CHAPTER 12

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Section I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

968. This chapter lists basic principles for the joint employment of air and ground force units in airborne operations. It further indicates, for guidance of ground force commanders and staffs, procedures to be used in the planning and execution of such operations. For additional detail, see FM's 1–30, 31–40, and 71–30.

969. Airborne forces generally are employed in close coordination with other ground, air, and naval forces. The missions are to attack, seize, and hold important objectives; to exploit initial airborne assaults; and to occupy areas or reinforce units beyond the immediate reach of other ground forces. Specific types of operations are—

a. A deep airborne envelopment into hostile territory and the seizure of an airhead from which to initiate further land or air operations. This invasion type operation is a major assault landing of extensive forces and resources and involves continued operations against the enemy. Logistical support initially will be entirely by air. An eventual link-up with ground or naval forces may be made.

b. The seizure of an area, in connection with other military ground operations, in such a manner that an early link-up between the airborne and other forces is practical. This early link-up type operation involves landings in rear of the enemy lines in which—

(1) Important tactical localities are seized and held in conjunction with or pending early arrival of military or naval forces.

(2) Movement of enemy reserves is blocked or delayed by capturing and holding critical terrain features thereby isolating the immediate battle area.

c. The seizure of an area for use as an airbase from which to initiate further air, or airborne operations.

d. The seizure of an area to deny its use to the enemy.

e. The destruction of enemy forces, installations, and facilities followed by a prompt withdrawal or relief of attacking elements.

f. The reinforcing of threatened or surrounded units.

970. a. Airborne combat differs from ground action in that—

(1) There is usually an absence of heavy equipment, such as heavy artillery and armor, in the airhead.

(2) The circular shape of the airhead facilitates rapid employment of reserves at threatened points.

(3) The requirement for protection of airfields and strips from enemy observation and fire restricts the freedom of maneuver of the airborne commander.

(4) The restrictive effect of bad weather is felt more strongly.

(5) Supporting services are present in limited numbers, initially, thereby increasing difficulties of control, supply, and communication.

(6) Troops are extremely vulnerable during landing and assembly.

(7) Mobility and fire power of troops landed in the airhead are restricted more than in normal ground operations. The normal shortage or lack of friendly armor requires the airborne commander to emphasize the use of other means for strengthening antitank defense and increasing offensive power.

b. The characteristics of airborne operations are outlined in the following paragraphs.

971. Relative characteristics of air transported, glider, and parachute operations are—

a. Parachute operations require specially trained units whereas aircraft can be used to land units which have had a minimum of specialized training.

b. Parachutists can make day or night jumps; gliders can be landed at night with only sufficient light to discern terrain features; light aircraft can land on favorable terrain or roads on bright moonlight nights, but other aircraft require lighter runway markers.

c. Powered aircraft require use of captured airfields or construction of airstrips; glider landings can be made on relatively level and unobstructed terrain, but parachute units can land on any terrain which is free of obstacles dangerous to the individual upon contact.

d. Glider formations are more sensitive to weather and antiaircraft fire than powered aircraft.

e. Gliders can land heavy vehicles and equipment on terrain which is impracticable for use of powered aircraft. Small vehicles can be dropped by parachute on many types of terrain.

f. Operational radius of action is greater for parachute operations than for those which require glider tow or landing of airplanes to discharge passengers and matériel.

g. Parachute troops can be delivered into an area faster than glider or air transported forces. Units utilizing heavier equipment can be delivered by glider or airplane.

h. Gliders normally are used only once in an assault operation, whereas powered aircraft may make successive trips to the airhead.

972. a. The employment of airborne forces envisions—

(1) A movement by air to overcome distance, geographical barriers or enemy defenses.

(2) Use of the forces which are not committed to action, by threat of employment, to compel the enemy to disperse defense forces and facilities to protect vital installations.

b. Airborne operations require a high degree of coordination between air and ground forces and naval forces acting in conjunction or present in the area of operations. Therefore operations generally should be under theater control for over-all planning and supervision.

c. Because of the inherent vulnerability of airborne operations, air superiority within the area of operations is a fundamental prerequisite. Protection for marshaling, air movement, and establishment of the airhead must be adequate to prevent effective enemy counteraction.

d. In invasion type airborne operations, parachute units are normally used to make the initial assault. Air-transported units then move into protected landing areas and, when organized, attack from the airhead to exploit the tactical advantages gained. If there is no requirement for a parachute and glider assault,

ground units which have been trained for air movement are employed.

e. To obtain maximum effectiveness in the initial assault, airborne landings are conducted in mass and in the smallest practicable area.

f. When conducted in conjunction with ground or amphibious operations, airborne operations are launched to give maximum assistance to the main effort. Airborne attack may precede the ground or amphibious attack.

g. Airborne operations may be conducted in daylight or at night. Additional training and practice are required for night operations.

h. In large scale airborne operations desirable airhead characteristics are—

(1) Adequate landing areas.

(2) Dominating terrain features or barriers which facilitate defense of the airhead.

(3) Adequate road nets connecting the landing areas, the objective, and the dominating terrain features.

973. A large scale airborne assault requires the support normal to any large operation. Service support must be sufficient to meet operational demands. In addition, airborne operations require—

a. Strategic and tactical air forces sufficient to insure air superiority in the operational area.

b. Troop carrier forces whose strength, state of training, and type of aircraft insure successful movement of all necessary equipment and combat and service units.

c. Departure airfields within flying radius of the airhead. These airfields should allow dispersion of both powered and glider aircraft. Runways must permit the marshaling and rapid departure of large groups of loaded gliders.

d. Airborne and ground units properly trained and equipped to accomplish the combat missions assigned.

e. Marshaling areas with adequate service troops, facilities, and equipment to guard, house, and feed troops, and to provide signal communication and necessary briefing aids.

f. Air transported service units to construct advanced air strips within the airhead and to control air traffic.

g. Supporting units to insure accurate weather information and electronic or visual guides to and from the airhead area.

974. a. It is the responsibility of the theater commander to request forces and facilities which are needed to launch required airborne assaults. Within the limits of the means actually provided, he determnes the scope of the airborne operations that can be conducted.

b. To facilitate planning and to provide an agency which insures timely recommendations on the use of airborne forces, an airborne planning section is included on the theater staff.

c. Having approved an airborne operational plan, the theater commander usually assumes responsibility for over-all coordination, issues directives to all participating units defining their responsibilities and functions, and designates the commander. It usually is advantageous to establish a joint headquarters composed of army and air force personnel to plan and execute all airborne operations. This facilitates continuity of effort, rapid planning, and vigorous execution.

d. During the air movement the troop carrier commander controls the movement of the transported army units.

e. The senior army commander in the airhead is the airhead commander.

f. After the landing is made, the army and troop carrier units remain under command of the airborne operation commander until a ground juncture is effected. At that time troop carrier units revert to their normal assignment and army units come under the appropriate commander in the area.

g. The communications zone and air force units in a supporting role support the airborne force as directed by the theater commander.

975. a. All field forces must be capable of conducting large scale airborne operations. Forces designated for such operations should be given a warning directive well in advance of the operation.

b. The theater commander may direct an army headquarters, with appropriate supporting troops, to devote itself primarily to preparation and training for airborne operations. Airborne and air-transported divisions or corps will be assigned by the theater commander for the specific mission.

c. The army or separate corps commander influences the action by securing and disseminating information of enemy forces which

may affect the command; by his presence in critical areas; by changing boundaries, missions, and objectives; by shifting troops; by committing reserves; by arranging for support aviation; by allocation of logistical support; and by timely shifts of priorities for air movement into the airhead. After the initial combat phase of an airborne operation has been completed, the force operates in its normal ground role.

976. a. Every army corps must be capable of commanding an appropriate number of airborne divisions, air-transported divisions, or a combination of both types, in either the assault, build-up, or exploitation phase of an airhead operation.

b. In a separate corps airborne operation, the corps normally operates directly under theater headquarters or an army group until such time as the established airhead has been reached by ground units. At the time of link-up, the corps normally reverts to command of an appropriate army.

c. Any corps designated to command airborne forces should be given the earliest possible warning directive to permit it to complete preparations for executing the mission. During this preparatory phase, a separate corps completes all the preparations listed for the army. When a corps is operating independently in an airborne operation, it assumes the logistical support functions of an army, to include the operation of essential administrative installations as required by the situation. A corps, subordinate to an army for an airborne operation, is relieved of most administrative functions and permitted to confine its preparations principally to planning and training for its part in the tactical ground operation.

d. The theater commander may direct one or more corps headquarters, with appropriate supporting units, to emphasize planning and training for airborne operations. This directive does not preclude the commitment of the designated corps headquarters to ground operations. The decision to direct such specialization depends largely on the anticipated number and frequency of airborne attacks and the number of corps headquarters available in the theater.

e. In an airborne operation, close control is necessitated by the fluid character of combat in an airhead which requires rapidity of decision and aggressive action. The corps commander in an airborne operation influences the action by his presence in critical areas and by appropriate action covering each of the factors listed in paragraph 975 c.

977. a. The basic tactical airborne unit is the division. Its primary role is to conduct parachute and glider assaults. It is capable of landing in unprepared areas and immediately and effectively engaging the enemy.

b. The airborne division, as initially committed, can be expected to fight and exist as a tactical unit without relief or resupply for approximately 48 hours. The initial lack of heavy weapons in the assault is compensated for by special combat training including rehearsal, effective use of surprise, thorough planning, and the concentration of a superior force in the objective area.

978. a. The division requires at least 7 days to prepare for an operation.

b. In organizing for combat, the division is divided into the assault, follow-up, and rear echelons. The assault echelon normally includes parachute and glider elements. The follow-up echelon may include glider, airplane, overland, or seaborne elements. The rear echelon includes administrative personnel and units not required initially in the objective area.

c. Equipment available for the airborne assault is identical to that for ground operations, except that medium armor, heavy artillery, and heavy engineer equipment, at present, cannot be transported by air.

979. a. Most units may be adapted for air movement after sufficient training and with certain modifications of organization and equipment.

b. A commander is justified in resorting to air movement of a ground unit only when geographical obstacles, hostile barriers, distances, or expediency forbid or seriously limit the use of other types of transport.

980. Tactical air and troop carrier elements are closely associated with ground units in an airborne operation. Strategical air forces, air defense units, and the air-sea rescue services assist airborne operations when the situation requires their participation.

ARMY AND AIR FORCE RESPONSIBILITY

981. Army responsibility includes—

a. Concentration, organization, and equipping of the airborne forces.

b. Conduct of airborne and ground training as required in preparation for an airborne mission.

c. Planning and supervision of the ground phase of the airborne assault.

d. Recovery of initial supplies and equipment and the provision of service units for the unloading of aircraft in the airhead.

e. Control of supplies from air fields in the airhead to supply points.

f. Repair of air fields or construction of air strips within the airhead during the assault phase.

g. Evacuation to airhead air fields.

982. Communications zone responsibility includes—

a. Procurement and delivery of supplies and equipment to rear air bases.

b. Movement of the airborne forces to marshaling camps and the provision of accompanying equipment and supplies.

c. Evacuation from rear air bases.

983. Air force responsibility includes—

a. Concentration, organization, and equipping of air units participating in an airborne operation.

b. Providing the army with necessary facilities for air training and for conduct of training of air force units.

c. Planning and supervision of the air participation in an airborne assault.

d. Air movement of troops, equipment, and supplies to landing areas within an airhead.

e. Receipt, unloading, and temporary storage of supplies at rear bases.

f. Preparation and loading of follow-up supplies and delivery to the airhead.

g. Procurement of aerial delivery containers and cargo parachutes.

h. Assistance in the logistical organization for the receipt of supplies on airhead air fields.

i. Evacuation from airhead air fields to rear air bases.

j. Operation, construction, and maintenance of air fields in the airhead after the assault phase.

984. Joint responsibility includes—

a. Planning of vital interest to both services, including selection of landing zones, and time and space factors involving troop and supply delivery must be accomplished jointly.

b. Army and air force pathfinder teams should be trained jointly in order that the respective duties of each will be coordinated.

Section III. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

985. a. An airborne operational plan is the outgrowth of continuous preliminary planning developed by theater and unit staffs. This planning is based on availability of aircraft and the changing tactical and logistical conditions in the theater. The theater planning staff considers numerous possible airborne operations. From among these emerge certain probable operations which are assigned to subordinate units for development.

b. A unit directed to plan one or more airborne operations initiates planning immediately and continues until the operation is either cancelled or executed. The amount of detail involved in the planning and the detailed intelligence sought varies with the level of the headquarters.

986. Planning directives from higher headquarters may be oral and fragmentary in the early stages of planning. A complete directive is issued later, usually as a result of a theater air-ground conference. Directives issued by all commands contain operational information, intelligence, weather, and necessary logistical information. In addition, directives include general landing areas; composition, equipment, and departure airfields of air force units; pathfinders and guides; special equipment; and arrangements for altering or cancelling the operation.

987. Detailed planning is best developed by working backward from the objective area in the following sequence:

a. Develop ground tactical plan, determine strength and composition of the forces required.

b. Develop the logistical plan.

c. Develop a landing plan which indicates the sequence, time, and place of arrival of troops and matériel.

d. Prepare flight and air movement plans based on the landing plan.

e. Prepare marshaling plan based on plan of air movement.

988. Simplicity is a guiding principle in the planning and preparation for airborne operations. To attain simplicity—

a. Avoid a complicated plan for distribution of troops at departure airfields.

b. Use landmarks which are easy to locate and identify from the air.

c. Avoid a complicated scheme of landing.

d. Do not depend on a plan which is entirely contingent upon the arrival of any one air serial or ground unit.

e. Do not prescribe difficult and distant objectives immediately after landing.

f. Do not duplicate objectives.

g. Airborne participation must be integrated completely into the over-all plan.

989. Planning time requirements can be reduced and effective execution facilitated by the development of airborne, troop carrier, and communication zone standing operating procedures.

990. Combat elements of the airborne force are selected in accordance with the mission and operating conditions imposed. These may include airborne or air-transportable units, or any combination of the two. Supporting elements from all arms and services may be assigned. Troop and cargo-carrying capabilities and availability of aircraft, the initial landing capacity of the airhead, and other limitations impose definite restrictions on the organization of the airborne force. Special planning therefore is necessary to reduce aircraft requirements and assure maximum fire power and mobility in the parachute or glider elements.

991. The nature and location of landing areas are important in formulating the scheme of maneuver. The general location in which they are to be established is governed necessarily by the mission. Landing areas may be assigned in broad general terms. In lower units, more specific designation of their locations is required by the higher commanders. Landing areas should provide dispositions favorable to the ground tactical plan and be of sufficient size to accommodate the landing forces.

992. a. In an airborne operation, the airhead is the area in hostile territory established by the airborne assault force to protect the

subsequent landing of troops and supplies by air. It is part of the objective area. It normally includes all of the landing areas and all airfields and airstrips in the landing areas. The principal factors which determine the location, extent, and form of a proposed airhead are the mission, the location of proposed landing areas, the size and organization of the airborne force and air forces involved, the offensive and defensive characteristics of the terrain in the objective area, the expected time available for organization of the ground, and the expected enemy reaction.

b. The limits of the airhead are defined by the airhead line, which constitutes a tentative defensive position for the airhead, and an outpost line, to which security forces are pushed for screening purposes. These lines are selected in advance and modified as more detailed information becomes available.

993. a. The ground tactical plan is based upon normal considerations governing the conduct of ground operations but is modified by the special conditions which develop from dispersed landings and lack of initial command control. Special consideration must be given to the time and place at which the assault and reserve elements are landed; consolidation and reorganization of the assault forces; and capabilities of the airhead organization to continue fire and logistical support.

b. Plans for the advance outward from the airhead to the ultimate objective may be prepared simultaneously with the assault plan. Uncertainty of success of various landings and the possibility of loss of troops, matériel, and aircraft en route, and during landings, requires flexibility in such plans.

994. Logistical plans of armies, corps, or divisions, vary in scope, coverage, and sequence in planning. The logistical plans of all commands, however, cover all five essential elements of logistics; namely, supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, service, and management.

995. a. Upon determination of forces required, assignment of mission, and selection of general landing areas, allotment of supporting troop carrier units is made.

b. A daily allocation of aircraft units is made, based on the number of balanced divisions and supporting units that can be landed each day. The allocation of aircraft indicates the troop carrier units which transport each airborne unit. The airborne and troop carrier commanders study assigned landing areas and select general areas for each subordinate unit.

c. Airborne commanders and troop carrier commanders study assigned landing areas to select and agree on specific drop zones, landing zones, airstrips, and airfields. In formulating the tactical plan, the sequence and exact place for landing of all units finally is established. The airborne and troop carrier units then prepare the detailed air movement table.

d. When required, plans are developed to bring in air-transported troops and matériel after the seizure of an airhead and the construction or capture of suitable airfields. These troops may include infantry divisions, corps, and army troops, and service elements to support them.

996. An air support plan is formulated based on the over-all air force mission and the amount of strategic, tactical, and troop carrier air effort available.

997. Upon designation of the general landing areas, troop carrier staffs initiate planning for an air movement. The troop carrier commander's plan for the air movement prescribes the use and allocation of troop carrier units and facilities in a manner which meets the requirements of the airborne commander as far as technical and tactical limitations permit.

998. Backward planning from the landing area is the best approach to the problem. Final approach routes and air traffic in the target area, route over enemy and friendly territory, serial formation assembly, air traffic, and concentration for the air movement are considered in that order. Plans are made for each based upon the following considerations:

a. Estimate of enemy air and ground dispositions which can be avoided or neutralized.

b. Distinctive terrain features for use as aids to navigation, or control, or both, and coordination points.

c. Conformation of suitable landing areas and location of terrain obstacles.

d. Anticipated weather.

e. Concept of air traffic density as it may be affected by a day or night operation.

f. Other terrain features which affect ground observation and ground fire. Centers of population, main roads, proximity to interceptor airfields, radar and air warning system, antiaircraft

defense system, thinly held front-line sectors, and time and distance in enemy territory are all considered for effect on the air movement and routes.

g. The air route selected should be as short as practicable, delay alerting the enemy air defense system, take advantage of terrain features for navigation and control points, establish a free air passage corridor over naval forces, where required, and minimize conflict with other theater air traffic. The plan is integrated with other theater agencies.

999. a. The marshaling plan covers three principal and related activities. These are the movement of tactical units to marshaling camps; the provision of certain facilities and services by the communications zone while units are in the marshaling camps; and plans for loading of aircraft.

b. The preparation of standing operating procedures for marshaling and publishing of warning orders and fragmentary information well in advance are essential to smooth execution of a marshaling plan.

PLANS FOR CONSOLIDATION AND BUILD-UP OF TROOPS AND MATÉRIEL

1000. After assault units have seized their objectives and have accomplished initial missions, a temporary transition to the defensive is usually necessary. The mission of the force changes from an attack on the initial objectives to one of a perimeter defense. The new mission can be coordinated by selection of an airhead line and by prescribing boundaries between or areas of responsibility to units.

1001. The conduct of the defense of the airhead usually is delegated to the commander of the assault force. In preparation for this defense, the commander plans to phase in troops and supplies, to furnish an integrated antitank defense, and to reinforce his field and antiaircraft artillery. The plan is flexible to permit changes as the tactical situation varies.

1002. Some major factors to be considered in the build up plan are—

a. Airfield construction.

b. Development of a system for the reception of troops and matériel.

c. Concentration of units for further operations.

d. Installation of logistical facilities on a scale to support contemplated operations.

1003. The exploitation phase insures the fulfillment of the operational mission. Plans for successful exploitation may include—

a. Enlarging the airhead as an advanced airbase, naval base, port, staging area, or missile site.

b. Seizing critical terrain, road and rail nets, canals, natural resources, and protecting potential allies.

c. Destruction or capture of manufacturing areas, resources, missile sites, airfields, or enemy forces.

d. Seizing other terrain inaccessible to other type ground troops.

1004. If the initial contact is with amphibious forces, at a port or shore line, plans are made for eliminating enemy opposition, coordinating naval gunfire and air support, and signaling safe entry to amphibious units.

1005. If an inland contact with advancing ground forces is contemplated, plans are made for coordinated use of air and artillery support. Requirements include—

a. Prearranged plans for junction and assumption of command by the senior headquarters.

b. Command and staff liaison.

c. A system of mutual recognition and identification prescribed in signal operation instructions.

d. Early radio contact to establish front-line positions, no fire, and bomb lines.

e. Maximum use of available liaison aircraft to describe positions and to assist in making final link-up.

Section IV. EXECUTION OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

1006. a. The air movement of assaulting airborne troops delivers the force to its assigned landing areas, with minimum dispersion in time and space, to achieve maximum benefit from tactical surprise. To accomplish this, emplaning take-off, and air assembly of serials from all airfields are scheduled closely by the air headquarters controlling the over-all air movement.

b. Pathfinder serials, when required, precede the main troop carrier column. Parachute pathfinder teams place and operate navigational aids in the landing area.

LANDING AND REORGANIZATION OF AIRBORNE UNITS

1007. a. The landing and reorganization of airborne units and their matériel are two critical phases of the airborne assault which are executed with all possible speed and precision. When necessary, security is sacrificed for speed and control of reorganization.

b. Airborne troops normally are landed as close to their objective as possible without coming under small arms fire. The troops should have a reasonable time to collect equipment and assemble as tactical units before engaging in combat. Surprise may be enhanced, however, by landing on the objective or making the move to the objective as short as possible. A short move prevents the exhaustion of troops resulting from forced marches, carrying heavy combat loads, and manhandling equipment over long distances.

1008. a. An airborne division normally lands its three combat teams in three general drop zone areas in less than an hour. Command echelons are placed in assault serials. The actual landing is made by battalion groups. The glider element lands in parachute combat team areas or in an area centrally located. Gliders normally land after parachutists have cleared the area of local enemy resistance.

1009. Battalions and separate units reorganize in a prearranged manner making use of assembly areas, assembly aids, and identification markings for personnel and equipment. Assembly areas are established just off the landing areas. For reference they are marked by prominent landmarks and assembly aids. The first parachute units to land normally are charged with gaining and maintaining the security of the drop and landing zones. Other units move directly to their assembly areas, by planeload or gliderload, carrying with them all equipment needed for the assault.

1010. a. Each battalion commander reports location and status of personnel and equipment before moving from the assembly area to the objectives. Battalions normally will report readiness for action in 30 to 60 minutes.

b. Designated personnel remain on the drop and landing zones to protect the area, assemble stragglers, care for casualties, and to complete the removal of supplies.

c. The reorganization of the division is complete when all elements of the units are in their proper places and communication is established.

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INITIAL GROUND MISSIONS

1011. a. The infantry battalions proceed on their assigned mission when assembled. The smaller units, which may have left the drop zone earlier on independent missions, either have seized the objective or obtained information as to the defenses. Combat during this period is based primarily on aggressive action by small units. Commanders attack as rapidly as the situation permits, utilizing all available fire support. A system of reinforced road blocks is used to mobilize enemy forces. Enemy communications facilities are disrupted promptly. Artillery is placed under centralized command as soon as possible. During the development of the coordinated attacks, detachments protect the flanks and rear, gain contact with neighboring units, destroy or capture enemy troops, and otherwise consolidate their assigned area.

b. Units or personnel which are landed in areas other than those planned, direct their efforts to the accomplishment of the general mission and establish contact with their respective headquarters as soon as practicable.

1012. The regimental commander places himself where he can best coordinate the actions of his battalions to secure a decision. The division commander shifts the fire of artillery, arranges for air support, and uses reserves as the situation dictates.

1013. As soon as the initial objectives have been captured, the combat teams seize further objectives which facilitate the establishment of a coordinated division defense. Then, defensive positions are organized, signal communication established, reserves reconstituted, and other measures taken to prepare the force to repel enemy counterattacks or to resume the offensive.

LANDING AND REORGANIZATION OF AIR TRANSPORTED UNITS

1014. Based on the capacities of the secured airstrips or airfields, air-transported units land as rapidly as possible. If combat teams are expected to initiate combat within a few hours after landing, unit integrity is maintained by airfield or adjoining airfields.

1015. From the deplaning area, air-transported units move by

air serial organization to a designated assembly area carrying with them all equipment needed for their immediate tasks. Upon arrival in combat team assembly areas, groups are directed to their subordinate areas where units report the status of personnel and equipment.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMAND POSTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

1016. The immediate establishment of communication, as parachute, glider, and air-landed elements arrive in the combat area, is essential for effective command control of ground operations. For effective command control signal communication is maintained within the airborne forces, with supporting aviation and naval forces, with troop carrier units concerned with build-up and air supply and evacuation, and to widely separated airborne or ground forces with a common or coordinated mission.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIRHEAD

1017. The major consideration after the initial landings have been effected and the initial ground missions accomplished is the advance to and seizure of the airhead line. This extends the occupied area to a sufficient distance beyond the airstrips and airfields to insure uninterrupted landings of air-transported troops, equipment, and supplies, and secures the requisite terrain features and maneuver space for such further offensive or defensive operations as the mission may require. The advance to, and seizure of, the critical terrain features of the airhead line is accomplished with maximum speed. For purposes of coordinating this advance, the airborne assault commander may designate successive objectives or phase lines.

1018. The airhead line is occupied and organized to the extent demanded by the situation. Adjustments in the preplanned dispositions of troops and installations are made to fit the realities of the terrain and the situation. Appropriate active and passive reconnaissance and security measures are taken, which usually include the establishment of a predetermined outpost line to which security forces promptly advance. In the early stages of the operation the defensive positions are usually lightly held and the bulk of the forces are held in reserve for counterattacking enemy penetrations. As reinforcing units are landed in the airhead the positions are more heavily organized.

1019. The build-up of the airhead proceeds concurrently with the

seizure and organization of the airhead line. As additional combat troops arrive they are used to reinforce the front-line positions, to constitute reserves, and to prepare for such offensive operations as the mission may require.

SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS

1020. a. Ground operations to exploit the advantages obtained by the establishment of the airhead follow the normal pattern of ground operations.

b. After the airhead has been established firmly, airborne units either are relieved to permit preparation for subsequent airborne assaults or are reorganized and re-equipped for sustained ground operations.

c. Withdrawal from an airhead may be forced by the enemy or may be made voluntarily. Advance planning is imperative as the limitations of transport aircraft and the circular nature of the airhead introduce complicating factors not present in the normal ground withdrawal. When the situation permits, the plan usually provides for evacuation in the following sequence: supplies, matériel, and troops.

SUPPLY PHASES

1021. Supply operations within an airhead are divided into these three phases—

a. Accompanying supply phase—recovery and distribution of accompanying supplies by assault airborne forces.

b. Unit air supply phase—receipt, recovery, and distribution of unit air supply by assault airborne forces.

c. Replenishment supply phase—receipt, classification, storage, and distribution of replenishment supply, and the receipt of accompanying supplies in follow-up echelon.

CHAPTER 13

THE DIVISION

Section I. INFANTRY DIVISION

1022. a. The infantry division is the basis of organization of the ground field forces. It is triangular in composition. Three regiments of infantry, a heavy tank battalion, a combat engineer battalion, an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion, and four field artillery battalions comprise the major combat elements. It is the smallest unit that is composed of all the essential ground arms and services and which can conduct, by its own means, ground operations of general importance. It can strike or penetrate effectively, maneuver readily over any type of terrain, and absorb reinforcing units easily. It can act alone or as part of a higher unit.

b. The organization of the infantry division includes the minimum number of organic units with which the division can be expected to engage in sustained combat. In many situations, in order that the division may engage in decisive operations, it must be reinforced with additional means such as artillery, armor, engineer, and antiaircraft elements.

c. The doctrines of combat, enunciated in preceding chapters of this manual, apply to the operations of the infantry division.

1023. The combat value of the infantry division derives from its ability to combine the action of the various arms and services, to maintain combat over a considerable period of time, to fight sustained close combat, and to gain and hold ground. The ability of the infantry division to absorb and supply reinforcing units such as artillery, armor, engineers, and additional service units gives it a flexibility which contributes heavily to its combat effectiveness. With special training and special equipment as necessary it can participate effectively in any type of special operation.

1024. When a division is operating as part of a larger unit, it usually must conform to the plan of action of the higher commander. In an advance, the corps commander ordinarily will prescribe a zone of advance for each division of the corps. The road net within the zone may influence largely the march formations and supply arrangements within the division. The corps also may prescribe the general line which advance guards of the division will cross at a given time at the beginning of the march, the extent of the march, as well as any special formation of the corps for the advance.

1025. When fully motorized by the attachment of additional transport, the infantry division is a highly mobile unit. It is especially suited then to execute the following types of operations:

a. To provide close support of armored units; to consolidate and hold gains made by such units.

b. To seize and hold important localities pending arrival of less mobile forces.

c. To exploit success achieved by armored, airborne, and other units.

d. To execute envelopments and turning movements either in close cooperation with armored and other mobile units or, under favorable conditions, to execute these operations independently.

e. To constitute a powerful mobile general reserve for use either offensively or defensively as the situation demands.

1026. The army or corps reconnaissance elements or covering forces may be operating in advance of the divisions. While cooperation and contact between these reconnaissance elements and those of the division are necessary, their presence in no way relieves the division commander of responsibility for reconnaissance by, and security for, his own command.

1027. a. When the division is moved by air transport the type transport aircraft furnished will determine what divisional heavy equipment can accompany it. If heavy equipment such as medium tanks, medium artillery, and engineering vehicles cannot be transported, the capacity of the division to engage in long sustained combat is reduced.

b. The infantry division has neither the characteristics nor the means of the airborne division to permit it to land from the air in an area not previously secured by friendly troops.

1028. In combat, the mission assigned the division may require the division to act in close coordination and cooperation with adjacent divisions or to operate at a distance from the main force. The decisions and actions of the division commander in either situation are predicated upon the greatest assistance to the successful execution of the task of the higher commander.

1029. a. Situations will arise during combat when it becomes desirable to decentralize command functions normally exercised in division headquarters. In such situations combat teams are formed. For details see paragraph 20.

b. When the situation makes such action advisable, the infantry division can readily organize a mobile task force whose major components include infantry and artillery battalions and all or part of the divisional tank battalion. Such a force may be augmented by the attachment of suitable reconnaissance, engineer, signal, and medical elements.

Section II. ARMORED DIVISION

1030. The armored division is the basic large armored unit of the combined arms. It comprises a balanced force of essential ground arms and services so organized and equipped as to make it tactically and administratively self-contained and especially suited for missions which require great mobility and fire power.

1031. a. As presently organized, four tank battalions, four armored infantry battalions, four armored field artillery battalions, one antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion, one reconnaissance battalion, and one armored engineer battalion comprise the major combat elements of the division. These battalions are administratively self-sufficient. A division headquarters, two combat command headquarters, a reserve command headquarters, a division artillery headquarters, and a trains headquarters comprise the larger command and control elements of the division. The combat commands and reserve command headquarters are tactical headquarters with no organic troops other than their own headquarters companies.

b. Battalions and other units, both combat and service, are attached to combat commands and to the reserve command by the division commander in accordance with the missions he assigns these commands. Division artillery headquarters, operating under division headquarters, exercises command over the division artillery whenever the tactical situation permits. The trains head-

quarters is a tactical headquarters which provides for the control, movement, and protection of those elements of the division trains assigned to it. It also performs administrative functions for the rear echelon of division headquarters. It exercises no technical supervision of units of the division trains.

1032. The organization of the armored division provides great flexibility in the composition of its combat formations. If organizing for combat, the armored division is prepared to fight in two or three flexibly organized combat commands. The composition of each is varied from time to time to perform most advantageously the tasks at hand. The reserve command controls the combat units not assigned to the other combat commands. The reserve command, with its attached combat elements has the mission of supplying the combat commands with rested and rehabilitated units or of being employed in combat as a third combat command.

1033. a. The units within the combat command ordinarily are organized under the combat command commander into smaller task forces consisting basically of tanks, armored infantry, and armored engineers. Each task force usually consists of a reinforced battalion commanded by the battalion commander. These reinforced battalions are formed either by the attachment of tanks from a tank battalion to an armored infantry battalion or by a similar attachment of armored infantry from an armored infantry battalion to a tank battalion. Armored engineer detachments normally are attached to these reinforced battalions.

b. The proportion of tanks and armored infantry within these reinforced battalions varies. One may be strong in tanks while another may be strong in armored infantry, but the basic principle of employing tanks and armored infantry together is maintained.

c. Artillery battalions may be attached to or placed in support of the combat command. Artillery battalions normally are not attached to reinforced tank or armored infantry battalions but are designated as direct support battalions for them. Reconnaissance and service elements attached to a combat command operate under direct control of the commander of the combat command.

1034. Successful operation of the armored division depends upon the proper utilization of its mobility, fire power, and shock action.

a. To achieve the maximum mobility, movements must be planned and coordinated. Techniques of marching, maintenance,

and resupply of fuel, lubricants, and spare parts must be perfected. Obstacles, terrain, and weather are restrictive factors affecting the mobility of armor.

b. To achieve the maximum utilization of fire power, adequate supplies of ammunition must be available and in the possession of the combat units; resupply must be adequate and timely.

c. The fire power and mobility of the armored division are utilized to permit it to close with the enemy to exploit shock action with decisive results. A well organized and defended position, protected by obstacles and mines, restricts the employment of shock action and increases the importance of fire power.

OPERATIONS

1035. The armored division may be employed in most types of ground combat either as part of a larger force or independently for a limited period of time. It is specially suited to execute the following type missions:

a. Offensive operations planned to achieve deep penetration and seizure of decisive objectives such as dominating terrain, communication centers, bridges, lines of communications, higher enemy headquarters, and other vital areas in the hostile rear, or envelopment and destruction of hostile forces.

b. Mobile defensive operations planned to utilize the armored division as a counterattack force or as a covering force in retrograde movements.

c. Destruction of hostile armor.

1036. a. In offensive operations the employment of the armored division is dictated by its outstanding characteristics of independent mobility and predominant tank strength. Where these characteristics can be employed effectively, the armored division may lead or provide the principal effort in the initial attack. Under circumstances where the armored division cannot initially be employed effectively, or is held in reserve during the reduction of a strongly organized area, the armored division must be prepared to attack through the infantry division as soon as the obstacles have been breached or bridged. Generally, the initial attack of the armored division, through the infantry divisions, employs teams of tanks and armored infantry, supported by massed artillery fires and other weapons in rapidly repeated attacks on successive objectives, moving ever deeper into the enemy's defensive organization, destroying his reserves, overrunning his

artillery, and disrupting his communications. The momentum of this initial attack by the armored division must be maintained.

b. As soon as the hostile defensive organization is penetrated, the armored division moves rapidly to the exploitation phase, advancing in one or more columns deep into enemy territory to seize vital communications centers or terrain objectives. During this phase, armored units will attack from march columns, where practicable, will bypass resistance, will make assault crossings of streams, and will perform any special operations necessary to accomplish their mission.

1037. In defense, the armored division is best employed in mobile reserve as a counterattack force. It may be assigned a front-line defensive sector to occupy, but the armored division is not particularly adapted to such a role. When so employed, its sector must be designed to permit it to exploit advantageously its relatively weak infantry strength and its comparatively great strength in armor. This can be achieved by—

a. Employment of defensive-offensive methods which permit it to hold wide fronts with weak infantry garrisons backed by strong and mobile reserves.

b. Reinforcing the armored division by additional infantry to permit it to hold a frontage equivalent to its over-all combat power.

c. Assigning it a relatively narrow sector comparable to its infantry strength while holding its strong armored component in corps reserve located to facilitate its use on the front of its own division.

1038. For a more complete discussion of the elements of the armored division, see FM 17–100.

Section III. AIRBORNE DIVISION

1039. The airborne division is the basic large unit of the combined arms for use in airborne operations. The specific organization and equipment of the airborne division is essentially that of an infantry division with less heavy equipment and a lower ratio of supporting units. A parachute maintenance company is provided to store, maintain, pack, issue, and recover parachutes and other specialized airborne equipment.

1040. In organizing for combat, the division normally is divided into an assault echelon, a follow-up echelon, and a rear or base

echelon. The assault echelon usually is further divided into combat teams and divisional units. The assault echelon is landed by parachute and glider. The follow-up echelon contains additional transportation, heavy equipment, and supplies. It rejoins the division by air, land, or sea as soon as practicable after the airborne assault. The rear echelon contains the administrative echelons of all units and the parachute maintenance company.

1041. The preparation of the airborne division for airborne assaults includes specialized training in details of air movement, airborne assault, and ground combat. All personnel are trained in parachute, glider, and air-transported techniques. Units and staffs are experienced in the specialized procedures of marshaling, air movement, assault landings, reorganization after landing, and the conditions which exist in combat operations in enemy territory.

1042. When committed to normal ground operations, the division must be given additional heavy transportation. However, it does have excellent tactical mobility and can operate effectively over difficult terrain. When given a ground mission, the attachment of armor, additional artillery, and service units is normal. (See TO&E 71 for composition of the airborne division.)

1043. The primary mission of the airborne division is to seize objectives in enemy territory by means of assault parachute and glider landings. Suitable division missions include seizure of bridges, defiles, or other key terrain to assist the advance of friendly troops, or to hinder the movement of enemy forces, or both; and, as a part of a larger airborne force, to seize and protect an area suitable for the landing of normal ground force units which are trained to make a movement by air transport. In view of the limitations of an airborne division in seizing and holding objectives indefinitely, it is normal to reinforce it quickly or to effect a ground link-up with other forces.

1044. In seizing an objective the airborne division may elect to land directly on the objective or to land at a distance and make a normal ground attack. A combination of both methods has many advantages. Units landed on the objective can secure maximum surprise in attacking the enemy while units landed at a distance can delay the arrival of enemy reinforcements and enter the fight for the objective when and where needed. It is essential that the objective be seized and that the division be regrouped in a defensible position before the enemy reacts with sizable forces.

1045. Continuous and effective liaison with the troop carrier air force is essential to successful operations of the airborne division. Joint training to develop smooth teamwork is mandatory.

1046. Air supply and air evacuation of casualties of the airborne division, when it is performing its primary role, is the responsibility of the air force. In the initial stages, supplies are delivered by parachute or glider into the objective areas. This normally is followed by landing supplies by transport aircraft, after suitable landing fields have been seized and prepared. Finally, after the link-up is made with friendly ground forces, supplies are delivered and distributed in the normal manner.

APPENDIX

LESSONS OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1. The Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, after its thorough investigation of the attack, reached the conclusion that certain supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies existed in the armed forces of the United States and recommended that serious consideration be given by the Army and Navy to 25 principles which it enunciated in the hope that something constructive might be accomplished that would aid our national defense and preclude a repetition of the failure of 7 December 1941.

2. Acting on this recommendation the Chief of Staff of the Army approved the simplicity, soundness, and applicability to the conduct of war of the principles referred to in the paragraph above and directed that the 25 principles be studied throughout the Army and that they be explicitly enunciated in appropriate field manuals and other publications.

3. The 25 principles presented by the congressional committee are set forth below. They are treated in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

I. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility.

II. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates.

III. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.

IV. The delegation of authority or issuance of orders entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised.

V. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision.

VI. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition.

VII. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action is of the essence.

VIII. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in time of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials.

IX. The unapproachable and superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt.

X. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials.

XI. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness.

XII. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning and significance of the original.

XIII. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations.

XIV. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization.

XV. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident.

XVI. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information.

XVII. An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility.

XVIII. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality.

XIX. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction.

XX. Personal and official jealousy will wreck any organization.

XXI. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies.

XXII. No consideration should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task.

XXIII. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed.

XXIV. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility.

XXV. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority.

4. All of these principles are included in existing field manuals either directly or by implication, but since they are not treated as a whole in any Department of the Army publication, they are discussed more fully below with references to the appropriate field manuals covering the subject.

I. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility. — Staff agencies charged with the responsibility and authority for the

preparation and issuance of tactical or strategical orders in the name of the commander, and those charged with intelligence operations, including the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of information concerning an actual or possible enemy, and the dissemination of resulting intelligence, must work as one team. Only thus can orders and instructions be in consonance with available intelligence and therefore take full advantage of the situation and capabilities of an actual or possible enemy. This requires that those responsible for the preparation of orders and instructions be constantly and fully aware of the situation and capabilities of an actual or possible enemy. Responsibility for initial coordination rests jointly on intelligence and operations staff agencies. When orders or requests are not in consonance with available intelligence because of differences of views as to the implications thereof, those differences must be resolved by the chief of staff if he is authorized to do so or, if not, then by the commander himself. Final responsibility and authority are vested in the commander. (See FM 101–5.)

II. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates.—Orders issued to subordinates must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity. The more urgent the situation the greater the necessity for conciseness. When definite action is required a definite order should be given. In war nothing can be taken for granted, and no assumptions as to the meaning of messages are warranted without closest supervision to make certain that the intentions of the commander are understood. When it is necessary to place a subordinate in a position in which he must act on his own judgment, the object to be obtained must be made clear and he should be furnished with all crucial information and intelligence accompanied by the best estimate of its significance. (See FM 101–5.)

III. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.—Unity of effort toward a common objective cannot be obtained if subordinates who may have to act on their own judgment are not told all that it is or may be necessary for them to know. The secrecy of the source of information or intelligence should not be taken as a reason for not making the information or intelligence known to commanders to whom it is vital. While the information or intelligence is given, the security of the source may remain guarded. It is therefore the primary duty of the intelligence officers of all echelons of command to keep their commanders and all others concerned fully informed of the situation and capabilities of an actual or possible enemy. In absence of instructions

from their commanders as to what is advisable to make known to subordinate commanders, they should take the view that it is better to err on the side of giving too much information or intelligence rather than too little. (See par. 221.)

IV. The delegation of authority or issuance of orders entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised.—(See principle V below.) Subordinate commanders must understand not only the orders of their superiors but also the intentions which inspire them. Thus the responsibilities of a commander and his staff do not end with the issue of the necessary orders. They must insure receipt of the orders by the proper subordinates, make certain that they are understood, and enforce their effective execution. It is sound practice to recognize as implicit, in the delegation of authority or the issuance of orders, the responsibility of inspecting and supervising to determine that the delegated authority is properly administered and the orders carried out. (See FM 101–5.)

V. The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision.—The principle of the supervision of subordinates is well understood. It should be stressed, however, that when a subordinate is at such a distance from the commander that personal supervision is not possible, the reports of the subordinate's plans and actions must be carefully checked to make sure that they comply with instructions given. More complete intelligence of the enemy situation and capabilities must be furnished the subordinate than is ordinarily the case. Also liaison officers, who are representatives of the senior commander and who are fully informed of the situation and the intentions of the senior commander, should be employed to insure that the subordinate and the senior commander have mutually complete information and intelligence and a mutual understanding of plans and orders.

When the subordinate is close at hand, personal conferences between the higher commander and the subordinates who are to execute his orders must be held in order that the subordinates may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of the superior and may correctly interpret the orders issued. Within the scope of authority delegated to it, the staff must supervise the execution of plans and orders and take the necessary action to carry out the commander's intentions. (See pars. 112 and 128.)

VI. The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition.—Long range plans or estimates can be vitalized by timely repetition. An energetic followup of instruc-

tions must insure that they are effectively executed or are modified at the proper time to fit a change in the situation. Repetition for the purpose of intensifying and insuring alertness is especially appropriate in critical situations extending over a considerable period of time. (See FM 101–5.)

VII. Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action is of the essence.—During strained relations preceding a state of war and in periods of comparative calm in battle it is vital that commanders and staff officers be on the alert to detect indications of any change in intentions of a potential or actual enemy. At such times the significance of information and even the absence of it assumes immediate and great importance. Doubt as to probable enemy intentions should be resolved in favor of positive and aggressive action on his part. Blind acceptance of continuance of the *status quo* may be fatal. (See pars. 96 and 109.)

VIII. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in time of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials.—A sound appreciation of the situation and capabilities of an actual or possible enemy requires long and painstaking study based on detailed knowledge gained by training and experience in the coordinated search for information, in its proper evaluation and interpretation, and in the dissemination of the resulting intelligence. This indicates the need of a central, joint or combined, intelligence agency, if appropriate, comprising an adequate staff of capable and experienced intelligence and counterintelligence personnel of the interested services, to which all information of an actual or possible enemy is sent, and where it can be properly evaluated and interpreted and the resulting intelligence disseminated to all commanders, agencies, or headquarters concerned. Frequent changes in key intelligence and counterintelligence personnel enhance the possibility of unsound intelligence and commanders estimates, and, more important, may destroy the full confidence of responsible commanders in the intelligence presented to them. It is seldom that commanders have sufficient time to make the detailed studies necessary to arrive at sound conclusions as to enemy capabilities; for this they must rely upon their intelligence staff officers. If, in addition, their intelligence staff agencies are incompetent, or lack a commander's full confidence, the results may well be disastrous. As indicated under principle I above, however, final responsibility for securing the information and intelligence which he must have in a particular situation, and upon which he must

base decisions that will enable him to accomplish his mission regardless of what an actual or possible enemy may do, rests upon the commander. (See par. 94.)

IX. The unapproachable and superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt.—A commander should be accessible to his subordinates and should carefully avoid creating the impression that he is unapproachable. He should bear in mind that no man has so firm a grasp of his business or has attained to such complete understanding as to warrant deafness to the opinions of his subordinates. A commander should not be intolerant of a subordinate seeking clarification of his orders; this contact should be encouraged, for the commander who inspires his subordinates to speak out with frankness, who never upbraids them for faulty opinions, who never ridicules them, who encourages their personal confidences, has a hold on them that is difficult to shake. The commander who listens with consideration to the opinion of a subordinate binds that subordinate to him in the most effective manner. It is incumbent on the subordinate commander to seek a clarification of any doubt on his part as to the meaning of the orders he received from the higher commander, regardless of the latter's attitude. A commander should always be careful to treat his subordinates with utmost consideration. He should be quick to recognize merit in his subordinates and should be loyal to them, for no commander can expect loyalty from his subordinates unless he carries conviction of loyalty to them. In leadership there is an inviolable law of reciprocity. (See pars. 90 and 91.)

X. There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials.—The exercise of command functions requires imagination, foresight, and an intuitive application by commanders of the principles of war. Any procedure which limits the imagination or initiative of subordinate commanders should normally be avoided. It is equally important that intelligence and other staff officers be possessed of a high degree of resourcefulness in order that all information available to an organization can be fully developed and exploited to the end that resulting intelligence, in suitable form, can be placed at the disposal of all commanders concerned in order that the utmost effective use of it can be made. The secrecy of certain sources of information must not blind the intelligence agency as to their ability to disseminate intelligence revealed. The source of the information may still be safeguarded, even though the intelligence

conveyed is made known to those to whom it is of vital importance.

XI. Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness and appropriateness.—Every commander must make sure that he understands the wishes and intentions of his superiors. Not only must he understand his orders but he must be sure that he understands the intention which lies behind the orders. In orders it is essential that there be no opportunity for misunderstanding by any subordinate of the exact intended meaning of all terms used. The use of highly technical or even technical military language when there is danger of misunderstanding is to be avoided. It is essential that orders be clear and explicit. (See par. 137.)

XII. There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning and significance of the original.—The practice of paraphrasing coded intelligence messages is a proper procedure in order to preserve the secrecy of codes, but in performing this difficult task it is very essential that while protecting the code, the meaning of the message must not be lost or distorted from its true meaning. Carelessness in paraphrasing messages inevitably leads to misunderstanding of the message and may lead to a completely false idea of the actual meaning of the text. In paraphrasing the guiding principle must be to reproduce the true meaning of the message even though to do do may compromise the code. (See pars. 209-211.)

XIII. Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations.—Inflexible procedures which cannot be subjected to sufficient alteration to satisfy the exigencies of a given situation generally lead to failure. Proceeding through channels is normal and should be followed, but not to the extent that a grooved pattern is followed regardless of the demand for distinctive action. Flexibility should characterize all military organization and operations. The attempt to follow set rules where the situation demands otherwise may prove fatal. Military decisions are founded on reason and judgment which are the result of the comparison of well weighted ideas and not on a set of fixed methods. (See FM 101-5.)

XIV. Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization.—(See principles XXI and XXII above.) The basic premise upon

which all intelligence work is founded is that it is the duty of every individual and headquarters to transmit promptly all items of enemy information to higher, lower, and parallel echelons to whom it is of value. The promiscous distribution of highly secret material is dangerous, nevertheless it must be made available to all those whose responsibility cannot competently and intelligently be discharged without the knowledge of its content. By skillful paraphrase the information contained in a highly secret document may be made known and still protect the secrecy of its source. This is particularly important insofar as it concerns dissemination of intelligence concerning enemy capabilities. Wide distribution of such information or intelligence does not compromise the success of a commander's own action. Military information is of no value unless it reaches those who have need of it in such form and in time to serve their purposes. (See pars. 135 and 211.)

XV. There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident.—The aim of any military commander is to deceive his enemy as to his intentions. As a rule the deception is carried out by a course of action calculated to fix in the mind of the enemy certain false assumptions in order that the blow the commander delivers will be insured of surprise. The self-evident must never be accepted without great caution, and a commander must never forget that, regardless of hostile appearances, he is at all times responsible for the protection of his command from surprise in any direction from which attack is possible by land, sea, or air. (See par. 121.)

XVI. Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information.—Few matters call for more judgment in war than to know how much information it is advantageous to make known to subordinate commanders and how much to conceal. As a general rule officers of all grades must keep in mind that unity of effort toward a common end cannot be obtained if subordinates who may have to act on their own judgment are not told in time all that it is necessary for them to know. The success of operations must not be jeopardized by secrecy precautions. (See pars. 199 and 221.)

XVII. On official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility.—One of the qualities essential to the successful exercise of command is professional knowledge and training. These qualities are of little value unless the commander applies them to the improvement of conditions within his command. This requires that he know what

is and what is not being done by his subordinate commanders. As the size of the command increases, the problem of personal contact beween the commander and his troops becomes increasingly difficult, but loses none of its importance. It is as vital to the general officer who exercises high command as it is to the platoon commander who leads his platoon in battle to know what is going on in his organization. The successful commander must be a professionally qualified leader; command and leadership are inseparable.

Where more than one service is involved in the defense of an outpost it is important that each commander know the plans and operations of the other in order that the defense may be efficiently coordinated. Assumption on the part of one that the others are acting correctly, without verification, may prove false. (See pars. 90 to 96.)

XVIII. Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality.—(See principle XV above.) The basic doctrine that the commander alone is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do, emphasizes the fact that a command must always be prepared for any event, however unlikely, within the physical capabilities of an actual or possible enemy. What an enemy is most likely to do must not lead the commander to neglect to consider all lines of action within the hostile capabilities. In order for a commander to guard against surprise, his estimate of enemy capabilities must be accurate and complete, his security measures must be adequate, his reconnaissance must be effective, and he must require that all subordinate units be ready for action at all times. (See pars. 105 and 111.)

XIX. Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction.—Clear and decisive orders are the logical result of definite and sure decisions. Generally they are preceded by long and detailed study by the commander and all staff sections of the headquarters and are transmitted to the subordinate commanders through the normal chain of command. Any bypassing of the channels of command by personal conversation or letters should be resorted to only in the most urgent situations. When it is done, however, the staff should be informed immediately of all actions taken or orders given, else staff confusion, misinterpretation, and misunderstanding of current orders will result. (See par. 133.)

XX. Personal and official jealousy will wreck any organization.—(See principle IX above.) Jealous adherence to prerogatives

and unwillingness on the part of commanders to make concessions in the interest of common welfare, especially when the forces involved have a similar mission, leads to a failure of either to accomplish its task. Selfishness should never dictate the actions of a commander or staff officer.

XXI. Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies.—Personal friendship and contacts on a social basis, as fine as they are, cannot be used as a substitute for command liaison. The heavy responsibility of a commander makes it mandatory that official matters be dealt with on official terms in such a manner as to insure that all concerned have the same knowledge of the situation and that all effort in the accomplishment of the task at hand is integrated and coordinated. (See FM 101–5.)

XXII. No consideration should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task.—Regardless of the various supervisory or administrative responsibilities that devolve upon a commander by virtue of his position, his fundamental responsibility is to carry out his mission. No excuse or explanation can justify or even temper his failure to discharge that responsibility.

The exercise of command produces individual or collective military action on the part of subordinates regardless of the latter's will. The commander of an organization is thus the controlling head. He is responsible for everything his command does or fails to do. The introduction of a staff group into the organization in no way alters this basic principle of command and responsibility. The staff members are assistants to the commander, performing in his name such details pertaining to his functions of command as may be delegated to them, but the commander retains full responsibility as though the staff had not been provided. A commander who attempts to shift responsibility to his subordinates is not worthy of command. (See par. 108.)

XXIII. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed.—The commander is responsible for seeing that his staff and other subordinate agencies are informed of his activities as commander. Through his chief of staff he should make sure that information and operations of the staff are coordinated and that there is a smooth, uninterrupted flow of information and intelligence from higher to subordinate and from subordi-

nate to higher headquarters. When it is vital and urgent that certain information reach either a lower or higher headquarters, it should be forwarded by the most rapid means available regardless of the set practices of military channels. (See par. 199.)

XXIV. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility.—A commander, through his chief of staff, must have a standard procedure for the processing and handling of staff papers. It must be simple and must insure that a record is kept of all persons who have access to the papers. Only in this way can the commander determine definitely where to assess responsibility for inaction or failure to comply with instructions. This applies particularly to the handling of highly secret matters, since there is a natural tendency to overstress the secret grading of such papers. (See par. 150 and AR 20–5.)

XXV. In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority.—There must always be a close correlation between responsibility and authority, for to vest a commander or staff officer with responsibility and no corresponding authority is eminently unfair. A commander must make clear to his subordinates their authority to make command decisions in an emergency during his absence. Succession in command is clearly defined in AR 600–20 and AW 119 and 120. It is of particular importance, in view of atomic and other scientific developments, that it be clearly defined through several levels.

In cases where the orders of a commander specify tasks only, they by implication convey all necessary methods and means to perform these tasks. To the extent that methods and means are prescribed by a higher commander, responsibility devolves upon him for their correctness. Staff officers as such do not exercise command, but assist the commander to the extent he may require. If a staff officer, by virtue of delegated authority, issues an order in the name of the commander, responsibility remains with the commander even though he may not know of the order. (See AR 600–20, AW 119 and 120, and FM 101–5.)

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FIELD MANUAL

FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS OPERATIONS

CHANGES No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C., *25 July 1952*

FM 100-5, 15 August 1949, is changed as follows:

CHAPTER 6

SECURITY

Section VII. SECURITY AGAINST AIRBORNE ATTACK, GUERILLA ACTION AND INFILTRATION.

279. *a.* The threat from airborne attack, guerilla action, and infiltration requires special security measures. Responsibility for these * * * entire danger area.

b. Many of the security measures taken against armored attack constitute common protection against airborne attack, guerilla action, and infiltration. Security measures common to all include warning systems, certain reconnaissance measures and the provision of mobile reserves.

280. (Superseded) *a.* Measures common to security against airborne attack, guerilla action, and infiltration are a comprehensive warning system; adequate signal communications, perimeter defense of logistical and service installations as well as combat unit positions; reconnaissance, both ground and air; training of all personnel for combat against hostile airborne troops, guerillas, and infiltrators; plans for prompt and aggressive action against these forces; and rehearsals of the plans.

b. Security measures for antiairborne defense should provide for the attack of incoming enemy aircraft by fighter aircraft and antiaircraft fire, and the destruction of airborne forces while they are in the process of landing or immediately thereafter. When the possible drop or landing zones are limited, as in island or mountainous warfare, they may be denied to the enemy by use of obstacles; mining; and, where possible, by use of artillery. Field fortifications may also be constructed in areas of probable airborne attack.

c. Security measures for antiguerilla defense should include frequent aerial reconnaissance and ground patrols throughout the area, permanent guards at critical localities on lines of communications,

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armed escort for motor convoys and trains. Friendly civilians may be used as guides and agents in order to determine the movement or general location of guerillas. These same measures are applicable against infiltrators who have reached the rear areas, inasmuch as they operate the same as guerillas after penetrating the combat area.

d. Security measures to prevent or limit infiltration by the enemy are reconnaissance and active patrolling, particularly by front-line units during periods of reduced visibility; thorough mopping-up operations during the progress of an attack; planning fires along favorable avenues of approach; placing mine fields; trip flares, barbed wire, and other antipersonnel obstacles along favorable avenues of approach for infiltrators; ambushes by friendly forces in front of the main line of resistance; battlefield illumination; use of war dogs with patrols and security posts; search of civilian refugees passing through the lines; and check points located at critical points throughout the area.

281. For additional details relative to security measures against airborne attack, guerilla action, and infiltration, see chapter 9.

610. *a.* Airborne assaults are characterized by speed of execution and flexibility in choice of objectives. Airborne forces may * * * can be expected.

b. Airborne attacks are * * * local air superiority. After initial landing, and prior to the build-up phase, airborne troops require a brief period of reorganization and are limited in motor transport, heavy fire support, and armor.

610.1 (Added) *a.* Plans for defense against airborne attack must be integrated with plans for defense against guerilla action and infiltration. It can be expected that guerilla action and/or the infiltration of large numbers of enemy troops will be executed in conjunction with airborne attacks.

b. All personnel must be thoroughly trained and capable of engaging in combat operations. Service elements must receive combat training in addition to technical training. They must be able to protect themselves and their installations. All military personnel available to a commander must be employed in an integrated defense against airborne attack, guerilla action, and infiltration. Where airborne attack or large scale guerilla action against vital objectives seems

probable, higher commanders may assign combat troops to assist in the defense.

612. *a.* All units, command * * * civil defense organizations.
b. Rescinded.

612.1 (Added) *a.* Accurate and timely intelligence is essential for planning a defense against airborne attack. Intelligence of enemy airborne capabilities is generally developed at theater level. Detailed intelligence, however, must be developed by commanders charged with the preparation of plans for, and the conduct of the defense against, airborne attacks.

b. Detailed intelligence includes the location of possible drop and landing zones, logical airborne objectives, subversive or partisan elements of the indigenous population capable of assisting the airborne forces, avenues of approach to drop or landing zones, and possible defensive positions and routes of communications thereto for friendly defensive forces.

613. *a.* The demoralization inherent * * * available road net.
b. (Superseded) Once plans have been developed, they are continuously examined to insure that changing conditions are reflected by appropriate revision. Administrative plans and orders require particular attention with respect to defense against airborne attack. Enemy airborne or air action may seriously disrupt logistical arrangements. Plans must provide for logistical support of the combat forces and for the defense of the logistical establishment itself as well as security for installations, convoys, and trains. Precise plans and instructions for evacuation or destruction of supplies and equipment must be prepared, in order to deny their capture by the enemy.

614. (Superseded) *a.* Logical airborne objectives and drop and landing zones determine the disposition of defense units. This is modified by the availability of forces, the mission and proposed employment of the available forces, weather, terrain, adequacy of communication system, time and space factors for the movement of defending troops to the threatened areas as compared with time and space factors required by the enemy for build-up of his forces, and time required by the enemy to execute his mission after build-up has been accomplished.

b. Generally, forces cannot be provided to make all areas simultaneously secure against attack. Where troops are limited, minimum

defense measures should include an efficient warning system, planned and rehearsed local defense measures by all units, and a mobile reserve prepared to move on short notice to previously reconnoitered positions to launch a counterattack. Where sufficient means are available, the plan for the disposition of troops should provide a system of warning and combat detachments near all probable landing areas with provision for supplementary motorized patrols and local reserves for counterattacks. In addition, plans should insure a centrally located mobile reserve, strong in armor and firepower, to attack airborne units before they can be reinforced with heavier supporting weapons. The entire organization should be characterized by flexibility to meet the attacker's advantage of surprise and initiative.

614.1 (Added) *a.* Defending forces consist of local security forces and mobile striking forces. Local security forces provide close-in defense of installations and critical areas. They occupy prepared defensive positions and strong points in the event of attack and contain the airborne force until the arrival of the mobile striking force. Mobile striking forces are centrally located insofar as practicable and are strong in armor. Upon initiation of an airborne attack, they attack the airhead to destroy the forces therein before the enemy can reinforce them. Care must be taken in the disposition and commitment of the mobile striking force to provide maximum mutual support in order to preclude defeat in detail.

b. Higher commanders retain under their control additional striking forces which are committed once the location of the main airborne force has been determined. When committed, these forces are placed under the commander of the area in which the airborne attack has occurred.

615.1 (Added) *a.* Speed in meeting airborne attacks is essential to capitalize on the initial disorganization of airborne forces after they have landed; to deny the enemy unhampered opportunity to augment his forces; and to destroy the enemy forces before they can accomplish their mission. The methods adopted must inflict maximum damage as well as deny the enemy freedom of maneuver. Offensive methods combine fire and manpower to achieve maximum shock action, taking full advantage of the disorganization of the enemy airborne force incident to its landing.

b. The defense is conducted to counter the various phases of an airborne attack and consists of passive measures and active measures.

Passive measures include dispersion, concealment, camouflage, and realistic use of dummy installations and positions. Active measures consist of warning system, local security measures, and the conduct of the defense which is characterized by counterattack. Combining speed and flexibility, the defending forces exploit the inherent weaknesses of airborne operations.

615.2 (Added) On first knowledge of an enemy airborne attack, suitable fighter aircraft in the area takes to the air to destroy enemy aviation, both transport and fighter. Air support is made available to destroy enemy aviation supporting the airborne attack, to furnish air support to friendly forces, and to isolate the attacker from his logistical support and prevent the arrival of reinforcements.

616. *a.* Rescinded.

* * * * * * *

621. Rescinded.

623. (Superseded) The importance of an adequate and reliable warning and communications system cannot be overemphasized. The system must integrate early warning systems and local warning systems as well as provide for communications between command posts and units engaged. Alternate means of communications must be provided and all facilities protected from sabotage and guerilla action. Full use is made of existing commercial facilities as an alternate means of communications. The allocated commercial facilities must be reasonably secure and plans for their use must insure prompt availability on very short notice.

Section III.1 DEFENSE AGAINST GUERILLA ACTION AND INFILTRATION. (Added)

624.1 Defense against guerilla action and infiltration must be closely integrated with the defense against airborne attack. Plans must provide for the common use of forces, warning systems, communications, and command structure. See paragraph 610.1.

624.2 *a.* Guerilla action and infiltration are characterized by mobility, surprise, deception, and decentralized operations. Favored targets, because of their defense weaknesses, are command posts, lines of communications, isolated security detachments, artillery positions,

and logistical installations. Guerillas and infiltrators strike swiftly, inflict maximum damage, and withdraw as rapidly as they strike. The attacks are seldom supported by armor, reliance being placed on light automatic weapons, mortars, demolitions, and light artillery.

b. Swamps, forests, and mountainous areas provide excellent cover and concealment for assembly areas and hide-outs for guerillas and infiltrators. These areas should be thoroughly searched and kept under constant observation from the air and ground. If search and mop-up of these areas is impractical, they should be sealed off and isolated by patrols and by strong points holding vital terrain features and blocking routes of exit.

c. Periods of haze, fog, inclement weather, and darkness serve to screen movements of guerillas and infiltrators and provide them the greatest opportunity for surprise in attacks or sabotage. Movement of large groups of displaced persons may also screen and cover guerilla and infiltrator activities. Under such conditions maximum security precautions must be taken by defending forces.

624.3 *a.* Accurate and timely intelligence is essential to successfully combat guerillas and infiltrators. This should include intelligence concerning: strength, composition, and location of guerilla forces and infiltrators; terrain, with particular emphasis on areas suitable for hide-outs and the routes thereto; plans and movements of guerilla forces and infiltrators; identity of guerilla leaders; civilian supporters; communication facilities; and sources of supply.

b. An effective counterintelligence net is equally important. Through civilian supporters and agents, guerilla forces develop a highly effective intelligence system. Great care must be taken through secrecy, deception, and screening of civilian employees, to prevent accurate information of operations and troop movements from falling into the hands of guerillas and infiltrators.

c. The normal combat methods of procuring information are applicable in defense against guerilla action and infiltration. Additional means of procuring information are the planting of agents within the guerilla forces, monitoring guerilla communication facilities, use of local civilians to report guerilla movements and locations, and the use of observation and warning posts throughout the area. Reconnaissance and patrolling, both ground and air, are extensive and are carried out day and night. Ground patrols must be of sufficient strength to defend themselves.

624.4 When planning for defense against guerilla action and infiltration, the commander must consider the extent of the threat to the area, terrain, possible targets for guerillas and infiltrators, suitable areas for guerilla and infiltrator bases, forces available, and must closely correlate military plans with the political, administrative, and economic aspects of the area. Plans must be broad and realistic, based upon known tactics and capabilities of the enemy and coordinating the political, administrative, and military phases of the operations. Detailed plans must be developed for specific areas. Continuity of command and policy are essential. Provisions are made for extensive ground and aerial reconnaissance, and adequate warning system, coordination with plans of adjacent areas, local defense of installations and critical areas, and the use of local civilians as guides, agents and antiguerilla units. Routine means of securing an area or installation should be altered frequently to prevent guerilla forces from obtaining detailed accurate information about the composition and habits of the defense. The plan must provide for bold, aggressive operations against guerilla forces and infiltrators, since it is only by offensive action that guerilla forces and infiltrators can be suppressed.

624.5 *a.* Defense against infiltration is designed to prevent or limit infiltration of enemy forces through front lines and to destroy those who have succeeded in penetrating the forward positions.

b. Measures which prevent or limit infiltration are—extensive reconnaissance and patrolling by front-line units (particularly at night); the use of war dogs; carefully prepared fire plans; battlefield illumination; ambushes by friendly forces in front of the main line of resistance; patrols and sentries screening gaps between units; and the thorough search of the area as an attack progresses. Barbed wire, trip flares, mine fields, booby traps, and other antipersonnel obstacles along possible routes into and through friendly lines are essential. Frequently, enemy personnel disguised as civilians will mingle with refugees passing through the front-line areas. Counteractions are the systematic search of all civilians moving toward the rear and the establishment of collecting points for interrogation and further processing of civilians.

c. Once infiltrators have penetrated to rear areas, they operate in the same manner as guerillas. Therefore, defensive measures adopted against guerillas are applicable to infiltrators.

624.6 *a.* Once guerilla forces have been located in the area, immediate steps are taken to initiate offensive action against them. Friendly forces so employed must be adequate to insure success, since failure will embolden the guerillas and encourage others to support and join them. Where terrain permits, armor and artillery should support the attacking force. Tactical air support is provided and light aircraft are used for reconnaissance, control, and observation of fires.

b. To achieve success in antiguerilla operations, surprise is essential. It is achieved by strict security restrictions during planning, by conducting reconnaissance and patrolling in such a manner that plans are not divulged, and by the use of cover plans to mislead the guerilla forces. Surprise may be obtained by attacking during inclement weather or at night and by approaching guerilla strongholds over difficult terrain or along little known trails.

c. Offensive action against guerillas must be coordinated between adjacent commands engaged in antiguerilla operations. If a command is carrying out antiguerilla operations in one area while a nearby command is passive, the guerillas will move into the quiet area until danger has passed and then return. Continuous pressure must be maintained until the guerilla menace ceases to exist.

624.7 The most effective method of destroying guerillas is to encircle them, blocking all avenues of escape simultaneously to prevent withdrawal of the guerillas prior to the attack. Airborne troops are particularly effective in this type of operation. Airborne troops, or troops transported by helicopters, must be dropped or landed sufficiently far from the main guerilla force to prevent their being attacked prior to reorganizing after landing. Where terrain, lack of time, or insufficient troops preclude encirclement, enveloping attacks are launched followed by aggressive pursuit of the hostile forces which succeeded in withdrawing or which were dispersed during the main engagement. Troops transported by helicopters can be landed according to desired tactical employment; preserving tactical unity, and reducing the delay necessary for reorganization.

624.8 *a.* Forces employed to combat guerillas may be furnished by either combat or service troops. Dependent upon the size of the guerilla force and the extent of the area involved, forces employed will vary in size from small patrols to large units of combined forces. Patrols may be formed by troops manning logistical installations to attack and destroy small guerilla bands operating in the vicinity of

the installation. The destruction of strong guerilla forces or those widely dispersed is usually executed by combat units.

b. Special antiguerilla units may be formed to combat guerillas. These units must be prepared for prolonged operations, using guerilla methods. Personnel making up these units are usually selected volunteers, supplemented with screened civilians who act as guides and interpreters. They are an effective means of conducting operations with small forces and are principally employed to destroy small guerilla bands, harass guerilla communications and supply, and, in conjunction with other antiguerilla units or combat units, attack and destroy large guerilla forces.

624.9 In addition to prompt and aggressive offensive action against guerillas and infiltrators, other measures must be adopted. These are: the all-around defense of installations and troop positions; establishment of security detachments at critical localities on lines of communications, patrolling of lines of communications; armed escort for convoys and trains; constant patrolling throughout the area; guards and patrols around installations to prevent surprise; liberal use of mines, trip flares, booby traps, and other physical obstacles; and a reliable and extensive communication system. The movement and location of guerillas must be promptly reported and closely followed so that offensive action may be taken.

624.10 Except in front-line-combat areas, guerilla forces and infiltrators cannot exist without civilian support. Consequently, every effort should be made to prevent these irregular forces from receiving support from the civilian population. Such an effort can be assisted by isolating guerilla forces from the civilian population and from each other. More important, however, is the necessity for winning the support of the indigenous population away from the guerillas and infiltrators. This can best be accomplished by the establishment of cooperation and good will between the civil population and the military forces. In those instances where control of indigenous government is vested in the commander and administered by his organization for Civil Affairs/Military Government, adherence to basic military government principles will do much toward diverting the civil population from activities designed to prevent the maintenance of good order and public safety. Propaganda plays an important part in winning the good will and trust of the local populace.