TC 3-22

Security Force Assistance Mission Handbook

JANUARY 2025

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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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Security Force Assistance Mission Handbook

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Preface

TC 3-22 provides a training blueprint for all US Army forces who deploy to conduct Security Force Assistance.

The principal audience for TC 3-22 is non-SFAB units who are tasked to conduct SFA. However, units and personnel who are within an SFAB will also find this TC informative. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 6-27.)

TC 3-22 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

TC 3-22 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

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Introduction

Security Force Assistance is one of the most important things that our Army does. This is a mission that is executed across the continuum of conflict. US Army forces work with our partners and allies during competition to set conditions to prevail in combat by fighting from a position of advantage or dissuade our enemies from initiating a conflict. In crisis, US advisors are able to rapidly embed in partner nation formations and enable those partners to significantly increase their combat power by supporting them with US enablers and intelligence. This rapid increase in coalition combat power can have a significant deterrent effect in a crisis situation. Last but not least, if combat operations are required, US forces can again embed with partner nation forces and significantly increase their combat power through effective advice and US enabler support.

This Training Circular provides guidance to US forces on how to plan, prepare, and execute a Security Force Assistance mission. The US Army has specialized forces, the Security Force Assistance Brigades, who focus on this mission. However, demand for SFA forces and advisors greatly exceeds capacity. Therefore, non-SFAB forces are frequently called upon to deploy and conduct Security Force Assistance missions. The manual is intended for the entire force, but it is particularly focused on those forces outside of SFABs who are frequently called upon to deploy and conduct Security Force Assistance. The TC is written primarily through the lens of deployment during competition, but throughout the TC one thread remains strong: all SFA forces deployed in competition must always be prepared for a change of mission. Our adversaries may choose to create a crisis or conflict at any time. In that case, those forces deployed to conduct SFA during competition may rapidly find themselves in the midst of a crisis or conflict. By following the guidance in this Training Circular, US Army forces will be prepared to execute SFA missions across the continuum of conflict.

Training Circular 3-22 uses the Operations Process of Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess to form the basis for the Training Circular.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of concepts and terms that are relevant to Security Force Assistance

Chapter 2 focuses on the pre-deployment tasks of Plan and Prepare. It provides a detailed timeline of pre-deployment tasks and a schedule to execute them.

Chapter 3 is focused on Execution. This includes details on RIP/TOA if a unit is relieving another unit and actions taken if arriving as an initial unit as part of an episodic SFA mission, or the lead element of a recurring mission. In particular, this chapter focuses on preparedness to immediately transition to conflict or crisis if required.

Chapter 4 focuses on the final step of the Operations Process, Assess. It also includes a detailed timeline of redeployment tasks, starting with tasks that must be conducted while in theater and going through tasks conducted at home station after redeployment. It must be noted that Assessments happen before, during, and after a deployment. Thus, although the assessment chapter is the last chapter since it is the final step in the Operations Process, several portions of this chapter apply to pre-deployment and execution activities.

Multiple appendixes provide greater detail on specific topics of interest. These are referred to throughout the main body chapters as appropriate.

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Chapter 1
Concepts and Definitions

This chapter initiates with a detailed definition of security cooperation. It then progresses to explore the objectives underlying security cooperation, delineating the various programs and activities that constitute this domain, as well as elucidating the significant role played by the Army in the realm of security cooperation. Subsequently, the focus shifts to an in-depth examination of the planning processes and organizational structures pertinent to security cooperation. The chapter culminates with an insightful analysis of operational and strategic approaches to mitigating risks associated with security cooperation.

SECTION I – STRATEGIC CONTEXT

1-1. The strategic context for security cooperation is multifaceted and dynamic, driven by a combination of global security challenges, national interests, international laws, alliances, and a range of economic, political, and technological factors.

SECURITY COOPERATION DEFINED

1-2. Security cooperation is defined as Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20).

THE PURPOSE OF SECURITY COOPERATION

1-3. The purpose behind security cooperation (SC) is to enable the joint force to leverage the capabilities of our allies and partners to meet strategic objectives by building combat power and increasing available maneuver space. Strategic competition highlights the requirement for combatant commands to shape an operational environment (OE) to deter adversaries and enable U.S. forces and our allies and partners to fight from a position of advantage in conflict. By conducting SC, the Army can add additional capability and create options for the joint force commander to engage, deter, and defeat adversaries through the most efficient use of U.S. resources.

1-4. Although the Department of State (DOS) leads the whole-of-government approach and provides oversight to SC, most Army activities are carried out and coordinated by, with, or through the theater army throughout the combatant command area of responsibility (AOR). These activities include—

- Develop and apply capabilities and capacity.
- Provide U.S. forces with access.
- Build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.

1-5. Security cooperation missions should be tied directly to supporting theater army campaign plans and potential contingency plans. SC activities are designed to develop partner capability, increase capacity, and enable interoperability. Additionally, SC missions can be used to enable access to specific key terrain needed across domains to provide maneuver space for possible contingency plans.

1-6. SC is comprised of three different activities:

- Security Force Assistance (SFA).
- Security Assistance (SA)
- Military engagement.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

1-7. Security Force Assistance is Department of Defense (DOD) activities that support the development of the d capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

1-8. Consistent with DOD policy for SFA, the Army develops, maintains, and institutionalizes the capabilities of its personnel to support DOD efforts to organize, train, equip, build, rebuild, advise, support, and liaise with FSF and relevant supporting institutions.

1-9. Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state (JP 3-22). When directed to do so in accordance with appropriate legal authorities, Army forces conduct security force assistance activities in support of combatant command campaign plans and national objectives.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

1-10. SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 3-20).

1-11. SA programs are an element of security cooperation funded under Title 22, United States Code (22 USC) and managed by the DOS. The DOD is the executive agent for SA under the DOS and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) administers the program for the DOD. SA programs are typically focused on the transfer of defense articles and services to eligible foreign governments, the provision of training and education to FSF, and the sale of construction services in support of partner nations' military establishments. (FM 3-22).

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

1-12. Military engagement is contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0).

1-13. Military engagement is one of the primary ways SC practitioners achieve influence. These key leader engagements occur at all echelons up to the highest levels of the Army staff and sometimes include major combined staff talks. Although it is common practice for military personnel to engage their counterparts in other militaries at all echelons, it is still critical for individuals and organizations conducting military engagement to understand and remember that the DOS has primary oversight for the diplomatic instrument of national power (FM 3-22).

THEATER COMMAND

1-14. Theater Commands are the primary managers of Security Cooperation activities. They serve as the regional arms that plan, coordinate, and execute initiatives aimed at strengthening alliances, building partner capacity, and promoting regional stability.

COMBATANT COMMAND

1-15. In accordance with the Unified Command Plan, combatant commands are established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Combatant commands are assigned AORs and work in support of, and in close coordination with U.S. embassies within their AORs to achieve U.S. national interests and global end states as detailed in the NSS and other guidance documents. This operational relationship is primarily related to the SC organization's execution of the combatant command's theater campaign plan with the host country's military. The combatant command and the ambassador ensure that the SDO/DATT does not receive conflicting guidance, instructions, or priorities. If conflicting guidance occurs, the SDO/DATT must seek clarification or resolution. The SDO/DATT chief is uniquely able to understand both the combatant command and the ambassador, balance their respective priorities, and leverage their resources. A key challenge for the SDO/DATT is to respond to the direction of the ambassador while at the same time satisfying coordination and support requirements from the combatant command.

1-16. DOD's strategic end states support the NSS to ensure the strategic end states complement and support foreign policy objectives. As part of theater campaign planning, combatant commands develop country plans that align with each ambassador's goals within the AOR because the activities and investments typically occur at the country level. Combatant commands exercise authority for force protection over all DOD

personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the combatant command's AOR, except for those for whom the COM retains security responsibility. This force protection authority enables combatant commands to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces. Combatant commands also provide directive authority over forces conducting exercises in that AOR.

THEATER ARMY ROLE

1-17. The Army normally executes its 10 USC, responsibilities to organize, train, and equip operational Army units through the theater army to support combatant command objectives. The theater army sets and maintains the theater for the conduct of multidomain operations. Setting the theater includes posturing Army forces and conducting SC activities that shape an OE and prevent conflict. Setting the theater shapes the environment and produces the conditions necessary for the joint force commander, when directed, to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and assure freedom of action. Sustained military engagement requires a combination of integrated regionally aligned conventional forces and ARSOF. Military engagement, along with intelligence collection and assured access, is critical to enabling the force to win decisively. Setting the theater includes theater opening; port and terminal operations; conducting reception, staging onward movement, and integration; force modernization and theater-specific training; Army support to other Services; as well as common user logistics to Army, joint, and multinational forces operating in the theater.

1-18. The theater army develops a theater campaign support plan in an annex to the combatant command campaign plan. The theater campaign support plan serves as the mechanism between planning, programming, budgeting, and execution processes by, with, or through the theater army. It is supported by Headquarters, Department of the Army; functional Army Service component commands (ASCCs); Army commands; direct reporting units (known as DRUs); and the Reserve Component to resource SC activities that shape an OE and achieve combatant command campaign plan (CCP) objectives and joint strategic campaign plan end states.

1-19. The theater army is the ASCC to the combatant command and fulfills all requirements of a Service component for Army forces assigned or attached to the combatant command. The theater army's primary responsibilities are—

- Execute combatant commander's daily operational requirements.
- Provide administrative control of Army forces.
- Set and maintain the theater.
- Set and support the operational areas.
- Plan and coordinate the consolidation of gains in support of joint operations.
- Exercise command and control over Army forces in theater.
- Perform joint roles in limited scope, scale, and duration.

1-20. ATP 3-93 depicts the organization of the theater army main command post. The theater army SC division normally resides within the assistant chief of staff G-3. It normally consists of a headquarters section, a plans and exercises section, and an international military affairs section with the total division consisting of eight to ten personnel and normally led by a colonel or lieutenant colonel.

SECTION II — U.S. EMBASSIES

1-21. The US Embassy serves as the primary representative of the US Government in a foreign country. The US Ambassador, or Chief of Mission, is the direct representative of the US President. Each ambassador reports directly to the President. Within the embassy are representatives from multiple US agencies, including the Department of Defense. The number of agencies represented will depend on the size of the embassy. Each of these agency representatives reports to the US Ambassador, who has authority and responsibility for all US government activities in the foreign nation. See Appendix I, US Embassy, for detailed information on US Embassies.

1-22. Department of Defense representation at U.S. Embassies overseas is generally divided into two principal offices with separate but mutually supportive roles, responsibilities, and authorities. These are the defense attaché office and the security cooperation organization. The defense attaché is also typically the senior defense official in country and referred to by the title SDO/DATT (Figure 1).




Figure 1-1. U.S. Government organization for security assistance and security cooperation

Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché

1-23. The Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) is the Chief of Mission's (CoM) principal diplomatically accredited military advisor and representative of all Department of Defense (DOD) elements within the country team, except for the Marine Security Guard detachment. The SDO/DATT is the single point of contact for all DOD elements working within or from the embassy.

Defense Attaché Office

1-24. The defense attaché office is an office of Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The senior defense official/ defense attaché heads the defense attaché office in country and is a member of the country team. The senior defense official/defense attaché is the principal military advisor to the chief of mission on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited Department of Defense military officer assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all Department of Defense matters involving the embassy or Department of Defense elements assigned to or working from the embassy. The defense attaché is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the

mission. The senior defense official/defense attaché is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to U.S. Government officials for in-country U.S. defense issues and activities that are not under the purview of the parent Department of Defense components. The attachés serve as liaisons with their host-nation counterparts and are valuable sources of information for the chief of mission and geographic combatant commander on the military affairs of the host nation. The defense attaché may be accredited to more than one country. The senior defense official/defense attaché is also the in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographic combatant commander, and is responsible (under the direction of the chief of mission) for coordinating administrative and security matters for all Department of Defense elements assigned to the country (except those under the control of a geographic combatant commander). The attachés assist in the foreign internal defense program by exchanging information with the geographic combatant commander's staff on host-nation military, political, humanitarian, religious, social, and economic conditions, and interagency coordination.

Security Cooperation Organization

1-25. The mission of the security cooperation organization is to enhance the long-term bilateral defense relationship between the host-country and the United States. This is accomplished by managing the many programs that fall under the security assistance and security cooperation umbrella. These include International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and special foreign assistance authorities such as Global Train and Equip (initially authorized by Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006). The security cooperation organization also manages humanitarian and civic assistance projects and serves as the principal U.S. Embassy liaison for the National Guard State Partnership Program and other training and assistance programs. The security cooperation organization chief serves as the geographic combatant command representative for cooperative security assistance to the country team and coordinates with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

1-26. A security cooperation organization typically consists of one to three U.S. military officers and may employ several foreign-service nationals. Not all Embassies have a specific security cooperation organization; rather, some may have only had a defense attaché office or no military personnel at all. In many countries, security cooperation and assistance functions are performed within the defense attaché office. The structure and existence of these offices may differ depending on the size of the U.S. mission, the nature of the bilateral relationship with the host-nation, or the organization of the geographic combatant command.

1-27. Security cooperation organization is a generic term that refers to Department of Defense organizations in a foreign country to carry out security cooperation and security assistance management tasks. These organizations and offices will have their own formal titles or designations—some established through joint diplomatic agreement between the United States and host nation.

Table 1-1 provides a list of the current security cooperation organization designations around the world. The term security cooperation organization is used throughout this publication.

Table 1-1. Security Cooperation Organization

Office Acronym	*Local Title*
JUSMAG-P	Joint United States Military Assistance Group (Philippines)
JUSMAG-T	Joint United States Military Advisory Group (Thailand)
JUSMAG-K	Joint United States Military Affairs Group (Korea)
KUSLO	Kenya—United States Liaison Office
MAP	Military Assistance Program (Jordan)
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office (Japan)
NLO	Navy Liaison Office (Bahamas)
ODC	Office of Defense Cooperation (approximately fifty European, East Asian countries, and others)
ODC	Office of Defense Coordination (Mexico)

Table 1-1. Security Cooperation Organization (Continued)

Office Acronym	*Local Title*
ODR	Office of Defense Representative (Costa Rica)
ODRP	Office of Defense Representative—Pakistan
OMC	Office of Military Cooperation (Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Qatar, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen)
OSC	Office of Security Cooperation (all African countries except Kenya; Iraq)
SAO-A	Security Assistance Office–Afghanistan (this office is a staff element within the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan [NTM-A/CSTC-A])
USLO	United States Liaison Office
USMAAG	United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (Dominican Republic, Peru)
USMILGP	United States Military Group (several South and Central American countries)
USMLO	United States Military Liaison Office (several South and Central American countries)
USMTM	United States Military Training Mission (Saudi Arabia)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT

1-28. A third Department of Defense office that may be encountered is a Department of Defense force protection detachment. The primary mission of force protection detachment is to detect and warn of threats to Department of Defense personnel (military, civilian, and dependents) and resources in-transit at overseas locations without a permanent Department of Defense counterintelligence presence. Force protection detachments serve as force protection multipliers for the U.S. Embassy country team in support of the Department of Defense presence in those overseas locations. Force protection detachments work directly with the regional security office to ensure the safety and security of Department of Defense personnel under the force-protection authority of the geographic combatant command.

SECTION III — SFA FORCES

1-29. The Army conducts SFA through both specialized forces who have SFA as a core part of their mission essential task list, as well as general purpose forces who are not trained, organized and equipped to conduct SFA but may receive a task to conduct an SFA mission for a specified duration of time.

1-30. Organizations who are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct SFA include Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs), Special Forces Groups and some other SOF forces, and Digital Liaison Detachments (DLDs).

1-31. Army forces who regularly conduct SFA but are not organized, trained, and equipped to do so include National Guard forces operating under the SPP (State Partnership Program), regionally aligned forces assigned to combatant commands for general purpose missions but utilized to conduct SFA, and CONUS based forces who are specifically requested by the combatant command through an RFF to execute a specific SFA mission, often due to specific technical skill sets.

FORCES SPECIALLY TRAINED TO CONDUCT SFA

1-32. The security force assistance brigade (SFAB) is the Army's dedicated conventional organization for conducting SFA, and its capabilities allow it to execute SFA developmental activities with the partner FSF in conjunction with unified action partners anywhere in the world. The SFAB complements the DOS, foreign area officers, ARSOF, regionally aligned forces, SA teams, State Partnership Program, digital liaison detachments, and other unified action partner activities to expand access and create options for senior military and civilian leaders. During competition and campaigning, each combatant command is allocated a persistent SFAB force package. Conducting security cooperation activities under the threshold of armed conflict, the SFAB often falls under operational and administrative control of the theater army. The combatant commander assigns tactical- or operational-level SFA developmental activities to the SFAB. Advisor teams can establish

relationships among other conventional force partners to enable the rapid integration of other multinational forces that may be essential during future multidomain operations (ATP 3-96.1).

1-33. Digital liaison detachments are assigned or attached to selected theater armies for employment at the theater army or in support at corps and division echelons. These teams provide SFA to the partner FSF through digital information management and communications interface capability for U.S. systems with a subordinate or parallel joint and multinational headquarters in an operational area. Digital liaison detachments are typically embedded in their counterpart staffs to facilitate mission command by clarifying orders, interpreting commander's intent, and identifying and resolving issues (ATP 3-94.1).

1-34. Army SOF are particularly well suited to conduct SFA due to their advanced skills, capabilities, and regional orientation. SFA and FID overlap without being subsets of each other (see figure 1-1 on page 1-3). At operational and strategic levels, both SFA and FID focus on developing partner FSF internal capacity and capability, however SFA also prepares the partner FSF to defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international coalition. FID and SFA are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are applicable to both (FM 3-05).

SFA PRACTICIONERS WITHOUT SPECIALIZED TRAINING

1-35. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a joint DOD SC program authorized by 10 USC, Section 341, and governed by DODI 5111.20. The SPP is managed by the National Guard Bureau, executed by the combatant commands, and sourced by the National Guard of the states and territories. The SPP links a State's National Guard with a partner nation's military, security forces, and disaster response organizations in a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. SPP is one of the few SC programs authorized to engage across the spectrum of country governmental organizations and is a multi-categorization SC tool. Historically, the majority of SFA missions conducted in many theaters are conducted through the SPP

1-36. Regionally aligned and allocated forces provide the combatant command with tailored, responsive, and consistently available Army forces. They meet combatant command requirements for scalable, tailored capabilities to support operational missions, military exercises, and theater SC activities. They represent those Army units assigned to combatant commands, allocated to a combatant command, and those capabilities distributed and prepared by the Army for combatant command regional missions. Assigned units have a regional mission and training focus, including emerging operations, security cooperation activities, and exercises.

SECTION IV — ADVISORS

1-37. In the complex landscape of modern military operations, the role of an advisor is both critical and multifaceted. Advisors serve as a vital link between various stakeholders, including military units, governmental agencies, and sometimes even non-governmental organizations. They operate under different legal and operational frameworks, which define their scope of work and set the boundaries for their roles and responsibilities. This guide aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the roles an advisor may be called upon to perform, from observation and mentorship to mediation and legal compliance. It integrates various aspects of advisory roles, including the legal frameworks that govern them, the complex environments in which they operate, and the specific tasks they may be required to undertake. The guide serves as an essential resource for understanding the intricacies involved in being an effective advisor in a conventional military setting.

ADVISOR ROLES, SELECTION AND REQUIRED SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES

1-38. The role of an advisor within a conventional military force is a complex and multi-dimensional one, often requiring a delicate balance of observation, mentorship, and mediation. These roles are not just titles but encompass a range of responsibilities and tasks that the advisor must skillfully navigate. Whether it's providing a ground-level operational picture to higher command, fostering a strong emotional bond with the unit for effective mentorship, or serving as a diplomatic mediator between different parties, an advisor's roles are critical for mission success. This section aims to delineate these roles in detail, offering a comprehensive understanding of what each entail and how they intersect and sometimes conflict. It also

integrates considerations for legal and operational frameworks, providing a holistic view of the advisor's function in a conventional military se

1-39. tting.

1-40. Screening and selection of advisors often proves to be the single most important step in executing an SFA mission. Appendix A gives detailed guidance on advisor screening and selection.

1-41. Advising techniques. ATP 3-07.10 provides excellence Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for advisors. This Multi-Service MTTP has been adopted by all service components within DOD as the single authoritative manual for advisors from the tactical to the strategic level. After selection, all advisors must familiarize themselves with this manual as part of their individual training path. Additionally, the MATA (Military Advisor Training Academy) at Ft. Moore, GA runs a *6-week* advisor training course that focuses on training advisor skills. This course is open to all DOD members via ATRRS and awards the Advisor skill identifier.

Chapter 2

Advisory Mission Pre-deployment Planning and Preparation

This chapter focuses on the tasks that need to be accomplished prior to execution of an SFA mission. The chapter is written from the perspective of a unit being alerted to deploy for an SFA mission and having 9-10 months' time to prepare. Many SFA practitioners may have less time to prepare for their mission, ranging from 24 weeks to 24 days to 24 hours. In situations where a shortened timeline is forced, leaders must make timely decisions on what tasks can and cannot be accomplished, then inform their higher HQ of the resulting risk.

This chapter begins by discussing assessments in detail. This starts with an overview of the Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation process used in Security Cooperation and compares that to Army doctrine on assessments. Since this TC follows the Operations Process paradigm of plan, prepare, execute, assess, there is an entire chapter on assessments later in the TC. However, that chapter is dealing with post-operations assessments. This chapter begins by talking about the initial assessments. The chapter than goes on to talk about predeployment planning, and then gives a detailed timeline of predeployment tasks to plan and prepare for an SFA mission.

SECTION I OVERVIEW OF SECURITY COOPERATION ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation are essential for ensuring that Security Cooperation activities are well-targeted, efficiently executed, and effective in achieving their goals. They provide the data and insights needed to make informed decisions, improve program design, and maximize the impact of security cooperation efforts.

PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS OF ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION (AM&E):

2-1. In the complex world of Security Cooperation (SC) activities, the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of Foreign Security Forces (FSF) plays a critical role. This process begins with initial assessments which are essential for establishing a successful advising engagement with a Partner Nation (PN). These initial assessments serve dual purposes: they inform the design of advising activities, such as a Combatant Commander's (CCDR) plan, and provide a baseline for accurately measuring the progress of SC activities and the enabling programs. Monitoring activities continue during the execution of the mission, and Evaluations provide critical input on the achievement of objectives.

Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Activities (AM&E) in Joint and Army Doctrine

2-2. Department of Defense's policy on AM&E for Security Cooperation is outlined in DODI 5132.14. This DODI is based on the Congressionally directed requirements for AM&E that are directed in each annual NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act). The NDAA is re-issued every year, so specific AM&E requirements frequently change. The term AM&E is not widely used elsewhere in DOD, but it is used for Security Cooperation and is used extensively by the DOS and other inter-agency partners when referring to Security Cooperation. Note that DOS uses the term "Security Sector Assistance" rather than Security Cooperation, but the two terms are nearly identical in meaning. (FM 3-22).

2-3. Army doctrine lays out 3 types of assessments: pre-operation assessments, during operation assessments, and post-operation assessments. In common Army usage, the stand-alone term "assessment"

often refers to post-operations assessments. Multiple Army processes use the word "Assessment" in this manner. For example, the Operations Process that this TC uses as a format methodology for SFA missions is Plan, Prepare, Execute, Assess. Similarly, the Army's Targeting Process of D3A is Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess. We take the time to highlight this fact in TC 3-22 because the common Army usage of the term "Assess" differs from the usage of the word "Assess" when it is used in the AM&E framework for Security Cooperation. In the AM&E framework, assess generally equates to the pre-operations assessment in Army doctrine, while Monitor and Evaluate more closely equate to the during-operations and post-operations assessments respectively.

2-4. Joint Publication 3-20 further expounds on DODI 5132.14 by adding Recommend and Direct to AM&E. This results in JP 3-20 calling for an Initial Assessment, followed by the detailed assessment activities of Monitor, Evaluate, Recommend and Direct. This addition of Recommend and Direct in JP 3-20 is not recognized by DODI 5132.14 nor is it used by DSCA or the interagency community. Most significantly, SFA practitioners need to be aware of the Security Cooperation usage of Assess, Monitor and Evaluate as used in DODI 5132.14 rather than the common Army usage of the term "Assess" to ensure they are utilizing a common language with our inter-agency partners when operating in the Security Cooperation /Security Sector Assistance realm.

ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES

2-5. Detailed assessment activities involve a comprehensive evaluation of the security environment, partner capabilities, needs, cultural and political context, risks, and stakeholder perspectives. These activities provide the foundation for effective planning, implementation, and evaluation of Security Cooperation efforts, ensuring that they are well-targeted, contextually appropriate, and aligned with strategic objectives.

ASSESSMENT (INITIAL)

2-6. Key elements of these initial assessments focus on three fundamental and interrelated considerations. First is the level of progress towards building a robust security relationship with the PN, which is crucial for understanding the depth and efficacy of cooperation. Second is the assessment of the FSF's capability and capacity, offering insights into their operational readiness and potential areas for development. The third aspect is the assessment of U.S. access within the PN, including the anticipated freedom of action, which hinges on the bilateral relationship between the United States and the PN.

MONITORING PROCESS

2-7. Monitoring in SC activities involves a comprehensive and ongoing observation of joint forces and FSF. Advisors, working closely with their counterparts, play a crucial role in this process. They focus on understanding how partner forces and mission accomplishment evolve over time, even across multiple advisor missions. Monitoring uses Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) to track FSF tasks and informs decisions at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This involves assessing whether tasks are completed as planned, within the stipulated timeline, and within projected costs.

2-8. End-Use-Monitoring (EUM) is a specific monitoring requirement dictated by Congress. It is often associated with the SA activities of Foreign Military Sales and may consist of such things as serial number inventories and monitoring to determine if law of war violations have occurred. SFA practitioners will rarely be asked to directly participate in EUM, but they may assist the SCO in EUM while monitoring the progress of their partner forces.

EVALUATION PROCESS

2-9. Evaluation, an essential aspect of the commander's role, can occur at any level. It involves the systematic collection and analysis of information about ongoing or completed SC activities. This process assesses an advisor mission's relevance, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, with a focus on documenting achievements, attaining end states, and determining the value of continuing advising activities. Evaluations are typically administered by teams from a Combatant Command (CCMD), Subordinate Unified Command (SCC), or Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) headquarters, with advisors contributing objective assessments and data. These evaluations are critical at the strategic level and depend on operational evaluations to understand why certain efforts succeed or fail.

SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

Deployment planning is a critical and complex phase, faced with various challenges such as resource constraints, cultural differences, and logistical complexities. Collaborative planning across different levels of command is essential to ensure a well-prepared and effective advising mission. See ATP 3-07.10 for more information.

INITIAL COORDINATING AND PLANNING EVENTS

2-10. Conduct an in-depth mission analysis to determine readiness and initiate necessary coordination for entering and operating within the host country. This phase sets the foundation for a successful deployment and operation.

MULT ECHELON PLANNING

2-11. Establish clear command and support relationships. Assess and integrate operational requirements with the mission's objectives. Develop and refine measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for various courses of action, ensuring alignment with broader security objectives and plans.

FUNDING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

2-12. Identifying appropriate funding sources and coordinating with related agencies for mission support is pivotal. This includes understanding the implications of different funding authorities and ensuring that financial resources are aligned with the mission's needs and objectives.

PRE-MISSION PLANNING AND CULTURAL ACCLIMATIZATION

2-13. Thorough review and analysis of existing campaign and country plans are essential. This helps in identifying gaps in capabilities or capacities of the host nation's forces. Additionally, a deep understanding of the host nation's culture, politics, and social dynamics is crucial for developing rapport and effective collaboration.

HOST NATION APPROVAL AND COUNTRY CLEARANCES

2-14. Navigating the visa application process and ensuring compliance with country clearance requirements are critical administrative tasks. Efficient handling of these processes prevents delays and ensures smooth entry and operation within the host country.

LEGAL BRIEFINGS AND COMPLIANCE

2-15. Comprehensive briefings on the rules of engagement, local laws, and customs are vital. These briefings, typically provided by the Staff Judge Advocate, ensure that the advising team operates within the legal boundaries and respects the host nation's legal framework.

DETAILED PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEYS

2-16. Conducting thorough site surveys provides essential insights into the operational environment. These surveys inform the advising team about command structures, support mechanisms, and sustainment relationships, vital for mission success.

MEDICAL AND HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

2-17. Assessing medical capabilities in relation to the mission's requirements is crucial. This includes understanding local medical infrastructure, evacuation procedures, and availability of medical supplies, ensuring the health and safety of the team.

ADVISOR TEAM COMPOSITION AND TRAINING

2-18. Tailoring the advising team to fit the specific requirements of the mission is essential. This involves assessing the proficiency levels and resources of the host nation's forces and organizing the advising team accordingly. Continuous mission analysis supports a range of advising tasks, from institutional instruction to tactical training.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

2-19. Understanding the degree of unit dispersion and preparing for independent operations if necessary is critical. This includes considerations for communication, supply chains, and emergency procedures, ensuring operational effectiveness and safety in a dispersed environment.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY AND SAFETY

2-20. Developing and refining personnel recovery plans is essential, especially for geographically dispersed deployments. These plans should be regularly reviewed and updated to ensure the safety and security of the advising team members.

SECTION III — DEPLOYMENT–300 TO DEPLOYMENT

Deployment is a carefully planned operation. The path to deployment is punctuated by a sequence of essential tasks crafted to help ensure the deploying unit is ready for its mission. From the Geographic Combatant Command issuing task orders to the collaboration with Army Service Component Commands and Security Cooperation Organizations, each step is vital. This document presents a detailed timeline of tasks that need to be completed prior to deployment.

D–300 TASKS

2-21. The following sections details tasks broken down by a recommended NLT day to have the task completed. In many cases, units will be alerted for deployment inside of this timeline. In that case, unit commands may have to determine which tasks they will have to assume risk with and inform their higher headquarters of the risk taken.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND ISSUES TASK ORDER

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:** Subordinate commands.
- **Remarks:** The geographic combatant command issues a task order to the deploying element with required formats. Traffic is passed to the deploying unit on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network. The deploying element higher headquarters must identify the command and support relationships for the deploying element to determine who has operational control, tactical control, and administrative control over the element while in country.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND PROVIDES EXERCISE/ TRAINING TERMS AND FUNDING LINES AVAILABLE

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The geographic combatant commander provides the Army Service component command with exercise/ training terms and funding lines available. This document serves as an example for understanding operational requirements, funding, and authorities linked to assigned exercise or training missions.

The ASCC will work with the Security Cooperation Division, the advising unit-to-deploy, and the host nation to identify essential tasks to be trained on. NOTE: The type of authority may impact the Essential Tasks/activities the advising unit can conduct with the host nation.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT REVIEWS SECURITY COOPERATION CHECKLIST (SEE APPENDIX J) WITH GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND AND ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element Higher headquarters (S3/G3).

- **Remarks:** The deploying element reviews the deployment or guidelines with the geographic combatant command and Army Service component command. The deploying element updates as required and according to geographic combatant command deployment standard operating procedures.

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION CONDUCTS VETTING OF HOST-NATION FORCES TO TRAIN

- **Originator:** Appropriate security cooperation organization
- **Staffing:** Department of State.
- **Remarks:** The host-nation units must meet U.S. statutory criteria and human-rights requirements. (Planners should refer to the Leahy Amendment for additional information and training guidance to elements that have a duty to report.) The deploying element leadership must have a list of vetted host nation personnel and units they are authorized to engage with. Typically, the Leahy Vetting can take between 60-120 days for processing and approval.

U.S. EMBASSY AND GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND PROVIDE MISSION APPROVAL

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (G3 or S3)
  - Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element identifies the commander's purpose, intent, and mission statement; constraints; restrictions; rules of engagement; and implied tasks to finalize mission planning. The deploying element develops task organization and by-name deployment roster to commence critical administrative requirements.

D–240 TO D–210 TASKS

DEPLOYING ELEMENT REVIEWS AND ASSESSES HIGHER HEADQUARTERS OPERATION ORDER/OPERATION PLAN CONCEPT OF SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S4)
  - Operational contract support staff.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element should review any existing higher headquarters planning documents to determine how sustainment is to be provided during the operation. Based on analysis of these plans, planners determine what sustainment gaps exist and may need to be filled by contracted support. Common examples that should be considered or may require contracting or other purchasing means are linguists, class I, lodging, mobile telephones, Internet, vehicles, drivers, and fuel.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT DETERMINES POTENTIAL CONTRACT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AND OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT POINTS OF CONTACT

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S4 and operational contract support)
  - Geographic combatant command (J8).
- **Remarks:** Many Army unit staffs have one or more operational contract support–trained staff officers or noncommissioned officers, sometimes working together as an operational contract support cell that leads and coordinates operational contract support planning and integration across the command. These individuals—who may be part of the deploying unit or higher headquarters staff—should be consulted as soon as the deploying element identifies it may use existing contract support or require new contract support for the operation. The operational contract support cell can assist the deploying element with the following:
  - Coordinating for contract support that already exists in theater.

- Providing important points of contact for supporting theater support contracting activities and civil augmentation program support available (for example, logistics civil augmentation program).
- Understanding capabilities, limitations, and restrictions on use of contracted support.
- Assisting with requirements development and submitting contract support request packages.
- Understanding and complying with contract oversight requirements (usually through identification and nomination of qualified, formally trained contracting officer representatives).
- If no operational contract support cell or operational contract support–trained individuals exist within the deploying unit or higher headquarters staff, planners should seek assistance from supporting contracting activity or contracting support brigade. JP 4-10 and ATP 4-92 provide additional information on operational contract support planning and execution.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT DETERMINES IF AN ACSA (ACQUISITION AND CROSS-SERVING AGREEMENT) IS IN PLACE WITH THE HOST NATION

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S4 and operational contract support)
  - Geographic combatant command (J8).
- **Remarks:** An ACSA allows US personnel to draw support directly from the host nation. The host nation is then monetarily reimbursed for this support. This is often the preferred way for Advisory forces to draw their support. When advising in combat operations, this may be the ONLY way for US Advisors to draw some types of support.
  - If an ACSA is not currently in effect with a host nation, SFA forces should endeavor to set one up as part of their mission. This will significantly ease advising during combat if the mission transitions from competition to crisis/combat, or if the US works with the partner nation to conduct combat operations at any point in the future.
  - At times, the primary strategic goal of a particular SFA mission may simply be to get an ACSA in place to set conditions for possible future combat operations. See FM 3-22 for further details.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS GOVERNMENT TRAVEL CREDIT CARD APPLICATION AND COMPLETES TRAINING

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 Defense Travel System manager).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must allot enough time for the predeployment site survey team to complete and receive cards before departure. All members of the deploying element should apply for government travel cards. Deploying Element Identifies and Orders All Necessary Major End Items.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS GOVERNMENT TRAVEL CREDIT CARD APPLICATION AND COMPLETES TRAINING

- **Originator:** Deploying element supply; medical; communication; and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear personnel.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element identifies and orders all necessary major end items and other items (for example, medical items; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment; tool kits; engineer equipment; communication equipment; and so on) identified as shortages to ensure they are fully mission capable. Planners should refer to the deployment order and geographic combatant command guidance for mission applicability.
  - For medical events where there is a need for higher care, Soldiers should request an authorization through International SOS (TriCare) for covering medical bills. When possible, this should happen prior the medical care.
  - Any medical emergencies where an out-of-country air evacuation is needed, the unit should contact the US Embassy and the ASCC for coordination.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM SUBMITS PASSPORT/ VISA REQUESTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 battalion [unit] passport manager).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element should plan for (and expect) significant delays during the visa application process due to political considerations and potential inefficiencies at host-nation embassies and consulates. Some countries may require a letter of introduction that should be requested through the supported Embassy security cooperation organization. An approved visa is often required for country clearance and can delay the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System approval process. Deploying units should always refer to the Foreign Clearance Guide to verify the entry requirements.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS BEGINS SOURCING FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE–SPECIFIC OR REQUIRED MOVEMENT TRAINING

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Unit and post training management.
- **Remarks:** Required training to prepare a security force assistance training team may need to be resourced through an outside agency (for example, a mobile training team) or prioritized amongst competing home-station units and should be sourced as soon as possible. Planners should refer to AR 350-1 and installation –specific training management and resourcing regulations for specific requirements and constraints.

D–180 TASKS

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND ISSUES INITIAL TERMS OF REFERENCE AND GUIDANCE

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element or its higher headquarters (S3 or G3).
- **Remarks:** The geographic combatant command issues initial terms of reference and guidance to the appropriate Service component command, which submits a request for forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the geographic combatant command and the Service. The deploying element is designated and issued a warning order, which formalizes its plans for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; base support; communications integration; and sustainment. Deploying units facilitate mission planning by conducting predeployment site surveys and subsequent coordination for ammunition, air, and logistics.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND IDENTIFIES FUNDING AUTHORITIES

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command or higher headquarters (G3 or S3).
- **Staffing:**
  - Deploying element
  - Higher headquarters (S3 and S4).
- **Remarks:** The Geographic Combatant Command in coordination with the Embassy Security Cooperation Office determines if the mission will be done under Title 10 (SFA) or Title 22 (SA) authority. The geographic combatant command identifies Title 22 funding authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act (if appropriate) and coordinates with the U.S. Embassy and Department of State to transfer funds through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to Service component commands. Service component commands execute a military interdepartmental purchase request to obtain funding. If under Title 10 authority, Army Service component commands (or a designated joint task force) are funded through the established base budget, overseas contingency operations funding, or funds otherwise appropriated by Congress. If required, the geographic combatant command (in conjunction with the country team) negotiates an acquisition and cross-support agreement with the host nation to ensure payment of logistical support for services provided by the host nation. Additionally, other bilateral agreements may exist that ensure the availability of appropriated host-nation resources. These agreements may include payment to the U.S. through

foreign military sales. Note that if the deployment is funded through Title 22 funds, the mission is actually to conduct Security Assistance. If the deployment is funded through Title 10 funds, the mission is to conduct Security Force Assistance. For the mission executor on the ground, the difference between conducting SA and SFA may be transparent. However, the two different Security Cooperation funding sources come with different authorities, restrictions, and administrative requirements.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND GRANTS DIRECT LIAISON AUTHORITY

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element and their higher headquarters.
- **Remarks:** The geographic combatant command grants direct liaison authority between the deploying element and security cooperation organization or assigns deploying forces to a Service component or a joint task force. Additional levels of command may require copies of official traffic and coordination.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS PROPOSED PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY DATES

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S3)
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element submits proposed predeployment site survey dates to the geographic combatant command. The proposed dates should include time spent going to and from the geographic combatant command headquarters for briefings and guidance, as well as travel to the host nation. Planners must consider crossing time zones and delays in foreign countries. Planners must anticipate the requirements to obtain official passports and visas. In addition, planners must consider whether they will be using commercial aircraft or U.S. military aircraft. Country clearance requirements by country are published in the Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm). Country clearance is obtained through the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System; this system may be accessed at https://apacs.dtic.mil (for unclassified missions and travel) or https://apacs.dtic.smil.mil (for classified missions and travel).

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONFIRMS OPERATIONS ORDER ISSUE FROM GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters staff.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** It is important for the deploying element to identify issues prior to advance echelon departure.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONTINUES CONTRACT SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS DEVELOPMENT

- **Originator:** Deploying element (requiring activity).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (operational contracting support staff, S4, and supporting contracting activity/ contracting support brigade).
- **Remarks:** Requiring activities routinely perform requirements development tasks. Requirements development begins with the decision, based on the overall support planning process, that a unit's support requirements (supply, service, or minor construction) will be fulfilled by commercial support. General requiring activity requirements development related tasks include the following:
  - Developing contract support requirements packages to include independent government estimate, initial statement of work or performance works statements, any letters of justification, draft quality assurance and surveillance plan for service contracts, and any other supporting documents, as required.
  - Obtaining local staff, command, and funding approval of all requirements packages.

- Nominating technically qualified and process-trained contracting officer representatives for service contracts.
- Tracking contract support requirements packages through the approval process.
- If members of the deploying element will be working at the U.S. Embassy or receiving support or services from non-Department of Defense Embassy offices, the Department of Defense may need to reimburse the Department of State for these services using the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services System. These requirements should be discussed with the security cooperation organization and Embassy financial management office during the predeployment site survey.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SELECTS ADVISORS FOR THE MISSION (GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES ONLY). SEE APPENDIX A (ADVISOR SCREENING AND SELECTION).

- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters
- **Remarks:** General purpose forces who are not organized, trained, and equipped for SFA tasks must select which members of the unit will serve as advisors for the deployment. Historically, the selection of advisors is often the most important task to enable success of an SFA mission. See Appendix A, Advisor Screening and Selection, for details on selecting advisors. The selection of advisors made at this stage of the process is not final. Following the PDSS (Pre-Deployment Site Survey), the deploying unit should update its Advisor selection based on information learned/confirmed during the PDSS.

DEPLOYING ADVISORS FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH APPROVED TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR ADVISING FROM ATP 3-07.10

- **Staffing:** Deploying headquarters
- **Remarks:** ATP 3-07.10 is a multi-service TTP providing approved tactics, techniques, and procedures for advising across all service components.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND AND UNIT REQUIRED TRAINING

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Army Service component command
  - Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** All regionally aligned forces are required to be trained in their standard Headquarters Department of the Army–approved mission-essential task list. Regionally aligned forces in support of United Nations or African Union peacekeeping missions receive training from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Regionally aligned forces in support of advise-and-assist missions receive training from 3-353d Advise and Assist Battalion (Joint Readiness Training Center). (U.S. Forces Command Order: Regionally Aligned Forces Training Requirements [111316ZFEB14]).

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES BASIC EMBASSY KNOWLEDGE TRAINING

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command/Army Service component command.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must ensure Soldiers are trained on basic embassy structure and personnel. The country Embassy Web page should provide updated information on personnel and activities. Utilize CALL Handbook 23-05-(730), Guide to the US Embassy, as a reference and see Appendix I, US Embassy.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES BASIC SECURITY COOPERATION TRAINING

- **Originator:** Deploying unit.
- **Staffing:** Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance.

- **Remarks:** All deploying leaders should go to Joint Knowledge Online and take the following JKO course: Security Force Assistance 101- J3OP-US1336 (1hr). This one-hour course provides an excellent overview of Security Cooperation and Security Force Assistance from the strategic down to the tactical level.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT REGISTERS FOR SOCIUM ACCOUNTS AND COMPLETE SOCIUM USER TRAINING

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** DSCU (Defense Security Cooperation University)
- **Remarks:** All deploying leaders should have a SOCIUM account. SOCIUM is the web-based program of record for all Security Cooperation events. All SFA events must be recorded in SOCIUM, to include Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation data from the event. SFA practitioners must register for a SOCIUM account and take the basic user course. This will enable them to record their own SFA activities, as well as refer to past and adjacent SFA events within their Area of Interest. See Appendix K (SOCIUM) for detailed instructions.

DEPLOYING ELEMENTS RESEARCH PREVIOUS AND ADJACENT SFA AND SA MISSIONS IN THEIR AREA OF INTEREST AND COORDINATES AS APPROPRIATE

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Security Cooperation Office for US Embassy in host nation, National Guard SPP partner for host nation, regionally aligned SFAB for AOR, TSOC for AOR,, SATMO (Security Assistance Training Management Organization).
- **Remarks:** Prior to developing a tentative concept for execution of partner training, the deploying element research past and ongoing SFA events with the partner nation. Some of these events will be in SOCIUM; however, SOCIUM is a recent program of record, and the database is not complete. If the deploying element is relieving an outgoing SFA element for a persistent advising mission, the outgoing element will have most of the necessary information. If not, the Security Cooperation Office within the US Embassy of the Host Nation should have a record of previous SFA events that may be related to your mission. Most partner nations also have a SPP (State Partnership Program) partner from the National Guard. The SPP partner for that nation will have detailed information on the host nation's military and previous SFA missions, to include monitoring and evaluation information from the mission. Additionally, the regionally aligned SFABs may have conducted missions with that particular host nation. If so, they will also have information on the host nation military and a record of previous SFA missions they have conducted. Last of all, SATMO is the organization that manages all SA events for the US Army. These training events are often tied to items such as FMS (Foreign Military Sales) and may be contracted training. Understanding SATMO-driven training events within the host nation is also important. Gathering all of this information is critical to developing a realistic tentative concept of training prior to conducting the Initial Assessment on the PDSS.

DEVELOP TENTATIVE CONCEPT(S) OF TRAINING PRIOR TO PDSS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Security Cooperation Organization
- **Remarks:** During the PDSS, leaders from the deploying element will conduct the Initial Assessment. Conducting through research and developing tentative concepts for training prior to the PDSS will assist in this effort. SFA practitioners must be highly cautioned to not become wed to their tentative concept. In all likelihood, it will change significantly during the Initial Assessment. However, going into the PDSS with a tentative concept—or multiple tentative concepts, is advisable. Note that the tentative plan must consider all congressionally mandated WPS (Women, Peace, and Security) requirements as appropriate, IAW Appendix I. Also, see Appendix B, Team Leader Checklist, re: concept of training.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT RECEIVES MEDICAL THREAT BRIEF

- **Originator:** Medical personnel

- **Staffing:** Deploying element
- **Remarks:** The deploying element receives pertinent medical threat information and guidance per their respective mission, theater, and area of responsibility.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS AMMUNITION REQUEST

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3 ammunition manager).
- **Remarks:** Request should be submitted not later than 180 days prior to the draw date. Planners must identify ammunition type by Department of Defense Identification Code. Ammunition required will be from two categories: 1) ammunition required to conduct the host-nation security force assistance training, and 2) force protection ammunition, which requires a separate request for each category. Deploying element should coordinate with the Department of Defense office to ensure that host-nation–specific ammunition restrictions and requirements are considered.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS AMMUNITION PURCHASE REQUEST

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Remarks**: The deploying element should submit this request if Title 10 ammunition is required (that is, if the unit is not utilizing preprogrammed training ammunition).

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM COMPLETES THEATER/COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUIRED TRAINING

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team and deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Battalion (unit) passport manager and S3.
- **Remarks:** Planners should reference the mission execution order or deployment order for specific training requirements. The predeployment site survey team must adhere to the strict guidelines described in Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm) Theater/country clearance requires the following: Antiterrorism/Force Protection Level 1 training, an updated DD Form 1833, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 training; human rights class; updated passport and visa; theater-required vaccinations and yellow shot card; and itinerary.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES TRAVEL ITINERARY FOR PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element, geographic combatant command, security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** Itinerary dates should include time spent going to and from the geographic combatant command headquarters for briefings, guidance, and so on, and travel to the host nation. The predeployment site survey team should refer to the geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures for additional information.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS PASSPORT/VISA REQUESTS FOR MAIN BODY

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 battalion [unit] passport manager).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element should expect and plan for significant delays during the visa application process due to political considerations and potential inefficiencies at host nation embassies and consulates. Some countries may require a letter of introduction that should be requested through the supported Embassy Department of Defense office.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS CUSTOMS FORMS, DIPLOMATIC NOTE, COPY OF DENSITY LIST

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**

  - Higher headquarters (S2 and S3)
  - Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** Units should contact the geographic combatant command or refer to the deployment order for additional guidance.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COORDINATES WITH UNIT PASSPORT MANAGER

- **Originator**: Deploying element.
- **Staffing**: Higher headquarters (S1 or unit passport manager).
- **Remarks**: The deploying element is responsible for maintaining copies of all official passports and expiration dates. Additional information may be found in the unit standard operating procedures.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COORDINATES MOVEMENT SUPPORT

- **Originator**: Deploying element.
- **Staffing**:
  - Higher headquarters (S4 or G4)
  - Installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and higher headquarters requests movement support from their installation transportation office. The installation transportation office is the coordinating agency for military and commercial aircraft and ships. The installation transportation office coordinates movement to the aerial port of debarkation if the installation does not have a collocated airfield. CJCSI 4120.02C provides additional information regarding movement priority for specific mission types. Deploying elements and headquarters should refer to the Defense Transportation Regulation to ensure that coordinated transportation plans comply with applicable regulatory requirements.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS VERIFIES AMMUNITION HANDLER CERTIFICATION

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must have personnel that are certified for movement of supplies and equipment. Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedure and check for installation availability.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS VERIFIES HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CERTIFICATION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must have personnel that are hazardous material certified for movement of supplies and equipment. Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedure and check for installation availability.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT IDENTIFIES STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (IF APPLICABLE)

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (staff judge advocate).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Specific restrictions or requirements of the status of-forces agreement will inform training and affect administrative and logistical requirements. The unit staff judge advocate should brief deploying unit leadership on specific legal protections provided by the status-of-forces agreement or other agreements between the U.S. Government and the host nation. If there is no SOFA, the US Embassy, through the Security Cooperation Office, can provide information on existing Diplomatic Notes that are fulfilling that function.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS COORDINATE WITH EMBASSY DEFENSE ATTACHÉ OFFICE AND SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.

- **Remarks:** The deploying element should contact the U.S. Embassy security cooperation organization to coordinate the conduct of the predeployment site survey and verify country clearance requirements for predeployment site survey team– to include team composition, mission, timeline and desired itinerary, and tasks. The Embassy security cooperation organization will coordinate to support the predeployment site survey and ensure that the senior defense official, ambassador, and country team are aware of and concur with the predeployment site survey prior to execution. The security cooperation organization schedules required protocol and briefings at the Embassy and with the host nation.

Predeployment Site Survey Team Submits Theater/Country Clearance Requests Using the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey element or higher headquarters (S-3).
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System is a Web-based tool designed to aid Department of Defense travelers on official business overseas in meeting the clearance requirements outlined in the Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide. The Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System can be accessed using a Department of Defense common access card at https://apacs.dtic.mil. The Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System automates the process of requesting and approving diplomatic and personnel clearances through a common, centralized, and secure database. The deploying element team must adhere to the strict guidelines described in Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm). Depending on unit or supported command standard operating procedures, the deploying element, higher headquarters or supported command will submit the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System itinerary for the deploying element to obtain theater and country clearance prior to travel. The Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System requests must be submitted not later than 30 days prior to departure. The deploying element should contact their geographic combatant command and security cooperation organization points of contact prior to submitting an Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System request to ensure local policies and procedures are followed and to facilitate rapid processing.

D–160 TASKS

Deploying Element and Higher Headquarters Determine Linguist Support Requirements and Availability

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:**
  - Geographic combatant command, higher headquarters (G3)
  - Security cooperation office.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must consult the deployment order and geographic combatant command to determine linguist support requirements or designated attachments. If none are provided or available, deploying element should coordinate with the security cooperation organization for local-national interpreter support. See Appendix G for more detail on linguists.

Deploying Element Identifies Place, Unit, and Personnel it Will Link Up With During the Predeployment Site Survey

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element should identify if the personnel and unit present during the predeployment site survey will be the same personnel from the unit performing the linkup upon main-body arrival.

- Deploying Element confirms that Theater/Country

CLEARANCE REQUESTS FOR PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM ARE APPROVED

- **Originator:** Deploying Element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
  - Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must adhere to the strict guidelines described in Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm). Theater/country clearance requires the following: Antiterrorism/Force Protection Level 1 training, an updated ISOPREP Card (DD Form 1833); Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 training; human rights class; updated passport and visa; and itinerary.

D–150 THROUGH D–100 TASKS

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM PROVIDES IN-BRIEF TO GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND (IF APPLICABLE)

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command staff.
- **Remarks:** The predeployment site survey team performs an in-brief as required by the mission and the geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM DEPLOYS

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The predeployment site survey team should deploy not later than D–120.

U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND FINALIZE TERMS OF REFERENCE

- **Originator:** security cooperation organization and geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:**
  - Host nation.
  - Security cooperation organization
  - Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The U.S. embassy and the geographic combatant command representative identify what the deploying element will provide and what the host nation will provide. Changes to initial terms of reference must be identified.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM SENDS THE INITIAL ENTRY REPORT

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command and higher headquarters (S3 or G3).
- **Remarks:** The initial entry report is sent as required by the geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures (usually within a few hours of arrival).

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM CONDUCTS SURVEY (SEE APPENDIX C)

- **Originator**: Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing**: Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The predeployment site survey team gathers all pertinent data on the predeployment site survey checklist to have accurate data for requests for supplies and requests for information. See Appendix C for a PDSS guide and checklist.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM SECURES MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR TRAINING BETWEEN HOST-NATION COMMANDER AND MISSION COMMANDER (IF APPLICABLE)

- **Originator**: Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:**
  - Security cooperation organization
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Higher headquarters (G3 or S3).
- **Remarks:** The memorandum of agreement outlines the terms agreed upon by all parties involved in the training, providers of resource requirements, and outcome expectations with direct assistance from security cooperation organization. The memorandum of agreement should be distributed to the host nation unit and higher headquarters by the security cooperation organization and to the geographic combatant command, Army Service component command, and deploying unit higher headquarters by the predeployment site survey team. Depending on the mission type, size, and scope, the deploying unit may support an existing agreement or an ongoing engagement. In this case, the predeployment site survey team must confirm training and resource requirements for which they will be responsible during the deployment.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM REDEPLOYS THROUGH GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The predeployment site survey team redeploys according to the geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM IDENTIFIES NONDISCLOSURE APPROVALS AT GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

- **Originator**: Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:**
  - Security cooperation organization
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Higher headquarters (G3 or S3).
- **Remarks**: The predeployment site survey team identifies nondisclosure approvals that are not contained within the developed mission training strategy to maintain operations security.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM OUT BRIEFS THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command staff.
- **Remarks:** The predeployment site survey team out briefs the geographic combatant command according to the mission and geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures.

PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY TEAM SUBMITS TRIP REPORT AND AFTER-ACTION REVIEWS

- **Originator:** Predeployment site survey team.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3) and supported command.
- **Remarks**: This report may be submitted to others as required.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT LINKS UP WITH THE AIR FORCE LIAISON

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.

- **Remarks:** If the deploying element is using a new landing strip for training, the U.S. Air Force will need to send personnel to certify the location.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND DISPENSES MONIES ALLOCATED TO MISSION

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- Staffing:
  - Higher headquarters (G3 or S3)
  - Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The geographic combatant command identifies and disseminates the amount of money allocated to mission budget and constraints. Funding may include more than one title authority (that is, more than one "pot of money" to resource the mission), title funding authority, and amount allocated. The Army Service component command identifies resources required to fund basing and operations in conjunction with security force assistance. The Army Service component command apportions resources out of on-hand operations and maintenance funding and accounts for expenditures. Those apportioned funds are derived from existing operations and maintenance funds or overseas contingency operations funds until such time that the mission becomes a named operation, and then funds are appropriated for the mission by Congress under Title 10. The geographic combatant command identifies and disseminates any on-hand funds it wishes to use from funds previously apportioned through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency in conjunction with humanitarian assistance programs, counterterrorism programs, or commanders' initiative funds that may contribute to the foreign humanitarian assistance mission.

GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND ASSIGNS A MISSION TRACKING NUMBER

- **Originator:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (G3 or S3)
  - Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The geographic combatant command assigns a mission tracking number. This number is used for all requests for information, requests for supplies, and for mission tracking purposes on unclassified media.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS UPDATES AND CONTINUES INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** This data is used to plan and develop the personnel recovery plan, threat assessments, briefs, and so on.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS DETAILED BUDGET ESTIMATE FOR APPROVAL

- **Originator:** Deploying element or higher headquarters (S3 and S4).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and S3 G4 and G3).
- **Remarks:** Upon completion of the predeployment site survey, the deploying element identifies ammunition, air, transportation, life-support, contracts, Embassy services (requiring International Cooperative Administrative Support Services billing), and operational fund costs to be within budget. Planners should use unit or geographic combatant command provided formats, title funding authority, and amount allocated.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT DEVELOPS INITIAL MISSION TRAINING STRATEGY AND IDENTIFIES RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3, S4, and S6, as required).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element develops the mission training strategy based on the memorandum of agreement developed by the host nation and the geographic combatant command (for example, medical, sniper operations, intelligence collection, site exploitation, and host-nation legality). Next, planners must identify training venues and durations and then input costs for resources into the

budget estimate. The deploying element should report any potential budget shortfalls through the chain of command to the geographic combatant command, Army Service component command, or joint task force.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT OBTAINS INITIAL MISSION TRAINING STRATEGY FROM THE ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND OR DESIGNATED JOINT COMMAND AND IDENTIFIES RESOURCES

- **Originator:** Army Service component command.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3, S4, and S6, as required).
- **Remarks:** The mission training strategy must be based on the memorandum of agreement developed by the host nation and the geographic combatant command (for example, medical, sniper operations, intelligence collection, site exploitation, and host-nation legality). The Army Service component command and deploying unit estimate basing requirements to inform the geographic combatant command effort to obtain land-use agreements from the host nation. A Service component is designated as the lead Service and base operating support integrator for the area of operations. The lead Service and base operating support integrator establishes basing and assumes costs.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT IDENTIFIES NON–MODIFIED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT ITEMS, TO INCLUDE TIME TO TRAIN ON EQUIPMENT

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element identifies equipment and training limitations based upon the predeployment site survey and coordination with the security cooperation organization.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CROSSCHECKS THE MISSION TRAINING PLAN AGAINST THE MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST AND HOST-NATION MISSION REQUIREMENTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3) Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** Planners must develop programs of instruction that meet mission requirements, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness that identify whether or not the training is progressing and the effectiveness of the training. During the predeployment site survey, the deploying element should discuss programs of instruction with host-nation commanders and leaders to gain perspective and elicit input.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONDUCTS IN-PROGRESS REVIEWS AND APPROVAL BRIEFS WITH PARENT UNIT AND GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND AS REQUIRED

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3) Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element requests briefing formats and requirements from parent unit and geographic combatant command.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT BEGINS FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING AND IDENTIFIES RESOURCE AND INTELLIGENCE GAPS

- **Originator:**
  - Deploying element higher headquarters (S2 and S4 or G2 and -4)
  - Geographic combatant command.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command and Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element uses information from the predeployment site survey, open sources, the U.S. embassy (regional security officer) threat assessment, and a site vulnerability assessment to develop a force protection plan for locations, route selection, and insider threat prevention. (See Appendix E, Force Protection, for more details).

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPS, COORDINATES, AND IMPLEMENTS PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING FOR DEPLOYING ELEMENT

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters, as required.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element conducts regional, cultural, basic language, individual and collective tasks, rapport building, medical, and engagement skills training according to the deployment training guidance. Planners should refer to mission execution or deployment order for additional guidance.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONTINUES MOVEMENT COORDINATION

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (G3 and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manager)
  - Installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** Not later than D–90, the Unit Deployment List is submitted with Level 6 data. The Unit Deployment List is transmitted to the Computerized Movements Planning and Status System and submitted to Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. This also serves as the strategic lift request.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT IDENTIFIES SUSTAINMENT GAPS AND SUBMITS INITIAL REQUEST FOR SUPPORT

- **Originator**: Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (-3 and S4 or G3 and G4).
- **Remarks:** Support requests should include Class I through Class X supplies, as well as military occupation specialty– specific attachments based upon mission requirements. Support requests should be according to mission terms of reference and memoranda of agreement support by the geographic combatant command.

D–90 TASKS

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS OPERATIONAL FUNDING REQUEST

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and comptroller).
- **Remarks:** Operational funding is used for items and services that cannot be obtained prior to deployment or to replenish expendable items used during the deployment and training. To the greatest extent possible, the deploying element should acquire needed mission supplies prior to deployment, as availability in the host nation may be limited or nonexistent. The predeployment site survey personnel can inquire and reconnoiter sources and types of supplies available.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SUBMITS COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY REQUESTS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S6).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command G6.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element requests communication information and guidance and submits required unit communications information according to geographic combatant command guidance. Planners should coordinate with the Embassy for classified and sensitive information policies and storage capabilities. Specific local procedures and expectations for communications security storage and control should be discussed with the defense attaché office during the predeployment site survey.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SCHEDULES AMMUNITION DRAW AND COORDINATES HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CERTIFICATION AND PALLETIZATION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Ammunition supply point.
- **Remarks:** Planners must submit required documents (electronic DA Form 581 [Request for issue and Turn-On of Ammunition], signature cards, and so on).

DEPLOYING ELEMENT BEGINS INSTRUCTOR TRAINING

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S3)
  - Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** Leaders and Soldiers identified as instructors and trainers attend required certification courses or unit designated training according to command guidance.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS PERSONNEL SUPPORT REQUEST (PROCESSING FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT AND SOLDIER READINESS PROCESSING)

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 or G1).
- **Remarks**: Processing is conducted as required by the command.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONDUCTS MEDICAL TASKS

- **Originator:** Medical personnel.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Requirements and tasks should be provided according to execution or deployment order guidance and should include required medical training, vaccinations, and medical evacuation planning.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PREPARES LEGAL DOCUMENTS IN ANTICIPATION OF DEPLOYMENT

- **Originator:** Judge advocate general and higher headquarters.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element (individual Soldiers).
- **Remarks:** Common legal issues include wills, powers of attorney, and Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 USC 501) matters (involving leases, contracts, and so on). Processing of these documents can be completed at a Soldier readiness center, and group appointments may be possible for deploying personnel.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS GATHERS MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE AND SUBMITS REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THE MISSION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff and S2).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Medical intelligence is required to order and develop medical supplies (Class VIII), force health protection items, preventive medical supplies, medications, and packing lists. The medical staff should identify antivenom storage requirements or bite-kit requirements and identify all approved host-nation hospitals, blood supplies, and approved supply vendors. Additional information is available at the National Center for Medical Intelligence at:
  https://www.ncmi.detrick.army.mil.

MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITY OR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND DEPLOYING ELEMENT EMPLOY PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION ANALYSIS AND REPORTING TOOL IN CONJUNCTION WITH HOSPITAL PHARMACY FOR THE ENTIRE UNIT

- **Originator:** Medical treatment facility and higher headquarters (medical staff).

- **Staffing:** Deploying element and medical personnel
- **Remarks:** The Medical Protection System is used to identify nondeployable personnel. https://medpros.mods.army.mil/MEDPROSNew/.

Higher Headquarters Analyzes Predeployment Site Survey Information, Develops Medical Contingencies, and Resources Medical Supplies (Class VIII)

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** This information is required to develop the medical concept of support and to order preventive medical supplies and medications. Planners must identify medical rules of engagement and emergency medical procedures in country or in adjacent countries to preserve life, limb, or eyesight for U.S. personnel and host-nation personnel. Planners should refer to the predeployment site survey trip report.

Deploying Element Submits Density List

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Deploying element
  - Security cooperation organization
- **Remarks:** This list must account for all high-dollar and sensitive items going on the deployment. The list must be extremely accurate by national stock number and serial number. The deploying element must report any changes as soon as possible to accurately track the density list and gain approval for items that may be unlawful or considered contraband. Some countries may require a list of items that the host nation considers contraband. If the deploying element did not inform the appropriate host-nation authorities and receive approval prior to entering the country, the host nation may confiscate (nationalize) specific items. Any changes must be reported as soon as possible and accurately tracked.

D–60 TASKS

Deploying Element Submits Hazardous Material and Diplomatic Sheet Load Plan and Manifest

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (-4 and S3).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 air operations) and installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element submits a hazardous materials listing and provides the information needed by supporting units, the country team, and appropriate host nation personnel to plan, prepare, approve, and fully support the deploying element. The diplomatic aircraft sheet and load plan require this information to accurately plan and prepare the requisite documents. If the deploying element does not provide accurate information to the country team or aircrew, the host nation may not allow the aircraft to land or offload, and the host nation may confiscate deployment items.

Higher Headquarters Submits Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request Funds to U.S. Embassy for Contract Support (if required) or International Cooperative Administrative Support Services Memorandum of Understanding for U.S. Embassy Services and Support

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters or geographic combatant command (G8).
- **Staffing:** U.S. Embassy.
- **Remarks:** The higher headquarters or geographic combatant command comptroller sends funds to the U.S. Embassy contracting office for contract support under existing or newly awarded contracts. It should be noted that under a 2008 Department of State memorandum, the Department of State is no longer required to process contracts for the Department of Defense. Therefore, depending on Embassy-specific policies, the geographic combatant command or Army Service component

command contracting offices or contracting brigades may be directly responsible for contracts related to the security force assistance mission. If members of the deploying element will work regularly at the Embassy or require support from non-Department of Defense Embassy offices or services, the geographic combatant command or Army Service component command may need to pay for these services using the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services System. This requires a memorandum of understanding between the geographic combatant command or Army Service component command and the Embassy finance office. International Cooperative Administrative Support Services System requirements should be discussed during the predeployment site survey.

Deploying Element Identifies Field Ordering Officer and Paying Agent and Begins Training

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** The field ordering officer must be in the rank of staff sergeant or above; the paying agent must be in the rank sergeant first class or above.

Higher Headquarters Conducts a Counterintelligence Brief with Specified Collection Authorities if Applicable

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S-2).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.

Deploying Element Completes Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Level 1 Web-Based Training

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S-3) and geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** This training must be completed within one year of deploying (common access card required). The deployment order may provide additional data regarding required suspense. Planners should refer to https://jkodirect.jten.mil/html/COI.xhtml?course_prefix=JS&course_number=-US007 for additional information.

Deploying Element Completes Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 Web-Based Training

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S-3) and geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must adhere to the strict guidelines described on the theater/country clearance Web site (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm). Theater/country clearance requires the following: Antiterrorism/Force Protection Level 1 training, an updated isolated personnel report card; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 training; human-rights class; updated passport and visa; and itinerary. Planners should refer to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 training at http://jko.jten.mil/references/SERE_tip%20sheet_jun%202013.pdf.

Higher Headquarters Provides Country and Cultural Brief

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedures and deployment order for geographic combatant command training requirements. Theater-specific briefs should be reviewed and updated at D–15 to ensure knowledge retention and incorporate any changes.

Higher Headquarters Provides Threat Brief

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.

- **Remarks:** Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedures and deployment order for geographic combatant command training requirements. Threat briefs should be reviewed and updated at D–15 to ensure knowledge retention and incorporate any changes.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AWARENESS BRIEF

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedures and deployment order for geographic combatant command training requirements.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES PASSIVE COLLECTION BRIEF

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing**: Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedures and deployment order for geographic combatant command training requirements.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES OTHER THEATER- SPECIFIC BRIEFS

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Planners should refer to the unit standard operating procedures and deployment order for geographic combatant command training requirements.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS CONSOLIDATES ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (S2) and deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command and Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** DD Form 1833 must be completed within six months from D-day (common access card required). Additional information is available at: https://prmsglobal.prms.af.mil/prmsconv/profile/survey/survey.aspx.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS VERIFIES ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION LEVEL 2, ANTITERRORISM OFFICER CERTIFICATION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (antiterrorism officer and S3).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3) and geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must check geographic combatant command requirements. Typically, each unit is required to have at least one Antiterrorism/Force Protection Level 2–certified Soldier.

COMPTROLLER PROVIDES FIELD OPERATIONAL FUND BRIEF AND CERTIFICATION FOR FIELD ORDERING OFFICER

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (comptroller).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must ensure responsible personnel are appointed and memoranda and certifications are maintained with the individual for reference and guidance purposes. The deploying element must ensure the field ordering officer maintains a “do-not-buy list” from the comptroller.

COMPTROLLER PROVIDES OPERATIONAL FUND BRIEF AND CERTIFICATION FOR THE PAYING AGENT

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (comptroller).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.

- **Remarks:** The deploying element must ensure responsible personnel are appointed and memoranda and certifications are maintained with the individual for reference and guidance purposes. The deploying element must ensure the paying agent maintains a "do-not-buy list" from the comptroller.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING OR BRIEFING

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (staff judge advocate).
- **Staffing**: Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must complete Web-based training. Joint Knowledge Online Human-Rights Training is available at: https://jkodirect.jten.mil/html/COI.xhtml?course_prefix=J3S&course_number=N-US649-HB.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT IDENTIFIES RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OR RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (staff judge advocate).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and higher headquarters keep copies of training certificates or memoranda for submission to the geographic combatant command. Planners should refer to deployment order and geographic combatant command training requirements pertaining to rules of engagement or rules for the use of force.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES HUMAN TRAFFICKING AWARENESS TRAINING

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (staff judge advocate).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and higher headquarters keep copies of training certificates or memoranda for submission to the geographic combatant command. Planners should refer to deployment order and geographic combatant command training requirements pertaining to human trafficking.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES THEATER POLICIES TRAINING

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (staff judge advocate).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and higher headquarters keep copies of training certificates or memoranda for submission to the geographic combatant command. Planners should refer to deployment order and geographic combatant command training requirements pertaining to theater policies.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT TRAINING

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (staff judge advocate).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and higher headquarters keep copies of training certificates or memoranda for submission to the geographic combatant command. Planners should refer to deployment order and geographic combatant command training requirements pertaining to law of armed conflict training.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT PREPARES SHIPPING DOCUMENTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (G3) and installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element is required to submit (at a minimum) military air, time-phased force and deployment data worksheet, hazardous material, diplomatic sheet, and load plans. Higher headquarters may provide additional guidance and requirements. Depending on unit type and standard operating procedures, this task may be automated through the Unit Deployment List and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process or facilitated directly by the installation transportation office.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES PLANNING COST ESTIMATE AND BOOKING COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT SHIPMENT

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must check acceptable items, sizes, weights, schedules, transit times, costs, and required permits. The final delivery address and postal code will be required for accurate door cost estimate and security requirements.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES DENTAL AND EYE EXAMS

- **Originator:** Supporting dental and medical treatment facilities.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** For green (deployable) status on the Medical Protection System, planners should refer to https://medpros.mods.army.mil/MEDPROSNew/.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS UNIT MEDICAL REQUESTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element medical personnel.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters medical personnel and medical treatment facility.
- **Remarks:** All medical requests and controlled medication requests must be submitted to the unit's medical treatment facility for action.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ORDERS PREDEPLOYMENT MEDICATION, CLASS II (EXPENDABLE), AND CLASS VIII (MEDICAL) SUPPLIES

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (medical authority and S4 or G4).
- **Remarks:** This information should include preventive medical supplies (such as mosquito netting, insect repellant, and fly or rodent traps). FM 4-02 provides additional information.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS COURIER ORDERS REQUEST

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2 or G2).
- **Remarks:** This request is submitted as required by the geographic combatant command deployment requirements to carry classified information and cryptographic material (radio fills).

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SUBMITS REQUEST FOR ORDERS FOR DEPLOYMENT

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S1 or unit administrative specialist)
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (G1)
- **Remarks:** The deploying element submits a request for orders for deployment as required.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT IDENTIFIES PERSONAL DEMAND ITEM REQUIREMENTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S-3 or S-4).
- **Remarks:** Guidance on specific theater and mission requirements will be found in the execution order or deployment order. Mission requirements may include the wear of civilian clothing during travel or during Embassy or host-nation functions or interactions.

D–45 TASKS

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COORDINATES CONTAINER AND PALLET MOVEMENT AND STAGING

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element, installation transportation office, and departure airfield.

- **Remarks:** The deploying element requests and coordinates a time and place for each phase regarding the prepositioning of required materials; constructing, moving, staging, and securing palletized cargo; coordinating materials handling equipment; and loading.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS VALIDATES COMPLETION OF ADVANCED ECHELON AND MAIN BODY THEATER/ COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must adhere to the strict guidelines described in Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide (https://www.fcg.pentagon.mil/fcg.cfm). Theater/country clearance requires the following: Antiterrorism/Force Protection Level 1 training, an updated DD Form 1833; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 training; human rights class; updated passport and visa; theater-required vaccinations and yellow shot card; and itinerary.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS ADVANCED ECHELON AND MAIN BODY THEATER/COUNTRY CLEARANCE REQUESTS USING THE AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL AUTOMATED CLEARANCE SYSTEM

- **Originator:** Deploying element or higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing**:
  - Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System is a Web-based tool designed to aid Department of Defense travelers on official business overseas in meeting the clearance requirements outlined in the Department of Defense Foreign Clearance Guide. The Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System automates the process of requesting and approving diplomatic and personnel clearances through a common, centralized, and secure database. The deploying element team must adhere to the strict guidelines described in Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide Depending upon unit or supported command standard operating procedures, the deploying element, higher headquarters, or supported command submits the Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System itinerary for the deploying element to obtain theater and country clearance prior to travel. Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System requests must be submitted not later than 30 days prior to departure. The deploying element should contact their geographic combatant command and security cooperation organization points of contact prior to submitting an Aircraft and Personnel Automated Clearance System request to ensure local policies and procedures are followed and to facilitate rapid processing.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS THE FINAL MANIFEST

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 and S3 air operations).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must submit standard name-line information of all deploying Soldiers that passed processing for overseas movement/Soldier readiness processing.

D–30 TASKS

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SCHEDULES MISSION IN-BRIEF TO ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND, GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND, AND COUNTRY TEAM

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3) and deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.

- **Remarks:** Army Service component command and geographic combatant command guidance and standard operating procedures may require deploying elements to conduct mission in-briefs. The country team may require the deploying element to provide a mission or information brief. If this briefing is not required, it is still beneficial for the deploying element to interface with the country team and provide an option for updating and informing the country team on the deploying element's mission.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ISSUES SPECIAL (NON–DENSITY LIST) INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Coordination must be conducted to receive requested supplies.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONDUCTS MISSION BRIEF BACK WITH DEPLOYMENT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS (TYPICALLY A DESIGNATED JOINT COMMAND OR LAND COMPONENT COMMAND)

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Commander and staff.
- **Remarks:** Mission briefs are conducted as required by unit or supported-command policy.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES ALL VALIDATING EVENTS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:**
  - Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
  - Geographic combatant command
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must complete all unit validating events, to include retraining, recertification, and modifications to programs of instruction.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL BRIEFS

- **Originator:** Judge advocate general.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Guidelines and specific theater training will be outlined in the execution or deployment order.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT RECEIVES PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

- **Originator:** Public affairs office.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** In addition to guidance from higher headquarters (public affairs guidance found in the execute order, deployment order, and fragmentary order), the deploying element should coordinate with the Army Service component command J39 regarding information operations plans, strategy and ongoing messaging programs and coordinate with Embassy public affairs section upon arrival in country to receive updated guidance.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES DEFENSE TRAVEL SYSTEM FORMS INPUT

- **Originator**: Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 or unit Defense Travel System manager).
- **Remarks**: The Defense Travel System uses data from DD Form 1610 [Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD Personnel].

PROCESSING FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT AND SOLDIER READINESS PROCESSING FOR DEPLOYING ELEMENT

- **Originator:** S1/medics.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.

- **Remarks:** The deploying element develops the final manifest from the processing for overseas movement and Soldier readiness processing.

EMBASSY SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION APPROVES THEATER/COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR ADVANCED ECHELON AND MAIN BODY

- **Originator:** Department of Defense office.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S3 or G3).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and staff must coordinate and follow up with the geographic combatant command and security cooperation organization to ensure the country clearances are approved prior to movement into country.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS COMPLETE ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2 or G2).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element completes DD Form 1833.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS SEND FINAL SHIPPING DOCUMENTS FOR PERMITS

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must coordinate with commercial air to send final shipping documents to transit airports and destination country. The deploying element must also coordinate with the U.S. Embassy or military liaison to obtain required permits.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT COMPLETES PROCESSING FOR OVERSEAS MOVEMENT/SOLDIER READINESS PROCESSING FOR DEPLOYING ELEMENT

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S1 and medical staff).
- **Submit:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** For green (deployable) status on the Medical Protection System.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ISSUES COURIER ORDERS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** Units must ensure all personnel have required copies of courier orders, to include any special requirements.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SPLITS PROPERTY BOOKS

- **Originator:** Deploying element commander.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and Property Book Office).
- **Remarks:** Deploying element ensures that a forward and rear unit identification code is established and all property on the rear unit identification code is accounted for by a designated rear-detachment commander.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT IDENTIFIES ATTACHED ENABLERS

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3) and geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element and higher headquarters identify and coordinate attachment timeline and command relationship with personnel and teams designated to attach and support as enablers or subject-matter experts. Attachment should occur not later than D–10 to facilitate final deployment coordination.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS UPDATE AND VALIDATE RED CROSS AND CASUALTY NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command or supported command and security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** Deploying element and higher headquarters must update their Red Cross notification and casualty notification standard operating procedures to account for small, separated elements and the communication challenges that may be encountered during and security force assistance or regionally aligned forces mission.

D–20 TASKS

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONDUCTS MISSION BRIEF TO GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND, SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, AND COUNTRY TEAM

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters staff.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** This brief may be conducted face-to-face or by secure video teleconference according to the geographic combatant command, security cooperation organization, and country team

DEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS FINAL MANIFEST

- **Originator**: Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 and S3 air operations) and installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element uses standard name-line information for all deploying Soldiers that passed processing for overseas movement and Soldier readiness processing.

D–15 TASKS

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONFIRMS EXECUTE ORDER ISSUED FROM JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters staff.
- **Staffing:** Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- **Remarks:** It is important for the deploying element to identify issues prior to advance echelon departure.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT REVIEWS AND SIGNS DOCUMENTATION FOR STAY-BEHIND PROPERTY BOOK ITEMS

- **Originator**: Deploying element and higher headquarters (property book office).
- **Staffing**: Higher headquarters (S4 or G4 property book officer).
- **Remarks:** The deploying element reviews stay-behind property book items and completes paperwork as required.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT REVIEWS AND SUBMITS PERSONNEL RECOVERY PLAN TO ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND AND GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S-2 or G-2).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2 or G2)
- Joint Personnel Recovery Agency at the Army Service component command and geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The personnel recovery plan should be based off predeployment site survey information and current intelligence. The deploying element ensures all Soldiers receive high-risk of-isolation training in conjunction with survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (appropriate level) training, and are entered into Department of Defense isolated personnel report systems. Furthermore, the deploying element ensures Soldiers are integrated into the lead component or joint task force personnel recovery plan. The deploying element ensures all Soldiers receive required

antiterrorism/force protection training and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training according to geographic combatant command requirements.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ISSUES COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY FILLS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S6).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element radio operators and passengers with courier orders.
- **Remarks:** If required, this task should be performed in accordance with the geographic combatant command communications requirement standard operating procedures.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ISSUES FIELD ORDERING OFFICER AND PAYING AGENT MEMORANDA

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element field ordering officer and paying agent.
- **Remarks:** The field ordering officer and paying agent should maintain a copies of the memoranda during the deployment.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ISSUES COMMERCIAL ITINERARIES FOR ADVANCED ECHELON (IF REQUIRED)

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (-1).
- **Staffing:** Advanced echelon, deploying element, and security cooperation organization.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PUBLISHES AND ISSUES INDIVIDUAL ORDERS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S1 or unit Defense Travel System managers).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PUBLISHES AND ISSUES COURIER ORDERS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Courier orders are published and issued as required by the mission and the geographic combatant command.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ISSUES MEDICATIONS

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** If unit has designated medical personnel, medications should be distributed and controlled by the assigned medical personnel.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT ENSURES SOLDIERS HAVE 90 DAYS OF PERSONAL MEDICATION AND HAVE ENROLLED IN TRICARE AND MAIL-ORDER PHARMACY PROGRAM

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff) and deploying element command team.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Leaders must ensure Soldiers have adequate personally required medication on-hand to start the deployment and a method of refilling required medications during deployment.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT BEGINS ANTI-MALARIAL MEDICATION (IF REQUIRED)

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element begins anti-malarial as required.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES MEDICAL BRIEF, MEDICAL EVACUATION PLAN, MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE PLAN, AND SEASONAL FLORA AND FAUNA THREAT BRIEF

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The medical plans should be vetted by the security cooperation organization and the geographic combatant command or Army Service component command surgeon's office prior to deployment.

D–13 TASKS

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS CONFIRMS ADVANCE ECHELON AND MAIN BODY THEATER/COUNTRY CLEARANCE AND COMPLETE ITINERARY

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S-1 and S-3).
- **Staffing:** Advanced echelon and main body of deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element must adhere to the strict guidelines described in Department of Defense Electronic Foreign Clearance Guide. Theater and country clearance requires the following: Antiterrorism/Force Protection Level 1 training, an updated DD Form 1833; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Level 100 training; human-rights class; updated passport and visa; and itinerary.

D–10 THROUGH D–1 TASKS

ADVANCE ECHELON DEPLOYS

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT LOADS, SHIPS AND STAGES PALLETS AND CONTAINERS AT DEPARTURE AIRFIELD

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3) and installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** Containers and pallets are placed or shipped to the staging area at the departure airfield.

ADVANCE ECHELON INITIAL ENTRY REPORT SENT

- **Originator:** Advanced echelon.
- Staffing:
  - Higher headquarters (G3/S3)
  - Geographic combatant command
  - Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The initial entry report is sent as required by the mission and geographic combatant command using the standard five-line/five W's (who, what, where, when, why) format or according to unit standard operating procedures. The advance echelon makes contact with and begins coordination with the Embassy security cooperation organization.

ADVANCE ECHELON BRIEFS GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

- **Originator**: Advanced echelon.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** This brief is conducted according to the mission and geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures.

AMMUNITION DETAIL DRAWS AND PALLETIZES AMMUNITION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3) and deploying element.

- **Staffing:** Ammunition supply point.
- **Remarks:** The ammunition detail must have proper certifications, authorities, and equipment.

Advance Echelon Prepares for Main Body Arrival

- **Originator**: Deploying element advance echelon.
- **Staffing:** Security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks:** The advance echelon must coordinate with security cooperation organization and host-nation assets to facilitate customs and the unloading of personnel, weapons, and equipment and transportation to final destination.

Deploying Element Identifies and Begins Reporting Requirements

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command, security cooperation organization, and others (as required).
- **Remarks**: Reporting requirements are described in the geographic combatant command deployment requirements standard operating procedures.

Higher Headquarters Disseminates Itineraries for Main Body Personnel

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element, advance echelon, geographic combatant command, and security cooperation organization.
- **Remarks**: Itineraries are disseminated as required. This step is particularly important if the main body is traveling using commercial air.

Deploying Element Signs Out on Temporary Duty

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).

U.S. Air Force and Deploying Element Completes Joint Inspection of Pallets and Containers

- **Originator:** U.S. Air Force and deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Crew providing airlift.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element should have a push/pull detail on standby for joint inspection and four hours prior to aircraft departure.

Higher Headquarters Provides Final Predeployment Unit and Family Readiness Briefs

- **Originator**: Higher headquarters (chaplain).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3).

Deploying Element Provides Pallet Rider Brief

- **Originator:** Deploying element and higher headquarters (S3).
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element selects deploying element passengers to travel with equipment. Commercial air provides pallet riders for cargo flow based on planned movement. Deploying elements should coordinate with commercial air (by telephone or face-to-face) for jump-seat safety procedures.

Deploying Element and Security Cooperation Organization Coordinate Preclearance for Permits and Customs

- **Originator**: Deploying element and security cooperation organization.
- **Staffing**: Host nation.

- **Remarks:** The deploying element coordinates with commercial air, the security cooperation organization, and the U.S. Embassy to obtain permits and pre-customs clearance.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT OBTAINS COMMERCIAL AIR JUMP-SEAT APPROVAL LETTER

- **Originator:** Deploying element and commercial air.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element coordinates with commercial air for pallet rider jump-seat approval letter.

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS COORDINATES WITH COMMERCIAL AIR SECURITY FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
- **Staffing:** Commercial air point of contact.
- **Remarks:** The deploying element's higher headquarters coordinates with the commercial air corporate security team to ensure the security team and operations receive advance notification of deploying unit requirements.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT PICKS UP FINAL SHIPMENTS OF CLASS VIII MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND CONTROLLED MEDICATIONS/NARCOTICS

- **Originator:** Deploying element (medical personnel).
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** A signed hand receipt must be provided to the issuing entity. If authorized to sign for and administer narcotics, this task will be completed immediately prior to departure and these medications will be hand-carried.

SECTION IV — ADVISOR PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY (PDSS)

Site surveys are critical parts of the pre-mission planning and coordination process for persistent and episodic deployments. See Appendix C for a PDSS checklist.

PDSS CHECKLIST

2-22. Preparation. Prior to deploying, the team leader and selected members of the advisor team may have an opportunity to visit the area of operations (AO). Ideally, the PDSS is scheduled 180–270 days prior to beginning the mission and is an extremely useful tool to help the new advisor team understand the operational environment. A PDSS checklist can help answer many questions regarding foreign security forces (FSF) in the area and shortcomings or opportunities to focus advisor efforts for the incoming team. If available, incoming teams should consider conducting video teleconferences or gaining access to web portals containing current information.

2-23. Every advisor team will have differing missions, AOs, units, and personalities with which they will engage. The environment, relationships, FSF level of autonomy, and level of stability within the AO help define their mission.

2-24. Prior to departure for the PDSS, the incoming team leader should assemble the request for information list based on input from the team. The checklist in Appendix K of this Training Circular provides a basic outline. Team members involved in developing the PDSS may use the checklist as a guide when preparing their PDSS plan.

2-25. However, it is important for the incoming advisor team to remain flexible and keep an open mind with respect to training and operating with their assigned FSF.

2-26. Site Survey Checklist. The site survey checklist helps answer questions identified by the team during its preparation for deployment. The checklist can be modified to aid the site survey team in acquiring information for planning before deployment.

SITE SURVEY TEAM MISSION

2-27. The mission of the site survey team is to report on the current FSF mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations conditions. It also clarifies in-country command and control (C2) systems and logistics relationships for the follow-on unit's mission execution and coordinates the in-country reception of the main body. If possible, the PDSS should be conducted by members of the actual advisor team in conjunction with the partner force.

SITE SURVEY TEAM PROCEDURES

2-28. Before departure, the site survey team conducts predeployment activities. Unit standard operating procedures should be used when conducting predeployment activities; however, the following lists suggested activities:

- Obtaining required travel documents (i.e., visas and passports) through the unit's personnel staff and a copy of the country clearance messages sent by the United States (US) embassy, if required, through the unit's operations staff and the country briefing through the appropriate intelligence office.
- Ensuring site survey team members' medical and immunization records are current.
- Determining financial management support (e.g., the location of supporting finance unit funding).
- Confirming all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team's itinerary and are available for coordination.
- Receiving and updating the threat briefing and reviewing the rules of engagement (ROE) and status-of-forces agreement (SOFA).
- Conducting a mission analysis and back brief in accordance with unit standard operating procedures. The team tailors its mission analysis and back brief to the site survey mission.
- Assess deployment location to identify environmental threats and hazards to obtain appropriate equipment (mosquito nets, treated uniforms, iodine tablets, additional canteens) to mitigate risk to the team.
- Upon arrival in the AO, the team processes through customs, notifies the security cooperation (SC) officer of its arrival and status, and requests an updated threat briefing. The survey team must be ready to brief the mission and program of instruction to the SC officer for approval or modification.
  - The PDSS team plans its security according to the anticipated threat. Adjustments are made as required by the situation on the ground. The PDSS team members—
  - Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) according to the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility.
  - Maintain a team internal guard system—aware of the locations of all other SF advisors—and be ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions.
  - Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an emergency.
  - Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside of the immediate area controlled by the team.
  - Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction.
  - Discuss visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their understanding and to maintain effective rapport.
  - Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status and the inspection of its facilities.
  - Establish mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack.
  - Rehearse team alert and defensive plans.
  - Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force rehearsals of defensive plans.
- The survey team commander and operations staff confirm the team's command relationship (COMREL) with the next higher, in-country, US commander. The team commander also briefs that commander, if requested, on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

- The survey team commander obtains any additional guidance from the country team. At a minimum, the commander meets with the SC officer to confirm the ROE, evasion and recovery support, and any limitations on the relationships with FSF counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following topics with the SC officer.
  - Improvements to the task organization to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of the available assets, counter the anticipated threat, allow for swift transitions in the organization for contingencies, and maintain a reserve appropriate to the size of the HN force employed.
  - Improvements to the intelligence portions of the plan or order so that all relevant sources of information have been exploited and the information has been analyzed to allow the
  - HN commander to plan actions that seize the initiative.
  - Improvements to the execution so that the mobility of the HN unit is employed to achieve all possible tactical advantage, the minimum firepower needed is used to accomplish the given tasks, restrictions on the rules of engagement are specified, and subunit missions (to include the reserves) are clear.
  - Improvements to the service and support plans so that only mission-essential supplies and equipment are taken, that Soldiers are not overburdened at the expense of the mobility, and that resupply and medical evacuations are available as needed.
  - Any other improvements needed to ensure the OPLAN or OPORD is complete, to include human-rights considerations, measures, or required training.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES

2-29. Initial terms of reference. (This is captured in a formal document that includes the initial, agreed upon training objectives and support requirements for the advisor and the FSF.)

- Terms of reference (a final, signed agreement).
- The political situation.
- Social customs.
- Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.
- Currency control.
- Procedures for obtaining intelligence support from the next higher operational control commander.
- Administrative support.
- Legal status in relation to the foreign country (i.e., SOFA).
- Procedures for obtaining logistics from the next higher, in-country US commander, if applicable
- If the Leahy Amendment Vetting of Foreign Forces has been completed.
- If country clearance requirements are met.
- If foreign disclosure requirements will be met.

2-30. The team commander confirms communications and reporting procedures between the country team or the next higher, in-country, US commander, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor units still in mission preparation. The team commander, also, must verify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission.

2-31. The team commander confirms procedures for obtaining logistics based on the team's mission orders and COMREL. Support may be from the next higher, in- country, US commander depending on COMREL or other logistical sources. The team commander identifies a point of contact (POC) at the country team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center of the US military staff. The POC then informs the team of necessary actions during increased threats or emergencies requiring evacuation of US personnel from the AO. The team commander also coordinates procedures to obtain intelligence support from the country team, the next higher, in-country, US commander, or other US agencies.

2-32. The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next higher, in- country headquarters, the country team, or the out-of-country support element. The survey team:

- Identifies the supporting element's location.
- Contacts the supporting element to determine any limitations on support.
- The team should know the expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.

- Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body in accordance with the requirements in the survey team operation orders.
- Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, survey team, and follow-on advisor team.
- They identify alternate and emergency communications procedures for C2, logistics, and medical or casualty evacuation.
- Determines the established communications support requesting procedures for the follow-on advisor team.
- The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronize operations. The team:
- Identifies the location of appropriate FSF and international or US agencies. Contacts the appropriate agencies to establish initial coordination.
- Exchanges information and intelligence.
- Confirms or establishes communications procedures.
- Reports the newly established or changed procedures for inclusion in the follow-on advisor mission.
- The survey team commander establishes a direct working relationship and rapport with the FSF commander.

THE SURVEY TEAM

- Briefs the FSF commander on the advisor team survey mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the advisor team by the higher US commander.
- Assures the FSF commander the commander's assistance is required to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisor assistance.
- Deduces or solicits the FSF commander's estimate of the unit's capabilities, required training, and advisor assistance, including material requirements. The team discusses training (i.e., plans, current status, units available, facilities, and any additional requirements).
- The survey team obtains the FSF commander's approval of the plan in accordance with the partner nation's (PN's) security force development plan and requests a linkup with their counterparts under the mutual supervision of the FSF commander and survey team commander.
- The team does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises) to the FSF commander about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill material requirements. In particular, the survey team does not:
  - Make any comment to the host government concerning US Government resources of any kind.
  - Provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the external threat as perceived by the FSF.
  - Provide advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations.
  - The survey team analyzes the FSF unit's status to determine its requirements for advisor assistance. The team:
  - Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and advisor assistance courses of action (COAs).
  - Prepares written estimates for advisor assistance COAs prioritized in order of desirability.
  - Analyzes the FSF location and its effects on the populace.
  - Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.
  - Determines FSF existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.
  - Determines the compatibility of recommended US equipment with equipment in the FSF inventory.

2-33. The survey team helps the FSF unit prepare facilities (i.e., training, security, and administration) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the facilities the FSF unit has designated for its use during the mission. The team identifies any deficiencies that will prevent execution of the advisor assistance COAs. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the FSF commander the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found. The survey team commander:

- Ensures the FSF commander understands the desired COAs are tentative (contingent on the US commander's decision).

- Ensures the higher, in-country, US commander and country team are informed of significant findings in the survey of the FSF unit.
- Provides recommended COAs to the follow-on advisor team after obtaining input from the FSF commander.
- The survey team always ensures its security according to the latest threat assessment. The team:
- Fortifies its position (i.e., quarters, communications, medical spaces, and command), using available means, keeping in mind the requirement to maintain low visibility.
- Establishes and maintains an internal alert plan.
- Organizes and maintains an internal guard system with at least one member who is awake and knows the location of all team members. The guard is ready to react to emergencies by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions according to established ROE and evasion and recovery procedures.
- Maintains communication with all team members outside the immediate area occupied by the team's main body.
- Before departing from the AO, the survey team visits all appropriate US and FSF staff agencies and identifies any unresolved problem areas.

Chapter 3

Advisory Mission Execution

This chapter provides information on the elements essential to successful execution of advisory missions. The chapter provides a template to enable advisors to understand and address unique challenges and develop comprehensive and resilient mission strategies. However, it must be noted that advisory mission execution will vary based on the specific mission context, geopolitical environment, and changing nature of international relations and military operations. Therefore, application of this template must be tailored to each advisory mission's unique circumstances. Like previous chapters, this chapter is written primarily for units deploying in competition. However, this chapter also spends significant time highlighting key considerations for crisis and conflict.

US Advisors in Korea before the start of the Korean War

The experience of the US Advisors in Korea at the start of the Korean War is highly instructive on what could happen during a surprise transition from competition to conflict. In this historical example, a small US advisor force had been working with the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army for several years when the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) surged across the border in June of 1950. The US advisors immediately found themselves in a desperate fight for personal survival as they were overrun. Guidance to fight with and support the ROK forces came relatively quickly as the KMAG advisors desperately worked to establish communication with each other and with their ROKA counterparts. This resulted in several noteworthy successes, as well as several noteworthy failures. For example, LTC Thomas McPhail's advisory actions with the ROKA 6th Division significantly delayed the initial NKPA advance in one sector for 3 days. However, by contrast, poor communication resulted in a large portion of the ROKA and their advisors getting stranded north of the Han River when the bridges across the river were destroyed by the South Koreans themselves on Day 4 of the war. The trapped KMAG advisors were forced to Escape and Evade (E&E) on foot to get back to Soul and link up with their higher HQ.

Subsequently, KMAG advisors were instrumental in further delaying advancing NKPA forces south of the Han River and helping to organize the desperate defense of the Pusan perimeter. This delay provided the time and maneuver space for US forces to arrive. In one case, a KMAG advisor named CPT Frank Lucas single-handedly drafted, organized, and trained a battalion of almost 1000 South Koreans in a period of 5 days on his own initiative. This "regiment" then entered combat on the Pusan perimeter. Other KMAG advisors were instrumental in assisting the RSOI of arriving US forces.

Overall, the KMAG experience highlights several key benefits and shortfalls for US Advisors who are deployed to an area before a surprise transition to conflict. For example, the lack of effective communication with US aircraft significantly impeded the integration of effective US Air Support, resulting in multiple incidents of fratricide. While the US Advisors were key to enabling the ROKA to delay the NKPA in many cases, this was primarily due to the ingenuity, initiative, and resolve of the individual advisors who acted without orders or guidance due to ineffective communication. Luckily, this delay was still long enough to enable US forces to get to the fight, but barely. The desperate RSOI in Pusan with units moving directly off the boat and into the fight was another area where the KMAG assistance was critical. Thus, we can see that in the future, all US Advisory Forces must be fully prepared to execute a variety of contingency plans to reduce the risk of such a near-catastrophe, even if the advisors are initially deploying for a "competition" advisory mission. Additionally, the selection of advisors who can effectively operate independently with zero guidance continues to be of paramount importance.

"41 Days in Korea: From Competition to Conflict for the U.S. Military Advisory Group" by LTC Garrett M. Searle. Article appearing in SFA Quarterly 30th Ed., MAR 2024.

KEY CONSIDERATIONS UPON ARRIVAL IN THEATER

3-1. Regardless of whether an advisory element is deploying into a competition, crisis, or conflict environment, the following key considerations must be immediately addressed:

- Build rapport with host nation forces. Successfully establishing rapport is critical to the success of all advisory missions. See ATP 3-07.10 for techniques to build rapport with host nation forces.
- Update Initial Assessment from PDSS and refine training/advisory plan as required.

- Coordination, collaboration, and liaison with other forces and organizations.
- When deploying in competition, all advisors must be always prepared to immediately transition to crisis or directly to combat.

UPDATE INITIAL ASSESSMENT FROM PDSS

3-2. The advisory element must update their Initial Assessment of the FSF. Things may have changed from the PDSS. For example, changes in leadership, FSF unit missions, or FSF unit resources may cause alternations to the plan. The US advisory element must be prepared for the FSF to have either greater or lesser capability and resources than what was assessed during the PDSS.

3-3. If the advisory element is relieving another element in a persistent advisory mission, the advisor will have to make additional initial assessments during the relief in place (RIP) or transfer of authority (TOA) period. These cover:

- The effectiveness of the advisor team being replaced.
- The first and most important assessment the advisor must make is of the outgoing team to determine if the advisors were successful during their tour. If they have good relationships with both the FSF unit and the US unit, the SOPs may be valuable, and the incoming advisor can continue the established relationships. If the incoming team determines the outgoing team was ineffective, then it can begin making lists of things to fix and relationships to build. See ATP 3-07.10 for further information.

3-4. If the advisory element is advising during combat operations, these will most likely be in the context of a multi-national coalition. Thus, additional items must now be assessed as part of the Initial Assessment:

- The US unit operating in the AO/AI.
- Coalition units operating in the AO/AI.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR UPDATING THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT IN COMBAT

3-5. Due to the possibility of rapidly changing situations during combat, it is possible that there may be significant changes between the PDSS and deployment if an advisory team is deploying to conduct combat advising. Thus, there are some special considerations for updating the Initial Assessment in combat. See ATP 3-07.10 for more details.

- Advisor team leaders should prepare their teams for an initial worst-case scenario when it comes to updating their initial assessment in combat.
- Advisors will probably not have conducted predeployment training with the US units they will now be working with while conducting ASLA combat integration tasks.
- US or coalition units may be unaware of the advising team's specialized predeployment training and capabilities.
- US and coalition units may not be familiar with the FSF leaders, capabilities, or limitations in the AO. One selling point to the partnering organization is the advising team can offer a deep understanding of the FSF, including personalities, culture, and human networks.
- NGOs may have biases or restrictions against working with US military organizations like the advisor's team.
- Third-country militaries operating unilaterally may present challenges due to national caveats. Advisor teams should always seek guidance and the authority to coordinate directly with third-country militaries.

COORDINATION, COLLABORATION, AND LIAISON

3-6. Coordination. Civilian agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures. Although there is no command relationship between military and civilian organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction.

3-7. Collaboration. Effective operations require close coordination, cooperation, and information across military, interagency, and nongovernmental entities. A common technique for promoting collaboration between military and civilian entities is forming a civil-military operations center (CMOC) (see JP 3-57and

FM 3-57). Advisor units will rarely have the capability to establish a CMOC, but they should be aware if one is established by other US forces.

3-8. Liaison. Direct, early liaison is a valuable source of accurate, timely information, especially where involvement by civilian agencies and organizations may precede military forces and present opportunities to enhance force effectiveness significantly. An additional benefit is an opportunity to build working relationships based on trust and open communications among all organizations. Ongoing liaison and an exchange of liaison personnel with engaged organizations are equally important.

TIPS FOR INTERACTION

3-9. Consider these tips when interacting with various stakeholders:

- Recognize all US Government agencies, departments, international organizations, NGOs, and private-sector groups in the AO.
- If applicable, meet with other US Government agencies, NGOs, or international organization representatives early to understand their roles and responsibilities, policies, procedures, and goals. Ensure they understand the military's mission, goals, and objectives.
- Understand how they conduct planning and vice versa. Consider creating an integrated planning team or other temporary entity to address how military activities may be synchronized to complement their work.
- Form a unifying goal with a desired end state. Spend time on clarifying and restating the goals to be achieved.
- Support their objectives by tying short-term projects with long-term goals, without compromising the military mission.
- Accept that they may not be able to allocate resources to achieve short-term results. Using resources of other US Government agencies is governed by law (e.g., the Economy Act), policy, and regulation. Advisors should involve the staff judge advocate and comptroller to ensure compliance. Since advisor teams do not deploy with a staff judge advocate or comptroller, this requires reach back to the advisor's home station.
- Continuously exchange information (within security restrictions) to avoid confusion over objectives, differences in procedures, resource limitations, and shortfalls or overlaps of authorities. Exchange LNOs, if acceptable to the other organization.
- Never drop in on an international organization or NGO. Arrange meetings deliberately. Give them the option of meeting inside or outside military installations to maintain their appearance of neutrality.
- Do not refer to NGOs or international organizations as force multipliers, partners, or any term that may compromise their neutrality.
- Do not interfere with their work with the civilian population, to include elements deemed as unfriendly.
- Be understanding if another organization, even within the US Government, decides not to participate in a project or program.
- Respect views on bearing arms within NGO or international organization sites.
- Use bridging agencies (e.g., the USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation or United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator) to coordinate with other organizations (e.g., Doctors without Borders).
- Ensure all organizations, sharing responsibility for the job, receive appropriate recognition. This recognition strengthens the bonds of interdependence and encourages each stakeholder to participate in the process by validating and reinforcing roles and responsibilities. (See ATP 3-07.10 for more information)

TRANSITION TO CRISIS OR ARMED CONFLICT

3-10. SC practitioners must always be ready to immediately transition to conflict since the transition from competition to crisis may occur rapidly and with little to no warning. As the U.S. military footprint becomes more regionally aligned, it will be more important to build, maintain, leverage, and expand partner nation relationships and security capacity gained during competition to mitigate the lack of response time during crisis. Pre-positioned combat equipment to enable the rapid transition to crisis or armed conflict becomes a key consideration when deemed necessary.

3-11. While transitioning to crisis or armed conflict, it is critical for SFA forces already in the crisis or conflict zone to understand their legal status. All US forces are always permitted the right to self-defense. However, the decision to become a combatant is reserved for the highest levels of the USG. Therefore, SFA forces must take deliberate efforts to ensure they fully understand and abide by their combatant status as determined by the National Command Authority. To provide options to senior leaders, deployed SFA forces should always be prepared to transition to a combatant status and work with their partner security forces. SFA forces should also be prepared to maintain a noncombatant status, which may involve withdrawing from the country during a transition to crisis or conflict. If US forces withdraw from the country, it is likely that SFA forces will continue to support their partner forces. But they will do so from an adjacent country. In this instance, SFA forces will still likely work through their partner FSF to achieve theater objectives in a noncombatant role.

3-12. Advisory elements must always have an internal plan to immediately transition directly from competition to conflict with no warning. Dependent on the SOFA and other agreements in place, the Advisory team may not immediately have access to the weapons, ammunition, and communication equipment they will need to effectively conduct the combat integration activities of ASLA (Advise, Support, Liaison, Assess) in combat. As part of their deployment planning, advisory elements should determine where they may stage these items to have them available if needed. In some cases, this staging may be outside the host nation country. In those cases where the necessary equipment is a significant distance away, advisory elements must also develop a plan to retrieve the equipment or have it rapidly delivered.

TIMELINE: DEPLOYMENT DAY TO D+12

D–Day Tasks

Main Body Deploys

- **Originator**: Deploying element.
- **Staffing**: Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Movement window planning is typically within 10 days of the deploying element's D-date.

Commercial Air Provides Pickup and Transport of Cargo

- **Originator:** Not applicable.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Commercial air picks up the shipment at the point of origin. Pallet riders and hazardous material certifiers escort commercial-air trucks to the commercial-air airport ramp station. Hazardous material certifiers attend commercial-air dangerous goods inspection at commercial-air airport ramp station. Cargo and pallet riders are transported that same night or early the following morning.

D+1 Tasks

Main Body Sends Initial Entry Report

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3) and geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The initial entry report is sent using the standard five-line/five-W (who, what, when, where, why) format or according to unit standard operating procedures.

Deploying Element Makes Contact With Security Cooperation Organization or Exercise Support Group to Establish Accountability in Country

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Security cooperation organization or exercise support group.
- **Remarks:** These offices are responsible for tracking the number and identity of U.S. personnel in country and should be made aware of your arrival so that they can provide accurate information to the country team and host nation. Local standard operating procedures will determine the format for this report, and it may be simply a verbal affirmation of the element's arrival.

D+2 THROUGH D+12 TASKS

U.S. SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER BRIEF THE DEPLOYING ELEMENT

- **Originator:** Security cooperation organization and regional security officer.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** The security cooperation organization and regional security officer briefs are conducted as required by the U.S. Embassy for all U.S. personnel in country. This brief will include specific information regarding force protection and medical evacuation procedures. The security cooperation organization and regional security officer should be consulted regarding plans to conduct medical evacuation or force protection rehearsals.

DEPLOYING ELEMENT CONDUCTS CHIEF OF MISSION BRIEF

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Security cooperation office.
- **Remarks:** Some ambassadors require a briefing from missions and teams rotating into county. The security cooperation office will schedule this briefing and provide guidance on content and format for the brief. Often, the format for these briefings will be informal or conversational and designed to assess the maturity and competence of the team. The chief of mission may request a follow-on briefing at the conclusion of the training event.

COMMERCIAL AIR DELIVERS CARGO

- **Originator:** Commercial air.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Commercial air and the U.S. Embassy provide import clearance, and commercial air delivers the cargo. Pallet riders escort the trucks, hand over original return documents to local commercial air team and verify return pickup schedule before departure. The deploying element maintains oversight of equipment status through commercial air contact.

ADVISING ELEMENT UPDATES INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF FSF, AND OUTGOING ADVISORS AND U.S. FORCES IF APPROPRIATE

- **Originator:** Deployed advisory element.
- **Staffing:** Security Cooperation Organization.
- **Remarks:** Upon arrival, the advisory element immediately updates its Initial Assessment that was developed during the PDSS. If relieving an outgoing advisory element, the incoming team also assesses the outgoing team's relationship with the FSF. If arriving for combat operations, the US advisors also update their assessment of US and coalition forces they may be working with.

DEVELOP AND REHEARSE PLAN FOR IMMEDIATE TRANSITION TO CONFLICT

- **Originator:** Deployed advisory element.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element and Security Cooperation Organization
- **Remarks:** Deployed advisory teams must be prepared to immediately transition to combat operations at all times. At a minimum, this transition plan must consist of the following elements:
    a. Immediate force protection plan. Plan to quickly move to a secure location in case of invasion/attack by 3rd party. See Appendix E, Force Protection.
    b. Communications plan. Plan to establish communication with higher in case of EW attack. Plan to establish communication with partner forces in case of transition to conflict. Plan to provide US enabler support to partner force in case of transition to conflict.
    c. Weapons and ammunition plan. Plan to retrieve/draw weapons and ammunition in case of transition to conflict.
    d. Medical support plan. Plan to obtain necessary medical support in case of transition to conflict. This may have to rely on host nation support.

e. General classes of supply support. Plan to obtain other necessary supplies in case of transition to conflict. This may be through an ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement) with the partner nation.

DEVELOP AND REHEARSE PLAN FOR SUPPORT TO NEO (NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION)

- **Originator:** Deployed advisory element.
- **Staffing:** Security Cooperation Organization and Regional Security Officer at US Embassy.
- **Remarks:** In the event of a transition to crisis or conflict, the Chief of Mission may elect to execute a NEO (Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation). Deployed advisory elements may find themselves part of the NEO in many capacities, so they should familiarize themselves with the embassy's NEO plan. For example, advisors may find themselves being evacuated as non-combatants. Alternately, advisors may find themselves assisting the embassy staff to conduct an NEO. Or advisors may find themselves coordinating with host nation security forces to provide security for a NEO. In all cases, it is important for deployed advisory elements to fully understand the embassy NEO plan.

D+12 THROUGH MISSION COMPLETE TASKS

EXECUTION OF ADVISORY MISSION

- **Originator:** Deployed advisory element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** The advisory element executes their advisory mission IAW FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10.

MONITORING OF FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES DURING ADVISORY MISSION

- **Originator:** Deployed advisory element.
- **Staffing:** Security Cooperation Office.
- **Remarks:** The advisory element continually assesses the ally/partner they are advising. Within the Security Cooperation paradigm of AM&E, this is known as Monitoring. The advisory element uploads their monitoring information to SOCIUM using approved MOPs and MOEs throughout the execution of their mission.

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Chapter 4
Assessments

We introduced assessments in chapter 2 of this training circular. That introduction served to provide enough information for advisors to understand the role of the Initial Assessment and put that Initial Assessment in context. This chapter discusses the operation assessment process, highlighting the advisor's role in monitoring, evaluating, recommending, and directing. It introduces the FSF Assessment Model, which includes organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional assessments. These assessments help advisors understand and estimate the capabilities and capacities of FSF. The chapter also explores long-term monitoring activities across multiple advisor rotations, providing insights into the evolution of partner forces and mission accomplishment. It emphasizes the continuous nature of the operation assessment process, which starts immediately upon mission receipt and continues throughout the mission. The chapter underscores the importance of advisors continually updating their assessments, as these estimates can significantly impact the progress towards achieving mutual US and PN objectives.

SFA ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION ACTIVITIES

4-1. The Army supports the assessment, monitoring, and evaluating process throughout the planning and execution of SFA. This continuous process is used by Army forces to monitor and evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the U.S. and FSF, influence decision-making at appropriate levels, and initiate leader action to modify or cease developmental activities. This helps to determine return on investment, enabling policymakers to identify and enhance or eliminate ineffective initiatives, and provides reliable information to support policy and legislation (DODI 5132.14).

4-2. Well-planned and executed assessment processes produce information and decisional advantages. These benefits include enhancing the understanding of a partner force's capacity and capability across the entire governance, executive, generating, and operating construct and the operating environment.

4-3. SFA activities alone are unlikely to achieve a strategic end state. To progress towards a strategic end state, multiple complementary SC activities must be conducted over time to achieve a desired result. Assessments are performed in close collaboration with the U.S. country team, the host-nation government, and other multinational partners. It is crucial for SFA planners to participate in assessment working groups to help determine whether SFA activities are contributing to the achievement of the strategic end state, or if they need to be modified or reconsidered.

FSF ASSESSMENT

4-4. As previously discussed, advisors play a vital role in supporting the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation process. When assessing FSF and their supporting institutions, CCMDs, SCCs, joint task forces, and TSOCs use the FSF Assessment Model (Logical Order of Assessment). See Figure 4-1.




Figure 4-1. FSF Assessment Model (Logical Order of Assessment)

4-5. The FSF Assessment Model consists of four interdependent assessments—organizational, operational, environmental, and institutional—conducted in the order listed. Advisors can expect to support these assessments as well as use them to inform their planning as it relates to their specific counterparts.

4-6. The FSF assessment is continuous, collaborative, and simultaneous in nature. While these assessments may seem separate and distinct, they are not—they are interdependent and reinforcing to inform decision-making at the appropriate levels.

ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT.

4-7. This assessment should evaluate to what extent (scale, scope, duration parameters) an FSF core process/entity is organized, manned, trained, equipped, led, and resourced based on its assigned role/mission. To determine the organizational structure of the FSF, advisors will need to understand what the organization is designed to do. The organizational assessment should answer these questions: What are the FSF's roles? What is the FSF mission (FSF mission analysis)? What are the FSF's developmental goals and objectives? (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT.

4-8. This assessment reveals strengths and weaknesses in an FSF core process/organization as it attempts to fulfill its directed role or purpose. This assessment follows a common operations process to determine how well the FSF can plan, execute, and assess their assigned missions or roles. This assessment requires that a core process(es)/organization demonstrate in an actual operation, exercise, or simulated environment, the FSF's ability to plan, execute, and assess activities that accomplish directed missions or objectives. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).

- A clear understanding of the FSF operational or institutional mission serves as the starting point to base the operational assessment. The operational assessment reveals strengths and gaps in the FSF's ability to perform their missions, roles, or functions, and it measures how well the FSF can conduct their missions. It is not only a snapshot of FSF warfighting capabilities, but also of the FSF operating concept and how those functions work to support each other.
- Assessments of FSF operational standards, capabilities, and gaps must include root cause analysis. For example, a unit that did not properly conduct a cordon and search may have failed because it lost communication with part of the cordon force, or it may have gone to the wrong location. The lack of communication could be because of old and worn-out equipment, poor equipment maintenance, insufficient training, poor leadership, lack of an SOP, or a number of other causes. The wrong location could be caused by incomplete intelligence, poor navigation skills, or navigational equipment failure. In both cases, operational assessments need to identify and address the root cause of why the unit did not perform to standard. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).
- Operational assessments also identify FSF strengths to build on and help focus resources during future operations and engagements. In total, operational assessments are a critical piece of the advisor team handover process as discussed in appendix X.

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT.

4-9. This assessment considers current conditions in the environment and their effects on a specific FSF organization. The environmental assessment should validate the suitability of an FSF organization's directed missions. This also may reveal the requirement to develop additional capabilities or capacities in the FSF beyond those normally associated with a similar type of security force. The environmental assessment answers the following question. What are the effects of PMESII on the FSF?

4-10. Advisors working with higher headquarters staff and other SME (e.g., civil affairs) analyze each PMESII variable using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events to determine the following:

- To what extent a variable(s) impacts FSF capability development or the ability of the FSF to accomplish its mission?
- What are the threats?
- Are there any geographical considerations?
- The environmental analysis must consider an understanding of current conditions that affect specific FSF units and their core processes. Operational variables such as PMESII positively or negatively influence development. For example, if a commander is perceived to be corrupt, the commander's unit may be denied resources, which would hamper unit development. Conversely, units with a strong political or social connection may receive priority for new equipment. PMESII is only one of many frameworks that can be utilized to collect environmental data, so it is important to identify the environmental drivers or inhibitors of success in achieving mission objectives, even if they fall outside of a doctrinal template. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).
- Environmental assessments are critical in understanding the operational environment, beginning in the planning process.

Note. Advisors will need to work with their higher headquarters staff and other SMEs to conduct the environmental assessment.

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT

4-11. This assessment seeks to evaluate institutional capability and capacity and determine how the FSF resolves gaps in one or more G-EGO functions. This assessment examines the outputs of each FSF G-EGO function and provides consideration for potential implications to US-provided OTEBA and funding activities. The institutional assessment evaluates FSF capabilities by examining the G-EGO framework holistically. An FSF capability is enabled by one or more legal, policy, or DOTMLPF solutions. To close existing capability gaps found in the institutional assessment, advisors aligned to the Service headquarters (air, land, maritime, cyberspace, space) equivalents of FSF will lean on DOTMLPF core process recommendations. Whereas advisors aligned to a ministry will lean on policy process recommendations that may impact specific

DOTMLPF processes or operational matters (e.g., C2, intelligence, fires, sustainment, etc.). Within DOD, this is collectively viewed as a DOTMLPF approach, which advisors can logically apply within and across FSF. However, core processes within the governance function of FSF, which establish legal authorities and national policy, routinely impact DOTMLPF and operational matters within FSF and its supporting institutions. Advisors aligned to principals and process owners within the executive function of FSF will often collaborate with US interagency advisors to inform the development of a PN's parliament or national security-like council. The institutional assessment will typically be formally conducted and maintained at the CCMD, SCC, or TSOC level, but advisors will likely be asked to monitor (observe and analyze) information and make recommendations pertinent to the FSF as an institution using the elements of each G-EGO function. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).

FSF MONITORING

4-12. Monitoring is a continuous observation of conditions relevant to the current operation. It involves not only joint forces carrying out activities but also expects advisors, in concert with their counterparts, to monitor the activities of the Friendly Security Forces (FSF) to inform decision-making at the appropriate levels. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).

4-13. This process speaks to the long stare (over multiple advisor rotations) at how partner forces and mission accomplishment are evolving. It enables planners and advisors to understand changes in the operational environment based on advising activities. This understanding further informs a commander's intent, guidance for planning, prioritization, and execution.

4-14. Monitoring involves collecting and analyzing relevant indicators of performance or effectiveness and conditions in an operational environment that affect those indicators. The FSF Assessment Model provides a tool for advisors to monitor the activities of the FSF, focusing on tasks carried out by FSF, normally using Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). This monitoring informs and is informed by assessments at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within the joint force and the FSF.

4-15. Within the assessment process, monitoring allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the commander's intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation, including gender and sociocultural information. Monitoring, therefore, enables evaluation and measurement of developmental activity progress toward a desired end state.

FSF EVALUATION

4-16. Evaluation is a critical process that involves using specific criteria to judge progress towards desired conditions and determining the reasons behind the current degree of progress. This process is at the heart of the assessment process, where most of the analysis occurs. It is primarily a commander's responsibility but can be conducted at any level.

4-17. The evaluation process involves the systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed activity. This could be an SC activity such as advising, its design, implementation, and results. The process helps SFA planners and practitioners determine what is working and what is not, providing them with insights into how to accomplish the mission.

4-18. Evaluations play a crucial role in determining an advisor mission's relevance, efficiency, sustainability, and impact with respect to mission accomplishment. This information forms the basis for improving effectiveness and informing decision-makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities.

4-19. Distinct from initial or follow-on assessment and monitoring, evaluation focuses on documenting the achievement of objectives, the attainment of end states, and in some cases, the value of continuing advising activities. Evaluations at the strategic level depend on operation evaluations, which are critical in explaining why certain efforts succeed or fail.

4-20. Evaluations are typically administered by teams from a CCMD, SCC, or TSOC headquarters. However, advisors also play a significant role in providing objective assessments and collecting focused data/feedback

on behalf of the evaluation team. At the tactical and operational level, advisors normally contribute to the evaluation process through assessments.

4-21. Continual assessments depict changes in the operational environment and track progress, effects, and end state or objective achievement status. This makes them a primary tool for evaluation teams. All key participants in a particular activity or operation should be committed to seeing the mission objectively. They should also be involved in the development of the operation assessment process or monitoring plan, collection of relevant data, and reporting. Evaluation is a comprehensive process that involves various levels of command and requires the active participation of all key players. It is a vital tool for understanding the effectiveness of operations and making informed decisions for future planning and activities. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).

SFA ASSESSMENT, MONITORING AND EVALUATION CONSIDERATIONS

4-22. Assessment Interaction During the planning phase, it's crucial for SFA planners and practitioners to collaborate to assign appropriate MOEs and MOPs to developmental activities. These indicators should ideally mirror the intended outcomes of the activities, thereby facilitating the attainment of broader strategic goals and end states. Figure 4-2 on page 63 offers a helpful illustration of the assessment interaction framework. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).




Figure 4-2. Assessment interaction

4-23. SFA AM&E Considerations When conducting AM&E of a partner FSF, it's important to consider cultural aspects. SFA planners and practitioners must be cognizant of the cultural differences between USG standards and the host nation's norms when assessing the effectiveness of a partner security force. Ignoring these cultural differences could hinder progress and distort results. What theater army planners might deem as inadequate capability and capacity standards could be perfectly acceptable to the partner force.

4-24. Striking the right balance between qualitative and quantitative measurements of the partner FSF within the CCP and country plans is vital. AM&E tend to be more qualitative at the strategic and operational levels, with the availability of hard data potentially influencing the balance of quantitative assessments.

4-25. AM&E of a partner nation force's "will to fight" is particularly important in crisis and conflict situations. Factors such as military leadership, morale, cohesion, discipline, culture, and history of the partner nation are crucial in assessing the will to fight. Understanding these factors is key to evaluating combat

effectiveness as it can directly impact U.S. national and theater strategy and future resource commitments. Given the complexity of human nature, assessing the will to fight is largely subjective and may require a mixed-method approach using various tools, techniques, and metrics.

4-26. SFA planners and practitioners should also consider the "lag time" in the AM&E process, the methodology, and the cause-effect relationship between an effort or set of efforts and the achieved results. It's important not to prematurely draw conclusions on causal linkages and to have realistic expectations for progress in terms of when outcomes and end states will be realized.

4-27. AM&E not only guides activity development by theater army SFA planners but also inform decision-making by the combatant command and country team. Commanders must endorse the methodology. To ensure success, SFA planners within the combatant commands and theater armies need to maintain flexibility, provide proper AM&E training across all staff elements, and invest significant time and effort in AM&E resources. (see FM 3-22 and ATP 3-07.10).

TIMELINE: REDEPLOYMENT–90 TO REDEPLOYMENT–1

R–90 TASKS

Redeploying Element Coordinates Movement Support

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Geographic combatant command or Army Service component command, higher headquarters (S4 or G4), and installation transportation office.
- **Remarks:** The redeploying element and higher headquarters request movement support from Army Service component command or geographic combatant command. The Unit Deployment List is submitted with Level 6 data to the Army Service component command/geographic combatant command not later than R–90. The redeploying element coordinates with their home-station higher headquarters and installation transportation office to facilitate reception and movement from the aerial port of debarkation on arrival.

REDEPLOYING ELEMENT SUBMITS SCHOOLS REQUESTS

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3).
- **Remarks:** If required, schools requests and follow-on unit training should be submitted according to higher headquarters guidance.

R–45 TASKS

Redeploying Element Submits Hazardous Material Lists, Hazardous Waste, Diplomatic Sheets, Load Plans, and Manifests

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 air operations).
- **Remarks:** Some hazardous waste must be retrograded to the continental United States. Planners should coordinate with higher headquarters for guidance on the disposal and shipment of such materials.

R–30 TASKS

Redeploying Element Begins Relief in Place or Transfer of Authority With Deploying Element

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Relief in place or transfer of authority is conducted as required.

R–10 TASKS

Redeploying Element Conducts In-Country Out briefs

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3 and commander).
- **Remarks:** Out briefs are performed as required.

Redeploying Element Initiates Contract Descope and Closeout Actions

- **Originator:** Redeploying element (field ordering officer and paying agent).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (comptroller).
- **Remarks:** Contract support may include vehicles, mobile telephones, facilities, and numerous other life-support services under external support or theater support contracts. Redeploying elements must be prepared descope (or closeout) supporting contracts as they prepare for departure from the operational area. Depending on the length of deployment and level of support provided, this may require a detailed plan for the phased reduction of support. The redeploying element should identify all open contracts, determine which need to be descoped or terminated and which remain mission-essential or needed for life, health, and safety until departure from the operational area. When contractors have satisfactorily completed performance of contracts and final payments have been made, contract files should be closed out as soon as possible. Some typical contract closeout actions are as follows:
  - Redeploying element validates that contracted service is no longer needed and notifies supporting contracting activity to descope or terminate.
  - Contracting officer representative (if appointed) submits final invoice to the contracting officer, ensures all contractor equipment is removed and all government furnished property (if provided to a contractor) is returned, and submits completed contracting officer representative file to contracting officer for proper file storage. Any funds not expended are de-obligated.

Redeploying Element Completes Final Check 1

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Commercial air contacts redeploying element or higher headquarters (preferably by telephone) to identify any changes for schedule, shipping items, or pallet riders.

R–7 TASKS

Redeploying Element Completes Final Check 2: Pickup Date and Time, Permits, Export Clearance

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Commercial air and the U.S. Embassy obtain permits and pre customs clearance.

R–5 TASKS

Redeploying Element Clears Operational Funds and Receipts

- **Originator:** Redeploying element (field ordering officer and paying agent).
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (comptroller).
- **Remarks:** The operational fund is cleared by reconciling SF 44s, receipts, and cash balances. Upon reconciliation, the field ordering officer and paying agent sign a “cleared” document. The field ordering officer should maintain copies of all documentation (that is, “cleared” documents, SF 44s, and receipts) as proof of operational fund closeout in the event an audit is conducted.

Redeploying Element Clears the Embassy

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** U.S. Embassy.

- **Remarks:** Clearance items may include badges and other issued material.

Redeploying Element Initiates Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 or G4).
- **Remarks:** Financial liability investigations for known property losses should be initiated prior to redeployment to ensure that relevant information/statements can be gathered from local sources if necessary.

R–5 THROUGH R–1 TASKS

Redeploying Element Conducts Mission Out brief to Theater Command or Geographic Combatant Command

- **Originator**: Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Theater command or geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** As applicable per higher headquarters guidance.

R–1 TASKS

Redeploying Element Completes Final Check 3: Last Check

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Commercial air conducts a last check with pallet riders for all required cargo and paperwork.

Redeploying Element Conducts Final Sensitive- Item Checks

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** None.
- **Remarks:** Checks are conducted according to unit standard operating procedures and reporting requirements.

Push/Pull Detail is Positioned at Home-Station Airfield

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3)
- **Remarks:** The detail should be on standby two hours before scheduled aircraft arrival.

TIMELINE: REDEPLOYMENT DAY TO REDEPLOYMENT+90

R–DAY TASKS

Redeploy

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** None.

Commercial Air Provides Pickup and Transport

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks:** Commercial air picks up the shipment at the point of origin. Pallet riders and hazardous material certifiers escort commercial air trucks to the commercial-air airport ramp station. Hazardous material certifiers attend commercial-air dangerous goods inspection at commercial-air airport ramp station. Cargo and pallet riders are transported that same night or early the following morning for flight departure.

Redeploying Element Submits Accountability or Redeployment Report

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3) and Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** The accountability/redeployment report is submitted using the standard five-line/five-W (who, what, when, where, why) format or according to unit standard operating procedures. This report is due within five hours of redeployment. Sensitive items and classified material and equipment must be accounted for and turned in prior to submission of accountability report.

R+1 TASKS

Redeploying Element Conducts Sensitive Items Inventory

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Signs in Using DA Form 647 (Personnel Register)

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Turns in Communications Security Destruction Log

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S6).
- **Remarks:** None.

Higher Headquarters Issues Unit Redeployment Checklist Guidance

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters.
- **Staffing:** Deploying element.
- **Remarks:** Guidance is issued if applicable per unit and higher headquarters standard operating procedures.

R+2 TASKS

Commercial Air Provides Delivery to Home Base

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Not applicable.
- **Remarks**: Commercial air clears U.S. import customs preclearance at first gateway hub instead of final destination airport.

Redeploying Element Inventories Iridium, Global Satellite Modem, International Maritime Satellite, and Phones

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S6).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+3 TASKS

Redeploying Element Completes Post deployment Health Assessment Survey

- **Originator:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Staffing**: Redeploying element.
- **Remarks:** None.

R+5 TASKS

Redeploying Element Completes Personnel Asset Inventory

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Verifies Entitlements Stop/Start

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Settles Travel Vouchers

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (resource management office).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Clears Narcotic Hand Receipt

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Turns-in Automation Equipment for Reimaging and Updates

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing**: Higher headquarters (information management office).
- **Remarks:** None

Redeploying Element Processes Change Requests to Reconnect to Network

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (information management office).
- **Remarks:** None

Redeploying Element Processes Network Password Resets

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (information management office).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Processes Request to Reconnect to Network Idle for Over 90 Days

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (information management office).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Conducts Arms Room Security Inspection

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Conducts Classified Material Account Inventory

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+10 TASKS

Redeploying Element Inventories and Accounts for Medical Equipment and Orders Medical Supplies

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Completes Post Deployment Processing Through Soldier Readiness Center

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (medical staff).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+20 TASKS

Redeploying Element Submits Personnel Tempo Update

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Conducts Initial Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss (Lost, Damaged, or Destroyed)

- **Originator:** Redeploying element
- **Staffing**: Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Accounts for All Government Purchase Card Purchases on Hand Receipts

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing**: Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+22 TASKS

Redeploying Element Submits Electronic Military Personnel Office Updates

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+29 TASKS

Redeploying Element Identifies and Executes All Calibration Requirements

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (maintenance and S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Begins Necessary Equipment Services

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (maintenance and S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Reestablishes Government Purchase Cards

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (resource management office).
- **Remarks**: None.

R+30 TASKS

Deploying Element Submits Lessons Learned and Reports

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S-3 or G-3), Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** Units should use the after-action report format provided by the geographic combatant command or higher headquarters. Input should also be entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. See Appendix F, Post-Mission de-brief.

Deploying Element uploads final assessments and reports in SOCIUM

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- **Remarks:** Units should use the report format provided by the geographic combatant command or higher headquarters. Input should also be entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. Final report into Socium must take into account all Congressionally mandated WPS (Women, Pease, and Security) reporting requirements IAW Appendix H.

Deploying Element Submits Expenditures Report

- **Originator:** Deploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S3 or G3), Geographic combatant command.
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Resolves Deployment-Related Legal Issues

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing**: Higher headquarters (judge advocate general).
- **Remarks**: Legal issues include powers of attorney, Servicemembers Civil Relief Act issues, and potential legal claims.

Redeploying Element Conducts Clearance Verification and Status

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Verifies and Turns in Passports

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1 and S2).
- **Remarks**: None.

Redeploying Element Completes Physical Security Inspection (SF 701 and SF 702)

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S2).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Returns All Bulk Items

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

REDEPLOYING ELEMENT ACCOUNTS FOR ALL UNIT-PROCURED ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND ADDS TO RECORDS

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and property book officer).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Updates All Individual Hand Receipts

- **Originator**: Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Conducts Ethics Training (Government Purchase Card)

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (resource management office).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Establishes Defense Travel System Hierarchy and Profiles

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (resource management office).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+35 TASKS

Redeploying Element Inventories and Returns All Loan Equipment

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and property book officer).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+40 TASKS

Redeploying Element Conducts 100-Percent Property Inventory

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and property book officer).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Completes and Returns All Lateral Transfers

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and property book officer).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Creates Shortage Annexes and Adjusts Documents

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Merges Forward and Rear Property Books

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4 and property book officer).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Identifies Broken/Inoperable Radio Equipment for Refit

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.

- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S6).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+45 TASKS

REDEPLOYING ELEMENT INSPECTS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ORGANIZATION CONTAINERS FOR SERVICEABILITY

- **Originator**: Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

REDEPLOYING ELEMENT PROPERLY DISPOSES OF UNSERVICEABLE ITEMS

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S4).
- **Remarks:** None.

R+60 THROUGH R+90 TASKS

Redeploying Element Submits Complete Awards Cycle

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (S1).
- **Remarks:** None.

Redeploying Element Completes Post deployment Health Reassessment Survey

- **Originator:** Redeploying element.
- **Staffing:** Higher headquarters (medical staff) and medical treatment facility.
- **Remarks**: None.

Appendix A

Advisor Screening and Selection

In the dynamic and complex landscape of security cooperation, the role of advisors is pivotal in fostering effective partnerships and enhancing the capabilities of allied and partner nations. The selection and deployment of the right advisors can significantly influence the success of security cooperation initiatives, ensuring that partner nations receive the expertise and support they need to address their security challenges. This chapter delves into the critical process of advisor screening and selection, highlighting the importance of identifying individuals with the right mix of technical skills, cultural sensitivity, and strategic vision. By exploring best practices, key considerations, and the essential criteria for selecting advisors, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive guide for ensuring that security cooperation efforts are led by competent, well-suited professionals who can drive meaningful and sustainable outcomes.

ADVISOR SELECTION

A-1. Advisors are specially selected and trained personnel who understand the operational environment and provide effective leadership. Providing mentorship, ensuring unity of effort and purpose, and establishing sustainability help build legitimacy for operations by the FSF and governance by the HNs.

A-2. The success of the advisor mainly depends on personal attributes centered on human relations. The successful advisor is one who can analyze the situation and that of the FSF and HN colleagues and to adjust the counterpart's decisions and behavior accordingly. In addition to the technical and tactical competence necessary to validate an advisor's capacity, advising requires having other attributes that cultivate relationships, such as empathy, patience, and the ability to influence without manipulating. Not every Soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions. Although certain individuals seem to instinctively possess the requisite skill set, others must undergo extensive interpersonal training. The selection and training process for advisors is designed to optimize the inherent abilities of the Soldier through a variety of training and operational experiences. Because advisors operate in very ambiguous environments, it is difficult to establish objective criteria to assess potential advisors. However, research and experience indicate that several personality traits greatly enhance the Soldier's ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture. Of the traits listed below, no single trait is paramount. Advisor selection and training programs seek to develop an understanding of the contributions for each trait. These traits include—

- Tolerance for ambiguity.
- Situational awareness.
- Realistic goal and task setting.
- Ability to accept and learn from failure.
- Open-mindedness.
- Emotional and social intelligence.
- Ability to withhold judgment.
- Maturity.
- Empathy.
- Adaptability.
- Ability to communicate effectively.
- Tactfulness.
- Flexibility.
- Diplomatic conduct.
- Intellectual curiosity.
- Collaborative nature.
- Humility.
- Persistence.
- Motivation of self and others.
- Leadership.
- Self-reliance.

- Integrity.
- Strong sense of self.
- Language capability.
- Tolerance for differences.

Cross-Cultural Communication

A-3. Communication is the transfer of messages from one person to the next. These messages may be passed along verbally, in writing, or by signals. In essence, the sender encodes the message, and the receiver decodes it. The type and style of encoding used is based upon the sender's history, beliefs, values, prejudices, attitudes, and preferences. The receiver decodes messages based upon lifestyle, group membership and rank, worldview, status, language, and social practice. Communication is a two-way process in which the encoding and decoding methods can affect both sending and receiving. Effective communication occurs when the message is perceived and responded to in the manner that the sender intended. In effective communication primarily occurs from poorly chosen words, flawed timing, a confused mixture of verbal and nonverbal signals, poor listening skills, and communication noise. Communication noise describes the influences that detract from effective communication.

CULTURAL GAP BARRIERS

A-4. Each culture has its own rules regarding who a person may speak to, how and when the person may speak, and what topics the person may speak about. Many cultures rely heavily on nonverbal signals to communicate. In such cultures, posture, expression, and actions convey more than spoken or written words. Language is the ultimate communication barrier. The successful advisor should study, at a minimum, common phrases in the HN's language. In addition, advisors must recognize that there are topics of conversation that should be avoided whenever possible (for example, religion, politics, ideology, and personal questions).

Developing a Sense of Cultural Awareness

A-5. Advisors must recognize they are a product of their own culture. They must learn as much as possible about the culture of the people with whom they need to communicate. When communicating with people across cultures, advisors must abandon any sentiments of ethnocentrism—the tendency of individuals to judge all other groups according to their own group's standards, behaviors, and customs. Such notions lead an individual to see other groups as inferior by comparison.

Recognizing Differences

A-6. Each culture has its own way of accomplishing required daily tasks. Advisors must understand that each society may approach things differently; it does not mean that the society is inefficient or less intelligent. Being different should not be viewed as a negative. Respect for counterparts must be always maintained.

Learning to Adapt

A-7. Advisors must be flexible and ready to adapt and adjust their behavior; however, they must be careful not to overdo their flexibility. Individuals who are overly flexible are often perceived as being insincere. The successful advisor must strive to act in a way that is appropriate to the target culture. Above all, advisors should be themselves and show sincerity.

Developing Tolerance

A-8. Advisors must develop a tolerance for deviations from accepted norms. Events or activities that may seem extraordinary to newcomers may be common practice in the culture. Advisors must be aware that members of the foreign culture may be astounded by that which is considered commonplace in the United States. Careful observation should be made before judgments are rendered about seemingly peculiar behavior.

Interpreting the Clash of Cultural Values

A-9. Cultural incongruity between the advisor and the environment can lead to varying levels of misinterpretation and friction. Values that one holds can be particularly sensitive for both the advisors and the people they deal with. A clash in values can lead the advisor to regard those of another culture as unwelcome, unnatural, backwards, or immoral. Advisors must be careful to avoid reactions that subvert their own purposes. For example, a graft functions similarly to a show of allegiance to a superior in certain non-Western cultures. Bribery, being associated with corruption in the West, is looked upon as criminal, whereas in many non-Western countries, bribery is part of social existence (largely based on political or fiscal survival). Most Americans would view a bribe with moral indignation. An advisor may anger many non-Westerners if reacting to a patronage system with moral outrage. Advisors must carefully weigh the costs and benefits to the mission, as well as their approach in dealing with such situations and look for a palatable solution for all parties. As in the case of a patronage system, it is best not to reinforce it by refraining from doing what the counterpart asks if the request only serves to reinforce it. The advisor should deliberately explain why such requests cannot be fulfilled and the adverse effects on the decision-making process, the HN unit, and the HN. Furthermore, an advisor should ensure the counterpart understands that the recommendation is not personal but instead is based on principle to maintain rapport.

Personal Contact

A-10. Personal contact is the most effective way to bridge organizational barriers. Interorganizational stumbling blocks are very real and the prejudices that arise from them are exacerbated by misunderstanding and ignorance. Often, it is too easy to attribute negative attitudes and hostile motives to faceless groups. Advisors must employ superior interpersonal skills and deal directly and closely with individual members of other organizations. This type of contact can effectively reinforce commonality and diminish the impact of disparity. These personal relationships are the key to effective interorganizational relationships.

FACTORS AFFECTING COMMUNICATION ACROSS CULTURES

A-11. Five key aspects greatly impact communication across cultures. These factors are:

- Level of formality.
- Level of directness and explicitness.
- Perception of time.
- Perception of the individual versus the group.
- Demonstration of emotion.

LEVEL OF FORMALITY

A-12. Levels of formality vary greatly from culture to culture. Most Asian cultures are on the high end of the formality continuum. In contrast, the North American culture places very little emphasis on formality. Advisors must recognize the importance placed on formality and adjust their behavior accordingly. To most Germans, chewing gum when receiving a briefing may indicate that the individual is not paying attention. This translates into lack of respect for the speaker and may even be construed as offensive. Conversely, Americans can be quite casual at work. Chewing gum during a presentation may not indicate a lack of attention. In certain settings, it may not even be considered a lack of manners. To be successful, advisors must be aware of such cultural inconsistencies. A simple action that is completely acceptable in one culture may be considered distasteful in another. Time spent researching such issues of formality serves as an advantage when serving in an advisory capacity.

LEVEL OF DIRECTNESS AND EXPLICITNESS

A-13. Certain cultures are very direct and explicit in their communication, whereas other cultures are indirect and vague. Most people from Asian and Middle Eastern cultures place a high reliance on shared experience, nonverbal cues, and the context in which the communication takes place. Consequently, they often seem indirect and vague in their verbal communication. In some countries, such as the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, people tend to rely heavily on the spoken word for communication. Consequently, verbal interactions are very direct, precise, and explicit. Reliance on context is low, as is reliance on nonverbal cues. To outsiders, this style of communication may be perceived as too direct and overly talkative. The

indirectness that characterizes communication in some cultures is often a strategy designed to prevent another person from losing face. It may be viewed as consideration for another person's sense of dignity. In cultures that are direct and explicit in their communication, however, this indirectness may be perceived as dishonesty or insincerity, suggesting that the speaker may have something to hide.

A-14. When communicating with people from a more indirect culture, it is important to exercise extra caution—both in what is said and how it is said. Being overly direct may result in unintentional offense. Careful attention must also be given to nonverbal cues, shared experiences, and the circumstances in which the communication takes place. The true meanings of messages may reside more in these nonverbal cues than in the words uttered. When communicating with people from a more direct culture, typical American candor is more appropriate. When dealing with more direct cultures, ill-prepared advisors may become offended when ideas or opinions are attacked with an unaccustomed degree of directness. To be successful, advisors must bear in mind that some cultures employ such directness as a technique to achieve clarity. Advisors must be objective in listening to what their counterparts have to say and remember that attacks on ideas are not intended to be personal or deliberately embarrassing. Finally, because direct cultures place little reliance on context, advisors must pay particular attention to the spoken word.

PERCEPTION OF TIME

A-15. Cultures may differ greatly in their perception of time. Edward Hall, a prominent researcher in the field of intercultural communication, made a useful distinction between monochronic-time and polychronic-time cultures:

- In monochronic-time cultures (most Western countries), members place a great emphasis on Schedules, precise reckoning of time, and promptness. In such cultures, the schedule takes precedence over the interpersonal relation. Furthermore, because of this urgency to maintain schedules, members of such cultures tend to get to the point quickly. This directness may be viewed as rude or brash in polychronic-time cultures.
- In polychronic-time cultures, time is viewed as fluid. Members of polychronic-time societies do not observe strict schedules—agendas are subordinate to interpersonal relations. Most Asian countries (as well as several Latin American and Middle Eastern countries) are considered polychronic-time
- cultures.

A-16. By knowing how the concept of time is embraced, advisors can better adapt to a new cultural environment. Because the United States is a monochronic-time culture, Americans must learn to be patient with polychronic-time cultures for whom punctuality is, at best unimportant, and at worst a negative trait.

Perception of the Individual Versus the Group

A-17. Cultures may be individualistic or collective in their orientation. Geert Hofstede was another prominent researcher in intercultural communication who describes an individualist culture as one in which the ties between individuals are loose—where people are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate families. In a collectivist culture, people are raised from birth into strong, cohesive groups. These groups offer a lifetime of protection in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. In individualist cultures, the individual takes center stage. Independence is highly valued. Individuals earn credit or blame for the success or failure of their endeavors. In collectivist cultures, an individual is regarded as a part of the group. Interdependence prevails among individuals in the same group. Credit or blame for success or failure belongs to the entire group. Individuals do not seek recognition and often are uncomfortable if it is offered.

Show of Emotion

A-18. Each culture has its own system of expressing emotion. Some cultures tend to be very expressive with their emotions and show their feelings plainly by laughing, grimacing, or scowling. Other cultures tend to be more repressive. Rather than showing their feelings openly, members of these cultures keep their emotions controlled and subdued. When people from these two cultures interact, misunderstandings are common. Those from the more expressive culture may view people from the repressive culture as cold or unfeeling. Similarly, those from the more repressive culture may view their more expressive colleagues as immature and eccentric. Advisors must avoid snap judgments. To communicate effectively, the advisor must be able to display the appropriate level of emotion.

Nonverbal Communication

A-19. Nonverbal communication uses facial expressions, gestures, physical contact, and body postures to convey meaning. Although there are many excellent books on the subject, virtually every publication discusses nonverbal communication from a particular cultural vantage point. Nonverbal communication and culture are inseparable; one can only properly understand this type of communication if one understands the culture from which it originates.

Body Language

A-20. Body language and gestures are products of custom, and they are just as important to communication as spoken or written language. The improper use of a gesture—even as simple as a thumbs-up gesture or a two-finger peace sign—can upset a carefully nurtured relationship. The most basic survival gesture—the smile—is a visual signal that is universally understood. However, even though the smile is understood in every culture, some fine distinctions do exist between cultures. Russians, for example, very rarely smile on the street. The French believe Americans smile too much. Japanese people seldom smile during (what they consider to be) formal circumstances, such as a photograph for a driver's license or Christmas card. Malaysians and Indonesians tend to smile—even giggle—when they feel nervous or embarrassed.

A-21. The common symbol for OK, made by touching the tips of thumb and index finger, is one of the best-known gestures in the United States. In other cultures, however, the same gesture may mean something entirely different. For example—

- In the south of France, this gesture is used to indicate zero or something worthless.
- An individual who uses the symbol to indicate OK may negate a negotiated arrangement or offend a counterpart by indicating that the deal (or the individual) is worthless.
- In Japan, this gesture is used to indicate a coin or money. An individual who uses the symbol to indicate OK may offend the counterpart by appearing to ask for a bribe.
- In Brazil, Germany, and Russia, this gesture is used to indicate intimate body parts.
- An advisor carelessly using this gesture may appear to be suggesting something unintended.

A-22. Advisors must pay particular attention to seemingly minor differences. For example, Americans tend to beckon a waiter by raising a single finger. That type of pointing gesture is frowned upon in Japan, where pointing is done with the thumb of a closed fist. In most of Europe, a person beckons a waiter holding their hand in front of them (fingertips forward with the palm facing the floor) and making a scratching motion with the fingers. Another common beckoning gesture in the United States is made by holding the index finger straight up (facing inward) and curling it up and down. In Australia, Indonesia, and Mexico, this gesture is reserved for animals and prostitutes. The use of body language in the AO should be studied thoroughly before deployment. Once deployed, advisors should continue to study the body language used by local nationals. The surrounding circumstances must also be considered (for example, how the people call a waiter or how they wave goodbye). Advisors should observe posture, body language, and common gestures, such as people tapping the sides of their noses, or flipping the lobes of their ears.

Interpersonal Distance

A-23. The space people maintain around their bodies reflects the desire to control the people who can get close to them and the circumstances in which it is deemed acceptable. An individual who violates another's interpersonal space without consent is usually perceived as hostile or aggressive. The perception of appropriate interpersonal distance varies between cultures and reflects the style and tone of the society. Figure A-1 on page 78, provides an intentionally broad overview of these variations. However, the guidelines provided cannot be applied to every relationship or circumstance, even within a single cultural group. Few areas of nonverbal communication are more sensitive than interpersonal space. Fortunately, the appropriate distance is easy to respect once it is identified. For Soldiers serving in advisory roles, interpersonal distance is particularly important when administering or receiving criticism. In such instances, individuals must be sure they do not stand too close to one another. An interpersonal gap that is too short can make one, or both individuals feel threatened and defensive. People who feel defensive have trouble expressing themselves clearly, and they may become resistant to suggestion, correction, and criticism and may even become aggressive.




Figure A-1. Interpersonal Distance

Touch

A-24. Touch should be minimized when communicating across cultural lines. Although some cultures are more open to touching than others, even the most demonstrative groups have rules of propriety and etiquette. Physical contact made at the wrong time can cause serious misunderstandings. In mainstream American culture, touching is generally discouraged. Native-born Americans tend to abandon touch at an early age and substitute words as the primary means of communication. Northern Europeans, such as people from Germany, Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom, are similarly uncomfortable with touch from anyone other than intimate family members or friends.

A-25. Touching is discouraged in most Asian cultures, particularly to the back, head, or shoulder. In addition, small children are not to be touched by anyone outside the immediate family. Whereas it is common for an American adult to playfully tousle the hair of a small child, such actions may be deemed extremely offensive in some Asian cultures. In the example of the small child's hair, an advisor's well-meant attempt to ease tension, display a sense of humor, and build trust would achieve the exact opposite. There are rules for touching.

A-26. Because U.S. society is so aware of the potential for people to use negative touch to intimidate or threaten, most Americans are careful in how they touch. Researchers classify Americans as low touchers in relation to the rest of the world. However, the use of touch in such a multicultural society varies. Some Americans never touch anyone outside their immediate family, even though they may prize such a person's friendship. Others touch often—usually on the shoulders and arms—but such contact is not designed to express any real meaning. In the United States, touch is used mainly when individuals meet or depart (for example, a handshake or a casual hug).

A-27. Americans can simulate the feeling of touch (without ever touching) by allowing others to move in close when talking. Close friends may exchange hugs, pretend punches, or kisses and touch frequently when talking. For acquaintances and superiors, a simple handshake is all that is expected. Some people are considered high touchers and give friendly arm, back, and shoulder touches—even to new acquaintances. Some Americans show in public what might be considered private expressions of affection in other cultures (for example, prolonged kisses or other overt displays of affection).

A-28. Handshakes exchanged in the United States tend to be more firm than other cultures. For instance, Chinese, Japanese, and most Africans use light handshakes. This does not indicate that they are unassertive; it simply is a cultural trait. Russians and most Europeans use firm handshakes. Similarly, this does not necessarily imply that they are assertive or tough.

Eye Contact

A-29. Rules for appropriate eye contact vary among cultures; however, few people consciously recognize that such rules even exist. Still, individuals usually act according to society norms. These individuals have unconsciously absorbed the rules of their culture. Among the majority of North Americans, the accepted rule is for individuals to make intermittent eye contact with the people to whom they are speaking. If people hold eye contact for too long, they may be considered aggressive. If people hold eye contact too briefly, they may come across as disinterested. An individual who consistently fails to make eye contact may appear evasive or Dishonest. Advisors must be sensitive to cultural variations when making eye contact. In some African cultures, for example, it is considered impolite to make more than the briefest eye contact. To most Americans, such an exchange would imply that the other party was distracted and not paying attention.

Facial Expressions and Gestures

A-30. It is not unusual for Americans to use facial expressions to convey doubt, surprise, distrust, anger, agreement, or rejection. Other cultures are less expressive with facial expressions. For example, a Japanese counterpart's face may be expressionless, but inside, that partner may be furious. Similarly, the partner may enthusiastically agree with a recommendation, although their outward expression might be interpreted as indifference. Most Americans use many hand gestures. In most European and Pacific Rim countries, hand gestures are kept to a minimum. In Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, it is also common for people to use hand gestures to emphasize their points of view. Advisors must exercise caution in both the number and magnitude of hand gestures.

Communication with Illiterates

A-31. Soldiers frequently operate in developing countries—and even some industrialized nations—where large segments of the population are either illiterate or semiliterate. In many cases (such as in Haiti), this segment of the population represents the primary target audience with whom the unit must communicate. An illiterate or semiliterate audience presents a challenge that requires creative and enhanced communication skills. To reach an illiterate or semiliterate segment of the population, there are several existing channels of communication that can be used; others can be created. Radio is a powerful means of reaching illiterate or semiliterate populations. Other techniques include interpersonal communication, traditional or folk communication, simple graphics, and other basic printed materials. When dealing with an illiterate or semiliterate audience, the advisor should:

- Determine how people receive information. The lack of literacy skills does not necessarily indicate an absence in the flow of information.
- Identify the key communicators for the target audience. Very often, word of mouth is the best. way to share information among audiences for whom written materials are ineffective.
- Identify the informal communications networks (the grapevine) in the community. In some areas, the most effective communication networks lack leadership or formal structure. Advisors must identify members of the community who trust the unit and are willing to help.
- Include the use of printed materials. Photo novels, comic books, and wall posters that use more graphics and fewer words can convey powerful messages.
- Cater visual communication materials to the target audience. Images that effectively convey a message in one culture might carry an entirely different meaning in another. Artwork should be tested on a sample audience.

TOPICS TO APPROACH WITH SPECIAL CAUTION

A-32. Each culture has topics that are considered forbidden. These subjects are simply not discussed in casual conversation. The nature of these topics can vary widely; however, advisors should avoid (at least initially) the following four subjects:

- Religion
- Politics
- Personal matters
- Fitness

Religion

A-33. Discussing religion can immediately destroy the communication process, particularly if the local nationals believe that offense was given. Whether actual or perceived, the damage done may be very profound, as cultural sensitivities may be acute. This is evident in the case of Islam, for example.

Politics

A-34. Political discussions can become very heated and should be avoided if possible. In regions where political issues dominate the news, avoiding such discussions may prove difficult. An advisor must ensure that these types of discussions are handled in a diplomatic manner if there is no polite way to avoid it.

Personal Matters

A-35. It is considered rude to ask other Americans highly personal questions. Advisors should extend the same courtesy to members of the local national population. In certain rural areas of West Africa, where the world is seen in generalities, it is considered extremely rude to ask specific questions.

Fitness

A-36. Physical skills and the resulting personal fitness can be critical to personal and professional credibility when dealing with military counterparts. Fatigue reduces overall capability, diminishes perceptiveness, impairs thought processes, and impedes cross-cultural communication. Physical training programs are readily adaptable to the requirements of a given target culture and region.

Regional-Specific Proficiency

A-37. As knowledge of a given culture is developed, certain activities or capabilities may emerge as critical to cross-cultural communications and effective counterpart relations. For example, some level of proficiency in a popular local sport may help establish interpersonal relationships that permit more effective communication and greater influence. Soccer is an example of a widely played sport. More localized examples include horseback or camel riding; swimming; trapping; or even singing, dancing, and playing musical instruments. Small investments in skills seemingly unrelated to military mission requirements can provide disproportionately high returns in influence.

Final Tips on Communication

A-38. Researching a target audience's culture can be an endless activity. Advisors must not become bogged down in the minute details of a single cultural feature. Instead, they should strive to understand all aspects of the culture. If advisors demonstrate a basic knowledge and a willingness to listen and learn, they will achieve a more effective exchange. Advisors should consult with individuals who live in the HN and know the local customs. A one-hour interview with a native may be more productive than a week of formal language and culture Training.

A-39. Effective communication requires practice. Advisors should rehearse to practice favorable body language and to eliminate unfavorable gestures and postures. Body language is as important as the verbal message. It should appear natural—not labored or uncomfortable. Advisors must recognize that an American stereotype—possibly a negative stereotype—likely precedes them. They should try to understand and discern this stereotype. Over time, advisors may be able to improve the local impression of Americans.

Advisor Techniques

A-40. The most important mission of an advisor is to enhance the military professionalism of the HN counterpart. An advisor must influence the HN military and prepare them to deal with the changing

environment by emphasizing civilian control and demonstrating the advantages of a democratic system of government.

A-41. A major cause of failure by an advisor is the inability to maintain a good working relationship with the counterpart. The unsuccessful advisor often fails to understand why the counterparts do not feel the same sense of urgency. On occasion, an advisor is unable to realize that the counterpart will remain and continue to fight (or prepare to fight) the adversary long after the advisor's end of tour and to the safety of the U.S.

A-42. The advisor must know HN sociopolitical and military organizations and their interrelationships— to include personalities, political movements, forces involved, and social drives. With this knowledge the advisor must encourage the counterpart to understand the need for an integrated civil-military effort the counterpart must learn that military actions are subordinate to, and supportive of, the economic and social actions required to defeat the adversary.

A-43. Rapport is a symbiotic relationship between people based on mutual trust, understanding, and respect. Personal dislike, animosity, and other forms of friction characterize the lack of rapport. The need to establish rapport with the HN counterpart is the result of a unique military position in which the advisor has no direct authority or control over the actions of the HN partner. However, an advisor can influence or motivate the counterpart to act in certain ways by using the proper advisory techniques.

A-44. Rapport results when everyone perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and compatible (working toward a common goal). If the advisor can convey this attitude to the HN counterpart, long-lasting and effective rapport will exist.

ADVISOR CONSIDERATIONS

A-45. Advising the counterpart to select a particular course of action (COA) is only effective if the counterpart perceives that the advisor is professionally competent to provide sound advice. If the counterpart does not perceive the proposed solution to a problem as realistic, the competence of the advisor may be questioned. The advisor must make every effort to explain to the counterpart that the recommended COA is realistic and effective.

A-46. Advisors must be flexible and ready to adjust their behavior; however, they must be careful not to overdo their flexibility. Individuals who are overly flexible are often perceived as being insincere. The successful advisor must strive to act in a way that is appropriate to the target culture. Above all, an advisor should be genuine and show sincerity. Over compartmentalizing must be avoided, as distrust can be prevented simply by not being overly secretive.

A-47. The prospect that an advisor may—from time to time share in the same risks of HN counterparts to properly set the example should be clear. This shared risk may especially be critical in a combat environment. By sharing the same risks as that of the HN counterparts, the advisor will dispel any appearance of a privileged status that may potentially harm relations or lose rapport.

A-48. Awareness of cultural differences and any impact is the first prerequisite for successfully working with a counterpart. Being sensitive to the fact that differences exist and carefully observing actions and reactions can enable the Soldier to adjust behavior and modify actions to achieve greater influence with the counterpart.

A-49. Advisors must recognize they are a product of their own culture. They must learn as much as possible about the culture of the people with whom they are expected to communicate with. Advisors must understand that each society may approach things differently; it does not mean that the society is inefficient or less intelligent. Being different should not be viewed as negative. Respect for counterparts must always be maintained. Advisors must avoid snap judgments. To communicate effectively, the advisor must be able to display the appropriate level of emotion.

A-50. Advisors must develop a tolerance for deviations from accepted norms. Events or activities that may seem extraordinary to newcomers may be common practice in the culture. Advisors must be aware that members of the foreign culture may be astounded by that which is considered commonplace in the United States. Careful observation should be made before judgments are rendered about seemingly peculiar behavior.

A-51. Advisors often must work with counterparts with different or opposing values. Any time spent trying to change the basic values of the counterpart is time wasted; furthermore, such efforts are likely to create lasting resentment. Advisors should have some understanding of the value system of their counterpart. Values are usually nonnegotiable; they are basic rules about what is right and wrong.

A-52. Advisors must be careful to avoid reactions that subvert their own purposes. A clash in values can lead the advisor to regard those of another culture as unwelcome, unnatural, backwards, or immoral. In dealing with a counterpart who has conflicting values, it is typically best to persuade the individual that the desired action or behavior is not really in conflict with the counterpart's values. If an action is contrary to the advisor's values, the advisor should explain the adverse effects on the decision-making process, the HN unit, and the HN. Furthermore, an advisor should ensure his counterpart understands that any recommendation is not personal, but instead is based on principle to maintain rapport.

A-53. Advisor should strive to establish and maintain good rapport by conveying to the counterpart sincere interest in the counterpart, the nation of the counterpart, and its cause; the advisor will not belittle the counterpart or effort made by the counterpart and must ensure the counterpart understands that the advisor has no intention of taking over. Advisors must demonstrate that they have come to help because they believe the counterparts' goals to be just, fair, and deserving of success. Genuine rapport is slow to develop and can be ruined in an instant.

A-54. When advising in a combat environment, decentralized elements often rely on indigenous forces for security and for establishing, building, and maintaining rapport with all foreign nationals. Rapport is a critical part of the force protection plan as it is meant to keep the peace with counterparts and potentially provide early warnings of an imminent outbreak of hostilities or instances of electromagnetic warfare.

A-55. Advisors must recognize the importance placed on formality and adjust behaviors accordingly. A simple action that is completely acceptable in one culture may be considered distasteful in another. Time spent researching such issues of formality serves as an advantage when serving in an advisory capacity.

A-56. Advisors must not become bogged down in the minute details of a single cultural feature. Instead, they should strive to understand all aspects of the culture. If advisors demonstrate a basic knowledge and a willingness to listen and learn, they will achieve a more effective exchange. Advisors should consult with individuals who live in the HN and know the local customs. A one-hour interview with a native may be more productive than a week of formal language and culture training.

A-57. Advisors should rehearse to practice favorable body language and eliminate unfavorable gestures and postures. Body language is as important as the verbal message. It should appear natural—not labored or uncomfortable. Advisors must recognize that an American stereotype—possibly a negative stereotype—likely precedes them. They should try to understand and discern this stereotype.

A-58. Advisors must develop and employ keen problem-solving skills. Doctrinally accepted U.S. tactics, techniques, and procedures must be adapted and articulated in culturally acceptable and supportable terms. Advisors must be objective listeners when communicating with their counterparts and remind themselves that attacks on ideas are not intended to be personal or deliberately embarrassing. Soldiers must employ leadership and instructional techniques appropriate to their role as advisors and to specific regions and cultures.

A-59. Advisors must create balanced training programs to address the deficiencies and needs (rather than the preferences) of the HN force. Advisors establish training objectives and maintainable standards, focus on combat effectiveness, and praise training accomplishments. Advisors must emphasize the need for continuous training and encourage counterparts to maximize training opportunities. Counterparts must understand that the training mission needs—

- Military discipline and leadership.
- Noncommissioned officer empowerment.
- Marksmanship and small-unit tactics.
- Health, strength, and endurance elements.
- Proper maintenance.
- Rehearsals.

A-60. Advisors provide training to military, police, and other civilian forces. They must coordinate with other advisory personnel in the AO and with cooperating U.S. agencies covering psychological operations (PSYOP) influence activities, agricultural improvements, medical services, population and resources control, and similar activities.

A-61. Advisors should train their counterparts to use the training resources that they control, to request additional resources from superiors, and to properly allocate resources to subordinate forces. Advisors should stress the importance of resources such as ammunition, films, and training aids and show how to construct and use field-expedient training devices and facilities.

A-62. Advisors must be competent in both formal and informal methods of instruction. When dealing with an illiterate or semiliterate audience, the advisor should:

- Determine how people receive their information.
- Identify the key communicators for the target audience.
- Identify the informal communications networks (the grapevine) in the community.
- Include the use of printed materials.
- Cater visual communication materials to the target audience.

A-63. Advisors must use the U.S. chain of command to obtain assistance and disseminate guidance. Care must be taken to distinguish between the U.S. chain of command and the HN chain of command. Advisors provide recommendations—not orders—to their counterparts. Only the counterpart should issue orders to subordinates.

A-64. Advisors must keep their counterparts informed of advice given to their subordinates. Fellow U.S. personnel should be kept informed of advice offered to counterparts. HN officials should be persuaded to pass information up, down, and across the chain of command. If warranted by the HN military customs, senior-ranking personnel should be saluted, referred to by their rank (as customs permit), and shown respect. Effectiveness is greatly enhanced when the advisor displays respect for the counterpart and the HN chain of command.

A-65. Finally, all U.S. advisor rotations must end at some point, and often, a U.S. replacement follows. It is imperative to have enough time allocated during the relief in place and transfer of authority beforehand to sensitize the new advisor to the environment and counterparts.

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Appendix B

Advisor Team Leader Checklist

This checklist serves as a comprehensive guide to ensure that the Advisor Team is well-organized, fully equipped, and ready to address the unique challenges and responsibilities that result from deploying as a Team.

B-1. The recommended tasks required to accomplish advisor missions are:

- Deploy the team.
- Provide command and control (C2).
- Advise foreign security forces (FSF).
- Protect
- Sustain
- Redeploy the team.

TASK 1: DEPLOY THE TEAM

B-2. Deploying as a team involves the coordinated movement and establishment of your advisor team and its resources into a new operational environment. This task requires careful planning, preparation, and execution to ensure a smooth and safe transition.

BUILD AN EFFECTIVE TEAM

B-3. Building an effective team starts with fostering open communication, mutual trust, and a shared commitment to common goals.

- Select team members based on subject matter expert (SME) skills, advisor knowledge, cross-cultural communications skills, teaching ability, regional orientation, and mission objectives.
- Internally task organize by ability, function, and personality.
- Conduct team building activities, tasks, or functions.
- Conduct advisor training.

CONDUCT PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

B-4. The Team must conduct a comprehensive pre-deployment preparation by completing individual and collective tasks, analyzing relevant reports, conducting site surveys and area studies, and ensuring Leahy Amendment vetting.

- Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks. Understand and employ planning considerations for the advisor environment.
- Identify and analyze any existing reports, assessments, or after-action reviews (AARs) from similar engagements.
- Conduct a predeployment site survey (PDSS). Refer to appendix B for an example of a PDSS checklist.
- Conduct an area study and intelligence preparation of the operational environment.
- Ensure Leahy Amendment vetting of foreign security forces (FSF) has been completed.

TASK 2: COMMAND AND CONTROL

CONDUCT PLANNING FOR ADVISOR-SPECIFIC MISSIONS

B-5. The Team must conduct Advisor-Specific missions to effectively address the unique requirements and objectives of their assignment, ensuring they provide tailored advice, training, and support that meet the specific needs of their counterparts and contribute to the overall success of the mission

- Conduct concurrent team planning for all FSF events.
- Conduct planning for movement to each mission location.
- Understand the rank, gender, and age perceptions of the advisor team while working with the FSF and local populace.

- Conduct planning for engagements with critical stakeholders.

COORDINATE AND DECONFLICT WITH HIGHER, SUPPORTING, AND ADJACENT UNITS (COALITION AND FSF)

B-6. The Team must coordinate with all other organizations within the AO.

- Identify higher, supporting, and adjacent units.
- Establish rapport and communication with higher, supporting, and adjacent units.
- Advise and influence higher, supporting, and adjacent units on the advisor mission and requirements.
- Execute reporting procedures and requirements.
- Conduct an assessment across the FSF capabilities and identify capacity gaps or institutional shortfalls for future resources and higher unit regional understanding.

IDENTIFY AND ESTABLISH RAPPORT WITH KEY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO)

B-7. The Team needs to identify and establish rapport with Key Personnel in the Area of Operations to build trust, facilitate open communication, and gain a deeper understanding of the local context, enabling more effective collaboration and successful mission outcomes

- Identify key FSF personnel.
- Establish rapport with key FSF personnel.
- Identify key local civilian, religious, and governance leaders.
- Establish rapport with key local civilian, religious, and governance leaders.

TASK 3: ADVISE FSF

B-8. An Advisor Team needs to advise the Foreign Security Forces to enhance their capabilities, promote professionalism, and foster interoperability, ultimately supporting the host nation's ability to maintain stability, security, and sovereignty. This collaboration helps to build strong partnerships and contributes to regional and global security efforts.

EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE IN AN ADVISING ENVIRONMENT.

B-9. The ability for an advisor to communicate with a counterpart is critical to the success of the advisor mission. Interpreters are often relied upon to bridge communication gaps, but they are not always available or dependable for providing an accurate representation of a translated conversation based on language skill or experience working with the military. Thus, language training for the advisor team is an important aspect of the train-up to facilitate mission success, and include the following skills:

- Effectively communicate without an interpreter by—
  - Exchanging common greetings in the language used in the AO.
  - Identifying and employing nonverbal communications common in the AO.
  - Understanding verbal and nonverbal threat indicators common in the AO.
- Effectively communicate through an interpreter by—
  - Understanding the language and security capabilities of the interpreter.
  - Evaluating the trustworthiness of the interpreter.
  - Understanding the background, cultural, and gender biases of the interpreter.
  - Planning and preparing an interpreter for a communications event.
  - Conducting a meeting or event through the interpreter.
  - Preparing to work with a non-vetted or unfamiliar interpreter.
  - Understanding the regional perceptions of the interpreter based on background, culture, or gender biases to manage employment of the interpreter.
  - Planning a negotiation with the interpreter and mediate a conflict with FSF or key local civilian, religious, and governance leaders.

GAIN AND USE INFLUENCE TO PROGRESS ADVISOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.

B-10. An advisor must be able to influence the counterpart to act in ways that may be different from past experience and cultural norms. Without the ability to influence the counterpart's actions, the advisor mission may fail. Affinity between the advisor and counterpart must exist for true influence to occur. A successful advisor will put an influence strategy in motion resulting in a voluntary, long-lasting change in the counterpart's actions despite the absence of formal authority. Successful influence is gained through a combination of rapport building techniques used to demonstrate value, credibility, and trust. This can only be achieved when everyone perceives the other as competent, mature, responsible, and compatible (working toward a common goal). If the advisor can convey a committed attitude to the FSF counterpart, a long lasting, effective advisor relationship will exist. This commitment is conveyed by—

- Demonstrating the professional ability of one's own military occupation and function on the advisor team.
- Demonstrating to the FSF counterpart that the advisor provides value.
  - Demonstrating SME advisor knowledge.
  - Demonstrating access to the advisor team and coalition support or effects.
- Determining and employing proper influence techniques.
- Understanding and employing effective negotiations.
  - Prepare to conduct negotiations with the FSF counterpart.
  - Prepare the FSF counterpart to conduct negotiations with local leaders.
  - Prepare the FSF counterpart to conduct negotiations with coalition forces.
- Effectively advise higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces.
  - Build rapport with higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces.
  - Educate higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces on the capabilities and limitations of the FSF counterpart and unit.
  - Influence higher, supporting, and adjacent units or coalition forces to progress advisor mission objectives.

ADVISE FSF UNIT MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST, MISSION OBJECTIVE, OR ASSIGNED TASKS.

B.11 Advisors must teach, coach, and advise FSF to develop their professional skills. Teaching means to provide instruction and education to FSF to develop skills and knowledge necessary to do a particular task or mission. Coaching means to assist a counterpart in reaching the next level of knowledge or skill by practicing those skills and building on previous teaching. The goal is for the FSF to assume more responsibility for success while the advisor gives assistance as required. Advising means to provide counterparts with counsel to assist them in making a decision based on applying knowledge. The distinctive feature is the recipient is responsible for making the decision while the advisor only provides counsel. Need a lead-in sentence here to introduce the bullet points:

- Develop an advisor campaign plan.
  - Incorporate FSF objectives into the campaign plan.
- Assess the FSF unit's, team's, or individual's strengths and capabilities.
  - Develop measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.
- Employ SME and military occupational specialty and experience bases to support mission.
  - Teach individual and collective tasks.
  - Coach/walk through mission rehearsal and assist.
  - Advise FSF leaders in the mission.
  - Advise the FSF leaders on the benefit of organizational assessments through AARs within the context of the FSF cultural norms.
- Evaluate effectiveness of the advisor effort.
  - Determine FSF leader development needs and education.
  - Conduct an assessment of the FSF organization to determine capabilities, capacity, or institutional gaps.

UNDERSTAND AND OPERATE WITHIN OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS FROM HIGHER

B-12. Understanding and operating within the operational limitations set by higher headquarters is crucial for an Advisor Team to ensure they align with the overall mission objectives, maintain legal and policy compliance, and optimize resource allocation, ultimately contributing to a cohesive and effective operation.

HEADQUARTERS

B-13. Every unit, team, or individual working with FSF must receive guidance on what operational constraints may exist. The advisor will almost always possess more detailed information than the FSF require or need to possess. The advisor should always receive a detailed briefing from the appropriate intelligence office prior to departing on any advisor mission. Likewise, the advisor may have many assets that may be provided to FSF counterparts. The advisor must be aware of all the assets and under what conditions they may be provided to the FSF counterpart. In addition, the advisor must not only verify the training tasks for the FSF, but must also evaluate the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that apply to those tasks. This includes—

- Determining when to provide or withhold information from a counterpart.
  - Understanding and ensuring all information is cleared for foreign disclosure through a foreign disclosure officer (FDO).
- Determining when to provide or withhold assets from a counterpart.
  - Ensuring funds are properly used and approved through an appropriate funding source.
  - Understanding the United States (US) and FSF standards regarding corruption and acceptable business conduct.
  - Understanding and ensuring all material is cleared for foreign disclosure through an FDO.
- Determining effective TTP for the counterpart's usage.
  - Understanding and ensuring all TTP are cleared for foreign disclosure through an FDO.

OPERATE WITH CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE.

B-14. The advisor must be able to anticipate the actions of the counterpart, understand those actions within the cultural context, and influence those actions to achieve an acceptable outcome. The advisor will not always be able to influence outcomes but must determine an acceptable level and influence adherence to that level. The advisor must also inform and educate own chain of command on any deviations from advisor and unit acceptable norms and convey the cultural context of the counterpart's actions.

- Understand the local ethical model and employ acceptable solutions within it.
  - Educate the chain of command on deviances from US-accepted cultural behavior.

TASK 4: PROTECT THE TEAM

B-15. The Advisor Team can enhance its safety and security, ensuring that team members are protected while effectively executing their mission by implementing measures.

PLAN FOR A QUICK RESPONSE FORCE (QRF)

B-16. The advisor deploys through the full range of operations or environments where adversarial threats can expand from nonexistent to a daily, persistent threat to the advisor team and FSF. With the goal of developing the FSF for self-sustainability, the advisor must advise the FSF to prepare and conduct organic partner nation (PN) QRF support. Based on the advisor's situation, QRF support may be available in country or out of country and be comprised of US and coalition forces or PN forces. Additionally, the advisor should assist the FSF with developing a QRF plan with organic FSF assets from the PN structure, whether it is Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, police, paramilitary, or local security forces.

B-17. Plan QRF for the advisor team based on local and regional threats, which includes:

- Advising the FSF leadership on planning for a QRF to:
  - Assist the FSF in establishing threat indicators to activate the QRF.
  - Assist the FSF in a communications hierarchy to support and activate the QRF.
  - Assist the FSF in linkup procedures between the QRF and FSF in duress.
  - Advise the FSF on rehearsing the activation through linkup of the QRF.

IMPLEMENT A TEAM FORCE PROTECTION PLAN WITH A POSTURE THAT CAN BE ADJUSTED BASED ON CURRENT OR EMERGING THREATS

B-18. The advisor team should understand the threats inherent to the region and the security situation of the operational environment. The advisor team should plan for and look at ways to mitigate threats to the team and FSF. A force protection posture should be implemented based on the threat to the advisor team and adjusted as new threats emerge or the situation improves. The advisor team should have a way to rapidly communicate the posture among other team members. The plan should include advisor team and FSF team protection. Advise the FSF leadership on proper planning for force protection and plan management.

- Integrate FSF into the protection plan.
  - Execute emergency procedures.
  - Plan for organic and nonorganic fire support.
  - Conduct personnel recovery.

TASK 5: SUSTAIN THE TEAM

B-19. The Advisor Team must sustain the Team through constant running estimates on group cohesion and viability.

- Develop relationships with supporting units, organizations, and assets.
- Coordinate gaining basic necessities.
- Mitigate culture shock.
- Maintain unit cohesion and morale.

TASK 6 REDEPLOY THE TEAM

B-20. The Advisor must prepare for new TOA/RIP with incoming Team while ensuring the most critical tasks are addressed.

- Conduct effective FSF unit or counterpart transfer to the follow-on advisor team.
- Prepare historical documentation of the mission.
  - Prepare a written AAR.
  - Prepare written lessons learned or a record of events and training.
- Follow through to ensure post-mission products are discoverable the next unit if no face-to-face transition occurred.
- Conduct individual, collective, unit, and directed tasks.
  - Understand and employ planning considerations for deploying from the advisor environment.
  - Ensure proper disposition of equipment.

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Appendix C

Advisor Predeployment Site Survey

This appendix provides an example of considerations for conducting a site survey. Site surveys are critical parts of the pre-mission planning and coordination process for persistent and episodic deployments.

PDSS CHECKLIST

C-1. Preparation. Prior to deploying, the team leader and selected members of the advisor team may have an opportunity to visit the area of operations (AO). Ideally, the PDSS is scheduled 180–270 days prior to beginning the mission and is an extremely useful tool to help the new advisor team understand the operational environment. A PDSS checklist can help answer many questions regarding foreign security forces (FSF) in the area and shortcomings or opportunities to focus advisor efforts for the incoming team. If available, incoming teams should consider conducting video teleconferences or gaining access to web portals containing current information. These considerations include:

- Every advisor team will have differing missions, AOs, units, and personalities with which they will engage. The environment, relationships, FSF level of autonomy, and level of stability within the AO help define their mission.
- Prior to departure for the PDSS, the incoming team leader should assemble the request for information list based on input from the team. The provides a basic outline. Team members involved in developing the PDSS may use the checklist as a guide when preparing their PDSS plan. However, it is important for the incoming advisor team to remain flexible and keep an open mind with respect to training and operating with their assigned FSF.

C-2. Site Survey Checklist. The site survey checklist helps answer questions identified by the team during its preparation for deployment. The checklist can be modified to aid the site survey team in acquiring information for planning before deployment.

SITE SURVEY TEAM MISSION

C-3. The mission of the site survey team is to report on the current FSF mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations conditions. It also clarifies in-country command and control (C2) systems and logistics relationships for the follow-on unit's mission execution and coordinates the in-country reception of the main body. If possible, the PDSS should be conducted by members of the actual advisor team in conjunction with the partner force.

ADVISOR TEAM SITE SURVEY CHECKLIST

C-4. The Advisor Team Site Survey Checklist provides an overview of the current Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Medical, Communication and an overview of the same for the FSFs.

Intelligence

C-5. This overview helps the team understand potential threats, key players, local dynamics, and historical context, enabling them to make informed decisions, identify security risks, and tailor their advisory efforts more effectively. By being aware of the intelligence landscape, the team can better protect themselves and optimize their support to the host nation's security forces.

- Intelligence briefing.
- Threat briefing.
- Maps and photos of the area.
- Weather forecast data.
- Restricted and off-limits areas.
- Local populace (i.e., attitudes, customs, and dangers).
- Regional and local special events and dates of significance.
- Local populace (i.e., attitudes, customs, and dangers).

- Regional and local special events and dates of significance.

Operations

C.6. This overview ensures that the team is aligned with the broader objectives, enabling them to focus their site survey on relevant areas, identify critical infrastructure, assess security requirements, and gather information that directly supports their advisory role.

- Initial coordination.
  - Training plans.
  - Aviation support (available hours and type of aircraft).
  - Foreign security forces (FSF) plans.
  - Problem areas.
  - Evasion plan of action: related directives, guidance, plans, or orders.
- Points of contact (POCs), phone number list, communications requirements, and systems used.

Logistics

C.7 This overview provides crucial information about available resources, supply chains, and infrastructure,

- Transportation requirements.
- Special equipment requirements.
- Other support requirements.
- Construction equipment and supply requirements.
- Advisor basing/billeting arrangements.

Medical

C.8 This overview provides essential information on local healthcare facilities, available medical resources, and potential health risks, ensuring the team is prepared to address medical emergencies and maintain their health throughout the mission.

- Location and availability of medical care for advisor team members.
- Medical evacuation distances, times, procedures.
- Health threats, to include endemic disease, occupational and environmental health considerations, prophylaxis requirements.
- Location and availability of CL VIII medical supplies.

Communication

C.9 This overview provides crucial signal and current interaction with local agencies.

- Requirements for communicating with higher headquarters.
- Requirements for communicating with partner unit.
- Requirements for communicating with embassy or emergency personnel.
- Requirements for communication within the team.

FSF Unit Commanders

C.10 This overview provides the Team with a common operating picture (COP) among the local units.

- Training estimate.
- Current training status.
- Units available for training.
- Command and control.
- Additional training desires.
- Unit policies.

FSF Provided Intelligence

C.11 This overview supports the Advisor Team during the Site Survey by offering valuable local insights, identifying potential threats and security concerns, and providing up-to-date information on the operational environment. This intelligence helps the team make informed decisions, enhance their situational awareness, and tailor their advisory efforts more effectively, ultimately improving the safety and success of their mission.

- Local civilians.
- Security policies and problems.
- Populace control requirements (e.g., identification cards or passes).

FSF Operations

C.12 support the Advisor Team during the Site Survey by providing local expertise, coordinating access to key facilities and personnel, ensuring security and logistical assistance, and sharing operational insights. This collaboration helps the Advisor Team conduct a more comprehensive and efficient survey, enhancing their ability to understand the operational environment and effectively advise their FSF counterparts.

- Training plan.
- Support available.
  - Ammunition.
  - Weapons.
  - Vehicles.
  - Aircraft and air items.
  - Facilities: training areas, arms rooms, ammunition storage facilities, classrooms,
  - ranges, training aids, and special equipment.
- Unit equipment.
- Landing and drop zones in the area.
- Maps.
- Rations for field training.
- Daily training schedules and status reports.
- POC for training problems.
- Holidays and unit requirements that may interfere with training.
- Medical and dental support.
- Communications capabilities.
- FSF current activities.

FSF Logistics

C.13 Logistics supports the Advisor Team during the Site Survey by providing essential resources such as transportation, supplies, and equipment, facilitating access to local infrastructure, and offering insights into local supply chains and logistical capabilities. This support ensures the Advisor Team has the necessary tools and information to conduct a thorough and effective site survey, enhancing their operational readiness and collaboration with FSF counterparts.

- Detachment facilities.
  - Barracks.
  - Drinking water.
  - Messing facilities.
  - Secure storage areas.
  - Morale, welfare, and recreation facilities.
  - Medical facilities.
  - Hangars.
  - Electrical power supply (220v); plug configurations.
- Fuel supply (e.g., diesel, automobile gasoline, aviation gasoline, or jet propulsion fuel, type 8).
- Rations.
- Transportation.
- Lumber and materials for training aids.

- Special equipment.
- Ammunition.
- Availability of construction equipment, tools, and supplies.

SITE SURVEY TEAM PROCEDURES

C.14 Before departure, the site survey team conducts predeployment activities. Unit standard operating procedures should be used when conducting predeployment activities; however, the following lists suggested activities:

- Obtaining required travel documents (i.e., visas and passports) through the unit's personnel staff and a copy of the country clearance messages sent by the United States (US) embassy, if required, through the unit's operations staff and the country briefing through the appropriate intelligence office.
- Ensuring site survey team members' medical and immunization records are current.
- Determining financial management support (e.g., the location of supporting finance unit funding).
- Confirming all agencies concerned with the site survey have been briefed on the team's itinerary and are available for coordination.
- Receiving and updating the threat briefing and reviewing the rules of engagement (ROE) and status-of-forces agreement (SOFA).
- Conducting a mission analysis and back brief in accordance with unit standard operating procedures. The team tailors its mission analysis and back brief to the site survey mission.
- Assess deployment location to identify environmental threats and hazards in order to obtain appropriate equipment (mosquito nets, treated uniforms, iodine tablets, additional canteens) to mitigate risk to the team.

C.15 Upon arrival in the AO, the team processes through customs, notifies the security cooperation (SC) officer of its arrival and status, and requests an updated threat briefing. The survey team must be ready to brief the mission and program of instruction to the SC officer for approval or modification.

C.16 The survey team commander and operations staff confirm the team's command relationship (COMREL) with the next higher, in-country, US commander. The team commander also briefs that commander, if requested, on the planned execution of the survey and the required preparations for the main body.

C.17 The survey team commander obtains any additional guidance from the country team. At a minimum, the commander meets with the SC officer to confirm the ROE, evasion and recovery support, and any limitations on the relationships with FSF counterparts. The survey team commander discusses the following topics with the SC officer:

- Training objectives.
- Initial terms of reference. (This is captured in a formal document that includes the initial, agreed upon training objectives and support requirements for the advisor and the FSF.)
- Terms of reference (a final, signed agreement).
- The political situation.
- Social customs.
- Guidelines for official and personal associations with foreign personnel.
- Currency control.
- Procedures for obtaining intelligence support from the next higher operational control commander.
- Administrative support.
- Legal status in relation to the foreign country (i.e., SOFA).
- Procedures for obtaining logistics from the next higher, in-country, US commander.
- If the Leahy Amendment Vetting of Foreign Forces has been completed.
- If country clearance requirements are met.
- If foreign disclosure requirements will be met.

The team commander confirms communications and reporting procedures between the country team or the next higher, in-country, US commander, the survey team, and the follow-on advisor units still in mission

preparation. The team commander, also, must verify the availability of communications equipment needed to support the mission.

C.18 The team commander confirms procedures for obtaining logistics based on the team's mission orders and COMREL. Support may be from the next higher, in country, US commander depending on COMREL or other logistical sources. The team commander identifies a point of contact (POC) at the country team crisis management element or at the emergency operations center of the US military staff. The POC then informs the team of necessary actions during increased threats or emergencies requiring evacuation of US personnel from the AO. The team commander also coordinates procedures to obtain intelligence support from the country team, the next higher, in-country, US commander, or other US agencies.

C.19 The survey team establishes direct working relationships with its next higher, in country headquarters, the country team, or the out-of-country support element. The survey team:

- Identifies the supporting element's location.
- Contacts the supporting element to determine any limitations on support. The team should know the expected reaction time between the initiation of the support request and its fulfillment.
- Requests support for the in-country reception of the main body in accordance with the requirements in the survey team operation orders.
- Confirms or establishes communications procedures among the supporting element, survey team, and follow-on advisor team. They identify alternate and emergency communications procedures for C2, logistics, and medical or casualty evacuation.
- Determines the established communications support requesting procedures for the follow-on advisor team.

C.20 The survey team establishes procedures to promote interagency cooperation and synchronize operations. The team:

- Identifies the location of appropriate FSF and international or US agencies.
- Contacts the appropriate agencies to establish initial coordination.
- Exchanges information and intelligence.
- Confirms or establishes communications procedures.
- Reports the newly established or changed procedures for inclusion in the follow-on advisor mission.

C.21 The survey team commander establishes a direct working relationship and rapport with the FSF commander. The survey team:

- Briefs the FSF commander on the advisor team survey mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the advisor team by the higher US commander.
- Assures the FSF commander the commander's assistance is required to develop the tentative objectives for training and advisor assistance.
- Deduces or solicits the FSF commander's estimate of the unit's capabilities, required training, and advisor assistance, including material requirements. The team discusses training (i.e., plans, current status, units available, facilities, and any additional requirements).
- The survey team obtains the FSF commander's approval of the plan in accordance with the partner nation's (PN's) security force development plan and requests a linkup with their counterparts under the mutual supervision of the FSF commander and survey team commander.

C.22 The team does not make any promises (or statements that could be construed as promises) to the FSF commander about commitments to provide assistance or fulfill material requirements. In particular, the survey team does not:

- Make any comment to the host government concerning US Government resources of any kind.
- Provide any kind of independent assessment or confirmation of the external threat as perceived by the FSF.
- Provide advice on tactics, doctrine, basing, combat planning, or operations.

C.23 The survey team analyzes the FSF unit's status to determine its requirements for advisor assistance. The team:

- Collects enough information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and selects tentative training and advisor assistance courses of action (COAs).

- Prepares written estimates for advisor assistance COAs prioritized in order of desirability.
- Analyzes the FSF location and its effects on the populace.
- Collects and analyzes all information affecting force protection.
- Determines FSF existing logistics and maintenance support shortfalls and capabilities.
- Determines the compatibility of recommended US equipment with equipment in the FSF inventory.

C.24 The survey team helps the FSF unit prepare facilities (i.e., training, security, and administration) for the execution of the mission. The survey team inspects the facilities the FSF unit has designated for its use during the mission. The team identifies any deficiencies that will prevent execution of the advisor assistance COAs. After the inspection, the survey team commander recommends to the FSF commander the most desirable COAs to correct any deficiencies found. The survey team commander:

- Ensures the FSF commander understands the desired COAs are tentative (contingent on the US commander's decision).
- Ensures the higher, in-country, US commander and country team are informed of significant findings in the survey of the FSF unit.
- Provides recommended COAs to the follow-on advisor team after obtaining input from the FSF commander.

The survey team always ensures its security according to the latest threat assessment. The team:

- Fortifies its position (i.e., quarters, communications, medical spaces, and command), using available means, keeping in mind the requirement to maintain low visibility.
- Establishes and maintains an internal alert plan.
- Organizes and maintains an internal guard system with at least one member who is awake and knows the location of all team members. The guard is ready to react to emergencies by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions according to established ROE and evasion and recovery procedures.
- Maintains communication with all team members outside the immediate area occupied by the team's main body.

C.25 Before departing from the AO, the survey team visits all appropriate US and FSF staff agencies and identifies any unresolved problem areas.

Appendix D

Advisor Team Handover

In a Transfer of Authority (TOA) or a Relief in Place (RIP), an Advisor Team ensures a smooth handover through a structured process that typically involves several key stages. The outgoing team prepares a comprehensive handover package that includes detailed reports, status updates, and relevant documents. They also conduct a series of briefings with the incoming team to share insights, experiences, and any critical information. During the overlap period, both teams may work together to ensure the incoming team understands the current situation, key stakeholders, and ongoing projects. The outgoing team then gradually transfers responsibilities, ensuring the incoming team is fully integrated and capable of taking over before their departure. This process aims to maintain continuity, minimize disruptions, and preserve the momentum of the advisory efforts.

ADVISOR TEAM RELIEF IN PLACE OR TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY

D-1. In support of a persistent advisor engagement, transition of forces and transfer of authority (TOA) are required. Every advisor unit follows a theater-approved relief in place (RIP), or TOA checklist managed by the outgoing advisor team leader. The incoming team should maximize opportunities to learn from those who are leaving. They should observe the outgoing team and learn how its relationships work with its foreign security forces (FSF) counterpart. The incoming team should ask lots of questions, but not question methods until after completing an assessment.

D-2. The operational environment is often diverse, dynamic, and volatile. In addition, every area of operation is different and requires an analysis based on political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time aspects defining the area. Understanding these aspects explains how the FSF unit operates, defines its motivations and perceptions, and determines its effectiveness. The following are questions for consideration by the incoming advisor team. These are particularly useful if the advisor is assigned a new FSF unit and does not have an opportunity to hold a RIP or TOA.

POLITICAL

D-3. The Advisor Team needs to know the current political dynamics, key stakeholders' interests, any ongoing policy changes, and potential sensitivities or conflicts that could impact the transition, to ensure a smooth and effective process aligned with the prevailing political environment

- What is the dominant political party in the area?
- Is the government effective at influencing the people?
- Do the people support the government?
- Is there a shadow government in place and is it the source of power?
- Is there an effective neighborhood action council?
- When and where does it meet?
- Is the neighborhood action council’s process infiltrated by militia or insurgent sympathies?

MILITARY

D-4. The Advisor Team needs to know the current military structure and ongoing missions.

- What FSF authorities operate in the area?
- Do the advisor’s FSF have jurisdiction?
- What is the division of labor between civil and military units in the area of operations (AO)?
- What is the infiltration factor by insurgents or militia in the team’s assigned FSF and others in the area?
- What are the insurgent’s lines of communications and support?

- What threats exist and how will they fight the FSF unit?
- What coalition units operate in the AO and what can be expected from them?

ECONOMIC

D-5. The Advisor Team needs to be aware of the current economic indicators, such as GDP growth, inflation rates, unemployment figures, and market trends, as well as any ongoing economic policies, reforms, or challenges that could affect the transition and the team's future operations, to make informed decisions and ensure economic factors are appropriately considered in their planning.

- What is the poverty level of the AO?
- What is the primary source of income?
- What criminal activities exploit the AO (e.g., racketeering, prostitution, extortion, illegal fuel sales, bomb making, etc.)?
- What job opportunities exist to employ the young and disenfranchised?
- What roles do the FSF have regarding corruption within the economic arena in the AO?
- What corruption is best left alone in the interest of mission accomplishment?

SOCIAL

D-6. The Advisor Team should be aware of the current social climate, including public sentiment, social trends, any ongoing social issues or unrest, cultural sensitivities, demographic shifts, and the status of essential services like healthcare and education, to ensure the transition is socially responsible, respectful, and tailored to the needs and expectations of the local population.

- Is there a tribal network in the AO?
- Who runs the families and tribes?
- Does the presence of women and children in the streets indicate stability or merely the perception of it?
- Is there a dominant religious or ethnic group, and, if so, where does it get its support?
- What is the ethnic breakdown by neighborhood or village?
- Where do the sectarian dividing lines exist?

INFORMATION

D-7. The Advisor Team needs to be aware of the current information environment, including the availability and reliability of communication channels, prevalent media narratives, the influence of social media, any ongoing disinformation campaigns, data security protocols, and the status of information technology infrastructure, to ensure effective communication, maintain situational awareness, and safeguard sensitive information throughout the transition.

- Are there any local media in the area?
- How do people receive their news?
- How might deception be used against the advisor’s team?
- What is the enemy using to influence information in the area?
- What are the FSF doing to promote a positive perception of security?
- What are FSF or partner units doing to detract from promoting a positive perception of security?

INFRASTRUCTURE

D-8. The Advisor Team needs to be aware of the current infrastructure situation, including the condition and capacity of critical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, power grids, water supplies, and telecommunications networks, as well as any ongoing or planned infrastructure projects, maintenance requirements, and potential vulnerabilities or disruptions, to ensure the transition process is logistically sound and supports the continued functioning of essential services.

- What is the current sewage, water, electric, and trash pick-up assessment in the AO?
- What projects must be supported by the FSF?
- What projects require external support?
- What defines the AO: urban or agrarian (what affect does the physical geography have on an insurgency)?

- What are the road conditions?
- Are there political offices, sensitive sites, or other restricted areas?

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

D-9. The Advisor Team needs to be aware of the current physical environment, including weather conditions, geographical features, any ongoing environmental issues such as pollution or natural hazards, the status of natural resources, and any seasonal factors that could impact operations, to ensure the transition is safe, environmentally responsible, and adapted to the physical conditions on the ground.

- How do geographical considerations affect the FSF?
- How does terrain benefit or compartmentalize the FSF?
- How do rivers and other water sources affect the population?
- How do weather or other environmental considerations impact the situation?

TIME

D-10. The Advisor Team needs to be cognizant of how the FSF perceive Time.

- Is there a sense of urgency from the people within the AO?
- How do they view time?
- What are the FSF's time constraints?

DEPARTING TEAM LEGACY

D-10. The Advisor Team needs to be aware of the Departing Team's legacy in a respectful, thoughtful, and systematic manner, the Advisor Team can ensure a smooth transition and build a solid foundation for their own efforts.

- The FSF counterparts will speak of the old team as if they were long lost brothers after their departure.
- Honor this relationship.
- Whether they thought the predecessors were competent or incompetent, they usually speak highly of them.
- The advisor should not speak ill of the predecessors, regardless of opinion, as this will not endear the advisor to the counterparts.

MISSION HANDOVER PROCEDURES

D-11. The following outline the mission handover procedures.

TIMELINE

D-12. Table 1 is a sample timeline (checklist) that lists the tasks an advisor team performs for mission handover. During long-term advisor operations, the commander may elect to replace an advisor team using a mission handover. Mission handover is the process of passing an ongoing mission from one unit to another with no discernible loss of continuity. On occasion, advisors may be going into a country where there has been a gap since the last advisor team was in country (episodic engagement). Advisors should look to the combatant command, the theater Service component, the theater special operations command, the senior defense official, or any other in-country, US defense entities to complete as much of a hand off as possible. Table 1 below is based on a 179-day requirement and involves two advisor teams.

Table D-1. Sample Mission Handover Timeline

Outgoing Team		*Incoming Team*	
Day	***Requirements***	***Day***	***Requirements***
1	• Following planning and preparation, the advisor team (less advance party) deploys to the area of operations (AO). • The advisor team deploys with all personnel and equipment required to perform the assigned mission. If this is a first deployment to the AO, the advisor team deploys a site survey team (advisor team members) to coordinate all training with the foreign security forces (FSF) unit and the United States embassy. If there is an advisor team in country, the incoming advisor team deploys an advance party to coordinate with the deployed advisor team and counterparts. • Area assessment begins as soon as the advisor team members arrive in country. The advisor team sends the information it gathers from the area assessment to the incoming team. See appendix H for an example of an area assessment. • As soon as the advisor team arrives, it establishes communications links with the higher, in-country command and control element. The advisor team also establishes a communications link with the advisor commander who has authority to order the handover. This link becomes the information and intelligence link between the in-country and incoming advisor teams. It is maintained and monitored in accordance with prescribed communications schedules. • FSF training begins as soon as the advisor team is settled.	179	• The incoming advisor team receives notification it will replace the current advisor team in 179 days. The advisor team starts its pre-mission planning. • The advisor team coordinates for its deployment into the AO. • Leave, common tasks training, and range qualifications take place immediately after the mission notification. • The advisor team starts training for the assigned mission. It must use this time wisely. Support for the upcoming mission must come from all levels. • Review personnel files.
30	• The advisor team sends training reports at least every 30 days. These reports indicate how the FSF unit is responding to the in-country advisor team's training program. • The incoming advisor team uses these reports to modify its training programs and schedules.	90	• The advisor team receives formal mission notification. • All travel arrangements are finalized; the in-country advisor team is notified.
45	• Command inspections performed by the advisor commander are vital for an advisor team and give the commander a chance to see what the advisor team has accomplished. Inspections ensure the FSF is looking after the welfare of the advisor team and any problems with the FSF are corrected immediately.	85	• The formal advisor team training program begins. All other support requirements must stop; the advisor team mission must take priority.

Table D-1. Sample Mission Handover Timeline (Continued)

Day	*Requirements*	*Day*	*Requirements*
60	• Training reports (same as day 30).	80	• The advisor team senior medical noncommissioned officer (NCO) begins screening the members' records. The medical NCO ensures all personnel have physicals and their shots are up-to-date and obtains and crossmatches their blood types within the team. • The advisor team prepares initial shortage lists and sends them to the battalion logistics staff officer (S-4). If the advisor team requires special items, it requests them as soon as possible.
89	• The team prepares a detailed intelligence report. This report becomes a major part of the incoming advisor team's mission planning process. • The incoming advisor team receives this report the same day it receives its mission notification and starts its detailed planning.		
90	• Training reports (same as day 30). Mid-tour leave is programmed into the training schedule. This leave must be staggered so it does not interfere with training. In-country leave should be considered, if appropriate.	70	• Final leave is granted to advisor team members. • They ensure their personal affairs are in order.
100	• Command inspection. • The advisor team finalizes its travel arrangements. The initial arrangements were made the day the advisor team deployed.	60 to 40	• A member from the incoming advisor team may conduct in- country coordination. The advisor team's commander ensures only the commander's personnel are on this team. • The advisor team prepares its final shortage lists and sends them to the battalion S-4. The advisor team picks up specialized items from the S-4.
110 to 165	• The incoming advisor team has had its formal mission notification and has started its mission preparation. • Training reports (same as day 30). Command inspection. • This period is the most critical phase of the mission. • The advance party advisor team members depart. The incoming advisor team advance party quickly meshes with the remaining in-country advisor team members and their FSF counterparts. They establish rapport and begin the next phase of training. The in-country advisor team must have completed all training by this time.	30	• The advisor team medical personnel complete a final medical screening. Members receive their shots at this time. Personnel who sustained injuries during certification and validation training and require more time to recover, may be replaced.

Table D-1. Sample Mission Handover Timeline (Continued)

Day	*Requirements*	*Day*	*Requirements*
179	• The remaining in-country advisor team members depart.	20	• The advisor team members' dependents (families) receive a briefing. Every effort is made to answer all questions that do not create a security risk for the deploying advisor team. • Dependents are provided a point of contact in the event of problems.
		18	• The advisor team palletizes its equipment and personal gear.
		16	• The advisor team establishes a communications link.
		14	• The advance party members deploy to the AO. They meet with the in-country advisor team members, establish rapport with their FSF counterparts, and conduct necessary coordination. • The incoming advisor team (less its advance party) deploys to the AO. The mission handover is completed.

PROCEDURES

D-13. The overall authority for the handover and assumption of command lies with the commander ordering the change. The authority for determining the handover process lies with the incoming commander, since this commander will assume responsibility for the mission. This changeover process may affect the conditions under which the mission continues.

D-14. The outgoing commander advises the incoming commander on the tentative handover process and mission assumption directly or through a liaison. If this handover conflicts with the mission statement or the incoming commander's desires, and the conflict cannot be resolved with the authority established for the incoming commander, the commander ordering the relief resolves the issue.

D-15. As a rule, the commander ordering the change does not automatically place the outgoing advisor team under the incoming advisor team during the changeover process.

CONSIDERATIONS

D-16. The incoming and outgoing advisor team commanders must consider the following seven factors.

Mission

D-17. The incoming advisor team commander must make a detailed study of the advisor mission statement and understand the present and implied mission tasks. The mission also may require a unit with additional skill sets, such as specific weapons employment or water operations. Knowing the mission, the commander's intent, the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), and the information requirements will help the incoming advisor team commander understand the mission. The incoming advisor team must become familiar with all ongoing and upcoming information requirements and CCIRs. After an in-depth study of the operational area, the incoming advisor team commander should complete the handover in a manner allowing for continued, uninterrupted mission accomplishment. The changeover must not allow the enemy to gain any operational advantages.

Operational Area

D-18. The in-country advisor team provides continuous intelligence updates to the advisor commander (e.g., priority intelligence requirement, information requirements, or relevant operational, strategic, and tactical information). The incoming advisor team must become familiar with all ongoing and upcoming mission priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and CCIRs.

Enemy Forces

D-19. The incoming advisor team commander must have the latest intelligence on all enemy forces affecting the mission. This information can be obtained through the unit intelligence officer and include data on criminal- or terrorist-related incidents over the past several months. In addition to the normal intelligence provided to the incoming advisor team commander on a regular basis, the situation calls for a meeting with an intelligence liaison from the outgoing team commander.

Friendly Forces

D-20. For the incoming advisor team, learning about the friendly forces is as important as knowing the enemy situation. The team must be familiar with the command-and-control structure for daily operations. It must know all blue (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational) units and green (nongovernmental, private, and charitable) organizations in the AO and be aware of the purpose and capabilities of its mission support base. If possible, the incoming advisor team members should receive biographical data on their FSF counterparts including photographs. This data allows advisor team members to familiarize themselves with their counterparts before deployment.

FSF

D-21. The incoming advisor team plans and prepares for a quick and friction- free transition in counterpart relations. However, potential, anticipated friction between the FSF unit and the incoming advisor team may cause the relief to take place more slowly than desired. Therefore, the incoming and outgoing advisor teams need a period of overlap to allow for in-country, face-to-face contact with their counterparts before the mission handover. Continued execution of the mission must be achieved within the capabilities of the advisor teams, the FSF unit, and the available supporting assets. The best case is, if US combat support units are to be relieved, the relief should occur after the relief of the advisor teams they support.

Civilian Populace

D-22. The incoming advisor team must do an in-depth area study giving close attention to local problems. Popular support for US activities taking place within the AO may directly influence changes in the mission statement. The outgoing advisor team must provide all critical information and describe, in detail, the completed civic action projects and those still underway. The incoming advisor team must understand the functioning of the local government and the status of any international civilian or government agencies involved in or influencing the situation in its AO.

Time

D-23. The depth and dispersion of units and the number of operations conducted determine the time required to exchange advisor teams. There must be an overlap period to allow the incoming advisor team to become familiar with the AO and to establish rapport between the team personnel and their FSF counterparts. However, the handover operation must take place as quickly as possible. The longer the operation takes, the more vulnerable the advisor team in the AO becomes as a target for the enemy or terrorists. A quickly executed relief reduces the time available for the enemy to strike before the incoming advisor team has time to consolidate its position. The advisor team commander should not sacrifice continued, uninterrupted execution of ongoing operations for speed. The incoming advisor team needs to have enough time to observe training techniques and procedures and conduct debriefings on lessons learned.

RIP/TOA

D-24. An effective RIP/TOA is a critical part of keeping a mission moving toward its end state as units begin and finish their rotations. It is in the interests of mission success and both the outgoing and incoming units to achieve an effective RIP/TOA, but a number of human barriers hinders the process. These barriers and techniques for overcoming them are enumerated below:

D-25. Hubris and ego drive some outgoing units to want to protect the recognition they will receive for their work and incoming units to downplay the previous unit's accomplishments. Advisors must commit to the mindset that working their way out of a job by achieving FSF that have sustainable capacity, and capability is the ultimate measure of success. Overcoming the barrier of hubris establishes mutual respect, honors the hard work of previous US advisors, and keeps each unit oriented on the proper focal point: mission success. For outgoing units this means:

- Advisors continue to own the mission after departure by genuinely trying to make the next unit better than their own. If advisors failed to meet their own expectations, they should have the humility to identify what kept them from achieving more and offer recommendation on how to overcome those barriers if it could be done again.
- Advisors recognize the limitations of their situational awareness and make use of the outgoing unit's tacit knowledge to help evaluate and war-game ideas on how to proceed.
- Force capacity limits and administrative procedures can prevent having two people in the same position even for a short time. Units should take advantage of technology to elongate the handover process as much as possible. They should treat the mission like a movie, not a snapshot, by observing it unfold through situation reports and discussions prior to the incoming team's arrival.
- Outgoing personnel should make every possible effort to identify and contact their replacements. Incoming personnel should contact sitting advisors as soon as possible after being notified. Once established, the collective RIP discussion should be ongoing to and through TOA.
- Determining how to best allow successive teams to "stand on the shoulders of giants." This barrier recognizes the limited human capacity to absorb an entire deployment's worth of data. The question for the outgoing team becomes "what is the most important information to convey to the new team and how is it best delivered so that they can stand on our shoulders and reach higher?"
- Humans are iterative learners. Units should build an RIP plan that intentionally covers the same priority information multiple times. The incoming unit will make new connections with each iteration, and these connections will allow them to create new solutions that they can ask the outgoing team to war- game. Even if the teams determine that the new solution is not feasible, uncovering the "why" through this process will leave the new team with a deeper understanding of the problem set and the environment.
- The relationship should persist, but often does not. The crossover point—where the incoming unit's knowledge base is more relevant and complete with respect to the current environment than the outgoing unit's—is somewhere beyond the TOA. Therefore, it is helpful for the outgoing unit to write and discuss a three-month plan as if it were going to be extended on the mission, given its tacit knowledge. Likewise, any changes to that plan by the incoming unit can be shared with the outgoing unit after its departure to determine if there is any history or cultural nuance that the new team is missing.

ADVISOR TEAMS SHOULD COORDINATE A VIRTUAL MEETING WITH THE TEAM IN COUNTRY.

D-26. During this meeting, the controlling headquarters should be involved and provide the command's perspective of the mission. The current advisors should discuss what they are currently doing and where the mission should be when the incoming team arrives. If possible, it would be good to add key members from the last previous team to return from the mission to get a full appreciation of the mission.

Appendix E
Force Protection

E-1. Advisors operating in small teams in remote locations have always found themselves in challenging environments where individual advisor security was questionable due to a lack of understanding their counterparts and their motives. Attacks on advisors by individuals have brought to light the challenges of securing themselves while advising their counterparts and maintaining an air of mutual trust.

THE ADVISOR'S THREAT ENVIRONMENT

E-2. Advisors operate in conditions anywhere on the competition continuum. They must deal with local criminal activity, directed terrorist threats, and open combat. Their rules of engagement will differ for every mission. In many environments, advisors may not be armed, while in others, they may have access to quick reaction forces and indirect fire or close air support. Additionally, advisors must maintain control of their equipment and be careful not to disclose information to unapproved sources. In this section, we will explore some of the attributes that make the advisor's threat environment unique.

DECLARED THEATERS OF ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT (DTAACS).

E-3. A DTAAC environment is generally semi permissible or non-permissible. The threats are clear and present, and advisor teams will typically travel to and from engagements, as well as conduct meetings/training in a combat posture. Carrying weapons, wearing body armor, and establishing external and internal security is often normal in this setting. In this environment, the security of the advisor team is often rooted in the relationship and trust it has built with its partners, so the team must tune its awareness to what is normal in the environment and with foreign security forces (FSF) behavior to identify abnormalities and anticipate threats.

OUTSIDE OF DECLARED THEATERS OF ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT (ODTAACS).

E-4. An ODTAAC environment is generally permissible or semi permissible. Advisor teams might stay in a partner nation (PN) hotel or eat in local restaurants rather than stay in a hardened defense like those found in a DTAAC. The threats tend to be less visible, more insidious, and less familiar to the average advisor, and the advisor team will likely not be carrying weapons when not training with FSF. In an ODTAAC environment, it is easy to be lulled into a false sense of security and overlook the many threat vectors at play, from simple crime to kidnapping and terrorism to great power competitors. In this environment, advisor teams must be hyper-vigilant of patterns and abnormalities in the environment, as well as news trends that might change the local reception of US Service members. Teams will want to move in buddy teams or groups even for routine travel or tasks and incorporate a member of the FSF in those groups to benefit from their local knowledge. In the sections that follow, additional TTP should be considered while maintaining a smart force protection posture.

LEXICON

Force Protection.

An overarching security program developed to protect uniformed advisors, civilian employees, facilities, information, and equipment in all locations and situations across the competition continuum.

Guardian Angel.

An individual designated to perform duties similar to those of a personal security detachment by conducting passive surveillance during all engagements with PN forces and representatives, including the local populace. The guardian angel's activities should not jeopardize the trust and confidence of the PN force.

At Risk.

Uniformed advisors, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and DOD contractors operating worldwide are at risk because of the value that they represent to threat actors of all kinds.

Key Leader Engagement.

An engagement between individuals to clarify information requirements, exchange information, or gain a decision.

Personal Motivation.

Perpetrators act on their own accord; motivated by personal dispute, combat stress, extremist ideology, mental illness, and cultural insensitivity of international forces.

Co-option.

Perpetrators who are recruited or coerced by the opposition. The opposition uses physical intimidation, financial incentives, ideological appeal, and family ties.

Infiltration.

The opposition enlists in the PN security force with the intent of collecting intelligence or conducting high-profile attacks against coalition or PN forces.

Impersonation.

The opposition uses PN security force uniforms to gain access to coalition or PN security force facilities to conduct an attack.

Evasion.

The process whereby isolated personnel avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control.

Evasion Plan of Action.

A course of action developed prior to executing a combat mission that is intended to improve a potential isolated person's chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing the recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader's action and movement.

Isolated Personnel.

United States military, DOD civilians, and contractor personnel (and others designated by the President or Secretary of Defense) who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in a United States sponsored military activity or mission, and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.

Isolated Personnel Guidance.

A series of classified, country-specific products developed to provide information to enhance survivability in the event of isolation or captivity. Isolated personnel guidance incorporates information found in other references and are designed to be used with intelligence assessments, culture briefs, country studies, and other products.

Isolated Personnel Report (also referred to as an ISOPREP).

A DOD form containing information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an isolated person by a recovery force.

Personnel Recovery. The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.

Recovery.

Personnel recovery actions taken to physically gain custody of isolated personnel and return that person to friendly control.

Irregular Threat.

A diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. In the context of growing great power competition, irregular threats are becoming harder to identify. In some cases, they are merely a collection on team activities such that TTP, patterns, or objectives can be passed to the host nation of the threat—or such that the team can be threatened or extorted for anything embarrassing or anything that can be twisted to seem embarrassing. In other cases, these threats can be used to sabotage or subvert the advising mission, like in the case of threat financing.

E-5. Threat financing can present itself in a variety of ways, but it is typically a clandestine activity, so it is difficult to determine whether the source of what the team is experiencing is rooted in malicious intent or a coincidence. For instance, FSF may have massive absences or tardiness during training events, which disrupts

mission accomplishment for the team; the FSF behavior could be tied to foreign financing that did not show up during Leahy vetting. There may be subversion of training because a foreign entity is paying to create a major accident or traffic jam along the route to training each day, or they are paying members of the FSF to disrupt or slow down mission progress while also collecting and passing information on the team. In some cases, threat financing does not affect the advising mission, but advisors may see indicators that would be of value to the US embassy that a foreign entity is attempting to gain greater influence over the PN by purchasing things like a majority of the shipping ports or tourist infrastructure. With these examples of threat financing in mind, we will briefly discuss what the advisor's role is in identifying and reporting threat financing.

Note: Leahy vetting is the implementation of US law through the process in which prospective aid recipients are searched for evidence of past commission of gross human rights violation.

- A mapping of the fiscal operational environment (OE) is something that should be included in a team's country study. The first team working on a particular mission should consider requesting special operations forces support or tapping into finance or comptroller expertise to get an initial baseline of the fiscal OE. This support may come in the form of collocating with the team (depending on force cap limitations) or reach back support.
- During mission preparation, advisors should receive a sensitization brief from the combatant command or theater special operations command on activity in the PN by strategic competitors. These briefings are important to understand the competitors' activities and objectives within the PN and where there are holes in
- the US understanding of the threat picture. Advisors often have unique placement in and around a PN, so maintaining continual situational awareness can lead to reports that provide valuable information to the agencies that analyze the OE.

FORCE PROTECTION CONCEPTS, PERSONNEL SELECTION, AND TRAINING

E-6. Force protection can be critical to an advisor and the advisor team's success. Advisors must strive to maintain situational awareness and understand all current, external, and internal threats in their assigned area of operations. Advisors should know what looks normal. Understanding the culture, history, local languages, and values can be an advisor's greatest asset. Isolated personnel guidance is a country- specific product to enhance the advisors' understanding of the impact of these factors. These factors include:

- While advisors focus on building their counterparts' capability and capacity, it is critical the advisors operate in secure environments. In wartime, this can be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
- Remember, the rapport advisors develop with their counterparts can strengthen their counterparts' desire to protect them and their team. It is important for advisors working with PN military forces and police to build rapport and trust. In some cultures, advisor teams are considered the guest of the PN security force and any harm to advisors can reflect negatively on the host.
- Interpreters can be crucial to rapport building with FSF and can aid in picking up on side-bar conversations and interpreting nonverbal cues of potential threats.
- Rapport can be the advisors' first line of defense. Advisors should keep their counterparts close by learning everything they can about them. They should learn their problems and develop solutions.
- For advisor teams with a dedicated security force, early selection and training of those individuals are important. The individuals selected must demonstrate sound tactical judgment as well as tactical patience and should be prepared to respond immediately to threats.
- For advisor teams without a security force, the advisor team should have each individual trained to perform force protection roles as part of additional duties. When performing force protection duties, it is critical that force protection duties be their only focus and that no additional advising duties be performed.
- Where appropriate, teams should develop several levels of defensive preparation and overwatch to ensure self-protection.

- A unit standard operating procedure should cover preparation and mindset at the individual, buddy team, section, and overall unit levels and provide for reach back support. Advisors should rehearse buddy team and section-level drills and individual precombat inspections regularly.
- Knowledge of PNs is the first level of security. Knowing what is "normal" and recognizing the "absence of normal" are the best ways to spot indicators of an insider threat. Actions to take vary. They may be immediate actions in self-defense, or the advisor may decide to start quietly by building a PN target packet.
- Periodically, the team should hold an internal debrief or after-action review of changes in partner behavior and rapport.

E-7. In addition to spotting indicators of immediate and future threats, team members should always know their closest rally point; who is overwatching them; the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans; standing linkup procedures; local danger areas; and the lost advisor drill in accordance with their evasion plan of action. Evasion plans of action are described in JP 3-50.

E-8. Individual preparation and mindset are the next layers of security. All team members should carry (on their person) items to navigate, signal, sustain, and protect themselves for a short period. Most important, advisors need to be "escape- minded." Advisors must have a comprehensive knowledge of their issued communication devices and how to secure them, and a working knowledge of survival equipment and techniques and aids (e.g., personal locater beacons, evasion charts, blood chits, pointee-talkees). Advisors must remain knowledgeable of their evasion plan of action and isolated personnel report and be mentally and physically prepared to survive and evade (perhaps over an extended period) until recovered or upon reaching friendly forces.

THE FIRST LEVEL OF OVERWATCH IS THE BUDDY TEAM

E-9. Advisors should develop a habit of keeping an interval between team members, covering each other's flank (360°), and covering entryways and avenues of approach. Team members should maintain situational awareness for each other and be ready to shoot first.

THE SECURITY FORCE IS THE SECOND LEVEL OF OVERWATCH

E-10. Leaders will have to enforce using buddy teams during mundane activities (such as key leader engagements), during physical training, or in the tactical operations center. They ensure teams are able to support each other as much as possible (mutual support), even if it is only as an immediate reaction team. Where appropriate, leaders develop standard operating procedures to ensure someone has a loaded weapon any time the advisor or team is working with local nationals. The weapon may have to be concealed. Leaders plan for the worst-case scenario and rehearse for active shooter, isolated Service member, and lost individual situations.

THE FINAL LEVEL OF OVERWATCH SHOULD BE REACH BACK

E-11. support to higher headquarters and continental United States intelligence support. Advisor teams should constantly spot and assess potential threats and vet them with organizations having more time and assets. Additionally, the teams should consider using biometric and other technical identification equipment and have a plan for where to send information gathered using it.

E-12. Advisors should make sure to complete their current antiterrorism training and any other theater force protection requirements prior to deploying. (For additional information on force protection, ADP 3-37 and ATP 3-37.15.)

Appendix F

Post-Mission Debriefing Procedures

GENERAL

F-1. The advisor team commander conducts a debriefing providing an overview of the mission, military geography, political parties, military forces, insurgents, foreign security forces (FSF), underground, targets, health and sanitation practices of the populace, and evasion and recovery.

F-2. Redeployment is not the end of the mission. Upon arrival at the redeployment location, the advisor team undergoes an extensive debriefing. The supported unit intelligence section organizes and conducts the debriefing subject to the unit's standard operating procedures.

F-3. The intelligence section coordinates with higher level intelligence organizations to take part in the advisor team debriefing. All deployed personnel must be available for the debriefing.

F-4. After the debriefing, the advisor team leader, with the assistance of other members of the team, prepares two documents: an after-action review (AAR) and a report of lessons learned. Depending on the nature of the mission, these documents may need to be classified.

AAR

F-5. The AAR states the who, what, when, where, and how of the operation. It is a permanent record of the team's major activities from isolation to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template by which past missions may be compared and future missions planned. Normally, the AAR is submitted through command channels to the higher commander no later than 48 hours after an advisor team has been debriefed. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon keep copies of the advisor team's AARs.

LESSONS LEARNED

F-6. Shortly after completing the AAR, or simultaneously with its submission, the advisor team leader submits a report of lessons learned. This is the team leader's reflection on the most recent operation and recommendation for the future. One preparation method is to organize the lessons according to the seven joint warfighting functions: command and control, movement and maneuver, information, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The debrief addresses what worked or did not work during the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes or substitutions are needed for existing tactics, techniques, and procedures for the unit. Though the specific format will be provided by the component headquarters the team is serving, below is an example of a post-mission debrief.

Note: Useful AARs are built throughout the mission, rather than waiting until the end to recall all of the impressions the team had throughout. A best practice is to revisit the AAR framework and any points of interest the US embassy and component headquarters had, then recording relevant ideas in a weekly situation report (SITREP). This method opens a line of communication with the chain of command and periodically reminds the team members to remain aware of all aspects of the mission.

POST-MISSION DEBRIEF

F-7. The advisor team commander conducts brief after the completion of a mission, project, or operation to analyze and discuss what happened, why it happened, and how it can be done better in the future.

MISSION

- A brief statement about the mission by advisor team commander.

EXECUTION

F-8. The Execution captures the planning, execution, resources, outcomes, and interactions of a military operation.

- A brief statement of the concept of operation developed before the deployment.
- A statement of the method of operation accomplished during the operation, including deployment, routes, activity in the area of operations, and redeployment.
- Uniforms and equipment used.
- Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results. Communications equipment used and results.
- Casualties (friendly and enemy) sustained and disposition of bodies of those killed in action.
- Friendly contacts established, including descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results.

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY

F-9. The Military Geography is the study of the spatial and environmental factors that influence military operations and strategy. It involves understanding how physical features like terrain, climate, and natural resources, as well as human factors like population distribution, infrastructure, and cultural dynamics, can affect the planning, execution, and outcomes of military activities. This field helps military planners and strategists make informed decisions about where and how to deploy forces, manage logistics, and anticipate potential challenges and opportunities in different geographic areas.

- Geographic name, universal transverse mercator or geographic coordinates, and locations.
- Boundaries (north, south, east, and west).
- Distance and direction to nearest major cultural feature.
- Terrain.
  - What type of terrain is dominant in this area?
  - What natural and cultivated vegetation is present in the area?
  - What is the density and disposition of natural vegetation?
  - What is the approximate degree of slope?
- What natural obstacles to movement did the advisor observe and what are their locations?
- What natural or man-made drainage features are in the area?
  - Direction of flow.
  - Speed.
  - Depth.
  - Type of bed.
- What are the physical layouts of rural and urban settlements?
- What are the layouts of various houses within the area?
- How would the advisor describe any potential landing or drop zones?
- How would the advisor describe any beach landing sites, if applicable?
- How would the advisor describe any areas suitable for cache sites and what are their locations?

PEOPLE

F-10. The Post-mission debriefing typically involves several key individuals: the mission commander or team leader, who provides an overview of the operation; mission participants, who share their firsthand experiences and observations; intelligence officers, who offer insights on the mission's intelligence aspects; analysts, who evaluate the mission's effectiveness and outcomes; and sometimes higher-ranking officers or stakeholders, who may provide strategic context or make decisions based on the debriefing's findings. Together, these individuals contribute to a comprehensive assessment of the mission, identifying successes, lessons learned, and areas for improvement.

- What major ethnic groups or tribes populate each area?
- What is their attitude toward other ethnic groups or tribes in the area?
- What is the principal religion of the area and how is it practiced?
- What influence does religion have on the people?
- What are the religious holidays?
- What are their taboos?

- What are their religious conflicts?
- How would the advisor describe the average citizen of the area (height, weight, hair color, and characteristics)?
- How do the people of this area dress compared with other areas?
- What type of clothing, footwear, ornaments, and jewelry do they wear?
- What symbolism is attached to certain items of jewelry or ornaments?
- What are the local traditions, customs, and practices?
- Between males and females?
- Between young and old?
- Toward marriage, birth, and death?
- Between the populace and local officials?
- What is the ordinary diet of the people?
- What was the attitude of the populace toward the advisor and the foreign security forces (FSF) with the advisor?
- What was the general feeling and attitude of the populace and the FSF troops toward the government and leaders, government policies, and general conditions within the country?
- What was the general feeling of the populace toward the United States, its policies, and involvement with other nations?
- How did the populace cooperate with the advisor team?
- What is the approximate wage and economic status of the average citizen?
- What formal and informal educational practices did the advisor observe?
- What is the state of health and well-being of the people in this area?
- Did the populace in this area speak the national language differently from others in the country? If so, how?
- What percentage of the populace and the indigenous forces speak English or other foreign languages?
- Was the advisor approached or questioned by some member of the populace about the advisor team or the advisor's mission? If so, describe in detail. Give names, if possible.

POLITICAL PARTIES (MAJOR AND MINOR PARTIES)

F-11. The debriefing can influence the government by informing policy adjustments and resource allocation based on mission outcomes. It also affects the people by shaping public perception and trust in military operations. Foreign influence may be considered, especially in missions with international implications, to understand external reactions and potential future collaborations. Ethnic and ideological factors can contextualize the mission's impact on diverse communities and beliefs. Regional and international perspectives help assess the broader implications of the mission on geopolitical dynamics. Finally, analyzing stability, strengths, and weaknesses is crucial for identifying areas that require improvement and for enhancing future mission effectiveness.

- Leaders. Policies.
- Influence on the government.
- Influence on the people.
- Foreign influence.
  - Ethnic and ideological.
  - Regional.
  - International.
  - Stability, strengths, and weaknesses.

MILITARY

F-12. An assessment of friendly forces (FSF) is crucial for a comprehensive mission evaluation. The debriefing examines the disposition, composition, identification, and strength of these forces, as well as their organization, armament, and equipment, to understand their capabilities and limitations.

- Friendly forces. Disposition.
- Composition, identification, and strength. Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. Mission.

- Leadership and capabilities of officers and noncommissioned officers compared with those of the United States.
- Logistics.
- Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment. Methods of resupply and their effectiveness.
- Psychological strengths and weaknesses. Relationship between the FSF and the populace. Influence on the local populace.
- Recommendation for these forces (military and/or paramilitary) for unconventional warfare contact.

THREAT VECTORS

F-13. Evaluating insurgent forces involves several key factors The debriefing assesses the disposition, composition, identification, and strength of these forces, along with their organization, armament, and equipment, to understand their capabilities and potential threats.

- Disposition.
- Composition, identification, and strength. Organization, armament, and equipment.
- Degree of training, morale, and combat effectiveness. Mission.
- Leadership capabilities. Logistics.
- Maintenance problems with weapons and equipment. Method of resupply and its effectiveness.
- Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- Relationship between insurgent forces, the advisor’s team, and the populace.
- Influence on the local populace.
- Sources of funding.

POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES

F-14. The debriefing assesses the current Police and Security Force's Readiness, Capabilities and Alignment.

- Disposition, strengths, and location. Organization, armament, and equipment. Logistics.
- Motivation, reliability, and degree of training. Psychological strengths and weaknesses.
- Relationship with the government and local populace.

AUXILIARY AND UNDERGROUND

F-15. The debriefing assesses the current auxiliary forces that essential support and underground forces conducting covert operations to achieve their objectives.

- Disposition, strength, and degree of organization.
- Morale and general effectiveness.
- Motivation and reliability.
  - Support.
  - Logistics.
  - Intelligence.
  - Operations.
  - Communications.

TARGETS

F-16. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current targets, facilitating better planning, execution, and evaluation of future operations

Rail System

F-17. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current rail system, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- General route.
- Importance to the local and general area.
- Bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
- Bypass possibilities.
- Key junctions, switching points, and power sources.

- Location of maintenance crews who keep the system operational during periods of large-scale interdiction.
- Security. Telecommunications system.
- Location and description of routes, lines, and cables.
- Location of power sources.
- Location and capacity of switchboards.
- Critical points.
- Importance to the local general area.
- Capabilities of maintenance crews to keep the system operating, at a minimum.
- Security.

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant (POL) Storage and Processing Facilities

F-18. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current POL, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- Locations.
- Capacity of storage facilities.
- Equipment used for the production of POL.
- Power source.
- Types and quantities of POL manufactured.
- Methods of transportation and distribution.
- Rail.
- Truck.
- Ship.
- Air.
- Pipeline routes and pumping station capacities.
- Security.

Electrical Power System

F-19. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current Electrical Power System, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- Locations and descriptions of power stations.
- Principal power lines and transformers.
- Locations of maintenance crews, facilities, and their reaction times.
- Critical points.
- Capacity (kilowatts).
- Principal users.
- Security.

Military Installations and Depots

F-20. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the Military Installations and Depots, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- Size.
- Activity.
- Location.
- Units.
- Equipment.
- Reaction time.
- Security.

Highway and Road System

F-21. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current highway and road system, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- Name and number.
- Type of surface, width, and condition.
- Location of bridges, tunnels, curves, and steep grades.
- Bypass possibilities.
- Traffic density.
- Location of maintenance crews, facilities, and their reaction times.
- Security.

Inland Waterways and Canals

F-22. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the inland waterways and canals, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- Name and number.
- Width, depth, and type of bed.
- Direction and speed of flow.
- Location of dams and locks, their power source, and other traffic obstructions.
- Location and descriptions of administrative, control, maintenance, and reaction crew facilities.
- Location and description of navigational aids. Natural and synthetic gas systems.
- Locations and capacity of wells and pipelines.
- Storage facilities and capacity.
- Critical points.
- Maintenance crews, facilities, and reaction times.
- Principal users.
- Security.

Industrial Facilities

F-23. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current industrial facilities, helping better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- Capabilities of plants to convert their facilities, in wartime, to produce essential military materials.
- Types of facilities.
- Power sources.
- Locations.
- Sources of raw materials.
- Number of employees.
- Disposition of products.
- General working conditions.
- Critical points.
- Security.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

F-24. The debriefing provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of the area's health and sanitation, facilitating better decision-making, planning, and operational improvements.

- To what degree do hunting and fishing contribute to the local diet?
- What cash crops are raised in the area?
- What domestic and wild animals are present?
- What animal diseases are present?
- What is the availability and quality of water in populated and unpopulated areas?
- What systems are used for sewage disposal?
- What sanitation practices did the advisor observe in the populated and unpopulated areas?

- What are the most common human illnesses and how are they controlled?

EVASION AND RECOVERY

F-25. The debriefing assessed the sources of populace assistance, safe houses, shelter types and adequacy, fire management, food preparation, campsite selection, trail sterilization, and local edible plants for survival purposes.

- From which element of the populace was assistance most likely?
- Would the advisor recommend any safe houses or areas for evasion and recovery purposes?
- What types of shelters were used?
- Were fires small and smokeless?
- Were shelters adequate?
- Was food properly prepared?
- Were camp sites well chosen?
- Were camp sites and trails sterilized after movement to a new one?
- What edible wild plants are found in the area?

MISCELLANEOUS

F-26. The debriefing discusses the rest of the miscellaneous conditions that may affect the mission.

- Weather.
- Wind speed and direction.
- Temperature.
- Effect on personnel and equipment.
- Problems encountered.

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Appendix G

Use of Translators and Interpreters

Translators and interpreters provide an invaluable cultural context to the advisor. A good interpreter can have huge gains with the local population and the HN forces. Interpreters should be cared for like a member of the ODA. Careful screening and selection will pay huge benefits if they are properly used.

SELECTION AND THE USE OF INTERPRETERS

G-1. The use of interpreters is an unsatisfactory substitute for direct communication, but there are situations in which interpreters may be necessary. These individuals may be the only link between the advisor and the counterpart (or other important local nationals). The SF advisor must strive to maximize interpreters' strengths and anticipate their weaknesses.

AGE, GENDER, AND RACE

G-2. Factors of gender, age, and race are potentially troublesome and can seriously affect a mission. Because differences from country to country vary greatly, advisors should check with the in-country briefing teams for specific taboos or favorable characteristics. In certain cultures, for example, the status of females in the society is such that they should not be used as interpreters with male sources.

TIME

G-3. When planning communications, advisors must allow additional time for interpreters to do their job. A 10-minute conversation may take up to 30 minutes, depending on the interpreter's ability. Advisors should plan accordingly when scheduling meetings.

RANK AND MILITARY AFFILIATION

G-4. Advisors must consider rank when planning for interviews. If the interviewees are officers, it is better to have an officer or civilian act as interpreter. If the sources are enlisted, an officer interpreter might be intimidating and stifle participation and interaction.

G-5. Interpreters are usually contracted civilians. They may not be accustomed to military methods, hardships, discipline, and courtesies.

G-6. Even though not military related, the education level, their status within society, and their religion are also important considerations in selecting interpreters.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

G-7. When working with interpreters, there are several other factors that the advisor must consider. Advisors should—

- Try to use two-man interpreter teams, as one may catch what the other missed or forgot.
- Avoid organizing interpreters into interpreter pools. This detracts from their ability to react quickly to unexpected situations.
- Keep operations security in mind and assume the interpreter's first loyalty is to his or her country, not the United States.
- Prepare the interpreter for technical terms. The interpreters must know the subject area and translate the advisor's meaning, as well as their word
- Establish rapport with the interpreter through personal contact. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, the mission could be in serious jeopardy.
- Learn the interpreter's background and show genuine concern for his or her family, aspirations, and education.
- Double-check that the interpreters understand. Many may attempt to save face by purposely concealing their lack of understanding.
- Instruct the interpreter to mirror the tone and personality of the advisor's speech.

- Instruct the interpreter not to interject their own questions or personality.
- Avoid such phrases as, "Tell him or her that..." and "I would like to have you say..."
- Avoid looking at the interpreter during discussion—remain focused on the other person.
- Break thoughts into small, logical, translatable segments.
- Avoid idioms, jokes, military jargon, and slang.
- Control the interpreter. The advisor should inform him or her to never ask questions of their own and to never paraphrase the interviewer's question or the source's answers.
- Instruct the interpreter to never hold back information given by the source. Such withholding, regardless of how insignificant the interpreter may feel it to be, may adversely affect the conversation and the mission.
- Test the interpreter periodically for accuracy, loyalty, and honesty. Control of the interpreter is increased if he or she knows that he or she is periodically tested.
- Avoid bullying, criticizing, or admonishing the interpreter in the presence of the source. The advisor should criticize in private to avoid lowering the prestige of the interpreter— thereby impairing interpreter effectiveness.
- Use paraphrasing when trying to confirm the understanding of critical information. For example, "If I understand you correctly you are saying…" "To be sure you understand me, please explain in your words what you think I am saying."
- Use the best interpreters when conducting important meetings.
- When using unfamiliar interpreters, ensure the interpreter is not interjecting their own message when translating; some well-meaning interpreters promise things beyond the intent of an advisor.
- Mitigate potential problems by reviewing the agenda and reviewing goals for upcoming meetings with interpreters.

G-8. The use of interpreters and translators seems very straightforward—the advisor simply speaks in English and the interpreter repeats it in the appropriate language. However, translation should not be taken lightly. Obviously, language is vital to communication across cultures, but language can also be the source of many misunderstandings in intercultural communication.

G-9. Translators and (especially) interpreters are seldom native speakers of both languages. Normally, they are native speakers of one language with training in the other. This means that they have a good command of the formal language when used correctly and by a speaker with an accent they are familiar with.

CHALLENGES WHEN WORKING WITH INTERPRETERS

G-10. There are several challenges the advisor must overcome when working with interpreters. These challenges include:

- Translation.
- Pronunciation.
- Word choice and meaning.
- Slang and idiomatic expressions.

TRANSLATION

G-11. In communicating with people of a different culture, advisors should use at least a few words or phrases in their language. It is even better to have sufficient command of the language to be able to ensure that the interpreter or translator is not straying from the desired message.

G-12. There is a strong tendency to translate messages literally (word-for-word) from the language of the speaker to the target language. This technique may work well, but it can lead to embarrassing situations.

PRONUNCIATION

G-13. Misunderstandings in intercultural communication can arise even when two cultures use the same language. Even though English is used widely throughout the world, regional differences exist in pronunciation. This can make it difficult for speakers of English from two different countries—or even two different regions of the same country—to understand one another.

G-14. English is one of the official languages of Singapore. It is often used as a lingua franca—for official communication—among the various language subgroups on the island and is often used by government officials and businesspersons to communicate with their countrymen. However, English speaking foreigners frequently have difficulty understanding because of the differences in pronunciation. To Americans, Singaporeans do not clearly pronounce words with similar beginning and ending sounds. Some words, such as tree and three or pen and pan, become garbled. This can lead to misunderstandings—despite sharing a common language.

WORD CHOICE AND MEANING

G-15. Advisors must use caution in selecting words to translate. Ambiguous and unfamiliar words should be avoided.

AMBIGUOUS WORDS

G-16. The same word may have different interpretations in different cultures. In most parts of Asia, for example, the word family refers to parents, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, and so on. To an American or European, family usually refers to the immediate family. If two colleagues—one Asian and one American—were to carry on a conversation about their families, they may think that they were talking about the same thing, but they were not.

UNFAMILIAR WORDS

G-17. The use of unfamiliar words can sometimes lead to expensive mistakes. For example, in a fictional discussion between an American executive and a Japanese customer, the American concludes by saying, "Well then, our thinking is in parallel." They bid goodbye, but months pass without further word. Finally, the frustrated American inquires as to why. The Japanese customer replied, "You used a word I did not understand—parallel. I looked it up in my dictionary and it said parallel means two lines that never touch." The customer concluded that the American executive thought their positions were irreconcilable.

G-18. To avoid miscommunications, advisors should take simple measures to achieve greater clarity in meaning. They choose words carefully, ensuring they are unambiguous and easily understood. Qualifications and definitions should be provided for terms that are likely to be misunderstood. Advisors should never assume that the message was correctly understood. Instead, they should ask for feedback to ensure the audience clearly understood the message as intended.

SLANG AND IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS

G-19. Cultures develop their own slang and idiomatic expressions that may be foreign to other cultures using the same language. For example, Australians commonly refer to a friend as a mate, but in the United States, mate primarily refers to a spouse. Idiomatic expressions can be especially confusing for non-native speakers who are not very proficient with the language. For example, "pulling someone's leg" is a common idiomatic expression for joking around, but an interpreter unfamiliar with this expression would be puzzled because, obviously, he or she had not even touched the speaker—let alone pulled on their leg. Because the world abounds in languages and dialects, and because it is often impossible to predict where an SF advisor may be sent and may lack the linguistic ability to communicate effectively.

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Appendix H

Women, Peace, and Security

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK

H-1. Security cooperation (SC) is a primary mechanism through which the DOD implements the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017 and the 2023 WPS Strategy due to its direct involvement with foreign security forces. Through WPS integration into SC, the DOD works to support the ability of Allies and partners to build defense capability and institutional capacity that is diverse, inclusive, upholds principles of human rights, and capable of responding to the unique security needs of host nation populations. SC with Allies and partners is a core component of the Department's ability to fulfill the requirements of the 2017 WPS Act, the 2020 WPS Strategic Framework Implementation Plan (SFIP), and 2023 WPS Strategy. (2022 U.S. Government WPS Congressional Report, July 2022).

H-2. As appropriate, the WPS initiatives should be integrated into SC planning and considered for SC activities with Allies and partners. The WPS initiatives are not all-inclusive, and in most cases, planners should consult with gender advisors or WPS points of contact within each Combatant Command (CCMD) to support planning, execution, and assessment of SC activities. Gender advisors are technical subject-matter-experts (SMEs) responsible for integrating a gender perspective in military operations, in accordance with WPS guidance (they may sometimes be referred to as WPS advisors or as WPS program managers, dependent upon their command or component-level roles and responsibilities). (JP 3-20).

APPLICATION OF A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

H-3. The WPS program brings useful women, youth, familial and gender views, and issues impacting the populace, as well as course of action (CoA) options. It fits well within the PMESII lens within and is an ideal multiplier to security force assistance. (SFA Quarterly, December 2020).

H-4. DOD's implementation of WPS initiatives apply a gender perspective into the planning, execution, and assessment of SC activities. A crucial component to protecting the human rights of women and children is first understanding how perspectives and security needs differ among men, women, boys, and girls within the operational environment. By applying a gender perspective, PNs can understand how an action impacts men, women, boys, and girls differently based on their gender and sociocultural roles. A gender perspective exposes gender differences and how being treated as a man or woman in society shapes a person's needs, interests, and security. A gender perspective sheds light on the power relationships among men, women, and children; exposes who has access to and control of resources; and highlights who participates in decision making in society. The U.S. can strengthen the capability and capacity of Allies and partners to respond to the different needs of those in their society by providing capacity building activities, training, and education to defense and security institutions on how to account for and respond to the variation in security needs across the population. (JP 3-20).

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

H-5. To plan effectively, it is important to coordinate with interagency partners, civil society, and key stakeholders to ensure training and education materials on human rights and international law are tailored to the PN context. WPS initiatives should be integrated within DOD missions, authorities, and resources. Importantly, DOD WPS efforts should complement DoS and USAID efforts rather than replace them. SC Planners should follow the following steps for integrating WPS initiatives within SC activities:

- Review relevant guidance to identify country-level objectives for Allies and partners. This may include combatant campaign plans (CCPs), integrated country strategies (ICSs), country SC plans, and component command CSPs/country plans.
- Conduct a baseline PN gender analysis. A gender analysis is an examination of the relationships and interactions between men and women, their access to and control of resources, the constraints they face relative to each other, and sociocultural power structures. This should be part of the country-level baseline assessment with WPS relevant questions included. The following factors should be incorporated into the baseline gender analysis:

  - Institutional, generating force, and operational levels.
  - WPS-related policies.
  - Participation of women in PN military.
  - Sexual violence and gender-based violence.
  - Environmental context (i.e., gender factors in society).
- Identify WPS supporting initiatives based on PN needs identified in the baseline gender analysis. Examples of WPS supporting initiatives include:
  - Increasing number and rank of women in the PN military.
  - Women NCO Corps development.
  - Combatting sexual harassment and assault among own forces.
  - Combatting gender-based violence during operations.
  - Gender analysis of operations.
- Review significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs) and other SC plans and programs to determine approach for WPS integration. Examples of significant security cooperation initiatives include:
  - WPS can be integrated into existing operations, actions, and activities.
  - WPS activities can be separate, discrete activities within SSCIs.
  - Leverage out-year planning to insert WPS initiatives if not planned for current fiscal year (FY) execution.
  - Just like any other capability, identify end states and objectives and work backwards.
- Highlight WPS initiatives in relevant proposals submitted to higher headquarters.
- Include WPS supporting metrics in SC AM&E that:
  - At a minimum, sex-disaggregated participation data should be included (i.e., number of male and female participants from PN military participating in SC activity).
  - Report activities to appropriate gender advisor for the annual data call to meet congressional reporting requirements as stipulated in legislation.
- The following are planning considerations for integrating WPS principles within SC planning, execution, and investments:
  - WPS principles should support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and CCPs' objectives.
  - WPS activities should build on previous activities each FY and not be one-off events. Maintaining consistency with Allies and partners on one or two WPS principles throughout SC activities generally has the best results.
  - PNs should be prioritized based on presence of WPS national action plans, percent of women in the PN military, level of senior leader support within the PN, and U.S. ambassador support.
  - Do not put WPS where it should not be. WPS should be focused on where it provides the most value for the overarching SC objectives.
  - Allies and partners may be interested, willing, and able to implement WPS principles. PN militaries may already be implementing WPS principles, but they do not use the same terminology or recognize the activity as supporting the global WPS mandate. DOD can build on these existing opportunities.
  - Work with a country SME to better understand the sociocultural norms, behaviors, and interactions between PN men and women. (JP 3-20).

U.S. AUTHORITIES FOR WPS IMPLEMENTATION

H-6. Table H-6 is a framework for explaining the Key 10 USC authorities that explain the initiatives aimed at advancing the Women, Peace, Security within the United States.

Table H-1. Key 10 USC Authorities and Suggested Use in support of DOD WPS Implementation

Key 10 USC Authorities	*Suggested Use in support of DOD WPS Implementation*
Authority: 10 USC § 312 authorizes payment of partner-nation personnel expenses for their attendance at and planning of conferences, seminars, and bilateral/multilateral meetings that enhance interoperability. Costs for travel and per diem for PN personnel to participate in a conference, workshop, or seminar to discuss WPS objectives, assess PN capability gaps, or plan or conduct WPS subject matter exchanges; Authority Global Combatant Command (GCC) Inherent Authority	• Hosting a multilateral workshop involving female officers from PN militaries to build their knowledge of military logistics. • Meeting with senior leaders from a PN military to identify key steps for recruiting and retaining women in the Armed Forces. • Bilateral or multilateral workshops with PN military legal professionals to address accountability measures to improve sexual exploitation and abuse. • Workshops and events on WPS topics should reinforce country level SC objectives and other programs; they should not be one-off events.
Authority: 10 USC § 332 is the principal authority for Defense Institution Capacity Building (ICB) activities. This includes providing advice or training on defense or security institutional functions related to WPS, including for the purposes of: • Enhancing civilian oversight of foreign security forces. • Establishing responsible defense governance and internal controls to help build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions. • Assessing organizational weaknesses and establishing a roadmap for addressing shortfalls. • Enhancing ministerial, general, or joint staff, or service level core management competencies.	• Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDAs)/DOD civilian experts providing human resources information on the recruitment, retention, and career progression policies and processes to enable women's participation in PN Armed Forces as a part of their advisory role. • MoDA/DOD civilian experts providing financial advice for budgeting for uniforms and gear that fit female bodies. • Policy development for maternity/paternity leave; sexual harassment and assault prevention and response in the Armed Forces, childcare and family support services for servicemembers; family support for female peacekeepers during deployments. • Establishing accountability policy, processes, and procedures for areas that often disproportionately affect women entering or maintaining a career in the Armed Forces such as sexual harassment and assault, fraternization, standards of conduct.
Authority: 10 USC 342 (DOD Regional Centers) which are international venues for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants.	• Regional Centers should endeavor to establish WPS programs targeted toward DOD priority PNs, and more broadly, increasingly admit women from PNs to participate in their full range of courses. • Report on sex-disaggregated data (# of men; # of women) who attend their center annually. • All curriculum focuses on counter transnational threats, countering violent extremism and combatting terrorism, must include modules and/or discussion opportunities on women as combatant/foreign fighters, enablers of extremist organizations, builders of community resistance, and victims of extremist activity.

Table H-1. Key 10 USC Authorities and Suggested Use in support of DOD WPS Implementation (continued)

Authority: 10 USC § 333 authorizes the use of funds for training and equipping partners for the purpose of counterterrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction, counter narcotics, countering transnational crime organizations, maritime and/or border security, military intelligence operations, and coalition operations. Sec 333 must include an ICB component and human rights training. DSCA O&M funded.	• ICB components for 333 should examine opportunities listed above for 332. • Human rights training should include gender-based differences violations of human rights against men and women. This can include differences in gender-based violence and different protection needs to uphold human rights and equality under the law.

H-7. Table H-2 is a framework for explaining the Key 22 USC authorities that explain the initiatives aimed at advancing the Women, Peace, Security within the United States.

Table H-2. Key 22 USC Authorities (ICW Department of State (DoS)) and the Use in support of DOD WPS implementation

Key 22 USC Authorities **(ICW Department of State (DoS))**	***Use in support of DOD WPS implementation:***
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) –funds international counternarcotic activities, anticrime programs, and anti-human trafficking programs.	• Law enforcement capabilities should include an assessment or implementation for female engagement and community policing efforts. Evidence shows female police units provide similar benefits to gathering information as Cultural Support Teams for militaries. • Anti-trafficking activities should include best practices for engaging a potential female victim of trafficking and connecting them to services. Activities should also include warning signs for male victims of trafficking. • Activities may include how to gather/maintain chain of custody for evidence gathering if victim or trafficking discloses sexual abuse. • All law enforcement activities should educate PNs on local community and/or international organizations supporting victims of crime, specifically those that understand the unique and different needs of women and children.
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) –funds programs to provide articles, services, and training for countries participating in international peacekeeping operations, including UN and regional operations (e.g., the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)).	In coordination with DoS, GPOI has been the most successful program DOD has executed to implement WPS. Examples include: • Conducting courses with Police/Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs) on Gender in Peace Support Operations. • Conducting female and engagement and outreach training as part of UN pre-deployment training. • Developing and training Engagement Team in accordance with the UN Infantry Battalion Manual. • Training National Investigative Officers on preventing and responding to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, including accountability mechanisms. • Training on civil-military engagement best practices to enable P/TCCs to liaise with their UN civilian counterparts on mission.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) – IMET provides grant financial assistance to selected foreign military and civilian personnel for training and education on U.S. military practices and standards. The State Department controls the funds and has policy authority; DOD, through DSCA, administers the program.	• Security Cooperation Offices (SCOs) should identify opportunities to work with PN militaries to begin investing in the development of female leadership within their Armed Forces. • Often women in PN Armed Forces fail to meet the English language requirements to qualify for IMET; steps can be taken to overcome this obstacle. • SCOs should craft programmatic solutions that blend DOD and DoS authorities, programs, and activities to achieve a defense WPS objective.

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY FOCUS AREAS FOR CAPABILITY & CAPACITY BUILDING ACTIVITIES

H-8. The following are focus areas for capability and capacity building activities that are essential for enhance Allies and Partners' militaries to effectively recruit, employ, develop, retain and promote individuals from diverse backgrounds, addressing organizational weaknesses within defense institutions.

Diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)

Capability and capacity building activities that enable Allies' and partners' militaries to better recruit, employ, develop, retain, and promote women, people of different races, ethnicities, and other intersecting identity characteristics. DEI addresses an organizational weakness within defense institutions.

Recruitment and retention

Capability and capacity building efforts can advise and train ministries on addressing shortfalls in PN recruitment and retention of men and women within foreign security forces (FSFs). This will help build security organizations that can sustain the workforce needed to employ operational capabilities and often suitable to include within human resources programs.

Gender balance/integration

Establish a roadmap for addressing shortfalls associated with integrating women into the armed forces, often suitable to include within human resources programs.

Inclusive leadership development

Work with Allies' and partners' senior leadership at the ministerial level to build core management competencies for leading diverse and inclusive defense institutions comprised of men and women. This is necessary to create effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions by establishing an environment that prevents stereotyping and discrimination and enables the inclusion and advancement of different people in organizations with security missions.

Professionalization of FSFs

Activities should address organizational weaknesses associated with gender-based violence, including sexual harassment and assault, sexual exploitation and abuse, and conflict-related sexual-and gender-based violence. Addressing these areas builds effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions.

Sexual harassment and assault

Addresses the institutions, management competencies, and accountability mechanisms necessary for preventing, responding, and holding members of FSF accountable for instances of sexual harassment and assault between members.

Sexual exploitation and abuse

Address the institutions, management competencies, and accountability mechanisms necessary for preventing and responding to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by a member of the FSF against a host nation civilian.

Conflict-related sexual and gender violence

FSF may often encounter survivors of conflict related sexual and gender violence during post conflict or stabilization activities. Activities may be used to train ministry level officials on roles and responsibilities of security organizations for addressing conflict related sexual and gender-based violence, and to develop the internal controls, management competencies, and accountability mechanisms to ensure FSF are trained and equipped to prevent and respond to instances of conflict related sexual violence.

Protection of civilians

FSF are often called upon to protect civilians during post conflict and stabilization activities by preventing and responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, with consideration for the different protection and security needs of women and children. Activities may be used to train ministry level officials on roles and responsibilities of security organizations for protecting civilians and children affected by armed conflict and developing internal controls and management competencies to provide oversight of FSF, and/or establishing accountability mechanisms.

Protection of children affected by armed conflict

FSF are often called upon to protect children affected by armed conflict specifically. This includes institutions, oversight, and management mechanisms that enable FSF to detect and respond to recruitment and use of children; the killing and maiming of children; sexual violence against children; attacks on schools and hospitals; abduction of children; and denial of humanitarian access.

Countering trafficking in persons

Activities that establish responsible governance and internal controls for enabling security organizations to recognize, address, and prevent trafficking in persons. This is a particularly useful WPS focus area for capability and capacity building activities in support of counterterrorism, counter-illicit drug trafficking, counter-transnational organized crime, and maritime and border security operations.

Building the gender advisory workforce of PNs' gender advisors and gender focal points

Gender advisors are technical subject matter experts responsible for integrating a gender perspective in military operations. DOD can train PN gender advisors and gender focal points assigned to the foreign ministry of defense or those assigned to regional organizations with security missions as part of capability and capacity building activities.

Gender analysis within defense institutions

A gender analysis is an examination of the relationships and interactions between men and women, the constraints they face relative to each other, and sociocultural power structures. Capability and capacity building activities can provide ministerial level advise or training on integrating gender analysis as part of building core competencies and capabilities to manage defense related processes.

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Appendix I

Embassy Formation

EMBASSY INFORMATION

I-1. Embassies are the focal point for U.S. government representatives in foreign countries. The embassy is normally in the capital; however, there may also be consulate generals, sometimes referred to as consulates, established in other cities depending on the size of the country and the need to extend its services across a larger area. Collectively, the U.S. presence in a foreign country is referred to as a mission.

I-2. The chancery is the main building on the embassy ground that houses the main offices of the country team. Large embassies often have annexes within the compound. The staff normally live in apartments or houses within the local community but may stay within the embassy grounds, if necessary, because of security concerns. The embassy and consulates are considered part of U.S. territory; however, the host country is responsible for protecting the grounds.

I-3. Collectively, embassy staff consists of representatives of the government agencies and organizations resident within the mission, as well as the various sections and offices that align with the various Department of State (DoS) bureaus and career tracks. Embassy and consulate staffing is made up of the interagency group consisting of foreign service officers (FSOs) and locally employed staff (LES) that carry out the daily responsibilities of the embassy or consulate.

I-4. The physical size of the embassy, staffing, and organization varies based on location and the diplomatic requirements particular for each host nation. There is an adage that states, "If you've seen one embassy, you've seen one embassy." Figure I-1 shows the organization of a generic country team with the positions normally represented in some form. Small embassies or consulates may only have one FSO and an LES representing a section where larger embassies or consulates may have much larger numbers.




Figure I-1. Generic country team structure

I-5. The ambassador is the head of the country team which consists of the deputy chief of mission, section heads of all the departments or U.S. government organizations within the embassy, and other personnel as the ambassador desires. The country team meets on a regular basis and is responsible for conducting

interagency coordination in the planning and implementation of foreign policy activities and operations within the country. Members outside of the DoS are responsible for informing and coordinating their actions with their parent organization. Local issues that have regional or worldwide implications may rise to the national level for resolution.

EMBASSY STRUCTURE

I-6. An embassy is the official diplomatic representation of one country in another, and its structure is designed to facilitate various diplomatic functions efficiently. At the top of the hierarchy is the Ambassador, who serves as the chief of mission and the primary representative of their home country. Supporting the Ambassador are several key sections, including the political section, which handles political relations and negotiations; the economic section, which focuses on trade and economic affairs; the consular section, which provides services to citizens of the home country; and the public diplomacy section, which manages cultural and educational exchanges. Additionally, there are administrative and support sections that handle logistics, security, and other essential operations. Each of these sections works together to promote the interests of the home country and foster strong bilateral relations."

AMBASSADOR

I-7. The ambassador, also known as the chief of mission (CoM), is the personal representative of the President and the highest-ranking U.S. diplomat in the country. Ambassadors are responsible for all U.S. policy and interagency actions within the country. The ambassador is either a career FSO or political appointee of the President. The number of careers versus political appointees vary by administration but between 60 to 70 percent are career foreign service. Ambassadors are the most visible representative to the host nation and the chief spokesperson for the embassy.

I-8. Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 codifies the authority of the CoM and provides considerable power and authority over what happens within the embassy. The CoM is authorized to see all communications, except for some by the CIA, conducted by the departments and sections within the embassy. Ambassadors can expel or deny entrance of U.S. government employees from the country. Executive branch agency employees, with the exception for personnel working under the command of a military area commander, working in the country must keep the CoM informed of their activities and comply with all directives. Additional information on military members and organizations under CoM authority can be found on the Foreign Assistance Manual (FAM).

DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION

I-9. The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) is like an executive officer or deputy commander within the military. DCMs are second in charge and responsible for the management of embassy operations and ensures the country team works together in support of the mission. The DCM plays a key role in planning major events, such as presidential and integrated country strategy (ICS) visits. They also look after work-life balance and quality of life issues within the embassy and broader staff.

CHARGÉ D' AFFAIRES

I-10. The Chargé d' Affaires, or often referred to as the "Chargé" is the person, usually the DCM, in charge of the mission in the absence of an ambassador. This person has the same rights, privileges, and authority as an ambassador, but not the formal rank.

CONSULS GENERAL

I-11. Consuls Generals (sometimes known as CGs) are subordinate to the ambassador and in charge of principal officers of U.S. Consulate Generals that may be in the country. In some cases, such as in China, there are several Consulate Generals located in the country, with each headed by a Consul General. In the context of an embassy, Consuls General are the most senior consular officers and manage their own sections at the embassy as well as providing guidance and oversight of the sections of any Consulate Generals present in country.

REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER

I-12. Regional Security Officers (RSOs) are sworn federal law enforcement officers responsible for the safety and security of all diplomatic personnel, facilities, and classified information. They are the focal point for all force protection matters and publish emergency action plans (EAPs) that cover actions in natural disasters, civil unrest, and other emergencies. The RSO supervises the security guard detachment of U.S. Marines if one is present at the mission. The RSO provides an introductory security orientation briefing to all newly assigned embassy personnel.

OFFICE MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST

I-13. Office management specialists perform a wide range of administrative, operational, and technical program support to the ambassador and DCM. Their functions may include running the embassy front office and providing general support of oversight of office budgets, planning, and scheduling meetings, and preparing written materials.

MANAGEMENT SECTION

I-14. The management section is responsible for daily embassy operations that include logistics, administrative, human resources, financial matters, the motor pool, and facilities.

POLITICAL SECTION

I-15. The political section reports on the host country's internal political developments and external relations and seeks to advance bilateral and multilateral U.S. policy objectives. Like their economic officer colleagues, they work to build relationships within government, business, nongovernmental organizations, and academia. Their reporting analysis informs U.S. policy formulation.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

I-16. The public diplomacy section engages with media and local organizations to promote U.S. interests. They also manage culture and information programs to increase foreign understanding of U.S. society.

CONSULAR SECTION

I-17. The Consul General heads a consular section and assists U.S. citizens in the host nation and facilitates the adjudication of visas, passports, reports of birth, other documents, and notarial services. Consular officers provide emergency services to citizens by visiting them in jail and hospitals, assisting U.S. citizen families arranging repatriation of remains and effects following an American death overseas, and assisting with evacuation in conflict or natural disaster.

ECONOMIC SECTION

I-18. The economic section promotes U.S. economic and commercial interests by building relationships with their counterparts in the business, government, and academia realms. Their reporting and analysis inform U.S. economic and trade policy.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL/DEFENSE ATTACHÉ

I-19. The Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) is the CoM's principal diplomatically accredited military advisor and representative of all Department of Defense (DOD) elements within the country team, except for the Marine Security Guard detachment. The SDO/DATT is the single point of contact for all DOD elements working within or from the embassy. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5205.75 covers the duties and responsibilities of the SDO/DATT.

DEFENSE ATTACHÉ OFFICE

I-20. The Defense Attaché Office (DAO) consists of service attachés as representatives of the military services in the host country. The Defense Intelligence Agency manages the Defense Attaché System, which oversees DAO staffing at embassies. The DAO will manage security assistance programs if there is not a security cooperation organization (SCO) within the embassy organization.

SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION

I-21. The SCO is the DO

I-22. D entity in the embassy responsible for overseeing security cooperation and security assistance (SA) with the host nation. SCO functions and responsibilities may vary at each embassy.

I-23. SCO is a generic term. The actual name varies by embassy although the duties and responsibilities are basically the same. Some of the more common names are U.S. Military Advisory Group, Office of Defense Cooperation, and Office of Military Cooperation. The Foreign Affairs Handbook, 2 FAM- 2 H-113.2 CoM Authority and the Department of Defense, subparagraph b, provides a partial list of SCO names. Check the embassy website or contact the SCO directly to confirm the correct name.

I-24. The four main sources of authorities come from U.S. laws, DOD policy and instructions, Defense Security Cooperation Agency guidance, and from the supporting geographic combatant command (GCC). The SCO manages both SA and SC activities which fall under different legal authorities. SA programs fall within the DoS under Title 22 of the U.S. Code and authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, or other appropriation acts. Additionally, SA provides defense equipment, education and training, and other defense-related services. DoS owns and manages these programs but are executed by the DOD due to their military nature.

I-25. SC falls under Title 10 of the U.S. Code and the National Defense Authorization Act. These programs provide defense articles, training exercises, information exchanges, and defense relationship building events.

I-26. The SDO/DATT directly supervises the SCO, which works under the authority of the CoM. The GCC maintains administrative control over SCO personnel for evaluations, financial and personnel records. The SCO is responsible to the GCC for providing input into the theater campaign plans and the country-specific annex. The SDO/DATT resolves any conflicts in guidance or priorities between the CoM and GCC to balance the requirements and available resources.

I-27. SCO staffing varies by embassy based on the SA and SC workload. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the GCC utilize the Joint Manpower Program to determine and validate staffing requirements. DOD monitors the number and type of personnel (military, civilian, contractor, and LES) in a SCO through an annual reporting requirement. The GCC submits manpower changes approved by the CoM through DSCA to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final approval. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5132.13 covers SCO staffing.

I-28. SCO offices may be located within the embassy, a separate building nearby, or within the host nation ministry of defense. The type, funding, and number of security cooperation programs in the host country determines the size of the SCO. Personnel staffing may include a mix of military, contractor, and locally employed staff.

I-29. The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is a security cooperation program that pairs U.S. states with foreign countries in enduring relationships to conduct engagements and capacity building events in support of national security objectives. The state will assign a bilateral affairs officer to the SCO to assist with planning and executing training and engagement events conducted by the state. The SPP is executed by the National Guard Bureau and coordinated with the GCC and CoM of the partner country. More information is at https://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/.

LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF

I-30. Embassies employ foreign nationals and resident U.S. citizens eligible to work in the country to support the mission. They provide local knowledge and contacts and may serve many years in their position. Their capabilities and years of knowledge may result in them having significant responsibilities in overseeing programs and functions. The RSO vets locally employed staff (LES) but they do not possess security clearances that allows access to classified information.

I-31. The types of positions vary. LES roles include assistants in any of the embassy sections, or in office or program management, professional positions, security guards, drivers, or various other skilled trades. There is no single source of open LES positions. Each embassy website maintains job openings and application

procedures. Typically, the number of LES at an embassy or consulate far exceeds the number of American staff.

OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY

I-32. In addition to the main diplomatic sections, a U.S. Embassy often houses representatives from various other U.S. government agencies, each contributing to the overall mission. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) manages foreign aid and development programs. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may have agents stationed to assist with law enforcement and investigative matters. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) promotes agricultural trade and supports food security initiatives. Medical professionals ensure the health and well-being of embassy staff and may assist with public health efforts. The Marine Security Guard Detachment provides security and protects classified information, ensuring the safety of the embassy and its personnel. These organizations work collaboratively under the ambassador's leadership to advance U.S. interests and support the host country."

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

I-33. The amount, type, and complexity of U.S. assistance determines U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) representation in the host country. A mission director is usually the head of the USAID contingent of FSOs and local staff. A mission Military-Civil Coordinator (MC2) manages DOD engagement and facilitates military cooperation with USAID specialists in non-disaster operations. They are the point of contact for any DoD-USAID coordination when present at a mission.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

I-34. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) maintains legal attaches (sometimes known as legates) in 93 offices in U.S. embassies and consulates around the world. The agents work with local and international authorities to share information, investigate, and apprehend criminal and terrorist organizations that threaten U.S. national security. Agents will also conduct training with the host nation’s law enforcement officials to build interoperability and capacity. Additional information is available on the FBI website at https://www.fbi.gov/.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

I-35. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) within the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) maintains FSOs at embassies to facilitate trade and represent the interests of the U.S. agricultural sector. The agricultural attaché promotes and expands access for U.S. products in the host nation. They also provide non-emergency food aid and technical assistance to foreign countries. The agricultural attaché is focused on promoting U.S. interests and products where the USAID agricultural officers are interested in host nation development. Additional information is available on the USDA website at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/.

MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS

I-36. The Bureau of Medical Services provides regional medical officers (RMOs), nurse practitioners, physician assistants, psychiatrists, and laboratory technicians to support embassies and consulates. The number and specialties of the medical providers is based on the size of the mission and capabilities of local healthcare. Additional information can be found at https://careers.state.gov/career-paths/worldwide-foreign-service/specialist/medical-andhealth/.

MARINE SECURITY GUARD DETACHMENT

I-37. There are 2,450 Marine Security Guards at 150 missions around the world. A staff sergeant (E-6) or above leads the Marine Security Guard Detachment (MSGD), which works with the RSO to protect sensitive information and facilities. The MSGD also assists the RSO with controlling access to embassy grounds and responding to bomb threats; demonstrations; and nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks.

LOCAL LAW, DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS

I-38. Local Law refers to the legal system and regulations of the host country where an embassy is located, which typically applies to both local citizens and foreign residents but may have exceptions for diplomatic personnel. Diplomatic Immunity is a principle of international law that exempts diplomats from the jurisdiction of the host country's courts, protecting them from prosecution or detention, except in certain exceptional circumstances. This immunity is essential for diplomats to perform their duties without fear of local interference. Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are agreements between a host country and a foreign nation that station military forces within its territory. SOFAs outline the legal status and rights of military personnel, addressing issues like criminal jurisdiction, taxation, and the use of facilities. Together, these concepts help govern the interactions between host countries and foreign diplomatic or military presences, facilitating smooth and respectful relations."

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

I-39. Diplomatic immunity for specific members of the embassy staff has a basis in international law. The two primary international agreements are the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) of 1969.

I-40. The embassy staff and close family members are typically subject to privileges and immunities from local laws based on their status as accredited members of a diplomatic mission or consular post. Being an accredited member requires several factors: the individual lives in the metropolitan area, works at least 90 consecutive days, are employed full-time (at least 35 hours per week), and their work supports the diplomatic mission. There are several limitations to diplomatic immunity. Diplomats must still obey local laws and pay speeding and parking tickets that result in a fine but not a court appearance. The ownership of real or personal property, other than within an official capacity, is not protected from litigation. LES are citizens and residents in the host country and not typically provided diplomatic immunity.

I-41. The Foreign Affairs Manual at https://fam.state.gov/ and the DoS website at https://www.state.gov/ provides additional information on diplomatic immunity.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS (SOFAS)

I-42. SOFAs address the status of U.S. armed forces and the application of local laws within a country. Most of these are bilateral agreements but some, such as within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, are multilateral. SOFAs also may cover taxes and fees, customs regulations, wearing of uniforms, carrying of weapons, and driver’s licensing. SOFAs are only applicable during peacetime and become void in time of war.

I-43. A SOFA does not provide the same protection as diplomatic immunity. The agreement may designate exclusive or shared jurisdiction with the signatory country over prosecuting criminal and/or civil offenses by U.S. personnel. The U.S. and host country often share jurisdiction with each having specific areas of responsibility A country may request the other signatory waive jurisdiction based on the circumstances of the offense, but it does not have to be honored.16 The Office of Security Negotiations and Agreements in the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is responsible for leading the negotiation and signing of SOFAs. A list of current SOFAs can be found on the DoS website at. Table I-1 lists the rank equivalencies of military, civilian, and foreign service officers.

Table I-1. Rank Equivalents: Military/Civilian/Foreign Service Officer

Foreign Service Grades	*Diplomatic Title*	*Consular Title*	*Military Equivalent Rank*	*Civil Service Equivalent*	*NATO*
Career Ambassador	Ambassador		General/Admiral	SES-6	OF-9
Career Minister (FE-CM)	Ambassador; Minister-Counselor	Consul General	Lieutenant General/ Vice Admiral	SES-5	OF-8
Minister Counselor (FE-MC)	Ambassador; Counselor	Consul General	Major General/ Rear Admiral (Upper Half)	SES-3 & SES-4	OF-7
Counselor (FE-0C)	Counselor	Consul General/ Consul	Brigadier General/ Rear Admiral (Lower Half)	SES-1 & SES-2	OF-6
FSO-1	Counselor; First Secretary	Consul General/ Consul	Colonel/Captain	GS-15	OF-5
FSO-2	First Secretary	Consul	Lieutenant Colonel/ Commander	GS-13 & GS-14	OF-4
FSO-3	Second Secretary	Consul	Major/ Lieutenant Commander	GS-12	OF-3
FSO-4	Second Secretary	Vice Consul	Captain/ Lieutenant	GS-10 & GS-11	OF-2
FSO-5	Third Secretary	Vice Consul	1st Lieutenant/ Lieutenant Junior Grade	GS-8 & GS-9	OF-1
FSO-6	Third Secretary	Vice Consul	2nd Lieutenant/ Ensign	GS-7	OF-1

Foreign Service Grades
CMSFS-CA. Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Personal Rank of Career Ambassador
CMSFS-CM. Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Career Minister
CMSFS-M-C. Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor
CMSFS-C. Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Counselor
CMSES. Career Member of the Senior Executive Service
FSO. Foreign Service Officer

KEY PEOPLE WITHIN THE EMBASSY STAFF

I-44. While it is good to be aware of Embassy Staff presence and functions, they do not all normally have direct involvement with the military elements at the embassy. However, there are several key members that may have a direct impact on military activities in the host nation. In some cases, such as a training team in the host country for a short time, the interaction will be through the SDO/DATT or SCO. It is important to maintain good relations with the people listed below:

- **Ambassador**

  - It is essential to have the full faith, confidence, and trust of the ambassador.
- **Deputy Chief of Mission**
  - The DCM may often act as a gatekeeper to the ambassador; therefore, it is a good idea to establish a personal relationship with the DCM to facilitate the free flow of information and counsel.
- **Consul General (CG)**
  - It is a good practice to ensure the CG is aware of any military engagements or activities in their area. Offer to provide the CG briefings or after-action reports to ensure they have situational awareness and inform their own reporting requirements.
- **Office Management Specialist for the Ambassador and DCM**
  - They have no official power but can facilitate access to the ambassador and DCM.
- **SDO/DATT and SCO**
  - A military team that will be in the host nation for an extended period conducting a complex mission should consider placing a liaison officer in the SCO to assist with planning and communication.
- **Regional Security Officer**
  - It is important to maintain a good relationship and gain the confidence of the RSO. Take their concerns and advice into account and do not become a force protection liability.
- **Management Officer**
  - Establishing a good relationship with the management office staff is helpful in gaining support for in facility, contracting, and logistics operations areas.
- **Public Affairs Officer**
  - Compare the embassy guidance with that given by the military public affairs officer to see if there are any contradictions. Ask for approved messages, talking points, and anticipated questions and answers to prepare Soldiers for media engagements.
- **Locally Employed Staff (LES)**
  - Their knowledge of the local culture, host nation government, and inner workings of the U.S. embassy can be a great benefit. LES do not have security clearances, so practice good operational security measures when in their presence.

Source: Military Guide to the U.S. Embassy, Center for Army Lessons Learned, NO. 23-05 (730) 2023.

Appendix J

Security Cooperation Activity Checklist

J-1. Suggest including some sort of introductory paragraph that introduces the checklist. What it's used for. Who uses it. That sort of thing.

- Read Security Cooperation (SC) guidance (most likely on SIPRNET).
  - Army component guidance/higher headquarters guidance.
  - Command guidance.
  - Country specific guidance for partner nation (PN).
  - Applicable fiscal year (FY) SC guidance.
  - Relevant program guidance.
  - Relevant section(s) of the current NDAA.
  - Relevant section(s) of the current consolidated appropriations act.
- Identify and read relevant operational doctrine and directives for SC activity.
- Obtain higher headquarters activity guidance.
  - Activity objectives.
  - Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs).
  - Strategic guidance.
  - Public Affairs (PA) guidance.
- Review lessons identified through previous operations and exercises.
  - Center for Army Lessons Learned.
  - After-action reviews/reports.
- Enter planned event into Socium.
- Submit request for and obtain unit diplomatic/country clearance.
- Conduct mission analysis to answer the questions:
  - What tasks must the unit do for mission accomplishment?
  - What is the purpose of the activity?
  - What limitations have been placed on own force's actions?
  - What capabilities are required to support the activity?
  - What additional assets are needed?
- Request required forces that cannot be sourced from within the requesting organization.
- Develop mission analysis outputs.
- Identify SC activity funding source.
  - Review associated legal constraints.
  - Identify reporting requirements for expenditures.
- Identify personnel requirements.
  - Passport/visa/military identification, theater and country clearance, and customs policy for uniformed personnel, civilians, and contractors.
  - Required medical screening and immunizations.
  - Complete isolated personnel report, as required.
  - Ensure government charge card authorizations and policies of use are promulgated.
  - Ensure proper uniforms for geography, weather, and activity.
  - Ensure proper command relationships and associated operational and tactical C2 entities and authorities.
- Request staff judge advocate assistance in identifying memorandums of understanding/status of forces agreements/visiting forces agreements that exist within host nation (policy on weapons and uniforms).
- Identify PN (and host nation (HN), if applicable) interagency, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) points of contact for coordination.
- Arrange for PN (and HN, if applicable) liaison officers and interagency/international organization/NGO representatives to augment tactical/operational units, as appropriate.
- Contact combatant command (CCMD) country desk officer and CCMD gender advisor for advisement and coordination.

- Contact country team and security cooperation organization (SCO) (if established) in the PN for advisement and coordination.
- Obtain HN licensing/credentialing requirements if required (e.g., medical, construction).
- Identify logistics requirements and support.
- Identify contracted support requirements, including non-logistics functions.
- Arrange for cultural awareness training.
  - Schedule specific training on customs, cultural sensitivities, and norms for unit leaders and those who will interact with the HN.
  - Ensure language and translation requirements are identified and met by embassy support and/or augmented personnel.
- Identify communications requirements.
  - Obtain communications resources for austere locations.
  - Ensure redundant and backup systems are available and tested.
- Obtain format of situational reports to higher headquarters, frequency of reporting, and means of reporting. Develop data collection plan to support MOEs, MOPs, operation and assessment monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E).
- Publish evacuation plan of action prior to mission in accordance with FM 3-50.
- Depending on time constraints conduct predeployment site survey or advance command element team to prepare for activity.
- Enter execution related information into Socium.
- Draft observations during activity planning and execution and conduct an after-action review. Submit upon completion or as directed.
- Draft an after-action report per higher headquarters direction and update Socium event entry to lessons learned as applicable.
- Coordinating HN access/approval to conduct EMS operations.

Appendix K

Socium

INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIUM GUIDEBOOK

K-1. This document establishes the U.S. Army Socium Guidebook for Service Security Cooperation (SC) stakeholders involved in Socium. This Guidebook supplements the https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/socium (Includes SAAR forms created and maintained by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). This guidebook, applicable to the Army's Total Force, is intended to remove procedural ambiguity, standardize data entry, and maximize data fidelity. This guidebook is not intended to supersede either DSCA or Combatant Command (CCMD) guidance. However, in the absence of CCMD guidance regional stakeholders will adhere to the policies and guidance in this Guidebook.

BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIUM GUIDEBOOK

K-2. Socium, Latin for "partner," replaces the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (G-TSCMIS) as the authoritative Security Cooperation Database for the Department of Defense. Socium will facilitate and integrate planning, budgeting, collaboration, design, management, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting for all U.S. Security Cooperation (SC) activities.

K-3. Socium performs each function in a manner that meets the mandate of the FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and later NDAA reforms by enabling Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) and Defense Institution Building.

K-4. Socium introduces a comprehensive lifecycle management system for (SC) operations, activities, and investments (OAIs). Additionally, it enables the community to address long-standing issues, such as (1) building and streamlining the approval process and strategic alignment of Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs); (2) version control, collaboration, and development of the Training and Equipment Lists (TELs); (3) converting prose into structured data to enable business analytics; (4) archiving, uploading, and searching community documentation to aid knowledge transfer and records management; (5) centralizing an AM&E framework to house pertinent data points to improve execution; and (6) interfacing with other authoritative data sources to increase knowledge and reduce data-entry.

K-5. HQMC, Plans, Policies, & Operations (PP&O), Strategy & Plans Division (PL), International Affairs Branch (PLU) is responsible for acting as a liaison between USMC stakeholders and DSCA, identifying gaps and recommending changes to Socium.

ADMINISTRATION

K-6. Entries into the Socium interface tool are designed to take less than ten minutes. SOCIUM users should become familiar with operating the SOCIUM interface by reviewing training materials. The role of 'Socium Manager' is designed as a collateral duty and will involve a moderate administrative responsibility.

LINKS AND RESOURCES

K-7. Stakeholders involved in Socium should use the following resources to gain a thorough understanding of the guidance and policies for Socium.

- Socium: https://socium.dsca.mil/
- SIPR Socium: https://socium.dsca.smil.mil/
- Socium Test Site: https://socium.test.dsca.mil/
- Socium Milsuite Site: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/socium (Includes SAAR forms) Socium GIS Guide:
  - https://gis.apps.dsca.mil/portal/apps/storymaps/stories/975f320919cb41dfbfd7fca2bb88acc3
- Initiatives Reference Guide: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/docs/DOC-1151672

REQUESTING ACCESS

K-8. To request access to Socium, users must complete a System Authorization Access Request (SAAR) and email it to their designated OIO. Users may also refer to the Socium Milsuite site for the OIOs at other Socium organizations, such as the CCMDs and Services.

K-9. Socium Organizations are included in Table K-1.

Table K-1. Socium Organizations

Socium Organizations				
Army	National Guard	SOCOM	EUCOM	CYBERCOM
Air Force	Space Force	AFRICOM	TRANSCOM	DoS
Navy	Joint Staff	CENTCOM	NORTHCOM	DTRA
USMC	OSD	INDOPACOM	STRATCOM	Other
Coast Guard	DSCA	SOUTHCOM	SPACECOM	

K-10. The SAAR form, and detailed instructions on filling it out, can be found on https://milsuite/book/groups/socium.
To complete a SAAR, Socium Users must have a(n):

- Common Access Card
- Cyber Awareness Challenge Training Certificate
- .mil, .gov, or .edu email
- Explanation/justification for roles, authorities, and level of access
- Secret Clearance (if accessing the SIPR Socium)
- Trainings (not needed but your OIO might request it to be done.):
  - SOC 101: Introduction to Socium
  - SOC 102: Roles and Rules in Managing Security Cooperation Activities.
  - SOC 103: Workflows, Legal Authorities, and Data Reporting
  - SOC 104: Strategic Planning and Advanced Data Reporting
  - SOC 104: Socium Strategic Planning – Five Year Plan
  - SOC 105: Working in the SIPR Environment in Socium

K-11. Socium training can be found on at https://www.dscu.mil/registration/register/aspx?BOL=TRUE&course_=SOC-101&class_=5652&EOL=TRUE. After completing the SAAR and submitted to their OIO, users will receive an email when they are able to log in.

SIPR ACCESS

K-12. For Socium users with an active NIPR account who need access to Socium SIPR, follow the SAAR modification process to request Socium SIPR access:

- Send a digitally signed email requesting access to Socium SIPR to their supervisor.
- After supervisors verify users' need for access, proper access level, and Annual Information Awareness (AIA) training requirements, they will send a digitally signed email to their organization's designated OIO requesting access on behalf of the user.
- OIOs will review, digitally sign, and send their requests to DSCA Service Desk at dsca.mechanicsburg.imt.mbx.servicedesk@mail.mil.
- Users must have an active Secret or higher clearance verified by their security manager and have completed the AIA training within one (1) year.

USER TYPES

K-13. As users fill out the SAAR form, the user will need to request access to specific roles in the system. The roles are not mutually exclusive, meaning a user can request multiple.

ORGANIZATION

K-14. Users may only be assigned to one organization. Army stakeholders must determine whether their work focuses primarily on a Geographic Command or the Service as a whole.

AUTHORITIES

K-15. Users can select which legal authorities authorize the activity they record in Socium, including Title 10 Chapter 16 authorities (i.e., 333, 332) and other Title 10 authorities (I.e. Foreign Disaster Assistance). Activities are recorded through unique workflows, such as Country Strategies, Strategic Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs), and the General Activity Workflow (GAW), which serves as a catch all for all remaining activities. All USMC users should request access to the GAW and all other authorities they are likely to plan events under during their tour in the billet. Users should verify the legal authorities used to authorize the activities recorded in Socium to ensure they are recorded appropriately. Note that users may create an entry associated with one organization, and users in a supporting organization may create and link the supporting entry to the original one.

REGION

K-16. Users can align themselves to activities in certain Areas of Responsibility (AORs). Service-wide users can select all of the CCMDs.

ROLES

K-17. Users can request different roles on the SAAR forms when they create a Socium account. Users are encouraged to request multiple roles. The various roles are briefly explained in Figure K-1, but Socium Training 102 provides a more in-depth analysis of the roles and how they work in Socium.




Figure K-1. User Permissions

Analyst

K-18. Analysts can view any workflow in Socium but have no editing permissions. This is recommended for decision makers and users who may need situational awareness of SC activities but are not directly involved in planning or implementation.

Activity Planner (Recommended)

K-19. Activity Planners are the most common role in Socium and the role closest to most users in the legacy system, Global Theater Security Cooperation Management System (G-TSCMIS). Activity Planners create activities and oversee planning actions. This role is a useful catch all for those who do not exactly align to other roles.

Strategic Planner

K-20. Any user who assists in the development of country strategies or SSCIs should select the strategic planner role. This is recommended for stakeholders with country-specific portfolios such as desk officers.

Contributor (Recommended)

K-21. Contributors can support and add content to any workflow, including those from other organizations. This is recommended for most USMC Socium Users for situational awareness of other activities and to avoid dual reporting.

Implementing Agency Manager

K-22. The Implementing Agency Manager represents an agency. These users can create/edit data in the planning phase to review feasibility of activities and create/update data in the execution phase.

Reviewer

K-23. The Reviewer role is recommended for any user whose portfolio includes planning and review cycles. This is highly recommended for users who work on or review SSCIs.

Financial Integration Manager

K-24. These DSCA business users work to integrate financial data with other systems; this role is not applicable to USMC users.

AM&E Manager

K-25. AM&E Managers work on Assessments, Monitoring, and Evaluation processes, as defined in DODI 5132.14 and subsequent polices.

Organizational Data Manager

K-26. These organizational leaders represent the Socium Groups described above and have elevated permission levels. Users should contact their OIO if they are interested in being Organizational Data Managers (ODMs), as there are a limited number of ODMs per organization.

System Administrator

K-27. System Administrators must be part of the DSCA development team; this role is not applicable to USMC users.

ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

K-28. Users should use Socium throughout the SC planning and execution process. Some databases, such as NIPR Command and Control of the Information Environment (C2IE) may push data to Socium. The elimination of dual entry should be a priority for all Socium users. All Socium users should ensure their entries are clearly labeled and are not duplicative of existing data. Introductory sentence for the bullet list needed here:

- OSD and Joint Staff: OSD and Joint Staff may report OSD and Joint Staff Engagements in Socium.
- Combatant Command: In conjunction with other tools, CCMDs will have visibility of all SC activities in their AOR. CCMDs should enter all CCMD-led SC activities into Socium.

- The Services: The Services should report all SC activities not already reported by the CCMDs, Component Commands, or other implementing agency. Please refer to the Legacy Record Association Tool on the homepage to retrieve legacy entries from G-TSCMIS, Intelink, and Combatant Command (CCMD) Theater Information Security System (C-TSCMIS), or search for SC activities in the Activity List before creating a new activity. The Services may either be a resource provider for an SC event, or they may be the executor of the event. The Services may conduct SC in the form of events, activities, or exercises, or by providing training opportunities at the Service's professional military educational institutions. They may also conduct staff talks, senior leader engagements, or seminars.

NIPR AND SIPR

K-29. Socium is operational for NIPR and SIPR and will continue to be developed. Socium SIPR will use line-item classification, but all unclassified aspects of an entry will appear on NIPR. The connection between NIPR and SIPR is not instantaneous— there is a 24-hour lag between when updates made on the NIPR side appear on SIPR and when unclassified components of an entry made on SIPR appear on the NIPR side. Also, documents will not transfer across domains. For example, documents uploaded on NIPR will not appear on SIPR.

SOCIUM TRAINING

K-30. Available training courses included in the training package for Socium are provided for those who require training. Users may create a Defense Acquisition University account to access Virtual Campus by visiting https://www.dau.edu/faq/p/New-DAU-Account. After account creation, users may search "SOC" in the search bar and view the Socium courses: https://dau.csod.com/GlobalSearch/search.aspx?s=&q=Socium. An overview of each course includes:

- SOC-101 Introduction to Socium: This web-based training teaches basic end users to perform basic navigation within Socium to plan, create, and manage entries for security cooperation activities and initiatives. It delivers an opportunity to perform key tasks, including the review and approval of activity workflows.
- SOC-102 Roles and Rules in Managing Security Cooperation Activities: This web-based training teaches basic end users to differentiate user roles, responsibilities, and permissions in Socium. It includes an overview of user data role interactions within a workflow lifecycle.
- SOC-103 Workflows, Legal Authorities, and Data Reporting: This web-based training provides an overview of workflows and associated legal authorities for managing SC activities. It includes detailed guidance on how to use data elements, such as the Training and Equipment List (TEL) to support an activity workflow.
- SOC-104 Strategic Planning and Advanced Data Reporting: This web-based training provides an overview of strategic planning and the strategy to capability (S2C) framework. It also includes an overview of data outputs related to SSCIs.
- SOC-104 Socium Strategic Planning – Five Year Plan: The course shows users how to interact with the 5-Year Plan tool in the Strategic Planning workflow of Socium.
- SOC-105: Working in the SIPR Environment in Socium: This course provides an overview of how to manage security cooperation initiatives and activities within the SIPR environment in Socium.

SOCIUM ENTRIES

K-31. Socium users should input entries for SC events, activities, and exercises that occur between their organization and ally and partner nations (PNs), or any activity in support of SC engagements. Users should verify with their organizations the authority used to authorize the SC activity to ensure accurate reporting.

K-32. Legal authorities represented in Socium include the following:

- Title 10 Chapter 16: §311, §312, §321, §331, §332, §341, §342, §343, §345, §347, §348, §349, §350
- Title 10 Other: §401, §402, §404, §407, §166a, §2557, §2561, Mil (Mil conducted under other authority).
- Temporary Authorities: FY08 122233, FY02 §1234, FY08 §1234, FY15 §1206, FY18 §1207, FY15 §1236, FY15 §1535(A)(5), FY16 §1250, FY16 §1251, FY16 §1263.

- Title 14: §195 USCG Training.
- Title 22: Nationally Funded FMS, FMF, IMET, DOD-executed PKO, EDA, DOD Drawdowns.
- Title 50: §3711, §3712, §3713 –CTR.
- General Activity Workflow: This catch-all category replicates G-TSCMIS Events for basic SC planning and tracking. This is most appropriate workflow to use when no specific authority is used to execute the event.
- SSCI: This category tracks significant Security Cooperation Initiatives within Socium.

Source Notes

This division lists sources by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, it lists the page number followed by the paragraph number.

1-1 *41 Days in Korea: From Competition to Conflict for the U.S. Military Advisory Group" by LTC Garrett M. Searle. Article appearing in SFA Quarterly 30th Ed., MAR 2024. Page 46*

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, Army) precedes the definition. The proponent publication for terms is listed in parenthesis after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AM&E	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
DOTMLPF-P	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
OTEBA	organize, train, equip, build, advise
AAR	After action review
AO	area of operation
AOR	Area of responsibility
ASCC	Army Service component commands
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
CCP	campaign plans
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COM	Chief of mission
CCMD	Combatant Command
CCDR	combatant commander
C2	command and control
CCP	Command Campaign plan
COMREL	command relationship
CCIR	commander’s critical information requirements
COA	course of action
DTAACS	DECLARED THEATERS OF ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT
DATT	Defense attaché
DAO	Defense Attache office
DOD	Department of Defense
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOS	Department of State
DCM	deputy chief of mission
DRU	Direct reporting units
DEI	Diversity, equity, and inclusion
EAP	emergency action plans
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FY	fiscal year
FAS	Foreign Agricultural Service
FDO	foreign disclosure officer
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FSF	Foreign security forces
FSO	foreign service officers

GCC	Geographic combatant command
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
G-EGO	governance, executive, generating and operating
HN	Host nation
ICS	integrated country strategies
IMET	International Military Education and Training
INCLE	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
JCF	Joint chief of staff
JPP	Joint Planning Process
LNO	Liaison Officer
LES	locally employed staff
MSGD	Marine Security Guard Detachment
MOE	measures of effectiveness
MOP	measures of performance
MC2	Military-Civil Coordinator
MoDA	Ministry of Defense Advisors
NGO	Non-government orgnation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OE	Operation environment
ODTAAC	OUTSIDE OF DECLARED THEATERS OF ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT
PN	Partner nation
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
POL	Petroleum, oil, and lubricant
POC	point of contact
P/TCC	Police/Troop Contributing Countries
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time
PDSS	Predeployment Site Survey
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QRF	QUICK RESPONSE FORCE
RMO	regional medical officers
RIP	relief in place
RFF	Request for Forces
ROE	rules of engagement
SC	security cooperation
SCO	Security cooperation Organization
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
SDO	Senior defense office
SCC	Service component command
SSCI	significant security cooperation initiatives
SITREP	Situation report
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SFIP	Strategic Framework Implementation Plan
SME	Subject matter experts
TCPs	theater campaign plans

TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
TOA	transfer of authority
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
U/SECDEF	Under Secretary of Defense
U/SECSTATE	Under Secretary of state
US	United States
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VCCR	Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
VCDR	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security

SECTION II – TERMS

assessment

A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. (JP 3-0)

crisis

An emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)

liaison

That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (FM 6-0)

foreign assistance

Support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 3-0)

military engagement

Contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. (JP 3-0).

rules of engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/ or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 3-84)

security cooperation

Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (JP 3-20).

security force assistance

The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-20)

security forces

Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (JP 3-22)

security sector reform

A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)

stability operation

An operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (ADP 3-0)

stabilization activities

Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

support

The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains other forces in accordance with a directive requiring such action. (JP 1, Volume 2)

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FM 1-02.1. *Operational Terms*. 28 February 2024.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

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10 USC Section 312, *Payment of personnel expenses necessary for theater security cooperation*.
10 USC Section 332, *Friendly foreign countries; international and regional organizations: defense institution capacity building*.
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10 USC Section 341, *Department of Defense State Partnership Program (SPP).*
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https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ328/PLAW-114publ328.pdf.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

"*41 Days in Korea: From Competition to Conflict for the U.S. Military Advisory Group*" by LTC Garrett M. Searle. Article appearing in SFA Quarterly 30th Ed., MAR 2024.

PRESCRIBED FORMS

This section contains no entries.

REFERENCED FORMS

Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) website at https://armypubs.army.mil/.
Unless otherwise indicated, DD forms are available on the Department of Defense website at https://www.esd.whs.mil
DA Form 581. *Request for Issue and Turn-In of Ammunition*.
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TC 3-22

29 January 2025

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