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US ARMY OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

THE AIRLAND BATTLE AND CORPS 86

TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5

25 MARCH 1981

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

FOREWORD

Operational Concepts for the AirLand Battle and Corps Operations - 1986

This is one of a series of TRADOC Pamphlets used to disseminate operational concepts.

Operational concepts describe how combat, combat support, and combat service support operations are to be conducted. They set forth functions and tasks to be accomplished by the various levels of command during combat. They are to be used by Army training, organization, doctrine, and materiel developers to develop their various programs. They may also be used by the operating forces of the Army in the conduct of training and other preparations for combat operations, pending incorporation of the concept into doctrinal and training literature.

This pamphlet sets forth two operational concepts. The first, The AirLand Battle, is the umbrella concept describing the perceived battlefield of the 1980's. The Army 86 Studies were developed from the notions embodied in this umbrella concept, as were the Army 86 Concepts describing how combat, combat support, and combat service support operations are to be conducted. The second concept, Corps Operations 1986, is a derivative of the umbrella concept and sets forth the operational concept for corps operations on the AirLand Battlefield. It identifies missions and articulates the operational concepts by which the corps will accomplish these missions.

The focus of the two concepts is to realize the full potential of the US forces. Together, they form the basis for fielding, improving, and modifying the Army 86 generation of organizations, systems, and equipment through the remainder of the 1980's and into the 1990's.

DONN A. STARRY
General, United States Army
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651

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No 525-5

25 March 1981

Military Operations
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE AND CORPS OPERATIONS - 1986

		Paragraph	Page
CHAPTER 1.	OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE		
	Purpose	1-1	2
	General	1-2	2
	Limitations	1-3	4
	Operational concept	1-4	4
CHAPTER 2.	OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR CORPS OPERATIONS - 1986		
	Purpose	2-1	25
	General	2-2	25
	Limitations	2-3	26
	Operational concept	2-4	26
APPENDIX A.	COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS		31
B.	INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION		39
C.	TARGET SERVICING		45
D.	COVERING FORCE OPERATIONS		47
E.	INTERDICTION		51
F.	AIR DEFENSE		54
G.	MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY		58
H.	BATTLE SUPPORT		60
I.	RECONSTRUCTION		68
J.	REAR AREA COMBAT OPERATIONS		72
K.	NBC SUPPORT		79

CHAPTER 1

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE

1-1. Purpose. The AirLand Battle Concept outlines an approach to military operations which realizes the full potential of US forces. Two notions--extending the battlefield and integrating conventional nuclear, chemical and electronic means--are blended to describe a battlefield where the enemy is attacked to the full depth of his formations. What we seek is a capability for early initiative of offensive action by air and land forces to bring about the conclusion of battle on our terms.

1-2. General.

a. This concept primarily deals with war in areas of the world where there are large numbers of relatively modern, well-equipped forces who use Soviet style operational concepts and tactics. Quite naturally, therefore, the threat against which the concept is designed is typified by the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, the larger aggregations of mechanized forces in the Middle East, or the threat from the north in Korea.

b. The concept emphasizes the all too frequently ignored or misunderstood lesson of history--that once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something--else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations cannot be simply to avert defeat--but rather it must be to win.

c. This concept does not propose new and radical ways to fight. Rather, it describes conflict in terms of an environment which considers not only conventional systems, but also chemical, nuclear, and electronic. It also forces consideration of this conflict in terms of reaching the enemy's follow-on echelons. Consideration of such a battlefield is necessary if we are to reinforce the prospects of winning.

d. Extending the battlefield is not a new notion; it is a more descriptive term for indicating the full potential we must realize from our acquisition, targeting, and weapons systems. The battlefield and the battle are extended in three ways:

(1) First, the battlefield is extended in depth, with engagement of enemy units not yet in contact to disrupt the enemy timetable, complicate command and control, and frustrate his plans, thus weakening his grasp on the initiative.

(2) Second, the battle is extended forward in time to the point that current actions such as attack of follow-on echelons, logistical preparation and maneuver plans are interrelated to maximize the likelihood of winning the close-in battle as time goes on.

(3) Lastly, the range of assets figuring in the AirLand Battle is extended toward more emphasis on higher land Army and sister service acquisition means and attack resources.

e. What emerges is a perception of the battlefield in which the goal of collapsing the enemy's ability to fight drives us to unified employment of a wide range of systems and organizations on a battlefield which, for corps and divisions, is much deeper than that foreseen by current doctrine. The word "doctrine" is used advisedly. It must be acknowledged at the outset that there is probably little set forth here which is not already being done and done well in some operational units. The purpose of the AirLand Concept is less to suggest innovation than it is to pull together many good ideas for making extended attack an integral feature of our combat capability--in all units.

f. In essence our message can be distilled in four primary notions:

(1) First, deep attack is not a luxury; it is an absolute necessity to winning.

(2) Second, deep attack particularly in an environment of scarce acquisition and strike assets, must be tightly coordinated over time with the decisive close-in battle. Without this coordination, many expensive and scarce resources may be wasted on apparently attractive targets whose destruction actually has little payoff in the close-in battle. The other side of this coin is that maneuver and logistical planning and execution must anticipate by many hours the vulnerabilities that deep attack helps create. It's all one battle.

(3) Thirdly, it is important to consider now the number of systems entering the force in the near and middle term future. Not just weapons of greater lethality and greater range, but automated systems and communication systems for more responsive command control, as well as sensor systems to find, identify and target the enemy, and to assess the effectiveness of deep attack (figure 1-1).

(4) Finally, the AirLand Concept is designed to be the unifying idea which pulls all these emerging capabilities together so we can realize their full combined potential for winning.




Figure 1-1

g. The AirLand Concept is not a futuristic dream to remain on the shelf until all new systems are fielded. For instance, with minor adjustments, corps and divisions can and must begin to learn and practice fighting the AirLand Battle now--during 1981. The payoffs in readiness for combat will be enormous; and implementing the concept today means that we are building the receptacle into which every new system can be plugged immediately, minimizing the build-up time to full capability.

h. To insure that the AirLand Battlefield is understood in the full context of the integrated conventional-nuclear-chemical-electronic and extended battlefield, this pamphlet will first review, in a broad sense, major aspects of the concept, then describe how, by attacking assaulting and follow-on echelons simultaneously, the prospects for winning increase dramatically.

1-3. Limitations. None.

1-4. Operational concept.

a. In peacetime, the purpose of military forces, especially in the context of operations in areas critical to United States interest, is to reduce to a minimum whatever incentives the enemy's

leadership might perceive as favorable to seeking military solutions to political problems. In NATO, in the Middle East, and in Korea, our defensive strategy must extend beyond simply denying victory to the other side; it must, instead, postulate a definable, recognizable (although perhaps limited), victory for the defender. Enemy leaders must be made to understand clearly that if they choose to move militarily, no longer will there be a status quo ante bellum--something to be restored--rather, the situation they themselves have created is one which will be resolved on new terms.

b. As the strategic nuclear balance teeters, so grows the enemy's perception of his own freedom of action at theater levels--conventional and nuclear. Theater forces should not be considered solely as a bridge to strategic nuclear war. They are weapons which must be considered in the context of a war fighting capability.

c. These considerations dictate that NATO strategy must, from the outset, be designed to cope with the Soviet conventional-nuclear-chemical-electronic-combined arms-integrated battlefield threat. The growing threat of nuclear capabilities elsewhere suggests this strategy to be appropriate in other critical areas as well.

d. The Warsaw Pact/Soviet style strategy embraces two fundamental concepts:

(1) In the first, mass, momentum, and continuous combat are the operative tactics. Breakthrough (somewhere) is sought as the initiator of collapse in the defender's system of defense.

(2) In the alternative, surprise is substituted for mass in the daring thrust tactic. In NATO, this could involve a number of BMP regiments in independent attacks which without warning would seek to deny to defending forces the opportunity to get set forward. Both tactics are essentially maneuver based schemes whose purpose is to disrupt the operational tactics of the defender, albeit by different methods.

e. The need for deep attack emerges from the nature of our potential enemies--their doctrine and their numerically superior forces. Whether our enemy is stylistically echeloned as shown in figure 1-2 is not really critical. What is important is that superiority in numbers permits him to keep a significant portion of his force out of the fight with freedom to commit it either to overwhelm or to bypass the friendly force. The existence of these follow-on echelons gives the enemy a strong grip on the initiative which we must wrest from him, then retain in order to win.




Figure 1-2

f. NATO strategy (and defensive strategies in other key areas of the world as well) must be designed to preserve the territory, resources, and facilities of the defended area for the defender. In none of the critical areas of the world, those to which US forces are likely to be committed, is there sufficient maneuver room to accomodate a traditional defense-in-depth strategy. The defense must therefore begin well forward and proceed aggressively from there to destroy enemy assault echelons and at the same time to slow, disrupt, break up, disperse, or destroy follow-on echelons in order to quickly seize the initiative and go on the offense.

g. The operative tactics by which US forces seek to implement the operational concept set forth above must provide for quick resolution of the battle under circumstances that will allow political authorities to negotiate with their adversaries from a position of strength. This is so because the enemy generally enjoys a short-term

advantage in ability to mobilize additional forces quickly. Clearly then, one purpose of the AirLand Concept must be to preempt the possibility of prolonged military operations. Further, these operative tactics should seek simultaneously to:

(1) Deny the enemy access to the objectives he seeks.

(2) Prevent enemy forces from loading up the assault force fight reinforcing assault echelons and thus achieving by continuous combat what might be denied them by a stiff forward defense.

(3) Find the opportunity to seize initiative--to attack to destroy the integrity of the enemy operational scheme, forcing him to break off the attack or risk resounding defeat.

h. Because of the enemy's advantage in the numbers, attack of follow-on echelons must always begin when those echelons are relatively deep in enemy territory. If an outnumbered defender waits to mount a counterattack until his numerically superior foe has penetrated the defender's territory, it is always too late to bring effective forces and fires to bear to defeat the incursion. Particularly is this the case if theater nuclear weapons are considered necessary to defeat the penetration. Therefore, on an integrated battlefield, systems designed to defeat enemy assault elements, to disrupt follow-on forces and to seize the initiative by attack, must be able to deliver conventional and/or nuclear fires throughout the spectrum of the battle--throughout the depth of the battlefield.

i. Keys to a credible warfighting capability on an integrated battlefield are:

(1) Sensor/surveillance systems to prevent surprise attack in peacetime and provide necessary targeting/surveillance information in wartime.

(2) Delivery systems--dual capable, with sufficient range, accuracy, and lethality to hold enemy follow-on echelons at risk in peacetime and to successfully attack them in wartime.

(3) Command control sufficient to integrate all source intelligence in near real time, in peacetime, and in wartime, and to provide that intelligence and targeting information to maneuver force employments in near real time as well.

j. The operative tactics which support such an operational concept of an integrated defense well forward are:

(1) See deep and begin early to disrupt delay and destroy, follow-on/reinforcing echelons.

(2) Move fast against the assault echelons.

(3) Strike assault echelons quickly so as to prevent them from achieving their objectives.

(4) Finish the opening fight against assault and follow-on echelons rapidly so as to go on the attack and finish the battle against the assault Armies before follow-on Armies can join the battle.

k. Areas of interest and influence.

(1) In the execution of such a set of operative tactics there must be a division of responsibilities among commanders. Just as the means with which commanders see and fight the battlefield vary, so should their primary areas of interest vary.

SEE AND ATTACK IN DEPTH




Figure 1-3

(2) As in figure 1-3, each level of command has a dual responsibility. Each must attack one of the enemy's assault echelons and must see, or determine the intentions of, a follow-on echelon. Doctrinally, we say that the enemy's first echelon divisions, the regiments in front of the assault division, as well as the follow-on regiments, are the responsibility of the defending division. In an attack, those same echelons would also be the division commander's responsibility. The brigade commander fights first echelon assault regiments. The division commander fights the first echelon assault divisions. The corps commander fights first echelon Armies; it is the corps commander's responsibility to find and disrupt the advance of second echelon divisions of first echelon Armies before they become a part of the first echelon problem. At the same time, the corps commander is very interested in where the second echelon Army of the Front is deploying. At corps level, he must tie into national target acquisition systems and other surveillance means to get information concerning where that Army is and what it is doing. His primary responsibility in battle fighting has to do with the follow-on echelons.

1. Attacking the follow-on echelons.

(1) For such a division in areas of interest and influence to be effective in wartime, it must be frequently practiced during peacetime. It is critical for us to realize that as the enemy achieves the echelonment so necessary for his success, he inherently creates vulnerabilities--targets. These same vulnerabilities provide us with the opportunity to put threat second echelon forces at great risk. But only through repetitive exercise will we be able to capitalize on his vulnerabilities.

(2) What we must do is practice acquiring and targeting Warsaw Pact units now--during peacetime, so we will be prepared to attack them if need be. In addition, we can do careful intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and thus be prepared to attack high value targets such as fixed bridges and mobile sites that will cause threat follow-on echelons to bunch up and present themselves as attractive targets. Additionally, attacking other high value targets, such as, combat service support facilities--which must exist to support rolling forces, or selected command posts, will also generate delay. Attacks directed in this manner will provide friendly forces time to finish the battle at the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT).

(3) Figure 1-4 shows the problem inherent in fighting against echelonment tactics. If the battle is fought with no directed interdiction, enemy follow-on echelons have a "free ride" until they enter the close-in battle. The figure suggests what happens when

follow-on echelons are ignored and allowed to stack up behind assaulting forces at the FLOT until a breakthrough is achieved. The enemy retains flexibility, initiative, and momentum to apply his mass at a point and time of his choice. As indicated by the hachured lines, deep attacks seek to deprive him of this freedom. There are three primary tools for a deep attack;

(a) Interdiction--air, artillery, special operating forces.

(b) Offensive electronic warfare.

(c) Deception.




Figure 1-4

(4) In practical current terms, interdiction--principally battlefield air interdiction, is the primary tool of deep attack. At present, the range of jammers precludes effective use against follow-on echelons. However, jamming can be used in the close-in battle as a non-lethal substitute for fires and battlefield air interdiction sorties which can then be freed for deep attacks.

(5) We would like deep attack to destroy enemy forces before they enter the close-in battle, but in today's terms, and in all probability, tomorrow's as well, expense and scarcity of assets will limit the practically achievable effects of delay and disruption.

Delay and disruption, however, must be aimed at more ambitious goals then just fractional attrition or harrassment. The real goal of the deep attack is to create opportunitites for friendly action--attack, counterattack, or reconstitution of the defense on favorable ground well forward in the battle area. This can be done by avoiding piecemeal employment of acquisition means and attack resources. These resources must be concentrated on critical targets which have the most payoff in upsetting enemy plans and to create situations wherein the friendly force can seize the inititative and win.

(6) It is important to stress here that the deep attack is not just a tool of the defense. It is, if anything, even more critical in the offense. It is essential to winning because it creates opportunities to seize and retain the initiative. It is equally important that corps and division commanders fight this deep battle at the same time and in close coordination with the close-in battles. It is true that these commanders already have their hands full with the close-in battle; but the compelling reason for active corps and division commander involvement is because the number of targets we would like to attack and can acquire far exceeds available attack assets. It is also essential then, that attack means not be applied indiscriminately. Limited strike and acquisition means must be applied in a planned, well-organized and conducted scheme to support the plan for winning. Piecemealing long-range target acquisition and attack resources is a luxury that cannot be allowed. The commander's choice of when to use deep attack means must be taken in such a way that it will create a window for offensive action some hours in the future. That choice must be based on a single unified scheme of maneuver and a plan of fires for the whole of the extended battle. The expected window for decisive action must be created in an area where previous plans have assured the availability of sufficient logistical support and fire support as well as maneuver forces.

(7) This demand for careful coordination of present and future action throughout the depth of the battlefield dictates that the plan stem from the concept of a single commander. Separation of the close-in and follow-on battles invites the risk that windows will not be generated, or that if generated, units will be ill prepared to identify and exploit them.

(8) What emerges from this requirement for unity of command across the near and far components of the fight is a view of an extended battlefield, with well defined depth and width in which the commander is fighting not several separate battles, but one well integrated battle with several parts highly interrelated over time. The depth of this battlefield beyond the FLOT is really a function of the commander's planning horizon expressed in hours.

(9) The following scenario describes an integrated battle situation in which it would be greatly to the commander's advantage to fight assault and follow-on echelons simultaneously. From the outset, it is acknowledged that in this scenario it would be advantageous to use tactical nuclear and chemical weapons at an early stage and in enemy territory. It is also fully realized, however, that authorization to do this may not be granted in timely fashion, and that being the case, the battle will have to be fought with so-called conventional systems. Even though this somewhat reduces defensive combat power, the concept described here maximizes the remaining conventional power.

THE AIRLAND BATTLE
THE DEEP BATTLE

- **DELAY, DISRUPT, DESTROY**
- **ATTACK COMMAND CONTROL, SERVICE SUPPORT, SOFTER TARGETS**
- **AIR BATTLE**
- **LAND BATTLE**




Figure 1-5

(10) Figure 1-5 portrays the corps commander's concerns in the deep battle--those enemy forces that are within 72 hours of the close-in battle. The corps commander needs to have a well laid out, flexible plan, and be thinking 72 hours into the future, in order to fight both close-in and extended battles, gain the initiative, win the fight, and do it quickly. What is the purpose of looking out to 72 hours depth? There are many things a corps must do in those hours. Particularly, they are used to plan, order, and execute those maneuver, fire support, and logistical preparations necessary to seize an opportunity for offensive action.

(11) The presence of any enemy formation in the corps commander's area of influence should trigger a reevaluation of his long range plan and generate options for defeating this force along with all others in the area of influence. Several options will probably be retained at this point; however, the range of options narrows as the force approaches and closure time decreases. Almost all options will include attack of the force to inflict delay and disruption. Although distances here are great, the payoff can be considerable since the critical targets include soft skinned logistical and command control elements whose value will be far less when closer to the front line battle.




Figure 1-6

(12) As the force closes (figure 1-6), its impending impact on the front-line battle will become more apparent and the relative merits of the various attack options will begin to sharpen. Options at this stage should include deep nuclear strikes with Lance or air delivered weapons. Targets at this stage are far more vulnerable to nuclear effects than at the FLOT; they are still well beyond the danger radius to friendly forces and the time until closure is realistic enough to allow request release and execution to occur.

(13) Of course, the commander must have a strong conventional option in the event nuclear release is not forthcoming. He must identify the critical time at which he must finally commit himself to one course of action. In any event, he seeks to hold the enemy formation out of the division area of influence long enough for division commanders to have sufficient space and time to accomplish their missions and prepare for the next echelon.

THE AIRLAND BATTLE

- **DISRUPT, DESTROY, DELAY**
- **REALTIME TARGET ACQUISITION**
- **ATTACKING FORCE HAS FEW MOVEMENT ALTERNATIVES**
- **TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS USED NOW, IF THEY ARE TO BE USED AT ALL**
- **AIR BATTLE**
- **LAND BATTLE**




Figure 1-7

(14) When the force enters the division area of influence--about 24 hours distance from the FLOT (figure 1-7), the entire process is triggered again on a lower scale. Here the importance of real time target acquisition dominates. Since at this point, the attacker is committed to specific attack avenues, he has few movement alternatives left to him. The defender can capitalize on that. Again, if tactical nuclear weapons are to be used, they must be used now. In a review of innumerable planning exercises in which assumed enemy penetrations were drawn with great care to reflect that point "beyond which the integrity of the defense is jeopardized," it was found that if the penetration was allowed to develop as it was drawn in the defended territory, it was always too late to react successfully. If for no other reason, therefore, it is of paramount importance that the planning process begin while that follow-on echelon target is still deep in his own territory and that nuclear release be requested in sufficient time to allow employment when he is still 24 to 60 hours

from the FLOT. As in the earlier part of this battle, the commander must integrate the full spectrum of air and land weapons systems. It is, at this point, still an air and land battle, perhaps more air than land, however.

THE AIRLAND BATTLE

- **DESTROY, DISRUPT**
- **DEFEAT ECHELON IN CONTACT**
- **CHEMICAL WEAPONS USED NOW**
- **ATTACK FOLLOW-ON FORCES**
- **AIR BATTLE**
- **LAND BATTLE**




Figure 1-8

(15) By the time the folowing echelons close to within about 12 hours of the FLOT (figure 1-8), they become the concern of the brigade commander. At the 12 hour line, actions must be taken that not only delay and disrupt the following echelons, but also help to defeat those in contact at the FLOT. Given the right target, and that the enemy has already used chemical weapons, it is here that our use of them can be integrated--they should be used to isolate one part of the battlefield while an attack is launched against another part of the follow-on forces. It is here that the land aspects of the battle predominate; that is, the battle is more land than air. With a little luck, the outcome will find enemy assault forces destroyed, freedom to maneuver will have been restored, and the initiative will have been captured from the enemy (figure 1-9). In the end, this simultaneous attacking of echelons becomes key to the primary objective of the AirLand Battle; to win, not just to avert defeat.

(16) Studies show clearly that successful interdiction does result in a degradation of the enemy's massive firepower. It is also clear that successful interdiction results in a reduction of enemy

momentum brought on through loss of support and that it provides the defender time to secure nuclear release, if required. Finally, interdiction reduces the attacker's alternatives by disrupting his ability to execute his intended plan. The conviction that well planned interdiction can provide these results is based in part on the target value analysis phase of a fire support mission area analysis completed by the Field Artillery School. Part of that analysis was a simulation comparison of 1980 European corps battles; first without and then with interdiction. While the predicted availability of interdiction means may have been sanguine, some significant trends were nonetheless observed.

THE AIRLAND BATTLE
THE OUTCOME

- **ENEMY ASSAULT FORCES DESTROYED**
- **RESTORED FREEDOM TO MANEUVER**
- **INITIATIVE HAS BEEN CAPTURED**




Figure 1-9

EFFECT OF INTERDICTION

- **ENEMY IS ABLE TO MOUNT FEWER REGIMENTAL ATTACKS**
- **ENEMY FIRST ECHELONS DEFEATED EARLIER**
- **FRIENDLY RESERVES NOT NEEDED SO EARLY**
- **ENEMY PENETRATIONS FAR LESS EXTENSIVE**

Figure 1-10

(17) Each of these interdiction effects (figure 1-10) is highly desirable. But their exact significance is more apparent considering the simulation output over time. Specifically, a look at the effect of interdiction on enemy strength at the close-in battle shows the real value of deep attack (figure 1-11).




Figure 1-11

The top curve shows that without interdiction the enemy is able to maintain consistent superiority at the FLOT over time. During this period, the defender's strength is dwindling, freedom of action deteriorates, and the enemy's grip on the initiative decisively tightens.




Figure 1-12

(18) What properly employed interdiction can provide is shown in the lower curve of figure 1-12. Here, enemy follow-on echelons are held out long enough to create periods of friendly superiority in which the initiative can be seized with enough time to act. The longer and more frequent these windows can be made (figure 1-13), the greater the chance of winning, providing we are prepared to identify them and act at the time and the place where they develop.




Figure 1-13

(19) We may not be capable of creating windows of such frequency and duration across the entire corps front, but it is now possible to create such opportunities, and if aggressively exploited, they could lead to the generation of longer, more extensive opportunities for higher level decisive action building toward a major offensive.

m. Interdiction planning.

(1) Summarizing, it can be seen that interdiction is key to battlefield success. The enemy's momentum can be altered by attacking high value second echelon targets, reducing his ability to mass and build up momentum. Interdiction is the method whereby we achieve the leverage necessary to slow him down and ultimately stop him from achieving his objectives.

(2) It is interdiction that allows us to focus our attacks on those enemy targets whose damage, destruction, or disruption would help us fight the battle to our advantage. Interdiction has as its main objective that portion of the enemy's force which is moving toward the FLOT or is in staging areas preparing to join that fight.

(3) This interdiciton concept does, however, imply some changes in current ways of thinking. Most especially is this the case in command control. In order to execute the concept, we must recognize the need to learn how to skillfully use resources far beyond those organic to corps and division, and to plan their application over a greatly expanded battlefield. Of significance here is the establishment of timely and responsive working relationships with air forces for both target acquisition and attack.

(4) The interdiction battle will be fought at the corps and division level. To do this well, it must be practiced routinely. Interdiction targets at division level are directly linked to tactical objectives. At corps, however, interdiction is a function of controlling target presentation rates and densities. As the enemy's second echelon moves closer to the FLOT, interdiction becomes more closely related to the defensive scheme of maneuver.

(5) Advanced planning is absolutely critical to a successful interdiction battle. It is imperative that such planning be conducted continuously. This will insure that commanders are aware of courses of action open to the enemy, and the vulnerabilities of each, thus enabling them to attack targets which present the highest payoff at a particular time. Prior to and during initial stages of the battle, the division intelligence officer, applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield techniques, must forecast enemy strength, progress, and dispositions at selected times. By assessing these developing vulnerabilities, he can recommend courses of action for interdiction attacks. When blended with the scheme of maneuver, these enemy vulnerabilities can then be exploited.

(6) Following such an interdiction planning process, the intelligence officer can develop an enemy probable event sequence which can be used to predict with some high degree of accuracy which courses of action the enemy is likely to follow. That is, the intelligence officer should be able to forecast what events must occur and in what order to produce the desired disposition of enemy forces at any critical moment. This probable event sequence is simply a template against which to assess the progress of events. It identifies interdiction requirements which will have to be met if friendly commanders are to influence the battle in a desired direction.

(7) Interdicition targeting can be a complex and demanding staff process, particularly at division level. Its effect is to create time and space gaps, not to relieve maneuver forces of having to face second echelon elements. It is most effective when it is an integrated effort, one which effectively integrates fire support, electronic warfare, deception, and intelligence with maneuver.

n. Current and future capabilities.

(1) Having made a case for effective, continuous interdiction, what is the Army doing to achieve such a capability? Considering the weapons, sensors, and automation capabilities which will be available through Army 86 efforts, we will be able to do these things quickly and efficiently on the battlefield of the mid to late 80's. But, what about now? The answer is that there is, today, considerable potential to do just what has thus far been described. Since the penalty in terms of battle outcome is too severe to wait until 1986 to adopt the AirLand Battle Concept, our Army must set about now seeing how we might get the most of current capabilities. Even using conservative planning factors, interdiction of critical enemy second echelon elements is possible within existing means. But to make that a reality, we must begin transitioning to those concepts now and practice them daily. If we begin that transition with the resources at hand, we will thus be better prepared to fight and win, while simultaneously maturing the conceptual notions in the day to day work of operational units. Such an approach will also insure that we have the right capabilities included in the Army 86 force designs.

(2) And so as in all aspects of our profession, we must practice now what we intend to do in war. We must train as we will fight. Management of sensor assets in peacetime by those who will be expected to use them in war is the only prudent approach. The same applies to the correlation of data in determining high value targets. We must get the data into the hands of those who will be expected to use it in the future. We must establish integrated targeting cells in all fire support elements (FSE) now. It is important that this capability be developed at corps and divisions for nuclear as well as for conventional and chemical targeting. It is also important that it be done not just among USAREUR units, but in USARPAC units as well.

(3) For the present, many of the acquisition means and most of the attacking means will come from air forces. This is particularly true for corps interdiction requirements. Regardless of who owns them, these are the means we need to gain the best battlefield return. Applying them according to the conceptual notions described above is the way to realize their greatest potential.

(4) Recent exercises have demonstrated that the type of targeting information described earlier is available now--with current means. What next needs to be done is to design exercises for corps and divisions which will focus that information at their level. To make the interdiction battle occur properly, and in a timely manner, corps and divisions must also be able to manage the current family of sensors.

(5) We know the tendencies and patterns of threat units when they are deployed as they would be in a second echelon formation. The task is to make this information available to corps and division commanders for their use in interdiction targeting.

(6) For timely acquisition, we need to insure that corps have control of sensor systems such as the OV-ID SLAR, GUARDRAIL, QUICK-LOOK, and ITEP. Of equal importance is that there be a direct down-link of this information to divisions. Data from a number of other supporting means must also be made available. This category includes the RF-4C, SAR, national systems, and theater systems. Among the most challenging problems is to create the down-links necessary to pass what's already available to corps and divisions in a timely manner.

o. The need for training target cells.

(1) To begin an adequate effort at fusing this data and developing interdiciton targeting, cells must be established in all fire support elements at levels from brigade through echelons above corps. These cells must learn to exploit enemy vulnerabilities by blending the information and expertise available from all source intelligence centers and electronic warfare support elements. Historically, we have focused all our training efforts on winning the fight in the main battle area. However, we are now entering a new dimension of battle which permits the simultaneous engagement of enemy forces throughout the corps and division area of influence. To accomplish this, we must emphasize training in four basic areas:

(a) Friendly acquisition capabilities.

(b) Threat tactical norms.

(c) Friendly attack systems.

(d) Specific techniques, such as, target value analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

(2) For this to be totally successful, both Army and Air Force targeteers must be trained to work together in these functions. Micro-computers, which are currently available in an off-the-shelf configuration, can provide excellent assistance to this training effort. They can store a multitude of data from terrain features to fire plans, from friendly weapons systems to likely threat courses of actions. They can perform target analyses and display them in alpha-numerics and graphics. If such systems were available in division targeting cells now, and we created the necessary down-links for passing acquisition data, targeteers could train now at their wartime tasks in a realistic manner.




Figure 1-14

(3) Figure 1-14 shows a notional division fire support element. The operations cell includes the target analysts. What needs to be done, and we have embarked on this course, is to establish the targeting cell and staff it with people who are currently performing similar tasks elsewhere. We must bring the operations types and the targeting types together.

(4) For such a fire support element to be effective, its personnel must train together daily, as a team, using real time or near

real time data supplied by an integrated sensor network such as described earlier. If actual real time data is not available, then simulated acquisition information could be used, so long as the data base used was developed using previously collected actual information. Through continuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield, a clearer analysis of the area of operations can be developed; one which will facilitate updating interdiction plans and thereby better support operations plans. Such a training activity would contribute greatly to developing confidence and proficiency. By exchanging views and working together, Army and Air Force target cell personnel could establish a credible capability now to deal with any future second echelon threat.

p. Remaining challenges.

(1) Like most things of great worth, this capability will not be easily gained. There are many challenges; but in the end, it will be worth all the effort necessary to make it happen. Foremost among the challenges are those which inhibit our ability to blend current operational requirements of sensor means with the need to conduct real time training at divisions and corps. It will also be difficult, though essential, that appropriate security clearances be acquired for all personnel working in the target cells. This is especially important, for they must have access in peacetime to the data they will be expected to process in war.

(2) Recognizing that it is beyond our capability to conduct actual exercises which simulate threat second echelon patterns so target cells will have something to train against, it is within the state of the art for computer simulations to postulate and portray scenarios which the enemy traditionally follows because they're based on his known tendencies. This would be a useful substitute for targeteers to practice such analytical tasks as event sequencing. Lastly, we must continue to upgrade our communication capability and take advantage of existing commercial facilities. If we do all this, the payoff will be more than worth the investment.

q. Summary.

(1) The challenges notwithstanding, the message of all this is quite clear:

(a) Attacking deep is essential to winning.

(b) Attacking deep and the close-in fight are inseparable.

(c) Planning for the employment of nuclear-chemical-electronic means, either singularly or in combination with conventional means, is continuous and is conducted concurrently with conventional planning.

(d) The AirLand Battle Concept is the keystone of force modernization.

(e) We can begin today to practice, learn, and refine the AirLand Battle Concept.

(2) The ideas of the AirLand Battle Concept are in fact the very same ideas upon which the Army 86 concepts are based--See and Attack Deep--and as might be expected, therefore, organizations of Division and Corps 86 correspond in makeup and function to elements of the AirLand Battlefield team.

(3) The question before the Army now is how to implement the concept quickly, especially that part which addresses extending the battlefield. While there are yet some questions, it is not likely that man-years of study will clear them up to the satisfaction of all concerned. It is, therefore, time to learn to use the concept on the ground with real troops, real equipment, and the real world problems of field commanders.

(4) The time for implementation is now. This is so because there is, first of all, promise of a major increase in combat effectiveness with current means. There also exists an enhanced capability to exploit new sensors, weapons, and command control systems as they are fielded. This enhanced capability is even more evident in the field of micro-processors and computers. As a nation, we have a considerable advantage over our potential adversaries in this technological field. If we strive to put that advantage to work for us, it could become a significant combat multiplier. Finally, of equal importance, there is an opportunity to cause the enemy to wrestle right now with a problem he has traditionally assumed does not exist.

CHAPTER 2

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR CORPS OPERATIONS - 1986

2-1. Purpose. To set forth an operational concept for corps operations on the 1986 battlefield.

2-2. General.

a. It is to be expected that corps will enter battle in 1986 against Soviet forces or their surrogates. Such forces rely heavily on maneuver, supported by massive firepower, to destroy enemy defenses. During offensive operations, Soviet forces in large numbers attack to achieve mass. Soviet forces are echeloned to achieve momentum and to provide continuous operations.

b. Each level of command is echeloned. The front is organized into first- and second-echelon armies. Armies are organized into first- and second echelon divisions. Divisions are organized into first- and second-echelon regiments. Regiments are organized into first and second echelon battalions.

c. The first echelon normally consists of one-half to two-thirds of the force and most of the supporting artillery. The second echelon is organized to maintain the momentum of the attack and to seize subsequent objectives. The first echelon conducts the assault, wears down the enemy, and creates gaps through which the second echelon can follow to deliver the decisive blow.

d. Follow-on echelons are spaced on the battlefield so that they can be committed to reinforce or bypass assaulting forces according to an established timetable or when tactical opportunities can be exploited. If terrain and weapon systems are used correctly, the defending force has the capability to destroy each assaulting echelon in turn or cause it to break off its attack. If follow-on echelons are allowed to join residual elements of assault echelons, the defender is soon overwhelmed by the number of targets that must be destroyed at the line of contact to defeat the enemy. Therefore, destruction of assault forces alone cannot defeat a Soviet attack.

e. In enemy offensive operations, success is gaged in relation to the cost imposed on attacking forces. The enemy commander might accept a 70 percent attrition level if he is deep in the enemy defensive area and believes that he can still achieve his subsequent objective. Conversely, a 30 percent attrition level sustained in the early stages of an attack may be unacceptable enough to cause the enemy commander to break off the attack, withdraw and go elsewhere, or seek reinforcement to reengage later. The US response must be to make each kilometer of advance too costly for the enemy or to so disrupt his operations as to collapse his ability to continue to operate.

2-3. Limitations.

a. The corps commander must receive NATO approval prior to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

b. First use of chemical weapons has been denied by the National Command Authority. The corps commander must also obtain national and NATO approval prior to initiation of chemical warfare.

2-4. Operational concept.

a. When conducting combat operations, it is necessary to think in terms of the time and space necessary to defeat enemy forces in contact before it becomes necessary to directly engage those which follow. The battlefield, then, can be viewed in terms of areas: one in which we must exert influence immediately; the other which is of interest because enemy forces there can threaten operations at a future time. Areas of influence and interest are significant because they generate, in general terms, commanders' information requirements.

(1) Area of influence. That part of the battlefield where targets must be acquired and fire brought to bear against enemy forces by weapons under the commander's direction is called an area of influence. As a general rule, each echelon of command plans for operations within its area of influence. General guidelines of areas of influence are as follows:

Level of Command	Time	Approximate Distance Beyond Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)
Battalion	0-3 hrs	5 km
Brigade	0-12 hrs	15 km
Division	0-24 hrs	70 km
Corps	0-72 hrs	150 km
EAC	72+ hrs	150+ km

When enemy forces in the area of influence are a threat to a subordinate commander's operations, but beyond his means to attack, he must seek assistance from his superior commander.

(2) Area of interest. Beyond the area of influence is an area in which there are enemy forces capable of affecting future operations. This is called an area of interest. Guidelines for areas of interest are as follows:

Level of Command	Approximate Time Beyond FLOT	Approximate Distance Beyond FLOT
Battalion	0-12 hrs	15 km
Brigade	0-24 hrs	70 km
Division	0-72 hrs	150 km
Corps	0-96 hrs	300 km
EAC	96+ hrs	Out to 1000 km

b. Whether attacking or defending, each echelon of command must create for its major subordinate echelons the time and space necessary for those echelons to defeat enemy forces in contact before it becomes necessary to engage those not yet in contact. This is done by attacking deeper enemy echelons in order to delay, disrupt, and destroy those echelons before they can affect the operations of subordinates. For example, the division may interdict deeper enemy regiments while its brigades fight assaulting enemy regiments or defending enemy battalions; corps may interdict deeper enemy divisions while the division fights assaulting enemy divisions or defending enemy regiments. The subordinate commander may request that the superior commander take specific measures against deeper enemy forces, normally in the subordinate's area of interest. When this is the case, the subordinate commander should also specify what he wants done to the enemy formation--delayed for a specific time, canalized along a specific avenue of approach, or defeated in a specific area.

c. The corps plans and allocates resources for operations up to 72 hours in the future. Enemy forces which can affect corps operations generally are found within about 150 kilometers of the forward line of own troops. Corps generally conducts offensive operations by massing fires or forces against enemy flanks, gaps, or rear; by seeking to avoid enemy strength; by going against enemy weak areas; and by using economy of force in areas from which forces have been drawn in order to mass. Divisions normally attack first- and second-echelon defenses. Corps plan operations against deeper defensive echelons, reserves, and reinforcing forces. Whereas divisions normally defend against assaulting enemy divisions, corps interdicts second-echelon enemy divisions of first-echelon enemy armies to disrupt and delay those forces before they can join the battle. The corps directs the air-land battle and provides security for the rear area. The corps integrates national/Allied/Air Force sensor inputs, develops and disseminates combat information and intelligence, and sustains and reconstitutes forces operating with the corps. The corps works with host nation civil and paramilitary support structures.

(1) When defending, the corps conducts operations to destroy assaulting enemy echelons; simultaneously, operations are conducted to break up the mass, slow forward momentum, and disrupt the enemy's ability to conduct continuous operations so that assaulting enemy echelons can be defeated before they are joined by follow-on echelons.

(2) When attacking, the corps conducts operations to destroy or bypass forward enemy defenses; to move rapidly into the enemy rear where soft targets--command, control, and logistics installations--can be found and destroyed. Simultaneous operations are conducted to find and attack reserves positioned in depth before they can join the battle.

(3) Forces are positioned on the ground so that conventional operations are not disrupted if either side should use nuclear or chemical weapons.

(a) Defending commanders select positions which offer the best compromise between protection from the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons and the need to mass weapons against a conventional attack. Units are dispersed in depth. Terrain is used to the best advantage to reduce the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons.

(b) Attacking commanders infiltrate units, moving over multiple routes to the objective area. Once in the objective area, they are concentrated to seize an objective or destroy the enemy. Following success, they disperse and again move over multiple routes deeper into the enemy rear.

(4) The planning, coordination, and employment of nuclear and chemical weapons are integrated with maneuver. Nuclear weapons are used by defending forces to disrupt and destroy follow-on echelons to create the time and space for maneuver against assaulting echelons. Enemy second echelon divisions disrupted by nuclear weapons must take time to reorganize and reestablish control over subordinate units before continuing to attack. During this period, defending forces maneuver to the flanks and rear of the assaulting division and attack to collapse its ability to conduct combat operations. Nuclear weapons can also be used against first-echelon divisions as an economy of force measure in order to mass forces for an attack elsewhere.

(a) Attacking forces use nuclear weapons against defending enemy first-echelon divisions to create and extend gaps through which they can maneuver into enemy rear areas. Delivery systems accompany the attacking force. Nuclear weapons are also used to destroy enemy divisional reserves before they can influence the battle. Attacking units exploit the effects of nuclear weapons by leaving a small force to engage the flanks and rear of an enemy force while a larger force continues the attack.

(b) Nuclear weapons can also be used to rubble selected areas in order to restrict enemy movement, or to disrupt enemy electronic operations with bursts calculated to energize the effects of EMP.

(c) Chemical weapons are used to attrite and degrade first echelon forces. They are primarily employed to interdict second echelon forces and for deep interdiction against enemy command and control centers, logistical support activities, etc. They are used to deny rapid movement of enemy forces through a designated area. Chemical weapons can be employed in selected areas to canalize attacking enemy forces into locations where the defender can maneuver against the enemy or where nuclear weapons can be used. Chemical weapons can also be used to interrupt selected enemy avenues of approach into the defensive area.

(d) Chemical weapons can be used by attacking forces to deny selected areas to the enemy--for example, chokepoints along avenues of approach for enemy divisional counterattack forces and favorable locations for artillery positions. They are also used to neutralize enemy positions through which friendly forces will attack.

d. To conduct combat operations, 10 battlefield tasks must be accomplished by the corps. They are:

(1) Air defense: Destroying, nullifying, or reducing the effectiveness of enemy air assets including fixed-wing, aircraft, helicopters, and missiles. Included are maneuver, target acquisition, target processing, target attack, and target attack assessment.

(2) Battle support: Providing to committed forces those supplies and services necessary to conduct combat operations. Included are resupply of ammunition and POL, medical services, graves registration, battlefield recovery and repair, and control of these activities.

(3) Command control and communications: Timely command decision-making by analyzing information, assessing the situation, insuring accurate information distribution, and directing and controlling the force during combat operations. Included are monitoring the enemy and friendly situation, planning and replanning, estimating, deciding, and providing for operations security.

(4) Counterfire: Suppressing, neutralizing, or destroying, by means of friendly indirect fire and electronic measures, Threat indirect fire systems which are capable of firing their primary weapons on friendly forces. Targets include enemy mortar, cannon, missile and rocket, air defense, and associated command control, target acquisition, and support systems. Counterfire operations include maneuver, target acquisition, battle control, target processing, target attack, and target attack assessment.

(5) Force movement: Preparing for and executing the rapid movement of troops and supplies about the battlefield to concentrate combat power at critical times and places. Operations include coordination, planning, movement, and control.

(6) Interdiction: Disrupting, neutralizing, and destroying Threat forces beyond line of sight not capable of firing their primary weapon systems on friendly forces, and other Threat forces not directly participating in the direct fire battle. Targets include first-echelon units not directly participating in the direct battle, second-echelon regiments, and other second-echelon units. Operations include maneuver, receiving target information, battle control, target processing, target attack, and target attack assessment.

(7) Intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (ISTA): Gathering and providing timely information regarding disposition and intent of Threat forces with respect to the command decisionmaking process and directly to specific users. Integral to the ISTA task is the function of managing intelligence assets and conducting counter C3 operations. Operations include target development, situation development, weather and terrain analysis, and dissemination of timely information.

(8) Mobility, countermobility, and survivability: The task of altering the battlefield--terrain and atmosphere--to enhance survivability, to impede enemy movement, and to enhance friendly movement. Operations include position fortification, decontamination, emplacement of barriers and obstacles, and overcoming natural and manmade obstacles.

(9) Reconstitution: The task of timely reconstitution of the force in terms of people, organizations, command structure, and materiel. Operations include resupply of all classes of supply, evacuation, recovery/maintenance, health services, personnel management, sustaining services, and those extraordinary measures taken to quickly restore a depleted unit to an acceptable level of combat effectiveness by critical personnel replacement.

(10) Target servicing: The task of neutralizing and/or destroying Threat forces within line of sight which are capable of firing their primary weapon systems on friendly forces. Targets include tanks, combat vehicles, ATGMs, and dismounted infantry. Operations include maneuver, target acquisition, battle control, target processing, target attack, and target attack assessment. Implied is the requirement to secure and hold terrain when necessary to service targets. Target servicing may also include the employment of supporting weapons such as mortars, field artillery, tactical aircraft, and electronic jammers as they contribute to the direct fire battle.

e. In the following appendixes, operational concepts for accomplishing each of these tasks are described in detail.

APPENDIX A

COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C^3) OF COMBAT OPERATIONS

A-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for command control of combat operations by a corps on the 1986 battlefield.

a. To defeat an enemy, the heavy division must destroy enemy first-echelon assaulting or defending forces by fire and maneuver. To provide the time and space necessary to destroy enemy first-line forces, enemy follow-on forces must simultaneously be delayed and disrupted by fire or maneuver or both. At every opportunity, divisional forces attack enemy follow-on forces to disrupt their efforts to join with and become part of or to support the assault force.

b. To fulfill this aim, the heavy division must have a command control system. The system coordinates maneuver forces, fire support, intelligence, air defense, combat support, combat service support, and USAF offensive air support operations.

A-2. Limitations. None.

A-3. Operational concept.

a. Command control is the process of directing and controlling the behavior of others in order to attain an objective; it includes employment of the physical means involved--the communications, control centers, information-gathering systems, and the staffs and facilities necessary to gather and analyze information, plan for what is to be done, and supervise the execution of what has been ordered. The unique character of command control of military operations is that it must be effective under the extraordinary stress of battle. More often than not command control in battle must be accomplished under extreme stress, in situations which are obscure, in compressed time, and under the psychological and emotional stress of having suffered personnel and materiel losses. In order to win, US Army forces must gain and maintain the initiative, creating opportunities for decisive action which will lead to the collapse of the enemy's fighting ability. This process will probably take the form of initial operations which are predominantly defensive but which involve an ever-increasing element of offensive action intended to force the enemy into a reactive posture, and will escalate to a decisive offensive thrust. During both defensive and offensive phases, it is essential that commanders at each level provide their subordinate commanders with sufficient space and time to defeat enemy forces with which they are engaged. In order to do this, each commander must use available firepower

and, when feasible, maneuver forces to prevent enemy follow-on echelons from closing into the direct fire battle except at places and times consistent with friendly capabilities.

b. The corps command control system consists of organizations, processes, procedures, and facilities that enable the commander and his staff to:

Know what resources are available

Find out what is going on

Decide what to do about it

Issue the necessary instructions to get it done

Keep track of how well the instructions are being carried out

(1) The corps C^3 system supports the commander's decisionmaking process, providing him with the capability to evaluate the current situation and a projection of the outcome, then comparing the outcome against his desired state. If the result of the comparison is a shortfall, the commander then, based on the friendly situation, will identify the alternatives available to him--a combination of some or all of the following: attack by fire, maneuver, reallocation of support, or adjustment of reconstitution priorities.

(2) The corps C^3 system must support the commander in influencing all enemy forces capable of entering the battle within 72 hours in an area extending 150 km beyond the FLOT. The corps area of interest extends as far as 300 km beyond the FLOT. In this area are found the forces that can affect future operations.

(3) The corps is the principal headquarters for nuclear fire planning. Planning is continuous and target-oriented. Necessary selective employment plans are developed to optimize the results of strikes against time-sensitive targets.

(4) Integration of the air-land forces is done through corps.

(5) Corps airspace management is handled by the corps airspace management element under the supervision of the corps G3 and consists of representations from the corps air defense artillery, aviation units and air traffic control personnel from echelons above corps.

(6) Liaison with Allied forces must be provided for. Liaison parties must be provided with secure communications equipment and vehicles and be language qualified.

c. The corps commander commands operations against the enemy main effort. At the same time, he directs the interdiction battle against follow-on enemy forces, handing off those forces to divisional commanders as they close and become part of the divisional battle.

(1) The corps commander locates himself where he can best direct corps operations. This may be at a corps tactical command post or at the corps main command post. If a corps tactical command post is used, staff assistance-intelligence, operations, fire support--necessary to make assessments, issue instructions, and follow the battle must also be located there.

(2) The corps commander has a deputy who represents the corps commander in matters of command authority and responsibility when the corps commander is not available. While his specific command control functions may vary from time to time, generally he should be made responsible for operation of the corps command post system, for rear area security, and for those essential corps links with critical support elements outside the corps--air support, intelligence support, and logistical support.

(3) The corps chief of staff directs and coordinates all staff activities; he is the commander's principal advisor. Generally, he directs the day-to-day work of the corps main command post and its tactical operations center. The corps general staff sections--G1 through G5--execute the tasks unique to their specified areas of responsibility as directed by the chief of staff. They plan necessary command control measures in their functional areas, prepare orders or contributions to orders, and supervise the execution of orders on behalf of their commander. Chiefs of these sections may report directly to the corps commander. When they do the chief of staff must be appropriately informed beforehand, or, if this is not possible, immediately afterward. Rear area combat operations are directed by the deputy corps commander, and are planned and coordinated by the RACO under the direction and control of the G3 rear.

d. Control of the corps is accomplished through corps command posts. Command post functions are generally grouped into those which relate to directing the battle and those required for sustaining the force. Normally, three command posts are established: the tactical command post from which the commander directs the battle; the main command post containing the staff elements that permit the commander to see the battle, allocate resources, control the follow-on echelon battle, plan future battles, and position combat service support; and the rear command post element which is concerned with sustaining the force and reconstitution. An alternate corps command post will be established at corps artillery headquarters.

(1) Survivability. Survivability must be a major feature of the corps C^3 system. The survivability options available to the corps command posts are:

(a) Concealment.

(b) Reduced size and signature.

(c) Duplication of functions.

(d) Wide dispersion.

(e) Hardening.

Combining several of these options can significantly improve survivability. In addition to concealment through masking of the command post communications, survivability of the command post will be signficantly enhanced by employing both duplication and dispersion. For this reason, the command post configuration that follows is a dispersed one. To provide a measure of survivability, the corps and main command posts will be organized functionally into cells--redundant cells and, as required, major cells which will be further broken down into subcells. A minimum distance of 500 meters must be maintained between cells to insure survivability against current nonnuclear devices. There should be 5- to 8-km distance between redundant cells. Added survivability can be achieved by making use of existing buildings that further aid in masking actual command post locations. The cellular command post concept provides the corps commander with a degree of flexibility not previously available. the commander may, at his discretion, mass the various cells into the more traditional command post configuration and establish a TAC CP based on the perceived degree of the threat and situation.

(2) Corps command post configuration. During all combat operations, the corps C^2 apparatus will be organized into the following cells:

(a) Command cell. The decisionmaking cell will consist of the corps commander and representatives from the G2, G3, and special staff as desired by the commander. it will be 100-percent mobile and capable of communicating with other cells and corps combat forces.

(b) Alternative command cell. This cell, with the deputy commander, will duplicate the command cell in both function and personnel. For survivability, this cell will not be located closer than 15 km from the command cell or 10 km from any other major US or Allied unit. In addition to monitoring the current status of thE CLOSE-in battle and follow-on echelon battle, the deputy commander will manage rear area operations.

(c) Current operations cell. This cell will consist of those elements necessary to provide the commander with control of the direct fire battle. To achieve desired dispersion and resiliency, the current operations cell should be split into two smaller cells, each working one 12-hour shift.

(d) Battle coordination cell. This cell maintains a current and projected view of the whole battle, continually updating proposals to the commander for the execution of future battles. The personnel who make up this cell will be assigned to the corps G3 section and have those disciplines necessary to provide expertise in operations, intelligence, fire support, air defense, electronic warfare, logistic support, mobility/countermobility, Air Force liaison, and special staff support as desired by the commander. Again, there will be two subcells, each working a 12-hour shift.

(e) Operations support cell. This cell coordinates support of the current direct fire battle and directs the follow-on echelon battles; develops and disseminates commanders' FRAGORDS, and allocates resources to affect the favorable outcome of the current battle. Again, there are two subcells.

(f) Intelligence cells. These cells will contain the ASAC and will receive, process, fuse, and pass on intelligence information to the command cells, current operations cells, operations support cells, and battle coordination cell.

(g) Fire support cell. This cell consists of two elements; targeting and operations. Integral to both elements are representatives of all fire support means supporting the force. (Offensive electronic warfare, air force, ANGLICO and field artillery.) The fire support cell is capable of:

Performing target analysis

Integrating fire planning

Coordinating other fire support systems such as close air support/ offensive air support

This cell must support the corps cellular command post and be capable of providing simultaneous direct assistance to the current operations cell and operations support cell. The fire support cell will be required to provide, as required, a small subcell which can displace at the direction of the corps commander and become part of the corps tactical command post.

(3) Intracommand post communication. In addition to the battlefield display available to the commander through the automated C system, personal interaction between the corps commander and major staff elements

will be accomplished using a closed circuit television (CCTV) system. The CCTV system will be supported by new emerging communications (radio and automatic digital switching) equipment. This equipment has the capability required to transmit high-density digital traffic to include transmission of a video signal. A CCTV camera and monitor will be available to each of the corps CP cells, thereby providing a visual as well as audio exchange of battlefield information. The availability of a video exchange with the commander limits the requirement for exposure to chemical agents by virtually eliminating the need to travel between staff sections.

e. Corps communication will be provided by a Corps Signal Brigade structured to provide required command and control communications for combat, combat support and combat service support units found in a type 3 2/3 Division Corps Sector.

(1) The communication system will be capable of providing the commander:

(a) Timely info.

(b) Means for staff coordination.

(c) Means of passing guidance and orders to subordinate commanders.

(d) Electronic countermeasure resistant system.

(e) Redundancy to accept damage and continue to operate. Redundancy will be achieved by the use of state-of-the-art equipment consisting of:

1. Automatic circuit and message switching of telecommunications.

2. SINCGARS radios equipped with COMSEC device.

3. Single channel TAC SAT.

4. Tactical Record Traffic Facsimile.

(2) Communication with Allied/NATO organizations will be established through the use of the NATO interface unit. This equipment will provide the interface for the corps communications into the allied/NATO system. Communication liaison teams from the corps Signal Brigade equipped with improved high frequency and SINCGARS radios will enhance the capability of the interface equipment.

(3) Communication with subordinate divisions and other units will be established by direct multichannel TACSAT links on the corps command system, by multichannel terrestrial, links on the corps area system and through the single channel TACSAT and HF command net. The corps commander will also have a FM link to the divisions. The interface with the EAC (US) will be established by providing a link up capability between the corps area signal system and the EAC area system. Additional communication will be available to corps HQ through the EAC command net.

f. The corps G5 exercises staff responsibility for civil-military operations in support of corps operations. Corps and smaller units are enabled to conduct civil-military operations as follows:

(1) The corps ability to conduct various civil-military operations is derived by tailoring capabilities to meet the local tactical and socio-political requirements. The tailoring is accomplished by the assignment of Civil Affairs (CA) individuals or teams that possess those specialties needed. These CA elements operate on a command support basis. They operate by coordinating with local agencies or persons to accomplish the following functions:

(a) Identify local resources and facilities available to support US operations.

(b) Coordinate needs for the acquire local resources, facilities and support from local agencies and or persons.

(c) Minimize interference by the civilian populace in military operations.

(d) Assist the commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the civilian populace.

(e) Provide support to local governmental agencies.

(2) Divisions, separate brigades, and group level organizations are provided integral CA assets that provide dedicated command support for conduct of civil-military operations.

g. Military police provide both area and functional support as follows:

(1) Circulation control of vehicles and personnel.

(2) Tactical and physical security.

(3) Evacuation and control of enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees.

(4) Rear area combat operations (RACO).

(5) Pretrial detention of US military prisoners.

(6) Law enforcement and criminal investigations.

(7) Route and area reconnaissance/surveillance.

The size and composition of the military police structure are determined by the number of divisions supported, the geographical size of the corps--particularly the corps rear area--the main supply routes, and the population contained in the corps area, both US and host nation.

APPENDIX B

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND TARGET ACQUISITION

B-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth the operational concept for intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (ISTA) for the corps on the 1986 battlefield.

B-2. General.

a. The corps plans and allocates resources for operations up to 72 hours in the future. The defending corps commander directs, coordinates, and supports operations conducted by its divisions against assaulting enemy divisions. The corps interdicts second-echelon enemy divisions to disrupt and delay those forces before they can join the battle. The attacking corps commander directs, coordinates, and supports operations conducted by its divisions against enemy regiments. The corps interdicts combat and combat support forces positioned in depth that can affect the operations of its divisions. Such forces generally are found in the corps area of influence or within 150 km of the FLOT. In order to plan for future operations, the corps commander needs intelligence about additional enemy forces that can close on the operational area within 96 hours. Such forces generally are in the corps area of interest or within 300 km of the FLOT.

b. To be successful, the corps must have information about the enemy: his strengths, locations, direction of attack or area selected for defense, and his ability to conduct combat operations. Generally, two categories of information important to combat commanders are:

(1) Combat information: Raw data which can be passed directly to combat and combat support units to be used for fire and maneuver, without interpretation, analysis, or integration with other data.

(2) Intelligence: Data which requires some form of validation, integration, and comparison with other data or analysis before it can be used or fully exploited.

Combat information, even though used information, may still be of vital importance as intelligence. In such a case, the same data can be both information and intelligence, but in sequence. Intelligence-collection systems acquire a great deal of combat information which the commander must have immediate access to for combat action. Commanders must insure that intelligence-collection systems rapidly provide combat information to those who need it. At the same time, it is input for processing.

c. To accomplish his mission, the corps commander needs a system which can develop rapid and accurate targeting information and intelligence on enemy forces within his area of influence. The system must also be able to interface with adjacent and Allied units, EAC, and national systems to track and project enemy movement throughout the commander's area of interest. Additionally, the corps system must be capable of augmenting the ISTA capabilities of the divisions and other corps troops to weight the attack/defense or to cover the corps area when divisions are unable to perform their ISTA mission.

B-3. Limitations. None.

B-4. Operational concept.

a. General. Direction of tactical intelligence operations begins with the combat commander. Each commander needs information about enemy forces that can influence his operations. Commanders also plan the attack against those enemy forces. Tactical intelligence, therefore, must satisfy the requirements of commanders at several echelons.

b. Areas of influence and interest. Commanders normally think in terms of time and space necessary to defeat or bypass an enemy force before others can reinforce. Commanders then view the battlefield in terms of areas: one in which they must exert influence immediately and another which is of interest because enemy forces there can affect future operations. Areas of influence and interest are significant because they generate, in general terms, commanders' information requirements.

(1) An area of influence is that part of the battlefield where a commander must be able to acquire targets and attack enemy forces with weapons under his direction. These include organic direct and indirect fire weapons and jammers, as well as weapons and jammers from higher echelons and other Services which may be under the direction of a specific commander. As a general rule, each echelon of command plans for operations within its area of influence. Normally, any force that can affect operations within 3 hours is of concern to battalion commanders; within 12 hours, brigade commanders; within 24 hours, division commanders; and within 72 hours, corps commanders. The following provides guidelines for areas of influence:

Level of Command	Approximate Time Beyond FLOT	Approximate Distance Beyond FLOT
Bn	0-3 hrs	5 km
Bde	0-12 hrs	15 km
Div	0-24 hrs	70 km
Corps	0-72 hrs	150 km
EAC	72+ hrs	150+ km

(2) An area of interest is that part of the battlefield which extends beyond the area of influence, in depth and width, to include areas in which enemy forces capable of affecting a commander's future operations are found. Information about forces in the area of interest, beyond the area of influence, is generally used for planning future operations. Each echelon of command receives information about enemy forces in its area of interest primarily from its next superior command. This information also may be produced by other Services, other Army commands, and national agencies. The following provides guidelines for areas of interest.

Level of Command	Approximate Time Beyond FLOT	Approximate Distance Beyond FLOT
Bn	0-12 hrs	15 km
Bde	0-24 hrs	70 km
Div	0-72 hrs	150 km
Corps	0-96 hrs	300 km
EAC	96+ hrs	Out to 1,000 km

(3) During combat operations, areas of influence and interest will vary--they depend on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available. They will also vary depending on the mobility of friendly and enemy forces.

(4) As a general rule, information about activity in an area of influence must be provided to a user in real time as much as possible. The definition of real time may vary with the factors of mission, enemy, and terrain, and with the echelon of command requiring the information. For example, companies and battalions generally need combat information about activity in their area of influence in minutes; brigade, perhaps

within 15-30 minutes; division, within an hour. Information about activity in an area of interest, beyond the area of influence, must be provided in time to plan for future operations.

(5) Echelons of command responsible for operations in areas of influence are also responsible for finding, targeting, following, and reporting on enemy forces there. Each command uses organic resources to collect information, and using information from all available sources, produces intelligence assessments, develops targets, and makes reports.

c. Corps. The corps is generally the first level of command where information from national and tactical systems is brought together.

(1) In their areas of influence, corps commanders need locations of enemy divisional and Army command posts, nuclear and chemical delivery systems, radio-electronic combat units, logistics installations, communications, and frontal aviation operations centers. Corps gets this information from:

Subordinate divisions
Corps cavalry
Corps electronic warfare intelligence units
Corps air defense groups
Adjacent corps
Tactical air reconnaissance
Echelons above corps (EAC)--to include national systems

(a) Information collected by corps is provided to its divisions, adjacent corps, and echelons above corps. Corps integrates information from all sources to plan operations against enemy forces in its area of influence.

(b) A corps needs to know generally what enemy forces are in its area of interest, beyond its area of influence, where they are going, and when they are expected to enter the corps area of influence. This intelligence is provided by echelons above corps, to include national systems.

(2) Corps must rely on EAC, Air Force, and national levels capable of developing intelligence to depths of 300 km forward of the FLOT. The corps provides to the division, on a force-fed basis, combat information and intelligence relating to the division's area of interest and coordinates the tasking of EAC, USAF, and national systems to satisfy division essential elements of information (EEI). The division must also provide combat information and intelligence to corps based on the corps commander's EEI.

(3) ISTA operations include:

(a) Intelligence preparation of the battlefield: The continuous process of developing a comprehensive and complete data base of terrain, weather, and enemy information. This information is integrated and analyzed prior to hostilities to increase the accuracy and timeliness and assist in the deployment of ISTA collection assets.

(b) Target development: The process of providing direct and correlated targeting information which meets the commander's target selection standards. It involves cueing ISTA assets to provide accurate and timely detection, identification, and location of enemy activity in sufficient detail for effective attack. Targeting information is provided immediately to the fire support system based on the dynamic parameters established by the corps commander.

(c) Situation development: The process that provides information/ intelligence which enables the corps commander to see the battlefield in sufficient time and detail to generate the appropriate force and fire support at the right time and place. This also includes the details of the environment (weather and terrain) and the projection of enemy intentions based on the evaluation of information from all sources.

(d) Collector management: Dynamic collector management insures continuity of operations while enhancing sensor survivability. Through a centralized management and control mechanism, ISTA collectors will interface with and complement collectors of adjacent corps, EAC, Air Force, and national systems.

(e) Electronic warfare: Corps must have the capability to jam enemy targets within 150 km of the FLOT. As directed by SOP and the corps C^3 system, a corps control mechanism will direct jamming operations in the corps area to insure the integration of jamming with fire support and maneuver. Coordinated employment of jamming, artillery, and air support will help the corps commander achieve the goal of disrupting or neutralizing 50 percent of the enemy's critical C^2 systems.

(f) Operation security (OPSEC) support: OPSEC support provides the commander with the ability to see himself through the eyes of the enemy commander. It includes maintaining a current data base on enemy intelligence capabilities and friendly unit high-value targets, patterns, and profiles; identifying friendly vulnerabilities as seen by the enemy collection system; recommending countermeasures; and providing support for deception planning and for rear area combat operations.

(g) Counter C^3: The integrated use of operations security, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction to deny information to the enemy so as to influence, degrade, or destroy his C^3 capabilities.

The ISTA elements at corps are an integral part of the Army ISTA system which encompasses interoperating ISTA elements from division level to the National Command Authority. Although each corps requires an ISTA capability, not every corps will be equipped with the same numbers and types of sensors. The corps ISTA capability should provide a dedicated command and control package; air/ground sensor mixes; air/ground jammers, an automated combat information system for correlation and dissemination of data from all sources; and elements to interface with adjacent corps, EAC, and national, Allied, and other Service systems.

APPENDIX C

TARGET SERVICING

C-1. Purpose.

a. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for servicing targets by a corps on the 1986 battlefield.

b. Target servicing is the task of neutralizing or destroying Threat forces within line of sight which are capable of firing their primary weapon systems on friendly forces. To do this, it is necessary to acquire and develop targets, maneuver to attack those targets, or bypass enemy forces in order to attack deeper targets. From time to time, it will be necessary to seize and hold terrain in order to attack enemy targets.

C-2. Limitations. None.

C-3. Operational concept.

a. Enemy targets may be attacked by fire or electronic means--jamming--from both air and ground delivery systems. The corps gets USAF close air support sorties from echelons above corps--normally the theater air component. USAF fighter bombers may be employed alone or together with US Army attack helicopters. When the latter method is used, the weaknesses of one system are offset by the strengths of the other. In order to employ close air support, enemy air defense systems are suppressed by fire or electronic means using divisional systems. Suppression of enemy air defense is further described in Appendix E, Interdiction.

b. When defending, the battlefield is organized into a covering force area, a main battle area, and a rear area. The covering force area begins at the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The forces operating in this area are the first echelon of defense. They are normally controlled by corps. The division provides forces to the corps for covering force operations. When circumstances do not permit corps control of covering forces, the division controls them. Covering forces are organized around armor and antitank systems, ground and air. They fight to destroy as much of the enemy forward of the main battle area as possible. As this occurs, the enemy should reveal the location and direction of his main effort. Tanks, infantry carriers, and air defense systems are principal targets.

c. Forces in the main battle area are the second echelon of defense. If the covering forces are forced rearward, they join main battle area forces after necessary reconstitution. Forces in the main battle area then concentrate against the main effort, and fight to destroy the attacker or cause him to break off his attack, they also strive to create conditions favorable to attacking the enemy. Principal targets are the same as for covering force operations.

d. Once the defender has taken the initiative, he moves to attack and to get into the enemy rear to collapse the enemy's ability to conduct combat operations. This can be done by concentrating maneuver and fire at an enemy weak point, breaking through enemy forward units, and exploiting. Once through enemy forces, the corps continues to exploit. As the enemy begins to collapse, pursuit begins without loss of momentum. Command control installations, target acquisition systems, field and air defense artillery, and combat service support units are principal targets.

e. When nuclear and chemical weapons are used units may infiltrate, moving or leapfroging over dispersed routes; concentrate rapidly in the objective area; attack; and then disperse again moving to a new objective. Nuclear fires are used to destroy enemy forces along the attack route, causing casualties without creating residual radiation or obstacles. Artillery moves with the force, firing forward of the advance to open a gap through which attacking forces move. Enemy forces along the flanks are also attacked with nuclear weapons delivered by force artillery. Chemical weapons are used to protect the flanks of the attack, denying routes likely to be used by enemy counterattack forces.

f. Corps command control installations, combat service support, and some combat support are located in the rear area. From time to time, the rear area may be attacked by airborne or airlanded forces, guerrillas, or saboteurs. As a general rule, corps forces found in the rear area organize to defend themselves against such attacks. Some rear area combat operations can be conducted by corps military police. Also, a dedicated rear area combat unit may be found in the corps. When divisional forces are unable to cope with the threat in the division rear area, combat units are provided by the corps for this purpose. When this occurs, corps units may be controlled by corps, or their control maybe passed to divisions. Rear area combat operations (RACO) is further described in Appendix J.

APPENDIX D

COVERING FORCE OPERATIONS

D-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for corps covering force operations on the 1986 battlefield.

D-2. Limitations. None.

D-3. Operational concept.

a. General. A covering force operation provides the main body (in this case, the divisions) with early warning, reaction time, maneuver space, and information about the enemy. It is a tactically self-contained force which operates at a considerable distance from the front, flank, or rear of a moving or stationary force. Its mission is to develop the situation early and defeat the enemy. If the latter is not possible, the covering force deceives, delays, and disorganizes the enemy until the covered force can react effectively. The corps provides and controls a covering force in both offensive and defensive operations.

b. Defense.

(1) The covering force is the initial defensive force. It operates in a covering force area (CFA) that begins along the actual or anticipated line of contact and extends rearward to the forward edge of the main battle area (FEBA). The size of a covering force varies with the terrain, the time available, and the mobility of enemy and defending forces. In a situation in which limited warning of an enemy attack is given and covering forces have little time to occupy or prepare good defensive positions, the operation initially may be like a movement to contact, followed by a meeting engagement. However, as time permits, operations such as improvement of battle positions, positioning of adequate forces, and terrain reinforcement become defensive in nature, differing little from the operations in the main battle area (MBA).

(2) The mission of the covering force is to destroy as much of the attacking enemy as possible. To do this, it must first find the enemy then fight him with sufficient force to cause him to deploy, plan a deliberate attack, and concentrate forces, thus revealing the location and direction of his main effort. As the enemy shifts forces, brings up artillery, and masses for a main attack, he will reveal how strong he is and where he intends to attack. A covering force also seeks to keep the actual location of the main battle area from being known by the enemy. To do this, the covering force may have to fight forward of the main battle

area until a specified time so that MBA preparations can be completed. For such operations, the specified time must be stated, along with other instructions, in the covering force mission.

(3) The covering force takes up the fight as far forward of the MBA as possible--far enough forward to permit forces in the main battle area to concentrate to defeat enemy forces remaining after the covering force fight or cause them to break off their attack. Battalions and squadrons of the covering force fight from a series of coordinated, mutually supporting battle positions. These positions are sited to make maximum use of protection offered by the terrain and to minimize the vulnerability of the defender's weapon systems while maximizing their effectiveness. To the units in the covering force, the battle is very much like the action of any battalion in the MBA. When directed to do so, the covering force hands off the enemy to MBA forces, then moves to a designated area in the MBA and prepares for operations there. Normally, this will be a battle position deeper in the MBA where there will be some time to rearm, refuel, reorganize, and prepare to fight again.

(4) The covering force may be controlled by either the division or the corps. Brigade control will be the exception. The command level used for controlling a covering force generally depends on several factors including the width and depth of the covering force area, the commander's ability to communicate with subordinate units, the number of battalion-size units operating in the covering force area, and the time available. Handoff normally takes place between battalion- and squadron-size units of the covering force and the brigades in the MBA through which they pass. To facilitate handoff and passage of covering forces, control of covering forces passes to MBA brigades some distance forward of the FEBA. The distance varies with terrain, the support capability of field artillery in the MBA, and the readiness of brigade commanders to assume control. Specific passage lanes and other details are coordinated between covering force and MBA units as necessary. Covering forces must retain freedom to maneuver prior to passage of control to MBA brigades. When MBA brigades assume control of the battle, the covering force passes through MBA forces as quickly as possible to minimize the vulnerability of both.

(5) The size and composition of the covering force depend on the mission, enemy, terrain, and forces available. These factors take on added significance and complexity depending on the attack mode chosen by the enemy, the depth of the area available for covering force operations, and the time required by MBA defenders to get set for action. The covering force is normally organized around tank-heavy task forces and regimental cavalry. A covering force operating in front of a division could well consist of up to four or five tank-heavy battalion task forces or regimental cavalry squadrons and attack helicopter, field artillery, air defense, and engineer units. The corps will specify whether the

division is to organize a covering force or whether the corps will do so. When the corps organizes the covering force under its control, the division may provide some forces to corps for that purpose. When the division is responsible for covering force operations, the commander should expect to receive one or two armored cavalry squadrons from corps armored cavalry regiment.

c. Offense:

(1) Advance, flank, or rear covering force. Covering forces to the front, flanks, or rear of the corps have the objective of preventing surprise of the main body of troops as well as protecting attacking units from detection or engagement by Threat security forces attempting to slow or stop the momentum of the attack. To accomplish their mission, covering forces:

(a) Deny the enemy information about the size, strength, composition, and objective of the main body.

(b) Destroy the reconnaissance/security zone forces.

(c) Develop the enemy situation through deception and attacks to prevent effective enemy counterattacks.

A covering force operates with the main body beyond the range of artillery. The distance is a function of the mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available. A reinforced regiment may act as a covering force at a distance as great as 50-60 km from the main body initially. An ACR can act as a covering force without reinforcement, but it is normally reinforced with maneuver, combat support, and combat service support units. Air cavalry conducts zone reconnaissance on a broad front forward of ground cavalry units.

(2) Movement to contact. The purpose of a movement to contact is to gain or regain contact with the enemy and to do so in such a way as to risk the smallest possible part of the force while the remainder is available to respond immediately when contact is made. The covering force for a corps movement to contact is normally the armored cavalry regiment (ACR) reinforced with field and air defense artillery and engineers. Reconnaissance squadrons from the divisions may reinforce the ACR or act as an advance or flank guard for their divisions.

(3) Meeting engagement. A meeting engagement occurs when a moving force makes contact with a moving or stationary enemy force about which it has little or no information. The action ceases to be a meeting engagement when the situation has been developed and other actions are undertaken such as a hasty attack or defense. The primary goal in a meeting engagement is to seize the initiative from the enemy. The

covering force commander must determine as quickly as possible whether the enemy can be bypassed or must be attacked and destroyed. Bypassed forces must be reported to the next higher headquarters. If an attack is to be conducted, it may be hasty or deliberate depending on the information available on the enemy forces in contact.

APPENDIX E

INTERDICTION

E-1. Purpose.

a. This appendix sets forth the operational concept for interdiction operations conducted by a corps on the 1986 battlefield.

b. The interdiction threat will consist of a variety of targets ranging from soft targets such as trucks to more hardened targets such as tanks.

E-2. Limitations. None.

E-3. Operational concept.

a. Second-echelon forces that can affect operations within 72 hours are of concern to the corps. When the corps is defending, such forces are normally second-echelon divisions of first-echelon armies; when the corps is attacking, such forces are normally second-echelon divisions. The purpose of attacking those second-echelon forces is to provide time and space necessary for ground and air forces to defeat assaulting enemy regiments by fire, or to provide an opportunity for ground forces to attack enemy forces by fire and maneuver. Second-echelon forces of interest to the corps commander may be located and tracked by both Army and Air Force intelligence systems. These forces may be attacked by:

(1) Army cannon, rocket, and missile systems.

(2) Battlefield air interdiction (BAI) sorties, as primary missions.

(3) CAS, as alternate missions.

(4) Returning AI sorties, as alternate missions.

(5) Air Force and Army electronic systems.

b. The corps commander determines what it is he wants done to second-echelon forces that can affect his operations--disrupted or delayed for a specific period of time, rendered ineffective, or diverted from their present route to another route more favorable to the corps. When the corps commander is unable to attack sufficient second-echelon targets with weapons under his direction, he passes a request to echelons above corps for assistance.

c. As the battle unfolds, the corps normally retains control of operations against uncommitted enemy ground forces. However, control of operations against these enemy forces may be passed to a subordinate division as those forces are committed against that division. In any event, the corps commander controls operations against the enemy main effort.

d. As a general principle, the weight of the tactical air forces should go to attacking follow-on echelons, once the main attack has been identified. During offensive operations, the weight of tactical air forces should be used against enemy reserves.

e. Requirements for BAI vary with the need to disrupt enemy momentum. BAI operates against enemy momentum in two ways:

(1) By attacks on lines of communication (LOC)--bridges, river crossings, mountain passes, and along routes of advance.

(2) By attacks on maneuver, fire support, logistics, and command control elements in march column or in assembly areas.

f. BAI is jointly planned as the threat of second-echelon divisions of first-echelon armies becomes a concern of the corps commander. He selects targets for attack. The air commander determines the vulnerability of the target to air attack; the sorties required, to include support sorties; and availability of sorties. Attack priorities are established. Immediate BAI requirements may be satisfied by aircraft on ground or airborne alert or by diverting airborne aircraft.

g. Army and Air Force planning and operations elements must be integrated at the corps level to facilitate the planning and execution of air/ground operations in support of the corps. The ground force element provides, interprets, and exchanges information, and coordinates and requests air support. The Air Force element plans and executes immediate and preplanned air support.

h. Requests for support are weighed against the availability of assets. This is done by assessing the danger of a target when compared with other requests. It must be determined at what range (where), when (time and space), how often (number of sorties, rounds of artillery), and with what (air, artillery, or EW) a target should be attacked to provide the desired effect. Poststrike reconnaissance to determine the status of targets after the attack should be planned.

i. In order for US AF fighter bombers and US Army attack helicopters to operate, enemy air defenses must often be suppressed. There are two types of enemy air defense suppression operations: campaign and local.

(1) Campaign operations are planned by the senior Air Force headquarters against enemy air defense systems. These operations are conducted early in a combat operation to destroy or neutralize as many air defense systems as possible. Campaign targets are passed to the corps by echelons above corps (EAC). The corps may engage or pass requirements to its divisions.

(2) Local operations are conducted in support of specific missions--attack helicopters, close air support, battlefield air interdiction, or air interdiction.

The corps, working with USAF liaison personnel, determines air defense suppression requirements in support of close air support or battlefield air interdiction missions flown for the corps. Corps suppresses enemy air defenses with its weapons--fire or electronic. If the corps is unable to meet suppression requirements, assistance is requested from the Air Force. Local requirements in support of air interdiction operations or corps battlefield air interdiction may also be passed to the division by corps.

APPENDIX F

AIR DEFENSE

F-1. Purpose.

a. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for air defense of the corps on the 1986 battlefield.

b. The purpose of corps air defense is to preclude enemy airpower from impeding corps operations. The corps, in coordination with the Air Force, must limit the effectiveness of enemy aircraft and air defense suppression weapons in order to conduct successful operations. The corps must also manage the airspace over the corps area in accordance with agreed procedures.

F-2. Limitations. None.

F-3. Operational concept.

a. General.

(1) Air defenses must restrict enemy airpower from impeding corps operations through the use of both passive and active air defense measures. Passive air defense and hardening, dispersing, and concealing potential targets make targets more difficult to detect and destroy. Active air defense , ground-based firepower, electronic warfare, and airborne platforms destroy aircraft prior to launch or prevent Threat aircraft from reaching their targets and completing their missions by destroying or neutralizing them. Destruction enroute or neutralization requires that aircraft be detected, that timely warning information (location, direction of movement) be passed to the air defense system, and that enemy efforts to suppress the friendly air defenses be degraded or overcome. If aircraft are able to penetrate to their target, target destruction can be totally or partially precluded by use of passive means (smoke, replicas, procedures to control target signature).

(2) The air defense system must pass early warning information. It must attack the enemy with sufficient firepower and electronic means and with a complementary family of weapons so that an attempt to exploit the weaknesses of one air defense system will expose the enemy to the strengths of another. Air defense artillery (ADA) with the corps must identify air targets before the enemy weapons can be employed so that they can be attacked with long-range ADA weapons. Corps air defense artillery is normally integrated and managed centrally to permit rapid and efficient response to a sudden attack and is linked to the joint/combined force air defense system. However, ADA tactical operations are decentralized commensurate with the situation to permit the corps air defense artillery to respond to the needs of the corps.

(3) Air defense of the corps is fundamentally reactive; enemy air operations dictate when and where air defense operations are conducted.

(a) Detection and warning must be conducted continuously throughout the theater and corps. Speed and range of aircraft require that all active air defense units be interconnected to provide adequate warning to elements of the corps.

(b) Threat efforts to degrade air defense effectiveness must be countered by defensive and offensive means.

(c) Prevention of aircraft launch requires interdiction of airfields. As part of the interdiction task, enemy airfields and launch sites must be pretargeted with quick-reaction interdiction systems. Targets are allocated between Air Force assets and field artillery with the corps.

(d) When launched, enemy aircraft should be attacked enroute to their target. These aircraft must be continuously engaged by an interdependent system of active air defense weapons. Defensive counterair operations must begin early. Air defense artillery must be concentrated to defend specified assets against attack from any direction, but may be used in an attrition role when the tactical situation so dictates. The mobility of corps air defense artillery must be commensurate with the mobility of the defended assets and adequate for survival on the battlefield.

(e) Passive measures must be employed against all likely targets. Target characteristics dictate the passive measure used (e.g., smoke can be employed around most targets, but replicas are probably limited to use around fixed assets). To the degree possible, such passive means as smoke should only be employed immediately prior to attack so as to preclude compromise. Early warning is necessary for such air defense means to be successful.

(4) The degree of centralization of air defense operations is a function of the ability of the air defense artillery to react. The ADA commander must be capable of conducting interconnected detection/early warning operations and directing air defense operations. Air defense operations in the corps rear area tend to be more centralized than in the divisional areas because more time is normally available to react. As a minimum, early warning information must be provided to units in forward areas.

b. Echelons above corps (EAC).

(1) The joint or combined force:

(a) Establishes uniform air defense command/control procedures for all levels of command and disseminates them to subordinate elements.

(b) Directs counterair operations to destroy/degrade enemy air capabilities.

(2) EAC support to the corps normally is provided by an ADA group. The number and type of ADA battalions attached to this group will be as required to accomplish the group's tactical mission.

c. Corps.

(1) Corps ADA units are deployed to defend priority assets in the corps rear area, to reinforce divisional ADA, to provide air defense for covering/ screening forces, or to operate in an attrition role when necessary.

(2) The corps manages its airspace and, through the supporting ADA force, disseminates air defense command/control instructions to subordinate elements; it also provides available forces for air defense of corps priority assets. In the absence of organic ADA, the supporting ADA group of EAC provides the latter two services.

d. Division. The division receives air defense command/control instructions from the corps through the TOC. In addition, a second channel is provided through the liaison team provided for HIMAD units operating in or near the divisional area. The division commander may modify air defense command/control procedures to make them more restrictive (but not less restrictive) than those disseminated from higher echelons.

e. Airspace management. The objectives of corps airspace management and air traffic control are to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious use of airspace to provide for efficient support of combat operations.

(1) Friendly aircraft must be able to enter, depart, and move within the corps operational area free of undue restrictions while artillery fires in support of the ground force continue uninterrupted. The tempo and complexity of modern combat rules out a management system that requires complicated or time-consuming coordination. The likelihood of poor or enemy-jammed communications dictates maximum reliance on procedural arrangements.

(2) To meet the requirements of simplicity and flexibility, the airspace management system must operate under a concept of management by exception. Needlessly restrictive procedures or controls are to be avoided. Each Service must be free to operate its aircraft within the theater airspace in accordance with agreed procedures. Aircraft below the coordinating altitude operate in coordination with the appropriate

airspace management element. The boundary between low- and medium-altitude regimes is situation-dependent and can be adjusted. Only when aircraft pass from one regime to another is traffic coordination required.

(3) Joint Air Force and Army airspace management elements at corps and division provide the framework for implementing the system. Generally, Army aircraft operate below coordinating altitudes forward of the division rear boundary. Artillery rounds in flight are not considered a significant danger to aircraft. These weapons are under the control of the ground commander requesting or ordering artillery fires and are coordinated through fire support coordinators and air liaison officers. Conflicts are generally avoided by passing information about major movements or high concentrations of fire--but risks are taken.

APPENDIX G

MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY

G-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for tactical mobility, countermobility, and survivability (MCS) support for the corps on the 1986 battlefield. General engineering operations are also described.

G-2. Limitations. None.

G-3. Operational concept.

a. General. Corps MCS tasks consist of operations necessary to keep the corps tactical forces and logistic support moving, to deny the enemy mobility, and to provide for survival of critical corps assets.

(1) Mobility. The primary purpose of tactical mobility operations is to reduce or negate the effects of natural or manmade obstacles on the movement of maneuver units, weapon systems, and critical supplies. Operations include:

(a) Breaching or removing obstacles bypassed by the divisions.

(b) Conducting deliberate river crossings and performing follow-on bridge repair or replacement.

(c) Repairing and maintaining routes of communication and main supply routes.

(d) Clearing and assisting in military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT).

(2) Countermobility. The purpose of obstacle employment is to enhance the effectiveness of friendly fires, to slow the enemy, and to provide time and space for friendly forces to fire and maneuver. Obstacle employment in the area to the rear of the division is planned and accomplished by the corps, and is integrated with the corps fire plan and the division obstacle plan. Primary obstacles are planned and executed at the lowest possible level. Obstacles are sited to strengthen weapon systems. During offensive operations, they are employed by the corps to strengthen the defense and protect the corps flank. Corps engineer atomic demolition munition (ADM) teams employ and execute ADM missions and may be further allocated down to division. Corps ADM teams are supported by the division in the preparation of command sites, construction of emplacement

sites, and the provision of security. All matters concerning ADM are coordinted through the corps for verification and inclusion in the corps obstacle plan.

(3) Survivability. The purpose of survivability operations is to employ protective positions to improve the survivability and effectiveness of corps forces. Protective positions include natural terrain features as well as manmade structures. The corps provides geographic information to its subordinate units. Corps engineers provide for protection of personnel, systems, and facilities.

b. General engineering. Corps general engineering operations include:

(1) Improving and maintaining essential combat and main supply routes.

(2) Replacing assault or destroyed bridges with tactical bridging, employing combat battalions and corps bridge companies.

(3) Developing forward support airstrips and helipads.

(4) Water production.

(5) Terrain studies

(6) Construction, maintenance, and repair of command/communications facilities and hospitals.

c. Division. Corps also provides general support engineers to augment organic and direct support units in the division area.

APPENDIX H

BATTLE SUPPORT

Section I. GENERAL.

H-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for a corps on the 1986 battlefield. Battle support is provided by both Army and Air Force units. Battle support is performed by divisional combat service support (CSS) units and CSS elements organic to combat battalions and brigades.

H-2. Limitations. None.

H-3. Operational concept.

a. Defense.

(1) Covering force area.

(a) Supply and services. The covering force will carry basic loads of class I operational rations (meal, ready-to-eat), necessary class II and IV, bulk class III, package class III, and class V to sustain itself until resupply can be accomplished. In addition, class III and class V stocks will be pre-positioned in the covering force area (CFA). Emergency resupply will be accomplished by airdrop and/or ground transportation. Graves registration (GRREG) during the covering force operations will be the primary responsibility of the units deployed. Unit commanders are responsible for initial identification, collection, and evacuation of remains. When hasty burials are required, unit commanders will maintain records of such burials and locations. Normally, the support will be provided by the covering force's organic direct support (DS) units (Armored cavalry regiment (ACR)--support squadron; mech/armor--support company). Backup support will be provided by corps support command (COSCOM) supply and service companies and division support command (DISCOM) units.

(b) Medical. Medical support will be provided by organic medical elements through unit aid stations. Medical evacuation within the covering force area will be provided by corps air and ground ambulance units. Evacuation will be from the battlefield and aid stations to other medical facilities farther to the rear. This will be accomplished through a corps clearing company that will be brought forward for additional support.

(c) Transportation. Transportation--both air and ground--will be used for emergency supply of class III and V. Normally, organic vehicles will be used to the maximum extent possible.

(d) Personnel and finance. Except for casualty reporting and strength accounting, normally no other actions will be performed in the covering force area.

(e) Maintenance. Only the functions of battlefield recovery and minimum essential repair will be accomplished by maintenance elements supporting the covering forces. Primarily, organizational-level and limited direct support maintenance will be performd by CF units. The recovery of damaged weapon systems will be performed by unit organizational maintenance elements. These personnel will normally be the first on the scene to provide repair and/or recovery support to inoperable or battle-damaged equipment. Backup organizational-level support will be provided by the supporting DS maintenance element. At predetermined collecting points, support maintenance units and teams perform those rapid turnaround tasks which must be performed to return weapon systems to combat-effective condition. As stocks or repair parts are depleted, increasing emphasis will be placed on cannibalization of unrepairable systems as sources of essential parts. Evacuation will be undertaken only when time and/or assets do not permit repair forward.

(2) Main battle area (MBA).

(a) Supply and services. Combat units rely primarily upon their own organic CSS elements and their DS backup elements for battle support. GS-level CSS organizations (corps) augment the DS level as required. Corps CSS organizations perform in both the DS and GS role to nondivisional combat units and in the GS role to divisional combat units. Corps ammunition units establish ammunition supply points (ASPs) in the division rear areas or immediately to the rear of the division rear boundary to permit divisional and nondivisional units to draw vital stocks during the conduct of the battle. Corps transportation assets are used to transport selected, high-use ammo items from the corps rear, pre-position them forward to the brigades, and configure them as mobile ammunition transfer points (ATP) to shorten the combat unit resupply time. ATP will be maintained by DISCOM, but the transport assets will belong to the corps. Corps aviation will pick up emergency ammunition loads in the corps rear and deliver them directly to the trains of engaged battalions and, in some situations, directly to battalions. Corps petroleum supply units deliver POL supplies (diesel, Mogas, and JP4) to the division rear and, as an exception, to brigade forward support areas and battalion trains areas. Corps ground and aviation transport will be required to maintain division stocks continuously and to meet emergency requirements with deliveries into the battle areas of divisional and nondivisional units. Corps graves registration units receive combat casualties from division and nondivisional units. Corps resupply vehicles backhaul the dead from combat units to corps GRREG collection points where they are processed for further evacuation or for temporary burial as the situation demands. Emphasis will be on identification and minimum processing for

rapid evacuation to more permanent theater or CONUS facilities for final processing. Weapon systems are replaced as described in Section II.

(b) Medical. Organic medical aid personnel provide the initial triage at the aid stations. Corps medical units operate clearing points for corps troops. Additionally, they receive patients evacuated from divisional and nondivisional units. Corps medical facilities hold patients who can be returned to duty within times specified by the theater evacuation and medical regulating policies. Essentially, casualties will be evacuated no farther to the rear than their situations demand or corps treatment facilities require.

(c) Transportation. The critical resupply of ammo (class V) and POL (class III) to units is accomplished through coordination between the materiel management center (MMC) and the movement control center (MCC) to determine priority and mode of transportation. Corps ground or air assets and Air Force assets will be used to resupply POL and ammo to units engaged in the central battle.

(d) Personnel and finance. Most administrative functions are not performed in the main battle area. The only functions that will be performed there are strength accounting and casualty reporting.

(e) Maintenance. Corps maintenance support is normally limited to assistance to organizational and divisional direct support units (DSUs), battlefield recovery and evacuation, and repair of essential weapon systems. Corps GS maintenance support teams are organized to provide commodity-oriented, on-site assistance to divisional and corps units in or near the battle area. Equipped with transportation, tools, and essential repair parts, these teams will work through division and non-divisional maintenance battalions to augment direct support maintenance.

(3) Rear area.

(a) Supply and service. Distribution points are located throughout the corps. For class I, the corps GS base will issue to both divisional and nondivisional DSU. The DSU submit requisitions to the corps MMC which, in turn, send MROs to the GS units. Corps transportation assets deliver the rations to the requesting DSU. For classes II and IV, the corps MMC will direct GS supply units to release materiel to both divisional and nondivisional direct support units. Corps transportation delivers the supplies to the requesting DSUs. The corps petroleum supply units are responsible for providing GS bulk class III to the corps. Bulk fuel is stored as far forward as possible. Requisitions for class III come from the DISCOM's MMC and nondivisional supply DSU to the corps MMC in the form of status reports. The corps MMC directs release of fuel to

the DSU. Corps transportation assets are used to deliver bulk POL to the DSU. All corps units are authorized basic loads of conventional and missile ammunition which enable them to fight for several days until resupplied. Primary corps unit ammunition resupply considerations are positioning, handling, and transportation. The rear area ASP are located as far forward as the situation will allow. This permits easy access for transportation, users, and ammunition handlers. In the corps rear area, all sustaining services will be provided on a routine basis.

(b) Medical. Located in the corps rear area are most of the hospitals of the corps medical units. The medical support provided will be the same as in the main battle area. Dental services, veterinary services, preventive medicine, optometric/optical services, mental health care, and blood bank services are performed on an area basis.

(c) Transportation. Support in the corps rear area consists primarily of routine movement of troops, supplies, and equipment to sustain corps units and other units located in the corps rear. The corps MMC assigns priorities of movement by type of task supported, with emphasis on sustaining combat and combat support units in the corps area.

(d) Personnel and finance. Routine support provided by personnel and administrative and finance organizations is performed in the corps rear area. The personnel unit provides personnel management, personnel actions, and postal services on an area basis. Direct on-site support will be provided to troops through administrative contact teams (ACTs) which will be made up of both personnel and finance specialists.

(e) Maintenance. Maintenance in the rear area is performed by corps DS and GS units on an area basis. Any units situated within the corps may require DS and GS maintenance on a job-order basis. This is accomplished as rapidly as possible, priorities permitting. Such support will focus on essential maintenance for maneuver and RACO units which have a continuing mission within the corps rear area. Recovery of disabled/battle-damaged equipment will be the responsibility of owning units which deliver equipment to collection points. DS maintenance teams from corps DS battalions attempt rapid repair and return to the user at the collecting point. If repairs cannot be made on-site, the DSU will coordinate evacuation of equipment with its parent unit's maintenance base. Work beyond the capability of DS units will be further evacuated to GS units. Supplies and services will be provided based on guidance from corps--balancing the needs of the committed divisions.

Section II. WEAPON SYSTEM REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS (WSRO)

H-4. Purpose. This section sets forth a method of supplying the combat commander with fully operational replacement weapon systems--both combat vehicle and crew.

H-5. Limitations. Although this concept can be applied to other weapon systems, the tank is used as an illustrated example in this paper.

H-6. Definitions. Logisticians use the term "ready for issue" as if it had a clear definition. AR 725-50 defines the term as "Condition Code A." Condition code A is defined as "issuable without qualification." Therefore, "ready for issue" is not a precise term, rather it has different meanings to different people. The result is that a logistician wanting to issue a weapon uses a much more liberal definition of "ready for issue" than the soldier who must use it in combat. For the purposes of this concept, the following definitions apply.

a. Ready for issue weapon--The weapon has been removed from its previous condition of preservation for shipment or storage and made mechanically operable according to current equipment serviceability criteria or other appropriate standards. All ancillary equipment (fire control, machineguns, radio mounts, and radios) is installed. The vehicle has been fueled, and basic issue items (BII) are aboard. There is no ammunition aboard.

b. Ready to fight weapon system--A crewed, ready for issue weapon with ammunition stowed aboard; the weapon has been boresighted and verified.

c. Linkup--The process of joining a ready for issue weapon with a trained crew.

H-7. Operational concept.

a. Weapon system management.

(1) Battalion.

(a) The battalion executive officer directs the flow of replacement weapon systems in the battalion. It is also his job to insure that the maximum number of battalion weapon systems are ready to fight all the time. He does this working with the S1(personnel) and the S4 (logistics). Based on priorities established by the battalion commander, he allocates replacement weapon systems to companies in the battalion.

(b) The situation report, updated by spot reports, provides the battalion commander and staff with the weapon system's status in the companies. Detailed crew and logistics status information is maintained by the S1 and S4, and aggregated by them for use with their staff counterparts at higher levels of command.

(2) Brigade. The brigade headquarters, unlike the battalion and division headquarters, is a tactical headquarters which influences numbers of weapon systems available to subordinate commanders largely through task organization. It is not an administrative headquarters; it does not directly allocate weapon systems to battalions. If, for some reason, it is necessary for the brigade commander to influence weapon system replacement, he does this through his executive officer who acts as a weapon system manager (WSM) for the brigade.

(3) Division. The division manages and allocates weapon systems based on priorities established by the division commander. The division provides replacement weapon systems directly to battalions. Efficient allocation of limited resources is best accomplished by managing weapon components separately. In order to manage weapon systems, a manager and a reporting system are required. A WSM is designated within the division materiel management center (DMMC). The WSM is charged with weapon system management for the division. A personnel warrant officer is assigned to work with the WSM in the DMMC to manage crew replacements. Sections within the DMMC (e.g., property book; maintenance; and class II, IV, and VII) in addition to the adjutant general keep the WSM advised of the status of weapon system components.

(4) Corps. WSRO in the corps is managed in a similar manner for nondivisional units. the WSM and supporting personnel are assigned to the corps MMC. Priorities are established by the corps commander. However, he will normally accept the priorities established by his major nondivisional unit commanders within their own specialized areas. For example, the commander of the armored cavalry regiment would establish priorities for systems issued to his units.

(5) Weapon System Status Report (WESS). The WESS provides, at a glance, unit losses and a summary of how operational weapons and crewmen can be brought together when ready to fight systems are not available to be provided by the division. The quick-fix indicates how one or two components may be able to get entire systems ready to fight. Battalion weapon system status is sent to brigade for information and simultaneously to the division WSM. A consolidated division WESS is forwarded to corps to advise the corps WSM of divisional status. A corps WESS can be used to show weapon system status within the corps for selected systems. Once the corps WSM has determined the status of corps systems, he recommends weapon system allocation within the MMC. The corps WESS is sent to the TA MMC who keeps the DCSLOG and DCSPER apprised of the TA commander's priorities. Report frequency is determined by each commander. The WESS report is used to provide up-to-date status and is not a cumulative report.

b. Weapon system replacement.

(1) Incoming tanks from CONUS are de-processed by a heavy materiel supply company or other suitable unit in the TAACOM or COSCOM. This occurs at or near the port; tanks are then transported to corps or division, where they are made ready for issue.

(2) These tanks stored in pre-positioned war reserve stocks (PWRS) at corps must be at a low level of preservation so that they may be made ready for issue within a few hours, not the several days required to deprocess from level A storage.

(3) Transportation of tanks from theater army to corps is normally by rail. Those shipped to division may be by rail or heavy equipment transporter (HET). Replacement crewmen arrive in theater at the rear of the corps and are transported forward to the division support area by the most expeditious means. Ready to fight weapon systems are normally transported to battalion by HETs. They may be driven under their own power, but this is less desirable. If ready to fight weapon systems are formed at COSCOM, they may travel from corps to division by rail or HET, and are normally transported to battalion by HETs. Here again, they may be driven, but this is not desirable.

(4) The primary linkup point for weapon systems (tank with crew) is in the division support area. the DISCOM commander organizes the linkup point generally with S&T and maintenance battalion elements. The operational readiness float (CRF) platoon of the maintenance battalion can be used to provide people to make the tank ready for issue. The crewmen, working with division personnel, make the tank ready to fight.

(5) Conditions permitting, division should provide time and facilities for crew-weapon familiarization training or checkout in the linkup area. This training should include gunnery, driving, enemy and Allied vehicle identification, air defense procedures, standing operating procedures, and other subjects appropriate to the operational environment. Whenever possible, new crews should be formed using a nucleus of experienced crewmen together with inexperienced replacement crewmen. Training of replacement crews for nondivisional units may be accomplished by corps. It is not intended that wartime training be elaborate; the intent is to familiarize crews with operating conditions in the combat area.

(6) The WSM must coordinate closely with the maintenance management officer of the DMMC to verify the status of tanks being repaired in direct support maintenance units.

(7) WSM must have information about crewmen being treated in medical facilities supporting each level of command. Such information may include the number of crewmen in supporting medical facilities who are expected to be returned to duty in the command and when. Crewmen returned to duty then join other crewmen to form complete crews.

(8) New crewmembers can join a partial tank crew (those whose tanks have been destroyed or evacuated to DS maintenance) at linkup points to form complete crews. There they pick up a replacement tank, make it ready to fight, and rejoin their unit or another unit as directed.

(9) The corps must be prepared to manage linkup in the event the tactical situation precludes linkup in the DSA. Linkup would take place at the heavy materiel supply company or its equivalent.

d. Weapon system managers. Weapon system replacement is managed at each level of command. Weapon system managers should be established at the following levels of command:

(1) Battalion. The XO is presently a weapon system manager who allocates weapon systems to companies based upon the commander's priorities, unit losses, and assets available. He is the data repository for weapon system information.

(2) Brigade. The XO is the data repository for weapon system information. However, because the brigade is a tactical rather than an administrative headquarters, the brigade is normally not involved in allocating weapon systems.

(3) Division. A weapon system manager is required within the DMMC. A personnel warrant officer should be assigned to the WSM from the AG company.

(4) Corps. A weapon system manager is required within the COSCOM MMC. A personnel NCO or warrant officer should be assigned to the WSM from the corps personnel operations center.

APPENDIX I

RECONSTITUTION

I-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for reconstitution of corps forces on the 1986 battlefield. Reconstitution is the task of timely regeneration of the force in terms of people, organizations, command structure, and materiel during and in preparation for battle.

I-2. Limitations. None.

I-3. Operational concept.

a. General. Once a unit becomes ineffective, specific actions must be taken to return it to the desired level of combat effectiveness. Units must rapidly identify the extent, distribution, and specific types of personnel and equipment losses; assess residual combat capabilities; alleviate the most pressing, debilitating effects of attrition; preserve all possible resources; and lay the groundwork for subsequent recommitment, reorganization, or regeneration. Recovery measures include reestablishment of command and control; damage assessment; security procedures; emergency medical procedures; damage control procedures; and battlefield recovery, evacuation, and repair of damaged equipment.

b. Reconstitution.

(1) Covering force area (CFA).

(a) Supply and service. Critical items of class VII will be received in the area in a "ready-to-fight" condition. These items will come from operational-ready float, war reserve, and lower priority units. The weapon system replacement operations (WSRO) system will be used to the maximum extent possible.

(b) Medical. The reconstitution of forward units is partially accomplished through emphasis on the early return of patients to duty. Medical units either partially or totally attrited through combat are the responsibility of the next higher level of health care. Each level is designed to reconstitute, within limitations, the next lower level.

(c) Transportation. During unit regeneration, corps transportation will move units, individuals, supplies, and equipment.

(d) Personnel. WSRO will be used, to the extent possible, with personnel coming from theater, PERSCOM, and those returned from medical channels. Replacements will be provided on a one-for-one basis, in place, to the maximum extent possible.

(e) Maintenance. Maintenance in support of unit regeneration will normally be performed after the CF has passed into the main battle area. The mission of maintenance--both organic, DS and GS--will be to return combat-ready equipment to covering force elements rapidly and in large numbers. This effort will be performed by the combined efforts of organizational, DS, and fix-forward teams of backup corps GS maintenance elements. Commodity- oriented general support battalions located in the corps rear will transport class VII stocks to predetermined unit regeneration sites and will evacuate severely damaged weapon systems requiring extensive repair. Operational readiness float and DX items will be exchanged to the extent practicable with designated priority units to return those units to combat readiness in the shortest possible time. Class IX replenishment in support of unit PLL and DS unit ASL will be accomplished during unit regeneration of CF units. Priority of maintenance support during unit regeneration will always go to primary weapon systems first, then to lesser systems in descending order as time permits.

(2) Main battle area (MBA).

(a) General. Survey teams are organized to determine the requirements of ineffective units. Requirements are passed to division and corps. Reconstitution teams go forward to the ineffective units and assist in making them ready.

(b) Supply and service. The goal of unit regeneration is to get the most combat units back into the battle as quickly as possible. Priorities must be given to units that will, based on potential, contribute to the battle the quickest. This will require swift assessment of need by qualified personnel and exceptional response by corps combat service support organizations. Regarding major weapon systems, the WSRO system of replacement will be used with the replacement items coming from operational float, stocks in corps/TSA, and other lower priority units. The corps CSS organization must be able to rapidly assemble regeneration supplies, personnel, and equipment. It must identify the availability of resources and determine whether to perform the function in the division area or corps forward area based on unit condition and the battlefield situation. Additionally, the CSS organization must possess mobility commensurate with the risk to its elements.

(c) Medical. Medical facilities provide resuscitative/definitive care for patients to insure their earliest possible return to duty; this provides replacements to assist in the reconstitution effort. Reconstitution of medical units either partially or totally attrited through combat is the responsibility of the next higher level of health care. Each level is designed to reconstitute, within its limitations, the next lower level. At the corps level, the treatment units will be organized similar to those of the division medical companies, and will serve to reconstitute or replace divisional units. Wheeled vehicle

ambulances from the corps ambulance companies will replace division-level ambulances sent forward to reconstitute maneuver battalion losses. Reconstitution of division-level tracked vehicles and corps-level assets will take place through the normal supply/replacement channels.

(d) Transportation. Transportation will be concentrated primarily on the movement of class VII critical weapon systems and the personnel to man these systems. Close coordination of these movements is necessary between the MCC, MMC, and the personnel administration center (PAC) of the corps. Backhaul of transportation assets will concentrate on evacuation of disabled critical weapon systems. Heavily attrited units that cannot be regenerated in place will be moved to the rear with corps transportation assets.

(e) Personnel and finance. Efforts here are to replace key personnel, crews, or individual skills to keep units combat effective. Critical personnel resources will come from the replacement systems as well as the medical system. The regeneration of units will require rapid assessment, identification of resources, and priority unit designation of critical corps personnel assets. The WSRO system of replacement will be used.

(f) Maintenance. The mission of corps maintenance units will be to repair and return the maximum number of primary weapon systems to bring the committed force to an acceptable level of combat readiness. This mission will concentrate on mission-essential maintenance only (MEMO), the fix-forward concept, and weapon system priorities as established by senior commanders. Class IX support of this effort will consist of issue of repair parts from repair parts companies in the corps rear to the corps maintenance units and the teams performing regeneration, and will rely on available supported unit stocks for quick-fix. Corps maintenance elements will provide support to the type corps regeneration units involved in WSRO in the MBA. This will be minimal support to include such tasks as deprocessing new equipment, if required, and crew assistance with the installation of fighting components, sights, radios, etc.

(3) Rear area.

(a) Supply and service. Supply units will support the regeneration effort by providing equipment and supplies to outfit attrited units. Whether a unit is regenerated in the rear area or other places in the corps, major weapon systems will be processed and made ready for issue.

(b) Medical. The medical units in the corps rear area will provide unit regeneration support using the same procedures outlined for the main battle area.

(c) Transportation. The corps transportation units deliver new equipment and personnel from rear holding areas and perform backhaul of disabled equipment to corps GS facilities. The priority of support will be given to movement of primary weapon sytems to regenerate the attrited force. As required, corps transportation units will assist in rapid regeneration of RACO forces operating within the corps rear.

(d) Personnel and finance. The personnel replacement system will use the same procedures outlined for the main battle area to regenerate units in the corps rear area.

(e) Maintenance. Corps DS/GS teams will be tailored to repair as many weapon systems as possible in a minimum amount of time. Priority of support will be given primary weapon systems employing mission-essential maintenance only (MEMO). Replenishment of class IX will be made through area support DS maintenance companies to owning unit PLLs on unit requests.

APPENDIX J

REAR AREA COMBAT OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

J-1. Purpose.

a. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for rear area combat operations in the corps on the 1986 battlefield.

b. Rear area combat operations (RACO) may be conducted against an enemy operating in an area from the brigade rear boundary to the corps rear boundary. The threat ranges from individual acts of sabotage to the insertion of enemy airmobile or airborne units of battalion or regimental size. While low-level threats can normally be countered by most units assisted by military police, the threat created by a large enemy force being inserted in the rear area can only be contained or eliminated by a trained combat force.

J-2. Limitations. None.

J-3. Operational concept.

a. General.

(1) Corps rear area combat operations are planned for and coordinated by the rear area operations center (RAOC). Such operations are directed by the corps commander.

(2) The division plans for and coordinates RACO from the brigade to the division rear boundary.

(3) In both the division and corps, base commanders are responsible for their own base defenses.

b. Execution.

(1) Division will plan and direct RACO in the division area of operations (AO) until additional combat power is required.

(2) The corps RAOC will monitor the division's situation, direct RACO in the corps rear area, and coordinate all RACO activities within the corps.

(3) Dedicated combat forces are positioned in key locations, in the vicinity of landing zones or likely objectives, to be readily available for commitment as rapidly as possible.

(4) When the threat is judged to be serious enough, the corps commander will decide when and where to commit combat forces.

(5) If the Threat is located in a division rear area, the corps commander has several options. He can place the dedicated combat force under division control with the provision that the force is only to be used for RACO; he may change divisional boundaries to accommodate the insertion of the combat force; or he may designate a separate operational area within the division for the dedicated combat force.

(6) In the corps rear, an operational area normally is designated.

(7) When the dedicated combat force is joined with other forces of the corps, joined forces fall under the operational control (OPCON) of the dedicated combat force.

(8) The corps commander positions the RAOC to facilitate the unity of planning, coordination, supervision, and execution of RACO. Support teams from the RAOC work with the COSCOM logistical operations control center, area support groups, the dedicated combat force, corps military police, corps engineers, host nation, division rear areas, and elsewhere as required. Support teams are deployed throughout the rear area to advise combat service support commanders on their base defenses. The RAOC plans for the integration of base defenses with the dedicated combat force, engineers, military police, civil affairs, and host nation.

(9) The initial response against a threat in the rear area will normally consist of whatever local forces are available as well as military police. When the threat surpasses the capability of the local force to defeat it, the corps or division commits more forces.

Section II. THREAT TO DIVISION AND CORPS REAR AREAS

J-4. Purpose. This section describes the threat to the rear area.

J-5. General. A major element of Soviet military doctrine is disruption of the opposing force's rear area operations that include, but are not limited to, command and control centers, communications networks, supply facilities, airfields, and reserve echelons. Such disruption may be carried out either deep in the corps rear area in what appear to be independent operations, or immediately behind the main battle area closely coordinated with the initiatives of maneuvering forces. Enemy forces employed in the rear area include airdropped or airlanded conventional units, special operations teams specifically trained for reconnaissance and sabotage, and activated sleeper-agent cells and networks.

J-6. Threat categories. The threat is divided into three levels. The three levels are further subdivided into seven categories. These levels do not occur independently. The fact that incidents, as defined by a certain category, are happening in one location does not mean that the next incident will be one contained in the follow-on category. Therefore, they should not be considered a progression in the intensity of hostilities. The three levels and seven categories are as follows:

a. Level I.

(1) Soviet-controlled agent activity.

(2) Sabotage by Soviet/Warsaw Pact sympathizers.

(3) Activities conducted by terrorist organizations.

b. Level II.

(1) Diversionary operations.

(2) Sabotage and reconnaissance missions of tactical units.

c. Level III.

(1) Airmobile operations.

(2) Airborne insertions.

J-7. Level I activities.

a. Soviet-controlled agent activity. Conservative estimates of the number of agents located in NATO countries, controlled directly or indirectly by the Soviet KGB, range up to 20,000. Espionage, interdiction, and subversion are among the primary missions of these agents. Most of them have a passive role during peacetime, but their activation will be keyed to a buildup in preparations for war. They are scattered from the border provinces back through the theater army. It may be assumed that large numbers of these agents will be located in highly populated areas and industrial complexes.

b. Sabotage by Soviet/Warsaw Pact sympathizers. Among the populations of the NATO countries, there are numerous people who are sympathetic with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. While not part of any organized agent activity, they constitute a threat US/NATO to military personnel, facilities, and communications in rear areas. Their activities may include random acts of sabotage, arson, theft, and assassination.

c. Activities conducted by terrorist organizations. Groups whose sole stated purpose is the overthrow of their government or economic system may attempt to conduct their own terrorist activities during a rise in hostilities. Their actions may be directed against the civilian populations, host nation military forces, US dependents and military forces, and commercial/military facilities.

J-8. Level II activities.

a. Diversionary operations. The Soviets maintain a highly trained diversionary brigade in eastern Europe. Manned by skilled officers and senior NCOs, their training includes demolitions, communications, foreign weapons, and languages. Even before the first battle actually commences, the brigade may be deployed across the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in small teams. Entry can be accomplished by numerous methods including airdrop, helicopter, vehicle, foot, and by sea. Wearing NATO uniforms and speaking European languages, including English, they will attempt to penetrate military facilities, march columns, and organizations to disrupt, destroy, or mislead NATO forces. Their primary targets include nuclear weapon storage sites and launch systems, command and control clusters, communications facilities, and reserve formations. Other Warsaw Pact armies maintain similar organizations within their airborne forces.

b. Sabotage and reconnaissance missions conducted by tactical units. Each Soviet division has a reconnaissance battalion within its structure. The battalion's mission is to conduct armored ground reconnaissance of the enemy's rear area to a depth of 50 km beyond the FEBA. It is capable of operating in a width of 50-60 km on three or four axes. Six or eight armored reconnaissance squads, each consisting of two to three BRDMs and/or BMP-Rs and motorcycles, are used. Some of these squads may be reinforced with tanks. Their primary mission is reconnaissance, but they may attack small targets of opportunity or conduct sabotage operations against logistical installations. In addition, long-range patrols can be flown in by helicopter. They would be supported by fighter-bombers and can be resupplied by helicopter or parachute. They can range out through the division rear area to reconnoiter potential avenues of approach leading into the corps rear area or locate reserve forces and headquarters elements.

J-9. Level III activities.

a. Airmobile operations. The Soviets do not possess dedicated airmobile troops. Instead, they believe that the motorized rifle unit can perform an airmobile operation since it basically conducts a ground attack from a distant assembly area. This allows for great flexibility in selecting units for airmobile operations. Additionally, airborne forces may be employed in battalion strength to conduct airmobile operations. Soviet doctrine stresses the use of battalion-size units conducting airmobile operations to depths of 50 km, which places them in the division rear area. Because of the number of helicopters required to lift the approximately 500 men of a motorized rifle battalion, most such operations will be conducted without their organic armored vehicles. The main objectives of airmobile operations include nuclear weapon storage sites and launch systems, command and control clusters, key terrain on avenues of approach into the corps rear area, major logistical facilities, and reserve forces.

b. Airborne insertions. The Soviets maintain a force of more than 50,000 paratroopers organized into elite parachute divisions. Their employment is controlled by the Soviet Ministry of Defense and governed by the availability of aircraft. Soviet airborne doctrine specifies four categories of airborne operations.

(1) Strategic airborne assault. This involves one or more airborne divisions under Ministry of Defense control. Strategic objectives may be at considerable depth and could include seizure of airbases, seaports, or other targets vital to the success of Threat operations.

(2) Operational airborne assault. This operation involves up to a division-size parachute assault force to depths of 300 km in support of a Front offensive. Potential missions are securing bridgeheads, securing

airlanding or river crossing sites, seizing other key terrain, leapfrogging contaminated areas to exploit the results of nuclear strikes, encircling enemy forces, and destroying enemy nuclear delivery means.

(3) Tactical airborne assault. This consists of operations involving primarily airborne forces in helicopter assaults of battalion or lesser size used against forward-deployed enemy objectives. Tactical missions are essentially the same as those of the operational airborne assault with reduced depth of employment, size of force, and level of control.

(4) Special-purpose airborne assault. This consists of operations by either parachute assault or helicopter assault forces--company-size or smaller--organized as reconnaissance or raid groups. Parachute assault forces may be targeted at either tactical or operational depths. Missions include target reconnnaissance and other intelligence collection; destruction of nuclear delivery means; disruption of command, control, and logistical functions; and rear area harassment.

J-10. Tactical air, artillery, and missiles. Soviet tactical air forces support the attacking divisions by close air attacks against enemy units and facilities to a depth of 50-100 km. In addition, close air support is allotted to units engaged in direct combat throughout the main battle area and into the rear area. Armed helicopters as well as fighter-bombers are used to prepare landing zones prior to airmobile operations, and may remain on station to provide close air support and overhead protection during the attack. The Soviets have long-range artillery (up to a caliber of 240 mm) that can fire out to 50 km beyond the FEBA. Their doctrine calls for massed barrage fires in advance of a major attack. These fires will roll from the FEBA back into the division rear area. It is not expected that artillery at higher levels will be dedicated in support of small unit attacks in the division rear area. This is because each motorized rifle battalion has organic mortars. However, artillery forward observers may accompany the attacking force, thus providing the capability to shift fires against major command and control facilities and logistical clusters as needed. In addition to conventional artillery, the Soviets have missile launcher units that can fire the SCUD and FROG missiles. These missiles are capable of delivering high explosive, chemical, or nuclear warheads to ranges of 250 km beyond the FEBA. Their employment is usually in support of major attacks or against located enemy reserve formations.

J-11. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare. The Soviets possess the capability to employ NBC warfare if the political and military situation dictates. The Soviet Army is the best trained and equipped force in the world in the NBC environment. If hostilities escalate into a chemical environment, the Soviets expect to use chemicals to contaminate logistical complexes and the surrounding main supply routes, avenues of approach through the rear areas, and reserve formations. Biological

attacks may be made against the same targets. Nuclear strikes will be used to create large holes in the defenses, allowing speedy breakthrough into the theater army area.

APPENDIX K

NBC SUPPORT

K-1. Purpose. This appendix sets forth an operational concept for NBC support to a corps on the 1986 battlefield. NBC support includes the use of smoke, NBC reconnaissance, field decontamination, determination of areas of contamination, and the reporting of decontaminated areas.

K-2. Limitations. NBC reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke support are not available from EAC.

K-3. Operational concept.

a. NBC units in the corps will--

(1) Employ smoke to counter enemy ground or air-delivered line-of-sight weapons, screen friendly maneuvers, conceal troop/battle positions, obscure enemy observation, and deceive the enemy.

(2) Perform NBC reconnaissance of contamination in nondivisional areas.

(3) Provide partial equipment decontamination support and assist in personnel and complete equipment decontamination.

(4) Provide an NBC center (NBCC) to provide NBC hazard prediction and warning, plan smoke operations, and assist in chemical target analysis and fire planning.

b. The corps uses both hasty and deliberate smoke. Hasty smoke is delivered by division or corps artillery and by division mortars, and is normally used for short-term requirements in areas where there are no friendly operations. Deliberate smoke will normally cover friendly units but may be used to cover enemy units as well. Deliberate smoke is used for extended periods to cover friendly activities throughout an area of operation because it greatly improves the survivability of exposed forces. Deliberate smoke should be used to provide concealment throughout the corps for such activities and installations as airfields, C^3 centers, logistical facilities, assembly and staging areas, river crossings, preparation and occupation of defensive positions, and vital structures and MSRs. Smoke is also used as a countermeasure to enemy aerial attacks.

c. NBC reconaissance by corps units is limited to the corps rear area. Reconnaissance reports are sent to the all source analysis center which disseminates them to those who need them.

d. Decontamination of equipment and materiel is the using unit's responsibility. Corps NBC units perform personnel decontamination first, then assist in equipment and materiel decontamination, as required, for nondivisional units.

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
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