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SUPPLEMENT TO INSTRUCTIONS

(PROVISIONAL)

Issued January 8, 1916

ON THE

OFFENSIVE OF SMALL UNITS

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EDITED AND PREPARED AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, 1917


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WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, *December 10, 1917.*

The following pamphlet, entitled "Supplement (Provisional) to Instructions issued January 8, 1916, on the Offensive of Small Units," is published for the information of all concerned.

[062.1, A. G. O.]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

JOHN BIDDLE,
Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. P. McCAIN,
The Adjutant General.

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SUPPLEMENT TO INSTRUCTIONS ON THE OFFENSIVE OF SMALL UNITS.

INTERIOR ORGANIZATION OF COMPANIES AND CONDUCT OF THE OFFENSIVE BY SMALL UNITS.

In order to secure a judicious training of the specialists of an infantry company and their proper use in battle, they must be grouped and organized. Some modification, therefore, is now required in the interior organization of the company.

As a result, moreover, of experience gained from the course of events, it is possible to issue precise rules for the specialists and for the combat of small units in general, complimentary to the instructions issued January 8, 1916, "On the Offensive Combat of Small Units."

The following notes give rules on these points and also specify the characteristics of the new infantry armament. They will be distributed right down to platoon commanders and will be brought to the knowledge of all concerned as widely as possible.

REORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY COMPANY.

As soon as the enemy's first line is taken the fight is most often carried on by detachments of the strength of a half platoon.

In order that this detachment shall have within itself its firing power, cohesion, and ability of movement it is necessary, instead of organizing it at the moment of need, to make of it an elementary unit, having the various means of action of the Infantry well balanced and well organized, capable of being echeloned in depth and of being easily adapted to concrete conditions.

It is a matter of organizing the company in fighting half platoons, homogeneous and similar, having as distinct a place *in the platoon organization* at rest and at instruction as when fighting.

I. COMPOSITION OF THE FIGHTING PLATOON AND HALF PLATOON.

Theoretically, after losing the men normally assigned to duties out of ranks or permanently employed with the combat trains, the platoon can present only the following strength:

Grand total for the company (table of war strength)	194
Men of the company (out of ranks) to be distributed as equally as possible among the groups:	
Captain's group—	
Supply corporal	1
Drummers and buglers	4
Cyclists	1
Signalers	2
Observers	2
Pioneers	4
Messengers	4
Combat train group—	
First sergeant	1
Mess corporal	1
Captain's orderly	1
Drivers	3
Cooks, tailors, cobblers	6
Detached—	
Noncommissioned officer (adjutant) chief of platoon	1
Supply sergeant	1
Hospital attendant	1
Others—	
Pigeon handlers, stretcher bearers (substitutes for men out of ranks on permission or unavailable)	5
Total	38
Remainder	156
Per platoon 156 ÷ 4	39

Three sergeants [1] and 36 corporals and privates.

In fact, these figures represent a grand maximum because of the men on permission, ill, unavailable, guarding food and ammunition depots * * * It is well to estimate on 8 corporals and privates per platoon being out of ranks because of the above reasons; this will reduce the strength of the fighting platoon to 36−8=28 corporals and privates.

[1] Note of the General in Chief, No. 1519, of August 2, 1917.

The above considerations limit the maximum strength of the fighting half platoon to 1 sergeant and 18 corporals and privates, and the minimum strength to 1 sergeant and 14 corporals and privates; the excess of 4 men can be considered as an emergency for filling up the minimum half platoon. (This strength will be constantly maintained by reinforcements.)

Automatic riflemen.—Under such conditions is it proper to have two crews of automatic riflemen in each half platoon? We must reply in the negative.

The limit of use of any weapon of great fire efficiency is reached when that weapon requires for its supply a personnel which can only be procured for it by first impoverishing to a certain degree the other indispensable fighting elements.

If one wishes to preserve the absolutely necessary proportion of soldiers armed with rifle, bayonet, and grenade, one is led to supply the half platoon with a single automatic rifle (F. M.) manned by one crew consisting of a corporal and 3 automatic riflemen, and in addition put at the disposal of the company commander a reserve of 4 automatic rifles (F. M.), making an allowance of 12 autorifles for each company. The present allowance being 16 autorifles, the excess of 4 will be turned over to the divisional center of instruction where they will constitute a reserve of autorifles at the disposal of the general of the division.

The crew of automatic riflemen in each half platoon and the possible organizing of extra men as emergency automatic riflemen will enable the company commander, when conditions demand, to use his reserve of 4 autorifles to advantage. They can always be used for reinforcing, in whole or in part, in a defensive fight where provisioning and supplying with munitions are easily assured.

Rifle grenadiers V. B. (Vivien-Bessieres).—The V. B. grenadiers will be part of the group of automatic riflemen. Each group will thus comprise an armament of a flat trajectory and an armament of a curved trajectory.

Grenadier riflemen.—All riflemen should know how to throw grenades. All grenadiers should know how to use—

The rifle when the enemy is out of range of grenades or when the latter are exhausted;

The rifle and bayonet in hand-to-hand fighting.

The distinction between grenadiers and riflemen is done away with. There will only be grenadier riflemen.

These are the main points in the distribution of the strength of the fighting platoon and half platoon.

II. ORGANIZATION OF FIGHTING STRENGTH.

Chief of section					1
Sergeant file closer					1
	First half platoon, sergeant chief of half platoon.....1		Second half platoon, sergeant.1		2
	Group 1.	Group 2.	Group 3.	Group 4.	
Minimum fighting group.	Corporal... 1 Grenadier riflemen(2 of which are throwers). 6	Corporal... 1 Autorifleman. 1 Ammunition carriers. 2 Rifle grenadiers (V. B.). 3	Corporal... 1 Autorifleman. 1 Ammunition carriers. 2 Rifle grenadiers (V. B.). 3	Corporal... 1 Grenadier riflemen(2 of which are throwers). 6	
Total ...	 7	 7	 7	 7	
Emergency comprising 3 corporals (4, less the mess corporal) for the entire company.	Grenadier riflemen. 2	Autorifleman. 1 Rifle grenadier V. B. orrifleman ammunition carrier 1	Autorifleman. 1 Rifle grenadier V. B. orrifleman ammunition carrier 1	Grenadier riflemen. 2	
Total.....	 9	 9	 9	 9	36
Total maximum for the fighting platoon.....					40

It is understood that this similarity of the half-platoons and equal strength of the fighting groups will most often be fictitious but when the chief always bears in mind the spirit of the *theoretical* organization he will be able to distribute the means at his disposal to the best advantage and carry his unit at the maximum *actual* fighting strength.

III. ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT.

COMBAT AMMUNITION SUPPLY.

The supplying of the first line with ammunition is a problem for the regiment and battalion, taken up in the plans of operation of the Colonel and Chief of Battalion.

HALF PLATOON.

Sergeant: Rifle, 56 cartridges, 6 grenades.

Grenadier riflemen (insignia of grenadier).	Automatic riflemen (insignia of rifleman). Grenadiers (V. B.) (insignia of grenadier).
Corporal: Rifle, 56 cartridges, 10 grenades, of which 2 are V. B. Throwers: Rifle, 56 cartridges; revolver, 27 cartridges; 12 grenades. Grenadier riflemen: Rifle, 88 cartridges, 10 grenades, of which 2 are V. B. NOTE.—The above figures on the apportioning of ammunition for the grenadier riflemen are only an indication, but it is best to consider them rather as a minimum.	Corporal: Rifle, 56 cartridges, D. A. M., 4 clips for the autorifle (special cartridge pouch). Gunner: 4 clips in the 8 loaders' clip pockets, 4 in the special pouch. First ammunition carrier, 16 clips: 8 clips, 1 packet (of 64) in the haversack, 8 clips in the pouch. Second ammunition carrier: 12 clips in the haversack, 1 packet (of 64) in the cartridge bag. Rifle grenadiers (V. B.): Each with 1 tromblon and 12 V. B. grenades.

(*a*) *The grenade belt* will be replaced by a grenade sack now being developed.

(*b*) The throwers will be supplied with a carbine and knife-bayonet instead of the rifle. This issue will be made without previous requisition to the armies, according to the output of manufacture of carbines.

IV. PICKED FIGHTERS.

It will always be advantageous to form picked soldiers in the following proportions:

For a half platoon.—Two grenadier throwers; 1 automatic rifleman, 1 grenadier, (V. B.); gold insignia.

The "cor de chasse" (marksmanship insignia) will be awarded to the grenadier riflemen according to the present regulations.

Sergeants and corporals will be able to receive the insignias, even several.

Employing the picked fighters is governed by the note of the general commander in chief, No. 3786, of September 4, 1917.

V. INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTION.

All noncommissioned officers and as many privates as possible will be instructed in the handling of all the weapons.

PÉTAIN.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW INFANTRY ARMAMENT.

The following table shows the evolution of infantry armament since the beginning of the war:

	At beginning of war.	Present time.
Rifle and bayonet	Nearly total personnel	
Hand grenades	Nil	32 grenadiers per company.
Rifle grenades	do	16 grenadiers per company.[1]
Automatic rifles	do	8 per company.
Machine guns	2 per company	8 per 3 companies.
37-mm. guns	Nil	1 per battalion.

[1] The soldiers armed with the Viven Bessières tromblon for rifle grenades will have many occasions, notably during the course of an assault, to use their rifle and bayonet. Furthermore, in the formation for combat they are generally placed in line with the riflemen. It is for these reasons that they are, with their ammunition carriers, divided between the two groups of riflemen.

HAND GRENADES.

On the defensive, can produce an excellent short-range barrage. In the hands of fearless, expert, and well-provided grenadiers, they provide for the establishment of *centers of resistance* which are difficult to destroy, and which will afford protection to important features of the defensive line, such as salients, machine guns, outlets of communication trenches, etc. All except awkward men should be able to take their part in making a barrage at 30 yards' range; one man is required per 10 yards' frontage with the offensive, or one per 16 yards with the defensive grenade.

On the offensive, the hand grenade will reach defenders under cover who have escaped the bombardment. It provides an excellent weapon for cleaning out trenches and for working along communication trenches.

The grenadier group may be divided. This will often be necessary, especially when it is united with an automatic riflemen group to form a "wave."

Range, accuracy, and discipline are the important points in grenade fighting. These result from training, and it is impossible to overestimate their importance.

V. B. RIFLE GRENADES.

They may be employed as articles of trench equipment to harass the enemy, but are primarily for battle use.

On the defensive, the 16 grenade riflemen per company will project 150 grenades per minute and *automatically* set up an inpassable barrage at 90 to 170 yards' range. Several grenade riflemen concentrated on a trench will stop hostile grenade throwing.

On the offensive, the rifle grenade lengthens the zone covered by the hand grenade, and will reach an underground enemy at a considerable distance.

In the numerous local fights where artillery support is unobtainable the rifle grenade supplies its place in the accurate bombardment of the enemy's centers of resistance. It cuts off hostile groups which are being attacked by hand grenades and prevents their retreat or reinforcement. Finally, it is most efficacious against hostile counter attack.

In all situations, but more particularly in the offensive, it pays to employ concentration of fire with this weapon.

AUTOMATIC RIFLES.[1]

CHARACTERISTICS.

(1) Extreme mobility.

(2) Reliable effect at short distances. The fire is kept low automatically.

(3) Fairly good effect at medium distances.

(4) Considerable flexibility of control. Sweeping fire can be carried out with facility. A change of objective can be made instantly.

(5) Fire possible when in movement. Under certain circumstances the enemy may be compelled by this means to keep under cover at the time of the final rush to the assault.

The weapon has neither the rigidity nor rapidity of fire of the machine gun, and can not altogether replace it. It resembles it, however, in moral effect. Moreover, it can accompany a small unit under circumstances where it would be impossible to set up a machine gun.

The automatic rifle, therefore, is preeminently the weapon to accompany infantry, for holding ground gained, and for stopping counter attack. A great volume of fire is obtainable the very moment the objective is seized; the fire is flexible, and, furthermore, it gives time to bring up a machine gun deliberately and place it in a favorable position, particularly for flank defense.

In a captured position it can sweep communication trenches along which the approach of the enemy's reserves may be expected. At this juncture it should be used as a preventive weapon to act on the enemy's morale and make his counter attack come to nothing.

[1] The durability of the mechanism of the Chauchat automatic rifle has been questioned. Experience has proved that this objection is not well founded, if care is taken not to remove the rifle from its case until the moment for its use. Mud is one of its principal enemies.

37-MM. GUN

CHARACTERISTICS.

(1) Enough mobility to enable it to accompany the infantry at all stages of the fight.

(2) Extreme accuracy.

(3) Ease of adjustment.

(4) Effective range up to 1,600 yards.

(5) Adapted to fire from a masked position.

The effects of the shell resemble those of a grenade, but it will penetrate two or three rows of sandbags, a timber shelter or a steel plate before bursting.

This weapon is built to destroy any visible machine guns by direct fire.

It will also give good results against troops taken in enfilade.

Experience shows that this gun can seldom be used in the infantry "wave," as it is immediately spotted and destroyed.

RESULTS TO BE OBTAINED FROM THE NEW COMPANY ARMAMENT.

The best results will only be obtained from the newly-constituted companies, provided three primary conditions are fulfilled:

(1) The weapons must act in combination with one another.

(2) The supply of stores and ammunition must be insured.

(3) The men must be expert in the use of these weapons.

(*a*) The *combination* of rifles, machine guns, automatic rifles, 37-mm. guns and rifle grenades forces the enemy to lie close in their holes, while the grenadiers and riflemen hurl themselves forward and bring them to a hand-to-hand encounter.

The weapons of low trajectory (*i. e.*, rifle, machine gun, automatic rifle, 37-mm. gun) engage everything that shows above the ground, and the high trajectory weapons (hand and rifle grenades) engage everything that goes to earth.

The riflemen complete the results and follow up the successes obtained by the specialists.

(*b*) The perfect organization of the *supply of stores and ammunition* is necessary in order to secure a sufficient supply for the various weapons at all times.

The heavy and cumbrous matériel, now required to keep the new weapons supplied, makes its provision all the more delicate an operation.

(*c*) *Training* is even more necessary with the new armament than with the old.

Arms of high efficiency are only effective when in the hands of disciplined and courageous experts, under officers with accurate knowledge of the weapons. All must get the idea out of their heads that specialists are a race apart, whose rôle in daily life and in battle is different from that of their comrades. These all live and fight in the same ranks and in close union with the riflemen. Their training only is specialized.

As this war goes on, the method of fighting is being continually modified; it is the duty of everyone to follow this evolution, and to take immediate advantage of every advance. With equal courage on either side, the best trained wins.

The present-day company, with all its weapons and a proportion of machine guns in support, can produce a far greater volume of fire than could the same unit at the beginning of the war.

The difference is noticeable at medium ranges, and is striking at ranges under 200 yards. In the defensive the company can now hang on to its ground much more firmly while awaiting the protection of artillery barrage. This last property is particularly valuable to infantry during the period when, after the capture of an objective, the artillery has not yet obtained sufficiently exact knowledge of the situation to enable it to afford support.

In the offensive, infantry has regained the power and manœuvering ability which was so much reduced by the introduction of trench warfare.

Once the artillery has breached the enemy's defenses the infantry can now dash forward into the latter and break up any local resistance of hostile counter attacks with their own weapons.

CONDUCT OF THE FIGHT.

THE PLATOON.

The present method of fighting is characterized by a reduced density and increased depth of formation.

Recent experience shows that an interval of four or five paces between men extended in line insures the minimum of casualties without loss of cohesion.

This interval may be considered as the normal between riflemen; and, to avoid the loss of control resulting from overextension, the section should, from the first, be distributed in depth and not in breadth.

The normal fighting front of the section is from 80 to 100 paces. A platoon may take part in the fight:

(1) As an assaulting unit.

(2) As a reinforcing unit.

As an assaulting unit.—(*a*) The first line, generally called "wave," usually consists of the 1st half platoon (grenadiers and automatic riflemen).

The grenadiers deal with bodies of the enemy sheltering in trenches and shell holes.

The automatic riflemen direct their fire on any who show themselves, whether running back or advancing to counter attack.

(*b*) The second line (or "wave") is formed by the 2d half platoon. The V. B. rifle grenadiers use their plunging fire to form a barrage either in front of the line they hold, or in rear of the line attacked; they may also bring fire to bear on the enemy under cover who are too far off to be dealt with by the hand grenade.

The riflemen follow up the first "wave" and use their rifles and bayonets to settle the fights commenced by their comrades.

The platoon commander moves with the second line between his rifleman groups.

The distance between two "waves" varies from 10 to 15 paces.

Under certain circumstances there may be reason to place riflemen in the first "wave," particularly when the front of the platoon is greater than the normal. It is then advisable to employ them by groups to join up with the automatic-rifle group.

As a reinforcing unit.—If strength admits, the platoon adopts a two-line formation like an assaulting section.

The platoon commander moves in front with his line of specialist groups, in a favorable position to guide his platoon according to the progress of events in front. He either deploys his groups or moves them in single file to keep them longer in hand.

When the supporting platoon is minus one of its specialist groups (as will be seen later) its commander may dispose it in a single "wave."

THE COMPANY.

Distribution.—The front allotted to the company varies from 220 to 330 yards.

The company is generally able to place two assaulting platoons side by side in its battle front. It may also place three, and exceptionally four. Platoons not forming part of the assaulting line become reinforcing platoons.

The assaulting platoons form the first two "waves" of the company ("assaulting waves"), which act as described in section (*a*) above.

Immediately behind the "assaulting waves" come the parties for "cleaning up" the trenches; these form the "*cleaning up*" or third "wave" (V. further on). The remainder of the company

(one or two platoons less any detailed as "cleaning up" party) form one or two "waves" according to strength, denominated reinforcing or manoeuvring "waves."

The company commander moves at the head of the last mentioned. Reinforcing platoons follow the "cleaning up wave" at a distance of about 40 to 50 paces.

Plan of operations.—The success of an attack depends on the accuracy with which it is carried out. A commander should draw up his plans in such a manner as to ensure accuracy of execution.

The plan of operations is based on:

(1) The rôle assigned to the unit.

(2) The obstacles to be overcome in order to ensure success.

(3) The means at the disposal of the unit.

(*a*) The rôle of the unit and any supplementary means which may be placed at its disposal are detailed in the battalion commander's operation orders.

(*b*) The obstacles to be overcome are known nowadays in almost complete detail, thanks to excellent methods of observation and the information placed at the disposal of the troops by the staff (*i. e.*, intelligence reports on the enemy's defenses day by day, photographs, large scale plans, sketches, and information from various sources).

(*c*) All this information must be classified by the regimental commander, and useful extracts or reproductions freely distributed so as to reach all companies concerned. The company commander issues the necessary copies to his subordinates, N. C. O.'s included, and sees that each sketch shows the route and objective of the unit in colored pencil.

The company commander issues the plan of operations for his company in the form of an operation order. This must be submitted for approval to the battalion commander without giving rise to paper work and correspondence.

The plan of operations details:

(1) The rôle of the battalion, of the company concerned, and detached companies.

(2) The number of assaulting platoons, the starting point of each, and its rôle and objective.

(3) The number and composition of "cleaning-up" parties and their respective rôles in accordance with the orders of the battalion commander.

(4) The distribution and respective rôles of reenforcing platoons (from these the "cleaning-up" parties will be taken) and the routes they are to follow.

(5) Lines of attack of different units and their compass bearings.
(6) Distance between different echelons.
(7) Position of company commander.
(8) Time the assault is to start.
(9) Method by which the artillery fire is to be timed to conform with progress of the infantry.
(10) How the platoon and company commanders are to keep each other informed of their respective positions, especially the use of signaling devices (rockets, lights, etc.).
(11) Methods of communication with neighboring units.
(12) The method to be adopted to mark out the front occupied either at some particular time or on some line agreed upon, or as required.
(13) The occupation of the captured position, and following up the success obtained.
(14) Outfit to be taken.
(15) Supply of ammunition, including V. B. rifle grenades, and ammunition for automatic rifles and machine guns. Whether to be supplied under company or battalion arrangements; where these supplies will be drawn or delivered.
(16) Situation of store depots for wire, sandbags, tools, etc., required for the organization of the new front.
(17) Evacuation of the wounded.

Remark re paragraph 9.—The company commander must explain to the men how the artillery fire will lift as the assault progresses, and how, in consequence, the infantry must march, as it were, into the shell fire, following up the barrage as closely as it is possible to do so. Officers with the attack carry no swords; they will be dressed and equipped like their men, with badges of rank as inconspicuous as possible.

THE BATTALION.

Distribution.—The battalion commander places one, two, or three companies in line according to the front allotted.

Companies in second line assume, as thin as possible, a march formation, moving to a great extent in line of groups in single file.

Plan of operations.—The battalion scheme is based on the same rules, and falls under the same heads as that of the company. In addition, the battalion commander issues orders for the following:

(1) "Cleaning up" the trenches.
(2) The employment of the machine-gun company.
(3) The employment of the 37-mm. gun.

(4) Occupation of the position won.
(5) Reconnaissance of a further objective, and following up the advantage gained.
(6) Replenishment of ammunition, etc.
(7) Liaisons.

"*Cleaning up*" *of trenches.*—This is an extremely important operation, and must be carried out methodically and speedily. Courageous men are required and very energetic commanders.

The "cleaning-up" scheme is drawn up by the battalion commander according to instructions issued by the regimental commander. It is founded on aeroplane photographs, which show up the principal dugouts of the enemy. With this assistance the battalion commander fixes the strength necessary to "clean up" each group of duguots, details the unit to furnish the detachments, and the duties of the latter when the "cleaning up" is completed. As a rule, "cleaning-up" parties [1] are made up of grenadier groups reenforced by riflemen; they are always under the command of N. C. O.'s.

In some cases the strength of a party may be half a platoon or a platoon, and sometimes a complete company may be detailed to "clean up" some *point d'appui* of particular importance. "Cleaning-up" parties are never drawn from assaulting platoons, which must be keep intact. They are drawn from reenforcing platoons or from companies or battalions in second line.

When the objective of the first-line companies consists of two lines of trenches some distance apart it is indispensable to detail separate "cleaning-up" parties for each group. But whatever their objective, the *whole* of these "cleaning-up" detachments march in rear of the assaulting "waves."

Once their particular task is completed, the "cleaning-up" parties may be employed on the preparation and occupation of the captured trenches. In this case machine guns or automatic rifles are detailed to assist them. "Cleaning-up" parties move in line or small columns, according to circumstances. Frequent drills in "cleaning-up" trenches must be carried out.

The machine gun company is the powerful means at the battalion commander's disposal for completing, by its fire effect, the operations of his other units. He regulates its work—

(1) at the opening;
(2) during the progress of the attack;
(3) in the occupation of the objective assigned.

[1] "Nettoyeurs."

(*a*) *At the opening of the attack* the machine guns of battalions in the first line follow their battalions. They will be distributed at the discretion of the battalion commander, chiefly with a view to their installation on the captured front. The machine guns of the battalions in second line are placed, to begin with, on the front from which the attack starts. Placed at selected points affording good fields of fire, they may be employed to advantage in covering the flanks of the first-line battalions by directing a stream of fire on any intervals which may occur between them, or more particularly on the outer flanks of the battalions on the wings of the whole force. When the shape of the ground permits, it is also desirable to bring these machine guns into action against the enemy's second or third lines, his communication trenches, or any machine guns which show themselves. But all necessary precautions must be taken to avoid hitting or obstructing our own troops.

(*b*) *When the attack is under way* the battalion commander sends all or part of his machine guns to positions which have been pointed out beforehand, and which offer the best facilities for securing the ground won either by his own battalion or those on either side.

(*c*) To keep a secure hold on ground when it is captured the fullest possible use should be made of the various weapons, viz, machine guns, automatic rifles, and rifle grenades. Distribution on these lines will result in bringing the automatic rifleman groups and rifle grenadiers into the first line occupied, and bring the grenadiers and riflemen into reserve to provide against counter attacks. Furthermore, the battalion commander must distribute his machine-gun company and the automatic riflemen and rifle grenadiers of the company or companies in reserve in such a manner as to increase the volume of fire available in the front line.

The 37. mm. gun.—This is, as a rule, a battalion weapon. In certain cases, however, the regimental commander may keep it in his own hands.

It is employed—

(1) To prepare and accompany the attack.

(2) To break the resistance of enemy groups during the progress of assault.

(3) To cooperate in the occupation of the position when captured.

(*a*) *To prepare and accompany the attack.*—Before the attack starts the gun is mounted in an emplacement so as to act efficaciously either by destroying any machine-gun emplacements disclosed at the last moment or by battering the second or third lines of the enemy.

To avoid the destruction of the gun, it should only be brought into action at the last moment.

(*b*) *During the course of the attack* the 37-mm. gun goes forward when it can be of no further use in its initial position or when it is required by the infantry to destroy some center of resistance.

Its movements must be provided for in the operation order.

On account of its vulnerability, it is never placed in the first "waves," but may accompany the battalion commander.

Its use is to destroy machine-gun emplacements or clean out fire or communication trenches when opportunities occur to enfilade them. Its employment too close to its target is to be avoided. Masked fire should be used as much as possible.

(*c*) *Occupation of the captured position.*—The 37-mm. gun helps to secure a firm hold of a position won, in the same manner as a machine gun.

It is placed so as to bring fire (oblique for preference) to bear on the probable lines of approach of enemy counter attacks. It is always advantageous to arrange to have more than one masked emplacement, so as to prevent the gun being easily spotted by the enemy's artillery.

Plan of occupation of the captured ground.—It is based on the instructions of the regimental commander drawn up in accordance with the scheme laid down by higher authority.

It will provide for the following:

(1) Number of troops to be detailed to occupy the position.
(2) Their distribution in breadth and more particularly in depth.
(3) The distribution of machine and 37-mm. guns.
(4) Works to execute; construction of fire and communication trenches; distribution of work to units.
(5) Information regarding sites of depots of all sorts of stores, tools, wire, pickets, stakes, sandbags, etc.
(6) Approximate positions of different headquarters.

Reconnaissance of further objectives and following up a success.—The capture of the assigned objective is not the end of the battalion offensive.

It is, above all, necessary—

(1) To regain contact with the enemy.
(2) To reconnoiter the enemy's new position.
(3) To prepare and then carry out a forward movement with the idea of either securing a base of departure for a fresh advance, or of getting fullest possible value out of the success already obtained.

Contact is regained and the fresh position reconnoitered by patrols detached from the first-line troops as soon as they reach the captured position.

Their objectives are indicated in the orders for the attack.

These patrols are composed of grenadiers and automatic riflemen strengthened by riflemen, who make their way rapidly toward their objectives. They occupy these objectives and form the skeleton of a fresh line to be occupied and organized as quickly as possible.

Full advantage should immediately be taken of any gaps in the enemy's defenses.

Enterprising infantry will always find opportunities of completing an initial success by the seizure of *points d'appui* whose reduction would cost them dear the following day. It is particularly important to seize immediately any point which the enemy has abandoned.

The limiting of objectives does not imply the suppression of initiative.

The battalion commander must not lose sight of the fact that successes are not attained by the infantry alone, but by *combination with the artillery.* Further progress, therefore, must be studied beforehand in communication with the artillery and worked out in fullest detail.

The necessity of sending back quick and frequent reports must be strongly impressed on all officers and noncommissioned officers.

Replenishment of supplies, ammunition, and stores.—The regimental and battalion commanders are responsible for the arrangements for these services.

Whatever may be the replenishment arrangements, horse transport will invariably be brought as far forward as possible to avoid fatigue work to the troops. Donkeys and mules will be found most useful for the purpose.

(1) *Supplies.*—At starting, men will take all the food they can carry and 3 or 4 pints of water. Cooking and water carts, under charge of a very energetic officer or noncommissioned officer, will be brought as close up to the troops as possible. Food of too liquid a nature for easy carriage is to be avoided. It is sometimes useful to employ a sort of squad ration basket containing the food for the whole of the following day. Pre-

served provision depots may also be established at company headquarters. Solidified alcohol will be issued to the men for heating food.

(2) *Ammunition and signal lights.*—These are drawn from advanced depots, each containing all descriptions of ammunition that can be asked for.

The development of the specialist services, leading as it does to a great consumption of weighty and bulky stores, makes the careful organization of the replenishment system of vital necessity.

A convenient arrangement is to make up ammunition into lots, each containing a proportion of—

(*a*) Rifle ammunition.

(*b*) Machine-gun and automatic rifle ammunition, hand grenades.

(*c*) V. B. rifle grenades.

(*d*) Rounds for 37-mm. gun.

(*e*) Rockets and signal lights.

(*f*) Illuminating rockets.

(*g*) Sandbags (for carrying stores).

When ammunition is demanded one complete lot is sent up in the absence of notification to contrary.

(3) *Stores.*—As in the case of supplies and ammunition, depots should be placed close to the trenches from which the attack is to start, in the neighborhood of company and battalion headquarters.

Approved.

J. JOFFRE.


SKETCH PLANS.

The dispositions shown are merely explanatory. In practice they are to be modified according to circumstances.



1ST LINE CY IN ATTACK FORMATION WITH 3 ASSAULTING PLATOONS

FRONTAGE 220 YARDS



EXPLANATIONS.


G Grenadier.	A_c Auto-rifleman Corpl.	rg. Rifle Grenade man.	P.C. Platoon Commander.
G_c " Corpl.	R Rifleman	C. Carrier.	S_1 Sergt. of 1st ½ Platoon
A Automatic Rifleman	R_c Rifleman Corpl.		S_2 " " 2nd ½ Platoon

⊙ Company Commander

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1ST LINE Cy IN ATTACK FORMATION WITH 3 ASSAULTING PLATOONS

(FRONTAGE 280 TO 330 YARDS)



EXPLANATIONS.

G. *Grenadiers.*
A. *Automatic Rifleman*
R. *Rifleman*

rg *Rifle Grenade men.*


P.C. *Platoon Commander.*

R *Runners*


P. *Pioneers.*

Sketch No 3.

BATTALION IN ATTACK FORMATION (FRONTAGE 440 TO 550 YARDS.)



PLAN SHOWING ACTION OF CLEANING UP PARTIES OF TEN BATTALION IN ATTACK FORMATION SHOWN IN SKETCH No 3.



31303°—18. (To follow page 23.) No. 4