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". . . . MODERN WARS ARE NOT INTERNECINE WARS IN WHICH THE KILLING OF THE ENEMY IS THE OBJECT. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY IN MODERN WAR, AND, INDEED MODERN WAR ITSELF, ARE MEANS TO OBTAIN THAT OBJECT OF THE BELLIGERENT WHICH LIES BEYOND THE WAR."

WAR DEPARTMENT
GENERAL ORDER No. 100
24 APRIL 1863

DDC
DEC 21 1966
D

A PROGRAM FOR THE PACIFICATION AND LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

(SHORT TITLE: PROVN)

DDC CONTROL
NO. 65354

PREPARED BY THE
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

MARCH, 1966

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FOREWORD

> "Vietnam is involved in two simultaneous and very difficult tasks, nation building and fighting a vicious and well-organized enemy. If it could do either one alone, the task would be vastly simplified, but its got to do both at once . . . Helping Vietnam . . . may very well be the most complex problem ever faced by men in uniform anywhere on earth."

This is the appraisal of America's senior military officer in South Vietnam. PROVN agrees but submits that more than "men in uniform" must face up to this "most complex problem" -- and soon. America must come to grips with all that is involved in Vietnam. Official planning sights in Washington, and in Saigon, need raising. PROVN contends that people -- Vietnamese and American, individually and collectively -- constitute both the strategic determinants of today's conflict and "the object . . . which lies beyond" this war.

PROVN is charged "to develop new courses of action to be taken in South Vietnam by the US and its Allies, which will, in conjunction with current actions, modified as necessary, lead in due time to successful accomplishment of US aims and objectives." This study task is shouldered by the Army in discharge of statutory responsibilities. Moreover, the Chief of Staff must fulfill the direct charge of his Commander-in-Chief:

> "While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern."
> (National Security Action Memorandum 55)

In its examination, PROVN ranges well beyond current considerations and judgments guiding our internal security and development assistance operations. Central facts emerge from this examination: the United States must ensure the pacification and long-term development of South Vietnam; no over-all, integrated plan for this now exists; "no unified effective pattern" is available to the programmer for translation into specific objectives and the scheduling of actions required to attain them. Hence, PROVN submits a framework for projecting national effort -- part plan and part program -- to meet the unique challenge of our times.

The unique character of this challenge stems from realization that, in supporting the development of a national South Vietnam, we are confronted with a dimension of conflict and parameters of required assistance, under pressures of domestic and international stress, that are unprecedented in our experience. No longer do we face a temporary engagement absorbing merely a fraction of our effort and the bare minimum exposure of resolve. Confronting Americans now is a prolonged, deepening commitment. For -- should the United States and the Government of South Vietnam today embark upon the best program of action that minds, funds and technology might devise -- few of us could expect to witness the ultimate viable, free and "independent, non-communist South Vietnam." PROVN remains convinced, however, that such an expenditure of national effort and resolve is mandatory. Developing South Vietnam affords the opportunity to do something about developing ourselves.

1 March 1966

ABSTRACT

PROVN examines the situation in South Vietnam within the context of history and in broad perspective. Specific problems of pacif[illegible]tion and long-term development are identified, and specific [illegible]ctions are proposed to alleviate them. The ultimate objective; a free and independent, non-communist nation.

The United States must restructure, better manage and integrate its support effort; provide positive political guidance, under provisos for applying leverage and constraints; redirect the Republic of Vietnam-Free World military effort to achieve greater security; focus nonmilitary assistance to achieve cohesion within the Vietnamese society; and, orient socio-economic programs to exploit the critical geographic areas population and resource concentration.

PROVN submits that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam must accept the principle that success will be the sum of innumerable, small and integrated localized efforts and not the outcome of any short-duration, single master stroke.

PROVN SUMMARY STATEMENT

The situation in South Vietnam (SVN) has seriously deteriorated. 1966 may well be the last chance to ensure eventual success. "Victory" can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese, typically a rural peasant, to support willingly the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The critical actions are those that occur at the village, district and provincial levels. This is where the war must be fought; this is where that war and the object which lies beyond it must be won. The following are the most important specific actions required now:

- Concentrate US operations on the provincial level to include the delegation of command authority over US operations to the senior US Representative at the provincial level.
- Reaffirm Rural Construction as the foremost US-GVN combined effort to solidify and extend GVN influence.
- Authorize more direct US involvement in GVN affairs at those administrative levels adequate to ensure the accomplishment of critical programs.
- Delegate to the US Ambassador unequivocal authority as the sole manager of all US activities, resources and personnel in-country.
- Direct the Ambassador to develop a single, integrated plan for achieving US objectives in SVN.
- Reaffirm to the world at large the precise terms of the ultimate US objective as stated in NSAM 288: A free and independent, non-communist South Vietnam.

The task of the enemy is much easier. He is opposing a "government" that cannot validly claim the active loyalty of a majority -- even a significant minority -- of the people. The US and the GVN, on the other hand, are dealing essentially from a point of weakness. Building upon the foundations of an ineffectual government, we must develop and "deliver" a positive program that assists the GVN to create an attractive environment so that a firm commitment of the individual to his nation will take root and grow. The VC do not have to deliver until they win. We have to deliver in order to win. The strategic implications of failure necessitate total resolve and effort.

The Strategic Importance of South Vietnam

The future role and accompanying strategy of the US in Asia, especially regarding the security of Southeast Asia, critically depends on the outcome of the current conflict in SVN. US foreign policy, through the short range, will have as its central focus the containment of world communism. Communist China today poses the most immediate danger. Targeting on the less-developed nations, the Communist Chinese have adopted the aggressive doctrine of "wars of national liberation" as a vehicle for communist encirclement of the US and Western Europe. Reiterated by Marshal Lin Piao on 2 September 1965, this doctrine is currently being tested in SVN.

US strategy in mainland Southeast Asia includes supporting the provisions of the 1962 Geneva agreements in Laos, continuing to strengthen Thailand economically and militarily and restoring peace and security

in SVN. In general, US policy calls for the continued development of the individual countries of all Southeast Asia and their increasing regional integration -- economically, socially and politically -- through the agency of such programs as the Mekong River Development Scheme and the recently established Asian Development Bank.

The outcome of US involvement in SVN will determine the future strategy which we as a nation can or will be willing to adopt in Asia.

Major Problem Areas

Five major obstacles stand out above all others as hindering the achievement of the ultimate US objective in SVN:

- A Well Led and Adequately Supported Communist Political-Military Machine: Long experience, the defeat of the French under the nationalist mantle, a formula attuned to peasant aspirations and sanctuaries continguous to the entire western flank of SVN have provided the Communists a significant advantage.

- An Inefficient and Largely Ineffective Government, Neither Representative of nor Responsive to the People: Instability, ineffectual leadership, corruption, overcentralization and disdain for the peasantry have compounded the limitations of skills, experience and equipment.

- The Marginally Effective US Method of Operation: Rapid expansion, lack of understanding of the nature of the conflict, inappropriate response and interagency competition have undermined US efforts to overcome the other four problem areas which fundamentally determine the nature of the conflict in SVN.

☐ The Escalating Requirement for Material Resources to Prosecute the War and Meet Consumer Demands: Having an underdeveloped agricultural economy, SVN does not possess the indigenous resources, the communications infrastructure or the skills necessary to sustain the rapidly escalating conflict.

☐ The Vietnamese Peasant Outlook: Fatalism and war-weariness have sapped peasant motivation; governmental corruption and inefficiency have caused disillusionment; and deeply ingrained traditional values have retarded social change.

US Short-Range Objectives

US short-range objectives must be designed and established to provide a base for gaining the initiative in the current struggle and to ensure significant progress toward overcoming the crucial obstacles. The five major short-range objectives should be:

- The defeat of PAVN and Main Force VC units and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political infrastructure among the population.
- The development of GVN leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.
- The establishment of an integrated US civil-military organization and method of operation capable of ensuring execution of US-GVN plans and programs in SVN.
- The provision of a war-supporting economic infrastructure and initial foundations for economic growth.
- The development of an allegiance to the GVN among the South Vietnamese people.

The Concept of National Operations

The situation in SVN is both challenging and unorthodox; it calls for the application of new and imaginative emphases and techniques. The US must devise an effective counter to "wars of national liberation." The proposed US concept of operations is a broad-front offensive which directs major efforts along three mutually supporting axes -- eliminating armed Communists; ensuring the effective performance of the GVN; and conducting an effective combined US-GVN Rural Construction Program. To launch and sustain the momentum of this offensive, four initiatives must be taken now:

(1) The deployment of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) to destroy PAVN and Main Force VC units and base areas and to reduce external support below the sustaining level. Rural Construction can progress significantly only in conjunction with the effective neutralization of major enemy forces. The bulk of US-FWMAF and designated ARVN units must be directed against base areas and against lines of communication in SVN, Laos and Cambodia as required; the remainder of these forces must ensure adequate momentum to priority Rural Construction areas.

(2) The establishment of Rural Construction as the essential vehicle for extending security to, developing the requisite leadership of and providing the necessary social reform for the Vietnamese people. The war has to be won from the ground up; the people of the countryside

are the target. RVNAF must be the main Allied military element supporting Rural Construction, with the US providing material and technical assistance and stimulating social reform as required. Requisite authority and resources must be provided to the province chief.

(3) The exercise of more direct US involvement to ensure the attainment of US-GVN objectives. Discriminate US involvement in GVN affairs -- ranging from skillful diplomatic pressures, through the application of politico-economic leverage, to US unilateral execution of critical programs -- is essential. The GVN has been either unwilling or unable to accomplish successfully many requisite tasks. The eventual creation of a cohesive society in SVN requires, however, that GVN achieve effectiveness and be directly credited with success. The US must exercise its influence to evoke GVN performance.

(4) The delegation of command authority from Washington to the district level in SVN and the concentration of delegated authority at each intermediate US organizational level in SVN. The requisite flexibility and responsiveness of day-to-day operations can only be achieved if those closest to the situation are delegated adequate authority and means to influence counterpart action. An Executive Agent in Washington should coordinate support activities in the US; the US Ambassador in SVN, raised to the new post of Single Manager, should exercise unequivocal authority over all in-country US activities, personnel and resources; and a single, senior US representative (SUSREP) should be appointed at each lower echelon to function as the counterpart of his parallel GVN senior official. Maximum authority must be delegated to

province. The Single Manager must be authorized an adequate supra-agency planning staff and a deputy for Rural Construction and Development (RC&D) who exercises operational control over USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and the Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group (JUSMAAG) as well as MAP functions (a reduced MACV). US military units in SVN must be under the command of a newly established CINC US Forces Vietnam, coequal with the Director of RC&D.

Priorities. US-GVN priorities for action must be established on the interrelated bases of population and natural resource concentrations, the location and nature of the enemy, available Allied resources, current successes and military logistical requirements. The complex interrelation of considerations for establishing priorities and the varying mixtures of limited military, economic and political resources that may be marshalled to achieve any one objective make the determination of priorities extremely difficult. For these same reasons, establishing clear priorities is all the more important. After securing requisite logistical bases, the first priority must be the Delta (current emphasis on An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon). The second priority area comprises the Coastal Lowlands; the third is the Central Highlands.

Mid-Range Objectives and Subobjectives

Successful achievement of the short-range objectives should allow gradual transition toward mid-range development objectives. These objectives, together with representative subobjectives, are as follows:

● The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability. Subobjectives would include: elimination of VC infrastructure, use of Allied forces to support completion of the Rural Construction Program and transfer of Regional Force-Popular Force responsibilities to the National Police as the RCP progresses.

● A government representative of, and responsive to, its people. Subobjectives would include: an efficient governmental and administrative system, increased authority and prestige of province chiefs and the development of responsible and forward-looking political parties.

● A US organizational presence adequate for assured national security and development. Subobjectives would include: termination of the Executive Agent, return to the country team organizational concept (as the RCP nears completion) and the reduction of the US presence commensurate with increased GVN capability.

● The amelioration of divisive social factors. Subobjectives would include: maximization of minority group integration into the social fabric, expansion of social reforms and the reintegration of the former VC into the society.

● A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion. Subobjectives would include: initiation of major land reform, acceleration of Mekong regional development and the development of light industry.

Long-Range Objectives: The Ultimate South Vietnam

Achievement of US-GVN mid-range objectives will lay the foundation for the long-term development of SVN as a free, independent, non-

communist nation. Development should proceed toward a society that enjoys inner social cohesion; a viable government; a diversified, maturing economy; and, an adequate security posture. In less than 50 years, SVN should have effectively integrated its significant minority groups into the fabric of its society. The government should be basically democratic with firmly established political institutions capable of withstanding crises and allowing for the legal and peaceful transfer of political power. Economically, SVN should have passed the take-off point to self-sustaining growth. A somewhat smaller, well-equipped and well-trained military establishment, backed by regional and international security guarantees, should be able to ensure national security. Throughout the long-range period, the US presence should be minimal.

Measuring Progress

The PROVN questionnaire analysis (See: ANNEX G), supplemented by field investigations, indicates that the most reliable estimates of progress are the qualitative evaluations reported by US representatives and competent Vietnamese who have a direct involvement in the area concerned. Statistical indices are being maintained on nearly every measurable aspect of the conflict, from casualty ratios to VC propaganda incidents. While such statistics are useful, and provide part of the necessary input for any over-all evaluation, many of the more important indicators -- particularly those concerned with the nonmilitary aspects of the conflict -- are not subject to precise quantification.

Over-all evaluations reported by USREPs at the provincial and district levels should be collated, further evaluated and checked by personnel with previous field experience who have been assigned to the Director of Rural Construction and Development for this specific purpose. These evaluators will be able to provide ordinal ranking of districts, in terms of continuing progress, that will constitute the most valid framework for the analysis of related statistics.

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The following SPREAD SHEET is a graphic problem - facts - action portrayal of PROVN highlights.


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The ACTION CATALOGUE lists 140 specific actions designed to achieve the stated objectives.

MAJOR PROBLEMS	CRITICAL FACTORS — WEAKNESSES	CRITICAL FACTORS — STRENGTHS
COMMUNIST POLITICAL MILITARY MECHANISM WELL LED AND SUPPORTED: EFFECTIVE AT ALL LEVELS	PAVN-Main Force VC undefeated and reinforcing rapidly. Base areas in SVN, Cambodia, Laos and NVN support Communist efforts.	Superior effectiveness of US-FWMAF, proven.
	GVN military, police & intelligence performance is poor -- leadership uninspired & untrained.	ARVN troops perform well under good leadership. ARVN troops better supported than PAVN-VC.
	Able, dedicated VC infrastructure pervades and dominates large areas and population groups.	Extensive US-GVN intelligence effort in-being and building.
	VC firmly possess "Nationalism" as a cause.	GVN has potential of "capturing" revolution from VC.
	VC appeals attuned to popular aspirations and motivations. VC terroristic methods feared and effective.	VC also alienate population by indiscriminate use of terror and military force.
	Noncombatant casualties caused by GVN-FWMAF alienate people. No VC-PAVN-NLF amnesty provision in Chieu Hoi. Long-standing causes of insurgency continue.	ARVN troop misconduct and counter-productive tactics are correctable. Chieu Hoi Program has proven potential. GVN recognizes need for, and could make social and political reforms.
	Rural construction efforts have failed.	Areas have responded to development programs. Some lower echelon officials will pursue Rural Construction. Leverage has produced success.
GVN INEFFICIENT AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE NEITHER REPRESENTATIVE OF NOR RESPONSIVE TO THE PEOPLE	SVN political-military leadership weak.	US civil-military scafolding can guide, assist or directly influence. Social groups source of potential leadership.
	Institutionalized mandarin and French inefficiency. Committee rule characterized by self-interest, separatism and in-fighting. Overcentralized authority. Inefficient, corrupt Civil Service.	Existing GVN could be made efficient. Some dedicated and capable officials exist. Some lower echelon officials effective if given authority. GVN recognizes need for civil service reform.
	Advisors lack authority and resources.	Powerful US influence could be used.


BLUEPRINT FOR NATIONAL ACTION

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


IAL ACTION SECRET

OR SHORT-RANGE THRUSTS	SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES	MID-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND SUBOBJECTIVES	LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES AND SUBOBJECTIVES
		3	
DEPLOY US AND FWMAF SO AS TO DESTROY VC PAVN BASE AREAS, FORCES AND REDUCE EXTERNAL SUPPORT BELOW SUSTAINING LEVEL	DEFEAT OF PAVN-MAIN FORCE VC AND REDUCTION OF VC GUERRILLAS & POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.	ESTABLISHED CAPACITY TO DEFEAT SUBVERSION AND MAINTAIN STABILITY. (1) Reorientation of majority of allied forces to support and expedite mid-range completion of the RCP. (2) Provision of sufficient security for principal land LOCs to permit routine use. (3) Initiation of a positive program to survey, clear selectively and secure the national land borders. (4) Reduction of RF, PF and RCC in pacified provinces with a concurrent increase in NP strength and nation building operations.	**A SECURE NATION** (1) Deactivation of all paramilitary forces with careful and detailed arms collection. (2) Improvement of the organization and equipment of the RVNAF. (3) Establishment of GVN and US membership in a functioning regional defense organization. (4) Reorientation of NP to principal missions of maintaining law and order, and border surveillance and control.
CONDUCT RESOURCES (ECONOMIC WARFARE) AND POPULATION CONTROL AS A MEANS OF ELIMINATING VC INFRASTRUCTURE.			
ESTABLISH RURAL CONSTRUCTION AS THE ESSENTIAL VEHICLE FOR EXTENDING SECURITY, DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP AND PROVIDING SOCIAL REFORM.			
MOBILIZE LEADERSHIP BY ENLISTING INACTIVE TRAINING EXISTING AND DEVELOPING POTENTIAL LEADERS.	LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES CAPABLE OF FURTHERING NATION BUILDING.	GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF, AND RESPONSIVE TO ITS PEOPLE. (1) An efficient tovernmental and administrative system. (2) Authority and prestige of province chiefs increased to point of effective government. (3) Gvn operating within framework of a constitution. (4) Developing responsible and forward-looking political parties.	**A VIABLE GOVERNMENT** (1) A stable government with institutionalized procedures for changing leadership. (2) A professional civil service. (3) Full support of political institutions by all sectors of society. (4) Active participation in the community of nations.
EXERCISE OF DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT REQUISITE TO ENSURE	US ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION THAT	US ORGANIZATION AND PRESENCE CAPABLE TO SUPPORT PACIFICATION AND NATION BUILDING (1) Termination of executive agent.	**MINIMUM US PRESENCE** Withdrawal of subnational


Rural construction efforts have failed.
Areas have responded to development programs.
Some lower echelon officials will pursue Rural Construction.
Leverage has produced success.
GVN INEFFICIENT AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE NEITHER REPRESENTATIVE OF NOR RESPONSIVE TO THE PEOPLE
SVN political-military leadership weak.
US civil-military scafolding can guide, assist or directly influence.
Social groups source of potential leadership.
Institutionalized mandarin and French inefficiency.
Existing GVN could be made efficient.
Committee rule characterized by self-interest, separatism and in-fighting.
Some dedicated and capable officials exist.
Overcentralized authority.
Some lower echelon officials effective if given authority.
Inefficient, corrupt Civil Service.
GVN recognizes need for civil service reform.
MARGINALLY EFFECTIVE US METHOD OF OPERATION
Advisors lack authority and resources.
Many advisors vying for rapport.
Powerful US influence could be used.
Advisory effort eclipsed by influx of units.
US talent is available.
Ambassador unable to coordinate agency activities.
US operations amenable to change.
SVN REQUIRES WAR MATERIALS CONSUMER GOODS AND SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE
War distorted economy.
US assistance can make up economic deficit.
Security situation restricts development effort.
Current US-GVN RC plan can reduce security problem.
Lack of trained manpower.
US technical assistance and GVN training programs can bridge trained manpower gap.
WAR WEARY VIETNAMESE OUTLOOK: TRADITIONAL, CYNICAL, FRUSTRATED
Motivation vitiated by fatalism and war weariness.
Prime motivators are family, locale, religious and ethnic loyalties.
Peasants disillusioned by corrupt and dishonest officials.
Vietnamese "bandwagon" to a winning side.
Promises of reform ignored.
Aspirations and grievances can be catalogued.
Social change difficult.
People resilient and desire some change.
US can influence reforms.

SECRET


Place maximum US-GVN effort on Rural Construction.
Discriminately take positive action to force performance.
Intensify leadership training throughout GVN.
Provide guidance and assistance.
Execute administrative and fiscal reform -- "Little Hoover Commission."
Improve legal system (substantive law, legal institutions, popular understanding and acceptance).
US influence Directory to act in national interest and to transfer power to Prime Minister.
Decentralize authority to province and district.
Institute civil service reform and develop career program.
Apply leverage and political action to achieve critical tasks.
Enlarge and tailor lower echelon teams.
Designate senior USREPs at all levels.
Select key personnel without regard to parent agency.
Introduce Single Manager system (Ambassador).
Direct Ambassador to develop integrated plan.
Designate Presidential Assistant as Executive Agent in Washington.
Continue emergency transportation measures.
Continue CIP and PL 480 support.
Assign RC priority to Saigon-Bien Hoa and Bassac-Mekong areas.
Continue elementary school program.
Expand provincial high schools and technical schools.
Appeal to existing motivations to stimulate action.
Reinforce and support local successes.
Conduct positive program of social change and reform at all levels.
Couple US resource support with GVN commitment to social reform.
Establish and sustain public education.
ESTABLISH RURAL CONSTRUCTION AS THE ESSENTIAL VEHICLE FOR EXTENDING SECURITY, DEVELOPING LEADERSHIP AND PROVIDING SOCIAL REFORM.
MOBILIZE LEADERSHIP BY ENLISTING INACTIVE TRAINING EXISTING AND DEVELOPING POTENTIAL LEADERS.
EXERCISE OF DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT REQUISITE TO ENSURE ATTAINMENT OF US GVN OBJECTIVES.
MAINTAIN PRESENT ECONOMY WHILE LAYING FOUNDATION FOR LONG RANGE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
PROVIDE NECESSARY MATERIAL TO PROSECUTE WAR.
CONTINUE EDUCATION TO ASSIST BOTH RURAL CONSTRUCTION AND NATION BUILDING.
ENLIST PREDOMINANT LOCAL ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS LOYALTIES TO GAIN COMMITMENT OF POPULATION.
LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES CAPABLE OF FURTHERING NATION BUILDING.
US ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION THAT ENSURES EXECUTION OF US-GVN PROGRAMS.
WAR-SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND INITIAL FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
POPULAR ATTITUDES FAVORING GVN OVER VC
operations.
GOVERNMENT REPRE
AND RESPONSIVE T
(1) An efficie
and admini
(2) Authority
province
to point
governmen
(3) GVN operat
framework
(4) Developing
forward-lo
parties.
US ORGANIZATION
CAPABLE TO SUPPO
AND NATION BUILD
(1) Terminatio
agent.
(2) Establish
policy sup
(3) Selective
military
district
teams.
5
A VIABLE ECONOMI
ORIENTED TOWARD
(1) Develop l
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(2) Diversify
and incre
rubber pr
exports.
(3) Execute L
program,
developm
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and parti
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DIVISIVE SOCIAL

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and control.

STABLISH RURAL
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RAINING EXISTING AND
EVELOPING POTENTIAL
EADERS.

LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES CAPABLE OF FURTHERING NATION BUILDING.

GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF, AND RESPONSIVE TO, ITS PEOPLE.

(1) An efficient governmental and administrative system.

(2) Authority and prestige of province chiefs increased to point of effective government.

(3) GVN operating within framework of a constitution.

(4) Developing responsible and forward-looking political parties.

A VIABLE GOVERNMENT

(1) A stable government with institutionalized procedures for changing leadership.

(2) A professional civil service.

(3) Full support of political institutions by all sectors of society.

(4) Active participation in the community of nations.

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TTAINMENT OF US GVN
BJECTIVES.

US ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION THAT ENSURES EXECUTION OF US-GVN PROGRAMS.

US ORGANIZATION AND PRESENCE CAPABLE TO SUPPORT PACIFICATION AND NATION BUILDING

(1) Termination of executive agent.

(2) Establishment of AID as policy support arm.

(3) Selective withdrawal of military components of district and province teams.

MINIMUM US PRESENCE

Withdrawal of subnational US civil-military teams.

MAINTAIN PRESENT
ECONOMY WHILE LAYING
FOUNDATION FOR
LONG RANGE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT.

PROVIDE NECESSARY
MATERIAL TO
PROSECUTE WAR.

WAR-SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND INITIAL FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.

A VIABLE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE ORIENTED TOWARD EXPANSION.

(1) Develop [illegible] and US ship[illegible] capital good materials.

(2) Diversify agriculture and increase rice, rubber production and exports.

(3) Execute land reform program, initiate development of Central Highlands and participate in Mekong Regional Development Program.

A DIVERSIFIED, MATURING ECONOMY

(1) GVN continue expansionary thrust in economic area.

(2) GVN continue SVN's SEA regional integration.

(3) US eliminate assistance programs.


CONTINUE EDUCATION
TO ASSIST BOTH RURAL
CONSTRUCTION AND
NATION BUILDING.

ENLIST PREDOMINANT
LOCAL ETHNIC AND
RELIGIOUS LOYALTIES
TO GAIN COMMITMENT
OF POPULATION.

POPULAR ATTITUDES FAVORING GVN OVER VC

ELIMINATION OF SIGNIFICANT DIVISIVE SOCIAL FACTORS

A COHESIVE SOCIETY


THE THRUSTS & SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES
MAJOR PROBLEMS
CRITICAL FACTORS
ACTIONS

THE

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BLUEPRINT FOR NATIONAL ACTION

THE FOUNDATION

BASIC US NATIONAL OBJECTIVE

A FREE AND INDEPENDENT, NON-COMMUNIST SOUTH VIETNAM.

BASIC US NATIONAL POLICY

TO ASSIST THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO PRESERVE AND FURTHER THEIR INDIVIDUAL AND NATIONAL FREEDOM; TO ENSURE AND ADVANCE THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH; AND TO DEVELOP AND SUSTAIN A VIABLE AND JUST GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE TO ITS CITIZENRY.

THE CONCEPT

● THIS SPREAD SHEET ADDRESSES PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THEIR BROADEST CONNOTATIONS. AS A PROJECTION INTO THE FUTURE, IT DERIVES FROM THE OBJECTIVE-POLICY FOUNDATION SET FORTH ABOVE. IN SUCH PERSPECTIVE, THE CONDITIONS OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT ARE CONCEIVED AS INEXTRICABLY LINKED CATALYSTS IN AN EVOLVING PROCESS. EACH SERVES AND REINFORCES THE OTHER IN THE MOVEMENT TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF A SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATION. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF WAGING THE REQUIRED UNIFIED EFFORT, IT IS ENVISIONED THAT PACIFICATION FUNCTIONS AS THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE COMPONENT, WHILE DEVELOPMENT OPERATES AS THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE COMPONENT, OF OVER-ALL US-GVN STRATEGY.

● STARTING WITH THE EXISTING MAJOR PROBLEMS, THIS SPREAD SHEET ADDS STIPULATED ACTIONS NECESSARY TO GUIDE AND STIMULATE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. THE BROAD AREAS REQUIRING MAJOR US-GVN EMPHASIS IN THE SHORT RANGE ARE PORTRAYED AS NINE THRUSTS. EACH THRUST IS SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC US-GVN ACTIONS. ONLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS ARE DEPICTED; THESE ARE SUBMITTED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TOTALITY OF INTERRELATED FACTORS OPERATING IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE APPENDED SPECIFIC ACTION CATALOGUE, HOWEVER, DOES CONTAIN A LISTING OF ALL 140 SPECIFIC SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS PROPOSED IN PROVN CHAPTERS AND ANNEXES.

2

● IN THE MID AND LONG-RANGE TIME PERIODS, SOLELY THE MOST CRUCIAL OBJECTIVES AND SUBOBJECTIVES FOR US-GVN ATTAINMENT ARE SUBMITTED. THESE ARE PROJECTED FORWARD FROM A FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED BY SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES.

THIS BLUEPRINT IS BEING PROPOSED AS A PROGRAMING BASIS, NOT

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THE REQUIRED UNIFIED EFFORT, IT IS ENVISIONED THAT PACIFICATION FUNCTIONS AS THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE COMPONENT, WHILE DEVELOPMENT OPERATES AS THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE COMPONENT, OF OVER-ALL US-GVN STRATEGY.

● STARTING WITH THE EXISTING MAJOR PROBLEMS, THIS SPREAD SHEET ADDS STIPULATED ACTIONS NECESSARY TO GUIDE AND STIMULATE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. THE BROAD AREAS REQUIRING MAJOR US-GVN EMPHASIS IN THE SHORT RANGE ARE PORTRAYED AS NINE THRUSTS. EACH THRUST IS SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC US-GVN ACTIONS. ONLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND SPECIFIC ACTIONS ARE DEPICTED; THESE ARE SUBMITTED AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TOTALITY OF INTERRELATED FACTORS OPERATING IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. THE APPENDED SPECIFIC ACTION CATALOGUE, HOWEVER, DOES CONTAIN A LISTING OF ALL 140 SPECIFIC SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS PROPOSED IN PROVN CHAPTERS AND ANNEXES.

● IN THE MID AND LONG-RANGE TIME PERIODS, SOLELY THE MOST CRUCIAL OBJECTIVES AND SUBOBJECTIVES FOR US-GVN ATTAINMENT ARE SUBMITTED. THESE ARE PROJECTED FORWARD FROM A FOUNDATION ESTABLISHED BY SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES. THIS BLUEPRINT IS NEITHER PROPOSED AS A PROGRAMING DESIGN, NOR AS A FORM OF SHORTHAND SUBSTITUTE FOR EITHER ESTABLISHED PROCESSES OR THOSE THAT REMAIN TO BE DEVELOPED IF THE US AND ITS ALLIES ARE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE OF TOTAL NATIONAL SCOPE. RATHER, IT IS SUBMITTED AS A SYNTHESIS OF PROVN FINDINGS IN STUDYING THE ISSUE OF DEVELOPING "NEW COURSES OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH WILL, IN CONJUNCTION WITH CURRENT ACTIONS, MODIFIED AS NECESSARY, LEAD IN DUE TIME TO SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF US AIMS AND OBJECTIVES."


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5

SPECIFIC ACTION CATALOGUE

PROVN recommends 140 separate actions to achieve the US short-range objectives in SVN. These actions are grouped under the nine thrusts which appear on the spread sheet; actions supporting two or more thrusts appear more than once. These thrusts are broad avenues of endeavor which include many specific actions. References to those pages which discuss the rationale for, and the method of execution of, each action are listed. The US agency with the capability best to assist the GVN in executing the proposal, or to initiate action leading to its execution, is indicated.

PROVN recommendations in the short-range period are not exhaustive. There are many ongoing programs (e.g., pig-corn) and lesser actions which PROVN believes should continue; consequently, the omission of these programs from the catalogue does not imply their discontinuance.

Success of the short-range PROVN proposals hinges on adoption of a policy of more direct US involvement in GVN affairs. The US must use its powerful influence constructively to ensure success. The need for this positive and constructive influence is founded on the premise that people and ideas are more effective weapons than military hardware in battling for men's minds. The influence suggested requires tact and skill to foster, stimulate and guide the growth of structures and behaviors. The exercise of positive and constructive US influence requires the courage to become directly involved where we must, the patience to abstain when appropriate and the wisdom to know the difference. To do otherwise could result in failure.

Short-Range Thrusts and Specific Actions

Thrust. The exercise of direct US influence requisite to ensure attainment of US-GVN objectives.

(1) Alter the US method of operation to ensure execution of essential programs and reforms.
US AMB (2-18,19) (3-7 to 10)

(2) Authorize and encourage use of resources as leverage at all levels.
US AMB (2-19,40)

(3) Institutionalize techniques to bring US influence to bear on Rural Construction.
US AMB, Dir USOM (2-38,39) (4-18 to 21) (5-52)

(4) Decentralize authority to province and below.
US AMB, Dir USOM (2-27,34) (3-13,21,36) (4-19 to 21)

(5) Tailor teams according to unique requirements of province and district to include technical and administrative personnel.
Corps SUSREPs (2-20,45)

(6) Retain custody of resources in US channels to maximum extent.
US AMB (2-40,56)

(7) Select 43 Lt Colonels and Colonels together with an all agency sector team for cross training and deployment to SVN.
Special Assistant to President, SECDEF, SECARMY, CofS US Army (2-44,49)

(8) Institute SVN civil service reform through development of career program.
Dir USOM (3-36 to 38)

(9) Exercise selective support of successful provinces and districts.
All SUSREPs (2-37)

(10) Identify and achieve elimination of corrupt GVN officials by rendering efficiency reports and ultimately by combined board proceedings.
All SUSREPs (2-19,37,40)

(11) Strengthen office of Prime Minister.
US AMB (3-15,19)

(12) Execute Administrative Reform -- "Little Hoover Commission."
Dir USOM (3-14)

(13) Simplify and clarify lines of authority.
Make ministerial representatives at province and district responsible to province and district chiefs, respectively. Make district chief responsible to province chief only. Make province chief responsible to Prime Minister (except for Rural Construction).
US AMB (3-13 to 20)

(14) Tailor US civil-military scaffolding to parallel GVN structure as necessary.
US AMB (2-14,15,18,19)

(15) Designate current MACV "advisor" senior USREP at all levels.
US AMB (2-16,24)

(16) Initiate social and economic development programs for Montagnards.
Dir USOM (3-53 to 56)

(17) Specify counterproductive GVN actions authorizing use of veto.
US AMB (2-22,40) (ANNEX I-29)

(18) Increase interaction between GVN and leaders of various social, religious, and political groups.
US AMB (3-35)

(19) Use US political influence to discourage unjustified group agitation.
US AMB (3-36)

(20) Encourage development of social organizations, (e.g., trade unions and youth groups),
US AMB, Dir USOM (3-49,50) (4-67 to 72)

(21) Designate Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam Affairs as Executive Agent for SVN.
President (2-12)

(22) Eliminate the Mission Council.
US AMB (2-53)

(23) Designate Ambassador as US Single Manager (with Supra-Agency Planning Staff) with full responsibility for the US effort in SVN.
President (2-11,12)

(24) Place current MACV sector and subsector advisory elements under the DRCD, responsive to the Ambassador.
US AMB (2-16 to 18)

(25) Institute fiscal reform.
Dir USOM (3-14,45,46) (4-17 to 21, 60 to 63)

(26) Expand NIA physical plant and graduate output.
Dir USOM (3-38)

(27) Develop vocational training centers.
Dir USOM (3-38) (4-69,70)

(28) Initiate intraministerial in-service training programs.
Dir USOM (3-38)

(29) Institute Administrative Court for other than GVN Legal Affairs.
Dir USOM (3-20)

(30) Set popular allegiance to the GVN as principle objective.
US AMB (2-28,47)

(31) Develop new Constitution.
US AMB (3-17)

(32) Form National Assembly
US AMB (3-17,35)

(33) Initiate long-range planning.
US AMB (2-26,31)

(34) Establish AID as primary foreign policy support arm to include career foreign service officer status for field representatives.
SECSTATE (2-44,51)

(35) Establish an Institute for Political-Economic-Social Research.
Dir USOM (3-41)

(36) Form executive cabinet from men with compatible ideas.
US AMB (3-19)

(37) Permit political opposition participation in government at ministerial sublevel.
US AMB (3-20)

(38) Conduct controlled elections at lower echelons.
US AMB (3-29 to 33)

(39) Encourage responsible, forward looking political parties.
US AMB (3-50 to 52)

(40) Use the term "representative" rather than "advisor" since the former is more descriptive of the role of ensuring action on US-GVN objectives.
US AMB (2-24)

(41) Discontinue the Vietnam Coordinating Committee.
President (2-12,52)

(42) Establish a Director for Rural Construction and Development (DRCD).
US AMB (2-16,17,53)

(43) Designate CINCUSFV coequal with DRCD.
US AMB (2-17.53)

(44) Direct the supra-agency staff to prepare a combined national level plan for RC and Development of SVN.
US AMB (2-31,32,53)

(45) Place all US agencies in-country (except USFV) under the DRCD.
Special Assistant to President, US AMB (2-17,18,53)

(46) Bring the MACV sector and subsector advisory effort within the Single Manager system with the status of a separate element (JUSMAAG) coequal with USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and STATE.
US AMB (2-17,54)

(47) Designate senior US representatives (SUSREPs) to direct US assistance activities at GVN corps and subnational levels.
US AMB (2-15,16,54,55)

(48) Direct that four SUSREPs assume command of the US sector and subsector advisory effort and such US military units as support Rural Construction within their respective territorial areas.
US AMB (2-54)

(49) Direct that the advisory teams with RVNAF units committed to the support of RC in-provinces come under the operational control of the provincial SUSREP.
Corps SUSREP (2-54)

(50) Assist development of effective legal system.
US AMB (3-38 to 41)

(51) Simplify the national political environment by encouraging polarization of existing "political" groups around broad political concepts rather than around parochial interests.
US AMB (3-34)

(52) Establish outlets for political expression.
US AMB (3-35,50 to 53)

(53) Integrate minority group participation in government.
US AMB (3-53 to 60)

(54) Establish system for citizen complaint against corrupt officials.
US AMB (3-20,46)

(55) Re-establish Directorate General of Budget within Ministry of Defense.
US AMB (3-45)

(56) Include code of conduct training for public servants in NIA, intraministerial curricula, and public school system.
Dir USOM (3-38,46)

(57) Establish and sustain a USREP questionnaire-debrief program.
US AMB (2-28,49,56)

(58) Conduct intensive socio-cultural research in Vietnamese society to identify those aspects which must be modified through induced social change.
SECSTATE (2-28,46,56) (ANNEX I-4)

(59) Conduct intensive behavioral science research to determine how best to influence social change in emerging nations.
SECSTATE (2-47,56)

Thrust. The establishment of Rural Construction as the essential vehicle for extending security to, developing the requisite leadership of and providing the necessary social reform for the Vietnamese people.

(1) Establish a Director for Rural Construction and Development.
US AMB (2-16,17,53)

(2) Focus priority RC effort on densely populated areas.
US AMB, Dir USOM (4-15) (5-23,24)

(3) Orient major RC effort and initiate RC planning at village level.
DRCD (2-31) (5-25)

(4) Establish clearly defined basis for effective GVN execution of the RCP at all levels.
US AMB (2-38,39)

(5) Achieve GVN provision of ministerial representation to Corps to increase responsiveness to Rural Construction tasks.
US AMB (2-34)

(6) Achieve unity of command and effort at provincial level.
US AMB (2-28,35) (5-32)

(7) Improve organization and method of operation of RC cadre.
DRCD (5-26 to 32)

(8) Accept and train for role of social change.
All US Agencies (2-24,48)

(9) Assign Rural Construction Evaluators to DRCD to assess district progress.
US AMB (2-43)

(10) Retain custody of resources in US channels to maximum extent.
US AMB, SUSREPs (2-35) (ANNEX G)

(11) Selectively support districts showing progress by shifting resources.
All SUSREPs (2-20,21)

(12) Selectively undercut GVN levels of obstruction, where necessary, to protect success or prevent failure of RCP.
US AMB (2-36,37)

(13) Take division out of chain of command for RC.
US AMB, DRCD, Chief JUSMAAG (5-32)

(14) Allocate a substantial proportion of ARVN division forces to province on a "permanent" basis to operate under control of province chief.
US AMB, DRCD, Chief JUSMAAG (5-33)

(15) ARVN corps and division maintain small mobile reserves for operations in CTZ and DTA
US AMB, DRCD, Chief JUSMAAG (5-33)

(16) Improve operation and organization of SOIC and SSOIC.
DRCD, Chief JUSMAAG (5-38)

(17) Employ ARVN allocated to provinces in area saturation tactics.
DRCD, Chief JUSMAAG (5-39,40)

(18) Provide security for hamlets, LOCs and installations by aggressive, external mobile action.
US AMB (5-42)

(19) Render reports on GVN officials not supporting the RCP.
SUSREPs (2-19,40)

(20) Direct that the advisory teams with RVNAF units committed to the support of RC in provinces come under operational control of province SUSREP.
US AMB (2-54)

(21) Direct the supra-agency staff to prepare a combined national level plan for RC and Development of SVN.
US AMB (2-31,32,53)

(22) Use part of Allied combat engineer forces in support of RC.
US AMB (5-46)

(23) Involve military forces with population through civic action.
US AMB (5-47)

(24) Expedite indemnification for war damage.
US AMB (5-47)

(25) Discontinue unobserved artillery fire in populated areas.
US AMB (5-19)

(26) Conduct fighter-bomber strikes in populated areas only in support of units in contact.
US AMB (5-19,20)

(27) Confine "scorched earth" tactics to VC war zones.
US AMB (5-50)

(28) Curtail troop misconduct toward noncombatants.
US AMB (5-19,20)

(29) Cease use of GVN troops as tax collectors.
US AMB (5-20)

(30) Institute firm, well-publicized amnesty program.
US AMB (5-20 to 22)

(31) Integrate Chieu Hoi returnees into SVN society taking advantage of individual capabilities.
US AMB (5-20)

(32) Elevate Chieu Hoi to ministerial level.
US AMB (5-21,22)

(33) Devise techniques to encourage provision of intelligence by local people as a priority undertaking.
DRCD (5-48)

(34) Integrate intelligence process at each territorial echelon.
DRCD (5-48)

(35) Enforce CI measures to protect security of friendly operations and installations.
DRCD, CINCUSFV (5-48)

(36) Orient NP against VC political infrastructure.
Dir USOM (5-49)

(37) Apply economic warfare selectively.
Dir USOM (5-50)

(38) Institutionalize techniques to permit US influence on RC.
US AMB (5-52)

(39) Execute techniques to improve RVNAF leadership, training and discipline.
US AMB (5-53 to 56)

(40) Initiate motivational training for all GVN armed forces.
DRCD (5-59)

(41) Increase ARVN foxhole strength with emphasis on company grade officers.
Chief JUSMAAG (5-60,61)

(42) Use minority and sectarian forces in native areas under territorial control.
US AMB (5-61,62)

(43) Do not accept "foreign legion" forces for use in SVN.
SECSTATE, SECDEF (5-62)

(44) Improve and enforce draft.
US AMB (5-63)

(45) Provide for suitable senior officer rotation; use talent of selected "retired" RVNAF officers.
US AMB (5-65)

(46) Develop national building skills through military training.
DRCD (5-68)

(47) Increase use of surface LOCs for supply movement.
DRCD, CINCUSFV (5-68 to 70)

(48) Supply RVNAF through US logistical channels rather than MAP.
Special Assistant to President, US AMB, CINCUSFV, DRCD (5-69,70)

(49) Ensure necessary preconditions prior to negotiations.
Special Assistant to President, SECSTATE, US AMB (5-70,71)

(50) In event of cease-fire, stress security, police action and nonmilitary support of RC.
US AMB (5-71,72)

Thrust. The deployment of US-FWMAF so as to destroy PAVN and Main Force VC forces and Base Areas and to reduce external support below sustaining level.

(1) Curtail significant infiltration through actions of increasing intensity.

(a) Commit VNMC elements and USMC DAGGER THRUST forces against VC-held coastal areas of SVN.

(b) Expand defoliation of VC held coastal areas.

(c) Prepare to close GVN-Cambodian border and quarantine Sihanoukville.

(d) Reinforce aerial interdiction by committing ground forces appropriately in I and II CTZs.

(e) Commit US and Free World Special Forces into Laotian Panhandle.

(f) Reinforce aerial interdiction by committing ground forces on raids in Laotian Panhandle.

(g) Prepare to occupy and defend strip across DMZ and Laotian Panhandle.

Special Assistant to President, SECDEF, Chairman JCS, US AMB, CINCUSFV (5-8 to 12)

(2) Continue B-52 raids against in-country war zones.
Special Assistant to President, SECDEF, Chairman JCS, US AMB (5-12)

(3) Occupy and demolish in-country war zones.
DRCD, CINCUSFV (5-12,13)

(4) Take diplomatic and military action (as required) against external safe havens.
Special Assistant to President, SECSTATE, SECDEF, Chairman JCS, US AMB (5-15)

(5) Undertake combined operations against PAVN-Main Force VC with US-FWMAF and designated ARVN units.
US AMB (5-15 to 18)

(6) Improve responsiveness of supporting fire and tactical air support.
CINCUSFV (5-17,18)

(7) Discontinue USMC enclave concept in favor of more aggressive action.
CINCUSFV (5-18)

(8) Orient on enemy and stress continuous pursuit.
CINCUSFV (5-17)

(9) Designate CINCUSFV coequal with DRCD.
US AMB (2-17,53)

Thrust. Mobilize existing leadership base by enlisting the inactive, training the existing and developing potential leaders.

(1) Expand National Institute of Administration physical plant and graduate output.
Dir USOM (3-38)

(2) Execute techniques to improve RVNAF leadership, training and discipline.
US AMB, DRCD (5-53 to 57)

(3) Initiate intra-ministerial in-service training program.
Dir USOM (3-38)

(4) Initiate motivational training for all GVN armed forces.
DRCD (5-59)

(5) Encourage development of social organizations, e.g., trade unions and youth groups.
US AMB, Dir USOM (3-49,50)

(6) Provide for use of talent of selected "retired" RVNAF officers, and provide for suitable senior officer rotation.
US AMB (5-65)

(7) Develop nation building skills through military training.
DRCD (5-68)

Thrust. Conduct resources (economic warfare) and population control as a means of eliminating VC infrastructure.

(1) Intensify efforts to deny rice to VC-PAVN in Central SVN.
Dir USOM, Chief JUSMAAG (4-39)

(2) Confine "scorched earth" tactics to VC war zones.
US AMB (5-50)

(3) Apply economic warfare selectively.
US AMB (5-50)

(4) Prepare to close GVN-Cambodian border and quarantine Sihanoukville.
Special Assistant to President, SECSTATE, SECDEF, Chairman JCS, US AMB (5-11)

Thrust. Provide necessary material to prosecute the war.

(1) Supply RVNAF through US logistical channels rather than MAP.
Special Assistant to President, US AMB, CINCUSFV, DRCD (5-68 to 70)

(2) Revise MAP procedures to enable USREPs to retain custody and release authority within Area Logistics Commands.
SECDEF, US AMB, (2-56)

(3) Continue CIP and PL 480 support.
Dir USOM (4-26 to 28)

(4) Continue emergency transportation support.
Dir USOM (4-57 to 60)

Thrust. Maintain the SVN economy during short-range period thereby laying foundation for long-range economic development.

(1) Continue CIP and PL 480 support.
Dir USOM (4-26 to 28)

(2) Continue rice imports.
Dir USOM (4-38)

(3) Accelerate rural development emphasizing agriculture.
Dir USOM (4-37)

(4) Continue emergency transportation support.
Dir USOM (4-57)

(5) Support refugee program.
Dir USOM (4-33)

(6) Support preventive medicine effort.
Dir USOM (4-63)

(7) Support provincial hospitals.
Dir USOM (4-63)

(8) Conduct selective land reform.
Dir USOM (4-43)

(9) Support Agricultural Extension Service.
Dir USOM (4-40)

(10) Execute tax laws.
Dir USOM (4-60)

(11) Continue limited urban housing program.
Dir USOM (4-57)

(12) Reduce salt-water intrusion.
Dir USOM (4-48)

(13) Continue Fifty City Water Supply Project.
Dir USOM (4-56)

(14) Develop cooperatives.
Dir USOM (4-41,42)

(15) Improve credit.
Dir USOM (4-43)

(16) Develop rural electric cooperatives.
Dir USOM (4-49)

(17) Continue Mekong Project planning.
Dir USOM (4-51,74)

Thrust. Enlist predominant local, ethnic and religious loyalties to gain commitment of population.

(1) Integrate minority group participation in government.
US AMB (3-53 to 60)

(2) Discontinue unobserved artillery fire in populated areas.
US AMB (5-19,20)

(3) Conduct fighter-bomber strikes in populated areas only in support of units in contact.
US AMB (5-19,20)

(4) Confine "scorched earth" tactics to VC war zones.
US AMB (5-20)

(5) Curtail troop misconduct toward noncombatants.
US AMB (5-19)

(6) Cease use of GVN troops as tax collectors.
US AMB (5-19)

(7) Institute firm, well publicized amnesty program.
US AMB (5-20 to 22)

Thrust. Continue education to assist both Rural Construction and nation building.

(1) Expand provincial high schools and technical schools.
Dir USOM (4-67)

(2) Continue elementary school program.
Dir USOM (4-65)

(3) Encourage technical education in universities.
Dir USOM (4-70)

(4) Develop nation building skills through military training.
Dir DRCD (5-68)

(5) Expand English language training.
Dir JUSPAO (4-69)

(6) Continue youth program.
Dir USOM (4-70 to 72)

PROVN IN DIGEST

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INTRODUCTION

The United States could fail to achieve its objective in South Vietnam. Steps taken in 1966 may either ensure eventual success or reinforce the present trend to win battles but lose the war. We have underestimated the complexities of the situation; thus, th US response has been inappropriate. 1/ A lack of understanding as to the total nature of the conflict persists. Our assistance techniques and support organization have proved to be only marginally effective in coping with the military, political, economic and psychological components of the "nonwar" being waged.2/

The Government of South Vietnam (GVN) presently controls less than 10 per cent of the countryside. Although USMACV reports indicate that GVN controls slightly over 50 per cent of the population, Premier Ky admitted to Secretary of Defense McNamara in January of this year that the GVN controlled only 25 per cent of the population.

The situation today in South Vietnam, in certain significant respects, bears an alarming resemblance to that facing the French in 1954. In June of that year, the US Far East Command reported:

> "The lack of an adequate administrative, political and economic followup plan for otherwise successful clearing operations often results in the subsequent infiltration and reestablishment of the Viet Minh forces in a cleared area."

US and other Free World assets committed in South Vietnam have not yet altered significantly the situation in our favor.3/

THE TASK

Two fundamental problems frame our task in Vietnam. The first is an enemy -- possessor of a well-led and supported communist political-military mechanism -- who enjoys a record of success in the face of French combat power. The second, and closely related issue, is the war-weary Vietnamese outlook: traditional, cynical and frustrated. An understanding of these two pervasive problems is a precondition to discussion of the PROVN proposals.

The Communist Political-Military Mechanism.

There are approximately 16,000,000 people in SVN -- 80 percent of them rural dwellers. Communist attention is focused on the rural population which, according to Peking doctrine, provides the essential bedrock for successful "peoples' revolution." VC successes demonstrate that the Communists in SVN know how to achieve peasant support and to develop political awareness; the GVN has not yet learned these techniques.

The VC aim to change the present society through achievements, loyalties, dedication, motivation and -- where necessary -- coercion, intimidation and terror.4/ Many of them are inspired by intense love of their own people and a deep seated hatred of Westerners. They are effectively led by disciplined professional organizers. The Vietnamese Communists have captured and used nationalism as a central theme in their rise to power and drive to expand. Their overt dogma remains "anti-colonialism"; only the identity of the "colonialists" has changed.5/

Infrastructure of Control. The so-called National Liberation Front is the direct and purposive extension of the Lao Dong (Worker's) Party which was Communist-established in NVN on 4 March 1951. Politically and militarily linked from the national level down through military regions, provinces, districts, villages and local hamlets, the mechanism is tailored to subvert the populace of SVN. Its roots, since the new label "Viet Nam Cong San" was affixed in Hanoi late in 1954, have taken hold to the degree that there well may be "an element of VC in every South Vietnamese." To its opposition, the VC infrastructure is highly efficient, disciplined and invisible. The attainment of increasingly close ties between the movement's political and military action arms, with effective subordination of the latter to the former, appears to have been the main objective of policy shifts since 1960.

The VC movement is governed through responsive command and control channels which emanate from the Lao Dong Party headquarters in Hanoi. Party control echelons include the Central Office of SVN (COSVN), the National Front for the Liberation of SVN (NLF) and the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP). An intelligence net is thoroughly braided throughout this structure.

COSVN is the highest executive organ in SVN. Prior to its establishment, Hanoi had divided SVN into five Military Regions plus a "special region" encompassing the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh complex. Today, most VC affairs are managed from Tay Ninh where Lao Dong policies are received and translated into directives for execution by lower echelons. COSVN components include both military and political subdivisions.

Each Military Region (also tactical headquarters) shelters a politically indoctrinated populace, within existing war zones and base areas, and contains an administrative mechanism that parallels established lines of authority. A military section, integral to the political side of each VC regional organization, ensures that political orders to military units are executed in consonance with COSVN policy. Conversely, a party line vigilance is maintained over the activities of the individual VC fighting man. Numbers of VC fighting units assigned to a Military Region (MR) depend on its size. The MR, as a tactical headquarters, may directly control not only organic main force VC and local units, but also additional main force VC units temporarily committed for the execution of a single operation. A varying number of provinces are included in the MRs. Each province is governed by a political-military commissariat which is subordinate to the political component.

The Heart of the Insurgency. Each VC district is governed by a committee which receives its orders from the provincial commissariat and, in turn, controls certain full-time military forces of company or platoon size. The district committee is the key level in the total VC configuration. It is responsible for consolidating VC gains and for introducing VC control into new territory. The prime link between the district headquarters and the populace is maintained by "mission" or "activity" teams, with no more than one team normally allocated to a village. These teams circulate throughout controlled areas, hold

meetings, explain VC policies, propagandize VC activities and collect information for the pervasive intelligence system.

The VC-controlled villages and hamlets in SVN are governed either by a committee or an individual who is charged with raising paramilitary forces or militia and tax collection. Propaganda activities and harassment sorties are also accomplished at these levels.

The intelligence organization permeating all VC political and military groups is critical to the viability of the total-system infrastructure. Its key directive element is an elaborate organization located in Hanoi -- the Central Research Agency. The VC intelligence system has developed an extremely effective scheme for the classification of native South Vietnamese. It serves as an instrument of increasing and personalizing communist pressure on the individual villager.

Motivation. The motivation of today's VC youth often is the result of dissatisfaction with conditions in their home villages. Some have not seen a GVN representative in their village for two years. Some have objected to the behavior of ARVN-RF-PF (Armed Forces Vietnam, Regional Forces, Popular Forces) personnel who have treated villagers with insolence and brutality. Aerial attacks and artillery fire, applied indiscriminately, also have exacted a toll on village allegiance. Others resent having been forced by GVN to leave their areas, abandoning homesteads and ancestral shrines. For a number of Vietnamese, the choice lies between joining the army of a government they neither know nor respect (and which appears to represent solely a corrupt military clique and the rich) or enlisting in the Front organization which at least exhibits sensitivity to their aspirations.

Enemy Forces. Enemy force capabilities must be assessed in terms of three major conflict configurations: the PAVN and Main Force VC, local forces and guerrillas, as well as cadre. Operations of the PAVN-Main Force VC are more conventional than those of guerrillas. This configuration strives to dominate an area, place Allied forces on the defensive, gain control of the population and finally defeat Allied combat formations. VC tactics must make allowance for Allied air and artillery supremacy and mechanical mobility differential. When they are unable to make this allowance, they suffer resounding defeats.

PAVN and Main Force VC units, should they be defeated or become convinced that they will be defeated in mobile warfare, have the option of assuming a guerrilla configuration. The VC do well at this. As guerrillas, they attempt to deny use of surface LOCs and continue to terrorize the SVN population. By means of carefully planned and rehearsed raids and ambushes, they continue to exhibit the capability to inflict serious casualties on friendly troops. The VC are relatively self-sustaining; so far, they have obtained most of their support locally -- by donations, purchases, taxation and theft. The cadre, deep rooted and relatively untouched to date by either US or GVN counter-action, ensure such a support foundation.

Enemy Vulnerabilities. Despite the over-all excellence of his tactical performance, the VC in SVN has revealed definite and exploitable vulnerabilities. It is improbable that the more fundamental of these vulnerabilities can be wholly overcome. Most appear to be deeply ingrained in facts and trends which are not readily susceptible to change.

Strictly on the military side, his vulnerabilities reinforce the fact that the VC cannot hope to cope with the power which the US and GVN can, and will if necessary, commit to his destruction in battle. (1) The VC is inflexible. Because of scarcity of command and control means, enemy combat unit commanders have come to rely heavily on extremely detailed plans and well-rehearsed execution. It is difficult for them to react in order to prevent disaster or to exploit an unexpected opportunity. (2) The VC must disperse to survive. Dispersed elements lack strength for offensive initiatives, suffer from lack of information and guidance and may run out of food as well as medical supplies. Once dispersed, the VC seek to reassemble. At this time, they are in their most vulnerable attitude. (3) The VC must remain on the move. VC elements forced into continuous movement to avoid Allied air and ground action suffer reduced morale and combat effectiveness due to fatigue and logistical difficulties. Many VC defectors have cited this as the cause of their defections. (4) The VC is austerely supported. Units lack heavy supporting firepower. In extension, and although it is doubted that many actually suffer from hunger, they are plagued by poor medical evacuation and treatment, lack of essential medicines and salt, as well as shortages of weapons, spare parts and ammunition.

Aside from the overt and conventional battle, there are indications of growing Vietnamese resentment of VC practices. The VC "revolution" has not caught fire; no popular uprising has occurred. The VC will be most vulnerable when, in Vietnamese eyes, he has turned into a would-be-conqueror

and oppressor. "Liberation" does not spring from compulsory conscription, extortionist taxation, summary requisition of sorely needed food, forced labor, constant surveillance, service as cannon-fodder and terror. The point has been reached for waging the major psychological offensive required to exploit and widen such evident vulnerabilities as are apparent in these VC practices.

Infiltration. Most of the significant infiltration into SVN now is overland across the DMZ or via the Ho Chi Minh trail where sophisticated surface LOCs have been developed through the Laotian Panhandle. These LOCs now provide weapons, ammunition and personnel replacements for a two-corps equivalent force which is reported to be increasing at the rate of one regiment per month. Air interdiction programs have not produced sufficient results.

Rapid achievement of VC goals is largely dependent on their ability to continue this massive infiltration into SVN. Reduction of external support below the sustaining level must be recognized as one of the most important immediate tasks of the war; so long as the VC continue to receive substantial external support, the Allied task will remain enormously magnified.

War Zones and Safe Havens. In and out-of-country base support areas are vital organs of the VC effort in SVN. The five major war zones are of surprising sophistication; they contain supplies, training facilities, arms manufacture and repair facilities, hospitals, and serve as rest areas. They are not easily accessible to the GVN and are not highly populated and located so as to be on or near principle infiltration routes. In addition to the Do Xa, War Zone C, War Zone D, Dong

Thap Muoi, and U Minh, there are many lesser war zones and safe havens built up over time inside SVN. As more forces are committed by the enemy, his logistical problems multiply; as these problems increase, his bases become more critical.

External safe havens exist in Cambodia and Laos as well as in NVN. The Cambodians are not inclined, and the Laotians are unable, to deny these areas to the Communists. They serve as assembly areas from which frequent impulses of fresh or rested enemy troops enter SVN, and to which exhausted and temporarily defeated remnants withdraw to reconstitute and retrain. These base areas, in combination with uninterrupted infiltration routes and LOCs, present a serious threat to the Allied cause. Long-term neutralization of base areas would seriously cripple the VC effort.

The Vietnamese Outlook

Vietnamese Society. South Vietnam is a society in turmoil. Vietnamese institutions, long dominated by the French, were unable to produce change rapidly enough to cope with this society's needs. Consequently, SVN society now reflects a curious admixture of organization and disorganization operating simultaneously. The GVN is attempting to build a new society while concurrently undertaking operations to destroy the VC "shadow society" rising within it. On the other hand, the VC are equally bent on denying GVN this opportunity to organize; they play upon existing Vietnamese dissatisfactions and magnify long standing social differences. The Communists initially and successfully accelerated

the process of evolutionary change in SVN to revolutionary proportions. The GVN's ability to answer this challenge, by providing a better society, remains in doubt.

Family loyalty and tradition permeate all facets of Vietnamese life and continue to serve as the criteria for both individual and official behavior. These traditional social values and institutions, however, are changing under the duress of destructive VC activities, the impact of changing times and the pressures of a massive American presence. Although the Vietnamese are ethnically and culturally a relatively homogeneous society, recent events have both created new, and intensified old, divisive social factors. Nevertheless, family loyalty, the basic ingredient of localism, remains as the source point upon which to build a social system in SVN.

The Peasant. The peasant has been exposed to the stresses and pain of war for many years. As the middle man in the conflict, he has been abused and exploited by groups both in and out of power. As a consequence, fatalism and war-weariness have sapped his motivation; governmental corruption, inefficiency and abusiveness have reinforced his disillusionment. To some peasants, conflict has become a way of life to be endured with an attitude of either apathetic indifference or hopeless resignation to the bewildering war waging that courses about them. In the past, the peasant has been tradition-bound and impassive toward change. Now the option to accept or reject change is no longer his to control, and he is at the mercy of his would be benefactor. To the peasant, the art of the promise

has been overworked by both VC and GVN; tangible, and thus credible, results have yet to be demonstrated in his village. He has become aware of, and desires, the benefits of education and medical treatment; however, personal security persists as his prime aspiration of the moment. Once security prevails, the peasant may expect change, but his traditional confucian outlook will inhibit him from seeking it. His loyalty can be won, but change and its benefits initially must come to the peasant -- not the reverse.

The Urbanite. The urbanite sets himself apart from his rural brother. Generally, he exhibits a negative view toward the peasant whom he considers backward, ignorant, naive and deserving of his lot in life. Central to this perspective is the hope that the conflict can be confined to the countryside with minimum disruption to city life. Many urbanites regard the VC with tacit admiration and manifest this attitude via noninvolvement in US-GVN programs, open criticism of GVN military leadership and thinly veiled resentment over nonreceipt of equal attention in the US support effort. The prevalent urban attitude toward the war is one of withdrawal; it is considered to be a matter strictly between "the military" and the VC. There are positive indications that some South Vietnamese intellectuals are committed to the building of their country rather than solely to furthering themselves and their families within an opportunistic frame of reference. However, the governing military elite must change significantly in attitude and behavior toward this group if the intellectual penchant for sidelines criticism is to give way to constructive effort.

Urban-Rural Conflict. The traditional gulf between the peasant and the urbanite remains. The war is temporarily reinforcing and broadening the disruptive impact of this rift. The small and relatively well-established urban population has insulated itself from the rural population. VC propagandists play upon the recent refugee influx as a threat to urban security and as a serious competitor for US aid. The majority of the population remains rooted in the countryside and either ignores the totality of Vietnamese society or accepts the VC-sponsored social system. Consequently, the VC effectively control the geographic bulk of the country by virtue of a well-developed, relatively unchallenged infrastructure deeply entrenched at village level. Slow expansion of VC control proceeds today as Communist policy continues to drive and seat this wedge of infrastructure between what are essentially two social systems -- Urban versus Rural.

The Vietnamese Counterpart. The totality of our US effort is inserted into the society of SVN at thousands of key points -- each one is referred to as a Vietnamese counterpart. Whether, and how, he can be influenced is crucial to achievement of US objectives in SVN. Psychologically, and when compared to Westerners, Vietnamese are realists who are working pessimists. This brand of pessimism is reflected in the personal and official behavioral traits of wait -- endure -- persist -- avoid judging. The war has induced a primary concern with individual survival; as such, the Vietnamese seem reluctant and exceedingly difficult to motivate. The realities of the current situation are reinforced by a tradition of non-commitment as a basis for normal personal behavior. The individual who

demonstrates initiative thereby places himself in a position to be held responsible if things go wrong.

While these shortcomings may be serious in the short range, they can serve as a foundation for US action to assist the social revolution in SVN. Because of a reluctance to stand on principles, the Vietnamese are quite vulnerable to manipulation within the framework of an appropriate social reward and punishment system. Consequently, a Vietnamese official can be expected to endure a US Representative relationship and consistently respond in a fashion totally at variance with his personal convictions or social preferences. Influencing counterpart thought and action demands the application of considerable force if traditional attitudes toward activity and the rural population are to be overcome.

As described earlier, the behavior of the VC seemingly contrasts sharply with the foregoing description of those Vietnamese with whom the US must deal. VC behavior appears optimistic rather than pessimistic. Why the paradox? The answer probably resides in the underlying motivation which the VC possess for their cause; it apparently is of a potency that permits them to override the negative aspects of their cultural heritage.

Factors Influencing Change. There are very serious obstacles to social change in SVN. Lack of dedicated leadership and a tendency for leaders (particularly the military elite) to view themselves as masters and not servants of the people constitutes the prime roadblock. Crusaders for a social cause in Vietnam are rare, and existing behavioral codes offer

adequate excuses to protect leaders from making firm commitments. If commitments are stated firmly, this by no means assures action. In addition, many of the military elite through which the US is forced to work are motivated almost completely in terms of personal gain. They condone, if not encourage, at least moderate graft and corruption; in the context of the current situation, their traditional disdain for the rural population constitutes a most serious problem for people-oriented programs.

Change, when it occurs, will be difficult to root deeply in SVN. The belief that all in life is transitory has many followers; it will require a massive effort to convince the Vietnamese that substantive and positive change has occurred in their version of reality. This difficulty, in turn, will be aggravated by a gnawing suspicion among the intellectuals that the motivation underlying our commitment involves perpetuating self-interests in SEA rather than defeating communism within the boundaries of SVN. Protracted failure of US-GVN follow-through on social reform programs, when linked to a preoccupation with predominantly US military actions, can deepen Vietnamese distrust significantly. The repeated failures of nonmilitary programs appear to have inured many Vietnamese to the prospect for success against the VC. The effort to break the chain of reorganise, rename, refund and fail on a yearly basis presents, perhaps, the greatest motivational challenge to the American official presence.

On the positive side, successful change in Vietnamese society is possible. Student groups and young district chiefs form a significant

potential source of the leadership needed to influence the Vietnamese social system toward change. Some Vietnamese can be talked to frankly and honestly about the salvation of their country. Though many remain unconvinced as to the firmness of US resolve and commitment in SVN, they can be expected to "bandwagon" to a winning side. First, however, they must be convinced that the end of the war is at hand and that "the object . . . which lies beyond the war" is worth the struggle.

Thus far, the US reach for solutions has exceeded its grasp of the basic problems in SVN. The problem confronting America is: How to formulate an appropriate, truly integrated, civil-military response to the tried and proved Communist political-military mechanism operating inside Vietnamese society today? US recognition of this central problem and all of its ramifications, coupled with an ensuing change in US organization and method of operation, could lay the foundation for Allied success in SVN during 1966.

STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

US Asian Policy, Objectives and Strategy. US strategy in SVN must be commensurate with over-all American policy, objectives and strategy in Asia as well as the Far East, and, in particular, with the application of those objectives and strategy to Southeast Asia. Further, US strategy in SVN must evolve directly from US short and longer-range objectives in SVN.

US foreign policy, through the short range, will have as its central focus the containment of world communism. Communist China today poses

the most immediate danger. US policy and objectives in Asia, as well as in the Far East, are primarily concerned with the elimination of this danger through the containment of Peking expansionism -- its most direct manifestation.

US strategy in mainland Southeast Asia includes, and gives special emphasis to, support of the provisions of the 1962 Geneva agreements in Laos, continued strengthening of Thailand economically and militarily and the restoration of peace and security in SVN. In general, US strategy in Southeast Asia focuses upon the continued development of each individual country and upon the increasing regional integration -- economically, socially and politically -- of all Southeast Asian countries through such programs as the Mekong River Development Scheme and the recently established Asian Development Bank.

In contrast to the more general policy matters indicated above, the US ultimate national objective in SVN is not yet clearly understood by the American public, by the Vietnamese, by our overt and covert enemies, or by desk officers in the US agencies that are involved. A PROVN survey -- recounted in ANNEX F to the Study -- revealed that no two agencies of the US government viewed our objectives in the same manner. For example, the Military Assistance Plan Book for 1966 lists reunification of Vietnam by force as an objective. Desk officers of the Department of State's Vietnam Working Group have contended that it is not a US objective that SVN be noncommunist. Confusion of the issue with varied objectives, and failure to use that unequivocal statement of our fundamental objective -- a free and independent, noncommunist South Vietnam -- as

set forth in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, hinders effective interagency coordination and the integrated application of US support efforts.

PROVN emphasizes the need to ensure both the clear understanding of the NSAM 288 objective by all parties concerned and the use of that fundamental objective as the foundation for developing more specific short, mid and long-range objectives to guide action programs.6/

US Short-Range Objectives in SVN. US short-range objectives must provide a base for gaining the initiative in the current struggle and must ensure significant progress toward overcoming critical obstacles. PROVN establishes the following five major short-range objectives:

-- The defeat of PAVN-Main Force VC units and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political infrastructure, to include its subversive cells, among the population.

-- The development of GVN leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.

-- The establishment of a US organization and method of operation capable of ensuring execution of US-GVN plans and programs in SVN.

-- The provision of a war-supporting economic infrastructure and the initial foundations for economic growth.

-- The development of an allegiance to the GVN among the South Vietnamese people.

The Core of US Strategy in SVN. US strategy to achieve the above objectives should assume the dimension of a broad-front offensive which directs major efforts along three, mutually supporting axes:

-- The commitment of US and FWMA Forces primarily to destroy PAVN-Main Force VC units and base areas as well as to reduce external support below the sustaining level.

-- The establishment of Rural Construction as the essential vehicle for extending security to, developing the requisite leadership of, and providing the necessary social reform for, the Vietnamese people.

-- The exercise of more direct US involvement in GVN affairs to ensure the attainment of US-GVN objectives.

Key to the effective execution of this strategy is the development of a single, integrated plan 7/ that reflects formal acceptance, by both the US and the GVN, of the major short-range objectives upon which this strategy is based.

The Question of Priorities. The successful execution of US strategy hinges upon the establishment of realistic priorities for the allocation of available resources. All resource categories -- material, time, financial and human -- are, and will remain, limited in SVN. It is imperative that available resources be massed at the decisive points.

Constraints on the establishment of priorities are numerous and interrelated. As there is the requirement to build now for the future in all aspects of the society, a simplified system of priorities, involving the sequential phasing of programs based on their relative immediate importance, is impossible. There is also the need to maintain the momentum of less critical ongoing programs, 8/ both to conserve gains already realized and to meet political requirements. The need to maintain

some Rural Construction momentum in all provinces is a case in point. Finally, there is the factor of interdependence among all facets of the society which precludes the development of one sector without concurrent advances in most of the others.

PROVN proposes guiding principles, as follows, for the establishment of priorities:

-- The fundamental determination of priorities must be made among the functional categories of programs. Currently, there are four essentially equal first priority categories:

(1) Combat Operations.

(2) Rural Construction.


(3) Relative Economic Stability.

(4) Logistical Support for all three of the above.

-- Within functional categories, further priorities for the allocation of available resources must be established on the interrelated bases of such factors as population and natural resources concentrations (See: Figure 1); the location and nature of the enemy; and, the degree of criticality of requisite inputs. Regarding the highest priority categories, PROVN recommends the following initial allocations:

(1) Combat Operations -- the bulk of US and FWMA Forces and designated RVNAF units should be directed against enemy base areas and against their lines of communication in SVN, Laos and Cambodia as required; the remainder of Allied force assets must ensure adequate momentum to activity in priority Rural Construction areas.

FIGURE 1


STRATEGIC REGIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
CENTRAL COASTAL LOW LANDS
CENTRAL HIGHLANDS
SOUTHERN DELTA
33%
23%
38%
EACH FIGURE=1%
POPULATION
RICE PRODUCTION

(2) Rural Construction -- in general, the geographic priorities should be, in order, the Delta, the Coastal Lowlands and the Highlands; currently, the highest priority areas are the densely populated and rich resource Delta provinces of An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong and the Hop Tac area surrounding Saigon.

(3) Economic stability -- current emphasis must be directed toward curbing inflation and reducing the excessive demands for skilled and semiskilled labor imposed upon an over-strained economy.

(4) Logistical support -- war material, construction materials and basic foodstuffs must be accorded preference until ongoing efforts enable the reduction of transportation shortages and bottlenecks.

-- The establishment of priorities must be flexible in the highest degree. Considerable situational differences exist not only among but within the various provinces. Programs must accurately reflect these variations. Further, the fluidity of the situation everywhere requires that priorities be constantly reviewed and adjusted so as to reinforce success and minimize the adverse impact of failure.

-- The requirement to build now for the future must be kept constantly in mind. Current situational problems must not be permitted to obscure the details of future needs. The US and GVN must initiate a five year (or equivalent) planning cycle to ensure that proper nation building foundations are being laid and that appropriate development perspective is maintained.

MAJOR PROBLEMS AND PROVN PROPOSALS

PROVN identifies five major problem areas; two of these -- the Communist Political-Military Mechanism and the Vietnamese Outlook -- have been addressed as fundamental problems framing our task in SVN. The remaining three are:

-- The Marginally Effective US Method of Operation,

-- An Inefficient and Largely Ineffective GVN, and

-- The Requirement for Socio-Economic Growth.

The following proposals respond directly to four of these problems; the fifth -- the Vietnamese Outlook -- is addressed indirectly throughout.

In developing recommendations to apply in SVN, both the US and the GVN components must be addressed. Of these two, only the American side is amenable to direct change; any alteration on the GVN side will occur indirectly and as a result of US actions. Consequently, by far the most significant PROVN proposal is the one concerned with a US method of operation that is designed and used specifically to generate constructive GVN activity. All else is idle philosophy if we fail to resolve this residual problem -- nonfunctioning Vietnamese officialdom. Unless these officials function constructively, we both lose. This is the crux of the matter and the harsh reality of our situation in SVN.

Marginally Effective US Method of Operation

The US has failed to assess the complexities of the total situation in SVN. Present support organizations and advisory assistance techniques

have not sufficed in our attempts to cope with the interrelated political, economic, psychological and military components of the "nonwar" being waged. The current situation is of such urgency that much more must be demanded of both the GVN and the US. Today, our individual operating agencies in SVN receive both external direction from Washington and local guidance from the Mission Council in Saigon. US efforts are characterized by divergent activities reflecting differing attitudes, competing interests and varied concepts for winning in SVN. On the military side, for example, corps and division advisory groups are preoccupied with purely military activities; only marginal support has been accorded critical nonmilitary programs in the provinces. As the unilateral efforts of US field agencies have expanded, their province representation has burgeoned concurrently -- with each representative directly advising "his" province chief in terms of his parent agency interests.

Present US military actions are inconsistent with that fundamental of counterinsurgency doctrine which establishes winning popular allegiance as the ultimate goal. While conceptually recognizing the total problem in our literature, Americans appear to draw back from its complexity in practice and gravitate toward a faulty premise for its resolution -- military destruction of the VC. Frustrated by our inability to find "the method" to cope with conflict of this nature, we have resorted to methods employed in wars of the past to address almost exclusively the battle's military dimension. Remaining aloof from what "we consider" to be areas strictly of Vietnamese concern -- political and social reforms -- may well constitute a tragic blunder.

New US Role. A more adequate and broad gauge US response must be developed to deal with the totality of "wars of national liberation."9/ The long standing US policy of "nonintervention" in internal affairs has definitely blunted the thrust of our advisory effort. At the national level in SVN, studied avoidance of US actions which might infringe upon national sovereignty has armed the Vietnamese with a powerful tool for exerting leverage on the American system. At subnational levels, the US advisor has been denied the critical and constructive tools of leverage essential to stimulate the thinking and doing of his counterpart. In the real world, we are now too heavily involved to discount or deny the exercise of direct US influence in GVN affairs as a possible course of action. The potential inherent in the application of positive US influence, as a means of preventing GVN failure in the present situation, must override our extreme sensitivity to the stigma associated with such labels as "colonialist" or imperialist."

We must be prepared to recognize, to accept and to play a new role in this conflict. In broadest possible perspective, Americans will have to perform as social innovators in order to respond fully to the GVN's intrinsic needs for assistance. This must be accomplished on a society-to-society, rather than on a primarily military-to-military, basis. Thus far, we have attempted to force both advice and tangibles into that society with the hope that such inputs would survive GVN imperfections. The Vietnamese social system -- clearly deteriorating from internal deficiencies and the pressures of the VC "shadow society" rising within

it -- has proved to be a barrier of formidable consequence to our effort. The provision of advice alone has been verified as an inadequate technique for overcoming obstacles of such proportion. In the future, material assistance must be provided contingent upon its use by the GVN to produce needed social reform, particularly at the village level. If we lose in Vietnam, we pay the price no matter how carefully American officials rationalize the need to respect Vietnamese sovereignty.

Preparing for the New US Role. At present, the US is not well prepared to assist the passage of the Vietnamese people through a social revolution even they themselves cannot fully understand. However, those major ideas, ideals, values and attitudes that contribute to any modern cohesive society can be identified. Moreover, the subtle techniques of transferring them to a foreign counterpart can be learned and employed by US representatives.

At the very minimum, the ability to influence the Vietnamese in the creation of a social environment wherein freedom and independence can flourish depends upon the availability of three essential ingredients:

(1) An integrated, current body of knowledge describing the Vietnamese society and identifying those elements within its political, economic, military and other subsystems which must be stabilized through induced social change.

(2) The knowledge of how social change may be influenced in a direction commensurate with stated objectives.

(3) A group of US representatives who understand the methods used

to produce change and who are competent to bring them to bear on the problem in SVN.10/

Many contend that Americans are not on firm ground in presuming the competence to advise Vietnamese on how best to respond toward their own people; further, that social change can be produced only by the Vietnamese. Our experience in the field spikes this contention. Americans are not totally excluded from this process today; many have become deeply involved at district and province levels and have successfully employed methods not yet reflected in US organization and methods of operation. Most of our advisors in rural SVN have identified the elementary needs of the people and the fundamental activities that alienate them. They have attempted to urge their GVN counterpart into actions essential to meet village-level needs, but many have failed in this attempt. The GVN official lacked the motivation, and the advisor lacked the crucial means of influence.

More Direct US Involvement.11/ Steps must be taken to press for skillful and resolute action on the part of the GVN to solve basic problems now alienating the Vietnamese people. This means exercising a greater degree of US influence in Vietnamese affairs. The US support effort should be geared to influence any Vietnamese leader -- at any political level and within any organizational structure -- to contribute to the achievement of responsive government. The issue then becomes one of providing selective support to the existing government at points of US advisory organization by building an integrated civil-military

scaffolding designed to stand alongside the weak GVN structure. This scaffolding would constitute physical evidence of the US commitment at every level and would reinforce, but not supplant, GVN organization. Its ability to address GVN functional problems, particularly, should serve both to foster confidence and to motivate dedicated Vietnamese at province and district to get on with the job. The scaffolding also should facilitate the introduction of US resources into selected points of the GVN structure either to press or reinforce official action responding to the need of the Vietnamese people or to terminate counterproductive action. This approach offers significantly more promise of success than tacit acceptance of Vietnamese reluctance to perform when resources and ability are present but motivation is lacking.

Bypassing GVN obstruction at Saigon or any subordinate level stands as a relatively unexplored US course of action. US teams at corps level must be authorized to press the momentum of success at the province level; they must also be warranted to insulate province operations from arbitrary acts, or failures to act, at higher GVN levels.

The fundamental problem at province and district is a lack of execution rather than an inadequacy of plans. Vigorous "political action" and "leverage" constitute means of reinforcing the underlying Vietnamese potential for achieving a viable, responsive government. Properly employed, political action and leverage are coherent and constructive techniques affording direction, purpose and momentum to GVN efforts.

Whereas "political action" must be largely reserved for exercise

by the Ambassador at national level, "leverage" should be exercised by US Representatives (USREPs) at all levels. Its application should be viewed as ranging through a continuum from subtle interpersonal persuasion to withdrawal of US support. To date, the US has administered leverage in haphazard fashion and with varying degrees of success. To ensure consistent application, leverage must originate in terms of reference established by government-to-government agreement. Subsequently, its specific terms must be stated in each plan and program. There must be a clear recognition, throughout both US and GVN channels, of its precise context and the means by which it is to be exercised. Leverage, in all its implications, must be understood by the Vietnamese if it is to become an effective tool.

Single Manager Concept. Organizing a truly integrated civil-military US effort in SVN is essential both to provide a model for GVN emulation and to contest the tried and proved communist politico-military mechanism. Such an executive action would constitute a totally new American foreign operations field undertaking. This is not a proposal for reorganization; the US has yet to organize its assets for waging the form of conflict ongoing in SVN. The senior USREP in-country must be designated "Single Manager." Currently, our Ambassador in Saigon would function in this capacity.12/ This does not preclude Presidential designation of a senior military officer to hold this post; neither does it rule out appointment of the senior military officer in-country to assume such responsibility on order. It is absolutely


essential that a single US official must, through the exercise of command authority, direct the total US effort in SVN. (See: Figure 2) The President must be provided with civil-military command options to achieve and sustain a flexible and resilient US posture that realistically addresses:

-- The dimensions of the current situation which dictate the need to succeed, by unified civil-military actions, at district and province levels throughout SVN.

-- The eventuality of escalating or deteriorating situations which dictate the need to achieve military victory, in SVN or SEA, under the provisions of Unified Command arrangements.13/

Integrated Plan. The development of a single integrated plan, covering the entire spectrum of programs and governmental activities in SVN, is essential. US agencies represented there must agree upon a common concept for achieving basic objectives and for translating that concept into a practical plan of action. The concept must address the actual needs, rather than our conceptions, of Vietnamese society. Establishment of the US Single Manager and his mandate to form, as well as to use, a supra-agency staff should end divergencies which have not upheld the credibility of US efforts. The precise terms of NSAM 341, with respect to harnessing US agency activities in the field, should be reflected in fact and in deed throughout our structure. Future US support must be: (1) proffered to the GVN in integrated plans and programs at Saigon level; and, (2) made contingent upon evidence

FIGURE 2



(1) Advises RVNAF on RC, commands support troops, administers and supports, but does not control, Military Unit Teams. Includes Air Force and Naval elements.
(2) Corps SUSREP responds to DCRD and advises VN corps commanders on all aspects of Rural Construction. Acts as sole advisor to VN corps commander when bulk of ARVN units committed to Rural Construction.
(3) Less those assigned for village and hamlet security.
(4) Includes corps, division, regiment and battalion Military Unit Teams of ARVN units committed to search and destroy. Corps military representative responds to CINCUSFV, advises VN corps commander on military operations other than Rural Construction.
(5) US Support Units and Military Unit Teams RVNAF units not allocated to provinces.
(6) Includes all Military Unit Teams of RVNAF units allocated to provinces for RC.
(7) US Forces committed to support pacification and development as they become available.

SUSREP = Senior US Representative
TOC = Tactical Operations Center
RVNAF = Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
USOM = US Overseas Mission
JUSPAO = Joint US Public Affairs Office
POLAF = Political Affairs Staff Officer
CAS = CIA (Controlled American Source)
ARVN = Army of Vietnam
SOG = Studies and Observations Group
SF = Special Forces

USARV = US Army Vietnam
2 AD = 2d Air Division (USAF)
III MAF = 3d Marine Amphibious Force
NAVFORV = US Naval Forces Vietnam
FFV = Field Forces Vietnam (Corps Hq)
RC = Rural Construction
FWMAF = Free World Military Assistance Forces
DRCD = Director of Rural Construction and Development
LOG = Logistics Command
JUSMAAG = Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group

demonstrating that the GVN is responding to the needs of its people. The Ambassador's supra-agency staff must coordinate the single integrated plan with the appropriate GVN ministries (commissioners). A combined, truly integrated and long-range action pattern must be achieved.

Decentralization. The concept of decentralized execution takes on new meaning when applied to SVN. To succeed, we must actually decentralize and delegate to Americans and Vietnamese at district and province levels the requisite resources and authority to accomplish the tasks at hand. Their exercise of this authority must be buttressed and sustained up through the command chain. New problems demand new solutions. New solutions imply new operational techniques. Delegation of authority permits effective pursuit of programs and imaginative exploitation of local opportunities. This altered method of operating, as visualized in performing the new US role, would thrust the US army officer (historically apolitical) more deeply into Vietnamese affairs at the province and district levels.

US province and district teams must be tailored to ensure their ability to control and allocate effectively the resources obtained through greater decentralization. The process of continuous team tailoring is particularly critical at province and district. At these levels, the political, economic and military aspects of the local situation share one common element -- rapid and inevitable change. In some areas, VC domination inhibits active pursuit of a coherent Rural Construction program; USOM technicians are confined to the provincial or district towns.

In these instances, US team expertise should be withdrawn to reinforce success achieved in another locale or to lend experience to planning at the next higher US-GVN echelon. The improved security situation in areas such as An Giang, however, encourages the initiation of development activities. Additional US technicians could be employed here to exploit the evident development potential. It must be pointed out, however, that the rate of US expansion in development activity must be contingent upon GVN ability to match the effort. The total organizational superstructure must exist for but one purpose -- support of the US-GVN nation building effort ongoing at province and district levels.

Actions at the Washington Level. The President must ensure full integration of the US assistance effort for SVN. The task at hand cannot be discharged by committee-system management both in Washington and in Saigon. PROVN recommends:

(1) Charging the Ambassador, as US Single Manager, with full responsibility for the US effort in SVN and providing him with the degree of command and control authority required to discharge his responsibility.

(2) Discontinuing the Vietnam Coordinating Committee.

(3) Designating a Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam Affairs and empowering him, as an Executive Agent, to:

(a) Coordinate the required national effort in the name of the President.

(b) Establish such Washington-level arrangements as may be

required to provide executive agency support to the US effort in SVN. Major emphasis will be placed on precluding US interagency competition.

(c) Coordinate, with Washington-level parent agencies, the operational and logistical requirements of in-country agency representatives as requested by the US Single Manager in Saigon. Conflicts will be resolved by Presidential decision if required.

Actions at the Saigon Level. The Ambassador, as US Single Manager, must require unity of command in the application of US support in SVN. PROVN recommends:

(1) Eliminating the Mission Council.

(2) Establishing a Director for Rural Construction and Development (DRCD) responsible for directing the execution of all US programs not specifically assigned to CINCUSFV.

(3) Designating CINCUSFV as a coequal with the DRCD. Technical, logistical and combat support channels will be retained with out-of-country agencies as required.

(4) Forming a supra-agency staff and using it to develop support plans (short, mid and long-range), to establish priorities, to coordinate military and nonmilitary programs and to integrate operations of the total US effort.

(5) Stipulating, specifically, that the supra-agency staff (in conjunction with GVN) prepare a combined national-level plan for the Rural Construction and Development of SVN. This plan will be:

(a) Dependent upon inputs initiated at village level with US participation in the planning process from the outset.

(b) Agreed to, in principle and in fact, by all US agency representatives in-country.

(c) Binding on GVN for execution.

(d) Prefaced by a comprehensive statement of the respective governmental support roles, levels of resource input, leverage authorizations and military force commitments to security missions.

(6) Requiring that US agencies in-country be placed under the operational command of the DRCD with agencies (except as specified in the following subparagraph) retaining technical and administrative communication channels directly to their Washington-level parent agencies. Logistical and operational matters will be communicated, only as approved by the US Single Manager (Ambassador), to the designated Executive Agent in Washington. The Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam Affairs will act as coordinator on such matters, referring them to the individual Washington-level parent agencies or to the President for execution or decision as required.

(7) Bringing the military advisory effort (JUSMAAG) within the purview of the Single Manager system with the status of a separate military command -- coequal with USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and STATE. JUSMAAG will retain administrative, technical and logistical communication channels to CINCUSFV.

(8) Designating senior US representatives (SUSREPs) to direct US assistance activities at GVN subnational levels in his name.

(9) Directing the four SUSREPs at GVN corps level to assume command

of the US advisory effort and operational control of such US military units as may be committed to support Rural Construction within their respective territorial areas.

(10) Directing CINCUSFV to designate four military representatives, for service at GVN corps level; each will serve as Chief of the Corps Military Unit (Advisory) Team and will command US military unit (advisory) teams with RVNAF units not committed to the support of Rural Construction in the provinces.

(11) Directing that the US military unit teams with RVNAF units committed to the support of Rural Construction in the provinces will come under the operational control of the SUSREP at that level.

Actions at Corps and Lower Level. The designated SUSREP, in the name of the US Single Manager, must require full integration of the US assistance effort in his territorial area. PROVN recommends:

(1) Reorganizing the US presence at provincial level based on determinations as to the nature of the existing local situation.

(2) Responding solely to the orders and instructions of the Director for Rural Construction and Development (DRCD).

(3) Directing SUSREPs at province and district levels to tailor their US teams according to specific area requirements and anticipated programs.

Rural Construction

Rural Construction (RC) must be designated unequivocally as the major US-GVN effort. It will require the committment of a preponderance

of RVNAF and GVN paramilitary forces, together with adequate US support, coordination and assistance. Without question, village and hamlet security must be achieved throughout SVN. Unity of command and effort is required now at province level, with the province chief directing all GVN activities (military and nonmilitary) in the province. His counterpart, the SUSREP, must direct all US activities which support RC activities in the province. RC is the principal means available to broaden the allied base, provide security, develop political and military leadership, and provide necessary social reform to the people. Decentralized and deliberate execution, within the framework of today's agreed Rural Construction Program (RCP), offers singular promise of solving our two fundamental problems in SVN -- overcoming the VC political-military apparatus and stimulating the South Vietnamese social revolution.

Area Priority. Priority for the RC effort must be as follows: (1) the densely populated area around Saigon (Hop Tac), An Giang, Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong and Go Cong provinces in IV corps; and, (2) the coastal lowlands of Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai. Additionally, RC must be initiated on a modest basis in all provinces and especially those with larger populations. The Vietnamese people are, and must remain, the true and paramount objective of all US-GVN efforts. The time for "model province test cases" has passed.

Village. The RC effort is critical at village level. This is

where all the elaborate plans made at higher echelons must be translated into action. This is the point of decision at which Allied strategy must be aimed. Territorial chiefs and USREPs must concentrate their efforts here and now. The detailed planning for construction and development must be initiated at village, because only at this point are fundamental RC requirements known. Requirements must be consolidated at village, district and province, and the province RC plan must apply assets accordingly.

Cadres. RC cadres are critical components of the total effort; infrastructure must be implanted at village level throughout SVN. Current GVN cadre proposals -- relating to organization, administration and functioning -- seem adequate and warrant US support. To be effective, the following basic principles must govern RC cadre operations: (1) Cadre should be natives of the area. (2) Cadre should work with, and through, the natural and official village leaders. (3) Cadre must temporarily substitute for such leaders, if none are available, until effective community leaders are developed.

Cadre Groups (RCG) should be procured and allocated roughly on the basis of one per district throughout SVN. The group chief should be a graduate of the GVN's National Institute of Administration (NIA). Cadre must be draft-exempt, and their time spent in the field should count toward fulfillment of individual military obligations. All cadre must receive motivational training and technical schooling as required. This instruction should be given by mobile training teams that function at

the cadre location. Technical cadres must receive specialized training which is either directly administered or sponsored by the appropriate and concerned GVN ministry.

Organization and GVN Force Employment. As matters currently stand, the province chief (key GVN official in the RC effort) is the recipient of orders and advice from far too many individuals and agencies with cross-purposes policies to promote. His authority is circumscribed and has been watered-down with the passage of time. GVN has inserted another echelon in the chain of directive authority for RC -- the ARVN division. This will interfere with, rather than expedite, progress. The ARVN division role must be limited to the provision of requisite security forces to the provinces circumscribed by the Division Tactical Area (DTA), on a relatively permanent basis, to gain and maintain the climate of order and stability essential to RC progress. The proportion of the division so committed should be determined by the corps commander and be based on his detailed analysis of the overall situation. The division reserve for mobile operations (that battle component not committed to the provinces) will be heavier when the DTA contains sizeable PAVN-Main Force VC elements; it will be lighter in those instances wherein the enemy within the DTA is represented mainly by guerrillas and local forces. The corps commander must direct, coordinate and support all RC efforts in the Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The only Saigon-level ministerial representation he requires now is that which can assist in planning and executing the technical or specialized aspects of RC.

Security. The need to sustain security pervades every ramification of RC. The people we hope to bind together with their government at the lowest levels must be afforded a secured physical environment, or all else is meaningless, and no program will succeed. The various forces capable of providing this environment must be unified from the standpoints of direction and purpose. Realistically, in SVN, this is best achieved at province level. They must include the ARVN as a major component -- as many of its battle-tested units as can possibly be devoted to this mission. These integrated national security forces must be associated and intermingled with the people on a long-term basis. Their capacity to establish and maintain public order and stability must be physically and continuously credible. The key to achieving such security lies in the conduct of effective area saturation tactics, in and around the populated areas, which deny VC encroachment opportunities. This calls for vigorous, decentralized, small unit, day and night operations -- generally conducted in the form of raids, patrols and ambushes. The longer an area remains subject to such purposive security saturation by ARVN and other national stability forces, the more tangible will be GVN's demonstration of resolve to meet a basic need of its villagers. The people, cognizant of a continuously present security force which operates all around them, are afforded practical opportunities for support of the GVN and betrayal of the VC among them. Surface LOCs will become increasingly secure as the VC are denied the freedom of action required to lay mines and prepare ambushes. The fighting

involved in providing security for RC at the village and hamlet levels in SVN is the most difficult, continuous and dirty imaginable. Recognition of this reality and the application of professional assets, in depth, to prosecute such a form of warfare is mandatory. The VC can and must be challenged and defeated in the same dimension as he maintains his principal effort.

US-Free World Forces. The primary role of these forces should be to create and maintain the land power control situation which will permit and facilitate RC progress in the priority territorial areas. US-FW land forces -- in combined operations with an established proportion of the RVNAF (including Rangers, Airborne and Marine battalions) must, in effect, "isolate the battlefield" by curtailing significant infiltration, demolishing the key war zones, and fully engaging PAVN-Main Force VC units wherever and whenever they are located.14/ Unrelenting pressure must be imposed upon these major enemy combat formations; no US-FW enclave concept of operations will suffice in this regard or further the essential nation building processes that must be initiated at this time. As US-FW units can be spared from the conduct of search and destroy missions, they should be committed (by battalion or brigade) to the more critical and difficult provinces for the purpose of supporting RC. Units so assigned would function under the operational control of the province SUSREP. At no time should US-FW combat operations shift the American focus of support from the true point of decision in Vietnam -- the villages. Victories over extraneous PAVN or VC Main Force battalions,

that possess a three or four day per month operational capability, must not be allowed to generate false optimism. Such battle wins are not indicative that this enemy is ready to quit or that he has been touched in his prime operating dimension.

Selective Warfare. Counterproductive troop behavior and operational practices which alienate the Vietnamese people must be terminated. Specifically, the following types of activity must be stopped: (1) misconduct in the form of brutality, theft, confiscation, rape and dangerous driving; (2) unobserved artillery fire in contested populated areas; and, (3) air strikes in contested populated areas that are not performed in support of units in contact with the enemy.

Intelligence. Information on the enemy which has been volunteered to GVN by its citizens is by far the most valuable indicator of RC progress. No amount of technical equipment, funds, secret agents or organizational genius can substitute for voluntary intelligence; this maxim must guide the Allied intelligence effort. Additionally, the intelligence process must be integrated (with only "Special Intelligence" exceptions) at each territorial echelon; it must be coordinated and directed by the GVN chief and senior USREP at each level. At corps, national and US forces levels, the major effort must be targeted on major in-country enemy movements and larger enemy unit location. At the other end of the spectrum, the National Police (NP), cadres and small GVN units actively supporting RC must locate, identify and ultimately ferret out both the subversive cells integral to the VC political

infrastructure and the local guerrillas who establish and maintain the level of turbulence calculated as most damaging to GVN interests.

Police. The potential NP contribution to the RCP, as well as to achievement of the long-term goal incident to establishing a viable GVN, will not be realized until policemen are stationed in strength in the villages and hamlets of SVN. Police must be so introduced as early as possible and must be responsive directly to the appropriate GVN territorial chief. NP effectiveness will increase when demobilized ARVN, RF and PF personnel are screened, recruited, trained and ultimately assigned in or near their home villages. Police operations and methods are necessary ingredients of the stabilizing influence required in all stages of insurgency. In support of RC, the major police contributions lie in execution of nation-wide population and resources control programs and in neutralization of the VC political infrastructure. Specifically: (1) the NP Field Force should be disbanded since it duplicates ARVN-RF-PF forces and operations; (2) US police operations advisors should be assigned to the district (subsector) teams as required; (3) as areas are pacified, NP strength should be increased by drawdown on demobilized paramilitary forces; (4) CAS and USOM Public Safety Division advisors to the NP must be placed under the control of the senior USREP in province; and, (5) NP regions must be rearranged to conform with the CTZs, and colocated headquarters must be established.

Population and Resources Control. Within the framework of RC, these programs must remain designed to separate the VC from their sources

of supply, recruits and intelligence. Generally, resources control is the crux of economic warfare and is aimed at terminating VC ability to live primarily off the GVN economy through taxation, hijacking, accommodation and coercion. Laws providing a basis for applying the following essential control measures are in existence: (1) proclamation of contraband items (these can be applied selectively depending on the region); (2) establishment of restricted areas; (3) use of travel controls and curfews; (4) right to detain suspects; (5) requirement for identification cards; (6) conduct of family census programs; (7) establishment of fixed and mobile checkpoints on roads, trails and waterways; and, (8) conduct of raids and searches.

Since control measures are both troublesome and distasteful, they should be lifted as soon as they are no longer required. Psychological operations must be used to impress on the Vietnamese villager that these impositions are really the fault of the VC and will no longer be required when this enemy has been expelled. Results from interrogation of the violators of these laws constitute the basis of effective police intelligence procedures against the VC political infrastructure.

VC Political Infrastructure Program. US-GVN concentration on the war against companies, battalions and regiments perhaps has led us astray. Results of a British study show that the Malayan enemy's real weakness was not residual in such military problems as are normally associated with supply, weapons, camp, organization, doctrine or recruits; these could be revamped, replaced or renewed. Almost all losses could

be endured and adjusted except one -- the death of key individuals. Fallen leaders could not be replaced; with their death, experience, iron-hard determination and skills developed after years of jungle w[illegible]e were lost. Imbedded in the VC infrastructure in SVN today are the leaders who collect the money, arms, supplies, recruits and intelligence which are passed on to the next higher echelon. They exercise control over the area and over the civilian population. One single prisoner or a dead leader might save years of work, prevent future ambushes, atrocities and murders. A major NP program which is specifically designed to neutralize the communist subversive cell structure must be executed in each province of SVN now and as a matter of priority.

The Influence of the Province Senior USREP. As advisors, Americans have employed many techniques to influence the local situation. These have included persuasion, leadership, example, service as a de facto executive and mild forms of leverage. Territorial US Army advisors are virtually unanimous in their conviction that something more is required. They must be both capable and empowered to influence RC progress; the mechanisms for exerting US influence must be built into the US organization and its methods of operation.

PROVN recommends that the following detailed measures be included in the terms of reference which should be established as the mandate for province senior USREPs: (1) Reinstitution of the US approval requirement for expenditure of funds (joint "sign-off") to support projects within the RCP (e.g., POL for RC material transport, cadre salaries, school

construction and self-help projects). (2) Commodity support for RC projects (e.g., cement, roofing, PL 480 food) must be initiated by the senior USREP. (3) Requests for personnel transportation by US means must be initiated and authorized by the senior USREP. (4) The senior USREP must be authorized to recommend RC planning priorities and participate in quarterly CTZ reviews of the RC effort. (5) The senior USREP must be authorized to participate in other combined US-GVN and US unilateral reporting on the provincial RC situation. (6) The senior USREP must be authorized to recommend the extent of US technical participation in the province (e.g., well drillers, agricultural specialists, Seabees).

In addition to the foregoing measures, a most important control available to the senior USREP is his authority to withdraw or redeploy district teams. In a district where no progress can be made because of the noncooperation of GVN district authorities, the US district team should be withdrawn until a more satisfactory GVN response can be ensured. This can be done at province level by selective removal of US team members whose GVN counterparts are nonproductive.

The Structure of Government

A viable, noncommunist government in SVN is fundamental to the achievement of US objectives. Failure to develop such a public supported political order not only will preclude winning a true military victory, it will ensure losing a negotiated peace. Achievement of an effective government, responsive to the needs and aspirations of the

South Vietnamese people, is still possible; however, under present policy, where US political restraint has foreclosed responsible involvement in GVN political development, it is not probable.

The current GVN is a government without a popular mandate. It seized power through the imposition of military force and retains control by the exercise of this same power factor -- buttressed now by unequivocal US support. Governmental policies are formulated by a committee whose personal interests frequently prevail over national interests. Promises of reform are articulated by GVN spokesmen who have no genuine interest in bringing social reform to the people. Translation of these promises into action, however, is dependent upon a self-oriented, corrupt bureaucracy which is not engrossed in the public, particularly in the peasant. This obstacle -- the elite's disinterest -- is monumental, and, unless we apply US operational methods that will project reforms to the people, either through or around the elite, our chances of success are nil.

Ministerial interaction and cooperation are minimal. The administrative system is an admixture of archaic mandarin and colonial French procedures that institutionalize inefficiency. Program directives that find their way through the bureaucratic maze of Saigon are communicated through tangled lines of civil and military authority; they are executed by inexperienced, poorly motivated, ineffective personnel.

The net result is a discredited government that is neither representative of, nor responsive to, the needs and aspirations of its people.

Long-standing and legitimate causes of insurgency are still present. Promises of reform melt into maintenance of the status quo. At present, GVN exerts no meaningful influence over most rural areas of South Vietnam.

Despite weaknesses in the political fabric of SVN, the Vietnamese people have many enviable qualities and some strengths. The proportionate number of intellectuals has been judged higher than that of Europe. The Vietnamese enjoy considerable opportunity for social mobility. Disagreements between many sectors of the population are more imagined than real. Strong filialism, resiliency and the will to stand and fight have permitted the Vietnamese to retain a distinctive national identity throughout a history of continued foreign domination.

Vietnam has many highly educated, efficient and dedicated individuals. Patriotic and experienced military officers are available to lead brave and skillful Vietnamese troops. There are capable Vietnamese available to serve as catalysts in the process of turning a sense of "peoplehood" into an awareness of "nationhood." Many district chiefs have demonstrated impressive leadership potential. Vietnamese repeatedly have demonstrated their ability to rise up in manifestations of fierce patriotism. The ingredients of success are present. It is the effective application of these ingredients that is missing.

Decentralization. For the present, the national government's decision making power should be limited to such matters as centralized planning of the war effort, coordination of war plans, assignment of national priorities, development of the national budget, and the creation

and allocation of resources. Decentralization of authority, however, must occur in deed as well as in word. Delegated authority must be explicit and be positioned at province level and below. In the short range, the corps commander must play a major role in the planning, coordination and direction of RC activities. Fiscal and material resources, however, should be released by Saigon directly to province. Direct technical lines of communication should be maintained between national level ministries and ministerial representatives at provincial level. ARVN divisions should assist provinces in military affairs only and be restrained from interfering in civil administration activities. Prestige and authority commensurate with his responsibilities should be returned to the province chief. Delegation of authority to subordinate echelons by the province chief should be encouraged but left to his discretion. It should not be prescribed for nation-wide application. Decentralization will also permit province and district chiefs to appeal more effectively to existing local loyalties.

Administrative and Fiscal Reform. Before GVN efficiency can be significantly improved, a major revision and updating of the administrative and fiscal system must occur. Stress must be placed on simplification and clarification of procedures; moreover, the overwhelming burden of nonfunctional paper work must be reduced. Ministries of the national government and subordinate echelons should be authorized to expedite fund allocations without recourse to time consuming, complicated, bureaucratic delays. A joint US-GVN team of administrative and fiscal

experts -- the equivalent of a "Little Hoover Commission" -- would be an appropriate vehicle for evaluating and making appropriate recommendations. Previous attempts at administrative study and reform have been made by GVN but have never reached fruition.

A Constitution. A constitution can be a meaningless document, particularly if its formulators have no popular support. Nevertheless, rule of law is more likely to prevail over rule of man when governments attempt to operate under a formalized legal frame of reference. Positive and candid American encouragement and assistance should be offered to the GVN in its present efforts to develop a constitution.

A Representative Institution. No formal organization exists wherein the interests of the people of SVN can be represented. The immediate establishment of a national assembly to represent these people manifests certain pitfalls, but the failure of GVN to form a representative institution over a protracted period of time surfaces far greater pitfalls.

A South Vietnamese national assembly should be broadly representative of the various sectors of the population. Initially, it would be a consultative body without legal power and serve as a vehicle for communication between the people and the national government. Its initial functions should be similar to existing provincial councils -- representation without formal authority; as rapidly as feasible, however, this national assembly should be vested with increasing formal authority. A mid-range objective should be to make it a legislative body and, hopefully in the long range, it would develop into a legislative branch

of government coequal with the executive branch. The assignment of responsibilities to this assembly must occur rapidly.

Power Relationships. Rule by such a system as the National Leadership Committee is inefficient. It provides some stability by counterbalancing the foci of power, but it does not permit effective government. GVN should be encouraged to move toward the following organization in terms of power relationships:

(1) The power of the National Leadership Committee should be used to support the Prime Minister. At present, it is not practicable to disband this body. However, through positive political action on the part of the US, the committee members must be induced to subordinate their personal interests to the national good.

(2) For the present, there should continue to be a chief of state selected by the military. When the national assembly develops into a responsible, as well as representative, body it should nominate the chief of state. Late in the short-range time period, this nomination should be endorsed or vetoed by a controlled national election. In the mid range, the chief of state could be selected by a free popular election.

(3) The chief of state should nominate the Prime Minister. For the present, this selection should be approved by the military. Early in the mid-range time period the nomination should be approved by the national assembly. For the present, the Prime Minister should have full authority to appoint and discharge ministers. In the mid range, the

Prime Minister's cabinet selections should be approved by the national assembly. At this point in time, it should be possible to permit the greater participation of competing power groups.

(4) For the present, various political power groups should have a voice in the government by appointment to subministerial committees. Committees for economic planning, social welfare, rural development, public relations and related activities should contain qualified representatives of various special interest groups.

(5) Ministerial efficiency should be improved by redefining responsibilities to avoid duplication of work.

(6) Interministerial meetings should be used to make immediate and coordinated decisions on routine matters. The delays now generated by use of formal correspondence between ministries must be terminated.

(7) An administrative court should be established. At present, there is no formalized method for redress of grievances concerning such services as licenses, permits or routine applications. Government employees frequently discard such correspondence without processing it or replying to the sender. Tracer correspondence is usually ignored. Routine applications frequently take in excess of one year to process. An administrative court would permit citizen recourse in the event that his correspondence was unanswered after a reasonable period.

Provincial Government. To increase the effectiveness of provincial government, the following actions should occur:

(1) Appointive and discharge authority for province chiefs should be held by the Prime Minister.

(2) In explicit and unequivocal terms, the province chief must be delegated authority adequate to permit his effective discharge of responsibilities. Previous attempts by the national government to delegate this authority have been subverted by individual ministries and intervening military commanders.

(3) Province chiefs should possess direct authority over ministerial representatives functioning on the province staff. Ministerial representatives should maintain technical liaison with their parent ministries, for exchange of technical information, but their first responsibility must be to the province chief.

(4) The province chief should exercise command authority over district chiefs. District chiefs should be nominated by the province chief and approved by the Prime Minister. It is desirable, but not necessary, that they be selected from local talent.

(5) The selection process for province chiefs should not only consider integrity, leadership ability and loyalty, but should also emphasize the candidate's local reputation. While not absolutely essential that province chiefs be chosen from the local citizenry, a favorable reputation would negate some of the harmful effects of arbitrary appointment of officials by GVN without elections.

District Government. Current lines of district chief authority are not clear; his personal authority is poorly defined. His staff is frequently inadequate, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The authority delegated to the district chief must be adequate to

enable his complete discharge of assigned responsibilities. This authority must be clearly defined and explicit, but the delegation of authority should be made selectively by the province chief and not specified by Saigon in an identical manner for all districts. District staffs should be tailored by province to meet specific local requirements. The district staff for pacified areas should include assistance for military activities, administration, public health, education, agriculture, public works, information, social welfare and youth and sports. The district chief in a VC controlled area is severely restricted and does not need as large a staff.

Village Government. Village governments should not be tailored by Saigon for uniform application throughout SVN. Superimposing Saigon organizational concepts upon workable village arrangements unnecessarily complicates village administration. Local governments should be organized discriminately to meet the requirements of particular population units. Maximum use should be made of existing village governments. Pay of local government officials is particularly inadequate and should be increased. Provincial training programs for village and hamlet officials should be instituted.

Elections. A free national election in the near future is unrealistic. Free national elections under international supervision would result either in widespread communist victories or "mobocracy." If the Communists win such an election, as some important Vietnamese officials predict, US and GVN efforts to sustain a noncommunist SVN will have been

in vain. If the NLF did not win the election, its followers could claim fraud, accuse the government of dishonesty and renew the insurgency to avenge the "imperialistic trick." It is entirely unlikely that any international agency could provide the degree of supervision required to assure "honest elections." Irrespective of communist influence, several factors militate against successful national elections in the immediate future: (1) the rural population is largely illiterate and isolated from issues outside their limited world of family, hamlet and village; (2) the south Vietnamese are not sufficiently educated to grasp the ramifications of national political issues; (3) unseasoned by experience with democratic processes, the people could be influenced all too readily by the blandishments of a demagogue with a penchant for appeals to emotions and prejudices; (4) without a minimal consensus which can accomodate open political competition, elections are likely to be destabilizing -- differences among the populace would hinder the formation of national unity; and, (5) people who have traditionally lived under authoritarian rule frequently find it difficult to reject the patterns of authority and will vote the way they are told.

Elections should not be considered an end in themselves but rather should serve as a step in the process of political development. Human rights such as freedom of speech, public assembly and personal liberty are necessary preconditions for making elections meaningful. Elections should not be conducted in accordance with a preconceived time table. They should be held: (1) after social and political awareness have been

achieved; (2) after GVN has established a secure environment; (3) after GVN programs for social, environmental and economic improvement have produced tangible benefits for the people; (4) after a sense of political compromise and a consensus to accept the will of the majority have been developed; (5) only at levels of government where voters have a direct interest in political issues; and, (6) before the denial of political participation through elections becomes a serious divisive influence.

While national elections -- either a plebiscite for reunification of Vietnam or free elections within SVN -- should not be held prior to 1971, a form of controlled election may be feasible at an earlier date. Such an election would be limited to GVN controlled areas and to GVN screened candidates. A further safeguard would provide for an indirect election whereby existing provincial councils (also selected by controlled election procedures) would represent their constituents at the polls. In any event, the decision to hold elections should be made by GVN without premature US pressure.

Government Stability. Coups, semi-coups and coupettes are a fact of life in the government of SVN. They are manifestations of a continuing political shake-out after nearly 80 years of autocratic rule. Coups should be viewed as natural in the current phase of SVN political evolution, for it lacks an institutionalized system for changing leadership. Barring external restraints, this situation eventually should produce a more stable governmental structure that is founded on political

power groupings rather than on a facade of popular support. It is within the US capability to define the parameters within which changes in leadership can occur.

Government stability should be viewed in dynamic, rather than static, terms. True "stability" in the midst of a social revolution should represent controlled change and not maintenance of a status quo.

The national political environment can, and should, be simplified. Groups that agitate against one another because of Communist stimulation and Vietnamese character should be coalesced around concepts that have a greater commonality of interest. GVN leadership should engage in more constructive interaction with the leadership of the various politically active groups. The divisive tendency to criticize automatically and condemn GVN officials could be dissipated if GVN leadership were to maintain continuous personal liaison with nongovernmental leaders.

GVN should permit an outlet for political expression. Purely repressive measures that prohibit the voicing of public criticism do not eliminate the censure; they force and reinforce its covert expression. Stifled political frustrations breed instability and coups. Pressures resulting from unexpressed political frustrations could be dissipated in a constructive manner through responsible political parties, newspapers and a national assembly.

The development of a representative and responsible national assembly could have an additional stabilizing influence by providing an orderly means for changing government leadership. Selective and judicious

replacement of GVN officials by a representative body would tend to insulate government programs from the disruptive effects of coups. Widespread replacement of key officials would be avoided.

The increased decentralization of authority to province level would provide increased stability at lower echelons of government. With increased authority and adequate resources, province chiefs could continue operations independently during reorganization periods in Saigon.

The development of a professional civil service will also further the stabilization of the processes of government. Program execution and day-to-day operations could continue under the control of lower echelon administrators while changes in senior personnel were in progress. The US could contribute to GVN stability by: (1) supporting the institution of government rather than becoming overly committed to particular individuals; (2) more convincingly communicating US long-range goals and objectives to GVN; and, (3) using its influence to convince agitating groups of the necessity for a period of governmental stability. The US Ambassador should frankly and directly explain this requirement to faction leaders. He should encourage groups to take complaints directly to the GVN rather than to demonstrate and become a divisive influence. GVN should be encouraged to consider and act upon legitimate complaints.

Developing a Professional Civil Service. The maladies of the civil service of SVN are so numerous, disruptive and sanctioned by tradition that it is not sufficient merely to encourage a gradual reformation. The present categories of civil servants and statutes pertaining thereto

should be abolished. A new career program should be developed and formalized by law. The program should include a system for rewarding dedication and efficiency, eliminating inefficiency and providing career incentives such as retirement benefits, selective job security and reasonable salaries. A senior level promotion system with an up-or-out proviso should be defined. Career development programs should include provisions for both managerial and technical personnel. Vocational training for junior-level civil servants should be increased within the school system and through the development of vocational training centers. In-service training programs should be instituted within the ministries. The National Institute of Administration (NIA) should be expanded; its curriculum should include courses designed to develop a service-oriented code of conduct for civil servants.

The US should support the development of a professional civil service by increasing its support to the NIA, assisting in the development of vocational training centers and encouraging nongovernmental assistance such as that previously given by the Michigan State University Advisory Team.

Legal System. A responsive and functioning legal system is essential to a free and viable SVN. Without sound laws fairly and efficiently administered, it is difficult for any government to maintain order, protect individual rights and execute its programs.

Improvement of the legal system will require action directed toward three basic areas: the substantive law, the legal institutions which

administer that law, and the popular understanding and acceptance of these institutions and the law with which they deal. To achieve this, the GVN should establish a commission of leading laymen, lawyers and judges to survey the workings of their law in nation building and to determine what the law must perform in their present and future society. This commission should be apolitical and composed of men of high standing; it should be sufficiently well supported so that it can retain essential specialists for field inquiry and research.

Graft and Corruption. Petty graft is normal practice in most governments of Asia. However, graft and corruption in SVN have exceeded any acceptable limits, even by Vietnamese standards, and have become major obstacles to effective government. More important than the resultant diversion of resources is the significant loss of respect which accompanies flagrant and ostentatious corruption on the part of senior GVN officials. As a matter of priority, graft and corruption in SVN must be brought under control.

Amnesty. The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program must be improved in both organization and resources. A realistic amnesty provision must be established in order to provide enemy soldiers, guerrillas, cadres and those villagers residing under VC domination with a credible avenue of escape from communist control. These individuals must not only be integrated into the current struggle on GVN's side now, but they must also be reintegrated into the social fabric of SVN in order to provide leadership, talent and manpower for long-term development.

Requirement for Socio-Economic Growth

Cohesive Society. Vietnam, at present, is not a cohesive society -- one that is reasonably attuned to member expectations and aspirations and one whose members are committed to the purposes of that society. Wartime stresses have done much to overcome certain obstacles to social and economic change in SVN. For example, the Vietnamese have demonstrated a willingness to accept and employ new agricultural techniques; such a positive factor provides cues for the accelerated development of SVN. In developing programs, the US must make maximum use of Vietnamese private and public institutions already in being. Attempting to implant a new set of societal or administrative combinations on a "crash" basis would only further confuse the already distorted arrangement.

Major Thrusts. While reduction of the insurgency currently receives paramount attention, the longer-range objectives of US policy call for a sustained nation building effort. US-GVN nation building programs, ongoing and projected, have as their goal a viable socio-economic infrastructure that can meet the growth requirements of SVN.

The security and nation building programs are interrelated; each forms part of a continuum, and the balance between them must be adjusted against the security situation. Parts of SVN are already in an environment amenable to long-range development. These areas present excellent opportunities for US-GVN acceleration of nation building efforts.

All current major socio-economic development programs in SVN must

be carried on in the context of strong government involvement, indispensable US support and a pervasive concern with security.

For the most part, US programs are derivatives of GVN programs in that their size and scope are determined primarily by the GVN ability to absorb US assistance effectively. Exceptions to this basic US-GVN operational relationship fall in the category of: (1) unilateral small-scale US military civic actions; (2) military construction; and, (3) US-initiated emergency responses to politically sensitive situations (e.g., refugees). The prime program categories are: war infrastructure; rural development; urban development; and, socio-economic institutions.

War infrastructure programs are those keyed directly to the short-range requirements necessary to win the war in SVN and maintain the economy. However, even these short-range increments, for the most part, contribute in some manner to long-range growth and development.

Rural development programs focus on provincial operations and those activities that better enable GVN to function effectively in the countryside. These increments have both a short and long-range orientation. The programs are keyed specifically to the needs of an agricultural economy and the rural population upon which the insurgency feeds.

Urban development programs also have both a short and long-range thrust. In the short range, they have as primary goals the expansion of employment and improvement of urban welfare as a means of reducing VC penetration. The urban effort is associated with the requirement to carry out an expansionary economic policy designed to improve levels

and conditions of employment and to stimulate domestic output. Measures to encourage light industrialization in the private sector are included in this package. The long-range aspects of urban development are a continuation of the short-range thrust and include the expansion of power output and light industry diversification.

Socio-economic institutional development programs focus on credit, foreign trade, taxation, health, education, youth activities and women's affairs. These institutional requirements impact on both the immediate war situation and the long-range need to develop a cohesive society in SVN.

War created limitations require that US-GVN programs be both highly selective and discriminate. In the short range, development must be focused on support of the GVN economy and RC. The thrust of US programs must:

(1) Accord priority to strengthening current economic aid to assure its effectiveness as a stabilizing element, through counterinflationary activity, and as an offensive economic warfare system that will deny resources to the VC.

(2) Recognize that limitations on human and material resources demand that the US-GVN effort be highly selective. The shortfall of human skills in SVN cannot be overcome by material saturation.

(3) Support and, if necessary, initiate those socio-economic programs that provide tangible evidence of GVN national purpose, as well as those which serve to strengthen the cohesiveness of Vietnamese society.

(4) Sustain programs that provide clear proof of GVN concern for the Vietnamese people and its recognition of the need for peaceful change as the only valid alternative to violent revolution.

(5) Buttress programs that effectively compete with the VC for the allegiance of the people; these must be executed in the face of an immediate and dynamic insurgency threat.

In carrying out such programs, the relationship between socio-economic benefits and GVN presence must be made clear. As a principle, benefits should be limited to areas under GVN control so as to deny resources to the VC and to dramatically demonstrate the rewards accruing to association with the government. GVN assistance should have as its primary goal support of RC and development efforts rather than the indiscriminate, unilateral economic improvement of individual well-being.

Support in contested areas must be highly selective and based on specific operational considerations. However, the principle of selective support must apply to permit operational flexibility. The US-GVN effort must be capable of exploiting weaknesses in VC control and of capitalizing on opportunities to demonstrate effective government in significant enclaves.

US Assistance Required. US assistance in support of US-GVN objectives has as its point of departure:

(1) An offensive aspect that actively competes for the allegiance of the South Vietnamese population.

(2) A defensive thrust that is organized to negate the VC effort to disrupt the economy of SVN.

(3) The achievement of maximum economic stability in a wartime environment.

US assistance must be measured against the following guidelines and tests of utility:

(1) The positive and measurable political and psychological impact on the assistance of the population.

(2) GVN economic and administrative capacity to absorb the assistance.

(3) GVN willingness to participate in, support and follow through on the project.

(4) The contribution to the war effort made by the project.

(5) The avoidance of program fragmentation due to the competing short-range emergency and ongoing long-range nation building requirements.

(6) Assistance having, as short-range priority, the provision of that support necessary to establish an effective GVN.

(7) Assistance being tied into an expansionary economic policy designed to improve conditions of employment and welfare of segments of both the rural and urban population.

(8) The project's anticipation of a long-range shift away from imports of consumer goods toward imports of industrial raw materials and capital goods.

Rural Development. It is in the agricultural sector that SVN has held, and continues to hold, obvious comparative advantages. Agriculture

will remain the basis of the economy from today throughout the long-term time period. Conversely, SVN does not appear to possess the resources necessary for massive industrial development. If GVN is to compete successfully in the future on the world rice market: (1) the cost of production on the farms must be lowered; (2) transportation means must be made more efficient; (3) handling charges reduced; and, (4) the tax system must be adjusted to encourage exports.

Over the mid and long-range, agriculture must expand and diversify; this will avoid the vulnerability inherent in an economy solely dependent on rice and rubber crops for foreign exchange. Emphasis in agriculture should be on: (1) increasing farm production and diversification; (2) returning abandoned farmland to production; (3) opening new farm areas; (4) improving irrigation facilities; (5) developing an effective credit system; (6) improving security of tenure; (7) introducing new agricultural product strains; and, (8) developing industrial corps in conjunction with associated processing industries.

Urban Development. Over the short-range period, US-GVN urban development programs should remain aimed at:

(1) Urban social improvement that will bolster public confidence and ease the burdens of the low-income population.

(2) Encouraging investment in productive enterprise so as to raise domestic output, absorb purchasing power and encourage financial commitments to the SVN economy.

(3) Creating income-increasing measures to provide added incentives for the urban mass.

Throughout the mid and long-range period, urban development should be focused on achieving sound industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. These sectors must be adapted to the real needs and resources of SVN. Development efforts require improvement of the investment climate and increased exploitation of a trained manpower base; additionally, light industry diversification and growth must be encouraged to meet the needs of an expanding economy.

Concurrent with the need for industrial base growth, is the requirement for a commensurate increase in the skilled labor force that can contribute to, and profit from, gains in the industrial sector. In addition, the living conditions of the urban labor force must be improved to assure its continued commitment to an expansionary national economy.

Economic Infrastructure. Inflation remains the top short-range economic challenge to GVN stability. The US must continue a large scale import program to keep the SVN economy solvent. The economy is under heavy pressure due to mounting GVN defense spending and budgetary deficits, increasing VC interdiction and taxation of local commerce, an expanding money supply and US competition for limited in-country resources.

Institutions Started. The development of institutions is pertinent to both urban and rural growth. While most of these institutional elements are in existence or require immediate initiation, they are the basis for, or are themselves components of, long-range development. Some of these institutional requirements are:

(1) Fiscal. In the short range, the US must exert pressure on GVN to apply selectively the tax programs already on the books; this will drawdown on the urban income surpluses that are primarily war generated. In the mid and long range, the US must assist GVN in an overhaul of the total tax structure to include tax policy and organization for the administration of tax laws.

(2) Public Health. Support or non-support of health activities should be tied to the security situation in the short range. The requirement is to cut the VC off from medical support, plus the need to isolate the VC from the population.

Day-to-day training, management and logistical support of the inept GVN health organization requires US focus. To meet the logistics needs of this medical system, a combined US-GVN supply organization has been established. Due to poor GVN performance, however, the US must continue, when necessary (as in the past), to go it alone to get this critical job done.

Throughout the mid and long-range periods, a preventive medicine program should be emphasized. Preventive medicine, tied in with health education and efforts to improve potable water systems and sewage disposal, is basic to any extensive health program in SVN.

(3) Education. The US-GVN must: (a) continue the elementary school program; (b) expand support to provincial high schools; (c) increase vocational schools; (d) review teaching practices and classroom performance; (e) assure that the maximum constructive benefit is obtained

from printed instructional materials; (f) encourage an increase in technician output from universities; and, (g) take a positive interest in student youth movements. In addition, and most significant, the US should not support the continuance of GVN schools in VC-dominated areas.

(4) Youth. SVN youth -- high school and university students -- have the capability to organize for and conduct political activities that can be both a propaganda and physical challenge to GVN. However, it now seems evident that these youths, although antagonistic toward the present GVN, are not going to operate for the VC.

A low-keyed program that will be attractive to the suspicious, sensitive and basically antigovernment urban youth should continue to constitute a valuable secondary thrust during the short range. Concurrently, the US should encourage some mode of accommodation between GVN and the student organizations.

Mid and Long-Range Objectives

The short-range objectives, with which PROVN is primarily concerned, are designed to provide the requisite foundation for a gradual transition toward the development, in the mid and long range time frame, of a free and independent, noncommunist South Vietnam. PROVN emphasizes that efforts must be initiated now to build toward that future, and many of the specific components of the short-range action pattern are intended for this purpose. The principal mid-range objectives are:

-- The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability.

-- A US organizational presence adequate for assured national security and development.

-- The amelioration of divisive social factors.

-- A viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion.

The achievement of US-GVN mid-range objectives will, in turn, lay the foundation for the maturation of SVN. Development should proceed toward a society that enjoys inner social cohesion; a viable government; a diversified, maturing economy; and, an adequate security posture. Throughout the long-range period, and beyond, SVN should be effectively integrating its significant minority groups into the fabric of its society. The government should be basically democratic with firmly established political institutions capable of withstanding crises and allowing for the legal and peaceful transfer of political power. Economically, SVN should have passed the take-off point to self-sustaining growth. A somewhat smaller, well-equipped and well-trained military establishment, backed by regional and international security guarantees, should be capable of sustaining the national security. Throughout the long-range period, the US presence should be minimal.

CONCLUSION

To achieve the ultimate US objective in SVN, PROVN proposes a "Blueprint for National Action." This approach brings together a multitude of long-standing recommendations, refines them, and results in an action pattern that carefully integrates military, political, social and

economic factors. Of necessity, this approach departs significantly from traditional methods of operation. The PROVN document sets forth a conceptual framework, buttressed by a detailed listing of specific and catalogued actions, that is designed to serve as a US-Free World counter to the Communist strategy of "wars of national liberation."

PROVN contends that people -- Vietnamese and American, individually, and collectively -- constitute the strategic determinants of today's conflict. People are the decisive elements of that "object ... which lies beyond" this war. The GVN, with US support, must orient on this point of decision. This fact, too often mouthed without real understanding in the now trite phrase "winning the hearts and minds of people," must guide all of our future actions. This significant point is stressed: the current battle for the villagers of South Vietnam may well be one of the most important and decisive conflicts in world history. PROVN focuses on this central battle; all other military aspects of the war are secondary.

PROVN reemphasizes, and brings into focus, those integrated critical actions which must be accomplished. There is no tidy package solution; success in South Vietnam will be the sum of innumerable small and integrated localized efforts, not the outcome of any short-duration, single master stroke. The United States must:

-- Restructure, better manage and integrate its support;

-- Provide positive political guidance to the GVN, under provisos for applying leverage;

-- Redirect the Republic of Vietnam and Free World military effort to achieve greater security for the Vietnamese villager;

-- Focus nonmilitary assistance to achieve cohesion within the Vietnamese society; and,

-- Orient socio-economic programs to exploit critical geographic areas of population and resource concentration.

As President Johnson pointed out on 13 May 1965:

> "It is not enough to just fight against something. People must fight for something, and the people of South Vietnam must know that after the long,brutal journey through the dark tunnel of conflict, there breaks the light of a happier day. And only if this is so, can they be expected to sustain the enduring will for continued strife. Only in this way can long run stability and peace come to their land."

NOTES

1. In the past, the US has formulated two responses which have proved to be inappropriate in coping with the insurgency in SVN. From 1954-61, our predominantly military advice nurtured a conventional GVN military force structure designed to repel overt armed invasion. Events have proved this formulation to be grossly in error. From 1961-66, our reaction to the situation has been mainly military in substance and reliant, almost totally, on the provision of US advice to achieve GVN execution. This narrowly based response has failed to address the social-political-psychological-economic facets of South Vietnamese aspirations and grievances which constitute the crux of the problem. While the Communist have carefully braided such aspects into a deep-rooted organization designed to carry out a fully integrated social assault in SVN, the US assistance effort remains compartmented in its military versus nonmilitary approaches to problem solving and short-term perspective as to the extent of its involvement. Regarding our reliance on advice, the last five years should have taught us that counsel alone will neither induce action, nor terminate counter-productive activity, on the part of Vietnamese officials.

We are now in the midst of reappraising US-GVN efforts in order to develop and project an appropriately integrated broad-based program. If any integrated plan or program is to be translated into action in SVN, forceful and appropriate US pressure must be brought to bear upon the actual roots of the problem. To bring this pressure to bear, the US must organize and provide its field representatives with adequate tools for the authorized exercise of leverage sufficient to energize GVN effectiveness at village, district and province levels. Finally, the US must also accept the fact that its commitment in SVN will be at least as long as it has been in Korea -- possibly longer.

The World of 1970 -- four years away -- is forecast (WINS II) as "insurgency conflict prone within the emerging nations." The US must anticipate a seriously heightened conflict environment in 35 of these nations (31 will be classifiable as insurgencies with communist influence figuring in at least half of these instances). It is in the national interest to design an effective US civil-military response now -- and, in SVN.

2. The term "nonwar" is used to describe a new form of international confrontation and involvement. Vietnam emphasizes the great difficulty experienced in gradually escalating from military assistance to active conflict without a declaration of national emergency. We are learning to fight a "nonwar" with unique identifiable characteristics: (a) Vietnam is, in a large part, a confrontation of ideologies; (b) successful attainment of immediate military objectives still will leave

political, economic and social-psychological conflicts that initiated the "nonwar" unresolved; and, (c) objectives "beyond the war" imply the need for a social revolution achieved through US assistance (e.g., a strategy for peace and not war). Wars of national liberation, while low-level in combat intensity by comparison with larger-scale wars, are extraordinarily complex. Such conflicts cannot be waged solely with orthodox techniques, nor can they be terminated definitively by master strokes. "Nonwar" requires broad-gauge application of national power; its parameters exceed the purview of any single US executive agency. Finally, "nonwars" are forecast as the trend of the future; unfortunately, we have yet to develop a response to meet and deal with this trend.

3. During the last several years, the situation in SVN has seriously deteriorated. For example, contrast the situation in 1961 with that of today. The VC organization has been expanded. Headquarters of the Nambo (area of SVN) has been augmented by high-level cadre from NVN's Lao Dong (Worker's) Party and reorganized into the Central Office for SVN (COSVN); this operational hub now has as its front organization --- the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). Each year VC infiltration routes and procedures have been refined to handle more personnel and equipment. Over 40,000 personnel have been infiltrated -- 14,000 infiltrators in 1965 have been confirmed with an additional 5,000 termed "possible." 1965 marked the inception of regular NVN Army unit infiltrations. The GVN today controls less area and fewer people -- and the VC controls more -- than was the case in 1961. This is in spite of the presence of over 200,000 US and FW support personnel. The coups have produced governments that have been less effective than the 1961 regime. The economy has continuously deteriorated. The intensity of the fighting has increased -- during the closing week of February, over-all US casualties reached their highest peak (109 KIA - 747 WIA).

4. In this unorthodox war, the VC have a distinct advantage in that they do not have to deliver until they win. The GVN role is more difficult, because it can achieve viability only through the willing support or effective tolerance of a large majority of the Vietnamese population. This requirement follows from the stated GVN objectives and the methods of government control derived therefrom. VC efforts, on the other hand, are functionally concentrated on separating the Vietnamese people from the GVN, thereby undermining the latter. Primary VC thrusts are designed to discredit the GVN by emphasizing either: (2) governmental excesses; or, (b) official failure and inability to alleviate existing discontent.

The "heart of this insurgency" lies in the villages and districts of SVN; selective terrorism is utilized by the VC, in support of its broad-gauge social assault, wherever appropriate and necessary. VC effectiveness stems from a deep-rooted, cohesive organization which has proved capable of filling the political vacuum created by GVN loss of administrative control and the demonstrated willingness to use coercive

measures (especially selective terrorism) to achieve its goals. In this endeavor the VC design is served by the obvious GVN shortcomings, the legacy of "nationalism" stemming from Viet Minh defeat of the French, the lack of Vietnamese political consensus as to the appropriate form and goals of government, the charismatic appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the GVN image as prime buttress of the status quo. Thus, the GVN must prove itself capable of serving public aspirations and governing effectively to win. The VC have only to maintain that state of turbulence required to underscore GVN ineffectiveness to enjoy eventual communist victory.

5. If the US becomes more directly involved in the internal affairs of SVN, as PROVN recommends, we must be prepared to counter the accusations of "Yankee imperialism" and "neo-colonialism". PROVN recommendations are based on the premise that US policies are not developed within a framework of constraint and sensitivity to propaganda. Such themes have been touted by our communist opposition for twenty-one years. Those who want to believe such accusations will believe them; those who favor US policy will rationalize it. Our credibility on this issue is high (e.g., Philippine independence (1946); withdrawal from Lebanon (1958); and, current renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty). One overriding advantage impacts upon US activities in SVN: The ultimate US and GVN objectives are identical -- "a free and independent, non-communist South Vietnam." The US should capitalize on this and move forward more vigorously on all fronts to achieve this mutual objective. Many prestigious Vietnamese importune for greater US involvement in their internal affairs.

PROVN recognizes the extreme sensitivity and complexity of greater US involvement and in no way infers a totalitarian imposition of US will irrespective of Vietnamese desires. PROVN recommends "the application of tact and skill to influence ... events constructively" by "carefully selected individuals." While the application of leverage at lower politico-military echelons may be more direct and overt, it is envisioned that its use will be institutionalized through joint agreement as to techniques by both the US and GVN. The introduction of advice and material resources will thus be tied to a commitment on the part of responsible officials to produce long overdue social reform. Mutual agreement on leverage is feasible and realistic. If a GVN official has counterproductive impact on the population due to corrupt or oppresive practices, his replacement serves both US and GVN interests.

USIA must respond to the psychological thrust proposed by PROVN with less emphasis on war themes and more emphasis on "the light at the end of the tunnel" or "the Great Society" approaches. The Vietnamese people must be informed of the US intent to respond on a society-to-society basis. Hence, the future American role of social innovator demands greater US influence over Vietnamese affairs, but only so as to assist in addressing aspirations of the people. This must be communicated not

only within SVN, but to our Allies, our enemies and the nonaligned. Of equal importance, GVN psychological operations must undertake a program of counterpropaganda to explain clearly and convincingly to the Vietnamese people that the US is in SVN to assist them in their fight against aggression and oppression -- not to colonize -- not to establish military bases -- not to fight a US war.

6. It is necessary that we "reaffirm to the world at large" our national objective in SVN. Evidence that there is confusion regarding the US objective in SVN -- among the US public at large, within the branches of Government and throughout the capitals of the world -- can be derived through an analysis of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, a comparison of official public statements of the US objective, or a close reading of newspaper columnists both here and abroad. This confusion has been compounded by the US "Peace Offensive" initiated in December 1965. An apparent contradiction exists between the US willingness to "negotiate" and the US objective, if expressed in terms of NSAM 288 (a free, independent non-communist SVN), since the latter would appear to require the "unconditional surrender" of VC-NLF-NVN objectives in SVN.

A clear, unequivocal understanding -- by the US public and the world at large -- of the US objective in SVN is essential if the requisite determination and effort is to be forthcoming. Such a clear, unequivocal statement may restrict US foreign policy "flexibility." However, such loss of flexibility is warranted by the significance of the NSAM 288 objective to US strategy in Asia (and in SEA in particular) and the criticality of the current situation.

7. The development and adoption of a single, integrated plan would bring general and specific advantages. In general terms, such a plan would make US-GVN progress toward established goals more efficient. Civil-military requirements could be reviewed in total context, priorities established commensurate with capabilities, and resources allocated to achieve realistic objectives. Additionally, a single plan would provide the essential vehicle for combining US and GVN efforts and for stimulating GVN development of its own unified action pattern through its annual budget and supplementary appropriations.

In specific terms, such a plan would allow the US to reduce and (if possible) eliminate actual or potential program conflicts which could be counterproductive to the over-all effort; moreover, it could optimize the allocation of scarce resources among all "critical" and other essential programs. Specific examples of program conflicts and resources misallocations which could be alleviated (at least in part) by such a plan are: (a) US and GVN construction requirements vying for available materials (especially within US-supported programs); (b) recruiting competition for cadre requirements; and, (c) GVN military draft of critically needed civil servants and other specialists.

8. It is difficult to assess specifically the "critical programs" of such a large undertaking. However, a "critical program" must be recognized and sustained for receipt of "primary emphasis" in SVN, at any particular time, given the conditions then existing.

All actions listed in the Action Catalogue are "essential" in that they should be allocated at least those resources adequate to maintain some degree of momentum. PROVN moves forward on a broad front. The designation of "critical programs" facilitates the best allocation of scarce resources to ensure accelerating forward momentum in the major thrusts of the total effort. Selection should be based on preventing failure in any essential thrust area, on reinforcing demonstrated success, and on satisfying the preconditions for otherwise critical programs.

The determination of "critical programs" must be made at each administrative level within the US Single Manager system as a dynamic process reflecting a continual review of all pertinent factors and the flexibility to designate various programs as "critical" with available resources reallocated accordingly. Programs currently considered critical are:

Category I:

Defeat of PAVN and Main Force VC
Rural Construction
Commercial Import Program and Public Law 480
Effective GVN Functioning

Category II:

Civil Service (Personnel System) Reform
Reduction of Corruption in GVN
Strengthening of Prime Minister's Office
Administrative (Procedures) Reform
Fiscal Reform
Establishment of Outlets for Political Expression
Military (US & GVN) Civil Action
Incemnification
Amnesty
Chieu Hoi
Utilization of NP Against Political Infrastructure
Economic Warfare
Leadership Training for RVNAF
Clear LOCs
Curtailment of Infiltration
Destruction of In-Country Safe Havens
Rural Development
Refugee Support
Elementary Education

9. To deal with the totality of these "wars of national liberation" new and imaginative emphases and techniques are advocated. PROVN submits a blueprint for US national action that is new. It brings together a multitude of long-standing recommendations, refines them and proposes an action pattern, carefully integrating military, political, social and economic factors. Of necessity, this approach departs significantly from traditional methods of operation. PROVN sets forth this conceptual framework, buttressed by a detailed listing of specific actions, that is designed to serve as a US-Free World counter to the communist strategy of "wars of national liberation." The several new and imaginative components of PROVN are:

(a) More direct US involvement in GVN affairs to ensure the attainment of US-GVN objectives. This degree of involvement in "sovereign" affairs, even though invited, would be precedent setting in SVN. It is realized that this altered method of operation would thrust the US Army officer (historically apolitical) into Vietnamese internal affairs at the district and province levels. However, given the situation in Vietnam today, this degree of involvement is necessary to pursue Rural Construction and nation building from the ground up.

(b) Decentralization. For success, we must actually decentralize and delegate to Americans and Vietnamese at district and province levels the resources and authority to accomplish the tasks at hand. This decentralization would reverse American trends toward centralization and Vietnamese continuation of a French system which retained decision-making at highest levels.

(c) Single Manager Concept. Organizing a truly integrated civil-military US effort in SVN (as a model for GVN emulation and to contest the tried and proved communist politico-military mechanism) would constitute a totally new field undertaking. In this connection, the Honolulu Conference results (JCS 2343/783) stipulate that the US "will try to formulate a way to better our organization in support of the Vietnamese effort." In order to provide this better organization, PROVN believes that the direction of our effort, by committee system both in Washington and in Saigon, must be terminated. A firm executive hand must be evident at both of these points of decision.

(d) Open-ended funding.

(e) Focus of Rural Construction planning at village level.

(f) In extension, techniques are recommended to: stimulate social change; improve amnesty program; curtail infiltration; develop legal system; conduct elections; deal with religious groups; and, control graft.

10. Locating qualified personnel who understand, and can apply, methods used to produce change is a difficult task that must be solved. This is no new requirement. President Kennedy told the West Point Class of 1962 that, to counter wars of national liberation, the US needed "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of training." A month later, at the White House, he specified that our new breed of military professional required "a broad knowledge of the whole government to identify themselves with the aspirations of the people . . ." Major General Yarborough, speaking two years later, cited indications of progress.

> "There is beginning to emerge a new breed of soldier, wise in the ways of cold war strategy, appreciative and skilled in the power of psychological operations, knowledgeable of his own country's aims, both internally and internationally . . . but are we still blindly building dinosaur-like conventional armies when they have no chance of success in this new arena? Are we paying enough attention to the type of instrument needed to fight political wars involving entire peoples, both in and out of uniform? Have we yet really recognized the requirement for a new kind of soldier?"

General H. K. Johnson stated in August 1964:

> " . . . The time appears to be at hand to extend our thinking to embrace counterinsurgency operations and other types of US participation overseas in time of nominal peace (as) a normal third principal mission of the Army, going hand in hand with (missions for) nuclear warfare and conventional warfare . . ."

General M. D. Taylor described SVN in December 1965:

> " . . . Out in the districts . . .young men in uniform do things they never dreamed of in their military training. While they have military tasks in training and improving the hamlet militia, they are in all sorts of activity which are far from military -- how the pigs are faring, how the crops are doing, how is the dispensary working, is the maternity hospital adequate -- they deal with these and many other questions that are part of the complexities of community-building."

PROVN, based on ANNEX G, contends that a sufficient number of qualified US Army personnel now are available to carry out the proposed program. If the assignment is made professionally rewarding, leaders competant for the task will fight to be so assigned. Specifically,

26 of 31 sector and subsector returnees from SVN indicate a desire to serve another tour in the same capacity. Additionally, 28 of 55 subsector and 9 of 25 sector advisors now on duty in SVN would extend their tours given full command of the US program in their respective areas. The major problem over the short-range period is identification and selection of USREPs. This can be accomplished by a personnel research program as follows: (a) using ANNEX G data, identify a group of the most successful advisors; (b) obtain complete background records on these advisors; (c) establish categories as to education, branch, age and (by using intercorrelation techniques) establish a profile of "the successful advisor;" (d) determine Army-wide talent fitting the established profile; and, (e) encourage other agencies to undertake a similar effort.

11. By "more direct US involvement" PROVN proposes the exercise of "political action" and the use of "leverage" in a deliberate and coordinated manner, to the extent necessary, so as to ensure the accomplishment of critical US-GVN programs. The US must be prepared to execute selected critical programs unilaterally, should the GVN prove unable or unwilling. To some PROVN members, "US intervention" is more descriptive. The US is already "involved" in GVN affairs and has been so involved for over two years. To date, however, US "involvement" has been largely haphazard and uncoordinated.

The following actions and programs, representative of past US involvement, should be more intensively, extensively and deliberately applied in the future. Specific areas in which more direct US involvement is necessary include: (a) the selective support of successful districts; (b) the refugee program; (c) participation in PW interrogation; (d) request for relief of nonproductive officials; (e) joint "sign off" authority for release of RC resources; (f) US military operations without prior notification of GVN; (g) operation of TOCs and SOICs; and, (h) the payment of indemnification.

12. By designating the Ambassador as "single manager," PROVN advocates increasing his authority. All US ambassadors have been delegated the authority and responsibility "... to oversee and to coordinate all the activities of the United States Government in country ..." This authority specifically did not include "... United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area military commander" (President Kennedy to Chiefs of Mission, May 29, 1961). The terms of reference (2 July 1964) provided to Ambassador Taylor by President Johnson were "parallel" to those stated by President Kennedy. However, President Johnson added that "...specifically, I wish it clearly understood that this over-all responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate."

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PROVN significantly increases both the formal and the practical authority delegated to the Ambassador in SVN. Whereas Ambassador Taylor perhaps had the formal authority to control and integrate effectively the US effort in-country, the lack of an adequate supra-agency staff and subordinate organization inhibited his assuming this role in practice. PROVN not only grants the Ambassador the requisite authority but specifies the organizational structure necessary for effective execution. Whereas Ambassador Lodge may not have as complete terms of reference as did Ambassador Taylor, PROVN specifies the degree of authority required to produce results in the post of US Single Manager.

13. Unified command arrangements could be altered by designating the Ambassador as Single Manager. However, insofar as command arrangements are concerned, PROVN considers that the critical civil-military arrangements are those within SVN; external command arrangements that relate to US military organizations in SVN must adjust to support the war effort. PROVN does not present a specific solution to military command arrangements outside SVN, but recognizes that:

(a) The fundamental law of the land establishes civilian authority over the military. This is a strength in our heritage. PROVN, however, does not rule out Presidential designation of a senior military leader as Ambassador (US Single Manager).

(b) We have long recognized that the problem in SVN is neither exclusively, nor predominantly, military. To date, we have not organized and applied our effort in a manner demonstrating this recognition.

(c) Adopting PROVN could eliminate CINCPAC from the command chain and, subject to the President's decision as Commander-in-Chief, could subordinate the direct influence of the SECDEF and JCS on the total situation in SVN.

(d) Relationships between the Ambassador, senior military commander and operating agency representatives in-country -- as well as CONUS parent agencies -- must evolve in practice.

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(d) Relationships between the Ambassador, senior military commander and operating agency representatives in-country -- as well as CONUS parent agencies -- must evolve in practice.

(e) The President must at all times be provided with the flexibility to exercise any of several civil-military command options. Under the PROVN proposal, one evolutionary form of unified civil-military command arrangement is outlined.

(f) The Army Staff currently is monitoring the problem of more closely integrating the US military effort in SEA. However, the need still persists to meet the test of NSAM 55: "the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern." The establishment of firm military command arrangements in SEA could be "a logical first step in cleaning up the command arrangements in Vietnam and, through an evolutionary process, could lead to the ultimate command proposals advanced by PROVN."

In promulgating NSAM 341 (2 March 1966), the President has assigned to SECSTATE "authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the over-all direction, coordination and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government overseas." As Commander-in-Chief, however, he has ensured military command prerogatives and reserved to himself the powers of decision with respect to such an organizational option as PROVN proposes.

14. The PROVN commitment of RVNAF and US-FWMAF units constitutes a change in their current missions. RVNAF must constitute the main allied military element supporting Rural Construction (RC). This will be opposed by the ruling GVN military elite, since it dissipates their power base through decentralizing control of ARVN. The bulk of ARVN's maneuver battalions are currently assigned the mission of fighting PAVN-VC Main Force units. While the essentiality of accomplishing this mission is recognized, it is at least equally important that provisions be made for employing ARVN units, along with Popular Forces and Regional Forces, to provide village and hamlet security.

Under the single managership of the Ambassador, the Commander-in-Chief, US Forces Vietnam (CINCUSFV) and the Director, Rural Construction and Development (DRCD) must decide and develop the US position, in any given time frame, as to the specific ARVN units which should: (a) be employed with USFWMAF units in accomplishing the overall CINCUSV mission; as well as, (b) be employed in support of RC (as advised and assisted by JUSMAAG which functions under the DRCD) to accomplish village and hamlet security missions. This situation would change as the war changes. For example, it is envisaged under the PROVN concept that the majority of the ARVN units in the IV Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) might today be committed to the village and hamlet security mission; PAVN and Main Force VC operations are not now prevalent in that CTZ. On the other hand and in terms of today's situation in the I, II, and III Corps areas, the majority of the ARVN units would continue to be

employed in combined search and destroy operations with US-FWMAF units against prevalent PAVN-Main Force VC units in those three CTZs.

One major change on the US side is involved under PROVN. All US sector and subsector advisory teams function under territorial Senior US Representatives (SUSREPs) who, in turn, function under the DRCD. The employment of US advisory teams to RVNAF units that have been assigned to support RC, however, is coordinated through the conduct of operational planning and liaison between the Chief of JUSMAAG (functioning under the DRCD) and component commanders operating under the CINCUSFV.

US-FWMAF units will continue to operate against PAVN-Main Force VC units as a primary mission. As a secondary mission now, and increasingly as the situation in other CTZs shifts toward that prevalent in IV Corps today, some US-FWMAF units would be committed to energize RC efforts in priority areas, but a return to enclave or static defense posture will suffice in the realization of pacification and nation building in SVN.

CHAPTER I

THE SITUATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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CHAPTER I- SUMMARY

The situation as it now is in SVN is described in the military, political, economic and socio-cultural spheres, and in terms of the US support effort. The historical background of the situation then is developed. Regions, significant ethnic groups, religions, the Viet Cong and the provinces are analysed, briefly described, and their significance presented. Major factors that impact upon the changing situation in SVN are depicted, and the significance of their interrelationship is submitted.

Terrain accentuates and perpetuates those socio-cultural differences that influence the cohesive development of SVN. Historical influence is the most significant source of cohesive factors. Regional differences result in significant antagonistic attitudes between some Vietnamese; historical events have prevented SVN from developing national leaders. Because ethnic Vietnamese are the predominant social group in the lowlands, their single language and common cultural and historical background produces a potentially strong source of cohesiveness. Their religious and cultural patterns emphasize the desirabil · of integrating diverse belief systems and customs into a . rmonious pattern. Externally imposed political belief systems pro'oke the strongest divisive influences.

CHAPTER I

THE SITUATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

General Situation

In this winter of 1965-66, the situation in South Vietnam (SVN) alarmingly resembles that facing the French in 1954:


> "The lack of an adequate administrative, political and economic follow up plan for otherwise successful clearing operations often results in the subsequent infiltration and reestablishment of the Viet Minh forces in a cleared area. ...
>
> "The Viet Minh are active in subverting the population by threat of reprisal, and frequently prevent the natives from cooperating with French forces. Although not actively hostile to the French forces, the civil populace seldom will reveal Viet Minh locations and plans." 1/

US and other Free World assets now committed to the war have not significantly altered the situation in our favor. COMUSMACV employs the classic "find-fix-destroy" formula against PAVN-Main Force VC units. Despite local victories, it is difficult to locate any area that has been reclaimed from the VC and pacified by the Government of Vietnam (GVN). Local guerrillas, bridging the gap between Main Force VC units and local populations, are not being defeated. They deny use of surface lines of communication to GVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). Loss of these lines cannot be overcome by use of air and augmented water transport. ARVN commanders increasingly remain in garrison defense, leaving the countryside -- and the night -- to the VC. Attempts to interdict VC and PAVN overland

infiltration routes into SVN have not been successful, and the Communists are now increasing their forces more rapidly than is the Free World. This condition will persist through June of 1966. The Free World cannot yet provide adequate support to its forces. Although friendly forces still control autonomous cities, province capitals and most district headquarters towns, most of the countryside is dominated overtly and covertly by the enemy -- a condition sought by Mao's recipe for insurgent victory. (See: Figure 1-1)

The present GVN is neither efficient nor effective; it does not represent or respond adequately to its citizens.2/ Corruption is rampant and ever-increasing. The all-powerful National Leadership Committee of ten generals reaches major decisions and develops policies on a "rule by committee" basis, in which self-interest and self-survival may override the national interest. Administrative and technical know-how are lacking in this government that retains control solely on the basis of US support and by the exercise of military power. Yet, despite this facade of a government by and for the military, the Prime Minister wields little real executive power. Both power and authority, despite their concentration at the national level, are so diffused as to reinforce ineffectiveness. Hence, each GVN province chief -- key figure in the hoped-for pacification of the countryside -- must respond to requirements with inadequate authority and insufficient staff assistance. He must pay heed to four or five superiors, each of whom may hold sufficient influence to relieve him, and listen to the advice of a seeming multitude of uncoordinated external "advisors." His

Figure 1-1


THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
NOVEMBER 1965
FRENCH CONTROL
VIET MINH CONTROL
FRENCH SITUATION 1954
51
RURAL 40%
CITIES 11%
26
23
GVN
VC
DISPUTED
PERCENT OF POPULATION

village chiefs are paid $12.50 per month, while GVN-hired truck drivers receive $15.00 in the same time span. As late as 22 October 1965, US subordinate officials in Saigon were conducting informal discussions as to the "initiation of programs aimed at extending the rule of law" throughout the GVN administration and countryside of Vietnam "as part of the true revolution."

The US position and our policy concerning SVN are not clearly understood by the American public, by the Vietnamese, by our overt and covert enemies or by the US agencies that are involved. Statements of our national objectives pertaining to SVN, as contained in documents of the Department of Defense, Department of State, Agency for International Development and the US Information Agency, not only are viewed differently by each support agency, but conflict in detail. (See: ANNEX F) Failure to use the unequivocal statement of our fundamental objective, as set forth in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, hinders effective interagency coordination and the integrated application of US support efforts.

The US effort in SVN continues to lack an agreed upon, interrelated program for the support of pacification or Rural Construction as of this date; there is no adequate, agreed plan or program for the long-term development of a nation. The American combat effort has escalated dramatically -- and at the expense of providing advisory support to the GVN. Our advisory effort lacks continuity and is receiving diminishing command supervision as the MACV staff is absorbed with the operations of US combat units. Lack of effective interagency coordination,

compounded by unilateral direction from separate agency heads in Washington -- together with the absence of an agreed, disciplined approach to problem solving and sense of urgent purpose -- characterize US in-country operating policy and procedures. Duplication of effort and overmanning, complicated by a widening gulf between headquarters and the field, are examples set for GVN emulation in Saigon.

A plethora of US short-range and nonintegrated plans, representing an almost equal number of failures, have tended to perpetuate themselves in renamed and refunded versions; most have been accepted by the Vietnamese without US stipulation of requirements for both supervision and accomplishment. The SVN economy, primarily agricultural and subsistence oriented, is kept from collapse only by support in the form of American aid. The GVN budget for 1965 totaled $310.6 million (VN $150: $1); as of 10 Decenber 1965, the US was spending this much to hold the line in SVN every 11.3 days. Part of this very aid, together with the growing American troop presence, exerts almost irresistible inflationary pressures. In the face of an expanded money supply, basic commodities have retained a remarkable price stability -- owing to US-supported import stocks. Other Free World nations also provide limited logistical and economic support of various kinds in addition to an increasing number of military units; its quantity, in proportion to available national assets, has by no means matched US official expectations. The potential value of much of this assistance effort is negated by our failure to unify US planning and execution.

The divergent socio-economic classes and ethnic groups of SVN continue to constitute prime targets for exploitation via carefully organized

and thoroughly braided political-military efforts of the VC. The GVN has not yet provided an appealing and cohesive alternative. Although most statistics relating to the SVN situation are suspect, certain data do indicate trends. SVN has but one doctor per 25,000 population; the ratio in Japan is one-to-920. The drop-out rate in elementary schools has accelerated from a reported 49 percent of total enrollment in 1961 to 60 percent in 1964. The Vietnamese peasant and his non-committed urban cousin are weary of war and economic deprivation. The peasant is capable of accepting peace under any master or leader who provides him with realistic personal security and an opportunity to earn a minimal livelihood, with some hope of education for his children, medicine and treatment for the ills of his body, and a simple sense of personal dignity. Fulfillment of these fundamental needs is promised, but cannot yet be provided, either by Communist or Free World contenders for the loyalty of the people of SVN.

Despite the obvious gravity of the current situation, there is nothing in the nature of men, money, equipment or advice required to achieve our objective in SVN that the US cannot provide in full measure -- once the actual situation and the nature of obstacles to achieving our national objectives are clearly understood. But, to achieve the necessary states of integrity, honesty, empathy, courage, patriotism, drive and efficiency among the Vietnamese themselves will require more than the material resources provided by the US. The Free World must provide to the peoples of SVN and to their fledgling government an

unmistakable example of dedicated, cohesive, farsighted and forcefully directed effort. This is the major polarizing influence that PROVN foresees as available to compete with that of the VC brand of "nationalism" dominating the scene in SVN today.

What brought the South Vietnamese to the present situation, and what are the principal factors that bear upon any proposal to remedy the current drift toward defeat? The roots of the present situation are buried deep in the past and in the facts of terrain and population as follow.


The Evolution of Vietnam: A Summary

The Central Facts of Southeast Asia's Historical Evolution. The mainland states of Southeast Asia (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam and Malaya) comprise a land mass in which geography has strongly influenced the course of history. The Asian continent is divided by the Himalayan Range and the Annamese Chain, which branches off to the southwest along the western border of Vietnam. These massive barriers have discouraged significant racial intermingling and limited major military invasion by nations born in opposing compartments. They have allowed Chinese and Indian civilizations to develop relatively independently of each other. (See: Figure 1-2)

This compartmentalization emphasizes the physical separation of the primary spheres of Chinese and Indian influence. But, from the very earliest times, these two influences have been brought to bear on

the entire subcontinent, with Indian influence predominating in all areas except North and South Vietnam (after the fall of the "Indianized" kingdom of Champa in the 15th century).

Figure 1-2



Regardless of the pervasiveness of such influences, the potency of indigenous cultures must not be underrated. Descriptions such as "Further India" and "Little China" tend to obscure the fact that each of the smaller land compartments has long manifested its own strong cultural individualities. The very enormity of India and China, which have been rooted on the Asian continent over time, have tended to overshadow these peculiarities; nevertheless, each of the

lesser nations has exhibited distinctions that militate against generalizing on the area as a whole. The principal ethnic group in each country possesses its own language -- fragmented into varieties of dialects. The art and architecture of Cambodia and ancient Champa, for example, are significantly distinct from those of India. And, while the Vietnamese have absorbed many of the customs and techniques imposed under China's dominion, they have managed to remain a separate and distinctly individualized people.

To truly understand the evolution of this heterogeneous area today, historical perspective can be achieved only through country-by-country analysis. But, as the record attests, efforts in this direction have revealed far too little. More concentrated focus on the area's historical evolution is critical to the US in terms of tomorrow; this assertion is borne out clearly in contemporary attempts to develop strategic projection into the future. (See: ANNEX H)

SEA has been subjected to the intrusive influences of Western culture, commerce and religion. All of its evolving mainland countries, other than Thailand, have shared the common status of "colonial territory" and thus have experienced the aroused forces of anticolonial nationalism. Such dynamic forces have greatly influenced the course of recent SEA history. Current preoccupation with national-level instability in SVN, for example, tends to overlook some of the area's historical dynamics. The coup is a common method of achieving change. Thailand has held recognized national status for a longer time than the US and USSR combined; its stability index would rate highest in

SEA. Yet, over the past 30 years Thailand has suffered no less than 26 major and minor coups.

The role of Vietnam in this area's evolution has been particularly important. South Vietnam is the boundary zone between Chinese and Indian spheres of influence. Through resistance to Chinese invasion and refusal to become completely sinicized, the Vietnamese have served as a substantial buffer against incursions from the north into the rice bowl of SEA. Their defense against Asian history's largest and most aggressive nation has shielded the region from China's form of expansionism which is far more penetrating and politically pervasive than that of India.

With Southeast Asian evolution in mind, the critical aspects surfacing from the study of Vietnamese history are brought into more useful perspective. Strengths and weaknesses influencing today's war are immersed in aspects drawn from the historical trace. (See: APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX A)

Key Factors. The recorded facts of the rise of nationalism and emergence of communism surface the most important factors influencing the present situation in SVN. Nationalism has operated as a catalyst for continuous, though disunited, anti-French activities dating from the late 19th century and enduring until French military-political withdrawal following the 1954 Geneva Conference. Its persistent propaganda has served as a central factor of the Vietnamese Communists in their rise to power and drive to expand. As communism is the crux, nationalism is a primary psychological warfare theme of today's struggle. Hanoi while maintaining close alignment with Moscow and Peking, professes to

represent the true "nationalist" cause. On the other hand, Saigon also perceives of itself as leading a nationalist fight to curb the incursion of Ho Chi Minh's communism.

ANNEX A traces the evolution of nationalism and the surfacing of communism; the thrust of communism clearly proceeded apace with nationalism. Communist flexibility, via shifts of strategy to meet changing international and local conditions, stands out sharply. But more importantly, the communist capacity to assume and sustain virtually total control of the nationalist movement in Vietnam is underscored. In extension, Ho Chi Minh's practical use of "nationalist" credentials as a prime stimulus to reunify the country on his terms remains a factor of continuing significant impact on today's war.


There are other only slightly less critical factors, however, that buttress the surge of nationalist and communist movements and thus relate to the current conflict in terms of specific import on Vietnamese public and official actions.

From the beginning of their recorded history, the Vietnamese have clearly perceived China's dominant position. Through the centuries, even after achieving victory over Chinese military forces, Vietnamese rulers have paid tribute to China. Newly enthroned Emperors dispatched envoys with alacrity both to request recognition and to acknowledge Chinese suzerainty. This practice continued until 1885 when a Franco-Chinese agreement, recognizing French rule, was signed. Vietnamese adoption of Chinese customs has sustained an admiration and respect for Chinese culture. Despite the pervasive influence of the in-country

French educational system and the impact of external travel and education in Europe, this admiration of China endures. Accompanying it, however, is a visceral distrust engendered by numerous Chinese occupations and threats of reoccupation. Hanoi has gone to considerable effor[illegible]nce 1954 in an attempt to dispel this attitude by avowing th[illegible]mmunist China is a new "socialist sister nation" rather than [illegible]rpetuation of the traditional threat of the past.

The continuous and systematic southward movement of the Vietnamese people also contributes to the catalogue of today's crucial issues. Figure 1-3 portrays this movement in time.

Figure 1-3



As the Vietnamese projected out from Tonkin, regional animosities developed which continue to vitiate present-day national unity. This factionalization is based on: (1) Southerner and Centralist absorption of Cham and Cambodian culture to the point of evoking changes in customs,

dialect and personality; (2) participants in the march southward being considered by Northerners to be misfits, vagabonds and adventure-seekers who generally lacked culture; (3) decreased southern settler concern with efficiency and frugality due to the abundance of arable land and food -- as opposed to continuing Northerner concern with careful working of the land to obtain maximum production; and, (4) more direct and enduring Northerner contact with the structured Chinese administrative system and culture -- whereas, as settlements migrated southward, the impact of central control faded. The difference in arable land availability has special meaning that persists today. Food shortage remains a threat to the existence of the DRV, and this constitutes a significant vulnerability for US-GVN exploitation.

Strong family and village loyalties accompanied the evolution of Vietnamese history; these were reinforced by Chinese influence and southern migration. Such sentiments are so deep that strong loyalties to larger political entities have never developed. The absence of allegiances between contiguous villages, much less to the country itself, has made unified effort above village level difficult to foster.

A significant, and often misconstrued, aspect of history derives from the matter of national partition. Partition is not new to the Vietnamese. The country was split just north of the 17th parallel from 1620 to 1802; it was reunited and managed to sustain this condition until French encroachment turned into French domination. In 1884, it was divided into three political regions (Annam, Tonkin and Cochinchina)

which were perpetuated throughout the period of French control. It was again divided at the 17th parallel following the French defeat in 1954. In spite of these long-standing divisions, revolutionary leaders have advocated reunification since the advent of early 20th century anti-French activities. Reunification appears uppermost among objectives of today's DRV; it persists as an evident desire of some members of the GVN power structure, especially among those senior officers born in NVN. On 23 June 1965, Secretary of State Rusk addressed this deep-rooted aspiration in terms of looking forward to the day when "a free decision by the peoples of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification can be worked out by peaceful means."

History also points to the Vietnamese as a dynamic and aggressive people who, when faced with the need for more arable land, carried out a systematic expansion into the Kingdoms of Champa and Cambodia and, for a time, held suzerainty over Laos. In fact, France saved Cambodia and Laos from further Vietnamese incursion when Paris ordered the occupation of all three in the 19th century. Although it is commonly said that the Vietnamese are a "peace-loving people who merely want to be left alone," history does not bear this out. Figure 1-4 depicts their major conflicts with foreign forces, ranging from Chinese occupation to French occupation. It indicates that, throughout history, the Vietnamese have battled for both the survival and expansion of their territory.

Although the tradition of military service, either as a member of the village militia or the imperial guard, dates back through the

1 CONFLICTS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND

YEAR	111 (B.C.)	39-43 (A.D.)	248	541
ADVERSARY	China	China	China	China
PURPOSE AND OUTCOME	CHINESE ARMY OF 5 REGIMENTS SEEKING ACCESS ROUTE TO INDIA DEFEATS NAM VIET ARMY. NAM VIET IS MADE THE CHINESE PROVINCE OF GIAO CHI WITH A CHINESE GOVERNOR. PROVINCE IS LITTLE MORE THAN LENIENTLY GOVERNED PROTECTORATE. LOCAL POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS REMAIN RELATIVELY UNCHANGED.	REPRESSIVE GOVERNOR PROVIDES BACKGROUND FOR ANTI-CHINESE ARMED REVOLT LED BY TRUNG SISTERS. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT REVOLT HAS WIDE POPULAR SUPPORT. BATTLES FOUGHT BY AND FOR FEUDAL MINORITY THREATENED WITH POLITICAL EXTINCTION. INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL, THE SISTERS RULE FOR 3 YEARS UNTIL CHINESE RETURN AND IMPOSE DIRECT RULE PLUS CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM.	TRIEU AU (THIRD VIETNAMESE HEROINE) LEADS UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLT AGAINST CHINESE. STAGED BY THE UPPER CLASS, HER 1000-MAN ARMY IS DESTROYED AFTER A 5-MONTH STRUGGLE. THE SMALL SIZE OF HER ARMY INDICATES SUPPORT OF EARLY REVOLTS PRIMARILY BY UPPER CLASS WITH FEW POPULAR ADHERENTS.	LY BON, A DESCENDANT OF A CHINESE REFUGEE FAMILY, LEADS A REVOLT AGAINST THE CHINESE. PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL, HE PROCLAIMS HIMSELF KING OF A SMALL "LIBERATED" AREA WHICH HE RULES FOR 3 YEARS. THE CHINESE RETURN, REOCCUPY THE TERRITORY AND FORCE HIM INTO LAOS WHERE HE IS KILLED.
YEAR	1069	1075-1077	1216-1218	1257
ADVERSARY	Champa	China	Champa Cambodia	Mongols
PURPOSE AND OUTCOME	THE VIETNAMESE ATTACK THE KINGDOM OF CHAMPA ANNEXING THE PRESENT PROVINCES OF QUANG TRI (SVN) AND QUANG BINH (NVN). THE CHAM CAPITAL IS SACKED AND BURNED. THE KING AND 50,000 MEN ARE CAPTURED AT THE CAMBODIAN BORDER.	TO PREVENT A CHINESE INVASION, LY THUONG KIET WITH 100,000 MEN ATTACKS CHINESE ALONG VIETNAMESE BORDER. CHINESE ARMY OF 100,000 MEN COUNTERATTACK. ALTHOUGH INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL, LOGISTICS, HEALTH AND CLIMATIC PROBLEMS PLAGUE THEIR ARMY RESULTING IN A STALEMATE. KIET MAKES PEACE OVERTURES AND CHINESE WITHDRAW IN EXCHANGE FOR TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS.	VIETNAMESE ARMY, RECONSTITUTED UNDER TU KHANH, REPELS TWO INVASION ATTEMPTS (1216 and 1218) BY CAMBODIANS ALLIED WITH CHAMS. NO TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS BY EITHER ADVERSARY ALTHOUGH VIETNAMESE SOUTHWARD EXPANSION CONTINUES.	MONGUL ARMY SEEKING PASSAGE THROUGH VIETNAM TO ATTACK SOUTH CHINA RAZES HANOI(THEN CALLED THANH LONG). MONGOLS, WEAKENED BY CLIMATE, ARE UNABLE TO WITHSTAND VIETNAMESE OFFENSE LED BY TRAI TONG AND WITHDRAW TO YUNNAN (CHINA). LOCAL MILITIA PARTICIPATE IN VIETNAMESE VICTORY.
YEAR	1361-1384	1389	1405-1428	1460-1471
ADVERSARY	Champa	Champa	China	Champa
PURPOSE AND OUTCOME	CHAM HERO CHE BONG NGA CONDUCTS CONTINUOUS SERIES OF ATTACKS THAT KEEP VIETNAM IN TURMOIL. IN 1371 HE CONQUERS HANOI, BURNS THE PALACE AND RETURNS WITH NUMEROUS CAPTIVES. HIS YEARLY INCURSIONS ARE SUCCESSFUL UNTIL 1380 WHEN DEFEATED BY LE QUI LY. IN 1382 THE CHAMS AGAIN RAVAGE THE COUNTRYSIDE FOR 6 MONTHS WITHOUT BEING CAPABLE OF OCCUPYING HANOI.	CHAM FORCES UNDER CHE BONG NGA INVADE RED RIVER DELTA. VIETNAMESE FORCES KILL NGA CAUSING CHAM WITHDRAWAL. AS A RESULT, CHAMPA CEDES ONE-THIRD OF ITS TERRITORY TO VIETNAM.	ON THE PRETEXT OF RESTORING THE TRAN DYNASTY, CHINA INVADES VIETNAM WITH 200,000 TROOPS. CHINESE RULE CONTINUES UNTIL LE LOI LEADS SUCCESSFUL REVOLT. AS EMPEROR, HE INITIATES ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS. HE IS KNOWN AS THE "PEACE MAKING" KING. DYNASTY HE FOUNDS REMAINS UNTIL 1786.	VIETNAMESE SOUTHWARD MIGRATION CAUSES CONTINUOUS CONFLICT WITH CHAMPA. IN 1470-71 VIETNAMESE CAPTURE THE CHAM CAPITAL, KILL APPROXIMATELY 30,000 PEOPLE AND FORCE CHAM KING TO WITHDRAW TO THE SOUTH. CHAM KINGDOM IS REDUCED TO A FEW DISTRICTS AROUND THE PRESENT COASTAL TOWN OF PHAN RANG.

2

EEN VIETNAM AND FOREIGN FORCES – 111 B.C. TO 1885 A.D.

	541 China LY BON, A DESCENDANT OF A CHINESE REFUGEE FAMILY, LEADS A REVOLT AGAINST THE CHINESE. PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL, HE PROCLAIMS HIMSELF KING OF A SMALL "LIBERATED" AREA WHICH HE RULES FOR 3 YEARS. THE CHINESE RETURN, REOCCUPY THE TERRITORY AND FORCE HIM INTO LAOS WHERE HE IS KILLED.	722 China MAI THUCH LOAN, A MUONG MONTAGNARD, JOINS FORCES WITH OTHER MONTAGNARD TRIBES AND RAISES AN ARMY TO FIGHT THE CHINESE. HE SUCCEEDS IN CLEARING A "PROTECTORATE" IN A CORNER OF THE PRESENT NGHE AN PROVINCE IN NVN. HE IS DEFEATED BY CHINESE FORCES AFTER A FEW MONTHS. THE RUINS OF HIS FORT AND A TEMPLE BUILT IN HIS HONOR REMAIN IN NGHE AN.	938 China DISORDER PRECEDING THE FALL OF CHINESE TANG DYNASTY PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPEL THE CHINESE. GENERAL NGO QUYEN LEADS A SUCCESSFUL REVOLT, PROCLAIMS AN INDEPENDENT STATE AND ESTABLISHES THE NGO DYNASTY. CHINESE ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE THE RED RIVER DELTA ARE UNSUCCESSFUL. THE PRIME MOTIVATION FOR EXPELLING THE CHINESE IS INDIVIDUAL GAIN RATHER THAN NATIONAL WELFARE.	968-982 Champa RELATIONS WITH THE KINGDOM OF CHAMPA ARE HOSTILE OVER THIS PERIOD, AND THE TWO KINGDOMS ARE IN CONSTANT CONFLICT. IN 982, GENERAL LE HOAN LEADS AN ARMY INTO CHAMPA, SACKS ITS CAPITAL AND RETURNS TO DAI VIET.	10[illegible] Cham EMPEROR LY THA[illegible] NAMESE ARMY INTO CHAMPA ON A PUNI[illegible] FOLLOWING CHAM RAI[illegible] MESE TERRITORY. CHAMPA (IN THE PR[illegible] PROVINCE OF BVN) BURNED. FIVE THO[illegible] ARE CAPTURED AND SE[illegible] VILLAGES FOR ASSIMI[illegible] ZENS.
	1257 Mongols MONGOL ARMY SEEKING PASSAGE THROUGH VIETNAM TO ATTACK SOUTH CHINA RAZES HANOI(THEN CALLED THANH LONG). MONGOLS, WEAKENED BY CLIMATE, ARE UNABLE TO WITHSTAND VIETNAMESE OFFENSE LED BY THAI TONG AND WITHDRAW TO YUNNAN (CHINA). LOCAL MILITIA PARTICIPATE IN VIETNAMESE VICTORY.	1284 Mongols MONGOL ARMY INVADES VIETNAM AND CAPTURES HANOI. EMPEROR TRAN NHAN TON CONSIDERS SURRENDERING BUT IS CONVINCED TO RESIST BY GENERAL TRAN HUNG DAO. SUCCESSFUL COUNTEROFFENSIVE, ENTIRELY SUPPORTED BY THE POPULACE, AND LED BY TRAN HUNG DAO DEFEATS THE MILITARILY SUPERIOR MONGOLIAN ARMY AND FORCE ITS RETREAT TO CHINA.	1287-1288 Mongols ATTEMPTING TO AVENGE THEIR PREVIOUS DEFEATS, MONGOLS WITH 300,000 MEN MAKE ANOTHER EFFORT TO CONQUER VIETNAM. IN THE SPRING OF 1288 THEY ARE DEFEATED AT THE BATTLE OF BACH DAN GIANG (PRESENTLY IN NVN).	1312 Champa EMPEROR TRAN ANH TON INVADES CHAMPA WITH 3 ARMY CORPS FORMING IT INTO A FEUDAL STATE OF VIETNAM. THIS STATUS IS MAINTAINED UNTIL 1326 WHEN CHAMS WITH MONGOL ASSISTANCE ABROGATE THE STATUS OF SUZERAIN.	134[illegible] Lao[illegible] TWO VIETNAMESE SUCCESSFUL EXPEDITI[illegible] LAOTIANS IN THE A[illegible] PROVINCE (NVN) ALLE[illegible] PEACE ON THE FRONTI[illegible] YEAR VIETNAMESE FO[illegible] SIVELY DEFEATED MARK[illegible] OF THE TRAN DYNASTY.
	1460-1471 Champa VIETNAMESE SOUTHWARD MIGRATION CAUSES CONTINUOUS CONFLICT WITH CHAMPA. IN 1470-71 VIETNAMESE CAPTURE THE CHAM CAPITAL, KILL APPROXIMATELY 30,000 PEOPLE AND FORCE CHAM KING TO WITHDRAW TO THE SOUTH. CHAM KINGDOM IS REDUCED TO A FEW DISTRICTS AROUND THE PRESENT COASTAL TOWN OF PHAN RANG.	1692 Champa CHAM KING, PA TRANH, UNSUCCESSFULLY REBELS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE WHO ARE VIGOROUSLY IMPOSING THEIR CULTURE ON THE CHAMS. CHAMS ARE DEFEATED AND THEIR TERRITORY BECOMES A VIETNAMESE PROVINCE UNDER CHAM GOVERNOR. DESPITE HARSH TREATMENT OF CHAM - VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE CONTINUES TO INCREASE IN THE AREA.	1788 China EMPEROR QUANG TRUNG REPELS A CHINESE INVASION ATTEMPT. VIETNAMESE FORCES, CONSISTING OF 100,000 MEN, DEFEAT 200,000 CHINESE TROOPS AND RESTORE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER. SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE RETURN, QUANG TRUNG DISPATCHES AN ENVOY TO CHINA BEARING GIFTS AND DELIVERING VOWS OF SUSTAINING A LASTING PEACE.	1650-1850 Cambodia DURING THE 17TH, 18TH and 19TH CENTURIES, THERE ARE SEVERAL RUTHLESS VIETNAMESE INVASIONS OF CAMBODIA. LAND-HUNGRY VIETNAMESE ABSORB CAMBODIAN PROVINCES OF THE MEKONG RIVER DELTA SETTLING THOUSANDS OF THEIR PEOPLE IN THE AREA AND CONTINUOUSLY PUSHING INLAND. VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION ARMIES ASSIST IN ENFORCING VIETNAMESE CUSTOMS.	1858-[illegible] Fran[illegible] UNDER THE PRETE[illegible] ING PERSECUTION OF FRANCE INITIATES CO[illegible] NAM. A SERIES OF ENGAGEMENTS RESULT AND CHINESE RECOGNIT[illegible] COLONIZATION OF CO[illegible] FRENCH PROTECTORATE ANNAM AND TONKIN.

N FORCES – 111 B.C. TO 1885 A.D.

722	938	968-982	1044	YEAR
China	China	Champa	Champa	ADVERSARY
THUCH LOAN, A MUONG MON- JOINS FORCES WITH OTHER TRIBES AND RAISES AN AR- IT THE CHINESE. HE SUC- CLEARING A "PROTECTORATE" ER OF THE PRESENT NGHE AN IN NVN. HE IS DEFEATED BY FORCES AFTER A FEW MONTHS. OF HIS FORT AND A TEMPLE HIS HONOR REMAIN IN NGHE	DISORDER PRECEDING THE FALL OF CHINESE TANG DYNASTY PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPEL THE CHINESE. GENERAL NGO QUYEN LEADS A SUCCESS- FUL REVOLT, PROCLAIMS AN INDEPEN- DENT STATE AND ESTABLISHES THE NGO DYNASTY. CHINESE ATTEMPTS TO RE- TAKE THE RED RIVER DELTA A"I UNSUC- CESSFUL. THE PRIME MOTIVATION FOR EXPELLING THE CHINESE IS INDIV..UAL GAIN RATHER THAN NATIONAL WELFARE.	RELATIONS WITH THE KINGDOM OF CHAMPA ARE HOSTILE OVER THIS PERI- OD, AND THE TWO KINGDOMS ARE IN CONSTANT CONFLICT. IN 982, GENERAL LE HOAN LEADS AN ARMY INTO CHAMPA, SACKS ITS CAPITAL AND RETURNS TO DAI VIET.	EMPEROR LY THAI TO LEADS VIET- NAMESE ARMY INTO THE KINGDOM OF CHAMPA ON A PUNITIVE EXPEDITION, FOLLOWING CHAM RAIDS INTO VIETNA- MESE TERRITORY. THE CAPITAL OF CHAMPA (IN THE PRESENT THUA THIEN PROVINCE OF SVN) IS SACKED AND BURNED. FIVE THOUSAND PRISONERS ARE CAPTURED AND SENT TO VIETNAMESE VILLAGES FOR ASSIMILATION AS CITI- ZENS.	PURPOSE AND OUTCOME

1284	1287-1288	1312	1348	YEAR
Mongols	Mongols	Champa	Laos	ADVERSARY
GOL ARMY INVADES VIETNAM RES HANOI. EMPEROR TRAN CONSIDERS SURRENDERING NVINCED TO RESIST BY GEN- H HUNG DAO. SUCCESSFUL FENSIVE, ENTIRELY SUPPOR- THE POPULACE, AND LED BY DAO DEFEATS THE MILITARILY MONGOLIAN ARMY AND FORCE AT TO CHINA.	ATTEMPTING TO AVENGE THEIR PREVIOUS DEFEATS, MONGOLS WITH 300,000 MEN MAKE ANOTHER EFFORT TO CONQUER VIETNAM. IN THE SPRING OF 1288 THEY ARE DEFEATED AT THE BAT- TLE OF BACH DAN GIANG (PRESENTLY IN NVN).	EMPEROR TRAN ANH TON INVADES CHAMPA WITH 3 ARMY CORPS FORMING IT INTO A FIEDAL STATE OF VIETNAM. THIS STATUS IS MAINTAINED UNTIL 1326 WHEN CHAMS WITH MONGOL ASSIS- TANCE ABROGATE THE STATUS OF SUZERAIN.	TWO VIETNAMESE LEADERS CONDUCT SUCCESSFUL EXPEDITION AGAINST THE LAOTIANS IN THE AREA OF NGHE AN PROVINCE (NVN) ALLEGEDLY TO ENSURE PEACE ON THE FRONTIER. FOLLOWING YEAR VIETNAMESE FORCES ARE DECI- SIVELY DEFEATED MARKING THE DECLINE OF THE TRAN DYNASTY.	PURPOSE AND OUTCOME

1692	1788	1650-1850	1858-1885	YEAR
Champa	China	Cambodia	France	ADVERSARY
NHO, BA TRANH, UNSUCCESS- BELS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE VIGOROUSLY IMPOSING THEIR ON THE CHAMS. CHAMS ARE AND THEIR TERRITORY BE- VIETNAMESE PROVINCE UNDER EMPEROR. DESPITE HARSH TREAT- CHAM - VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE TO INCREASE IN THE AREA.	EMPEROR QUANG TRUNG REPELS A CHINESE INVASION ATTEMPT. VIET- NAMESE FORCES, CONSISTING OF 100,000 MEN, DEFEAT 200,000 CHI- NESE TROOPS AND RESTORE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER. SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE RETURN, QUANG TRUNG DISPATCHES AN ENVOY TO CHINA BEARING GIFTS AND DELIVERING VOWS OF SUSTAINING A LASTING PEACE.	DURING THE 17TH, 18TH and 19TH CENTURIES, THERE ARE SEVERAL RUTH- LESS VIETNAMESE INVASIONS OF CAM- BODIA. LAND-HUNGRY VIETNAMESE AB- SORB CAMBODIAN PROVINCES OF THE MEKONG RIVER DELTA SETTLING THOU- SANDS OF THEIR PEOPLE IN THE AREA AND CONTINUOUSLY PUSHING INLAND. VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION ARMIES ASS- IST IN ENFORCING VIETNAMESE CUS- TOMS.	UNDER THE PRETEXT OF PREVENT- ING PERSECUTION OF MISSIONARIES, FRANCE INITIATES CONQUEST OF VIET- NAM. A SERIES OF MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS RESULT IN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE RECOGNITION OF FRENCH COLONIZATION OF COCHINCHINA AND FRENCH PROTECTORATE STATUS OVER ANNAM AND TONKIN.	PURPOSE AND OUTCOME

Figure 1-4

centuries, recent history has markedly changed the image of the GVN military as "defenders of the people." The present GVN armed forces were formed under the French, on whose side they fought until 1954. This stigma of siding with the colonialists and resisting the fight for independence persists today. In fact, today's GVN national colors are the same as were carried by Vietnamese units fighting with, and commanded by, the French. Communist forces, on the other hand, date from the "Liberation Army" formed by Ho Chi Minh in 1944; their successes during the war against the French provide the foundation upon which their tradition has been built. VC military formations display their own distinctive flag.

Another critical factor surfaced by history is the recent absence of enduring, unifying leadership. Rulers between the reign of Emperor Ham Nghi (1884-85) and the Geneva Conference of 1954 remained under overwhelming French influence or were removed. Emperor Bao Dai so degraded the throne through cooperation with the French, Japanese and Viet Minh that imperial rule likely never again will be acceptable to the Vietnamese. Neither the charisma of Ho Chi Minh with his communist ideology, nor the "personalism" advocated by Ngo Dinh Diem, has truly coalesced the Vietnamese people.

In the final analysis, one must ask, "Are the Vietnamese people aware of their country's long, dynamic past?" They are. This awareness has been intensified by a pervasive consciousness of having survived Chinese, Cham and Cambodian incursions and of having won independence

from modern French forces in battle. The rural peasantry perpetuates this history primarily through folk tales, songs and plays. Intellectuals and the politically aware, although more aware of recent history as taught by the French, use ancient history to stress the Vietnamese tradition of resisting aggression and foreign domination. Despite such awareness and pride in past events, traditional perspective has been disrupted by Western education, technology, living standards and modern warfare. The forces of change have generated an intense desire by the politically aware for improved standards of living, social justice and participation in the political process. The inability of GVN to fulfill these aspirations in SVN heightens tensions and furthers insurgent capabilities.

These key historical factors provide a backdrop for the analysis of Vietnam today. All have influenced the present; undoubtedly, they will influence the future.

The Regions

Vietnamese geography offers a series of significant contrasts: SVN is split by the two strategic vegetation zones that divide the Indochina nucleus.3/ (See: Figure 1-5) Stretches of rice-heavy lowlands skirt hundreds of miles of mountainous backbone to fan out into the southern delta lands. Single cities and towns in these lowlands contain more people than several entire provinces of the hill country added together. Some geographic areas are parched and desolate at the same time that other portions are flooded. (See: Figure 1-6)

Figure 1-5




HIGHLANDS AND PLAINS
OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA
TERRAIN
FORESTED HIGHLANDS
FORESTED AND
CULTIVATED PLAINS
SOUTH CHINA
NUCLEUS
GEOLOGY
MESOZOIC FOLDING
INDOCHINA NUCLEUS

Figure 1-6



METEOROLOGICAL REGIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
INTERIOR HIGHLANDS
AMOUNT (INCHES)
MEAN RAINFALL
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH RAIN IN PARENTHESES
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0
(6) (2) (0) (1) (3) (7)
PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
N D J F M A M J J A S O
MONTH
EASTERN COASTLANDS
AMOUNT (INCHES)
MEAN RAINFALL
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH RAIN IN PARENTHESES
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0
(10) (5) (3) (3) (5) (9) (9) (8)
PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NORTH
N D J F M A M J J A S O
MONTH
SOUTHEASTERN COASTLANDS
AMOUNT (INCHES)
MEAN RAINFALL
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH RAIN IN PARENTHESES
15.0
10.0
5.0
0
(10) (6) (2) (1) (2) (2) (8) (6) (8) (5) (10) (12)
PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
NORTH
N D J F M A M J J A S O
MONTH
MEKONG LOWLANDS
AMOUNT (INCHES)
MEAN RAINFALL
MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS WITH RAIN IN PARENTHESES
15.0
10.0
5.0
0
(12) (7) (2) (1) (2) (6)
PREVAILING WIND DIRECTION
NORTH
EAST
SOUTH
WEST
N D J F M A M J J A S O
MONTH

The most evident physiographic distinction in SVN also is reflected in the political border that lies between the former French Protectorate of Annam in central Vietnam and the French Colony of Cochinchina in southern Vietnam. This irregular geographic dividing line lies just south of 12 degrees North Latitude. Above this boundary the climate is tropical wet; below the boundary it is tropical, with both dry and wet seasons. Although this dual division will emerge in several facets of the discussion that follows, and despite the distinct division, it is not the most significant regional difference in SVN.

The most fundamental regional distinction in SVN, and in mainland SEA in general, is the Lowlands versus Highlands contrast. In the lowlands area live most of the people of SVN. (See: Figure 1-7) Here is where almost all of the paddy is grown; here the religious, social and economic patterns -- and the general level of sophistication and world-view -- bear similar themes and overtones, but differ sharply from those of the nonassimilated minority groups of the Highlands. Such distinctions between Highlands and Lowlands provide a basis for that traditional suspicion and distrust which characterizes relations between ethnic Vietnamese and the Montagnard tribesmen, a reflection of the seemingly universal distrust between hillsman and flatlander found elsewhere throughout the globe.

In contrast to the Highland-Lowland distinctions are certain North-South differences. Channelized by mountain barriers to the west and by the South China Sea to the east, the Coastal and Southern Lowland regions of SVN reflect differing echelons of geographic North-South


Figure 1-7


TERRAIN AND POPULATION DISTRIBUTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
KONTUM
PLEIKU
PHU BON
DARLAC
QUANG DUC
TUYEN DUC
PHUOC LONG
LAM DONG
POPULATION
0
19
386
PERSONS PER SQUARE KILOMETER
TERRAIN
0
200
2,000
ELEVATION IN METERS


distinctions that in turn are reflected by internal suspicions, dislike and distrust within ethnic Vietnamese themselves. A trace of the successive steps of latitudinal movement through history (See: Figure 1-3) is reflected, to one degree or another, in Vietnamese dialectal differences and in distinction between judicial regions. It also is manifest in chronic outspoken criticism of personality and attitude among the inhabitants of North Vietnam (Tonkin China, now wholly within the NVN-DRV area), Central Vietnam (Annam, now partly included within each of the SVN-NVN area). These inherent historical differences were hardened and amplified by French colonial distinction between Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina. Prior to the 18th century, a simple North-South difference seems to have predominated. (See: Figure A-1-4)

Current GVN and VC military and political zones and regions disregard many implications of the more natural topographic and historical regions. (See: Figures 1-8 through 1-10) The sole significant exception is that boundary between II and III Corps Tactical Zones which approximates the historic Annam-Cochinchina boundary. The conflicting lines of the present varied judicial, police and other administrative regions clearly indicate the lack of integrated governmental effort within SVN. And, to attempt the determination of logical government administrative regions in relation to the present hodgepodge of natural, judicial, tactical and logistical zones is like attempting to

Figure 1-8


PRESENT ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
ACRICULTURE
DEMOGRAPHIC
POLICE
POLITICAL
COURTS

MILITARY ZONES OF SOUTH VIETNAM - VC



KHU 5

1. QUANG TRI
2. THUA THIEN
3. QUANG DA
4. QUANG NAM
5. QUANG NGAI
6. BINH DINH
7. KONTUM
8. GIA LAI
9. PHU YEN
10. KHANH HOA
11. DARLAC
12. TUYEN DUC-A

KHU 6

13. QUANG DUC
14. LAM DONG
15. TUYEN DUC-B
16. NINH THUAN
17. BINH THUAN
18. PHUOC LONG

KHU 7

19. TAY NINH
20. BINH DUONG
21. BINH LONG
22. PHUOC THANH
23. BIEN HOA
24. BA RIA

25. KHU SAI -GON, CHOLON GIA-DINH

KHU 8

26. LONG AN
27. KIEN PHONG
28. KIEN TUONG
29. MY THO
30. BEN TRE
31. AN GIANG

KHU 9

32. VINH LONG
33. TRA VINH
34. CAN THO
35. RACH GIA
36. SOC TRANG
37. BAC LIEU
38. LONG KHANH

MILITARY ZONE

I CORPS

QUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
QUANG NAM
QUANG TIN
QUANG NGAI

II CORPS

KONTUM
BINH DINH
PLEIKU
PHU BON
PHU YEN
DARLAC
KHANH HOA
NINH THUAN
TUYEN DUC
QUANG DUC
LAM DONG
BINH THUAN

III CORPS


BINH TUY
LONG KHANH
PHUOC LONG
BINH LONG

IV CO

25th
9th DIV

Figure 1-9

NAM - VC



MILITARY ZONES OF SOUTH VIETNAM - GVN

I CORPS

QUANG TRI
THUA THIEN
QUANG NAM
QUANG TIN
QUANG NGAI

II CORPS


KONTUM
BINH DINH
PLEIKU
PHU BON
PHU YEN
DARLAC
KHANH HOA
NINH THUAN
TUYEN DUC
QUANG DUC
LAM DONG
BINH THUAN

III CORPS

BINH TUY
LONG KHANH
PHUOC LONG
BINH LONG
BINH DUONG
TAY NINH
HAU NGHIA
BIEN HOA
PHUOC TUY
LONG AN
GIA DINH

IV CORPS

GO CONG
KIEN TUONG
KIEN PHONG
DINH TUONG
KIEN HOA
VINH BINH
VINH LONG
AN GIANG
KIEN GIANG
CHUONG THIEN
PHONG DINH
BA XUYEN
AN XUYEN
BAC LIEU
CHAU DOC




2

cut up an apple pie without disturbing the individual pieces of fruit: each overlaps the other. (See Figure 1-8)

The obvious natural regions, when analyzed against the conflicting tangle of today's administrative zones and regions in SVN, have considerable significance for US and Free World strategy, as well as concepts involving pacification and long-term development.

The most significant natural regional complexes in SVN are: (1) the Delta area of Southern Vietnam that was once Cochinchina; (2) the Coastal Lowlands of what was once the southern half of Central Vietnam, or Annam; and, (3) the Highlands of what was once Annam. The Coastal Lowlands and Delta region may be subdivided into zones. (See: Figure 1-10) In the Delta region, and in a little over one-third of the total area of the countryside, live 65 percent of all the people of SVN; here is grown 86 percent of the rice of SVN; and here is located almost all the industrial complex of SVN. In the coastal region, in exactly one-third of the country's total area, live 30 percent of the people; here also is the most important historical and cultural center; and here is the most significant source of fish. In contrast to the southern and coastal lowland regions of SVN, only five percent of the people are located in the somewhat less than one-third of the total land area of SVN that is classifiable as the Highlands; very little of commercial value is now exploited there. Yet, much of what eventually must become a significant part of the economic base of SVN is located in these Highlands, and many of the present avenues of VC approach


Figure 1-10


SIGNIFICANT REGIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
ZONE I
CENTRAL COASTAL LOW LANDS
CENTRAL HIGHLANDS
ZONE II
ZONE III
SOUTHERN DELTA
ZONE IV
ZONE V
ZONE VI

from the North lie through these hills. They also shield the routes to safe havens and for logistical support from Laos and Cambodian. (See: Figure 1-11)

Free World strategic planners must determine in what priority, and whether or not, available forces should be employed to: (1) control the avenues of approach of PAVN-Main Force VC units into SVN; (2) attempt to achieve greater control of the people and the rice of SVN; (3) destroy PAVN-Main Force VC units. Planners must analyze the future socio-political impact of the regional location of requisite Free World troop bases and logistical facilities. They must consider the impact of these locations in combination with the factors involved in achieving our ultimate objective "beyond the war" not solely in terms of the immediate military effort. The thrust of the US and Free World strategy, and its relation to the varied regions of SVN, cannot avoid impact upon any pacification and long-term development effort. For example, until the present ARVN trend towards lack of aggressive action is reversed, a decision to not deploy Free World troops into the Delta could equate to a decision for "no contest" in the Delta -- hence to offer up the rice bowl of SVN to the VC. This could be viewed as offering to US commanders a hunting license for PAVN units in the Highlands and, at the same time, establishing a VC game preserve in the Delta.

Figure 1-11


STRATEGIC REGIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
CENTRAL COASTAL LOW LANDS
CENTRAL HIGHLANDS
SOUTHERN DELTA
28%
EACH FIGURE=1%
POPULATION
RICE PRODUCTION

Ethnic Groups

The people of SVN today resemble the lines of debris that litter the high-water mark on any beach: tides of history successively have borne group after group of different peoples into SVN, the later arrivals smashing against earlier settlers. But, although each new group apparently moves with irresistible force against the earlier group, favorable contours in the terrain provide collection points where remnants of the defeated reside.


Two and one-half millenia of Chinese cultural impact have produced in this emerging nation a civilized and complex ethnic Vietnamese majority group -- side by side with such minority groups as the Katu mountain tribe which still practices human sacrifice. Hence, it may be expected that ethnological fact and fiction will be difficult to separate. In fact there is no political or scientific agreement: (1) on how many ethnic groups there are in SVN; (2) as to how many languages are spoken; (3) on how many people there are in SVN; or, (4) on how many individual members there are in various ethno-linguistic groups.

So few anthropological studies have been made of the peoples of SVN, and so meager are the published scientific results, that it is relatively meaningless to speak in terms of ethnic groups as such. The division of the SVN peoples into variously ascribed numbers of groups (ranging from six to more than 100) reflects facts as to the varied languages and dialects spoken by these peoples, rather than factors of

differences among their traditions and similarities of behavioral patterns. But, because there is some degree of relationship between similarities of belief and behavior and use of the same language, it is convenient at this point to speak of "ethno-linguistic" groups. The most useful statistic for general use is to speak of six really significant population groups or peoples of SVN: the overwhelming majority group of ethnic Vietnamese, and the much smaller minority groups of ethnic Chinese, Montagnard, Khmer, Cham and (as a useful "lumping") resident non-Vietnamese foreigners. (See: Figure 1-12) In turn, these six populations may be subdivided into some 100 distinct ethno-linguistic groups. (See: Figure 1-13) There is a total of approximately 15 million inhabitants of SVN.4/

Vietnamese. Without question, the most significant population group in SVN is formed by the ethnic Vietnamese. These speakers of a distinct language of several areal dialects number over 12 million, form over 80 percent of the country's inhabitants, provide most of its leaders, fill most of the ranks of the armed forces and bring forth most of the direct products of nature. Although there are significant lines of socio-economic and cultural cleavage between rural and urban, illiterate and educated, provincial versus Saigonese and northern versus southern Vietnamese, there is an overwhelming source of homogeneity in their common language and their common set of values and outlook on life. A substantial proportion -- perhaps over 50 percent -- of modern Vietnamese words are of Chinese origin, and many of the

Figure 1-12


ETHNOLINGUISTIC REGIONS OF SOUTH VIETNAM
KEY:
VIETNAMESE
MALAYO-POLYNESIAN
MON-KHMER
NON-SVN EUROPEANS, MOSTLY IN CITIES.
HUE
DA NANG
(TOURANE)
SEDANG
KONTUM
BAHNAR
JARAI
PLEIKU
RHADE
BAN ME THUOT
NHA TRANG
DALAT
STIENG
PHAN RANG
CHAM
CAMBODIAN KHMER
SAIGON
CHINESE IN CHOLON-SAIGON

present-day Vietnamese patterns of behavior and attitudes and artifacts result from the impress of Chinese culture. Such facts, however, are less meaningful than the central fact that these words and attitudes now are common to ethnic Vietnamese and are shared between most classes and groups.

Despite the lack of a detailed scientific knowledge in depth of Vietnamese culture,5/ there are a number of significant generalizations as to Vietnamese outlooks and aims that can be made with some confidence. To the exclusion of almost all else, the Vietnamese is oriented directly on himself and on his immediate family and kinsmen; only stray thoughts and loyalties may mount beyond neighbors and village to encompass his country. But essentially, and until very recently, his thoughts have been inner directed rather than outer directed; moreover, they are riveted on the present and the past rather than aimed at the future. Unquestionably, Vietnamese aspirations have risen under the impact of constant VC and GVN promises. But, concern with the means of providing for himself and his family weighs far more heavily than does any sense of unachieved, unknown political "liberty." Possession of land, and education for his children to better enable his own and his family's livelihood in the future, provides an immeasurably greater stimulus to activity by a Vietnamese than the need to be responsible to villagers of another hamlet or another province. Medicines for relief of his body aches or some family member's anguish provide more of an incentive to labor than do words extolling the virtues of an unfelt government or political party or an unseen, thus unknown, "leader."

1 ■ identifies the entry as an ethnolinguistic group or principal subgroup. Information follows an invariable order, set apart by semicolons: standard reference term; synonyms or alternative names; subgroups; language family; location by province (estimated population in parentheses.s); GVN estimated total population/Summer Institute of Linguistics estimate. Lack of data is shown by (-).

2 Some synonyms and alternative terms are cross indexed in alphabetical order, and refer to the more common term by use of=. Thus "AOTA = MUONG" indicates "AOTA is synonymous with MUONG."

3 Some subgroups also are cross indexed in alphabetical order, by use of +. Hence AN + *MUNG indicates that AN is a subgroup of the *MUNG.

4 Major language families are underlined and the entry boxed; non-indigenous groups are starred (*).

a

■ ADHAM; A'DHAM; (-); MPH, RADE group; DARLAC; 13,449.
A'DHAM = ADHAM
AN + *MUNG
ANNAMESE = VIETNAMESE
AO-TA = MUONG
■ ARAP; ERAP; (-); MPH, JORAI group; PLEIKU: 4,620.
ATTOUAT = KATU

AUSTROASIATIC LANGUAGE FAMILY; (-) MON-KHMER, VIET-MUONG, SEMANG SENOI.

AUSTRONESIAN = MALAYOPOLYNESIAN

b

BAHIENG + CHRAU
■ BAHNAR; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group (some say MPH); KONTUM (7120), PHU BON (1260), PHU YEN, PLEIKU (3106), TUYEN DUC (4); 11,490.
BAHNAR CHAMS = HROY
■ BAHNAR GROUP; (-); JOLONG, LOUKO, KREM, LAKONG, ALAKONG, BON, TONO, TOLO, BRONOM, COLAR, BAHNAR BONOM, BAHNAR RENGAO, KONTUM; MON-KHMER; BINH DINH, KONTUM, PHUBON, PLEIKU, TUYEN DUC: 58,833/75,000.
BAHU=BRU
BIET + MNONG
■ BIN; PIN: (-); MPH, RADE group; DARLAC;3,382.
BLA + CHRAU
BLACK TAI = * THAI
BLO + RHADE
BOLOVEN + LOVEN
BONG MIEU = CUA
■ BONOM (1); (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group BINH DINH; 6,392.
BONOM (2) = ? MONOM
■ BOUT; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; E. of KONTUM, S. of MONOM group; (-).
■ BRAO; LAVE, LOVE; (-) MON-KHMER; extent to LAOS, CAMBODIA; N.C. THAILAND; (-).
■ BROU GROUP; BRU, BARDO, MUONG LEONG, LEUNG, KALO, LEU, QUANG TRI; VANKIEU; MON KHMER (KATUIC); QUANG TRI, (also LAOS, HVN); 22,370/40,000.
■ BRU; BARU, B'RU, LEU; (-); MON-KHMER (KATUIC); QUANG TRI; 855.
B'RU = BRU
BUDIP + STIENG
■ BUDONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, MNONG group; DARLAC; 1,501.
BUHAN + CHRAU
■ BULACH; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; PHUOC LONG;3,000.
BUNOR + MNONG
BU-PRENG + CHRAU

c

CADO = CHURU
CA LO = KALO
CAN = HROY
CAMBODIAN = KHMER
■ CAO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; (W. of AN DIEM, on border of LAOS); (-).
CA-BONG = KAYONG
CAU MA = MAA
CAU SRE = SRE
■ CHAM; NGUOI, CHAM - PA; (-); MPH; BINH DINH (4550) BINH THUAN (11,409), NINH THUAN (15,474), BINH TUY (851), TUYEN DUC (851)(between PHAN RANG and PHAN THIET); 32,294/50,000.
■ CHAM-CAMBODIAN (differs from Cham of Central Vietnam); (-); (-); MPH; TAY NINH, Also CHAU-DOC, Saigon-Cholon; "several thousand".
CHAM-PA = CHAM
CHAN + *MUNG
CHAO + *MUNG
CHIL = KIL
■ CIL; KIL, KHIL; (-); mon-KHMER, KO'HO' group; NINH THUAN (46), TUYEN DUC (10,479).
■ *CHINESE; (-); (-); SINO-TIBETAN LANGUAGE FAMILY,SINITIC GROUP; CHOLON (and Urban areas) over 1,000,000.
CHO RO = MAA
CHO SOP = MAA
CHO TO = MAA
■ CHRAC; (-); (-); S. LONG KHANH, S.W. BINH TUY: 15,000.
CHRAO = CHRAU
■ CHRAU; CHRAO, JRO; BAHIENG, KEU, JRE, BUHAN, BU-PRENG, BLA, BUTWAQ, CHALAN; MON-KHMER, CHRAU Group (Stiengen); BIEN HOA (1000), BINH TUY (426), LONG KHANH (4505), PHUOC TUY (4000), DARLAC;9,931/15,000.
■ CHRAU GROUP; (-); CHRAU, DALMER, TAMUN; MON KHMER; BIEN HOA, BINH LONG, BINH TUY, LONG KHANH, PHUOC TUY: 11,428/15,000.
CHRAU = CHURU
CHRU = CHURU
■ CHURU; CHRU, CURU, CADO, CHRAU; (-); MPH (closely related to CHAM), NINH THUAN (1939), S.E. TUYEN DUC (4,059); 4,998/15,000.
CHU TY + JARAI
CIL = KIL
COR + SEDANG
CREQ + KRE
■ CUA GROUP; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; QUANG NGAI; 11,542.
■ CUA; KHUA, KOR, TRAW, BONG MIEU, (Mountain groups = KOL, DOT, YOT; Foothills group = TRAW, CONG; (-); MON-KHMER, CUA group (Bahnaric); Northern QUANG NGAI, into QUANG - TIN; 11,562/20,000.
CUEU = CHURU

d

■ DALMER; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, CHRAU group; LONG KHANH; 924.
DAHJA + SEDANG
DAVACH = KRE
DAVAR = KRE
■ DIE;?Same as JEH; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; KONTUM; 4,082/10,000.
DJARA = JARAI
DJARAI = JARAI
DONG = CUA
DOT = CUA
DRAM + JEH
■ DUAN GROUP; (-)(? same as TAKUA or KAYONG); LUON; MON-KHMER; NE KONTUM; 3,500.
■ DUANE; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; QUANG NGAI (Border of Laos); (-).
DUE Rue + MNONG
DUONG + SEDANG

e

■ EDE; E-DE; (-); MPH, RADE group; DARLAC; 24,552.
E-DE = EDE
EPAN + RHADE

■ *"FOREIGN" (-); Pakistanis, Japanese, Korean, German, Italian; (VARIED); (CITIES); ("few thousand").
■ *FRENCH; (-); (-) INDO-EUROPEAN; (Cities and plantations); (17,000; most not metropolitan French.)

■ GAR; MNONG GAR, PNONG GAR; (-); MON-KHMER (Stiengan); S.E. DARLAC, TUYEN DUC; 10,000.

h

HABAU = HRAU
■ HALANG GROUP; (-); HALANG, KYONG; MON-KHMER, BAHNARIC (very close to JEH); W. KONTUM (? another group in N. KONTUM E. of DAKSUT.); 3,064/10,000.
■ HALANG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HALANG group; KONTUM; 2,516.
■ HALANG DOAN; DUAN (may belong to JEH); (-); MON-KHMER; KONTUM; (under 1,000).
■ HARA = HRUY
HARN = SEDANG
HBAU + JARAI
■ H'DRUNG; HEDRUNG, HEGRONG, HODRUNG; (none); MPH, JORAI group; PLEIKU; 3,112.
HEDRUNG = HDRUNG
HEGRONG = HDRUNG
HODRUNG = HDRUNG
■ HRE GROUP; HREI DVAK, BAVAR,DAVACH, DAVAR; KARE,KRE, KREI, RABAH (TAVA), CREQ (KARE), TALIANG; MON-KHMER (BAHNARIC); W. and S. QUANG NGAI; 43,015/100,000.
HREY = HRE
H'ROI = HROY
■ HROY; H'ROI, BAHNAR CHAMS, CAM, HARA; (-); MPH; BINH DINH (450),PHU BON (798), PHU YEN (6,385); ?,633/--"small group."
HRUE + JARAI
H'UNG + RHADE

■ *INDIAN; HINDU; (-); (-); (CITIES); (-).
INH = *MUNG

j

■ JARAI; DJARAI, JORAI, DJIRAI, DJARAI; include HBAU = HABAU, ARAP (SRAP), TO-BUAN, SEJAN. CHUTY, PLEI KLY; MPH; DARLAC (5,276) KONTUM (10,920), PHU BON (22,146), PLEIKU (88,464), BINH TUY (2,787: 137,325/150,000).

JEH BRILAR + JEH
■ JEH GROUP; DIE, YEH; DIE, JEH PERAK, JEH BRILAR, DRAM,? LANG YA; MON-KHMER, (BAH-NARIC), (very close to HALANG); N.W. KONTUM, and possibly QUANG TIN and LAOS; 4082/10,000.
JEH PERAK + JEH
■ JOLONG; (-); (?); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR Group; KONTUM; 1,155.
JORAI = JASAI, DJARAI, includes H'DRUNG, ARAP. JRE + CHRAU

k

K'AH + RHADE
■ KALO; CA LO, DA LO; (-)(may belong to BRU); MON-KHMER; QUANG TRI; (-).
KA LO = KALO
KAMBUJH = KHMER
KAO = KATU
KARE = CREQ
KATO = DATU
KATOU = KATU
■ KATU GROUP; KATO, KA-TU, MONUI, KATOU, TEU, ATTOUAT, KAO, KHAT, THAP, NGUON TA, TA RIVER VAN KIEU, PHUONGKATU; KHA, KTU, TEU; MON-KHMER (KATUIC), very close to PHUONG; QUANG NAM, QUNAM TIN, THUA THIEN, KONTUM, (also LAOS); 23,136/40,000.
KA-TU = KATU
■ KATUL; K'TUL; (-); MPH, RADE group DARLAC;10,808.
■ KAYONG; CA-BONG, KOYONG, KAGIUONG, OA GIONG, KATANG; (-); MON-KHMER (BAHNARIC); Remote Mountains of N.W. QUANG NGAI, and N.W. KONTUM
K'DRAO + RHADE
KEUNG = KRUNG
■ KIA; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KATU group; QUANG TIN; 800.
KHAS PAKHO = PACOH
KHAT = KATU
■ KHMER; CAMBODIAN, KAMBUJU; (-); MON-KHMER; TAY NINH, PHU VINH, ANYUYEN; 350,000-400,000.
KHUA = CUA
■ KHWANH; MNONG KHWANH; (-); MON-KHMER;(-); (-).
KIL = CIL

KMRANG + SEDANG
■ KOHO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KOHO group; BINH THUAN (180), KHANH HOA (194), LAM DONG (9546), NINH THUAN (443), QUANG DUC (4), BINH TUY (4409) TUYEN DUC (30,000); 14,576/45,000.
■ KO'HO' GROUP; (-); CIL, CHIL, KOHO, LAT, LOHO, MAA, NOP, TRINC,SRE, KALOP, LAYA, RION, NOP, TALA; MON-KHMER; BINH THUAN, KHANH HOA, LAM DONG, NINH THUAN,QUANG DUC, TUYEN DUC, BINH TUY, LONG KHANH; 64,770/100,000.
KOL = CUA
KOR = CUA
■ KOUKO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR Group; BINH DINH; 6,000.
KOYONG = KAYONG
KPA + RHADE
KPENG + MNONG
■ KRE; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HRE group; QUANG NGAI; 15,144.
■ KREM; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; BINH DINH; 9,099.
■ KRRE; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HRE group; QUANG NGAI; 27,871.
■ KRUNG; KEUNG; (-); MPH ; DARLAC;5,998.
■ KTU; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KATU group; QUANG NAM (40659), QUANG TIN (9977), THUA THIEN (1716), KONTUM (300); 16,062.
K'TUL = RHADE
■ KUA; KOR, TRAW (-); (-); QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI, QUANG NAM; 20,000.
KUEN + MNONG
■ KYONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HALANG group; KONTUM; 548.

LA-DANG = NOANG
LA-GIA = LAYA
■ LAKONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; PLEIKU; 1733.
■ LANG YA; (-); (-) (part of JEH); MON-KHMER; QUONG NAM, (S. Laos, N. of the JEH); 9,000.
■ LAT; (-); (-);MON-KHMER, KO'HO' group; TUYEN DUC; 1,271.
LAVE = BRAO
■ LAYA; LA-GIA; (-); MON-KHMER; (-); (-).
LEU = BRU
■ LOHO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KO'HO' Group; TUYEN DUC; 7,202.
LOI = *MUNG
LOVE = BRAO
■ LOVEN; BOLOVEN; (-); MON-KHMER; (-);(-).
■ LUON; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, DUAN group; KONTUM; 3,500.

m

MAA; MA, CAU MA; MATO, MA RO, MA SOP, CHO TU, CHO RO, CHO SOP; MON-KHMER, KO'HO' group; LAM DONG (15,039), QUANG DUC (4,581); TUYEN DUC (4,609), LONG KHANH (1841), DARLAC; 26,070.

MALAYO-POLYNESIAN LANGUAGE FAMILY (MPH); AUSTRONESIAN; CHAM, CHRU, HROY, JORAI, RADE, ROGLAI groups; BINH DINH, BINH THUAN, DARLAC, KHANH HOA, KONTUM, NINH THUAN, PHU BON, PLEIKU, QUANG DUC, TUYEN DUC, BINH TUY (None in I and IV corps zone - only insignificant number in III corps zone. Note: in Lam Dong Province; 304,768/372,000.

■ MAN; (-); YAO; MIAO-YAO; (refugees); (few).
MA RO = MAA
MA SOP = MAA
MA TO = MAA
M'DUR = M'DHUR
■ M'DHUR; M'DUR, M'THUR; (-); MPH, RADE group; DARLAC (160), PHUBON (13,461), PHU YEN (2,165); 17,226.
■ MEKAM; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; QUANG NGAI;(-).
■ MEO; MIAO; (-); MAAO-YAO; (refugees); (few).
MNAL = MUONG
■ M'NHON
NHON = MUONG




Figure 1-13

ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUPS OF SOUTH VIETNAM

KATOU = KATU

■ KATU GROUP; KATO, KA-TU, MONUI, KATOU, TEU, ATTOUAT, KAO, KHAT, THAP, NGUON TA, TA RIVER VAN KIEU, PHUONGKATU; KHA, KTU, TEU; MON-KHMER (KATUIC), very close to PHUONG; QUANG NAM, QUNAM TIN, THUA THIEN, KONTUM, (also LAOS); 23,136/40,000.

KA-TU = KATU

■ KATUL; K'TUL; (-); MPN, RADE group DARLAC;10,808.

■ KAYONG; CA-RONG, KOYONG, KAGTUONG, CA GIONG, KATANG; (-); MON-KHMER (BAHNARIC); Remote Mountains of N.W. QUANG NGAI, and N.W. KONTU

K'DRAO = KHADE

KEUNG = KRUNG

■ KHA; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KATU group; QUANG TIN; 800.

KHAS PAKSO = PACOH

KHAT = KATU

■ KHMER; CAMBODIAN, KAMBUJU; (-); MON-KHMER; TAY NINH, PHU VINH, ANYUYEN; 350,000-400,000.

KHUA = CUA

■ KHWANH; MNONG KHWANH; (-); MON-KHMER;(-); (-).

KIL = CIL

KMRANG = SEDANG

■ KONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KHO group; BINH THUAN (180), KHANH HOA (194), LAM DONG (9346), NINH THUAN (443), QUANG DUC (6), BINH TUY (4409) TUYEN DUC (30,000); 14,576/45,000.

■ KO'HO' GROUP; (-); CIL, CHIL, KONO, LAT, LOBO, MAA, NOP, TRING, SRE, KALOP, LAYA, RION, NOP, TALA; MON-KHMER; BINH THUAN, KHANH HOA, LAM DONG, NINH THUAN,QUANG DUC, TUYEN DUC, BINH TUY, LONG KHANH; 64,770/100,000.

KOL = CUA

KOR = CUA

■ KOUKO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR Group; BINH DINH; 6,000.

KOYONG = KAYONG

KPA = KHADE

KPENG = MNONG

■ KRE; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HRE group; QUANG NGAI; 15,144.

■ KREN; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; BINH DINH; 9,099.

■ KRRE; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HRE group; QUANG NGAI; 27,871.

■ KRUNG; KEUNG; (-); MPN; DARLAC;5,998.

■ KTU; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KATU group; QUANG NAM (4069), QUANG TIN (9977), THUA THIEN (1716), KONTUM (300); 16,062.

K'TUL = KHADE

■ KUA; KOR, TRAW (-); (-); QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI, QUANG NAM; 20,000.

KUEN = MNONG

■ KYONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, HALANG group; KONTUM; 548.

LA-DANG = NOANG

LA-GIA = LAYA

■ LAKONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; PLEIKU; 1703.

■ LANG YA; (-); (-) (part of JEH); MON-KHMER; QUONG NAM, (S. Laos, N. of the JEH);9,000.

■ LAT; (-); (-);MON-KHMER, KO'HO' group; TUYEN DUC; 1,271.

LAVE = BRAO

■ LAYA; LA-GIA; (-); MON-KHMER; (-); (-).

LEU = BRU

■ LOHO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KO'HO' Group; TUYEN DUC; 7,202.

LOI = *NUNG

LOVE = BRAO

■ LOWEN; BOLOVEN; (-); MON-KHMER; (-);(-).

■ LUON; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, DUAN group; KONTUM; 3,500.

■ MAA; MA, CAU MA; MATO, MA RO, MA SOP, CHO TO, CHO RO, CHO SOP; MON-KHMER, KO'HO' group; LAM DONG (15,039), QUANG DUC (4,391); TUYEN DUC (4,609), LONG KHANH (1841), DARLAC; 26,070.

MALAYO-POLYNESIAN LANGUAGE FAMILY (MPN); AUSTRONESIAN; CHAM, CHRU, HROY, JORAI, RADE, ROGLAI groups; BINH DINH, BINH THUAN, DARLAC, KHANH HOA, KONTUM, NINH THUAN, PHU BON, PLEIKU, QUANG DUC, TUYEN DUC, BINH TUY (None in I and IV corps zone - only insignificant number in III corps zone. None in Lam Dong Province; 304,768/372,000.

■ MAN; (-); YAO; MIAO-YAO; (refugees); (few).

MA RO = MAA

MA SOP = MAA

MA TO = MAA

M'DUR = M'DHUR

■ M'DHUR; M'DUR, M'THUR; (-); MPN, RADE group; DARLAC (160), PHUBON (11,461), PHU YEN (2,165); 17,226.

■ MENAM; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; QUANG NGAI;(-).

■ MEO; MIAO; (-); MAAO-YAO; (refugees); (few).

MRAL = MUONG

■ M'HON

MNOM = MUONG

■ MNONG GROUP; PNONG,MNONG GAR, PHI BREE; CIL, CHIL, BREENG, BU PRANG, RLAM, PRONG, KUEN, BUR BUR, PREH (PEH), BUNOR, KPONG, BUDONG, BIET, M'NONG, NONG,BU NONG BIH BRI, RONONG; MON-KHMER (Stiengan); DARLAC, QUANG DUC; 27,730/35,000-40,000.

■ M'NONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, MNONG group; DARLAC (11,340), QUANG DUC (12,433); 23,773.

MNONG GAR = MNONG

MNONG KIL = KIL

MON = MUONG

■ MORAM; MONOM; (-); MON-KHMER, Mo'NO'M group; KONTUM; 2130.

MON-KHMER LANGUAGE FAMILY; (-); BAHNAR, BRAU, CHRAU, CUA, DUAN, HALANG, HRE, JEH, KATU, KO'HO', MO'NO'M, MNONG, PACOH, RENGAO, SEDANG, STIENG, STRIENG, TAKUN; AUSTROASIATIC; QUANG NAM, QUANG NGAI, QUANG TIN, QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN, BINH DINH, DARLAC, KHANH HOA, KONTUM, LAM DONG, NINH THUAN, PHU BON, PLEIKU, QUANG DUC, TUYEN DUC, BIEN HOA, BINH LONG, BINH TUY, LONG KHANH, PHUOC LONG, PHUOC TUY; 557,988/545,000 - 555,000.

MONOM = MORAM

■ MO'NO'M GROUP; CONOM MENAM; MORAM; MON-KHMER; KONTUM; 2,150/5,000.

MORUI = KATU

MPN = MALAYO-POLYNESIAN

MRU = CHRAU

M'THUR = M'DHUR

■ MUONG; AO-TA, MON, MAAL, MWON, MGUE, NGUO, NGUON,NHA LANG, SACH, THO; (-); VIET-MUONG LANGUAGE FAMILY; DARLAC, PLEIKU "REFUGEES;" 8,000.

MXRANG = SEDANG

■ NGEN; NGRE; (-); MON-KHMER; (mainly LAOS);(-).

NGRE = NGEN

NGUE = MUONG

NGUOI = CHAM

NGUOI KINH = VIETNAMESE

NGUON = MUONG

NGUON TA = KATU

NHA LANG = MUONG

■ NHANG; TAY, GIAI, GIANG, NYANG; (-); TAI; (refugees); (few).

■ NOANG; LA-DANG; (-); MPN; (S.E. of DALAT); ("several thousand")

■ NOAR; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; QUANG NGAI;(-).

■ NONG; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, MNONG group; QUANG DUC; 1,120.

■ NOP; NOUP, TO LOP; (-); MON-KHMER, KO'HO' group; LAM DONG; 981.

NOUP = NOP

*NUNG; NONG; INH, LOI, AN, CHAN, PHAN SINH, CHAO, TUNG, = XUONG, QUI-RIN; TAI; QUANG DUC (3,000), BINH TUY (821), BINH THUAN, LONG KHANH (2,000); 7,821/50,000.

NOTE: There appear to be two groups of "NUNG", both refugees. Some speak the TAI family dialect related to THU; the larger group of renowned figures speak a Chinese dialect.

■ ONG; (-); (-); (-); DARLAC; (-).

■ PACOH GROUP; KHAS PAKHO, PAKOH,POKON; TOI-OI, PAHI; MON-KHMER (Katuic); QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN (also LAOS); 6,584/15,000.

PAKOH = PACOH

■ PERH ("PREH"?); (-); (-); MON-KHMER, MNONG group; DARLAC; 1,336.

PHAN SINH = *NUNG

PHI BREE = MNONG

■ PHUONG; HUU RIVER VAN KIEU; (-); MON-KHMER (Katuic); (inland from HUE); (-).

PHUONG KATU = KATU

PIH = BIH

PLEI KLY = JARAI

■ PLIE-RIE; (-); (-); MPN, RADE group; DARLAC; 3,125.

POKON = PACOH

PREH = MNONG

PRONG = MNONG

■ PRU; (-); (-); MON-KHMER;(-); (-).

PUAN = JARAI

QUI RIN = *NUNG

RABAH = HRE

RADAY = RHADE

RHADE = RHADE

■ RAGLAI; ORANG RAGLAI; (? RAI); MPN; BINH THUAN (4,061), KHANH HOA (9,607), LAM DONG (2,381), NINH THUAN (11,294), TUYEN DUC (90), BINH TUY (342); 27,775.

■ RAI; SEYU; (-); MPN; BINH TUY, BINH THUAN TUYEN DUC; 5,000-10,000.

■ RANGAO; RANGAS; (-); MON-KHMER, RENGAO group; KONTUM; 9,123/10,000 - 15,000.

■ RENGAO GROUP (May be part of SEDANG or BAHNAR); RENGAO, ROMGAO, RO-NGAO; RANGAO; MON-KHMER (Bahnaric); KONTUM; 9,123/10,000 - 15,000.

■ RANGAS = RANGAO

RENGAO = RENGAO

■ RHADE; RADE, EDE, RADAY, E-DE; KPA, M'DUR, M'DHUR, ADHAM, KATUL,PLIHRIE, A'DHAM, K'TUL, DODRAO BIH, KHUNG, RDE KPA, KPAH, EDO, K'AH, K'DRAO, H'WING; MPN; KHANH HOA (5,795), PHU YEN (6,514), PLEIKU (571), QUANG DUC (1,070), TUYEN DUC (6) DARLAC, BMU BON; 13,956/100,000.

■ RIEN; RIONG; (-); MON-KHMER (Bahnaric); (S.W. of DALAT); (-).

RLAH = MNONG

RO = CHRAU

■ ROGLAI (1); (-); ADLAI, RADLAI, *ALOP; MPN; BINH THUAN, KHANH HOA, LAM DONG, NINH THUAN, TUYEN DUC, BINH TUY; 28,021/42,000 - 57,000.

■ ROGLAI (2); CAC GIA; (-); MPN; (N.E. of Phan Rang); 3,000.

■ ROH; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; BINH DINH; 12,000.

■ ROLOM; MNONG ROLOM, RLAM, LOM; (-); MON-KHMER (Stiengan); 5,000-10,000.

RONGAO = RENGAO

SACH = MUONG

■ SAYAN; (-); (-); MON-KHMER; QUANG NGAI;(-).

■ SEDANG GROUP; HADANG HOTEANG, HARN, HMEANG, KO-DANG, KOTEA, NOTEA,DANJA, (? RENGAO), TO-DRAH, XMRANG, DUONG COR, (?RALANG); MON-KHMER (Bahnaric); KONTUM,QUANG NAM, BINH DINH; 25,120/40,000.

■ SEDANG TODRAH; DIDRAH; (-); MON-KHMER (Bahnaric); (E. of KONTUM; (-).

SESAN = JARAI

■ SOP; (-); (-) (? MAA); MON-KHMER (Stiengan); (-); (-).

SOTEANG = STIENG

SRAP = ARAP

■ SRE; CAU SRE; (Some say subgroup of KO'HO'); MON-KHMER (Stiengan), (-); (-).

■ STIENG; SOTEANG; BUDIP, BOLO, BULACH; MON-KHMER (Stiengan); BINH LONG (13,794), LONG KHANH (1,379), PHUOC LONG (21,528)? BIEN HOA, and in Cambodia; 36,701/36,000.

■ STRIENG; (-); (-)(may be dialect of JEH); MON-KHMER; QUANG TIN, (also LAOS), KONTUM;1,120.

TA-BOI = TAO-AI

TAI LANGUAGE FAMILY; (-); MUNG, LAO, SHAN, THAI; TAI KADAI; TUYEN DUC (5,000), BINH TUY (821), LONG KHANH (2,000); 7,821/50,000.

■ TAKUN GROUP; KOTUA, DUAN, LANGYA; MR; MON-KHMER (Bahnaric); QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN; 2,700/-

TALIANG = HRE

■ TALOP; (-); (-); MPN, ROGLAI group; BINH THUAN; 247.

■ TAMUN; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, CHRAU group; BINH LONG; 373.

■ TAO-AI; TA-BOI, TAU-OI, TAU-IO; (-); MON-KHMER (Katuic); QUANG TRI, THUA THIEN, (also in LAOS); 11,000.

TAU-IO = TAO-AI

TAU-OI = TAO-AI

TAVA = BAHAN

TAY DEN = *THAI

■ TEU; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, KATU group; QUANG NAM (3,769), TUA THIEN (2,505); 6,274.

TEU = KATU

■ *THAI; BLACK THAI, WHITE THAI, TAI DAM, TAY DEN, THAI NOIR; (-); TAI; (refugees); 60,000.

THAP = KATU

■ THO; THOBA; (-); TAI; BINH THUAN (refugees); 5,000.

THOBA = THO

TO-BUAN = JARAI

TO-DRAH = SEDANG

■ TOHO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; BINH DINH; 10,000.

■ TOI-OI; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, PACOH group; QUANG TRI (1,884), THUA THIEN (4,700); 6,584/15,000.

■ TOLO; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BAHNAR group; PLEIKU; 994.

TRAW = CUA

■ TRINC; TRINH; (-); MON-KHMER, KO'HO' group; KHANH HOA (656), PHU BON (3,489); 4,145.

TRINH = TRINC

■ TRUNG

■ VAN KIEU; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, BRAU group; QUANG TRI; 22,370/40,000.

VIET-MUONG LANGUAGE FAMILY; - ; MUONG, VIET-NAMESE; AUSTROASIATIC.

VIETNAMESE; ANNAMESE, NGUOI KINH; (-); VIET-MUONG; (lowlands + all SVN); 12,000,000.

■ WE; (-); (-); MON-KHMER, TAKUN group; QUANG NAM (1,200), QUANG TIN (1,500); 2,700/-

YEN = JEH

YOT = CUA

Above all, after a generation of witnessing death and desolation and of experiencing the physical tugs and hauls of strange protagonists who enforce listening to alien thoughts that appear divorced from his sense of reality, the Vietnamese wants security from fear and pressure. He must hope for the chance to live his life as he sees fit. But, being "left alone" is not enough. For the Vietnamese wants social justice -- though being left alone may equate with social justice, in that it eliminates oppression.

No advocate of a new political doctrine or of forced or guided social change of any kind can afford to overlook the fact that the Vietnamese peasant or poet, petty politician or premier -- whatever may be his intellectual yearning -- essentially is an undisciplined individual whose only real sense of loyalty or responsibility is to himself and to his family, and -- less strongly -- to his village. This fact is the fundamental component of Vietnamese character and, excepting the presence of the VC, probably is the chief limiting consideration in the development of any plan or course of action for the long-range development of SVN.

Chinese. The so-called "overseas Chinese" minority group is second to the ethnic Vietnamese in economic importance. There are somewhat over one million of them, divided into two groups: the million or more ethnic Chinese who, for all practical purposes, control the commerce and economy of SVN; and the tribal Nungs (perhaps 40,000).

The well-organized ethnic Chinese are found principally in the Cholon portion of greater Saigon, and in the other major cities and

towns of SVN. For nearly two millenia, they have complicated Vietnamese economic and political life.6/ As a rule they are either merchants, money lenders or providers of some other form of service to the Vietnamese; some cultivate gardens. But, for all practical purposes, the Chinese maintain what amounts to a stranglehold on business in SVN; this form of domination has been sustained despite GVN efforts to break it by promulgating such devices as the enactment prohibiting "all foreign nationals" from 11 professions and businesses known to be largely in Chinese hands. There is little doubt that the Chinese have traffic with the VC and carry on business activities in VC-controlled territories. The Chinese are not assimilated; they still retain their own language, custom and practices, operate their own schools, have their own organizations and continue to wear their traditional dress. The "Cholon" Chinese have, in large measure, successfully evaded attempts to integrate them into Vietnamese cultural life and to draft them into the armed services. Recently, however, USA Special Forces personnel have been able to draw them into the CIDG.

The Nung tribesmen, having fought for the French against the Viet Minh, "voted with their feet" in 1954 and migrated to SVN. Professional soldiers by tradition and preference, the Nung have found a useful place in both the military forces and the economy of SVN. They manifest Chinese cultural traditions; they do not, however, associate themselves with the other overseas Chinese in SVN. Both ethnic Vietnamese and the "Cholon Chinese" tend to look down upon the Nung as aric tribesmen, associating them with the Montagnard; the Nung re-

sent this attitude, respond with an equal measure of dislike and contempt toward both Vietnamese and Chinese -- and "ride shotgun" for US field advisors.

Montagnard. The least well-known and most controversial population group in SVN is the Montagnard (French: "mountain folk"). For all practical purposes, they inhabit the Highlands of Vietnam -- the mountains, hills and valleys; the Vietnamese, Chinese, Khmers, Chams and varied foreigners inhabit the Lowlands. Although the Montagnard form only some seven percent of the population of SVN, they occupy more than one-half of the total land area. The term "Montagnard" has been retained from the French and is used officially by GVN because there is no appropriate indigenous term; the older Vietnamese term Moi ("savage" or "wildman") is obviously anathema to the Montagnard.

There is no agreement as to how many Montagnard individuals or tribes there may be. This fact relates not only to the lack of official censuses and the extent of VC control over Montagnard territory, but also to a lack of scientific agreement as to what constitutes an ethnic group or a language or dialect group, as contrasted with a subgroup. Further complications spring from the fact that, not only do the Montagnards move about within their traditional territories, but the war has caused their penetration into new and strange lands. Many of the so-called Montagnard "groups" are only identifiable as a name on a map.

The GVN lists a total of 670,577 Montagnards; joint estimates by US linguists and anthropologists working in SVN raise this figure to 997,000; USA Special Forces personnel, possessing firsthand familiarity with the Highlands, indicate that there may be considerably more than one million such tribesmen.

The Montagnard of SVN form part of a band of hill peoples who stretch across mainland SEA, in between the more Indonesian peoples and the Chinese. This band of highlanders provides a lucrative target for covert operation by either stimulators of insurgency or promulgators of stability. At present, the Montagnard and other hill people are divided socially and geographically. They now are too unsophisticated politically to react to external pressures and counterpressures with other than bewildered shifts of allegiance or hatred from one to another outside agency. Although the tribes in general have not yet learned how to play one side against the other for their own advantage, leaders of the FULRO movement in SVN appear to be rapidly developing such knowledge.7/

Well over half of the Montagnards speak dialects of the Austro-Asiatic language family, generally considered to include Vietnamese and Khmer, as well as dialects of many of the Montgnards resident in NVN. 8/ Hence, it may be said that these Montagnard tribesmen are distant kinsmen of both the ethnic Vietnamese and the Cambodians. Much more distantly related are those Montagnards who speak Malayo-Polynesian languages and dialects (including Cham, discussed separately below).

The ancestors of these peoples clearly intruded into Vietnam by sea and are related to those peoples who inhabit islands of the South Pacific. In addition, there are a few Tai speakers who migrated from NVN in 1954; they speak dialects related to Siamese.

The level of culture that characterizes the Montagnard (See: Figure 1-14), although varying in complexity according to the historical impact of neighboring Vietnamese and other groups, differs considerably from that of the ethnic Vietnamese.9/ He lives closer to nature, is more easily influenced by changes in environment and habitat, and holds simpler wants and belief systems. For the most part, he wishes to be left alone to live as his forebears lived, and to work and worship in his own fashion. Until recently, the Montagnard's world was encompassed by the walls of the valley in which he planted and the simple huts of the village in which he lived. He was aware that there were other villages and other men -- some of whom spoke his own tongue, and some of whom spoke differently. But, this did not impact upon him save to offer a means of hunting heads or bodies in the traditional test of his manhood.

That the Montagnard cannot, and will not, be left alone to pursue the old ways is due to several inescapable facts. The first is that he occupies areas astride routes which VC returnees and PAVN units use to infiltrate and to provide supplies to VC recipients. Second, and irrespective of the outcome of the war, is the fact that much of the economic potential for an ultimate SVN is to be found in the Highlands, the traditional haunts of the Montagnard. Third, some of the Montagnards

themselves -- stirred by both internal and external influences -- have assumed the leadership of a movement to weld together the tribes in an organization that can express itself and exert the necessary influence to achieve certain demands. Several aborted revolts attempted by FULRO have stirred the GVN to anger and reaction. But the Montagnards are more feared than understood. That the tribes can be led to action despite the lack of any tradition of significant loyalty above village level is attested by the certain, though still limited, organizational successes of both the VC and USA Special Forces in recent years.

Cambodians. Over one-third of a million Khmer-speaking Cambodians inhabit portions of the Mekong Delta area from the Cambodian border to Saigon, just as half a million ethnic Vietnamese live in Cambodia. They are clustered in and around Vinh Binh, Kien Giang, An Xuyen, Bac Lieu, Chau Doc, Phong Dinh, Chuong Thien and Ba Xuyen provinces; but they are not a majority in any province. An additional unknown number of former Khmer residents of the area have fled into Cambodia in recent years to escape VC terrorism. The Khmer intermarry with the Chinese, are friendly with the Cham, but avoid the Vietnamese.

The Khmer, while less aggressive but at the same time less restrained, are virtually as sophisticated as the neighboring ethnic Vietnamese in rural areas they inhabit. The chief difference is that the Khmer speak Cambodian and follow the Theravada ("Hinayana") branch of Buddhism, in contrast to the speech and the Mahayana Buddhism of the Vietnamese. They retain many cultural traits that reflect their history of strong Indian influence. Although the Khmer are somewhat

ETHNIC VIETNAMESE AND MONTAGNARD ETHNOGRAPHIC COMPARISON

NAME

VIETNAMESE; Annamese; Nguoi Kinh.

HABITAT

LOWLANDS; deltas of Mekong and other rivers; few in Highlands.

POPULATION

THIRTEEN MILLION, estimated; no reliable census; townships vary from under 100 to over 30,000; over one-fourth under 2,000, more than half under 3,000.

RACE

MONGOLOID-INDONESIAN origin as tribal peoples; subsequent Chinese admixture; straight black hair, round head, broad face, high cheek bones, mongoloid eye fold, sparse body hair, small size; Northerners taller, more Mongoloid, lighter skin, heavier build.

LANGUAGE

TONAL; monosyllabic; related to Muong sub-group of Mon-Khmer, Austroasiatic family; 27th largest group in world; vocabulary and sounds heavily influenced by Chinese. Literacy rate 30-50%.

SETTLEMENTS

VILLAGES; 80% live in over 3,500 townships, balance in 5 cities and larger towns; villages near water course, shore or road; center of village has market, council house, temple for village guardian spirits and formal religious sects; house designed around reception room, with altar for ancestors; villages almost autonomous until recently, governed by local council of notables; now run by smaller number of appointed officials.

KINSHIP SYSTEM

PATRILINEAL, PATRILOCAL; some polygamy and concubinage; paternalistic, but women very influential; marriage arranged by families; 3/4 of Vietnamese belong to 12 out of the 300 named family groups; child-rearing exceptionally permissive; little discipline.

SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM

VILLAGE-CENTERED; moulded originally on Chinese imperial concept, with emperor, nobles and mandarin administrators governing from capitol city; French changed to colonial system; 43 provinces and 238 districts; mandarin-French influence continues in bureaucratic system; elite social class of intellectuals, wealthy and (more recently) military officers; Vietnamese possess "sense of peoplehood, not nationhood."

RELIGIOUS SYSTEM

SYNCRETIC; most ethnic Vietnamese adhere to formal sects such as Mahayana Buddhism, Catholicism, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao but add syncretism of prehistoric animism and spirit worship with Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese type of ancestor reverence; elaborate cycle of ceremonies; extensive use of good luck charms and divination; curers have many quasi-magical remedies.

ECONOMY

SURPLUS AGRICULTURE; based on wet rice (PADDY) planting and some market garden cash crops; extensive fishing, some animal husbandry; export crops of rice, rubber, coffee, tea and pepper.

TRANSPORTATION

FOOT PATHS between hamlets and villages; canals and streams important in South; roads connect provinces; few automobiles, some bicycles, motor scooters and trucks for delivery, especially in South.

AESTHETICS

TRADIC THEATRE, literature, poetry, and music are important to people of all classes; gambling widespread.

ASPIRATIONS

CONCERN WITH SURVIVAL leads to basic desire for security through land ownership and the material rewards and profitable status that education brings to self and kinmen; secondary desire for flood control, better water supply, sanitation.

PERSONALITY AND OUTLOOK

DISPASSIONATE, emotional restraint valued; real sense of dignity of man, but ruthless lack of concern with life of man; consider Vietnamese superior to all other peoples; loyalties in order: family, hamlet, village, district -- rapid diffusion of non-kin loyalties; prime orientation on family and kin; nepotism and graft may express family loyalty; offspring from marriage more important than romantic love; suspicious of, distrust and downgrade everyone but selves; Northerners consider Southerners soft, lazy and luxury loving, Southerners consider Northerners more energetic, commercially aggressive; fear of censure or of making mistakes leads to lack of initiative and need for detailed instruction; dislike giving orders or making decisions, because fear premature commitment; individual retains sense of own importance, but individual feelings of distress at injustice or pain not important; self interest leads to "pull down the leader" attitude; few absolute beliefs, few crusaders; new proposals, and direct action must be carefully considered before willing to support; changes come by adaptation of old rather than adoption of new; tradition respected, but does not override obviously useful new ideas; scholarship and academic achievement highly valued.

NAME

MONTAGNARD; Moi; Nguoi Thuong.

HABITAT

HIGHLANDS; plateaus, valleys, hill areas extending into Southern Laos, Eastern Cambodia.

POPULATION

ONE MILLION, estimated; no reliable census; widely divergent estimates; differing groups vary in size from under 1000 to over third of a million.

RACE

INDONESIAN appearance; straight to curly hair, medium height, relatively husky, dark skinned; no mongoloid eye-fold; close physical resemblance between members of differing groups.

LANGUAGE

NON-TONAL; polysyllabic; dialects belong to Mon-Khmer of Austroasiatic family and to Malayo-Polynesian; contiguous tribes of different groups can understand each other; less than 5% literacy.

SETTLEMENTS

SMALL HAMLETS; few large multifamily houses, large bachelor's house and small spirit house, often enclosed by stockade; headman and council of older males, usually household heads, handle rituals, administration of justice, and contact with outside world; houses often on piles, interior compartments for individual families, common room for family gatherings and receiving guests.

KINSHIP SYSTEM

MATRILINEAL, MATRILOCAL, Malayo-Polynesian groups in central SVN; Northern Mon Khmer Patrilineal; some groups in between Ambilineal; Mon Khmer below Malayo-Polynesians Matrilineal; marriage based on alliance between families, not romance between individuals; elite often self-perpetuating by intermarriage; bride price; polygamy rare; adoption common; children given responsibility early in life.

SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEM

HAMLET-CENTERED; strong collective spirit; no real tribal organization; little political superstructure or leadership beyond hamlets, despite claimances to 'kingship'; some short-lived political alliances; territorial claims on economic basis, not political; inter-hamlet warfare and feuds continue, but less stress; elaborate ritual alliances, some based on marriages; blood bond-friendships; contact with varied outsiders results in differences between groups, but resist dominance by outside groups; social classes include freemen, debtors, slaves, foreigners.

RELIGIOUS SYSTEM

ANIMISTIC; large pantheon of good and evil spirits (YANG) rule fate, control elements, determine harvests, cause illness; placate with ritual sacrifices and heavy drinking; sorcerers deal directly with spirits, establish source of witchcraft, prescribe remedies; humans possess varied soul force; sorcerers have high status, much religious and some political influence; ethnocentric belief in own group as "the people," or first men to appear.

ECONOMY

SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE; based on "slash-and-burn" dry rice (RAY) planting; kitchen gardens and secondary crops of manioc, maize and millet; raise chickens, pigs, buffaloes, goats; fishing, hunting and forest-gathering important; little trade among most groups.

TRANSPORTATION

FOOT PATHS; some use canoes.

AESTHETICS

DRINKING PARTIES, music, folk tales, local costumes and jewelry important to all.

ASPIRATIONS

CONCERNED WITH PRESENT, not future; wish to be left alone to maintain their own way of life: (i.e., to hold celebrations, make rice wine, and own bronze gongs, rice wine jars, water buffalo); some individuals promulgating federated independence movement.

PERSONALITY AND OUTLOOK

PLACID; easily pleased, simple, honest; loyalty first to family, then local group, then to "man with biggest stick;" fear death when in good health, but when sick wish merely to "lay down and die"; strongly resent, fear and distrust Vietnamese.

conservative culturally and retain their traditional dress and particular version of elaborate weddings and funerals, they are not as militant in the preservation of their cultural identity as are the ethnic Chinese. Cultural patterns stress the importance of rice. Despite a tendency to isolate themselves from the Vietnamese, whom they distrust, they no longer have their own schools (other than Pagoda classes) or newspapers. They are patriarchal, have an atonal language which employs different vocabularies for different classes of people, and are taller, darker skinned and more muscular than the Vietnamese.

Warfare was once an important characteristic of the Khmer, and able-bodied men from 20-50 still tend to take their place as members of the RF and PF. In recent months, small groups of formerly dissident Khmer have come over to the GVN side and have been absorbed into the local defense structure. These "white scarfs" or "white turbans" were members of the military army of a Cambodian Government-sponsored politico-military organization, the Khmer Kompuchea Krom (KKK). The KKK seeks the return to Cambodia of certain southern provinces now a part of SVN; they carry out propaganda and intelligence collection activities.

Not to be confused with most of the ethnic Khmer minority living in SVN are members of the Khmer Serei (Free Cambodia) Revolutionary Movement. The Khmer Serei Cambodians are a clandestine underground group that operates in exile from across-the-border areas within SVN and Thailand. This organization is anti-Communist and pro-Western; and, together with its political arm (the National Front for the Liberation of Cambodia), is headed by old Cambodian Nationalist Son

Ngoc Thanh. The movement aims to overthrow Prince Sihanouk and utilizes a mobile radio station, political propaganda and troop indoctrination and paramilitary activity to achieve this end. Members of the Khmer Serei have been recruited into the CIDG and are used in units commanded by ARVN Special Forces personnel in the performance of regular anti-VC missions. GVN has provided financial support to the Khmer Serei from time to time, but CIDG members are used only against the Viet Cong (although the military training received may ultimately benefit the KKK).10/

Cham. All that remains in SVN of the once-mighty Empire of Champa are 50,000 Chams who now live in less desirable areas of the Central lowlands, near the coast in Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces. (There are other Chams resident in Cambodia.) Their drab villages are built on the dunes of an ancient dessicated plain which lacks sufficient rainfall to support the growth of trees, gardens or hedges.

The Cham speak a Malayo-Polynesian language (now gradually being replaced by Vietnamese), but their culture reflects the impress of Indian religion and commercial contacts. The superb artistic expression and the four castes which once were present exist no longer. All military and political power has seeped from the Cham as have their onetime upper classes; the survivors have little knowledge of the sophistication of their former civilization.

Despite the loss of much of the beauty and complexity of the ancient Cham culture, degenerate forms of the Brahmin and the Muslim religions still are present. Ancestor worship exists side by side with

the Muslim God and the gods of the Brahmin; the priests of the ramshackle mosques get along well with non-Muslim villagers. Some Cham men marry Vietnamese girls, though to do so means a break with the village, and a requirement to move outside the ancestral compounds.

But, other than providing a few traditional medical remedies highly valued by the Vietnamese, and adding a slightly exotic living-history touch to the melange of ethnic groups in SVN and as a living link to the temple remains viewed by tourists, these survivors of a broken empire have little immediate impact on the present situation. Nevertheless, the Cham must be considered separately from the Montagnard, even though they are related linguistically. The leaders of FULRO and other political leaders, such as Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, clearly intend to utilize the historical greatness of the Cham name to further their own aims.11/

French and Other Foreigners. About 17,000 French citizens live in SVN. Only one-fourth of these are from Metropolitan France. Most are of Oriental descent, primarily ethnic Vietnamese. Yet, although many Vietnamese have bitter memories of the French colonial period, French culture and France itself continues to be regarded highly. Preference for a source of overseas education still is directed at Paris, and a French degree still is requisite to highest status among intellectuals and is a prerequisite to practice as a professional. French teachers in Vietnam today far outnumber US teachers. Some French businessmen who left Vietnam in 1954 have since returned; the French social world flourishes. But there is a significant lack of contact with US and

other Free World representatives. French economic influunce in SVN is more real than apparent; hence, it is underestimated. French cultural influence pervades SVN.

A small but significant number of Indians and Pakistanis reside in SVN. Some of these retain French citizenship obtained in the former French colonies. Most of them are shopkeepers, moneylenders and exchangers in Saigon.

The sprinkling of resident Japanese, Korean, German, Italian and US nongovernmental nationals, totaling a few hundred at most, live in the cities of SVN. Most of them have, or represent, commercial interests. Otherwise there are few non-Vietnamese, apart from the increasingly massive numbers of United States and Free World military and civil representatives who are temporarily present in support of the war effort.

The fact that there are numerous ethnic groups in SVN should <u>not</u> seriously interfere with efforts to bring about a responsible cohesion. For example, there are none of the serious ethnic-religious differences that confound Hindu-Muslim relationships in India. In fact, the cultural traditions of the area stress harmony and the desirability of syncretism. And, overwhelmingly significant is the fact that ethnic Vietnamese so predominate in numbers, and their culture is so homogeneous and pervasive, that they offer a major stabilizing potential. This fact, however, must not be permitted to obscure the reality that existing cultural and attitudinal cleavages between ethnic groups do provide useful tools for troublemakers; the VC have put them to use, with marked impact.


Religious Groups

Despite fiction with respect to the significance and the activities of various "cliques and claques," widespread interest in religions of the world has ensured the availability of useful data on religion in SVN. With the growth of interest in political manipulation, and the active part played in recent courses of history by priests and followers of religious belief systems, an understanding of these fundamental groups becomes critical. (See: ANNEX B)

The four principal religious belief systems in SVN in some respects cut across regional and provincial lines. (See: Figure 1-15) Mahayana Buddhists, Roman Catholics, Hoa Hao Buddhists and Cao Dai syncretists represent growing political forces that rank second only to the South Vietnamese military in terms of leadership potential. The much smaller groups of Theravada Buddhists, Protestants, Hindus, Moslems and Baha'i are considerably less significant. Animistic beliefs of the Montagnard tribes cannot be considered a formally structured religion in the same sense as other socio-religious systems of Vietnam.

Cutting across formal religious lines in SVN are supplementary belief systems stemming from prehistoric ancestral patterns and from later millenia of Chinese contact. The nature worship, ancestor worship and systems of ethical behavior such as Confucianism and Taoism which spring from these Chinese sources have seeped through most of the varied ethno-linguistic groups of SVN. They are reflected in that eclecticism and syncretism which is such a fundamental part of the South Vietnamese way of life.

Figure 1-15


NON-BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS ADHERENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
LEGEND:
CATHOLIC
HOA HAO
CAO DAI

Buddhists and Catholics alike show an increasing internal cohesiveness. And, at least currently, there is a tendency to seek avenues of cooperation and means of eliminating intergroup differences. Serious frictions between members of the two groups still exist, but shared objectives appear to include winning the current war against communism and building a free and more prosperous society in SVN. Buddhists are afflicted with leadership competition and intergroup friction, by regionalism, by the separatism of small groups and by fundamental differences within and between the Mahayana and Theravada sects. Suspicion of Catholics and hostility to those who do not see things their way continues to characterize some Buddhists. But there is a discernable trend to moderation and cooperation. Catholics also are divided among themselves on regional grounds, although here again moderation appears to be the dominant theme at present.

The dynamic and aggressive Hoa Hao Buddhist sect represents the most clear-cut example of successful local resistance to VC domination, yet those very factors of strong local leadership and locally developed ideology which lead to the Hoa Hao success also may militate against their easy integration with other Vietnamese, if not carefully handled.

The Hoa Hao sect began with Buddhism and made it simpler. Believers are all considered equal and neither hierarchy nor secluded monks are woven into the religion. Doctrine may be preached anywhere; temples and pagodas are not necessary. Rites are simple and underriding, consisting only of a short sentence, or pledge, made twice a day.

Hoa Hao's four precepts are to honor one's parents, love one's country, respect Buddhism and its teaching as well as love one's fellow man. Maroon is a sacred color, because it does not distinguish between colors and is therefore symbolic of human unity.

The less dramatic success and the more syncretic nature of the Cao Dai, taken together with their greater geographic diffusion, offer less of a political threat to GVN, and hence the potential of easier integration with the rest of SVN.

The Viet Cong

The most significant political faction in SVN are the VC. Many useful facts concerning the VC are available. (See: ANNEX C) But none answer the critical question: "Who are the Viet Cong?" It is about as difficult to sift fact from fiction on this issue as it is to explain that apparent resiliency and will to fight which characterizes the Vietnamese insurgent. Possibly the greatest present danger facing the US in Vietnam rises from a possibility that our planners may be deceived by oversimplified answers to this critical question and be led to the conviction that: (1) "the war" can be won by "exterminating the VC"; and, (2) the most appropriate strategy to follow is that solely entailing the use of "infantry, artillery and armor."

This cautionary warning is not to deny that the ultimate stimulus for the VC-NLF insurgency stems from NVN. Neither can it be denied that the VC insurgents are encouraged, materially supported and -- at least in some very significant respects -- directed by Hanoi, as influenced

by Moscow and Peking. Nor can it be denied that communist inspiration has forged the false issue of US "colonial" designs upon SVN, or that the VC have drafted and otherwise forced unwilling Vietnamese countrymen to fight for the insurgent cause. Communist philosophy constitutes the ultimate external stimulus to VC activity, despite methodological strife between the two major red capitols.

But neither can it be denied that VC insurgents have moved significantly toward capturing a true "revolution of rising expectations"; they have capitalized upon oppressive tactics utilized by the GVN and have made practical use of the harsh realities of a tragic situation. Nor can one deny that the VC insurgents display a fierce will to fight and capacity to die for principles that stem from far more than external ideological stimuli. In SVN, the Free World forces are fighting against something other than "communism."

Who are the Viet Cong? Overwhelmingly they are South Vietnamese. A very responsible US official contends that "there is at least an element of the Viet Cong in every Vietnamese.12/ Strength data of real significance in determining the extent of VC insurgency are not those developed by order-of-battle intelligence specialists. Radiating from most individual VC are webs of kinship responsibility and neighborhood preferences that bind together a larger proportion of the South Vietnamese citizenry than could ever be deduced via traditional intelligence methods. This interrelated set of webs of responsibility and preference accounts as much for insurgent successes as does VC resolve in battle.

In contrast to the foregoing statement, however, an additional aspect of VC success has been manifested in the effective separation of individual VC from some of the inhibiting aspects of kinship. The VC use existing kin relationships in their manipulation of the people. However, kin relationships (and all that these entail) would not appear to be restrictive within the VC organization itself. The VC, in a sense, represent an entirely new society. In this new society, the "ties that bind" are those of achievement, loyalty, dedication and motivation. These ties supersede but feed upon those of kinship, and the disavowal of old indebtedness. Yet, these same old ties appear to be the obstacles which inhibit the GVN from effectively executing their programs, and they provide stimuli which support corruption, nepotism and a tendency to regard family over nation.

The VC insurgents are South Vietnamese from whom most traditional restraints have been stripped by the ruthless discipline and organization of a new ideology. But, for the VC, the explicit goals of that ideology (rather than its implicit philosophy) are based upon very real nationalistic and political requirements and the harsh lessons of history. Many VC are inspired by intense love of their own people and by a deep-seated hatred of Western outsiders -- a hatred based upon the inescapable fact that the outsiders not only are strangers and nonkinsmen but are recent intruders. Even more than by nationalism, large numbers of VC are motivated by a desire for a simple form of social justice and a strong, just government of their own. And in this they differ from their noninsurgent countrymen only in that they are effectively led by disciplined leaders.

Leadership! Professionalism! The ultimate reason -- that so-called "mystique" -- which accounts for the apparent VC success in battle is a form of emergent organizational leadership. This leadership fully recognizes individual ability regardless of parentage, and draws upon the fundamental fact that a true soldier depends upon the respect of his fellows and is bound closely thereby to his leaders and his organization.

The ramifications of successful leadership, even more than secondary factors such as the use of kin relationships, have enabled the VC to draw strength from the roots of the insurgency and to achieve their present state of control over the SVN countryside. The GVN, in its successive regimes, also has had the identical opportunity to draw upon kin relationships and to exploit instances of past social injustice. But its leaders have lacked (and still lack) an ideological focus; they do not yet conceive of, much less sustain, an effective system for either identifying or developing and furthering leadership potential.

The facts of inspired leadership and an apparent quest for social justice, together with ramifications of kin relationship and the interrelated ties of the vast numbers of people involved, account for the significance of the VC to the SVN future. One who sees the true complexities of the situation in Vietnam must agree with the statement of a US senior officer who, when questioned by PROVN, maintained:

> "I cannot answer the question, 'Who are the Viet Cong?', but I can tell you this: whoever they are, and whatever the outcome, they will play a fundamental role in the Vietnam of the future."

SVN eventually must make use of the VC and their kinsmen; most especially their leadership potential must be exploited. To "kill them off," as US proponents of simple solutions contend and as is practiced today by GVN, will prevent attainment of our basic national objective with respect to SVN. For a country cannot be free if it lacks sufficient leaders; it cannot be independent if its human resources have been destroyed; it cannot be non-communist to the exclusion of being pro-something.


The Provinces

The most significant administrative level in SVN, in terms of pacification, continues to be the province. But province boundaries and areas seem always subject to adjustment in order to fit the actual or assumed needs of the politico-military situation. Some provinces have been abolished by decree and others have been created to extend government to the rural areas. But such changes merely connote the trappings, rather than the realities, of government. Despite such ploys, the province remains the most meaningful location of Vietnamese military, political, legal, educational and other administrative institutions. The character of a province chief and his staff (See: Figure 1-16) ultimately can constitute a critical difference in the achievement of US-GVN objectives.

The number of SVN provinces has varied between 41 and 45 from time to time; currently there are 43. (See: Figure 1-17) Provinces are subdivided into districts, and districts into villages and hamlets, as will be described in Chapter III. The province chief, currently


Figure I-16

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION



NOTE: This diagram reflects the realities of dual direction and control within the latest available schematic depiction of an idealized province. The actual structure of any particular province might differ considerably from that shown above.

Figure 1-17


NORMAL GEOGRAPHIC PROPORTIONS
PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM
SKEWED PROPORTIONS TO REFLECT COMPARATIVE POPULATION SIZE
17TH PARALLEL
THUA THIEN
QUANG NAM
QUANG TRI
QUANG TIN
KONTUM
QUANG NGAI
PLEIKU
PHU BON
BINH DINH
DARLAC
TUYEN DUC
QUANG DUC
LONG KHANH
LAMDONG
PHU YEN
PHUOC LONG
BINH DUONG
KHANH HOA
BINH LONG
TAY NINH
NINH THUAN
BIEN HOA
BINH THUAN
BINH TUY
HAU NGHIA
GIA DINH
DINH TUONG
LONG AN
VINH LONG
PHUOC TUY
KIEN TUONG
KIEN PHONG
GO CONG
KIEN HOA
CHAUDOC
VINH BINH
CHUONG THIEN
PHONG DINH
KIEN GIANG
BA XUYEN
AN GIANG
BAC LIEU
AN XUYEN

a military officer in all but two provinces, and concurrently a sector commander (hence, a creature of the ARVN corps commander), receives advice from several US representatives, responds to the dictates and whims of corps and division commanders and their staff, is influenced by the various GVN ministers and bears responsibility for the entire area. As will be seen in the subsequent analysis of Hau Nghia Province, these divergent pressures surely relate to the critical nature of the present situation.

The current contention "There is not one war, there are 43 wars in South Vietnam" requires examination. Despite the delineation of Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) and Division Tactical Areas (DTA) of responsibility, most military operations in SVN take place within single provinces and are sharply constrained by province boundaries. And, the same is true of boundaries of districts within the provinces. The VC evidently have recognized this vulnerability and take advantage of it; however, there are some indications that the VC themselves suffer from a somewhat similar boundary-preserve fixation. There are apparent realities that underscore this "43 wars" concept as an almost basic ingredient of today's situation. For the Vietnamese appear unwilling to delegate responsibility or authority; officials do not coordinate adequately; and, there is no aggressive assumption of the leadership responsibility required to close with and defeat an enemy.


From the viewpoint of strictly military considerations of terrain, habitat, the nature and disposition of the enemy, as well as ultimate strategic facts bearing upon the situation, the "43 wars" concept is

not valid. But the extant "43 wars" of SVN constitute an administrative fact of life. These administrative considerations must soon be modified to accord with more vital requirements of military operations and regional characteristics of SVN, if US-GVN objectives are to be achieved.

PROVN was charged with the analysis of SVN on a province-by-province basis. There are varied approaches to making such an analysis; Figure 1-18 represents graphically the results of one such approach. These data and their symbolic depictions show the overlapping nature of similarities and differences between provinces; to some extent, these similarities and differences reflect regional characteristics. Comparing these to the map of SVN and considering their graphic depictions in the context of our acknowledged principles of war, underscore the requirement that there should not be "43 wars" ongoing in SVN.

An analysis of the current provincial situation, taken from responses to the Ambassador's monthly list of nine critical questions, 13/ is reflected in Figure 1-19. This depiction supplements that of Figure 1-1 in that it reflects whether or not the trend of province movement toward "pacification" this month is more favorable than it was last month. This constitutes the official opinion of the responsible US military and civilian advisors in the field as modified by higher headquarters. Hence, it tends to point out trouble areas for which corrective action may be necessary. Nevertheless, a comparison of

COMPARISON OF PROVINCES




LEGEND:

ELEVATION (METERS)	0 - 200	200 - 500	500 - 1000	1000 - 2000	OVER 2000
TERRAIN	LEVEL TO ROLLING	ROLLING TO HILLY	HILLS AND LOW MOUNTAINS	INTERMEDIATE MOUNTAINS	HIGH MOUNTAINS
GEOLOGY	ALLUVIUM	SEDIMENTARY	METAMORPHIC	EXTRUSIVE	INTRUSIVE
RAINFALL (INCHES)	40 - 60	60 - 80	80 - 100	100 - 140	OVER 140
GROUND WATER	DEEP SOURCES FRESH	ALL DEPTHS FRESH	WELLS EASY TO SITE	WELLS HARD TO SITE	WELLS VERY HARD TO SITE
VEGETATION	CULTIVATED AREAS	MARSH	SWAMP	OPEN FOREST	DENSE FOREST
SIZE (THOUSAND KM.)	0 - 2	2 - 4	4 - 6	6 - 8	8 - 10
POPULATION (THOUSANDS)	800 - 1000	600 - 800	400 - 600	200 - 400	0 - 200
VILLAGES	0 - 29	30 - 59	60 - 89	90 - 119	120 - 150
TOTAL RICE PRODUCTION (THOUSANDS)	400 - 500	300 - 400	200 - 300	100 - 200	0 - 200
PER CAPITA RICE PRODUCTION	800 - 1000	600 - 800	400 - 600	200 - 400	0 - 200

PROGRESS TOWARD STABILITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

PROVINCIAL TRENDS, NOVEMBER 1965



COMPARATIVE ADEQUACY OF PROGRESS TOWARD STABILITY IS REFLECTED BY INTENSITY OF SHADING.

LEGEND: SOME PROGRESS

SERIOUS DETERIORATION

Figures 1-1 and 1-19 suggests some of the problems raised by the use of current indicators of progress. (See: Chapter II)

The province of Hau Nghia (west of Saigon) currently is in serious difficulty. US reporters label its populace as "anti-GVN" and its officials as "unreceptive to US advice." The study of extreme cases sometimes shows more clear cut facts to analyze than does a study of "average" cases. As such a special analysis of factors involved in Hau Nghia's case was accomplished by PROVN in SVN during December of 1965; this was supplemented by field research. The district of Cu Chi was selected for even more intensive analysis. Previous and on-going RAND studies provided additional materials.14/ A comparison of the results of these studies indicated that Hau Nghia reflected many of the critical problem areas that have led SVN to its present undesirable situation. These factors are shown in the map and factual matter of Figures 1-20 through 1-22.

The results of a province-by-province analysis, supplemented by a study in depth of the province of Hau Nghia, demonstrate that:

(1) Each province shares certain characteristics with each other province.

(2) But, each province forms a separate and unique entity.

(3) There are some very wide differences among many of the provinces; others closely resemble one another.

(4) Although the province chief occupies one of the most critical GVN administrative posts in SVN, too often he is appointed as a result of favoritism, personal loyalty -- or outright bribery -- rather than




HAU NGHIA PROVINCE SITUATION
25 NOVEMBER 1965
PHU DUC
CU CHI
DUC HUE
DUC HOA
LEGEND
SECURED 12,285
UNDERGOING SECURING 38,951
CLEARED 65,817
NEITHER GVN NOR VC CONTROL 0
VC CONTROL 109,120
GENERAL LOCATION OF VC BASE
POPULATION 226,173


Figure 1-21


THE STRUCTURE OF HAU N



E OF HAU NGHIA PROVINCE


S. secret GVN




DUC HUE DISTRICT - DUC HUE DISTRICT
DUC HOA DISTRICT - DUC HOA DISTRICT
CU CHI DISTRICT - CU CHI DISTRICT
PHU DUC DISTRICT -
LONG AN PROVINCE - LONG AN PROVINCE - LONG AN PROVINCE - LONG AN PROVINCE - LONG AN PROVINCE -
CE - BINH DUONG PROVINCE - BINH
TAY NINH PROVINCE -

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VC

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- VIET CONG ORGANIZATION
- PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
- DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
( ) - STRENGTH FIGURES
pfd - PRESENT FOR DUTY
afo - AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONS
CU CHI DISTRICT - CU CHI DISTRICT
PHU DUC DISTRICT - PHU DUC DISTRICT
- LONG AN PROVINCE -
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HAU NGHIA PROVINCE FACTOR ANALYSIS

NAME: HAU NGHIA - "Everlasting Devotion"

LOCATION: In III Corps Tactical Zone, 25th Division Tactical Area, interface with tongue of Cambodia (see Figure 1-23); 21 kilometers from Saigon.

HISTORY AND SITUATION: Created 13 October 1963, from Duc Hoa and Duc Hue districts of Long An, Cu Chi district of Binh Duong and Phu Duc District of Tay Ninh provinces, supposedly to bring least secure districts under "one manageable area" of quarantine and control; Cu Chi declared a "pilot" district in Hop Tac, but no significant assistance ever given; earlier was site of unsuccessful Diem regime "strategic hamlet" experiment; GVN lacks effective control despite large percent of Cao Dai adherents and nearness to Saigon; major problem in 1965 when CG of III Corps made nepotistic effort to place known ineffective ARVN major as province chief; USOM representative kidnapped by VC January 1966.

AREA: 1,031 square kilometers; 40th in relative size of the 43 GVN provinces.

POPULATION: 264,000 approximately; all census figures vary; 20th in relative size of the GVN provinces; 193-290 persons per sq. km. in northeast part; 97-193 in central area; 19-97 in southern part.

CAPITOL TOWN: Khiem Cuong (Bao Trai); 2,000 population; no urban areas.

DISTRICTS:

Cu Chi (Phu Hoa)	-	107,300 population.
Duc Hoa	-	88,500 population.
Duc Hue	-	20,500 population.
Phu Duc	-	47,700 population.

VILLAGES: 24 HAMLETS: 153

ETHNIC GROUPS: Almost completely ethnic Vietnamese; no significant numbers of Montagnard, Cham or Khmer.

RELIGIOUS ADHERANCE:
47% Buddhists
33% Cao Dai
18% Catholic
Some Hoa Hao in Regional Forces.

TERRAIN: Nearly level, under 100 meters elevation.

PRECIPITATION: 60-80 inches annually.

DRAINAGE: Marshy; all but NE area wet or inundated annually; cut by Song Van Co Dong River.

ROAD CONSTRUCTION SUITABILITY: Plastic clay in marshes, swamps and flood plains, silt that overlies clay of some flood plain areas, makes drainage and soil stabilization difficult; streams, canals and marshes restrict road alignment.

ECONOMIC PRODUCTS, (1963):
81,000 tons rice
130,000 tons sugar
220 tons rubber
(some tobacco, pineapples, peanuts and manioc).

INDUSTRIES: Sugar refining, 50 rice mills, food processing mills at Hiep Hoa; textiles at Hoc Mon, 3 peanut oil factories, 3 brick kilns, ice cream factory, coffee factory; national sugar refinery at Hiep Hoa.

GEOLOGY AND SOILS: Quarternary alluvium sands, gravel and unconsolidated material.

RURAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS: 126 hamlets planned; 8 are secured, 19 undergoing securing, 19 in cleared areas.

VEGETATION: Cultivated open paddy fields separated by tongues of marshland in NW and South; few trees.

GEOLOGY AND SOILS: Quarternary alluvium sands, gravel and unconsolidated material.

MINERAL RESOURCES: None known.

CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL RESOURCES: None known.

HIGHWAYS: 53 kilometers of all weather two lane, asphalt surfaced highway, Route 1 runs through Northern area from Saigon to Cambodian border; fair condition; total of 322 kilometers of roads, many now impassable.

AIRFIELD: Small field at Bao Trai now closed down; military field at 25th Div Hq.

WATERWAYS: Major river passes through Southern area; another waterway forms NE border.

TELECOMMUNICATION: None; 39 TR-5 and 154 MT-1 radios installed in hamlets; also military nets.

ELECTRIC POWER: None.

VIET CONG: (See: Figure 1-23) Control 53% of population, influence at least 42% more (GVN controls 5% or less); continuously disrupt economy -- block river and highway traffic, mine crops, terrorize population; urge local people to revolt against GVN officials, appeal to them not to assist in constructing government-protected hamlets, call on local youth not to perform military service; attempt to set up "peoples organization" for old people, women and girls; by Feb 1965 4,291 total active VC (Company of 60 provincial hardcore; 1,085 cadre and 987 guerrillas of irregular militia; 979 secret self defense corps; 1,180 people's self-defense).

DISTRICT CHIEF COMMENTARY: We are "pilot district," but have not got enough men, can get hardly any medicines, have no ambulance, no dispensary, no morgue; yet spend hundreds of dollars a day here in town on artillery shells for suppressive fire; if we are to be real "pilot district," promises given to us so many months ago must be made concrete -- "il faut concretisation'"

DISTRICT ADVISOR COMMENTARY: Losing part of territory every day; local forces not big enough; ARVN has regiment in the district; they sweep but do not hold; will not cross over borders, so VC take advantage of this to create "safe haven;" division itself tied down in guarding bridges, and always must be back home from operations at night; no recruiting because no young people left -- taking many losses, and no replacements; school construction going well, but effort may be wasted as areas in which building are going to VC; construction MCO can go anywhere he wants, and people work on schools willingly through PTA, because VC can send own kids to schools; RF-PF will build schools, though will not build their own quarters; local GVN officials will not build or spend money when it does not fit earlier programs; some officials will not spend money for anything, as afraid of making mistake; people will not eat bulgar wheat, despite USOM representative recipes and sales talk, (and know we don't eat or use this in our own messhalls); another reason is psychological impact of item given only to "poor, sick and wounded."

MACV ADVISORS ASSESSMENT: Biggest problems are (1) Lack of leadership and unwillingness to delegate authority; (2) Lack of willingness to close with enemy or take casualties; (3) Lack of supervision of execution of orders; (4) Insufficient troop strength; (5) Inability to get rid of ineffective French overseers; also, Popular Forces soldiers paid equivalent of less than $10.00 a month; originally supposed to both work own farm and to fight, either on guard duty or on local operations; now there is no time even for training, and cannot live on pay received; pay so poorly administered that PF recruit may have to desert to get enough to eat; Regional Forces do not get adequate weapons, because: cannot keep adequate leadership because no delegation of authority; if they discuss it (sufficient reason, that is no one to replace him.

CAS ADVISOR COMMENTARY: Basic problem is GVN lack of understanding of what war really is about, the interrelationship of military and civilian facets; too much separation of military operations and civic action; other basic problems are: the basic Vietnamese character itself, with disregard for all but oneself and one's own family; lack of leadership; and prevalent corruption; counter-terror teams, political action teams and advanced political action teams are at province and district chiefs disposal; have specific missions, but are not always used in these missions, hence there is need to educate province and district chiefs; Cu Chi lost its advance political action team through misuse of funds; another major problem: even if RVN decided to agree to amnesty, might be impossible to get the ideal VC to stop action -- 95% of VC in this province are local, not from the North; they get (and need) very little help from Hanoi; can make grenades and other weapons almost without outside help.

PROVR VISITOR COMMENTARY: Only the areas within military posts are under GVN control, and this without much discipline; utilized battalion-plus mid-day operation to remove dead and wounded from outpost only two kilometers from district capitol of Cu Chi; insist armed escort to walk 100 yards from military compound in district capitol market, on route 1; so many radios lost to VC that they monitor all radio chatter; utilize flak jackets, loaded weapons with safety off and high speed jeep travel to drive few hundred yards on main road from district HQ to regimental HQ; lack of liaison between adjacent districts/provinces caused death of civilians from one province by artillery from next province, when crossed boundary line to work in regular plantation, because others assumed were VC; despite 20 years experience of district chief ARVN captain, once in French army, and years of American advisors, routine operation clearly demonstrated lack of understanding of most basic fundamentals of security; no attempt at troop discipline or population control; command element easily spotted by "antenna farm;" civilians of all ages and both sexes on every type of vehicle move through "column of bunches" formation during entire combat operation; attempted to eliminate nearby sniping only by suppressive fire -- no effort to maneuver; troops dispose of basic load by shooting up town as withdraw; problem in training and disciplining troops because wives and children live in same compound with men; wives cause much trouble, aggravated by men having arms and ammunition in quarters; intelligence effort fairly good, but not given sufficient credence; both times nearby town overrun had firm advance information, but by time report "typed up" as required, too late to be of use; efforts by advisors to teach English impeded by poor quality of texts provided, lack of fundamental training in how to teach noncilitary, non-US personnel; district chief supposedly "most inefficient, most corrupt in RVN;" if this so, have little to fear; he is intelligent and courageous, but lacks adequately trained advice and appropriate sensible support.

Figure 1-22

SECRET

R ANALYSIS

OILS: Quarternary alluvium sands, gravel and lidated material.

UCTION PROGRESS: 126 hamlets planned; 6 are , 19 undergoing securing, 19 in cleared areas.

Cultivated open paddy fields separated by of marshland in NW and South; few trees.

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CAS ADVISOR COMMENTARY: Basic problem is GVN lack of understanding of what war really is about, the interrelationship of military and civilian facets; too much separation of military operations and civic action; other basic problems are: the basic Vietnamese character itself, with disregard for all but oneself and one's own family, lack of leadership, and prevalent corruption; counter-terror teams, political action teams and advanced political action teams are at province and district chiefs disposal; have specific missions, but are not always used in these missions, hence there is need to educate province and district chiefs; Cu Chi lost its advance political action team through misuse of funds; another major problem: even if NVN decided to agree to amnesty, might be impossible to get the local VC to stop action -- 90% of VC in this province are local, not from the North; they get (and need) very little help from Hanoi; can make grenades and other weapons almost without outside help.

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DIVISION G5 ADVISOR COMMENTS: Basic problem is no one left in hamlets, no administration in hamlets -- yet there are 9 division equivalents facing us; G-5 of division handles Rural Construction, Psychological Warfare and Civic Action; attempt to integrate efforts of province chiefs through sector S-5s; JUSPAO now beginning to work; we are beginning to move out, and we can move out toward our objective in Rural Construction, even under the present tactical situation.

USOM ADVISORS COMMENTARY: VC control entire area, except for military posts; some officials, including district chiefs, "totally corrupt" and have "an accomodation" with the VC; most fundamental problem is clash between province chief (one general's protege) and 25th Division commander (another general's protege); division does not seek out VC, breaks contact when going is rough; main effort of CG is to avoid casualties; some indication he tries to avoid offending VC in case they win; still losing ground militarily, but not doing so bad economically; Cu Chi most significant district; worst corruption at regional level (corps commanders), hence provincial and district chiefs' jobs "for sale" at known price; women (and the favors of wives) play a major part in corruption, financially and sexually.

BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST ANALYSIS: Villagers are reluctant even to discuss past, for fear either VC or GVN will harm them; traditional village cohesiveness disrupted by wartime relocation of families, many deaths due to fighting, people moving to Saigon, contact with soldiers; estimates vary, but at least 55 to 70 percent villagers support VC, only one to 13 percent support GVN, balance not committed; when French returned in 1946, people identified selves with Viet Minh; rape, looting and violence by French soldiers alienated villagers; after Dien Bien Phu some Viet Minh and families went North, never returned; people accepted Diem Government at first, but soon resented loss of village autonomy, new GVN-appointed officials who were strangers, Diem's cult of "personalism," Madame Nhu's activities, Catholic favoritism, and the power of the Can Lao (Labor) party lost faith in Diem and were antagonized by corruption and cruelty of administrators, climaxed by forced relocation to strategic hamlets; VC played on GVN antagonisms, but then themselves soon antagonized people by increased taxes and other demands; but VC maintain presence in the villages and exploit kinship ties; use a "carrot" approach, supplemented by terroristic murders, kidnappings and tortures; Rau Nghia important to VC as passageway for men and material from Cambodia to the rest of SVN; whole VC Bns can move intact through area; but GVN Bn cannot operate as a Bn size unit because of defense missions; cannot be gone on operation for more than one day, and must always leave a guard force.

Villagers judge GVN and VC by ability of each to provide security to pursue occupations and to raise children in peace; villagers testify that security is most fundamental consideration; villagers have witnessed inability or unwillingness of GVN soldiers to provide continuous protection; have been provided security and then deprived of it without explanation too many times; are not persuaded GVN has a genuine interest in their welfare and future; GVN presence rarely felt in village away from district towns; officials have insufficient personal contact with individual villagers, bureaucracy eliminates the personal touch required; VC attempt to identify selves with villagers and their problems; they do not destroy schools, but do eliminate other GVN public services; react more rapidly than GVN troops; infiltrate GVN troops and then perform acts to discredit GVN; GVN Information Service program a glaring failure, as is Chieu Hoi; to provide permanent pacification, GVN must build up its village organization to actually maintain and supervise programs; above all, GVN must learn to keep it's promises to the people.

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on the basis of his training, background and personal aptitude for the job. And, too often, he does not remain in the job long enough to learn it properly or to benefit from the learning process if this has time to take place.

(5) The responsibilities of province chiefs not only are complicated and confounded by VC politico-military activities and by inadequate and inappropriate US-GVN administrative structures, but their potential as nation building leaders is restricted by the relatively low rank and lack of social position accorded to many incumbents.

Despite these facts, which are clearly apparent in-country and warrant no added demonstration by sophisticated analytical forms, the US-GVN effort by and large has tended to treat all provinces alike. Both GVN and the US Country Team has dealt with them as relatively identical segments of a whole, rather than as varied individual entities. Hence, they often are provided with cadres of the same size and advisor teams of the same size; they may even be allocated resources of the same amount, rather than have their unique requirements recognized.

Factors of Change

History and the social sciences do not, as yet, have much to contribute to US planning when it comes to setting forth objectives for national change and to determining specific means of achieving these objectives, despite the untapped potential of the use of such scientists. (See: ANNEX K) Nevertheless, there are two fundamental

facts to which both history and the social sciences have attested over and over again:

(1) Change, including change in the nature of nations as well as in the physique of animals and of men, is inescapable; to unduly avoid or preclude change is to invite death.

(2) Factors of change are inextricably interrelated; to vary the intensity or the nature of one factor cannot help but impinge upon the intensity and the nature of other factors.

What are the factors of change that impinge upon the situation in SVN, and upon the direction in which that nation is moving? Some of the more significant factors are depicted in Figure 1-23. The threefold significance of the interacting factors to US strategy and policy follows:

First, the multiple forces set forth in Figure 1-23, and in preceding chapter discussions, negate simplistic arguments by those who contend that "the solution" to the problem of Vietnam lies only in "killing VC," "more combat divisions," "negotiations," or "leave the country to the obvious regional power, China." Varying a single factor may influence some of the other factors, but such manipulation cannot assure control over sufficient numbers of them to achieve an objective.

For example: There is a general consensus that the single most important fact of life which prevents nation building in SVN is the lack of security. Few Rural Construction programs can be carried out

Figure 1-23

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THE HARDENING OF IDEOLOGICA

NON-ALIGNED NATIONS

LAOS
CONTROL OF STRATEGIC AREAS
INTERNAL IMBALANCE OF POWER
PAST TREATMENT BY FREE WORLD
INTERNAL UNDERDEVELOPMENT

CAMBODIA
FEAR OF VIETNAMESE EXPANSIONISM
RESENTMENT OF UNITED STATES

INDONESIA

SINGAPORE

BURMA

OTHERS

FRANCE
ECONOMIC INTERESTS
INTELLIGENCE
CULTURAL TIES

COMMUNIST WORLD

RED CHINA
PREVAILING MILITANT COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY
IDEOLOGICAL QUARREL WITH RUSSIA
MEMORIES OF WESTERN AGGRESSION
INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS (FOOD SHORTAGES)
HISTORIC RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM
GEOGRAPHIC PLACEMENT
IMMENSE POPULATION
OVERSEAS CHINESE COMMUNITIES

RUSSIA
CURRENT VERSION OF COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY
IDEOLOGICAL QUARREL WITH CHINA
GEOGRAPHIC RELATION TO CHINA
INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

NORTH VIETNAM
COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY
NATIONALISTIC GOALS
NEED FOR RESOURCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM

OTHERS

THE FILTER OF GENERAL FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR

PAL FACTORS THAT
JPON SOUTH VIETNAM

ESS OF MAN'S SOCIAL EVOLUTION

PRESSURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EVENTS

THE HARDENING OF IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS

COMMUNIST WORLD

RED CHINA
PREVAILING MILITANT COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY
IDEOLOGICAL QUARREL WITH RUSSIA
MEMORIES OF WESTERN AGGRESSION
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RUSSIA
CURRENT VERSION OF COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY
IDEOLOGICAL QUARREL WITH CHINA
GEOGRAPHIC RELATION TO CHINA
INTERNAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

NORTH VIETNAM
COMMUNIST PHILOSOPHY
NATIONALISTIC GOALS
NEED FOR RESOURCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM

OTHERS

FREE WORLD

UNITED STATES

POLITICAL
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS
DIPLOMATIC ATTITUDES
CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES
"COUNTRY TEAM" CONCEPT
POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS
"BLANK"-TYPE ORGANIZATIONS
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
FREE WORLD LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY

SECURITY
CONTAINING COMMUNISM
MILITARY ATTITUDES
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
STATISTICAL INDEXES
PERSONNEL PRACTICES
TACTICAL DOCTRINE
CASUALTIES
TEST CASE

ECONOMIC
FOOD SURPLUSES
MILITARY SURPLUSES

SOCIO-CULTURAL
ACADEMIC ATTITUDES
MISSIONARY ACTIVITY

KOREA
SUPPORT BY US
PRESTIGE GOALS
ANTICOMMUNISM


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
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THE FILTER OF GENERAL FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR

EXTERNAL


THE FILTER OF SOCIO-CULTURAL OUTLOOK
THE ENNUI OF WAR AND OPPRESSION
SECURITY
HERITAGE
BANDITRY
WARLORDISM
BORDERS
WAR ZONES
PAVN
MAIN FORCE VC
VC GUERRILLAS
RVNAF
STRUCTURE
DISCIPLINE
TRAINING
LEADERSHIP
LOGISTICS
DEPENDENTS
SENIOR OFFICERS
TACTICS
CONSCRIPTION
DEFECTION
WEAPONS USE
ARTILLERY
AIR STRIKES
DEFOLIATION
HERBICIDES
GAS
RURAL CONSTRUCTION
CHIEU HOI
VETERANS
CRIMES
POLICE
PRISONS
US ADVISORS
POLITICAL
NATIONALISM
GENEVA ACCORDS
REUNIFICATION
GVN STRUCTURE
MILITARY LEADERS
"MINISTRIES"
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BUREAUCRACY
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
CORRUPTION
PUBLIC INFORMATION
VOTING
JUSTICE
LEGAL SYSTEM
COURTS
REFUGEES - DPS
FULRO
KHMER SERI
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
ECONOMIC
NATURAL RESOURCES
WEATHER
WATER
RICE
FOOD PRODUCTION
AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS
FISHERIES
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
LAND REFORM
TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATION
CONSTRUCTION
HOUSING
URBAN AREAS
ELECTRIFICATION
URBANISM
FINANCE
BUSINESS
CURRENCY
INDUSTRY
SMUGGLING
HEALTH - DISEASE
DEATH
THE RESTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF H
THE IMPRESS OF HISTO

3


EXTERNAL
INTERNAL
THE FILTER OF SOCIO-CULTURAL OUTLOOK
THE ENNUI OF WAR AND OPPRESSION
POLITICAL
NATIONALISM
GENEVA ACCORDS
REUNIFICATION
GVN STRUCTURE
MILITARY LEADERS
"MINISTRIES"
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BUREAUCRACY
POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
CORRUPTION
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TRANSPORTATION
COMMUNICATION
CONSTRUCTION
HOUSING
URBAN AREAS
ELECTRIFICATION
URBANISM
FINANCE
BUSINESS
CURRENCY
INDUSTRY
SMUGGLING
HEALTH – DISEASE
DEATH
SOCIO-CULTURAL
OUTLOOK – PERSONALITY
THEMES
PRIMACY OF FAMILY
HARMONY
ADORNMENT
GAMBLING
MUSIC – ART
LANGUAGE – WRITING
DEMOGRAPHY
REGIONS
VILLAGES
CLASSES
PEASANT – ELITE
RURAL – URBAN
RELIGIONS
BUDDHISTS
CATHOLICS
HOA HAO
CAO DAI
PROTESTANTS
ETHNIC GROUPS
VIETNAMESE
CHINESE
MONTAGNARD
CHAM
KHMER
FOREIGNERS
WOMEN
YOUTH
EDUCATION
STUDENTS
INTELLECTUALS
ESTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF HABITAT
E IMPRESS OF HISTORY.

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in areas where the VC control movement on land and water as well as demonstrate the capability to eliminate leaders or GVN public servants at will, by assasination or abduction. This fact often is cited in argumentation supporting the "kill VC" solution to the SVN problem. But, this simplistic approach neglects other significant facts and factors. To concentrate resources solely on the "kill" factor, at the neglect of Rural Construction and other significant means of winning the people of SVN over to GVN, permits the continuation of some of the very factors that stimulated VC growth to its present dimension. Hence, the "kill VC" approach breeds <u>more</u> VC who will have to be killed. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, this approach could result in the eventual "winning" of a war in a country that becomes depopulated in the process. This is not the US "object ... which lies beyond the war."

A second example of the result of concentrating efforts on varying single factors may be drawn from the administrative field. There is a general consensus that the GVN bureaucracy is seriously afflicted with graft, as well as being ineffective. It would be technically feasible to eliminate most graft by the combined use of a substantial number of US counterpart monitors at all echelons, joint signatures on planning and disbursement vouchers, computerized data processing to trace all actions, a substantial field-reporter and action-officer inspection system as well as the application of strong leverage. And, there is no doubt that such measures <u>should</u> be undertaken; the results would facilitate the direct application of funds to their programed projects.

Nevertheless, despite the elimination of graft, the administrative system still might remain ineffective if additional measures were not taken to resolve problems raised by neglect of other factors in the graft-corruption equation. One of these today is that form of deliberate misrepresentation which is practiced by a responsible official to meet the human needs of his office. For example, a district chief may retain dead or AWOL PF soldiers on his "present for duty" roster, as his sole means of assisting their resident dependents -- in the face of other forms of GVN inadequacy. And, because "squeeze" traditionally has been the prerogative of Oriental officials, this is as much a factor in the present levels of their wages as is the salary of our own waitresses whose pay is largely dependent upon tips. Before excessive graft and corruption can be controlled, one must resolve such other problems as an adequate salary for the official from whom a traditional source of income will be removed, as well as the enactment and enforcement of laws, and provision of funds to realistically ameliorate his other responsibilities. (See: Chapter III)

Second, the very complexity of, and conflict between, those factors involved make it obvious that if GVN and Free World forces achieve a goal satisfying the leaders of one of the US social or political groups related to a factor impinging on the situation, and that factor is in conflict with the goals of another social or political group, the possibility of satisfying both groups is severely

limited. There is little likelihood of a national or an international socio-political consensus being reached on any major facet of the Vietnamese situation.

For example: there are major opinion-forming groups in the US which publicly and vociferously question our policies in SVN and our right to be in Vietnam. They advocate withdrawal. Other groups not only support our presence in SVN but advocate more vigorous prosecution of the war. (See: Figure 1-23) The attitudes, methods and activities of such groups relate to ultimate objectives which have little to do with the country of Vietnam. To continue or to "win" the war in SVN, by either military or other means, conflicts with the ultimate objectives of these groups. They will continue to use the realities of military action there to meet their own ends as long as the American presence continues. On the other hand, should the US pull out of SVN and no longer maintain a military presence there, and not achieve that objective for which so many casualties have been suffered, the veterans' organizations of the country would raise a major objection with serious political overtones.

Third, and most significant for the results of the PROVN analysis, is the significance of the interrelatedness of factors. This very interrelatedness is what makes the development of solutions so difficult. If the factors were independent variables, it would be relatively easy to resolve the situation by addressing each problem with a separate program for solution -- an effort that is not unknown in SVN. But, the development of an integrated plan which will take all of the

dependent variables of the factors into consideration becomes incredibly complex.

Considering the multiplicity, mutual conflict and interrelated nature of those factors shown in Figure 1-23, coupled with the discussion and examples above, it must become clear that any national action plan purporting to attack a problem of the complexity of the present situation in must:

(1) Set forth a clear and unequivocal ultimate objective of the plan, and specify the principal means and steps essential to the achievement of that objective.

(2) Then, demonstrate that it has isolated those factors impinging upon the situation in SVN and that it has related these factors both to the objective and to the means of achieving it.

(3) Finally, provide evidence that its action phasing has incorporated the means of controlling the impact of the factors involved upon ultimate achievement of the objective.

Critical Factors Influencing Future Actions

Terrain continues to be the fundamental divisive factor which accentuates and perpetuates socio-cultural differences that now and in the past have influenced the cohesive development of SVN. The Lowlands remain the source of most wealth and culture; the Highlands continue as a refuge area in which economically and culturally underdeveloped tribes eke out their existence. The Highlands barrier channeled Vietnamese toward the South in their era of expansion; the Lowlands' richness attracted those Vietnamese

pioneers and armies who overran the Empire of Champa; and, the same Lowlands then stimulated Chinese imperialists and French colonialists to dominate the Vietnamese. Assuredly the Lowlands rice bowl still remains the chief prize sought by NVN.

The weight and influence of history are second only to terrain as a continuing source of divisive influence; probably it is the most significant source of cohesive factors. From the wellsprings of history come the socio-cultural regional differences of SVN. Vietnamese Southerners still look upon Northerners as harsh, miserly and aggressive; Northerners look with contempt upon their Southerner countrymen as soft and lazy -- the descendents of those crude pioneers who sought an easy life in far lands rather than remain with their kinsmen and be content with a meager share. These regional differences influence the attitude of GVN cabinet members and senior officers of ARVN to a g eater degree than they do the attitude of peasants. And, the complex impress of history also has tended to prevent the development of national leaders, as successive conquerors intentionally have destroyed, or otherwise prevented, any apparent maturation of more than local leadership.

Yet, for those ethnic South Vietnamese who constitute over 80 percent of the country's population, the weight of history has produced more similarities than differences. Irrespective of slim regional differences, the Vietnamese language is a single tongue of slightly differing dialects that remain mutually intelligible. And, members of most significant minority groups speak some Vietnamese. Most Vietnamese are as united in distrust of China and the Chinese, and France and the French as well, as they are joined in admiration and respect

for both Chinese and French achievements and culture; they remain weighted down with mandarin and French bureaucratic systems. Moreover, the successive series of Chinese and French conquests have left the Vietnamese with the same set of folk heroes and a common historical tradition. This tradition is best summed up in the old popular saying: "One thousand years of the Chinese, but we still don't wear pigtails."

Those very influences that in some respects are divisive also provide sources of cohesion. Although there are several formal religions that significantly differ from one another in Vietnam, and from time to time are the source of friction and conflict, the religions themselves are sufficiently malleable (in the eclectic Vietnamese culture setting) to enhance the possibility of coexistence. Surviving descendants of conquered Chams and Khmers live in relative peace with the Vietnamese, rather than under a cloud of friction. The antagonism that exists between the Vietnamese and Montagnard is relatively meaningless (at the sub-national-government level), because the Montagnard and the Vietnamese still are separated distinctly by the very terrain which has enabled the points of difference between them to persist. The ethical and eclectic nature of the religions, and those fundamental facets of national character and Vietnamese culture which stress the need to adapt and conform and to take what is useful from all sources, have ameliorated the potential sources of conflict. Intruders and conquerors have adopted regional, family and village customs, just as the resultant modern Vietnamese have adopted

many of the ways of their own conquerors.

Of greatest immediate significance to the military situation in SVN are cohesive and divisive influences stemming from international ideologies. Moved in one direction in the heat of grievances, some Vietnamese have followed Communism under a nationalist label to what they believe is their destined goal. Now, having traveled down that path, neither Red China nor the USSR can afford their turning back. Other Vietnamese have pursued an opposed course; now the US and its Allies cannot afford their being swallowed up by the other side. But, most South Vietnamese remain uncommitted. The future freedom and independence of SVN depends upon developing a means of convincing these noncommitted and the Western-tending Vietnamese -- still the most significant portion of the people of SVN -- how valuable it is to achieve the Free World goal. Just as important, perhaps even more so, is the requirement to devise means of enabling the present VC-NLF sustainers to cross over to GVN allegiance. In historical, national and regional cohesive influences, there can be found some of the means of stimulating and easing the stress of this crossover.

Notes

1. US Far East Command, Commander US Naval Forces Far East. "Special Intelligence Study, Indochina." Jun 54.

2. "The present Government of Vietnam is not legitimate." This charge has been sustaining since the downfall of Diem in 1963; the sensitivity of issues thus broached can be expected to persist (perhaps with increasingly adverse input on US policy) for some time to come. GVN leadership has exhibited marked sensitivity with respect to its "legitimacy," especially under the drumfire of communist propaganda. They appear to be concerned primarily from the standpoint of GVN integrity as a nation in its relationship to the US. Although it lies outside the charge of PROVN to analyze the legitimacy issue, the need to underscore its significance to highest US-GVN levels is apparent. Rather than avoiding it, a mutual policy position is needed to deal with such allegations as follow: (a) under the Geneva Accords of 1954 (Sect III), SVN is merely a temporary "zone" and does not thus qualify politically as a state; (b) the present GVN was not installed with the consent of its citizenry and, therefore, cannot trace itself to a legitimately installed government; (c) the GVN does not control the majority of the territory South of the 17th parallel and cannot provide fundamental security for as much as half of the populace residing there; (d) the GVN could not sustain itself for any appreciable length of time without support from exterior sources; and, (e) not only are there countries who recognize and maintain Vietnamese relations solely with NVN, but there are UN member states who recognize the counterclaims of the National Liberation Front and maintain formal diplomatic relations with that anti-GVN organization. (See: ANNEX C)

3. "Military Geographic Regions of the World," Engineer Intelligence Study, AMS E 45, 1961, 294.

4. This is a rounding off of the GVN-MACV figure of 14,780,200. Other agencies of the US, such as AID and the DIA, use the UN projected figure of 16,224,000.

5. Despite a hundred years of research by French, Vietnamese and other scholars -- and irrespective of two thousand years of archival recording and scholarship by the Chinese -- very little is known about South Vietnamese culture and character from a scientific, anthropological viewpoint. Those data that have been preserved with such care are not responsive to the questions of modern science. Of the flood of recent books, monographs, articles and papers which purport to describe and discuss the Vietnamese (much of which partake of the character of

"instant anthropology") the work of Dr. Gerald Hickey can be regarded as most significant, scientifically. (See: Village in Vietnam, Yale University Press, 1964, for the most complete compendium) Current research in progress by Michael Pearce, reported in three Rand Monographs (See: Bibliography) also has considerable subjective resume value.

6. Buttinger, Joseph "The Ethnic Minorities in the Republic of Vietnam," Problems of Freedom, Edited by Wesley R. Fishel, Glencoe, 1961.

7. Tactical Operations Center. A Study of the Montagnard Demands, Their Results, and The United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Race (FULRO). APO San Francisco 96243 Jul 65.

8. The modern classification of languages in mainland SEA rests upon an article by Joseph Greenberg, a specialist in African languages, in the 1954 Compendium, Anthropology Today, University of Chicago Press. The classification was offered by him primarily as an example of his "inspectional method" of linguistic analysis; it was not developed by the rigorous comparative method that is favored by more conventional linguists. Nevertheless, his groupings are utilized by most SEA scholars. (See: Fundamental text by Lebar and Hickey, Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia, Yale University Press, 1964).

9. Available information on the Montagnard is best found in three recent compilations: Montagnard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Viet-Nam, US Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, 2nd Edition (March 1965); The Major Ethnic Groups of the South Vietnamese Highlands, by Gerald C. Hickey, Rm-4041-ARPA, The Rand Corporation Santa Monica (April 1964); Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia, by Lebar, Hickey and Musgrave, Yale Human Relations Area Files Press, New Haven (September 1964).

10. A Study of the Khmer Serei (C). Hqs 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) 1st Special Forces Tactical Operations Center, APO San Francisco, California 96243; The Khmer Serei in South Vietnam (C) Hqs USMACV (10 February 1965). (SECRET)

11. U.S. Department of State Airgram. "Montagnard Dissidence: FULRO," 23 Dec 65 (CONFIDENTIAL).

12. By a key general officer in the MACV structure; the same concept has been separately stated by professional Vietnamese historians.

13. Answers to these questions are the basis of monthly joint

situation reports made by US province advisors (MACV and USOM) through channels to the Rural Construction Province Reports Center, where they are consolidated and disseminated to the Ambassador and other interested agencies. As such, they represent the most official situation report available to CINCPAC and DOD.

14. See: Bibliography for monographs by Michael Pearce.

CHAPTER II

US ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION

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CHAPTER II – SUMMARY

PROVN submits that existing US support operations have proved ineffective in coping with the political, economic, military, social and psychological aspects of the situation in SVN. Our advice and tangibles, forced into an imperfect system, have not produced desired reforms. A ruling military elite, motivated by personal gain and manifesting disdain for the rural population, has proved to be a major obstacle to our assistance effort. An organization and method of operation which permits a more adequate US response is required to: (1) press GVN address of the legitimate aspirations and grievances of its people; and, (2) contest with the communist politico-military mechanism.

The Single Manager concept of US organization is proposed. The Ambassador, as Single Manager in Saigon, is given full responsibility for the US effort in SVN. A Director of Rural Construction and Development is established, and the politico-military advisory effort is transferred to his control. Additional changes include establishment of a supra-agency planning staff, field team tailoring and deployment of cross-agency trained teams. The method of operation proposed visualizes more direct US involvement in GVN affairs. To permit such involvement, the nature of the effort must change from one of providing advice to that of accomplishing US objectives. US representatives at all levels must be granted maximum authority and resources to stimulate GVN action and to terminate counterproductive GVN action.

PROVN contends that the US must learn to wage a new form of conflict in SVN. We must learn and organize from the "bottom up," simultaneously responding to current problems and generating a body of knowledge upon which future doctrine can be based.

Chapter II

UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION

Introduction

Major Short-Range Action Recommendations. The US has underestimated the complexities of the situation in SVN. Established support organizations and assistance techniques have proved both insufficient and ineffective in coping with military, political, economic and psychological components of the "nonwar" being waged. US organization and methods have failed to provoke GVN action in response to the fundamental aspirations of the Vietnamese people. The current situation is of such urgency that much more must be demanded of both the GVN and the US. To so respond, a new US policy, structure and method of operation adequate to deal with existing circumstances must be established. Specifically, PROVN recommends the following actions now to sustain ultimate achievement of the basic US objective:

- Organize the US assistance effort, in both Washington and SVN, to ensure its unified control and direction.
- Tailor US civil-military field organizations to influence all aspects of the existing situation.
- Change operating methods to provide US representatives (USREPs) with the authority and influence required to press GVN counterpart action and achievement in the critical field of social reform.1/

■ Exploit success at province and district in SVN by decentralizing and concentrating authority, as well as major US support, at these levels.

■ Accept and discharge a more active US role with respect to influencing the direction of change in SVN.

The Short-Range Objective to be Achieved. A US organization and method of operation capable of ensuring the execution of US-GVN plans and programs in SVN.

Summary Assessment

Over-all Requirements. SVN constitutes the test of American determination and ability to disprove the "wars of national liberation" formula. US pledges and prestige are at stake. Through reaffirmation, the US national objective statement -- a free and "independent, non-communist South Vietnam" -- provides substance to our "object ... which lies beyond the war." In extension, PROVN proposes the following policy statement as a means of translating this basic expression of national purpose into a unified, effective national pattern of action:

> "In the discharge of all responsibilities incident to ultimate achievement of its NSAM 288 goal, the United States of America is pledged to assist the people of South Vietnam to preserve and further their individual and national freedom; to ensure and advance their socio-economic growth; and, to develop and sustain a viable and just government responsive to its citizenry."

The Current US Effort. US policy and purpose must be translated into meaningful and integrated results by US agencies in the field. Today, our individual agencies in SVN receive both external direction

from Washington and local guidance from the Mission Council in Saigon. US efforts are characterized by the divergent activities of parent executive agencies whose representatives reflect differing attitudes, competing interests and varied concepts for winning in SVN. Cleavage is apparent with respect to both the nature of the ongoing conflict and the objectives sought in waging it.

CIA (CAS) supports paramilitary or civilian groups performing clandestine and unconventional operations, as well as intelligence gathering and certain conventional operations. The rationale generally used by other field agencies to explain CAS involvement in conventional support activities is that CIA has more functional flexibility in its charter and wider latitude in applying its funds. CAS places its emphasis on provincial programs that are set in motion by dealing directly with GVN province officials. The major effort is aimed at identifying and destroying the VC infrastructure throughout the countryside.

AID (USOM) supports Rural Construction and economic development activities and reinforces GVN ministerial functions. Emphasis is placed on rural programs by operating through existing governmental channels. The major effort is aimed at winning the allegiance of the people to the GVN.

STATE (AMEMB) supports a limited field reporting staff that sustains contacts among Vietnamese elites and key GVN provincial officials. This element is not "chartered" to function as an arm for waging political warfare. Emphasis is placed on discharging the

Ambassador's representational responsibilities and on monitoring impacts deemed adverse to Vietnamese sovereignty. The general concern is establishing a stable, central government in Saigon as opposed to participating in active field operations.

DOD (MACV) commands US military forces and supports the development, as well as the employment, of GVN regular military units in the performance of combat, combat support and combat service support activities. To a lesser extent, advice is provided to paramilitary forces. Emphasis is placed on destruction of PAVN-Main Force VC units. Sector and subsector advisors also provide a broad spectrum of advice to provincial and district officials. The major effort establishes security as the prime requirement and necessary prelude to Rural Construction operations.

USIA (JUSPAO) coordinates the total psychological operations effort in SVN and supports the development of programs designed to carry GVN's message to the Vietnamese people. A workable national plan of action has been prepared to achieve this end. But, the "art of the promise" has been overworked by both the GVN and the VC. Recent organizational changes and increased US interest await fulfillment of GVN pledges to the rural population. Only when GVN credibility is established, will intensified psychological operations explaining the social reform program find an audience in the countryside.

Agency Effectiveness Appraisal. The interagency and intra-agency wars in SVN sometimes tend to overshadow VC operations in their disruptive

impact. Lack of unity reduces effectiveness at every level of US execution. At lower levels, the need to perform as an outstanding "single agency representative" (e.g., USOM man, CASREP, MACV advisor) competes with the need to present a firm, coordinated and unified US position to an often reluctant, sometimes vacillating, counterpart. At higher levels, US efforts most acutely reflect the biases of Washington parent agencies. On the military side, corps and division advisory groups with ARVN have been preoccupied with "purely military activity" to a point where only marginal support has been accorded to critical nonmilitary programs in the provinces. Such perspective can only further aggravate relationships at a time when nation building activities must take place in SVN.

The present organizational relationship among US agency representatives at province and district makes it difficult to develop and execute any coordinated US program. As the unilateral efforts of these agencies have expanded, their province representation has expanded concurrently -- with each representative directly "advising" the province chief in terms of his parent agency's interests. Operating at province level on the principle that "men of good will can reason together," while excellent in theory, has failed in practice. One man has to be in charge. (See: ANNEXES G and J)

The cross-purpose activities of US field agencies also stem, in part, from differing views of the Vietnamese problem and how to solve it. Most US-GVN endeavors are divided into two conceptual categories,

military and nonmilitary. Resultant programs have been assigned to a single US agency sponsor. In general, military programs are targeted on the destruction of PAVN and Main Force VC units, and nonmilitary programs have been riveted on "winning the hearts and minds of the people" to the GVN. Though requiring substantially different methods of attack, these two broad undertakings must not be viewed as separate and distinct problems. Their solutions must neither become a matter of one-two priority nor fall strictly within the purview of a single US agency. Supporting destruction of the VC infrastructure is an excellent example of the type of priority task that is neither susceptible to accomplishment by single agency effort nor compatible with a neat military-nonmilitary division of labor. Achievement of US-GVN short-range objectives will require a cohesive US effort that is more closely coordinated with that of the GVN -- one that responds to the full range of military, political, economic and psychological complexities inherent in a nonorthodox war.

The Measures of Military Success. Prior to massive US intervention in SVN, military operations against the VC produced marginal results at best. Frequently, successes were achieved at the expense of nonmilitary programs through the diversion of forces committed to securing the population. ARVN division commanders (and their US counterparts) often resented employing forces to support provincial pacification efforts. The "quick kill" of a VC battalion, though seldom realized, was considered the more important objective. Too often, the net result of this fixation needlessly exposed a previously secure area to VC guerrilla force incursion. Today, our eagerness to do the killing for the GVN must at least

be matched by US determination to force GVN action on critical "people-oriented programs." USOM submitted this description of the situation as it existed in 1965:

> "The United States and South Vietnam have suffered major reverses at the hands of the North Vietnamese. A large-scale joint US-GVN counterinsurgency campaign has thus far been unsuccessful. It has been unsuccessful in part because of inability to provide and maintain security in face of the intensified insurgency campaign; in part because of the political turmoil and lack of continuity of successive governments; in part because of US-GVN errors of judgment and lack of understanding of the nature and solution to the problem; and, in part because of the lack of Vietnamese leadership who espoused a cause sufficiently important and attractive to motivate and unify the Vietnamese people. ... Primarily because the counterinsurgency effort has failed, the US has brought sizeable US combat forces in the area North of Saigon ... In the Southern half of the country, the insurgency remains a more classical guerrilla warfare ... It is likely that the increased US military involvement has denied the Viet Cong a military victory without, by any means, assuring a US-GVN military victory."2:3/ *

Several in-country examinations of US organization have questioned the value of the "Country Team" as a mechanism for dealing with the situation in SVN. In March of 1965, a memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to the President provided the following assessment:

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*The citation 2:3/ refers to page 3, reference number 2, in the Notes section of this chapter. This referencing is standard throughout PROVN from this point.

> "Furthermore we are convinced that the basic elements of US nonmilitary programs are sound. The men are generally first-rate, and the funds and administrative channels are adequate. As to organization, General Johnson's mission went over carefully proposals to change the framework of the mission, and specifically to place the pacification program of USOM, USIS,or CIA directly under the MACV headquarters. Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson as well as General Westmoreland opposed any such sweeping changes, and we believe here this judgment was correct. Except for possibly some aspects of the coordination process in the pacification program we do not need to revise the main structure of our efforts."

A year has passed, and pacification problems have not been solved by revising "some aspects of the coordination process." In fact, some ground has been lost. Rapid troop build-up, coupled with deployment forecasts, will impose additional strains upon the existing structure. Pressing demands of a purely US military nature will continue to require priority attention. The primary focus of MACV on combat operations, particularly those involving US units, may relegate the Rural Construction effort to a lower priority than the situation warrants. Such relegation, actual or implied, can only further weaken GVN military motivation to conduct operations in support of the rural population. Present US military actions are inconsistent with that fundamental of counterinsurgency which establishes winning popular allegiance as the ultimate goal. While conceptually recognizing the total problem, we appear to draw back from its complexity in practice and gravitate toward a faulty premise for its resolution -- military destruction of the VC. Somewhere in the background, however, hope appears to persist that social reform will inevitably follow the establishment of security. Frustrated by our

inability to find methods to cope with the total problem, we have resorted to military methods employed in wars of the past. Remaining aloof from what "we consider" to be strictly areas of Vietnamese concern -- political and social reforms -- may well constitute a tragic blunder. A more adequate US response must be developed to deal with "wars of national liberation;" the current battle for the villagers of SVN may well be one of the most important conflicts in world history.

Organizing for Future Support

Over-all Requirement. From a future support standpoint, the US desires to enlist and sustain the energies of a government that is actively concerned with, and responsive to, the needs of the Vietnamese people. Government in this sense must not be construed as synonymous with an unconditionally US-supported Vietnamese military elite. The US can perform such an assistance role throughout the entire range of responsive support activities only when its executive agencies (in concert) have developed a doctrine, a simple plan of action and an organization capable of ensuring results. Actually, few changes in US doctrine are needed. Prime emphasis must be placed on getting the Vietnamese to do the job required. The prerequisite to such an accomplishment lies in achieving an integrated US effort at all levels. In determining ways and means of activating GVN, past success registered at the province level needs to be recognized, built upon, expanded and extended upward through our system.

Integrate US Support in Washington. The requirement for a flexible and integrated response that brings all US agency contributions to bear

on changing aspects of the situation reinforces the need for decentralization. The ease of today's direct communication with Saigon has facilitated the control of in-country operations by participating Executive Branch agencies. Neither the requisite data base for making support determinations, nor the machinery for accomplishing effective interagency coordination, are adequate to justify existing Washington-level influence. The appointment of a Presidential executive agent for Vietnam is required. He must be empowered to harness, to integrate and -- where necessary -- to restrain the flow of guidance and resources through five command channels to five separate field elements in Saigon. Previous efforts to increase the authority of the Ambassador have failed to produce the needed coordination and management of the US in-country effort.

The firm hand of a single executive, rather than some new form of interagency committee, is needed now to assure that operational effectiveness is not encumbered in SVN. The establishment of a Special Assistant to the President for Vietnam Affairs, together with a select staff manned to support his functions, could best discharge executive agent responsibilities in the name of the President. This individual would provide the separate departments and agencies in Washington, as well as the US Ambassador in Saigon, broad policy guidelines for the support of field operations. Washington-level agencies must be required to place their most highly qualified personnel at the disposal of the Ambassador in Saigon. They must also provide personnel for the permanent staff of the executive agent, as well as such staff support as he may

require. In addition to coordinating and integrating Washington-level response to requirements specified by the Ambassador, this staff would act on such other issues as supplementary fund requests.

Above all, this Special Assistant to the President must possess full power of decision with respect to terminating separate agency management of programs prepared in Washington for execution in SVN. His controls must ensure that only logistical and technical assistance communications are channeled directly from these agencies to their field echelons. It is recognized that, from Washington outward, the agencies will resist loss of the full discretionary authority they now exercise over their own personnel and material resources. As such, the authorities of both the Ambassador and the Executive Agent must be developed in detail and promulgated either by Presidential Executive Order or National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM). It is crucial that men who fill these posts enjoy the confidence of the President and use the power delegated to them. Their specific authorities must be known and acknowledged throughout the Executive Branch. Moreover, their terms of reference should provide authority to obtain needed expertise and resources from any department or agency of the US Government. Placed at the disposal of the US Ambassador -- and applied consistent with his authoritative control -- such assets would combine to form a model US civil-military response for GVN emulation.

Integrate US Support in SVN. In Saigon today, no operational concept or organizational arrangement offer promise of producing the degree of unified control and direction required. For lack of a total-system concept and structure for execution, in-country activities are frequently unrelated because of diffused responsibility and authority. The US

Ambassador must be delegated unequivocal authority as sole manager of all US activities, resources and personnel in-country. Only then can a truly integrated civil-military organization contest with the communist politico-military mechanism in SVN. Organization of US operations under a "Single Manager" system could provide unified control and positive direction as the initial step toward integration of the US civil-military effort.

(1) The Single Manager Concept. The senior US representative in-country must be designated "Single Manager." Currently, our Ambassador in Saigon would function in this capacity. This does not preclude Presidential designation of a senior military officer to hold this post; neither does it rule out appointment of the senior military officer in-country to assume such responsibility on order. Overriding all other considerations, one senior US official must (through the exercise of command authority) direct the total US effort in SVN. The concept envisions providing the President with civil-military command options and a flexible US posture that address:

-- The dimensions of the current situation which dictate the need to succeed, by unified civil-military action, at district and province levels throughout SVN.

-- The eventuality of escalating or deteriorating situations which dictate the need to achieve military victory, in SVN or SEA, under the provisions of Unified Command arrangements.3/

PROVN submits the principle that success in SVN will be the sum of innumerable small, effective localized efforts and not the outcome of any single eventuality or master stroke. These efforts will be waged -- and,

won or lost -- in the villages and districts of Vietnam. The Single Manager concept, providing US civil-military support from village to Saigon, establishes the unified action pattern essential to each effort. At Saigon, one man is charged with ensuring against failure on any front and under any contingency. The letter of instruction provided to Ambassador Taylor by President Johnson delegates authority sufficient to justify adoption of the Single Manager concept.

July 2, 1964

Dear Ambassador Taylor:

As you take charge of the American effort in South Vietnam, I want you to have this formal expression not only of my confidence, but of my desire that you have and exercise full responsibility for the effort of the United States Government in South Vietnam. In general terms this authority is parallel to that set forth in President Kennedy's letter of May 20, 1961 to all American Ambassadors; specifically, I wish it clearly understood that this overall responsibility includes the whole military effort in South Vietnam and authorizes the degree of command and control that you consider appropriate.

I recognize that in the conduct of the day-to-day business of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, you will wish to work out arrangements which do not burden you or impede the exercise of your overall direction.

At your convenience, I should be glad to know of the arrangements which you propose for meeting the terms of this instruction, so that appropriate supporting action can be taken in the Defense Department and elsewhere as necessary.

This letter rescinds all conflicting instructions to U.S. Officers in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable Maxwell D. Taylor
The American Ambassador

Subject to the Ambassador's authority, senior USREPs must be charged with full responsibility for executing the total US effort in assigned territorial areas. Each of these leaders must function as the sole


counterpart to the responsible Vietnamese official at his level. Initially, and in view of the prevailing security situation, MACV sector and subsector advisors should be named senior USREPs. All other US agency representatives performing functions at each territorial level must be placed under the command of this senior USREP (SUSREP) in the Ambassador's chain of command. (See: Figure 2-1)

(2) The Single Manager Staff. The Ambassador must be directed to establish and use a supra-agency planning staff. This staff must be charged with preparing the single integrated plan that is essential to coordinate US-GVN efforts on all fronts. Personnel for the staff should be selected on the basis of demonstrated ability, experience and skill. They should be drawn largely from all US operating agencies in-country. For example, selected individuals from the Rural Construction Office of the MACV staff could become an integral part of the supra-agency planning staff. Personnel so assigned must be responsive solely to the Ambassador in his function as US Single Manager. This staff must be chartered to draw upon the operating staffs of the various US agencies in-country for data and specific inputs. One of the staff's major functions must entail the complete coordination and integration of US military and nonmilitary activities. For example, the single integrated plan must be developed from the village upward and address both the grievances and aspirations of the Vietnamese. All staffing directives must emanate from the Single Manager's staff and must be recognized as binding on all US agencies. US theater-level joint staff organization and procedures provide both justification and precedent as to the requirement for a supra-agency staff in SVN today.

(3) The Director of Rural Construction and Development (DRCD).

Figure 2-1

SECRET



(1) Advises RVNAF on RC, commands support troops, administers and supports, but does not control, Military Unit Teams. Includes Air Force and Naval elements.
(2) Corps SUSREP responds to DCRD and advises VN corps commanders on all aspects of Rural Construction. Acts as sole advisor to VN corps commander when bulk of ARVN units committed to Rural Construction.
(3) Less those assigned for village and hamlet security.
(4) Includes corps, division, regiment and battalion Military Unit Teams of ARVN units committed to search and destroy. Corps military representative responds to CINCUSFV, advises VN corps commander on military operations other than Rural Construction.
(5) US Support Units and Military Unit Teams RVNAF units not allocated to provinces.
(6) Includes all Military Unit Teams of RVNAF units allocated to provinces for RC.
(7) US Forces committed to support pacification and development as they become available.

SUSREP = Senior US Representative
TOC = Tactical Operations Center
RVNAF = Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
USOM = US Overseas Mission
JUSPAO = Joint US Public Affairs Office
POLAF = Political Affairs Staff Officer
CAS = CIA (Controlled American Source)
ARVN = Army of Vietnam
SOG = Studies and Observations Group
SF = Special Forces

USARV = US Army Vietnam
2 AD = 2d Air Division (USAF)
III MAF = 3d Marine Amphibious Force
NAVFORV = US Naval Forces Vietnam
FFV = Field Forces Vietnam (Corps Hq)
RC = Rural Construction
FWMAF = Free World Military Assistance Forces
DRCD = Director of Rural Construction and Development
LOG = Logistics Command
JUSMAAG = Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group

SECRET

Nonmilitary aspects of the assistance effort must be placed under the operational control of the DRCD. This in-country US principal must respond directly to the Ambassador (US Single Manager). At each succeeding lower level of US organization (paralleling as necessary the GVN structure), a senior USREP must be designated and delegated command authority over all US agency representatives at that level. The current MACV advisor in-place should be so designated initially. When the nature and scope of the local effort dictate, the representative of another operating agency could assume the senior USREP post. Such a determination must be monitored by the DRCD.

Civil-Military Scaffolding Concept. Past inadequacies of GVN civil and military leadership are common knowledge. Usually, these shortcomings have been attributed to a lack of ability which could be remedied by extensive training. However, training has proved to be only a partial answer; existing Vietnamese inadequacies are more directly related to the lack of motivation. In our past search, solutions to Vietnamese problems were sought as if they could be found packaged in certain GVN leaders or could be surfaced by reorganizing their governmental and military structure. Such US efforts have only served to reinforce the long-standing Vietnamese penchant for reorganization as the panacea for every problem. Organizational change on the US side is far more likely to produce results than reorganization by the GVN. Although desirable, there is no urgent requirement that US structure duplicate, or even fully parallel, that of the GVN. The major US consideration now is

to avoid reflecting the confusion inherent in the Vietnamese system.

Steps must be taken to press for skillful and resolute action on the part of the GVN to solve basic problems now alienating the Vietnamese people. This means exercising a greater degree of US influence in Vietnamese affairs. More direct US involvement will require strengthening of the US posture in-country. In fact, the US support effort should be geared to influence any Vietnamese leader, at any political level and within any organizational structure, to contribute to the achievement of responsive government. The issue then becomes one of selective support to existing government at points of US choosing, rather than unqualified support of any government. This solution enables US reinforcement of GVN officials that produce. It will necessitate modification of the present US advisory effort to build a civil-military scaffolding alongside the weak GVN structure. Such a framework must be capable of helping when possible, pushing when necessary and going it alone when circumstances dictate. It should stand as physical evidence of the US commitment at every level. Its thorough and selective address of GVN functional problems should serve both to foster confidence and motivate dedicated Vietnamese to get on with the job. The scaffolding also should facilitate the introduction of US resources into selected points of the GVN structure either to press or reinforce official actions responding to the needs of the Vietnamese people. This selective application of resources to overcome GVN inaction will require the services of experienced USREPs

who are empowered by the US Single Manager to employ leverage. This is a more productive approach than tacit acceptance of Vietnamese reluctance to perform when resources are not lacking and ability is not an issue.

Tailoring US Teams. The organization of advisory teams currently operating in the US assistance structure must be examined in detail. The need exists to determine their capacity to respond throughout the full range of support-intervention functions proposed in the US civil-military scaffolding concept. With these data, decisions can be made as to the specifics of current team composition as well as requirements for expansion of US team support to all districts in SVN. Each team now in-place should be tailored to meet and deal with the existing combination of GVN organizational capabilities and unique area requirements.

The process of continuous team tailoring is particularly critical at province and district. At these levels, the political, economic and military aspects of the local situation share one common element -- rapid and inevitable change. In some areas, VC domination inhibits active pursuit of a coherent Rural Construction program; USOM technicians are confined to the provincial or district towns. In these instances, US team expertise should be withdrawn to reinforce success achieved in another locale or to lend experience to planning at the next higher US-GVN echelon. The improved security situation in areas such as An Giang, however, encourages the initiation of development activities.

Additional US technicians could be employed here to exploit the development potential. It must be pointed out, however, that the rate of US expansion in development activity must be contingent upon GVN ability to match the effort. The US intent to reinforce -- and not supplant -- GVN must be evident and credible.

The US team must be designed to respond to these situations through adaptive organizational tailoring. Figure 2-2 is an example of a US team tailored to the unique requirements of Kien Hoa Province as they are presented in ANNEX J. In practice, the senior USREP must determine his personnel requirements and organization based upon the major thrust of the ongoing effort in his area of concern. Deciding who is to be the senior USREP must, in turn, be dictated by the nature of this effort and be determined at the next higher US echelon.

Constraints on US Action

Despite concerted US efforts to improve programs in SVN, the problem of provoking appropriate action on them by GVN officialdom persists. The need to bring more US influence to bear in such situations has been constrained by the "armed take over" and "administrative occupation authority" connotations of intervention. The feeling that President Diem's downfall in 1963 was hastened by threatened US withdrawal of support has further sensitized Americans to the issue of "intervening" in the sovereign affairs of the GVN. A representative admonition, addressing solely the sensitivity inherent in applying leverage, is contained in ANNEX E (page E-22). Such sensitivities, however, must not be permitted

to cloud the central issues:

(1) That the self-limiting role of the advisory effort to which we have adhered has become obsolete in light of conditions in SVN.

(2) That the US, with ingenuity not yet exercised, could further the development of a governing structure in SVN that is responsive to the South Vietnamese people.


As the Director of the USIA stated in his 16 March 1965 Memorandum for the President:

> "Even when appropriate steps are taken to increase and improve these programs on the American side, we shall still face the crucial problem of provoking proper action on the part of the Vietnamese Government ... We must press the GVN to move * * * * * Steps must be taken to give USIA the necessary leverage to induce the province chiefs ..."4/

Senior USREPs must be accorded the faith and prerogatives required to cope with problems at their levels of performance. Unrealistic and self-imposed restraints must not limit a positive and constructive US response. In the past, announcements of unlimited US support for SVN or for particular Vietnamese -- when coupled with a policy of noninvolvement in internal affairs -- have hindered the achievement of program objectives. The US advisory effort has been denied critical tools of influence needed either to penetrate the thinking of a counterpart or to provoke him into action. Moreover, the US has been prevented from establishing a graduated and low level, in-country veto needed to correct the unsound practices of GVN officials. (See: Chapter IV) Such veto power is essential to the elimination of those small but irritating GVN tactics that continue to alienate the South Vietnamese people.5/ This is an

Figure 2-2

PROPOSED US SECTOR TEAM ORGANIZATION



(1) SENIOR USREP:
- Senior US Representative, US Lt Col or Col

(2) DEPUTY:
- Assistant to SUSREP, US Maj
- Supervises Admin Section
- Coordinates Staff

(3) USOMREP:
- Province USOM Representative with one assistant (both civilian)
- Supervises distribution of AID funds & commodities
- Maintains direct liaison with SUBSECTOR REPs
- Areas of Responsibility:
  - Agriculture
  - Economic
  - Education

(4) PSYOPS REP
- US Capt with assistants as follows:
  - JUSPAOREP (civilian)
  - US Lt for Chieu Hoi Center
- Areas of Responsibility:
  - USIS-VIS
  - VIS Cadres
  - War Claims (w/USOMREP)
  - Chieu Hoi Program
  - Chieu Hoi Cadres

(5) INTELLIGENCE-POLICE REP:
- US Maj with assistants as follows:
  - CASREP (CIA)
  - Special Police (CIA)
  - USOM PSD REP or Military Police REP
  - US Capt intelligence trained
- Areas of Responsibility:
  - Province Intelligence Coord Center
  - Special Police Operations
  - Counter Terror Operations
  - Province Interrogation Center
  - National Police Operation
  - Intelligence Agent Net
  - Resources Control
  - Sector Operations and Intelligence Center
  - Special Chieu Hoi Cadre

(6) RF-PF REP:
- US Maj with assistants:
  - US Capt - RF REP
  - US Capt - PF REP
- Areas of Responsibility:
  - RF-PF Training
  - RF-PF Logistics-maintenance
  - RF-PF Military Operations (coord w/OPNSREP)
  - People's Self Defense Force

(7) OPERATIONS-TRAINING REP:
- US Maj with assistants:
  - US Capt - SOIC
  - US Lt - Fire Support Coordination:
    - Helicopter control
    - AID

(8) RURAL CONSTRUCTION RE
- US Maj or civilian equiv with assistants:
  - US Capt or equiv civilian
  - US Lt or equiv civilian
- Areas of Responsibility:
  - Selection, training, & operations of all RC cadres, i.e.:
    - Census Grievance
    - Land Reform
    - Mobile Administrative
    - People's Action Team
    - Village Committee-in-Exile
    - Refugee Resettlement
    - Armed Propaganda
  - Census Grievance (coord w/INTELLIGENCE REP)
  - New Life Hamlet Development
  - Land Reform Program
  - Village Elections
  - Rural Construction Programs with commodity and financial assistance of USOMREP
  - Rural Construction Budget

(9) SUBSECTOR REP
- US Capt with assistants:
  - US Lt - PSYOPS-RURAL CONSTRUCTION REP
  - US E-7 - Intelligence-Police NCO
  - US E-6 - PSYWAR-RURAL CONSTRUCTION NCO
  - US E-5 - Radio OP

indispensable preliminary to the establishment of GVN credibility throughout rural SVN.

When GVN officials refuse or are reluctant to undertake measures necessary to gain popular support, a clear-cut and formalized US response is required. The solution lies in being organized to exert this US influence without alienating the Vietnamese people. The US is now too heavily involved to discount the exercise of its direct influence in GVN affairs as a possible course of action. Its potential to prevent GVN failure in the present situation must override fear of the stigma attached to such labels as "colonialist" or "imperialist." If we lose in Vietnam, we pay the price no matter how carefully we rationalize the need for a careful regard for Vietnamese sovereignty.

The Vietnamese Outlook. Vietnamese, particularly elite groups, react negatively toward US activities which impinge upon their sovereignty. Others overtly question the sincerity of the US commitment. Both responses frequently serve to constrain action or foster inaction. Recent events, such as the belated 1965 press announcement of North Vietnam's offer to negotiate in 1964, have generated serious second thoughts by the Vietnamese as to US firmness and sincerity. A resume of Vietnamese interpretations of past events is presented to illustrate this constraint in operation:

> (1) "Khanh was told that he could not go North or the war would expand, however the US decision to expand was immediate when US ships were fired upon. And again when US billets were attacked, a major retaliatory effort was launched against North Vietnam. Now it appears that the US is more concerned with self interests than Vietnamese interests."

(2) "We were told that we were winning the war in Vietnam in '64 - when we were actually losing it. The US public statements that the war was going well were contradicted by existing local conditions. Now it appears that the intent behind fostering this aura of success was to create a positive political environment in America for the national election. This demonstrates little concern for the Vietnamese people."

(3) "The US was invited to assist fighting communists and to help establish a free and independent Vietnam. Now it appears the US is drawing the line against communism in Southeastern Asia and is preoccupied solely with its own military activity."

(4) "Before the US troops were committed, we could not use gas, napalm, or pursue Viet Cong into Cambodia and the US demonstrated great concern for the peasant. Now ARVN and the US use all of these weapons, sometimes indiscriminately, and have created a great refugee problem for us to solve. US support is difficult to understand."6/

The effectiveness of the combined effort continues to be limited by conflicts in both American and Vietnamese outlook as to the nature of the struggle and their respective roles in its solution.

Counterpart Relationships. The development of a productive counterpart system remains one of the most difficult and challenging undertakings of the US assistance effort. The title of "advisor" is no longer appropriate to the task at hand in SVN. In Vietnamese, this term ("Co Van My") translates out as "counsellor" and implies operating without authority and at counterpart sufferance. However, the actions required of the US presence call for positive influence rather than advisory suggestion. Essentially, the USREP should be charged with ensuring the execution of US-GVN plans. As such, he must represent the interests of the United States Government and not acquiesce to the Vietnamese official

system. Yet, the advisory counterpart system presently employed highly personalizes advisor activity, and values informal working relationships.

While many GVN officials are inexperienced, most do recognize what must be done and know how to do it. Failure to act is more frequently the result of subjective factors. Persuasion through personal rapport has become vitiated through Vietnamese sophistication and willingness to manipulate US advisors for frequently selfish ends.

The US Single Manager system -- by providing GVN leaders with one American counterpart to include an operating US staff -- places the conduct of US-GVN operations on a business basis. This permits the impersonal application of sanctions on an organization-to-organization basis. Loss of rapport, as is the case in person-to-person confrontations, thereby is minimized. Counterpart friendships have achieved some successes in SVN; however, such associations do not provide the broad-based path to long-term development. Personalized relationships take a long time to develop and are not truly transferable to a successor upon completion of a duty tour.

A New US Role

The obstacles to social change in SVN are great, but they are not insuperable. The Vietnamese belief that all in life is transitory has many followers; consequently, it will require massive effort to convince them that substantive and positive change has occurred. In fact,

the repeated failure of US-GVN nonmilitary programs now appears to have persuaded many Vietnamese to reject all prospects of success. The massive American combat presence has not diluted this negativism; rather, it has heightened Vietnamese intellectual suspicions regarding the underlying motives of the US in SVN.

Scope of the Task at Hand. The US-GVN effort must soon register some evident gains in other than purely combat operations. In the nonmilitary endeavor area, these gains must be credible at the peasant level where cultural traditions have never encompassed more than village limits. The cultural heritage of the peasant has not prepared him for a passionate devotion to abstract ideas (e.g., the "spreading oil spot"); neither has it encouraged him to identify with the troubles of the less fortunate who are not members of his own village. These basic facts of life submit a prime motivational challenge to the US presence. As a first step, the US Single Manager in Saigon must break the annual nonmilitary program chain of reorganize, rename, refund and fail.

The VC continue to exacerbate dissatisfaction and to wage professional overt and covert combat. Their major effort, however, is addressed to accelerating the evolutionary process of social change to revolutionary proportions. Thus far, the VC have succeeded in articulating the peasants' aspirations and have identified with their expectations for social reform. The articulating and identifying have been accomplished mainly by the selective application of terror against corrupt village officials. In contrast, the GVN has produced no credible response at village level. In the most basic

and physical sense, the VC have tailored their efforts for maximum impact at village level. They are performing actively, and at the appropriate level, as innovators within a social framework of communist design. (See: ANNEX C) Consequently, the VC still control the geographic bulk of the country by virtue of a well-developed and relatively unchallenged infrastructure deeply imbedded at village level.

The US must recognize this enemy infrastructure as the most significant obstruction to social change; once recognized, US-GVN assaults can be launched against it. We must further acknowledge that the very imperfections of the GVN we are assisting have produced the social conditions that require our presence. Its leadership continues to distort and resist efforts to execute social reforms. A more realistic US approach, based on recognition of the realities of Vietnamese society and the frailties of its social character, could increase the probability of ultimate US-GVN success. ANNEX I provides a detailed description of Vietnamese society.

The potential US Army role in such an undertaking is considerable. Field experience in Vietnam since 1954 affords the Army an opportunity to take the lead in proposing and developing an adequate response to the dual challenges -- VC infrastructure and GVN inaction. USREPs who have been assigned at the choice points of social change in SVN (province and district levels) will attest to the fact that more resources are available for exploitation than perhaps may be realized. In a sample of 140 experienced sector and subsector advisors, 85 percent considered

their tours to be extremely rewarding and to be critical preparation for the future Army role in counterinsurgency. Eighty-five percent of the returnees in this sample indicated a desire to serve a second tour in the same capacity. Fifty-one percent of the subsector and 36 percent of sector advisors now on duty in SVN would extend their tours provided: "I would have full command of the total US program in my area of responsibility and adequate resources to do the job as I saw it." In short there are a number of Americans who have faced up to the complexities of the problem and remain convinced that the job can be done. (See: ANNEX G) The implication is clear. These USREPs have identified with the strengths and aspirations of the Vietnamese people, primarily the peasant. Performance of a new US role to capitalize on such significant beginnings is imperative now. Later, the methods that have produced results can be integrated into counterinsurgency doctrine and training for successors.

Particulars of the Role. If there is a single factor which can serve to energize and assist in polarizing Vietnamese society today, it is the United States presence in SVN. We must be prepared both to recognize and to accept this role. In broadest possible perspective, it requires American performance in the role of social innovator and response to Vietnam's request for assistance on a society-to-society, rather than on a primarily military-to-military, basis. Thus far, the US appears unwilling to regard Vietnam as a society in trouble. We

have attempted to force both advice and tangibles into that society with the expectance that they would survive imperfections of the governing system. None of our material assistance has been given contingent upon its use by the GVN to produce needed social reform, particularly at the village level. The Vietnamese social system -- clearly deteriorating from internal deficiencies and pressures of the VC "shadow society" rising within it -- has proved to be a barrier of serious consequence to our less than total effort.

Americans believe deeply in the value of rapid and vast change. As such, we should accept the role of social innovator in Vietnamese society. Required social change, if produced at all in SVN, will not be initiated by massive US military intervention. A select group of US representatives who understand the very inner workings of Vietnamese society, however, could begin the task.

Planning Fundamentals

Staging and Phasing. The multitude of ongoing US-GVN programs, when weighed against the limited resources available for program support, demands careful planning of the US assistance effort. Staging of support must be approached by a practical and realistic examination of the actual situation in the light of the US objectives specified for achievement. Rarely will such an examination provide the US planner in SVN with the conviction that he can project a specific time for the attainment of program goals. Even the completion times of subprogram projects

cannot be forecast with accuracy. Programs are too interrelated, and situational factors are far too complex, to permit such prediction. US planners for SVN must conceive of objective attainment in time frames rather than in terms of specific dates.

Some programs must be planned and organized for application by sequential phasing. One attainable subobjective must be achieved before significant activity and support can be introduced to move the program on toward attainment of subsequent subobjectives. Many US-GVN programs, however, do not lend themselves to a clearly defined phasing sequence. Such programs must be initiated and supported subsequently on the basis of determining, by application, the best method to further their progress. These programs are oriented on objective achievement by altering the intensity of efforts applied or by shifting emphasis or content.

Current US long-range planners must treat both Rural Construction (RC) and long-term national development simultaneously and as a single integrated problem to be solved. In this respect, ultimate national development goals must be established and kept in mind throughout the process of dealing with short-range planning issues. The critical short-range planning factors are resources availability, Vietnamese talent and the interrelated complexities of today's situation. Realistically, the quantity of current US-GVN programs must be reduced; this is essential to provide the GVN system with a load that it can reasonably be expected to shoulder and follow through to completion. This requirement, however, calls for a judicious, rather than wholesale, US termination of ongoing programs. The US Single Manager's staff must

objectively review all of the details of each program (objectives and actual progress achieved); measure these findings against the realities of the current and projected situations; and, finally, balance this analysis against the estimated contribution of each program to national development. Critical to this task is the judgment which the staff must secure from senior USREPs. Plans must represent joint inputs from senior USREPs and their GVN counterparts. As in all phases of the planning process, these inputs must include village-level requirements. (See: Chapter IV) The US must not revert to a finger-in-the-dike approach; moreover, its planners must not kill a program that has just taken root to enable the initiation of some new program.

GVN needs to revert to a five-year planning cycle as soon as the disruptive effects of the war begin to abate. Now is the time to generate the US-GVN planning machinery that is needed to guide such an effort.

In practical terms, long-range planning decisions for Vietnam should merely establish priorities. These decisions should not be couched strictly in "either-or" terms; they should respond to the major issues and provide for shifts in US-GVN emphasis within the limits of available resources. Should major emphasis in the future be placed on universities or grade schools? Should future internal security be primarily dependent on military forces or police forces?

The Single Integrated Plan. The development of a single integrated plan covering the entire spectrum of programs and governmental activities in SVN is essential. US agencies represented there must agree upon a

common concept for achieving basic objectives and translate the agreed upon concept into a practical plan of action. The concept must address the needs of Vietnamese society. Establishment of the US Single Manager and staff should end concept and practice divergencies which have not upheld the credibility of US efforts. Detailed supra-agency planning will identify areas of duplicatory agency effort; isolate those areas where there is strong agency competition for skills within an overextended Vietnamese manpower base; and expose areas where marginal fund allocations have been too thinly spread to deal with major problems. Future US support must be: (1) proffered to the GVN in integrated plans and programs at Saigon level; and, (2) made contingent upon evidence demonstrating that the GVN is responding to the needs of its people. The US must guard against unilateral development and staffing of programs followed by verbal pro forma agreement from the Prime Minister or another high GVN official. In the past, such officials either have been unable to understand or have lacked interest or concern. Programs so advanced and received have not been executed. All planning efforts, particularly those in the nonmilitary areas, can be improved by expanding Vietnamese participation in the process. There are Vietnamese who have sound ideas: some are GVN ministers; others are junior officials fresh from the university.

The Ambassador's supra-agency staff must coordinate the single integrated plan with appropriate GVN ministries (directorates). The latter must establish an interministerial planning committee paralleling the US supra-agency staff for this specific purpose. (See: Chapter III)

Under such terms, US diplomatic action will play a decisive and continuing role. Every effort must be made to avoid the rupture of US-GVN ties. However, a clearly defined set of positive inducements and negative sanctions must be established, clearly understood on both sides and held in readiness for use when the achievement of US objectives is of overriding importance.

Prime considerations in this combined planning process would include:

(1) Specific GVN and US agency tasks.

(2) Funding allocations by program component and subcomponent.

(3) Cadre and other civilian support requirements.

(4) Military force commitments.

(5) Phasing of program completion to ensure that successive steps are undertaken based upon prerequisite success and not on elapsed time.

(6) Establishment of priorities strictly within military and nonmilitary programs but no assignment of priorities between these two critical categories.

(7) Accomplishment of intermediate objectives based upon the "stair step" principle. Resources for step two should be forthcoming only after step one is accomplished, inspected and formally accepted by local US-GVN representation. Agreement on this method of operation must be established by the US Single Manager.

(8) Terms of program reference establishing both specific US-GVN responsibilities and the specifics of leverage available at each level

to ensure objective achievement.

(9) Precise delineation of both the US role in execution and the available US resources support to provide a uniform basis for the provision of advice and control of supplies.

(10) Specific enumeration of counterproductive activities that authorize USREPs' use of the veto to terminate parts of programs.

(11) Publication of the single integrated plan in both English and Vietnamese language versions with distribution through both command chains simultaneously.

(12) Provisions for combined program progress evaluation and post program audits.

Planning must be concurrent at Saigon, corps and province levels. This will ensure flexibility in execution at district and village. The major thrust of all planning must be to compete with the VC at village level in SVN. The on-site quarterly review of US-GVN progress provides the data base for evaluating field execution and for refinement of the basic plan. GVN provision of ministerial representation to corps, as achieved by US Single Manager political action, will increase the responsiveness of that echelon to Rural Construction tasks. The SUSREP at corps will directly influence planning and execution.

Execution Fundamentals

Decentralized Execution. The concept of decentralized execution takes on a new meaning when applied to SVN. New problems demand new solutions. New solutions imply new operational techniques. Decentralization permits effective pursuit of programs and imaginative exploitation

of local opportunities. ANNEX G provides valuable insights on the essentials for producing forward motion in districts and provinces.

> "Advisors should become moderately involved in political matters.
>
> "Friendly persuasion, founded on professional respect, followed by bringing pressure to bear through the next higher echelon when necessary, is the way to get plans executed.
>
> "The control of resources to carry out pacification programs should be decentralized to province or below. US advisors should have at the minimum 'sign-off' authority over resources at the level of utilization.
>
> "US-GVN plans can be more effectively accomplished by integrating efforts at the national level, using the control of resources by US advisors to ensure proper execution. Currently there are too many plans, programs and ministries for a single national effort and resources dwindle while more plans are made."

It is difficult to determine the degree of centralized GVN control that is actually required in Saigon. One point, however, is clear, GVN officials in the field use "overcontrol by Saigon" as an excuse to avoid taking the initiative. The frequent "Saigon must tell me" response is too often used by province chiefs in matters concerning National Police, pacification cadres or other centrally directed activities. Nevertheless, Saigon does experience real difficulty in visualizing, as well as in supervising, the execution of plans for 43 provinces and their district subdivisions. This is particularly true in the case of nonmilitary endeavors. Varied local interests, competition with the VC infrastructure and complexities inherent in the nature of the rural population make centralized control impossible at the Saigon level. In extension, both the US and the GVN field representatives have manifested reluctance to transmit either local problems or recommendations through multiple command channels.

Their problems may go unanswered, and their recommendations are either denied or unsupported. This further dilutes the base for supervision and fosters inertia at lower levels. Adoption of the US Single Manager system could overcome these serious obstacles. It will better align the USREP in the province with a support effort geared to the needs of his GVN counterpart.

Sponsoring and Protecting Success. It becomes increasingly apparent that talent, good intentions and excellent understanding of the problem exist at province and district. However, these lower echelon Vietnamese officials are frequently frustrated by bureaucratic inadequacy and the inability of the present military power elite to cope with the situation. There is wide agreement that the US must make GVN work; but, GVN seems to work better from the bottom up and in direct relation to the ability of USREPs to exert influence. Previous efforts to realign the Vietnamese national government have consistently failed to alter its method of operation. Bureaus attempt to retain authority at Saigon level by voicing concern that decentralization will make "warlords" of corps commanders. The countercontention is that nothing will move without government stability in Saigon. It is difficult to establish which level -- corps or ministry -- has scuttled the most US-GVN programs.

There is merit in the view that the national government will never grow unless it is given something to do. However, it may have grown too much at the expense of rural areas. A social reform remedy demands

some selective undercutting of national government in the short range.

Bypassing Saigon or any subordinate level of GVN obstruction stands as a relatively unexplored US course of action. US teams at corps level must be authorized to press the momentum of success at the province level; they must also insulate province operations from arbitrary acts or failures to act at higher GVN levels. If a corps commander assumes unwarranted civil authority and thereby interferes in a province chief's domain, the senior USREP at corps should reinforce local leverage by submitting a request through US channels to the Prime Minister for removal of the offending commander. Political action by the US Single Manager on receipt of such a request is mandatory, and the establishment of a firm Saigon-level counterpart system should provide the foundation for his positive support of field operations. Confidence in US ability to influence the GVN must replace sensitivity with respect to sovereignty.

The Tools of Urgency. Steps must be taken to give USREPs the necessary tools to induce their GVN counterparts to accomplish essential tasks. This is a precondition for success in view of today's critical situation.

The fundamental problem at province and district is lack of execution rather than inadequacy of plans. Vigorous "political action" and "leverage" constitute means of reinforcing the underlying Vietnamese potential for achieving a viable, responsive government. The US must ensure effective accomplishment of the essential elements of its program. Properly employed, political action and leverage are coherent

and constructive techniques affording direction, purpose and momentum to GVN efforts.

Whereas political action is largely reserved for exercise by the Ambassador at national level, leverage should be exercised by USREPs at all levels. Generally, leverage is thought to connote solely the use of resources to initiate actions or to achieve greater results with a minimum expenditure of effort. As envisioned for use in the US Single Manager system, leverage will bring to bear American presence, influence and resources to accomplish US-GVN objectives. Its application should be viewed as ranging through a continuum from subtle interpersonal persuasion to withdrawal of US support. To date, the US has administered leverage in haphazard fashion and with varying degrees of success. Field advisors consistently cite the requirement for additional leverage. Its potential, however, has been largely overlooked at lower levels. At higher levels, fear of misuse by subordinates constrains delegation of authority for its use.

Leverage is only effective in those instances where Vietnamese failure to use existing resources and coordinated US advice is attributable to a lack of motivation. To ensure consistent application, leverage must originate in terms of reference established by government-to-government agreement. Subsequently, its specific terms must be stated in each plan and program. There must be a clear recognition, throughout both US and GVN channels, of its precise context and the means by which it is to be exercised. Leverage, in all its implications

must be understood by the Vietnamese if it is to become an effective tool. Mere understanding of written terms, however, offers no guarantee of increased success; GVN understanding emerges after leverage has been applied skillfully at all levels. Hence, common concepts and procedures must be understood and followed by all US agencies involved in its application. The US proposal of a plan or program, to include funding, must be contingent upon Vietnamese acceptance of this procedure. Moreover, USREPs at the lowest levels must stipulate the same priority actions to their Vietnamese counterparts as the US Single Manager specifies to his in Saigon. The senior USREP at each level should determine when formal leverage, as stated in approved plans, is to be employed after due consideration of the circumstances by all agency representatives on his team.

It can be argued that some Vietnamese will rail at leverage as another US attempt to "take over the country." The fact remains, however, that the US intent is to orient an imperfect system toward the legitimate aspirations of its people. The need for leverage is underscored by James Cross in Conflict in the Shadows:

> "Inevitably this is tricky business. Advice, counsel, and cooperation are all acceptable terms and concepts, even when both parties are fully aware of the pressures being exerted, but anything that smacks too openly of coercion or bullying may boomerang politically against the larger nation and cause difficulties not only with the smaller ally but with other nations as well. Still, some method of exerting polite but effective control has to be found. American programs in a number of states amount to heavy commitments, but in some, and at the time of writing South Vietnam is an example, the United States cannot exert sufficient leverage decisively to influence the course of events."7:145/

Types of Leverage. The US dollar remains the greatest single lever; however, its application can take many forms. Chapter IV presents a detailed discussion of the application of economic leverage.

Examples of Military Leverage:

(1) Negotiation of the military assistance program to stipulate that release authority of MAP equipment will be retained by the US logistical advisor at Area Logistical Commands.

(2) Recommendation for counterpart attendance at US schools.

(3) Control of combat, combat support and combat service support units.

(4) Withdrawal of entire US agency representation from units (or political subdivisions) disregarding US advice, followed by a request for relief of the Vietnamese concerned through US channels.

(5) Continue rendering informal efficiency reports on counterparts, to include a recommendation for removal if necessary.

Examples of Organizational Leverage:

(1) Participation by the senior USREP in combined planning to include finalization of agreements at all levels of US presence.

(2) Audit of RC expenditures by combined US audit teams.

(3) Review of Vietnamese rejection of advice on major issues by combined US-GVN board at the next higher echelon.

(4) Reporting by all USREPs of Vietnamese inactivity or deviation from programs to the next higher command echelon.

Measuring Progress. The intense US emphasis on demonstrable and measurable results must be abandoned. The reporting system is excessively preoccupied with the quantitative evaluation of dubious measures of success. Little credence is attached to the subjective assessments of experienced people on the ground. Somehow, a form of "metering philosophy" dominates both planning and operations. The demand for facts has created unreliable statistical inputs from Vietnamese and has established an orientation toward demonstrating US advisory success at the expense of Vietnamese reality. The Vietnamese prepare beautiful plans; once completed, the documents themselves are viewed as progress, and little heed is given to their execution. Confronted with the requirement to achieve results in the face of limited personnel resources, promising programs have been destroyed to get a new one under way. On the American side, to report a deteriorating situation is all too frequently regarded as an admission of US, rather than Vietnamese, failure. Intentional distortions contribute to the confusing "forest of fractions" portraying success. "Measle sheets" indicating strategic hamlet progress are displayed as a part of every briefing. More time spent on influencing effective GVN activity, and less time spent in reporting on the lack of it, should be the order of the day.

The question of how to measure progress in the pacification effort has never been answered satisfactorily. Various numerical yardsticks have been used. Attempts to employ these yardsticks lead invariably to the same conclusion: it is difficult to quantify success in pacification.

Typical advisor comments amplify the problem. Some feel that it is not possible to talk about "yardsticks" in connection with Vietnam for the following reasons: (1) one can only have a "yardstick" if one knows the objective; (2) there must be something accomplished before it can be measured; (3) the situation is too fluid for "yardsticks"; (4) developing "yardsticks" is a symptom of the illness in the advisor effort; (5) more than one tour is required to see progress; and, (6) each program has a different "yardstick." After making firsthand observations in SVN, Philip Geyelin (Wall Street Journal) reported that:

> ". . . something funny happens to low level expert counsel on its way up the bureaucratic heights. It gets tailored for political comfort, or to fit preconceptions. It gets reduced to catchwords or cliches, or committed to computers for display in glib statistics or graphic charts. No matter how carefully qualified and unsusceptible to generalities the original judgment may have been, the end product may have the appearance of unquestioned truth."8:10/

The problem bears a marked similarity to that faced in attempts to develop indices of combat effectiveness. Firepower can be assigned a numerical value; but, what weight should be assigned to bravery or leadership? There are too many major factors in the equation that simply cannot be assigned a number. Realistically, decisions in SVN must be based upon assessments of the total situation and not just upon its reportable aspects. Yet, it is quite clear that progress must be both measured and reported. Qualitative assessment is the key means of evaluating the thrust of nonmilitary activity in SVN. PROVN proposes the following method of providing an index of success relative

to the Rural Construction (RC) effort.

Just as some Army officers (because of their perception, training and experience) are able to judge the effectiveness of a battalion simply by spending some time with it, some Americans now are qualified to judge RC progress at district level. It is doubtful that such evaluators can tell you what they look for; many unquantifiable impressions register on an experienced USREP. It is therefore proposed, under the US Single Manager concept, that a team of officers or civilians be assigned to the Office of the Director for Rural Construction and Development (DRCD) and be charged with the mission of assessing pacification. Necessarily, these men should be fluent in the Vietnamese language and possess province or district level experience in Vietnam. Each evaluator would visit each district where an assigned US Team is functioning. The resulting evaluations would provide a rank ordering of the visited districts based upon observed progress in RC.

In the final analysis, the most valid measures of success in achieving a free and independent Vietnam must be inferred from the actions of the Vietnamese people at the village level. Such subjective impressions are difficult to obtain and not readily reduced to statistics, but they must be solicited from USREPs to serve as a framework within which related statistics can be evaluated.

Talent For The Task

Personnel Selection and Training. Effective operation of the US Single Manager system will depend on the quality and preparation of

personnel selected to operate it. The human and job skills required, particularly of those performing as senior USREPs, are rarely found in a single individual. Once found, that individual particularly, a civilian technician is rarely willing to accept the personal and professional risks of the job. Moreover, too many military officers and foreign service officers now are inclined to treat counterinsurgency as a secondary task. The Agency for International Development (AID) is not authorized to offer professional foreign service career status to its personnel, and considerable difficulty has been experienced in hiring the relatively short-term contract civilians that are needed to perform USOM field duty. The US Army has borne much of the burden incident to discharging province and district responsibilities in SVN. Frequently, Army officers at the scene have performed by default those associated tasks definitively ascribed to other US agencies. On occasion, the sector advisor is assisted by retired Army personnel who are serving as field representatives for other agencies. In other instances, the assisting representative is another Army officer (in mufti) bridging the personnel gap for US agencies.

At least through 1970, therefore, Army personnel will constitute the prime source of experienced field leadership for duty in SVN. Due to the urgency of the situation there, action must be taken now to prepare and apply this capability to assure its maximum impact. Selection, not training, is the critical factor in achieving such impact.

In view of the crucial importance of the Rural Construction effort, it is essential that the Army take the following action:

(1) Select, on a volunteer basis, 43 highly qualified Army lieutenant colonels and colonels for assignment as sector advisors in Vietnam.

Successful performance throughout a previous assignment in Vietnam, on a similar task, should be the prime consideration.

(2) Give these officers cross agency refresher training with other US agency provincial representatives and deploy the "team package" to SVN.

(3) Provide these teams with the results of province-oriented data analysis covering SVN and their anticipated areas of assignment. (See: ANNEX G)

(4) Locate their families in the proximity of the SVN duty station; enforce, rather than encourage, a policy of monthly visits by sponsors to their dependents.

(5) Encourage tour extensions and publicize such assignments as a prototype whose outcome will determine the future Army role.

(6) Provide, as appropriate, for a personal orientation of each team by the Army Chief of Staff. In sum, sector team service should be established as a worthwhile, dignified and supported national priority assignment. The senior USREP post of national responsibility should pass to civilian representatives as the US Single Manager effort becomes predominently civil in nature and sufficient civilian capabilities are developed by other US agencies.

Over the short-range periods, the Army must accept the major role imposed upon it at sector and subsector levels in SVN; this is dictated by the nature of the existing security situation. The training of personnel for phased introduction into the US Single Manager system is crucial. All of the preceding changes in US organization and method are proposed by PROVN, based upon determinations of how best to support the province-district level of effort. Future training of USREPs and

their successors to function at province and district level must be accomplished both in the US and in SVN. All US operating agencies must join in developing the training program and in providing the staff required to administer it. Course content must be anchored to specific territorial areas and should include a realistic address of data held on the GVN counterparts with whom the teams will be working.

Over the short-range period, the US must initiate cross agency training capable of producing the skilled, broad-gauge, supra-agency personnel required to manage US support affairs under conditions of crisis. The basic knowledge and judgment must already exist in the personnel of the first increment selected in 1966 for this type of duty; these selections must be based upon detailed analysis of their entire career development pattern.

Throughout the mid-range period, each US agency must develop its own professional operating capabilities and field support doctrine based primarily on experience in SVN. The Department of State should ensure the development of a stronger political arm for application in counterinsurgency situations and in extension of its tacit observer-reporter-representer role. Other departments must recognize the political nature of the situation and develop a nucleus of capable managers within the framework of programs monitored by the Department of State. Congressional enactment must provide an adequate allocation of career foreign service officer posts for AID.

Influencing Social Change. The training program for future USREPs should treat social change as a major item; ANNEX I addresses this field. At the very minimum, the ability to influence the Vietnamese in the

creation of a social environment wherein freedom and independence can flourish depends upon the availability of three essential ingredients:

(1) An integrated, current body of knowledge describing the Vietnamese society and identifying those elements within its political, economic, military and other subsystems which must be stabilized through induced social change.

(2) The knowledge of how social change may be influenced in a direction commensurate with stated objectives.

(3) A group of US representatives who understand the methods used to produce change and who are competent to bring them to bear on the problem in Vietnam.

Such US representatives exist, but action must be taken to meet the requirements of items (1) and (2) above with increased vigor. It is contended that Americans are not on firm ground in presuming the competence to advise Vietnamese on how best to respond toward their own people; further, that social change must be produced by the Vietnamese. Yet, Americans are not totally excluded from this process today; many have become deeply involved at district and province levels through use of methods not yet reflected in current organization and operations. Most of our advisors in rural SVN have identified the elementary needs of its people and the fundamental influences that alienate them. No special powers are required to make these judgments. Most have attempted to urge their GVN counterpart into actions to meet village-level needs and have failed in this attempt. The GVN official lacked motivation.

There is wide recognition of the difficulties faced in motivating individuals and groups within our own culture. Such recognition has

generated a marked reluctance to consider seriously the issue of motivation in an alien culture. Actually, we have failed to explore the possibilities inherent in motivating people possessing different attitudes, values, beliefs and patterns of social, as well as individual, behavior. In a very real sense, USREPs need more detailed understanding of the particular social system in which they are assigned to operate. Through such knowledge, they will be better prepared to revise programs and to initiate meaningful proposals. Such proposals must be workable within social parameters characteristic of USREPs' areas of influence.

USREPs are not properly armed to defeat active insurgency: (1) if they are not empowered to exert US influence to the extent necessary to achieve US objectives in SVN; and, (2) if they are unable to articulate American intellectual conviction. The latter capability has especial significance in the prevailing situation. Some physical understanding of our free way of life, together with its accompanying democratic ideals and values, is needed now in SVN. Contacts with USREPs can influence Vietnamese thinking and behavior on these counts. Some intermediate action must be taken pending the achievement of results via the long-range process of education. The advisor-counterpart relationship offers an excellent opportunity to influence social change. The military institution is dominant in SVN, and its attitudes, values and beliefs are critical to successful pacification and long-term development. The doctrine for accomplishing US objectives at these levels largely lies in the experience of the men who have served as the counterparts

of GVN province and district chiefs on an intimate daily basis. As yet, synthesis of such experience has not been set forth in "Advisory Instructions" or in "counterinsurgency doctrine." Specifically, the basic training of tomorrow's USREPs should focus on what has been "learned the hard way" at village level in SVN. ANNEX G statements, as follow, are submitted as an initial step in this direction:

Language (Quang Ngai: 1964)--"... how much more effective I could have been in so many areas if I could have reached the people in their own tongue. This was always a gnawing ache in my stomach ... Language poverty reduced my effectiveness from 40 to 50 percent."

Agency Roles and Programs (Hau Nghia: 1964)--"It took me quite a while to figure out who all the US civilians visiting province represented and what they were trying to convince the province chief that he should do. ..."

Willingness to Serve (Long An: 1964)--"I would go back to the same job under any set of conditions. There is no more critical assignment in the US Foreign Service today and, unless there are some radical changes, these positions will be filled by soldiers for some time -- and in many places -- during the years ahead."

GVN (Vinh Binh: 1965)--"How are the ministries arranged, and what is the GVN budgetary procedure? Neither the district chief nor myself really knew how to secure civic action funds, reimbursement for crop damage, Regional Force death gratuities or relocation funds. In the area of nonmilitary projects, I am often left in the dark until too late to influence the projects one way or the other -- many projects are years old, and the money has been allocated. But, through change in district personnel or disinterest, nothing has been done."

Political (Long An: 1965)--"Americans, especially the US military, hesitate to engage in political indoctrination because of our traditional role -- US civilian control. We must counter (insurgency) with an aggressive political indoctrination program that is realistic but, most of all, active. We must equip our advisors better and become more active in political affairs under insurgency conditions!"

Counterpart Relationships (Long An: 1965)--"First, you must successfully learn to think like an Asian. This requires one to make the transition from what seems like a good idea to an American to what makes sense to a Vietnamese."

Specific Area Knowledge (Binh Dinh: 1964)--"I doubt that I could apply expertise gained in my province to other areas of Vietnam. What I do, I do -- I just go to work at 0600 and wait for things to happen -- common sense is essential."

Mid and Long-Range Projections

Mid-Range:

Objectives.

(1) US organizational presence capable of supporting pacification and assisting nation building in SVN.

(2) Progressive transfer of US support at district and province from US military to US civil operating agencies.

(3) Presence of capable Vietnamese counterpart mechanisms at province and district so that US "purse string" and resource controls are no longer required.

Actions.

(1) Termination of the Executive Agent role and the return to

"normal" Washington support and coordination arrangements.

(2) Establishment of AID as a primary US foreign policy support arm, to include career foreign service officer status for most field and administrative personnel.

(3) Selective withdrawal of US military components of district and province teams as GVN civil authority assumes responsibility from GVN military for government.

Long-Range:

Objective. Minimum US presence.

Action. Withdrawal of subnational US civil-military teams.

Conclusions

PROVN has reviewed the expansion and involvement of US agencies in SVN. The aim was to determine if any pattern emerged which could be translated into a meaningful interagency organization and doctrine for combating future "wars of national liberation." The following findings were fundamental:

General. The Army will continue to make the major contribution to the "advisory" effort. Consequently, the Army should continue to train and carry out this responsibility, while simultaneously encouraging other agencies to develop or augment appropriate field operating arms. All agencies in SVN must extend their efforts outward to the countryside to assist senior USREPs.

Rather than strictly advisory, the mission of USREPs should be one

of ensuring the fulfillment of US-GVN programs, particularly those of a nonmilitary nature. US and GVN goals cannot be attained until US guidance is accepted and acted upon at every level of the GVN -- civilian and military. This requires the assignment of sufficient US agency managerial and technical talent to permit the tailoring of sector and subsector teams. A US civil-military scaffolding must be constructed beside the ineffective GVN structure. The former must be capable of independent performance as a last resort. (See: Chapter IV) The following specific short-range actions to organize the US presence and to facilitate the adoption of this method of operation are proposed:

Required Actions at the Washington Level. The President must require full integration of the US assistance effort for SVN. PROVN recommends:

(1) Charging the Ambassador, as US Single Manager, with full responsibility for the US effort in SVN and providing him with the degree of command and control authority required to discharge SVN responsibility.

(2) Discontinuing the Vietnam Coordinating Committee.

(3) Designating a Presidential Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, as executive agent for SVN, and empowering him to:

(a) Coordinate the required national effort in the name of the President.

(b) Establish such Washington-level arrangements as may be required to provide executive agency support to the US effort in SVN. Major emphasis will be placed on precluding US interagency competition.

(c) Coordinate, with Washington-level parent agencies, the operational and logistical requirements of in-country agency

representatives as requested by the US Single Manager in Saigon. Conflicts will be resolved by Presidential decision if required.

Required Actions at the Saigon Level. The Ambassador, as US Single Manager, must require unity of command in the application of US support in SVN. PROVN recommends:

(1) Eliminating the Mission Council.

(2) Establishing a Director for Rural Construction and Development (DRCD) responsible for directing the execution of all US programs not specifically assigned to CINCUSFV.

(3) Designating CINCUSFV as a coequal with the DRCD. Technical, logistical and combat support channels will be retained with CINCPAC and DOD as required.

(4) Forming a supra-agency staff and using it to develop support plans (short, mid and long-range), to establish assistance priorities, to coordinate military and nonmilitary programs and to integrate operations of the total US effort.

(5) Designating, specifically, that the supra-agency staff (in conjunction with GVN) prepare a combined national-level plan for the Rural Construction and Development of SVN. This plan will be:

(a) Dependent upon inputs initiated at village level with US participation in the planning process from the outset.

(b) Agreed to, in principle and in fact, by all US agency representatives in-country.

(c) Binding on GVN for execution.

(d) Prefaced by a comprehensive statement of the respective governmental support roles, levels of resource input, leverage authorizations and military force commitments to security missions.

(6) Requiring that US agencies in-country be placed under the operational command of the DRCD with agencies (except as specified in the following subparagraph) retaining technical and administrative communication channels directly to their Washington-level parent agencies. Logistical and operational matters will be communicated, only as approved by the US Single Manager (Ambassador), to the designated Executive Agent in Washington. The Executive Agent will act as coordinator on such matters, referring them to the individual Washington-level parent agencies and the President for execution or decision as required.

(7) Bringing the sector and subsector advisory effort within the purview of the Single Manager system with the status of a separate military element (JUSMAAG) -- coequal with USOM, JUSPAO, CAS and STATE. JUSMAAG elements will retain administrative, technical and logistical communication channels to appropriate service components of USFV.

(8) Designating senior US representatives (SUSREPs) to direct US assistance activities at GVN corps and subnational levels in his name.

(9) Directing the four SUSREPs at GVN corps level to assume command of the US sector and subsector advisory effort and such US military units as support Rural Construction within their respective territorial areas.

(10) Directing CINCUSFV to designate four military representatives,

for service at GVN corps level; each will serve as a member of the corps SUSREP's staff when the majority of ARVN units are committed to Rural Construction. Corps military representatives will respond to CINCUSFV and advise the ARVN corps commander on military operations conducted in conjunction with US forces and on operations not in direct support of Rural Construction.9/

(11) Directing that the US advisory teams with RVNAF units committed to the support of Rural Construction in the provinces will come under the operational control of the SUSREP at that level.

Required Actions at Corps Level. The designated SUSREP, in the name of the US Single Manager, must require full integration of the US assistance effort in his territorial area. PROVN recommends:

(1) Reorganizing the US presence at province level based on determinations as to the nature of the existing local situation.

(2) Responding solely to the orders and instructions of the Director for Rural Construction and Development (DRCD).

(3) Directing SUSREPs at province and district levels to tailor their US teams according to specific area requirements and anticipated programs.

Additional Actions.

(1) Establishing the role of USREPs as "agents of social change" and expanding capabilities for the performance of this role.

(2) Incorporating adequate and appropriate means of influencing the execution of all US-GVN plans and programs.

(3) Providing, throughout the US Single Manager System, protective assistance to sincere and dedicated Vietnamese officials who are striving to create a government that is responsive to the people.

(4) Revising procedures of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) to enable US retention of the custody of military end-items (provide custody and release authority to USREPs within the Area Logistical Commands).

(5) Establishing and sustaining a questionnaire-debrief program that will enable and increase understanding of the situation at all levels of US-GVN relationships in SVN. All USREPs and selected Vietnamese should be requested to respond to carefully developed questions on situation problem areas for automated analysis.

(6) Conducting intensive socio-cultural research on all facets of Vietnamese society to develop an integrated, current body of knowledge describing Vietnamese society (to include the identification of those elements within the political, economic, military and other subsystems which must be stabilized through induced social change).

(7) Conducting intensive behavioral science research to determine how best to influence social change and political reform in emerging nations (project would attempt to identify social indicators of internal war and to analyze possible courses of action to reduce this potential).

Notes

1. Lieutenant Colonel Volney F. Warner, author of Chapter II, US Organization and Method of Operations, nonconcurs in the substitution of terminology such as "involvement" or "influence" for the term "intervention." Such editorial substitution acquiesces to the political meaning of this word and reflects concern for its nonacceptability at higher governmental levels. In the opinion of the author, a substantive change is implied and a major issue involved. Military intervention is fact. Intervention in nonmilitary activities is essential to produce GVN response to the aspirations and grievances of the Vietnamese people. Such intervention is not only desirable but necessary to lend substance and credibility to US objectives "beyond the war." Repeated refusal to acknowledge the realities of Vietnam, as experienced by US Army officers on the scene, contributes to our continued ineffectiveness. Requests by US Sector and Subsector Advisors for greater decentralization of authority and resources have gone unanswered since 1963. In the Author's judgment, the policy of nonintervention is the basic reason for withholding these essential tools of leverage from lower echelons. The new method of operation visualized in Chapter II cannot be initiated until such decentralization occurs. If it occurs, the anticipated nature of the operation to follow would be more accurately described as "intervention" than by more politically palatable terminology.

2. Country Assistance Strategy Statement sent from USOM Vietnam to Washington by Ambassador Lodge. Although the strategy was not cleared through the Mission Council due to a short Washington suspense date, the statement of the existing situation is accurate. Saigon, 1965.

3. It is pointed out that, in the Honolulu Conference record of 7-8 February 1966, it is stated: "The US will try to formulate a way to better our organization in support of the Vietnamese effort." (JCS 2343/783, 28 February 1966, p. 13, SECRET). The creation of a new type civil-military organization in Saigon under the Single Manager will alter military command relationships with CINCPAC. Placing the total military effort under the Ambassador clearly indicates that CINCPAC's authority over military matters within SVN will be eclipsed and perhaps eliminated. CINCPAC's present responsibilities in NVN, Thailand and Laos may, however, remain unchanged.

4. Memorandum for the President from the Director, US Information Agency, dated 16 March 1965 (SECRET).

5. As cited in ANNEX I and emphasized by US advisor respondents in ANNEX G, the specifics over which SUSREP veto power is required include; (1) driving at excessive speeds through villages; (2) stealing means of peasant livelihood; (3) aerial bombing and artillery firing (particularly H&I fires at night); (4) condoning payment of taxes to multiple collection

agencies; (5) failing to provide relief from VC or GVN terrorization; (6) remaining aloof from practices denying legitimate indemnification payments for combat operations losses; (7) permiting forceful relocations in the face of such abuses as collection and personal use of allocated funds by corrupt officials; and, (8) requiring the provision of transportation without reimbursement; maintaining a "hands off" posture on such official forms of extortion as: buying MEDCAP basic drugs, sale of identification photos, ransoming those arrested for not having ID cards on hand. The authority to withhold US resources could prove to be an effective "veto" with respect to such practices.

6. These comments consist of subjective impressions expressed by Vietnamese presently assigned to the Voice of America, USIS. Washington, 1965.

7. Cross, James E. Conflict in the Shadows. New York, 1963.

8. Geyelin, Philip. "Void in Vietnam," The Wall Street Journal, 24 August 1965.

9. The ARVN Corps Commander must, of necessity, be advised by both the Corps SUSREP and Corps Military representative. However, both the counterpart relationship and the nature of the advice given vary as the war changes. For example, it is envisaged that under this concept, the majority of the ARVN units in the IV Corps area might today be operating under the JUSMAAG (and, in turn, under the DRCD), because main force VC and PAVN operations are not now prevalent in the IV Corps. The Corps SUSREP would be the sole advisor to the ARVN Corps Commander. On the other hand, under today's situation in the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps areas, the majority of the ARVN units would continue to be employed with USARV (and, in turn, under CINC US Forces Vietnam) for search and destroy operations against Main Force VC and PAVN units in those Corps Tactical Zones. The corps military representative would advise the ARVN corps commander on military operations not directly related to Rural Construction. Responsibility for coordination and advice to the ARVN Corps Commander on RC, however, always remains with the Corps SUSREP.

CHAPTER III

VIABLE GOVERNMENT

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CHAPTER III—SUMMARY

PROVN examines the political situation in SVN with a view toward establishing realistic political objectives, identifying obstacles to the attainment of these objectives and indicating specific US and GVN actions designed to achieve an effective governing system.

PROVN concludes that a viable and non-communist GVN is fundamental to the achievement of US objectives. Failure to develop a public-supported political order not only will preclude winning a true military victory, it will assure losing a negotiated peace. PROVN further concludes that the present GVN is inefficient, ineffective and neither representative of nor responsive to the needs and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people. Under present policy, where US political restraint has foreclosed responsible involvement in GVN political development, the governmental situation will not improve.

PROVN recommends that the US adopt a course of action whereby the US brings its influence to bear constructively in a systematic effort to stimulate, foster and guide the growth of fundamental political institutions and responsible GVN behavior. The US must take immediate action to induce GVN to fulfill its promises of social and political reform, to decentralize authority to province level, to simplify administrative and fiscal procedures and to develop a professional civil service. Delaying the execution of a positive program for the achievement of responsive government will render the ultimate US objective in SVN unattainable.

CHAPTER III

VIABLE GOVERNMENT

"... unless this basic issue -- the US ability to influence the GVN -- is resolved satisfactorily, our already questionable chances of success in South Vietnam will be significantly reduced."
(Warrenton Report, 13 January 1966)

Introduction

A viable non-communist government in SVN is fundamental to the achievement of US objectives. Failure to develop a viable, public-supported political order not only will preclude winning a true military victory, it will assure losing a negotiated peace. Achievement of an effective government responsive to the needs and aspirations of the South Vietnamese people is still possible. Under present policy, where US political restraint has foreclosed responsible involvement in GVN political development, it is not probable.

Specifically, PROVN recommends that the US must influence GVN accomplishment of the following actions to enable ultimate attainment of the basic US objective:

- Fulfill promises of social and political reform.
- Decentralize authority to province.
- Simplify administrative and fiscal procedures.
- Develop a professional civil service.

The short-range objectives to be achieved:

- Positive attitudes toward GVN.
- Leadership and institutional practices capable of furthering nation building.

Summary Assessment. The current GVN is a government without a popular mandate that seized power through military force and retains control through this same power buttressed by unequivocal US support. Governmental policies are formulated by a committee whose personal interests frequently prevail over national interests. Promises of reform are articulated by GVN spokesmen. Translation of these promises into action, however, is dependent upon a self-oriented, corrupt bureaucracy which is not interested in the public, particularly in the peasant.

Ministerial interaction and cooperation are minimal. The administrative system is a mixture of archaic mandarin and colonial French procedures that institutionalize inefficiency. Program directives that find their way through the bureaucratic maze of Saigon are communicated through confusing lines of civil and military authority; they are executed by inexperienced, poorly motivated, ineffective personnel.

The net result is a discredited government that is neither representative of, nor responsive to, the needs and aspirations of its people. Long-standing and legitimate causes of insurgency are still present. Promises of reform melt into maintenance of the status quo. At present, GVN exerts no meaningful influence over most rural areas of SVN.

Despite weaknesses in the political fabric of SVN, the Vietnamese people have many enviable qualities and some remarkable strengths. The

proportionate number of intellectuals in SVN has been judged higher than that of Europe.1/ The Vietnamese enjoy considerable opportunity for social mobility. Disagreements between many sectors of the population, exclusive of the VC, are more imagined than real. Strong filialism, resiliency and the will to stand and fight have permitted the Vietnamese to retain a distinctive national identity throughout a history of continued foreign domination.

Vietnam has many highly educated, efficient and dedicated individuals. Patriotic and experienced military officers are available to lead brave and skillful Vietnamese troops. An intense devotion to country lies unharnessed amidst a significant element of the population. There are capable Vietnamese available to provide a catalyst that can turn a sense of "peoplehood" into an awareness of "nationhood." Vietnamese repeatedly have demonstrated their ability to rise up in manifestations of fierce patriotism. The ingredients of success are present; it is the effective application of these ingredients that is missing.

An understanding of how cultural factors influence the political inclinations of Vietnamese mentality is a necessary preliminary to developing a plan for achieving viable government in SVN. Traditional conceptions of power and administration exert considerable influence on the political atmosphere.2:10-11/ One key principle is adaptability -- the tendency to shift to the winning side which traditionally has been valued by the wise Vietnamese. The Vietnamese politician or bureaucrat does not "stand on principle" as Puritan morality might demand. Instead his first concern is the welfare of himself, his kinfolk, his village -- maybe his province -- and, sometimes, his nation. If accepting a bribe will further the pres-

tige and power of his family in relationship to other families, then this is to him a sensible thing to do. Other Vietnamese fully expect this behavior as long as it does not exceed certain bounds. Political alignments may shift in order to capitalize on newly manifested opportunities for immediate gain. Thus, in the light of these established principles of political dynamics, for some time to come one must expect Vietnamese political life to be filled with what Americans call venality and lack of dependability. It would be unrealistic to expect that any premier or any group of administrators could bring about rapid reform based upon adherence to any American moral or political concept of right and wrong.

A second cultural principle bearing on the operation of the political system relates to the first. A good man in Vietnam is eclectic; he takes elements from apparently different systems of thought and action and combines them into a scheme with which he can live. Vietnamese are not absolutists -- neither absolute Catholics, nor Buddhists, nor Diemists, nor Communists. Such factors contribute to the Vietnamese penchant for shifting with the political weather and deviating as appears expeditious from an announced set of principles.

Another significant cultural influence in Vietnam is the importance of the intellectual. Without some meaningful evidence of a scholarly background, it is difficult for a leader at the national level to be accorded prestige. Whether nonscholarly, pragmatic military leaders can overcome this traditional obstacle and win popular support remains to be seen.

Against this background, a program to achieve a viable government is set forth in the following pages. Only those aspects of governmental activity that bear a meaningful relationship to achieving this objective are discussed; a definitive discussion of all aspects of Vietnamese government would detract attention from the critical issues.

Without meaningful US influence, the efficiency of the GVN administrative structure will improve very little, if at all. Village, district and province officials will continue to experience, and contribute to, delays in programs; paper work will continue to increase; regulations will continue to multiply; appropriations will continue to melt away through graft and corruption.

The people of Vietnam have the potential to achieve a viable government; they will not and cannot achieve this potential without positive US political assistance. Any program will become an exercise in frustration if the US is not willing to accept responsibility for vigorous and coercive political action in SVN. A policy of US political aid may save SVN and, at once, give new hope to other politically underdeveloped countries around the world.

Political Action

Political action, as that phrase is used here, means positive, vigorous "persuasion." It is a systematic effort to foster, stimulate and guide the growth of fundamental political and social structures and behaviors. Political action in SVN requires the application of tact and skill to influence political events constructively to achieve US

objectives. The need for constructive political influence is founded on the premise that people and ideas are more effective weapons than military hardware in waging a battle for men's minds. Failure to use political influence reflects a faith that stable political institutions and a viable government will come into existence in Vietnam provided we supply enough guns, troops and money. GVN has not developed a capacity to govern effectively. It will not move by some automatic process toward stable, responsible nationhood. Supplying material resources is not enough.

Political action is normally considered the province of the Department of State (DEPSTATE) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However, most Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) in the US Embassy in Saigon perform their mission by observing, predicting, reporting, philosophizing and, hopefully, negotiating. While occasional attempts are made to influence the course of political events, they are, as a rule, low key, infrequent and meet with a remarkable lack of success. FSOs have been trained in a tradition which forbids direct involvement in the political affairs of other nations. The policy of noninvolvement is valid and necessary in normal diplomatic situations. Consequently, most FSOs in Saigon consider political action neither desirable nor feasible. This political tradition of noninvolvement is unnecessarily restrictive and not consistent with the exigencies of countering Communists in SVN. While the CIA does have a charter for political action, its plans must be approved by DEPSTATE.

Argumentation that the US should not involve itself politically with GVN fails to consider that the US provides over 200,000 troops, millions of dollars' worth of equipment and 75 percent of the GVN budget. It is

naive to think that the US is not now influencing politics. The US presence today is the most significant political fact in Vietnam. But this presence is an unplanned political force with counterproductive impact. The Vietnamese often believe that failure of the US to take a stand on political issues means that the US totally supports GVN, including its arbitrary decisions, its corruption and its inefficiency. For example, in Vietnamese eyes the awarding of business and import licenses on the basis of nepotism, bribes and political favoritism appears to be sanctioned by the US. Apparently unequivocal support of GVN practices by the US discourages reform from within. VC propaganda claims that the US publicly supports GVN but covertly confuses and disrupts it so as to facilitate a US takeover.

While considerations of Vietnamese sovereignty are important, these considerations should not become an obstacle to the achievement of US national objectives. Standing on this outdated diplomatic principle can result in military defeat.

The US must assist in the political development of SVN. The exact techniques of political action cannot be definitively set out in a "Handbook for Diplomats." Due to the complexity and sensitivity of political action, details for action must, of necessity, be determined at the proper time and place by carefully selected individuals. Illustrative examples of specific opportunities for the exercise of political action are cited throughout this chapter. The important point is for the US to recognize that Vietnamese political development requires as much consideration, planning and action as do the economic and military spheres. The whims

of self-appointed Vietnamese officials and the aspirations of corrupt bureaucrats should not be elevated above the welfare of the Vietnamese people. Use of constructive influence to guide political events does not infer total "interventionism." It means that the US should have the courage to intercede politically where it should, the patience to accept political situations that should not be influenced and the wisdom to know the difference. Recommendations that follow are based on the assumption that the US will adopt a course of action that achieves the proper combination of courage, patience and wisdom.

Government Organization and Administration

General. Governmental structure and administration in SVN are based upon the following principles: (1) unitary government; (2) centralization; (3) deconcentration; and, (4) hierarchical administrative structure. Each of these principles is closely interrelated to the others.

(1) Unitary Form of Government. Under this doctrine, the national government possesses all powers. It represents a unified structure. Provincial and local units of government are considered as appendages of the central unit. The national government performs the following role in relation to lesser units: it creates them; it allocates functions to them; it maintains financial controls over their budgetary, taxation and expenditure operations; it determines the forms of representation that the population has at the local level and those that the lesser units have at the national level; it delineates lines of responsibility from agencies

of lesser units to central agencies; and it promulgates rules concerning government servants, including recruitment, assignment and other aspects of personnel administration.


(2) Centralization. Final decision-making authority rests with the National Leadership Committee, the Chief of State, the Prime Minister, or designated ministries. Although officials at lower echelons make decisions, the direction -- to include reversing lower echelon decisions -- is in the hands of higher administrative levels. Ultimate control and coordination responsibilities reside at the highest level.

(3) Deconcentration. Some authority to make decisions is delegated -- never transferred -- to lower level officials. Centralization is a structural concept denoting the source of authority and reservoir of power, while deconcentration is an operational concept setting forth those lower level officials permitted to make certain decisions. Such decisions are subject to review by higher authority.

(4) Hierarchical Administrative Structure. A single administrator is assumed to have final responsibility and authority. The structure of an agency resembles a pyramid with final authority at the apex.

Responsibility for governmental administration currently is diffused among eight echelons: national, corps (regional), division, province, district, canton, village and hamlet. (See: Figure 3-1) Schematically, and in contrast to the function of the administrative structure, the GVN resembles an inverted pyramid. Skeleton organizations with minimal authority at the local level support a gross bureaucracy at the national level. Most authority is retained at Saigon; that authority which is delegated among

Figure 3-1


THE ECHELONS OF GOVERNMENT.
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
REGION
4
PROVINCE
43
DISTRICT
CANTON
238
VILLAGE
2,550
HAMLET
10,333

subordinate echelons is so diffused that authority seldom matches responsibility. A summary of governmental operations at each echelon follows; only areas of administrative activity requiring corrective action are discussed.

(1) Lines of Authority. Lines of authority from the national government to the hamlet must be simplified and clarified. The interrelationships of various governmental officials and the rationale for changes are discussed under subheadings of various echelons of government.

(2) Decentralization. The national government should retain decision-making power for the present. This power should be limited to such matters as centralized planning of the war effort, coordination of war plans, assignment of national priorities, development of the national budget and the creation and allocation of resources. Decentralization of authority, however, must occur in deed as well as in word. Delegated authority must be explicit and be given to province level and below. In the short range, the corps commander must play a major role in the planning, coordination and direction of Rural Construction activities. (See: Chapter V) However, fiscal and material resources should be released by Saigon directly to province. Direct technical lines of communication should be maintained between national level ministries and ministerial representatives at province level. ARVN divisions should assist provinces in military affairs only and be restrained from interfering in the activities of civil administration. Prestige and authority commensurate with his responsibilities should be returned to the province chief. Delegation of authority to sub-

ordinate echelons by the province chief should be encouraged but left to his discretion; it should not be prescribed for nation-wide application.

(3) Administrative and Fiscal Reform. Before GVN efficiency can be significantly improved, a major revision and updating of the administrative and fiscal system must occur. Stress must be placed on simplification and clarification of procedures. Ministries of the national government and subordinate echelons should be authorized to spend funds without recourse to time-consuming, complicated, bureaucratic delays. The overwhelming burden of nonfunctional paper work must be reduced. A joint US-GVN team of administrative and fiscal experts, the equivalent of a "Little Hoover Commission," would be an appropriate vehicle for evaluating and making appropriate recommendations. Attempts at administrative study and reform have been made by GVN but have never reached fruition.

National Government. The national government is in a continuous state of flux. Each change in GVN leadership has resulted in replacement of many key officials as well as changes in fundamental organization. At present, the Congress of the Armed Forces is the highest formal governmental body. (See: Figure 3-2) In reality, this organization has no power and little influence; it is a facade designed to suggest broad-based military support and unity.

The National Leadership Committee (Directory) is composed of 10 generals theoretically responsible to the Congress of the Armed Forces. This Committee, chaired by the Chief of State, is characterized by separatism and conflict which result in power struggles among individuals and cliques.


National policies and basic decisions are made on the basis of the relative power of various factions rather than as the result of independent judgments and majority rule. Considerations of self-survival or personal advancement often override those of national interest.

Policies and decisions formulated by the National Leadership Committee are passed to the Central Executive Committee for action. The Central Executive Committee is chaired by the Chief of the Executive, the Prime Minister. The actual power of the Prime Minister is severely circumscribed. Lacking a political base among the populace, the Prime Minister must rely upon the support of the National Leadership Committee for continuance in office. Hence, punitive action by the Prime Minister against any member of this committee for dishonesty or inefficiency would result in political suicide.

Several ministries execute government policy. No consistent and ordered system of ministerial appointments has evolved. The Quat government collapsed over the issue of replacing a minister. The various ministries duplicate effort. There is little interaction or cooperation among them. No standardized working arrangements exist. The problem is compounded when the government is formed on the basis of compromise as reflected in attempts to divide ministerial positions among representatives of various power factions.

Military forces are the best organized non-communist group with significant power in SVN. Hence, any government in the near future must be either military or sanctioned by the military. Yet, military leaders lack much of the administrative and technical knowledge necessary to govern

Figure 3-2


REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
WAR CABINET 1/
PROVISIONAL CONVENTION
PROCLAIMED ON June 19, 1965
CONGRESS
OF THE ARMED FORCES
ECONOMIC & SOCIAL
COUNCIL
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP
COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN: CHIEF OF STATE
HIGH COUNCIL
OF MAGISTRATES
CIVIL SERVICE
SUPREME COUNCIL
NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF SECURITY
CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL
STAFF
CENTRAL EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE
PRIME MINISTER
ASSISTANTS TO CHIEF
EXECUTIVE
INSP. GEN. OF ADMIN.
AND FINANCE AFFAIRS
DIR. GEN.
OF PLANNING
OFFICE OF
MONTAGNARD
AFFAIRS
N. I. A.
DIR. GEN. OF
BUDGET AND
FOREIGN AID
COMMISSIONER GENERAL
FOR SOCIAL &
CULTURAL AFFAIRS
COMMISSIONER GENERAL
FOR JUSTICE
COMMISSIONER GENERAL
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMISSIONER GENERAL
FOR ECONOMY
& FINANCE
COMM.
FOR
EDUCATION
COMM.
FOR
HEALTH
COMM.
FOR
LABOR
COMM.
FOR
SOCIAL
WELFARE
COMMISSIONER GENERAL
FOR WAR AND
CONSTRUCTION
COMM.
FOR
AGRICUL
TURE
COMM.
FOR
FINANCE
COMM.
FOR
ECONOMY
COMM.
FOR
INTERIOR
COMM.
FOR
YOUTH
COMM.
FOR
PSYWAR
COMM.
FOR
DEFENSE
COMM.
FOR
RURAL
CONSTRUC-
TION
COMM.
FOR
PUBLIC WORKS
& COMMUNICATIONS

effectively. On the other hand, civilians can provide some of the requisite technical knowledge but have no power base.

Two workable solutions to the problem of national government in SVN are a civilian government supported by the military or a combination military-civilian government. The former is desirable; the latter is probable. The US should support either of these options.

Organization of National Government. The political dynamics of the present GVN make effective government at the national level impossible. A more workable arrangement should be encouraged by the US. An immediate, wholesale reorganization is neither feasible nor desirable; a gradual, progressive change to an efficient organization is both feasible and desirable. The objectives toward which the national government should be encouraged to move are:

(1) A Constitution. A constitution can be a meaningless document, particularly if its formulators have no popular support. Nevertheless, rule of law is more likely to prevail over rule of man when governments attempt to operate under a formalized legal frame of reference. Encouragement and assistance should be offered GVN in their present efforts to develop a constitution.

(2) A Representative Institution. No formal organization exists where the interests of the people of SVN can be represented. The immediate establishment of a National Assembly to represent the people of SVN has certain pitfalls. Failure of GVN to form a representative institution over a long period of time has greater pitfalls.

A National Assembly should be broadly representative of the various sectors of the population: Buddhists, Catholics, labor unions, military and minority groups. The existing elected provincial councils would provide a logical source for determining provincial representation. The assembly would approximate 100 members. A workable solution for structuring a National Assembly would be to make it bicameral. The upper house would be composed of representatives of the various power factions while the lower house would provide provincial representation.

Initially, the National Assembly should be a consultative body without legal power. It would serve as a vehicle for communication between the people and the national government. Its initial function should be similar to existing provincial councils -- representation without power. But, as rapidly as is feasible, the National Assembly should be vested with increasing power. There should be a mid-range objective of making it a legislative body. Hopefully, in the long range this body would develop into a legislative branch of government coequal to the Executive Branch. The assignment of responsibilities to this assembly must occur in time. A representative body without responsibility would become irresponsible.

(3) Power Relationships. Rule by such a system as the National Leadership Committee is inefficient. It provides some stability by counterbalancing the foci of power, but it does not permit effective government. GVN should be encouraged to move toward the following organization and power relationships:

(a) The power of the National Leadership Committee should be used to support the Prime Minister. At present, it is not practicable to disband this body. However, through positive political action by the US, the committee members must be influenced to subordinate personal interests to the national good.

(b) There should continue to be a Chief of State. For the present, he should be selected by the military. When the National Assembly develops into a responsible as well as representative body, it should nominate the Chief of State. Late in the short-range time period this nomination should be approved or vetoed by a controlled election (yes-no ballot). In the mid range, the Chief of State could be selected by a free popular election.

(c) The Chief of State should nominate the Prime Minister. For the present this selection should be approved by the military. Early in the mid-range time period the nomination should be approved by the National Assembly.

(d) For the present the Prime Minister should have full authority to appoint and discharge ministers. He should select his ministers on the basis of harmonious beliefs and relationships and professional capability. The Prime Minister should avoid the self-defeating practice of dividing ministerial posts to appease competing power factions. 4/ In the mid range, the Prime Minister's cabinet selections should be approved by the National Assembly. By this time it should be possible to permit greater participation of competing power groups.

(e) For the present various political power groups should have a voice in the government by appointment to subministerial committees. Committees for economic planning, social welfare, rural development, public relations, and related activities should contain qualified representatives of various interest groups.

(f) Ministerial efficiency should be improved by redefining responsibilities to avoid duplication of work.

(g) Interministerial meetings should be used to make immediate, coordinated decisions on routine matters rather than delaying action by using formal correspondence between ministries.

(h) An Administrative Court should be established. At present there is no formalized method of redress of grievances concerning such services as licenses, permits or routine applications. Government employees frequently discard such correspondence without processing it or replying to the sender. Tracer correspondence is usually ignored. Routine applications frequently take in excess of one year to process. An Administrative Court would permit a citizen recourse if his correspondence were not answered after a reasonable period.

Corps and Division. Under the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, province chiefs usually were personally selected by the President and enjoyed direct communication with Saigon, either through the Minister of Interior or directly with the palace. Divisions and corps existed for military planning and coordination, but not for direct control over other aspects of provincial activities. The province chief was the direct representative of the President. He played the major role in executing government

policies and had operational responsibility within the boundaries of his province.

When the Army took control after the coup against Diem, corps commanders announced their intention of increasing their control over all aspects of provincial activities. This control has steadily expanded to the point of making the corps commander a government delegate. At present, the corps commander exercises appointive and discharge authority over the province chief. The province chief's original authority has been usurped to the extent that he is looked upon as the division and corps representative in the area.

Placing the corps commander in the governmental hierarchy imposes an additional layer of bureaucratic delay without a corresponding increase in efficiency. The usurpation of authority by corps commanders promotes disunity. Corps commanders can and do ignore or modify national-level policy guidance. Directives to provinces emanating from Saigon can arrive at province changed to the extent that the original intent is subverted. Governmental authority at provincial level has decreased as the power of the corps commander has decreased.

To ensure decentralization of authority to province, the corps commander's authority should be limited to support of the Rural Construction Program. (See: Rural Construction, Chapter V) Civil administration should be conducted through civil lines of authority. 5/ (See: Figure 3-3)

Province. There are 43 provinces in SVN. The number of provinces changes frequently as new boundaries are selected on the basis of political, administrative or military considerations. The focus of counterin-

surgency activities is at province. Hence, the province chief is both a civil administrator and a military commander. Obstacles to effective government at province are:

(1) A military chain of command is superimposed on an organization originally intended for only civil administration. The province chief is responsible in varying degrees to a division commander, a corps commander, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Rural Construction and the Prime Minister. These officials frequently have sufficient power or influence to relieve a province chief.

(2) The province chief's military superiors interfere in civil affairs, and his civilian superiors issue conflicting instructions. Confused lines of authority and imprecise division of responsibility among civilian ministries make it difficult for the province chief to identify his own responsibility for various activities.

(3) Rapid turnover of province chiefs frequently hinders effective administration due to an inevitable lack of technical experience and familiarity with those problems peculiar to a province.

(4) The authority and responsibility of the province chief are poorly defined and depend to a considerable extent upon his personal relationship to division, corps and Saigon officials. This relationship changes with each change in leadership at Saigon, corps and division.

(5) Province chiefs frequently are selected on the basis of personal loyalties, manipulability and military qualifications; they usually lack skill as civil administrators.

(6) Province chiefs are appointed and not elected; they frequently have little popular support. The province chief's responsibility is upward to his several superiors rather than to the people of the province.

(7) Ministerial representatives at province are more responsive to various Saigon ministries than to the province chief.

(8) The province chief does not have appointing or discharging authority over district chiefs, his key subordinates.

To increase the effectiveness of provincial government, the following actions should occur:

(1) Appointive and discharge authority for province chiefs should be the Prime Minister.

(2) The province chief must be delegated authority in explicit, unequivocal terms. This authority must be adequate to permit him to discharge his responsibilities effectively. Previous attempts by the national government to delegate this authority have been subverted by individual ministries and intervening military commanders.

(3) Province chiefs should have direct authority over ministerial representatives on the province staff. Ministerial representatives should maintain technical liaison with their parent ministries for exchange of technical information, but their first responsibility must be to the province chief. (See: Figure 3-3)

(4) The province chief should exercise command authority over district chiefs. District chiefs should be nominated by the province chief and approved by the Prime Minister. It is desirable but not necessary that they be selected from local talent.


(5) The selection process for province chiefs should not only consider integrity, leadership ability and loyalty but should emphasize the candidates' local reputation. While not absolutely essential that province chiefs be chosen from the local citizenry, a favorable reputation would mitigate some of the harmful effects of arbitrary appointment of officials by GVN without elections. In the mid or long-range time frame it may become feasible to select the province chief by an elective process. This would present a complex dichotomy whereby the province chief would be simultaneously responsible to an electorate and a central government. Such an arrangement could be made to work through an institutionalized decentralization of power.


District. A district is a subdivision of a province. There are 238 districts in SVN ranging from 2 to 11 districts per province. The appointing authority for district chiefs varies from the Prime Minister to the province chief depending upon the area concerned. The district chief is a key figure in rural areas and can be an effective link between the national government and the people. He is low enough in the structure to be in constant contact with the people yet high enough to remove him from the narrow parochialism of the villages and hamlets.


The lines of authority for the district chief are not clear. His personal authority is poorly defined. His staff is frequently inadequate both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The authority delegated to the district chief must be adequate to meet his responsibilities. This authority must be clearly defined and explicit, but the delegation of authority should be made selectively by

Figure 3-3


BE NICE TO THE PEOPLE
BOMB NOW PAY LATER
BLOCK CANALS
CLEAR LOC
PUSH PATS
HIRE HATS
MAKE MACS
KILL WATER BUFFALO
WIN HEARTS AND MINDS
PLANT RICE
DESTROY CROPS
SPEND MORE MONEY
WATCH YOUR BUDGET


INFORMAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Prime Minister
GVN
MINISTRIES
CORPS
DIVISION
PROVINCE
PSM
PSM
PSM
PSM
DISTRICT
PSM = Provincial Staff Member
Examples: Public Works,
Agriculture, National Police,
Education


PROPOSED LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Prime Minister
GVN MINISTRIES
CORPS
DIVISION
Prov Chief
Sector Cmdr
PROVINCE
PSM
PSM
PSM
PSM
DISTRICT
Command
Technical
Military Support
Liaison,
Coordination

2

the province chief and not specified by Saigon in an identical manner for all districts.

District staffs should be tailored by province to meet local requirements. The district staff for pacified areas should include assistants for military activities, administration, public health, education, agriculture, public works, information, social welfare and youth and sports. The district chief in a VC-controlled area is severely restricted and does not need as large a staff.

A mobile administrative team should be maintained as part of the provincial pacification organization for areas undergoing clearing operations. This team should be staffed to execute programs appropriate for a pacified area. It should be dispatched on a timely basis to pursue Rural Construction operations in all newly cleared areas and operate until the existing district staff can assume full responsibilities. (See: Rural Construction, Chapter V)

Canton. A canton is a grouping of several villages. The canton chief is responsible for maintaining liaison between the village and the administrative agencies at district and province. He assists the district chief in the execution of directives from higher authorities and settles disputes among villagers.

The canton is nonexistent in many areas of SVN. It is being, and should be, eliminated as an unnecessary layer of government.

Village and Hamlet. There are about 2,550 villages in SVN; no exact statistic is valid. The village is the lowest echelon of government that is legally recognized. Village administration is under two separate agen-

cies: the Village Citizens Council and the Village Administrative Committee. The Village Citizens Council was intended to be an elected body meeting monthly to function as a "legislative" body. This council is nonexistent in many villages. The Village Administrative Committee is appointed by the province chief and acts as an executive body for village administration; it is composed of a chairman, a vice-chairman and from one to four members.

A traditional village was governed by the natural power group of the community -- high status "notables." In a ritual-bound social structure, they served as corporate representatives of the village in most dealings with the outside world in addition to making decisions on internal matters.

Under the successive French, Viet Minh and Diem regimes, legal power was taken away from the councils, and they now are selected or imposed by external authority. Some powers and responsibilities have devolved upon the official Village Administrative Committee, but this body only in part overlaps in membership with the real venerables. Thus there exists a dominance by a shadow group of folk who hold some economic and moral power in the community, but lack authority from the national regime to exercise this power.

The hamlet is an administrative subdivision of a village. There are some 10,333 hamlets in SVN; a figure less certain than that for the villages. Hamlets are governed by a hamlet chief and a three to five member committee. GVN decrees provide that hamlet officials be elected, but many hamlet committees are either appointed by the province chief from within the hamlet or sent into the hamlet by GVN. The position of hamlet chief

is extremely hazardous. Because the salary is approximately $12.50 monthly, the office does not provide sufficient inducements to attract and hold capable leaders. Hamlet governments formed of outsiders and sent by GVN are poorly motivated, inexperienced and largely ineffective; they are viewed with suspicion by the people.

The village-hamlet organization of SVN frequently is misunderstood by both Americans and Vietnamese. Villages are not always collections of hamlets. In some areas of SVN neither the term "village" nor "hamlet" is accurate; population groupings exist that are not collections of hamlets and have no interrelationship to a larger grouping or village. Therefore, village governments should not be tailored by Saigon for uniform application throughout SVN. Superimposing Saigon organizational concepts upon workable village arrangements unnecessarily complicates village administration. Local governments should be discriminately organized to meet the requirements of particular population units. Maximum use should be made of existing village governments. Pay of local government officials is particularly inadequate; it should be increased. Provincial training programs for village and hamlet officials should be instituted.

Elections. On 28 July 1965, President Johnson asserted, "the people of South Vietnam shall have the right to shape their own destiny in free elections -- in the South or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision." 6/ This statement substantiates the morality of US intervention. Beyond that, however, a national election in the near future is unrealistic. "Free" national elections under international supervision would result either in widespread communist victories or "mobocracy."

The VC political apparatus is well established in many villages throughout SVN. Ubiquitous, well-trained and efficient NLF political action cadres now are operating and would continue to operate even if a cease-fire were negotiated. In addition to political action cadres available to influence voters, over 100,000 VC would be returning to villages prior to elections. (See: ANNEX C)

In contrast, GVN cadre programs have a history of failure. The present plans call for training cadres to compete in the area of low level propaganda; GVN officials estimate, however, that more than a year is required to train even a minimum number. But, regardless of results that might come from the cadre training program, GVN is not likely to earn widespread popular support until the insurgency is defeated and programs for social, economic and environmental improvement demonstrate tangibly their interest in the people's welfare.

Free national elections at this time (which would have to include NLF candidates) would be disruptive regardless of the outcome. If the Communists win such an election, as some important Vietnamese officials predict, US and GVN efforts at keeping SVN non-communist will have been in vain. If the NLF did not win the election, they could claim fraud, accuse the government of dishonesty and renew the insurgency to avenge the "imperialistic trick." It is entirely unlikely that any international agency could provide the degree of supervision required to assure "honest elections."

An important Vietnamese labor leader expressed his views on national elections by claiming:

> "The VC have organised the villages so well that GVN has been able to gain but little support among villagers. If free or even internationally supervised elections were held in SVN the results would be disastrous. The people have simply lost faith. They would not believe elections really free and honest. Liberty and democracy are empty slogans. Social justice has been promised too often. The villager longs for peace. The VC major slogan is peace and the VC are convincing when they point out that GVN and US are making war, due to our bombings and use of artillery."

Irrespective of communist influence, several factors militate against successful national elections in the immediate future:

(1) The rural population is largely illiterate and isolated from issues outside their limited world of family, hamlet and village.

(2) The SVN people are not sufficiently well educated to grasp the ramifications of national political issues.

(3) Unseasoned by experience with democratic processes, the people could be easily influenced by the blandishments of demagogues. A "knight in shining armor" who appeals to the emotions and prejudices of the masses may be swept into office.

(4) Without a minimal consensus which can accommodate open political competition, elections are likely to be destabilizing. Differences among the populace would hinder the formation of national unity.

(5) People who have traditionally lived under authoritarian rule frequently find it difficult to reject the patterns of authority and will vote the way they are told.

Elections should not be considered an end in themselves but rather serve as a step in the process of political development. Human rights

such as freedom of speech, public assembly and personal liberty are necessary preconditions for making elections meaningful. Elections should not be conducted in accordance with a preconceived timetable. They should be held:

(1) After social and political awareness have been achieved.

(2) After GVN has established a secure environment.

(3) After GVN programs for social, environmental and economic improvement have produced tangible benefits for the people.

(4) After a sense of political compromise and a consensus to accept the will of the majority have developed.

(5) Only at levels of government where voters have a direct interest in political issues.

(6) Before the denial of political participation through elections becomes a serious divisive influence.

While national elections -- either a plebiscite on reunification of Vietnam or free elections within SVN -- should not be held prior to 1971, a form of controlled election may be feasible at an earlier date. (See: ANNEX G) Such an election would be limited to GVN-controlled areas and to GVN-selected candidates. A further safeguard would provide for an indirect election whereby existing provincial councils (also selected by controlled election procedures) would represent their constituents at the polls. In any event, the decision to hold elections should be made by GVN without premature US pressure.

The following considerations should be applied to the development of the electoral process by stages.

First Stage: Conduct lower echelon elections from a slate developed by GVN. Selection of candidates by GVN would help protect against communist influence, administrative inefficiency and demagoguery. Elections of this type should first be held at hamlet, continuing up the ladder as each echelon meets the preconditions for elections. National elections would be initially conducted under a controlled electoral process for a Chief of State nominated by the National Assembly.

Second Stage: Free elections at lower echelons (short and mid range).

Third Stage: Free elections at all echelons (late mid range).

Government Stability

Coups, semi-coups, demi-coups and coupettes are a fact of life in the government of SVN. They are manifestations of a continuing political "shake out" after nearly 80 years of autocratic rule. Coups should be viewed as natural in the current phase of SVN's political evolution, for it lacks an institutionalized system for changing leadership. (Thailand has experienced 26 major and minor coups since 1935.) Barring external restraints, the situation eventually should produce a more stable governmental structure founded on political power groupings rather than on a facade of popular support. The question, therefore, is: "Can SVN afford this political luxury?" The answer is: "Yes, but only within clearly defined parameters." It is within the US capability to define and enforce these parameters.

While there are many groups involved in the political dynamics of SVN, the differences among these groups, as well as differences between present

GVN and individual group objectives, are more imagined than real. A disruptive aspect of Vietnamese national character is to suspect all "outsiders," as well as to suspect formal government. Character assassination, particularly of political leaders, is a disruptive influence that GVN leaders must contend with.

The three most disruptive and powerful pressure groups in the contemporary situation are the military, Buddhists and Catholics. Vietnamese youth usually operate within the framework of religious organizations. Agitation comes from leadership factions within these groups and is seldom representative of majority opinions.

Governmental stability should be viewed in dynamic rather than static terms. True "stability" in the midst of a social revolution should represent controlled change and not maintenance of the status quo.

The national political environment of SVN can and should be simplified. Groups that agitate against one another because of communist stimulation and Vietnamese character should be coalesced around concepts that have a greater commonality of interest. GVN and the US should subtly discourage the formation of political groupings around parochial interests. More appropriate and constructive political identifications should be encouraged around broader platforms. For example, political concepts regarding the war could be either (1) to fight or (2) to negotiate; regarding foreign relations, either be (1) neutral or (2) pro-US; in economic and social programs the political tendency could be (1) conservative or (2) liberal. This approach would help to secularize political parties and stimulate the development of political participation on other than

religious bases. Political groupings with a cross-factional base would tend to simplify and stabilize the political situation.

GVN leadership should engage in more constructive interaction with the leadership of the various politically active groups. The divisive tendency to automatically criticize and condemn GVN officials could be dissipated if GVN leadership were to maintain continuous, personal liaison with nongovernmental leaders. For example, a candid explanation of GVN plans and policies made to a political party leader and accompanied by a request for recommendations and assistance could result in additional support for GVN. Conversely, a superior, indifferent attitude by GVN leadership will continue to have the opposite effect. Many "opinion formers" would welcome an opportunity to work constructively for an honest and sincere administration if they were asked to do so in a personal, straightforward manner.

GVN should permit an outlet for political expression. Purely repressive measures that prohibit the voicing of criticism do not eliminate the criticism; they force it to be expressed covertly. Unexpressed political frustrations breed instability and coups. Pressures resulting from unexpressed political frustrations could be dissipated in a constructive manner through responsible political parties, newspapers and a National Assembly.

The development of a representative and responsible National Assembly could have an additional stabilizing influence by providing an orderly means for changing government leadership. Selective and judicious replacement of GVN officials by a representative body would tend to insulate

government programs from the disruptive effects of coups. Widespread replacement of key officials would be avoided.

The increased decentralization of authority to province level would provide increased stability at lower echelons of government. With increased authority and adequate resources, province chiefs could continue operations independently during reorganization periods in Saigon.

The development of a professional civil service will help to stabilize government. Program execution and day-to-day operations of government could continue under the control of lower echelon administrators while changes in senior personnel were in progress.

The US could contribute to GVN stability by:

(1) Supporting the institution of government rather than becoming overly committed to particular individuals.

(2) More convincingly communicating US long-range goals and objectives to GVN.

(3) Using its influence to convince agitating groups of the necessity for a period of governmental stability. The US Ambassador should frankly and directly explain this requirement to leaders of these factions. He should encourage groups to take complaints directly to GVN rather than to demonstrate and become a divisive influence. GVN should be encouraged to consider and act upon legitimate complaints.

Developing a Professional Civil Service. GVN cannot administer governmental activities efficiently and effectively without a base of professionally competent civil servants. The existing civil servants in SVN are a part of the problem of governmental inadequacy. Civil servants are organized

into self-oriented, nearly autonomous bureaucratic groupings. They are largely indifferent toward the public and do not have a code of public service and moral conduct. Poorly trained bureaucrats are underpaid to work in an archaic administrative system. Opportunity for graft is viewed as an implied fringe benefit of government service.

There are too many categories of civil servants. They are each regulated by individual, uncoordinated statutes. The "floating" and "daily" categories have no job security; the "regular" category has so much security that its members are lazy. The National Institute of Administration (NIA) is training students in selected areas of public service. Overall, the NIA provides an excellent program. However, the curriculum overemphasizes mechanics and contains no instruction on civil service ethics; it does not teach low level skills; its physical plant cannot meet the requirements for graduates; its graduates look upon themselves as rulers vastly superior to the people.

The maladies of the civil service in SVN are so numerous, disruptive and sanctioned by tradition that it is not sufficient merely to encourage a gradual reformation. The present categories of civil servants and statutes pertaining thereto should be abolished. A new career program should be developed and formalized by law. The program should include a system for rewarding dedication and efficiency, eliminating inefficiency and providing career incentives such as retirement benefits, selective job security and reasonable salaries. A senior-level promotion system with an "up or out" proviso should be defined. Career development programs should include provisions for both managerial personnel and technical personnel.

Vocational training for junior-level civil servants should be increased within the school system and through the development of vocational training centers. In-service training programs should be instituted within the ministries. The NIA should be expanded. The curriculum should include courses designed to develop a service-oriented code of conduct for civil servants.

The US should support the development of a professional civil service by increasing support to the NIA, assisting in the development of vocational training centers and encouraging nongovernmental assistance such as that previously given by the Michigan State Advisory Team.

Legal System. A responsive and functioning national legal system is essential to a free and viable SVN. Without sound laws, fairly and efficiently administered, it is difficult for any government to maintain order, protect individual rights, and execute its programs.

The Vietnamese legal foundation is both French and Oriental. The organization and structure are basically French; the frame of reference is Oriental. Formal juridical institutions exist only in the urban areas. Neither these institutions nor the laws are well known outside the major population centers. Rural Vietnam still follows various procedures of tribal and customary law. The present legal institutions of SVN have little impact on the pacification effort. The bar, while scholarly, is small and confined to the major cities as well as largely involved in mercantile problems. The bench, while honest and thorough, has not been a vigorous participant in pacification; it does not venture much outside the major population centers.

The legal institutions have proved increasingly incapable of meeting the growing, complex demands of independent nationhood. Successive governments of SVN have failed to exploit available legal capabilities for leadership and help in the solution of national problems. It is significant, however, that the existing legal institutions constitute an adequate foundation which, with proper aid and stimulation, can be developed and refined to serve as useful instruments in the pacification and long-term development of SVN. Essentially, GVN must fulfill the requirement for Vietnamese-developed law molded to fit Vietnamese needs.

Improvement of the legal system will require action directed toward three basic areas: the substantive law; the legal institutions which administer that law; and the popular understanding and acceptance of these institutions and the law with which they deal. To achieve this, the GVN should establish a commission of leading VN laymen, lawyers and judges to survey the workings of their law in nation building and to determine what the law must perform in their present and future society. This commission should be nonpolitical and composed of men of high standing; it should be sufficiently well supported so that it can retain essential specialists for field inquiry and research.

If requested by GVN, the US should assist this commission by providing qualified advisors from organizations such as the American Bar Foundation, the Institute for Judicial Administration, the National College of State Trial Judges or from university law faculties. If the Vietnamese prefer technical advisors from Asian nations experienced with the problems of

modifying Western legal concepts to meet Oriental requirements, the US should support this course of action.

Beginning now and continuing through the long range, the US single manager should aid and encourage the GVN to:

(1) Enact and enforce laws defining and protecting the rights of all individuals, including those of minority groups.

(2) Establish sound procedures for disseminating the laws throughout the country.

(3) Improve the efficiency of the courts and prepare to expand their influence into the more remote areas as quickly as pacification permits.

(4) Examine the emergency laws to determine their adequacy and to consider the enactment of further measures to achieve more effective population and resource control.

(5) Support the present GVN effort to recodify its laws so as to speed progress and ensure a critical and creative attempt at providing the nation with understandable codes of law reasonably based upon its needs and traditions.

(6) Organize the judges into a body similar to the Judicial Conference of the US through which they can act collectively on matters of salary, tenure, selection and standards of conduct.

(7) Expand the facilities and improve the instruction at the two SVN law schools.

(8) Establish more effective procedures to aid persons unlawfully confined.

(9) Develop graduate and professional exchange programs.

(10) Expand the RVNAF Military Justice Corps to function in more areas of law, particularly as defense counsel and in performing legal assistance. Raise the rank and status of the Director of Military Justice and increase the proportionate number of senior field grade officers within the corps. These measures would increase the prestige of the corps, provide a training ground for more young lawyers and establish a more effective means for extending the influence of law beyond the cities and into rural Vietnam.

For a definitive description of the Vietnamese legal system, see ANNEX D.

Political-Economic-Social Research. At present there has been no systematic GVN effort on an adequate scale to analyze Vietnamese politics, economics and society. Successive governments have planned for political, economic and social development without experienced personnel and without the benefit of academic research and assistance. Hence, GVN should establish an Institute for Political-Economic-Social Research. This should be a permanent institution with a mission of analyzing Vietnamese political, economic and social dynamics.

This institute should include visiting scholars from other Free World nations. Close liaison with international organizations working in related fields should be maintained. Opportunities for observation trips to other nations should be made available to Vietnamese members. The US should provide encouragement and financial assistance.

Graft and Corruption

Petty graft is normal practice in most non-communist governments of Asia. However, graft and corruption in SVN have exceeded any acceptable limit and have become major obstacles to effective government. More important than the resultant diversion of resources is the significant loss of respect which accompanies flagrant and ostentatious corruption on the part of senior GVN officials. On 16 July 1965, the Prime Minister of SVN declared that "corruption exists everywhere. The rich get richer while the mass of the poor Vietnamese see little hope for improvement. The masses, therefore, are very vulnerable to VC propaganda." 7/ He later explained, "the Minister of Finance doesn't even trust the economic police anymore ... even they take money . Most of the politicians have taken bribes." A former Prime Minister claims that it is virtually impossible to find a man for a ministerial position who is both capable and honest. A survey of US Army representatives in SVN lists corruption among the "primary peasant grievances" against the GVN. (See: ANNEX G) Returning from SVN, a Presidential envoy reported that "corruption ... is beyond belief and developed, in a sense, to the status of a fine art."1/ As a more specific example, CIA reports that officials in the Ministry of Economics charge a standard bribe of 5 piasters on every US dollar value of imports. Additionally, 50 officials in this ministry receive a fixed monthly bribe of 30,000 piasters from the Chinese Merchants Association for extending favors to the Chinese. 8/ The Mission Liaison Group in SVN cites graft and corruption as a primary obstacle to GVN effectiveness.

The primary focus of interest for many government and military officials has changed from defeating the VC to acquiring US dollars.

Reasons for the tremendous upsurge in corruption in the past two years include:

(1) Vietnamese officials are not convinced of the sincerity of the US commitment. Neither are they confident that a particular GVN regime will remain in control for more than a few months. Further, many Vietnamese are not convinced that the war is being won. These considerations develop a deep sense of insecurity in GVN officials. They are uncertain as to how much longer they will retain their position. Because of Vietnamese attitudes and values, an official's first loyalty is to himself and his family. Under such circumstances they easily rationalize a "get it while the getting's good" attitude -- particularly since all about them are suspected of doing the same.

(2) The fiscal system is archaic and there is poor supervision over subordinates.

(3) Examples of corruption prevail at the highest echelon of government, the National Leadership Committee, and since the Prime Minister is responsible to the National Leadership Committee, he cannot effectively move against a corrupt clique within the Committee.

(4) Graft has become both an art and a clique activity, thereby making detection difficult.

(5) The US hesitates to check on the expenditure of funds for fear of offending the Vietnamese and tarnishing rapport.

(6) The pay of many civil servants is so low they cannot afford to be honest.

(7) The tax collection system provides an opportunity for extortion. For example: district chiefs are sometimes permitted to retain 50-75 percent of tax revenues "collected" by military force. Province and district chiefs are appointed by division and corps commanders. As these can be "lucrative" positions, appointments can resemble an auction more than a selection.

The six primary types of graft in GVN are:

(1) Misuse of commodities in the Military Assistance Program.

(2) Misuse of money and products in the Commercial Import Program.

(3) Misuse of funds generated in the Development Program.

(4) Misuse of funds and commodities in the Rural Construction Program.

(5) Kickbacks on projects funded by GVN.

(6) Extralegal acts: for example, selling import licenses, selling military deferments, encouraging desertion from local forces without reflecting same in payrolls.

No governmental administrative system provides a guarantee against graft. Financial systems can be devised, however, that permit early detection of illegal practices. Modern, efficient systems of financial and resource management can be instituted in SVN, provided that either GVN truly wants to control graft or the US is willing to use its influence to force reform measures. Measures undertaken to reduce corruption must

simplify and streamline the flow of funds. Cumbersome measures that retard cash and resource flow should be avoided.

No single reform measure will immediately change the attitudes of Vietnamese officials; such a fundamental change requires years to achieve. Nevertheless, several measures can be initiated immediately that will keep graft and corruption within limits:

(1) The US must make clear its long-range policy and objectives in SVN in a more consistent, more convincing manner in order to remove suspicion and uncertainty regarding the sincerity and reliability of the US commitment. (See: ANNEX F)

(2) A review by a joint US-GVN commission must be initiated of all GVN fiscal and administrative operations to simplify and streamline fiscal procedures -- particularly the vouchering system.

(3) A postaudit system must be established to eliminate requirements for time-consuming preliminary approvals on expenditures. This function should be performed by an agency such as the current Directorate General for Budget and Foreign Aid assisted by USREPs. (See: Chapter IV)

(4) The joint sign-off arrangement should be reinstituted whereby provincial USREPs approve expenditures from Rural Construction funds. (See: Chapter IV)

(5) A separate Directorate General of Budget should be re-established within the Ministry of Defense. At present the general staff is responsible for both expenditure and audit. The procedure should be: (a) Joint General Staff recommends expenditure; (b) Minister of Defense approves-disapproves request; (c) Joint General Staff acts upon approved requests;

and, (d) Minister of Defense (through Director General of Budget) audits expenditures. A separate budget agency for the Ministry of Defense should be established due to the volume of funds. When fiscal procedures improve significantly, the responsibilities of this budget agency can be assumed by the Directorate General for Budget and Foreign Aid.

(6) Appointive and discharge authority for province and district chiefs should be moved from corps and division commanders to the Prime Minister and province chief respectively.

(7) Civil service reforms must reduce the number of employees, increase pay, develop a career program and initiate other reforms.

(8) A standard list of fees for all government services should be widely publicized and permanently posted. Receipts to citizens should be required for all money paid to GVN officials.

(9) GVN should establish a procedure whereby citizens can report incidents of malpractice by officials directly to the national government.

(10) The amount of cash or negotiable assets currently being dropped into the Saigon "grab bag" should be reduced.

(11) Training in the ethics of public service should be included in the curriculum of NIA and all ministerial in-service training courses.

(12) The US should force reform measures through political action. Evidence of corruption on the part of GVN officials should be brought directly to the Prime Minister with an offer of US assistance in taking corrective action. With approval of the Prime Minister, a senior USREP

should approach GVN officials known to be participating in graft and make a candid request for reform. If all else fails, the US should resort to public pressure. Threat of public disclosure would act as a powerful influence. It is essential that the US should not be viewed in Vietnamese eyes as condoning corruption. Moreover, the US must take positive steps to prevent and punish any corrupt acts on the part of its representatives in SVN.

Winning and Organizing Popular Support

There are approximately 16,000,000 people in SVN -- 80 percent of them rural dwellers. The urban population enjoys relative security and is less vulnerable to communist influence. Communist attention is focused on the rural population. According to communist doctrine, the revolution will be successful when the rural population is won. Therefore, it should be clear that the emphasis for counterinsurgency must also be placed on the rural population. Yet the attitudes of the simple peasant are frequently misunderstood.

The Vietnamese peasant often is characterized as apathetic and indifferent, only hoping to be left alone. In the past the peasant's aspirations were neither high nor complex. He did want to be left alone to till his fields, to live his traditional life and to venerate his ancestors. Under the impact of incessant GVN and communist propaganda, however, he has come to expect more. The peasant of today wants his own land, improved crop production, education for his children, medical care,

a nearby water supply, reasonable and fair taxes, more material comforts and decent, respectful treatment from GVN officials and military personnel. Above all else he wants security.

Twenty years of warfare have been accompanied by inconsistent and inequitable tax systems, terrorism, indiscriminate killing, loss of home and land, corruption, forced relocations and human suffering. The peasant has been unable to articulate his interests meaningfully or influence his environment. Rather than being apathetic, he now is frequently frustrated and cynical. The aggressiveness, endurance and devotion to the cause demonstrated by many VC are, in part, manifestations of frustrations -- and, in any event, not expressions of apathy and indifference. The VC successes present ample proof that the Vietnamese peasant can be motivated and organized. These successes also demonstrate convincingly that the Communists know how to achieve peasant support and political awareness, whereas GVN has not yet learned how to win support or promote political awareness.

To compete successfully for peasant political support, one must not only understand peasant aspirations but must recognize that his political support occurs after he has experienced tangible manifestations of improved living standards. Improved living standards must include protection from the VC. Therefore, political allegiance will emerge after security and economic improvements. When these priorities are not recognized and executed, Rural Construction (RC) efforts will fail and political support will not materialize.

Labor. Labor institutions have an excellent potential for organizing large segments of Vietnamese society. Trade-unions in SVN are largely apolitical in nature. Their objectives are directly related to the aspirations of members. Labor organizations can provide tangible results in terms of improved living standards. They appeal to workers on the basis of enlightened self-interest rather than through time-worn political slogans of personal sacrifice and democracy. Hence, worker's organizations tend to surface natural leaders.

The labor force of Vietnam is a key component of the political fabric. Its well-being is a relative measure of the viability of SVN. In a very real sense, the long-range stability of GVN depends upon the opportunities available to workers of all categories and an attainable objective of sharing in the rewards of progress.

In spite of the potential contribution that labor institutions can make toward the development of Vietnam, GVN treats them in a high-handed, arbitrary manner. They have been forbidden to meet without prior GVN approval. Requests for permission to meet have been denied or granted only hours before the planned meeting time. Labor meetings have been harassed and disbanded by GVN officials, leaders have been arrested on spurious charges and officials have been refused permission to attend the International Labor Conference. Partially due to GVN actions, the Tenant Farmers Federation has dropped from 350,000 dues paying members to 48,000.9/

At the present time, the Ministry of Labor is not making a substantial contribution to the war effort or meeting normal operational expec-

tations. Many of its functions and offices have a minimum number of staff members. Real services to the public are limited. Branch offices exist in slightly more than half of the provinces.

Vietnamese labor leaders are convinced that labor cadres can effectively compete with the NLF for the allegiance of the farmer. The chief obstacles to the development of trade-unionism in SVN are GVN's repressive attitude and the apprehension as well as misunderstanding on the part of US officials regarding worker's unions.

GVN should encourage the development of trade-unionism; the US should support this development under USOM sponsorship. With GVN and Vietnamese labor leaders' consent, counterparts from responsible US unions should be encouraged to work with SVN trade-unions.

Political Parties. There are between 40 and 60 political groupings in SVN. They range from insignificant 50-member coteries to larger organizations loosely termed "political parties." The larger political parties are remnants of once powerful organizations that were formed to fight against the Viet Minh and the French. The two largest political parties are the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) and Dai Viet. The Dai Viet is considerably larger, better organized and more influential; it claims 5,000 cadres, 50,000 members and nearly a million followers. These figures cannot be substantiated and are almost certainly exaggerated. None of the political organizations has developed a forward looking, definitive, articulated platform that would compare favorably with the NLF.

Today, the activities of these parties are characterized by infighting, jealousy among the leadership and debilitating separatism. It is neither feasible nor practical for the US to encourage the development of any particular political party in SVN at this time. To do so would result in even greater fragmentation and expose the people of SVN to exploitation. In extension, the US should not encourage directly the formation of a new political party to coalesce the various political factions and "mold them into a dynamic united front." While a coalition of parties into an active organization that would compete with the NLF is desirable, and some Vietnamese politicians believe that this is feasible, such an initiative should be strictly Vietnamese. A realistic appraisal of the Vietnamese character, the disinclination to conciliate and compromise and other realities of the Vietnamese political environment make US active support of this course of action infeasible. The multitude of negative factors impinging upon this task make the chance of success too remote for the US to accept the risks of intimate political involvement with political parties.

While the US can do very little at this point in time to develop responsible political parties, GVN should be encouraged to permit greater freedom of association with all non-communist political groups. Although this runs the risk of further dividing and confusing the Vietnamese people, attempts by GVN to suppress political expression encompasses the greater risk of driving parties underground and polarizing their interests around an anti-GVN theme.

More time is required to permit a political shakeout after years of political suppression. This must be a part of a natural political evolution. Sufficient maturation and sophistication should have occurred in the mid-range time frame to permit more positive support by the US in the development of GVN political parties.

Communication Between GVN and People. The US has proposed an excellent psychological operations plan focused on improving GVN communication with the people. Relatively sophisticated equipment for mass communication now is available to support this plan. Newspapers, propaganda magazines, psychological operation leaflets, national and provincial radio transmitters, transistor receivers, propaganda movies, performances by government entertainment teams, information centers, posters and airborne loudspeakers abound; television is imminent. But, despite all of GVN's communication equipment and potentiality, the whispered word from an NLF cadre, plying enlightened self-interest, is more effective than a bank of airborne loudspeakers blasting the merits of greater sacrifice from 3,000 feet. Unkept promises and empty cliches constitute the core problem. Although continued improvement of the present GVN technical apparatus and communication system is desirable, and training Vietnamese to maintain and operate the available communication equipment is necessary, these are not fundamental issues. The emphasis of US effort in this area must target on improving the intent of the communicator.

A National Ideology. The most recent development in a long list of psychological proposals to win the war in SVN falls under the heading of

"a national ideology." Proponents of a national ideology state that it is the missing ingredient. But, as important as such an ideology may be, it must emerge -- not just be cranked out as another slogan. Ideologies and slogans provide neither comfort nor inspiration to the peasant. Rice and medicine interest the Vietnamese far more than do such slogans as "Liberty and Equality."

"Polarizing the peasants," "developing a broad-based political movement," and "winning the hearts and minds" are not new concepts. Successive GVN regimes have outdone one another in their efforts at paying lip service to these principles. From Ngo Dinh Diem to Nguyen Cao Ky, the premiers of SVN have articulated all the correct procedures for rallying the people in the countryside. Each program, <u>if</u> properly executed, would have achieved a significant degree of success. The GVN, assisted by the US, could win rural support by offering the people an attractive, understandable and demonstrative alternative to the NLF in a secure environment. No new insights, psychological breakthroughs or novel inspirations are prerequisite. Effective and sincere pursuit by GVN of existing programs, combined with needed social reforms, can motivate and polarize the peasants. Nothing less will succeed.

Political Implications of Population Groups

<u>Montagnards</u>. Attitudes of the Montagnards and ethnic Vietnamese have varied from mutual distrust to hatred and scorn. Traditional GVN relationships with the Montagnards have reflected these feelings. But,

as security began to deteriorate in the Highlands, GVN adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward the Montagnards. On 17 October 1964, the Khanh government issued a decree providing for a broad program of economic and social development. Before significant progress could be made on this program, the Khanh Government fell. Subsequent governments reaffirmed the commitments to the Montagnards in principle but have neither budgeted for nor acted upon the promised reforms.

GVN-Montagnard relationships continue to deteriorate. On 25 August 1965, GVN broke off negotiations with the leading Montagnard spokesman, Y-Bham Enoul, and informed him that any Montagnard military units that did not return to the government on GVN terms would be bombed. At the same time, the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister informed the Director of Montagnard Affairs that limited GVN resources did not permit social welfare projects for Montagnards. Throughout the period of increasing GVN-Montagnard friction, US-Montagnard relations have been friendly. This relationship has caused a high degree of suspicion that US officials have supported or even fomented the Montagnard position and has increased the sensitivity of GVN to US recommendations regarding Montagnards.

Leading the agitation for Montagnard autonomy is the United Front for the Struggle of the Oppressed Races (FULRO) whose leader and chief spokesman is Y-Bham. FULRO's alleged purpose is to "free from oppression" by both GVN and the Viet Cong, Montagnards, Chams and Cambodian Vietnamese. FULRO demands that the Highlands be made an autonomous area

with its own government, its own military force and its own flag, with only an economic association with SVN. The organizational structure of FULRO is cloaked in secrecy.

Montagnard demands have been presented in different ways at different times and places. FULRO demands are the most extreme and insist upon full autonomy. Other demands were presented at meetings in Kontum on 13 October 1964 and at Pleiku on 15-17 October 1964. These requests are more conservative and center around economic assistance and political participation.10/

At present there are enough GVN accomplishments and enough GVN failures that a persuasive leader could cause significant numbers of Montagnards either to revolt or to support GVN. Fruitful negotiations between Y-Bham and GVN would benefit both sides. GVN could negotiate with a relatively effective leader of the Montagnards and have more forces fighting the VC. Y-Bham would be in a much better position to help the Montagnards. An accommodation between GVN and Y-Bham should be encouraged.

With or without the cooperation of FULRO, GVN should be encouraged to integrate the Montagnards into the national structure with full consideration of their aspirations. An economic and social development program for Montagnards should be initiated by GVN and supported by USOM. Qualified Montagnards should be admitted to NIA, military training centers and other GVN training facilities. They should not be granted an autonomous zone, but should be granted a large degree of local autonomy

and allowed to participate in all governmental activities relating to their welfare. Montagnards should be granted equal rights and be treated as Vietnamese citizens rather than as an alien minority.

Chinese. The Chinese have a strangle hold on the Vietnamese economy; given sufficient motivation, they could paralyze it. Communist agents infiltrate through the Chinese community. Wealthy Chinese should be encouraged to plan and participate in an economic development program for SVN. GVN should encourage and assist in the gradual dispersion of the concentration of Chinese in the Cholon area. In the near future, when they fulfill their responsibilities as citizens, Chinese should be permitted representation in the government. GVN should encourage integration of Chinese into Vietnamese society. Agitators who are not Vietnamese citizens and refuse to cooperate with GVN for the national interest should be deported.

French. The French have a serious impact on Vietnam. Opinions regarding French influence range between those who consider them a subversive, insidious influence to those who classify them as a problem of rapidly declining significance. Facts are difficult to come by. One source states:

> "French intelligence services in Saigon are actively directing espionage and subversive activities motivated by and promoting the French policy of neutralization of the RVN. The over-all French neutralization movement is reported to be under the control of the Saigon Documentation and Counterespionage Service (Service de Documentation et de Contre Espionage de Saigon). The supporters of this movement have been taking advantage of the Viet Cong propaganda to publicize their position on neutralism since

such Viet Cong propaganda tends to support the French neutralization effort. Personnel directly or indirectly connected with the movement include French Embassy officials, Attache officers, plantation owners, businessmen and citizens who formerly worked in the various police and security agencies in Vietnam under the French. French directed commercial firms are being exploited to gather information and to spread propaganda favoring the adoption of the French neutralist policy." 11/

The GVN and US should permit and encourage Free World business enterprise in SVN to eliminate French monopolies. The US should compete more effectively with the French in terms of resident educators, sponsored educational facilities and foreign scholarships. The US should encourage and support GVN in their efforts to end French political influence in SVN. The US presence will have a significant impact in this regard.

Religious Groups. Second only to the military, religious groups represent a powerful political force on the South Vietnamese political scene. Of the four major religious groups (Buddhists, Catholics, Hoa Haos and Cao Dais), the Buddhists and the Catholics are the most significant politically. While Buddhist leaders claim 80 percent of the population are Buddhist, probably less than 30 percent are devout.

Only eight percent (mostly urban) of the Buddhists are organized and controlled by the Buddhist hierarchy. The Catholics, while numbering about 10 percent of the population, exert a disproportionate political influence due to their superior organization.

The Buddhists, and the Catholics to a lesser degree, are characterized by competing factions. Recent indications, however, point to both

an expanding organisational capability and increasing internal cohesion for both groups. The growth in power of the religious groups need not be a critically divisive factor on the political scene, however. In both major religious groups the "moderates" remain in a position of ascendancy. Moreover, although differences, both latent and articulated, do exist between the two, there is clear evidence that the Catholics and Buddhists are beginning to seek means of cooperation toward their mutual objectives. These objectives remain essentially those of winning the war against the Communists and building a free, prosperous society.

It is imperative that US policy, both in its direct relations with the religious movements and in its relations with the GVN, be designed to support those forces tending toward conciliation and cooperation and to discourage those elements -- both among the religious radicals and in the GVN -- which are pursuing a contrary policy. In this regard many things can be achieved, a few of which are suggested below:

(1) The US should make clear:

(a) Its stand for religious freedom and rights, to include a guarantee of those rights as a sine qua non for effective US support of joint US-GVN objectives.

(b) Its understanding that religious issues do and will continue to feature in the politics of SVN but that the major religious organizations themselves should acknowledge that the church as an institution should not be directly involved in the by-play of politics.

(c) Its wholehearted support of any and all efforts designed to bring the various religions in SVN closer together in an atmosphere

of mutual cooperation and singleness of purpose toward the greater interests of the nation.

(2) The US should tactfully, but firmly, counsel the GVN against either repression of legitimate religious interests or the temptation to manipulate the religious groups for political purposes.

(3) The US, through the GVN, should encourage and impartially assist all the religious groups in SVN to strengthen their ties with international religious organizations, so as to foster a sense of dignity, responsibility and achievement through religious rather than political activities.

(4) Moreover, as a means of depoliticizing the religious groups in SVN, while at the same time ensuring that their legitimate religious grievances may be clearly and effectively articulated, efforts should be made to encourage the establishment of a national "Commission on Religious Affairs." Such a commission would be composed of the leading personalities in each of the major religious groups and would serve as a vehicle for dignifying collectively the religious movements. While it is inevitable that such a commission would also constitute a sounding board for political grievances, it is believed that not only is it desirable to have a mechanism for clearly and responsibly articulating these grievances, but that such a commission, by constituting a focus for the articulation of grievances, would make far easier the joint task of the GVN and the US for counseling moderation and responsibility and for responding rapidly to legitimate grievances where they are shown to exist.

These recommendations are not exhaustive; both time and experience should point the way to many additional measures which will prove effective in achieving the desired goals. What is essential is a positive, forward policy on the part of the US designed to elevate and draw the religious groups together in the religious field, through GVN auspices, and to progressively discourage active religious group participation in the political process. With skill, tact and candor -- and with adequate resources -- such a policy should prove both feasible and rewarding.

Mid and Long-Range Projections

Political dynamics and the structure of political institutions cannot be forecast into the long-range time frame with sufficient accuracy to permit programing. However, once long-range objectives are established, the thrust of US-GVN political activities can be developed in relationship to specific goals. While not always attainable, the following objectives can provide a frame of reference to serve as a basis for short-term programs for political development. A listing of mid and long-range objectives follows:

Mid-Range Objectives

(1) Chief of State nominated by National Assembly and approved by national referendum.

(2) Prime Minister nominated by Chief of State and approved (with Cabinet) by National Assembly.

(3) An efficient governmental organization and administrative system.

(4) Operational vocational training centers adequate to needs.

(5) National Institute of Administration graduate output to meet GVN requirements.

(6) Authority and prestige of province chiefs increased to the point of permitting effective provincial government.

(7) A reformed civil service moving toward professional competency.

(8) GVN operating within the framework of a constitution.

(9) National Assembly becoming a legislative body.

(10) Sufficient stability to permit greater participation of opposition groups in government.

(11) Developing responsible and forward-looking political parties.

(12) Expanding social organizations (e.g., trade-unions, youth groups).

(13) Recodification of laws within the framework of a developing legal system.

(14) Depoliticization of religious groups.

(15) Increasing support of governmental institutions by various social, religious and political groups.

(16) Operating programs for social and economic development of Montagnards.

(17) Representation of all minority groups in National Assembly.

(18) Graft and corruption reduced to acceptable limits.

(19) A developing diplomatic corps.

(20) Return of Vietnamese citizens currently living in US and France to participate in nation building.

(21) Tempering of demands by students and intellectuals for democratic perfection with a realistic appreciation of what is possible in a developing nation short of experienced administrators.

Long-Range Objectives

(1) A stable government with fully institutionalized arrangements for changing leadership.

(2) Active, constructive political parties with broad-based membership.

(3) National Assembly fully established as legislative branch of government.

(4) Free elections at all echelons.

(5) A professional, service-oriented civil service.

(6) A modernized legal system.

(7) Full support of political institutions by all sectors of society.

(8) Integration of minority groups into society.

(9) A professional diplomatic corps.

(10) Active participation in the community of Free Nations.

Conclusion

A program to achieve a viable government in SVN is as essential as are programs for military security and socio-economic development. Neither military nor socio-economic objectives can be achieved without achieving political objectives. Nevertheless, at present the US does

not plan for or constructively influence the political development of SVN. Under the present US program of assistance to SVN, governmental efficiency and effectiveness continue to decrease. Massive injections of US combat power are not matched by social and political reforms. A "fight now -- reform later" concept prevails.

If a viable government in SVN does not emerge accidentally, or if it fails to develop through some automatic process of internal direction, the present US course of action will fail to achieve US national objectives in SVN. If this failure is the result of a political defeat, little comfort will be found in the convenient rationalization that the US stood on diplomatic principle and made little effort to guide Vietnamese political development.

To reverse the trend of political deterioration, the US must embark on a course of positive political action in SVN. The US must engage in a systematic effort to stimulate, foster and guide the growth of fundamental political institutions and responsible behavior. This program for achieving a viable government must achieve meaningful success in the immediate and short-range time frame. Delaying the execution of a positive program for effective government beyond this time period will make the US objective of "a free, independent, non-communist" SVN unattainable.


For a summary of actions required to achieve a viable government, see Figure 3-4.

AN ACTION PATTERN FOR VIABLE GOVERNMENT --

OBSTACLES TO VIABLE GOVERNMENT	SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS 1966-1971 MAJOR OBJECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES CAPABLE OF FURTHERING NATION BUILDING.	MID-RANGE OBJECTIVE 1972-1976 MAJOR OBJECTIVE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE O RESPONSIVE TO, ITS PEO
GVN inefficient and largely ineffective: ● Committee rule characterized by self-interest, separatism and infighting. ● Institutionalized mandarin and French inefficiency. ● Unsatisfactory ministerial cooperation and interaction. ● Confusing lines of authority. ● Inefficient, self-oriented bureaucracy.	Decentralize authority to province and below. Institute Civil Service reform and develop career programs. Strengthen office of Prime Minister. Execute Administrative reform -- "Little Hoover Commission." Develop vocational training centers. Expand NIA physical plant and graduate output. Initiate intraministerial in-service training programs: Simplify and clarify lines of authority: Make ministerial representatives at province and district responsible to province and district chiefs, respectively. Make district chief responsible to province chief only. Make province chief responsible to Prime Minister (except for Rural Construction).	Return of Vietnamese citizens currentl and France to participate in nati Chief of State nominated by National As approved by national referendum. Prime Minister nominated by Chief of Sta proved (with Cabinet) by National An efficient governmental organization a trative system. Operational vocational training centers needs. NIA graduate output meets GVN requirement Authority and prestige of province chiefs to the point of permitting effecti government.
GVN unstable; lacks popular support: ● Neither representative of nor responsive to the people. ● Discredited in public mind. ● Long standing causes of insurgency continue to exist. ● SVN society is factionalized. ● GVN contributes to societal separatism. ● GVN and Vietnamese people are suspicious of US motivation and intentions.	Establish an Institute for Political-Economic-Social Research. Develop new constitution. Form National Assembly. Institute Administrative Court. Form executive cabinet from men with compatible ideas. Permit political opposition participation in government at sub-ministerial level. Conduct controlled elections at lower echelons -- followed by free elections. Encourage responsible, forward looking political parties. Use US influence to force social and political reforms. Encourage development of social organizations, e.g. trade unions and youth groups. Assist development of effective legal system. Simplify political environment at national level by encouraging polarization around broad political concepts rather than around parochial interests. Increase interaction between GVN and leaders of various social, religious and political groups. Establish outlets for political expression. Initiate social and economic development programs for Montagnards. Integrate minority group participation in government. Use US political influence to discourage unjustified group agitation. Develop and communicate long range US objectives and policies regarding SVN.	A reformed Civil Service moving toward p competency. GVN operating within the framework of a c National Assembly becoming a legislative Sufficient stability to permit greater pa of opposition groups in government. Developing responsible and forward looking parties. Expanding social organizations, eg. trade youth groups. Recodification of laws within the framewor developing legal system. De-politicization of religious groups. Increasing support of GVN by various social religious and political groups. Operating programs for social and economic ment of Montagnards. Representation of all minority groups in Na Assembly.
Graft and corruption pervade GVN destroying image of government and diverting resources: ● Few GVN constraints against corruption. ● Archaic fiscal procedure. ● Vietnamese character. ● Unstable environment. ● US condones graft and corruption.	Establish Commission on Religious Affairs. Provide incremental release of program funds based upon satisfactory performance. Execute fiscal reform. Re-establish Directorate General of Budget within Ministry of Defense. Include training in ethics of public service in curricula of NIA, intraministerial instruction and public school system. Establish system for citizen complaint against corrupt officials.	Graft and corruption reduced to acceptable A developing diplomatic corps. Tempering of demands by students and intel for democratic perfection with a real precigtion of what is possible in a nation short of experienced administ

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
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Viable Government Thrust



Notes

In conducting field research to obtain political intelligence and a data base from which to develop a program for viable government, a concerted effort was made to seek out Vietnamese with diversified political experience. Interviews ranged from an afternoon with a professional revolutionary whose expertise lay in developing political awareness and support at village level to four days with a former Prime Minister. Interviews were conducted in depth with the average discussion ranging over a period of three days. A balance with respect to interviewees was achieved between members of the existing government, members of former governmental and nongovernmental political activists or observers. To protect the personal safety and reputation of individuals and to achieve candor, assurances were given that names would not be associated with particular comments. The necessity for observing strictest confidence was demonstrated on 30 December 1965 when an editor of the Chinh Luan (Political Discussion) Newspaper was assassinated by VC terrorists. In addition to interviewing Vietnamese, discussions were held with US officials concerned with Vietnamese political affairs at Department of State (to include US Embassy officials in Saigon and the Lansdale Group), CIA, USOM, MACV and JUSPAO. Many of these officials would comment only on the basis of nonaccreditation. As a further effort to evaluate political activities, formal meetings of governmental bodies in both urban and rural areas were observed by PROVN representation.

1. PROVN interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger, 20 November 1965.

2. Sorenson, John L., and Pack, David K., Unconventional Warfare and the Vietnamese Society, China Lake, California, 1964.

3. The terms "minister" and "commissioner" are used interchangeably in SVN. Whereas "minister" is the term used in informal correspondence and conversation, "commissioner" has recently been adopted for use in formal organization charts.

4. The diverse power factions impacting upon the national government are critical. Various factions, particularly religious groups, have demonstrated the ability to cause government collapse. When ever prime ministers have acceded to the demands of one group, it has frequently exacerbated relationships with other factions. Acquiescing to competing demands can lead to a spiral of concessions resulting in a situation which makes effective government impossible. Assigning key ministerial positions to appease various groups results in a cabinet of lobbyists representing conflicting interests. Ministerial interaction, cooperation and teamwork become unattainable. The overriding consideration at this stage of

political development is to permit the prime minister to select his key assistants from capable administrators who can work together as a cohesive team. With this asset and US assistance (See: Government Stability, this Chapter), the national government can operate more effectively. Workable relationships with the various power groupings can be achieved through techniques specified in other sections of this Chapter.

5. Recent statements by Ambassador Lodge, USOM officials, Foreign Service Officers in the US Embassy, Chief of State Thieu, Prime Minister Ky, Dr Phan Huy Quat and others reveal strong opposition to developing a more powerful role for the corps commander in the administration of civil government. There is a unanimous feeling among these individuals that the increasing power of the corps commander in civil government is contributing to national disunity. There is increasing evidence that injecting corps into the civil lines of authority delays and disrupts civil administration. The PROVN position of delegating authority to province, rather than to corps, conflicts with ANNEX E (p.E-16). It is recognized, however, that the ANNEX E position enjoyed considerable support in the early post-Diem period and persisted well into 1965. The current difficulties between the national government and Generals Thi, Vinh Loc and Quang (Commanding Generals 1st, 2nd and 4th Corps respectively) are manifestations of this traditional trend toward "warlordism."

6. Johnson, Lyndon B., We Will Stand in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., 1965.

7. US Embassy Saigon, "Memorandum of Conversation (U)," 16 July 1965, DA IN 41320 (SECRET).

8. US CIA Cable, "Deeply Rooted Corrupt Practices in the Ministry of Economy (C)." DA IN 229907, 11 January 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL).

9. USOM, Cable, "Recommendations of Additional USOM Labor Activities for Vietnam (U)," 22 March 1965 (UNCLASSIFIED).

10. USOM, Special Report, "GVN Montagnard Development Program and USOM Support Thereto (U)," 30 August 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL).

11. "Republic of Vietnam Counterinsurgency Report," USARPAC Special Report Number 468, 25 March 1965.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH

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CHAPTER IV- SUMMARY

PROVN examines the socio-economic growth situation and identifies the short-term actions necessary to support both the war effort and the long-term nation building needs of SVN.

PROVN concludes that wartime stresses have done much to overcome obstacles to social and economic change in SVN. The Vietnamese have demonstrated a willingness to accept new techniques. These positive factors provide cues for the accelerated development of SVN. However, war created limitations require that US-GVN programs be both highly selective and discriminate. In the short term, development must be focused on support of the SVN economy and the Rural Construction Program. The positive relationship between socio-economic benefits and GVN presence must be a definite component in all aspects of program execution.

SVN does not suffer extreme population pressure; it is a food surplus area with land waiting for development. Furthermore, SVN holds a comparative advantage in the world agricultural market. As a matter of priority, the country's agricultural advantages must be exploited in both the short and long term. In the long term, the accruals from regional economic exploitation of the Mekong Basin will constitute an additional plus factor in reinforcing national development in SVN.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROWTH

Introduction

Major Short-Range Action Recommendations. US-GVN development activities have not been successful. They have failed to provide the resources needed to support reduction of the insurgency or the socio-economic infrastructure and institutions essential to a viable and expanding economy.

Socio-economic programs have been stalemated by: (1) GVN's inability to provide and maintain security; (2) political turmoil that has drained both public and government morale; and, (3) faulty US-GVN judgments as to the nature of, and solutions to, the insurgency.

Specifically, PROVN recommends the following actions now to achieve basic US objectives:

- US continue economic assistance programs required to control inflation and provide necessary material resources.
- GVN execute current and projected socio-economic programs, supported, as necessary, by US manpower and material resources.
- GVN relate socio-economic development projects to government presence in rural SVN.

The Short-Range Objective to be Achieved. A war-supporting economic infrastructure and the initial foundations for economic growth.

Summary Appraisal of the Situation. While reduction of the insurgency currently receives paramount attention, the longer-term objectives of US policy call for a sustained nation building effort. US-GVN nation building programs, ongoing and projected, have as their goal a viable socio-economic infrastructure that can meet the growth requirements of SVN.1/

The security and nation building programs are interrelated; each forms part of a continuum, and the balance between them must be adjusted against the security situation. Parts of SVN are already in an environment amenable to long-term development. These areas present excellent opportunities for US-GVN acceleration of nation building efforts.

Socio-Economic Facts of Life

South Vietnam as an Economic Unit. The French viewed Annam, Cochinchina and Tonkin as complementary economic units. They brought into production the rice lands of the Mekong Delta and rubber plantations in the Central Highlands. In addition, some industry was established in Tonkin which is rich in coal and ores. A transportation network was built to carry the products of these regions to the ports of Saigon in the South as well as Haiphong and Hon Gai in the North. The system was designed to facilitate exchange between the crop surplus South and the more industrialized food deficit North. The 1954 partition destroyed this economic relationship.2/

It is estimated that SVN has a population of more than 16 million people and a population growth rate of three percent per annum. The SVN wartime GNP has been pegged at VN$150 billion in 1965 (VN$60: $1). The GNP growth rate averages four percent per annum. SVN's economy can be classed as agricultural and undiversified, with about 80 percent of the population deriving its livelihood from the land.1/

A key to the socio-economic potential of SVN is the factor of agricultural productivity. The rice areas of the Delta have not been exploited to their maximum output. The temperate Highlands of central SVN are, for the most part, in a primeval state, but much of this region is suitable for diversified agricultural development. Moreover, the salt-water and fresh-water fish resources have undergone only limited commercial exploitation. As a result, and in spite of a high birth rate, SVN does not suffer the extreme pressure of population on resources that characterize many parts of Asia. (See: Figure 4-1) The Vietnamese, in the midst of war, continue to have the largest caloric intake, per capita, in the Far East.

The SVN economy is "afloat" only because of US support. The US aid program has kept it from collapse and avoided serious inflation. The economy is under heavy pressure due to mounting GVN defense spending and budgetary deficits, increasing VC interdiction and taxation of local commerce, an expanding money supply and US competition for limited in-country resources. Beginning in mid-1965, competition for the extremely limited manpower and material resources in the area of

Figure 4-1

DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS FOR SELECTED FAR EAST COUNTRIES

	Japan	Malaysia	Philippines	VIETNAM	Laos
GNP PER CAPITA (estimated 1962 at 1961 prices in US dollars.)	530	300	120	92	60
PER CAPITA ELECTRIC POWER (1962 in KWH)	1,450	220	110	33	4
LITERACY RATE (latest available percentage)	95	50	75	30	13
LIFE EXPECTANCY (latest available in years)	68	58	55	35	30
INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN (latest available in persons)	920	5,300	6,400	28,800	57,000
ROAD MILES PER 1,000 SQUARE MILES (latest available)	4,230	80	270	100	30
POPULATION DENSITY (1963 per square mile)	670	80	260	230	30
POPULATION GROWTH (Current annual percentage)	1.0	3.2	3.2	2.8	2.0
AGRICULTURAL LAND PER CAPITA (1963 in acres)	0.2	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.9
CALORIC INTAKE PER CAPITA (latest available in calories)	2,300	2,290	1,910	2,490	1,900

Source: Far East - Trends in Production and Trade, Statistics and Reports Division, Agency for International Development, January 1964.

construction and support requirements) was stepped up by the heavy increase in US needs. Most of the distortions, shortages and bottlenecks can be linked to this military build-up. Shipping, docking and transportation facilities cannot support present distribution requirements. These pressures further strained commodity-wage relationships.3/

Overall, the SVN economy has adjusted reasonably well; and although inflation remains a major problem, it remains under control. At present, inflationary patterns have hit salaried government employees and fixed-income groups hardest. A remarkable feature of this economy has been the relative price stability maintained for such basic commodities as rice, fish sauce and cloth. Current agricultural shortages are the result of internal market fluctuations, transportation bottlenecks, VC interdiction and US-GVN military activity. The earlier rice shortages were caused more by market manipulation than by VC interdiction in the Delta; these have been offset by large-scale imports. A chain reaction marketing of hoarded rice stocks was triggered by this move. However, in certain rural areas (particularly Central VN) VC interdiction of communication routes continues to create severe, overall temporary shortages. Stepped-up US-GVN and VC military activity has further reduced agricultural production in the same zone. In contrast, economic life in the Delta has been relatively normal.

Nevertheless, the principal indicators of SVN economic activity, with a few exceptions, either show continuing decline or reflect war distortions:

(1) Rice exports have ceased.

(2) Rubber exports have been reduced.

(3) Industrial production has continued to expand.

(4) The rate of investment activity continues to increase.

(5) The money supply has increased.

(6) The retail price index continues to climb.

War Stimulated Social Change. The revolutionary change ongoing in SVN today, is operating as both a catalyst and a positive factor. The Vietnamese are being catapulted into technological development as a side effect of the war, and many of the factors resistant to change in a traditional society are being overridden by this dynamic.

SVN has become a laboratory for the selective application of military and economic technology. As a result of the heavy input of US materiel and expertise, a large force of skilled and semiskilled technicians have been created within RVNAF. In addition, US contractors have trained Vietnamese for nonmilitary jobs in construction and maintenance. This increase in mechanical, construction, communications and transportation skills should permit a more rapid acceptance and effective utilization of mechanization in both industry and agriculture.

In contrast to the large increases in mechanical and war-related skills, needed medical, scientific, teaching and public administrative resources have not benefited to the same degree. The absorption by RVNAF of already trained, or potential, civilian talent to fill junior military leadership requirements has consumed most of the

promising human resources. The day-to-day administration of government has been hit hardest by these indiscriminate manpower practices.

As a by-product of the stepped-up war effort, US military procurement and construction programs have added to the already strained condition of the local economy. Competition for critical construction resources in-country has driven the prices of materials and labor to new highs and acted as a brake on economic progress in the nonmilitary sector. Although efforts have been made by US agencies to reduce interagency competition for resources to support construction, resources remain inadequate.

US Economic Constraints. US procurement and funding policies are constraints on development programs in SVN and must be considered in planning, programing or executing actions. They reduce US program flexibility and responsiveness in the selection and timing of the increments for development. These limitations include: one-year budget cycles, restrictions on use of foreign flag vessels, the barter system, Limited Free World Source Procurement and balance of payments considerations.

A further constraint is political reality -- the long-range development goals that the US will actively support will decrease as the immediate SVN security threat is reduced. As a side effect, "over-promised" programs may become psychological boomerangs when the interest of US political leadership and voters wanes and the predictable pattern of retrenchment of overseas economic assistance ensues.

Free World Nonmilitary Assistance. In the short term, the US should continue its low-keyed effort to encourage Free World (FW)

participation in SVN. However, any effort to turn an "internal" war into an international crusade against communism would be counter-productive. Giving the enemy the dignity of a massive international effort only generates propaganda opportunities for the NVN leadership and encourages "international" communist support. The object here, from a socio-economic standpoint, is not to create another Spanish Civil War.

FW nonmiiitary assistance to SVN has been extremely limited. (See: Figure 4-2) Except for the provision of medical, engineering and teaching personnel, FW contributions do not represent a significant amount of the total nonmilitary effort. Furthermore, on the negative side, the increasing number and scope of FW assistance inputs have created progressively greater US-GVN problems of administration and coordination.

However, the symbolic import of this assistance in some cases outweighs its small contribution to the total effort. The presence in SVN of even token evidence of FW support is a psychological asset in the war. As of January 1966, 31 nations had provided some aid to SVN, and nine others had agreed to give assistance. Of these 40 nations, ten were providing aid prior to July 1964 when the US began public and private pressure to "show more flags."

For the most part, FW nonmilitary support has been given with reluctance and only after significant exertion of US diplomatic and economic influence. Evaluation of official communications, dealing with

FREE WORLD NONMILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

HUE
- CANADA: New science building for university.
- FRANCE: Professors at Medical School.
- GERMANY: Professors at university.
- UNITED KINGDOM: Professors at university, books for Faculty of Education.

AP BOI
HOBC BOB
- FRANCE: Investment in coal, chemical plants.
- GERMANY: Industrial development investment.

BENTUN
- PHILIPPINES: Surgical and medical teams.

QUI NHON
- NEW ZEALAND: Surgical team.

BAN ME THUOT
- AUSTRALIA: 50 Kw Radio Station under construction.

NHA TRANG
- AUSTRALIA: Workshop machinery for Apprentice Training Center.
- FRANCE: Medical personnel.

DANANG
- JAPAN: Dunhim dam, power plant and technicians.

DALAT
- FRANCE: Medical personnel.
- UNITED KINGDOM: Books for Atomic Research Establishment.

TAY NINH
- PHILIPPINES: Surgical team.

PHAN THIET
- PHILIPPINES: Surgical team.

THU DAU MOT
- PHILIPPINES: Surgical team.

BIEN HOA
- AUSTRALIA: Civil engineering team, surgical team.
- KOREA: Engineering and security force working on civic action projects.

THU DUC
- FRANCE: Cement plant.
- GERMANY: Technical high school construction.
- JAPAN: Electric transmission line, Thu Duc-Bien Hoa.
- KOREA: Technician instructors.
- NEW ZEALAND: Grant for construction of new Faculty of Science building.

PHU THO
- FRANCE: Medical personnel -- Grants for technical schools.

BA TIEN
- FRANCE: Cement plant.

LONG XUYEN
- AUSTRALIA: Surgical team.

VINH LONG
- JAPAN: Mekong River bridge planned.

SAIGON
- CANADA: Medical professor at Cho Ray Hospital.
- REPUBLIC OF CHINA: Materials, aid for electrical transformer station.
- FRANCE: Medical personnel at Grall Hospital; Experts at Centre de Developpement Industriel and Ecole Superieure Agronomique, Perosiform at Veterinaire.
- GERMANY: Instructors at Gia Thang Technical High School; Forestry experts at Department of Rural Reconstruction; 30 ambulances for Department of Health; Credit for construction of abattoir, 3 merchant ships; Grant for purchase of radio batteries, gasoline pumps.
- ITALY: Surgical team.
- JAPAN: Medical team at Saigon hospital
- NEW ZEALAND: Professor at Saigon University; Grant for equipment for Ngyuen Truong To Technical High School.
- PHILIPPINES: Paymar team.
- SWITZERLAND: 30 microscopes for Faculty of Pharmacy, Saigon University.
- UNITED KINGDOM: British Advisory Mission; Lecturers at Saigon University; Equipment and books for government institutions.

CO CONG
- SPAIN: Surgical team.

BEN TRE
- IRAN: Surgical team.

TAN AN
- PHILIPPINES: Paymar team

MY THO
- PHILIPPINES: Surgical team.


TAN HIEP
- PHILIPPINES: Paymar team.

PHU CUONG
- NEW ZEALAND: Engineering detachment on civic action projects.

PHU LOI
- PHILIPPINES: Paymar team.

AS OF JANUARY 1965:

Thirty-one nations, in addition to the United States, have provided aid to Vietnam. Nine other nations have agreed or promised to provide aid.



POPULATION
- UNDER 1,000
- 1,000 to 25,000
- 25,000 to 50,000
- 50,000 to 100,000
- 100,000 to 500,000
- 500,000 to 1,000,000
- 1,000,000 +

OTHER ASSISTANCE THROUGHOUT VIET NAM

AUSTRALIA: 1 million textbooks -- 106 Vietnamese training in Australia -- Wide range of goods and materials for construction -- Flood relief: 50,000 Australian pounds -- Refugee relief: 10,000 blankets; 14,000 cases condensed milk -- Agricultural experts.

BELGIUM: Flood relief: pharmaceutical supplies worth 390,000 Belgian francs.

CANADA: 130 academic and technical scholarships -- Flour and butter worth $850,900 since 1958.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 159 experts in agriculture, psychological warfare, electrical power -- 300 steel plows, 16 pedal-operated sewing machines, 30 tons of seed, 130 tons of fertilizer -- Flood relief: food and medical supplies worth $30,000.

DENMARK: Flood relief: pharmaceutical products worth 100,000 Danish crowns.

FRANCE: 417 grants-in-aid under French cultural program -- 168 Vietnamese in France on technical and academic fellowships -- 100 million francs in low-interest industrial credits -- Flood relief: 150,000 francs.

GERMANY: 40 Vietnamese in Germany for training -- Commodity credit of DM 11 million -- Flood relief: 970,000 piasters.

GREECE: Eleven cases of pharmaceutical products and surgical instruments.

GUATEMALA: 15,000 doses of typhoid-paratyphoid serum.

INDIA: Flood relief: Cloth worth 135,000 piasters.

IRAN: One thousand tons of gasoline.

IRELAND: Flood relief: 1,500 Irish pounds.

ISRAEL: $5,000 worth of pharmaceutical products.

ITALY: Nine science scholarships.

JAPAN: 50 scholarships -- $1,300,000 worth of ambulances, radios, prefabricated houses, medical supplies.

LAOS: Flood relief: 1 million kip.

MALAYSIA: 3,000 Vietnamese training in police administration in Malaysia -- Substantial numbers of military and police transport vehicles.

NETHERLANDS: Flood relief: 20,000 piasters worth of antibiotics.

NEW ZEALAND: 62 academic and technical training scholarships -- 10,000 NZ pounds for refugee relief.

NORWAY: Flood relief: 25,000 Norwegian crowns.

PAKISTAN: Flood relief: 25,000 rupees

PHILIPPINES: $5,000 worth of medical supplies.

SPAIN: Flood relief: pharmaceutical products.

SWEDEN: $10,000 for refugee relief.

THAILAND: 16-man Thai Air Force detachment training comparable Vietnamese pilots and technicians -- 100 tons of cement, 15,000 sheets of zinc roofing.

UNITED KINGDOM: 20 sets of mobile anesthetic equipment -- Flood relief: 16,000 blankets, 30 rolls of cloth -- 20 students training in UK.

FW government responses to US queries for assistance to GVN, gives evidence of FW delay and general noninterest. FW countries appear to be making a deliberate effort to dissociate themselves from the US-GVN war with the VC. The close relationship between the immediate national interest of the donors and the corresponding input of nonmilitary aid is also significant. As should be expected, there is a close parallel between national self-interest in the war in SVN and proximity to the conflict.

Concept of Support

Background. Socio-economic development activities in SVN, from 1954 to the present, have followed a cycle of relief and rehabilitation, to economic growth, to relief and rehabilitation. Throughout the period 1954 to 1961, with the exception of refugee resettlement, US aid was directed primarily towards long-range investment in the economic and social sectors. US assistance was associated with the development of national or central institutions, utilities and those aspects of industrial development normally connected with urban areas. Short-term direct benefits for the rural population and urban masses were not the prime object of US support.1/

Beginning in 1962, a partial realignment of the US effort occurred with the introduction of some short-term programs related to the reduction of insurgency in the countryside. Current US aid strategy reflects an increasing emphasis on meshing the total assistance program

with the military and political sectors of the fight.1/

US Thrust. The violently disruptive nature of the conflict in SVN inhibits the application of a conventional development regimen to the situation. In fact, much of the failure of the US effort in SVN is directly related to our inability to deviate, reprogram or respond to the reality of the event.1/ In developing socio-economic programs, the US-GVN must make maximum use of Vietnamese private and public institutions already in being. Attempting to implant a new set of societal or administrative combinations on a crash basis would only further confuse the already distorted arrangement. The US in SVN must:

(1) Give priority to strengthening current economic aid programs to assure their effectiveness as a stabilizing element, through counter-inflationary activity, and as an offensive economic warfare system that will deny resources to the VC.

(2) Recognize that limitations on human and material resources demand that the US-GVN effort be highly selective. The shortfall of human skills in SVN cannot be overcome by material saturation.

(3) Support, and if necessary initiate, those socio-economic programs that provide tangible evidence of GVN national purpose, as well as those which serve to strengthen the cohesiveness of Vietnamese society.

(4) Support programs that provide clear proof of GVN concern for the Vietnamese people and its recognition of the need for peaceful change as the only valid alternative to violent revolution.

(5) Support programs that are evolutionary, revolutionary and highly competitive; they must be executed in the face of an immediate and dynamic insurgency threat.

Policy Toward Secure, Contested and VC Areas. In carrying out short-term programs, the relationship between socio-economic benefits and GVN presence must be made clear. As a principle, benefits should be limited to areas under GVN control; this is essential to deny resources to the VC and to dramatically demonstrate the rewards accruing to association with the government. GVN assistance should have as its primary goal support of Rural Construction (RC) and development efforts rather than the indiscriminate, unilateral economic improvement of individual well-being.

To be effective, US-GVN socio-economic programs must be closely tied to the pace of the security effort. Attempts to win allegiance from the population or to induce from it a willingness to bear arms against VC harassment by the distribution of commodities or services without reasonable assurance of continued physical security are invitations to failure. An early US assistance concept espoused socio-economic good works which, by themselves and preceding security, were expected to galvanize the peasant into making a militant commitment against the VC. Programs executed under this concept were dramatically unsuccessful; bags of bulgur wheat have never been known to kill an insurgent. Further amplified, such a concept means the denial of GVN socio-economic development resources to contested zones as well as areas under VC

domination. To be worth defending, the quality of life under GVN must be markedly superior; there should be no rewards for "fence-sitting" or "wait and see."


Support in contested areas today must be highly selective and based on specific operational considerations. To eliminate the principle of selective support would reduce the operational flexibility required by both the GVN and the US. The GVN must be ready to exploit weaknesses in VC control and capitalize on opportunities to demonstrate effective government in significant enclaves.

Pricrity Areas. GVN's selection of the Saigon-Bien Hoa complex and An Giang Province as 1966 priority areas for execution of RC operations offers a good chance for success. An Giang, as a base point for exploitation, gives GVN access to an area that contains a significant share of human and material resources.4/ In addition -- and due to their relative security from VC pressure -- other good RC prospects include western Vinh Long, western and southwestern Kien Phong, eastern Chau Doc and areas immediate to the towns of Can Tho and Soc Trang. These areas contain large segments of the rural population that have proved responsive to US-GVN programs.


The belt along the Bassac and Mekong River axes offers the best current prospect for rural socio-economic efforts. These areas capitalize on the limited GVN capability to govern, are mutually supporting, and are manpower and food surplus reservoirs. The geographical, political religious and ethnic backgrounds of these Delta areas are factors that could operate to the advantage of GVN. (See: Figure 4-3) However, this expanded Delta thrust requires a concomitant increase in RVNAF

RURAL CONSTRUCTION


THE ACTIONS




THE
ENEMY
VC CONTROLLED AREAS


THE
PEOPLE

SECRET



SECRET

operational activity against VC-dominated zones adjacent to this region.4/

The areas under consideration are ready to accept significant socio-economic programs now. They are, for the most part, either under Hoa-Hao political domination or contain a large Khmer rural population. In the past, these areas have been afforded relatively low priority attention because of the Hoa Hao "threat" and the Vietnamese emotional fixation on Saigon. As a consequence, this zone has been given a relatively small proportionate share of the available material allocations.

The population centers following the trace of Highway 4 (linking Saigon with central Ba Xuyen) are a second, but important, priority for the RC effort. This heavily populated zone contains some of the richest agricultural land in SVN, and control of this axis links Saigon with the major population and resources base on the Bassac-Mekong.

Concurrently, some priority development activities must continue in the areas immediate to Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nh- Trang. Due to the presence of large concentrations of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), these locales have a symbclic significance that overrides their pragmatic economic and security limitations.

Funding. Over 20 percent of the world-wide US aid program is allocated for SVN. AID input for FY-1967 is estimated at $550 million plus $99 million for Public Law 480 food. Of this amount, $420 million will go for balance of payments support, the Commodity Import Program (CIP). US assistance to SVN breaks out into the following

main elements: (1) (CIP) commodities brought in for distribution through commercial channels; (2) project assistance -- material and technical assistance for such efforts as the Fifty City Water Supply Program; (3) nonproject assistance commodity input for such programs as Rural Construction; and, (4) Food for Peace (includes: Title I commodities sold to GVN and distributed through commercial channels; Title II commodities used in support of RC and emergency relief; and Title III commodities distributed through US voluntary agencies).

Estimates of GVN revenues for 1966 are: (1) domestic VN$14 billion; (2) customs duties (from CIP and GVN imports) VN$4-6 billion; and, (3) counterpart generated (by CIP and PL 480 transactions) VN$23-27 billion. The VN piasters generated through the CIP support RVNAF costs; of the VN piasters accumulated from PL 480 sales, 80 percent will also go to support RVNAF. (Ten percent remains for US use and 10 percent will go into US-GVN Rural Construction support.)

The overall VN$55 billion budget breakout is: (1) VN$14.1 billion to support ministry programs and expenses; (2) VN$4.1 to support joint USOM-GVN projects; (3) VN$1.5 billion for Rural Construction; and, (4) VN$35 billion to support RVNAF.

The US input into socio-economic programs is, in almost all cases, a part of a joint undertaking with GVN. The US provides commodities and technical assistance; GVN provides the administrative talent and local currency. The US must assume a more positive role in the administration of these programs. A key element in the success of various US-assisted activities will be the timeliness of decisions and other administrative measures taken by GVN to speed execution.

To encourage action, the US must exert pressure on GVN by making releases of commodities, technical support and funds incremental and conditional upon selected GVN administrative and operational accomplishments. This funding approach will provide increased leverage without sacrificing GVN involvement in the effort. For example, failure of GVN to carry out a public works program effectively could cause the US to withhold technical support and engineering materials scheduled for a project. A specific instance involved the 1965 transfer of dredges (scheduled for GVN Public Works) to an American contractor when the GVN refused to provide crews to operate the equipment. Withdrawal or reduction of the CIP is another means of exerting pressure. Selective withholding of the CIP in the Fall of 1963 hurried the overthrow of the Diem regime. US commodity support of the RC effort offers another entry point for cutback or rerouting, if need be, to stimulate GVN action.

A key to successful RC is a decentralized financial disbursement and commodity support system that is immediately responsible to program needs. The reinstitution of the provincial committee "sign-off" procedure is also a crucial aspect to this village-level thrust. As currently developed, the SVN budget planning and financial system is an unresponsive financial arrangement that, at its worst, is seriously counterproductive. The RC budget, which in theory supports the most critical aspect of the fight in the countryside, reflects an archaic set of financial rules.

Current GVN funding for RC projects is limited to support of those directly connected only with contested and VC-controlled

zones. Other programs closely associated with socio-economic development in rural Vietnam, in other than areas undergoing RC, are supported by annually programed Ministry budgets and local funds. This narrow approach to rural funding procedure destroys the flexibility of the province chief; it does not permit the reinforcement of success or the anticipation of contingencies in locales beyond the extremely limited real estate identified as "undergoing RC."

The inability to transfer funds between RC projects within province, in combination with a GVN financial system that encourages inaction, hinders the responsive application of resources at the point of decision -- the village. There is an urgent need for both RC contingency and RC provincial development funds that can be used selectively in the province by the province chief and the USREP as part of the provincial committee.

The principle of the GVN post audit should apply to actions within established policy taken by the province. Of even greater importance is the requirement for support and financial review of provincial operations by both US and GVN agencies in Saigon. Under previous policy, vouchers covering expenditures (although agreed upon by the US-GVN provincial committee) were in many instances, unilaterally rejected by GVN national agencies without US knowledge or participation in Saigon. Provincial committee decisions are only as good as Saigon review procedures, and failure to support US field operations in the past has done much to destroy US impact at province level.

Adequate financial procedures for RC require that:

(1) US-GVN re-establish the provincial committee in an operational role. Although, in the final analysis, the GVN province chief is the executive and makes the decisions, the USREP should have "sign-off" participation on those projects which are key to the RC effort.

(2) The planning and funding cycle for RC be simplified.

(3) Provincial development and contingency funds be re-established to allow operational flexibility.

(4) A firm policy of US-GVN review be instituted at Saigon level to provide support for provincial committee decisions. US provincial sign-offs must be back-stopped by US agencies in Saigon; otherwise, the provincial committee concept will have no impact.

(5) Release of commodities and funds to GVN in Saigon and in the provinces for RC be conditional upon selected GVN demonstration of its desire and ability to accomplish stated goals.

(6) Contingency funds for RC be made available to the senior USREP in-province to meet emergency requirements.

(7) US-GVN planning procedures for RC, at regional and Saigon levels, be integrated to assure effective policy and resources support.

(8) A quarterly US-GVN regional review of provincial RC operations be instituted to permit adjustment of goals and resources as necessary.

Socio-Economic Development

The survey of action components in the areas of socio-economic development that follows is not intended as a catalogue of all US-GVN activities. Rather, it is an attempt to highlight those elements that

are of particular significance to the accomplishment of US objectives in SVN.

Current Effort. All current major socio-economic development programs in SVN are carried on in the context of strong government involvement, indispensable US support and a pervasive concern with security. These development components are identified as: (1) war infrastructure; (2) rural development; (3) urban development; and, (4) socio-economic institutions.

For the most part, US socio-economic programs are derivatives of GVN programs in that their size and scope are determined primarily by GVN ability to absorb US assistance effectively. Exceptions to this basic US-GVN operational relationship fall in the category of: (1) unilateral small-scale US military civic action and military construction; as well as, (2) US-initiated emergency responses to politically sensitive situations (e.g., refugees).5/

War Infrastructure Programs are those keyed directly to the short-term requirements necessary to win the war in SVN and maintain the economy. However, even these short-term increments for the most part contribute in some manner to long-term growth and development.

Rural Development Programs focus on provincial operations and those activities that better enable GVN to function effectively in the countryside. These increments have both a short and long-term orientation. The programs are keyed specifically to the needs of an agricultural economy and the rural population upon which the insurgency feeds.

Urban Development Programs also have both a short and long-term thrust. In the short term, they have as primary goals the expansion of employment and improvement of urban welfare as a means of reducing VC penetration. The urban effort is associated with the requirement to carry out an expansionary economic policy designed to improve levels and conditions of employment and to stimulate domestic output. Measures to encourage light industrialization in the private sector are included in this package. The long-term aspects of urban development are a continuation of the short-term thrust and include the expansion of power output and light industry diversification.

Socio-Economic Institutional Development Programs. Within this category, efforts are identified that focus on credit, foreign trade, taxation, health, education, youth activities and women's affairs. These institutional requirements impact on both the immediate war situation and the long-term need to develop a cohesive society in SVN.

The War Infrastructure Program

The war infrastructure program in support of US-GVN objectives has as its point of departure:

(1) An offensive aspect that actively competes for the allegiance of the South Vietnamese population.

(2) A defensive thrust that is organized to negate the VC effort to disrupt the economy of SVN.

(3) Achievement of maximum economic stability in a wartime environment.

War infrastructure programs must be measured against the follow-

ing guidelines and tests of utility:

(1) Their direct, positive and measurable political and psychological impact on the population.

(2) GVN economic and administrative capacity to absorb the program.

(3) GVN willingness to participate in, support and follow through on the project.

(4) Their contribution to the war effort.

(5) Avoidance of program fragmentation due to the competing short-term emergency and ongoing long-term nation building requirements.

(6) Their having, as short-term priority, the provision of that support necessary to establish an effective GVN.

(7) Their being tied into an expansionary economic policy designed to improve conditions of employment and welfare of segments of both the rural and urban population.

(8) Their anticipation of a long-term shift away from imports of consumer goods toward imports of industrial raw materials and capital goods.

Economic Stabilization. The rising cost of living continues to be a major concern throughout SVN and looms as the most volatile immediate economic issue. However, the mobilization of the necessary human and material resources to carry out short-term US-GVN objectives, requires a continued increase in aggregate real income. This, in turn, heightens the inflation. Sharply increased US-GVN expenditures, combined with larger domestic incomes, continue to outstrip the ability of a fully

employed economy to respond by increasing domestic production.3/

Inflationary signs are price increases. Prices are up 50 percent in Saigon for the year. In the Delta, however, prices have remained lower; but, in Central VN living costs are higher than in the capital. The upward spiraling of the cost of living is having a significant demoralizing impact among fixed-income groups. On the other hand, elements of the rural population, as well as urban laborers and entrepreneurs, are benefiting from the inflationary trend.

Inflationary pressures will intensify as the US military build-up and related construction program expenditures mount. Continued inflation, without commensurate salary increases, can undermine GVN ability to continue in power. Further contributors to the inflationary spiral are US personnel. The black market in MPCs, dollars, checks and money orders is related directly to the US presence. Although script has been put into use at an accommodation rate of VN$118 to the dollar, the black market rate for dollars and script continues to rise. The difference between the legal and illegal rates has caused an increasing evasion of the script system by US personnel (including contractors) through the use of postal money orders, personal checks and other means.

It is within the capability of the US to reduce this source of MPCs unilaterally and significantly by limiting the amounts of money paid to personnel in-country and pursuing a more active effort in the identification and punishment of violators. However, under present circumstances, further controls on either the script and dollar flow

would only drive the black market rate higher and further distort the economic situation. The best course of action is to make piaster-MPC exchange as convenient as possible for US personnel and continue postal money order controls in combination with the tightening of customs procedures by GVN. The chief means of short-term inflation control are:

(1) Restraint in income creation. Holding the GVN budget to VN$55 billion in 1966 is the optimum approach to reducing deficit financing.

(2) Limitation of real income. Effective execution of tax laws already on the books is a means to this end. However, the security conditions in the countryside, in combination with a GVN tax moratorium on farm lands, make generalized tax levies impossible. What is needed is a tougher approach to tax collection in the urban commercial, real estate and income tax sectors of the economy.

(3) Supplying goods and services to meet increased incomes. This absolute need can be met by the continued use of the US CIP in conjunction with a US demand that GVN use its foreign exchange balance in a stepped-up import program. At a time when labor is in short supply and domestic production is at nearly peak capacity, it is desirable to make imports cheap relative to domestic goods. This will divert excess demand away from local production.

The CIP and the PL 480 food programs continue as the most effective counterinflationary tools available to the US. These programs fill the gap between what SVN can produce or import and what people need for more than subsistance. They will play an increasingly important role

in offsetting inflationary pressures as the demand for goods turns more toward imports. Reduced GVN foreign exchange earnings require the US to finance over 75 percent of SVN's commercial imports. Without these, the economy and the war effort would collapse.

Balance of payments aid, or budget-support aid (CIP and PL 480), covers the entire spectrum of commodity imports to include such items as: industrial raw materials, petroleum products, fertilizer, cement, pharmaceuticals, raw cotton, tobacco, dried milk, wheat, flour and industrial equipment. (See: Figure 4-4) Under the CIP and PL 480, Title I arrangements, commercial importers are licensed by GVN and pay into a counterpart fund the official piaster value of the goods brought into SVN. Monies generated by this GVN counterpart fund have, for many years, financed the RVNAF military budget.

Although the emphasis in CIP financing is on industrial raw materials and nonluxury goods, counterinflationary pressures may override this consideration. The US has no choice but to finance the importation of large quantities of consumer goods and raw materials into SVN. To allow price increases to erode all real gains from increased monetary incomes by restriction of the CIP, would be self-defeating at this juncture. However, it is recognized that the CIP spawns a class of rich merchants who live off of the aid program and create an artificially high standard of living for the Vietnamese which is not consistent with SVN's state of economic development. Nevertheless, in the short term, the CIP and PL 480, Title I programs must be increased to meet legitimate market demands, to discourage speculation and hoarding, and to dampen growing inflationary pressures.

Specifically, the US economic strategy in SVN is to use the CIP and PL 480 to: (1) maintain near price stability on the basic necessities of the poor; (2) prevent major price increases in other CIP goods; (3) absorb consumer demand; (4) meet the requirements for consumables and raw materials for construction; and, (5) as a contingency measure, apply selective US-GVN market flooding or withdrawal of commodities to reduce runaway pricing in the private sector.

Concurrently, to avoid economic subversion through illegal use of the CIP, the US must take a more active interest in the procedures under which licenses are issued and in the monitorship of final user patterns. Increased pressure for the hardening of licensing practices and closer watch of CIP-related commercial movement outside of SVN are further means of improving control of this highly lucrative aspect of the US support effort.6/

In the mid term, concurrent with the increase of imports financed with GVN foreign exchange, CIP financing must be shifted as the resources gap between domestic production and domestic purchasing closes. Imports selected for CIP financing should neither substitute for, nor impede, domestic production; and, it is desirable during the mid term that CIP financing be restricted to industrial raw materials and nonluxury goods. PL 480, Title I imports should continue to be used to the maximum extent possible as long as they do not substitute for domestic production of like items. In the long term, CIP should be reduced and ultimately eliminated as the economy of SVN normalizes and the GVN balance of payments position improves. In later stages, emphasis should be placed on the provision of industrial raw materials

Figure 4-4

CONFIDENTIAL

FY 1965 VIETNAMESE IMPORTS

COMMODITY	AID-FINANCED COMMERCIAL IMPORT PROGRAM (Obligations)	GVN LICENSING FROM OUR FOREX
Grain Prep.		$ 168,186
Malt		2,371,847
Edible Oils		55,657
Linseed Oil		231,821
Raw Sugar	$ 3,800,000	3,877,647
Sugar Products & Glucose		72,679
Canned Meats		52,003
Dairy Products	638,222	765,543
Fish & Fish Products		16,517
Seeds		124,596
Legumes & Vegetables		280,440
Fruits, Dried & Fresh		301,902
Beverage Materials		546,278
Yeast		175,833
Beverages		458,765
Essential Oils		547,997
Hops		644,594
Ined. Vegetable & Animal Products		80,099
Naval Stores	118,150	
Alcohol	173,777	
Nitrogenous Fertilizer	4,956,514	24,323
Potash Fertilizer	482,922	
Phosphate Fertilizer	5,015,539	338,984
Ammonium Phosphate	222,480	
Pesticides		326,147
Chinese Medicine		800,177
Pharmaceuticals	13,199,761	3,233,682
Chemicals	7,297,551	992,165
Pigments & Dyestuffs	500,060	2,525,355
Plastic Products & Raw Material	2,613,601	467,742
Yarns & Threads	3,800,000	21,402,275
Textile Fabrics	600,000	6,228,114
Linen Fabrics & Cordage		114,400
Plywood		393,005
Hardboards		267,074
Paper Products	1,420,000	3,822,644
Newsprint	1,312,480	
Coke & Coal	499,735	58,687
Petroleum Fuels	14,701,000	
Petroleum Non-Fuels	2,453.000	
Non-Metallic Minerals	$ 2,273,379	$ 1,302,681
Cement	9,124,465	
Glass Products		293,012
Clay Products		559,096
Iron & Steel Mill Products	36,025,181	
Misc. Iron & Steel Mfg. Products	2,596,407	328,344
Nickel		57,835
Tin		363,282
Zinc		409,229
Other Non-Ferrous Metals	3,245,732	125,115
Machinery Parts		1,498,466
Generators, Motors & Parts	1,549,018	
Refrigerators		227,197
Electrical Appliances	3,749,124	645,588
Radios		735,932
Engines, Turbines & Parts	8,791,558	90,456
Const., Mining, Convey. Equipment	1,399,873	3,107
Machine Tools & Parts	800,312	
Metal Working Machinery	248,780	2,198
Textile Machinery Parts	450,000	671,402

COMMODITY	AID-FINANCED COMMERCIAL IMPORT PROGRAM (Obligations)	GVN LICENSING FROM GVN FOREX
Industrial Machinery	4,999,637	10,046,823
Agri. & Food Equipment	348,034	
Air Conditioners		399,940
Office Machines		590,160
Balances & Scales		97,606
Sewing Machine Parts		473,304
Motor Vehicles & Parts	4,500,000	3,508,789
Passenger Cars		1,874,615
Misc. Vehicles & Parts	298,223	4,763,460
Bicycle Parts		1,866,032
Service Station Equipment		31,813
Tractor Parts	268,597	164,645
Aircraft Parts		988,076
Railway Transportation Equipment		3,296
Vessels & Equipment		34,059
Scientific Appliances	598,707	659,605
Books, Magazines	50,000	806,733
Office Supplies		798,906
Musical Instruments		73,789
Photographic Equipment		858,451
Motion Pictures		$ 634,093
Watch Parts & Watches		438,850
Sporting Goods		186,343
Other Misc. Commodities		887,016
Tires, Tubes & Rubber Products	4,620,971	3,356,424
Emergency		850,169
Government Agencies		1,495,453
Ocean Transportation	1,250,000	
TOTAL	$150,992,761*	$94,968,709

*Not adjusted for minor final adjustments bringing total to $150,749,583.33. Excludes obligations from Master accounts of $1,867,132 prior year funds.

FY 1965 PL 480 IMPORTS

	LICENSING
Wheat Flour	$ 6,279,406
Milk, Evap. & Condensed	12,329,411
Dried Milk	111,294
Non-Fat Milk Solids	51,728
Tobacco	4,428,323
Raw Cotton	8,469,494
Rice	3,494,650
Other Dairy Products	160,157
TOTAL	$35,324,453*

* Ten months total; other two months undistributed by commodity code and amount, thus making the total for the entire year $39,385,559.

Source: AID, Office of VN Affairs, 1966

2

and of capital equipment necessary for development.

Rural Construction Support. RC is only possible if GVN can provide a level of security that, when combined with appropriate political and socio-economic programs, offers sufficient incentives for the population to provide active support to the government. In the absence of such incentives, individuals will try to withdraw from the conflict so as to minimize personal risk. Under these circumstances, development efforts are self-defeating; they become a source of material support for the insurgent.

The main US-GVN socio-economic target in the short term must be the disadvantaged rural population. The problems are: (1) to counter VC promises of a better life by effective economic action; (2) to increase the commitment of rural population to GVN by removing causes for disaffection; and, (3) to develop a GVN presence at the village level where the VC have penetrated most successfully. The short-term support requirements to meet these problems include: (1) the provision of "consumable" benefits to the rural population; (2) the delivery of such benefits soon rather than eventually; and, (3) the assurance that this extension of these benefits is associated with the presence of effective government.

The Vietnamese farmers bear the brunt of the war. Rural people have suffered the largest number of casualties and have been driven from their land by the contest between US-GVN and the VC in the countryside. However, farmers have profited in many instances from the conflict. Farmer purchasing power has increased in most cases in spite of inflation; more of the goods of the market place are with-

in their financial reach. Although taxed intermittently by both GVN and VC, farmers in many areas pay no land rent; many of their landlords have fled. In some areas, farmers have also benefited by taking over the abandoned fields of absent landlords.

Farmers have profited by the unprecedented interest in their welfare taken by the US-GVN and by the VC. They have been wooed indiscriminately with fertilizer, windmills, schoolhouses, wells, coconut seedlings and propaganda in an effort to "win their hearts and minds." In spite of this, the peasant has demonstrated an unlimited absorbtive capacity for socio-economic support without a corresponding commitment to GVN.

Self-help programs, although relatively inexpensive in terms of money and commodities, continue to be one of the most effective vehicles for combining GVN positive presence and local popular participation in the countryside. The hamlet self-help program has proven to be a most successful aspect of the short-term, socio-economic development effort in SVN. To capitalize on this Rural Construction success, the US must work with GVN to assure that the concept of government-assisted self-help continues to be applied in both secured areas and areas undergoing RC. It is an action program that, in its best form, works from the bottom up and is based on the desires of the hamlet citizens. Self-help depends for its success on the management and labor contribution of the hamlet dweller and on the quick response of provincial authorities with the necessary materials and technical resources. Examples of

successful self-help projects include the construction of roads, bridges, canals, maternity dispensaries, schools and markets.

Weakness in this program is attributable to slow GVN processing of requests from hamlets and delayed outlays of construction commodities and funds for use on the projects. As a result, much of the impact of the projects lost and the effort becomes another source of frustration to the hamleteer. The program has been hamstrung by limitations established by the GVN. Under current rules, only one self-help project can be authorized per hamlet, and only hamlets undergoing RC can receive project support. The policy fails to consider hamlet population, size and desire to participate. In addition, it denies government-assisted self-help projects to rural areas that are already under GVN control; this emasculates the concept of continued GVN help to the population in the field of community development. What has been overlooked within the US-GVN effort is the need for the government to demonstrate its continuing concern for the rural people who remain under tremendous wartime stress. It should be left up to the provincial committee to decide on the thrust and requirements for self-help and on the need to continue these projects in secured areas if necessary. Without flexibility at the action level, province, the program will not maximize on its tremendous known capabilities.


Refugees and Relocatees. As of the close of 1965, the refugee flow had leveled off at less than 800,000 persons, with fewer than 500,000 living in temporary shelters. (See: Figure 4-5) Of particular significance is the age spread in the refugee population. It

Figure 4-5

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SOUTH VIETNAM - THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

SOURCE: USOM/PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION



TOTALS

TOTAL REFUGEES.....771,034
RESETTLED REFUGEES.....251,285
REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS.....447,734

REGION I	REFUGEES	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
DA NANG	5,218		5,218
QUANG NAM	39,421	11,916	14,718
QUANG NGAI	82,873	19,181	58,798
QUANG TIN	14,111	5,000	9,111
QUANG TRI	14,350	4,260	6,804
THUA THIEN	8,605	4,695	3,910
SUB TOTAL	104,578	45,052	98,559

REGION II	REFUGEES	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
BINH DINH	129,202	31,259	97,943
BINH THUAN	7,360	2,772	4,588
DAR LAC	24,028	8,420	15,608
KHANH HOA	19,864	1,714	18,140
KONTUM	22,293		20,945
LAM DONG	8,245	4,853	3,392
NINH THUAN	20,382	20,229	153
PHU BON	15,114	14,640	494
PHU YEN	44,689	4,172	40,517
PLEIKU	8,367	1,763	6,604
QUANG DUC	3,298	1,475	3,823
TUYEN DUC	3,784	1,393	2,391
SUB TOTAL	308,636	92,690	214,498

REGION III	REFUGEES	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
BIEN HOA	11,462	4,413	7,049
BINH DUONG	13,936	899	13,037
BINH LONG	1,568	336	1,232
BINH TUY	9,523	8,516	1,007
CIA DINH	4,427	2,357	2,070
HAU NGHIA	8,805	3,899	4,906
LONG AN	13,573	5,943	7,630
LONG KHANH	11,608		11,608
PHUOC LONG	3,633	1,459	2,174
PHUOC TUY	3,507	3,120	387
TAY NINH	15,812	5,426	10,386
VUNG TAU	1,537	1,003	534
SAIGON	670		670
SUB TOTAL	100,051	37,371	62,690

REGION IV	REFUGEES	RESETTLED REFUGEES	REFUGEES IN TEMPORARY SHELTERS
AN GIANG	3,524	3,022	393
AN XUYEN	14,118	10,034	2,815
BA XUYEN	12,409	8,370	4,039
BAC LIEU	9,585	3,543	6,042
CHAU DOC	4,669	3,628	1,041
CHUONG THIEN	10,449	3,111	7,338
DINH TUONG	79,269	9,715	21,738
GO CONG	5,523	2,587	2,936
KIEN GIANG	9,897	6,189	3,708
KIEN HOA	6,736	5,799	521
KIEN PHONG	3,719	2,821	1,098
KIEN TUONG	6,498	3,076	3,423
PHONG DINH	6,936	1,547	5,389
VINH BINH	7,880	2,836	5,044
VINH LONG	14,567	8,104	6,463
SUB TOTAL	197,779	76,172	71,987

LEGEND:

- More than 20,000 refugees in temporary shelters
- More than 8,000 refugees in temporary shelters
- More than 5,000 refugees in temporary shelters
- Less than 5,000 refugees in temporary shelters

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contains a relatively small percentage of draft age males. As a result, this population group makes little contribution to the GVN labor force.

US-RVNAF bombing and artillery fire, in conjunction with ground operations, are the immediate and prime causes of refugee movement into GVN-controlled urban and coastal areas. However, in addition to those who moved for reasons related to security, the refugee category includes many of the chronically poor (both urban and rural) and those displaced by periodic floods in central SVN. A further background cause for the refugee influx is the desire of many Vietnamese families, originally relocated by GVN in the Central Highlands during the Diem regime, to return to the Coastal Lowlands. The land development program under which these people were moved and settled has been relatively unsuccessful due to poorly selected locations, lack of effective GVN administrative and economic support as well as a deteriorating security situation.

The SVN refugee population must be treated as an asset rather than a liability. However, GVN has assumed a negative attitude toward the total refugee problem. The Vietnamese feel that this situation is largely US caused, and that the problem would be solved if military activity diminished. This negative attitude is reflected in the pattern of nonperformance exhibited by the GVN Social Welfare Ministry. Due to this failure and because of US and international public opinion sensitivity toward refugees, the US must be prepared to go it alone, if necessary, to support this program.7/

The US and the GVN must avoid according any atmosphere of permanence to the refugee population in urban camps. Every effort must be made to recover abandoned farm areas and return these families to their homes as soon as possible. The terminal solution to the refugee problem is to secure the rural areas from which they originated and then relocate them in homes as part of an expanded, well-planned and supported land development effort. In the interim, temporary shelter construction is a requirement. Emergency school and vocational training programs geared to refugee needs are a means of making the most of their current urban area presence. However, the input of communal facilities should be kept to a minimum as part of the effort to emphasize the temporary nature of their displacement.

Care for people should capitalize on their cohesive family ties as well as on their natural grouping and movement in hamlet segments. Operations should de-emphasize institutionalization of refugee handling; established hamlet and family patterns should act as the basis for refugee camp organization. In addition, the limited capabilities of the work force within the refugee population should be used on military and other construction projects as a means of keeping them gainfully employed.

The refugee program is of particular value as a vehicle for Free World and US voluntary agency participation in SVN.7/ The refugee situation has propaganda impact, and non-US Government participation should be publicized. However, the immediate interest in refugees should not be allowed to override priority efforts in

the RC field. A strong Vietnamese criticism of the current US approach is that the refugees are frequently living better than are the farmers working adjacent to their camps.

The Rural Development Program

The Agricultural Base. The principal source of income in SVN is agriculture, and over 80 percent of the population derive their livelihood from the land. Rice and rubber have generated almost all of SVN's foreign exchange earnings from exports. Compared to Asian farmers in general, the Vietnamese farmer has demonstrated a remarkable response in favor of new farm production practices. His willingness to change is indicated by: (1) the rapid expansion in the use of chemical fertilizers; (2) the increase in demand for improved varieties of rice, American corn, vegetables and fruits; as well as, (3) the rapid multiplication of improved breeds of swine and poultry.2/

It is in the agricultural sector that SVN has held, and continues to hold, obvious comparative advantages. Agriculture will remain the basis of the economy throughout the long-term time period. Conversely, SVN does not appear to possess the resources necessary for massive industrial development. Under these environmental circumstances, a goal of long-term economic self-sufficiency would constitute a fundamental planning error. However, if GVN is to compete successfully in the future on the world rice market: (1) the cost of production on the farms must be lowered; (2) transportation means must

be made more efficient; (3) handling charges must be reduced; and, (4) the tax system must be adjusted to encourage exports.

Over the mid and long-term, agriculture must expand and diversify; this will avoid the vulnerability inherent in an economy solely dependent on rice and rubber crops for foreign exchange. Emphasis in agriculture should be on: (1) increasing farm production and diversification; (2) returning abandoned farm land to production; (3) opening new farm areas; (4) improving irrigation facilities; (5) developing an effective credit system; (6) improving security of tenure; (7) introducing new agricultural product strains; and, (8) developing industrial crops in conjunction with associated processing industries.

In the wartime environment of SVN, the most critical single economic factor is rice. To prevent the recurrence of a rice "crisis" such as occurred in the Summer of 1965, the US will have to continue to support a rice import program. The problems of transportation and VC interdiction in central Vietnam, in combination with the continuing effort of rice merchants to profit from market speculation, created the requirement for these rice imports. However, at the end of 1965, despite the failure of imports to arrive as scheduled, rice stocks were kept above the danger level in Saigon due to excellent deliveries from the Delta. The SVN rice crop for 1965-1966 should be equal to that of last year. When combined with the disgorgement of hoarded stocks from the early 1965 harvest, totals should more than meet the needs of the population under normalized distribution.8/

Rice prices in Saigon today are about 10 percent above those of a year ago. In central VN (a food deficit area), prices are much higher as this region must be supplied with rice from the US and Thailand. The higher prices reflect both transportation costs and speculation. The leverage of massive US and Thai rice imports, in combination with a rise in the official price of rice purchased from merchants for government sale, has for the time being reduced the need for drastic GVN action to assure rice deliveries. Plans for additional warehousing to permit rice stockpiling will further reduce speculation.

US-GVN efforts must be accelerated to gain control of rice output in contested, as well as secured, areas. At present, US-GVN attempts to gain control of rice are fragmented, uncoordinated and in part frustrated by the desires of merchants and farmers to leave the status quo undisturbed. This unprogramed and poorly coordinated rice control activity does not accomplish the goal of starving out the enemy; instead, it frustrates the rural population and increases the ranks of VC sympathizers.

VC and PAVN forces are provisioned from the SVN rice crop· denial of this source of supply would reduce these combat formations from operating fighters to individuals undergoing a survival exercise. The need for an all-out effort to acquire control of the rice crop is of particular importance in central Vietnam. VC-PAVN units, operating in rice deficit areas, use the central Lowlands provinces as their main supply source. The application of a thorough resources control effort

in this area would have an extremely quick and high return. More benefit will accrue to the conduct of immediate resources control measures of high intensity in central VN than to carry on halfhearted efforts country-wide. Concurrent with an all-out attempt to cut rice off from VC-PAVN forces will be the absolute need to anticipate food requirements for the rural population that move away from VC areas.

The use of fertilizer has been the most important new practice contributing to ' .sed agricultural production in SVN. Continued emphasis must be placed on increasing the use of chemical fertilizer as part of the effort to step up rice production in combination with continued plant protection efforts. Although fertilizer is a key commodity in any resources control effort, US-GVN-sponsored fertilizer programs (supplementing commercial distribution) have only recently been tied into the RC effort. It was not until 1965 that a decision was made to limit the sale of US-GVN-financed fertilizer to farmers in areas under government control; at this writing, commercially distributed fertilizer remains accessible to farmers in VC-controlled and contested areas. In the short term, both commercial and government loan-supported (or grant) fertilizer should be withheld from areas not under GVN control. Exceptions to this appi ach should be based on operations and propaganda considerations and be tied into the RC thrust.

The US-GVN effort should encourage the enlargement of extension service activities in rural areas. The Ministry of Rural Affairs Extension Service is an educational arm of GVN in the countryside. The

Extension Service has been accepted by the rural population because of its educational function; its mission sharply contrasts with the regulatory or administrative roles of other GVN agencies operating in rural areas. As with school teachers, the Agriculture Extension cadre represent a symbol of positive, cooperative government presence in rural SVN; this approach deserves continuing dynamic exploitation.

The Extension Service includes in its responsibilities rural youth work, home improvement and programs for rural women. Its youth organization (the 4-T Youth Club) is patterned after the US 4-H Club and has been well received. Over 2,000 4-T clubs were operating in 1965. The success of this "grass roots" organization must be exploited. However, the extension program (as a successful thrust) should not be turned into a clumsy propaganda vehicle. Extension Service operations must present the model of effective GVN presence that will help to emphasize the value of supporting the government. It must be more than a mere agricultural mouthpiece. It has direct access to the rural population and has an educational message with a direct pay-off for the farmer. US advisory interest in this agency must transcend mere technical assistance in bland agronomy. As an information channel to the farmer, it deserves the interest of US communications media technicians as well as agricultural technicians.

There is virtually no banking system in the rural areas of SVN. People carry their money in their pockets and their accounts in their heads. Rural capital is scarce and lending risks, along with interest

rates, are high. An effective credit system should be encouraged as a means of stimulating increased agricultural activity and higher incomes for the farmer-producer through the more efficient use of credit capital. A responsive GVN farm loan system, in conjunction with farmer cooperatives, would do much to reduce usury as a propaganda vulnerability exploited by the VC in the countryside.

The National Agricultural Credit Office (NACO) offers the GVN a vehicle to administer an effective country-wide system of agricultural credit that can demonstrate, in pragmatic fashion, GVN interest in the welfare of the farmer. If properly administered, NACO loans are an important development instrument in agricultural Vietnam. In fact, this loan program -- along with primary education and the maternal-child health program -- stands high among priority desires of the rural population. Through inconsistent loan policies and extremely poor administrative procedures, however, NACO has failed to provide the financial tools to the farmer-producer that would offer an alternative to the current rural financial structure dominated by the Chinese money lender. In its present state, NACO has proved most counterproductive and stands as a symbol of GVN ineffectiveness and inability to produce.

The credit program deserves more than passive US technical advisory monitorship. For the US to abandon interest in the NACO and the farmer cooperative program, or to let them drop arbitrarily while they are being "reorganized and consolidated," only compounds the failure. Rural credit is a direct means of influencing the farmer-producer through practical action and must be kept alive.

A system of agricultural cooperatives that will meet the basic needs of the farmer-producer for credit, production supplies, marketing and management should be encouraged in areas where security and farming practices are favorable. Self-help, self-management and self-ownership must be stressed in the program to avoid the deadening structure of GVN bureaucracy. The cooperative concept requires US-GVN support (to include initial financial backing) to get the program in motion, but the goal must be to encourage an independent cooperative organization that is sensitive to the farmer-producer's needs. Model cooperatives are needed to show by example what can be accomplished. The Vietnamese farmer-producer has already shown himself to be capable, if given half a chance, of organizing for cooperative action. This positive trait should be encouraged, as it directly challenges a major VC propaganda thrust.

The system of land tenure in SVN is extremely complex as the result of: (1) Viet Minh land reforms carried out during the war against the French; (2) the selective abrogation of the Viet Minh reform by Diem, followed by the Diem version of redistribution; and, (3) the current assault on the landlords and GVN authority by the VC. Landlordism, large holdings and tenancy were characteristic of the Delta during the French colonial period. Before 1952, there were no regulations governing farm leases, rents or loans; about 40 percent of the best land planted to rice was owned by 2,500 persons. In the Delta, the worst abuses of tenancy prevailed; the Viet Minh capitalized on

this fact. The flight of landlords, coupled with the abandoning of supervisory activity on the part of the larger absentee combines, left the peasant with land to farm and no landlords to pay. The Diem-promulgated 1956 land redistribution program added to this confusion as it was only partially executed and was further negated by the deterioration of security in rural areas. Of more recent significance is the fact that a major VC claim (if GVN wins, the absentee landlord and the tax collector will return) has been proved true. Tax collection, in conjunction with ARVN search and destroy operations, was an established pattern in contested and VC-controlled areas.

The rural population at this juncture is not as concerned over land redistribution as it is over tenant-landlord arrangements, interest charges and taxation. Extensive land reform should not be undertaken now throughout SVN. The effort, other than symbolic and highly selective, would only compound an already confused situation.

A low-keyed, thoroughly planned and executed, land reform operation (within a limited, highly selective model) with an effective propaganda follow-on would be of greater value than any haphazard scheme promoting "land for the landless." A model effort can be carried on under controlled conditions. The Ky government's limited beginning at land redistribution reflect this approach. GVN has been working successfully with former French properties in a relatively untangled ownership situation. In addition, the GVN moratorium on payments for land sold to the farmers under the 1956 land reform law, in combination

with a cancellation of rental and tax payments, has had a positive rural impact. The granting of title documents in selected areas has also appeared as a further indication of go d faith on the part of the current government.

Over the mid and long-range time period, the GVN should make a thoroughly planned and publicized effort to sort out and distribute land that is eligible for legal transfer. This program would include an evaluation of the village communal property in the central Lowlands, land under government ownership and land held above legal allocations by private owners. A continuing monitorship of tenancy agreements and a review of the land tax structure should be carried on concurrently with this effort.

Rubber Plantations. Rubber is at present the principal export crop and the country's main source of non-US-derived foreign exchange. Most of the rubber comes from large, well-organized and operated plantations established by French companies. These rubber-growing areas are located on the southern slopes of the central Highlands and extend on an arc (north of Saigon) ranging from Vung Tau northwest to the Cambodian border. VC War Zones C and D lie in a part of this rubber plantation belt. Because of the lack of security and the declining market for rubber, little has been done to maintain or replant the rubber areas since 1959; the plantations have deteriorated. However, rubber production has continued at a relatively high level until the present.

There is continuing evidence of accommodation between the plantation ownership and the VC to keep production from being uninterrupted.

Some of the larger French firms are planning to reduce operations temporarily due to increased US-GVN military activity in the area. The US-GVN must decide whether an all-out effort to attack the VC in the plantation areas is worth the short-term loss of GVN export credits from rubber. In addition, French Government concern and political hostility (attributable to pressure from the large rubber companies) is a consideration in any decision. Nevertheless, in the short term and based on the immediate need to destroy the VC safe havens in close proximity to the Saigon complex, military exigencies should override temporary economic and political disadvantages. Delaying the rubber production or restoration effort for the time necessary to reduce the VC threat to Saigon is a small price to pay for the security gains involved.

Throughout the mid and long term, the high-quality rubber crop of SVN should be further exploited -- foreign participation, to include managerial skills and capital, should be encouraged. Small plantation owners should be assisted in replanting efforts and encouraged to form cooperatives. In addition, GVN taxes on exported rubber should be adjusted to keep SVN prices competitive on the world market. It should be recognized, however, that declining synthetic rubber costs may make natural rubber noncompetitive.

Fisheries. After rice, fish is the most important food staple in SVN. Sea fishing is carried on along the entire coast of SVN, and about 250,000 people are engaged in the industry. In addition, the Mekong

and Bassac River systems and the canals of the Delta produce a significant quantity of fish. The salt-water fishing potential lies barely tapped. Current fish production does not meet the protein demands of SVN; nevertheless, even in a wartime environment, fish is exported to Hong Kong and Singapore.

The inexpensive motorization of the fishing fleet, improved landing facilities and the formation of cooperatives have done much to improve fish production and the living standards of the fisherman. Expanding the fishing fleet through motorization has lowered the intensity of local fishing grounds use by extending the range and time at sea. More than 10,000 boats have been motorized; the 1964 catch and exports reached all-time highs. This increase was accomplished by a US-GVN-sponsored sale of engines on a long-term loan basis that has brought about one of the more rewarding steps toward modernization in SVN. Fish catches have tripled per man hour of effort on motorized craft used for offshore fishing.

In the short term, the development of fisheries is directly connected with the problem of resources control as well as seaborne infiltration and denial operations. Currently, US-GVN resources control efforts have reduced fishing activity. A further loss in production has been caused by fishermen hiring out for construction work in US coastal enclaves. However, in those areas under GVN control, the continuing encouragement of fishermen's cooperative development and the motorization of the fishing fleet can continue. The growing synthetic

fiber fishnet industry is another tie-in with the fishing effort and should be encouraged. In the long term, increased motorization of the fishing fleet, in conjunction with improved fishing techniques -- to include canning, refrigeration, port facilities, oceanographic surveys, transportation and processing capabilities -- should be encouraged.

Major Developments. There are two water problems of major socio-economic importance in SVN: salt-water intrusion and poor drainage. Salt-water intrusion severely restricts cultivation and sources of potable water in the seven Delta provinces bounded by the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. In the Plain of Reeds, poor drainage has limited arable acreage due to the accumulation of toxic salt. Poor drainage also limits the productivity of the Camau Plain.

In the short run, GVN efforts to reduce salt-water intrusion in the heavily populated, food surplus and comparatively secure south-western Delta area (Quan Lo Plain) would have an immediate influence on rural development goals. It is relatively more economical to improve the water-control facilities in this key area (already under cultivation) than to attempt to bring the little-cultivated Plain of Reeds and Camau Plain into production. Both the Plain of Reeds (a food deficit area) and Camau Plain are dominated by the VC, and any projects in these areas would run into security problems negating the effort.

The heavily populated Quan Lo Plain contains some of the most productive rice land in SVN and is an area in which the GVN presence has been particularly effective. Priority should be accorded to this zone

as (in comparison to others) it can yield a larger gain at lesser cost. The development of barrages (dike systems) and sluice gates, in conjunction with canal work in the Ba Xuyen-Vinh Loi area (Quan Lo Plain), requires relatively little dredging and maximizes on the underemployed labor force during the dry season. A project of this nature has immediate impact on the rural population, as it gives them access to potable water -- a resource that is extremely expensive in the dry season. In addition, control of salt-water intrusion in these areas will permit the expansion of double cropping with a pumping system.

In the mid and long term, the Plain of Reeds and Camau Plain should be exploited, as these potentially rich areas can absorb much of the overflow population from the crowded and economically limited central Lowlands. The draining of the Plain of Reeds can be integrated with the multination Mekong Development Program. Water control systems in Cambodia will do much to reduce the flooding in this area and in the floating rice zones to the South. In addition, further small-scale irrigation efforts can be carried out in the central Lowlands.

The development of small-scale, cooperatively owned, rural electrification systems in secured areas of SVN is proving to be an excellent device for stimulating GVN-citizen joint action. The beginnings in An Giang and Tuyen Duc provinces are promising. Previous rural electrification efforts, although not of the same scale as the present program, have proved to be of psychological significance in bringing the feeling of an effective presence and security to hamlets during the night hours.

The Urban Development Program

Over the short-range period, US-GVN urban development programs should remain aimed at:

(1) Urban social improvement that will bolster public confidence and ease the burdens of the low-income population.

(2) Encouraging investment in productive enterprise so as to raise domestic output, absorb purchasing power and encourage financial commitments to the SVN economy.

(3) Creating income-increasing measures to provide added incentives for urban population segments other than the commercial elite.

Throughout the mid and long-range period, urban development should be focused on achieving sound industrial and commercial sectors of the economy. These sectors must be adapted to the real needs and resources of SVN. Development efforts require improvement of the investment climate and increased exploitation of a trained manpower base; additionally, light industry diversification and growth must be encouraged to meet the needs of an expanding economy.9/

Concurrent with the need for industrial base growth is the requirement for a commensurate increase in the skilled labor force that can contribute to, and profit from, gains in the industrial sector. In addition, the living conditions of the urban labor force must be improved to assure its continued commitment to an expansionary national economy.

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Light Industry. Industrialization is not a major short-range priority in SVN. Such limited industrial developments as will occur should support the GVN war effort insofar as possible. Throughout the mid and long-range periods, industrialization must continue to play a secondary role to agriculture -- the prime thrust.9/

Light industry should be oriented toward food and fiber processing and the production of such consumer goods as plastics and textiles. In addition, the manufacture of rubber and cement products should be exploited further to capitalize on the nation's raw materials.

Vietnam's industrial region (Tonkin) became a part of the DRVN in 1954. What little industry existed in SVN prior to that date was established by French capital and located in the Saigon area. Only light manufacturing and the processing of local agricultural and forest products were carried on in provinces.

The priority area in the mid and long-range for industrial development in SVN must remain the Saigon-Bien Hoa complex. It serves the area of greatest population density in SVN, and it is the center of the national transportation system. Moreover, the labor force to sustain industrialization is readily available and electric power is accessible.

The Da Nang area, serving the heavily populated north coast, is of secondary importance for industrial development throughout the mid and long-range periods. A third significant zone, the Bassac-Mekong axes in the Delta (Long Xuyen, Can Tho, Vinh Long, My Tho) possesses

a light industry potential for mid-range exploitation. The Cam Ranh Bay area has long-range significance, but no short-range industrial development priority should be established for this locale. Cam Ranh, as a complex, has no indigenous population base to service. Like the cement plant in Kien Giang Province, however, specialized industries (e.g., glass or fish processing) could be established there. There is a danger that the weight of the American presence -- in both the Da Nang and Cam Ranh base areas -- could distort industrial development priorities which should remain oriented on the realities of SVN geography, resources and population factors.

Foreign Investment. The GVN should encourage highly selective foreign investment in the short range, and a much increased overseas financial input over the mid and long-range periods. As a general rule, GVN has shown a preference for mixed companies that involve a partnership between foreign and Vietnamese capital. Furthermore, GVN itself participates as a partner in many activities, although it is the declared policy to reserve areas of the economy for private enterprise. For those industries that GVN considers basic, at least 50 percent of the ownership must be government.

Although not completely hostile, the GVN climate toward foreign investment has been desultory and obstructionist. As the security situation improves, GVN should make a genuine effort to encourage foreign investment on either a partnership or a management basis. GVN laws relating to investment are sound and provide a good basis for

development. In addition, a proposed extension of the US investment guarantee program would greatly assist GVN in the attraction of US capital. SVN sorely needs management skills that would accrue as a by-product of a well-planned foreign investment program. The US should encourage GVN participation in the SEA regional development banking structure as a further means of strengthening the investment climate and facilitating SVN's contribution to regional cooperation. A SEA banking system would serve as an important means, along with the Mekong Project, for overcoming fragmented approaches to regional economic development.

Power Generation. SVN is a power deficit area today. However, the Da Nhim power plant (near Dalat) has the potential to meet most of the country's needs. The inability of GVN to secure the transmission lines currently negates this potential. At present, electrical power for both illumination and light industry is largely limited to that provided by diesel systems in province towns and by individually owned generators supporting small industry. The Saigon area, in the immediate future, will have an adequate power supply. This has been accomplished by a "crash build-up" of an effective, but relatively uneconomical, diesel system that was installed to meet the emergency needs of the capital.

The development of any significant light industry in urban areas, other than Saigon, is contingent on expansion of the industrial power supply. Until the power transmission grid can be secured, light industry expansion remains restricted. Current limited development is based

solely on the use of local power resources; it is an interim stopgap measure that is justifiable only under wartime conditions.

As the security situation improves, the Da Nhim hydroelectric plant will produce enough power to meet all industrial needs except those of the Da Nang complex (this will be met by the thermal plant under development near the Nong Son coal mine). As a consequence, there should be only minimum capital outlay to maintain the provincial diesel generator systems (soon to be nationalized) in those areas included in the national grid. In the long-range period electric power generated from the Mekong Regional Development Program should be available to meet SVN's growing power needs.

Municipal Water Supply. The development of potable water supply systems in province and district towns should be continued as a low priority effort. Next to the Saigon water system USOM considers the "Fifty City Water Supply" program to be the highest priority public works task in SVN. The program has not been too successful. US-GVN have been unable to support well drilling and water distribution projects in the provinces due to a series of security, logistics and personnel problems that have crippled the effort. This program, although poorly carried out, has collateral advantages. It serves to absorb some of the urban unemployed in the provinces and, when completed, it will improve the general health of the population. The continuing poor performance of the program has not had too much adverse publicity as very little was promised publicly.

Low-Cost Public Housing. In the short and mid-range periods, the small scale low-cost urban housing program should receive continuing US-GVN attention and sponsorship. In the short term, this program should be held at minimum level due to its competition for materials with military construction. The urban public housing effort offers continued evidence of a better future to the Vietnamese laborer. Current income gains by the urban labor force are negated by the inability to find adequate shelter. The low-cost housing program can provide more immediate social benefits and derive more public support from the urban labor force than any other GVN public works effort. This housing program should remain focused on the labor force. Previous public housing efforts, utilizing lottery receipts to pay for construction, resulted in homes built for the upper middle class GVN elite.

Transportation. In the short range, emergency development of a national civilian logistics system must be continued. The inability of SVN's transp ation system to meet requirements have both military and civilian significance. Most of the important shortages and bottlenecks are the result of the rapidly increasing demand on the limited transportation resources. VC interdiction of LOCs, military competition for limited logistics capabilities, constrictions due to transport and warehousing shortages, as well as congested port facilities, are the main causes for the breakdown. Compounding this physical shortage of means has been the faulty decision-making and administrative lethargy of GVN.

The immediacy of the logistics problem, combined with the ineffectiveness of GVN management, has necessitated direct US intervention in the areas of management, procurement, cargo handling, warehousing, distribution and construction. Rice storage, civilian relief supplies, rural construction materials, as well as emergency commodity procurement and movement are the prime problem areas.

In the mid-range period, US inputs can be eliminated and GVN should phase out its effort as soon as the private sector of the national distribution system is rehabilitated. In the long-range period, GVN logistics activities should be terminated with the exception of such large-scale transportation requirements as lie beyond the capacity of private enterprise.

As a short-range means of reducing pressure on the Port of Saigon, the US should support the development of coastal and river shipping capabilities to bypass interdicted LOCs. Inland waterway transport. is the most economical means of moving bulk cargo in the Delta. As a further means of breaking the transportation bottleneck, large steel barges should be introduced for heavy cargo movement. The larger barges would reduce the total canal traffic and facilitate resources control. The introduction of coastal lift (from such Delta ports as Rach Gia on the Gulf of Siam, the Chau Phu, Long Xuyen, Can Tho, Dai Ngai, Vinh Long and My Tho on the Bassac and Mekong Rivers) would also reduce the VC tax-take on Delta roads and canals and curtail traffic pressure on the Vinh Long and Can Tho ferries. In addition, more

coastal shipping is needed to meet logistics requirements of Central SVN and to capitalize on US port development along the coast. In the Delta, long-term canal construction (in combination with bridging of the Mekong at Vinh Long and the Bassac at Can Tho) would accelerate commercial movement.

The immediate import of taxicabs to Saigon can reduce one of the most obvious and uncomplimentary aspects of the US troop build-up. The capital city's commercial transportation has been saturated to the point where an effective US-GVN response is required. The importation of taxis, combined with the development of a cooperative taxi organization encouraging independent driver ownership, could do much to overcome this public relations obstacle.

Throughout the short-range period, the US should encourage and assist GVN procurement of additional aircraft for Air Vietnam. An increase in the GVN commercial airlift capability is necessary to take advantage of the military airfield system and improve priority passenger and cargo travel. This increase is no panacea for GVN failure to clear VC-interdicted LOCs; however, it is needed to assure the movement of priority cargo and enable GVN officials to conduct government business at the scene of the requirement -- on the ground in the provinces.

The GVN rail link running from Saigon along the coast to the 17th parallel has both economic and psychological significance. It constitutes a symbol of government control. However, the continued effort to operate this system through contested areas has proved nonproductive

in both an economic and a propaganda sense. Railroad sabotage in contested areas has reinforced the VC propaganda theme of de facto control over transportation in SVN. GVN should restrict railroad operations to secured areas; emphasis should be placed on the development of coastal shipping and ports until railroad security is achieved.

Socio-Economic Institutions

The development of socio-economic institutions is pertinent to both urban and rural growth. While most of these institutional elements are in existence or require immediate initiation, they are the basis for, or are themselves, components of long-range development. The requirements for action identified in this section are related to the fiscal, health, education, special interest (youth and women) and the government planning needs of SVN.

Fiscal. The Chinese dominate the commercial sector of SVN's economy. Historically, the Vietnamese and Khmer have been noncommercial and (from the seventeenth century forward) the Chinese have performed the prime business role in Cochinchina. Although the Vietnamese have recently made some efforts to reduce the commercial hold of the Chinese on the economy, they have been in the main unsuccessful. A pervasive feeling of mutual suspicio operates to the disadvantage of the Vietnamese in commerce. This mutual suspicion prevents the Vietnamese from developing private credit and commercial relationships which are competitive with those of the Chinese. To shift this commercial balance

requires a positive institutional approach to the problem. Some of the means of achieving this change are:

(1) Developing agricultural producer cooperatives that generate capital and give the farmer a stronger position with respect to the Chinese middleman.

(2) Improving banking and rural credit institutions that will give the farmer access to low interest funds (for seed, fertilizer and equipment) that compete with rates of the Chinese moneylender.

(3) Carrying out tax laws on the books that will give GVN access to Chinese funds.

(4) Improving commercial credit practices to encourage competitive transportation enterprises and light industry that will break up the Chinese importer-distributor-retailer relationship.

The nonenforcement of GVN tax laws applicable to real estate and other commercial activity is the rule rather than exception. Evasion of taxes is conducted as a matter of principal rather than expediency. An all-out effort to collect taxes from these sources would have as much psychological impact as financial thrust. If properly publicized, it would give credibility to GVN ability to govern.

GVN property tax rates and the average tax burden are extremely low; the problem is not so much that of generating new taxes or reducing tax rates on the books but rather one of administering and enforcing the tax laws equitably. In the short term, dramatic increases of luxury taxes would not be as significant as the initiation of an

effective effort to execute the laws in force in the urban areas, initially, and then follow this up throughout the countryside.

Like other developing countries, most of GVN tax revenue comes from indirect taxes. Both GVN and the VC conduct tax drives. However, the haphazard and indiscriminate collection (or noncollection) of taxes reflects most unfavorably on GVN. Government taxation techniques in contested or VC-controlled areas are very questionable. The tax collector, doing his business as part of a military operation in a rural area, adds fuel to the VC propaganda line: "First comes ARVN, followed by the tax collector and the landlord."

In the short term, the US must exert pressure on GVN to apply selectively the tax programs already on the books; this will drawdown on the urban income surpluses that are primarily war generated. In the mid and long term, the US must assist GVN in an overhaul of the total tax structure to include tax policy and organization for the administration of tax laws.

The lack of banking facilities has imposed a negative factor in the economic development of SVN. The inability to transfer funds, in combination with a credit system dominated by Chinese, has stunted financial activity and reduced investment in light industry. As a means of overcoming this block, GVN should encourage the development of private banking institutions in the provinces and organize a government-supported development bank to service capital requirements for light industry and farm modernization. As a method of furnishing the people

with a way of saving and sending money, the feasibility of reinforcing the GVN postal system to function as a rural banking facility should be explored.

In the short term, SVN foreign commerce is influenced by two factors: (1) the availability of US aid to cover the balance of payments deficit; and, (2) the fact that customs levies on imports account for a significant part of public revenues. Export assets are rice and rubber (the biggest money-makers); hogs, tea, copra, kapok, peanuts, fish and duck feathers are also exported in some volume. Rice and rubber continue to be shipped out of the country although GVN (at this time) is an official importer of rice, and the rubber plantation areas are dominated by the VC. The fact that rubber is now the principal export product of SVN with a demonstrated export capability in the world market (even under the exigencies of war) constitutes a significant plus factor in terms of development. However, to maintain this initiative in the export field, GVN must actively compete for foreign markets in the mid and long term. In the long term, continued emphasis must be placed on the export of rice, rubber and fish. In exchange, the products of heavy industry and raw materials to support light industry should be introduced. This balance would capitalize on the tremendous agricultural potential of SVN and would stimulate light industry diversification.

Public Health. In the short term, support or nonsupport of health activities should be tied to the security situation. The short-term

requirement to cut the VC off from medical support, plus the need to isolate the VC from the population, tends to conflict with US humanitarian leanings. From a public health standpoint, a harsh approach toward resources control means that the large segment of the rural population (living outside GVN-controlled areas) would receive minimal or no medical support.

As a further effort to demonstrate the rewards of remaining in GVN secured areas, dispensaries and maternities in contested or VC-controlled areas should be closed down selectively. Medical care is a prime need for the Vietnamese, and the indiscriminate allocation of medical supplies and treatment facilities to areas not under GVN control only improves the VC medical situation. The concurrent drying up of commercially distributed pharmaceuticals will further crimp VC access to supplies. At the same time, the feasibility of cutting off access of the population living in contested and VC-dominated areas, to provincial hospitals and maternity dispensaries, should be considered. Additionally, a hard look should be taken at the MEDCAP effort that currently is tied into military field operations. For ARVN and the US to dispense medical supplies in large quantities to contested or VC-controlled areas only provisions the VC medical back-up.

RVNAF has taken 60 percent of the country's doctors, and only a few more than 250 Vietnamese doctors remain to take care of the entire nonmilitary population. Those who remain in the provincial hospitals must be administrators, general practitioners and surgeons due to lack

of management skills in the health organization. As a result, the GVN health system is no symbol of progress. US and Free World medical support to SVN hospitals has constituted one temporary means of filling some of this professional medical gap. As a side benefit, the human interest in the US-FW medical team roles in the provinces has been of excellent propaganda value.

However, it is the day-to-day training, management and logistical support of the inept GVN health organization that requires the US focus. To meet the logistics needs of this medical system, a combined US-GVN supply organization has been established. Due to poor GVN performance, however, the US must continue, when necessary (as in the past), to go it alone to get the job done.

Throughout the mid and long-range periods, a preventive medicine program should be emphasized. Preventive medicine, tied in with health education and efforts to improve potable water systems and sewage disposal, is basic to any extensive health program in SVN. Many of the nonwar-caused hospital admissions can be traced to poor sanitation. The prime need is not so much for sophisticated hospitals as it is for an active preventive medicine program among the population.

Concurrent with the preventive medicine effort, the GVN medical education capability for training doctors, supporting technicians and field workers should be expanded. In addition, the rural dispensary program and provincial hospital system should be brought to a level that will assure at least minimal support to the population.

Education. The US-GVN must: (1) continue the elementary school program; (2) expand support to provincial high schools; (3) increase vocational schools; (4) review teaching practices and classroom performance; (5) assure that the maximum constructive benefit is obtained from printed instructional materials; (6) encourage an increase in technician output from universities; and, (7) take a positive interest in student youth movements. In addition, and most significant, the US should not support the continuance of GVN schools in VC-dominated areas.

The literacy rate in SVN is estimated at a little over 30 percent; yet, an education for his children is one of the primary aspirations of the rural Vietnamese. To meet this need, the elementary school enrollment has been increased from 600,000 in 1955 to over 1,500,000 in 1964; however, there still are an estimated 1,000,000 children in SVN without a place to go to school. An even more limiting factor is the difficulty of proceeding beyond primary school level in the system. Fewer than 17 percent of the primary school graduates can continue their public schooling for want of facilities and teachers.

In the past, the US support to education in SVN has demonstrated little or no relationship to the stabilization problem; it has reflected an almost studied effort to disassociate itself from political partisanship. The hamlet school program, limited to the elementary level, was the only USOM education program identified as being a part of the counterinsurgency effort.

Education in SVN cannot remain apolitical. As a vehicle for social change and political communication, education plays a role in both

stabilization and nation building activities. It is in the education field that an effective US-GVN effort can have immediate impact on the commitment of SVN youth. It is recognized that unsubtle "sledgehammer" propaganda in the guise of educational output can destroy the credibility of education as a rational institution. However, to leave the GVN program in its current apolitical limbo abandons youth to the VC communicator.

The need for secondary schools in province, district towns and large villages is self-evident if we desire to demonstrate concern for rural youth who form the recruiting base for the VC. However, little US interest has been directed toward the provincial high school system, and the GVN approach to the needs of these high schools has been one of only partial performance. In contrast to this poorly supported system that is run directly out of Saigon, the primary school organization has a provincial supervisory staff and US programed commodity support as well as operational interest. Saigon supervision of provincial high schools must be bolstered, and the USOM education staff must include them as an area of field activity. The provincial high school program deserves more attention than it is getting now. The US-GVN effort cannot afford to let this dynamic group of rural youth drift in a school system that is ill supported and poorly manned. As soon as possible, the US should galvanize this important element of human resource potential by on-the-ground provincial advisory action and programing from the top.

Concurrent with the development of provincial high schools, GVN should expand on its limited national high school scholarship program (initiated by the Ky government). This program, if credibly executed and given publicity, could be a means of exciting interest and hope for a high school education.

Rural trade and agricultural schools are another education element that needs further expansion and requires a high level of demonstrated interest on the part of the US. These schools, like the secondary schools, have a direct impact on rural youth at a critical time in their development.

Teacher education, as well as the preparation and distribution of instructional materials, needs the benefit of close US support. The RVNAF draft has virtually eliminated the input of men into the teaching effort. The recruitment of women must be pushed to fill this gap. The teacher training and instructional materials program needs evaluation to assure that the dynamic and positive aspects of GVN's role as an agent for progress stands out in the teaching thrust.

Cutting off educational resources from contested and VC-dominated areas is essential to a program of vivid differentiation between those who are for the GVN and those who are not (to include fence sitters). The withdrawal of school teachers from contested areas will, in the short term, damage the overall elementary education program and admittedly abandon the school age population in these areas to the VC. However, as it is at present, the teacher that survives in a contested area is no positive spokesman for GVN.

The strong beginnings of a Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) movement is a factor of potential importance in the development of an action-oriented society in SVN. US-GVN officials should make a positive effort to support these organizations. The deep concern for the education of their children and poor GVN support of schools have been the main stimulants of PTAs. In spite of US-GVN support failure, embryonic associations are developing. They offer a creative social action vehicle that commits segments of the adult population to the government. PTAs are a truly "grass roots" nature. If properly nurtured through US concern and possible US people-to-people interest, they can be a catalyst for expanded citizen associations.

The US should exploit to the maximum its access to key opinion groups through the English language training program. When effectively conducted, English language training has proved to be extremely successful in SVN. The Vietnamese-American Association (VAA), or equivalent groups, should be encouraged in the provinces, and part-time US instructors as well as texts should be made more accessible. The US must capitalize on this evident desire to learn English from a practical standpoint; it increases the number of Vietnamese who can communicate with Americans. The program offers an excellent channel for US influence with key opinion groups, as it is a pragmatic form of face-to-face communication.

A well-executed adult education program gives GVN direct contact with a population segment that desires to improve itself and must use

a GVN agency to accomplish this goal. As a result, this audience provides an open target for the demonstration of effective GVN presence. However, to date, no concerted effort has been devoted to adult education and for the most part it remains an afterthought with GVN. An adult night school program is one means of teaching desired skills and achieving appropriate propaganda side effects. The "on the job training" approach, in which US contractors and US military units could train workers, offers a further means of skill development with a psychological operations bonus.

Today, the university system is a highly volatile political organism that, because of its unbalanced curriculum enrollment fails to meet the needs of a developing society. In the short and long term, the US must encourage the GVN to increase the technical specialist training capabilities of the universities. In addition, the introduction of US-sponsored teachers to the GVN university system -- coupled with the establishment of highly selective scholarships for advanced schooling in the US -- could be of value in the reorientation of higher education. In the main, the US should support university training of deserving students in South Vietnam rather than in the US.

Youth. SVN youth -- high school and university students -- have the capability to organize for and conduct political activities that can be both a propaganda and physical challenge to GVN. However, these youths, although antagonistic toward the present GVN, are not going to opt for the VC. They are against the government, but they realize that

GVN today offers them a better future than they would find as members of a disciplined communist order. The student, though recalcitrant, knows that he is in school as the result of the financial gains his family has achieved in a money-oriented society. VN youth groups, like the "out" politicians in Saigon, tend to be nonconstructive and petty in their perspective and behavior. However, their vociferousness, combined with school sanctuaries as operating bases in Saigon and Hue, makes them an element that must be considered in the political matrix of SVN.

The US side-stepped GVN in a direct approach to the organized youth movement in 1965. A US-funded "Summer Youth Program," as an effort to get students to take part in group work projects in the provinces, was planned and executed with some success. Although generally constructive, this unilateral US approach to the students has been plagued with politics, backbiting, inept student management and organizational anarchy.

In the main, the Saigon-Hue youth in their field activities have little impact on the rural population. Youth programs are generators of self-esteem for the participants and tend to work out pent-up student energy by deployment to the provinces and in this connection, the program serves a purpose. Urban youth should not be expected to act as the dynamic catalyst for GVN in the countryside; however, it is of value for the US to continue input into the student field effort. A low-keyed program, that will be attractive to the suspicious, sensitive and

basically antigovernment urban youth, should continue to constitute a valuable secondary thrust during the short term. Concurrently, the US should encourage some mode of accommodation between GVN and the student organizations. A means of avoiding an official US approach to VN youth would involve the use of US students. Selective American student participation should be a part of a joint US-GVN effort. These young Americans could help bridge the student-government gap. US students could be recruited on the same pattern as the successful USOM Provincial Operations Summer Intern Program of 1965. The students would be sponsored ostensibly by American student groups and the private aspect of their participation would be stressed.

An area that deserves closer US interest is GVN Youth Ministry activity in the provinces. This unilateral GVN program has an excellent potential for good; its target, the rural youth, is a prime objective for VC exploitation. In its present status, the rural youth project reflects gross mismanagement and a program that is, for the most part, limited to volleyball and pingpong in nearly empty buildings. With no formal US interest in the activity and weak administrative and logistical support from Saigon, this effort has defaulted. Boys raised in the boredom of the countryside are easily attracted to any action program. As GVN fails to fill this void, the VC have the field to themselves. To counter this gap, the US should encourage the expansion of the role of GVN Ministry of Youth and Sports at provincial level and provide US advisory support to it..

Women's Affairs. The US should encourage GVN to get maximum use from the female labor pool without encouraging the development of a militant women's organization. The participation of women in such general organizations as the "4-T," PTA and cooperatives should be encouraged as a means of involving this key element.

War exigencies have hurried the women of SVN into public life and into externalized social action. The VC have recognized the expanded impact of the women's role and have organized formal groupings of them for social action in support of the insurgency. This social action has been reflected in everything from mass protest demonstrations against US-GVN bombings to the individual purchase of drugs for the VC in a GVN-controlled village market. In contrast, GVN has made little studied effort to capitalize on woman power. Since the tragi-comic attempt to organize women under the aegis of Madam Nhu was aborted, the GVN has refused to go out of its way to activate a formal women's affairs program of any consequence. Only the GVN Agriculture Extension Service, working with farm women, has developed a small program stressing home improvement and child care.

GVN has been backed into the use of women in government as a result of the military drawdown on manpower. In the education field, when they have been given training for the job, women have filled the emergency requirement for rural elementary school teachers in a most excellent manner. To fill the draft-riddled staffs at province and district levels, GVN has been forced to use women in more than a clerical role.

In the Social Welfare and Agriculture Ministries, women have been used for field activities. In rural health, women play an important role in running the GVN village maternity system. In fact, there has been a dramatic increase in the impact of women in all government agencies throughout SVN; this pattern should be encouraged by the US support effort.

Government Planning. The US should urge the GVN to organize a socio-economic planning staff that can initiate proposals for mid and long-term development. This planning group, working within the context of the multination Mekong Basin development effort and SVN regional variants, could act as a planning catalyst for the country. A long-term planning group would tend toward objectivity and lend dignity and backstop authority to the publicized socio-economic proposals of GVN leadership. In developing a long-term thrust for the nation, the planning group should be encouraged to draw on the expertise of the US and UN, together with the planning talent of Free World countries. US technical personnel, from both the private and public sectors, should be projected for the group on an extended contract basis. Approaching SVN's long-term development and regional problems from a constructive economic standpoint may (in the long run) override the political nihilism that has plagued regional cooperation efforts in SEA.

Mid and Long-Term Projections

Projected US socio-economic objectives in SVN, over the mid and long term, focus on the nation building elements of development. In the

mid term, the US objective should be the development of a viable economic infrastructure oriented toward expansion. The long-term objective is a diversified and maturing economy, oriented toward international trade and based on the nation's comparative advantage in agriculture.

Today, the initial foundations for economic growth are already under way in a war crucible. In the mid term, wartime destruction and economic distortion will require the rebuilding and rechanneling of socio-economic activity concurrent with the initiation of new development programs. This will require a reorientation that will cause some predictable disruption as the shift is made from war emergency to peace in the mid term.

In the mid and long term, exploitation of SVN's agricultural comparative advantage should continue. Exports should be accelerated. Diversification of agriculture should be extended. The light industry sector of the economy needs further development. The expansion of SVN's education system should continue with emphasis on the secondary and technical schools. The universities should continue their reorientation to meet SVN's needs for scientific and technical skills. The health and welfare requirements of the rural and urban population must be identified and met. SVN should expand its participation in such regional development efforts as: banking, trade and exploitation of the Mekong Basin.

Conclusions

(1) Development in SVN, in the short term, is contingent on the success of security operations.

(2) The US must establish a system for direct US planning and resources and funding participation with GVN at central, regional and province levels to assure a coordinated development thrust.

(3) The US-GVN organization and procedures for the conduct of Rural Construction should be geared to reflect the need for project and funding flexibility at the action level -- province.

(4) Inflation remains the top short-range economic challenge to GVN stability.

(5) The US must continue a large-scale import program to keep the SVN economy solvent.

(6) US-GVN, as a foremost priority, should exploit those areas in which the security environment permits the most effective application of both short and long-term programs.

(7) The short-term priority for socio-economic support should go to the Saigon area and the Bassac-Mekong axes.

(8) In the short term, assistance must be related to GVN presence. There must be a direct demonstrable contrast between the better life under GVN and the hard life with the VC.

(9) Development assistance must be selectively denied to contested and VC-controlled areas.


(10) In the mid and long term, a light industrial sector, centered on Saigon, is required; agricultural production emphasis should center on development of the untapped rice lands in the Delta.

(11) SVN, in the long term, has resources to feed its population

and agricultural surpluses for export to meet its needs for foreign exchange. This productive balance must be encouraged.


(12) For a summary of actions to achieve socio-economic growth, see Figure 4-6.

AN ACTION PATTERN FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT --



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
CIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- SVN 1966 - 1986



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Socio - Economic Growth Thrust



Notes

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2. United Nations. "Toward the Economic Development of RVN: Report of the Economic Survey Mission to RVN." New York, 1959. A study accomplished early in the Diem era recommends that the main developmental focus be on Delta agriculture.

3. USOM Saigon. "Economic Policy," 23 December 1965, TOAID A-1733. Cable considers economic situation "critical but manageable" and states major reason it can be kept under control is the "massive availability of outside resources." USOM Saigon. "Regional Directors' Monthly Reports, November 1965," 20 December 1965, TOAID A-1681. Summary reports of regional socio-economic situation in SVN.

4. HQ USMACV. "RVNAF Counterinsurgency Roles and Missions," 4 February 1965. This document includes translations of GVN papers on rural construction concepts and procedures. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "Joint GVN National Security Council - U.S. Mission Council Meeting," 7 September 1965, A-165. Airgram describes GVN concept for national development that includes efforts in the following areas: internal defense and security, improvement of social services, establishment of political institutions and improvement of the administrative system

Saigon Post, Sunday Supplement. "100 Days in Office, a Report by Prime Minister Ky," 3 October 1965. Ky spells out GVN thrust in socio-economic area. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "Joint GVN-US Meeting," 6 November 1965, DA IN 153403. Cable identifies concept of Rural Construction Councils, role of cadres and province priorities for Rural Construction. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "Joint GVN-US Meeting, 10 December 1965," 11 December 1965, DA IN 195834. Cable describes concept of GVN rural construction as three-phased, military clearing, pacification and development. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "Ky's 200 Days," 17 January 1966, No. 2565. Contains translation of Ky's "200 Days Speech." GVN PM breaks out program for GVN into three main requirements, security, economic and political development.

5. HQ MACV. "Concept for Military Civic Action and Military Civil Affairs in the Republic of Vietnam," 26 October 1965. This document describes the MACV, CA concepts and spells out the primary responsibility of USOM for advising, assisting and supporting GVN nonmilitary governmental organs in the civil affairs area. HQ MACV. "MACV Position Regarding GVN Memorandum on Pacification," August 1965. In memorandum to Ambassador Lodge, MACV points out that failure of GVN pacification efforts have been primarily due to poor execution resulting from government instability plus the incapacity or unwillingness to carry out policies.

6. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "Diversions to VC," 8 November 1965, DA IN 154796. Message states that deliberate diversion by GVN or SVN businessmen is relatively small proportion of VC support. VC live off of total SVN economy.

7. U.S. Department of State, AID. "Report Issued on VN Refugees," Washington, D. C., 13 November 1965. Discusses the "asset" aspect of the refugee problem and the possible role of voluntary agencies.

8. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "Viet-Nam Rice Developments Report, No. 65-1," 6 December 1965, A-348. Summarizes rice stocks and deliveries, pricing and import prospects.

9. U.S. Embassy Saigon. "AID Administrator Bell's Statement," 4 January 1966, DA IN 222242. Mr. Bell spells out thrust of USOM program in SVN. Rural Construction will be supported with intense efforts in priority areas. USOM regional staffs will be increased for this program. Bell points out that industrialization does not have a high priority.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL SECURITY AND RURAL CONSTRUCTION

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CHAPTER V—SUMMARY

Today in SVN, security constitutes a precondition for progress in both Rural Construction and nation building. Obstacles to the achievement of national security are identified, and the specific actions required to overcome them are set forth.

PROVN establishes that two distinct, but interrelated, major efforts must be mounted with sufficient US-GVN force and emphasis to stem and reverse the Viet Cong effort. The first of these falls mainly to the US and other Free World forces: defeating the North Vietnamese Army and Main Force VC in SVN, curtailing significant infiltration and demolishing the war zones. The second falls mainly to the GVN armed forces: expanding the allied base in SVN, securing the population and isolating, as well as defeating, VC guerrillas and the Communist political infrastructure through vigorous pursuit of the Rural Construction Program.

PROVN recommends that the Allies selectively apply their assets to these efforts to ensure success. Suggested organizations and methods of operation are covered in detail. The significance of amnesty, force support activities and certain contingencies is stressed. Unity of command and of effort are essential. PROVN recommends that such unity be attained at province level and in the persons of the Province Chief and his Senior US Representative counterpart. These officials must control all US and GVN assets committed at that level.

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL SECURITY AND RURAL CONSTRUCTION

Introduction

Major Short-Range Action Recommendations. The creation of a secure environment in SVN is absolutely requisite to the success of any program. Specifically, PROVN recommends that the Allies accomplish the following actions now to sustain ultimate attainment of the basic US objective:

- Curtail significant infiltration.
- Defeat the PAVN-Main Force VC; destroy their war zones and safe havens.
- Adopt selective warfare as a principle of war in SVN.
- Pursue a vigorous Rural Construction (RC) program emphasizing essential areas and accompanied by aggressive military operations and amnesty.

The Short-Range Objective to be Achieved. Defeat of PAVN and Main Force VC units and the reduction of VC guerrillas and political infrastructure among the population.

Summary Assessment. After six years of continuous hostilities, and despite 1965's commitment of substantial US-FWMAF to overt combat, victory over the VC still eludes the GVN. The enemy's escalation of

the conflict on land where it counts has been more effective than that of the Allies, and inadequate measures have been applied to counter this escalation. Spasmodic GVN response to the various problems posed by this form of warfare has resulted in an unhealthy proliferation of units and organizations that are insufficiently supervised and coordinated; all too often, they operate in competition with each other.

The basic responsibility of any government is to provide for the physical security of its people. The very inability of GVN to meet this obligation throughout well over three-fourths of its land area reinforces its discredit in the eyes of all South Vietnamese. Thus, the need persists to pursue a systematic course of action whereby the internal and, ultimately, national security of SVN can be sustained.

The Enemy

In devising concepts, operational techniques and doctrine for the prosecution of war, a prime consideration is the enemy -- his strategy, tactics and attitudes. The last two decades of war in Vietnam and the lessons of the Malayan conflict highlight the necessity for organizational excellence, material resources and numerical superiority. Possessing these does not guarantee success. Available assets must be applied efficiently and selectively. In addition to defeating the enemy's military force, the people must be won and secured. The enemy's political infrastructure must be eliminated.

Current VC plans call for the attainment of strategic mobility. Since the Communists do not employ modern vehicular equipment to match friendly forces' tactical mobility, they attempt to create forces in several areas to achieve local numerical superiority. Through progressive development of guerrilla elements, then Main Force units, and more recently the introduction of PAVN personnel and units, the Communists have been attempting to amass enough maneuver battalions and larger units in widely separated areas to pose serious threats to major friendly formations. The enemy apparently hopes that achievement of this objective will tie down Allied forces to static defensive roles, permitting VC and PAVN elements to destroy selected targets at times and places of their choosing. Use of maneuver battalions to gain these ends is an expansion of tactics employed successfully -- although on a much smaller scale -- by VC territorial and lower echelon forces from 1961-64. Such a doctrine is logical and sound, as it facilitates exploitation of a major communist capability -- achieving deception and mass through violent surprise assaults.

Communist doctrine also calls for the establishment and defense of war zones, base areas and safe havens. Much time and effort are devoted to the organization and defense of base areas, including the construction of combat villages. Major engagements have occurred when Allied troops have penetrated VC base areas and infiltration centers; the underlying structure of the overall communist effort has been threatened. In some instances, the communist defenders fought only un-

til they could disengage; in other cases, they elected to stand and fight, probably because of the possibility of inflicting heavy casualties on Allied units and thereby gaining military success as well as psychological and political advantage.

As the Allies attempt to profit from mistakes of the French, the Communists surely are trying to learn from their errors in both wars. A particular case in point was General Vo Nguyen Giap's premature committment of his forces to conventional combat in 1951. After the French inflicted many losses, Giap returned to the mountains to pursue a slower war. Nevertheless, the gradual progression from small to larger combat forces continued; French Union Forces were defeated in even larger battles; the doctrine of "liberation warfare" was vindicated.

Communist tactics have not changed since 1960. What has changed is the intensity of their attacks and increased use of terrorism, propaganda and sabotage. Factors which have contributed to the acceleration of communist operations are: a larger force density, more allied initiatives and communist sensitivity to intrusions into their base areas. Also, the Communists need a victory.

The enemy must be considered in his three major configurations: the PAVN and Main force, local forces as well as guerrillas and cadre. Operations of the PAVN-Main Force are more conventional than that of guerrillas. They seek to dominate an area, place Allied forces on the defensive, gain control of the population and finally to defeat Allied

formations. Their tactics must make allowance for Allied air and artillery supremacy and mechanical mobility differential. When they are unable to make this allowance, they suffer resounding defeats. The PAVN and Main Force units have learned to live with other disadvantages: austere logistics, difficult communications and lack of artillery. The enemy prefers to mass sufficient force to conclude an engagement successfully before Allied reaction turns victory into defeat. This is done by dispersing immediately after an attack and concentrating again at rallying points. Other techniques include night attacks and superior use of camouflage, cover and concealment.

PAVN and Main Force units, should they be defeated or become convinced that they will be defeated in mobile warfare, have the option of assuming a guerrilla configuration. The VC do well at this. The nature of guerrilla warfare tends to negate mechanical and firepower advantages. The guerrilla operates in small dispersed elements -- massing only when he calculates that there is a good chance of success, dispersing again after operations have been carried out. He has the advantage of superior knowledge of the terrain. Best of all, he has the initiative. He works and moves at night and is at home in this milieu. As guerrillas, the VC can attempt to deny use of surface LOCs and continue to terrorize the SVN population. By means of carefully planned and rehearsed raids and ambushes, the VC can inflict serious casualties on friendly troops. The VC are relatively self-sustaining; so far they have obtained most of their support locally -- by donations, purchases, taxation and theft. The guerrillas have adapted to their environment and to countertactics

employed against them while following the principles outlined.

VC attack tactics are characterized by deliberate planning and rehearsals, rapid movement, violent execution and a quick well-disciplined withdrawal. A successful withdrawal to avoid encirclement is regarded as a victory.

Enemy Vulnerabilities. Despite the overall excellence of VC tactical performance, definite exploitable vulnerabilities accrue to the enemy: (1) Inflexibility. Because of scarcity of command and control means, enemy commanders have come to rely heavily on extremely detailed plans and well-rehearsed execution. It is difficult for them to react in order to prevent disaster or to exploit an unexpected opportunity. (2) Protracted dispersal. Dispersed elements lack strength for offensive initiatives, suffer from lack of information and guidance, and may run out of food and medical supplies. Once dispersed, the VC seek to reassemble. At this time, they are in their most vulnerable attitude. (3) Continuous movement. VC elements forced into continuous movement to avoid Allied air and ground action are reduced in morale and combat effectiveness due to fatigue and logistical difficulties. Many VC defectors have cited this as the cause of their defections. (4) Austere logistical support. It is doubtful that many VC actually suffer from hunger; but, they are plagued by poor medical evacuation and treatment, lack of essential medicines and salt, as well as shortages of weapons, spare parts and ammunition. (5) Lack of heavy firepower.

Interdiction of Infiltration

The Allies must commit sufficient assets and forces now to the

progressive curtailment of significant infiltration into SVN from external areas. The infiltration rate must be reduced to less than the attrition rate to which the PAVN-Main Force VC are being subjected within SVN.

Current Situation. Sophisticated surface LOCs have been developed by the enemy in the Laotian Panhandle.1:39/ These LOCs now provide weapons, ammunition and personnel replacements for a two-corps equivalent force. This force is reported to be increasing at the rate of one regiment per month. Air interdiction programs have not produced sufficiently significant results. Current intelligence estimates state that the VC plan to begin the general counteroffensive in July of 1967 with division-level operations in the highlands and coastal provinces. The aim is to gain control of the people, destroy the economy and inflict maximum losses on Allied forces.

The VC goals are totally dependent on their ability to continue this massive infiltration into SVN with little interference. Interdiction of external VC support must be recognized as one of the most important immediate tasks of the current war. So long as the VC continue to receive substantial external support, the Allied task will be enormously magnified.

Infiltration by Sea, River and Canal. Massive infiltration by sea has been well curtailed up to the littoral by MARKET TIME forces. These forces are increasing rapidly in strength and sophistication. The problem remaining is to intercept shallow water coastwise movements, especially on the littoral of the Gulf of Siam. These cannot be effectively stopped by MARKET TIME forces at this time. Sampans

which draw a few inches of water cannot be stopped by patrol craft and junks. When our patrol vessels approach a hostile shore line within small arms range, they can be subjected to heavy fire without being able to counter it adequately. The mangrove-clad west coast of the Delta area is mainly in enemy hands.

Overland Infiltration. Most of the significant infiltration of SVN now is by land, either across the DMZ or via the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos. To either survey and identify or to clear and deny the border has been dismissed as impossible.

Current GVN directives relegate the border surveillance and security mission to corps commanders. Corps commanders control Special Force-CIDG elements who have the missions of border surveillance and control (III and IV CTZ only) and operations against interior movement routes, as well as operations against VC war zones and bases. These forces are not equal to the task. Other covert programs, controlled and directed at the Saigon level, may have some success, but also will fall short of seriously interfering with overland infiltration.

The nature of terrain in the Laotian Panhandle tends to defeat aerial interdiction programs, particularly when there is no ground control and direction of the strikes.

Action Required

General. Interdiction of major infiltration falls mainly to US forces in SVN. The US must undertake a spectrum of actions of rising intensity in order to curtail infiltration to the requisite degree.

Some of the actions recommended below entail territorial violations, but the situation is sufficiently grave that technical and diplomatic considerations cannot be overriding.

Action Against Infiltration by Sea, River and Canal. VC control of the Delta coasts must be progressively reduced through expanded defoliation and small amphibious operations by Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) elements under control of Task Force 115, the US headquarters for MARKET TIME operations. USMC DAGGER THRUST operations must be conducted against coastal areas which come under VC control, wherever they may be.

The GVN must be convinced of the necessity of closing the Cambodian border. The rivers and inland waterways, including the Mekong international waterway, that provide ingress from Cambodia into III and IV CTZs must be blockaded and patrolled actively in order to prevent personnel and contraband from reaching VC forces in SVN. An immediate helpful step would be to assign the mission of border surveillance and control to the border province chiefs. If given the mission, they must also command the CIDG troops now assigned to border control, as well as any additional forces required.

MARKET TIME forces must be reinforced to provide the capability to quarantine Sihanoukville as required.

Action Against Overland Infiltration. Initially, and as a matter of top priority, the existing aerial interdiction programs must be reinforced by Allied ground action. The areas of the major entry points between Laos and SVN and across the DMZ are well known.

Substantial Allied air mobile and ground action, mounted from existing USA Special Forces bases and airstrips in I and II CTZs nearest the selected area of operations, must first operate against these entry areas within SVN. This, in connection with operations against in-country war zones which are closely connected with the infiltration routes, may suffice. If it does not, the Allies must expand such operations into the Laotian Panhandle, and possibly into Cambodia. As an initial external effort, Vietnamese, US or other FW Special Forces units should be committed. The Allied force should operate if possible in conjunction with Royal Lao Government troops in the area. A combined arms force with adequate and responsive air support is required to counter the PAVN-VC elements in the area. The combined force must destroy VC troops, logistical and transport means and damage LOCs to the point that repair would be time consuming. The duration of these operations should not be so long as to enable overwhelming enemy reaction. Air mobile operations can be staged from Kham Duc, Dak Pek, Dak To, Plei Me, Plei Mrong and Plei Djrong. Further escalatory possibilities include the long-term ground occupation of a strip across the Laotian Panhandle and the DMZ. This would require a substantial force, now estimated at six divisions.

Operations Against VC War Zones and Safe Havens

US-FWMAF and select ARVN units (Airborne, Rangers, Marines and designated Infantry units) must be committed in war zones and safe havens on a

long-term basis, in order to destroy enemy forces, supplies and logistical infrastructure therein, permanently impairing the utility of these facilities to the enemy.

Current Situation

In-Country. The five major war zones in SVN are of surprising sophistication, considering that they have been built by hand. They contain supplies, training facilities, arms manufacture and repair facilities, hospitals, and serve as rest areas. They are generally not easily accessible to the GVN, not highly populated and located so as to be on or near principal infiltration routes. The seat of the VC "shadow government" is believed to be in War Zone C. In addition to the five major war zones (Do Xa, War Zone C, War Zone D, Dong Thap Muoi, and U Minh), there are many additional lesser war zones and safe havens inside SVN that are essential to the VC. As more forces are committed by the enemy, his logistical problems multiply; as these problems increase, his bases become more critical.

Although the VC have displayed sensitivity to operations in the base areas, they still avoid major confrontations unless they believe a high assurance of success is possible. More often, they disperse and wait for the friendly unit to leave.

External Safe Havens. These exist in Cambodia and Laos as well as NVN. The Cambodians are not inclined, and the Laotians are unable, to cause the removal of these areas. These safe havens amount to assembly areas from which frequent impulses of fresh or rested enemy

troops enter SVN. Exhausted and temporarily defeated remnants are reconstituted and retrained in the safe havens. These, in combination with uninterrupted infiltration routes and LOCs, present a serious threat to the Allied cause.

Action Required

In-Country War Zones. Allied forces must operate on a long-term basis in these areas. There is little chance that the base area can be entered surreptitiously, especially when a heliborne operation is used for entry. Even an initial lack of secrecy can be overcome, however, by long-term occupation that is accompanied by continuous patrolling, searching and ambushing in such a way that the area of the war zone is completely covered. This activity must accompany selective defoliation and complete demolition of the base areas, so that their utility to the enemy is permanently removed. At the time a war zone or base area is to be entered, the routes out -- particularly those leading to populated areas -- should be heavily ambushed.

B52 air raids against the war zones are harmful to VC morale and effective against the base infrastructure, according to many VC defectors and PWs. These are a helpful supplement for ground occupation and should be continued on that basis.

Operations in the war zones could be facilitated considerably by the use of incapacitating chemical and biological weapons systems. Selected agents can be air-delivered before the initial entry of friendly forces. Use of these agents would: (1) hasten the favorable

conclusion of combat operations in SVN; (2) minimize casualties and loss of life among friendly and hostile forces, and among civilian noncombatants, thereby demonstrating and emphasizing humanitarian aspects of US international aims and goals; and, (3) minimize destruction of national resources to facilitate and reduce the costs of reconstruction and rehabilitation in postcombat operations.2/ The war zones and base areas increase in importance to the enemy in direct proportion to his force commitment. Effective operations against them are a crucial facet of the overall internal effort.

External Safe Havens. Support of PAVN-Main Force VC operations in SVN from safe havens in Laos and Cambodia must be terminated. In order to halt this external support from Laos (RLG), the US should seek permission from the RLG to conduct necessary operations in the Laotian Panhandle. Such permission might be obtained via a request from the RLG for assistance under the SEATO "umbrella" clause, or as an extension of the announced US-GVN policy of hot pursuit. In the case of Cambodia, after requesting RCG assistance in closing the border, safe havens could be neutralized by a prudent extension of the hot pursuit policy.

Operations Against the PAVN-Main Force VC

Allied forces must be committed against larger enemy formations, capitalizing on sophisticated intelligence means, superior firepower, mobility, control and responsiveness in order to destroy these forces.

Current Situation. While the Allies have registered a number of

impressive victories against these forces, they have not been decisive. The enemy has displayed a high order of recoverability from battle disaster. The 1st VC Regiment, for example, was defeated by the USMC at Van Thuong peninsula in August of 1965. It was operational again by October; in November, they seized the district town of Hiep Duc in Quang Tin Province.

Enemy spokesmen have publicly announced that their forces are quite capable of countering any weapon or tactic Allied forces choose to employ. They believe that the US will withdraw if faced with a moderate casualty rate. They scorn the Allies as having a noisy army, overburdened by equipment, and compare them to the French in this respect. The enemy plans to emphasize close fighting and hugging tactics to negate Allied materiel and firepower superiority. Their aim is to "kill US" in order to bring about a precipitate withdrawal.3/

Action Required. Although US-FWMAF will come to bear the brunt of the action against PAVN and the Main Force, certain ARVN units can make a significant contribution also. As a minimum, Airborne, Ranger and Marine battalions must participate in combined operations with US and Free World units. Some present equipment is inappropriate. Weapons or equipment that are not easily man portable in an infantry formation are not likely to justify their presence in SVN. Such weapons as 4.2" mortars, Entacs and 106mm recoilless rifles must sit out the war in storage or in defense of base areas. Some of the lighter crew-served weapons of the past need to be resurrected -- especially the

hand-held 60mm mortar and the 57mm recoiless rifle.

Tactics and operational techniques used against the enemy in his more conventional configuration can continue to center around the "find, fix, destroy" formula. Certain outstanding lessons learned, however, must be digested and practiced by US and other FW units before deployment. This could curtail tragic ambushes and other small disasters that continue to dog new units until they have "smartened up." Tactical brilliance alone cannot defeat the enemy. Thoroughness, patience and endurance -- combined with overwhelming well-coordinated fire support when a well-defined target has been established -- can produce local victory.

Beaten remnants must be hounded mercilessly to complete a successful engagement. Remembering the enemy's dispersal to avoid destruction, pursuing units also must disperse while staying oriented on the enemy. They must find the VC rallying points and defeat the enemy as he attempts to regroup. If the initial pursuit force is unable to continue due to casualties or fatigue, fresh units must be committed to continue the pursuit.

Heliborne operations to position forces around a fixed enemy or across his route of withdrawal can be decisive. They should be accompanied by all possible deceptive measures. Helicopter use for surveillance, fire support, evacuation and resupply magnifies friendly capabilities.

Friendly air, naval gunfire and artillery support are of a magnitude and violence unprecedented in this type of war. Responsiveness

of this supporting fire is good but it must improve. The enemy must understand that any stand-up, slug-out fight can have but one end for them -- defeat.

It is mandatory that the Allies make no blunders in this aspect of the war. The importance of defeating the enemy in his semiconventional configuration is unquestioned, but it must not command attention and resources to the point that the even more vital Rural Construction (RC) effort is neglected.

Methods. US-FW ground forces are using two different approaches in accomplishing assigned tasks. One is the USMC enclave system which places a high density of forces in a relatively small area backed by the sea. The obvious security, logistical and communication advantages accruing to this approach are offset by the minimum impact of the Marines outside their enclaves. To enlarge the current enclaves to a point where the populated lowlands and piedmont of I CTZ can be controlled will require more Marines than the corps possesses.

The Army method is to launch from relatively smaller inland bases long-range, large-scale offensive operations against the PAVN-Main Force VC and their base areas. Army operations are of varying duration with maximum emphasis on firepower, air power and mechanical mobility superiority. They have registered the greater military success; this type of operation, further, tends to keep US-FW forces out of competition with the Vietnamese in pacification activities.

Selective Warfare

Selective warfare must be adopted as a cardinal principle in order to avoid alienation of the population through unwise application of military force and troop misconduct.

Current Situation. It has been said that "gadgetry, air power, and artillery continue to be substituted for the discriminate ground actions which are required to prosecute this war without alienating the civilian population."4:2/ There is no question that a significant number of noncombatants have been killed and maimed; their houses, livestock and crops have been destroyed. The two greatest offenders are unobserved artillery fire in populated areas and aircraft strikes on hamlets when pilots receive fire from their vicinity. The population is bound to be alienated.

Another aspect of selective warfare is the conduct of friendly forces in contact with the local population. For the past three years, US advisors have reported ARVN behavior ranging from casual ill treatment of local people to downright brutality -- openly condoned and sometimes encouraged and participated in by the officers. (See: ANNEX G) Confiscation or theft of private property -- livestock, rice and quarters -- at the expense of people cannot win popular allegiance to GVN. ARVN and US speeding through towns where most traffic is pedestrian also has alienated the people.

Action Required. Certain simple rules must be rigidly enforced. Many of these have been promulgated by COMUSMACV. GVN must also insist

on the following as a minimum: (1) No unobserved artillery fire in populated areas. (2) No fighter-bomber strikes in populated areas unless they are in support of a friendly unit in contact. (3) "Scorched earth" measures are appropriate for VC base areas and war zones, but must not be taken in contested areas. (4) Troop conduct is a command responsibility; there must be no misconduct toward noncombatants. (5) Excessive speed must be avoided, especially on roads and in towns where there are many pedestrians. (6) GVN troops must not be used as tax collectors.

The enforcement of these basic rules is so vital to the war effort that it must be a matter for the US Ambassador to take up with the GVN Prime Minister if violations persist. Senior US Representatives (SUSREPs) must apply all possible influence, persuasion and leverage toward the enforcement of the principle of selective warfare.

Amnesty

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program must be improved in organization and resources. Above all, a realistic amnesty provision must be established in order to provide enemy soldiers, guerrillas, cadres and those living under VC domination with a credible avenue of escape from communist control. These individuals must not only be integrated into the current struggle on GVN's side now, but they must also be reintegrated into the social fabric of SVN in order to provide leadership, talent and manpower for long-term development.

Current Situation. The Chieu Hoi program has significant political and military value. The weakness of the current program lies in two major areas: (1) it does not provide for amnesty; and, (2) execution is poor.

A local GVN official decides whether or not an individual qualifies as a Chieu Hoi returnee (Quy Chanh) or as a PW. His decision may or may not be in the best interest of the GVN. An effective VC probably would be denied amnesty because of his past record. The deficiencies of the Chieu Hoi program include: (1) lack of adequate direction at the national level; (2) inadequate US advisory support (in August of 1965 there was one full time USOM advisor); (3) lack of qualified GVN personnel; (4) lack of coordination between Chieu Hoi officials and other GVN agencies; and, (5) unsound organization for program execution. Neither the US nor GVN has placed sufficient emphasis and resources behind this program. It is doubtful that the GVN considers the program worthwhile, since it has a history of US sponsorship.

The VC have a significant fraction of the available leadership talent in the country. The allegiance to GVN of this element is critical to the achievement of our long-range objectives. Psychological operations and the Chieu Hoi program offer the best opportunity to bring them over to the GVN side.

Action Required. The deficiencies of the Chieu Hoi program require immediate correction. The most urgent requirements are: (1) a

firm, well-publicized amnesty provision; and, (2) a demonstrable effort to retrain and resituate returnees in the most advantageous way possible -- both for the GVN and the returnees. Improvement and alteration of the Chieu Hoi program will require considerable unilateral US effort and application of leverage. An initial step must be to dignify the program by elevating it to ministerial level in the GVN.

Rural Construction -- A Concept of Operation

Rural Construction (RC) must be the major US-GVN effort. It must be supported by a preponderance of RVNAF and GVN paramilitary forces, together with adequate US support, coordination and assistance. Unity of command and effort must be achieved at province level. RC is the principal means available to broaden the Allied base, provide security, develop political and military leadership and provide necessary social reform to the Vietnamese people.

Current Situation. Pacification in SVN has proceeded in fits and starts since 1959 under diverse labels. Changes of government have interrupted the program in the field; both ground and people gradually have been lost. Systematic guidance on pacification by the GVN is set forth in RVNAF JGS Directive AB140 and Joint RVNAF/MACV Campaign Plan AB141. These documents are replete with all the appropriate words and charts. This campaign will be no more successful than its predecessors unless the population and the government are actually knit together at the lowest level; moreover, the highest level of the GVN must be fully and continuously committed and involved in this

task. American preoccupation with the US-FWMAF efforts against the PAVN and Main Force VC units has resulted in neglect of the supervision and support of the territorial advisors. These US advisors at sector (province) and subsector (district) are most knowledgeable and concerned with RC. Among them are the true American "experts" on pacification.

Division and corps commanders, from time to time, have withdrawn ARVN units supporting RC in given areas. Whatever the reason for the redeployment, the consequences to the people in the uncovered area invariably have been grave. People who have been provided security by ARVN and who have later cooperated with GVN -- believing the security was permanent -- have suffered heavily when abandoned to VC reprisal. In some areas, such as the Phuoc Chau Valley in Quang Tin Province, this has happened more than once. A successful pacification effort there will now be immeasurably more difficult.5/

In many areas, ARVN forces assigned to support RC have been ineffective due to inaction. The inaction results from more than poor leadership and inertia of unit commanders; confused, makeshift command arrangements and unrealistic constraints imposed by higher headquarters also are involved.

Action Required

A Strategy for RC -- Where Do We Start? Areawise, PROVN recommends that the effort be made in the following priority: (1) the densely populated area around Saigon (Hop Tac area); (2) An Giang,

Vinh Long, Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces in IV CTZ; (3) Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Tuyen Duc Provinces of II CTZ; and, (4) the coastal plains of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces of I CTZ. This listed priority deviates from RVNAF JGS Directive AB140 which establishes equal emphasis for all four areas.

Selection of the rich and highly populated areas listed in priorities (1) and (2) above is a reasonable approach. The coastal lowland areas in priorities (3) and (4) are also relatively rich and densely populated; added importance attaches to them because of the presence of US-FWMAF units and installations. The designation of these priority areas, however, must not imply that the RC effort elsewhere is static. The map (See: Figure 4-3) depicts the areas of greatest population density in SVN. The people are the true objective of all US-GVN efforts, and vigorous RC must be pursued in all areas of high population density in the short-range p· ·od. The "war of accommodation" that now exists in the Delta must be terminated, if necessary, by redeployment of US-FW forces to the area. PROVN does not agree with the assessment (See: ANNEX E, page E-18) which states "in the Mekong Delta, the Vietnamese now seem able to handle the military situation by themselves (i.e., without US troops)."

The RVNAF, police and paramilitary forces <u>now have the potential to secure these areas of high population density</u> under the following conditions: (1) sound organization, unity of effort, adequate leadership and motivation; and, (2) Allied success in curtailing significant

infiltration, destroying major PAVN-Main Force VC formations and neutralizing the war zones.

The "oil spot" is a valid concept for the initiation and expansion of RC activities. Past failures have not resulted from conceptual inadequacies. Each province must pursue this technique. Publicly announced categories of provinces such as "select," "showcase" and "born losers" must be avoided; such announcements tend either to reduce GVN motivation or to stimulate VC reaction unnecessarily.

The Contest at Village Level. The Vietnamese village is most susceptible to installation of VC infrastructure. It is least susceptible to GVN influenc Yet the village is the only political entity today that is capable of responding to popular aspirations. It is also the highest level of social identification experienced by the peasant majority. Contesting at village level -- since there is neither a continuous US nor GVN presence -- presents a major problem.

It is at the village level that most nonmilitary programs associated with RC finally fail. The confrontation of GVN cadres, officials and military forces with the peasant becomes real instead of theoretical in the village. Why the failure? We have depended upon officials of the same government that created most of the peasants' problems in the first place to return to the scene and correct them. To date, this presence has only served to heighten tension. Territorial USREPs must concentrate their efforts at the village level

and on GVN officials working therein, in order to bring about any improvement.

Planning From the Village Up. The following sequence is applicable:

(1) Districts conduct public assemblies of hamlet residents. GVN province, district and village representatives will be present at these assemblies along with the hamlet council, notables and family heads. The purpose of the assembly is to determine RC requirements for that particular hamlet. District USREPs and, if possible, the province senior USREP should be in attendance.

(2) Villages conduct public assemblies at which village officials, the village council and notables screen hamlet requirements. A rudimentary village RC plan results and is forwarded to district. This process makes the people participants in RC planning.

(3) The province formulates its RC plan from the village inputs. Province establishes priorities and consolidates requirements. The nonmilitary aspects of the plan will include both short and long-range development of such provincial projects as road and bridge construction, electrification, canal digging and public building.

(4) The province plan will be subject to review and approval at corps and national levels. When approved, funds and resources must be released directly to province for application to planned projects.

GVN Cadres for Rural Construction

Mission. The mission of all cadres should be to provide interim

leadership at the village and hamlet echelons and to develop popular support. They should wear down the communist political-guerrilla apparatus, creating a climate in which effective local leaders can be freely elected and the essential base for local self-rule established. Also, they should promote and assist social and economic development, provide basic government services where these cannot be furnished through normal channels and strengthen the relationship between the government and the governed.

General. Cadres should, whenever possible, be natives of the area in which they are to operate. It is necessary that they understand local political, economic and social structures and customs and apply this knowledge to their mission. This will require appreciation of the extent to which any of these structures have been compromised or discredited.

The cadre should work with, and through, the natural and official leaders of the village or hamlet to the maximum extent. This strengthens the status and effectiveness of normal government institutions and also reinforces the positions and abilities of the leaders. If no effective leaders are available who are acceptable to the GVN, the cadre must take responsibility for governing, while endeavoring to develop potential community leaders. Similarly, if existing leaders are discredited, the cadre team should supersede them until new leaders can be developed.

At national and provincial levels, the organization should emphasize coordination of the plans and activities of the technical

ministries to secure maximum contributions to the national war effort. Although it is not anticipated that the Rural Construction Cadre (RCC) should constitute a permanent peace-time organization, it does have the secondary long-range function of creating service-oriented government personnel. No standard period for a RCC team to remain in a village or hamlet can be predetermined; the time necessary will depend upon many variables. Similarly, it is not possible to say, except with full knowledge of the local situation, which hamlets must be the objective of the efforts of a team and which may not need a team. In some instances, one team might work simultaneously in several hamlets.

It must be emphasized that initiation of cadre reform measures should be prefaced by particular emphasis on familiarizing appropriate GVN-RVNAF officials with the new concepts and procedures.

There is a critical need to develop a body of elite, well-qualified, highly motivated cadres for service in areas undergoing RC. Detailed guidelines for their organization, training and employment should be developed in Saigon.

Organization and Management. Cadres must be welded into a cohesive, smoothly functioning field force. Priority effort must unify and strengthen the command chain to conform with that of GVN. (See: Figure 3-3) Improvement and clarification are required in operational procedures and methods of recruiting, motivating and training. Technical cadres should retain a technical relationship to their respective provincial services and ministries for purposes of training

and support. However, when working on the Rural Construction Program (RCP), technical cadres must come under operating control of the province chief. Technical cadres should share in such special benefits as equipment allowances, per diem payments and family allowances, for the duration of their field assignments with the RCC.

The RCC must be organized on a national basis with decentralized operational control. The organization should be characterized by the high quality of its personnel, by flexibility in organization and procedures and by efficient, imaginative use of resources. A small central headquarters should maintain personnel records, fix standards for recruiting, classifying and evaluating personnel, formulate basic operational and administrative policy, establish compensation scales, arrange for and supervise training (including advanced training at the National Institute of Administration) and make inspections.

The district team must be the basic operational unit. This team should consist of a headquarters element, to include control, administrative and support technicians as well as several village-hamlet teams. The number of village-hamlet teams depends on the nature of the district, its population, its relationship to the VC and the availability of trained cadres. The same consideration must apply to determination of the exact number and type of personnel in the district headquarters team.

The province-level team essentially should be a management and support group. This team should arrange for the training and

recruitment of technical cadres for district and village-hamlet teams, maintain records and prepare necessary reports. The provincial RCC chief should be considered a deputy province chief for Rural Construction; he should have administrative control over all construction cadres in the province and all technical cadres detailed to Rural Construction. In turn, he should remain under the operational control of the province chief and act within policy guidelines established by the national headquarters of the RCC, with which he should have channels of direct technical communication. Each subordinate team chief must have full responsibility for, and authority over, the personnel (construction, technical, or paramilitary) assigned or detailed to him.

Recruitment. Incompetent cadres must be eliminated before their presenee prejudices the RC program. An elimination process must continue through the period of training and development. New recruits should be selected with special attention to their motivation, anti-communist orientation, and potential for growth and development, as well as for their ability to effectively and favorably project the GVN image. All chiefs of district teams should either be National Institute of Administration (NIA) graduates or participants in the new interrupted-study program. (See: Chapter III) Cadres should be draft-exempt as long as they perform their duties in a fully acceptable manner. Time served as cadre in the field, terminated by honorable release, should count toward fulfillment of the military obligation of the individual.

Training. All cadre teams must receive motivational training prior to field deployment. This training should be conducted near the area of their planned employment and should be supplemented by periodic refresher courses. Technical training may be conducted at academic institutions or through traveling training teams or on-the-job training in the province, depending upon sources of adequate instruction. Potential team leaders should receive advanced training through one-year augmentation courses at the NIA.

Technical cadres must receive specialized training given or sponsored by their ministries. Ordinarily, such training should be given at provincial level. Selected cadres who demonstrate high capacity and motivation, but who have less than optimum academic preparation should be sent to the NIA for leadership training. Mobile training teams can supplement on-the-job training.

Interim GVN directives concerning RCC set up a Rural Construction Group (RCG) with a standard organization. The RCG is made up of 80 cadremen, organized into a command element and four teams: (1) the Armed Propaganda Inter-Team (PAT) of 40 men; (2) the Census Grievance Team (CGT) of 12 men; (3) the Civil Affairs Team (CAT) of 12 men; and, (4) the New Life Development Team (NLDT) of 12 men. All members are armed, and appropriate roles and missions are specified. However, the details of operation, recruitment and training are unclear. These factors and the other cadre requirements set forth above must be incorporated into RVNAF JGS Directive AB140.

PATs. The Armed Propaganda Inter-Team is also commonly called People's Action Team. PATs have been used separately or in conjunction with other cadres with varying degrees of success. PATs are intended as political activists. They are the recipients of good pay and equipment, as well as excellent combat and motivational training. PATs must be used in their intended role rather than as combat infantrymen. Their efforts and those of other RCG elements must be united under firm territorial control.

Requisite Organization and Force Deployment. Unity of command is almost nonexistent in SVN. The province chief receives orders from the division commander, the corps commander, the high command and the various ministries. Since no man can serve so many masters the natural result has been to bypass one or more of them and in turn to be bypassed by them. Hence, the province chief does not control his district chiefs or his ministerially associated service chiefs.4:7/ The province chief should have authority to remove or reassign all subordinates and to control the budgets of all activities within his province. Technical channels should remain open but must be stripped of decision-making authority relative to internal provincial affairs.


RVNAF JGS Directive AB140 definitely focuses responsibility and authority on the division as an echelon in the chain of command for RC. PROVN believes that this is unwise; division will interfere with, rather than expedite, RC progress in the provinces. The division headquarters should play a very limited role in RC. A substantial

proportion of the divisional combat and combat support forces should be permanently allocated to sectors within the Division Tactical Area (DTA) under the operational control of province chiefs. This proportion should be determined by the CTZ commander; it probably would differ in each DTA and province. The tactical elements remaining under division control should be employed as a mobile reserve. They should operate anywhere within the DTA to exploit success; they should seek out local VC base areas and operate along interprovincial boundaries. The mobile reserve could also act as a reaction force when required. The relationship between the division commander and the province chiefs should be one of cooperation, coordination and support. Any differences between the two must be resolved at CTZ level.

Similarly, the CTZ commander should maintain a small, preferably air transportable, reserve for operations within the zone. US-FW ground forces should contribute by continuing to engage larger PAVN-Main Force VC formations, by securing important surface LOCs, by operating in the war zones and by eliminating armed enemy within their Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR). See military organization chart (Figure 5-1) and schematic diagram of DTA (Figure 5-2).

The corps commander directs, coordinates and supports all RC activities in the CTZ. The only Saigon-level ministerial representation he requires is that which can assist CTZ and provincial staffs in planning and executing RC. It is imperative that the authority delegated to province chiefs in areas of governmental administration

Figure 5-1



1. Corps Commander surveys and directs allocation of ARVN Divisional troops to Provinces. Retains small airmobile reserve for employment anywhere in area of responsibility.


2. ARVN Div allocates troops to Provinces within DTA, administers, supports, and may rotate units within Province. A small Div reserve is maintained for operations within DTA against sizeable VC forces, bases, and as a reaction force.

3. ARVN Regt is under op con of Province Chief. If Regimental CO outranks Deputy for Security, he can be given the title, and the DS can become his assistant.

4. PAT (Peoples Action Team) is responsive to Territorial Chiefs. When an area is uncovered and a Village Chief elected, he should control PAT in his village.

5. An ARVN company may have a temporary base in a village. When the company (or larger formation) operates there, it is responsible for liaison and coordination with Village Chief.

Figure 5-2


POSSIBLE ARVN DEPLOYMENT IN DTA
9th DTA
10th DTA
Prov E
Prov B
DIV
MOBILE
RESERVE
Prov D
Prov A
155
Prov C
155
TAOR for US-FW MAF
(US)
10th DTA
8th DTA
NOTES
1.Div has 12 Inf Bn.
2.155 How, M113 and M114 units from Corps Troops.
3.All divarty aside from that shown with Div Mobile reserve allocated to Provinces.
4.One US Airmobile Company (UH1D helicopter) allocated to Div Senior Advisor for transport of mobile reserve.

other than RC not be usurped by the corps commander. (For civil lines of authority, see: Chapter III)

Province is the echelon at which unity of command and effort must first be achieved. ARVN forces assigned to the province must remain until they are no longer required and must operate under the province chief's control. The division commander may rotate like forces out of his mobile reserve into the provinces and vice versa. He can influence the military situation in the DTA with his mobile reserve and his presence. When the division or corps mobile reserve is committed within a given province, the reserve commander is responsible for coordination with the province chief or his deputy for security concerning the mission of the reserve force and the area in which it is to be used.

Tactical Task Division and Deployment for Support of RC. Regional Forces (RF) are under the command of the province chief. These forces should not be used outside their home province. If possible, they should be deployed in their native district. Normally, there are sufficient RF for one company (occasionally two) per district. The RF company should be under the command of the district chief and should be employed on mobile operations throughout the district. The base location must be changed frequently and RF dependents billeted at the district town. No more than 15 percent of the company should be on rest and rehabilitation (R&R) at any one time.

The Popular Force (PF) should be closely associated with the

population, living with the people, rather than in a mud fort. There should be a PF platoon with dependents living in every village, responsive to the village chief. PF squads should be used for any static security tasks in or near the population centers of the district.

Police must be made subordinate to the territorial commander. Well-trained police can make an excellent contribution to detailed intelligence on the enemy's political infrastructure. Police should, in conjunction with detection and elimination of the enemy cells, enforce the law and maintain order. Consistent with the security available, there should be police representation in all populated areas undergoing rural construction. By use of mobile checkpoints, police must check the movement of people and commodities in order to inhibit VC free circulation among the people and procurement of supplies.

ARVN units in the province must have no static security responsibilities. Police and PF are best suited for static security missions. The ARVN will have a far greater impact when used on continuous and decentralized mobile operations in or near the populated areas. Dependents should be centrally located, as with the RF, to terminate their status as camp followers. The present practice of breaking off operations before nightfall so that the ARVN unit can return to its garrison town and "guard" its dependents cannot be tolerated. This has been the subject of constant advisory recommendations and emphasis with little effect on the Vietnamese. Advisors must exert maximum

leadership, influence and leverage to correct this situation.

Method of Operation. Control of all military RC efforts in the province must be in the hands of the province chief. Should an ARVN regiment be assigned permanently to a province, that regimental commander probably would outrank the incumbent deputy for security. The regimental commander should then become the deputy province chief for security.

The nerve center of his command post is the Sector Operations and Intelligence Center (SOIC). Many SOICs now in existence are inadequate. They lack talented officers; in many cases there is no full-time US participation. When necessary, the SOIC must have a 24-hour-a-day capability. Since the province chief must control the entire GVN effort in the province, all government agencies designated by the province chief should be represented in the SOIC. These would include the National Police (NP), Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), and representatives from any artillery units stationed in the province, in addition to regular members. The senior USREP must provide for participation by members of his own staff, develop intelligence inputs from sources available to him, and offer liaison service with US-FW ground forces in the province. He must also arrange for response by such US means as surveillance and FAC aircraft to the requirements generated by the SOIC. Personnel in the SOICs must have responsibility and authority to act when required, without permission from higher headquarters.

The SOIC should be reflected on a smaller but equally active scale at subsectors.

Tactics to Support Rural Construction. In the more densely populated areas and on the fringes of these areas, the enemy consists of dispersed VC Main Force units, local forces, guerrillas and the covert political infrastructure. Despite their origins, these forces operate mainly as guerrillas. In the overall context of providing security for the RC effort, friendly forces supporting RC must become the counterguerrilla experts of the total Allied effort.

Certain of the more common counterguerrilla tactics, such as encirclements, sweeps, hammer and anvil operations and massive heliborne and armored operations, simply have not succeeded against the VC. Alerted by noisy preparations and execution, or through agents, guerrillas simply sidestep operations and oppose them with well-placed snipers and mines. Frequently, even the best planned and executed American operations have failed. What can result in success is the chance meeting engagement or enemy miscalculation. But these happenstances leave the initiative largely to the enemy and put friendly forces in the role of reacting. While reaction forces are necessary, they will never win the war. Guerrillas, as far as they can manage, fight at times, places and under conditions of their own choosing. Allied forces must orient their combat power on the enemy instead of on terrain. Short duration counterguerrilla operations lend themselves nicely to the planning and execution for which regular officers are

trained. These operations are relatively comfortable, in that units stay in billets near their families except for the relatively short period required to carry out the encirclement, sweep or hammer and anvil operation. They almost never produce substantial contact unless the enemy desires it.

Area Saturation is an Effective Solution. ARVN regiments (US brigades) are assigned areas. The regiment then assigns areas to battalions, who further assign areas of responsibility to companies. They establish bases and patrol their areas with at least two-thirds of the patrols at night. A considerable advantage accrues to friendly forces use of the infrared weapons sights. After three or four days, companies are assigned new areas overlapping those already patrolled by other companies. After a period, battalions are shifted; thus, any area is patrolled repeatedly at random intervals and in varying patterns. This generates meeting engagements and deprives guerrillas of their advantage -- the initiative. Because of better communications when a substantial contact is made, friendly forces can usually generate more combat power and defeat the VC. VC plans are upset, they know no rest and the night is no longer their ally.

The basic system can be embellished further by using ambush techniques and employing stay-behind forces. The 2nd ARVN Division, during 1964, shifted from conventional counterguerrilla to area saturation tactics. This resulted in an increase in VC killed from a dozen or so per month to over 50 per week and was accompanied by a commensurate increase in defections.5/

Area saturation operations are well suited for use in conjunction with RC in populated areas or on their fringes. Important bonus effects accrue to area saturation; the people, having continuously present security forces, gain confidence and begin to cooperate with GVN. Previously unusable roads became safe for travel, since the VC lack the freedom of movement they need to plant mines and set ambushes. Finally, the continuous grinding pressure reduces the VC to a fugitive, bandit status.

Area saturation -- detailed in MACV Lessons Learned No. 38 -- offers a stylized solution to the counterguerrilla problem. But any method of operation which provides for continuous decentralized operations in populated areas, taking the night and day initiative away from the guerrilla and providing security by means of aggressive outside action instead of reliance on fortifications, can succeed against the VC guerrilla. Units supervised actively by commanders and advisors who go along on raids, ambushes and patrols, invariably do better. The basic patrol, ambush or raiding unit in area saturation is a platoon; a platoon has enough firepower to sustain itself against a superior force for enough time to permit reinforcement, and it has a radio. A mortar or artillery FO must be included. This basic element can be scaled up to company size when the enemy situation dictates.

A preponderance of returned MACV advisors who were engaged in RC efforts report area saturation tactics as the most effective method of operations. (See: ANNEX G, pages 8 and 9) Many ARVN units hesitate to

use area saturation because of fear of defeat in detail and an inherent reluctance to decentralise operational authority. Other real constraints to ARVN operations exist in some areas in the form of restrictive orders from higher headquarters; these include: (1) never operate in less than battalion strength; (2) do not annoy French planters and do not cross land owned by general officers; and, (3) never get out of fixed artillery range.6/ This is one reason that the RF-PF now achieve most of the military results in these areas.

Providing Security in RC

General. Providing security is basic to the prosecution of the war in all phases. It is particularly crucial to the RCP. Often the enemy is able to deny security very economically, using a few local guerrillas as snipers and demolition teams. Countermeasures are available and must be pursued with the same tenacity that characterizes operations against larger enemy formations.

If there is any one rule that can be distilled to describe successful establishment of security, it is this: Security can best be provided from outside the installation, hamlet or LOC to be secured. Static outposts, forts and watchtowers are valuable only if they serve as patrol bases -- and few of them do. Aggressive external, mobile action is required. Security is seldom absolute. But it can be improved to the point that the enemy is unable to interfere seriously with RC activities without the introduction of a large force into the contested area. This changes the problem and invites US-FWMAF attention. Early warning of

the approach of a large enemy force traveling at night can best be provided by friendly troops who also are abroad at night. It must be kept in mind that the PAVN and some Main Force VC units are more isolated from the population than ARVN. It is the guerrilla and VC cadre who provide the bridge between these units and the rural people.

How to Secure a Hamlet. The GVN six-point pacification criteria relate to securing a hamlet.7/ A hamlet which has accomplished these, however, cannot be considered secure. The excellence of internal fortifications, fences, warning systems, artillery fire plans and communications to reaction forces relates to the problem of defense after security has failed.

For obvious reasons, most VC attacks occur at night. Many are assisted or participated in by hamlet residents who are covert VC. They are therefore able to circumvent practically any static defensive arrangement. Required countermeasures are as follows: (1) associate forces with the population on a long-term basis so that it is evident that the GVN is actually concerned with providing security; (2) use basic area saturation tactics, with emphasis on random pattern night patrols and ambushes; (3) conduct raids on local guerrilla force locations using PWs or Quy Chanh as guides -- make the VC worry about security; (4) use ARVN Battalion Intelligence and Reconnaissance personnel (or RF and PF), unarmed and in peasant garb, to circulate in adjacent areas during daylight to seek indications of an impending attack; (5) use similar forces posing as VC to enter questionable hamlets to deliver

propaganda lectures and identify VC sympathisers or active supporters; and, (6) infiltrate the local covert apparatus with a few high quality agents.

Appropriate echelonment of security forces with respect to populated areas is as follows: the PF must remain in and around the hamlets of a village on a permanent basis; the RF must be employed as a mobile force within the district and frequently change its base; finally, ARVN must be employed within the province on continuous decentralized operations (in random pattern) in the intervals between population centers and without regard to district boundaries. One small reserve reaction force should be maintained at district and another at province. These reserve forces often can be used to prepare ambushes for enemy forces detected en route to a populated area. They can also be used to exploit success when other forces have contacted the enemy.

The most reliable judge as to whether or not a hamlet is secure is the district chief. In addition, an experienced USREP at subsector can usually make a valid determination after visiting the village. The unquantifiable impressions that help him make this determination are such that he would likely be unable to state them.

How to Secure LOCs. An effective contribution to the security of surface LOC segments (roads and canals) can be made by the use of continuous "Trojan Horse" type countermeasures. These have long been recognized as effective but are seldom executed; it is easier to regard a road as insecure and fly over it. The VC finance a good share of

their war costs through road (and canal) user tax. VC collectors stop civilian traffic to check receipts for tax already paid or to collect the tax. Countermeasures are obvious and simple: well-armed soldiers with concealed weapons ride buses in civilian clothes and eliminate tax points and collectors; armed men can be concealed in produce trucks and sampans for the same purpose.

The ambush of a military convoy on the road requires considerable planning, preparation and some advanced information -- a time bracket for convoy movement plans is basic. When ambushes occur, obviously the VC control areas adjacent to the road and have some source of information as to when the convoy planned to move. Under these circumstances, the ambush is still preventable by the most basic means -- flank security on foot through the dangerous areas. This tactic slows the convoy to a walking pace but precludes an ambush. Any convoy should be tactically organized with air cover, flank security and assessments of the most likely areas for ambush. Armed convoys should move at random times, including night. Many armored vehicles used for convoy protection have a good infrared capability which is seldom exploited. Roads in relatively secure areas which have undergone area saturation for at least two months can be traversed by random infiltration of vehicles. These vehicles may receive long-range sniper fire (often incorrectly reported as an ambush), but such fire is usually ineffective.

Responsibility for security of LOCs in areas undergoing RC should rest with territorial commanders. On critical LOCs, such as National

Route 15 between Vung Tau and Bien Hoa, a US or FW unit should be assigned this responsibility with a TAOR which includes sufficient area on either side of the road to allow for effective operations. Such a mission is being accomplished successfully by the ROK Capital Division on Route 19.

Contribution to RC by US-FWMAF. The presence of a substantial, aggressive US or FW unit in a given area tends to dominate that area. RC should therefore be exploited in such areas. When US-FW units can be relied on to react against larger enemy units introduced into the contested area, the ARVN corps commander is able to allocate more forces to RC support and use smaller mobile reserve forces.

When sufficient US-FW units are deployed to SVN to accomplish those tasks which fall mainly to them, the troop level requirement for these tasks should begin to decrease; consequently, a proportion of these forces will be available for other commitment. At this time, available US-FW units can be committed to support RC in the more critical and difficult provinces. These forces would appropriately be committed by battalion and would be placed under command of the senior USREP at province.

Military Engineers. Engineers can make a tremendous contribution to RC. Repairing war damage to roads and clearing canals will facilitate movement of produce and goods to and from the markets. Combat engineer efforts should be closely coordinated with provincial Public Works. Public Works projects must be oriented on that part of the province under greater government control; combat engineers can be used in less secure areas.

Civic Action. Civic action is a helpful adjunct to the RCP when properly applied. One of the most meaningful forms to the Vietnamese peasant is the medical civic action program (MEDCAP). American medical NCOs of the subsector teams have provided impetus to this program. ARVN medics should participate in MEDCAP to a larger degree. Other civic action projects should be of the self-help variety, with the GVN providing some help, advice and some construction material as well as tools. The majority of the effort should be put forth by the local people on a voluntary basis. When people have participated in the construction of a school, a well or a dispensary, they have a stake in it and will be more inclined to protect and maintain it.

Such developmental programs as rural electrification can equate with civic action. These more ambitious programs, however, must be reserved for areas in which the people have cooperated well with the GVN. This reward for them can be an inducement to others.

Indemnification for war damage inflicted by the Allied forces on noncombatants must be swift and appropriate. Senior USREPs at district have used their revolving funds for this purpose on occasion. This practice may be effective in its short-range impact, but it does little to improve the GVN system. When such expenditures are made by USREPs for ARVN-inflicted damage, reimbursement should be sought through official channels.

Intelligence in RC

General. The US-GVN intelligence effort has been widely criticized. In spite of the criticism, this effort produces more intelligence than

the Allies can react to adequately. The major difficulty is reacting to the intelligence held while it is still valid.

The People. No amount of technical equipment, secret agents, organizational genius or funds can substitute for intelligence provided by the people. The people will help the GVN, especially when they are convinced that they will not be abandoned to the enemy later and when the nature of military operations and the conduct of officials and troops are proper.

Intelligence Proposals. The intelligence process must be integrated at each territorial echelon; it must be coordinated and directed by the senior GVN official and senior USREP at each level. At CTZ, national and US forces levels, the principal effort must be directed against both major in-country movement and larger enemy unit locations. At the other end of the spectrum, the NP, PATs and small GVN units must locate and identify part-time guerrillas and ferret out the VC political infrastructure. Specifically: (1) all US intelligence assets not attached to tactical units and habitually operating within the province must be under the direction of the senior USREP;8/ (2) all GVN assets must be under the direction of the province chief;9/ (3) MACV must make greater use of his authority to sanitize selective special intelligence (SI) information and ensure that it be released on a need-to-know basis down to and including the senior USREP at province; (4) coordination of intelligence efforts must be increased along all internal boundaries; (5) more counterintelligence (CI) effort and advisory support must be

expended on security of military information, deception plans, prevention of habitual reconnaissance patterns, prepositioning of artillery that compromises impending operations and eradication of VC information networks at all GVN echelons; and, (6) overall improvement of US-GVN efficiency must be achieved by management of the collection effort at province as follows: use of intelligence collection plans, use of meaningful EEIs, training of agents and agent handlers, establishment of source control and source evaluation programs as well as expeditious exploitation of PWs, Quy Chanh and VC documents. See Figure 5-3 for the proposed US intelligence organization.

Police in RC. The potential NP contribution to the RCP and the long-term goal of establishing a viable GVN will not be realized until policemen are stationed in strength in the villages and hamlets. Police must be introduced into these areas as early as possible and must be responsive to the appropriate territorial chief. NP effectiveness will increase when demobilized ARVN, RF and PF personnel are recruited, trained and ultimately assigned to their home villages. Police operations and methods are necessary to combat all stages of insurgency. In RC, the major police contributions are to conduct: (1) nation-wide population and resources control programs; and, (2) neutralization of the VC political infrastructure. Specifically: (1) the NP Field Force should be disbanded. It duplicates ARVN-RF-PF forces and operations; (2) US police operations advisors should be assigned to the subsector teams as required;10:23/ (3) as areas are pacified, NP strength should be increased by drawdown on demobilized paramilitary forces; (4) CAS and PSD advisors to the NP

must be placed under the control of the senior USREP in province; and, (5) NP regions must be rearranged to conform with the CTZs and colocated headquarters must be established.

Population and Resource Control Programs in RC

General. These programs are designed to separate the VC from their sources of supply, recruits and intelligence. Generally, resources control is the crux of economic warfare and is aimed at terminating VC ability to live primarily off of the GVN economy through taxation, hijacking, accommodation and coercion. "Scorched earth" measures are appropriate for application against VC war zones and safe havens; in contested areas, the major effort must be to extend security rather than to apply "scorched earth" measures.

Controls. Laws providing a basis for applying the following essential control measures are in existence: (1) proclamation of contraband items (these can be applied selectively depending on the region); (2) establishment of restricted areas; (3) use of travel controls and curfews; (4) right to detain suspects; (5) requirement for identification cards; (6) family census programs; (7) establishment of fixed and mobile checkpoints on roads, trails and waterways; and, (8) raids a. i searches.


Since control measures are troublesome and distasteful, they should be lifted as soon as they are no longer required. Psychological operations must be used to impress on the people that these inconveniences are really the fault of the VC and will no longer be required when the

Figure 5-3

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US INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION



(1) When ARVN division is committed to RC mission.

CICV, CTOC and SSOIC will include all agencies depicted for SOIC (when applicable).

FW Forces maintain liaison with, or participate in CICV, CTOC, SOIC, and SSOIC as necessary.

Senior USREPs at all echelons will establish liaison with, and provide intelligence support to, US and FW units in area.

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VC have been expelled. Results from interrogation of violators of these laws constitute the basis of effective police intelligence procedures against the VC political infrastructure.

Program Against VC Political Infrastructure in RC. US-GVN concentration on the war against companies, battalions and regiments perhaps has led us astray. Results of a British study show that the Malayan enemy's real weakness was not in the area of the familiar military problems dealing with supply, weapons, camp, organization, doctrine and recruits; these could be revamped, replaced or renewed. Almost all losses could be endured except one -- the death of key individuals. Dead leaders could not be replaced; with their death, experience, iron-hard determination and skills developed after years of jungle warfare were lost.11:179/ Among the VC infrastructure are the leaders who collect the money, arms, supplies, recruits and intelligence which are passed on to the next higher echelon. They exercise control over the area and over the civilian population.12:81/ One single prisoner or death might save years of work, prevent future ambushes, atrocities and murders.11:179/ A major NP program to neutralize the VC political infrastructure must be executed in each province as a matter of priority.

The Influence of the Province Senior USREP on RC

General. As advisors, Americans have employed many techniques to influence the local situation. These have included persuasion, leadership, example, service as a de facto executive and mild forms of

leverage. Territorial US Army advisors are virtually unanimous in their conviction that something more is required. (See: ANNEX G) They must be both capable and empowered to influence RC progress; the mechanisms for exerting US influence must be built into the US organization and methods of operation.

Control Mechanism Specifically, PROVN recommends the following detailed measures be included in the terms of reference for province senior USREPs: (1) reinstitution of the US approval requirement for expenditure of funds (joint sign-off) to support projects within the RCP (e.g., POL for RC material transport, cadre salaries, school construction and self-help projects); (2) commodity support for RC projects (e.g., cement, roofing, PL 480 food) must be initiated by the senior USREP; (3) requests for personnel transportation by US means must be initiated and authorized by the senior USREP; (4) the senior USREP must be authorized to recommend RC planning priorities and participate in quarterly CTZ reviews of the RC effort; (5) the senior USREP must be authorized to participate in other combined US-GVN and US unilateral reporting on the provincial RC situation; and, (6) the senior USREP must be authorized to recommend the extent of US technical participation in the province (e.g., well drillers, agricultural specialists, Seabees).

In addition to the foregoing measures, a most important control available to the senior USREP is his authority to withdraw or redeploy district teams. In a district where no progress can be made because of the noncooperation of GVN district authorities, the US district team

should be withdrawn until a more satisfactory GVN response can be ensured. This can be done at province level by selective removal of US team members whose GVN counterparts are nonproductive.

Leadership, Training and Force Support Activities

General. Actions required now are crucial to the development of the RVNAF as an effective force, not only to enable successful participation in the present struggle, but also to ensure a positive contribution to the nation building activities that must follow. There must, therefore, be no question of GVN acceptance. These are matters for the detailed and continuous attention of the highest US-GVN officials.

Leadership Situation. Leadership in the RVNAF is generally poor. This assessment by US military advisors is consciously or unconsciously based on comparison of ARVN leadership with that in US units or with the advisors' own concepts of leadership. It seldom takes into account either the overpowering fatigue that 20 years of war can impart or the meager diet, pay and future of the ARVN officer and NCO. VC leadership seems better by comparison; it has a revolutionary flavor and attracts zealots. In the words of Dang Van Sung, "Man is so made that he never wholeheartedly risks his life fighting for just a lesser evil; he may willingly die for an illusion." VC leadership, however, does not follow this premise; few VC officers perish in action. Apparently, they regard themselves as too valuable and are so regarded by their men.

Most advisors agree that, properly led, the Vietnamese makes an excellent soldier. Probably the greatest single lapse in leadership at

all levels in the RVNAF is supervision. Advisor supervision is helpful, but it cannot substitute for direct command supervision. Far too often the battalion commander does not place himself where he can best influence the action. In some regiments, the commander seldom leaves his elabora CP. Such commanders have no inkling of what goes on in battle or training. It is useless for his advisor to chide him, for an officer is interested mainly in impressing his rating officer.

The 2d ARVN Division, blessed with a highly motivated and fearless commander for the first six months of 1964, developed good leaders at all levels. This unusual Vietnamese was always in the division area, talking to his young officers, NCOs and troops. He accompanied them on foot into battle or on patrol, encouraging, exhorting and correcting mistakes. His own troops and his American advisors admired and respected him; it was desirable to be his subordinate. Some staff officers volunteered to command battalions -- even though this meant leaving their safer billets and living in the paddies and piedmont of the division area.

Because of his unique success, this division commander was promoted to general officer rank and transferred to Saigon as a staff officer. His replacement was more cautious, defensive and fearful of casualties; the situation grew worse. The vigorous night actions, raids and ambushes, as well as continuous movement, were replaced by static patrol bases which rapidly became defensive positions. The VC once more had regained the initiative in the 2d ARVN Division area.5/

Action Required. Development of leaders in Vietnam, as elsewhere, requires more than leadership schools and pronouncements. It requires command interest at high levels. Supervisory visits, a few words between the general and the soldier coupled with obvious manifestations of care and interest will pay unusual dividends. The Vietnamese esteem individual decorations highly and even more highly when they are presented by a high ranking officer. There is an unfortunate tendency to decorate commanders rather than the individuals who perform the heroic act.

One reward for combat proficiency is battlefield promotion or commission. Although some progress is being made in persuading the Vietnamese to use these incentives to better leadership, the concept requires continuing emphasis and encouragement. Legacies of the past inhibit the development of effective leaders. For example, many Vietnamese commissioned officers, as well as GVN public servants and intellectuals, cultivate long fingernails on their little fingers; this relic from the mandarin era signifies that the individual performs no manual labor. Staff duty at regiment or higher level generally is preferred to command duty. Proficiency in English has a bearing on selecting certain officers for key jobs, yet some battalion and company commanders speak no English at all.

A policy of requiring a series of balanced assignments, including command and troop duty below regimental level, should be initiated in ARVN. The image of a successful officer requires alteration. Officer

and NCO schools should be activated; highly decorated veterans must be used as instructors and employ the Fort Benning Infantry School "leadership committee" concept. Similar committees should be set up in each national training center in Vietnam. Current personnel management practices, such as overmanning higher level staffs at the expense of combat units, must be eliminated. The most important measure which should be initiated is a good example set by higher commanders. Troop visits in the field should be emphasized rather than visits to command posts for briefings.

The Chain of Command. Vietnamese commanders have been known to disobey orders in combat yet remain in command. This relationship prevails among commanders at all echelons in ARVN; it begins in the relationship between corps commanders and the Chief of the Joint General Staff. It reflects an attitude that permeates Vietnamese society.

Action Required. At lower echelons, the requisite discipline to enforce the chain of command must be brought about by more adequate command supervision accompanied by liberal use of disciplinary action. To relieve an erring officer of command does not bear the stigma in ARVN that it carries in other armies; hence, it must be accompanied by stern disciplinary measures. All too frequently the term "adequate command supervision" is dismissed as a cliche. Yet, this fundamental is the key to improvement and success in ARVN; continual advisory emphasis and stimulation are required. They cannot be dismissed. In extreme cases, there should be a provision for the Single Manager to recommend removal of

higher commanders who consistently violate sound command practices. (See: Chapter II)

Personnel Policy Influencing Troop Morale. RVNAF and RF-PF policies which impact on troop morale are nebulous. Dependent housing varies from unit to unit; in the case of the PF, it is appalling even by Vietnamese standards. Pay varies considerably between various elements that have similar tasks and does not reward the element which consistently does the most fighting. Dependent benefits such as the death gratuity are relatively well administered in ARVN, but a PF widow may wait an interminable period for gratuity pay if the provincial deputy for administration is not efficient.

Evacuation and hospitalization are relatively swift and sure for ARVN troops, but it becomes considerably less effective for paramilitary forces. A seriously wounded PF soldier in a remote outpost stands little chance of survival.

PX rations such as Quan Doi Vietnam cigarettes routinely are available to ARVN but are less available to paramilitary forces. More decorations are awarded to ARVN personnel, although the RF and PF do more day-in and day-out fighting and dying. Although some subsector advisors have made use of their special funds to improve the lot of the PF and their dependents, this patchwork measure does not substitute adequately for sound personnel policy.

Action Required. Senior officers must bring order, justice and similarity to the remuneration and benefits of diverse elements of the GVN forces.

GVN should initiate a form of combat pay, to provide some tangible recompense for fighting, which must be denied those who seek a noncombat post. ARVN regiments and battalions, serving strictly in garrison, should not receive combat pay.

Pensions and survivor benefits should be treated as priority expenditures and accorded expedited treatment. Senior province and district USREPs can assist in this, both by emphasis and unilateral US action.

Exposure to US and Free World Forces. The VNN and VNAF were the first elements of the RVNAF to be closely associated with US forces. This association clearly has been profitable and is attested by the increasing effectiveness of these elements. Conversely, there has been little association of GVN and FWMAF ground units. The Vietnamese have let it be known that they do not wish to have ARVN units serve under US or other FW commanders. The MACV policy follows:

> "As a matter of policy, US forces will not be placed under command or operational control of other allied commanders. This does not preclude the temporary tactical direction of US forces by Vietnamese or other allied commanders under exceptional circumstances and by mutual agreement, or temporary direction of Vietnamese forces by US or allied commanders. National unit integrity will be maintained."

This policy obviates routine association of regular forces. Vietnamese officers already have expressed considerable wonder at the willingness and ability of Americans to continue in battle despite casualties and adverse conditions. In I Corps, however, certain PF units have operated well in conjunction with US Marines.

Action Required. A close association of US-FW and ARVN in combat could have an inspiring effect on ARVN. An initial step toward eventual widespread association of Allied units must be to use certain select Vietnamese forces (Marines, Airborne, Rangers and designated infantry units) on a routine basis in combined offensive operations.

Motivation. US advice to ARVN has been deficient in this respect, although Nationalist China has provided advice on political motivational training in the military forces. Also, CAS has designed and sponsored motivational training for certain paramilitary forces and cadres which has been extremely successful.

Action Required. ARVN and paramilitary units will require a tremendous amount of training and supervision to develop leadership, initiative and aggressiveness. In addition, a strong socio-political motivational program is required to develop a consciousness of the need for military civic action roles and for national concensus. There is an urgent requirement for thorough political-social indoctrination for all GVN forces in order to increase the effectiveness of military operations associated with RC. The "will to fight" can be developed after the soldier understands the "why to fight." The development of realistic motivation among the GVN armed forces and paramilitary units must be an objective of military psychological efforts in SVN. The success of these efforts should enable GVN troops to develop that national identity and civic awareness which are essential to motivation. The CAS field architect of a successful RF-PF motivational program contends that

his method has other applications but cautions as to the need to operate as a Vietnamese -- not as an American.

> "This effort will not be a painless one. Americans will have to give up some deeply-ingrained habits of thought and operation. Where we are accustomed to dealing in broad principles and their equal application, we shall have to be willing to start instead with the particular, the concrete and the local and deal with these as we find them. Where we are accustomed to treating everyone alike, we shall have to apply ourselves to the formation of cadres, with special training, special responsibilities, and special privileges. Where we are used to dealing with a homogeneous soldiery, mobile and interchangeable, we must begin thinking of regional and religious ties. Where we are accustomed to communicating through mass media we must think instead in terms of personal contact. And where we are accustomed to thinking in terms of groups of people in functional or professional units, we must instead think of them in terms of land and the locality to which they are bound -- as villages and districts." 13/

Personnel Policies

General. Not only are sound GVN personnel policies essential to sustain the morale of the armed forces, they are also necessary for efficient use of available manpower. Generally, PROVN supports no increase of the RVNAF in number of units; an improvement in quality and efficiency is mandatory. The RVNAF, and particularly ARVN, have the potential to become the foremost local FW force in SEA.

Personnel Strength. The "present for operations" strength in infantry battalions now averages over 400 officers and men; this is better than it has been in years. It is unsatisfactory, however, when compared to the authorized strength of over 700; this is less than the strength of many Main Force VC battalions and most PAVN battalions. Absentees

have been detached to provide security for higher headquarters, to perform work details, to attend schools; others are in the hospital, on leave and pass or AWOL. The most critical shortage in many battalions has been the company officers. The desertion rate has been climbing steadily.

Action Required. The obvious and sound personnel management policies needed to improve the strength situation must be enforced by the firm hand of a senior commander. As to the desertion rate, appropriate disciplinary measures have not been uniformly applied. More importantly, leadership, morale and motivation measures, as well as the personnel policies that impinge on troop morale, urgently require improvement.

Use of Minority and Sectarian Forces. The formation of large sectarian and minority group military forces from the warlike Hoa Hao and Cao Dai would result in units more effective and better motivated than the average ARVN unit. This course of action was taken by the French in the Indochina war.14:235/ The resulting sectarian enclaves then had to be defeated by ARVN at the very time the new GVN was attempting to establish itself.15:390/

Use of such ethnic minorities as Montagnards in CIDG strike force units has had limited success; such success was mainly achieved due to the presence of USA Special Forces teams. The ARVN Special Forces evolved from the Presidential Survey Office (PSO), a type of secret police under Diem. They still retain the stigma of PSO as far as the balance of ARVN is concerned. The Montagnards detest them simply because they are Vietnamese. The feeling is mutual.

Action Required. The US must support the exploitation of sectarian cohesiveness; within the current force structure, however, this should extend only to paramilitary forces. Recruitment of additional sectarian RF companies and PF platoons, as required, and deployment of these forces locally under adequate GVN control will be sufficient to produce desired results.

ARVN Special Forces should either be committed to cross-border operations or be dissolved and re-incorporated into the balance of the armed forces. CIDG forces must be placed under command of the border district chiefs in III and IV Corps. In these areas, such forces can make a positive contribution to border surveillance and control. In I and II Corps, CIDG forces should also be placed under the command of appropriate district chiefs. In these areas, they can make only a limited contribution to border surveillance. In all districts where there are CIDG forces, US representation must be provided by a USA Special Forces "A" detachment. The US must support the eventual conversion of all CIDG to RF, PF or NP.

Foreign Legion. The US has had some firm offers of foreign volunteers to fight in Vietnam. For example, the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL) advanced a proposal in September of 1965 for a "foreign legion" volunteer brigade to serve in Vietnam. The APACL has no official standing with the governments of its members; it cannot provide organized forces. The US would be faced with organizing, training, equipping, deploying and providing logistical support to this brigade. While the

public pronouncements of the APACL help on the propaganda front, any military force it might provide would be of questionable value in comparison with the problems associated with actually bringing it to bear in battle.

Action Required. The US should solicit or support no foreign "volunteers" of this nature. The delicacy of the war effort in SVN militates against the mercenary type troops that would inevitably respond to a "foreign legion" opportunity. The US must instead reinforce its efforts to acquire additional organized FWMAF, especially from those nations who stand in greater danger if GVN falls.

The Draft. Failure to enforce the penal provisions of the draft law has caused the whole system to deteriorate. Only one in seven Vietnamese ordered to report for induction actually complies. Those persons easiest to conscript are GVN and supporting industry employees who are the easiest to locate; however, their services are more important to the national interest than those of the unskilled and unemployed who do not respond to the summons. There has been so little enforcement that no Vietnamese -- except GVN workers who would lose their pay -- fears the results of disobedience. This results in both poor manpower management and in failure to attain strength objectives. Another serious impact is the retention of men on completion of the established two-year term of service to three years and beyond. Morale suffers, confidence in GVN leadership lessens and the potential value of military service is decreased.

Only a small spectrum of manpower resources are deferred. Agricultural specialists and skilled workers are not deferred, although registered "students" receive almost automatic deferment whether or not they attend class.

Officers and NCOs are selected on the basis of education rather than demonstrated leadership and motivation. Men who have completed less than the equivalent of junior high school virtually are limited to the ranks and a maximum grade of chief corporal. Those who have completed junior high are sent to NCO school and become reserve sergeants on graduation. Men having the equivalent of high school or higher go to officer candidate school. This system militates against placing the best possible leaders in positions of authority and stifles initiative on the part of enlisted men.

The responsibilities of citizenship are not being enforced upon the Chinese and Montagnards. Only 238 ethnic Chinese are members of the armed forces out of a population segment of 1,200,000.

Action Required. Administration of the current GVN "Regulation of Military Service" (Decrees Number 29 and 30, dated 29 June 1953) must be improved in order to reverse the deterioration of the system. Additionally, the draft must be revised in order to: (1) Release nonregular soldiers on expiration of their terms of services. (2) Create a more reasonable deferment policy. "Students" who do not attend school regularly should not be deferred; but, key specialists, such as agricultural and medical technicians, should be considered

for deferment. (3) Terminate the unrealistic educational classification criteria. (4) Draft alien residents, such as Chinese and Frenchmen.

Rotation of Senior Officers. There is no apparent system, aside from the coup d'etat, to cause the rotation of the highest and secondary echelons of GVN general officers, (i.e., corps and division commanders and general officers on JGS RVNAF). It is mandatory that the talent of good men be fully developed and exploited. Senior commanders who are obstructive, inactive or seek to become "warlords" must be moved. Further, the GVN must both possess and exercise authority over these men.

Action Required. The US must support a rational and adequate rotation system among the senior GVN officers. The system should provide for: balanced developmental assignments; lessening the opportunities for warlords to emerge; placing dynamic men in critical command positions; and, removing inactive or obstructive senior officers from critical positions.

Employment of Former Generals. Successive coups have resulted in a mounting number of "retired" Vietnamese general officers. Many are about 40 years old and possess considerable leadership, education and managerial talent. The US and GVN should seek to either re-integrate these men into the RVNAF or employ them either as consultants or civil servants.

Training

General. The US-GVN will profit considerably by expending more effort on military training. These efforts would in the end likely shorten the duration of US military involvement in SVN, thus reducing overall US-FW casualties. Certainly better training for GVN forces would also reduce their casualties. Additional efforts to improve GVN military training need not be made at the expense of other programs.

Current Situation. The training of VNN and VNAF primarily is oriented on handling equipment. In the case of VNAF, much of this training is CONUS MAP. Both services have achieved an acceptable level of operational efficiency; this level is improving continually under the supervision of experienced Vietnamese and American officers. All VNN and VNAF personnel are volunteers. In ARVN and the paramilitary forces -- where the major effort is to train men to handle other men and to condition men to perform well in battle -- overall combat effectiveness is less than acceptable.

One of the best managed training installations is the Van Kiep National Training Center in Ba Ria, Phuoc Tuy Province. Van Kiep contains adequate areas, ranges and facilities; it is immaculate, well staffed, organized and advised by capable American officers. The center commander has developed innovations aimed at raising the quality of the training and improving the circumstances and morale of the trainees. Nevertheless, the products of Ba Ria are not uniform

in quality. Battalions are trained there as units, and recruits are trained as individuals. The recruit training is acceptable, but the quality of unit training depends on the participation by the battalions' officers. All too often, these officers regard the training period as an opportunity for maximum leave. Such units invariably have a high AWOL rate at the training center. The center commander does not command the units in training; the parent division retains command. Division commanders and staff officers seldom visit the unit in training, and elements have been summarily taken out of training to participate in operations at the whim of the division or corps commander.5/

Sector RF-PF training centers are modeled on national training centers but are much more austere as to instructor personnel and physical plant. The MACV shopping list contains a request for equipment and personnel to establish a "model" training center to set a standard for both Vietnamese and US units. This model center should stimulate training techniques, management and methods of instruction in other national centers. The fundamental training problem in the Vietnamese ground forces, however, stems from the fact that most officers attach little importance to training. This is particularly harmful to on-the-job training; this includes all training not received at the training centers.

Advisory debriefings indicate an alarming incidence of US advisor assumption of the training responsibility. Supposedly, this results from the commanders' preoccupation with administrative and

logistical tasks because he has no qualified staff officers. This lack of interest in training is closely related to leadership in a broader sense. Good commanders seldom entrust the training of their troops to other subordinates, let alone to a foreigner.

Action Required. Certain improvements to training facilities and techniques will be helpful, but the central problem of the military elite is involved here. Too many choose to remain aloof from their soldiers whatever they are doing -- training or fighting. Command supervision is no empty cliche. It is crucial to success, and it is now a missing ingredient in the GVN armed forces. The US presence must employ all the influence, leverage (including US controlled logistics) and persuasion possible, and at the highest levels, to change the military elite attitude toward command supervision.

Training Related to Nation Building. Many skills learned by men during their military service are of great value to the nation's future. This potential must be maximized in the appropriate service schools. Particular examples are heavy equipment operation, automotive mechanics, construction engineering, radio repair, nursing and accounting.

Literacy training must be offered in basic training. Young students are a potential source of literacy instructors. Some of these can be deferred in order that they can teach literacy to basic trainees. They must be given a choice to "teach or fight."

Logistics

Current Situation. The US-FWMAF currently suffer from logistical difficulties for want of the inclusion of appropriate support units

in the initial build-up. Adequate port facilities, including lighterage and materials handling equipment, are not available. Another major US-FWMAF logistical problem is transportation once supplies are off-loaded at aerial and surface ports. Equipment is available, but Allied forces lack the ability to move large quantities of supplies over surface LOCs due to lack of security. Substitution of transport aircraft is an inefficient stopgap.

One concrete result of the US-FW presence in SVN will be the development of a base infrastructure unique in SEA (e.g., Cam Ranh Bay complex). This development will resolve some of the logistical problems.

The RVNAF logistical system is basically sound and conforms with US logistical doctrine and concepts. Area Logistics Commands (ALC) -- located at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Saigon and Can Tho -- support all RVNAF units in their respective geographic areas. Road and rail routes are in limited use because of enemy action.

The major Vietnamese supply problem is caused by terms of reference of the Military Assistance Program. Provision of materiel to RVNAF is dependent on the availability of US excesses or "off the shelf" stocks: lead times are unpredictable. MAP procedures make no provision for replacing combat loss or establishing equipment and maintenance floats. US forces cannot purchase materiel in anticipation of a MAP requirement; therefore, emergency materiel support for RVNAF must come from US forces and their projected requirements. This

may not be available in quantities to satisfy the requirement.

Action Required. (1) Increases in US-FWMAF in SVN must be accompanied simultaneously by requisite increases in logistical units. (2) Present shortages in lighterage and materials-handling equipment must be filled. (3) Surface LOCs must be improved, constructed and used for heavy tonnage hauling wherever possible; lack of security should not be the governing factor. LOC security must be provided. (4) The RVNAF (including RF-PF) should no longer be supplied through MAP. As an Allied force using US equipment and supplies, they can and should be supplied through American logistical channels. A specific proposal is included in Chapter II.

The Negotiations Contingency

US-GVN agreement to "cease-fire conditions" tends to foreclose Free World options. On a closely held official basis, the fundamentals of a "satisfactory outcome" in SVN should be worked out in detail. To this end, PROVN submits the following framework of "satisfactory outcome" components for US-GVN approval:

(1) When, and if, discussions as to a "peaceful settlement" in SVN materialize: no cease-fire should be invoked; a 30-day time limit should be imposed on the talks; and US-GVN military actions should be intensified.

(2) Fully pacified status in the following specific areas: the provinces of Gia Dinh, Bien Hoa, Hau Nghia and Long An; the Northeast

coastal lowlands from the autonomous city of Hue through the province capital of Quang Ngai; and all provinces of the IV ARVN CTZ.

(3) Complete GVN control of all autonomous cities and all province capitals; all principal land communications arteries (rail and road) open to GVN forces day and night.

(4) No "safe havens" recognized; rather, offensive operations will be conducted to eliminate VC influence from areas not pacified in SVN.

(5) Termination, by Hanoi, of both infiltration into SVN and direction of the conflict in SVN.

(6) Prompt exchange of prisoners.

(7) Disarmament of the VC, but no insistence on their total elimination in SVN. Amnesty will be extended to all VC; hard-core VC, on apprehension, will be returned to NVN.

The Cease-Fire Contingency

General. A cease-fire situation is certainly possible in SVN. Actions taken during the cease-fire will determine whether communist or Free World interests will prevail afterward.

Impact on Opposing Forces. Presumably, all forces would be initially frozen in place -- from the larger PAVN-Main Force VC and US-FW units to lesser paramilitary forces. While this condition would be difficult to enforce, it is assumed that Allied forces and principal enemy forces would abide by the terms of cease-fire.

That part of the enemy structure which would be least influenced would be the covert political cadre; however, this cadre probably would be forced to discontinue the use of terror. The VC undoubtedly would exploit the propaganda capability of these political cadres to the utmost.

On the Allied side, the cease-fire should have least impact on the National Police (NP) and Rural Construction Cadre (RCC).

Required Actions. (1) As far as deployment limitations permit, the US must redouble its civic action contribution; (2) a term of the cease-fire must be the consideration of murders of GVN officials and cadreman as major national violations; (3) the US-GVN must maintain adequate security and surveillance of enemy forces during the cease-fire to minimize the effect of a surprise VC abrogation; (4) GVN NP and RCC must continue their efforts against the VC infrastructure by enforcement of applicable laws; (5) insofar as possible, NP and RCC should be reinforced by the transfer of selected PF personnel into these organizations; (6) GVN must employ all possible assets in an intensive psychological campaign aimed at countering that of the VC; and, (7) the nonmilitary aspects of the RCP should be pursued vigorously and with full US support.

Mid and Long-Range Projections

Mid-Range Objective. The established capacity to defeat subversion and maintain stability.

Major requisite actions which will contribute to the accomplishment of this objective are: (1) eliminate remaining VC political infrastructure; (2) improve the effectiveness of RVNAF through training and equipment modernization; (3) complete the Rural Construction Program (RCP) and reorient ARVN to its normal national security mission; and, (4) inactivate paramilitary forces and increase the strength and quality of the National Police.

The subobjectives below assume Allied success in the short range:

(1) Allied force reduction, with principal reduction in US-FWMAF.

(2) Reorientation of the majority of Allied forces to support and expedite mid-range completion of the RCP.

(3) Release to GVN of certain facilities excess to US-FWMAF requirements (e.g., camps, compounds and logistical installations).

(4) Reduction of RF, PF and RCC in pacified provinces with a concurrent increase in NP strength and nation building operations.

(5) Provision of sufficient security for principal land LOCs to permit routine use.

(6) Incorporation of some Vietnamese servicemen into US units on a government contract arrangement (like KATUSAs) as a method of further education and improvement.

(7) Reduction in the US advisory effort.

(8) Coordination of national intelligence and covert operations by a committee composed of the Executive, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), NP and J2 of JGS.

(9) Institutionalize GVN procedures regarding veterans affairs in order to provide medical treatment, educational opportunities and gainful employment to all discharged veterans.

(10) Initiation of a positive program to survey, clear and secure the national land borders.

Long-Range Objective. A secure nation. Major requisite actions contributing to the accomplishment of this final objective are: (1) organize the RVNAF into a somewhat smaller, professional force, which is capable, with NP assistance, of maintaining internal security and deterring local external aggression; (2) create a responsive, adequate reserve system for possible mobilization; (3) maximize the nation building potential of the RVNAF; and, (4) terminate US-FWMAF presence in SVN in favor of the security afforded by membership in a functioning regional defense organization.

The subobjectives below assume Allied success in the short and mid ranges:

(1) Inactivation of all paramilitary forces with careful and detailed arms collection.

(2) Improvement of the organization and equipment of the RVNAF, taking full advantage of lessons learned during the war in SVN.

(3) Deployment of major ARVN elements in such a way as to facilitate their training and their contribution to nation building, rather than to defend principal invasion routes.

(4) Retention of sufficient equipment, supplies, storage

facilities and logistical infrastructure by RVNAF to support regular forces and the initial phases of a mobilization.

(5) Retention and operation of sufficient training facilities and stations to support regular forces and draftees.

(6) Reorientation of the selective service system to a point where it is capable of maintaining an adequate level of trained reservists.

(7) Reorientation of NP to the principal missions of maintaining law and order, as well as of maintaining border surveillance and control.

(8) Establishment of GVN and US membership in a functioning regional defense organization aimed at the continued containment of Communist China.

Conclusions

In the short-range period, it is assumed that sufficient Allied forces will be deployed to SVN to hold in check PAVN and Main Force VC units and eventually to reduce and eliminate them. This elimination, however, is contingent on the development of a more effective GVN and of a far more vigorous effort by the entire RVNAF, police and paramilitary forces. This effort must be in no way secondary, or considered secondary, to that of the US-FW forces.

In the mid range, military efforts should continue to focus on Rural Construction and should be oriented toward the complete elimination of VC political infrastructure and of the basic reasons for

insurgency. Paramilitary forces should, by stages and at the discretion of province chiefs, be inactivated or integrated with the National Police or ARVN.

In the long-range period, a Vietnamese military force structure must be achieved which will serve to maintain internal security and at the same time deter aggression on the part of neighboring countries. Recognizing that SVN will never be able to cope unilaterally with a full-scale communist onslaught, the US must press for, sponsor and participate in, a regional defensive arrangement which will maximize the regional potential.

For a summary of actions required to achieve national security, see Figure 5-4.

AN ACTION PATTERN FOR NATIONAL SECURITY -- SVN 19

OBSTACLES TO NATIONAL SECURITY	SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS 1966-1971 MAJOR OBJECTIVE DEFEAT OF PAVN MAIN FORCE VC UNITS AND REDUCTION OF VC GUERRILLAS AND POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AMONG THE POPULATION.	SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS (CONTINUED)
PAVN-Main Force VC undefeated and rapidly reinforcing.	Curtail significant infiltration through actions of increasing intensity: ● Commit VNMC elements and USMC DAGGER THRUST forces against VC-held coastal areas of SVN, as an adjunct to MARKET TIME operations. ● Expand defoliation of VC-held coastal areas. ● Prepare to close SVN-Cambodian border and quarantine Sihanoukville. ● Reinforce aerial interdiction by committing ground forces appropriately in I and II CTZ. ● Reinforce aerial interdiction by committing ground forces on raids in Laotian Panhandle. ● Prepare to occupy and defend strip across DMZ and Laotian Panhandle. Continue B-52 raids against in-country war zones.	Occupy and demolish in-country war zones. Support destruction with CB incapacitants. Take diplomatic and military action (as required) against external safe havens. Undertake combined operations against PAVN-Main Force VC with US-FWMAF and ARVN units. Improve responsiveness of supporting fire and tactical air support. Discontinue USMC enclave concept in favor of more aggressive action. Orient on enemy and stress continuous pursuit. Ensure necessary preconditions prior to negotiations. In event of cease-fire stress security, police action and nonmilitary support of RC.
VC local forces, guerrillas and political cadre undefeated; they continue to obtain intelligence, recruits and supplies from the people.	Discontinue unobserved artillery fire in populated areas. Conduct fighter-bomber strikes in populated areas only in support of units in contact. Confine "scorched earth" tactics to VC war zones. Curtail troop misconduct toward noncombatants. Cease use of GVN troops as tax-collectors. Institute firm, well publicized Amnesty program. Integrate returnees into SVN society taking advantage of individual capabilities. Elevate Chieu Hoi to Ministerial level. Focus priority RC effort on densely populated areas. Orient major RC effort and initiate RC planning at Village level. Improve organization and method of operation of RC Cadre. Achieve unity of command and effort at province level. Take division out of chain of command for RC. Allocate as large a proportion as possible of ARVN division forces to provinces for support of rural construction under control of province chief.	Corps and division maintain small mobile reserves for operations in CTZ and TAOR. Improve organization and operation of SCIC and SSOIC. Employ ARVN allocated to provinces in area saturation tactics. Provide security for hamlets, LOCs and installations by aggressive, external mobile action. Use part of Allied combat engineer forces in support of RC. Involve military forces with population through civic action. Expedite indemnification for war damage. Devise techniques to encourage intelligence provided by local people as a first priority. Integrate intelligence process at each territorial echelon. Enforce counterintelligence measures to protect security of friendly operations and installations. Orient NP against VC political infrastructure. Apply economic warfare selectively.
Leadership, training and force support activities are inadequately developed to support a successful National Security effort.	Institutionalize techniques to improve RVNAF leadership, training and discipline. Initiate motivational training for all GVN armed forces. Increase foxhole strength with emphasis on company grade officers. Use minority and sectarian forces in native areas under territorial control. Improve and enforce draft.	Provide for suitable senior officer rotation; use talent of selected "retired" RVNAF officers. Develop nation-building skills through military training. Increase use of surface LOCs for supply movement. Supply RVNAF through US logistical channels. Do not employ "foreign legion" in SVN.

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PATTERN FOR NATIONAL SECURITY -- SVN 1966-1986

2

SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS 1966-1971

MAJOR OBJECTIVE

FEAT OF PAVN MAIN FORCE VC UNITS AND DUCTION OF VC GUERRILLAS AND POLITICAL FRASTRUCTURE AMONG THE POPULATION.

significant infiltration through actions of ng intensity:

mit VNMC elements and USMC DAGGER THRUST ces against VC-held coastal areas of SVN, as adjunct to MARKET TIME operations.

and defoliation of VC-held coastal areas.

pare to close GVN-Cambodian border and quar- line Sihanoukville.

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pare to occupy and defend strip across DMZ Laotian Panhandle.

B-52 raids against in-country war zones.

ue unobserved artillery fire in populated

ighter-bomber strikes in populated areas only t of units in contact.

"scorched earth" tactics to VC war zones.

troop misconduct toward noncombatants.

e of GVN troops as tax-collectors.

e firm, well publicized Amnesty program.

e returnees into SVN society taking advantage idual capabilities.

Chieu Hoi to Ministerial level.

iority RC effort on densely populated areas.

ajor RC effort and initiate RC planning at level.

organization and method of operation of RC

unity of command and effort at province level.

ision out of chain of command for RC.

as large a proportion as possible of ARVN forces to provinces for support of rural tion under control of province chief.

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rity and sectarian forces in native areas rritorial control.

and enforce draft.

SHORT-RANGE ACTIONS (CONTINUED)

Occupy and demolish in-country war zones. Support destruction with CB incapacitants.

Take diplomatic and military action (as required) against external safe havens.

Undertake combined operations against PAVN-Main Force VC with US-FWMAF and ARVN units.

Improve responsiveness of supporting fire and tactical air support.

Discontinue USMC enclave concept in favor of more aggressive action.

Orient on enemy and stress continuous pursuit.

Ensure necessary preconditions prior to negotiations.

In event of cease-fire stress security, police action and nonmilitary support of RC.

Corps and division maintain small mobile reserves for operations in CTZ and DTA.

Improve organization and operation of SOIC and SSOIC.

Employ ARVN allocated to provinces in area saturation tactics.

Provide security for hamlets, LOCs and installations by aggressive, external mobile action.

Use part of Allied combat engineer forces in support of RC.

Involve military forces with population through civic action.

Expedite indemnification for war damage.

Devise techniques to encourage intelligence provided by local people as a first priority.

Integrate intelligence process at each territorial echelon.

Enforce counterintelligence measures to protect security of friendly operations and installations.

Orient NP against VC political infrastructure.

Apply economic warfare selectively.

Provide for suitable senior officer rotation; use talent of selected "retired" RVNAF officers.

Develop nation-building skills through military training.

Increase use of surface LOCs for supply movement.

Supply RVNAF through US logistical channels.

Do not employ "foreign legion" in SVN.

MID-RANGE OBJECTIVE 1972-1976

MAJOR OBJECTIVE

THE ESTABLISHED CAPACITY TO DEFEAT SUBVERSION AND MAINTAIN STABILITY.

Allied force reduction, with principal reduction in US-FWMAF.

Reorientation of majority of Allied forces to support and expedite mid-range completion of the RCP.

Release to GVN of certain facilities excess to US-FWMAF requirements (e.g., camps, compounds and logistical installations).

Reduction of RF, PF and RCC in pacified provinces with a concurrent increase in NP strength and nation building operations.

Provision of sufficient security for principal land LOCs to permit routine use.

Incorporation of some Vietnamese servicemen into US units on a government contract arrangement (like KATUSAs) as a method of further education and improvement.

Reduction in the US advisory effort.

Coordination of national intelligence and covert operations by a committee composed of the Executive, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) NP and J2 of RVNAF JGS.

Institutionalized GVN procedures regarding Veterans' Affairs in order to provide medical treatment, educational opportunities and gainful employment to all discharged veterans.

Initiation of a positive program to survey, clear selectively and secure the national land borders.

LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE 1977-1986

MAJOR OBJECTIVE

A SECURE NATION

Deactivation of all paramilitary forces with careful and detailed arms collection.

Improvement of the organization and equipment of the RVNAF, taking full advantage of lessons learned during the war in SVN.

Deployment of major ARVN elements in such a way as to facilitate their training and their contribution to nation building, rather than to defend principal invasion routes.

Retention of sufficient equipment, supplies, storage facilities and logistical infrastructure by RVNAF to support regular forces and the initial phases of a mobilization.


Retention and operation of sufficient training facilities and stations to support regular forces and draftees.

Reorientation of NP to the principal missions of maintaining law and order, as well as of maintaining border surveillance and control.

Establishment of GVN and US membership in a functioning regional defense organization aimed at the continued containment of Communist China.

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Notes

1. U.S. CIA. "Infiltration and Logistics - South Vietnam," USIB Memorandum. USIB-D-24.7/4A, 28 Oct 1965.

2. Concept for Employment of CB Incapacitating Agents. Initially prepared by OACSFOR 20 Sep 1965. This proposal includes target analysis of most of the major war zones, and establishes the availability of the necessary quantities of recommended agents. Preparation of the various targets would be by air, and would be followed by ground occupation at the time when the selected agent was having its greatest effect.

3. Television panel discussion by Mr. Felix Greene, British author and authority on Communist China, who has recently returned from a three-week trip to NVN. His visit included a two and one-half-hour discussion with Ho Chi Minh. Washington, D. C., 6 Feb 65.

4. Young Turks Study. "Harnessing the Revolution in South Vietnam." Prepared by an Interagency Working Level Group, Saigon, Sep 65. (Mimeographed.)

5. Statement of Major Daniel F. Schungel, Major Thomas Nesbitt, Major Robert Hankins and Captain Richard J. Kattar; all advisors to 2nd ARVN Divisional Units during the time period 1963-64.

6. Statement of Lt Col Volney Warner, Kien Giang Sector Advisor Apr 1964 -- Nov 1964.

7. Six-point hamlet pacification criteria are:
   (a) Census of hamlet taken and VC political apparatus destroyed.
   (b) Paramilitary forces selected, trained, equipped and adequate to perform mission.
   (c) Obstacle system established for defense against VC guerrillas.
   (d) Communications system established.
   (e) Peasants organized and assigned specific tasks for hamlet security and "New Life" improvement activities.
   (f) Hamlet committee elected or appointed.

8. The US assets include CI personnel, MI collection personnel, ONI advisors to the VNN, USAF Detachment Six personnel, CAS advisors to the NP Special Branch, CAS advisors to the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), USOM Public Safety Division (PSD) advisors to the NP, and US consulate reporters. Not included are those sensitive US

capabilities which may be positioned in the province buc are responsive only to highest level authority.

9. The GVN assets include the Military Security Service (MSS), the 924th Support Group, the CIO personnel, NP Special Branch personnel and other NP efforts.

10, USACDCMPA, "Input to the PROVN Study Group" (U), 22 Dec 1965.

11. Crawford, Oliver. The Door Marked Malaya. London, 1958.

12. Kitson, Major Frank. Gangs and Counter-gangs. London, 1960.

13. Statement of Mr. Frank Scotten, CIA representative in SVN circa August 1964.

14. Paret, Peter. French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria. New York, 1964.

15. Fall, Bernard B. "The Political-Religious Sects of Vietnam," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII, Sep 55.