
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Leadership and Command on the Battlefield

Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM

Battlefield leadership at all levels is an element of combat



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Leadership and Command on the Battlefield



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
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
Commander's Intent ...

Capture how successful battlefield commanders at brigade, division and corps—the tactical echelons of command that get battalions to the right place, at the right time, and in the right combinations to fight and win battles, engagements, and campaigns—commanded their units in combat. Identify commonalities in techniques and procedures used at these echelons of command during Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.

Through the interview process, find out how they issued intent and orders during combat, where they positioned themselves on the battlefield, who they carried with them, and question them on other insights that facilitated their ability to command and lead their units during battle.

Distill the findings, publish them, and distribute to the field. Success rests on the ability to distribute a concise, readable, and useful pamphlet on command and leadership in battle that assists current and future combat leaders.

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GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, TRADOC

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Introduction

Battlefield leadership at all levels is an element of combat power. It is difficult to measure, but nonetheless is present and a decisive contributor to victory in battle. This pamphlet is dedicated to that dimension of combat power.

GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, TRADOC

This work began as an effort to understand success, specifically successful battlefield practices. While so much attention is being paid to learning the lessons of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, this overview tells the story of lessons already learned and incorporated, lessons learned from the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam and incorporated as the Army restructured in the 1970s. Those were tough lessons on training and doctrine—lessons that had cost the Army time, money, respect, and worse, the lives of its soldiers. While the Army has always been good at learning lessons, during the 1970s we tackled the lessons in earnest. Over the twenty year span between the end of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the Army's day-to-day business has focused on preparing itself for the next war. Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM validated Army doctrine and training. The concept formulation, doctrine development, and training emphasis produced a capable and lethal force.

The material that fed this work consisted of oral history interviews with a mix of the battlefield commanders of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Of those interviewed, three were corps commanders, seven were division commanders, and fourteen were brigade commanders. The commanders were asked a series of fourteen questions. The questions were tailored to battlefield leadership issues. Commanders were asked the same series of questions. All questions related directly to their wartime experiences.

The questions aimed at exposing the heart of battlefield leadership. How does a commander achieve effective battlefield leadership? Is battlefield leadership tied to equipment? Are those with the most

up-to-date equipment better commanders? Or is battlefield leadership independent or beyond specific hardware? How much interface, and at what points, and with whom, do they have with their subordinates? Who are their indispensable subordinates? Are there identifiable factors that could be taught in the schoolhouse?

That was the tack that the questions took. We found that battlefield leadership had to do with everything but equipment. Once the ability to communicate was established, the specific hardware pieces were far less important than what transpired on and through the lines.

Battlefield leadership has no simple or easy definition. It is at once a presence and a process. According to FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels,* command is the primary means whereby the vision is imparted to the organization... and leadership provides the toughness to see the vision implemented. The result of effective command is direction, the coordinated effort of many soldiers, teams, and units. Command thus encompasses leadership and all its variables, communication, and structure. Effective battlefield command assumes quality leadership, proper and adequate training, and a certain degree of organizational flexibility.

Battle command consists principally of commanders making tactical judgements and exercising leadership.

This volume addresses only battlefield leadership at brigade, division, and corps. Logistics issues, certainly crucial to successful warfighting, were intentionally not addressed. Leadership at lower levels—battalion and company command, and the functions of the primary battle staff in combat—will be addressed in future volumes.

Chapter 1

Preparation for Combat

Understanding commanders intent is bigger than the rehearsals and backbriefs conducted in theater or in the preparation for battle. It starts at home station the day the commander takes command. Training exercises, training plans, the standardization of battle plans and SOPs, all give commanders [illegible] inherent mindset on how the unit fights.



MG J.H. Binford Peay III
Cdr, 101st ABN DIV
(Air Assault)
DESERT STORM

CLEAR COMMANDER'S INTENT

Commander's intent is clearly the pivot around which a unit of any size moves. Commander's intent is the vision that must be imparted to, overlaid on, and absorbed by the organization so that the organization can achieve its mission. Commanders do this in a variety of ways. Some of the methods are personality driven, some are unit specific, many are a combination of both. Certainly commander's intent is laid down in garrison. It is based on standards of unit training, covers the basics of warfighting, and sets the




standard for mission accomplishment. It establishes a mindset that pervades the unit. Commander's intent, at once, gives guidance, sets limits, and provides the energy necessary to carry the unit in combat.

In preparation for combat, the commander's intent must be clear and simple. The commander's intent should be written and issued by the commander. The commander must articulate the end state of mission accomplishment in recognizable terms. The battle commanders that were interviewed for this study attributed successful passage of intent to wargaming sessions, rehearsals, and backbriefs.

A clear understanding of commander's intent helped commanders to make the immediate decisions required on the battlefield.

Preparing Teams for War



Commanders interviewed believed that these exercises and procedures, when routinely conducted during peacetime, laid the foundation for developing their commander's intent and philosophy in combat.

SYNCHRONIZATION

It is the responsibility of brigade, division, and corps commanders to get battalions and companies, the units responsible for conducting the fight, to the right place, at the right time, in the right combination to fight and win battles, engagements, and campaigns. Success demands synchronization and the ability to integrate combined arms on the battlefield. Synchronization is defined in FM 100-5, *Operations*, as "the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point". The commanders interviewed believed strongly that the key ingredients of a unit's ability to synchronize combat power on the battlefield were detailed plans, rehearsals, backbriefs, and contingency planning. However, commanders stated that the important product was not a rigidly applied synchronization matrix that they could not deviate from during the conduct of the battle.

Detailed Plans


War plans were wargamed, rehearsed, and backbriefed to ensure understanding and proficiency. Commanders stated that their plans were wargamed with all commanders, staff, combat support, and combat service support players present. That was a common thread through all the interviews. The final plan in most cases was not the sole product of the staff, but an amalgamation and synthesis of ideas from all elements as time and availability permitted.


Many made the point that senior commanders must resist the temptation to continuously fine tune the plan as the unit nears the time of attack. Most believed there comes a time when commanders must accept an 80% solution and get the plan in the hands of subordinate leaders to finalize their planning and not change it.




Rehearsals

The battlefield commanders endorsed rehearsals as invaluable to the success of the operations. Sandtable exercises and unit rehearsals identified issues and helped







solve problems that were not identified in the planning process. Commanders stressed the rehearsals were deliberate, detailed, and optimally attended by all players with all players contributing. Some units rehearsed the command and control of the operation using realistic distances and frontages expected of their maneuver forces. In some instances, it was discovered that the command and control structure did not support the scheme of maneuver and was adjusted prior to hostilities. Rehearsals, from corps to platoon, gave



commanders a better appreciation of space and time available on the battlefield.

LTG Carl W. Stiner, Cdr, JTF SOUTH, commented on the importance of rehearsals for contingency operations; *"Another aspect of preparation that is absolutely critical in our business is rehearsals. We never do anything, unless it's an emergency where you have to have wheels up in four hours, without rehearsals. We had rehearsed Panama, to include all targets, before we ever went in."*




Backbriefs

Backbriefs were important in that they gave commanders the opportunity to gauge understanding of their intent and the war plan. Commanders wanted their subordinate leaders to look them in the eye and explain their portion of the plan. As stated by Colonel Kellogg, Commander of the separate Task Force ATLANTIC, during JUST CAUSE; *"We had been in Panama for awhile, conducted our reconnaissance, and developed thorough operations plans. I had each commander down to company level backbrief me on his understanding of the intent and his execution of the plan. I had a final backbrief from battalion commanders at 1800 hours, D minus one, following the final guidance I received from LTG Stiner."*

Backbriefs allowed the commanders to come to a mental and visual agreement on the intent and the execution of the plan.

Contingency Planning

Detailed contingencies played a major role in the success of both operations. In wargaming sessions and rehearsals, units identified likely changes from the original order. When the decision was made to execute a change in direction or a change of mission, the contingency, or branch, had already been worked prior to combat which facilitated rapid execution. Commanders were quick to note that battlefield events do not unfold as planned and commanders must be ready to modify the order or make changes as actual battlefield events dictate. That requires great mental agility and flexibility on the part of leaders at all levels of command.





Commanders' Observations

We [British Army] use the term directives when we refer to commander's intent. It's a formal document and it is used as the basis upon which subsequent decisions are expected to be made by your subordinates. And as a general rule, the further you are away from the point of execution in time or space, the less likely you are to know all the facts and figures, and therefore you can't give any form of detailed orders, therefore you must state what it is you wish to achieve rather than what others are to do.

MG Rupert Smith
Cdr, 1st AD, (United Kingdom)
DESERT STORM

The whole plan was written by the XVIII Airborne Corps battle staff, but we adjusted the plan, based upon the subordinate commanders developing their plans and how they saw the targets and the unique characteristics and capabilities of their unit. So I tried to accommodate everybody to the extent that I could, because I wanted to give them the maximum latitude in accomplishing the mission.

LTG Carl W. Stiner
Cdr, JTF SOUTH
JUST CAUSE

As our plan evolved, we developed a concept of brigade level actions on contact and we rehearsed it thoroughly. The task forces did full up rehearsals with priority on movements and actions on contact. At brigade, I did backbriefs with each battalion and company commander, and we all did many "ROCK" drills. When we crossed the LD, I was comfortable that my concept and intent for fighting the meeting engagement was clear with all commanders. The actual fight turned out just as we envisioned.

COL William L. Nash
Cdr, 1st Bde, 3rd AD
DESERT STORM

During the final preparation phase for combat, I talked to every company commander. I wanted to look him in the eye and see how he and his unit were doing. I had each company commander backbrief me on the rules of engagement and his scheme of maneuver to ensure one last time that his plan fit into the battalion's and the brigade's plan as well as met everyones' intent.

COL Leroy R. Goff
Cdr, 3rd Bde, 3rd AD
DESERT STORM

Chapter 2

Conducting the Fight

You don't know what you can't see. The clarity of bits and pieces of information received at the CP may not be sufficient to paint an accurate tactical picture.



MG John H. Tilelli, Jr.
Cdr, 1st Cav Div
DESERT STORM

To paraphrase Clausewitz, during war everything is simple, but even the simple things are difficult. In the confusion of combat, commanders must make their presence known not only by their physical appearance, but also by the clear and concise manner in which they communicate their orders and intent to their subordinates. At each echelon of command this dimension of leadership is one of the critical factors in determining the success or failure of the entire unit.

COMMUNICATING ORDERS IN COMBAT

During combat, battlefield commanders issued their intent face-to-face when at all possible. Commanders would move forward to the subordinate leaders or conduct orders groups center of zone. When time or transportation did not allow for a personal meeting or an orders group, the commander issued the intent over the radio. In every

case the transmission was followed up with a personal meeting as soon as circumstances allowed. The battlefield commanders believed the personal meeting was essential. Only face-to-face could all parties be mutually assured of complete understanding.

If an order can be misunderstood, it will be misunderstood.

Battlefield commanders were always, with limited exception, in contact with one of their command posts. When a commander could not reach a subordinate leader, the order or message was relayed from the command post to a subordinate command post. Most commanders had no problem issuing orders to the command post of the subordinate command. The battlefield commanders who were interviewed were very sensitive to the need to free their subordinate leaders to command. Most stated that when they called for a situation report or other routine traffic, they were comfortable talking to the executive officer, the operations officer, or another designated person at the command post. While commanders didn't want their subordinate leaders tied to the radio, they did want someone in a position to speak for the commander to answer. Commanders also commented that specific people were designated to answer calls from higher headquarters in their absence.

It was common opinion that a clear commander's intent, intensive rehearsals, and contingency planning negated the need for excessive radio traffic.

KEEPING THE STAFF AND COMMANDERS INFORMED

An important aspect of battlefield leadership was lateral and vertical communications across the battlefield. It was imperative that the staff and other subordinate leaders be kept informed of orders or traffic issued by the commander to another commander. This is not to be confused with eavesdropping or crosstalk which will be discussed in chapter 3. This is an active measure commanders used to ensure complete dissemination of information. Commanders and commands used different techniques to keep the command informed. When using FM radio, commanders or staff monitored the higher headquarters command net and acknowledged the traffic even if it didn't specifically relate to their unit. During Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, when issuing orders face-to-face away from a transmission node, the commander performed that task himself or delegated a

member of the command group to relay the order to the command post. That became part of his responsibilities. Often it was any member of the command group who regularly attended the commander, for instance the aide-de-camp, or scribe, (note taker who passed the information to those who needed to know) to a general officer.

FORWARD TO READ THE BATTLEFIELD



Even in this age of modern technology, there is no substitute for the commander's presence forward to assess the situation and to make decisions affecting the synchronization of combat power. The clarity of information received at the command post may not be sufficient to paint an accurate tactical picture and valuable time could be lost trying to confirm the actual combat situation. The commander cannot afford to wait until all information has been gathered and processed. He must develop the ability, through training, to synthesize fragments of information and anticipate probable courses of enemy action or outcomes of friendly actions in order to maintain the initiative. Being at the right place at



the right time is not an exact science—successful commanders develop this intuitive art through training. However, commanders of large organizations with wide fronts must have the ability, as Colonel Holder observed, "to stay mentally and emotionally detached from their surroundings to visualize the larger impact on the unit and mission."

Seeing and reading the battlefield is an intuitive decision making process with different requirements at each echelon of command. Commanders must be in position to adequately and responsibly synchronize combat power assets in which they have direct control. The commander's position on the battlefield is one means of synchronizing combat power. By the process of wargaming, rehearsals, backbriefs, and contingency planning, the commander can determine where his presence will best effect the outcome of the battle. In order to command units on the move, commanders must rely heavily on other personnel within their command to assist with seeing the battlefield and allocating resources in a timely manner. A key aspect of assisting the commander with commanding his unit on the move is the battle staff. The commander must have trust and confidence in their ability to speak for the commander and make decisions in allocating resources.

Brigade

The brigade commanders who were interviewed positioned themselves forward to see the fight as well as the volume and the direction of fire. They generally traveled behind or with the lead task force, or at an otherwise critical point on the battlefield. During Operation JUST CAUSE, brigade commanders reported difficulty maintaining continuous communication with battalion commanders due to the nature of the terrain and the distances involved. They moved by whatever means were available from one battalion to another and met face-to-face with subordinate leaders to receive situational updates and observe the battlefield. The character of the operations will determine the method and place where the commander positions himself of the battlefield. For instance, Colonel Nix, Commander, 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne, JUST CAUSE, reported; *"I went in with each air assault that morning. On the last assault, my command and control Blackhawk was shot up and couldn't fly anymore. That afternoon, when the decision was made to insert the 4-325th Battalion at Fort Cimarron, I jumped on the lead Blackhawk with the battalion commander, no seats and twenty troopers, and off we went. Intelligence*





reported the objective was heavily manned, and we were expecting heavy contact. Fortunately, it didn't happen. I stayed with him until I was comfortable with the situation and then went to meet with other battalion commanders."

For Operation DESERT STORM, in some instances commanders moved to the flanks to position themselves to view the direction of fire and movement in order to ensure proper direction and thus prevent incidents of fratricide.

Commanders noted they needed to be personally involved and present in order to feel the intensity of the fight. It was stated that if a commander was not up front, if he could not see or get a sense for the battlefield, then he was not in a position to influence the outcome.

Division

Of the maneuver commanders interviewed, division commanders were located with the TAC or the commander of the lead brigade of the main effort. As with brigade commanders, all believed they had to be forward to see and read the battlefield and in position to allocate resources. Division commanders were primarily concerned with the synchronization of fires, long-range artillery, air and engineer support. Division commanders asserted they were not forward to fight

the brigade commander's fight, but forward to sense the intensity of the fight and be able to make intelligent on-the-spot decisions as regarded the resources they controlled, in order to best assist subordinate commanders.

Corps

The two corps commanders from DESERT STORM positioned themselves forward in the corps' zone with the division commanders or with the assistant division commanders. Commanders regularly moved across the battlefield and met face-to-face with subordinate leaders. They collocated their TAC or command group with the main effort division. The corps commanders reported spending very little time at the TAC and only went to the Main when absolutely neccessary. Corps commanders repeated what brigade and division commanders had stressed. They wanted to be far enough forward to understand the flow of the battle and in a position to responsibly allocate resources.

The Commander, Joint Task Force SOUTH for JUST CAUSE positioned himself in accordance with the unique requirements of the theater and the operation. The commander stayed near his command post the first day of fighting due to the problems encountered in the city, the delay of the 82nd Airborne Division, and working the arrival of the rest of the 7th Infantry Division. However, he still met face-to-face with all major subordinate leaders who were on the ground and stayed in constant communications with them during the fight. On the second day until the end of the fight, the commander went forward to see the battlefield and meet with subordinate leaders to get their assessment of the battles.

COMMAND PRESENCE

As stated above, commander's forward presence is necessary not only to allow the commander to view the battlefield, but also to allow the men to see the commander. All maneuver commanders interviewed stressed the importance of being visible to the soldiers. Forward command presence instilled confidence and improved morale. Similarly, commanders got a better understanding of the morale, health, and well-being of the men by talking to company commanders, platoon leaders, and soldiers. The commanders stated that it was important to talk to the commander who was closest to the fight to get the most accurate picture of the battle. Those interviewed




were quick to note that their presence forward was never intended to interfere with subordinate commanders leading their units. They believed, however, that visibility was crucial to effective leadership.

KEY PERSONNEL

As stated earlier, commanders must position themselves on the battlefield to adequately and responsibly synchronize and allocate the resources which they control. To accomplish this large task, commanders must rely heavily on other personnel within their command. Personnel in the command posts, the operations officer, the fire support coordinator, and others based on Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time available (METT-T), all play an important part in assisting the commander in seeing and reading the battlefield and allocating combat power in a timely manner. Commanders must decide which key personnel will travel with him, which will stay in the command post, and which will go forward, separated from him, as another set of eyes and ears. These decisions must be made during preparation for combat. These decisions are also means of synchronizing combat power. By the process of wargaming, rehearsing, backbriefs, and contingency planning, the commander can best determine where to position key personnel to best assist him in the conduct of the fight. There were various techniques used to employ the different people, however the functions performed by the staff were consistent.

The command sergeant major was a key player in assisting the commander on the battlefield. Most commanders had the senior noncommissioned officer forward traveling with them as another set of eyes with a different agenda. Commanders relied on their



experience, used them to ensure force discipline, provide feedback on the morale and welfare of the soldiers, and exert a command presence.

Brigade

At the brigade level, the executive officer was the workhorse of the operation and was normally located in the forward command post. He assisted with the integration of fires and maneuver as well as tended the combat service and service support arenas. He kept the higher command informed and ensured all orders were received by commanders. Many maneuver commanders interviewed believed the executive officer was the glue that held command and control together.

All brigade commanders had their operations officers forward either with or near them. Many used the S3 as another set of eyes with the secondary effort or on the flanks. Commanders used the S3 to pass orders, maintain communications with higher headquarters, and control fires and maneuver. All commanders carried an assistant operations officer with the command group. That officer posted the map, monitored the radio, and in some instances, received orders for the commander.

The fire support coordinator and the fire support officer were other key players that assisted the commander. In most all cases, one of the two would travel with the command group. The fire support element was split between the TOC and the forward command post.

During DESERT STORM, all commanders had the fire support coordinator, the commander of the direct support artillery (FSCOORD), or the fire support officer (FSO) close by during the fight. The fire support coordinator and the fire support officer were active players in the development of plans and decisions made on the battlefield. Commanders wanted the ability to talk face-to-face with the FSCOORD or the FSO as they shifted and changed priorities of fire.

During JUST CAUSE, commanders positioned the FSCOORD and the FSO differently due to a differing mission and situation. The brigade commanders traveled extremely light, and in most cases put the FSCOORD or FSO in the forward command post. Careful consideration was given their placement on the battlefield based on their responsiveness and ability to control brigade fires.

Other key personnel which traveled in the brigade command group included the command sergeant major, the ALO, and the S2 or the

assistant S2. Engineers, air defense artillery, and liaisons from other branches of the services were carried based on METT-T.

Division

During JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, division commanders were extremely mobile and traveled with a few select staff members. Key members, either with the commanders or in a command post, included the chief of staff, the assistant division commander for maneuver, the G3, the FSCOORD, the DIVARTY commander, the command sergeant major, and the aide-de-camp.

The assistant division commander for maneuver moved between the forward command post and the command group to keep the division commander informed of corps' guidance. The G3 generally accompanied the division commander and assisted in tracking the battle, passed orders, and maintained communications with the division TAC and the brigades. The FSCOORD usually traveled with the commander or was always in close communications by radio.

All the commanders emphasized the importance of the aide-de-camp in combat. The aide got the commander to where he needed to be on the battlefield, kept the commander in communications with corps, monitored the division command net for the commander, kept the TAC and the assistant division commander for maneuver posted on the face-to-face meetings with commanders, and often served as a deputy G3 on the move.

Corps

The deputy commanding general, the chief of staff, the G3, the G2, and the aide-de-camp were the essential personnel to the corps commander. Like the division commanders, the corps commanders moved constantly across the battlefield, over great distances, talking to commanders and staff of the divisions. On occasion, the G3 would travel with the commander. The chief of staff, the G3, and the G2 would come forward for orders groups as required.

For Operation JUST CAUSE, in addition to the above mentioned personnel due to the unique requirements of the operational theater, the corps commander relied even more heavily on liaison officers, the G4, a surgeon representative, and the G5 to keep him posted on displaced personnel and the status of their safety.

Commanders' Observations

Regardless of the size of the force during forced entry operations, my preference as Division Commander was to go in with the Assault CP as a part of the lead echelon. The commander needs to be on the ground to get a feel for the battle, and to synchronize the buildup of additional combat power. You cannot do that from home station, or from a ship afloat, or in an aircraft flying over the battlefield.

MG James H. Johnson, Jr.
Cdr, 82nd ABN DIV
JUST CAUSE/DESERT STORM

I positioned myself well forward on the battlefield, forward enough to sense the battle. I learned that well at the NTC years seven years ago when I took a rotation through there in 1985. I realized then that you got to be well forward to sense the battlefield and to get a good feel for it. You have to move to the critical place to find out first hand what is going on.

COL Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr.
Cdr, 3rd Bde, 7th ID
JUST CAUSE

You can reduce the amount of confusion on the battlefield by conducting detailed, thorough rehearsals. Commanders must command forward. The single greatest tool that aided my ability to command was being present at the critical place on the battlefield to see for myself what was going on. I knew what was tough and what wasn't.

COL Lon E. Maggart
Cdr, 1st Bde, 1st ID
DESERT STORM

The battalions did a great job of crosstalking to each other on the brigade command net, especially with identifying boundaries and keeping aware of what was happening on their flanks. We had zero fratricide incidents in the brigade and I attribute that to commanders talking to one another. I stressed in rehearsals that commanders control fires; leaders don't get themselves tied in on a one-on-one engagement, commanders control the fires of the organizations that they lead and that flank coordination was absolutely critical.

COL Anthony A. Moreno
Cdr, 2nd Bde, 1st ID
DESERT STORM

Commanders cannot develop the intuitive feel for where they are needed on the battlefield through simulation exercises. It must be developed through experience with field maneuver training.

COL George H. Harmeyer
Cdr, 1st Bde, 1st CAV DIV
DESERT STORM

Chapter 3

Proven Successful Battlefield Command Techniques

No spot report or situation report should ever have to be repeated on the radio with a competent battle staff. The battle staff must be integrated and not work in separate compartments. To be effective, they must be able to keep the map posted, coordinate fires, run the various radio nets, and more important, listen to what is being said on those radio nets. Battle staffs must be able to recognize when something is wrong or when a commander who is out there fighting needs additional resources. The commander must have trust enough in their ability to make decisions in his absence to allocate resources to subordinate commanders. This is absolutely key when fighting several battles at one time.




LTG Carl W. Stiner
Cdr, JTF SOUTH
JUST CAUSE

Battlefield leadership incorporates more than rehearsals, commander's intent, briefbacks, position on the battlefield, and communication. Successful leadership demands proper use of key personnel. While personnel assets and abilities vary widely with time and situation, all the maneuver commanders interviewed commented on several common leadership techniques that they found successful. The techniques centered on communication and the ability to synchronize combat power. Techniques we found in common, across operation and across unit, were heavy reliance on battle captains, command posts staffed with like-thinking people, liaison officers, disciplined use of radio eavesdropping, and cross-talking on appropriate radio nets.

BATTLE CAPTAINS

Commanders often mentioned a person in the forward command post whom they relied on as much as any other person during combat to assist them with the command of their unit. The commanders referred to this person as their battle captain. Battle captains were crucial to the success of leaders commanding their organizations. The battle captain was the workhorse of the operation and helped the commander maintain a clear picture of the battlefield. At corps, the battle captain was the G3 or the chief of staff, at division the battle captain was usually the ADC-M. Generally the battle captains at brigade and battalion were the executive officers. To run twenty-four hour continuous operations, the battle captain's responsibilities were often delegated to an assistant operations officer. The commanders stressed that the battle captain had to be experienced, know the commander's intent and plan, and be knowledgeable enough to speak for the commander.


The battle captain had several responsibilities which ultimately assisted the commander with the fight. Many considered him the hub of the operation. The battle captain's main focus was to ensure the conduct of and facilitate operations in the command post. That included synchronization of combat power, keeping the commander posted on all activity on the battlefield, the orders process, lateral coordination, communications to higher, and keeping the units current on intelligence and other aspects of the operation. In addition to the maneuver and fires responsibilities, he had duties in the combat service support arena as well. According to Major General John Tilelli, Jr., Commander, 1st Cavalry Division, *DESERT STORM*, *"Commanders must have great trust and confidence in the battle*



captain. He is the one that allows the commander to command the unit in combat. He makes the automatic things happen automatically, routine things to happen routinely, so the commander can concentrate on commanding and synchronizing the important parts of the battle and not worrying about where the next five thousand gallons of fuel is coming from."

COMMAND POSTS TRAINED TOGETHER AS A TEAM

The smooth functioning of the command post is critical in any combat operation. Staffs must be trained together as a team. It is imperative, for successful combat operations, that the personnel within the command post be similarly trained, have a common understanding of the operation and the commander's intent, and understand the expectations of the commander. Training a command post to work together was accomplished through reinforcing standard operating procedures during all field training exercises, command post exercises, or war councils. After-action reviews were also critical to that process as commanders discussed not only the tactical portion of an operation, but priority of intelligence requirements, priority of information, and requirements of the mission. Commanders stressed that staffs must speak the same tactical language and understand the rapid orders process. They must understand their role in mission accomplishment and what the commander expects from them.



LIAISON OFFICERS

Liaison officers were used extensively throughout both Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Although often neglected during times of peace due to personnel and equipment shortages, in war liaison officers prove themselves indispensable. Combined and coalition warfare have increased the requirements for experienced, knowledgeable liaison officers for the conduct of joint operations. Liaison officers were always positioned with higher headquarters. When personnel were available, commanders also placed liaison officers with flank units and other units that the commander considered important to maintain communications. Aviation liaison officers were invaluable. Not only did they provide a link to the tactical air command, but offered a means of redundant communications, and proved a valuable intelligence conduit as well.

The battlefield commanders stressed that liaison officers must have a good understanding of the unit, its capabilities, its needs, and the operation. All stated the liaison officer must be smart, experienced, and able to speak and answer questions for the commander. Liaison officers must be equipped with the means to talk with their commander, and in many cases, have the capability to move on the battlefield.

In both JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM, liaison officers were a great source of information not routinely provided through normal

command channels. During JUST CAUSE, Major General James Johnson, Commander, 82nd Airborne, stated that his liaison teams with the Joint Special Operations Command, already in theater and working in his area of operations, were invaluable for the preparation and conduct of the operation. He could not talk to the Joint Special Operations Command directly, but could through his liaison officers. He found they provided an accurate and timely down link for human intelligence and other actions going on his area. Colonel Holder, Commander, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, stated that during DESERT SHIELD his liaison team to the special operations forces provided him valuable intelligence on his area of operations. Since that information did not come through normal intelligence channels, having the liaison team there was critical. Those were just two instances of the value of liaison officers, but similar situations were echoed by almost all commanders.

EAVESDROPPING


Maneuver commanders stated the importance of using the eavesdropping technique during the fight. Eavesdropping, or listening in to others' radio conversations gave commanders the ability to obtain real





time information without having to get directly involved. Most commanders verified that they monitored the transmissions between subordinate leaders and the command posts, and spoke only to clarify a point or when the need presented itself. Commanders believed their leaders and staffs senses should not be dulled by the continuous drone of the commander on the radio. When the commander did speak, the people would be more alert as to what he was saying.

Many commanders eavesdropped, or had their command posts eavesdrop, on the net of their main effort or the unit in contact. In that manner, the commanders were provided an additional means of seeing the battlefield and another method for feeling the intensity of the fight, all critical elements of success. A few commanders had the command posts listen to the command net on what they perceived was their most dangerous flank when manpower and equipment resources allowed.



Eavesdropping by the commander allowed him to exert a command presence without actually being present, gave him a method whereby he could "see" the battlefield across his front, and opened access to crucial battlefield information. One extremely signficant result of that radio monitoring on at least three occasions recorded was the prevention of fratricide. In each case, the commander noted that a flank unit was reporting enemy vehicles which were in fact friendly vehicles belonging to his unit.

Commanders stated that command posts must be drilled and trained on eavesdropping. It is not something that a commander can afford to assume will automatically happen. The noise and chatter of a command post combined with the electricity of the staff when units make contact will overshadow the importance of eavesdropping on other nets. Many of the battle captains delegated specific



responsibility to personnel to monitor certain nets within the command post.


CROSSTALKING

Crosstalk is the lateral communication between subordinates at all echelons. Crosstalk among subordinate leaders fills in the holes and vagueness of orders and guidance. All commanders noted they strongly urged subordinate leaders to crosstalk on the command net. Commanders believed it was important for all leaders to be aware of what was going on within and around the unit and how that action impacted on the unit as a whole.

Crosstalk between subordinate leaders freed the commander from the minute details of an operation as they were worked out on the ground by subordinate leaders and staffs. Issues such as establishment of boundaries, contact points, and front line trace were solved between subordinate leaders with the commander and staff eavesdropping and then acknowledging the traffic. Crosstalking and eavesdropping represented vital flows of critical information. Colonel Montgomery Meigs, Commander, 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, DESERT STORM, asserted; *"We lived off of crosstalk. At division level, many of the tough problems were solved by brigade commander crosstalk. We'd grab the issue before it had gotten up to division, and either make a decision on what to do and execute with the commander monitoring, or paint a picture of the alternative so the commander or ADC(M) could make a decision."*

CENTRALIZED PLANNING, DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION

Many commanders stated that the reason the plans were so well executed was due to centralized planning and decentralized execution. Commanders believed that once subordinate leaders and soldiers had been briefed on the plan and once commanders were comfortable with the



unit's understanding of the intent and execution, then commanders should allow the subordinate leaders and soldiers to execute the mission with minimal interference.

The battlefield commanders strongly believed that they must have trust and confidence in their leaders' and soldiers' abilities to engage and defeat the enemy. Commanders stated that this style of leadership cannot start on the battlefield. It must start on the practice fields on posts, maneuver areas, and training centers. Success with decentralized execution is achieved through a common approach to training, enforcing training standards, and an understanding of the commander's expectations.

Major General Funk, Commander 3rd Armored Division, DESERT STORM, stated; *"As the lead battalion crossed the line of departure, three thoughts occurred to me—what was going to happen 150 kms away in the fight, what could go wrong, and that I was just one guy in 20,533. If I hadn't trained and prepared those men and women for war, all the meetings and radio calls during the fight would not make a difference. The fight was in their hands now."*

FIXED CALL SIGNS

Almost all commanders used fixed call signs when operating on secure nets. Commanders stated fixed call signs reduced the items commanders had to think about when engaged in combat. Additionally, the majority of commanders interviewed maintained the same radio frequency during combat. Most maneuver commanders interviewed stated that after long periods of moving and fighting, the last thing they wanted to worry about was remembering the call sign of another commander or the fire support coordinator, all of which had recently changed. There were also other intangibles concerning the use of fixed call signs. When the commander came up on the net and stated, "This is Thunder 6," rather than "Bravo 42," everyone knew that the commander was on the net, and commanders speculated that it improved confidence and morale of subordinate leaders. Many believed it made a difference.

Commanders' Observations

The essence of command and control is not communications gear or equipment. The essence is leadership; detailed, yet simple plans rehearsed to the point that everyone understands their piece in the fight and are confident with their ability to execute, and then decentralized execution.

COL James T. Hill
Cdr, 1st Bde, 101st ABN DIV, (Air Assault)
DESERT STORM

During JUST CAUSE, I had good, competent liaison officers; not just to keep me informed of what their respective units were doing, but to also convey to their units how the battle was going. They are crucial to success, and you have to pick your best people. They have to have the moxie to stand up in front of a two or four star general, and brief him what their commander is thinking, their unit's capabilities, and make recommendations.

LTG Carl W. Stiner
Cdr, JTF SOUTH
JUST CAUSE

I monitored the main effort battalion net on my auxiliary radio. I could hear the company commanders talking between themselves and the battalion commander plus I was in position to see what they were doing. I knew first hand what was going on inside the main effort battalion.

COL George H. Harmeyer
Cdr, 1st Bde, 1st CAV DIV
DESERT STORM

Chapter 4

Excellence in Leadership


Battle drills and live fire give our troops a real edge. We just can't simulate combat conditions. ... you've got to take soldiers out there, get them dirty, sweaty, make them fire their weapons, bring the artillery in close. See the violence of the action, the smoke and confusion ... you've got to get them comfortable with that.



COL Jack P. Nix, Jr.
Cdr, 1st Bde, 82nd ABN DIV
JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM

TEAMWORK

Successful battlefield leadership springs from more than the formalities of rehearsals, briefbacks, written intent, or presence on the battlefield. Some aspects of command are intangible and escape clear definition. Yet, every battle commander interviewed mentioned the significance of teamwork and interpersonal relationships to successful leadership.




All the battlefield commanders of Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT



STORM stressed that successful command and leadership on the battlefield started with building a team, a cohesive organization of understanding and trust. The commanders believed it was critical to establish interpersonal relationships with their subordinates, relationships built on trust, confidence, credibility, and which included an understanding of the individual's strengths and potential weaknesses. Knowing people and knowing how they will react in a given situation is important for success on the battlefield.

Building a team within a large organization required a conscious effort by the part of the commander. Commanders fostered open dialogue, idea sharing, and the opportunity for team members to get to know one another. Commanders established teamwork within their organizations in several ways. The one most often brought up was the sponsoring of events in which commanders and staffs assembled to discuss warfighting issues and ideas. Field training exercises, command post exercises, professional development seminars, rehearsals, after-actions reviews, and hotwashes all added to the team building process and fostered cohesion among leaders.





Team building was important and played a crucial role on the battlefield. Commanders noted the difference between newly formed teams and those that had been working together for a period of time. From Operation DESERT STORM, a brigade commander reported; *"A task force came to us late in the preparation phase and had only worked with me and the unit for a short while before we deployed. The task force commander's understanding of the conversations that took place were different—not that he was incompetent, or that he and his unit did not perform equally as well—but it always took longer to explain what the intent of the orders were, an extra phone call or an additional explanation. With the other commanders with whom I had served with for at least a year, it was just another drill."*

TRAINING FOCUS

All had high praise for the Army's training process. Commanders stated that they were pleased with the performance of the Army's schools in preparing soldiers and leaders with the basics of warfighting and professional development of noncommissioned officers and officers. Many stated that subordinate leaders that they observed possessed the necessary skills to train individual and

collective tasks within their units to fight and win on the battlefield. Major command exercises such as ULCHI FOCUS LENS, BRIGHT STAR, OCEAN VENTURE, SAND EAGLE, and REFORGER contributed to the successes on the battlefields of JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.


All applauded the National Training Center (NTC), the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). However, the point was made that those exercises were just one step in the training process and had to be viewed as the graduate level evaluation. The combat training centers provided the closest opportunity for leaders to realistically train for battle and feel the intensity and fatigue of combat that resources and safety would allow.



The battlefield commanders stated that the combat training centers developed teamwork, were focused on the fundamentals of doctrine and warfighting, and trained the general orders process under pressure. The combat training centers trained commanders on where they were needed on the battlefield, how to use vantage points for orders, when and how to conduct a leader's reconnaissance, and how to read the battlefield.

Several commanders identified the need to spend more time teaching rapid orders drills in the schoolhouse and in unit training. Rapid orders drills were the norm in combat.

Many believed that the Battle Command Training Program was an invaluable training exercise that every division commander should go through. Commanders acknowledged that it has the limitations



associated with a command post exercise. However, commanders can move to subordinate leaders, issue orders face-to-face, receive estimates, and take the time to mentor commanders and staff. All believed, especially the division commanders, that it was a great way to train. It built cohesion, teamwork, confidence, understanding of the battlefield operating systems, how to integrate and synchronize combat power while reinforcing Army doctrine. Many asserted that it was an extremely productive program for the staff and commanders.

A COMMON DOCTRINE

All maneuver commanders interviewed stated firmly that the doctrine worked, proved its effectiveness on the battlefield, and served as a common denominator for large organizations integrating forces in preparation for combat. Commanders who served in JUST CAUSE stated unanimously that one of the main reasons forces were able to integrate so well so late was because of Army doctrine. Even though there were dissimilar organizations with different mentalities task organized together; Ranger, light infantry, airborne infantry, mechanized infantry—the fundamentals of Army doctrine of how units conduct war served as a common base.



All commanders stated unequivocally that commanders, regardless of echelon, must understand doctrine for success on the battlefield. Commanders reported that a thorough understanding of doctrine was essential to implementation of tactics and facilitated rapid execution of orders without much discussion or misinterpretation. The commanders believed that Army doctrine provided a discipline in terminology and language critical for successful battlefield operations.







Commanders' Observations

Troop, company, and battery ARTEPs must be evaluated by the Regimental or Brigade commander so subordinate units understand how they are expected to fight and fit in with the larger organization. ARTEP evaluation is an important step in establishing the understanding between captains and colonels that makes coherent operations possible when the regiment or brigade fights.

We need to pay more attention to the implicit part of command and control and battlefield leadership. Commanders training together and knowing each other, rehearsing and practicing operations, holding AARs immediately after an exercise, refining and enforcing SOPs, and ensuring there is good understanding two levels up and down are a few of the things we need to emphasize.

COL Don Holder
Cdr, 2ACR
DESERT STORM

We have to spend more time in the school house teaching rapid orders drills. Leaders know how to prepare an order complete with annexes and overlays, but we are not proficient on producing clear, concise orders under the pressure of time and stress found in combat. Rapid orders drills are the norm in combat. We need to make this part of our curriculum because there is a set of mental processes you have to train on in order to get proficient.

COL Lon E. Maggart
Cdr, 1st Bde, 1st ID
DESERT STORM

Summary

Command and leadership in combat is by no means an exact science. However, using the battlefield lenses of successful combat commanders several common techniques and principles seem to apply. First and foremost, the commander must convey a clearly understood intent to his subordinates in person whenever possible. This face-to-face communication applies not just to planning but to the execution phase of combat as well. Successful commanders positioned themselves forward in order to gain a feel for the fight and to be in position to allocate resources as necessary. This forward presence has the added advantage of increasing morale and esprit among soldiers in the front lines.

Training and teamwork during peacetime builds staffs and subordinate commanders who can anticipate requirements, and who have the mental agility to react to the fluid nature of the modern battlefield. Detailed plans, through rehearsals, contingency planning, and briefbacks are proven tools for training for the fog of war. This training and teamwork leads to the trust and confidence among all members of the team that is the indispensible requirement for victory in combat.

Our current doctrine works and serves as the common denominator for our Army. But doctrine is not dogma and as we move into a rapidly changing future we must continue to evolve and grow—both individually and as an Army. The intent of this pamphlet is to assist in this process by offering for your consideration some of the lessons learned from our recent battlefield success. If this publication does nothing more than generate an informed debate among current and future battlefield leaders, the effort will have been worthwhile.

Appendixes

Appendix A—Bullet Comments of Trends

- Preparation for Combat
- Conducting the Fight
- Proven Successful Battlefield Command Techniques
- Excellence in Leadership

Appendix B—Survey

Appendix C—Commanders Interviewed

Appendix A


Bullet Comments of Trends

[redacted]

- **Commander's intent must be clear, written by the commander and explained in person to subordinate commanders.**
- **Detailed plans, rehearsals, backbriefs, and contingency planning drive synchronization and the integration of combined arms on the battlefield.**
- **The final plan was not the sole product of the staff, but an amalgamation and synthesis of ideas from all elements as time and availability permitted.**
- **Rehearsals were detailed, deliberate, and optimally attended by all players with all players contributing.**
- **Unit rehearsals identified issues and helped solve problems that were not identified in the planning process.**
- **Briefbacks allow commanders to come to a mental agreement on the intent and the execution of the plan.**
- **Contingency planning gives commanders the mental agility and flexibility to call audibles off the original order while on the move.**



- **Complex mission changes and changes to intent must be given face-to-face or in forward orders groups. FRAGOs over the radio must be simple.**
- **As the commander fights his battle, the XO/S3, or battle captain must be empowered to receive orders and talk for the commander to higher headquarters.**
- **Be visible and show a command presence.**
- **Commanders must position up front to read the battle.**
- **Reading the battlefield has different requirements at each echelon of command.**
- **Move to the decisive point to assess the situation and allocate resources.**
- **Stay mentally and emotionally detached from immediate surroundings to visualize the larger situation and its impact on the unit and mission.**
- **You don't know what you can't see. The clarity of information received at the command post may not be sufficient to paint an accurate picture.**



- **Battle captains are critical to command post operations and keeping the commander informed.**
- **Command posts must be trained together as a team. Personnel within command posts must understand the commander's intent, the operation, their role in mission accomplishment, and the commander's expectations.**
- **Liaison officers are critical. Must staff and equip to position at higher headquarters and on the flanks. Must be experienced, know the plan, and articulate the commander's intent.**
- **Eavesdrop on the main effort or the unit in contact.**
- **Eavesdropping and crosstalk on the command net is imperative.**
- **Centralized planning, decentralized execution is critical for mission success.**
- **Fixed call signs at all levels on secure nets simplify operations.**



- **Teamwork and interpersonal relationships are keys to success. Builds trust and confidence, exposes strengths and potential weaknesses.**
- **The training process is producing commanders who are doing the right things on the battlefield.**
- **Current doctrine works. Serves as a common denominator for our Army.**

Appendix B

Survey

1. What method did you rely on to pass orders to commanders during combat? Is this the method you preferred or was there another?

2. How did you disseminate your Commander's Intent to your commanders during combat?

3. Where did you position yourself on the battlefield? Is this where you wanted to be? If not, why?

4. Who were the indispensable people on your team who allowed you to command and control your unit during combat?

5. Who did you insist accompany you or be close by during the fight?

6. How long had you known or previously worked with the leaders in your command? Did this affect the means or methods of passing orders or intent?

7. What primary vehicle did you command from during the fight? What systems did this vehicle have and were they adequate?

8. Did you at any time have the need to talk to a commander two echelons below your level during combat?

9. What method was used to inform the staff (Main or TAC CP) of orders and intent issued to commanders while you were away from these nodes?

10. What was the most effective means of distributing changes to graphics during combat?

11. Was the current command and control organization sufficient for your needs?

12. What equipment (radios, TACSAT, etc.) do you consider indispensable in enabling you to provide adequate command and control?

13. What was the most successful command and control technique used during the fight? The least successful? What should be included in our doctrine?

14. Is there anything left out in this survey about leadership and command that you wish to add?

Note: Some questions were not answered by every commander due to the time constraints of the interview.

Appendix C

Commanders Interviewed

GEN Carl W. Stiner. Commanded XVIII Airborne Corps from October 1988 to June 1990. During JUST CAUSE, served as Commander, Joint Task Force, SOUTH. Currently Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command.

GEN Frederick M. Franks, Jr. Commanded VII Corps from August 1989 to July 1991. Commanded VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

LTG Gary E. Luck. Assumed command of XVIII Airborne Corps in June 1990. Commanded XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

LTG James H. Johnson, Jr. Commanded 82nd Airborne Division from October 1988 to May 1991. Commanded 82nd Airborne Division during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM all under XVIII Airborne Corps. Currently Commander, First Army.

LTG J. H. Binford Peay III. Commanded 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) from August 1989 to June 1991. Commanded 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM under XVIII Airborne Corps. Currently assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army.

LTG Ronald H. Griffith. Commanded 1st Armored Division from October 1989 to July 1991. Commanded 1st Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM under VII Corps. Currently assigned as Inspector General, US Army.

LTG Barry R. McCaffrey. Commanded 24th Infantry Division from June 1990 to May 1992. Commanded the 24th Infantry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM

under XVIII Airborne Corps. Currently assigned as Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MG Paul E. Funk. Commanded 3rd Armored Division from October 1989 to April 1991. Commanded 3rd Armored Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM under VII Corps. Currently assigned as Commander, US Army Armor Center and School.

MG John H. Tilelli, Jr. Assumed command of 1st Cavalry Division in July 1990. Commanded 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. During Operation DESERT STORM, 1st Cavalry Division was OPCON to VII Corps, then CENTCOM reserve, then OPCON VII Corps. Currently assigned as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army.

MG Rupert Smith. Assumed command of 1st Armored Division (United Kingdom), in October 1990. Commanded 1st Armored Division (UK), during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. During Operation DESERT STORM, Division was under tactical control of VII Corps.

BG Joseph K. Kellogg, Jr. Commanded 3rd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division from September 1988 to August 1990. Commanded 3rd Brigade during Operation JUST CAUSE. Chief of Staff, 82nd Airborne Division, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Assistant Division Commander for Operations, 82nd Airborne Division.

BG Jack P. Nix. Commanded 1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division from September 1989 to September 1991. Commanded 1st Brigade during Operations JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD, and DESERT STORM under 82nd Airborne Division. Currently assigned as Assistant Division Commander for Support, 82nd Airborne Division.

BG Leonard D. Holder, Jr. Commanded 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment from July 1989 to July 1991. Commanded the Regiment under VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff, Central Army Group.

BG Montgomery C. Meigs. Commanded 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from September 1990 to January 1991. Commanded 2nd

Brigade, 1st Armored Division as part of VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as commander, 7th Army Training Command, USAREUR and 7th Army.

BG William L. Nash. Commanded 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division from June 1989 to July 1991. Commanded 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division as part of VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Deputy Commanding General for Training, US Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth.

COL George H. Harmeyer. Commanded 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division from May 1989 to May 1991. Commanded 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Commander, Operations Group, National Training Center.

COL John B. Sylvester. Commanded 1st Brigade, (Tiger Brigade), 2nd Armored Division from October 1989 to October 1991. Commanded Tiger Brigade during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Deployed with 1st Cavalry Division to Saudi Arabia, attached to 2nd Marine Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Deputy Assistant Commandant, US Army Armor School.

COL Lon E. Maggart. Commanded 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from June 1990 to April 1992. Commanded 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division as part of VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Executive Officer to TRADOC Commander.

COL Leroy R. Goff. Commanded 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division from August 1989 to August 1991. Commanded 3rd Brigade, 3rd Armored Division as part of VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as G3, V Corps.

COL Anthony A. Moreno. Assumed command of 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in July 1990. Commanded 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division as part of VII Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

COL John M. LeMoyne. Assumed command of 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division in December 1990. Commanded 1st Brigade, 24th Infantry Division as part of XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

COL James T. Hill. Commanded 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) from August 1989 to July 1991. Commanded 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) as part of XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Currently assigned as Chief of Staff, 101st Airborne, Air Assault Division.

COL Robert T. Clark. Assumed command of 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) in November 1990. Commanded 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) as part of XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

COL Theodore J. Purdom. Assumed command of 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) in October 1990. Commanded 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, (Air Assault) as part of XVIII Airborne Corps during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

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