

This pamphlet will be cited as the "C. E. Instructions." It explains the internal counter espionage organization of a military unit. The pamphlet entitled "Principles of Counter Espionage Organization and Control within the Military Establishment" explains the interrelation of the various Counter Espionage units to each other and to the whole system. It will be cited as the "C. E. Principles." The two pamphlets, taken together, constitute a working library for the Negative Intelligence Officer.

Special attention is invited to the secret nature of these instructions, and of all instructions, bulletins, codes, and ciphers pertaining to the Counter Espionage Service. They should be known to no persons other than the Commanding General or Commanding Officer, the Chief of Staff, the Intelligence Officer, and the Assistant Intelligence Officer. *When not in use, they should be kept in a safe.*

Copies of this pamphlet are issued only to Intelligence Officers of independent units. This numbered copy must be receipted for to Military Intelligence Division by the Intelligence Officer who receives it and who thereupon becomes responsible for its safekeeping and final disposition. It is issued to the Intelligence Officer in his official and not in his personal capacity. Should he at any time cease to be Intelligence Officer of the particular unit for which the pamphlet was issued, he must transfer it to his successor in office, if such there be, or return it promptly to Military Intelligence Division. It will not be turned over under such circumstances to the Commanding Officer, the Chief of Staff, or the Adjutant. Upon transferring this pamphlet to a successor, the Intelligence Officer will require a receipt and transmit the same promptly to Military Intelligence Division, which must know at all times who is responsible for its custody.

The following abbreviations are used throughout this pamphlet:

A.P.L.—American Protective League.
C.E. —Counter Espionage.
D.J. —Department of Justice.
I.O. —Intelligence Officer.
M.I. —Military Intelligence.
M.I.D.—Military Intelligence Division, General Staff.

# ARTICLE I.

## FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNTER ESPIONAGE SERVICE.

1. *Confidential Nature.* Positive Intelligence is a development of the service of security and information familiar to every officer as a part of his military education. Its necessity, nature and general functions are well-known and understood. Negative Intelligence or Counter Espionage is, of necessity, a confidential service; its existence is known, in a general way, to many officers, but there are few who realize the scope and nature of the work, and practically none outside the Intelligence Service who understand its methods.

2. *Resulting Problems.* This is as it should be, for secrecy is essential to the success of this service, but secrecy carries with it one serious disadvantage which must be overcome before an efficient counter espionage organization can exist. This disadvantage arises from the fact that the basic principles of counter espionage form no part of general military training, and hence the Intelligence Officer must educate himself, through his own studies, without the aid and advice of other officers such as may be obtained in nearly every other line of military activity. It follows also from the fact that this service is not generally understood, that the Intelligence Officer must inform himself thoroughly in order that he may be able to explain clearly to his Commander the functions and needs of his organization, for he must act by the authority of the Commander and the success of his work depends largely upon the confidence reposed in him by that officer.

3. *Nature of the Service.* First of all it must be definitely understood that Counter Espionage is not a separate branch of the service, but is a function which each military unit must perform for itself, just as it provides its own guard. The Military Intelligence Division, General Staff, is charged with the duty of instructing Intelligence Officers and of co-ordinating their work, but it cannot perform their duties. Nor can it provide Intelligence Officers for military units, for there is no body of officers from which such a detail can be made. It is sometimes practicable to have officers who have been detailed for Intelligence duty ordered to Washington for a brief course of instruction, but this must not obscure the outstanding principle that Intelligence Officers must, in the main, be detailed by the branch with which they are to serve, and that it is a duty of each commander of an independent unit to see to it that his command is protected by a proper C. E. system created therein under his own authority. (Principles, Sec. 2).

4. *Enemy Opportunity.* The rapid assembling and heterogeneous composition of our Army have given ample opportunity for espionage activity on the part of an astute and unscrupulous enemy. The Counter Espionage Service is now in actual conflict with the enemy in the United States, and the multifarious activities of enemy agents constitute a most serious menace to the accomplishment of our mission in the war. The enemy's secret service in the United States is highly organized; it represents years of preparation by experienced agents and the expenditure of vast sums of money. Before the entry of the United States into the war, influences of every sort were set to work to stifle legislation looking toward preparedness and aggressive measures were taken to prevent the manu-

facture and shipment of munitions. Since war became a reality the attack has become more subtle but none the less insistent. Military information is sought for the use of the enemy, direct attack upon our resources is made by means of acts of sabotage, and insidious propaganda is disseminated to implant the seeds of doubt, discontent and disloyalty for the purpose of weakening morale. Information has been received which indicates the intention of the enemy to place a representative in every one of our regiments. There will be no lack of opportunity nor will it be out of keeping with their observed methods.

5. *Counter Organization.* To combat such activities is the mission of the Counter Espionage Service. In so doing it must be so organized within each military unit that every case of disaffection, disloyalty or actual sedition shall be promptly communicated to headquarters and every suspicious activity within the military establishment shall fall within the constant observation of the Intelligence Officer or his agencies. In addition it is necessary that there be a constant exchange of information by Intelligence Officers among themselves and with the Military Intelligence Division.

6. *Pooling of Information.* The central office of the Military Intelligence Division at Washington examines, collates, records, and files information received from Intelligence Officers, with whom it works in the closest co-operation. It is, furthermore, supplied with information by Intelligence Officers in the American Expeditionary Forces, by the State Department, the Department of Justice, the United States Secret Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence, our Military Attachés abroad, as well as by the Intelligence Departments of the British, French and other allied governments. A further vast fund of information is supplied from miscellaneous and private sources. Information is at hand covering the cases of an immense number of persons or organizations whose actions or attitude have warranted suspicion. This information is at the disposal of the Intelligence Service and should be drawn upon freely. At the same time it is necessary, in order that the central pool of information shall continue to be useful as such, that Intelligence Officers shall promptly report to the Military Intelligence Division all cases handled by them so that the information may be available to the Intelligence Service generally. (Secs. 35-42).

7. *Scope of the Service.* The function of the Counter Espionage Service is informational and preventative rather than punitive. Positive Intelligence collects and disseminates the information upon which are based operations in the field, but it does not conduct such operations. Counter Espionage collects information upon which the proper authorities may act to prevent or suppress disloyalty or sedition and to apprehend enemy agents or sympathizers, but it does not usurp the function of executive officers in making arrests and directing punishment or that of the Judge Advocate in preparing evidence for courts martial. (Principles, Sec. 3).

8. *Necessity for Complete Organization.* Finally, it is imperative that an effective Counter Espionage Service be established immediately wherever troops are stationed and that it be constantly maintained at a high state of efficiency, so that nowhere within our Army can the activities of enemy agents or enemy sympathizers be carried on unobserved. (Secs. 51-56).

It is not intended, nor is it deemed desirable, to lay down hard and fast rules for the interior economy of the Counter Espionage Service. The problem of creating it lies within the province of the Intelligence Officer, who must solve it according to conditions and circumstances which will vary according to the locality and composition of the command. The following suggestions are offered as nothing more than an aid or guide to assist the Intelligence Officer in the accomplishing of his mission.

## ARTICLE II.

### Principles of Organization.

9. *Basic Principles.* The internal organization of a military unit for C. E. purposes is based upon three general principles, namely:

a. Decentralization.
b. Secrecy.
c. Direct communication.

10. *Decentralization.* The principle of decentralization rests upon the conviction that no individual acting in an executive capacity can efficiently direct the activities of more than a limited number of persons under his control. When the number of subordinates exceeds eight or ten it becomes necessary to decentralize by creating sub-divisions, each under the personal direction of a separate executive, the several executives reporting each to his immediate superior. In like manner it may prove necessary to divide and sub-divide the main sub-divisions, in order that no one person will be obliged to deal directly with more subordinates than he can handle efficiently.

In the Counter Espionage Service, where control is complicated by the necessity of secrecy, such decentralization is essential to efficiency, and the greater the number of ramifications which the development of the system entails, the more echelons of decentralization is it necessary to create. It is impossible to prescribe the degree of decentralization necessary in the C. E. Service of a military unit. The problem must be solved by the Intelligence Officer on the ground, having in view the number of men to be covered and the conditions under which they are grouped. (Secs. 13-17).

11. *Secrecy.* An organization such as that herein outlined is valueless unless its existence is kept inviolably secret. Counter Espionage must never be discussed by Intelligence Officers except among themselves; the term Counter Espionage must not be used in public or in any way which might attract attention to the system. It is well established that the most successful of those organizations whose activities are dependent upon secrecy have been those in which the members were unknown, not only to outsiders, but, as far as possible, to each other as well. It is, therefore, desirable that subordinates know as little about the general organization and the duties of others as is consistent with the fulfillment of their own mission, and, for this reason, rules should be drawn with care so as to tell operatives all they should know without revealing what they should not. These rules of secrecy are no reflection on the loyalty or discretion of members of the organization but are necessary protective measures. No person is infallible and one is always in danger of disclosing unconsciously to a clever agent of the enemy, *information which one knows.* One cannot disclose information which one does not know, and ignorance becomes a protection.

12. *Direct Communication* by other than military channels is the basis of successful co-operation among Intelligence Officers (Principles, Sec. 7) and in like manner the communication within the C. E. organization of a unit is carried on in disregard of the usual military channels and without the knowledge of officers subordinate to the Commander of the unit. It is inadvisable for the Intelligence Officer to communicate personally with his operatives, except under the most extraordinary circumstances, but all operatives report directly to the Intelligence Officer through the mails. (Sec. 25).

## ARTICLE III.

### PERSONNEL.

13. *The Intelligence Officer.* At the head of the C. E. system of any unit is the Intelligence Officer, or, in a Division, the Assistant Intelligence Officer for Negative Intelligence. It is usually desirable that this officer should frankly be known as such in order to have the advantage of information volunteered by members of the command who are not connected with the C. E. Service. This rule holds good in all but the smallest units. But the fact that this officer is employed upon Counter Espionage duty should not be emphasized and the fact that a C. E. organization exists within the command must be kept secret. The methods whereby such an organization can be created and can function secretly are herein explained.

14. *Echelons of Control.* Associated with the Intelligence Officer, but absolutely under cover as such, is an officer who will be designated as No. 1, who will constitute the point of contact between the Intelligence Officer and his organization, but whose name must never appear in connection with the C. E. work.

Directly under the No. 1 will be the executives of the first echelon of decentralization whom we will call the Nos. 2, and, assuming two echelons of decentralization, each No. 2 directs personally a limited number of executives of the second echelon to whom we will refer as Nos. 3. Each No. 3 controls certain operatives or agents who seek information by direct contact with the subjects to be observed.

Each No. 2 must know and be known to the No. 1 and the Nos. 3 under his immediate control, but Nos. 2 should not know or be known to each other.

Similarly, each No. 3 must know and be known to his No. 2 and the operatives under his immediate charge, but he should not know or be known to the other Nos. 3, nor should he know anything about No. 1.

Likewise, each operative must know and be known to his No. 3, but should not know or be known by any other operative, nor should he know anything about No. 2.

It is a general rule that information of value to the enemy should not be entrusted to operatives. Their discretion is always to be suspected and their fallibility to be expected. Likewise, when an operative becomes known, a substitute should be found for him. (Sec. 11).

15. *Number of Operatives.* It is not desirable to lay down hard and fast rules for the distribution of operatives. The organization must be on a scale so thorough as to leave no loophole for undetected enemy activity. The determination of the number of operatives adequate to ensure protection will be affected by the composition of the particular unit to be protected. Where the proportion of foreign-born soldiers is relatively high, or in units recruited from localities where influences such as the I. W. W. or conscientious objector propaganda have been active, it will probably be found wise to employ more operatives than where the men are from homes more strongly American. Again, sub-divisions within the unit may differ among themselves in this regard. The final allotment must be left to the discretion of the Intelligence Officer.

It is an axiom in secret service that each agent in active search of information should be checked by another agent whom he does not know as such and by

operatives in every group of men, such as company, battery or troop, in which a number of men are regularly thrown together so that it is possible for one man to be acquainted with and observe any member of the group. One operative in each platoon may be advisable, but since the counter-check is so important, no operative should confine his observations to his own platoon alone; platoons may be grouped to attain this end.

In special units the distribution of operatives will be varied according to circumstances, but in accordance with the same general principles. The object to be attained in general is to cover completely each group in the military service. (Sec. 8).

In general, it may be said that one operative in each fifty men is desirable and that one in every hundred may be considered the minimum ratio consistent with safety

The distribution of operatives according to these principles should be facilitated by the existing organization of troops into administrative or fighting units. In a division camp, of approximately 40,000 men, the Counter Espionage Organization to accomplish its mission will require a minimum of about 400 men.

16. *Number of Echelons.* Based upon the above estimate it is obvious that the sphere of control of the members of the executive echelon immediately in touch with operatives should approximate a battalion and that in a division the next higher sphere of control should approximate a brigade, which echelon can, as a whole, be conveniently controlled by the Divisional No. 1. There are many conditions, however, which call for a different arrangement. (Sec. 10).

17. *Replacement.* Provision should be made by the Intelligence Officer for the replacement of subordinates whose connection with the Counter Espionage Service administered by him may be severed.

If at any time an executive or operative becomes known as a member of the Counter Espionage organization or becomes in any other way undesirable, it is necessary at once to terminate his connection with the organization. This should be done with discretion to the end that injury to the system may not be worked by disgruntled ex-operatives.

To replace officers or men lost thus, or by transfer or casualty, suitable substitutes should be picked out by their superiors in echelon, and, after observation to determine their suitability, listed with the Intelligence Officer, with a view to their being promptly taken into the organization should necessity arise. This should be done without disclosure of the Counter Espionage organization to the men so listed. The Intelligence Officer should have a list, safely and secretly kept, of all the members of his organization; and with this another list of available substitutes. Such provision will, in case of the loss of an executive, obviate the loss of executives and operatives under him, and will enable his loss quickly to be made good.

## ARTICLE IV

### SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

18. *Qualifications.* The selection of personnel is the most difficult part of the task of organizing the Counter Espionage Service. The system stands or falls on the ability of its individual executives and operatives. Since each executive is to be charged with the organization of the echelon of which he is to be in control, the greatest care must be exercised in selecting the executives. They must be officers of ability, common sense, and, above all, unquestionable loyalty. Former experience as organizers and directors of organized activities is a valuable asset; officers of political experience have been found especially apt. No officer should be selected for a member of one of the higher echelons concerning the steadfastness and loyalty of whom there is the least doubt. M. I. D. is prepared, upon telegraphic request, to furnish within approximately two weeks a complete report upon the reputation of any officer in this regard.

In selecting operatives, the personal attributes of the man are more important than his former experience. In fact, former employment as a policeman or detective may actually render a man undesirable as an operative, since he is likely to be suspected by his fellows. Moreover, the police methods of handling criminals are quite out of place in the C. E. Service, and he may sacrifice transmitting information quickly to a desire to secure evidence sufficient to convict. Operatives, it must be remembered, are *informants—not private police.*

Operatives should have the faculty of keeping their mouths shut and their eyes open. They should be good listeners, not too talkative, but not so reserved that they do not make friends easily. They should be companionable, good mixers, and not so offensively good in their habits that men who are inclined to be "good fellows" will avoid them. Attractiveness to women may be a positive asset, since much information may be gained from women whom suspects frequent; it is a notable fact that our present enemy has an exceptional weakness for lewd women.

No type of man is more essentially out of place in the Intelligence Service than the one who fancies he is a born Sherlock Holmes or "gum-shoe artist." He at once lays himself open to suspicion by his "pussy-foot" manner, and is always tempted to make a case at the expense of the service.

19. *Rank.* The question of rank must be worked out to suit the exigencies of the situation. On the one hand the nature of the organization demands the use of officers and men regardless of rank, with the sole view of finding the individual best suited to the position. On the other hand, rank always carries authority, and it is bad policy to impose responsibility materially greater than the rank warrants. On this account, it is desirable that all executives be officers. Experience has proved that, once the enthusiastic co-operation of executives has been secured, differences in rank among them are relatively unimportant.

The employment of non-commissioned officers as operatives is not, as a rule, desirable. For the successful performance of an operative's duties it is essential that he be on the most intimate terms with the men he is observing; he must not be deterred from association with his comrades when off duty by the re-

straints incidental to difference in rank. For this reason it is well to be chary in the selection of corporals as operatives; duty sergeants should be employed only in case of necessity; while non-commissioned officers of higher rank should be employed, if at all, as special operatives. (Sec. 20).

The promotion of an operative, even though it comes partly in recognition of his success in this capacity, may impair his further usefulness to the C. E. organization. In such cases it is desirable to retain the man's co-operation, as for example, in the selection of a successor. It is suggested that if he is taken into the confidence of his immediate superior in echelon to the extent of being given a frank explanation of the situation and of the necessity for the severance of his connection with the organization, his sympathy will be kept. Furthermore, the way will be open for the later employment of his services, if occasion should arise.

20. *Special Operatives.* In certain cases the services of special operatives may become desirable. For the purpose of observing civilians employed in small numbers, or transient, about a camp, the use of an enlisted man in civilian clothes has proved successful. To cover the movements of a military suspect outside the limits of a military reservation, a special operative may be used where the employment of a regular operative is impossible. For such services, non-commissioned officers may well be employed by reason of their presumably superior intelligence.

The Intelligence Officer should, therefore, be on the alert to note men with the necessary qualifications to be used for special service. Men who have had previous detective experience will, in exception to the principles set forth above (Sec. 19), be highly desirable for work of this kind. Preliminary information as to such men may be obtained from the files of the Personnel Officer. The foregoing must not be construed as authority to maintain a private detective force in nearby communities and to usurp the proper functions of the various civilian agencies which are charged primarily with the observation and control of civilian suspects. (Secs. 58-64).

21. *Securing Personnel.* The greatest discretion will be necessary in picking out and approaching officers and men with a view to their selection as executives or operatives. Under no circumstances must the existence of the organization be revealed. The fact that the person making the appointment is connected with any organization must, therefore, be kept secret. *Enemy agents will be especially anxious to be employed.* Number 1 must circulate freely about the camp in the process of selecting his Nos. 2. A ruse may facilitate the desirable result of enabling No. 1 to circulate freely without exciting undue comment. Thus it may be found advisable for the No. 1 to be placed nominally upon some special duty, at least during the period of organization, so that his absence from his usual duties will not excite comment.

Experience has shown that a direct and sympathetic appeal to a loyal man's patriotism, made as man to man by his superior in echelon, and laying aside for this purpose distinction in rank, is, when coupled with an explanation of the necessity for beating the enemy at his own game, usually ample for enlisting his eager services. It is elementary that in such an interview an explanation of the C. E. System shall be avoided. The man should be cautioned or reassured that "tale-bearing" is not the mission desired of him, but that he has been selected for a mission of the most serious importance and the greatest delicacy involving the safety of himself and his comrades and for the confounding of an unscrupulous foe.

Too much stress cannot be laid on the fact that breaches of discipline, except as they reveal disloyalty, are not of interest to the C. E. Service.

22. *Form of Oath.* In organizing the Intelligence Service, a form of oath set forth below has often been put to the operatives. The modified name of the

service, "Service for Protection Against Spies," was adopted to make the oath more readily comprehensible, and to make the operatives' duties seem more attractive. The value of this oath may be very great if the person signing it is properly impressed, as suggested above, with the fact that the purpose of the service is to prevent betrayal of himself and his comrades. Its use is recommended. The oaths should be put to the men by the last echelon of executives.

SERVICE FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SPIES.

To protect my comrades and my country from the grave peril of secret enemies within our Army and our nation I do hereby enroll myself in the Service for Protection Against Spies, and do solemnly swear to be always on the alert in that Service; to observe and report to all circumstances which should arouse suspicion that secret enemies are seeking to betray the Army of the United States, to spread dissension among our people, to injure our camps, equipment or supplies, to cripple our industries, or otherwise to hinder and delay our preparation for and conduct of this war.

I do further swear that I will never, under any circumstances; directly or indirectly, by word, act or sign, reveal to any person other than , the Intelligence Officer, or the Commanding General, or persons designated by them, the existence of the Service for Protection Against Spies, or any like service, nor the fact that I am in any way engaged in or connected with such service, nor any secret that may be confided to me in the service, well knowing that only by the strictest silence and secrecy can I preserve my usefulness to the nation in this work.

All this I do solemnly swear upon my honor and before Almighty God, and may He keep me steadfast.

.....

In some Divisions this oath has been mimeographed and each operative required to sign a copy which is then returned to the Intelligence Officer for filing. In others, the oath is memorized and put orally to the operative. In either instance the operative should be required to repeat the oath as it is put to him.

23. *Instruction of Personnel.* The Intelligence Officer must ensure the adequate instruction in their duties of the members of his organization. He should prepare and issue through No. 1 simple mimeographed instructions for the guidance of the executives, embodying in his own words the ideas of the preceding paragraphs. In one division the following method was pursued with success. Mimeographed sheets were prepared for issuance through the channels to the last echelon of executives. On each sheet was printed a caution that the instructions were to be safeguarded under lock and key and *burned* by the last executive as soon as the operatives were all properly instructed. The instructions explained in simple language the desired tactful method of approaching prospective operatives; the manner of swearing them in, and of properly impressing them with their mission of high trust and secrecy; the device of assigning them fictitious names; the fictitious name and P. O. box to which operatives were to report; and the issuing of postage. The instructions further explained what were to be the subsequent relations of the last echelon of executives with their operatives on the one hand, and with the I. O. on the other. They were official communications, bearing the authority of the Commanding General, and duly authenticated. Each copy of the instructions was accompanied with the necessary number of mimeographed blank forms of the Oath of Enrollment. The last echelon of executives were instructed to read the appropriate portion of the instructions to each operative, at the time he was sworn in, and to require him to repeat the substance thereof in his own words. In the process of issuance, oral instructions were transmitted that superior echelons of executives should, for their information, study the mimeographed sheets before passing them on to their subordinates.

Short lists of suspects may in similar fashion be furnished to No. 1 for distribution to the executives concerned. These lists should group together suspects who will fall under the observation of the same operatives. They should state unmistakably the precise course of action desired with reference to each suspect or group of suspects (as, after a list of names, "To be observed carefully and reported.").

In no instance should such instructions or lists carry information other than that which is necessary to be known by the last echelon of executives. (Sec. 11).

## ARTICLE V.

### COLLECTION OF INFORMATION.

24. *Methods of Operatives.* Operatives may initiate investigations of suspected persons or be directed to investigate or keep under surveillance subjects to whom their attention is directed. The fundamental necessity that operatives should avoid revealing by word or act the duty upon which they are engaged has been emphasized. (Sec. 11).

This caution is particularly applicable to the ordinary operatives who obtain their information through constant association with the groups wherein they are placed. It cannot always be followed completely in the case of special operatives working directly under the Intelligence Officer (Sec. 20), but the very fact that a few of such special operatives are identified may serve in a measure to distract attention from the general C. E. System.

As to the operatives of the former class their duty is simply to proceed about their routine duties, keeping eyes and ears open and seeking to become intimate with all members of the groups which are under their observation. They will particularly seek the intimacy of those under surveillance, if this can be done without exciting suspicion, and will in general be on the alert to know all that occurs within their respective groups.

Operatives of the latter class, that is, special operatives, are more often entrusted with special missions and it is these who should be "planted" at places where particular acts of sabotage or the like are expected. The discovery of such an operative does not necessarily destroy his usefulness, since he is rarely detailed for duty among men by whom he is personally well-known and he can be promptly shifted to another scene of activity.

Operatives of this class may occasionally be hidden in hangars or at other points where especially destructive sabotage is anticipated in order to observe what occurs during the absence of the men ordinarily on duty there. Proper arrangements with the guard must be made under such circumstances. For this purpose it may be feasible to make use of a man of known loyalty who is not connected with the C. E. System and who acts in the capacity of an operative for but one occasion. Such a one need know nothing of the general system and may be employed through his immediate superiors if this course is deemed advisable. As a rule it is more satisfactory to employ special operatives upon cases of particular importance.

25. *Operatives' Reports.* Operatives will be instructed to report promptly all circumstances of importance which fall within their observation and to report at least weekly even if there is "nothing to report."

Except under extraordinary circumstances all reports will be written. Written reports are to be mailed to a fictitious addressee as arranged for by the I. O. In cases of extreme emergency oral reports may be made through the executive echelons but this practice is not to be encouraged as it tends to reveal the system. The executives will need to have private conferences with operatives from time to time and the number of these should not be unnecessarily increased. One I. O. believed he was promoting efficiency by requiring frequent conferences between the members of each echelon from No. 1 down to operatives.

As a result the non-commissioned officer of his unit discovered a German plot and reported to the Commanding Officer the names of the conspirators. The report proved to be a rather complete roster of the C. E. service in that unit.

In order to prevent the identification of an operative by the interception of his reports, a fictitious name should be assigned to each one. To facilitate the identification of reports, all operatives in one regiment may be assigned names beginning with A, arranged, for instance, alphabetically in convenient order, *e. g.*, Abbott, Adams, Ahearn, Allen, etc. Operatives in the next regiment would similarly be assigned names beginning with B, and so on. Many variations of this plan may be used. The secret file of the Assistant Intelligence Officer should contain a complete roster of the Division Intelligence Service, and this record should give the fictitious name assigned to each operative.

The transmission of reports must be accomplished in a matter-of-fact way, and the letter embodying the report should be written in a usual place (as, in the Y. M. C. A.), and mailed at a time when the operative would ordinarily mail a letter.

As little mystery as possible in writing a report on the part of the operative is to be desired. It may be written like any other letter, and supposing the fictitious name to which the report is to be rendered to be James Black, and the fictitious name of the operative to be Fred Bunsen, a model report might read as follows:

"Dear Jim:

Received your letter last week and I was mighty glad to get it. franz schmidt has been sending a lot of registered letters from town lately. The weather is rotten.

Let me hear from you soon,

Your friend,
Fred Bunsen.

It will be observed that proper names reported are begun with *small* letters, and that information conveyed is surrounded with matter of a purely trivial nature. With such precautions, a person looking over the writer's shoulder is not likely to have his attention attracted.

Operatives should be required to give the full name of persons reported or otherwise to indicate the subject with such particularity that there can be no doubt as to the identity of the person reported.

At the time of the organization of the Intelligence Service, postage must be furnished to the operatives to cover reports for at least a number of weeks. This postage should be issued to the operatives in cash by the last echelon of executives, who will then hold their men accountable. These disbursements will be certified through the channels to the Intelligence Officer, who will reimburse the executives concerned, also through the channels, from Intelligence funds.

The plan for sending and receiving mailed reports must necessarily vary, but it is usual for the Intelligence Officer to rent a Post-Office box under an assumed name or under the name of a fictitious corporation (*e. g.*, "The Southern Novelty Co."), to which such reports may be sent. This must be done by agreement with the Postmaster in most instances.

The Post Office box retained as suggested above should preferably be in the Post Office of the nearest village or town, rather than in the Camp Post Office, so that the fictitious name given may not seem to be connected with the military establishment. The Intelligence Officer should cause this box to be emptied at frequent intervals by No. 1 or by his confidential orderly or clerk. He should never empty the box in person.

26. *Documentary Evidence.* Letters and other documents found in the possession of suspects frequently have a value not appreciated by an inexperienced person. An innocent looking document may contain a code message which

can be deciphered only by an expert, or interlineations in sympathetic ink, which can be detected and developed only by laboratory methods. M. I. D. is prepared to handle matters of these kinds. It is highly desirable, therefore, that, whenever practicable, original documents be forwarded to M. I. D. for examination. When it is impracticable to forward originals, photographic copies should be sent. Amateur attempts to bring out invisible writing should be avoided, for they are usually fruitless and frequently destroy the writing so that it cannot be deciphered at a later time by experts.

Messages obviously in code or in cipher, which defeat local attempts at decipherment, should be transmitted immediately to M. I. D. for the purpose. The same disposition is to be made of messages in foreign languages which cannot be translated on the spot.

Exact notes should be made of the time, place, and circumstances under which each document was seized and the documents should be initialed or otherwise marked for identification by the seizing officer so that he may be able to identify them later in court, if necessary. At a recent trial for circulating seditious literature in camps, very little of the vast amount of printed matter seized and sent in by the Intelligence Officers was available as evidence for the reason that it could not be identified as coming from any particular camp.

27. *Covering Mail Matter.* Information of the greatest importance is often derivable from the intercepting of mail matter. The question of examining mail is, however, one of great delicacy. No legal right exists for the opening of sealed mail traveling within the United States. Mail matter is under the jurisdiction of the Postal authorities so long as it remains in the custody of any Post-office employee. It seems to become subject to the military jurisdiction as soon as it is delivered to the military authorities. Thus, mail in the hands of a mail orderly is under military control, but soldiers delegated to assist in a camp branch of a post office are to be regarded as postal employees and not as mail orderlies. The actual disribution of the mail to the enlisted men is usually accomplished by soldier mail orderlies or company clerks, who are clearly not employees of the Post Office. This suggests that an intelligent use of mail orderlies or company clerks may solve the problem of the occasionally desirable inspection of military suspects' mail. In some divisions many or all of the mail orderlies are Intelligence operatives.

It is possible that the bulk of the mail which it is desired to examine will pass through the camp Post Office. But the shrewder suspects may have mail sent to other addresses, necessitating co-operation with the general Post Office. In these cases, the Post Office should invariably be approached through the local agents of D. J. All D. J. agents have the rights of Postal Inspectors with regard to mail matter, and most of them have had experience in the collection of information from mail. To secure their co-operation will not only be in accord with the desires of the Post Office Dept., but will facilitate greatly the work of the Assistant Intelligence Officer.

A Post Office Inspector or D. J. agent has no authority to open mail but he may inspect it and take tracings of the envelope for record and comparison. A not infrequent device for locating a fugitive is to take tracings of the mail delivered to someone to whom he is expected to write and to follow up the clues furnished by handwriting and post-marks.

28. *Keeping Away From Suspects.* Experience has proved that it is usually undesirable for I. O.'s to come into personal contact with suspects. Many of these men are so clever and plausible that if allowed to plead their own cases before the I. O. the effect might be to nullify important work done by operatives. Personal interviews would have the further unfortunate effect of identifying the I. O. too closely with the system of which it is desired to keep suspects in

ignorance. It is best as a rule to keep the relations of the I. O. with suspects entirely impersonal, but circumstances may render this course impracticable. If it becomes necessary to interrogate a suspect the Judge Advocate may be in a position to render valuable assistance.

29. *Work for Executives.* It is to be noted that the duties of members of executive echelons, after the organization has been put into operation, are largely supervisory. There is danger that they will, on this account, lose interest in their work. The assignment to them of any tasks which may serve to stimulate their activity and make them feel that they are indispensable may have the effect of keeping many an efficient executive from degenerating into an indifferent automaton. When officers are to be placed under surveillance such duty will fall naturally on the executives, who will function practically as operatives, or it may be found desirable under such circumstances to appoint officers as special operatives for the particular occasion.

30. *Other Sources of Information.* Besides the information gained from the association of operatives with the groups to be observed (Secs. 24, 25), and the information furnished by other intelligence agencies, (Sec. 33), the Counter Espionage Service must arrange to cover special cases such as tourists and other persons visiting camp, or persons not in or around the camp but connected with suspects or suspected activities. It must have the co-operation of and co-operate with the local agents of the Department of Justice (this by the channel of the Intelligence Officer and the D. J. agent). It must cover the classes of mail coming to camp. It must watch the newspapers and other publications in circulation among the men and it is well to establish a waste paper basket censorship. (Secs. 58-64).

Much information is derived from volunteer informants or the local police. The hope of rewards for the capture of deserters generally keeps the local police on the alert and their co-operation should be sought.

## ARTICLE VI.

### HANDLING AND USE OF INFORMATION.

31. *Collation of Material.* The enemy's clandestine operations in the United States are organized on such a large and systematic scale that it is necessary to gain a comprehensive "bird's-eye" view of simultaneous activities throughout the country to understand and control them.

It is manifestly impossible for any local or branch Intelligence office to effect such comprehensive collation and it is equally evident that efforts to do so would only involve useless time and labor and result in the duplication of work.

It is essential that information be forwarded promptly for collation as well as for reference to such branches of the Intelligence Service as it may affect. It should be noted that the bearing of information from one locality on the situation in another may not be apparent locally but becomes evident when seen from the point of view of the central office of collation.

Department, Division, and local Intelligence Officers are responsible for the collection and verification of information, each within his province, and forwarding it to the Military Intelligence Division in time to be of value. They should examine the information available and make such collation as is necessary in the cases of persons, parties, or activities within their respective Departments, Divisions, or localities, but should not undertake the general collation which lies, more properly, within the province of the Military Intelligence Division.

Information from the operatives must be transmitted as promptly as practicable to the Intelligence Officer, in whose office the information is extracted and forwarded and the original reports burned.

The mission of the several echelons of executives is solely that of insuring that the operatives get the information and send it in. They are in no way responsible for the culling or collation of information and need not see the information which goes through them if such examination delays or jeopardizes transmission. Their duty is one of organization.

It is the Intelligence Officer who is responsible for the examination, culling, summarizing and forwarding of information and directing the lines of investigation which his secret service will carry out, and it is he who is the connection between the secret and the known organizations, and between the Counter Espionage Service and the Commander of his unit.

It is essential that the I. O. of any large unit have a private office, which shall be large enough to accommodate the office equipment and an adequate office force. He will need the assistance of several confidential clerks, non-commissioned officers and privates, of whom one at least should be an expert stenographer, and another, if possible, acquainted with office systems and filing methods. The office must have the usual equipment of desks, typewriter, telephone, filing apparatus, etc., including a safe and a locking steel filing cabinet. This equipment should be obtained from the Quartermaster.

The I. O. should install a complete filing system, affording facilities for comprehensive and cross-indexed records of suspects and the members of the organization. A card-system "tickler" will be found useful for keeping track

of periodical Individual Reports and other matters which need attention at periodical or irregular future intervals. A simple diary or desk memorandum calendar may be used for this purpose if the I. O. prefers. Many Division I. O.'s have found alphabetical filing more practicable than the decimal system; it should be reinforced by cross-files for each separate unit, (*e. g.*, a cross-file for all the suspects in a certain brigade or battalion) in order that a comprehensive view of the situation in any particular unit may be gained at any time.

A card for operatives' records which has been used with success by some I. O.'s is described as follows:

Under a space wherein is entered the operative's true name, fictitious name and organization, the card is ruled vertically into thirty-one columns, representing days of the month, and horizontally into twenty-four lines, giving two lines for each day of each month of the year. In the upper space is checked the date of receipt of ordinary reports and in the lower the date of receipt of special reports. On the reverse of the card may be entered data of date of appointment, time and amount of postage issued, nature of reports returned, and estimate of the ability of the operative. A simpler card may be used in the case of executives, with lists of the executives or operatives of the next echelon controlled by the executive concerned. One of the chief merits of some such system is that upon the transfer of executives or operatives from one C. E. organization to another the I. O. of the first organization can simply forward the cards of the executives and operatives concerned, thus putting the second I. O. in immediate possession of necessary data, without labor to the first I. O.

32. *Local Action.* The methods of co-operation with the C. E. system generally and of keeping in touch with M. I. D. necessarily occupy a large part of this pamphlet, but this must not obscure the fact that the primary duty of the I. O. is to report promptly to his own commander such cases as require local action and aid him in deciding upon the proper action by furnishing all available information upon the subject. In this regard the C. E. Service functions exactly as does the Positive Intelligence Service of a combat unit in the field. In such matters, M. I. D. is much more interested in what has been done than in the fact that something should be done about it.

The idea of systematic precaution is so new in our Army that there is need for explanation and constant insistence on its value. In some Divisions memoranda have been issued with the authority of the Commanding General, to be read by officers to their men or to be made the subject of informal talks, directing attention to the necessity for both officers and men to refrain from divulging information of value to the enemy. Men must be warned against writing letters home about troop movements, sending post-cards from ports of embarkation indicating dates of sailing, discussing army matters in public places or with strangers, revealing in a hundred careless ways details interesting to hostile ears and eyes. An I. O. by the exercise of a little ingenuity may adapt this suggestion to his needs.

The use of posters on company bulletin boards offers possibilities. They should be used with discretion, not so frequently as to blunt their novelty, and not left on the board so long as to grow stale.

33. *Transmission of Information.* Full advantage should be taken of the privilege of direct communication to transmit promptly to the point where it may be of use, all information gained by one Intelligence Officer regarding matters of interest to the I. O. at another station. At the same time every I. O. should feel free to ask directly of any other I. O. such co-operation and assistance as he may need. (See Principles, Secs. 7, 8, 9). Copies of all such lateral communications will be transmitted simultaneously to the proper "intelligence control." (Principles, Sec. 6).

When enlisted men or officers under suspicion or investigation by the Counter Espionage Officer are transferred to an organization outside that of the Intelligence Officer previously handling the matter, it is considered important that all records and information concerning the man so transferred be promptly sent to the Intelligence Officer of the organization to which the transfer is made. (Sec. 53).

To enable this to be done, it is suggested that the Counter Espionage organization keep in such touch with all men under suspicion as to be able promptly to report any prospective transfer, or at least a transfer actually made.

In reporting transfers the number and paragraph of the Special Order should be given in each case. This will enable the Intelligence Officer to whose station the transfer has been made to locate the man quickly by reference to the file of orders at headquarters.

To make a further check on such transfers and to keep a constant watch on all of the men, co-operation of the Personnel Office, which has the cards of each man, is advisable. It frequently happens that information is received of men who have not yet reported. In such cases, dummy cards are placed in the files of the Personnel Office so that as soon as the men report the Intelligence Officer is notified.

Facts having any Counter Espionage significance should be known only to the Intelligence Officer, but a confidential arrangement may be made with the Personnel Officer by which any change in the status of men whose names are given the Personnel Officer by the Intelligence Officer will at once be reported to the latter. Better to effectuate this plan, it is well to have an operative stationed in the Personnel Office. (Sec. 53).

In transmitting information care must be taken to include all data necessary to a full understanding of the case by the officer receiving the same, together with all available information as to his personality, antecedents and physical description. The data upon the classification card of an officer or soldier is helpful.

Reports from the Department of Justice, Office of Naval Intelligence, American Protective League, and similar sources, and letters from private informants, should in all cases be treated as *strictly confidential*. When these are sent to I. O.'s for their assistance in investigation of a case, the source of the information should not be divulged, except to commissioned officers of the Intelligence Service, who should be carefully instructed as to their absolute secrecy. (Sec. 59).

34. *Addressing Correspondence.* The direct communication authorized for use by the Intelligence Service is subject to the following rules:

a. All communications to I. O.'s are inclosed in two envelopes, the inner one being addressed to "Intelligence Officer—Confidential."

b. The outer envelope will be addressed to the "Chief of Staff" of Divisions and Ports of Embarkation; to the "Commanding General" of Geographic Departments; and to the "Commanding Officer" of all other units except as indicated in Rule c.

c. Communications addressed to Camps from which a Division has moved will be addressed to the "Commanding General" of that camp.

d. Communications to M. I. D. will be addressed to "Director of Military Intelligence, Washington, D. C."

e. Communications to M. I. D. that indicate dates of movements of troops should be inclosed in an inner envelope addressed to "Chief, M. I. 3 —Confidential."

## ARTICLE VII

### Reports to Intelligence Control

35. *Direct Communication.* The Intelligence Control of every post and station which reports to the commander of a geographical Department is the Department I. O. The Intelligence Control of all other units, including Department Headquarters, is M. I. D. (See Principles, Sec. 7). All Intelligence Officers report directly to their Intelligence Control on all cases of other than trifling importance and send to the Intelligence Control copies of all communications addressed to other Intelligence Officers and individuals. In addition, Intelligence Officers who report to Department Intelligence Officers will simultaneously send copy to M. I. D.; and Intelligence Officers within Departments, but not reporting thereto, will, on reporting to M. I. D., send to the Department I. O. copies of all reports concerning matters which may be of interest to him in maintaining his current estimate of the situation within the Department. (Sec. 6).

This last means that cases which concern the unit exclusively and are not likely to affect the situation outside, need not be reported to the Department I. O. by Intelligence Officers who are not under Department control, but that all cases which in any way affect the general situation or are likely to have ramifications within the Department outside of the unit involved should be reported both to the Department I. O. and to M. I. D. If it is difficult to decide which cases should be so sent, give the Department I. O. the benefit of the doubt. (See Principles, Sec. 12).

36. *Kinds of Reports.* Four quite different sorts of reports are indicated and attention is directed to the distinctions clearly to be drawn between them. They are:

a. Individual Reports.
b. Special Reports.
c. Situation Surveys.
d. Summaries.

Each of these reports relates to a different class of information and it is highly undesirable to mingle matter of two or more classes in the same document, for the reason that each class of information receives special treatment in M. I. D. and if the same document must pass through several processes there is much unnecessary delay and in the end there is difficulty in properly filing the paper. The nature of each of these reports is explained in the following sections. (Secs. 37-39).

37. *Individual Reports.* Every specific case is made the subject of an *individual report,* that is, a report of that individual case. This permits prompt handling of the case and accurate filing of the report with other papers in the same matter. Individual Reports will be rendered in the form prescribed for military correspondence. They should carry as their subject the name of the suspect reported, his rank and organization (if a member of the Military Establishment) or his known address (if a civilian). Such Individual Reports should be rendered immediately upon the discovery of facts tending to indicate enemy activity or disloyalty to the United States. Subsequent Individual Reports should thereafter be rendered, as hereinafter prescribed, for the purpose of

keeping the Military Intelligence Division apprised of subsequent developments.

Individual Reports to be rendered as herein prescribed should, in all cases where the facts reported render this possible, adhere as closely as may be to the following instructions, paragraphs to be numbered as indicated; sub-heads need not be lettered:

(1) Facts, actions, or statements giving rise to suspicion of the individual reported.

(2) Associates, correspondents, known relatives, or connections of the suspect.

(3) In so far as known,

a. Character and history of the suspect, including Service Record if a soldier.

b. Suspect's citizenship status, race, and place and date of birth.

c. Such facts as may be ascertainable indicating former residences, places of employment, and locations of relatives, of the suspect; with any other known facts which may be of aid in initiating collateral investigation.

(4) Source or sources of information reported; known reliability of such sources.

(5) Disposition taken, contemplated, or desired, with reference to the suspect.

At the bottom of the sheet will appear a notation indicating copies furnished to other investigating agencies to whom this report may be of interest and to which they may have been transmitted. An example of an Individual Report follows. (Sec. 38).

Subsequent to an initial Individual Report, further such reports should be rendered whenever new developments occur. Such subsequent reports will follow the form prescribed above, subject to the following modifications. Above paragraph One will be a reference to previous Individual Reports on the same subject, stating dates when such reports were rendered. Subsequent paragraphs will embody new information; and the final paragraph will be reserved for a statement of action taken, contemplated, or desired in this case.

It is the desire of the Military Intelligence Division to be kept constantly informed of developments. To this end, continuing cases of interest will be reported at intervals of not more than thirty days. Periodical Individual Reports covering such continuing cases may be brief, and may state merely, first, that no new developments have been ascertained; and second, that suspect is being continued under observation, and the nature of the surveillance being exercised. A case not definitely disposed of, where surveillance is being maintained by the Intelligence Officer, should be carried in the manner prescribed in this paragraph, until final disposition.

Care should be taken that carbon copies carry all the information shown on the original so that the officer receiving the same may be fully informed. Carbons of reports written on letter heads must reproduce enough of the letter head to enable the recipient to determine the place of origin.

38. *Example of Individual Report.*

CAMP HOWARD
Kalamazoo, Michigan.

June 4, 1918.

From: Intelligence Officer, 100th Division.

To: Director of Military Intelligence.

Subject: Hans Schmidt, Sergeant Battery B, 339th Field Artillery.

1. Schmidt seems to make a practice of talking to new "selects" and to make a break in the conversation when other non-commissioned officers join the group. Yesterday an operative from another regiment came in with the new men, and reports that Schmidt says

that he is "afraid" that we can never conquer Germany, that the French are about to quit, and Germany is getting great stores of food and a million ex-prisoners from Russia.

2. A secret inspection of his barracks bag revealed nothing of interest except a worn copy of "*Under Fire,*" the war-horrors book, and the following addresses in a memo book—John Keller, "Warchter u. Anzieger," St. Louis; Minna Barleber, 251 State St., St. Louis; Fritz von Kelhorn, General Delivery, Wilmington, Delaware. Schmidt was visited by the Rev. Kaltenbach, traveling Lutheran pastor, when the latter was here, and according to Sergeant McGregor of his Battery, is intimate with Henry Weibel, 399th Field Artillery, reported by your office to have been pro-German at his home. Agent Brown of the Department of Justice, reports that Schmidt frequently visits two German families, Dettelbach and Ludwig, in town here. He gets all mail at General Delivery in town post office.

3. Schmidt's papers show he was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1891, came to this country August, 1900, S. S. "President Lincoln" at New York, naturalized by naturalization of father, Johann Schmidt, in 1906, at Blanton, Wisconsin. Next relative, father at 2801 Walnut St., Blanton, Wis., home address same. Worked assembling room Bousch & Zomb Co., Rochester, N. Y., from 1914 until drafted at Camp Jackson, August 29, 1917; transferred here from Camp Jackson, January 12, 1918.

4. One of our operatives, of German blood, who reported this man and is thoroughly trustworthy, is becoming intimate with Schmidt, and will lead him on.

5. Justice Agent Brown is investigating connection with Dettelbachs and Ludwigs, and has arranged with Postmaster to inspect all mail addressed to Schmidt. Investigation at Blanton and Rochester and check on entry into this country and naturalization of father is desired. Also investigation of persons named in memo-book.

JOHN L. WITHINGTON,
Captain, United States Army,
Assistant Intelligence Officer.

Carbon copies to
Captain Britton, St. Louis.
Intelligence Officer, Camp Jackson, S. C.

39. *Special Reports.* Special reports are made of circumstances which cannot properly form the subject of an individual report. Such reports will be rendered in a form appropriate to the subject but approaching so far as possible the form prescribed for individual reports. Sudden changes in local conditions or a new situation involving morale may be appropriate subjects for special reports, as may an accumulation of minor matters, each not important enough to warrant an individual report but significant in the aggregate. Any matter of interest to M. I. D. and not appropriate for an Individual Report may properly be sent in a special report. Such reports should, however, be confined to a single subject although that subject may include a number of incidents.

40. *Classification of Cases as to Urgency.* Cases are subject to classification as to urgency as follows:

*Class A.* Matter which should be brought to the attention of the Director of Military Intelligence, immediately. Cases of this class should be reported at once by telegraph or cable, using the C. E. code. Reports by telegraph or cable should be confirmed simultaneously by mail. Confirmation should include the usual Individual or Special Report as well as the quotation of the despatch.

*Class B.* Matter which should not be delayed, but which can safely await the course of mail. Cases of this class should be reported by mail immediately. They may be in the usual form of Individual or Special Report and may be forwarded without letter of transmittal, but should bear on their face *in red* the stamp: *Immediate.*

*Class C.* Matter which should be brought to the attention of M. I. D., but not requiring immediate action. Reports of this kind should be made in the form prescribed for Individual or Special Reports and forwarded in due course.

41. *Situation Surveys.* Each I. O. will render to his intelligence control and to M. I. D. a weekly situation estimate (on Monday) for the purpose of informing him of the general conditions at the station of the I. O. Such reports are primarily a survey of the military situation and are not handled as individual cases but are filed for reference with the papers of that particular station,

and in the aggregate will enable the officers of M. I. D. to form an adequate conception of the circumstances under which each I. O. is working so that prompt and intelligent action may be taken upon particular matters as they arise.

Each Situation Survey will bear at its head the following information:
Name of Commanding General (or Commanding Officer).
Name of Chief of Staff (or Acting Chief of Staff).
Name of Intelligence Officer (or Acting Intelligence Officer).
Name of Assistant Intelligence Officer.

The following items are suggested as pertinent for a Divisional Survey: Strength of Division and Auxiliary Units, Status of C. E. organization, Morale, Health, Rations, Conscientious Objectors, Enemy or Pacifist Propaganda, Attitude of Foreign-born Selectives, Recreational Activities, Relations between one station and another, and the local situation generally.

The Survey of fixed posts and other units will naturally differ somewhat as to the items included. Only matters of general interest in forming an estimate of the military situation will be reported.

In addition to the Situation Survey (Military) required of all Intelligence Officers, there may be required of Department and Special Intelligence Officers and of Intelligence Officers at fixed posts a further report as to civil and political conditions in the vicinity of their stations which will be forwarded as a separate document in the form prescribed by M. I. D. This will be known as the Situation Survey (Civil) and will be so entitled.

42. *Department and Special Intelligence Officers' Summaries.* A fourth variety of report is required of Department and Special Intelligence Officers only. This is the *monthly summary* of civilian cases, required on the last day of each month for the purpose of giving a general survey of the situation as regards this class of cases. Nothing should be included in these summaries which has not been reported in an individual or special report and each entry should refer to the date of the individual or special report in which the matter is detailed. Each entry should be of telegraphic brevity and state simply the subject, the nature of the case and its present status. Every current case should be carried in each succeeding summary until it is finally reported as closed. The cases will be listed in the summaries according to the following classification, so far as applicable.

CLASSIFICATION BY SUBJECT.

I. CURRENT:
- A. Enemy Activity.
  - 1. *Espionage.*
    - a. Government secrets.
    - b. Military information.
    - c. General information.
  - 2. *Sabotage.*
    - a. Life and Health.
      - I. Civilians.
      - II. Troops.
    - b. Damage of crops, factories, ships, material, etc., by explosion, arson, etc.
  - 3. *Propaganda.*
    - a. Political.
    - b. Pacifistic.
    - c. Pro-enemy.
    - d. Misrepresentation.

4. *Treason.*
   a. Government or military employees.
   b. Civilians.
5. *Industrial.*
   a. Fraudulent contracts.
   b. Labor agitation.
   c. Obstruction of manufactures.
   d. Supplying enemy.
6. *Suspicious Circumstances.*
   a. Character or connections.
   b. Conduct or activity of unusual nature.
   c. Suspected disloyalty.

B. Criminal Activity.
1. Cases referable to Department of Justice.
2. Cases referable to other Civil authorities.
3. Violations of Military Law, etc., referable to other Military Authorities.

II. CLOSED.
(Same subheadings as I).

It is not intended, of course, to limit, obstruct, or discourage the activities of the Intelligence Officer along lines not covered by the forms of Summary. On the contrary, recommendations are invited as to amplification or modification of the form so as to meet the requirements which may have been overlooked in its preparation. In case the subheads prove insufficient to cover the cases to be noted, appropriate subheads may be added by the Intelligence Officer.

## ARTICLE VIII.

### CODE.

43. *General Remarks.* The code herein promulgated is so simple that it may readily be memorized and thereafter messages may be enciphered and deciphered without resort to this pamphlet. It is, however, very difficult to decipher by one who has not the key and is considered one of the safest of the simple ciphers in this regard.

44. *Arbitrary Signs.* To secure accuracy in proper names and prevent occasional doubt in regard to sentence ends, special uses are assigned to three letters in addition to their normal uses in spelling words: the letter *k* indicates that the next letter is a capital; *q* indicates the end of a word; and *x* indicates a period. It is not necessary to use these signs when no doubt can arise from their omission; but *names of persons and places*, however familiar, should *always* be definitely indicated by capitalization. The end sign should be used after a proper name when it is followed by a word not capitalized; when the following word is capitalized, the end sign may be omitted, since the *k* indicates sufficiently that a new word is beginning. (For distinction, see Step $a_1$ below).

45. *To Encipher:*

a. Prepare your message by writing it out with the necessary indications of capitals, word-ends, etc.

b. Rule on your paper four vertical columns of six lines each to receive the message.

c. Put a — sign (dash) in the following spaces; in column 1, spaces 1, 3, and 5; in column 2, spaces 2, 4, and 6; in column 3, spaces 1 and 3; in column 4, space 5.

d. Now insert the letters of your message in the unfilled spaces of the diagram in regular order *horizontally*, beginning at the top.

e. If the message is too long for a single diagram, make another and continue it. Do this as often as is necessary to write the complete message. But be sure not to begin to write in any diagram until you have filled the preceding one.

f. If the message does not fill out the last diagram, fill it out with such words as "period," "stop," "end," or with nulls. *Always fill out the diagram completely.*

g. Now substitute for each letter in the first two lines of each diagram the letter which follows it in alphabetical order; that is, change *a* to *b*, *b* to *c*, etc.

h. Now take out the letters of each diagram *vertically* in regular order; that is, all of column 1 before any of column 2, all of column 2 before column 3, etc.

i. Divide into groups of five and send.

k. The code address of this office is "Milstaff, Washington," but a telegraph operator may properly refuse to accept this address. In this event, the telegram should be addressed to "Director of Military Intelligence, Washington."

1. Example:

Milstaff, Washington.
My letter May 7 re Goldstein. He sent letter today to Mrs. R. P. Giddings, Talpa, Mo.

(Signed) Waters.

Step a: My letter May seven re k Goldstein q he sent letter today to Mrs. k R k P k Giddings k Talpa k Mo.

Steps b, c, d, e, f:

| | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | — M — Y | — N — R | — E — S | — Y — T | — I — N |
| 2 | L — E T | E — K G | E — N T | O — M R | G — S K |
| 3 | — T — E | — O — L | — L — E | — S — K | — T — A |
| 4 | R — M A | D — S T | T — T E | R — K P | L — P A |
| 5 | — Y S — | — E I — | — R T — | — K G — | — K M — |
| 6 | E — V E | N — Q H | O — D A | I — D D | O — X P |

Step g:

| | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | — N — Z | — O — S | — F — T | — Z — U | — J — O |
| 2 | M — F U | F — L H | F — O U | P — N S | H — T L |
| 3 | — T — E | — O — L | — L — E | — S — K | — T — A |
| 4 | R — M A | D — S T | T — T E | R — K P | L — P A |
| 5 | — Y S — | — E I — | — R T — | — K G — | — K M — |
| 6 | E — V E | N — Q H | O — D A | I — D D | O — X P |

Steps h and i:

Milstaff, Washington.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MRENT | YFMSV | ZUEAE | FDNOO | EL S IQ |
| SHLTH | FTOFL | ROTTD | TUEEA | PRI Z S |
| KNKGD | USKPD | HLOJT | KTPMX | OLAAP |

Waters 27.

46. *Care in Enciphering.* Remember always that the message is to be written into the diagrams *horizontally* and taken from the diagram *vertically.* Also that in preparing the message for sending each diagram should produce exactly fifteen letters or three code words. If this does not check out go back at once and find the error. Care in this regard will save much useless delay.

47. *To Decipher:*

a. The number of letters in a message in this cipher is always a multiple of fifteen. If a message when received does not contain the correct number of letters, or cannot be deciphered, ask the telegraph company for a "service" on it. This costs nothing. If it is still unintelligible wire the sender to repeat. This must be paid for.

b. Prepare a sufficient number of diagrams to receive the message. Each diagram will receive 15 letters. They are prepared exactly as in sending a message. (See *To Encipher*, paragraphs *b* and *c*).

c. Insert the letters in *vertical* order in the unfilled spaces of the diagram, beginning at the upper left hand corner; that is, fill first column 1, then 2, 3, and 4 in succession, then pass to the next diagram, and so on.

d. Now substitute for each letter in the upper half of each diagram (lines 1 and 2) the letter which precedes it in alphabetical order.

e. Read off the message *horizontally* in each diagram. Complete the reading of each diagram before going on to the next.

f. Divide the message into words according to the sense, omitting the signal letters.

g. If the message has been mutilated either by the encipherer or by the telegraph operator, begin at the unintelligible spot and try out the probable suppositions: 1—That one or more letters were put in wrong spaces. 2—That the encipherer forget to make the substitutions in lines 1 and 2. 3—That the encipherer made substitutions when they should not have been made. 4—That one or more letters were incorrectly transmitted by telegraph.
If the message is unintelligible from the very beginning, the encipherer may have put it up vertically instead of horizontally.

h. Message as received:

M. I. O., Fort Blank.

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LTO SA | QNENE | FLXLV | FOR JE | OORUT | EDFCM | UDDBL |
| O JOT I | SBXN S | BNPDE | S SL SE | IHUER | ONMNT | RFTNE |
| BO IEN | TD IUR | ATXKN | BVETG | XDTVH | X JK SO | QUK JP |

Churchill.

Steps *a* and *b* (Arrangement of message in diagrams):

| | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | — S — F | — J — E | — B — S | — D — I | — N — B | — U — B | — V — Q | |
| 2 | L — N L | F — O D | U — J B | B — S H | O — F O | T — T V | X — J U | |
| 3 | — A — X | — E — F | — L — X | — E — U | — T — I | — R — E | — H — K | |
| 4 | T — E L | O — R C | D — O N | N — L E | N — T E | D — X T | D — K J | |
| 5 | — Q N — | — O U — | — O T — | — S S — | — R N — | — A K — | — X S — | |
| 6 | O — E V | R — T M | D — I S | P — E R | M — E N | I — N G | T — O P | |

Step c (Decipherment of letters in lines 1 and 2):

| | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 | 1 2 3 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | — R — E | — I — D | — A — R | — C — H | — M — A | — T — A | — U — P | |
| 2 | K — M K | E — N C | T — I A | A — R G | N — E N | S — S U | W — I T | |
| 3 | — A — X | — E — F | — L — X | — E — U | — T — I | — R — E | — H — K | |
| 4 | T — E L | O — R C | D — O N | N — L E | N — T E | D — X T | D — K J | |
| 5 | — Q N — | — O U — | — O T — | — S S — | — R N — | — A K — | — X S — | |
| 6 | O — E V | R — T M | D — I S | P — E R | M — E N | I — N G | T — O P | |

Steps *d* and *e* (Division of message into words, etc.):

"Re M. Axtel. No evidence for court martial. Do not discharge unless permanent internment assured. Taking up with D. J."

48. *Caution.* Code messages must be handled with the greatest care. After being decoded they should invariably be paraphrased before transmission to any other person whatsoever. A code message and its translation should be kept as far apart as possible; they must never be filed together, or transmitted together as "confirmation copies." All papers used in coding and decoding should be burned as soon as they have served their purpose.

49. *Addressing Telegrams.* Telegrams for Intelligence Officers, either coded or clear, will be addressed directly to the Intelligence Officer and not to the Commanding Officer.

The number of this pamphlet is identical with the "Station Number" assigned to the Intelligence Officer to whom it is issued, and in sending telegrams, the I. O. should add this number to his signature for purpose of identification, thus—"Bryan 526."

50. *Telegraphic Requests for Information.* Telegraphic requests for information are made by giving the name of the individual or organization and the word "answer."

The answer for the Military Intelligence Division to a request for information will be in the same form.

In the case nothing is known of the subject the telegram in reply will give the name of the individual or organization and the word "none."

## ARTICLE IX.

### Continuous Cover.

51. *Responsibility of Intelligence Officer.* The importance of complete and continuous cover of every military unit has been emphasized, (See Secs. 8, 17, and Principles, Secs. 2, 24). Each Intelligence Officer will take every step within his power to effectuate this end by

a. Creating and maintaining an efficient organization within his own unit and keeping M. I. D. informed of the situation.
b. Reporting to M. I. D. his observations as to conditions without his unit which may call for action by that Division.
c. Aiding and advising other Intelligence Officers when requested to do so.
d. Promptly informing other Intelligence Officers of circumstances which fall within his knowledge and which should be known to them.
e. Taking steps to cause the organization of a proper C. E. Service within the remaining troops when his unit is about to move.
f. Instructing and advising his successor and turning over to him all information and files relative to local conditions and cases which remain behind.
g. Doing all things necessary to promote a closely knit and harmonious organization throughout the entire Army.

52. *Group Observation.* The duty of Group Observer is assigned by M. I. D. to one of several Intelligence Officers whose units are grouped geographically but are not under a single local command (Principles, Sec. 10). The officer so assigned is usually the one whose duties seem to give him the broadest view of the situation but other considerations, such as permanency, may control. It is to be remembered that a Group Observer, as such, has no authority over the other units of his group, but merely reports the local situation to M. I. D. Group Control may be assumed only by concurrence of the various commanders concerned and permission of M. I. D. (Principles, Sec. 11).

53. *Following Suspects.* The duty to inform the I. O. of a unit to which a suspect is transferred has been indicated, (Sec. 33, and Principles, Sec. 9). This requires close co-operation with the Personnel Officer (Sec. 33) and prompt action by the I. O. of the unit from which the transfer is made. The complete record and physical description of the transferred suspect should be transmitted in each instance. In the case of traveling civilian suspects, care should be taken to transmit all facts necessary to identification of the subject and to an understanding of the nature of his activities.

54. *Transfer of Troops.* If any subdivision of a military unit is transferred to another station, the I. O. should promptly report to the I. O. at the new station the name of the highest executive in the subdivision in order that there may be no interruption in the functioning of the C. E. System within the unit. Simultaneously he should transmit to the I. O. at the new station all data pertaining to suspects within the transferred unit.

Similar measures should be taken upon the transfer from one unit to another of a single successful executive or operative, or of a single suspect. Upon the transfer of a body of troops proper arrangements should be made with the highest C. E. executive therein to maintain proper cover in transit. (Principles, Sec. 25).

55. *Departure of Unit.* Particular care should be taken prior to the departure of a unit to provide for a proper C. E. Service in the remaining troops in order that there may be no hiatus in cover. To this end the records of the office should be thoroughly overhauled and a proper separation be made so that all information regarding local conditions and suspects remaining behind may be turned over to the new organization. It is also desirable to provide, so far as may be, for the installation of an independent C. E. Service in the remaining units in as complete a form as possible, prior to the departure of the principal unit. The Military Intelligence Division should be fully informed of the status in this regard both as to the nature of the organization left behind, the names of the new Commander and I. O. respectively, and approximately the number and disposition of the troops left on the ground. (Principles, Secs. 13, 23).

56. *Duty to Successor.* Each I. O. should at all times remember that he may have a successor and should therefore make and file such records and memoranda as will enable that successor to take up the duties of the office with the least possible loss of efficiency. It is always desirable to secure the appointment of a successor prior to the departure of the old I. O.

If the I. O. is transferred from the unit to which he has been attached, or is otherwise relieved, he should turn over to his successor, if one has been appointed, the records and files of his office, giving the new I. O. all possible information as to the personnel and operation of the C. E. system. If he leaves before the appointment of a successor he should give his No. 1 such instructions as will enable the latter to "carry on" until a new I. O. has been appointed. He will, in any case, inform M. I. D. at once regarding his prospective transfer, and arrange to have M. I. D. kept in the closest touch with the local situation.

## ARTICLE X.

### Liaison With Civilian Agencies.

57. *In General.* The necessity for establishing immediate liaison with civilian agents or organizations which may be of aid in the furtherance of intelligence work is of fundamental importance in the operation of the C. E. system. Among the civilian aids, official and unofficial, whose co-operation is desirable, are the Department of Justice, the American Protective League, the Y. M. C. A. Intelligence, local postmasters, customs authorities, sheriffs, police, railroad agents and detectives, private detectives in the employ of industrial plants, managers of telephone and telegraph offices, managers and clerks of hotels. (Sec. 30).

58. *Function of Department of Justice.* The Department of Justice is responsible for the prosecution of offenders against the Federal Law. Its agents, in their investigation, seek not only to gain information, but to prepare cases for prosecution by securing evidence in the form which will be necessary in court. It is highly desirable, therefore, that all cases which may fall within their province be reported to them as soon as practicable, so that they may examine evidence when fresh.

It is sometimes difficult to determine the exact line of demarcation between military and civil jurisdiction, and it is best to allow a certain degree of latitude which will result in Department of Justice co-operation in certain purely military cases and military co-operation in certain federal cases.

The fact that a case has been turned over to the Department of Justice agent does not necessarily affect its value as military intelligence.

The Department of Justice has exclusive control of the matter of internment of alien enemies. All civilian suspects fall properly within the scope of D. J., and Intelligence Officers act in such matters only as co-operating agents. Therefore, it is proper to take no steps in the field of civilian investigation without the knowledge and consent of the local D. J. agents or employees. In like manner, D. J. should undertake no investigations in military camps without the knowledge of the I. O. thereof. The functions of D. J. include many matters of no particular interest to Military Intelligence, but in the particulars above mentioned their interest is mutual. Since the beginning of the war, D. J. has placed its service at the disposal of M. I. The burden thus assumed has been heavy and the Intelligence Service must appreciate that fact and conduct itself accordingly.

59. *Relations with Department of Justice.* The cultivation of close and cordial relations with the local D. J. agents is especially to be desired. D. J. co-operates with the military authorities in every possible way, and the prompt exchange of information between M. I. D. and D. J. is mutually helpful to the highest degree.

There should be frank consultation with local D. J. agents on matters of mutual interest, and subordination to the general plans of D. J. in matters which fall within its peculiar field. Thus will be avoided rivalry and duplication of effort, and instead there will be the friendly co-operation of two agencies operating in similar but by no means identical fields of endeavor.

The practice of giving the local D. J. agent a desk in the office of the I. O., or of having uniformed operatives report to the office of the D. J., is not appr-

ed, for it is not desirable to advertise the intimate relations of the two offices, but otherwise the liaison can hardly be too close. Special operatives should be placed at the disposal of D. J., if desired, and conference should be frequent. No operations should be undertaken outside the camp by special operatives in civilian clothes without the knowledge of D. J.

Copies of all communications of more than passing interest between the I. O. and the local D. J. agent should be forwarded to M. I. D. But while the I. O. and the local D. J. agent should thus freely co-operate, it is important that Intelligence Officers shall not call upon the Department of Justice at large to conduct investigations or to furnish information from distant points. Such requests will be made through M. I. D. to the Chief of the Bureau of Investigation in Washington.

It is to be borne in mind that the privilege of access to D. J. reports has never before been granted to any other agency, and the trust reposed in Military Intelligence in this regard, which is shared by no other government branch, must not be abused (Sec. 33). These reports are highly confidential and copies may not be sent, neither may they be quoted as a source of information to *anyone* but an I. O. To others, say simply "Information is received" or some similar phrase. Note: As a general rule, never reveal any source of information except to officers or investigators of the Intelligence Service, whose entire discretion may be relied upon.

60. *Internment Procedure.* By agreement with the Department of Justice, the following procedure will hold in connection with requests by any officers or agents engaged in Military Intelligence work.

When it is considered necessary or desirable that an enemy alien be interned, request will be made upon the nearest United States District Attorney, giving the name, location and all information concerning the person's activities, which make it desirable that the internment be accomplished. The actual arrest of the person to be interned will be made under the direction of the United States District Attorney.

It is provided that "an enemy alien whom there may be reasonable cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety...will be subject to summary arrest...and to confinement." (Proclamation of April 6, 1917).

In order to intern an alien enemy, D. J. wishes to be informed of facts showing reasonable probability of danger. These facts may, if necessary, be based on confidential representations from the I. O., giving the information discovered by his under-cover operatives, without revealing their identity. Opinions as distinguished from facts are not considered, but there is no particular form in which the facts must be presented, that is, there is no need for affidavits.

Therefore, it is necessary to report with some particularity just what the man has said or done and also the surrounding circumstances, for one who has been goaded into disloyal statements is not necessarily dangerous. Names of witnesses are also desirable, and it may be well to have the man interviewed by the Judge Advocate and the result reported. The environment and activities of the subject while at home are also pertinent if these facts can be adduced.

The responsibility for the internment rests with D. J., and the decision is usually made by the United States District Attorney acting upon information furnished to him by the D. J. agent or I. O. or both, and, if necessary, after a personal interview with the subject. D. J. is anxious to do as requested by Military Intelligence, but it must have more substantial basis for action than mere request.

It is important that a full report be transmitted to M. I. D. either before or at the time of the request for internment, for D. J., as a rule, will not proceed

without a formal opinion from M. I. D. as to the desirability of the action requested by the I. O.

In case it is necessary to provide for the internment of an enlisted man, his discharge must first be provided for by proper representations made to The Adjutant General of the Army. The discharge of the man should be accomplished after authority therefor has been received but not until the representative of the Department of Justice has arrived to take charge of the man in question.

There are many degrees of remedy less than internment for duration of the war. A man may be arrested for a week, a month, two months, and discharged with a warning. He may be arrested and discharged under parole, either with or without bond, or with or without a supervisor. He may be ordered to go to a certain part of the country and remain there, or he may be sent to an internment camp for two months, six months or a year, and then paroled. In many cases a man is put under bond, if he can furnish one, and in many cases he is put under a supervisor, who must be an American citizen and who is responsible for him and his good behavior.

61. *American Protective League.* This is a body made up of three hundred thousand citizens covering nearly every locality in the United States, who have volunteered to make local investigations *for the Department of Justice.* A branch office is maintained in the office of M. I. D. and through this office the League conducts a very large number of investigations for Military Intelligence. Intelligence Officers will do well to get in touch through D. J. with the local representative of the League, if such there be, and make use of his organization, *in co-operation with D. J.*, for local investigations not requiring great finesse. (Principles, Sec. 26).

There are other volunteer organizations of like character but it is not wise to encourage the multiplication of such agencies, and if A. P. L. has the field adequately covered it is not advisable to seek the co-operation of other volunteer bodies. In no case should such organizations be used without the specific consent of M. I. D.

The name and address of the nearest A. P. L. representative may be secured from M. I. D.

62. *Y. M. C. A. Intelligence.* The Y. M. C. A. has, with the sanction of M. I. D., established an Intelligence Service among its workers which has done most excellent work and should be fostered and encouraged by Military Intelligence.

The fact that such a service exists is not generally known to the Y. M. C. A., and the Intelligence Headquarters is quite distinct from the General Y. M. C. A. Headquarters. Herein lies its greatest strength and Military Intelligence must be careful not to uncover the situation to outsiders or even to members of the Y. M. C. A.

The Chief of Y. M. C. A. Intelligence is Mr. W. G. Low, Jr., Room 1154, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York City, who was trained by Military Intelligence Division and is in constant touch with M. I. D.

Intelligence Agents have been appointed in most of the Camps and large cities and in most of these there has been established within the Y. M. C. A. personnel a C. E. service similar to that of the Army. The advantage of such an organization is obvious.

Y. M. C. A. Agents have been instructed not to make themselves known to the local Intelligence Officer but to await his first advances. However, they are also instructed to co-operate to the fullest extent with local Intelligence Officers when approached for that purpose. Therefore, if this co-operation is desired, the Intelligence Officer must take steps to get in touch with the Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Agent and to indicate his desires. Liaison having been established, the

further course of the Intelligence Officer will be dictated by his own judgment, subject, however, to the general considerations discussed hereafter.

The Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Agents are interested and willing, but are entirely inexperienced in intelligence work and cannot, of necessity, be instructed fully through Y. M. C. A. agencies, since it is impossible for that institution to maintain as elaborate an organization as that of the Army.

. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that Intelligence Officers should keep in touch with the Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Agents, in those camps or stations where it is found desirable to co-operate with them, and to encourage, instruct and advise them as to their work. If this is not done the Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Organization, which is now doing splendid work, will ultimately fall to pieces from inanition. .

At the same time it is vitally important that the Intelligence Officer shall studiously avoid making the Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Agent a mere member of the Military C. E. Service. It is the duty of the Y. M. C. A. Agent to report fully and frequently to his own headquarters, and unless he does so the general organization cannot be maintained. Therefore, the Intelligence Officer should impress upon the Y. M. C. A. Agent his duty in this regard in order that the Army may have a continuing use of this excellent service.

This warning is necessary for the reason that in some instances the Y. M. C. A. Agents have thought it sufficient to co-operate with the local Intelligence Officer and have ignored their own organization. The Intelligence Officer thus has, for a time, an excellent assistant, but sooner or later this man will be shifted by Y. M. C. A. Personnel and unless Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Headquarters is in touch with the situation it will not become aware of the fact and hence there will be no replacement. To permit such a contingency to arise through our own short-sightedness would be folly.

Along the same lines it is obvious that Intelligence Officers who have on their own initiative established a C. E. Service in the Y. M. C. A., as has been done at some camps not already reached by the Y. M. C. A. Intelligence organization, should report to Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Headquarters the name of the principal worker therein with the suggestion that he be made Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Agent, and should encourage such Agent to keep in touch with Y. M. C. A. Headquarters.

Y M. C. A. Intelligence Agents do not, however, report Military cases to their own headquarters but to the Local I. O. Their reports to Y. M. C. A. Intelligence Headquarters are confined to cases within the Y. M. C. A. personnel and surveys of the Y. M. C. A. situation.

63. *Local Police*, and detective forces and the detective forces of railways, mining and manufacturing corporations may be in a position to furnish valuable assistance and with few exceptions will be found eager to assist the Army in every possible way. As a source of information, such organizations may prove of great value. The Intelligence Officer should not neglect to establish liaison and to interest these agencies in his behalf. (Principles, Sec. 26).

64. *Other Local Aids.* Well-informed local citizens, bankers, hotelkeepers and clerks, railway, express and telegraph agents, and the managers of telegraph and telephone companies may prove useful sources of information, if properly approached, and the aid of loyal persons of suitable judgment is always to be sought so far as is practicable. Throughout the United States there are a few selected citizens of loyalty and discretion who have been appointed volunteer observers for M. I. D. and carry recognition cards which bear the photograph of the holder for identification. It is unlikely that the I. O. will come in contact with any of these men.

While the use of any of the above means of securing information is highly desirable, the I. O. should avoid anything which approaches the creation of a C. E. organization among civilians, except as indicated in Article XI.

## ARTICLE XI

### HANDLING CIVILIAN PERSONNEL.

65. *Establishments Predominantly Military.* At practically all military establishments civilians are employed in various capacities and in larger or smaller numbers. The nature of their employment may be (a) transient, with small numbers employed, as in minor construction or in repairs; (b) semi-permanent, where men are employed in considerable numbers in construction on a large scale. In either case proper measures should be taken by the I. O. to exercise due supervision over this civilian personnel.

Class (a) may perhaps best be handled—if any actual observation be necessary—by special operatives, possibly enlisted men in civilian clothes, working now with one group of civilians, now with another.

Class (b) is best handled by a C. E. organization similar to that prescribed for military units. A No. 2 (who may be a civilian foreman or superintendent) should be chosen and directed to organize such a system. This organization will be purely civilian in nature. It may be necessary to compensate executives in the organization for the time spent by them on C. E. duties in addition to their usual work. Operatives, on the other hand, should be expected to give their services, as a patriotic duty, without compensation. The organization so formed should function under the I. O. precisely as any military unit under control of a No. 2.

The swearing in of female nurses in Base Hospitals as operatives offers possibilities for the extension of the C. E. system. In one Division, a number of nurses who spoke the German language were employed with good results. Nurses have unusual opportunities for securing information from men when the latter are in a condition peculiarly susceptible to suggestion and apt to be caught off their guard.

The Y. M. C. A., Knights of Columbus, Salvation Army and similar organized camp activities frequently present a fruitful field for C. E. organization and this opportunity is by no means to be overlooked.

66. *Establishments Predominantly Civilian.* Many establishments under military control are so predominantly civilian in personnel that complete cover can be secured only by an extensive C. E. organization among the civilians themselves with practically no reliance upon military observers. A separate pamphlet, which may be shown to a civilian No. 1, explains such an organization. It may be procured from M. I. D. by applying for "Provisional Intelligence Instructions for Civilian Personnel under Military Control, June, 1918."

67. *Plant Protection.* Where a large number of civilians are employed, the "Plant Protection" may be of invaluable assistance. "Plant Protection" is a civilian sub-division of M. I. D., engaged in activity of a definite nature. It employs technically trained agents who are placed under cover among civilian employees for the purpose of reporting on labor conditions. These men are employed on the same basis as other employees, but receive additional compensation for their special services. They are limited in number and placed wherever their services are most desirable, being transferred to other plants as necessity



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dictates. These agents operate apart from the Intelligence organization, and should remain unknown to the I. O. They report to certain Agents in Charge, at various points throughout the United States, who in turn report to the I. O. such matters as may be of interest to him in the prosecution of his work. The name of the Agent in Charge of any particular territory may be obtained from M. I. D.

I. O.'s in charge of civilian employees should, on assuming their duties, communicate without delay with the nearest Agent in Charge of Plant Protection, with a view to efficient co-ordination of effort and interchange of information. Under no circumstances, however, should such interchange of information extend to small details of organization or names of operatives.

Where civilian agents of the Plant Protection are made use of, it should be borne in mind that the functions of these agents do not coincide with those of the C. E. organization. Such agents are not available in sufficient numbers to cover a given field with a thoroughness even approximating that of the C. E. organization. Their presence does not, therefore, release the I. O. from the obligation of organizing an efficient C. E. system within any considerable semi-permanent group of civilian employees. On the other hand, Plant Protection agents are in a position to report matters of dishonesty, fraud, incompetence, and kindred evils on the part of C. E. operatives, which might not be brought to light through the usual C. E. channels.

## ARTICLE XII.

### INTELLIGENCE FUNDS.

68. *Proper Use of Funds.* Funds for the operation of the Intelligence Service are available in reasonable amounts on requisition to M. I. D. Such funds are derived from a limited appropriation, and must not be used when other sources of income may be drawn on. Legitimate Intelligence expenses are such items as compensation of special executives or operatives, rental of Post-Office boxes, postage for operatives, purchase of information when information can be obtained in no other way. The language of the appropriation act is as follows:

> "For purchases ordered by the Military Intelligence Branch; newspaper subscriptions; drafting and messenger service; items of miscellaneous office expense; purchase of professional books of reference; hire of agents in the collection of information and payment of their expenses while so employed; the maintenance of intelligence agencies; and for such other expenses as are necessary in the proper conduct of the military intelligence work."

The fact that civilian operatives have occasionally been employed for short periods sometimes leads inexperienced Intelligence Officers to plan rather extensive and prohibitively expensive private detective bureaus of their own. No such plan can be approved and in general the employment of paid operatives is to be discouraged.

The following circular draws a distinction as to the use of Intelligence funds which must be borne in mind at all times:

CONFIDENTIAL.

February 13, 1918.

From: The Adjutant General of the Army.
To: The Commanding Generals of all Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army Divisions, the Commanding Generals of all Departments and the Commanding Officers of all excepted places.
Subject: Reimbursement for Charges and Expenses Paid.

1. With reference to A. G. O. Circular November 2, 1917, pointing out the duty of commanding officers to call violations of the law to the attention of the United States District Attorney, and to assist him in the prosecution of cases, you are informed that you will be guided by the following instructions;

(a) That whenever it appears that action is necessary, within your division, department or locality, to secure evidence for the prosecution of cases dealing with the unauthorized sale of liquor, of bribery, of white slavery cases, of draft evasion, and of other cases of violation of the civil law, you will direct your officers handling such cases to work in co-operation with the Department of Justice, and you will require them to make the necessary arrangements with local agents of the Department of Justice so that expenses necessarily incurred in seeking evidence will be taken care of by that Department.

(b) That whenever it appears that it shall be necessary to hire interpreters, spies or guides (under proper authority), provision should be made to cover the expenses of such employees under appropriations for Incidental Expenses, Quartermaster Corps (S. S. & T.), and you are informed that the word hire as here used will be interpreted to cover such necessary expenses of spies as may be determined as necessary and advisable by the officer employing said persons.

(c) That whenever it appears that it is necessary that expenses may be incurred in the prosecution of the necessary activity to obtain information for the Military Intelligence Section, War College Division, General Staff, (which is absolutely distinguished from the class of cases mentioned in (a) above), and also where the expenditures might be open to question by the Auditor of the War Department, under the appropriations above referred to for Incidental Expenses, Quartermaster Corps, or in cases where it is inadvisable that the expenditures be stated on vouchers which would pass in due course through the ordinary channels of correspondence in the Quartermaster Corps, that these expenses should be covered by special confidential vouchers and be submitted to the proper disbursing officer of the funds of the Military Information Section, Office of The Chief of Staff, and who would be one of either of the three following:

(a) Divisional Intelligence Officer;
(b) Departmental Intelligence Officer;
(c) Disbursing Officer, Military Information Section, Office of The Chief of Staff.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. B. WILSON,
Adjutant General.

Intelligence Officers of units going abroad will not take with them the unexpended balance of Intelligence funds remaining in their hands, but will return the same, properly invoiced, to M. I. D.

69. *Securing and Accounting for Funds.*

(a) Funds can be furnished in regular course approximately two weeks after requisition is received by M. I. D., or in case of extreme emergency, may be sent immediately. The Intelligence Officer receiving such funds becomes a Disbursing Officer and must be particularly careful to account for the same in proper form if he would avoid much serious embarrassment in the future.

(b) *Standard War Department Form No. 330* will be used in the payment of newspaper subscriptions, purchase of maps, items of miscellaneous office expense, such as postage stamps, post-office box rent, rent of typewriter (where necessary); hire of automobile for any special trips, and any expense *other than* personal.

(c) *Standard War Department Form No. 335* will be used in the payment of personal service, such as drafting and messenger service, clerical services, hire of agents, payment of their expenses, etc. When reimbursements are made to agent for expenses incurred, he should furnish an itemized list of expenses, certified as to correctness and justness, and signed. This list should accompany voucher in account current, and duplicate should be filed with retained copy of voucher to be produced if ever called upon to do so.

(d) Each voucher should show date, article, quantity, and price. (In the case of postage stamps, show denomination and quantity). It should be signed exactly as billed. The Officer disbursing this fund certifies to the voucher, as to correctness.

(e) Where payment is made by Treasury Check, the proper entries are made on voucher in spaces provided. If payment is made by cash, payee should sign receipt at foot of voucher in addition. All checks not Treasury checks are considered cash.

(f) Where an Officer reimburses himself for expenditures, receipts for items should be forwarded with the voucher.

(g) The duplicate or the memorandum copy of the vouchers should be held by the Officer for his own files.

(h) *O. C. S. Form No. 6.* Confidential voucher will be used where applicable. The use of this voucher was approved by the Comptroller of the Treasury to enable the War Department to carry on confidential work where "it would be prejudicial to the public interest to [illegible] the name of the recipients," and it is not desired that it be used indiscriminately for purposes for which it was never intended. Quarterly expenditures should be accounted for on *one* confidential voucher, which should be submitted in duplicate, using the blue sheet for duplicate copy.

(i) Every item under the confidential voucher must be supported by certified sub-vouchers, showing purpose, date and place. An agent paid under the Confidential voucher, should, where not prejudicial to his work, submit an expense account similar to that mentioned in Paragraph (c), but in this case the account should be forwarded with the Confidential voucher. These should be receipted wherever possible. Where no receipt is possible, a sub-voucher in the form of a certificate by the officer is required.

(k) As all sub-vouchers to the Confidential Voucher are retained in the Military Intelligence Division, there is no objection to giving names of recipients.

SAMPLE FORMS OF CERTIFICATES.

*Covering Items Under Confidential Vouchers.*

1—Where receipt is obtained:

"I certify that the above expenditures were actually made, are correct and just; that I have not been reimbursed therefor; and receipts are attached."

2—Where receipt is not obtained:

"I certify that I paid John Doe $..... on ..... for confidential information, for which it was impracticable to obtain a receipt."

"I certify that I paid Richard Roe $..... for services and actual expenses from ..... to ..... while on trip obtaining confidential information, and that owing to nature of work, it was impracticable to obtain receipts."

"I certify that ..... I paid a civilian $..... for confidential information, etc."

(l) At the end of each quarter (September 30; December 31; March 31; June 30), all sub-vouchers to the Confidential Voucher are listed on an abstract; this list and all sub-vouchers are attached to the blue (duplicate) of Form 6 O. C. S., and original and duplicates are both forwarded with the account.

(m) *All* vouchers for a Quarter are listed on Form 329-b, (abstract) and totaled, and this total is transferred to the credit side of Form 320-b (Account Current).

(n) The Account Current should have the proper information filled in the heading, giving the name of the office, the Officer's name, his official designation and period for which rendered. The debit side should show the amount the officer is responsible for, as balance from last account, through funds transferred to him (name of officer and date of transfer), or through War Warrant (number and date).

(o) The name of the appropriation "Contingencies, Military Information Section, General Staff Corps" should be shown in the blank column. On the line "Balance due the United States" should appear the difference between the amount the officer is responsible for and the total of the abstract.

(p) The certificate at the foot of the account current (lower right hand corner) should be completed and signed. If the Officer has cash on hand a disinterested party should verify and complete certificate in the lower left hand corner.



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(q) On the reverse of Account Current on the debit side of cash account, list all checks drawn to obtain cash. On the credit side, list all vouchers paid by cash. The difference, "Cash carried forward to next account" should agree with the item "Cash in office safe." (Military Attachés show this in the money of the country where stationed).

(r) The account current should be filled in on the first fold, and the first indorsement should be completed and signed.

(s) In the event the Intelligence Officer transfers all his funds, he will use Form 326 (Invoice of Funds Transferred) and submit a final account current.

(t) All money accounts will be rendered quarterly in compliance with paragraph 1100, Army Regulations, 1913, and forwarded to the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff.

(u) Quarterly reports must be submitted whether or not disbursements have been made.

(v) Literal compliance with the foregoing instructions is absolutely necessary.

(w) Intelligence Officers are warned that the War Department holds each disbursing officer personally accountable for Government funds in his possession, and that the amount of all funds not properly accounted for will be deducted from his pay.