HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

TRAINING CIRCULAR
7-98-1

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGE



DISTRBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

TRAINING CIRCULAR
NO. 7-98-1

TC 7-98-1
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC, 5 JUNE 1997

CONTENTS

Page

Preface iii

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1-1. Lesson Plans Overview 1-1
1-2. Recommended Lesson Groupings 1-3

CHAPTER 2. LESSON PLANS

Lesson 1. Principles of Stability and Support Operations 2-1
Lesson 2. Stability and Support Operations Activities 2-11
Sublesson 2-1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 2-13
Sublesson 2-2. Arms Control 2-43
Sublesson 2-3. Support to Domestic Civil Authority 2-45
Sublesson 2-4. Humanitarian Assistance 2-56
Sublesson 2-5. Disaster Relief 2-75
Sublesson 2-6. Security Assistance 2-88
Sublesson 2-7. Nation Assistance 2-90
Sublesson 2-8. Counterdrug Operations 2-93
Sublesson 2-9. Combating Terrorism 2-106
Sublesson 2-10. Peacekeeping Operations 2-108
Sublesson 2-11. Peace Enforcement Operations 2-125
Sublesson 2-12. Show of Force 2-157
Sublesson 2-13. Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies 2-169
Sublesson 2-14. Attacks and Raids 2-199
Lesson 3. Domestic and International Organizations 2-201
Lesson 4. Rules of Engagement Application 2-219
Lesson 5. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 2-245
Lesson 6. Intelligence Analysis 2-272
Lesson 7. Convoy Operations 2-325
Lesson 8. Media Strategy 2-363
Lesson 9. Mission Analysis 2-377
Lesson 10. Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operations 2-392

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Lesson 11. Cordon and Search Operations 2-424
Lesson 12. Search and Attack 2-454
Lesson 13. Negotiation 2-462
Lesson 14. Temporarily Disabling Techniques/Technology 2-472
Lesson 15. Military Police Operations 2-496
Lesson 16. Checkpoints 2-519
Lesson 17. Army Special Operations Forces Support 2-552
Lesson 18. Close Quarters Combat 2-582
Lesson 19. Logistics 2-602
Lesson 20. Engineers 2-679
Lesson 21. Fire Support 2-749
Lesson 22. Sniper Employment and Countersniper Measures 2-775
Lesson 23. Civil Disturbance 2-786

APPENDIX A. Situational Training Exercises A-1
APPENDIX B. Training and Evaluation Outlines B-1
GLOSSARY Glossary-1
REFERENCES References-1

PREFACE

This publication is a training support package of lessons of material previously found only in a variety of sources. These sources include FM 100-20, FM 100-5, FM 90-29, FM 90-8, FM 34-130, FM 7-98, FM 7-20, FM 7-10; CALL Newsletter 93-8, Peace Operations; the CMTC Peacekeeping Operations MTP White Paper; and the USAIS Peace Enforcement White Paper. USAIS will revise FM 7-98 as the definitive manual concerning stability and support operations at infantry brigade level and below.

This publication helps infantry brigade task force level units and below prepare for stability and support contingency missions. Using this publication, a leader can tailor the training plan for the unit's specific mission by grouping related lessons. Chapter 1, paragraph 1-2, contains recommended groupings.

Each lesson contains a reference to and a copy of the slides. Supporting STXs and T&EOs are in Appendixes A and B, respectively.

The proponent of this publication is US Army Infantry School. Submit changes for improving this publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to the Commandant, US Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, GA, 31905-5410 or send comments by e-mail to durantea@benning-emh2.army.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This training circular consists of lessons to help prepare a unit for stability and support operations contingency missions. These lessons can be grouped to form training for specific stability and support operations activities (paragraph 1-2).

1-1. LESSON PLANS OVERVIEW

Each lesson contains slide information and a copy of the slides (Chapter 2).

Lesson 1. Principles of Stability and Support Operations. This lesson discusses the principles of stability and support operations as they are in FM 100-5, Chapter 13. This lesson informs soldiers of the considerations common to all stability and support operations environments.

Lesson 2. Stability and Support Operations Activities. This lesson discusses the activities in FM 100-5, Chapter 13. The FM 100-5 list is not all inclusive, nor is this lesson. A list of lessons recommended for units preparing for stability and support operations regardless of the specific activity is provided. (See paragraph 1-2). Each activity is addressed in a separate sublesson. (Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are discussed as one activity in FM 100-5.) At the end of each sublesson, there is a list of related lessons that may be useful to a unit preparing for that mission. (See paragraph 1-2.) The sublessons that usually do not apply to infantry brigades and below contain general information. The sublessons are arms control, security assistance, nation assistance, attacks and raids, and combating terrorism.

Lesson 3. Domestic and International Organizations. This lesson informs soldiers of the key non-DOD federal agencies outlined in FM 100-19, as well as the United Nations.

Lesson 4. Rules of Engagement Applications. This lesson discusses rules of engagement (ROE) as a function of the stability and support operations principles of legitimacy and restraint. This lesson presents several rules of engagement from different stability and support operations activities. This lesson recommends the dilemma and vignette means of training specific rules of engagement. This lesson does not replace the need for a unit to train on its specific rules of engagement, but it can be used in conjunction with such training. It includes a discussion of ROE difficulties in the Dominican Republic and the resolution of those difficulties through soldier discipline.

Lesson 5. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. This lesson addresses the IPB process. This process is the same for stability and support operations as it is for war. However, the lesson emphasizes special intelligence products and considerations that assist IPB in stability and support operations. The IPB checklists for stability and support operations in FM 34-130, Chapter 6, are addressed in Lesson 2.

Lesson 6. Intelligence Analysis. This lesson focuses on the processing of information in stability and support operations. The lesson addresses the functions of recording, evaluation, and analysis.

Lesson 7. Convoy Operations. This lesson covers the planning considerations, organizations, and execution of convoy operations. Emphasis is on the estimate process to reinforce the principle that convoys are tactical operations that require the same degree of

detailed planning that any mission does. The lesson includes a convoy commander's checklist and sample order format, as well as an STX.

Lesson 8. Media Strategy. This lesson prepares leaders and their soldiers to plan for the impact of media interest in stability and support operations. The lesson explains the necessity for media in the area of operations. The lesson helps increase the soldier's confidence in meeting and communicating effectively with media representatives, while still accomplishing the mission.

Lesson 9. Mission Analysis. This lesson discusses the mission analysis process. This process is the same in stability and support operations as it is in war. However, this lesson emphasizes the need for controlling "mission creep" (the job becomes incrementally larger) and maintaining focus and synchronization in stability and support operations.

Lesson 10. Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operations. This lesson describes antiterrorism measures in static positions and during movement.

Lesson 11. Cordon and Search Operations. This lesson discusses the organization, command and control, and search aspects of a cordon and search operation. The discussion includes the graduated response technique used by the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia. The lesson includes a vignette of Operation Ratkiller during the Korean War to illustrate encirclement techniques. This lesson includes an STX.

Lesson 12. Search and Attack. This lesson discusses search and attack, which is a common operation in stability and support operations. It discusses the purpose, planning, and execution of the search and attack, while emphasizing the find, fix, and finish organization. This lesson offers different generic courses of action for the search and attack with advantages and disadvantages of each.

Lesson 13. Negotiation. This lesson discusses the skills and considerations necessary to aid negotiations. It outlines a method for setting the agenda, the facility required, the techniques for resolving disputes, and the recording of results.

Lesson 14. Temporarily Disabling Techniques and Technology. This lesson discusses the temporary disabling techniques and technology and the tactics and techniques for their employment. Different scenarios are presented in which temporary disabling techniques and technology may be useful.

Lesson 15. Military Police Operations. This lesson includes integration of military police skills into the combined-arms team and provides an overview of MP capabilities in stability and support operations.

Lesson 16. Checkpoints. This lesson discusses both hasty and deliberate checkpoints. Discussion includes the organization, site selection, construction, and operation of checkpoints. The discussion includes the flying checkpoint technique used by the 325th PIR in northern Iraq. This lesson presents checkpoint vignettes from the Dominican Republic to highlight learning points. An STX is included.

Lesson 17. Army Special Operations Forces Support. This lesson provides information on Army special operations forces' role in stability and support operations as it affects the general-purpose force at brigade level and below. Included are discussions of rangers, special forces, civil affairs, and psychological operations.

Lesson 18. Close Quarters Combat. This lesson describes the close quarters combat (CQC) technique for MOUT, which may apply in many stability and support operations situations. Other MOUT considerations also apply, but they are not a part of this lesson because they are included in unit training. The lesson includes close quarters combat

principles and fundamentals, reflexive shooting, and entry and clearing procedures. This lesson provides CQC familiarization only. To conduct CQC, a unit must undergo extensive crawl, walk, and run training that is beyond the scope of this publication.

Lesson 19. Logistics. This lesson includes the sustainment considerations for logisticians and staff officers to plan and develop the concept for support in stability and support operations. The integration and synchronization of these considerations by logisticians provide a tailored and flexible combat service support package for conducting operations in a stability and support operations environment.

Lesson 20. Engineers. This lesson discusses the engineering considerations in a stability and support operations environment. Lesson 20 focuses on engineer activities in mission analysis, planning, force tailoring to accomplish the mission, mobility, countermobility, and survivability.

Lesson 21. Fire Support. This lesson discusses the fire support considerations in a stability and support operations environment including employment considerations for counterbattery radar.

Lesson 22. Sniper Employment and Countersniper Measures. This lesson outlines the principles of sniper employment that applies to war and stability and support operations, and then discusses three key differences between the two environments. It discusses the specific employment of snipers at checkpoints, in cordon and search operations, in search and attack operations, in support of convoy operations, and in support of CQC. It also outlines measures a unit can take to protect itself from and react to snipers.

Lesson 23. Civil Disturbance. This lesson is a brief civil disturbance overview. It outlines the principles of riot control. The US Army Military Police School has a mobile training team for the training of non-MP units to perform civil disturbance activities. Units interested in this mobile training team should request it through the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

1-2. RECOMMENDED LESSON GROUPINGS

By grouping related lessons, a leader can tailor the training plan for the unit's specific mission.

a. Regardless of the stability and support operations activity being performed, the following lessons are recommended for training:

Lesson 1, Principles of Stability and Support Operations
Lesson 2, Stability and Support Operations Activities
Lesson 3, Domestic and International Organizations
Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application
Lesson 5, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Lesson 6, Intelligence Analysis
Lesson 7, Convoy Operations
Lesson 8, Media Strategy
Lesson 9, Mission Analysis
Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operations

b. In addition to this basic grouping, the following lessons are recommended by activity:

(1) *Noncombatant evacuation operations—*
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
(2) *Support to domestic civil authority—*
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques and Technology
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
(3) *Humanitarian assistance—*
Lesson 19, Logistics
Lesson 20, Engineers
(4) *Disaster relief—*
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 19, Logistics Operations
Lesson 20, Engineers
(5) *Counterdrug operations—*
Lesson 2, Sublesson 9, Combating Terrorism
Lesson 2, Sublesson 13, Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 12, Search and Attack
Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques and Technology
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
(6) *Peacekeeping operations—*
Lesson 13, Negotiation
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Logistics
(7) *Peace enforcement operations—*
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 12, Search and Attack
Lesson 13, Negotiation
Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques and Technology
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
Lesson 20, Engineers
Lesson 21, Fire Support
(8) *Show of Force—*
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
(9) *Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies—*
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 12, Search and Attack
Lesson 13, Negotiation

Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
Lesson 19, Logistics
Lesson 20, Engineers
Lesson 21, Fire Support

CHAPTER 2
LESSON PLANS

These lessons will prepare a unit for a stability-and-support operations-contingency mission. The leader can group lessons for the unit's specific mission. (See Chapter 1, paragraph 1-2.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The slides in this manual are printed back to back. To prevent the text on the reverse side from showing through when copying, a black-colored piece of paper must be placed over the reverse side.

LESSON 1. PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

SLIDE 1-1. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES

At the tactical level, unit accomplishments of some stability and support operations tasks (such as peace enforcement) sometimes require applying combat power and then the principles of war apply. However, given the nature and environment of many other scenarios, the principles of stability and support operations (FM 100-5 and FM 100-20) should also be considered during the estimate process. These principles are similar to the previous low intensity conflict (LIC) imperatives (political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance).

SLIDE 1-2. LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy applies to more than just the US Government and the US Army. Legitimacy is a condition growing from the perception of a specific audience of the legality, morality, and correctness of a set of actions. In stability and support operations, the perception of several audiences will influence the success of the mission. Audiences include the US public, the international community, the populations in the area of operations, and the soldiers taking part in the operation. Legitimacy may depend on adhering to objectives agreed upon, suiting actions to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Legitimacy may be reinforced by restraint in using force and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. If the audience perceives an operation as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support it; if perceived as not legitimate, the actions will not be supported and may be resisted.

SLIDE 1-3. RESTRAINT

Sometimes at odds with the short-term requirements of security is the principle of restraint. Most stability and support operations will be conducted under restrictions imposed by the rules of engagement. The Army is trained to employ overwhelming force to achieve the military objectives. In stability and support operations, the Army may be required to be more careful and use force appropriate not only to the tactical situation, but also to the political objectives it is supporting. If the use of force is believed to be disproportionate, soldiers may cause an increase in resistance, reduce their security, increase friendly casualties, and lose legitimacy. Predeployment training in the form of "what if" drills and ROE dilemmas are essential. Examples of ROE dilemmas are in Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application. Restraint can be enhanced by the improved accuracy of "own-the-night" technology such as

the commander's tactical aimer-pointer and the visible laser aiming light. These and other technologies enhance restraint by limiting collateral damage through increased accuracy.

SLIDE 1-4. SECURITY

In stability and support operations, there may be no enemy; if there is, they may be difficult to identify. This difficulty makes it hard to conduct an IPB. No doctrinal templates can be used to predict where the enemy is and what they will try to do. Regarding the end of the cold war, R. James Woolsey said, "Yes, we have slain a large dragon. But now we live in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of." The lack of human intelligence resources will make this problem worse in the infantry brigade, which are critical in a stability and support operations environment. Each soldier must be a source of human intelligence. He must be alert for any indicator of changes in the situation. Units must have well thought-out collection plans and not depend only on intelligence distributed from outside sources. In addition, operational security and force protection measures should adjust to the fact that units will be frequently operating in areas where some elements of the population are hostile and may be in position to observe all actions. All units must avoid establishing predictable patterns of activity. Where possible, units *should not* employ local people in billeting or administrative areas. Soldiers must remember that compromise of operations is a real threat. Security deals with force protection as a dynamic of combat power against virtually any person. These could include terrorist, a group opposed to the operation and even looters. Commanders must protect their forces at all times. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to transition rapidly from peaceful to combat posture. The difficulty in templating the threat, the nonlinear nature of the battlefield, and the pace of the situation in stability and support operations will often require a quick-reaction force to be available for security. The quick-reaction force should be dedicated to these types of contingencies; for example, a downed helicopter, an isolated force in distress, or a US facility under heavy attack. (See Lesson 5, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield; and Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operations.)

SLIDE 1-5. PERSEVERANCE

FM 100-5 states that in stability and support operations "the underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution." This presents a significant problem when looking at the principle of objective. Perseverance has not normally been the American way of war.

In many stability and support operations situations, the degree of commitment has international and long-range implications. For example, many experts have stated that because the US pulled out of Somalia, the peacekeeping efforts of the UN were doomed. Of the 27 countries involved in Somalia, 24 countries relied solely on the US for logistic support.

Normally, the US has been more successful in long-term involvement when direct military participation has not been required. The US efforts in Nicaragua and El Salvador are good examples of these efforts. (See Lesson 2, Sublesson 13, Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies.)

Applying the principle of perseverance is difficult for US forces, because the American public demands a quick resolution. Command information programs to keep the soldier

informed of the situation, and what is expected of him become of great importance. Family support organizations to keep the soldiers' families informed and to take care of them also contribute greatly to operational efficiency.

SLIDE 1-6. OBJECTIVE

"Decisive resolution" in stability and support operations will often be difficult. Nonetheless, when discussing the principle of objective, FM 100-5 tells commanders to "direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective." In some cases, the commander will have difficulty in determining the objective because of the political nature of the operations and the roles played by nonmilitary organizations. Commanders should translate their political guidance into military objectives through a rigorous mission analysis. (See Lesson 9, Mission Analysis.)

SLIDE 1-7. UNITY OF EFFORT

This is not the same as the principle of war unity of command. In stability and support operations, many times infantry forces must cooperate with agencies rather than commanding them. Additionally, the military operations may not be the main effort of the US's overall effort. Infantry forces may be involved with numerous government, nongovernment, and volunteer agencies, as well as military forces from other nations. The important point is that they all work toward the same objective. In theory, this is easy to state, in reality achieving it is difficult. (See Lesson 3, Domestic and International Organizations.)

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

THE PRINCIPLES

- LEGITIMACY
- RESTRAINT
- SECURITY
- PERSEVERANCE
- UNITY OF EFFORT
- OBJECTIVE

LEGITIMACY

- FOCUS ON HOST GOVERNMENT
- GENUINE AUTHORITY
- APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR REASONABLE PURPOSE

SLIDE 1-2

RESTRAINT

- RESTRICTIVE, DETAILED, POLITICALLY SENSITIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MAY CHANGE FREQUENTLY

SECURITY

- UNITS PROVIDE FORCE PROTECTION
- SOLDIERS MUST BE ABLE TO TRANSITION TO COMBAT
- SOLDIERS ALWAYS HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES

SLIDE 1-4

PERSEVERANCE

- STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS CAN BE SHORT TERM OR LONG TERM
- SOLDIERS MUST KNOW THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CONFLICT
- COMMANDERS MUST BALANCE DECISIVE ACTION VERSUS LONG-TERM AIMS

OBJECTIVE

- LEADERS MUST KNOW STRATEGIC AIMS
- LEADERS MUST SET APPROPRIATE OBJECTIVES
- LEADERS MUST ENSURE UNITY OF EFFORT

SLIDE 1-6

UNITY OF EFFORT

- OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WILL LEAD
- COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WILL BE LOOSELY DEFINED
- INITIATIVES WILL BE POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL

LESSON 2. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

This lesson has separate sublessons to address each of the stability and support operations activities. These sublessons include references to other *lessons* that apply to that activity; for example, the peacekeeping operations sublesson suggests that a unit preparing for that operation also study the lessons on negotiation, checkpoints, and convoy operations. The unit can tailor its training package to include the sublesson and the other suggested lessons.

The following lessons are recommended regardless of the stability and support operations activity:

Lesson 1, Principles of Stability and Support Operations
Lesson 2, Stability and Support Operations Activities
Lesson 3, Domestic and International Organizations
Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application
Lesson 5, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
Lesson 6, Intelligence Analysis
Lesson 7, Convoy Operations
Lesson 8, Media Strategy
Lesson 9, Mission Analysis
Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operations

ACTIVITIES

- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
- ARMS CONTROL
- SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
- DISASTER RELIEF
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE
- NATION ASSISTANCE
- SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
- COMBATING TERRORISM
- PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
- PEACE ENFORCEMENT
- SHOW OF FORCE
- SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES
- ATTACKS AND RAIDS

SLIDE 2-1

SUBLESSON 2-1. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-1-1. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION
Noncombat evacuation operations relocate threatened civilians. The threat can range from a natural disaster to a hostile military.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 2-1-2 through 2-1-5 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process. (See FM 34-130, Chapter 6.) The main difference between IPB for conventional operations and stability and support operations is the focus and detail required to support the commander's decision-making process. Other differences include the impact of the political situation and the large demand for demographic analysis.

SLIDE 2-1-2. DEFINE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
The first step of IPB is defining the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-1-3. DESCRIBE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
The second step of IPB is describing the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-1-4. EVALUATE THE THREAT
The third step of IPB is evaluating the threat.

SLIDE 2-1-5. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
The fourth step of IPB is determining the threat courses of action.

SLIDE 2-1-6. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
Engineers providing support for a noncombatant evacuation operation generally operate as part of a joint force. Engineer units may be part of the force conducting the operation. In other cases, they may provide support in another country by constructing temporary support facilities for either US forces or evacuees. Engineer units may also provide topographic products and data tailored for the operation. Engineers directly participating in the evacuation may perform a variety of tasks, depending on the situation. In a high-threat environment, engineers may perform combat-related engineering tasks. They may construct protective structures for both US forces and evacuees, if necessary. Airfields designated for use in evacuation operations could become damaged. Engineers must be prepared to repair them. Engineers may clear landing zones if helicopters are used to consolidate evacuees from outlying areas or to move evacuees to waiting ships or other secure areas. If evacuees must be transported on the ground, engineers may be involved in route reconnaissance and route clearance operations. Evacuees may move to another country temporarily before returning to the US. US forces may require a staging area near the country where they will conduct the NEO. If existing facilities are inadequate or not available, engineers may construct a temporary base.

SLIDE 2-1-7. THREE BASIC ENVIRONMENTS

Of the permissive, uncertain, and hostile noncombatant evacuation operations environments, hostile is the most difficult.

SLIDE 2-1-8. PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT
A permissive environment is the easiest to perform noncombatant evacuations.

SLIDE 2-1-9. UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
In an uncertain environment, commanders must disseminate rules of engagement early.

SLIDE 2-1-10. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
A hostile environment is the most difficult NEO environment to perform evacuations.

SLIDE 2-1-11. FIVE PHASES
There are five phases of a noncombatant evacuation. The most critical is the third—evacuation.

SLIDE 2-1-12. NEO (Wire diagram)
The parts of a noncombatant evacuation operation include marshalling force, security force, logistic element, administrative element, and command and control element.

SLIDE 2-1-13. EVACUATION SITE OPERATIONS
Of the four activities involved in an evacuation, the marshalling force operation is the most complex.

SLIDE 2-1-14. SAMPLE EVACUATION SITE
A generic layout for the evacuation site includes—

a. **Entry control point.** This is the initial screening point for the brigade support area and evacuation control center complex.

b. **In-processing and interview station.** This is inside the entrance to the ECC. Evacuees receive an initial orientation and briefing on what will happen to them.

c. **Security personnel area.** The reaction force is assembled here. Security personnel store their equipment here.

d. **Battalion TOC.** This is the command and control area for the ECC and the focal point of intelligence information.

e. **Comfort area.** This is where evacuees wait for their plane.

f. **Medical treatment area.** This area is for screening and treatment.

g. **Search area.** At this area, MPs with wands and dogs check out gray-list and black-list personnel.

h. **Holding and interrogation area.** This area is for holding and interrogating grey-list and black-list personnel and other detainees.

i. **Confinement facility.** This area is for holding black-list personnel until authorities come for them.

j. **Civilian authorities (local).** This area is for interpreters, wardens, and other agents.

k. **Pet holding area.** This area is for holding pets for evacuation.

SLIDE 2-1-15. MARSHALLING FORCE OPERATIONS

This is the heart of the entire noncombatant evacuation operation. It is soldier intensive and decentralized.

SLIDE 2-1-16. MARSHALLING TEAM(s)
The marshalling team is configured based on METT-T. However, the team should always consist of three elements: command group, search squad(s), and security squad(s). The search squad and the process section of the command group are discussed in more detail (Slides 2-1-17 and 2-1-19).

SLIDE 2-1-17. SEARCH SQUADS
The search squad must find the evacuees and explain to them the rules of evacuation. The amount of baggage should be specified by number and size. Theoretically, pets are not allowed, but experience indicates that exceptions are often made. Contraband items that can range from agricultural products to drugs should be identified. A citizen can always refuse evacuation, but he should sign a waiver stating so. If a citizen will not sign, the squad leader makes note of the time, date, and circumstances surrounding the offer. He should also remind US government employees and their dependents that they may not disregard an evacuation order.

SLIDE 2-1-18. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAM
Each embassy is required to have an evacuation plan. The plan should include information such as addresses, potential landing zones and pickup zones, assembly areas, and ground evacuation routes. Each plan includes “wardens” who notify the evacuees. The wardens should be someone who can recognize the evacuees. The warden can greatly assist the search squad.

SLIDE 2-1-19. PROCESS SECTION
Within the process section of the marshalling team command group, there are six elements: reception, registration, debriefing, medical, embarkation, and comfort.

SLIDE 2-1-20. RECEPTION
The reception element should be nonthreatening. At the end of the reception station, the unit begins the searches. If the unit has attached MPs, this is probably the most critical place to use their experience. A search team should consist of three soldiers: one to search bags, one to do body-pat searches, and one to provide security. A female soldier should be available to search female civilians. If there are two or more search teams, there should be an NCO in charge. An area (hot box) at least 35 meters away from the process line should be designated for contraband. An explosive ordnance disposal soldier should man the hot box. A searcher should have a list of contraband items and should take anything questionable to the hot box and then return to his station. A record of confiscated items should be made so that items may be returned to the owners if they prove not to be dangerous.

SLIDE 2-1-21. REGISTRATION

At this station, the evacuees are listed on a manifest in accordance with the embassy provided status list. Generally, this station has four personnel, so that more than one evacuee can be processed at one time.

SLIDE 2-1-22. DEBRIEFING

Evacuees may have human intelligence about the locations of other citizens, hostile forces, or terrain. The process section OIC should not run this station. He must be in a position to supervise the entire operation, not just one part.

SLIDE 2-1-23. MEDICAL

This is a quick medical check. More detailed medical procedures are generally deferred to arrival at a safe haven.

SLIDE 2-1-24. EMBARKATION

Evacuees at this station are listed on a manifest, and the evacuees are organized into an evacuation order. They are issued boarding passes based on their evacuation order, and baggage tags are verified.

SLIDE 2-1-25. COMFORT

This is a temporary waiting area for the evacuees. Chaplains and their assistants can be used to counsel evacuees suffering from stress.

SLIDE 2-1-26. HEAVY/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS

In an uncertain or hostile environment, BFVs or APCs can be used to move evacuees to the evacuation site or embarkation point. A hasty search is conducted before loading the noncombatants on the vehicles. Evacuees are provided helmets and personal protective armor to minimize injuries during transportation. All movements are conducted using convoy procedures. (See Lesson 7, Convoy Operations.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES: 1. The following lessons may be helpful in preparing for noncombatant evacuation operations:
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
2. See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
T&EO, Establish an Evacuation Control Center/Conduct Evacuation Control Center Operations
T&EO, Conduct Marshalling Force Operations

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATION

RELOCATE THREATENED CIVILIANS —

- UNITED STATES CITIZENS
- SELECTED HOST NATION CITIZENS
- THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS

SLIDE 2-1-1

DEFINE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- DETERMINE LOCATIONS OF ALL GROUPS THAT MAY INFLUENCE OPERATIONS
- DETERMINE COUNTRIES THAT MAY SHELTER EVACUEES
- DETERMINE COUNTRIES THAT MAY ASSIST OR HINDER OPERATIONS
- DETERMINE IF EVACUATION WILL BE PERMISSIVE OR FORCED
- IDENTIFY OPERATIONAL TIME SENSITIVITY
- IDENTIFY DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION THAT HAS PROMPTED EVACUATION

DESCRIBE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- IDENTIFY LEGAL ISSUES IMPACTING ON THE EVACUATION
- IDENTIFY LOCAL POLITICAL ISSUES
- IDENTIFY LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE
- IDENTIFY MAP LOCATION OF KEY FACILITIES
- CONDUCT A STANDARD OCOKA TERRAIN ANALYSIS
- ANALYZE THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON ADVERSE GROUPS AND EVACUATION OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-1-3

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- IDENTIFY ALL GROUPS THAT MAY INTERFERE WITH EVACUATION (INTENTIONALLY OR UNINTENTIONALLY)
- CONDUCT AN ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS FOR EACH POTENTIALLY HOSTILE GROUP
- CONDUCT AN ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS ON THE ADVERSE GROUPS

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- DETERMINE INFLUENCE ON LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
- IDENTIFY MOST LIKELY POINTS OF INTERFERENCE
- TEMPLATE INTENTIONAL AND UNINTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
- TEMPLATE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR GROUPS THAT MAY INTERFERE

SLIDE 2-1-5

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

- CONSTRUCT TEMPORARY SUPPORT FACILITIES
- PROVIDE TOPOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS
- CONSTRUCT PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES AS REQUIRED
- REPAIR AIRFIELD
- CLEAR LANDING ZONES
- PERFORM ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE AND CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

BASIC ENVIRONMENTS

- PERMISSIVE
- UNCERTAIN
- HOSTILE

SLIDE 2-1-7

PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT

- NO APPARENT PHYSICAL THREAT
- NO HOST NATION OPPOSITION
- MILITARY ASSISTANCE NORMALLY LIMITED TO SUPPORT AGENCIES
- SLOW, DELIBERATE OPERATION
- EASIEST, BUT MOST UNLIKELY ENVIRONMENT

UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT

- DEGREE OF DANGER IS UNCERTAIN
- HOST NATION MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN CONTROL, BUT CANNOT ENSURE SAFETY
- INCREASED NEED FOR A REACTION FORCE
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MUST BE DISSEMINATED EARLY

SLIDE 2-1-9


HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT

- HOST NATION OR OTHER THREAT EXPECTED TO OPPOSE EVACUATION
- MAY REQUIRE A SIZEABLE SECURITY ELEMENT AND A LARGE REACTION FORCE
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MUST BE STRICTLY ENFORCED
- EVACUEES ARE OFTEN DIRECT OR INDIRECT TARGETS OF VIOLENCE

FIVE PHASES OF A NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION

- PREDEPLOYMENT
- DEPLOYMENT
- EVACUATION
- SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS
- WITHDRAWAL

SLIDE 2-1-11


NEO
PREDEPLOYMENT
DEPLOYMENT
EVACUATION
SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS
WITHDRAWAL
MARSHALLING FORCE
SECURITY FORCE
LOGISTICS ELEMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENT
COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT
MARSHALLING TEAM(s)
TRANSPORTATION SECTION
COMMAND GROUP
SEARCH SQUADS
SECURITY SQUADS
COMMANDER
INTERPRETER
PROCESSING SECTION
RECEPTION
REGISTRATION
DEBRIEFING
MEDICAL
EMBARKATION
COMFORT


SLIDE 2 -1- 12

EVACUATION SITE OPERATIONS

- MARSHALLING FORCE OPERATIONS
- SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS
- LOGISTICS ELEMENT OPERATIONS
- ADMINISTRATIVE ELEMENT OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-1-13

SAMPLE EVACUATION SITE



MARSHALLING FORCE OPERATIONS

- MARSHALLING FORCE OPERATION IS THE HEART OF THE ENTIRE NEO
- EVACUEES ARE FIRST CONTACTED, COLLECTED, SCREENED, AND PREPARED FOR MOVEMENT
- COMMAND IS MOST DISPERSED AND VULNERABLE
- TRANSPORTATION OF TEAMS AND EVACUEES ARE ESSENTIAL PLANNING FACTORS

MARSHALLING TEAM

- SIZE CAN RANGE FROM PLATOON THROUGH BATTALION DEPENDING ON METT-T (THREAT CAPABILITIES, NUMBER OF EVACUEES, DISPERSION OF EVACUEES)
- A TEAM CONSISTS OF THREE ELEMENTS:
  - COMMAND GROUP (TEAM COMMANDER, INTERPRETER, PROCESSING SECTION)
  - SEARCH SQUADS
  - SECURITY SQUADS

SEARCH SQUADS

- MUST BE COMPETENT, CALM UNDER STRESS, AND HANDLE CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTIONS
- MUST KNOW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND RULES REGARDING BAGGAGE, PET, AND CONTRABAND
- MUST KNOW WHAT TO DO IF CITIZEN REFUSES OR REQUESTS EVACUATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAM

- EVERY EMBASSY IS REQUIRED TO HAVE AN EVACUATION PLAN
- WARDENS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOTIFYING EVACUEES
- STATE DEPARTMENT DETERMINES WHEN TO EVACUATE UNITED STATES NONCOMBATANTS AND DESIGNATED ALIENS

PROCESS SECTION ELEMENTS

- RECEPTION
- REGISTRATION
- DEBRIEFING
- MEDICAL
- EMBARKATION
- COMFORT

SLIDE 2-1-19

RECEPTION ELEMENT

- MEETS EVACUEES AND BRIEFS THEM ON EVACUATION PROCEDURES
- PROVIDES AN AMNESTY OPPORTUNITY
- CONFISCATES ALL WEAPONS
- INSPECTS BAGGAGE
- SEPARATES SUSPECTED ENEMY AGENTS OR CRIMINALS

REGISTRATION ELEMENT

- COMPLETES ALL ADMINISTRATIVE PAPERWORK (EVACUEE REGISTER, EVACUATION INFORMATION CARD, DD FORM 2585, REPATRIATION PROCESSING CENTER/PROCESSING SHEET)
- LISTS EVACUEES ON A MANIFEST IN ACCORDANCE WITH EMBASSY-PROVIDED STATUS LIST

  NOTE: THE COMMANDER OR REPRESENTATIVE MAKES THE FINAL DECISION TO EVACUATE SOMEONE

SLIDE 2-1-21

DEBRIEFING ELEMENT

- IS OPTIONAL DEPENDING ON METT-T (SITUATION OR TIME)
- SHOULD BE MANNED BY INTELLIGENCE OR CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAMS
- DEBRIEFS EVACUEES TO GAIN COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
- SERVES AS DETAINEE DEBRIEFING STATION

MEDICAL ELEMENT

- MEDIC OR DOCTOR CHECKS FOR SYMPTOMS OR COMMUNICABLE ILLNESS
- ADMINISTERS FIRST AID IF SITUATION PERMITS

SLIDE 2-1-23

EMBARKATION ELEMENT

- EVACUEES ARE LISTED ON A MANIFEST AND THEN ORGANIZED INTO EVACUATION ORDERS
- FINAL MANIFEST IS VERIFIED USING INFORMATION ON EVACUATION REGISTER
- THE ELEMENT PROVIDES ESCORT FOR EACH EVACUATION ORDER

COMFORT ELEMENT

- TEMPORARY WAITING AREA FOR EVACUEES UNTIL THEY ARE TRANSPORTED
- FOR LONG WAITS, THIS STATION MUST HAVE SUFFICIENT SHELTER, COTS, BLANKETS, LATRINES, WATER, INFANT SUPPLIES, AND FOOD
- LOGISTICAL OFFICER MAY CHOOSE TO INCLUDE MALE AND FEMALE SUNDRY PACKAGES

HEAVY/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS

- BFVs AND APCs ARE GOOD FOR MOVING NONCOMBATANTS FROM PLACE TO PLACE. THESE VEHICLES HAVE SUPERIOR PROTECTION AND MOBILITY AND THEIR ARMAMENT MAY DETER AGGRESSION. (NONCOMBATANTS SHOULD BE SEARCHED BEFORE BEING ALLOWED IN BFVs OR APCs.)
- CONVOYS SHOULD BE USED TO EVACUATE NONCOMBATANTS IN AN UNCERTAIN OR HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT. TASK ORGANIZATION SHOULD INCLUDE AN ADVANCE GUARD, MAIN BODY, AND A RESERVE OR REACTION FORCE.

SUBLESSON 2-2. ARMS CONTROL

SLIDE 2-2-1. ARMS CONTROL

Arms control is associated with weapons of mass destruction; for example, on 26 November 1993 Iraq accepted long-term UN monitoring of its weapons programs. Under the resolution, international weapons inspectors are allowed to roam Iraq freely and for an indefinite period to prevent Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

There is also an increasing concern about the low-technical menace of land mines. They kill or injure an average of 150 people a week worldwide—most of which are civilians. Some mines cost as little as $3 each. The estimated cost of clearing one mine is between $300 and $1,000. Infantry brigades do not play a large role in arms control; therefore, no further information on this activity is included in this manual.

ARMS CONTROL

- PROMOTES STRATEGIC MILITARY STABILITY
- CONTROLS NUMBERS, TYPES, AND PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS
- EXTENDS BEYOND WEAPONS TO INCLUDE C2, LOGISTICS SUPPORT, AND INTELLIGENCE MECHANISMS

SUBLESSON 2-3. SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITY

SLIDE 2-3-1. SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES

When armed forces are directed to assist in domestic emergencies within CONUS, the Army has primary responsibility. Army units support disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and similar operations. Federal law authorizes the domestic use of military force to suppress domestic violence or insurrection. The Constitution and federal law, however, restrict its use in this manner. Under the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act, neither the AC nor the Reserves may execute the law in the place of duly appointed law-enforcement means without specific presidential or congressional approval and direction. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to NG Title 32 soldiers until federalized (FM 100-5, FM 100-19, and FM 100-20).

SLIDE 2-3-2. MARINE SUPPORT CIVIL AUTHORITY IN 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOT

The Marines in Los Angeles were given the mission of establishing a presence and reinforcing capability to local authorities. As is often the case in stability and support operations, the Marines soon experienced “mission creep” (the job became incrementally larger).

INSTRUCTOR’S NOTE: See Figure 2-3-1 for a mission matrix the Marines used to keep track of this mission. This allowed them to, at a glance, see what soldiers and equipment they had tasked out. (See also Lesson 9, Mission Analysis.)

Another common stability and support operations theme that the Marines identified was the need for liaison. This included liaison with the police, the fire department, and other municipal authorities. The Marines found that the different agencies could complement each other; for example, the military had better night vision capability and the police had a better urban communication system. The Marines learned that in stability and support operations they had to adapt to the environment. They initially drew their boundaries along highways, which makes sense to a military officer used to assigning boundaries based on identifiable linear features. Unfortunately, the police jurisdictions did not conform to highway boundaries. Since they were there to help the police, the Marines used police boundaries. The military forces were dispersed throughout the city, doing different things, in areas of different threats. The ROE and arming status must accommodate these diverse situations. (See Figure 2-3-2.) (See Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application.)

Effective Date: 061000Z May 92

1st MARINES CIVIL DISTURBANCE MISSION

	MSN #	MISSION DESCRIPTION	MISSION LOCATION	PERS. REQ.	AO STATS	REMARKS
Compton P.D.	1-1	Town Center	Alemeda & Compton Blvd	Co	AO-1	Zero presence visability; company assembly area.
Compton P.D.	1-2	Fashion Center	Long Beach Blvd & Orchard	None	AO-1	Position covered by hourly mobile patrol x 24 hrs.
LASD Carson	1-5	Carson Mall	Avalon & Del Amo Blvd	1 PLT	AO-1	Zero presence visability; company assembly collocated area at LASD-Carson HQ nearby
Compton P.D.	1-9	PAC Bell Sites x2 Social Gas Sites x1	608 E. Compton Blvd 921 E. Compton Blvd 700 N. Long Beach Blvd	MP PLT(-)	AO-1	3 position covered by hourly mobile patrol x 24 hrs.
	Note: Hourly, one mobile patrol manned by MP Plt(-) covers MSN 1-2 and 1-0 sites. These patrols are escorted by Compton Police Department cruiser.					

Figure 2-3-1. 1st Marines Civil Disturbance Mission Matrix.

Arming Order	Rifle	Bayonet Scabbard	Bayonet	Pistol	Baton	Ammunition Magazine/ Chamber	Control
1	Sling	On Belt	Scabbard	holstered	Belt	In pouch/ empty	OIC/ NCOIC
2	Port	On Belt	Scabbard	holstered	Belt	In pouch/ empty	OIC/ NCOIC
3	Sling	On Belt	Fixed	holstered	Hand	In pouch/ empty	OIC/ NCOIC
4	Port	On Belt	Fixed	holstered	Hand	In pouch/ empty	OIC/ NCOIC
5	Port	On Belt	Fixed	holstered	Hand	In weapon/ empty	OIC/ NCOIC
6	Port	On Belt	Fixed	In hand	Belt	In weapon/ locked and loaded	OIC

Figure 2-3-2. Arming status.

SLIDE 2-3-3. INTELLIGENCE IN LOS ANGELES

Many of the usual IPB products apply in stability and support operations. However, there are also some additional ones. Since there is little threat data base, the S2 must build an order of battle. Gang graffiti, access to automatic weapons, violent or nonviolent tactics, and police records give the S2 some clues. These clues can be confirmed or denied based on reconnaissance and surveillance as in any other situation. (See Lesson 5, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.)

SLIDE 2-3-4. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITY

Military engineers have a major role in exercises conducted in Third World countries. Support to maneuver units may occur, but often the presence of combat units is not desired due to political sensitivities. Engineers are frequently the bulk of units involved.

US Army Reserve and Army National Guard engineer units participate in overseas Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises under the concept of overseas deployment training. Overseas deployment training provides the opportunity to conduct wartime mission-oriented training and planning in an overseas location to units deployed in support of JCS approved operations plans. This training also provides CONUS-based units with the opportunity to conduct mobilization, deployment, reception, execution of training, and redeployment activities at outside CONUS locations. The following are examples of engineer support to military civic action:

- Humanitarian and civic assistance projects provide a way for engineer personnel and equipment to augment other US nonmilitary programs. This assistance improves the quality of life in a host nation through rudimentary construction, health care, and sanitation programs.
- Engineer personnel can assist foreign military engineer units with self-help programs. Domestic personnel may learn about building roads, surveying, equipment operations, water supply and distribution, vertical construction and other skills.
- United States Army Corps of Engineers can establish field offices that serve as a training ground for indigenous engineers. The host nation forms a cadre of experts who can administer developmental programs.
- US Army engineer units can assist in constructing or developing infrastructures. This often occurs as part of another activity such as a unit deployment for training or a combined training exercise. Military civic action funds are used to pay for portions of small projects built by US forces as part of these activities.

SLIDE 2-3-5. LOS ANGELES EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Based on the Los Angeles experience, one Marine suggested that commanders consider using special equipment such as nonlethal weapons and protective clothing. (Peace poles are long shafts similar to pikes to keep crowds at a distance.) (See Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques/Technology.)

SLIDE 2-3-6. NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE IN LOS ANGELES

Most National Guard units were deployed before they could install lock plates to negate the M16's automatic capability. While this was initially a concern, it proved not to be a problem because of good fire discipline. In answer to the debate over whether or not special training is required for stability and support operations, the National Guard believed that their normal battle-focused, small-unit training served them better than the "stomp-your-left and drag-your-right" crowd control training. The National Guard was eventually federalized, and after that they had to refuse many missions because of the Posse Comitatus Act.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The following lessons may be helpful in preparing for a support to domestic civil authority operation:
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques/Technology
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat

SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES

- THIS SUPPORT CAN INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR DISASTER RELIEF, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND SUPPRESSION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR INSURRECTION
- POSSE COMITATUS ACT PREVENTS FEDERAL SOLDIERS FROM EXECUTING THE LAW IN THE PLACE OF DULY APPOINTED LAW ENFORCEMENT MEANS WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL

MARINE SUPPORT CIVIL AUTHORITY IN 1992 LOS ANGELES RIOT

- MISSION: PRESENCE AND REINFORCING CAPABILITY TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND ARMING STATUS ESTABLISHED
- FULL-TIME LIAISON
  - LIAISON OFFICER TERMINOLOGY
- BOUNDARIES COINCIDED WITH POLICE JURISDICTIONS RATHER THAN HIGHWAYS
- MILITARY HAD BETTER NIGHT VISION CAPABILITY
- POLICE HAD BETTER URBAN COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY
- AREAS OF VITAL INTEREST WERE NOTED
  - LIST OF CRITICAL FACILITIES

SLIDE 2-3-2

INTELLIGENCE IN LOS ANGELES

- OVERLAYS AND PRODUCTS
  - SITUATION OVERLAY
  - COLLECTION PLAN
  - CURFEW AREAS
  - POLICE JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES
  - CLOSED OR DANGEROUS ROADS
  - GANG LOCATIONS
  - TARGETS
  - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES
- TAILORED SPOT REPORT
- ORDER OF BATTLE
  - POLICE INFORMATION
  - GRAFFITI
  - TACTICS
  - TYPES OF WEAPONS
- SUGGESTIONS
  - ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOKS
  - HIGH-VALUE TARGET LISTS
  - PREDEPLOYMENT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
  - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITY

- HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC AID CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
- US ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ESTABLISH FIELD OFFICES FOR TRAINING
- ENGINEERS ASSIST WITH INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL SELF-HELP PROGRAMS
- TOPOGRAPHIC SUPPORT

SLIDE 2-3-4

LOS ANGELES EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- NONLETHAL WEAPONS
  - CS
  - WATER CANNON
  - NOXIOUS DYE THROWER
  - RUBBER BULLETS
  - STUN GUNS
  - ELECTRIC CATTLE PRODS
  - "PEACE POLES"
- PROTECTIVE CLOTHING
  - HELMETS
  - EYE SHIELDS
  - GLOVES
  - BODY SHIELDS
  - PADDING AND BODY ARMOR

NATIONAL GUARD EXPERIENCE IN LOS ANGELES

- URBAN AREA COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS
  - FIXED WITH COMMERCIAL AND CELLULAR PHONES
- FIRE DISCIPLINE
  - MOST SOLDIERS COMMITTED BEFORE LOCK PLATES INSTALLED
  - ONLY 20 ROUNDS FIRED
- POPULAR SUPPORT
  - GIVEN FOOD
  - CIVILIANS DID NOT WANT SOLDIERS TO LEAVE
- BATTLE-FOCUSED TRAINING HELPED MORE THAN CIVIL DISTURBANCE TRAINING
- EMPHASIS ON NONLETHAL FORCE
- MISSION ACCEPTANCE CHANGES WITH FEDERALIZATION
- STRESS
  - TAUNTS AND PROVOCATIONS
  - VEHICLES

SLIDE 2-3-6

SUBLESSON 2-4. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

SLIDE 2-4-1. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

(See Lesson 3 for the agencies involved in stability and support operations.) Overseas humanitarian assistance is governed by the Department of State. Within the US, it is governed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

SLIDE 2-4-2. 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SOMALIA

On November 30, 1993, the 10th Mountain Division was alerted to provide security for humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. In its after-action review, the 10th Mountain Division addressed each of the traditional battlefield operating systems and added three more: external coordination, force protection, and information dissemination.

SLIDE 2-4-3. INTELLIGENCE

As in most stability and support operations situations, the threat data base was sparse and the requirement for human intelligence was immediate. Special forces and the country team are in-theater assets that can help. As follow-on units arrive in theater, they should be integrated into the intelligence process. (Military police are a good source of HUMINT, as illustrated in Operation Restore Hope). Also needed were maps. DOD cannot stock sufficient quantities of maps of the entire world.

SLIDE 2-4-4. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Engineer support to humanitarian assistance is nearly the same as it is to disaster relief with the exception that the planning may be more deliberate and the construction more permanent in humanitarian assistance. DA may provide humanitarian assistance through a variety of means. This may include supplies, equipment, or support from selected individuals. At the other end of the spectrum, entire units may conduct humanitarian assistance operations. These units may come from the Active Army or USAR. Under some circumstances, ARNG units may be placed in a federal active duty status.

SLIDE 2-4-5. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION

When the 10th Mountain Division was alerted for Somalia, it was given a force cap of 10,000 soldiers. This decision was made before any mission analysis was done to determine what resources would be needed. Likewise, before the battle of 4 October 1993, the ground commander had requested mechanized vehicles, but his request was not granted. The need for these types of forces for mobility was recognized only after it was too late. While the forces can only ask for clear political objectives, the forces can create military end-states that support the political objectives. The 10th Mountain used the "four no's"—no bandits, no checkpoints, no visible weapons, and no technical weapons—to send a clear message to its soldiers as to what was expected. Mission creep is a phenomenon common to many stability and support operations activities. Mission creep is when the job becomes incrementally larger as time goes by. In many cases, this mission creep can drain resources from the original mission. The 10th Mountain's quick-reaction force is a good example of a victim of

mission creep. Originally intended to be an emergency force, the quick-reaction force was given more and more routine daily tasks because it was available and competent.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The next slide shows that when operating where no government exists, there are a lot of requirements. Before forces arrive, no one has been meeting these requirements. After awhile, people get used to having the military forces around and give them more and more to do.

SLIDE 2-4-6. CONDUCTING OPERATIONS WHERE NO GOVERNMENT EXISTS

In all humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, especially in a case as severe as Somalia, there is little or no infrastructure available. Leaders and their soldiers are there to help; not to be an additional drain on scarce in-country resources. This is a common stability and support operations theme. The 2-325th's Hurricane Andrew After-Action Report notes that "If the task force arrives in the area and has to draw upon already destroyed or depleted assets, it is now part of the problem, not the solution." In cases like Somalia, if the unit does not bring supplies with them, they will not get what they need anytime soon.

SLIDE 2-4-7. MANEUVER

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Lesson 7, Convoy Operations, for more information.

Convoy security was a large part of the 10th Mountain Division's activities. They coordinated their efforts with the security efforts of the humanitarian agencies themselves. There are no administrative actions in combat. Convoy staff integration and planning requirements are the same as any other operation.

SLIDE 2-4-8. OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

The 10th Mountain Division had to do a lot more than is normally expected in a humanitarian assistance operation. Within a given activity, there can be a wide spectrum of missions and threats. The common theme in all these operations was security. A former Somali policeman said "If there is no security, there is no food."

SLIDE 2-4-9. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN SOMALIA

If units did not bring it to Somalia with them, they were not going to get it anytime soon. CSS liaison officers and contracting officers were needed. One recommendation from the JRTC is that soldiers deploying by airland carry supplies with them. If each soldier carries something like a case of MREs, office supplies, communication wire, or even a mine, and then gives it to the S4 at the airfield, the unit has a ready-made stock of supplies. (See Lesson 19, Logistics.)

SLIDE 2-4-10. FIRE SUPPORT

The need for fire support rose and fell several times as the situation changed in Somalia. If not employed in the fire support role, the artillery can provide much needed personnel for liaisons, S5, and C2 duties.

SLIDE 2-4-11. MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY

The engineer planner is a critical staff member to ensure that all aspects of mobility, countermobility, and survivability are integrated into each operation. Mobility is the key to battlefield circulation (that is, keeping a convoy's front clear). Countermobility is essential at all checkpoints. Survivability is critical to the entire force.

The employment of attack helicopters in Mogadishu provided a tactical advantage, but a negative effect on civilians.

SLIDE 2-4-12. FORCE PROTECTION

The survivability capability of engineers can increase the unit's security. Force protection is a part of security, and the 10th Mountain Division thought it was important enough to list it as a separate battlefield operating system. The rules of engagement were developed jointly by the tacticians and the lawyers. Soldiers were trained on the rules of engagement using discussion and situational techniques. (See Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application.)

SLIDE 2-4-13. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

Disseminating information is critical. The audience was both the Somalis and the soldiers. Given the humanitarian nature of the mission, the 10th Mountain Division had to remain uncommitted to any particular clan (assuming of course that the clans were not interfering with the relief operation). Before the 10th Mountain Division deployed, they were told to expect widespread starvation. Instead, they found isolated instances. Thus, they had to keep the soldiers informed of why they were there. The impact of Cable Network News in stability and support operations is very important. (See Lesson 8, Media Strategy.)

SLIDE 2-4-14. EXTERNAL COORDINATION

With 21 different coalition forces, 49 different humanitarian agencies, and 4 different services, unity of effort was critical. Each humanitarian agency had its own agenda. Some agencies provided food, others education, still others medicine or agriculture. The Irish Concern cannot be treated the same as the International Red Cross. The 10th Mountain Division was forced into the negotiation business. Two general suggestions are—do not promise anything that cannot be delivered (lesson learned from Just Cause) and do not have the ranking man be the first to negotiate. If a junior man mishandles it, the problem can be corrected by bringing in a senior man. If the senior man goes first and mishandles it, the force loses credibility. (See Lesson 13, Negotiation.)

SLIDE 2-4-15. LESSONS LEARNED

Strategic sea and air lifts need to be revitalized. Forces need to know the critical role of humanitarian agencies and relief organizations. Rules of engagement must be appropriate, and soldiers must know them.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The following lessons may be useful in preparing for a humanitarian assistance operation:
Lesson 19, Logistics
Lesson 20, Engineers

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- PROMOTE HUMAN WELFARE, REDUCE PAIN AND SUFFERING, PREVENT LOSS OF LIFE OR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY FROM THE AFTERMATH OF NATURAL OR MAN-MADE DISASTERS
- OVERSEAS ASSISTANCE GOVERNED BY OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE (DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
- DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE GOVERNED BY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

10th MOUNTAIN DIVISION'S HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SOMALIA

- INTELLIGENCE
- COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION
- MANEUVER
- FIRE SUPPORT
- MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY
- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
- EXTERNAL COORDINATION
- FORCE PROTECTION
- INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

SLIDE 2-4-2

INTELLIGENCE

- NEED HISTORICAL PATTERNS AND THREAT DATA BASES
- NEED COLLECTION ASSETS TO BE IN THEATER FROM BEGINNING
- NEED 3 DIFFERENT SCALE MAPS
- NEED INTENSIVE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- ENGINEER MATERIALS
- COOPERATIVE PROJECTS
- QUALITY OF LIFE

SLIDE 2-4-4

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION

- PARALLEL PLANNING ANALYSIS WAS NEEDED
- STRATEGIC PLANNING APPEARED TO BE BASED ON AN ARTIFICIAL FORCE CAP RATHER THAN MISSION
- END STATES WERE NEEDED
- FOUR *NO'S* WERE USED: *NO* BANDITS, *NO* CHECKPOINTS, *NO* TECHNICAL WEAPONS, *NO* VISIBLE WEAPONS
- MISSION CREEP DRAINED RESOURCES
- DIVISION HEADQUARTERS COULD SERVE AS ARMY FORCES HEADQUARTERS, BUT NEEDS AUGMENTATION (TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, G6, AND LIAISON)
- ALL ARMY FORCES SHOULD BE KEPT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY FORCES COMMANDER
- SMALL, DEPLOYABLE, LANGUAGE-CAPABLE TEAMS WITH COMMUNICATION WERE NEEDED

CONDUCTING OPERATIONS WHERE NO GOVERNMENT EXISTS

- DEFINE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- WORK WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES
- SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN AGENCY OPERATIONS
- WORK WITHOUT AN INFRASTRUCTURE IN THEATER
- COORDINATE OPERATIONS WITH LOCAL ELDERS
- CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS WITH FACTIONS OR CLANS
- ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING SECURITY FORCES
- PROVIDE INFORMATION

SLIDE 2-4-6

MANEUVER

- MISSION WAS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
- MANY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES HIRE ARMED GUARDS FOR THEIR FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS
- A NATIONWIDE BADGE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM WAS DEVELOPED FOR AUTHORIZATION TO CARRY WEAPONS
- CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS REQUIRED GREATER NUMBERS OF LONG-DISTANCE COMMUNICATION ASSETS
- SEARCHLIGHTS WERE NEEDED TO SUPPORT SECURITY OPERATIONS (10th MOUNTAIN DIVISION PURCHASED 50 PORTABLE SEARCHLIGHTS)

OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

- SECURITY OPERATIONS
- RAIDS
- AIR ASSAULT ATTACK
- DEEP ATTACK (AVIATION)
- TACTICAL ROAD MARCH (MOTORIZED)
- ENGINEER OPERATIONS
- RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
- MOUT
- CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS
- PATROLLING
- DEFENSE
- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
- SEARCH AND ATTACK
- CORDON AND SEARCH
- ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
- CONVOY ESCORT
- THEATER COMMUNICATIONS
- ARM, FUEL, FIX, MOVE
- MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-4-8

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN SOMALIA

- UNIT LIAISON OFFICERS POSITIONED TO ASSIST IN SHIP LOADING
- COMBAT LOAD
- THEATER SUPPORT STRUCTURE SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECEPTION AND REDEPLOYMENT
- DEPLOYABLE DIVISIONS MUST HAVE READILY AVAILABLE, WARRANTED CONTRACTING OFFICERS
- TEMPORARY CHANGE OF STATION VERSUS TEMPORARY DUTY—SOLDIERS ASSIGNED TO DEPLOYING UNIT, NO 179-DAY LIMIT, NO PER DIEM OR TDY COSTS
- NINE-DIGIT ZIP CODE AND ARRIVAL OF POSTAL UNITS BEFORE MAIL CHANNEL OPENED EASED MAIL BACKLOG
- MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION KITS ISSUED

FIRE SUPPORT

- INITIAL THREAT ASSESSMENT REQUIRED A LOT OF FIRE SUPPORT—THIS WAS EVENTUALLY SCALED BACK TO 8 AH1 ATTACK HELICOPTERS AND ORGANIC MORTARS
- FIRE-FINDER RADARS WERE USED TO COVER CRITICAL FACILITIES (ALSO DETECTED SMALL-ARMS WEAPONS, WHICH MAKES TARGET ANALYSIS CRITICAL)
- AH1's WERE VALUABLE IN SHOW OF FORCE
- AC130's AND UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES COULD HAVE BEEN USED
- THE EMPLOYMENT OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN MOGADISHU PROVIDED TACTICAL ADVANTAGE, BUT HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON CIVILIANS

SLIDE 2-4-10

MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY

- STRATEGIC LIFT MUST ALLOW UNITS TO DEPLOY WITH ADEQUATE BARRIER MATERIAL FOR IMMEDIATE SECURITY
- HEAVY ENGINEER UNITS MUST DEPLOY WITH SUFFICIENT CONSTRUCTION MATERIAL TO BEGIN WORK WHEN THEY ARRIVE
- DEPLOYABLE MODULAR FACILITIES SIMILAR TO THE AIR FORCE HARVEST FALCON MUST BE DEVELOPED

FORCE PROTECTION

- G3 AND SJA JOINTLY DEVELOPED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- ROE FORWARDED TO CENTRAL COMMAND AND UNIFIED TASK FORCE SOMALIA FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL
- TRAINING INCLUDED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CARDS, VIGNETTES, AND SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES
- MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE, PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE, COMMAND EMPHASIS, DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, RESPONSIVE MEDEVAC, AND ADEQUATE MEDICAL SUPPORT WERE USED

SLIDE 2-4-12

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

- USED PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TO PROJECT FORCE AS BEING AN UNCOMMITTED AND NONALIGNED THIRD PARTY
- INFORMED SOLDIERS OF WHY THEY WERE THERE
- GOT SOLDIERS INVOLVED WITH THE COMMUNITY

EXTERNAL COORDINATION

- 21 DIFFERENT COALITION FORCES
- 49 DIFFERENT HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES
- ARMY, MARINE CORPS, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE
- HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES WERE NOT A HOMOGENEOUS GROUP
- COALITION FORCES SHOULD HAVE BEEN UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE ARMY FORCES
- ARMY FORCES FREQUENTLY CONDUCTED NEGOTIATIONS WITH LITTLE DEPARTMENT OF STATE GUIDANCE OR PARTICIPATION
- HAVING TO NEGOTIATE HINDERED THE MILITARY FORCE'S EFFORTS TO REMAIN NEUTRAL
- MORE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND UNITED NATIQNS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MILITARY FORCE WAS NEEDED

SLIDE 2-4-14

LESSONS LEARNED

- NEED STRATEGIC SEA AND AIR LIFTS REVITALIZATION
- KNOW THE CRITICAL ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS
- CONDUCT JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS
- KNOW WHAT SERVICES PROVIDE COMPLEMENTARY/ MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FORCES (ENGINEERS, AVIATION, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT)
- ENSURE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE APPROPRIATE AND UNDERSTOOD
- ESTABLISH CRITERIA AND CONDUCT ASSESSMENTS OF OPERATIONS (HOW TO MEASURE SUCCESS)
- CONSIDER CULTURAL AND POLITICAL BOUNDARIES WHEN DETERMINING MILITARY BOUNDARIES
- KNOW THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
- KNOW THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SF OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT ALPHA, PSYOP, CIVIL AFFAIRS)
- KNOW THE REQUIREMENT FOR POLITICAL COORDINATION AND PARTICIPATION
- ENLIST EXPERT HELP
- KNOW THAT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IS NOT A METL TASK

SUBLESSON 2-5. DISASTER RELIEF

SLIDE 2-5-1. DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

FM 100-5 discusses disaster relief operations within the context of humanitarian assistance. Disaster relief can be domestic or overseas. Disaster relief operations include refugee assistance, food distribution, medical assistance, restoration of law and order, and damage assessment and control.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 2-5-2 through 2-5-5 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process for disaster relief operations. (See FM 34-130, Chapter 6.)

SLIDE 2-5-2. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The first step of the IPB process for disaster relief is to define the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-5-3. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

The second step of the IPB process for disaster relief is to describe the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-5-4. EVALUATE THE THREAT

The third step of the IPB process for disaster relief is to evaluate the threat.

SLIDE 2-5-5. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

The fourth step of the IPB process for disaster relief is to determine the threat's courses of action.

SLIDE 2-5-6. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR FLOODS, EARTHQUAKES, TORNADOS, AND VOLCANOS

Military engineers may become involved in disaster relief operations as individuals, teams, or units. Individuals may provide technical assistance to civil authorities in the areas of damage assessment and work estimation. Teams may provide specialized support such as well drilling, power supply and distribution, or utilities repair or reconstruction. Missions that may require engineer-specific skills and equipment include the following:

a. Assessing damage to roads, bridges, structures, utilities, and so forth.
b. Supporting search and rescue operations with personnel and equipment.
c. Conducting topographic surveys for the extent of flood damage.
d. Overprinting maps to depict damage, water levels, key facilities, and search and rescue activities.
e. Opening roadways for emergency and medical traffic.
f. Constructing temporary bridges.
g. Providing emergency power.
h. Clearing debris, mud, and so forth.
i. Restoring critical facilities, services, and utilities.
j. Demolishing unsafe structures.
k. Providing and restoring power to critical facilities.
l. Providing expedient repair of critical distribution systems.

SLIDE 2-5-7. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMERGENCY SNOW REMOVAL

In addition to the majority of the same missions that engineers perform in support of other disasters, engineers support emergency snow removal by—

a. Clearing snow from critical roads and facilities.
b. Clearing access to critical facilities such as hospitals.
c. Hauling and dumping snow away from congested areas.
d. Transporting and delivering critical supplies.

SLIDE 2-5-8. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOREST FIRES

Engineers help fight forest fires by providing the following support:

a. Cutting fire breaks with equipment, chain saws, and hand tools.
b. Constructing base camps.
c. Constructing fire roads.
d. Transporting water.

SLIDE 2-5-9. DISASTER RELIEF FOLLOWING HURRICANE ANDREW

Obviously, disaster relief tasks are not METL-type tasks, but some tasks parallel traditional military activities. Distributing donated goods is not procedurally different from distributing any military supplies.

SLIDE 2-5-10. ADAPTABILITY ISSUES

Some common military tasks were readily adaptable to the Hurricane Andrew situation. The units adapted the search-and-attack technique to search and assist.

SLIDE 2-5-11. POSSE COMITATUS ACT ISSUES

The National Guard was not federalized during Hurricane Andrew so that it would not be hindered by the Posse Comitatus Act. This helped a lot. Not federalizing the NG may be SOP for similar situations in the future.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The following lessons may be helpful in preparing for a disaster relief operation:
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 19, Logistics
Lesson 20, Engineers

DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

- FALL WITHIN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
- ARE CONDUCTED IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS TO PREVENT LOSS OF LIFE AND PROPERTY
- CAN BE DOMESTIC OR OVERSEAS

SLIDE 2-5-1

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- IDENTIFY POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE THE DISASTER AREA
- IDENTIFY AREAS OR ACTIVITIES THAT MAY GENERATE REFUGEES
- IDENTIFY FURTHER THREATS TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
- IDENTIFY ALL MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, GOVERNMENT, AND NONGOVERNMENT PLAYERS
- ESTABLISH CRITERIA TO JUDGE EXTENT OF DISASTER AND TRACK RECOVERY

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- DETERMINE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL EXTENT OF THE DISASTER
- LOCATE POPULATION SECTORS REQUIRING ASSISTANCE
- COORDINATE WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
- FOCUS ON DEMOGRAPHICS
- CONSIDER EFFECTS OF LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
- DETERMINE IF THE ENVIRONMENT IS PERMISSIVE OR HOSTILE
- USE NON-DOD ASSETS AND HOST NATION RESOURCES TO FILL VOIDS IN DATA BASE AND MAP COVERAGE
- IDENTIFY LIMITS OF THE COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY

SLIDE 2-5-3

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- CONSIDER WEATHER AND ENVIRONMENT AS POTENTIAL THREATS
- IDENTIFY AND EVALUATE THREAT POSED BY ANY GROUPS THAT MAY OPPOSE FRIENDLY FORCE OPERATIONS
- CONSIDER INITIALLY NEUTRAL GROUPS AND PERSONNEL THAT MAY BECOME HOSTILE AS THE OPERATION PROGRESSES
- IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS AND CONTENTIOUS ISSUES

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- START WITH THREAT OBJECTIVES AND DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION FROM THERE. DO NOT FOCUS ON STRICTLY CONFRONTATIONAL COURSES OF ACTION
- CONSIDER EFFECT OF THE THREAT'S PERCEPTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES ON POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION
- CONSIDER INTERACTION OF EACH GROUP IF FACED WITH MULTIPLE THREATS
- EVALUATE THREAT IMPOSED BY DEGRADATION OF THE CAPABILITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
- IDENTIFY LIKELY TARGETS OF LOOTERS AND VANDALS

SLIDE 2-5-5

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR FLOODS, EARTHQUAKES, TORNADOS, AND VOLCANOS

- ASSESSING DAMAGE
- PERFORMING TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEYS
- OVERPRINTING MAPS
- CONSTRUCTING TEMPORARY BRIDGES
- PROVIDING EMERGENCY POWER
- CLEARING DEBRIS AND RUBBLE
- RESTORING CRITICAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES
- DEMOLISHING UNSAFE STRUCTURES
- CLEARING ROADWAYS FOR EMERGENCY TRAFFIC

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMERGENCY SNOW REMOVAL

- CLEARING SNOW FROM CRITICAL ROADS
- CLEARING ACCESS TO CRITICAL FACILITIES
- HAULING AND DUMPING SNOW AWAY FROM CONGESTED AREAS
- TRANSPORTING AND DELIVERING CRITICAL SUPPLIES

SLIDE 2-5-7

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR FOREST FIRES

- CUTTING FIRE BREAKS
- CONSTRUCTING BASE CAMPS
- CONSTRUCTING FIRE ROADS
- TRANSPORTING WATER

DISASTER RELIEF FOLLOWING HURRICANE ANDREW

- MEALS
- WATER
- HOUSING
- DONATED GOODS DISTRIBUTION
- INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE
- MEDICAL AID
- REPAIR WORK
- COUNSELING
- DEBRIS REMOVAL
- COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION BROADCASTS

SLIDE 2-5-9

ADAPTABILITY ISSUES

- SEARCH AND ASSIST
- MISSION ANALYSIS
- METT-T CONSIDERATION
- LEADERS' RECONNAISSANCE
- FORCE TAILORING
- PATROLLING
- COMMANDER'S INTENT
- SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY
- TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
- RAPID DEPLOYMENT

POSSE COMITATUS ACT ISSUES

- NATIONAL GUARD REMAINED UNDER STATE CONTROL TO PERFORM A PREDOMINANTLY LAW AND ORDER FUNCTION
- FEDERAL TROOPS DETERRED CRIME BY THEIR PRESENCE AND REPORTED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
- FEDERAL TROOPS LINKED TO POLICE BY RADIO

SLIDE 2-5-11

SUBLESSON 2-6. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SLIDE 2-6-1. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Security assistance takes many forms. The international officers who attend US schools are representative of the nation's security assistance efforts. Other examples are equipment left behind in a country after a training exercise there and items sold through the Foreign Military Sales program.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Infantry brigades do not play a large role in security assistance; therefore, no further information on this activity is included in this publication.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

- PROVIDES DEFENSE MATERIEL; MILITARY TRAINING; AND DEFENSE-RELATED SERVICES BY GRANT, LOAN, CREDIT, OR CASH SALES TO FURTHER UNITED STATES NATIONAL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES
- PROVIDES INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM
- PROVIDES FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM

SLIDE 2-6-1

SUBLESSON 2-7. NATION ASSISTANCE

SLIDE 2-7-1. NATION ASSISTANCE

FM 100-5 definition of nation assistance is diplomatic, economic, informational, and military cooperation between the US and the government of another nation, with the objective of promoting internal development and the growth of sustainable institutions within that nation.

SLIDE 2-7-2. NATION ASSISTANCE GOALS

The goals of nation assistance are to promote long-term stability, to develop sound and responsible democratic institutions, to develop supportive infrastructures, to promote strong free-market economies, and to provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Infantry brigades do not play a large role in nation assistance; therefore, no further information on this activity is included in this publication.

NATION ASSISTANCE

DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, INFORMATIONAL, AND MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ANOTHER NATION, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE GROWTH OF SUSTAINABLE INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THAT NATION

SLIDE 2-7-1

NATION ASSISTANCE GOALS

TO PROMOTE LONG-TERM STABILITY, TO DEVELOP SOUND AND RESPONSIBLE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, TO DEVELOP SUPPORTIVE INFRASTRUCTURES, TO PROMOTE STRONG FREE-MARKET ECONOMIES, AND TO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT ALLOWS FOR ORDERLY POLITICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS

SUBLESSON 2-8. COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-8-1. SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
Military efforts support law enforcement agencies, other US agencies, the states, and foreign governments to stop the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution.

SLIDE 2-8-2. LEGALITIES
DOD may provide training, assistance, equipment, and facilities as long as military readiness is not affected. The Posse Comitatus Act applies only to federalized forces; it is only a restriction in the US.

SLIDE 2-8-3. FURTHER PROBLEMS
The potential for terrorism and insurgency being linked to drug activity means that three stability and support operations activities could be involved. Also, the drug lords may be local heroes. For example, before he was killed by Columbian military and police, Pablo Escobar was credited with building housing projects for his hometown poor.

SLIDE 2-8-4. LESSONS LEARNED
Most counterdrug operations lessons learned are common stability and support operations themes: unity of effort, measurable end state, external coordination, and restraint.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 2-8-5 through 2-8-8 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process for counterdrug operations. (See FM 34-130, Chapter 6.)

SLIDE 2-8-5. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
The first step of the IPB process for counterdrug operations is to define the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-8-6. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
The second step of the IPB process for counterdrug operations is to describe the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-8-7. EVALUATE THE THREAT
The third step of the IPB process for counterdrug operations is to evaluate the threat.

SLIDE 2-8-8. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
The fourth step of the IPB process for counterdrug operations is to determine threat courses of action.

SLIDE 2-8-9. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
Engineer counterdrug efforts always complement, rather than replace, the efforts of other US agencies, the states, and cooperating foreign governments. ARNG units have also supported local law enforcement agencies by demolishing buildings used to distribute drugs in inner cities.

SLIDE 2-8-10. INTELLIGENCE

The concept of the decisive point and the center of gravity is important in a counterdrug operation. The IPB process helps determine these and allows leaders to focus on the effort.

SLIDE 2-8-11. OPERATION BLAST FURNACE CENTER OF GRAVITY AND INTELLIGENCE

The 1986 Operation Blast Furnace that involved the 193d Infantry Brigade was to interrupt cocaine production in Bolivia. Initially, the infantry battalion involved in Blast Furnace tried to work without the benefit of the IPB process. The Drug Enforcement Agency listed 250 targets, which it said were drug labs. Colonel Stephens, the TF Bayonet commander, stated that, "Targets were not a problem. Whether the targets were real or not was the problem." Using this system, Task Force Bayonet was successful on its first mission on 17 to 18 July, finding an airplane and a person. In the words of Colonel Stephens, that was "one in a row....We had one great successful hit and we went about three weeks with dry holes from that point on." That meant 24 additional failures. After that they realized there must be a better way and they started to apply the IPB process. They asked themselves what it takes to produce cocaine. They came up with a list of ingredients such as favorable soil, cover and concealment, friendly population, a lot of water, and transportation networks. When they put all these factors together, they greatly limited the scope of their search. This increased focus worked wonders. Colonel Stephens concluded that after applying the IPB process, "We went into over a hundred locations on the ground and we had success rate of about 34 percent. A turnaround from 25 strikes to 1 success to an overall ration of 3 to 1."

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES: 1. The following lessons may be helpful to a unit preparing for a counterdrug operation:

Lesson 2, Sublesson 9, Combating Terrorism
Lesson 2, Sublesson 13, Support of Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 12, Search and Attack
Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques/ Technology
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support

2. See Appendix B for T&EO, Interdict Smuggling Operations.

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

INVOLVES LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, OTHER UNITED STATES AGENCIES, THE STATES, AND COOPERATING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

SLIDE 2-8-1

LEGALITIES

- TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 371-378 GIVES MILITARY FORCES THE AUTHORITY TO ASSIST CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
- DOD MAY PROVIDE TRAINING, ASSISTANCE, EQUIPMENT, AND FACILITIES AS LONG AS MILITARY READINESS IS UNAFFECTED
- DOD MAY PASS INFORMATION COLLECTED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
- FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES ARE PROHIBITED FROM SEARCHING, ARRESTING, OR CONDUCTING ANY RELATED LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY INVOLVING CIVILIANS (POSSE COMITATUS ACT)

FURTHER PROBLEMS

- A FIRM LINK HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND INSURGENT MOVEMENTS AS WELL AS TERRORISTS
- THE DRUG TRAFFICKERS ARE WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE

SLIDE 2-8-3

LESSONS LEARNED

- NEED FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS
- NEED MEASURES OF SUCCESS
- ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH LOCAL DRUG-LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
- NEED INTERAGENCY TRAINING
- NEED INTERAGENCY PLANNING
- NEED INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION
- MAINTAIN SOLDIER PROFICIENCY
- USE IPB PROCESS
- USE RECORD-KEEPING TECHNIQUES
- DETERMINE IMPACT OF DOD RESOURCES ON COUNTERDRUG MISSION
- ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY WITH DRUG-LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
- NEED PUBLICITY OF COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- CONSIDER BOTH GROUND AND AIR AREAS OF INTERESTS
- DETERMINE DRUGS AND PRECURSOR ELEMENTS INVOLVED
- DETERMINE HOW AND WHERE MATERIALS ENTER THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
- CONSIDER LOCAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, EFFECTIVENESS OF HOST NATION MILITARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, AND NATURE OF HOST NATION GOVERNMENT

SLIDE 2-8-5

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- CONSIDER THAT MAP, CHART, AND GRAPHICS COVERAGE OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS AND AREA OF INTEREST MAY BE LACKING
- IDENTIFY AGRICULTURAL AREAS AND GROWING SEASONS
- CONSIDER HYDROGRAPHY, TERRAIN, AND WEATHER IN RELATION TO PRODUCTION, GROWTH, AND MOVEMENT CYCLES
- IDENTIFY ROUTES, MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES, AND STORAGE AREAS
- IDENTIFY ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PROCEDURES THAT AFFECT TRAFFICKING

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- CONSIDER THE STRUCTURE OF THE DRUG ORGANIZATION
- CONSIDER SECURITY ELEMENTS AND METHODS OF PRODUCTION, CONCEALMENT, AND TRANSPORTATION
- IDENTIFY "NARCOTERRORISTS" THREAT
- CONSIDER SUPPORT THAT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CANNOT OR WILL NOT PROVIDE TO THE POPULACE
- CONSIDER THREAT USE OF BLACKMAIL AND KIDNAPING
- DETERMINE THREAT'S ACCESS TO HIGH-TECH SYSTEMS

SLIDE 2-8-7

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- TEMPLATE ENTIRE PRODUCTION AND SHIPMENT PROCESS
- TEMPLATE ACTIONS ON CONFRONTATION
- DESCRIBE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES SUCH AS MONEY LAUNDERING AND CIVIC ACTIONS
- TEMPLATE SECURITY PROCEDURES

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

- PRODUCE PHOTOMAPS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS
- CONSTRUCT OR UPGRADE ACCESS ROADS AND AIRFIELDS
- CLEAR FIELDS OF OBSERVATIONS
- LOCATE INFILTRATION TUNNELS
- CONSTRUCT TARGET RANGES AND TEMPORARY BASE CAMPS
- REHABILITATE EXISTING DRUG-LAW ENFORCEMENT BUILDING
- PERFORM OTHER MISSIONS WITHIN CAPABILITY AND ALSO WITHIN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

SLIDE 2-8-9

INTELLIGENCE

- INTELLIGENCE BRINGS FOCUS TO INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
- BECAUSE OF ALL THE LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS, THE EFFORTS OF THE FORCES MUST BE FOCUSED WHERE THEY CAN DO THE MOST DAMAGE TO THE NARCOTRAFFICKERS. THESE KEY POINTS ARE THE NARCOTRAFFICKERS' CENTERS OF GRAVITY

OPERATION BLAST FURNACE CENTER OF GRAVITY AND INTELLIGENCE

- THE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON FROM BLAST FURNACE IS THAT THE CENTER OF GRAVITY ON THE SUPPORTING SIDE OF THE EQUATION IS THAT POINT AT WHICH CHEMICALS, COCA PRODUCTS, AND TRANSPORTATION COME TOGETHER. IN BOLIVIA, IN 1986, THAT POINT WAS THE COCA BASE/COCAINE HCI LAB.

- A SECOND LESSON LEARNED IS THE PRIMACY OF INTELLIGENCE. THE WELL-LEARNED PART OF THE LESSON IS THAT THE IPB PROCESS CAN BE USED TO IDENTIFY THE CENTER OF GRAVITY IN COCAINE PRODUCTION. THE CENTER IS THE PLACE AT WHICH CHEMICALS, COCA PRODUCTS, AND TRANSPORTATION COME TOGETHER.

SLIDE 2-8-11

SUBLESSON 2-9. COMBATING TERRORISM

SLIDE 2-9-1. COMBATING TERRORISM

Lesson 3, Domestic and International Organizations, states that the Department of State, Department of Justice, and Department of Transportation will be involved in combating terrorism. Combating terrorism consists of two parts: antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Antiterrorism involves everyone. It includes physical security, operational security, and personal security. The terrorist threat is greatest when it is least expected. In apparently peaceful stability and support operations, commanders must always be alert to the possibility of terrorist attacks. (See FM 7-98, page 3-4.) Counterterrorism is usually done by specially organized and trained counterterrorism units. If conventional forces are involved in counterterrorism, they will be in a limited support role. (See FM 7-98, page 3-9.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: For further discussion of the antiterrorism aspects of combating terrorism, see Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures for Brigade and Battalion Operation.

COMBATING TERRORISM

- DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (FBI), AND DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION)
- ANTITERRORISM IS DEFENSIVE MEASURES TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND PROPERTY TO TERRORISM
- COUNTERTERRORISM IS OFFENSIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO PREVENT, DETER, AND RESPOND TO TERRORISM

SLIDE 2-9 -1

SUBLESSON 2-10. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-10-1. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
A prerequisite for a peacekeeping operation is that peace already exists. Peacekeeping forces maintain, not make, peace. The ability to shift missions is based on a review of the factors of METT-T.

SLIDE 2-10-2. PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES
Principles of peacekeeping operations are objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

SLIDE 2-10-3. PEACEKEEPING MANDATE
Peacekeeping operations usually follow diplomatic negotiations that establish a mandate. The mandate describes the scope of the operation and the size and the type of force. The mandate specifies conditions imposed by the host nation. The mandate states the functions the peacekeeping force is to perform. A sample mandate from the Canadian peace operations manual is in Figure 2-10-1.

SLIDE 2-10-4. PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION
The three organizations involved in a peacekeeping operation are political council, military peacekeeping command, and military area command. Each national force has its own area of responsibility, but they all report to the peacekeeping command.

SLIDE 2-10-5. PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES
The typical peacekeeping objectives are separate opposing sides and establish a buffer zone. Supervise a cease fire or truce, prevent an armed conflict, and contribute to the maintenance of law and order, and return to normal conditions.

SLIDE 2-10-6. TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION
Some tasks by which the tasks can be accomplished are observing, patrolling, and traffic controlling.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 2-10-7 through 2-10-10 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process for peacekeeping operations. (See FM 34-130, Chapter 6.)

SLIDE 2-10-7. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
The first step of the IPB process for peacekeeping operations is to define the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-10-8. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
The second step of the IPB process for peacekeeping operations is to describe the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-10-9. EVALUATE THE THREAT
The third step of the IPB process for peacekeeping operations is to evaluate the threat.

SLIDE 2-10-10. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
The fourth step of the IPB process for peacekeeping operations is to determine threat courses of action.


SLIDE 2-10-11. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Specific engineer missions in peacekeeping operations falls into one of two categories—sustainment engineering or combat engineering support. If engineer soldiers will be integrated with other branches, the engineers should also be trained in patrolling, operating checkpoints and observation posts, and air assault operations. Sustainment engineering includes tasks that support the force through the construction and repair of billeting, support and logistics facilities as well as lines of communications. These tasks may include the construction, maintenance, and operation of water, electrical, and sanitation facilities.

SLIDE 2-10-12. BEIRUT
In 1983, the mission of the Marines was to establish a presence in Beirut. Establishing a presence is not a mission that has a clear military objective or end state. The situation changed in Lebanon. When the Marines first arrived, there was no dangerous threat. Billeting a large force in a single location was convenient and natural. When the political situation changed for the worse, the Beirut Airport became an isolated and vulnerable target. Yet no military adjustments were made.

SLIDE 2-10-13. INTELLIGENCE
This operation shows the need for and lack of human intelligence. If a unit receives 100 warnings of a car bomb that never materializes, the unit tends to get desensitized to the threat. The intelligence community can be perceived as "crying wolf." This is especially true if there are insufficient human intelligence sources to confirm or deny the warnings.

SLIDE 2-10-14. SECURITY
The failing of the Beirut peacekeeping operation was a failure to adhere to the principle of security. In the bombing, 241 people died. Contributing factors were insufficient security procedures, poor force protection, and confusing rules of engagement.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: 1**.** The following lessons may be helpful to a unit preparing for a peacekeeping operation:
Lesson 13, Negotiation
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
2. See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Collect and Disseminate Information
T&EO, Control Civilian Movement
T&EO, Protect the Force
T&EO, Supervise Minefield Clearance



B-GL-301-003/FT-001
FIRST DRAFT
ANNEX C

AN EXAMPLE UNITED NATIONS MANDATE

RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AT THE ____TH MEETING (DATE)

"The Security Council,

Noting that the present situation with regard to (country(s) is likely to threaten international peace and secuity and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution.

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the 'peaceful intentions' signed at New York on (date).

Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its article 2, par 4, which reads: 'All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of Force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in ( ) and ( ), or to endanger international peace.

2. Asks the Governments of ( ), which have the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in their countries.

3. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Governments of ( ), of a United Nations' Peacekeeping Force in those countries. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Government of ( ). The commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation.

A-1/2

4. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

5. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of ( ). The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

6. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Governments of ( ), a mediator, who shall use his best endeavors with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting ( ), in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having mind the well-being of the peoples of ( ) as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

(2123S)

A-2/2

Figure 2-10-1. Extract from Canadian peace operations manual.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

- SUPPORT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN PEACE IN AREAS OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT
- REQUIRE CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE DISPUTE
- REQUIRE UNITED STATES PERSONNEL TO BE IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS, PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE, OR IN A SUPERVISORY ROLE

SLIDE 2-10-1

PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES

- OBJECTIVE
- UNITY OF EFFORT
- SECURITY
- RESTRAINT
- PERSEVERANCE
- LEGITIMACY

PEACEKEEPING MANDATE

- IS ESTABLISHED BY DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS
- DESCRIBES SCOPE OF OPERATION AND SIZE AND TYPE OF FORCE
- SPECIFIES CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY HOST NATION
- STATES FUNCTIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS TO PERFORM

SLIDE 2-10-3

PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION

- POLITICAL COUNCIL: RECEIVES MANDATE AND COORDINATES STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
- MILITARY PEACEKEEPING COMMAND: HAS OVERALL OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE
- MILITARY AREA COMMAND: SINGLE NATION FORCE OPERATING IN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND REPORTING TO THE PEACEKEEPING COMMAND

PEACEKEEPING OBJECTIVES

- SEPARATE OPPOSING SIDES AND ESTABLISH A BUFFER ZONE
- SUPERVISE A CEASE FIRE OR TRUCE
- PREVENT AN ARMED CONFLICT
- SUPPORT THE DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE
- CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER, AND RETURN TO NORMAL CONDITIONS

SLIDE 2-10-5

TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH A PEACEKEEPING MISSION

- CONDUCT PATROLS
- ESTABLISH AND OPERATE AN OBSERVATION POST
- ESTABLISH AND OPERATE A CHECKPOINT
- PLAN FOR MEDIA
- CONDUCT LIAISON/NEGOTIATE
- ESCORT A CONVOY
- REACT TO AMBUSH
- REACT TO INDIRECT FIRE
- ESTABLISH A LODGEMENT
- SECURE A ROUTE
- CLEAR MINES
- PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- CONSIDER OUTSIDE INFLUENCES SUCH AS POLITICAL GROUPS, MEDIA, AND THIRD NATION SUPPORT TO THE BELLIGERENTS
- IDENTIFY LEGAL MANDATE, GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES, AND OTHER LIMITATIONS
- IDENTIFY PERTINENT DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
- IDENTIFY THE BEST AND WORST CASE TIME LINES OF THE OPERATION

SLIDE 2-10-7

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- CONSIDER DEMOGRAPHICS SUCH AS THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT AND WHAT WOULD CAUSE EACH SIDE TO AGREE TO PEACE
- ARE THE BELLIGERENTS LIKELY TO OBEY THE TREATY PROVISIONS
- DOES THE TERRAIN ALLOW PEACEKEEPERS TO SEE AND BE SEEN
- IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, AND AGENCY SUPPORT AVAILABLE

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- IDENTIFY ALL FACTIONS INVOLVED AND DETERMINE WHICH ARE LIKELY TO VIOLATE THE PEACE
- IDENTIFY THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY ORDER OF BATTLE OF EACH BELLIGERENT
- IDENTIFY AFFECT OF POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
- IDENTIFY LOCAL SUPPORT TO ALL BELLIGERENT PARTIES

SLIDE 2-10-9

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- TEMPLATE ACTIONS THAT WOULD VIOLATE THE PEACE AND THE ASSOCIATED INDICATORS
- TEMPLATE BELLIGERENTS' RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF THE PEACE
- TEMPLATE BELLIGERENTS' REACTIONS TO UNITED STATES' ACTIONS
- CONSIDER LOCAL POPULACE, HOST NATION GOVERNMENT, AND HOST NATION MILITARY REACTIONS TO FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

- COMBAT ENGINEERING SUPPORT—
  - TOPOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS—MAPS/OVERLAYS
  - ROUTE CLEARANCE
  - FORCE PROTECTION
- GENERAL ENGINEERING SUSTAINMENT—
  - BASE CAMP CONSTRUCTION
  - LOGISTIC BASE DEVELOPMENT
  - AIRFIELD/ROAD REPAIR

SLIDE 2-10-11

BEIRUT

- MISSION: TO ESTABLISH A PRESENCE, NOT INTERPRETED THE SAME AT ALL LEVELS OF COMMAND
- INTENDED TO BE A SHORT-DURATION OPERATION
- INITIAL WARM WELCOME DETERIORATED
- NO MILITARY ADJUSTMENTS MADE TO MEET CHANGED POLITICAL SITUATION

INTELLIGENCE

- LITTLE SPECIFICITY IN INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS
- OVER 100 WARNINGS OF TERRORIST CAR BOMB ATTACKS
- LACK OF EFFECTIVE HUMAN INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

SLIDE 2-10-13

SECURITY

- INSUFFICIENT SECURITY PROCEDURES
- MISTAKE TO BILLET ONE-FOURTH OF THE FORCE IN A SINGLE STRUCTURE
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: SENTRIES ON POSTS 4 TO 7 DID NOT LOAD WEAPONS
- DIFFERENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONTRIBUTED TO A MIND SET ADVERSE TO READINESS

SUBLESSON 2-11. PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-11-1. PEACE OPERATIONS

Peace operations is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities. These activities are divided into three principal areas: military support for diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Peace operations include the traditional peacekeeping operations, as well as more forceful activities such as the protection of humanitarian assistance, the establishment of order and stability, the enforcement of sanctions, the guarantee or denial of movement, the establishment of protected zones, and the forced separation of belligerents.

SLIDE 2-11-2. PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish the conditions for a peacekeeping force between hostile factions. Peace enforcement implies the threat of or use of force to coerce hostile factions to cease violent actions. Units conducting peace enforcement operations cannot maintain their neutrality in every instance; however, they must be impartial and treat all belligerents the same as nonbelligerents. They must be prepared to apply combat power to restore order, to separate warring factions, and to return the environment to conditions more conducive to civil order and discipline. In a theater of operations, both combat and noncombat actions may occur simultaneously. Forces conducting peace enforcement may be involved in the forcible separation of belligerent parties or be engaged in combat with one or all parties of the conflict.

SLIDE 2-11-3. DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

In a peace enforcement environment, the principles of stability and support operations should be applied. The mandate adds legitimacy to the operation and normally is issued by the UN Security Council or US Government in a unilateral action. The mandate should spell out the desired end state of operations. A political settlement must be possible. Competent authority is an expression of unity of command, and concurrent action refers to the fact that the military is only a part of the overall effort to achieve a settlement.

SLIDE 2-11-4. KEY ASPECTS

Use of force, rules of engagement, force protection, and training required are key aspects of peace operations that must be addressed when planning for a peace enforcement operation. These are addressed in detail in Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application.

SLIDE 2-11-5. USE OF FORCE ALTERNATIVES

Some alternatives to the use of force are deterrence, mediation, negotiation, population and resource control, rewards and penalties, warnings, and nonlethal use of force. (See Lesson 13, Negotiation; and Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques/Technology.)

SLIDE 2-11-6. PEACE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT

By the US definition, in a situation for which peace enforcement operations are required, armed conflict and not peace describes the situation. Also, one or more of the belligerents usually prefer it that way. Conflict, violence, disorder, and even chaos describe the

environment surrounding peace enforcement operations. The consent of at least one of the belligerents does not exist. Methods of coercion rather than cooperation will probably be the rule. Peace enforcement forces may have to fight their way in and use force to separate the belligerents. In any case, the threat of or use of force will be used. Peace enforcement operations are likely to disregard state sovereignty, particularly if the mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and has not invited the peace enforcers into his territory.

SLIDE 2-11-7. PEACE ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK

Peace enforcement operations follow a natural phasing that can be used as an execution framework for staff planning: introduction of forces, establishment of lodgement, expansion of the lodgement, establishment of the conditions to stop hostilities, establishment of the conditions for the exit of peace enforcement forces, the relief operations by peacekeeping forces, and redeployment of forces.

SLIDE 2-11-8. INTRODUCE FORCES AND PREPARE AREA OF OPERATION

During this phase of the operation, special operations forces may be introduced into the area of operations to begin sending intelligence back to the unit either at the home station or at an intermediate staging base. In addition, key intelligence can be obtained from other sources in country as well as with links with national level sources. A key requirement will be to determine whether or not the introduction of forces will be opposed and if some minimal security and early warning can be pre-positioned at the place of entry of US forces. (See Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support.)

SLIDE 2-11-9. ESTABLISH AND EXPAND THE LODGEMENT

This phase is the same as the unit's METL. During this phase, force protection and security are the most important tasks as the unit begins preparation for peace enforcement operations.

SLIDE 2-11-10. ESTABLISH CONDITIONS TO STOP HOSTILITIES

This is the critical phase of the operation and where the purpose of the mission can be achieved. Either by a show of force or combat operations the belligerents have to be coerced into separating from one another. Once separated, a buffer or demilitarized zone needs to be established to set the stage for a settlement among the belligerents. The military objectives have to be in support of the overall political goals in the region.

SLIDE 2-11-11. ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR EXIT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT FORCES

During this phase of the operation, conditions are created where the peace enforcement forces can be relieved by a peacekeeping force. For this transition to occur, the separation must be complete and the belligerents must agree to stop hostilities. A peacekeeping force cannot be introduced until this consent among belligerents is present.

SLIDE 2-11-12. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

There are some unique considerations the commander needs to consider in peace enforcement operations. Many times peace enforcement operations will take place as part of a UN or other alliance such as NATO. In addition, the military effort will normally be a part of the power projection and the US forces may not be the main effort. This increases requirements of the staff both externally, in coordinating with other headquarters (liaison officers); and internally, in coordinating activities of combat multipliers within the task force (for example, civil-military operations, psychological operations). One of the most important aspects of battle command is the concept of end state.

SLIDE 2-11-13. STRATEGIC END STATE

A military end state includes the required conditions that when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the strategic end state.

SLIDE 2-11-14. EXAMPLE END STATE

An example of an end state in a peace enforcement operation is when belligerent parties are engaged in productive diplomatic negotiation. The lines of communication are secured and all combatants are separated. A cease fire is implemented. A UN peacekeeping force is in place, and there is a sustained international humanitarian relief operation.

NOTE: Slides 2-11-15 through 2-11-18 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process for peace enforcement operations (see FM 34-130, Chapter 6; and FM 34-7.)

SLIDE 2-11-15. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The first step of the IPB process for peace enforcement operations is to define the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-11-16. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

The second step of the IPB process for peace enforcement operations is to describe the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-11-17. EVALUATE THE THREAT

The third step of the IPB process for peace enforcement operations is to evaluate the threat.

SLIDE 2-11-18. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

The fourth step of the IPB process for peace enforcement operations is to determine threat courses of action.

SLIDE 2-11-19. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Engineers perform normal combat engineer operations. They repair or construct facilities to support build up of initial entry forces. They reinforce facilities for force protection.

SLIDE 2-11-20. HEAVY INTEGRATION IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Armored vehicles have many capabilities that give them utility in a peace enforcement operation.

SLIDE 2-11-21. ADVANTAGES OF HEAVY CONSIDERATIONS
Heavy forces have mobility (depending on the terrain) to move quickly throughout an area of operations. More importantly, they have a tremendous psychological value that can deter aggression by belligerent forces.

SLIDE 2-11-22. DISADVANTAGES OF HEAVY CONSIDERATIONS
There are some potential disadvantages to the use of heavy forces. Belligerents can potentially focus combat power on them and destroy them piecemeal. They may be limited in their use by their ammunition upload (for example, mostly sabot ammunition). The movement of large tracked vehicles could destroy the local road network. Even if the vehicles do not destroy the roads, they could destroy private property adjacent to the roads.

SLIDE 2-11-23. HEAVY CONSIDERATIONS IN A BUILT-UP AREA
Often, peace enforcement operations occur in built-up areas. Employing heavy forces in built-up areas requires additional considerations. Vehicle mobility, weapon elevation, turret traverse, crew protection from snipers, and security against short-range antitank weapons all need to be considered in planning for use of tanks.

SLIDE 2-11-24. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC—GENERAL PROBLEMS
The 1964-1965 peace enforcement intervention in the Dominican Republic involved the Marines and the 82d Airborne Division. The general problems encountered in the Dominican Republic were chain of command violations, conflicting priorities, escalating requirements, equipment and personnel shortages, coordination difficulties, outdated OPLANs, and inadequate and inaccurate intelligence. Escalating requirements is now called mission creep. As usual in stability and support operations, there was scarce intelligence.

SLIDE 2-11-25. THE SITUATION
Neither side in the Dominican Republic was willing to make concessions. This situation required peace enforcement action. President Eisenhower had done this well in Lebanon in 1958.

SLIDE 2-11-26. INTELLIGENCE
There were the usual stability and support operations intelligence problems. MG York regretting not sending an officer to gather intelligence supports the 10th Mountain Division's comment about Somalia that intelligence sources must be in-theater from the beginning. Units do not want to play catch up with intelligence.

SLIDE 2-11-27. ESTABLISHING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Once the gap between the Marines and the 82d Airborne Division was secured, the intervention took on an even more political nature. This caused many problems for the military. One of the greatest of these problems was the rules of engagement. (See Lesson 4, Rules of Engagement Application, for a continuation of this discussion.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES: 1. A unit preparing for a peace enforcement operation must be able to perform all tasks on its METL. The following lessons may also be helpful:
Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 12, Search and Attack
Lesson 13, Negotiation
Lesson 14, Temporarily Disabling Techniques/ Technology
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
Lesson 21, Fire Support
2. See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Restore Law and Order
T&EO, Disarm Belligerents.

PEACE OPERATIONS

- MILITARY SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMACY
- PEACEKEEPING
- PEACE ENFORCEMENT

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS ARE MILITARY INTERVENTION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESTORE PEACE OR TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEKEEPING FORCE BETWEEN HOSTILE FACTIONS THAT MAY NOT CONSENT TO THE INTERVENTION AND MAY BE ENGAGED IN COMBAT.

SLIDE 2-11-2

DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS OF PEACE OPERATIONS

- PRESENCE OF A MANDATE
- ATTAINABILITY OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
- BALANCE
- FREEDOM OF ACTION AND MOVEMENT
- PROPORTIONAL USE OF FORCE
- CONCURRENT ACTION
- COMPETENT AUTHORITY

KEY ASPECTS


- USE OF FORCE
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- FORCE PROTECTION
- TRAINING

SLIDE 2-11-4

USE OF FORCE ALTERNATIVES

- DETERRENCE
- MEDIATION
- NEGOTIATION
- POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL
- REWARDS AND PENALTIES
- WARNINGS
- NONLETHAL USE OF FORCE

PEACE ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT



BOTTOM LINE:
IDENTITY OF AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS IS USUALLY UNCLEAR AND ALWAYS LESS WELL DEFINED THAN IN WAR

RIGID SUBORDINATION OF OPERATIONS TO POLITICAL GOALS

SLIDE 2-11-6

PEACE ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK


- INTRODUCE FORCES
- ESTABLISH LODGEMENT
- EXPAND LODGEMENT
- ESTABLISH CONDITIONS TO STOP HOSTILITIES
- ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR EXIT OF FORCES
- INITIATE RELIEF BY PEACEKEEPING FORCES
- REDEPLOY

INTRODUCE FORCES AND PREPARE AREA OF OPERATIONS

1. RECONNOITER
   - SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
   - LOCAL AGENCIES
   - LOCAL AUTHORITIES
2. DETERMINE METHOD OF ENTRY
   - FORCED ENTRY
   - UNOPPOSED

SLIDE 2-11-8

ESTABLISH AND EXPAND THE LODGEMENT



ESTABLISH CONDITIONS TO STOP HOSTILITIES

- SEPARATE BELLIGERENTS
- ESTABLISH BUFFER AND DEMILITARIZED ZONES
- MAINTAIN SEPARATION OF BELLIGERENTS
- SUPPORT POLITICAL GOALS

SLIDE 2-11-10

ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR EXIT OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT FORCES

- SEPARATION COMPLETE
- FORMAL CESSATION
- INITIATE RELIEF BY PEACEKEEPING FORCES WHEN THERE IS A PEACE TO KEEP

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- JOINT OR COALITION OR NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
- STAFF AUGMENTATION
- LIAISON OFFICERS
- END STATE

SLIDE 2-11-12

STRATEGIC END STATE

A MILITARY END STATE INCLUDES THE REQUIRED CONDITIONS THAT, WHEN ACHIEVED, ATTAIN THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OR PASS THE MAIN EFFORT TO OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER TO ACHIEVE THE FINAL STRATEGIC END STATE.

EXAMPLE END STATE

- BELLIGERENT PARTIES ENGAGED IN PRODUCTIVE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATION.
- LINES OF COMMUNICATION ARE SECURED AND ALL COMBATANTS ARE SEPARATED.
- A CEASE FIRE IS IMPLEMENTED.
- A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS IN PLACE.
- INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RELIEF OPERATION IS SUSTAINED.

SLIDE 2-11-14

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- IDENTIFY THIRD NATION SUPPORT FOR ANY OF THE BELLIGERENTS
- IDENTIFY OTHER OUTSIDE INFLUENCES
- IDENTIFY ALL SIGNIFICANT DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- IDENTIFY LEGAL LIMITS ON USE OF FORCE
- IDENTIFY DEMOGRAPHICS: CAUSES OF CONFLICT, OBSTACLES TO RESOLUTION, EFFECT ON BELLIGERENT AND FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION
- CONDUCT A STANDARD OCOKA ANALYSIS

SLIDE 2-11-16

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- IDENTIFY ALL BELLIGERENT GROUPS
- DETERMINE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GROUPS
- DETERMINE GROUPS' POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OBJECTIVES
- IDENTIFY GROUPS' MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND MEMBERSHIP DISCIPLINE
- DETERMINE WHAT FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION MIGHT INDUCE BELLIGERENTS TO OBEY THE LAW

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

TEMPLATE BELLIGERENT ACTIONS TO INCLUDE COMBAT OPERATIONS, SUPPORT FUNCTIONS, AND TERRORISM

SLIDE 2-11-18

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

- COMBAT ENGINEER OPERATIONS—
  - TOPOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS—MAPS/OVERLAYS
  - ROUTE CLEARANCE
  - FORCE PROTECTION
- GENERAL ENGINEERING SUSTAINMENT—
  - BASE CAMP CONSTRUCTION
  - LOGISTIC BASE DEVELOPMENT
  - AIRFIELD/ROAD REPAIR

HEAVY INTEGRATION IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

TANKS ARE EXCELLENT INFANTRY SUPPORT WEAPONS, SOME OF THEIR CAPABILITIES ARE—

- PROVIDE ANTITANK AND ANTIARMOR SUPPORT
- INTIMIDATE BELLIGERENT FORCES
- PROVIDE HEAVY WEAPONS SUPPORT TO INFANTRY FORCES
- PROVIDE TARGET ACQUISITION (ESPECIALLY DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY USING THERMAL SIGHTS)
- PROVIDE SURVIVABILITY TO MINES AND LIGHT ANTITANK WEAPONS
- PROVIDE SUPPORT TO CONVOYS
- PROVIDE SUPPORT DURING CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS
- PROTECT SOLDIERS AND OR NONCOMBATANTS AGAINST WEAPONS AND INDIRECT FIRES

SLIDE 2-11-20

ADVANTAGES OF HEAVY CONSIDERATIONS

- ARMOR/MECHANIZED FORCES CAN BE RAPIDLY EMPLACED AT DECISIVE POINTS THROUGHOUT THE SECTOR TO SUPPORT THREATENED FORCES
- HEAVY FORCES ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE AND CAN DETER AGGRESSION BY BELLIGERENT FORCES (CONSIDER FIREPOWER DEMONSTRATIONS AS A SHOW OF FORCE)

DISADVANTAGES OF HEAVY CONSIDERATIONS

- BELLIGERENTS CAN POTENTIALLY FOCUS ON, ISOLATE, AND DESTROY HEAVY FORCES IN A PIECEMEAL FASHION
- TANKS HAVE LIMITED BUNKER AND BUILDING DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY, DEPENDING ON THE AMMUNITION LOADED
- TANKS CAN DESTROY THE SECONDARY ROADS AND MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES
- TANKS CAN BLOCK ROADS AND DESTROY PRIVATE PROPERTY DURING MOVEMENT (THIS MAY OFFSET ATTEMPTS TO GAIN SUPPORT OF LOCAL CIVILIANS)

SLIDE 2-11-22

HEAVY CONSIDERATIONS IN A BUILT-UP AREA

- MOBILITY IS RESTRICTED TO ROADS OR STREETS, WHICH MAY REQUIRE CLEARANCE OF DEBRIS AND MINES
- WHERE POSSIBLE, TANKS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PARKS AND GARDENS THAT OFFER THE BEST FIELDS OF FIRE
- BUILDINGS MAY RESTRICT THE FULL TRAVERSE OF THE TURRET AND THE ELEVATION OF THE MAIN ARMAMENT MAY BE INSUFFICIENT TO REACH TOP FLOORS AND ROOFTOPS
- TANKS ARE VULNERABLE TO SHORT-RANGE ANTITANK WEAPONS AND TANK CREWS (IF EXPOSED) MAY BECOME CASUALTIES FROM SNIPERS—TANKS MAY NEED TO MOVE THROUGH BUILT-UP AREAS BUTTONED UP

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
GENERAL PROBLEMS

- CHAIN OF COMMAND VIOLATIONS
- CONFLICTING PRIORITIES
- ESCALATING REQUIREMENTS (MISSION CREEP)
- EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL SHORTAGES
- COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES
- OUTDATED OPERATION PLANS
- INADEQUATE AND INACCURATE INTELLIGENCE

SLIDE 2-11-24

THE SITUATION

- THE PROBLEM: WHICHEVER SIDE THOUGHT ITSELF TO HAVE THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE SHOWED LITTLE INCLINATION TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE OTHER
- THE SOLUTION: INTRODUCE OVERWHELMING FORCE EARLY TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF INTIMIDATION CONDUCIVE TO THE REDUCTION OR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES (LESSON LEARNED FROM LEBANON)

INTELLIGENCE

- **MG ROBERT YORK (CG, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION):** "A CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE VACUUM EXISTED DURING THE VITAL EARLY STAGES OF THE OPERATION."
- **MG YORK:** "THE DIVISION DID NOT KNOW FRIEND FROM FOE DURING THE PLANNING STAGE."
- SHORTAGE OF MAPS
- MG YORK LATER REGRETTED NOT SENDING ONE OF HIS SENIOR OFFICERS TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO GATHER INFORMATION DURING THE PLANNING PHASE
- SOLDIERS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED

SLIDE 2-11-26

ESTABLISHING THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION

- CEASE FIRE RESULTED IN THE ARMY AND MARINES HAVING A GAP BETWEEN THEIR POSITIONS; REBELS COULD EXPLOIT THIS
- SECURING LINES OF COMMUNICATION REQUIRED MORE TROOPS, BUT 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION NOT DEPLOYED FOR POLITICAL REASONS
- ONCE ESTABLISHED, THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION SPLIT THE REBEL FORCE AND IN EFFECT ENDED THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONALIST MILITARY SUCCESS

SUBLESSON 2-12. SHOW OF FORCE

SLIDE 2-12-1. SHOW OF FORCE
Shows of force may take the form of combined training exercises, rehearsals, forward deployment of military forces, or introduction and build up of military forces in a region. (FM 100-5, page 13-7.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slide 2-12-2 through 2-12-5 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process for a show of force (see FM 34-130, Chapter 6).

SLIDE 2-12-2. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT
The first step of the IPB process for a show of force is to define the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-12-3. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
The second step of the IPB process for a show of force is to describe the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-12-4. EVALUATE THE THREAT
The third step of the IPB process for a show of force is to evaluate the threat.

SLIDE 2-12-5. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
The fourth step of the IPB process for a show of force is to determine threat courses of action.

SLIDE 2-12-6. OPERATION GOLDEN PHEASANT, 1988 BORDER INCIDENT HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA
Operation Golden Pheasant occurred in Honduras in March 1988 as the result of about 2,000 Sandinistan soldiers crossing the border from Nicaragua into Honduras. The Congressional vote to terminate aid to the Contras may have been interpreted by the Sandinistas as a demonstration of a lack of US resolve. Operation Golden Pheasant proved otherwise. The US refused to commit itself to combat in spite of the Honduran request. This is consistent with FM 7-98's claim that "military operations in LIC ... are characterized by the indirect versus direct application of force." (FM 7-98, page 1-1.)

SLIDE 2-12-7. OPERATION GOLDEN PHEASANT SHOW OF FORCE
The operation involved the 82d Airborne Division and 7th Division. It capitalized on the rapid deployability of these forces. Additionally, FM 90-26 lists the first capability of airborne forces as "provide a show of force." (FM 90-26, page 1-5.) As a show of force, visibility was extremely important. Therefore, media coverage was intense. From 17 to 27 March there were more than 500 media personnel on assignment in Honduras, representing some 160 news organizations and 11 foreign countries. The US wanted full coverage to send a clear message to the Sandinistas and others that US support of the contras and Honduras was still tangible. Golden Pheasant contributed to the 22 March cease fire. After the deployment of US soldiers, the Sandinistas withdrew from the country and began serious negotiations for peace. Golden Pheasant, a show of force, was successful.

SLIDE 2-12-8. SANDINISTA REFORMS

As a result of Operation Golden Pheasant and other actions the US took (Lesson 2, Sublesson 13, Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies), the Sandinistas instituted these reforms. The result was the ouster of the Sandinista government by popular vote in February 1990.

SLIDE 2-12-9. WHAT MADE GOLDEN PHEASANT A SUCCESS

The keys to success in a show of force are similar to what allows a unit to succeed at any METL task.

SLIDE 2-12-10. KEY POINTS

Units conducting a show of force must deploy rapidly because of the political need for timely action. As the name "show" of force would imply, media coverage is desirable and must be planned. US actions in Honduras did cause some people to question the legitimacy of the Honduran government. This is a stability and support operations principle to which units must be sensitive.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for T&EO, Demonstrate a Show of Force.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The exact operation used in the show of force is probably on the unit's METL such as conduct airborne assault or establish a lodgement. Units must be prepared for combat. A show of force is a bluff. If it is not convincing, the unit must be prepared to fight. The following lessons may be helpful to a unit preparing for a show of force operation:
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support

SHOW OF FORCE

- DEMONSTRATES UNITED STATES' RESOLVE
- DEFUSES A SITUATION THAT MAY BE DETRIMENTAL TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS OR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
- LENDS CREDIBILITY TO UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS AND INCREASES REGIONAL INFLUENCE

SLIDE 2-12-1

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- STUDY PSYCHOLOGY OF KEY DECISION MAKERS
- IDENTIFY LEGAL PARAMETERS
- IDENTIFY MORAL ISSUES AFFECTING THE NATION INVOLVED
- IDENTIFY SCOPE OF PERTINENT POLITICAL ISSUES
- IDENTIFY PERTINENT ECONOMIC ISSUES

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- **PSYCHOLOGICAL:** ANALYZE DECISION MAKERS
- **LEGAL:** TERRAIN USE RESTRICTIONS
- **POLITICAL:** EFFECTS ON COURSES OF ACTION
- **MORAL:** UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION
- **ECONOMIC:** DOES A COURSE OF ACTION HARM THE ECONOMY?
- **TERRAIN:** DOES IT ALLOW OBSERVATION?
- **WEATHER:** CONSIDER IN TERMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

SLIDE 2-12-3

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF DECISION MAKERS
- WHAT COURSES OF ACTION WOULD INCREASE OR DECREASE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR TARGET DECISION MAKERS?

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- DESCRIBE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR KEY TARGET LEADERSHIP
- DESCRIBE THREAT ACTIONS TO BE INFLUENCED
- DESCRIBE THREAT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
- DESCRIBE THREAT REACTIONS TO FRIENDLY ACTIONS
- DETERMINE WHAT FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION WOULD INFLUENCE TARGET COMPLIANCE

SLIDE 2-12-5

OPERATION GOLDEN PHEASANT 1988 BORDER INCIDENT HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA

- 3 FEB: CONGRESS VOTES TO TERMINATE AID; CONTRAS MUST DEFEND SUPPLIES
- 10 MAR: ABOUT 2,000 SANDINISTAS CROSS BORDER; POOR CONTRA RESPONSE
- HONDO REQUESTS UNITED STATES COMBAT TROOPS
- UNITED STATES REFUSES, BUT OFFERS SYMBOLIC TRAINING EXERCISE INSTEAD

OPERATION GOLDEN PHEASANT SHOW OF FORCE

- 2,000 TROOPS FROM 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION AND 1,100 FROM 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
- EXCELLENT DEPLOYABILITY
- COMBINED TRAINING WITH HONDURANS
- MEDIA COVERAGE
- CONTRIBUTED TO 23 MARCH CEASE FIRE

SLIDE 2-12-7

SANDINISTA REFORMS

- A DECADE OF UNITED STATES PRESSURE AND LOSS OF SOVIET AID MOTIVATED REFORMS
- 17 MAR 1989: 1,894 EX-NATIONAL GUARD FREED
- FREEDOM OF SPEECH INCREASED
- 25 FEB 1990: EARLY ELECTIONS
- SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT OUSTED BY 55 PERCENT OF VOTES

WHAT MADE GOLDEN PHEASANT A SUCCESS

- WE TRAINED AS WE WOULD FIGHT
- THERE WAS A STRONG CHAIN OF COMMAND
- THE UNITS WERE WELL TRAINED
- THE SOLDIERS WERE PHYSICALLY FIT, TOUGH, AND CONFIDENT
- THE FORCE WAS PREPARED TO FIGHT LIGHT
- THE SOLDIERS OF THE XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS AND THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION POSSESSED A "GO-TO-WAR" PHILOSOPHY

SLIDE 2-12-9

KEY POINTS

- **DEPLOYABILITY:** ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT COMPLETED WITHIN 33 HOURS OF FIRST AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF
- **MEDIA:** FROM 17 TO 27 MARCH, THERE WERE MORE THAN 500 MEDIA PERSONNEL ON THE GROUND IN HONDURAS
- **COMBINED TRAINING:** BY THE THIRD DAY OF THE EXERCISE, UNITED STATES INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY UNITS LINKED UP WITH THE HONDURANS TO TRAIN

SUBLESSON 2-13. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

SLIDE 2-13-1. SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

The military is usually in a support role and hopefully operating in an indirect capacity.

SLIDE 2-13-2. THE INDIRECT APPROACH

At a 1988 colloquium on LIC, General Paul Gorman, the CINC of US Southern Command, stated that "the United States armed forces will not be combat participants in the sorts of struggles that are at issue here. The role of US forces in low-intensity conflict will almost invariably be indirect, and that certainly pertains to the role of the United States armed forces in any kind of support for insurgencies abroad."

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 2-13-3 through 2-13-6 identify considerations for each step of the IPB process for support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (see FM 34-130, Chapter 6).

SLIDE 2-13-3. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The first step of the IPB process for support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is to define the battlefield environment.

SLIDE 2-13-4. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

The second step of the IPB process for support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is to describe the battlefield effects.

SLIDE 2-13-5. EVALUATE THE THREAT

The third step of the IPB process for support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is to evaluate the threat.

SLIDE 2-13-6. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

The fourth step of the IPB process for support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is to determine threat courses of action.

SLIDE 2-13-7. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

US Army engineer support for insurgency operations may range from an advisory role to support to ground forces. These may be conventional and special operations forces. During support to an insurgency, special forces units will primarily use their organic engineer personnel. There are two MOS 18C engineers per 12-man operational detachment. These soldiers provide engineer-related advice, training, and assistance to the insurgent forces. Conventional engineer units may support special forces involved in these operations. They will primarily assist from locations outside the special forces area of operations. Special forces support bases, located in nearby countries, may require sustainment engineering support. Conventional engineer forces may provide specialized training to either special forces personnel or insurgents. Topographic engineering support may be provided in the

form of standard or special products. Vertical and horizontal construction by conventional engineer units may play a key role in these operations.

SLIDE 2-13-8. ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

In counterinsurgency operations, engineers coordinate with local military and police forces regarding security, intelligence, and combined operations. Security for US engineer operations should be provided by host nation forces whenever possible. This applies to security on job sites, in base camps, and during convoys. The types of support that engineers may provide include a variety of activities. In a counterinsurgency environment, mobile training teams, technical assistants, and engineer advisors may be needed. In addition, engineer unit deployments for training may be needed. Military-civil action may be needed along with support for special operations forces or combat operations may be needed.

SLIDE 2-13-9. INSURGENCY

The US has a political system that allows for dissenting views and a peaceful transition of power. This is not the case or the perceived case everywhere in the world. Sometimes an insurgency is the result.

SLIDE 2-13-10. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

Foreign internal defense is what the units do to help another country. The other term often used in conjunction with foreign internal defense is internal defense and development strategy. Internal defense and development strategy is what a country does itself to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (FM 100-20, page 2-7.)

SLIDE 2-13-11. PREREQUISITES TO INSURGENCY

Factors necessary for an insurgency to begin are vulnerable population, leadership available for direction, and lack of government control. (See FM 90-8, page 1-2 for details.)

SLIDE 2-13-12. OTHER REQUIRED CONDITIONS

Other conditions that help foster insurgency are popular support, unity of effort, will to resist, discipline, intelligence, propaganda, favorable environment, and external support. (See FM 90-8, page 1-2 through 1-3 for details.)

SLIDE 2-13-13. PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT

Once an insurgent organization is established and begins its activities, it progresses through several phases in its efforts to overthrow the government. There is not a marked transfer from phase to phase, and an insurgency can revert from Phase III to a lower phase as the North Vietnamese did after Tet. (See FM 90-8, page 1-4 for a detailed description of the three phases.)

SLIDE 2-13-14. AIMS AND GOALS OF THE GUERRILLA
The guerrilla wants to support the overall goal of the insurgent movement, gain support for the movement, and lessen government control.

SLIDE 2-13-15. GUERRILLA STRENGTHS
The units must do a relative combat power analysis against a guerrilla just like against a conventional enemy. Units seek to pit their strengths against the guerrilla's weaknesses. The guerrilla's strengths are intelligence, indigenous characteristics, knowledge, motivation and discipline, limited responsibilities, tactics, and physical condition.

SLIDE 2-13-16. GUERRILLA WEAKNESSES
The guerrilla's weaknesses are limited personnel and resources, individual factors, and operational factors.

SLIDE 2-13-17. HONDURAS
The US campaign against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua during the 1980s was done largely by support of the contras and of Honduras. Honduras was and is very important to US policy in Central America. In 1983, retiring Army Chief of Staff General Edward Meyer stated, "I believe Honduras is a strength. I'd really like to anchor the defense of the region initially on Honduras."

SLIDE 2-13-18. SUN TZU
A quote from Sun Tzu fits exactly what the US did with regard to the Sandinistas.

SLIDE 2-13-19. INDIRECT APPROACH
The US achieved the indirect approach by three means: establishing a presence, providing helicopter assistance after a border incident in 1986, and Operation Golden Pheasant (Lesson 2, Sublesson 12, Show of Force).

SLIDE 2-13-20. PRESENCE
One way the US established a presence was by a series of military exercises conducted almost continuously in the region. Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada also had a psychological effect on the Sandinistas. Big Pine II, the largest US military exercise to date, lasted six months and involved 12,000 soldiers. It also was going on during Urgent Fury. That the next exercise after Urgent Fury was code named Grenardo, which sounds a lot like Grenada, was no accident.

SLIDE 2-13-21. EFFECT ON NICARAGUA
The effect of Big Pine II and Grenada impacted on Nicaragua militarily, economically, psychologically, diplomatically, and socially.

SLIDE 2-13-22. AIRFIELDS AND RUNWAYS
One of the byproducts of this presence was the creation or upgrade of the Honduran infrastructure. This largely took the form of airfields and runways.

SLIDE 2-13-23. RESULTS OF PRESENCE

The three results of the US presence were covert support for Contra operations, psychological war on Sandinistas, and infrastructure to make intervention possible and credible. Much of the infrastructure the US created was in the form of security assistance. The Air Force base at Palmerola became critical in Operation Golden Pheasant when twenty-three C-141s and one C-5 airlanded elements of the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division there.

SLIDE 2-13-24. 1986 BORDER INCIDENT, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA

The US became more directly involved in Honduras in 1986 after the House rejected a contra aid package and 1,500 Sandinistas crossed into Honduras. The Hondurans requested US aid, and the final package included helicopter movement of 600 Honduran soldiers to within 10 miles of the fighting. This was the first direct involvement of US troops in a Honduran military operation.

SLIDE 2-13-25. REAGAN AND GUERRILLA WAR—CHE GUEVARA

and

SLIDE 2-13-26. REAGAN AND GUERRILLA WAR—MAO

The US learned a little bit about guerrilla warfare after its bad experience in Vietnam. Based on the writings of the Che Guevara and Mao, President Reagan demonstrated a good grasp of guerrilla warfare.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The following lessons may be helpful to a unit preparing for a support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies operation:

Lesson 11, Cordon and Search Operations
Lesson 12, Search and Attack
Lesson 13, Negotiation
Lesson 15, Military Police Operations
Lesson 16, Checkpoints
Lesson 17, Army Special Operations Forces Support
Lesson 18, Close Quarters Combat
Lesson 21, Fire Support

SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

- MILITARY PREDOMINANTLY SUPPORTS UNITED STATES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INFORMATIONAL OBJECTIVES
- UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR, THROUGH THE COUNTRY TEAM, PROVIDES THE FOCAL POINT FOR INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

SLIDE 2-13-1

THE INDIRECT APPROACH

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ARE CHARACTERIZED BY THE INDIRECT VERSUS DIRECT APPROACH

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- CONSIDER STRATEGIC LOCATION TO INCLUDE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, COASTAL WATERWAYS, AND THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT
- ANALYZE HOST NATION POPULATION, GOVERNMENT, MILITARY, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND THREAT
- EVALUATE POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ECONOMICS, FOREIGN POLICY AND RELATIONS, AND POLICIES ON MILITARY USE

SLIDE 2-13-3

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- IMPACT OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER ON MOVEMENT AND AGRICULTURE
- MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS
- POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL FACTORS

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- INCLUDE "PERSONALITIES" IN THE ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS; LOOK AT THE FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY OF EACH INDIVIDUAL
- CONSIDER WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO THE INSURGENCY; THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE WEAPONS MAY BE AN INDICATOR OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
- CONSIDER UNIT ORGANIZATION
- ANALYZE MOVEMENT PATTERNS
- CONSIDER WHERE THE INSURGENT WORKS AND LIVES

SLIDE 2-13-5

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- TEMPLATE ACTIVITY NEAR THE OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS AWAY FROM IT
- TEMPLATE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
- ROLE PLAY THE POPULATION
- TRAP OVERLAY

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

- SPECIAL FORCES ORGANIC ENGINEER CAPABILITY
- ADDITIONAL SUPPORT LIKELY TO COME FROM OUTSIDE AREA OF OPERATIONS
- SPECIALIZED TRAINING
- TOPOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS

SLIDE 2-13-7

ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

- ENGINEERS WORK IN CONJUNCTION WITH HOST NATION
- MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, ENGINEER ADVISORS MAY BE NEEDED
- ENGINEER UNIT DEPLOYMENTS FOR TRAINING MAY BE NEEDED
- MILITARY CIVIC ACTION MAY BE NEEDED
- SUPPORT TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES OR COMBAT OPERATIONS MAY BE NEEDED

INSURGENCY

AN ORGANIZED, ARMED POLITICAL STRUGGLE WHOSE GOAL MAY BE THE SEIZURE OF POWER THROUGH REVOLUTIONARY TAKE OVER AND REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT

SLIDE 2-13-9

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

PARTICIPATION BY CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AGENCIES OF A GOVERNMENT IN ANY OF THE ACTION PROGRAMS TAKEN BY ANOTHER GOVERNMENT TO FREE AND PROTECT ITS SOCIETY FROM SUBVERSION, LAWLESSNESS, AND INSURGENCY

PREREQUISITES TO INSURGENCY

- VULNERABLE POPULATION
- LEADERSHIP AVAILABLE FOR DIRECTION
- LACK OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL

SLIDE 2-13-11

OTHER REQUIRED CONDITIONS

- POPULAR SUPPORT
- UNITY OF EFFORT
- WILL TO RESIST
- LEADERSHIP
- DISCIPLINE
- INTELLIGENCE
- PROPAGANDA
- FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT
- EXTERNAL SUPPORT

PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT

- LATENT AND INCIPIENT
- GUERRILLA WARFARE
- WAR OF MOVEMENT

SLIDE 2-13-13

AIMS AND GOALS OF THE GUERRILLA

- SUPPORT OVERALL GOAL OF THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT
- GAIN SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT MOVEMENT
- INCREASE POPULATION'S VULNERABILITY
- LESSEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL
- PROVIDE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORIES
- TIE-UP GOVERNMENT RESOURCES
- WEAKEN RESOLVE OF GOVERNMENT MILITARY FORCES

GUERRILLA STRENGTHS

- INTELLIGENCE
- INDIGENOUS CHARACTERISTICS
- KNOWLEDGE
- MOTIVATION AND DISCIPLINE
- LIMITED RESPONSIBILITIES
- TACTICS
- PHYSICAL CONDITION

SLIDE 2-13-15

GUERRILLA WEAKNESSES

- LIMITED PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES
- INDIVIDUAL FACTORS:
  - PHYSICAL DANGER AND PRIVATION
  - FEAR OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
  - CONSTANT COMBAT
- OPERATIONAL FACTORS:
  - SECURITY
  - BASES DIFFICULT TO ACQUIRE
  - LACK OF TECHNOLOGY

HONDURAS

- BORDERS WITH EL SALVADOR, NICARAGUA, AND GUATEMALA
- COMPLIANT GOVERNMENT
- AFRAID OF NICARAGUA

SLIDE 2-13-17

SUN TZU

"... TO WIN ONE HUNDRED VICTORIES IN ONE HUNDRED BATTLES IS NOT THE ACME OF SKILL. TO SUBDUE THE ENEMY WITHOUT FIGHTING IS THE ACME OF SKILL."

INDIRECT APPROACH

- PRESENCE
- 1986 HELICOPTER ASSISTANCE
- OPERATION GOLDEN PHEASANT

SLIDE 2-13-19

PRESENCE

- HALCON VISTA, OCT 1981
- COMBINED MOVEMENT, JUL 1982
- BIG PINE, FEB 1983
- BIG PINE II, AUG 1983-JAN 1984
- GRENARDO I, APR 1984
- BIG PINE III, JAN-APR 1985
- UNIVERSAL TREK, APR-MAY 1985
- SOLID SHIELD, MAY 1987

EFFECT ON NICARAGUA

- MOBILIZED POPULATION TO DEFEND COUNTRY
- WORKERS PULLED FROM JOBS
- PRODUCTION CAME TO A STANDSTILL
- CITIZENS DUG AIR RAID SHELTERS
- 1,000 CUBAN ADVISORS ORDERED BACK TO CUBA
- AMNESTY PROGRAM FOR MISKITO INDIANS
- SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS KEPT LOWER PROFILE
- CANCELED PLANS FOR AIRDROP TO GUERRILLAS IN HONDURAS
- TEMPORARY RELAXATION OF PRESS CENSORSHIP
- TIMING OF 1984 ELECTIONS

SLIDE 2-13-21

AIRFIELDS AND RUNWAYS

- DURZUNA
- PUERTO LEMPIRA
- AGUACATE
- SAN LORENZO
- TRUJILLO
- LA CEIBA
- LA MESA
- PALMEROLA

RESULTS OF PRESENCE

- COVERT SUPPORT FOR CONTRA OPERATIONS
- PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR ON SANDINISTAS
- INFRASTRUCTURE TO MAKE INTERVENTION POSSIBLE AND CREDIBLE

SLIDE 2-13-23

1986 BORDER INCIDENT HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA

- HOUSE REJECTS AID PACKAGE; WITHIN 48 HOURS 1,500 SANDINISTAS CROSS HONDURAN BORDER
- HONDO REQUESTS UNITED STATES' AID ON 24 MARCH
- UNITED STATES APPROVES $29 MILLION PACKAGE
- 10 HUEYS AND 4 CHINOOKS TRANSPORT 600 HONDURAN SOLDIERS
- FIRST DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF UNITED STATES SOLDIERS IN A HONDURAN MILITARY OPERATION
- POLITICAL FAUX PAS FOR ORTEGA

SLIDE 2-13-24

REAGAN AND GUERRILLA WAR—CHE GUEVARA

- "FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE... THAT NO BATTLE, COMBAT, OR SKIRMISH IS TO BE FOUGHT UNLESS IT CAN BE WON"
- "PROCEED TO THE GRADUAL WEAKENING OF THE ENEMY"
- "THE BLOWS SHOULD BE CONTINUOUS"
- "THE STRIKE IS A MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN CIVIL WAR"
- "IT IS ESSENTIAL ALWAYS TO PRESERVE A STRONG BASE OF OPERATIONS AND TO CONTINUE STRENGTHENING IT DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR"
- "TRIUMPH WILL ALWAYS BE THE PRODUCT OF A REGULAR ARMY, EVEN THOUGH ITS ORIGINS ARE IN A GUERRILLA ARMY"
- "... THE ACTION CANNOT ENDURE FOR LONG, BUT MUST BE RAPID; IT MUST BE OF A HIGH DEGREE OF EFFECTIVENESS, LAST A FEW MINUTES, AND BE FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL"
- "THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEAL SHOULD BE DIFFUSED BY MEANS OF APPROPRIATE MEDIA TO THE GREATEST DEPTH POSSIBLE"
- "THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER MUST HAVE A DEGREE OF ADAPTABILITY THAT WILL PERMIT HIM TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF WITH THE ENVIRONMENT"

SLIDE 2-13-25

REAGAN AND GUERRILLA WAR—MAO

- "MILITARY ACTION IS A METHOD USED TO ATTAIN A POLITICAL GOAL"
- "THE PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF GUERRILLAS ARE THREE: FIRST, TO CONDUCT WAR ON EXTERIOR LINES; THAT IS, IN THE REAR OF THE ENEMY; SECOND, TO ESTABLISH BASES; AND LAST, TO EXTEND THE WAR AREAS"
- "HER [JAPAN'S] MANPOWER AND HER RAW MATERIALS, AND HER FINANCIAL RESOURCES ARE ALL INADEQUATE AND INSUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN HER IN PROTRACTED WAR"
- "DESTROYING [THE] ENEMY'S NATIONAL STRENGTH"
- LEADERS SHOULD BE "UNYIELDING IN THEIR POLICIES—RESOLUTE, LOYAL, SINCERE, AND ROBUST"

SUBLESSON 2-14. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

SLIDE 2-14-1. ATTACKS AND RAIDS

Attacks defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy. Raids are limited-objective attacks into enemy territory for a specific purpose other than gaining and holding ground.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Units tasked to perform attacks and raids probably have the task on their METL and routinely train for it. Therefore, no additional information is provided in this manual.

ATTACK S AND RAIDS

- ATTACKS AND RAIDS ARE USED TO CREATE SITUATIONS THAT PERMIT SEIZING AND MAINTAINING POLITICAL AND MILITARY INITIATIVE
- ATTACKS DAMAGE OR DESTROY HIGH-VALUE TARGETS OR DEMONSTRATE UNITED STATES CAPABILITY AND RESOLVE TO ACHIEVE A FAVORABLE RESULT
- RAIDS ARE USUALLY SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS INVOLVING SWIFT PENETRATION OF HOSTILE TERRITORY TO SECURE INFORMATION, TEMPORARILY SEIZE AN OBJECTIVE, OR DESTROY A TARGET

LESSON 3. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SLIDE 3-1. FEDERAL AGENCIES OTHER THAN DOD

One of the principles of stability and support operations is unity of effort. Many different agencies will be involved, and many times the military will not be the lead agency. The federal agencies other than the Department of Defense that may be involved in stability and support operations include Department of Agriculture, American Red Cross, and Federal Emergency Management Agency.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Table 3-1 shows the agencies that have a primary or support role in different activities.

SLIDE 3-2. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Active duty and National Guard units have been called upon to fight fires, particularly in the western states. The US Forest Service falls under the USDA.

SLIDE 3-3. AMERICAN RED CROSS

The American Red Cross is the lead agency for mass care.

SLIDE 3-4. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

FEMA is the lead agency for information and planning in response to domestic emergencies. The ARC and the FEMA are active players in disaster operations.

SLIDE 3-5. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Posse Comitatus Act limits the role that federal forces can play in law enforcement. The Department of Justice has the lead in counterdrug operations as a stability and support operations activity.

SLIDE 3-6. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The military is just one of our nation's foreign policy tools. Military objectives must support political objectives. The military receives guidance from the Department of State in all overseas stability and support operations. The military begins liaison with the Department of State through the country team.

SLIDE 3-7. THE COUNTRY TEAM

The country team is a multidepartment organization that helps the chief of the mission to do his job. While the composition may vary, typical representatives are security assistance organization, embassy staff, and US information service. The military is represented primarily by the defense attache and the chief of security assistance.

SLIDE 3-8. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

Two of the stability and support operations activities are peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The UN seeks to maintain international peace and security. Two of the charter's chapters (VI and VII) address conditions under which the UN becomes militarily involved.

SLIDE 3-9. UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

The UN contains six components—security council, secretary general, general assembly, military staff committee, secretariat, and field operations directorate.

SLIDE 3-10. SECURITY COUNCIL
The Security Council investigates any situation or conflict that threatens international peace and security, then usually tasks the Secretary General with preparing a plan.

SLIDE 3-11. SECRETARY GENERAL
The Secretary General is responsible for the organization, conduct, and direction of UN peacekeeping operations. He conducts negotiations, prepares the operational plan, and submits it to the Security Council for approval.

SLIDE 3-12. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FM 100-23 says that the General Assembly's powers in conflict resolution are not well defined. All it can do is make nonbinding resolutions.

SLIDE 3-13. MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE
Originally, the Military Staff Committee advised and assisted the Security Council and the Secretary General on matters of military concern. The MSC is usually composed of a small number of military officers contracted or seconded to the UN for a specified period. As such, it is somewhat of an international joint staff. However, cold war tensions and a lack of cooperation have not allowed the MSC to live up to these expectations.

SLIDE 3-14. SECRETARIAT
This is the UN's civil service. The Secretariat is responsible for the establishment, coordination, and administration of peacekeeping operations. Key members of the Secretariat are the Under Secretary of Political Affairs, the Under Secretary General Services, the Officer of General Services, and the Field Operations Directorate. The Field Operations Directorate provides the administrative and logistics support for peacekeeping operations.

SLIDE 3-15. FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS DIVISION
Each UN peace operation will have a UN official on staff. This official commands the deployed elements of the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD). This official is responsible for all matters related to the operation. The official is usually a career UN civil servant. The FALD, in coordination with selected military staff officers, is also responsible for negotiating the SOFA, receiving and dispatching UN personnel, and establishing administrative and logistic SOPs.




Table 3-1. Emergency support assignment matrix.

FEDERAL AGENCIES OTHER THAN DOD

- DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
- ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
- FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
- DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
- DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
- NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
- AMERICAN RED CROSS
- DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
- DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
- GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
- DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
- DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
- NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

- LEAD AGENCY FOR FOOD AND FIRE FIGHTING
- UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE IS UNDER DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

SLIDE 3-2

AMERICAN RED CROSS

- AMERICA'S OFFICIAL VOLUNTEER DISASTER RELIEF AGENCY
- LEAD AGENCY FOR MASS CARE

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

- FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S EXECUTIVE AGENCY FOR IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE TO A STATE AND ITS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
- LEAD AGENCY FOR INFORMATION AND PLANNING

SLIDE 3-4

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERDRUG
- INCLUDES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN OVERSEAS POLICIES
- MANAGES UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SLIDE 3-6

THE COUNTRY TEAM

- CHIEF OF MISSION'S MAJOR TOOL TO FULFILL HIS RESPONSIBILITIES
- FACILITATES IN-COUNTRY, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION
- COMPOSITION CAN VARY; TYPICALLY INCLUDES THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION, UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, EMBASSY STAFF, UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE, AND OTHER AGENCIES
- PRINCIPAL MILITARY MEMBERS ARE THE DEFENSE ATTACHE AND THE CHIEF OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

- PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IS THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
- CHAPTER VI ENCOURAGES STATES TO SEEK PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THEIR DISPUTES; IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN SUCH DISPUTES WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED
- CHAPTER VII ADDRESSES ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

- SECURITY COUNCIL
- SECRETARY GENERAL
- GENERAL ASSEMBLY
- MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE
- SECRETARIAT
- FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

SECURITY COUNCIL

- INVESTIGATES ANY SITUATION OR CONFLICT THAT THREATENS INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
- USUALLY TASKS SECRETARY GENERAL WITH PREPARING A PLAN

SLIDE 3-10

SECRETARY GENERAL

- RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ORGANIZATION, CONDUCT, AND DIRECTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
- CONDUCTS NEGOTIATIONS, PREPARES OPERATIONAL PLAN AND SUBMITS IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR APPROVAL

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

- ITS RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT BINDING
- ITS POWERS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION ARE NOT WELL DEFINED

SLIDE 3-12

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

- ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO ADVISE AND ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON MILITARY MATTERS
- COMPOSED OF A SMALL NUMBER OF MILITARY OFFICERS CONTRACTED OR SECONDED TO THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD
- ENVISIONED AS AN INTERNATIONAL JOINT STAFF THAT HAS NOT MATERIALIZED AS SUCH BECAUSE OF COLD WAR TENSIONS AND LACK OF COOPERATION

SECRETARIAT

- HEADED BY SECRETARY GENERAL
- RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, COORDINATION, AND ADMINISTRATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
- IS THE UNITED NATIONS CIVIL SERVICE
- UNDER SECRETARY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICY AND CONTROL OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
- UNDER SECRETARY OF GENERAL SERVICES RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION, FINANCIAL, AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
- OFFICE OF GENERAL SERVICES AND THE FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE PROVIDES ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

SLIDE 3-14

FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS DIVISION

- EACH UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATION WILL HAVE A UNITED NATIONS OFFICIAL ON STAFF
- THIS OFFICIAL COMMANDS THE DEPLOYED ELEMENTS OF THE FALD
- THIS OFFICIAL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MATTERS RELATED TO THE OPERATION
- THE OFFICIAL IS USUALLY A CAREER UNITED NATIONS CIVIL SERVANT
- THE FALD IS RESPONSIBLE FOR—
  - NEGOTIATING THE SOFA
  - RECEIVING AND DISPATCHING UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL
  - ESTABLISHING ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTIC SOPs

LESSON 4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT APPLICATION

SLIDE 4-1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

These are directives that specify the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and or continue combat. Rules of engagement incorporate domestic and international law, operational concerns, and political considerations. As military operations shift from peace to crisis or war and then back to peace, ROE are the primary means by which the commander conveys to his force the requirements stemming from these three distinct, but overlapping influences.

The rules of engagement followed by brigades and battalions in stability and support operations are based on ROE given to the commander's in chief of the unified commands by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Unless, they are superseded with ROE for a specific contingency operation or for prolonged hostilities, the CJCS Standing ROE for United States Forces (CJCS Instruction 3121.01) are enforced. Examples of stability and support operations in which the CJCS Standing ROE are superseded include domestic civil disturbance and disaster relief operations, and peacekeeping or other peace operations under the operational control of multinational command. The core of the CJCS Standing ROE document is unclassified. The supplemental rules that may be requested from CJCS are classified.

Leaders must ensure that soldiers know the rules of engagement and that the rules do not take away their right to self-defense. Leaders must ensure that each soldier has a ROE card and that he carries it with him at all times. Soldiers must know when they can use deadly force. They must know the classification level of the ROE, and they must know the tents of the Posse Comitatus Act.

Military personnel operating within the US may not participate directly—

- In arrest, search, and seizure, stop and frisk, or interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.
- In surveillance or pursuit.
- As informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.

SLIDE 4-2. MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN, TROOPS AND TIME AVAILABLE

Generally in wartime the commander, through ROE, will permit a wider use of military force. However, ROE restrict the use of military force to the achievement of the political objectives. In all operations, the commander is legally responsible for the care and treatment of civilians and property within the area of operations until transfer to a proper government. ROE assist the commander in fulfilling these responsibilities. ROE have varied in different conflicts and often changed during the respective phases from combat or crisis through peace-building or nation-assistance. Even during a single phase and operation, the rules have been amended at the different levels of command, which may have resulted in confusion. Also, rules appropriate for a particular operation may not be appropriate for another. ROE must be based on METT-T to include any restrictions that fall between the established peacetime ROE and those ROE normally associated with hostilities (wartime). When necessary, command guidance is needed to clarify ROE. While the rules must be tailored to the occasion, commanders should observe that nothing in such rules negates his obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action in unit self-defense.

SLIDE 4-3. SAMPLE ROE ISSUES

Additionally, the rules should concisely establish guidance for the search and seizure of inhabitants, the authority of local security patrols, the control of black market operations, and surrender of hostile personnel.

SLIDE 4-4. USE OF FORCE GUIDELINES

Planning for the use of force in peace operations should be influenced by the following guidelines.

a. **Firmness.** The commander's will and ability to use force as the last resort are essential to surviving hostile threats to personnel or mission fulfillment.

b. **Preliminary Warning.** In traditional peacekeeping, the parties in conflict should be informed of the circumstances in which peacekeepers might be obliged to use force. Warning procedures for each circumstance should be provided to the belligerent parties, ideally in their language. (In operations that go beyond traditional peacekeeping and in peace enforcement operations, where the consent and general good will of the parties is absent or questionable, command judgment and circumstances may require different procedures.)

c. **Anticipation.** Analysis of information may permit a timely deployment to a threatened area before the danger becomes serious. Commanders plan the manner in which the force will be used.

d. **Restraint.** In all cases, restraint remains a principle of peace operations. Restraint should guide all actions, in particular collateral damage, post-conflict objectives and desired end states, the legitimacy of the operation, and authorities involved. Certain key considerations that govern the use of force follow.

SLIDE 4-5. KEY CONSIDERATIONS

Forces use only the minimum force required to accomplish the mission. This consideration should control both the selection of operational techniques and tactics and the choice of options. The use of deadly force is authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain criteria are met.

a. First, lesser means have been exhausted or are unavailable.

b. Second, the risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons is not significantly increased by its use.

c. Third, the purpose of its use is one or more of the following.

Self-defense to avoid death or serious bodily harm. A unit commander has the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate action to defend the unit against hostile acts and hostile intent. Deadly force is always authorized to defend against an attack or to prevent attacks causing death or serious bodily injuries to others. The use of deadly force may be expanded depending on mission requirements. Nondeadly force is appropriate to control disturbances, to prevent crime, and to apprehend or detain persons who have committed crimes. The degree of force used must be no greater than that necessary under the circumstances.

SLIDE 4-6. TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION OF PERSONNEL

All commanders must instruct their forces carefully as to the rules of engagement and to the laws that govern armed conflict, with emphasis placed on the following.

a. All military operations, particularly in built-up or populated areas, are conducted using only that degree of force necessary and proportionate to accomplish the military mission.

b. In the conduct of operations, forces must make every effort to avoid injury to noncombatants and damage to civilian property or facilities.

c. Forces must not damage specially protected property (such as hospitals, schools, churches, cultural monuments) and similar facilities, which are not to be attacked unless they are being used by the enemy for military operations or purposes. If the tactical situation permits, when hostile forces are using facilities in these categories for military purposes, approval must be obtained before firing on the facilities. Hospitals are to be given special protection. If the enemy uses a hospital for hostile purposes, it may be engaged. However, a warning must be given, and no attack may be conducted until a reasonable time has elapsed.

d. Medical service emblems (the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the Red Shield of David) will be respected, and the personnel and facilities under their protection will not be attacked, harmed, or hindered in the conduct of their humanitarian functions.

e. Looting is prohibited. Personnel must avoid the appearance of looting and participating in the "spoils of war." Personal private property found in the area of responsibility is never a war trophy. Captured ammunition, firearms, and cash become the property of the US government. Taking legitimate war trophies must be authorized only by the appropriate authority.

f. No person will kill or wound any enemy who has surrendered; is unfit for combat by reason of sickness, wounds, or shipwreck; or is descending by parachute from a disabled aircraft. Anyone expressing a clear intention to surrender and not trying to escape capture may not be attacked. It is forbidden to declare that no quarters will be given or that no prisoners will be taken. Captured and detained persons will be afforded humane treatment. Medical care will be provided for sick or wounded captives on the same basis as provided for US forces.

g. ROE will be incorporated into every OPLAN and OPORD. Where time permits, ROE cards will be prepared and distributed to all personnel. ROE supplements are prepared and distributed to units as necessary. Mission-specific ROE usually do not replace the standard ROE.

h. Normally, the assistant chief of staff in a division is responsible for the coordination and development of all ROE. The staff judge advocate (SJA) reviews all ROE in coordination with the assistant chief of staff G3.

i. In the event changes to published ROE are required or requested by subordinate commands, the changes must be reviewed by the appropriate authority for his approval.

j. By order of the President, commanders may use toxic chemical munitions, riot control agents, or herbicides during war or combat operations only if National Command Authority (NCA) release approval is delegated to that commander. Where use of riot control agents in defensive modes to save lives is required, commanders must submit requests through command channels for approval. (Pepper spray is an RCA.)

k. Commanders are responsible for educating their personnel about the law of war. If all personnel know their individual responsibility, war crimes can be prevented. Commanders at all levels must ensure that all personnel seek clarification of orders that appear to violate the law of war. Personnel should be informed that "obeying a superior's orders" is not a legal defense to a war crime.

l. Personnel always report all violations or alleged violations of the law of war or the ROE through the chain of command to appropriate authority. Examples of proper authorities for reporting law of war violations include chaplains, judge advocates, or inspectors. All war crimes and similar criminal violations, whether believed to be committed by enemy or US or friendly forces, must be reported immediately through command channels to proper authority.

SLIDE 4-7. ROE TRAINING METHODS

Frequently, ROE are not understood and are not clearly or comprehensively written. These rules can be too detailed or too complex, and they can be ignored by the individual soldier. To compound this problem, units forget to have ROE rehearsals or training in the use of ROE. Two methods of training and rehearsing ROE are dilemma and vignette training. In both methods, the training can be conducted in a classroom environment or in a field training environment using lane training to add realism.

ROE dilemma method provides the soldier with a dilemma and offers a sequential order of actions the soldier should take to react to the dilemma. (See Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for sample ROE, and Figure 4-3 for example ROE dilemmas.)

ROE vignette training method poses the soldier with a detailed situation that requires the soldier to state or act out his solution to the posed situation. The trainer can also require the soldier to state the applicable part of the ROE from which he derived his solution. (See Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for sample ROE, and Figure 4-4 for sample ROE vignettes.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The sample ROE, dilemmas, and vignettes in Figures 4-1 through 4-4 are examples only. The unit will develop dilemmas, vignettes, and appropriate soldier responses according to METT-T and the ROE. Although the ROE will rule out certain responses and will insist that the soldier take the initiative to defend himself and fellow soldiers, there are no standard solutions. The examples provided and those developed by the unit are to encourage discussion within the unit to ensure all soldiers know the ROE.

SLIDE 4-8. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC POLITICAL CONTROL

An example of how ROE impacts on the military is the 1965-1966 intervention in the Dominican Republic. Political dominance is the first of the low-intensity conflict imperatives listed in FM 7-98 (page 1-2). It is incorporated into the FM 100-5 principles of stability and support operations under the principle of objective.

SLIDE 4-9. TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
There will be some sort of tactical rules of engagement in all stability and support operations activities. Some of the factors that influenced the tactical rules of engagement in the Dominican Republic were President Johnson's claims of neutrality; the ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict; and the fact that Santo Domingo was a tinder box of a city that could not stand much abuse. There was confusion over who was who, and the usual soldier problems.

SLIDE 4-10. WEAPONS TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
The initial tactical rules of engagement concerning the heavy weapons made sense.

SLIDE 4-11. ENGAGEMENT TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
What followed, however, did not. The initial tactical rules of engagement of *do not fire unless fired upon* was understandable given the situation. When this changed, however, to *do not fire unless your position is in imminent danger of being overrun*, force protection and morale problems developed. Now snipers (a major threat in stability and support operations) could engage US soldiers, but (within the limits of the new tactical rules of engagement) the US soldiers could not fire back.

SLIDE 4-12. HIGHER HEADQUARTERS RESTRICTIONS
Some of the other restrictions imposed upon the soldiers in the Dominican Republic were understandable, such as no flamethrowers in an urban area. Others, such as not being able to light areas at night, created security and force protection problems.

SLIDE 4-13. REBEL EXPLOITATION OF THE TACTICAL ROE
The rebels soon caught on to the tactical rules of engagement and took full advantage of them. Snipers were the cause of most of the US casualties in the Dominican Republic.

SLIDES 4-14. DISCIPLINE
In spite of these unrealistic limitations, the US soldiers performed well in the Dominican Republic. Most accounts of the intervention include exceptional soldier discipline.

EXTRACT FROM TF MOUNTAIN OPLAN 93-2 (OPERATION RESTORE HOPE)

1. (U) Situation. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

2. (U) Mission. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of the Operation.

(1) (U) If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders.

(2) (U) NOTHING IN THESE RULES NEGATES YOUR INHERENT RIGHT TO USE REASONABLE FORCE TO DEFEND YOURSELF AGAINST DANGEROUS PERSONAL ATTACK.

(3) (U) These rules of self-protection and rules of engagement are not intended to infringe upon your right of self-defense. These rules are intended to prevent indiscriminate use of force or other violations of law or regulation.

(4) (U) Commanders will instruct their personnel on their mission. This includes the importance of proper conduct and regard for the local population and the need to respect private property and public facilities. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply in an overseas area. Expect that all missions will have the inherent task of force security and protection.

(5) (U) ROE cards will be distributed to each deploying soldier.

b. (U) Rules of Self-Protection for All Soldiers.

(1) (U) US forces will protect themselves from threats of death or serious bodily harm. Deadly force may be used to defend your life, the life of another US soldier, or the lives of persons in areas under US control. You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defense if—

(a) (U) You are fired upon.

(b) (U) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life.

(c) (U) There is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your presence.

(2) (U) Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unit leaders or individual soldiers if their leaders are not present. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against US forces or other persons in those areas under the control of US forces. Factors you may consider/include—

(a) (U) Weapons: Are they present? What types?

(b) (U) Size of opposing force?

(c) (U) If weapons are present, the manner in which they are displayed; that is, are they being aimed? Are the weapons part of a firing position?

(d) (U) How did the opposing force respond to the US forces?

(e) (U) How does the opposing force act toward unarmed civilians?

(f) (U) Other aggressive actions?

(3) (U) You may detain persons threatening or using force that would cause death, serious bodily harm, or cause interference with mission accomplishment. You may detain persons who commit criminal acts in areas under US control. Detainees should be given to military police as soon as possible for evacuation to central collection points. (See paragraph 3d below.)

c. (U) Rules of Engagement. The relief property, foodstuffs, medical supplies, building materials, and other end items belong to the relief agencies distributing the supplies until they are actually distributed to the populace. Your mission includes safe transit of these materials to the populace.

(1) (U) Deadly force may be used only when—

(a) (U) Fired upon.

(b) (U) Clear evidence of hostile intent exists (see above for factors to consider to determine hostile intent).

(c) (U) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten—

1. (U) Human life.

2. (U) Sensitive equipment and aircraft.

3. (U) Open and free passage of relief supplies.

(2) (U) In situations where deadly force is not appropriate, use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission.

(3) (U) Patrols are authorized to protect relief supplies, US forces, and other persons in those areas under the control of US

Figure 4-1. Sample rules of engagement.

forces. Patrols may use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposing forces that evidence a hostile intent. Nondeadly force or a show of force should be used if the security of US forces is not compromised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes—

(a) (U) An order to disband or disperse.

(b) (U) A show of force/threat of force by US forces that is greater than the force threatened by the opposing force.

(c) (U) Warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocent civilians or the opposing force.

(d) (U) Other means of nondeadly force.

(e) (U) If this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandon its hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate.

(4) (U) Use of barbed wire fences is authorized.

(5) (U) Unattended means of force (for example, mines, booby traps, trip guns) are not authorized.

(6) (U) If US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces will use the minimum amount of force reasonably necessary to overcome the threat. A graduated response to unarmed hostile elements may be used. Such a response can include—

(a) (U) Oral warnings to demonstrators in their native language.

(b) (U) Show of force, including the use of riot control formations (see below for rules about using riot control agents).

(c) (U) Warning shots fired over the heads of the hostile elements.

(d) (U) Other reasonable uses of force, to include deadly force when the element demonstrates a hostile intent, which are necessary and proportional to the threat.

(7) (U) All weapon systems may be employed throughout the area of operations unless otherwise prohibited. The use of weapon systems must be appropriate and proportional considering the threat.

(8) (U) US forces will not endanger or exploit the property of the local population without their explicit approval. Use of civilian property will usually be compensated by contract or other form of payment. Property that has been used for the purpose of hindering our mission will be confiscated. Weapons may be confiscated and demilitarized if they are used to interfere with the mission of US forces. (See rule (10) below.)

(9) (U) Operations will not be conducted outside of the landmass, airspace, and territorial seas of Cortina.

(a) (U) However, any US Army Central Command force conducting a search and rescue mission shall use force as necessary and intrude into the landmass, airspace, or territorial sea of any country necessary to recover friendly forces.

(10) (U) Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to US forces and the relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area of operations.

(a) (U) If an armed individual or weapons crew demonstrate hostile intentions, they may be engaged with deadly force.

(b) (U) If an armed individual or weapons crew commit criminal acts but do not demonstrate hostile intentions, US forces will use the minimum amount of force necessary to detain them.

(c) (U) Crew-served weapons are any weapon system that requires more than one individual to operate. Crew-served weapons include, but are not limited to, tanks, artillery pieces, antiaircraft guns, mortars, and machine guns.

(11) (U) Within those areas under the control of US forces, armed individuals may be considered a threat to US forces and the relief effort whether or not the individual demonstrates hostile intent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarm and demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under the control of US forces. In the absence of a hostile or criminal act, individuals and associated vehicles will be released after any weapons are removed or demilitarized.

d. (U) Use of Riot Control Agents. Use of riot control agents requires the approval of the combined joint task force. When authorized, riot control agents may be used for the purposes including, but not limited to—

Figure 4-1. Sample rules of engagement (continued).

(1) (U) Riot control in the division area of operations including the dispersal of civilians who obstruct roadways or otherwise impede distribution operations after lesser means have failed to result in dispersal.

(2) (U) Riot control in detainee holding areas or camps, in an around material distribution or storage areas.

(3) (U) To protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, or paramilitary groups.

e. (U) Detention of Personnel. Personnel who interfere with the accomplishment of the mission or who use or threaten deadly force against US forces, relief material distribution sites, or convoys may be detained. Persons who commit criminal acts in areas under the control of US forces may likewise be detained.

(1) (U) Detained personnel will be treated with respect and dignity.

(2) (U) Detained personnel will be evacuated to a designated location for turnover to military police.

4. (U) Service Support. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

5. (U) Command and Signal. Basic OPLAN/OPORD. Acknowledge

JONES
MG

OFFICIAL

SMITH
Staff Judge Advocate

Figure 4-1. Sample rules of engagement (continued).

NOTHING IN THESE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT.

A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.

B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.

C. When US forces are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.

D. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.

E. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.

REMEMBER

1. The United States is NOT at war.
2. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.
3. Use minimum force to carry out the mission.
4. Always be prepared to act in self-defense.

Figure 4-2. Sample rules of engagement for ground forces used during Operation Restore Hope.

DILEMMA	OUR RESPONSE
1. Receive sniper fire.	Take cover; employ smoke, protect wounded; identify sniper locations; monitor sniper. Report to chain of command. Request battalion countersnipers.
2. Enemy activity (shooting, enemy presence, and so forth) encountered from hospital, church, shrine, school, museum, historical/cultural site.	Report to higher headquarters. Take cover, use deadly force to protect yourself if you are threatened with death or serious bodily harm. Secure local area; prevent enemy escape. Request assistance from civil authorities. Enter the building only if— —Authorized by higher headquarters. —Required to prevent loss of US/host nation lives. —You have the ability to secure yourself against baited ambush.
3. Enemy is holding hostages.	Report to higher headquarters. Allow civil authorities to handle. If hostage is in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or death— —Employ CS to separate captive from captors; care for captive; engage or capture enemy. —Use deadly force to protect US/host nation lives.

Figure 4-3. Sample rules of engagement dilemmas used by JTF-LA during the 1992 Los Angeles riots.

DILEMMA	OUR RESPONSE
4. Children or teenagers employ deadly force against friendly forces.	Take cover. Report to higher headquarters. If possible, employ CS to reduce threat; then detain and process as EPWs. Employ deadly force for self-defense.
5. Clandestine surveillance OP position compromised.	Report to higher headquarters. Move to alternate position.
6. Civil authority does not possess valid identification.	Report to higher headquarters. Retain and process as EPW (five S's); secure local area.
7. Armed civilians appear to be guarding their property.	Report to higher headquarters. Report to local authorities.

Figure 4-3. Sample rules of engagement dilemmas used by JTF-LA during the 1992 Los Angeles riots (continued).

1. **Situation:** You are on guard on the perimeter of your base camp. You observe X country personnel firing from behind some rocks on a hillside at your defensive positions. You estimate that they are approximately 300 meters away. What are your actions?

Solution: Return fire and report.

Applicable ROE: Deadly force may be used to defend your life or the life of another soldier or an innocent other.

2. **Situation:** You are walking to a work site outside the base camp. A group of four X country personnel appear walking toward you about 50 to 60 meters away. They are armed with AK-47s. They appear to be 11 or 12 years old. They point at you and stop. One raises his weapon toward you and fires a round. What do you do?

Solution: Return fire and report.

Applicable ROE: Deadly force may be used to defend your life or the life of another soldier or an innocent other.

3. **Situation:** You are manning the perimeter of your base camp and you observe an X country person in the vicinity of the wire several evenings in a row. Somehow, this same person makes his way into the camp one evening and you see him heading toward the command post.

Solution: Order him to stop. If necessary, physically stop him or fire a warning shot. Escalate force as necessary to detain him. Report and request military police support.

Applicable ROE: Detention of personnel. Personnel who interfere with the accomplishment of the mission or who otherwise use or threaten deadly force against US soldiers, material distribution sites, or convoys may be detained and evacuated to a central location.

4. **Situation:** You are in a vehicle traveling through a town. Young men and women are clustered near the road. As you slow down to go by, they point to their mouths, asking for food. You continue on your mission. They begin to shout and throw rocks. Several rocks hit your vehicle. A soldier riding in the back is hit in the shoulder. Your side mirror is hit and broken. What do you do?

Solution: Move out of the area as rapidly as possible and report.

Applicable ROE: The rules of engagement prevent indiscriminate use of force. US forces will protect themselves from threats of death or serious bodily harm.

5. **Situation:** You are on guard near a food distribution site. There is a populated X country village about 300 meters away. Two shots are fired from the village and you hear the rounds whiz by. You think you saw a muzzle flash from one of the huts/homes. What do you do?

Solution: Take cover, continue to observe, and report. A careful assessment must be made of the risk to innocent bystanders before making a decision on returning fire. If returning fire, use the weapon least likely to cause collateral damage, that is, single aimed rifle shots instead of automatic rifle fire or grenade launchers.

Applicable ROE: Use deadly force when use will not significantly increase the risk of death or serious bodily harm to innocent persons.

6. **Situation:** You are amidst some X country refugees at their refugee camp. You observe X country personnel stealing boxes of food from a storage area, and they are running away. What are your actions?

Solution: Order them to stop. Attempt to stop them and return the food. Report, request MP support, and continue to observe.

Applicable ROE: Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. This includes the requirement for marshalling area, convoy, and distribution site security.

7. **Situation:** You are riding in the back of the fourth vehicle of a convoy moving down the main supply route. You hear shots from the flank and see ricochets on the side of the road by your truck. You observe X country personnel quickly ducking behind some rocks about 100 meters away. The first three trucks in your convoy are driving on. You do not know if they saw or heard the shots. What do you do?

Solution: Return fire and report. Take further actions based on unit SOP or convoy briefing.

Applicable ROE: Actual use of deadly force where hostile intent of the opposing force is not abandoned. Fires will be directed at the individual or force involved or their known location.

8. **Situation:** You are in the lead vehicle of a convoy. An armed X country person is standing on the road to your front. As you approach,

Figure 4-4. Sample rules of engagement vignettes.

he remains in the road and motions for you to stop. To avoid hitting him, you halt your vehicle. The X country person walks up to you and demands food. He is holding his weapon, standing in front of your vehicle. What do you do?

Solution: Order him to leave the area. If he refuses, use all means necessary to remove him. Report.

Applicable ROE: A graduated or "step increase" response may be used to meet incidents of harassment or threats to property and mission accomplishment.

9. **Situation:** You are securing a Red Cross food distribution site. Several armed X country personnel are going through the food line. They tell the Red Cross worker that he did not give them enough food and they will not leave until he provides more. They point their weapons at the Red Cross worker and shout for more food. What do you do?

Solution: Order them to drop their weapons and fire a warning shot if necessary. Detain if possible. Shoot them if they attempt to harm you or the relief personnel.

Applicable ROE: Deadly force may be used to defend your life or the life of another soldier or an innocent other.

10. **Situation:** You are on guard at a roadblock. Your instructions are that no civilian vehicles may pass. A civilian vehicle approaches and stops at your roadblock. The vehicle has X country personnel inside. They are armed with AK-47s, which they are holding on their laps. The driver points past your guard post, indicating he wants to go by. What do you do?

Solution: Allow the armed men to pass and report, seek MP or other assistance.

Applicable ROE: A graduated or "step increase" response may be used to meet incidents of harassment or threats to property and mission accomplishment.

11. **Situation:** You are moving to a food distribution site from your base camp. There are many X country people in the area who are also moving toward the food site. Suddenly, you observe a group of armed X country personnel open fire on a group of unarmed X country people. You are in your weapon's range of both groups of X country personnel. What do you do?

Solution: Order the X country personnel to stop. Fire warning shots. If they point their weapons at you, or if they continue to fire on the unarmed civilians, engage them.

Applicable ROE: Deadly force may be used to defend your life or the life of another soldier or an innocent other.

12. **Situation:** You are in a vehicle moving along the main supply route. You observe three armed X country vehicles approaching from the opposite direction. The vehicles appear to be on their own and not involved in relief operations. You identify each truck as having machine guns mounted. What do you do for each of the following situations?

a. No one manning guns.

b. X country personnel behind machine guns.

c. X country personnel behind machine guns, loading ammunition, barrels pointed in your direction, and the vehicles moving on line.

Solution:

a. Watch them and report.

b. Halt and prepare to defend yourself. Fire warning shots if they continue to approach while manning the machine guns. Engage if they disregard warning shots.

c. Engage immediately, report.

Applicable ROE: US forces will protect themselves from threats of death or serious bodily harm. Deadly force may be used to defend your life or the life of another soldier or an innocent other.

Figure 4-4. Sample rules of engagement vignettes (continued).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- DIRECTIVES THAT DELINEATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH UNITED STATES FORCES INITIATE OR CONTINUE COMBAT ENGAGEMENT WITH HOSTILE FORCES
- ROE ARE THE PRIMARY MEANS THE COMMANDER USES TO CONVEY LEGAL, POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND MILITARY GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY FORCE

SLIDE 4-1

MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN, AND TIME AND TROOPS AVAILABLE

- RULES APPROPRIATE FOR A PARTICULAR OPERATION MAY NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ANOTHER
- WHILE ROE ARE TAILORED TO THE OCCASION, NOTHING NEGATES A COMMANDER'S OBLIGATION TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE ACTION IN UNIT SELF-DEFENSE

SAMPLE ROE ISSUES

- INHABITANT SEARCH AND SEIZURE
- LOCAL SECURITY PATROLS
- BLACK MARKET OPERATIONS
- SURRENDER OF HOSTILE PERSONNEL

USE OF FORCE GUIDELINES

- FIRMNESS
- PRELIMINARY WARNING
- ANTICIPATION
- IMPARTIALLY APPLIED
- RESTRAINT

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

- MINIMUM FORCE
- DEADLY FORCE
- REASONABLE

TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION OF PERSONNEL

- USE ONLY NECESSARY FORCE
- AVOID INJURY TO NONCOMBATANTS
- AVOID DAMAGE TO PUBLIC AND CULTURAL PROPERTY
- RESPECT MEDICAL SERVICES
- PROHIBIT LOOTING
- TREAT PERSONS WHO SURRENDER HUMANELY
- INCORPORATE ROE INTO OPORD/OPLAN
- ENSURE G3 AND SJA COORDINATION
- REQUEST ROE CHANGES
- REQUEST USE OF AGENTS
- KNOW THE LAW OF WAR
- REPORT VIOLATIONS OF LAW OF WAR

ROE TRAINING METHODS

ROE Dilemma Method

- **Dilemma:** Sniper fire received
- **Our response:** Take cover, employ smoke, protect wounded, identify sniper locations, monitor snipers, report to chain of command, request battalion countersnipers

ROE Vignette Training

- **Situation:** You are on guard on the perimeter of your base camp. You observe X country personnel firing from behind some rocks on a hillside at your defensive positions. You estimate that they are approximately 300 meters away. What are your actions?
- **Solution:** Return fire and report

SLIDE 4-7

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC POLITICAL CONTROL


- LTG BRUCE PALMER (COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES DOMINICAN REPUBLIC)—SITUATION IS "MORE POLITICAL THAN MILITARY" AND IT "IS INEVITABLE THAT WASHINGTON IS GOING TO TAKE DIRECT CONTROL"
- CENTRALIZED CIVILIAN CONTROL; PRESIDENT JOHNSON RELIED MORE ON SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- GENERAL HAROLD JOHNSON (CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY)—"ONE THING THAT MUST BE REMEMBERED...IS THAT THE COMMAND OF SQUADS HAS NOW BEEN TRANSFERRED TO WASHINGTON AND IS NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO THE PENTAGON EITHER"
- LTG PALMER—POLITICAL DECISIONS WERE MADE "WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT IMPORTANT MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS"

TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

PRESIDENT JOHNSON—ONE GOAL WAS TO "SAVE THE LIVES OF ALL PEOPLE"

ADD THAT TO—

- DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
- SANTO DOMINGO
- FRIEND OR FOE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS
- AGGRESSIVE TROOPS
- IMPERFECT FIRE DISCIPLINE



STRICT TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

SLIDE 4-9

WEAPONS TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION DID NOT TAKE TANKS
- MARINES TOOK TANKS BUT DID NOT USE THEM
- 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION REDEPLOYED ALL BUT ONE ARTILLERY BATTERY BY MAY 1965



SO FAR NO PROBLEM...

ENGAGEMENT TACTICAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- *FIRST* - DO NOT FIRE UNLESS FIRED ON
- *THEN* - DO NOT FIRE UNLESS POSITION IS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF BEING OVERRUN



FORCE PROTECTION PROBLEMS

SLIDE 4-11

HIGHER HEADQUARTERS RESTRICTIONS

- NO TEAR GAS
- NO FLAMETHROWERS
- NO PATROL AREAS
- NO LIGHTS

REBEL EXPLOITATION OF THE TACTICAL ROE

- SNIPERS
- FEMALE SNIPER SPOTTERS
- UNLOADING AMMUNITION IN PLAIN VIEW OF AMERICANS

SLIDE 4-13

DISCIPLINE

- IF RESTRAINT PROVIDED THE KEY TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS, DISCIPLINE PROVIDED THE KEY TO RESTRAINT
- DISCIPLINE WAS THE CRITICAL ELEMENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF UNITED STATES SOLDIERS IN THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION
- THE "DON'T FIRE UNTIL FIRED UPON" CONDITIONS REQUIRED THE STERNEST DISCIPLINE
- THEIR EXCEPTIONAL PERSONAL DISCIPLINE HAD BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THEIR MISSION
- THE SOLDIERS EXHIBITED GRACE UNDER PRESSURE

LESSON 5. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: This module provides the S2/G2 with a detailed overview of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in a stability and support operations environment. The instruction will concentrate on a modified version of the conventional, four-step IPB process. Successful operations in the stability and support operations environment require a thorough knowledge of the environment and an in-depth understanding of the battlefield. IPB provides the basis for operational success in the stability and support operations environment.

SLIDE 5-1. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

a. IPB graphic products can be modified for the stability and support operations environment. The IPB process can be modified to portray the intelligence estimate in a stability and support operations environment. These modifications stem from three primary factors inherent to most nonlinear or dispersed battlefields:

- The nature of the threat.
- Considerations for the civilian population.
- Cooperation between US forces and host nation civilian and military agencies.

Threat: The stability and support operations environment is characterized by many threats. What characterizes a threat in a peace enforcement environment may differ vastly from the threat in a counterdrug environment. The peace enforcement environment may include two or more conventional-type combatants, two or more paramilitary organizations, partisan organizations, and criminal elements. All of these must be considered by the S2/G2.

Civilian Population: Considerations for the host nation population is critical to the long-term success of stability and support operations. In spite of military aspects of terrain, the population may be the key terrain.

Host Nation Civil-Military Cooperation: The key to success in stability and support operations is the host nation. Certain elements of information that feed the IPB process may be available only through host nation agencies—if they exist at all. The US does not intend to remain indefinitely in an area as custodian. Thus, host nation civilian and military agencies must be incorporated into US operations early and continuously.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: As stated earlier, IPB for stability and support operations uses the conventional four-step IPB process but the application and graphic products are significantly different. Slides 5-2 through 5-20 discuss those steps and graphics.

SLIDE 5-2. DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The first step in the IPB process is defining the battlefield environment. IPB in the stability and support operations environment requires exceptionally detailed information. An important element of the IPB process is the collection of supporting information. Leaders must identify the commander's information requirements. Specific information requirements in stability and support operations extend well beyond those normally required for conventional operations. These requirements include—

- Political.
- Economic.
- Social.
- Geographic.
- Military.
- Threat.

All are examined from the perspective of their relative importance to the situation (mission) at hand.

Another step in defining the battlefield environment is determination of the area of operations, battle space, and area of interest. While the area of operations is normally determined by higher headquarters, definition of battle space and area of interest is largely influenced by input from the G2/S2. Yet another departure from conventional operations, the area of interest is frequently much larger in stability and support operations. Events well outside the area of operations may have a significant effect on operations.

SLIDE 5-3. DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

The second step in the IPB process is to describe the battlefield effects. Before production of the overlays associated with IPB in stability and support operations, one final preparatory step must be performed—evaluation of the effects of the environment. Although the evaluation is the same as in conventional operations, the depth and degree of detail required is much more extensive. Traditional effects (such as terrain, weather, geography, and infrastructure) must be considered from both a threat and friendly perspective. But, in addition to these traditional considerations, the effects of demographics, politics, media, and available facilities must also be considered.

SLIDE 5-4. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS TERRAIN ANALYSIS OVERLAYS

Specific overlays produced for operations in the stability and support operations environment include: population status overlay(s) (representing the key terrain; cover and concealment, lines of communication and logistics sustainability) representing other aspects of terrain; and key facilities and target overlays, which represent potential threat targets.

SLIDE 5-5. TERRAIN ANALYSIS

Specific overlays produced for operations in a stability and support operations environment include population status overlay (represents key terrain), cover and concealment overlay, lines of communication overlay, logistics sustainability overlay, and legal status overlay, also key facilities and target overlays, which represent potential threat targets.

- Villages and towns, in which the threat can blend with the population or gain influence over the population.
- Agricultural areas—many of which, in the developing world, are self-sustaining mini communities from which the threat may gain, through coercion or willing cooperation, logistical support and subsistence.
- Other sources of subsistence, for obvious reasons.
- Lines of communication, which the threat may use to move personnel, supplies throughout the area of operations.

- Medical facilities and supplies, which are in short supply among threat forces—especially in stability and support operations situations.

SLIDE 5-6. POPULATION STATUS OVERLAY

The population status overlay, a graphic depiction of the key terrain in the operational area, is the first of five overlays used during IPB in stability and support operations. The population status overlay reflects elements of information relative to the situation. Population status overlays can depict political disposition of the population, ethnic diversity (if identifiable), linguistic diversity, or any other elements of demographics—gain, that directly relate to the situation.

SLIDE 5-7. COVER AND CONCEALMENT OVERLAY

The cover and concealment overlay is a dynamic graphic product that helps the S2 focus on areas from which the threat might operate. It may, at first, be prepared from a position of little prior, specific threat knowledge. Areas that should be considered are areas that obviously provide sufficient concealment for threat forces—both literal and practical. Literal concealment is afforded by extremely dense vegetation. Practical concealment is provided by villages into which threat forces blend with the population. Areas that provide sufficient concealment for threat bases, camps, cache sites must also be considered. As more is known of the enemy's tendencies, this product becomes easier to produce. Concealed lines of communication (densely vegetated wadis, arroyos)—especially those between threat-controlled villages and camps should also be depicted on the cover and concealment overlay. Especially dense or rugged areas should also be considered.

SLIDE 5-8. COVER AND CONCEALMENT OVERLAY GRAPHIC EXAMPLE

Leaders consider baseline threat information (for example, patterns, trends and tendencies concerning space, vegetation type). Overlays will require some seasonal adjustment.

SLIDE 5-9. LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERLAY

The lines of communication overlay provides two important keys to threat activity—movement of personnel and movement of supplies. The lines of communication overlay may require seasonal adjustment. The lines of communication overlay should depict—

- All roads and trails within the area of interest.
- Railways and waterways, if applicable.
- Avenues of approach to key facilities, targets when considered with other products.
- Underground lines of communication, when applicable.

SLIDE 5-10. LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERLAY GRAPHIC EXAMPLE

As with any IPB product, the lines of communication overlay must be adjusted for specific considerations in specific situations. Leaders must consider the effect friendly operations has on the area. If a friendly patrol clears a route through an area with poor trafficability, that route then becomes subject to use by the threat.

SLIDE 5-11. LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY OVERLAY

The logistics sustainability overlay is yet another product that leads to effective analysis of the threat. It identifies areas that provide a source of logistics and materiel for threat

personnel—many of which are poorly equipped, aside from weapons and ammunition. Typical information that might be shown on a logistics sustainability overlay is—

- Water sources.
- Ranches, farms, and agricultural areas.
- Various stores—especially those removed or on the fringes of government-controlled areas.
- Pharmacies, hospitals, clinics and other sources of medical supplies.
- Sources of petroleum products.

SLIDE 5-12. LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY OVERLAY GRAPHIC EXAMPLE
Sources of subsistence and logistics are best represented by color symbols with some specific reference text. As with any IPB product, the logistics sustainability overlay must be based upon an accurate knowledge of the threat and it must be seasonally accurate.

SLIDE 5-13. KEY FACILITIES AND TARGET OVERLAY
The key facilities and target overlay depicts likely threat targets in the area of operations. Identification of key targets and facilities is based primarily on the threat's goals and objectives, as well as in-depth analysis of past trends and patterns of activity.

SLIDE 5-14. WEATHER ANALYSIS
As in conventional operations, the effects of weather on both friendly and threat operations must be a part of the IPB process. In addition to those conventional considerations, leaders include considerations for special activities.

SLIDE 5-15. RESULT OF DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS
The result of this step is a series of overlays that, considered together in varying combinations, provides a clearer picture of the threat. Integration of the effects of weather with the other products is done during this step of the IPB process.

SLIDE 5-16. EVALUATE THE THREAT
Step three of the IPB process is to evaluate the threat. In most stability and support operations situations, what constitutes the "threat" is frequently difficult to determine. The threat may be gangs in an urban domestic support operation or a multitude of conventional, pseudo-conventional, insurgent, paramilitary, guerilla, partisan and mass organizations in a peace enforcement environment. Specific information on threat ideology, strategy, doctrine (if any), tactics, and past activities provides the best baseline of knowledge on the threat—**NOT DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES.** When examining the area of operations and area of interest, leaders consider how the threat has operated in the past under the set of circumstances depicted by the graphic products. During the threat evaluation step, gaps in the knowledge of the threat must be identified. Deficiencies in knowledge of the threat should focus on, at a minimum: organization, equipment, support structure, traits, habits, and background. These deficiencies will drive the unit's initial collection efforts. Specific vulnerabilities and capabilities of threat organizations must also be identified. This identification is a necessary part of the intelligence estimate. It is during this step that the unit initiates the threat situation map, which shows what is known of threat organization and disposition at a given point in time.

SLIDE 5-17. DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

The fourth step of the IPB process, determine threat courses of action, is the step in which all of the previous efforts are merged into a conclusion that supports the commander's decision-making process. During this step, leaders must consider courses of action available to the threat—based on the graphic products and assessment of the threat's capabilities and vulnerabilities—and determine likely courses of action. With the knowledge of the friendly mission and limits of the area of operations and area of interest, leaders must identify those aspects of the environment that have the greatest effect on selection of a course of action. Determination of the most likely threat course of action must be based on correct identification of opportunities and limitations of the operational environment. Leaders must consider: What is the threat capable of? Given similar situations, what has he done in the past and what is he most likely to do now? We must consider the effects of our own *and* the threat course of action on the civilian population.

SLIDE 5-18. SITUATION TEMPLATE

Step four must also include development of the situation template. The situation template is what is known of threat disposition in the area of operations and area of interest, supplemented by the analysis of other threat activity in the area. The situation template depicts the most likely threat disposition and composition if the most likely threat course of action is initiated. It reflects the expected activity and where it is most likely to occur—using past trends and patterns as a guide, NOT DOCTRINE. The accuracy and use of the situation template depends on thorough knowledge of the threat.

SLIDE 5-19. EVENT TEMPLATE

The event template, also produced during step four of the IPB process, is the primary guide for collection and reconnaissance and security planning. Using the situation template and the friendly course of action as guides, leaders identify what the threat is most likely to do in response to the unit's course of action. Moreover, it provides the graphic representation of where to collect information either confirming or denying the most likely threat course of action. Leaders must identify specific named areas of interest to focus the collection as well as high-value targets and the time and place at which they are expected to appear. The event matrix further supports the event template, identifying specific indicators associated with specific named areas of interest. The event matrix is an invaluable tool to aid in patrol briefings.

SLIDE 5-20. DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

The decision support template is the final product in the IPB process. Due to the inherent difficulty of accurately predicting threat actions and reactions to friendly operations, S2s have found development of the decision support template to be especially difficult in the stability and support operations environment. The most effective decision support templates focus on friendly courses of action, while worst-casing threat courses of action. The decision support template is always supported by a matrix. The matrix as a stand-alone product is often the most useful of the two—especially in the stability and support operations environment.

SLIDE 5-21. DISSEMINATION

The bottom line in this entire sequence of events is dissemination of intelligence. S2s develop a thorough understanding of the threat, an in-depth understanding of the operational environment, and perform exhaustive, detailed IPB. S2s must ensure that the products of their efforts extend to the lowest level. Reports in the stability and support operations environment must include nonmilitary subjects—especially those points of use to the individual soldier. Standard types of dissemination techniques are intelligence summary, intelligence estimate, and updates.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

GRAPHIC PRODUCTS MODIFIED DUE TO—

- NATURE OF THE THREAT
- CONSIDERATIONS FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION
- HOST NATION CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION

SLIDE 5-1

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

- DETERMINE COMMANDER'S INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (EXPANDED FOR STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS)
  - POLITICAL
  - ECONOMIC
  - SOCIAL
  - GEOGRAPHIC
  - MILITARY
  - THREAT
- DETERMINE AREA OF OPERATIONS, BATTLE SPACE, AND AREA OF INTEREST
- IDENTIFY GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE OF THREAT, THREAT SITUATION, AND HOST NATION

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

- EVALUATE EFFECTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT
- CONSIDER TERRAIN, WEATHER, GEOGRAPHY, INFRASTRUCTURE
  - INCLUDE DEMOGRAPHICS, POLITICS, MEDIA, FACILITIES (AS APPLICABLE, BY COUNTRY, REGION, CITY, OR LOCALE)

SLIDE 5-3

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS TERRAIN ANALYSIS OVERLAYS

- POPULATION STATUS → - KEY TERRAIN
- COVER AND CONCEALMENT
  LINES OF COMMUNICATION
  LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY → - OTHER TERRAIN
- KEY FACILITIES → - POTENTIAL THREAT TARGETS

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

- KEY TERRAIN IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS IS THE POPULATION
- THREAT ASPECTS OF TERRAIN—
  - VILLAGES AND TOWNS
  - AGRICULTURAL AREAS
  - SOURCES OF SUBSISTENCE
  - LINES OF COMMUNICATION
  - MEDICAL FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES

SLIDE 5-5

POPULATION STATUS OVERLAY

DEPICTS, BY AREA, IMPORTANT DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Neutral 

Pro-Threat 

Pro-Government 

Spanish 

English 

Tagalog 

Chinese-Mandarin 

SLIDE 5-6


COVER AND CONCEALMENT OVERLAY

- IDENTIFY AREAS THAT AFFORD COVER AND CONCEALMENT TO THE THREAT (BOTH LITERAL AND PRACTICAL)
- IDENTIFY AREAS THAT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT COVER AND OR CONCEALMENT FOR BASES AND CAMPS
- DETERMINE AREAS OF POSSIBLE CONCEALED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS
- ISOLATE EXCEPTIONALLY RUGGED TERRAIN OR DENSE VEGETATION

SLIDE 5-7

COVER AND CONCEALMENT OVERLAY GRAPHIC EXAMPLE

REPRESENTATION OF THREAT COVER AND CONCEALMENT:



Consider baseline threat information

LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERLAY

- DEPICTS ALL ROADS AND TRAILS WITHIN AFFECTED AREA
- MAY REQUIRE SEASONAL UPDATE
- MAY INCLUDE RAILWAYS AND WATERWAYS, IF APPLICABLE
- MAY DEPICT AVENUES OF APPROACH WHEN CONSIDERED WITH OTHER PRODUCTS
- MAY ALSO INCLUDE UNDERGROUND LINES OF COMMUNICATION—SUBWAYS, SEWER SYSTEMS—IF APPLICABLE

SLIDE 5-9

LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVERLAY GRAPHIC EXAMPLE

TYPICAL LEGEND:



Consider impact of friendly operations

LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY OVERLAY


INDICATES AREAS THAT PROVIDE A SOURCE OF LOGISTICS, MATERIEL, SUSTENANCE FOR THREAT PERSONNEL:

- WATER SOURCES
- RANCHES, FARMS, AGRICULTURAL AREAS
- GROCERY STORES
- PHARMACIES
- SELF-CONTAINED SETTLEMENTS
- GAS STATIONS

SLIDE 5-11

LOGISTICS SUSTAINABILITY OVERLAY GRAPHIC EXAMPLE

TYPICAL LEGEND:




Overlay must be seasonally accurate

KEY FACILITIES AND TARGET OVERLAY

USED TO IDENTIFY LIKELY THREAT TARGETS IN AREA OF OPERATIONS

United States installations, outposts
Fuel facilities
Dams, hydroelectric facilities
Host nation military
Political figures
Choke points
Airfields
Schools, universities
Public assembly areas



Determine likelihood, importance of target from analysis and historical trends.

SLIDE 5-13

WEATHER ANALYSIS

CONSIDER EFFECTS OF WEATHER, DARKNESS ON FRIENDLY, THREAT OPERATIONS:

- MILITARY OPERATIONS
- CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS EFFORTS
- MASS ACTIONS
- FOOD SUPPLIES
- GENERAL MOBILITY

RESULT OF DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS

SERIES OF OVERLAYS

- COMBINE, IN VARYING ORDERS AND COMBINATIONS, TO PROVIDE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE THREAT SITUATION
- INTEGRATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR WEATHER, EFFECTS ON FRIENDLY, THREAT OPERATIONS

SLIDE 5-15

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- IDENTIFY SPECIFIC THREAT INFORMATION, NOT DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES, TO PROVIDE BEST KNOWLEDGE BASE
- CONSIDER HOW THE THREAT ORGANIZES, OPERATES, CONDUCTS OPERATIONS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES (HISTORICAL)
- IDENTIFY GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE OF THE THREAT:
  - ORGANIZATION
  - EQUIPMENT
  - SUPPORT STRUCTURE
  - TRAITS/HABITS
  - BACKGROUND
- IDENTIFY THREAT CAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES
- INITIATE THREAT SITUATION MAP

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

- INTEGRATES PREVIOUS PRODUCTS INTO A CONCLUSION
- BASED ON PREVIOUS PRODUCTS/ANALYSIS, WHAT ARE THE THREAT'S MOST LIKELY OBJECTIVES AND AVAILABLE COURSES OF ACTION?
- BASED ON ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY MISSION, LIMITS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS AND AREA OF INTEREST, IDENTIFY EVERY ASPECT OF THE ENVIRONMENT THAT MAY AFFECT THE COURSES OF ACTION
- BASED ON IDENTIFICATION OF OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS THE ENVIRONMENT OFFERS TO BOTH FRIENDLY AND THREAT FORCES, CONSIDER: WHAT IS THE THREAT CAPABLE OF? WHAT IS HE LIKELY TO DO IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS?
- ANALYZE REACTION OF LOCAL POPULATION, HOST NATION OFFICIALS TO FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION
- THIS STEP DRIVES THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

SLIDE 5-17

SITUATION TEMPLATE

- WHAT IS THE EXPECTED ACTIVITY/COURSES OF ACTION?
- WHERE IS IT LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE (NO DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES—USE TRENDS, PATTERNS AS A GUIDE)?
- LIKELY THREAT COMPOSITION, DISPOSITION IF ACTIVITY IS INITIATED (AGAIN, NO DOCTRINE)
- ACCURACY AND USE OF THE SITUATION TEMPLATE ARE BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE THREAT

EVENT TEMPLATE

- IS A GUIDE FOR INFORMATION COLLECTION AND RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY PLANNING
- DEPICTS WHERE TO COLLECT THE INFORMATION TO CONFIRM OR DENY A COURSE OF ACTION
- IDENTIFIES NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST TO FOCUS COLLECTION
- IDENTIFIES AND DEPICTS HIGH-VALUE TARGETS AND THE TIME AND PLACE THEY WILL APPEAR
- EVENT MATRIX (SUPPORTS THE EVENT TEMPLATE) DESCRIBES PHASING OF ACTIVITIES WITHIN EACH NAMED AREA OF INTEREST
- DUE TO LIMITED TIME FOR PLANNING, THE EVENT TEMPLATE MAY HAVE LIMITED APPLICATION IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

SLIDE 5-19

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

- DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP FOR STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
- WHEN USED, FOCUS ON FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION, WORST-CASE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION
- SUPPORTED BY MATRIX, INDICATORS OF THREAT INTENTIONS

DISSEMINATION

- PRODUCTS OF ANALYSIS MUST EXTEND TO LOWEST POSSIBLE USER LEVEL
- REPORTING WILL INCLUDE PERTINENT NONMILITARY SUBJECTS
- DISSEMINATION TECHNIQUES:
  - INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
  - INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
  - UPDATES

SLIDE 5-21

LESSON 6. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: This module provides the S2/G2 with a detailed overview of analysis and information processing in the stability and support operations environment. Examples from various stability and support operations mission categories are used to illustrate the examples. This class does not serve as a how-to for intelligence analysis but rather focuses on the tools used to process information from a wide range of sources and assist in the analytical effort.

SLIDE 6-1. DOMINANT CONSIDERATIONS

The dominant considerations for the S2 in the stability and support operations are political, economic, and social elements of information. Although a unit commander may consider these items in a conventional environment, the importance of these considerations are far greater in stability and support operations.

SLIDE 6-2. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Intelligence operations in any tactical environment are driven by priority intelligence requirements and information requirements. In that respect, stability and support operations does not differ from conventional operations. As in conventional operations, they provide the basis for intelligence collection and subsequent analysis. They are frequently more numerous in stability and support operations than in conventional operations and will probably be tied to more general gaps in information than to specific, physical decision points. Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements will almost undoubtedly include some nonmilitary requirements addressing those critical elements of information (political, social, and economic) addressed earlier. In the stability and support operations environment, priority intelligence requirements and information requirements will include details on specific areas, past threat activity and population information.

SLIDE 6-3. PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE

Some priority intelligence requirements may fit a certain stability and support operations scenario. Some may fit a peace enforcement scenario or a counterinsurgency scenario. As information is developed and more is learned of the situation, both priority intelligence requirements and information requirements become more focused and more specific, possibly concentrating on a certain event or area.

SLIDE 6-4. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE

The information requirements may reflect a definite concern for filling information gaps on the population, logistics, third party intervention, and identification of third-party organizations within the area of interest.

SLIDE 6-5. COLLECTION PLANNING

Priority intelligence requirements and information requirements form the basis for collection operations. To effectively manage a limited number of assets against a wide range of numerous requirements, prioritization is a major concern of the collection manager. The collection manager must develop collectable indicators that answer, in full or in part, the commander's priority intelligence requirements and information requirements. From those indicators, he must develop specific information requirements that become the tasking orders or requests for information. FM 34-7 recommends use of the dispersed or nonlinear battlefield collection plan to track assets against collection requirements.

SLIDE 6-6. INFORMATION PROCESSING

Information processing is the third step in the intelligence cycle in which raw information becomes intelligence. Processing information in the stability and support operations environment is directly affected by the factors of analysis—nature of society, nature of the conflict, nature of the government, general conclusions, and courses of action. Processing consists of three distinct steps—recording, evaluation, and analysis.

SLIDE 6-7. NATURE OF SOCIETY

The factors of analysis focus the S2 on the specific aspects of a situation that lead to understanding and effective analysis. The first of these factors is nature of society. These are the factors within this society, which have led to a situation that has necessitated the involvement of the US Army. To effectively understand the society, the S2 must pose these questions: What are the elements of the organization of this society that have led to this situation? Similarly, what are the resultant effects of their economic system? Has the political system contributed to this situation? If so, how? What of the history of this society and its contributions to this situation? And, finally, are there any characteristics of the physical environment that might have also contributed to the development of this situation?

SLIDE 6-8. NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

The S2 must also understand the dynamics of the conflict itself. In the peace enforcement environment especially, the conflict may be complex, steeped in historical, racial hatred with little relevance to modern conditions—as in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The S2 must identify the objectives of all belligerent parties involved, their organizational patterns, operational patterns, and their leadership—specifically, their backgrounds, training, and ideological commitment. He must understand their tactics and the effectiveness of those tactics, and he must identify their support structures. Only through an in-depth understanding of the "enemy" can the S2 identify comparative vulnerabilities and capabilities of the threat force.

SLIDE 6-9. NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Although the S2 may not be able to affect the government response, he must understand what the host nation government is doing in response to the situation at hand and how his unit's mission aids that response. At a minimum, he must know the role of the host nation security apparatus and whether they have applied coercive measures against the population. Is the host nation response balanced—addressing the genuine grievances inherent in this

conflict? Furthermore, the S2 must develop his own conclusions on this situation. Considering the other factors, what is necessary to solve this problem?

SLIDE 6-10. COURSES OF ACTION
Finally, in analyzing courses of action, the S2 must consider: Do the courses of action mobilize a large number of groups in support of the host nation? Are they balanced, addressing the legitimate concerns of those groups affected by the conflict? And do these courses of action assume a protagonist or antagonist role?

SLIDE 6-11. RECORDING INFORMATION
An essential part of processing information—especially in the stability and support operations environment—is recording of information received and queries submitted to various agencies. The sheer volume of information received and the lack of speed at which information comes together to form a complete picture require accurate recording. The format used for recording information is normally DA Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal. DA Form 1594 is an official and permanent record of information received and requests for information submitted to agencies. Messages received and subsequent requests for information issued must be logged in chronological order. Entries should include action taken, who notified of important events. Entries made should highlight the important information in reports and reference the disposition of the original report and where it is maintained.

SLIDE 6-12. INFORMATION FILES
Typical information files maintained for a stability and support operations situation include journal, hot, resource, current propaganda, personality, and organizational. Some of these files may contain duplicate information that is relevant to more than one category.

SLIDE 6-13. JOURNAL FILE
The journal file contains all previous DA Forms 1594 and serves as the index to the other information files. Maintenance of the journal file should be established by unit SOP.

SLIDE 6-14. HOT FILE
The hot file is the most important of the information files. It contains important, actionable information of immediate value and information that indicates an immediate security threat to friendly forces. The information is incident in nature or related to specific incidents requiring immediate action. This information must be easily accessible and should contain necessary action, to whom the information is of value, actions taken, and result.

SLIDE 6-15. CURRENT PROPAGANDA FILE
Propaganda contains important information about the goals, objectives, attitudes, and strategy of groups. It serves as a valuable aid to analysis. For those reasons, S2s maintain an information file on threat propaganda. At a minimum, this file should contain official ideological literature (which provides important information about the background of the group, its objectives and probable methods to achieve its goals); battleground materials (which, after contact with the belligerents, can provide still more information on the group); copies of speeches and grievances of the group that can be exploited through direct action,

civil affairs efforts, or psychological operations. This file should also contain the products of analysis of these materials.

SLIDE 6-16. PERSONALITY FILE
In the stability and support operations environment, the success and effectiveness of threat or belligerent organizations frequently depends on the leadership of single individuals. Much can be learned of the organization by analyzing the backgrounds of these individuals.

SLIDE 6-17. ORGANIZATIONAL FILE
The organizational files contain information on specific aspects of the threat organizations, subfactions, affiliated groups, and so forth. The information maintained on these groups should by no means be restricted to these topics.

SLIDE 6-18. INCIDENT FILE
Details concerning threat activities and incidents are in the incident file. Incidents (maintained on the incident map) provide an excellent method for tracking patterns and trends of past and present threat activity. The incident file contains details on these incidents.

SLIDE 6-19. AREA STUDY FILE
The area study file serves as the commander's data base for area study information, including demographic information necessary for production of intelligence preparation of the battlefield products and the intelligence estimate. Topics and subtopics maintained under area study files depend on the situation.

SLIDE 6-20. THREAT BASE/ENCAMPMENT FILES
Because of the inherent lack of doctrine on the part of most threat organizations in stability and support operations situations, specific information on details of the threat must be developed to "profile" the threat. Information on base camps, training camps, and other centers of threat activity, when considered with other information, can provide a more complete picture of the threat. Much can be learned of the threat's tactics, tendencies, effectiveness, training (in terms of both effectiveness and scope), and security through examination of its bases, camps, and so forth. Doctrine refers to the doctrinal specifications for these facilities, if known. The actual facilities must be evaluated in terms of compliance with doctrine. If doctrine is known and actual practice deviates from doctrine, the S2 must determine why, determine the degree of uniformity, if any, and profile (develop patterns) on threat facilities. The facilities should be examined for physical characteristics such as size, uniformity, and level of security as well as compatibility with their purpose. Example: Is a training camp that is training 100 personnel configured to train that many personnel? This example might indicate success of recruiting efforts and effectiveness of training.

SLIDE 6-21. HOST NATION SECURITY FILE
Tactical commanders do not routinely maintain information on host nation military and security forces. Those forces, however, can have a significant impact on US operations—either negative or positive. Commanders must, therefore, be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and tendencies of the forces they may be in support of or from which they might require support. The host nation security file focuses on these details.

SLIDE 6-22. THREAT ANALYSIS WORK SHEET/MATRIX

Although no graphic product can accurately depict the scope of the threat in stability and support operations, the threat analysis work sheet comes as close as any. It provides a tool for the S2 to graphically predict, from right wing to left wing and covert to overt, the scope of threat activity within an area. (The example depicted here illustrates (partially) the scope of the threat in the past civil war in El Salvador.)

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Some other tools that may be useful to the S2 are the association matrix, personality/activity matrix, and the coordinate register (Slides 6-23 through 6-25).

SLIDE 6-23. ASSOCIATION MATRIX

The association matrix is used to identify contacts, by frequency, between members of the threat organizations, subfactions, associated organizations, and supporting groups and organizations. Annotations of contacts between these members should include some method of identifying extent of contact.

SLIDE 6-24. PERSONALITY/ACTIVITY MATRIX

The personality/activity matrix associates threat individuals with specific activities. Annotations, as in the association matrix, should also include extent of involvement. The activity matrix, when used with the association matrix, provides a graphic tool to aid the S2 in identifying hierarchy within threat organizations as well as identifying members of specific cells with specific responsibilities.

SLIDE 6-25. COORDINATE REGISTER

The coordinate register is the view of a specific grid square on the map. It allows the S2 to examine terrain from a threat perspective—in detail. The coordinate register can be an aid to reconnaissance and security planning and to anticipate threat actions.

SLIDE 6-26. TIME-EVENT CHART

The time-event chart is yet another recording device that can assist the S2 in analyzing specific, important events. The chart identifies the specific event and tracks, in chronological order, events leading up to the significant event. It assists the S2 in identifying indicators of major events and provides a tool for tracking threat tendencies.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Other useful tools that must be considered by the S2 to assist in the analytical effort are the incident map, the situation map, and the personalities and contacts map (Slides 6-27 through 6-29).

SLIDE 6-27. INCIDENT MAP
The incident map (which usually covers a specific period of time) is a cumulative, graphic representation of threat activity, by location. It serves as an excellent guide for production of the intelligence estimate and predictive analysis. Entries on the incident map, accumulated over time, reveals clusters, trends and patterns of threat activity, and threat intentions.

SLIDE 6-28. THREAT SITUATION MAP
The threat situation map is an analytical by-product of the incident map. The situation map combines what is known of threat disposition and includes expected locations of threat forces, as indicated by the incident map. The situation map is a summary intelligence product depicting the current threat situation and serves as the graphic portrayal of paragraph 3 (enemy situation) of the intelligence estimate.

SLIDE 6-29. PERSONALITIES AND CONTACTS MAP
The personalities and contacts map is a graphic representation of the personality and activity matrix. Identified here are the items to be depicted on the map. The personalities and contacts map requires use of a large-scale map, usually in an urban environment.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The order of battle workbook is a comprehensive document detailing all that is known of the threat. The order of battle workbook includes all of the order of battle factors for stability and support operations, as identified in FM 34-3 and includes any necessary additional factors.

SLIDE 6-30. ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK
The order of battle factors for stability and support operations are composition, logistics, disposition, effectiveness, strength, personalities, tactics, electronic, training, miscellaneous data, and relevant information. Personality files are maintained during conventional operations. (“Personalities” is an order of battle factor that is critical during stability and support operations.)

SLIDE 6-31. REFERENCES
The S2's "database" for stability and support operations must include pertinent reference materials. His reference database must include doctrinal literature, open source materials on the situation, the area (which frequently provide a great deal of useful information), and any other information that may be useful.

SLIDE 6-32. EVALUATING INFORMATION
The second step in the processing of information is evaluation. By definition, the stability and support operations environment requires the S2 to obtain information on a wide range of requirements from agencies with which he may not be familiar. He must, therefore, evaluate incoming information for its pertinence, reliability, and credibility.

SLIDE 6-33. PERTINENCE
Information must be examined to determine its pertinence in terms of: relevance to the enemy or to your area of operation or area of interest; is it of immediate value, if so, to whom; might it have some future value?

SLIDE 6-34. RELIABILITY
The S2 may also have to evaluate the reliability of information and of the source. Experience is the best determinant of reliability—especially in the stability and support operations environment. When evaluating reports from troop units, consider the level of training of the unit in question, the accuracy of past reports and the unit's collective experience. Another key consideration in the evaluation of reliability is to understand that the headquarters closest to the source of information or to the topic of information may very well be the best judge of reliability. Lacking experience with a particular source, the S2 must ask these questions: What is the motivation of the source? What kind of information did he or she provide? What collection techniques were used? Does this person have the skills necessary to accurately provide this type of information?

SLIDE 6-35. CREDIBILITY
Credibility is the probability that the information is true. The S2 must evaluate the information's credibility. Is it possible? Is it consistent with itself—are there contradictions within the report itself? Is there any collateral confirmation (other sources—if not, seek it)? Does this information contradict other, similar information? If it does, which is more likely to be true? Do not necessarily disregard the information—even if contradictory—seek confirmation and plan for the worst.

SLIDE 6-36. INTEGRATION
Integration is probably the most difficult task for the S2 in a stability and support operations environment. The S2 must separate, collate, and combine bits of information from a multitude of sources to form a complete picture of the threat. Accurate integration of information requires a thorough knowledge of the environment. The S2 must know his biases and avoid preconceptions based on partial information.

SLIDE 6-37. BIASES
Bias is the analyst's or S2's worst enemy. It is especially difficult to avoid in the stability and support operations environment. Many stability and support operations situations place US soldiers into cultures that differ from theirs. It is difficult not to fall back upon biases when confronted with an unfamiliar situation.

SLIDE 6-38. INTERPRETATION
Yet another difficulty of conducting intelligence operations in the stability and support operations environment is interpretation of information. The S2 or analyst must determine the meaning of information and how it relates—if at all—to threat intentions. Given a baseline of information, how do further, seemingly insignificant bits of information relate to what is known? The correct interpretation of events provides a basis for determining enemy intent and updating the intelligence estimate.

SLIDE 6-39. ANALYTICAL METHODS

Although many different analytical methods exist, certain methods lend themselves to analysis in stability and support operations situations: pattern, link, combined.

SLIDE 6-40. PATTERN ANALYSIS

Pattern analysis is based upon the premise that the threat exhibits identifiable patterns of activity. Identification of these patterns and the sequence of events leads to the development of indicators or profiling of the threat. These indicators and the resulting specific orders or requests given to collection agencies are then used to confirm or deny like activity. The incident map is a useful tool to graphically track the indicators. As one indicator is observed, collection is then adjusted to focus on the next. Pattern analysis specifically targets identification of these patterns or trends of activity and the development of indicators.

SLIDE 6-41. LINK ANALYSIS

Developed to analyze radio nets, link analysis is used to develop links and relationships between persons and agencies among the threat, by activity. The association matrix, activity matrix, and time event chart can be used to develop the analytical product of link analysis, the link diagram.

SLIDE 6-42. LINK DIAGRAM

This example of a link diagram demonstrates the application of link analysis to a fictitious insurgent organization. Solid lines indicate definite, direct association. Dotted lines indicate suspected or indirect association. The cells themselves are indicated by blocks. The terrorism cell, consisting of Olivera and Reynolds, is further divided into a kidnapping "cell," consisting of Olivera; and an extortion cell, consisting of Reynolds. The terrorism cell is indirectly linked to the logistics cell (Cruz). Links between logistics, training and finance are shown by the solid lines. As more is developed on these cells and individual roles identified, the blocks can be further refined. Combining both pattern and link analysis is the preferred method for performing analysis in the stability and support operations environment or any tactical situation. Pattern analysis is useful for identifying and isolating collectable threat activity, while link analysis is more useful for identifying threat hierarchy and organization.

SLIDE 6-43. RISK ASSESSMENT


Although risk assessment is, by definition, the role of counterintelligence, it is an area with which the S2 must be familiar. Extensive uncertainty is, by definition, a virtual given in the stability and support operations environment. In that environment or any other, uncertainty equates to risk. Intelligence must determine the degree of uncertainty and fill in those gaps in knowledge. In any environment, the commander's greatest concern is risk, the S2's uncertainty.

SLIDE 6-44. RISK ASSESSMENT CHART

When uncertainty is added to lethality, risk increases. For example, the S2 receives a report indicating that the threat has obtained late generation, shoulder-fired air defense weapons—weapons never before reported, never used. The S2 seeks, but does not receive, collateral confirmation. Uncertainty about a major increase in lethality has increased. Risk, therefore, in conducting airmobile operations is increased in a like manner. This chart shows how the estimated number of surface-to-air missiles (if any) can equate to the degree of risk.

DOMINANT CONSIDERATIONS

POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL



ALL DIRECTLY
RELATE TO THE KEY
TERRAIN:
POPULATION

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

- PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR COLLECTION
- REQUIRE MORE INFORMATION IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT THAN IN CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS
- INCLUDE NONMILITARY INFORMATION:
  - DETAILS OF KEY THREAT PERSONNEL
  - DETAILS ON AREAS FREQUENTED BY THREAT PERSONNEL
  - DETAILS ON AREAS, COMMUNITIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS BELIEVED TO BE SUPPORTING THE THREAT
  - DETAILS OF PAST THREAT ACTIVITY
  - INFORMATION ON THE POPULATION

SLIDE 6-2

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLE

1. WHERE AND IN WHAT STRENGTH ARE THREAT FORCES?
2. WHERE AND HOW IS THE THREAT APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF POWER?
3. WHERE IS THE THREAT NOT APPLYING THE ELEMENTS OF POWER?
4. WILL THE POPULATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS BE SUPPORTIVE, HOSTILE, OR NEUTRAL TOWARD FRIENDLY OPERATIONS?
5. DOES THE THREAT HAVE AN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY?
6. ARE HOST NATION CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS SUCCESSFUL?

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS EXAMPLES

1. WHAT IS THE STRENGTH OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION OF THE THREAT?

2. HOW, WHERE, WHEN, AND BY WHOM WILL THREAT FORCES BE RESUPPLIED?

3. WILL CURRENTLY NONBELLIGERENT THIRD PARTIES REACT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF UNITED STATES FORCES? IF SO, WHERE, WHEN, AND HOW?

4. WHAT ARE THE FRIENDLY, THREAT, AND NONBELLIGERENT THIRD PARTY ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE AREA OF INTEREST?

SLIDE 6-4

COLLECTION PLANNING

1. FROM PIRs AND IRs, DEVELOP COLLECTABLE INDICATORS THAT ANSWER IN FULL OR IN PART THE PIRs AND IRs.

2. PREPARE SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS THAT ADDRESS THE INDICATORS.

3. USE THE DISBURSED/NONLINEAR BATTLEFIELD COLLECTION PLAN TO TRACK COLLECTION ASSETS AND AGENCIES AND ASSIGNED TASKS.

INFORMATION PROCESSING

- STEP IN THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE WHERE INFORMATION BECOMES INTELLIGENCE
- IMPACTED DIRECTLY BY FACTORS OF ANALYSIS
- CONSISTS OF THREE STEPS:
  - RECORDING
  - EVALUATION
  - ANALYSIS

NATURE OF SOCIETY

- SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
- ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND PERFORMANCE
- POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND DYNAMICS
- HISTORY OF SOCIETY
- ENVIRONMENT

NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

- OBJECTIVES OF THE BELLIGERENTS
- ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS
- OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
- LEADERSHIP (PERSONNEL, BACKGROUND)
- TACTICS
- SUPPORT STRUCTURE

NATURE OF THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

- NATIONAL SECURITY APPARATUS
- COERCIVE MEASURES
- BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

- REFLECT AN INTERACTION OF FACTORS
- DETERMINE MOBILIZING FACTORS

COURSES OF ACTION

- DO THEY MOBILIZE A PLURALITY OF SOCIETAL GROUPS?
- ARE THEY BALANCED
- ARE THEY PROTAGONIST OR ANTAGONIST?

RECORDING INFORMATION

- DA FORM 1594, DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
- OFFICIAL, PERMANENT RECORD OF INFORMATION
- CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF MESSAGES RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED
- IMPORTANT EVENTS, ACTIONS TAKEN
- CONCISE, SPECIFIC ENTRIES
- DISPOSITION OF ORIGINAL REPORT, WHERE MAINTAINED
- STANDARDIZED BY SOP

INFORMATION FILES

- JOURNAL FILE
- HOT FILE
- RESOURCE FILE
- CURRENT PROPAGANDA FILE
- PERSONALITY FILE
- ORGANIZATIONAL FILE
- AREA STUDY FILE
- INCIDENT FILE
- THREAT BASE/ENCAMPMENT FILE
- HOST NATION SECURITY FILE
- THREAT ANALYSIS WORK SHEET/MATRIX

SOME FILES MAY CONTAIN DUPLICATE INFORMATION, WHERE APPLICABLE

SLIDE 6-12

JOURNAL FILE

- CONTAINS PREVIOUS JOURNAL SHEETS AND SUPPORTING MATERIAL
- SETS UNIT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR FILES MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

HOT FILE

- MOST IMPORTANT FILE
- INFORMATION OF IMMEDIATE VALUE
- "INCIDENT" IN NATURE
- MUST BE EASILY ACCESSIBLE
- NEITHER THIS NOR ANY OTHER FILE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS, BOMBINGS, AND SO FORTH

CURRENT PROPAGANDA FILE

- IDEOLOGICAL LITERATURE
- BATTLEGROUND MATERIALS
- PRODUCTS OF ANALYSIS
- COPIES OF KEY SPEECHES
- EXPLOITABLE GRIEVANCES

PERSONALITY FILE

- BIOGRAPHIC DATA (EDUCATION, TRAINING, PERSONAL INFORMATION)
- LAW ENFORCEMENT RECORD
- SURVEILLANCE RESULTS
- AFFILIATIONS
- EXPLOITABLE GRIEVANCES

SLIDE 6-16

ORGANIZATIONAL FILE

- HISTORY
- STRUCTURE
- PAST ACTIVITIES
- AFFILIATIONS
- COMMAND AND CONTROL
- INTELLIGENCE, SUPPORT STRUCTURE

INCIDENT FILE

- TYPE
- LOCATION
- TIME
- CASUALTIES
- WEAPONS
- PERSONALITIES
- TACTICS EMPLOYED, EFFECTIVENESS

SLIDE 6-18

AREA STUDY FILE

CURRENT DATA PERTINENT TO—

- GEOGRAPHY
- POLITICS
- SOCIOLOGY
- ECONOMICS
- CULTURAL FIELDS

THREAT BASE/ENCAMPMENT FILES


- DOCTRINE, BY TYPE
- ACTUAL VERSUS DOCTRINE
- PROFILE INFORMATION
- EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
- UNIFORMITY
- SIZE
- COMPATIBILITY WITH PURPOSE
- SECURITY

SLIDE 6-20

HOST NATION SECURITY FILES


- ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
- ARMED FORCES:
  - ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY
  - MISSION OF MILITARY
  - COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, INTELLIGENCE
  - TRAINING LEVEL AND COMPETENCE
- PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY
- CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

THREAT ANALYSIS WORK SHEET/MATRIX




SLIDE 6-22

ASSOCIATION MATRIX



PERSONALITY/ACTIVITY MATRIX




SLIDE 6-24

COORDINATE REGISTER

- AID TO RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY PLANNING
- TOOL TO ANTICIPATE THREAT ACTIONS
- REVEALS THREAT PERCEPTIONS OF TERRAIN AND TARGETS
- FORCES CLOSER EXAMINATION OF TERRAIN

TIME-EVENT CHART



SLIDE 6-26

INCIDENT MAP

- COVERS A SPECIFIC PERIOD
- CUMULATIVE, HISTORICAL
- GUIDE TO INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE PRODUCTION
- DEVELOP SPECIFIC, ACCURATE SYMBOLS
- ACCUMULATED OVERLAYS REVEAL:
  - CLUSTERS OF THREAT ACTIVITY
  - TRENDS OF THREAT ACTIVITY
  - PATTERNS OF THREAT ACTIVITY

THREAT SITUATION MAP

- ANALYTICAL BY-PRODUCT OF INCIDENT MAP
- A FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT REFLECTING CURRENT THREAT SITUATION
- GRAPHIC PORTRAYAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

PERSONALITIES AND CONTACTS MAP

- LOCATIONS/ACTIVITIES OF AGENTS INVOLVED IN—
  - ESPIONAGE
  - AGITATION
  - ANY RELEVANT ACTIVITY
- RECORD:
  - APPEARANCES
  - MEETINGS
  - MOVEMENTS
- REQUIRES USE OF LARGE-SCALE MAP
- ESPECIALLY USEFUL IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT

ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK

CLASSIFICATION

ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK

FROM: (HOUR AND DATE)

TO: (HOUR AND DATE)

CLASSIFICATION

COMPOSITION
LOGISTICS
DISPOSITION
EFFECTIVENESS
STRENGTH
PERSONALITIES
TACTICS
ELECTRONIC DATA
TRAINING
MISCELLANEOUS DATA
RELEVANT INFORMATION

"PERSONALITIES" FACTOR IS STABILITY-AND-SUPPORT-OPERATIONS-SPECIFIC

SLIDE 6-30

REFERENCES

- MAINTAIN A WORKING LIBRARY WITH EASY ACCESS TO MATERIALS TO INCLUDE—
  - RELEVANT DOCTRINAL LITERATURE
  - OPEN SOURCE DOCUMENTS: BOOKS, NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES
- ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL
- S2s CANNOT HAVE TOO MUCH INFORMATION

EVALUATING INFORMATION

- MUST EVALUATE INFORMATION RECEIVED FOR DETERMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE
- USES THREE STEPS:
  - PERTINENCE
  - RELIABILITY
  - CREDIBILITY

SLIDE 6-32

PERTINENCE

THE EXAMINATION OF INFORMATION TO DETERMINE—

- RELEVANCE TO THE ENEMY OR TO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS OR AREA OF INTEREST
- IMMEDIATE VALUE? IF SO, TO WHOM?
- FUTURE VALUE?

RELIABILITY

- RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION AND SOURCE IS EVALUATED BASED ON EXPERIENCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT
- BEST CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING REPORTS FROM TROOP UNITS IS LEVEL OF TRAINING, PAST PERFORMANCE, AND EXPERIENCE
- HEADQUARTERS CLOSEST TO THE SOURCE MAY BE THE BEST JUDGE OF ITS RELIABILITY
- LACKING EXPERIENCE, THE S2 ASKS THESE QUESTIONS:
  - MOTIVATION OF SOURCE?
  - TYPE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED?
  - COLLECTION TECHNIQUES USED?
  - SKILLS?

CREDIBILITY

- PROBABLE TRUTH OF THE INFORMATION
- ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
  - IS IT POSSIBLE?
  - IS THE INFORMATION CONSISTENT WITH ITSELF?
  - COLLATERAL CONFIRMATION?
  - DOES THE INFORMATION CONTRADICT OTHER, SIMILAR INFORMATION?
  - IF SO, WHICH IS MORE LIKELY TO BE TRUE?

INTEGRATION

- COMBINATION OF ISOLATED ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION WITH OTHER INFORMATION TO FORM A LOGICAL PICTURE OF THE THREAT—A PUZZLE
- REQUIRES THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
- RECOGNIZES AND AVOIDS BIASES AND PRECONCEPTIONS

SLIDE 6-36

BIASES

- CULTURAL: WHAT IS OR IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO UNITED STATES FORCES MAY BE DIFFERENT ELSEWHERE
- ORGANIZATIONAL: UNITS DEVELOP A COLLECTIVE "ATTITUDE" ABOUT SIMILAR SITUATIONS
- PERSONAL: RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR OPINIONS ARE BASED ON YOUR PERSONAL EXPERIENCES
- COGNITIVE: RECOGNIZE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF REPORTS
  - VIVIDNESS
  - ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE
  - OVERSENSITIVITY TO CONSISTENCY

INTERPRETATION

- WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THIS INFORMATION? HOW DOES THE SEEMINGLY INSIGNIFICANT INFORMATION RELATE TO WHAT I KNOW?
- WHAT IS ITS SIGNIFICANCE, GIVEN MY COMMANDER'S INTENT?
- CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS PROVIDES A BASIS FOR DETERMINING FUTURE ENEMY INTENT AND UPDATING THE ESTIMATE

ANALYTICAL METHODS


- PATTERN ANALYSIS
- LINK ANALYSIS
- COMBINED ANALYSIS

PATTERN ANALYSIS

- BASED ON PREMISE THAT THREAT EXHIBITS IDENTIFIABLE PATTERNS OF ACTIVITY
- BASIC TECHNIQUE:
  - ISOLATE INDICATORS (PROFILE)
  - USE INDICATORS TO CONFIRM OR DENY LIKE ACTIVITY
  - USE INCIDENT MAP TO PROVIDE A GRAPHIC METHOD OF TRACKING INDICATORS
  - ACTIVATE ONE INDICATOR TO FOCUS COLLECTION ON OTHERS

LINK ANALYSIS

- USED TO DETERMINE LINKS AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONS, ACTIVITIES, AND SO FORTH
- CAN USE FOUR DIFFERENT RECORDING DEVICES:
  - ASSOCIATION MATRIX
  - ACTIVITIES MATRIX
  - TIME-EVENT CHART
  - LINK DIAGRAMS



LINK DIAGRAM
CPDC
KIDNAP
EXTORTION
TERRORISM
OLIVERA
REYN.
GUZMAN
SCHMIDT
EXT TVL
ECHEV.
FINANCE
WONG
TRAINING
CRUZ
LOGISTICS
AMPES.
PSYOPS
PROP.
MARX
DONG
PEND.
RECRUITING
COMMO
SAND.
POM.
INTEL
SLIDE 6-42

RISK ASSESSMENT

- UNCERTAINTY IS A GIVEN IN THE STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT
- DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY, FILLING IN INFORMATION GAPS IS THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE
- THE COMMANDER'S GREATEST CONCERN IS RISK; THE S2's GREATEST CONCERN IS UNCERTAINTY
- WHEN UNCERTAINTY IS ADDED TO LETHALITY, RISK INCREASES
- S2s TRANSLATE UNCERTAINTY INTO RISK

RISK ASSESSMENT CHART

UNCERTAINTY EQUALS NUMBER OF THREAT SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES



Consider: lethality, commander's intent

SLIDE 6-44

LESSON 7. CONVOY OPERATIONS

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: This lesson assists units at the tactical level to plan, organize, and defend convoys in a stability and support operations environment. For this instruction, a convoy is two or more vehicles moving from point A to point B through hostile or uncontrolled territory.

SLIDE 7-1. CONVOY OPERATIONS—THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

Every convoy is planned and executed as a combat operation; because, poor planning, lack of mental sharpness of all convoy personnel, and lack of rehearsals will get soldiers killed. As such, the commander's estimate of the situation is used and approached with stability and support operations considerations. This may seem a lengthy process, but the intent is that it becomes a mental, methodical, thought process that can be done in 5 minutes or 5 days of planning time. The commander may receive an operation order, but most often he receives a fragmentary order or a quick mission statement and a map brief from his commander. The estimate process works in any situation—mission analysis, situation and courses of action (METT-T factors), analysis of courses of action (war-game), comparison of courses of action, and decision.

SLIDE 7-2. MISSION ANALYSIS

The commander conducts a thorough mission analysis to determine exactly what is to be done and why. The commander does this by knowing the *commander's intent* two levels up. This allows the commander to use his initiative and judgment should he have to alter the plan during execution. This intent defines the purpose, which gives the latitude or parameters with which to work.

Next, the commander considers all the *specified tasks*. An example is "deliver humanitarian relief supplies to check point 3."

Next, he determines any *implied tasks*. For example, if the proposed route takes the convoy through different clans or factional populations, the implied tasks are to bring along an interpreter and to be prepared to negotiate or have a civil affairs representative to negotiate with groups encountered. Next, the commander determines constraints and limitations. These are anything that limits the freedom of action or movement. In a stability and support operations environment, there are many constraints and limitations to consider; for example, are there any particular routes that may be off limits to the convoys; are there designated movement times within which the unit must operate, for instance "no movement after 1800 hours." Another example may be a restriction on the number of vehicles or cargo that are allowed to move in a convoy. Rules of engagement may also affect the way that the unit can accomplish its mission.

The next part of the mission analysis is to determine the *mission-essential task(s)* of the convoy. This can be thought of as the task(s) that allows the unit to achieve its purpose. Common tasks for infantry units are seize, secure, or suppress, and so forth. For convoys, the stated task may be "to provide security for," "to move," or "to deliver." The mission-essential task that the commander has determined from the higher commander's operation order becomes the mission statement in his operation order.

SLIDE 7-3. RESTATED MISSION STATEMENT EXAMPLE

The commander writes the mission statement in the form of "who, what (*task*), when, where, and why (*purpose*)." This mission statement forms the nucleus of the convoy planning process. Everything the unit does revolves around achieving this mission.

SLIDE 7-4. ENEMY

The commander continues with the estimate process with the METT-T analysis and studies enemy or belligerent situation. He must discern the most recent belligerent locations, composition, and perhaps most importantly, the belligerent's recent activities. This information, coupled with knowledge of belligerent or insurgent doctrine helps the commander to predict the likelihood of being ambushed and the techniques that may be employed against the convoy. Although the risk of ambush is always prevalent, in humanitarian assistance missions and peace support missions, the equally dangerous threat is from minefields and roadblocks from various rival factions trying to gain political and military control. Of particular use to the commander may be an incident overlay that depicts belligerent activities by date and location. This graphic portrayal posted on the situation map aids in avoiding ambushes and roadblocks, which is the best defense. Additionally, a *population overlay* that depicts the different ethnic population locations aids in determining possible friendly or hostile areas. A major source of information is the nongovernment organizations. Because they have been in the country longer, they can tell the commander about patterns of belligerent roadblocks, ambushes, and trafficability of the roads. Other information should include what the belligerents have been successful at and what they like to do.

In Bosnia, the belligerents established roadblocks to delay or turn back the convoys. In Somalia, the belligerents demanded part of the cargo as a tax to allow the convoy to pass.

SLIDE 7-5. TERRAIN

The commander continues with the METT-T analysis in a logical sequence. Terrain is neutral to either combatant. The commander must know the effects of terrain as it relates to the unit and the enemy. Obstacles are anything that slows, hinders, or impede movement. Within the area of operations and interest, the commander should further study obstacles according to severely restricted terrain (this is terrain that is impractical to negotiate for the type of force moving through it); restricted terrain (this is terrain that the unit can negotiate but at a slower rate of movement); and unrestricted terrain (which is terrain that presents no problem to movement). Specific obstacles the commander looks for are steep crests, choke points, minefields, inferior road networks, and anyplace that may be a likely ambush point or roadblock along the route. Next, the commander identifies avenues of approach. These are areas (in the case of convoys, usually roads and trails) through which a unit can move. These avenues may be directed from higher headquarters (main supply routes) or the commander may be in the process of developing them. The commander looks at them in terms of how the unit may move across these avenues from point A to point B, but also looks for possible belligerent avenues of approach from the belligerents view point. The commander should think of threat avenues of approach in terms of air, mounted and dismounted avenues, and perhaps even tunnels. After identifying the likely avenues of approach, the commander should look at key terrain. This is any location or area that affords a marked advantage to either combatant(s). The commander should look at key terrain in terms of possible or likely ambush points for the belligerents to bring direct or indirect fire on the unit. The commander

examines observation and fields of fire. The commander determines the kind of observation and fields of fire that may be afforded along each avenue of approach, as well as from belligerent positions. Cover and concealment are often inseparable from fields of fires and observation. The commander examines the terrain to determine how it can conceal and protect the unit from enemy observation and fields of fire. The commander determines where the enemy may use this terrain to fire on the convoy. The commander should also examine the weather factors as they relate to the mission. The commander should obtain the latest forecast to determine any adverse weather conditions that may affect the operation.

SLIDE 7-6. TROOPS AND TIME AVAILABLE

Now, the commander must examine his troops. This is an important aspect of convoy operations, because convoys are frequently put together from ad hoc organizations, perhaps composed of nongovernment organizations, and various soldiers and vehicles from different units. The convoy commander must determine exactly who is under his control; what weapon systems he has available; and what leaders, by rank, so that he may form an effective chain of command within the convoy. He should also determine what communications assets are available, the maintenance status of the vehicles, which vehicles have trailers (these reduce speed and hinder turn around in the event of an ambush). Also, the commander must consider what fire support assets are available—artillery, mortars, or perhaps gunships or armored escort vehicles. If fire support is not available and based on the threat situation, the commander may need to request these assets to aid in security.

a. The commander considers the make up of the convoy.

(1) If it has infantry squads, platoons, or a company, the infantry can provide security and a potential assault counterattack force in the event of an ambush. The infantry can dismount before reaching potential ambush areas and clear dismounted through the area. This may have the effect of flushing or scaring off potential ambushers without a fight. This often results in a safe passage.

(2) If it has an antiarmor platoon section, the antiarmor section can provide long-range antiarmor fires with their TOW systems. If it has infantry antiarmor platoon, in addition to the TOW systems, a mix of MK 19 and caliber .50 machine guns are available, which can lay suppressive fires against suspected or known ambush sites. The commander must consider the bursting distance of the 40-mm round from the MK 19. If the terrain is closer than the minimum safe bursting range of the 40-mm grenade launcher, the caliber .50 or M60 machine gun should be used.

(3) If a military police platoon is attached, the platoon has a minimum of seven gun vehicles capable of mounting the MK 19 or M60 machine guns. Each MP team (one vehicle) has three MPs, one M249, and one M203. MPs are trained in traffic control and handling of civilians or refugees that may try to interfere with the convoy.

(4) If tanks are attached, the tanks offer the best protection against ambushes. They also have considerable devastating firepower that can suppress or destroy an enemy ambush. Not only can the tank crew deliver precision main gun fire (120-mm), they can engage targets with the coax machine gun (7.62-mm which can be integrated into the main gun site), the commander's caliber .50 machine gun, and the loader's 7.62-mm machine gun as well. Each M1 tank carries 40 main gun rounds, 500 caliber .50 rounds, 600 rounds for the loader's machine guns, and 10,000 for the coax machine gun as a basic load. Tank platoons may have a mine plow that can help clear a path through obstacles. Tanks also have excellent

cross-country mobility as a potential counterambush force. Tanks cannot "hold" terrain, and unless augmented with some dismounted infantry capability, they will have trouble clearing obstacles and potential choke points. The potential heat damage caused by the M1 exhaust system must also be considered.

(5) If Bradleys are attached, Bradleys have less protection than a tank, but they still have adequate protection against an ambush. Additionally, the 25-mm gun can fire both sabot and HE rounds to suppress or destroy lightly armored vehicles and dismounted personnel. Bradley units also carry a dismount fire team (+) on each vehicle. Bradleys operate in sections of two vehicles, which give the section a squad of dismount infantry. These infantrymen with close support from the Bradley vehicles can be used to clear obstacles and potential ambush areas.

(6) If M113s are attached, M113s have less protection than Bradleys, but more protection and firepower than an infantry unit. The M113s carry caliber .50 machine guns mounted in an open cupola. The vehicles can also carry a dismounted infantry squad in the rear of the vehicle.

All of the armored vehicles can assist in counterambush operations by driving close to the kill zone to engage the belligerents with large amounts of firepower. This allows the vehicles to give good covering fire to forces conducting a flank attack, while suppressing the enemy, and to afford protection to any dismounted soldiers who are caught in the ambush kill zone. Armored vehicles with tanks leading have no problem knocking down medium-size trees. Although the leading tank's primary sector of fire is generally to the front, Bradleys and M113s can effectively fire 360 degrees and cover the flanks and rear of the leading tanks.

In the forests at the JRTC, units have found that taking the entire convoy (trucks included) off of the roads and following trails made by the armored vehicles increased the survival rate of the convoys. The commander plans for the additional time that it takes to move cross-country and to recover the vehicles may get stuck on tree stumps, and so forth. The additional advantage of going cross-country rather than on roads is that the belligerents find it difficult to position ambushes in the middle of the woods.

b. The commander must know how many and what types of radios his unit has for communication. Some units have AM, FM, or VHF radio systems, other units have SINCGARS or SATCOM systems. These systems are not compatible with each other. The first consideration that the commander must make is how he will talk to higher headquarters. He must maintain continuous radio communications en route or request a retransmission to be sent or request a longer range radio system. The second consideration is how to request indirect-fire support. His command channel may be the request net or he may have to dedicate a fires net to the mortar or artillery unit. Third, the commander must determine how he will communicate with his subordinate leaders, and any signals for the entire unit. Fourth, the commander must have a backup radio in the event of a system failing. If he loses communications with his higher headquarters, he must move to higher ground and switch antennas or try different radios and frequencies to reestablish communication. Visual signals (such as smoke, flares) and arm-and-hand signals can have specific meanings. (During Operation Just Cause, some units used different colored smoke grenades to signal left and right turns for the convoy.) Flares or star clusters can be used to signal lifting or shifting of supporting direct or indirect fires during the counterambush assault. The commander must keep in mind that simplicity is most important.

c. For logistics, every convoy needs to be self-sustained for the conduct of the operation and any contingencies that may arise. The convoy must carry sufficient quantities of Class I, III, medical support, maintenance support, vehicle recovery equipment (such as tow bars, cables, M88s, and so forth). Soldiers and truck drivers from other units as well as all members of the convoy must know the SOPs to include immediate reaction drills, actions on contact, actions in an ambush, actions at halts, actions if a vehicle breaks down, who is in charge of the vehicle, and who will take charge at each level of control. Soldiers must be trained to drive the vehicle in case the driver becomes incapacitated. Soldiers must know the rules of engagement. Soldiers must also know what actions to take at a belligerent roadblock—are belligerents allowed to search the vehicles or not. Maintenance personnel are with the vehicle recovery equipment at the trail of the convoy. If the unit does not have maintenance personnel, someone should substitute for them in the convoy. The maintenance personnel should also be armed with the same protection as the other soldiers. The commander must guard or destroy any military vehicles that cannot be evacuated during movement. The convoy should have combat lifesavers with kits proportionally spread out through the convoy. The medical vehicles normally follow toward the rear of the formation for protection. Thus the vehicles will not have to travel against the convoy if someone is injured at the trail end. The commander must know how many host nation or nongovernment organization trucks are part of this convoy. He must also know what kind of cargo are they carrying. There is usually be some kind of restriction on the type of cargo allowed. The commander must know if the nongovernment organization or host nation members are cooperative with the way that the commander wants to accomplish the mission. (In Somalia, some relief agencies [nongovernment organizations] did not want to be associated with the military, but still needed the protection afforded by moving in the convoy. The US units traveled in front of and behind the nongovernment organization convoy, but out of sight. The US units were never out of supporting range in the event that they were needed to support the nongovernment organization convoy.) If soldiers are put in the vehicle to provide security, a leader must be in the front cab with the driver to ensure that the commander maintains control over the vehicle. Soldiers must be able to drive the vehicle in case of an emergency. The commander organizes the vehicles to provide maximum cover from fire as well as observation in all directions. Supplies can be piled on the outside of the cargo area to give the soldiers some protection. Important or critical cargo must be kept in easy access in the event that the cargo has to be quickly removed from the vehicle. Also, the commander must consider the maintenance status of the vehicles.

d. For engineers and fire support, the commander must know what engineer assets are available. Engineers from mechanized units have an M113 and 1 1/2-ton trailer for each squad, while engineers from infantry units do not have vehicles and must be given vehicle support. Engineers are excellent for breaching and clearing obstacles along the route. Engineers are trained in (in addition to mechanized reconnaissance units) en route reconnaissance and bridge classification. They can use explosives to clear paths and obstacles. Clearing a route requires considerable time and resources. When planning, the commander considers the possibility of obstacles (especially buried mines) and their impact on the time table. Also, once a route has been cleared, it must be secured. If a portion of the route is left unsecured for any period, it should be considered under hostile control and requires clearing before using it. The commander must not take a convoy out if he does not have a fire support plan.

Units in Somalia found that it was effective to have the infantry company mortar section moving in vehicles in the convoy formation to provide immediate indirect-fire support to suppress enemy ambush sites and to support the forces conducting the counterambush flanking attack. This technique is best accomplished with company mortars. Battalion mortars are best used either from an established base or by periodically moving them from firing position to firing position to provide immediate support. The major constraint to having the battalion mortars continuously moving is the mortar set up time. If the commander cannot bring his own indirect-fire support, he must know what is available. The commander must know if the rules of engagement allow use of indirect fire. If relying on indirect fire from a supporting unit not moving with the unit, the commander must know if he has a priority target. He must be able to communicate with the supporting unit. If required, he must clear the unit's fires with higher headquarters. The forward observer or some one trained to call for and adjust fires must be positioned in the front of a convoy, in an aircraft flying in support of the convoy, or beside the commander in the formation. If possible, the FO should be in an aircraft. The next best position is with the leader of the advance guard or with the commander. Preferably, a forward observer should be in both places. Priority targets are the most responsive way to get indirect-fire support (the difference between 2 to 5 minutes). The weapons of the supporting unit are laid on the data required to put a round on the target immediately when called. If the unit has a priority target, the commander establishes targets off to the side of the route of march (not on the road or trail), and shifts the priority target from one target to the next as the unit passes each target. Also, the commander must consider the type of munitions to fire. Delayed fuze allows the commander to bring the rounds in closer to his soldiers. The fire support element (FSE) of the headquarters initiating the convoy should develop a fire plan to support the convoy. Normally, this is a simple plan consisting of priority targets that the artillery or mortars will be laid on and shifted as the convoy progresses along its route. This keeps the artillery focused on the general area of the convoy and greatly improves its responsiveness. The key to success is to have the convoy commander briefed on the fire plan by the FSO and to have the fire support coordination nets readily available to shift the targets along the route. HF radios are needed in mountainous terrain such as in Bosnia. If the convoy is operating beyond the range of artillery, USAF CAS aircraft or Army attack helicopters should be operating on a standby basis. The convoy commander must be briefed on procedures and given the means to contact the aircraft either directly or through the FSE. To expedite clearance of fires, the FSEs of the convoy headquarters and the commanders owning the ground should coordinate a battle tracking matrix. The area of operations for the convoy is divided into 15 to 20 smaller sectors broken down along identifiable terrain features. As a unit patrols or convoys through a sector, it reports to its headquarters that it is occupying that section. This sector is given a code name of RED for occupied. If the sector is unoccupied, then the sector is given a code name of GREEN, meaning no further coordination is needed by the headquarters owning the land.

e. For time analysis, the commander considers how much time he has to plan and prepare for the mission. He determines the time between the present and the time the convoy must start marshalling to begin the mission. The commander uses only one-third of the time available; because, his subordinates need time to plan, brief, and conduct rehearsals with their subordinates. The commander gives detailed warning orders as much as possible and as

soon as possible so that leaders can begin their planning without waiting for the operation order. The commander must also consider how much time he has to complete the mission. When the commander analyzes his time available, he considers rehearsals and briefbacks. Convoys are made up of constantly changing units and organizations. Therefore, rehearsals are a must. Briefbacks are the minimum standard for each vehicle commander. The best rehearsal technique and the most effective is to have all of the convoy participants standing by their vehicles going through the reaction drills. (Figure 7-1.) The commander must also stress the need for each vehicle to have a strip map as a minimum, the leaders of each element of the convoy to have a standard military map to call for and adjust indirect fires. Rehearsal drills that are to be considered are react to sniper, negotiate a checkpoint, call for fire, react to ambush, actions at a halt, negotiate with local authorities, and rules of engagement dilemmas.

f. For maintenance, convoys consist of a variety of equipment, some in questionable working order (for example, nongovernment organization and host nation vehicles). If possible, those vehicles that are broken or questionable should be identified early and plans made to either transload the cargo or to tow it in the event of a break down. Vehicle floors are sandbagged including the vehicle cabs and under the seats. Windshields and windows are removed to reduce fragmentation. A wire cutter should be positioned high on the front of the vehicle. Chicken wire or chain linked fencing can be placed across the front bumper frame to detect rocks, bottles, firebombs, and grenades. The canvas is taken off of the trucks so that soldiers can see and shoot in all directions. The canvas doors are taken off of the HMMWVs. The canvas sides must be rolled up or removed. The cargo is positioned in the rear of the trucks along the outside walls of the cargo area to allow the soldiers to stand in the center of the cargo area using the cargo for protection. The most important supplies are positioned for ready access. The commander allocates time to accomplish those tasks and conduct the following inspections. Scheduled maintenance halts during long movements are needed to help prevent vehicle break downs, but security must be established and maintained by all personnel at all times. The commander inspects the supply vehicle's load plan to ensure that the proper supplies are being carried and no illegal or contraband supplies are loaded. Also, he checks to ensure that critical supplies are positioned where they can be quickly off-loaded in the event that the vehicle is damaged. He has the leaders spot check the maintenance of the vehicles. The commander spot checks the vehicle drivers for strip maps and knowledge of the planned route. He checks the vehicles to ensure that the vehicles are reinforced to protect the soldiers and personnel riding in the vehicles.

SLIDE 7-7. COURSES OF ACTION

This is a reasonable, feasible concept to achieve the mission. The commander develops two or three options to consider. One course of action may take the convoy along ROUTE BLUE, while another takes the convoy along ROUTE RED. Other courses of action may revolve around the manner in which an armored security escort is used in the convoy. The commander should consider several alternatives. A simple sketch of each course of action assists in "seeing" how it may look.

SLIDE 7-8. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION (WAR-GAME)

The commander should analyze two or three of the courses of action against the belligerent's most likely courses of action. War gaming gives a reality check of the options the

commander developed. For each course of action, the commander visualizes the belligerent reactions to the convoy along key points in the route based on his analysis of terrain and enemy. This process ensures that each course of action is viable and that the commander understands how the convoy mission will be executed and what it may be called on to do.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The instructor may "walk through" an example course of action.

1. Lower windshields and cover them with tarps (this reduces danger of flying glass and stops glare).

2. Place tailgates halfdown to ease dismounting (soldiers can then shoot and dismount fast).

3. Put at least two levels of sandbags on the floor of the cabs and cargo areas to protect against mines.


4. Stack sandbags along the sides of the cargo beds to protect soldiers from small-arms fire from the flanks.

5. Stack and fasten sandbags around the engine compartments to protect the engines (do not block the flow of air to radiators).

6. Place troop seats in the center, facing out, so soldiers can react fast.

7. Install wire-cutting apparatus in front of trucks to prevent injury of soldiers from wire stretched across the road.

8. Remove the rear safety straps for fast dismounting.



REAR VIEW

FRONT VIEW

Figure 7-1. Preparation of trucks for movement.

SLIDE 7-9. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION AND DECISION

Based on the results of his war gaming, the commander compares each course of action to determine which is the best in terms of accomplishing the mission. He may select a course of action based solely from the advantages and disadvantages determined in war gaming; or he may use a simple decision matrix to compare each course of action. The last step of this process is to select a course of action that best allows accomplishment of the mission. For convoy operations, this probably revolves around route selection or convoy organization and security procedures. (A sample operation order format for a convoy is in Figure 7-2.)

SLIDE 7-10. CONVOY ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE

Assuming the convoy has some sort of security detachment, the commander should organize it with an *advance guard*, *main body*, and *rear guard*.

The *convoy commander* is responsible for the entire convoy. He must be in a position where he can best command and control the convoy. This is probably in the main body. If the convoy commander is in the advance guard because of the lack of trained soldiers, his ability

to control the entire convoy is reduced. This is especially true if he becomes decisively engaged in an ambush and loses communications with the rest of the convoy. The commander must be in a position to make the decision in any situation. For example, the advance guard is ambushed. Does he commit the rear guard to counterattack the ambush, or does he allow the advance guard to break contact with the enemy and linkup with the main body while the rear guard takes over as the advance guard on an alternate route. The commander must control the fires of the units to prevent fratricide.

The *advance guard* provides immediate suppressive fire at the lead of the convoy in the event of an ambush. The leader of the advance guard should be a combat-arms leader who knows how to employ direct and indirect fires. He should have a unit that can conduct fire and maneuver. The advance guard should have some kind of breaching and clearing asset (either engineers or trained infantry) to quickly breach, clear, or bypass any obstacle. The leaders in the advance guard should be proficient in land navigation, and if possible, have a global positioning system as backup for navigation. The advance guard should be strong enough to fight any expected enemy ambush. Aviation and Air Force assets may also be used to augment the advance guard. Attack helicopters and AC-130s can provide quick and accurate fires as well as advance reconnaissance of the route. If air assets are not available, unmanned aerial vehicles or remotely piloted vehicles can provide some advance reconnaissance of the route to be used. A mortar section may be added to the advance guard for flexibility to fight out the engagement. (In Somalia, US forces found that the lead vehicles should be heavily sandbagged with two layers of sand bags and a fiber mat laid over it to reduce shrapnel. All occupants wore extra body armor and sat on protective vests, Windshields and windows were removed to reduce fragmentation.) The advance guard travels far enough forward to make contact with the enemy, yet allows the main body the flexibility to maneuver to avoid engagement with the enemy forces. (In Somalia, the distance was about 500 meters to 1 kilometer from the main body.) The advance guard clears obstacles and negotiates passage through checkpoints before the main body arrives. Terrain, enemy, and convoy size dictate distances to be used. The advance guard personnel looks for signs of recent digging or other mine indicators. The commander determines his advance guard based on his "troops available" analysis, but this element should be resourced first because of the likelihood of its making contact first.

The *main body* consists of the bulk of the convoy vehicles interspersed with security vehicles and soldiers. The main body needs 360-degree protection for itself. A combat vehicle should lead the main body with combat elements interspersed throughout the main body. No more than a squad should be placed in a single vehicle. (In Somalia, units of the 10th Mountain Division recommended that at least a platoon of combat power move in the main body.) The main body maintains radio or visual contact with the advance guard and rear guard security elements. If the main body is a large element, the commander divides it into serials commanded and controlled by leaders reporting directly back to the convoy commander. Some considerations for the serials in the main body is to keep the security force integrity inside the march unit as much as possible; for example, the squad leader and his dismount squad can be in different vehicles. The vehicles are close enough that if the squad has to dismount, the squad leader can control his soldiers. If possible, the commander tries to keep fire teams in one or two vehicles. Armored vehicle sections are kept together in a serial, because they are trained to work together as a section. The leader of each march unit

must know the commander's intent for the convoy operation so the leader can commit his security forces or retain them and move his element to a position of safety.

The *rear guard* consists of reactionary forces with combat power, and logistics vehicles. The rear guard defends the rear of the convoy against any potential enemy threat, conducts counterambush attacks to destroy or drive off belligerent ambushing forces to relieve elements of the convoy caught in an ambush.

SLIDE 7-11. SAMPLE ORGANIZATION (LIGHT/HEAVY)—TROOPS AVAILABLE

An infantry company commander has the following units and equipment available to him for a convoy operation.

Bradley Platoon

- Four M2s
- Two infantry squads
- Six VRC radios

Infantry Platoon

- Three infantry squads
- Two M60 machine gun teams
- Forward Observers with PRC-77

Infantry Company CP

- Two RATELOs with PRC-77 radios
- Company FSO with PRC-77
- 60-mm mortar section
- One ambulance with aidmen
- Two additional cargo HMMWVs
- Civil affairs/psychological operations team with two HMMWVs
- Light engineer squad
- Four 5-ton trucks
- M88 recovery vehicle
- Seven trucks with cargo

SLIDE 7-12. SAMPLE TASK ORGANIZATION (LIGHT/HEAVY)

The infantry company commander task-organizes his forces into an advance guard, main body, and rear guard.

ADVANCE GUARD: Two M2s, Engineer Squad/HMMWV

MAIN BODY: Infantry platoon with FO on three 5-ton trucks

REAR GUARD: Two M2s, recovery vehicle, medical vehicle, civil affairs/psychological operations team

SLIDE 7-13. SAMPLE ORGANIZATION (LIGHT)

An infantry company commander has the following units and equipment available for a convoy operation.

Military Police Platoon

- Four hard-top HMMWVs
- Two M60 machine guns
- Two MK 19 automatic grenade launcher

- Five VRC radios

Infantry Platoon

- Three infantry squads
- Two M60 machine gun teams
- Forward observer with PRC-77

Infantry Company CP

- Two RATELOs with PRC-77 radios
- Company FSO with PRC-77
- 60-mm mortar section
- One ambulance with aidmen
- Two additional cargo HMMWVs
- Civil affairs/psychological operations team with two HMMWVs
- Light engineer squad
- Four 5-ton trucks
- Three trucks with cargo

SLIDE 7-14. SAMPLE TASK ORGANIZATION (LIGHT)

The commander task-organizes his forces into an advance guard, main body, and rear guard.

ADVANCE GUARD: Two HMMWVs with M60/MK 19, Engineer Squad

MAIN BODY: Infantry platoon with FO on three 5-ton trucks

REAR GUARD: Two HMMWVs with M60/MK 19, recovery vehicle, medical vehicle, civil affairs/psychological operations team

SLIDE 7-15. RESERVE

The reserve is normally controlled and committed by higher headquarters. Reserves are determined by METT-T. Advantages of having an air assault reserve are that they can cover vast distances quickly, and they are not likely to be ambushed along the way. Disadvantages of having an air assault reserve are that they need a suitable landing zone, preferably secured; the air assaulting unit does have the tactical mobility or firepower of BFVs or tanks; once they are on the ground their tactical mobility is limited to where they can move by foot; and bad weather may restrict flying. Heavy reserves consisting of BFVs and tanks have the advantages of protection, firepower, and shock effect. Their disadvantages are that they can only move as fast as the supporting routes permit, and they are vulnerable to ambushes along their routes of march if they have to move on roads and trails. If the convoy has to move beyond adequate supporting capability of the reserve force, higher headquarters has the option to pre-position or designate units along the way to act as a reserve. The disadvantage could be that the designated unit may be in a fight of its own, or if the reserve is from a different unit, they may not have the same SOPs or communications capabilities.

SLIDE 7-16. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The commander organizes and plans the convoy. The optimum size for a convoy is METT-T driven, but primarily the number of leaders and the terrain must be considered. Convoys are broken down into serials of five vehicles. A leader (NCO) is in charge of each serial. The commander must have a communications plan. The plan must be rehearsed. If the convoy looks like it is too hard to attack, the enemy may leave it alone.

SLIDE 7-17. CONVOY DEFENSE - SECURITY FORCE

The best defense against ambush is avoidance. This should be foremost in his mind as the commander conducted his estimate and war-gamed each of his courses of action. However, he should be prepared to meet the challenge of an ambush should it arise.

SLIDE 7-18. CONVOY DEFENSE - MAIN BODY

The convoy commander must rehearse actions on contact for a variety of scenarios. The goal of each action is to free the convoy from contact so that it can continue its mission. The purpose of the convoy is to reach its destination, not to destroy the enemy in a movement to contact. If the elements in contact cannot break contact, then the reserve is committed.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES: 1. As a summary of key considerations presented in this lesson, a sample convoy commander's coordination checklist is in Figure 7-3, and a list of considerations for battlefield operating systems is in Figure 7-4.

2. See Appendix A, Section III for STX, Convoy Operations and Negotiate a Belligerent Checkpoint.

3. See Appendix B for—

T&EO, Defend a Convoy
T&EO, Negotiate a Belligerent Force Checkpoint
T&EO, Deliver Supplies or Humanitarian Aid
T&EO, Link Up With a Convoy

OPERATION ORDER

1. SITUATION:
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Weather and Light Data.
         (a) Temperature.
         (b) Wind speed and direction.
         (c) Forecast.
         (d) Light data.
         (e) Effect on convoy operations.
      (2) Terrain and Vegetation.
         (a) Description.
         (b) Effect on enemy.
         (c) Effect on convoy.
      (3) Road Conditions.
         (a) Description.
         (b) Construction materials.
         (c) Substantial loads and speeds/considerations.
         (d) Road width.
         (e) Road signs.
         (f) Bridge classification/width.
         (g) Overpass restrictions (height).
         (h) Fords.
      (4) Identification of Enemy Forces.
         (a) Uniforms and headgear.
         (b) Weapons, vehicles, aircraft type, and markings.
      (5) Enemy Locations.
         (a) Suspected.
         (b) Known.
         (c) Minefields.
         (d) Obstacles.
      (6) Disposition.
         (a) Strength.
         (b) Morale.
         (c) Reinforcement capability.
         (d) Expected course of action.
   b. Civilians/Noncombatants: ROE.
      (1) Populated areas.
      (2) Probable reaction.
   c. Neutral Nation Observers.
      (1) Uniforms.
      (2) Locations.
   d. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Mission next higher headquarters.
      (2) Intent next higher headquarters.
      (3) Locations of adjacent and supporting units.
      (4) Planned actions of adjacent and supporting units.
      (5) Units providing fire support.
   e. Attachments/Detachments.
      (1) Effective times.
      (2) Unit identification.
      (3) Type of control.

2. MISSION: Who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose).

Figure 7-2. Example of a convoy commander's operation order format.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Concept of the Operation. Purpose.

b. Maneuver (task and purpose for each subelement).

(1) Fire support (task and purpose).

(a) Target list.

1. Target number.

2. Locations and terrain features.

3. Description, munitions, size.

4. Type (linear, and so forth).

5. Purpose.

(b) Priority of fires.

(c) Control of fires.

(d) Accessed/requested (On...Channel...Frequency)

(2) Subunit mission.

(a) Preparation during convoy movement and during halts.

(b) During de-trucking and unloading.

(3) Detailed instructions.

(a) Load plan.

1. Number and type vehicles.

2. Crew and vehicle assignments.

3. Gross vehicle weight restrictions.

4. Distribution of weapon systems (TOW, MK 19, caliber .50, AT4, M60)

5. Sequence of loading and unloading.

(b) Order of movement.

(c) Formations day and night.

(d) March interval and speed.

1. Day.

2. Night.

3. Various road segments and terrain.

(e) Routes.

1. Primary.

2. Alternate.

3. Known danger areas.

4. Intersections.

5. Planned fire support target locations.

6. Checkpoints.

7. Phase lines.

8. Route clearance plan.

9. Traffic control points.

10. Staging or marshalling area.

11. Start and release points.

12. Destination point and de-trucking point.

(f) Actions on enemy contact.

1. Near ambush.

2. Far ambush.

3. Booby trap.

4. Mechanized and armor confrontation.

5. Sniper contact.

6. Aerial attack.

7. Indirect fire.

(g) Actions at danger areas.

1. Known intersections.

2. Fording sites and bridges.

3. Large open areas.

4. Defiles, sharp inclines, and overpasses.

Figure 7-2. Example of a convoy commander's operation order format (continued).

5. Roadblocks, traffic control points.

(h) Actions at obstacles.

1. Minefields.

2. Obstructive debris.

(i) Actions upon vehicle emergency and accident recovery procedures.

(j) Actions upon short halts.

(k) Actions upon long halts.

1. Unplanned (longer than 30 seconds).

2. Who dismounts. How far they push out to establish local security perimeter.

(l) Treatment of escorted noncombatants.

1. Translator, communication, liaison between senior civilian leader and platoon leader.

2. Civilian provisions (warmth, rations, water, and hygiene).

(m) Driver rotation and relief during extended drives.

(n) Driving during limited visibility.

1. Driver and track commander wear night observation devices.

2. Reduce speeds.

(o) Catch-up during break in contact.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) MOPP level.

(2) Preventive maintenance checks and services completion time.

(3) Marshall time and place.

(4) Technical inspection time (maintenance personnel).

(5) Initial inspection time and place.

(6) Communications exercise time (OIC/NCOIC).

(7) Briefback time by key leaders.

(8) Rehearsal time.

(9) Final inspection time.

(10) Load time.

(11) Start point time.

(12) All vehicles will have a designated track commander.

(13) All vehicles will have at least one map for each vehicle and at least one person with the operations graphics committed to memory.

4. SERVICE AND SUPPORT

a. Rations and Water.

(1) Rations and water for each man.

(2) Emergency rations.

b. Equipment/Supplies.

(1) Basis of issue items/pioneer tools.

(2) Rucksack plan.

(3) Resupply plan.

(4) Refuel plan.

c. Maintenance Plan.

(1) Vehicle services.

(2) Recovery plan.

(3) Bumper number and location of mechanics in each chalk.

(4) Bumper number and location of tow bars.

d. Method of Handling Wounded and Dead.

(1) Location of medical vehicles and aidmen.

(2) Method of evacuating casualties.

e. Evacuation of Captured Personnel and Equipment.

(1) Evacuation and handling of enemy prisoners of war (Geneva Convention and five Ss).

(2) Evacuation, processing, and reporting of captured equipment, documents, and intelligence requirements.

Figure 7-2. Example of a convoy commander's operation order format (continued).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

(1) Chain of command.

(2) Location of key leaders and radiotelephone operators.

b. Signal.

(1) Each vehicle will have at least one radio.

(2) Key leaders will have at least two radios in their vehicles.

(3) Channels, frequencies, and call signs for internal communications and external, adjacent, supporting units.

(4) Authentication table, SOI, current time period in effect.

(5) Code words.

(6) Brevity codes, operational schedules.

(7) Location of fill devices.

(8) Number combinations, challenges, and password by time period.

(9) Arm-and-hand signals.

(10) Pyrotechnics, flares, and other signals.

(11) Personnel status, logistics status, and status reports required and time sent.

Figure 7-2. Example of a convoy commander's operation order format (continued).

STATUS	EVENT
_____	Status of vehicles (with tow bars), weapons, and personnel manifest.
_____	Weather update.
_____	Intelligence update (enemy sightings, obstacles).
_____	Operations update (by battalion S3).
_____	Status attachments (who, what, mandatory attendance at warning order, operation order, rehearsals).
_____	Approved routes (with alternatives) and control measures (copies provided to each track commander). Remain overnight plan, if required. Bump plan. Include dispersion plan at destination.
_____	Fire support plan with overlay (copy provided to each track commander).
_____	Warning order prepared and issued(within 1 hour of receipt of mission).
_____	Air mission briefing for aviation contingencies.
_____	Current rules of engagement briefing.
_____	Logistical support (static security posts, fuel, casualty evacuation, maintenance, and recovery).
_____	Call signs and frequencies of stationary elements convoy will pass through and communications exercise.
_____	Reserve force plan (call signs and frequencies).
_____	Operation order prepared and issued.
_____	Priority rehearsals—actions on contact, breach obstacle, react to indirection fire, actions at halts, and MOUT.
_____	All units have sufficient Class I and V.
_____	All vehicles inspected for contraband and bombs and so forth.
_____	Distribution plan for critical and sensitive items.
_____	Route status briefing.
_____	Lane marking techniques and materials verified.

Figure 7-3. Example of convoy commander's coordination checklist.

INTELLIGENCE:

- Support staff IPB process to identify choke points, bridges, tunnels, critical road junctions, and populated areas.
- Provide intelligence brief and update to all commanders to include 1:50,000 enemy situation overlay.
- Maintain situation map.
- Maintain incident map to facilitate pattern analysis.
- Maintain threat order of battle database.
- Debrief convoy security elements and commanders.
- Coordinate for Quickfix and unmanned aerial vehicle support.

MANEUVER:

- Order of movement: advance guard, main body, rear guard.
- Distance between vehicles based on METT-T.
- The convoy commander operates on the following nets:
  - Convoy internal net.
  - Battalion-level command net.
  - Fire support net.

- The battle drill for the convoy when encountering an ambush is—
  - Main Body (the escorted unit) Actions.
    - Main body returns fire and attempts to fight through ambush.
    - If forces are split, elements forward of the ambush move to the next static security post.
    - Elements decisively engaged dismount and provide local security.
    - Elements not in contact secure themselves and await commitment of the reserve or additional forces from static security posts (antitank/military police).

  - Security Element Actions.
    - Element in contact returns fire to suppress identified enemy positions.
    - Vehicle drivers maneuver to allow gunners to provide continued suppression of the enemy positions.
    - Convoy commander calls for and adjusts indirect fire on positively identified enemy positions.
    - Ground infantry deploys to eliminate the enemy position within capabilities.
    - Convoy commander reports and requests assistance from reserve force, if required.
    - Aviation asset designates landing zones.
    - Reserve force arrives and deploys.
    - Convoy commander reorganizes and continues mission.
    - If breach is required, lead security provides overwatch while engineer squad breaches. Rear security provides the reserves.

  - Reserve Force (air assault or heavy force).
    - Brigade tactical operations center alerts the reserve company commander.
    - Company commander designates reaction platoon, hot loads air assets, or loads Bradleys, and deploys them on order (within 30 minutes).
    - Company commander deploys with reaction platoon.
    - Executive officer leads the remainder of the reserve company, if necessary.
    - Reaction force deploys.
    - Reserve force contacts the convoy commander on the battalion command net.
    - Reserve force company commander takes control of combat operations to allow the convoy commander to continue.

  - Security at Halts (two types).
    - Short halts.
      - Main body closes to within 25 meters, pulls to one side of the road, and awaits instructions. Lead vehicle determines which side to stop, others follow.
      - Convoy stays loaded up and ready to move.

    - Long halts.
      - Main body closes to within 25 meters.
      - Vehicles halt in place; convoy commander determines if the convoy remains in place or pulls to one side of the road.
      - Infantry platoon dismounts to secure the main body.
      - Drivers and track commanders dismount to secure vehicles.
      - Convoy is prepared to move with 5 minutes.
    - Reaction to indirect fire.

Figure 7-4. Battlefield operating systems.

- Convoy increases speed and moves out of impact area. Vehicles move forward to rally at next static security post.
- Vehicles do not drive into the impact area. If rounds are observed landing to the front, these vehicles conduct a short halt until they can move through.

FIRE SUPPORT:

- Fire support assets may be positioned along the route.
- A target list with priority targets is provided to the convoy commander and supporting indirect fire assets.
- Convoy commander shifts priority targets as convoy moves along the route.
- Convoy commander coordinates fires with the maneuver commander who owns the ground.
- Attack helicopters or USAF CAS aircraft cover areas beyond range of artillery.
- Q36 or Q37 radars are used to detect and employ counter fire against enemy indirect fire assets that attack the convoy.

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY:

- Precede each convoy with an M1 tank section with mine rollers to protect the convoy from hitting a minefield that was emplaced after the route clearing element has cleared the route. In the event the M1 tanks are not available, the attached engineer squad moving with the advanced guard must conduct hasty clearing based on IPB and the minefield indicator checklist.
- Assume all obstacles are booby trapped.
- Do not cut trip wires.
- Do not attempt to move discovered mines. These mines should be blown in place.
- Do not shoot at mines.
- Do not operate radios or electronic equipment in the vicinity of wires of discovered mines.
- Do not attempt to bypass discovered mines.
- Hasty or deliberate route sweeping operations are slow and deliberate; conduct sweeping operations only in the daytime.
- Be suspicious of dummy, surface-laid mines; no two minefields will be exactly alike.
- Detect mines and report them.
- Do not group personnel together; always stay 25 to 50 meters apart.

AIR DEFENSE:

- Despite air supremacy, the possibility of air attack should be considered.
- Air defense officer and S2 develop an aerial IPB.
- Use passive air defense measures:
  - — Conceal the load.
  - — Eliminate glare by using mud, tape, cardboard, or camouflage nets to cover headlights, mirrors, and portions of the windshields.
  - — Try to reduce dust clouds. Reduce speed to reduce dust.
  - — Use routes that offer concealment.
  - — Use air guards.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT:

- Inspect all vehicles for bombs and contraband.
- Convoys supported by a logistical and medical package operating out of the brigade support area.
- Main support battalion responsible for reinforcing (sandbag floors and sides) all troop-carrying vehicles.
- Primary means of medical evacuation is air and secondary means is ground. Conduct a daily air mission briefing.
- Dedicate an ambulance for each convoy.
- Each convoy is prepared to self-recover up to two vehicles and evacuate them to the nearest static security post.
- Static security posts are designated as collection points for enemy prisoners of war, casualties, and maintenance.

COMMAND/CONTROL:

- Command and control of convoys operating on the lines of communication is the responsibility of a battalion-level command.
- Control, dispatching, clearance, and reporting are coordinated through the forward support battalion or brigade S4 on the brigade administrative/logistics net.
- Fire support call signs and frequencies are disseminated.
- Convoy commander must receive a movement order.
- The escorted unit must rehearse battle drills.

Figure 7-4. Battlefield operating systems (continued).

- Rehearsals are conducted to integrate and synchronize all elements of the convoy.
- Convoy size of the escorted unit is no more than 20 vehicles including the security element.
- Battalion commander determines command and control for the reserves.
- Convoys are broken down into serials of five vehicles with an NCO in charge of each vehicle.
- Serial commander must have communications with the convoy commander (PRC-126).
- Convoy communications are checked before the start point.
- Aerial platforms and cellular phones used as alternate means of communications.
- Aviation in support of convoy operations must be on the convoy commander's frequency.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS (Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations):

- Employ PSYOP loudspeakers to assist in dispersing civilians who hinder convoy movement.
- Request civil affairs team assistance immediately if civilian crowds are blocking the main supply route.
- Ensure each truck has cards in native language requesting civilians to disperse.
- Report civilian requests for food, medical treatment, and so forth; do not stop to assist.

MINEFIELD INDICATORS:

- Damaged vehicles.
- Dead animals.
- Avoidance by local population.
- Signs of digging.
- Signs of concrete removal.
- Holes or grooves in the road.
- Boxes or parcels placed along the road or shoulder of the road.
- Parked vehicles, bicycles, without operators.
- Wires on the road surface or extending onto shoulders of the road.
- Metallic devices on road surface.
- Evidence of vegetation disturbance along shoulders of the road.
- Evidence of mine peculiar supplies: wrenches, shipping plugs, wrapping paper, safety collars from fuses.
- IPB templating of likely ambush sites.
- Knowledge of likely threat mines and recognition of threat mines.
  - — Observation of disturbances in previous tire tracks.
  - — Disturbance of road potholes or puddles.
  - — Differences in amount of moisture or dew on road surface.
  - — Be alert for any signs posted on trees that covertly alert the location populace to presence of mines.
  - — Difference in plant growth (wilting, changed colors, or dead foliage.

Figure 7-4. Battlefield operating systems (continued).

CONVOY OPERATIONS—THE ESTIMATE PROCESS

1. MISSION ANALYSIS
2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION—METT-T FACTORS
3. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION—WAR-GAME
4. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION
5. DECISION

MISSION ANALYSIS

1. COMMANDER'S INTENT TWO LEVELS UP
2. SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS
3. CONSTRAINTS AND LIMITATIONS
4. MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK
5. RESTATED MISSION STATEMENT

SLIDE 7-2

RESTATED MISSION STATEMENT EXAMPLE

CONVOY 3 CONDUCTS A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH ALONG ROUTE RED AT 100400MAR 94 TO DELIVER LOGISTICAL SUPPLIES TO COMMAND POST A, IN ORDER TO CONTINUE CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

ENEMY

- DISPOSITION
- COMPOSITION
- ENEMY DOCTRINE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
- POPULATION AND ETHNIC FACTIONS
- RECENT ACTIVITIES

SLIDE 7-4

TERRAIN

- **O**BSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE
- **C**OVER AND CONCEALMENT
- **O**BSTACLES
- **K**EY TERRAIN
- **A**VENUES OF APPROACH

TROOPS AND TIME AVAILABLE

TROOPS

TROOPS, WEAPONS, AND LEADERS

COMMUNICATIONS

LOGISTICS

ENGINEERS

FIRE SUPPORT

TIME

CURRENT

EXECUTION

OPORD

REHEARSALS

MAINTENANCE

SLIDE 7-6

COURSES OF ACTION

DEVELOP TWO OR THREE REASONABLE AND FEASIBLE OPTIONS

- BEST WAY TO ACCOMPLISH MISSION
- CONVOYS: ROUTE? ORGANIZATION?

ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION (WAR-GAME)

EACH COURSE OF ACTION VERSUS ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION —

- PROVIDES A REALITY CHECK
- DETERMINES ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH COURSE OF ACTION

SLIDE 7-8

COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION AND DECISION

BASED ON RESULTS OF WAR GAMING, WHICH COURSE OF ACTION ALLOWS ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION?

CONVOY ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE

DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT

REAR GUARD
(Rear Security)
FIREPOWER
CONVOY CSS
ASSETS

MAIN BODY
(Bulk of Convoy)
CONVOY
COMMANDER

ADVANCE GUARD
(Forward Security
Firepower Forward,
and Navigation)

SLIDE 7-10

SAMPLE ORGANIZATION (LIGHT/HEAVY)

TROOPS AVAILABLE

BRADLEY PLATOON

- 4 M2s, 2 SQUADS
- 6 RADIOS
- M88 RECOVERY VEHICLE
- ENGINEER SQUAD w/HMMWV or M113

COMPANY COMMAND POST

- SINCGARS RADIOS

COMPANY CONTROL

- CA/PSYOP TEAM WITH VEHICLES

INFANTRY PLATOON

- 3 SQUADS
- 2 M60 TEAMS
- FO
- 2 PRC-77s
- 3 PRC-126s
- M88 RECOVERY VEHICLE

ENGINEER SQUAD

- 4 EMPTY 5-TON TRUCKS
- 1 AMBULANCE W/AIDMEN
- 2 CARGO HMMWVs
- 2 60-MM MORTARS
- 7 TRUCKS w/CARGO

SAMPLE TASK ORGANIZATION (LIGHT/HEAVY)

- ADVANCE GUARD: 2 BRADLEYS, ENGINEER SQUAD WITH HMMWV
- MAIN BODY: INFANTRY PLATOON AND FORWARD OBSERVER ON THREE 5-TON TRUCKS
- REAR GUARD: 2 BRADLEYS, RECOVERY VEHICLE, MEDICAL VEHICLE CIVIL AFFAIRS/ PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAM

SLIDE 7-12

SAMPLE TASK ORGANIZATION (LIGHT)

TROOPS AVAILABLE

MILITARY POLICE PLATOON

- 4 HMMWVs
- 2 M60 MACHINE GUNS
- 2 MK 19s
- 6 VRC RADIOS

INFANTRY PLATOON

- 3 INFANTRY SQUADS
- 2 M60 MACHINE GUN TEAMS
- FORWARD OBSERVER
- SINCGARS RADIOS

INFANTRY COMPANY CP

- 3 PRC-77s, FSO

INFANTRY COMPANY CONTROL

- 2 60-MM MORTARS
- 1 AMBULANCE W/AIDMEN
- 2 CARGO HMMWVs
- CIVIL AFFAIRS/ PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAM w/ 2 VEHICLES
- LIGHT ENGINEER SQUAD w/HMMWV
- 4 EMPTY 5-TON TRUCKS
- 7 TRUCKS w/CARGO

SAMPLE TASK ORGANIZATION (LIGHT)

- ADVANCE GUARD: 2 HMMWVs WITH M60 OR MK 19, ENGINEER SQUAD
- MAIN BODY: INFANTRY PLATOON AND FORWARD OBSERVER ON THREE 5-TON TRUCKS
- REAR GUARD: 2 HMMWVs WITH M60 OR MK 19, RECOVERY VEHICLE, MEDICAL VEHICLE, CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAM

SLIDE 7-14

RESERVE

AIR ASSAULT:	1 INFANTRY COMPANY
	4 UH60s
	3 AH64s
GROUND ASSAULT:	1 BRADLEY COMPANY

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- ORGANIZE CONVOYS INTO SERIALS OF NO MORE THAN FIVE VEHICLES; EACH WITH NCO (LEADER)
- RESOURCE THE ADVANCE GUARD FIRST, THEN THE MAIN BODY, THEN THE REAR GUARD
- REHEARSE
- KNOW THE COMMUNICATIONS PLAN
- BE A HARD TARGET
- USE ARMORED VEHICLES TO PROTECT VIPs

SLIDE 7-16

CONVOY DEFENSE
(SECURITY FORCE)

- ELEMENT IN CONTACT RETURNS FIRE TO SUPPRESS ENEMY POSITIONS
- VEHICLE DRIVERS MANEUVER TO ALLOW GUNNERS TO SUPPRESS
- CONVOY COMMANDER CALLS FOR AND ADJUSTS INDIRECT FIRE
- CONVOY COMMANDER REQUESTS QUICK-REACTION FORCE, IF NEEDED

CONVOY DEFENSE
(MAIN BODY)

- MAIN BODY RETURNS FIRE AND IF IT HAS SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL, LEADERS ORGANIZE AND ATTEMPT TO FIGHT THROUGH AMBUSH
- IF FORCES ARE SPLIT, ELEMENTS FORWARD OF AMBUSH MOVE TO NEXT LINKUP POINT
- ELEMENTS DECISIVELY ENGAGE DISMOUNT AND PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY
- ELEMENTS NOT IN CONTACT SECURE THEMSELVES AND AWAIT COMMITMENT OF RESERVE

SLIDE 7-18

LESSON 8. MEDIA STRATEGY

SLIDE 8-1. THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ENVIRONMENT

The news media are a fact of life in military operations, especially in stability and support operations. Soldiers must be prepared to operate under scrutiny of national and international media representatives during all phases of operations. An effective public affairs strategy can enhance the unit's ability to operate and could be a pivotal factor in the success or failure of the mission.

The media can send live news reports from anywhere in the world to anywhere in the world. This media environment has compressed the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operations. Reports of the actions of a soldier manning a checkpoint or delivering relief supplies, the results of a skirmish, or the effects of a major combat action can have an immediate impact on public opinion, and therefore on the national military strategy. This, in turn, can have a direct impact on tactical execution, soldier morale, and the effectiveness of the force to execute and accomplish its mission. Therefore, soldiers must know the Army's strategy for and conduct of public affairs operations.

SLIDE 8-2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS MISSION

The Army has an obligation and a vital interest in keeping the American people informed. The nine guidelines and the principles of information through which the Army fulfills this obligation are in Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2. Being open, honest, candid, and courageous, the Army enables the American people to understand its character and competence. This information also reduces soldier stress and factors that undermine effective operations. Information reduces rumors, loneliness, isolation, and other distractions. It also enhances dedication, morale, esprit, ethical behavior and respect, and understanding for the situation and the local populace.

SLIDE 8-3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GOALS

The Army accomplishes the public affairs mission by acting in accordance with the fundamental public affairs goals. The goals expedite complete, timely, and accurate information to the media. The goals provide a balanced and fair presentation of information that communicates the Army perspective. The goals support open and independent reporting as the principal means of coverage of US military operations. The Army does not classify or otherwise withhold information solely to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act is supported in letter and spirit. In fact, Army policy is that information is withheld only when disclosure will adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces. Finally, the public affairs officer should plan to provide information to and support rear detachment personnel, family members, and local community.

SLIDE 8-4. BLUEPRINT FOR MEDIA RELATIONS

Solid public affairs planning, organization, and coordination is the basis for successful media relations. Media encounters should be considered opportunities rather than inconveniences; they are critical to building credibility with media representatives. Efforts should be made to aid the media. The commander and his soldiers should be accessible. The commander should speak to the media with candor and honesty. He should help the media to understand what

they are observing. The commander should provide escorts, transportation, and logistics support to media representatives.

SLIDE 8-5. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

The public affairs officer must be included in all phases of operational planning and execution. At battalion or brigade level, units probably will not have an assigned public affairs officer, but the division has a public affairs officer. There is also a Joint Information Bureau or some other public affairs unit supporting the operation and providing units with current public affairs guidance. Public affairs guidance contains information on the Army's perspective and messages and themes units can use during media encounters. One of the missions of public affairs units and soldiers is to serve as the liaison between the unit and the media—arranging escorts, coordinating interviews, media visits, and support requirements, and so forth.

SLIDE 8-6. INTERVIEW GUIDELINE "DOs"

Because of the large numbers of media and the nature of stability and support operations, units may encounter unescorted or unaccredited media or receive requests for interviews or support directly from media in the field. Every soldier should know how to react during media encounters. The basic do and do not for media encounters are in Figure 8-3.

DO:

- Know your rights. Soldiers do not have to talk with the media. Soldiers can decline to answer any question. They can end the interview at any time. If a soldier chooses to talk with a media representative, he may do so without fear of repercussion or punishment. The soldier may refuse to answer any question he feels is inappropriate. If he chooses to end an interview or conversation or choose not to speak with a reporter, he should do so tactfully without causing animosity, anger, or frustration.
- Know who you are talking to. Media should either be escorted by a public affairs or unit representative or have some type of media credentials. If a reporter is unescorted and unaccredited, soldiers do not detain him, but report him to their supervisor as soon as possible before providing support or allowing access to the area. Soldiers should assist reporters in getting proper authorization for access to the area.
- Know and understand the role of the media. Media are primary information channels of US democracy.
- Know who will hear you. Soldiers must understand that what they say can instantly be broadcast to fellow soldiers, allies, folks back home, and potential adversaries. A confident, prepared professional sends a more positive, effective message to all those audiences and supports the overall Army objective of deterrence and readiness.
- Know your limits. Soldiers must not attempt to talk about anything above their level. They must keep their responses to subjects within their own areas of responsibility and personal knowledge. Soldiers must not speculate. They must not repeat rumors. It is okay to say "I do not know."
- Be professional and courteous. If necessary, soldiers ask the reporter to repeat, clarify, or rephrase his questions.

- Avoid using the defensive "no comment" answer. Soldiers tell the reporter why they cannot answer a question. If the reason is valid, most times reports will understand and accept that. Soldiers should not avoid questions that make them uncomfortable or embarrassed by making up reasons to support that avoidance. Reporters appreciate and respect openness and honesty.
- Be prepared and willing to support the media. If required, the unit supports the media with escorts, transportation, and with food, water, or other supplies or support if necessary.
- Allow media access to soldiers and unclassified areas.
- Keep answers short and to the point. Soldiers should avoid rambling explanations full of jargon and acronyms.

SLIDE 8-7. INTERVIEW GUIDELINE "DO NOTs"


DO NOT:

- Lie.
- Violate operations security. Actual and potential adversaries have access to the information published by news media representatives. The best way to protect information that may jeopardize the soldiers, unit, or mission, or be used as propaganda against the US and allied forces is to practice security at the source. Leaders must ensure that their soldiers know what topics pertain to operations security. In stability and support operations, situations may change rapidly and issues that once were clear for dissemination may now need to be protected under operations security. On the other hand, the leaders may need to emphasize some topics normally considered operations security (for example, equipment types, numbers, capabilities) as a deterrent during stability and support operations.
- Let the media jeopardize or interfere with the mission or the safety of soldiers.
- Stage events for the media. The media should be passive onlookers to normal activities. The presence of media representatives should not result in special events solely to get favorable coverage or cover up an unfavorable situation. Before meeting with media representatives, soldiers should be made aware of public affairs guidance, informed of the Army perspective, themes and messages, and briefed to ensure their information is accurate and up to date. They should not be told what they can and cannot say.
- Lose control of emotions or be sarcastic. Soldiers must stay in control of the situation and their emotions.
- Threaten, detain, apprehend, or physically interfere with a reporter or confiscate film. If information is inadvertently provided or obtained by the media, soldiers must remain professional, seek the news media representative's assistance and cooperation or obtain assistance through the chain of command. If soldiers explain to a reporter why something is classified and the potential danger the release of such information could have on soldiers and the mission, most reporters will understand and comply. Soldiers do not attempt to forcefully confiscate the reporter's film, notes, or equipment.

SLIDE 8-8. PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING

From private to general, rifleman to Chief of Staff of the Army, soldiers must understand the significance of information communication. Soldiers must be prepared to address a wide range of issues and concerns, and understand and appreciate the potential implications of what they communicate. Soldiers must understand the principles of information and principles for news media coverage. Soldiers must know their rights with respect to the media. Soldiers must be familiar with and appreciate the impact that the media can have on the Army and be prepared to interact with media representatives. Proper training and familiarization with media relations enables soldiers to execute their missions in front of the media and the world with confidence and professionalism.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Plan a Media Visit
T&EO, React to a Media Interview



1. Open and independent reporting is the principal means of coverage of US military operations.

2. Media pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early-access pools do not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.

3. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at remote locations or where space is limited.

4. Journalists in a combat zone are credentialed by the US military and are required to abide by military security ground rules that protect US forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations try to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with US military operations.

5. Journalists are provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.


6. Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

7. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military are responsible for the transportation of pools.

8. Consistent with its capabilities, the military supplies public affairs officers with facilities to enable timely, secure, and compatible transmission of pool material and makes these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists file by any other means available. The military does not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

9. These principles apply as well to the operations of the standing Department of Defense National Media Pool system.


Figure 8-1. The nine guidelines for dealing with news media.



Department of Defense policy is to make available timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests for information from organizations and private citizens are answered in a timely manner. In carrying out this policy, the following principles of information apply:

- Information is made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act are supported in both letter and spirit.
- A free flow of general and military information is made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the armed forces and their dependents.
- Information is not classified or otherwise withheld to protect the government from criticism or embarrassment.
- Information is withheld only when disclosure will adversely affect national security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the armed forces.
- DOD's obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination within DOD and with other government agencies. The purpose of this activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public.

Figure 8-2. Principles of information.



- Know your rights.
- Know who you are talking to.
- Know who will hear you.
- Know the Army perspective.
- Speak briefly and directly.
- Do not try to avoid embarrassing or tough questions.
- Do not speculate or repeat rumors.
- Speak clearly. Avoid military acronyms and jargon.
- Do not make off-the-record comments.
- Do not be afraid to say "I do not know."
- Never lie.

Bottom Line:

- Do not pass up opportunities to talk to the media.

Figure 8-3. Media interview guide.

THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ENVIRONMENT

- GLOBAL VISIBILITY
- MEDIA CAPABILITIES
- COMPRESSED STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL LEVELS

PUBLIC AFFAIRS MISSION

- PUBLIC AFFAIRS FULFILLS THE ARMY'S OBLIGATION TO KEEP THE ARMY AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INFORMED.
- PUBLIC AFFAIRS HELPS TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS THAT LEAD TO CONFIDENCE IN AMERICA'S ARMY AND ITS READINESS TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME, CONFLICT, AND WAR.

SLIDE 8-2

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GOALS

- INFORMATION IS MADE FULLY AND READILY AVAILABLE
- A FREE FLOW OF GENERAL MILITARY INFORMATION IS MADE AVAILABLE
- INFORMATION IS NOT CLASSIFIED OR OTHERWISE WITHHELD TO PROTECT THE GOVERNMENT FROM CRITICISM OR EMBARRASSMENT
- INFORMATION IS WITHHELD ONLY WHEN DISCLOSURE WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT SECURITY, SAFETY, OR PRIVACY
- PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLANS AND COORDINATES TO EXPEDITE THE FLOW OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC

BLUEPRINT FOR MEDIA RELATIONS

- MAKE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION
- MAKE ROOM FOR LOCAL AND REGIONAL MEDIA
- BE WILLING TO SPEAK TO MEDIA AND MAKE SOLDIERS ACCESSIBLE
- PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT TO HOME STATION
- INSTILL IN LEADERS POSITIVE ASPECTS OF MEDIA ENCOUNTERS

SLIDE 8-4

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

- PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS ESTIMATE
- COMMUNICATE THE ARMY PERSPECTIVE

INTERVIEW GUIDELINE "DOs"

- KNOW YOUR RIGHTS
- KNOW WHO YOU ARE TALKING TO
- KNOW AND UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA
- KNOW WHO WILL HEAR YOU
- KNOW YOUR LIMITS
- BE PROFESSIONAL AND COURTEOUS
- AVOID USING "NO COMMENT"
- BE PREPARED AND WILLING TO SUPPORT THE MEDIA
- SPEAK CLEARLY, AVOID JARGON

SLIDE 8-6

INTERVIEW GUIDELINE "DO NOTs"

- LIE
- VIOLATE OPERATIONAL SECURITY
- LET MEDIA JEOPARDIZE OR INTERFERE WITH THE MISSION OR SAFETY OF SOLDIERS
- STAGE EVENTS FOR THE MEDIA
- LOSE YOUR TEMPER OR BE SARCASTIC
- THREATEN, DETAIN, APPREHEND, OR INTERFERE WITH A REPORTER

PUBLIC AFFAIRS TRAINING

- SOLDIERS MUST UNDERSTAND IMPACT OF MEDIA ON OPERATIONS
- SOLDIERS MUST KNOW HOW TO HANDLE MEDIA
- SOLDIERS MUST KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THEMSELVES IN THE PRESENCE OF MEDIA

SLIDE 8-8

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Mission analysis in stability and support operations uses the same procedures outlined in the 7-series FMs for any mission analysis. Commanders must adhere to the principle of nested concepts, establish a firm link between the main and supporting efforts, and focus on the mission-essential task.

SLIDE 9-1. MAIN EFFORT
The battalion commander ensures the battalion main effort’s purpose coincides with the purpose of the battalion.

SLIDE 9-2. SUPPORTING EFFORT
The supporting effort's purposes must be clearly linked to the main effort's assigned purpose.

SLIDE 9-3. MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK
Failure to accomplish a mission-essential task results in the company's failure to accomplish its primary purpose of the operation.

SLIDE 9-4. OBJECTIVE
The linkage of the tasks helps achieve the objective in accordance with FM 100-5. There is no principle of stability and support operations that requires a commander to piecemeal his force. Commanders often are led to do this under the guise of decentralization. But the goal of decentralization is to streamline decision making (see FM 100-5, page 2-6; and FM 7-20, page 2-3), not to forfeit synchronization, concentration, and mutual support.

SLIDE 9-5. "MISSION CREEP"
An unusual event that often leads commanders to fragment their force is mission creep. Commanders must guard against a tendency to expand the stated mission in an effort to accomplish more than is appropriate for the military.

SLIDE 9-6. MISSION MATRIX
One means used by the Marines in Los Angeles to keep track of mission creep is the mission matrix. This chart shows in a single picture how the unit's personnel and resources are employed. It alerts the commander as to when he is in danger of losing synchronization, and it is an effective tool to brief higher headquarters.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: The mission statement consists of a task and a purpose. However, higher headquarters has a tendency in stability and support operations to use operations (such as conduct peace enforcement operations) instead of tasks. This is natural because that is often how the higher headquarters expresses the mission. For example, the mission of the Joint Task Force-Los Angeles was to *conduct civil disturbance operations to restore order in the greater Los Angeles area*. The mission of the Marines in Beirut was to *establish a presence*. The military commander must do a rigorous mission analysis that

results in an appropriate and achievable task for his command.

SLIDE 9-7. TASK
A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and units. It is a specific activity that contributes to the accomplishment of the mission.

SLIDE 9-8. OPERATION
A group of similar missions.

SLIDE 9-9. TYPICAL TASKS
Some typical tasks for an Army unit are supply, repair, build, evacuate, provide medical treatment, guard, protect, advise, coordinate, and teach.

SLIDE 9-10. BOTTOM UP
Many times the commander's mission analysis results in a bottom-up sequence. (The 10th Mountain Division found this to be true in Somalia.)

SLIDE 9-11. EXAMPLE RESTATED MISSION
An example of a restated mission is "TF 2-21 conducts air assault XXXXXXZ May 94 to interpose itself between the forces of Faction AA and Faction BB, employing minimal necessary force to prevent contact between the factions and establishing the conditions for diplomatic negotiations."

SLIDE 9-12. FORCE TAILORING

Stability and support operations requires a new force-tailoring approach that sustains maximum Army capability to successfully execute war and stability and support operations. The force-tailoring approach is a two-step process. First, a thorough mission and task analysis is conducted to identify mission requirements. Second, a force suitability analysis is conducted to ensure that the force best suited for that particular mission—both by capability and within political awareness considerations—is employed. Political awareness considerations often will influence force tailoring and the potential for mission success more than operational requirements. In stability and support operations, mission success is linked to the political acceptability of the force. Political acceptability is a function of the perceptions of the international community, the US public, the indigenous population, and the application or threat of force. A stability and support operation should not exceed the internationally recognized mission mandate. Perception that a force has exceeded this mandate directly reduces the legitimacy of the mission and can lessen the probability of mission success.

Force tailoring based on force suitability provides a role for all Army forces in stability and support operations missions, not in every mission, but across the full range of stability and support operations missions. The potential combinations of units to fulfill stability and support operations are as diverse as stability and support operations scenarios are unique. Some stability and support operations scenarios, particularly at the higher end of the range of operations, may demand a combat force accompanied by its usual wartime CS and CSS units to perform their traditional wartime tasks. Other stability and support operations scenarios,

particularly on the lower end of the range of operations, mandate new combinations of forces, often primarily CS and CSS units organized in a nontraditional mix, but performing their traditional wartime missions. For example, in a humanitarian assistance operation, the task force lead unit may be a mobile army surgical hospital with a supporting infantry company to provide security.

Force tailoring based on force suitability helps sustain maximum Army capability for war and stability and support operations. It also helps reduce the Army's retraining and new equipment requirements appearing in much of the Army's emerging doctrine for stability and support operations. Many retraining and new equipment requirements result from employing Army forces to perform tasks that are unlike the tasks supporting their wartime missions. Most skills and tasks required for stability and support operations are present in the total Army force and can be applied through force tailoring.

MAIN EFFORT

THE BATTALION COMMANDER LINKS THE MAIN EFFORT'S PURPOSE DIRECTLY TO THE BATTALION'S PURPOSE

SLIDE 9-1

SUPPORTING EFFORT

THE SUPPORTING EFFORTS' PURPOSES MUST BE CLEARLY LINKED TO THE MAIN EFFORT'S ASSIGNED PURPOSE

MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK

FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH A MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK RESULTS IN THE COMPANY'S FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION

SLIDE 9-3

OBJECTIVE

EACH SEPARATE OPERATION MUST BE INTEGRATED WITH EVERY OTHER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRATEGIC AIM

"MISSION CREEP"

"MISSION CREEP IS AN INEVITABLE PART OF ANY OPERATION"

10th Mountain Division Somalia AAR

THE COMMANDER MUST GUARD AGAINST A TENDENCY TO EXPAND THE STATED MISSION IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOMPLISH MORE THAN IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE MILITARY. THE COMMANDER AND STAFF SHOULD NOT EXPAND THEIR MISSION, UNLESS THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL TASKS IS CRITICAL TO ACCOMPLISHING THE PRIMARY MISSION.

EXAMPLES INCLUDE INADVERTENT SHIFTING FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT OR DOING MORE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE THAN AUTHORIZED.

SLIDE 9-5

MISSION MATRIX

MISSION NUMBER	MISSION DESCRIPTION	MISSION LOCATION	PERSONNEL REQUIRED	AO STATUS	REMARKS

TASK

A CLEARLY DEFINED AND MEASURABLE ACTIVITY ACCOMPLISHED BY INDIVIDUALS AND UNITS. IT IS A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY THAT CONTRIBUTES TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION.

SLIDE 9-7

OPERATION

A GROUP OF SIMILAR MISSIONS

TYPICAL TASKS

TERRAIN	ENEMY	FRIENDLY	COMBINATION
SEIZE	DESTROY	OVERWATCH	RECONNOITER
SECURE	NEUTRALIZE	SCREEN	DENY
OCCUPY	SUPPRESS	COVER	CONTAIN
RETAIN	DISRUPT	GUARD	ISOLATE
	FIX	CLEAR	
	INTERDICT		
	BREACH		
	FEINT		
	DEMONSTRATE		
	BLOCK		

SLIDE 9-9

BOTTOM UP

COMMANDERS MUST DRIVE MISSION STATEMENTS, TASK ORGANIZATIONS, AND END STATES FROM THE BOTTOM UP... THIS DRIVING FROM THE BOTTOM WILL EITHER GET IDEAS APPROVED OR IT WILL FORCE HIGHER HEADQUARTERS TO GIVE MORE DETAILED GUIDANCE ON WHAT THEY EXPECT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED...

10th Mountain Division Somalia AAR


EXAMPLE RESTATED MISSION

TF 2-21 CONDUCTS AIR ASSAULT XXXXXXZ MAY 94 TO CLEAR AREA OF OPERATIONS BLACK OF ABCD FORCES IN ORDER TO SET THE CONDITIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES.

SLIDE 9-11

FORCE TAILORING

THE MEASURE OF UNIT'S CAPABILITY AGAINST POSSIBLE THREATS AND THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF THE FORCE.



LESSON 10. ANTITERRORISM MEASURES FOR BRIGADE AND BATTALION OPERATIONS

SLIDE 10-1. ANTITERRORISM MEASURES

This quotation from Sun Tzu, "Kill One, Frighten Ten Thousand", portrays the importance for planning and execution of effective antiterrorism measures.

SLIDE 10-2. COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY

Preventive and protective security measures should be taken by units and individual service members to protect themselves and their ability to accomplish their mission. The installation, base, port, or unit antiterrorism plan provides the mechanism to ensure readiness against terrorist attacks while the unit performs its tactical and technical mission during deployments. The degree of the protection required depends on the threat in a given location. The threat of terrorist attack in any environment requires varying degrees of protection. Commanders must constantly evaluate installation, base, or unit security against the terrorist threat to effectively evaluate security requirements. This responsibility cannot be ignored in any situation.

SLIDE 10-3. PROTECTING DEPLOYED FORCES

To adequately protect the force, the commander's antiterrorism planning must detail tactics, techniques, and procedures for the worst-case situation. Adjustments can then be made as the threat changes. Worst-case planning ensures that antiterrorism training and materials are available and ready, if the situation dictates.

SLIDE 10-4. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

The commander and staff should complete a thorough estimate of the situation using mission, enemy, terrain, and troops and time available and political planning factors in developing a security assessment. These questions aid in developing an estimate of the terrorist situation:

- **Mission.**
- What is happening?
- What is the unit's role?
- **Enemy.**
- Who are the potential terrorists?
- What is known about the terrorists?
- How do the terrorists receive information?
- How might the terrorist attack? (The commander and staff must consider this from the terrorist's perspective; for example, Would you ambush or raid? Would you use a sniper, mortars, rockets, air or ground attacks, suicide attacks, firebombs, or bicycle/car/truck bomb?)
- Does the unit have routines?
- What is the potential for civil disturbances and is there a potential for terrorists to use or influence these disturbances in an attack?

- **Terrain.**

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the installation or base and local surroundings?
- Are avenues of approach above or below the water or ground?
- Are there observation areas, dead spaces, fields of fire, illumination, or no-fire areas (for example, schools)?
- Are there tall buildings, water towers, or terrain (either exterior or adjacent to the perimeter) that could become critical terrain in the event of an attack?

• **Troops.**

- Determine the friendly situation.
- Are other US forces or equipment available?
- Are engineers in the area? Will they be able to provide support?
- Are emergency reinforcements available?
- What are the host nation responsibilities, capabilities, and attitudes toward providing assistance?

• **Time.**

- How long will the mission last?
- Are there time constraints?
- Will there be sufficient time to construct force protection facilities such as electronically controlled gates, and turnstile entrances for personnel?

SLIDE 10-5. DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN

Deployed forces should be defended with a combination of law enforcement assets, fortifications, sensors, obstacles, local-hire security forces (if applicable), unit guards, deception, and on-call support from reaction forces. Each situation requires its own combination of abilities based on available resources and perceived need. Special considerations should, however, be given to fortification, obstacles, and local security requirements.

SLIDE 10-6. FORTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS

Lessons learned from many contingency operations have pointed out that forces in stability and support operations have often failed to plan for material requirements such as these before deployment—wire fences, screens, canopies, sandbags, sensors, and overhead cover material.

SLIDE 10-7. OBSTACLES

Obstacles slow down or stop vehicles and personnel approaching an area. Constructing vehicle barriers (by using commercially installed electronic barriers, trenches, masonry barriers, concrete-filled oil drums, or vehicles staggered across the route creating a zigzag maze) forces vehicles to slow down and make sharp turns, which exposes the driver to capture or direct fire. Scattering speed bumps or sandbags on the route further slows traffic. Designing entrance gates (to allow access to authorized personnel by use of controlled turnstiles) provides time and protection to guards and slows down direct frontal attacks. Fences, entrance gates, and obstacles should be illuminated to provide easy observation and, if necessary, cover by fire.

SLIDE 10-8. LOCAL SECURITY

Local security must be around-the-clock to provide observation, early warning and, if necessary, fire capabilities. The security should include guards at entrances to check right of entry, in observation posts (OPs), perimeter, and on rooftops to view the surrounding area. These guard positions must also be integrated into the antiterrorism plan so as to enable their use in augmenting responding law enforcement personnel.

SLIDE 10-9 SECURITY EQUIPMENT

As a minimum, the security force should have available to them, and be trained in the use of, the security equipment.

SLIDE 10-10. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEFENSE

Measures taken to establish the defense must be continually reviewed and progressively updated to counter the changing threat and add an element of unpredictability to the terrorist's calculation. Defensive measures include—

- Determining priority of work (assign sectors of observation and fire, construct obstacles, fortify).
- Improving obstacles, fortifications, and the defense as a whole. Long-term deployments should program engineer assets and force protection funds toward the construction of permanent fixtures.
- Establishing inspections and immediate-action drills—training to implement the security plan.
- Maintaining radio communications with the military police, security guards, and reaction force.
- Obtaining current military and host nation police and intelligence assessments.

SLIDE 10-11. GUARD DUTIES

Guard duties are detailed in service regulations and in local, general, and special orders. In a terrorist environment, special orders should address as a minimum—

- Details of authorized passes; samples of passes should be provided.
- Procedures for searching people and vehicles.
- Response to approach by unauthorized personnel or hostile crowds.
- Specific rules of engagement in the event of civil disturbances, potential damage or injury to US personnel or specific property, looting, or arson.
- Response to unauthorized photography.
- Steps necessary to obtain police, reaction force, fire department, and ambulance.
- Guidelines for contact with host nation police.

SLIDE 10-12. ROAD MOVEMENT

Road movements are always vulnerable to terrorists attacks. If possible, alternate forms of transportation (for example, helicopters) should be used. If road movement is required, forces—

- Avoid establishing a regular pattern.
- Vary routes and timing.
- Never travel in a single vehicle.

- Avoid traveling at night or during periods of agitation (for example, religious holidays, and political holidays).
- When possible, keep a low profile (use vehicles that do not stand out).
- Plan alternate routes and reactions to various threatening scenarios.
- Plan communications requirements.
- Avoid dangerous areas (for example, ambush sites and areas known for violence).
- Provide adequate security.
- Plan in advance for maintenance and evacuation.

SLIDE 10-13. VEHICLE PROTECTION

Forces take the following precautions when using tactical and some types of commercial vehicles, such as trucks.

- Place sandbags on floorboards and fenders.
- Cover sandbags with rubber or fiber mats.
- If carrying personnel, sandbag the vehicle bed as well as the driver's compartment.
- Remove canvas so soldiers can see and shoot.
- Fold windshield in driver's compartment and install high-wire cutter.
- Carry no more than one squad per truck.
- Soldiers riding in truck bed face outward and are assigned sectors of observation and fire.
- Rig chicken wire or chain link screens on front bumper frame to deflect rocks, bottles, firebombs, and grenades.
- Carry pioneer tools (fire extinguisher in particular), a line with grappling hook to clear obstacles, and tow bars for disabled vehicles.

SLIDE 10-14. CONVOYS

In high-risk areas, the commander considers using armed escorts for convoy protection. The unit develops and rehearses immediate-action drills before movement. The unit performs route clearance before movement. The unit establishes and maintains communications throughout the route. The commander develops deception plans to conceal or change movement timing and route; deploys false convoys to contribute to the convoy's security. If possible, host nation police assets are included in the convoy. When selecting routes, the unit avoids entering or remaining in dangerous areas. If ambushed, the unit gauges response by enemy strength. The unit counterambushes by accelerating through the ambush area, counterattacking, withdrawing, or withdrawing and staging a deliberate attack. Convoy escort composition depends on available forces. Light-armored vehicles, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV); or trucks equipped with caliber .50 and MK 19 machine guns are effective. Helicopters and AC-130 gunships can also be used as air escort, if available. Escorts should be organized into an advance guard, main body escort, and reaction or strike group. Planning considerations include concept of operation; available transportation; order of march and road organization; disposition of advanced guard, main body escort, and reserve; assembly area for convoy; rendezvous time at assembly area, time of first and last vehicle, and expected arrival of first and last vehicle at destination; action on arrival; and required coordinating instructions for speed, spacing, halts, immediate-action

drills, breakdowns, and lost vehicles. The commander develops a fire support plan consisting of priority targets that shift as the convoy progresses along its route.

SLIDE 10-15. RAIL MOVEMENT

Rail movement is the most difficult form of transportation to conceal and protect because it follows a predictable route and railheads are difficult to conceal. Opportunities for deception are limited, and physical security is critical. The following security precautions should be considered:

- Restrict passengers to military personnel only.
- Search for explosives or possible hijackers before departure and after every halt (military working dogs are particularly suited for this mission).
- Ensure the railway is free of obstructions or explosives.
- Patrol the railway area.
- Place armed security personnel on duty throughout the journey to include engine room and trail car.
- Patrol and guard departure and arrival stations.
- Use deception measures.
- Provide air cover (AC-130, helicopters, and so forth).
- Maintain communications within the train and with outside agencies.
- Provide reaction force to be moved by air or coordinate host nation support (if available).

SLIDE 10-16. SEA MOVEMENT

Sea movement, especially aboard military vessels, can give a ground force commander a false sense of security. Sea operations are certainly more secure than urban patrols; however, ships in harbor or anchored off hostile coastlines are visible threats and high-risk targets. Ships in harbor need to evaluate each new port and determine possible terrorist threats. Crew members must know host nation support and responsibilities while in port or anchored in foreign waters. The ship's captain is solely responsible for the ship and all those on board. As a minimum, the captain—

- Establishes methods of embarkation and debarkation and patrol activities for all personnel.
- Identifies vital areas of the ship (for example, engine room, weapons storage, command and control bridge) and assigns security guards.
- Coordinates above and below waterline responsibilities.
- Establishes a weapons and ammunition policy and ROE, appoints a reaction force.
- Drills all personnel involved.

SLIDE 10-17. AIR MOVEMENT

For the most part, while a unit is being transported by air, it is under the authority of the Air Force or air movement control personnel. Troop commanders and Air Force personnel coordinate duties and responsibilities for their mutual defense. Personnel must remain vigilant and leaders must provide adequate security. Unit security personnel coordinate with airfield security personnel, assist departures and arrivals at airfields while en route, and

determine weapons and ammunition policies. Special considerations include the following topics:

- Road transport security while driving to and from airfields is critical. Arrival arrangements must be kept low profile. Road transport must not be pre-positioned at the airport for extended periods before arrival.
- If pre-positioned transport is required, a security element should be stationed within the airfield perimeter. Security at the arrival airfield can be the responsibility of the host nation and require close coordination. An open communications net must be maintained between all elements until the aircraft is loaded and communications reestablished on arrival.
- All personnel (air crews and transported unit) must be cautioned concerning the transportation of souvenirs and other personal items, which could be containers for explosives.

SLIDE 10-18. ANTITERRORISM CHECKLIST

Antiterrorism checklists aid in planning. (For more information, see Joint Pub 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.) In addition, the provost marshal is trained in antiterrorism planning and execution.

SLIDE 10-19. SOURCES OF GUIDANCE

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1300.7 provides guidance on authorized conduct for a hostage during peacetime. Military personnel should know the directive and the Stockholm syndrome. Personnel should know what conduct is expected of them should they become involved in a hostage situation. If they are aware of the effects of the syndrome, they may avert a possible tragedy. Today, the Code of Conduct is just as strong and viable a guide as it was when it was created. To further explain it and ensure its peacetime use, the DOD issued a policy for personnel who are subject to terrorist captivity. In this policy, peacetime is defined as an absence of armed conflict or an armed conflict not directly including the US.

SLIDE 10-20. DOD POLICY

DOD policy is that once a service member is isolated from US control, as in a hostage situation, his mission is to survive with honor.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 10-21 through 10-24 describe the differences between DOD guidance and the Code of Conduct.

SLIDE 10-21. CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE II AND DOD GUIDANCE

Code of Conduct Article II: I will never surrender of my own free will. I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

DOD Guidance: Regardless of the type of detention:

- Maintain military bearing.
- Remain calm and courteous.
- Project personal dignity.

SLIDE 10-22. CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE III AND DOD GUIDANCE

Code of Conduct Article III: If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole or special favors from the enemy.

DOD Guidance: Jailbreak is a crime and may provide detainer with further justification to prolong detention. Accept release.

SLIDE 10-23. CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE IV AND DOD GUIDANCE

Code of Conduct Article IV: If I become a POW, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

DOD Guidance:

- Name, rank, DOB, and innocent; circumstances leading to detention.
- Discussions limited to health, welfare, conditions of fellow detainees, and going home
- Avoid signing anything
- Make no oral statements
- If forced, provide as little as possible

SLIDE 10-24. CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE V AND DOD GUIDANCE

Code of Conduct Article V: When questioned, should I become a POW, I am required to give name, rank, serial number, and DOB. I will avoid answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

DOD Guidance: Surviving in some terrorists' detention may depend on conveying personal dignity and apparent sincerity to the captors.

SLIDE 10-25. DOD GUIDANCE SUMMARY

As a detainee, service members have no protection under the Geneva Accords and are subject to the laws of the country. Therefore, service members must avoid any combative or illegal behavior.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for T&EO, Protect the Force.

ANTITERRORISM MEASURES

"KILL ONE, FRIGHTEN TEN THOUSAND"

SUN TZU

SLIDE 10-1

COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITY

- ESTABLISH PREVENTIVE AND PROTECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES
- CONTINUALLY EVALUATE SECURITY AGAINST THE THREAT
- ADJUST SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AS REQUIRED BY THREAT

SLIDE 10-2

PROTECTING DEPLOYED FORCES

PLAN FOR THE WORST CASE; ADJUST FROM THERE

SLIDE 10-3

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

- MISSION
- ENEMY
- TERRAIN
- TROOPS
- TIME

SLIDE 10-4

DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN

- LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSETS
- FORTIFICATIONS
- SENSORS
- OBSTACLES
- LOCAL-HIRE SECURITY FORCES
- UNIT GUARDS
- DECEPTION
- RESISTANCE FORCES

SLIDE 10-5

FORTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS

WIRE FENCES:

- BARBED WIRE TO DELAY ACCESS
- CONCERTINA WIRE TO CHANNEL MOVEMENT THROUGH MANNED POINTS
- CHAIN LINK/WELD MESH TO PROVIDE BARRIERS FOR GRENADES, FIREBOMBS, OR HEAT ROCKET (AT LEAST 10 METERS STAND-OFF DISTANCE TO NEUTRALIZE HEAT BLASTS)

SCREENS: CANVAS OR PLYWOOD TO DENY OBSERVATION

CANOPIES:

- CHAIN LINK/WELD MESH TO PROTECT ROOFS
- CORRUGATED IRON TO DETONATE MORTAR PROJECTILES; ABSORB SHRAPNEL; COVER MACHINE GUNS POSITIONED ON ROOFS

SANDBAGS: TO ABSORB SHRAPNEL; PROTECT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

SENSORS: TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING

SLIDE 10-6

OBSTACLES

OBJECTIVE IS TO SLOW OR STOP VEHICLES AND PERSONNEL APPROACHING THE AREA

SLIDE 10-7

LOCAL SECURITY

- MUST PROVIDE AROUND-THE-CLOCK OBSERVATION, EARLY WARNING, AND FIRE CAPABILITIES
- MUST ALSO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE ANTITERRORISM PLAN

SLIDE 10-8

SECURITY EQUIPMENT

- PYROTECHNIC PISTOLS
- RIOT SHOTGUNS
- TEAR GAS LAUNCHERS
- HANDHELD FLASHLIGHTS
- ANTI-RIOT HELMETS
- SHIELDS 3'6" AND 6'
- CAMERAS WITH FLASH ATTACHMENTS AND TRIPODS
- HANDCUFFS
- BODY ARMOR
- LEG ARMOR
- HANDHELD RADIOS
- MARSHALING WANDS
- TELESCOPES AND TRIPODS
- BINOCULARS
- NIGHT VISION DEVICES
- LOUD SPEAKERS
- FIRE EXTINGUISHER
- SIDE-HANDLED BATONS
- TELESCOPIC SIGHTS
- PHOTOGRAPHIC FILTER
- POLAROID CAMERA
- WHISTLES
- CAMCORDER

SLIDE 10-9

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEFENSE

- DETERMINE PRIORITY OF WORK
- IMPROVE OBSTACLES, FORTIFICATIONS, AND DEFENSE
- ESTABLISH INSPECTIONS AND IMMEDIATE-ACTION DRILLS
- MAINTAIN RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
- OBTAIN CURRENT POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS

SLIDE 10-10

GUARD DUTIES

SHOULD ADDRESS—

- PASSES
- SEARCH PROCEDURES
- RESPONSE GUIDELINES
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- UNAUTHORIZED PHOTOGRAPHY
- REACTION FORCE
- HOST NATION POLICE RELATIONSHIPS

ROAD MOVEMENT

- AVOID REGULAR PATTERNS
- VARY ROUTES AND TIMING
- DO NOT TRAVEL IN SINGLE VEHICLE
- AVOID NIGHT TRAVEL AND PERIODS OF AGITATION
- KEEP LOW PROFILE
- PLAN ALTERNATE ROUTES, REACTION DRILLS, AND COMMUNICATIONS
- IDENTIFY DANGEROUS AREAS
- PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY
- PLAN EVACUATION AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

SLIDE 10-12

VEHICLE PROTECTION

- PLACE SANDBAGS ON FLOOR
- COVER SANDBAGS
- PLACE SANDBAGS IN VEHICLE BEDS
- REMOVE CANVAS
- FOLD WINDSHIELDS
- LIMIT PERSONNEL LOAD
- HAVE SOLDIERS FACE OUTWARD
- RIG SCREENS
- CARRY PIONEER TOOLS

SLIDE 10-13

CONVOY

- DEVELOP AND REHEARSE DRILLS
- PERFORM ROUTE CLEARANCE
- ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS
- DEVELOP DECEPTION PLANS
- INCLUDE HOST NATION POLICE
- AVOID DANGEROUS AREAS
- PLAN CONVOY ESCORT REQUIREMENTS

SLIDE 10-14

RAIL MOVEMENT

- RESTRICT PASSENGERS
- SEARCH BEFORE DEPARTURE
- CLEAR RAILWAY
- PATROL RAILWAY
- PROVIDE ARMED SECURITY
- PATROL STATIONS
- USE DECEPTION
- PROVIDE AIR COVER
- MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS
- PLAN REACTION FORCE REQUIREMENTS

SLIDE 10-15

SEA MOVEMENT

- ESTABLISH EMBARKATION AND DEBARKATION AND PATROL PROCEDURES
- IDENTIFY VITAL AREAS IN SHIP
- COORDINATE ABOVE AND BELOW WATERLINE RESPONSIBILITIES
- ESTABLISH RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND REACTION FORCE PROCEDURES
- CONDUCT DRILLS

SLIDE 10-16

AIR MOVEMENT

- PLAN TRANSPORT SECURITY TO AND FROM AIRFIELD
- SECURE PRE-POSITIONED AIRCRAFT
- CAUTION ALL PERSONNEL

SLIDE 10-17

ANTITERRORISM CHECKLISTS

- VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
- PERSONAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES
- VIP AND SENIOR OFFICER SECURITY MEASURES
- OFFICE PROCEDURES
- LOCK SECURITY
- TELEPHONE THREAT INFORMATION SHEET
- CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN FORMAT
- CRISIS MANAGEMENT CHECKLIST
- THREAT CONTROL SYSTEM
- EXPLOSIVE DEVICE PROCEDURES

SLIDE 10-18

SOURCES OF GUIDANCE

- CODE OF CONDUCT GUIDANCE FOR PEACETIME CAPTIVITY
- AR 350-30

SLIDE 10-19

DOD POLICY

"SURVIVE WITH HONOR"

SLIDE 10-20

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE II AND DOD GUIDANCE

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE II: I WILL NEVER SURRENDER OF MY OWN FREE WILL. I WILL NEVER SURRENDER THE MEMBERS OF MY COMMAND WHILE THEY STILL HAVE THE MEANS TO RESIST.

DOD GUIDANCE: REGARDLESS OF THE TYPE OF DETENTION:

- MAINTAIN MILITARY BEARING
- REMAIN CALM AND COURTEOUS
- PROJECT PERSONAL DIGNITY

SLIDE 10-21

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE III AND DOD GUIDANCE

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE III: IF I AM CAPTURED, I WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESCAPE AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE. I WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE OR SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE ENEMY.

DOD GUIDANCE:

- JAILBREAK IS A CRIME AND MAY PROVIDE DETAINER WITH FURTHER JUSTIFICATION TO PROLONG DETENTION.
- ACCEPT RELEASE

SLIDE 10-22

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE IV AND DOD GUIDANCE

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE IV: IF I BECOME A POW, I WILL KEEP FAITH WITH MY FELLOW PRISONERS. I WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION OR TAKE PART IN ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO MY COMRADES. IF I AM SENIOR, I WILL TAKE COMMAND. IF NOT, I WILL OBEY THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF THOSE APPOINTED OVER ME AND WILL BACK THEM UP IN EVERY WAY.

DOD GUIDANCE:

- NAME, RANK, DOB, AND INNOCENT; CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO DETENTION
- DISCUSSIONS LIMITED TO HEALTH, WELFARE, CONDITIONS OF FELLOW DETAINEES, AND GOING HOME
- AVOID SIGNING ANYTHING
- MAKE NO ORAL STATEMENTS
- IF FORCED, PROVIDE AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE

SLIDE 10-23

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE V AND DOD GUIDANCE

CODE OF CONDUCT ARTICLE V: WHEN QUESTIONED, SHOULD I BECOME A POW, I AM REQUIRED TO GIVE NAME, RANK, SERIAL NUMBER, AND DOB. I WILL AVOID ANSWERING FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY. I WILL MAKE NO ORAL OR WRITTEN STATEMENTS DISLOYAL TO MY COUNTRY AND ITS ALLIES OR HARMFUL TO THEIR CAUSE.

DOD GUIDANCE: SURVIVING IN SOME TERRORISTS' DETENTION MAY DEPEND ON CONVEYING PERSONAL DIGNITY AND APPARENT SINCERITY TO THE CAPTORS.

SLIDE 10-24

DOD GUIDANCE SUMMARY

- DETAINED PERSONNEL ARE SUBJECT TO THE LAWS OF THE COUNTRY
- PERSONNEL MUST AVOID AGGRESSIVE, COMBATIVE, OR ILLEGAL BEHAVIOR
- PERSONNEL ARE NOT PROTECTED UNDER GENEVA ACCORDS

LESSON 11. CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

SLIDE 11-1. CORDON AND SEARCH
FM 7-20 and FM 90-8 define cordon and search in built-up areas, but FM 90-8 discusses encirclements, which it does not restrict to MOUT. Many of the techniques are the same.

SLIDE 11-2. CONSIDERATIONS
As in most stability and support operations, liaison is critical. This is especially true of liaison with local police, because they are best suited to do the actual search. Because surprise is important to prevent escape, any reconnaissance that risks compromise immediately before the operation should be avoided.

SLIDE 11-3. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Normal IPB procedures for stability and support operations and MOUT situations apply for cordon and search. (See Lesson 5, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, for details.) Tactical maps do not provide adequate detail for the operation. Commanders coordinate with local authorities for more detailed maps and photographs; then number the buildings to aid command and control.

SLIDE 11-4. COMMAND AND CONTROL
FM 90-8 identifies the relationship between the military and the police as being based on the size of the operation.

SLIDE 11-5. CORDON PURPOSES AND METHODS
A cordon serves two purposes: primarily it prevents escape, but it also prevents reinforcement. A cordon is established with a series of roadblocks and checkpoints. (See Lesson 16, Checkpoints, for details.)

SLIDE 11-6. ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDON
The security element moves in *while*, rather than before, the search element moves in (FM 7-20).

SLIDE 11-7. SEARCH PARTY COMPOSITION
The search party consists of three elements: security, search, and reserve.

SLIDE 11-8. SECURITY ELEMENT
The security element encircles the area and prevents escape or reinforcement. The security element is also known as the cordon element.

SLIDE 11-9. POSSIBLE SPECIAL TEAMS
Special teams may be needed by the search element. Camcorders are useful in documenting the search. All suspicious material should be considered booby trapped until it can be inspected by the demolition and mine detection teams. (FM 90-10-1, Appendix D, discusses techniques useful in tunnel reconnaissance operations.)

SLIDE 11-10. TYPICAL ORGANIZATION FOR SEARCH OPERATIONS

A typical search operation organization includes mine-detector team, demolition team, search team, interrogation team, scout dog team, CA/PSYOP augmentation team, fire support team, prisoner team, and tunnel reconnaissance team.

SLIDE 11-11. SEARCH INCONVENIENCE
A search must cause some degree of inconvenience to the population to be effective, but it also must adhere to the stability and support operations principle of legitimacy.

SLIDE 11-12. SEARCH TEAM COMPOSITION
The search team should contain a local policeman, a protective escort, and a female searcher.

SLIDE 11-13. CONDUCT OF A SEARCH
The area is cordoned by static checkpoints and patrols to cover the gaps. Searches of subareas are then conducted.

SLIDE 11-14. METHODS OF SEARCHING
Searching can be done by one of three methods: central assembly, restriction to homes, or control of heads of households.

SLIDE 11-15. CENTRAL ASSEMBLY METHOD
In this method of searching, the population is moved to a central area. This method is simple and aids control and interrogation, but removing inhabitants from their homes may encourage looting or at least its perception.

SLIDE 11-16. RESTRICTION TO HOMES METHOD
In this method of searching, the inhabitants remain in their homes. This discourages looting, but also gives the inhabitants more opportunity to conceal evidence. As in most decentralized operations, control and allocation of resources, in this case interrogators, are more difficult.

SLIDE 11-17. CONTROL HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS METHOD
This method of search is a good compromise between the previous two. The head of the household accompanies the search while everyone else is brought to a central location.

SLIDE 11-18. PERIMETER AREA
The area around the built-up area, such as farmers' fields, must also be searched. If the security element has not been detected, the search element expands its search to include this area as well. If, however, the security element has been detected, the security element does this search.

SLIDE 11-19. "GRADUATED RESPONSE"
In Somalia, the 2-14th Infantry used a "graduated response" in conducting a cordon and search. Before entering the area, the 2-14th Infantry used psychological operations announcements to encourage inhabitants to leave peacefully. While this technique minimizes collateral damage, it does give the enemy time to react. As always, METT-T must be considered.

SLIDE 11-20. OTHER SOMALIA LESSONS LEARNED

The 2-14th Infantry found that getting out of the area requires planning just like getting into it does. They used attack helicopters extensively for close air support. (See FM 7-20, page C-25; and FM 90-8, page 3-20, for a discussion of aerial support in a cordon and search.)

SLIDE 11-21. HEAVY/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

Tanks, BFVs, LAVs, and APCs are useful as part of the security (cordon) force or as a reaction force to intercept a force entering or leaving the search area. The shock value of a tracked vehicle may deter aggression to the search force by civilians or belligerent forces. Tracked vehicles can act as hasty checkpoints to strengthen the cordon. They can carry large amounts of barrier materials, especially if they are towing trailers. The ROE must consider employment of the tracked vehicles weapon systems.

SLIDE 11-22. OPERATION RATKILLER

The cordon and search has applications outside of built-up areas as well; for example, Operation Ratkiller, which occurred in Korea. As is often the case in stability and support operations, the situation may transition to various levels of activity. In Korea in late 1951, the war entered a negotiation phase. However, previous conditions had been conducive to a guerrilla presence, and this presence had to be eliminated.

SLIDE 11-23. OPERATION RATKILLER, PHASE 1

The operation began using what FM 90-8 describes as the contraction technique. (See FM 90-8, pages G-3 and G-4 for details.)

SLIDE 11-24. OPERATION RATKILLER, PHASE 2

During Phase 2, the operation shifted to another area and continued to have success.

SLIDE 11-25. OPERATION RATKILLER, PHASE 3

During Phase 3, the operation returned to Chiri-san. This time the method used resembled the hammer and anvil technique. (See FM 90-8, page G-4 for details. Also note the use of concentric circles to reduce the chance of escape.)

SLIDE 11-26. OPERATION RATKILLER, PHASE 4

The military took charge of the large cordon and search operation. Once the problem was brought under control, local authorities took charge.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES: 1. See Appendix A, Section III for STX, Cordon and Search Operations.
2. See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Perform a Cordon and Search
T&EO, Search a Building
T&EO, Process Captured Documents and Equipment
T&EO, Handle Captured Insurgents or Belligerents
T&EO, Identify and Process Detainees
T&EO, Apprehend/Detain Noncombatants

CORDON AND SEARCH

A SEARCH TECHNIQUE IN WHICH A BUILT-UP AREA IS DIVIDED INTO ZONES AND A SEARCH PARTY IS ASSIGNED TO EACH ZONE

SLIDE 11-1

CONSIDERATIONS

- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- PLANS FOR DETAINED PERSONNEL
- LIAISON WITH POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
- REHEARSALS
- INFANTRY'S PRIMARY ROLE IS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND REDUCE RESISTANCE. SEARCHES SHOULD BE MADE UNDER POLICE SUPERVISION
- PHYSICAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE AREA IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE OPERATION IS AVOIDED

SLIDE 11-2

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

- COORDINATE WITH POLICE FOR DETAILED MAPS
- USE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS
- NUMBER BUILDINGS

SLIDE 11-3

COMMAND AND CONTROL

- BATTALION OR LARGER OPERATIONS USUALLY CONTROLLED BY THE MILITARY COMMANDER WITH THE CIVIL POLICE IN SUPPORT
- SMALLER OPERATIONS USUALLY CONTROLLED BY THE CIVIL POLICE WITH THE MILITARY IN SUPPORT

CORDON

PURPOSES

- PREVENTS ESCAPE OF INDIVIDUALS TO BE SEARCHED
- PROTECTS FORCES CONDUCTING THE OPERATION
- PREVENTS INSURGENTS TRYING TO REINFORCE OTHERS WITHIN THE AREA

METHODS

- CHECKPOINTS
- ROADBLOCKS

SLIDE 11-5

ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDON

- CAN BE DONE AT NIGHT TO ENHANCE SECURITY; TRADE-OFF IS CONTROL
- IDEALLY THE ENTIRE AREA IS SURROUNDED AT ONCE; DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE RAPID
- SECURITY ELEMENT SURROUNDS AREA WHILE SEARCH ELEMENT MOVES IN
- OBSERVED FIRE COVERS GAPS
- SECURED SUBTERRANEAN PASSAGES

SEARCH PARTY COMPOSITION

- SECURITY ELEMENT
- SEARCH ELEMENT
- RESERVE ELEMENT

SLIDE 11-7

SECURITY ELEMENT

- ENCIRCLES THE AREA
- PREVENTS ENTRANCE AND EXIT
- SECURES OPEN AREAS


SLIDE 11-8

POSSIBLE SPECIAL TEAMS

- EPW HANDLING
- INTERROGATION
- DOCUMENTATION (INCLUDE CAMCORDERS)
- CA/PSYOP
- DEMOLITION
- MINE DETECTION
- TUNNEL RECONNAISSANCE
- FIRE SUPPORT
- DOGS

SLIDE 11-9

TYPICAL ORGANIZATION FOR SEARCH OPERATIONS



NOTE: THESE TEAMS ARE EXAMPLES ONLY. ALSO, CIVILIANS MAY SUPPORT ANY OR ALL TEAMS.

SEARCH INCONVENIENCE

CONDUCTED WITH LIMITED INCONVENIENCE TO THE POPULACE; ENOUGH TO DISCOURAGE INSURGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS FROM REMAINING IN THE AREA, BUT NOT ENOUGH TO DRIVE THE POPULATION TO COLLABORATION.

SLIDE 11-11

SEARCH TEAM COMPOSITION


- ONE LOCAL POLICEMAN
- PROTECTIVE ESCORT
- FEMALE SEARCHER

SLIDE 11-12

CONDUCT OF A SEARCH

THE AREA IS ISOLATED AT ONCE USING MULTIPLE ROUTES. CONTACT PATROLS SCREEN BETWEEN OBSERVATION POSTS. UNDERGROUND PASSAGES ARE BLOCKED.

THE AREA IS DIVIDED INTO SUBAREAS. A SUBAREA IS ASSIGNED TO EACH SEARCH ELEMENT. CONTROL OF CIVILIANS IS ESTABLISHED USING ONE OR MORE SEARCH METHODS.



SLIDE 11-13

METHODS OF SEARCHING

- CENTRAL ASSEMBLY
- RESTRICTION TO HOMES
- CONTROL OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS

CENTRAL ASSEMBLY METHOD

- MOST CONTROL
- SIMPLIFIES THOROUGH SEARCH
- DENIES INSURGENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONCEAL EVIDENCE
- ALLOWS FOR DETAILED INTERROGATION
- REMOVING INHABITANTS FROM THEIR HOMES MAY ENCOURAGE LOOTING

SLIDE 11-15

RESTRICTION TO HOMES METHOD

- PROHIBITS MOVEMENT
- ALLOWS INHABITANTS TO STAY IN THEIR HOMES
- DISCOURAGES LOOTING
- MAKES CONTROL AND INTERROGATION DIFFICULT
- GIVES INHABITANTS TIME TO CONCEAL EVIDENCE

SLIDE 11-16

CONTROL HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS METHODS

- HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD REMAINS AT FRONT OF HOUSE
- EVERYONE ELSE BROUGHT TO CENTRAL LOCATION
- HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD ACCOMPANIES SEARCH
- LOOTING IS REDUCED
- BEST METHOD OF CONTROLLING THE POPULACE DURING A SEARCH

SLIDE 11-17

PERIMETER AREA

- PERIMETER IS SEARCHED BY THE SEARCH ELEMENT IF THE SECURITY ELEMENT HAS NOT BEEN DETECTED
- PERIMETER IS SEARCHED BY THE SECURITY ELEMENT IF IT HAS BEEN DETECTED

SLIDE 11-18

"GRADUATED RESPONSE"

2-14TH INFANTRY IN SOMALIA

- USED PSYOP ANNOUNCEMENTS BEFORE ENTRY
- GAVE OCCUPANTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE PEACEFULLY BEFORE MILITARY ENTERED
- MINIMIZED COLLATERAL DAMAGE
- (DISADVANTAGE) GAVE ENEMY TIME TO REACT
- WAS METT-T DEPENDENT

SLIDE 11-19

OTHER SOMALIA LESSONS LEARNED

2-14TH INFANTRY

- EXFILTRATION MUST BE REHEARSED
- ATTACK HELICOPTERS PROVIDE RESPONSIVE AND EFFECTIVE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
- DIRECT-FIRE CONTROL MEASURES MUST BE INCLUDED

HEAVY/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

- Tanks/BFVs have superior optics, communications, and speed that make them ideal as the security element; these capabilities allow them to quickly surround the cordon area and effectively seal it off (this is especially true during limited visibility with poor illumination).
- Tanks/BFVs have rapid mobility (on- and off-road) that makes them useful as a reserve to reinforce the search element or to intercept a force entering or leaving the cordon and search area.
- Tanks/BFVs provide a certain shock value that may inhibit belligerent or civilian reaction to the cordon and search operation.
- Cordons can use checkpoints and roadblocks to seal off an area—tanks/BFVs can enhance the effectiveness of these checkpoints and roadblocks.
- Tracked vehicles can carry large amounts of barrier materials to assist in the cordoning of an area.
- Tanks/BFVs can act as roadblocks and vehicle barriers at flying or hasty checkpoints.
- Rules of engagement must include instructions for employment of tank/BFV weapon systems.

SLIDE 11-21


OPERATION RATKILLER

- REFUGEES, INFILTRATION, AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE THE GUERRILLA THREAT DANGEROUS
- CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES PLACED SOME 8,000 GUERRILLAS AND BANDITS BEHIND SOUTH KOREAN LINES

SLIDE 11-22

OPERATION RATKILLER — PHASE 1

- 1 DEC: Republic of Korea government declares martial law.
- 2 DEC: Republic of Korea Capital Division and 8th Division move in from a 163-mile perimeter around Chiri-San.
- National police, youth regiments, and security forces cordon off the area.
- Noose continually tightened for 12 days; by 14 Dec, 1,612 guerrillas were killed and 1,842 were taken prisoner.



SLIDE 11-23


OPERATION RATKILLER — PHASE 2

- 19 DEC TO 4 JAN, CHIEF OBJECTIVE WAS MOUNTAINS AROUND CHONJU
- 4,000 GUERRILLAS WERE KILLED BY END OF DECEMBER

SLIDE 11-24

OPERATION RATKILLER — PHASE 3

- 6 Jan to 31 Jan, designed to round up any guerrillas that had returned to Chiri-San after Phase 1.
- 26th Regiment of the Capital Division set up blocking positions in the north while the 1st Cavalry Regiment attacked from the south in concentric circles.
- The core of the guerrilla force in South Korea was killed during this phase.



SLIDE 11-25

OPERATION RATKILLER — PHASE 4

- "MOPPING UP" OPERATION
- OFFICIALLY ENDED 15 MARCH WHEN LOCAL AUTHORITIES ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY

SLIDE 11-26

LESSON 12. SEARCH AND ATTACK

SLIDE 12-1. SEARCH AND ATTACK
The search-and-attack technique is used in counterinsurgency or insurgency situations. Units must take care not to over decentralize this operation. There is a dangerous tendency to emphasize the "search" at the expense of the "attack."

SLIDE 12-2. PURPOSES
Purposes for a search and attack are destruction of the enemy, denial of an area, protection of the force, and collection of information.

SLIDE 12-3. ORGANIZATION
A search and attack consists of find, fix, and finish forces. The main effort is the finish force. The actions of the find and fix forces must support this.

SLIDE 12-4. CIRCULAR PATTERN
A circular pattern is best for a search and attack.

SLIDE 12-5. LINEAR PATTERN
A linear pattern allows the commander to, with the help of some phase lines, keep his forces roughly on line and, therefore, within mutual support. The problem is that all forces must be ready to find, fix, and finish.

SLIDE 12-6. DECISIVE POINT
Concept development for a search and attack begins with determining a decisive point, just like any other operation does. On a counterdrug operation, it might be a drug lab. After picking the decisive point, the commander task-organizes the finish force to do its mission-essential task. He may want to insert his fix force first in case the enemy is alerted by the find force. By doing this, the fix force is in position to block any escape. The find force locates the enemy, probably by using the converging routes technique of zone reconnaissance. The finish force should be positioned near enough to the find force to attack before the enemy can escape.

SLIDE 12-7. FIRE SUPPORT
The commander develops a battle tracking matrix and orients Q36 radars to cover areas being searched.

SEARCH AND ATTACK

- A DECENTRALIZED MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
- MULTIPLE, COORDINATED PATROLS

SLIDE 12-1

PURPOSES

- ENEMY DESTRUCTION
- AREA DENIAL
- FORCE PROTECTION
- INFORMATION COLLECTION


SLIDE 12-2

ORGANIZATION

- FIND
- FIX
- FINISH


SIDE 12-3

CIRCULAR PATTERN




SLIDE 12-4

LINEAR PATTERN



SLIDE 12-5

DECISIVE POINT



SLIDE 12-6

FIRE SUPPORT

- DEVELOP BATTLE TRACKING MATRIX
- ORIENT Q36 RADAR TO COVER AREAS BEING SEARCHED

LESSON 13. NEGOTIATION

SLIDE 13-1. NEGOTIATION

The use of force during stability and support operations is a last resort, when all else has failed. A commander must develop alternatives to the use of force to achieve his mission. Such alternatives include deterrence, control measures, compulsion by rewards or penalties, protection, warning, nonlethal measures, and negotiation. This lesson plan contains guidelines for negotiations. It concentrates on the conduct of a formal meeting where soldiers may find themselves in the role of negotiator, mediator, conciliator, and even arbitrator. The principles apply to the squad leader responsible for negotiating safe passage for a humanitarian aid convoy through a checkpoint and to a senior commander conducting high-level discussions with belligerents to achieve a cease-fire at a meeting such as the Mixed Military Working Group.

SLIDE 13-2. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AT THE LOWER LEVEL

The aim must always be to resolve problems at the lowest level as quickly as possible to prevent small violations from escalating into serious disputes. US forces often find themselves acting as an intermediary between militia-based forces in third-world countries. In this type of situation, real power is often held at the lower levels by the belligerents, and orders are not often passed, much less acted on. A platoon leader may resolve a minor matter on the spot at the local level. If it becomes apparent that an issue cannot be resolved at a low level, it should be referred up to the level where a quick decision can be made.

SLIDE 13-3. PREPARATION

Any military officer with adequate preparation can act as a chairman of a negotiating meeting. To prepare for the meeting, the leader finds out the viewpoints and negotiating positions of both sides. This is probably best done by a personal visit by either the chairman or a liaison officer before the meeting. The negotiator determines the assets of each side, and what they would require in exchange for an asset. He establishes who will represent each side and what, if any, restrictions have been placed on their ability to reach a decision or compromise. Both sides should agree to be represented by an official of equal rank and authority. The negotiator finds out what agreements have been made at higher level meetings that have a bearing on the subject. If appropriate, he gets copies of any texts issued at those meetings. He uses his staff to war-game and rehearse the negotiation.

SLIDE 13-4. ARRANGEMENT OF THE MEETING

The negotiator ensures both sides are prepared for the meeting. He selects an appropriate place for the meeting that is acceptable to both sides, such as the US forces barracks. If this is the case, he must consider the security and travel arrangements of the delegates. Units may be asked to provide transportation for the delegates. The negotiator considers providing some or all of the following:

- Interpreters. Delegates are likely to use their own interpreters. If using local civilian interpreters, the negotiator must consider that they may not be considered neutral by the belligerents. Back-up interpreters should be available if accuracy of translation is in question.
- Refreshments.

- Clerical staff for the preparation of minutes or written agreements.
- Communications. Delegates may wish to consult with their superiors.
- Arrangements for recording of the minutes and display of maps.
- The press. The press usually does not expect to attend the complete meeting. They will usually be satisfied with interviews before and after the meeting.
- If hosting the meeting, arrangements for each delegate to be met and escorted to the negotiations.
- Arrangements for bodyguards and drivers.

SLIDE 13-5. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS

In beginning the negotiations, the chairman makes a few opening remarks. The chairman should introduce himself and any advisors. It may be appropriate for the delegates to introduce themselves. The chairman ensures that the correct spelling of names is recorded. The chairman should then invite the belligerents to state their case or opinions without interruption. Initial statements are likely to be contrived, full of innuendo, and occasionally irrelevant to the aim of the meeting, but they must be heard. The chairman should record the main points of the arguments and highlight the main points of agreement or disagreement.

SLIDE 13-6. MIDDLE OF NEGOTIATIONS

Having heard both sides, the chairman will have a good idea of the room for maneuver. At this stage, the chairman should adjourn the meeting for a few minutes. The adjournment will give each side a chance to consider their position in light of what has been said during opening remarks. The chairman may also wish to consult with his advisors to plot a strategy to achieve compromise. After the meeting reconvenes, the chairman must take firm control and attempt to direct both sides toward a compromise. The chairman should summarize the points of agreement and disagreement. A suggested strategy is to agree on areas of disagreement, and then prioritize the list. The chairman confirms that both sides would still like to find a compromise solution. He invites one or both sides to propose a compromise. A period of heated discussion is likely to follow. If the meeting is being conducted in a foreign language common to both belligerents, the chairman should allow them to talk directly to each other. An interpreter should keep the chairman informed about the main points of the discussion. The judgment about when to intervene to reestablish order needs careful timing. A well-trained interpreter can provide advice. Now is usually a good time for another adjournment. During the break, the chairman should consult privately with both sides to try to establish the compromise. The chairman should now have an idea of what is acceptable to both sides. The chairman should propose a compromise based on what is acceptable to him and the belligerents and then seek comments from both sides. The chairman should remain impartial; often he is not neutral because he has a vested interest in procuring a resolution to the problems. If both sides are still too far apart, the chairman may need to impose a time limit on the discussion to focus attention. The chairman may also wish to emphasize the consequences of the meeting breaking up without some sort of agreement.

SLIDE 13-7. END OF NEGOTIATIONS

The chairman, or one of his advisors, should highlight agreements and outstanding areas of disagreement. These may be in writing. A time and date should be provisionally arranged for the next meeting. To follow up, a suggested course of action is to debrief all the 'friendly' participants. The chairman should task the liaison officers to visit the belligerents to confirm compliance, clarify any misunderstandings, and prepare the ground for subsequent meetings. Procedures for monitoring compliance, reporting violations, and making complaints must be included. The chairman briefs higher headquarters.

In conclusion, the negotiator must be insistent but not belligerent; find out what the real issue is, it may not be apparent; not threaten, it may backfire; never, under any circumstances, provide unauthorized information to the other side.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for T&EO, Negotiate.

NEGOTIATION

- INTRODUCTION
- SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AT THE LOWER LEVEL
- PREPARATION
- ARRANGEMENT OF A MEETING
- CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS

SLIDE 13-1

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AT THE LOWER LEVEL

A FEW WELL CHOSEN WORDS AT THE SCENE OF AN INCIDENT CAN PREVENT ESCALATION.

SLIDE 13-2

PREPARATION

- UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM
- KNOW THE VIEWS OF THE BELLIGERENTS
- FIND OUT WHO IS COMING
- ARE ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS RELEVANT

SLIDE 13-3

ARRANGEMENT OF THE MEETING

- WHERE
- WHEN
- FACILITIES
- PRESS

SLIDE 13-4

BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS

- OPENING REMARKS
- AIM OF THE MEETING
- INITIAL STATEMENTS

SLIDE 13-5

MIDDLE OF NEGOTIATIONS

- TAKE TIME OUT
- PLOT STRATEGY
- SUMMARIZE AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT
- WORK THE EASIER COMPROMISES FIRST

END OF NEGOTIATIONS

- HIGHLIGHT AGREEMENTS
- OUTLINE DISAGREEMENT
- PROVIDE WRITTEN MINUTES
- DETERMINE TIME AND DATE OF NEXT MEETING
- DEBRIEF
- MAKE FOLLOW-UP VISITS
- BRIEF HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

SLIDE 13-7

LESSON 14. TEMPORARILY DISABLING TECHNIQUES/TECHNOLOGY

SLIDE 14-1. TEMPORARILY DISABLING TECHNIQUES/TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS

The use of temporarily disabling techniques/technology (TDTT) can provide significant advantages in reducing casualties and gaining tactical advantages against ill-equipped forces. This lesson covers TDTT, and the tactics and techniques for their employment.

SLIDE 14-2. EMPLOYMENT

Currently three TDTT systems are available. Riot control agents (RCAs), smoke, and commercially available technology (CAT). The use of available TDTT systems provides alternatives to deadly force and significant advantages in reducing casualties. There are two modes of action associated with these systems—active and passive. Riot control agents support the active mode by directly affecting personnel. Smoke supports the passive mode by altering the environment of the situation. Commercially available technology can be either active or passive in nature.

SLIDE 14-3. EMPLOYMENT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

The use of riot control agents must conform to national policy. During peacetime, commanders in chief must address riot control agents in their plans and request approval from the Secretary of Defense. Action officers on the joint staff verify that the Secretary of Defense has given authority for the use of riot control agents and that the rules of engagement (ROE) from the J3 address riot control agents. The approving authority to use riot control agents must come from the President of the United States. The rules of engagement not only address riot control agents generally, but also specifically explain when the use of riot control agents is authorized or direct that authorization be obtained from a specified level of command before it can be employed. The use of riot control agents should be considered in operations characterized by close combat, but permanent effects are not desired. Their use may also provide US forces with an opportunity to exploit an adversary's vulnerability or to permit withdrawal of friendly forces without the use of deadly force.

SLIDE 14-4. RCA EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

When using riot control agents, the unit must consider protective masks, weather conditions, location of friendly forces and nonbelligerents, burning type munitions that may start fires, projected-type munitions that can cause injuries, and grenades (nonbursting type) that may be thrown back.

SLIDE 14-5. SMOKE EMPLOYMENT

The use of smoke during stability and support operations is generally the same as during combat operations. The main function of the smoke is to deny observation. Three applications of smoke are obscuring, screening, and marking. Marking smoke does not provide a temporary disabling capability. However, the use of fluorescent particles to mark personnel and monitor their activities could be considered a form of TDTT against movement.

SLIDE 14-6. SMOKE EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the normal considerations for weather, use of HC and petroleum-based smoke (M157 smoke generator system) requires safety considerations. The chemical officer can provide specific recommendations based on safety messages. The choice of delivery means and available supplies may limit the duration of the smoke screen.

SLIDE 14-7. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

The riot control agents are CS and CR. Oleoresin Capsicum or Oil of Pepper (OC) is available commercially in aerosol form. They are all fast acting. Employment devices for CS and CR include hand grenades, 40-mm grenades, and manpack and vehicle-mounted dispensers. (OC is now also available through the supply system using NSN 1365-NC-350-3190.)

SLIDE 14-8. AVAILABLE RCA

The following inventory and DOD identification codes assist logistical planning. The M36 and M32 are handheld, pressurized dispensers with holsters. K532 through K768 are bulk agents for use with dispensers or field-expedient methods. On several occasions, hostile personnel in Somalia picked up the burning M7A3 grenades and threw them back at UN forces. The UN forces solved this problem by using bursting-type riot control agent munitions. The E8 tactical CS launcher is a manpacked, disposable launcher that fires sixty-four 35-mm CS projectiles in about 15 seconds. Depending on weather conditions, the resulting cloud may be as large as 40 meters wide by 150 meters deep. (For more detailed information, see TB 3-1310-255-10.)

SLIDE 14-9. RCA DISPENSERS

The M5 dispenser is heavy and requires mounting on either a HMMWV or helicopter. The M33A1 is a portable, manpacked dispenser for powder or liquid riot control agents. (For more detail, see TM 3-1040-220-12 or TM 3-1040-251-15.)

SLIDE 14-10. SMOKE SYSTEMS

The bottom line for using smoke is to reduce aimed fire. Differences between smoke systems range from time for desired effect, duration, concentration, and logistical support for sustained operations. Limited quantities of XM training smoke are available. They offer an environmentally safe but dense smoke; however, duration is one third less than standard HC smoke. Commercial foggers provide smoke coverage using a 3.5-horsepower engine and a smoke-agent cartridge. Each cartridge lasts 10 to 12 minutes.

SLIDE 14-11. COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY

Commercially available technology provides for both passive and active capabilities.

PASSIVE: The fluorescence identification system uses highly fluorescent and coded particles to link individuals to activities in marked buildings (or marked equipment). Coded particles are detected using ultraviolet light and a handheld scope. Paint guns can deliver fluorescent particles or dyes for marking. Foam dispensers can deliver high-expansion foam for dispersing crowds and immobilizing individuals.

ACTIVE: Stun devices such as commercial stun guns and cattle prods. Rubber bullets are approaching the high end of the TDTT spectrum. Without strict rules of engagement and soldier training, rubber bullets can result in deadly force. Similar aspects of command

liability apply to rubber grenades and smoke guns. Rubber grenades are also available with CS impregnated pellets. Smoke guns provide instantaneous confusion with blinding smoke and incendiary effect.

SLIDE 14-12. EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS

Employment scenarios are crowd control, support for rescue operations, breaking contact, support for raids or attacks, access denial to buildings, marking materials and tracking individuals.

SLIDE 14-13. CROWD CONTROL

For crowd control situations, the commander considers combinations of TDTTs. The key points are to exploit advantages, provide crowd escape routes, and plan withdrawal routes for friendly forces. When using riot control agents for crowd control, the commander must consider that if a group is motivated or inclined to violence, a small amount of agent may provoke an attack.

SLIDE 14-14. DISPERSE CROWDS WITH RCAs

The US force can use riot control agents along the release line. Special reaction teams within the formation stand by to use additional TDTTs. Or, US force can use riot control agents along a release line to allow for different wind conditions. Personnel delivering riot control agents along the release line need a security element.

SLIDE 14-15. BREAK CONTACT

When forces need to break contact, they can use combinations of TDTT. Riot control agents and smoke can be used to break contact and obscure direct fires.

SLIDE 14-16. SUPPORT RESCUE OPERATIONS

US personnel may be surrounded by hostile forces, and a rescue operation is required. The rescue force penetrates the surrounding hostile forces using combinations of TDTTs. The rules of engagement may provide the option to escalate the level of force needed to accomplish the mission. Once the rescue force penetrates the hostile forces and secures the US personnel, the rescue force use TDTTs to support the withdrawal.

SLIDE 14-17. SUPPORT RAIDS AND ATTACKS

A hostile force may use civilians as a human shield. The US force disperses the human shield using TDTTs and attacks the hostile force under concealment of smoke. The key point is that TDTTs move the human shield away from the line of fire. US policy dictates that TDTTs should **never** be used to move enemy forces into a kill zone.

SLIDE 14-18. DENY ACCESS TO BUILDINGS

Sniper and mortar teams can occupy and fire from buildings near the US compound. Based on the desired duration of effects, the commander can use riot control agents and render the buildings temporarily unusable. For example: CR applied to the interior using the M33A1 dispenser could keep the building unusable to anyone without protective masks. At end state, the unit decontaminates only those items or areas deemed critical to future operations or immediate return to the host nation. CR does not degrade in water and is quite persistent in the environment. Under suitable conditions, CR can persist on porous surfaces for up to 60 days. The commander should consider these facts before using CR. CR is removed from equipment or various surfaces by wiping, scraping, shoveling, or sweeping. Essential areas are wiped with rags soaked in propylene glycol or an automotive antifreeze solution, or alcohol; then scrubbed with nonbleach detergent and hot water, and rinsed with large amounts of cold water.

SLIDE 14-19. MARK AREAS

Fluorescent identification particles can be applied to perimeters, buildings, and equipment. The particles are composed of distinct colored layers that provide millions of codes based on the color sequences. Portable ultraviolet light sources fluoresce the particles, and a 100x pocket microscope revels the unique color code.

SLIDE 14-20. TRACK INDIVIDUALS

The commander designates buildings A, B, and C as named areas of interest. During routine surveillance operations at checkpoints and the local area, detection of coded particles can link individuals to marked buildings and activities in those buildings.

TEMPORARILY DISABLING TECHNIQUES/TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS

MATERIEL, TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES TO PROTECT THE FORCE

SLIDE 14 - 1

EMPLOYMENT

- PROVIDES SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE IN REDUCING CASUALTIES
- PROVIDES A TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OVER ILL-EQUIPPED FORCES
- PROVIDES TWO GENERAL TYPES OF TDTT SYSTEMS:
  - ACTIVE
  - PASSIVE

EMPLOYMENT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

- RCAs CANNOT BE USED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
- RCAs ARE USED IN OPERATIONAL SITUATIONS CHARACTERIZED BY CLOSE COMBAT WHEN PERMANENT EFFECTS ARE NOT DESIRED.
- RCAs CREATE A VULNERABILITY TO ALLOW UNITED STATES FORCES TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION OR WITHDRAW WITHOUT RESORTING TO DEADLY FORCE.

SLIDE 14-3

RIOT CONTROL AGENT EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- PROTECTIVE MASKS REQUIRED BY EMPLOYING FORCES
- WEATHER CONDITIONS
- LOCATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES AND NONBELLIGERENTS
- BURNING-TYPE MUNITIONS MAY START FIRES
- PROJECTED-TYPE MUNITIONS CAN CAUSE INJURIES
- GRENADES (NONBURSTING TYPE) MAY BE THROWN BACK

SLIDE 14-4

SMOKE EMPLOYMENT

- SILHOUETTE POTENTIAL UNFRIENDLY FORCES
- SCREEN MOVEMENT OF FRIENDLY FORCES
- OBSCURE AIMED FIRE AND TARGET ACQUISITION

SLIDE 14-5

SMOKE EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- WEATHER
- HC SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
- LIMITED DURATION

SLIDE 14-6

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

- CS
  - RATE OF REACTION: UP TO 15 SECONDS
  - DURATION OF EFFECTS: 5 TO 10 MINUTES
  - FORMS: SOLID AND LIQUID
- CR
  - RATE OF REACTION: IMMEDIATE
  - DURATION OF EFFECTS: 5 TO 10 MINUTES
  - FORM: LIQUID
- OC (OIL OF PEPPER)
  - RATE OF REACTION: IMMEDIATE
  - DURATION OF EFFECTS: UP TO 45 MINUTES
  - FORM: LIQUID

SLIDE 14-7

AVAILABLE RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

- M36 RCA DISPENSER CR (K533)
- M32 RCA DISPENSER CSX (K531)
- CR FOR M33A1 DISPENSER (K532)
- CS, 80 POUNDS (K764)
- CS, CAPSULES (K765)
- CS, FOR M33A1 DISPENSER (K768)
- M7A3 GRENADE RCA - CS (G963)
- M47 GRENADE RCA - CS (G922)
- E8 TACTICAL CS LAUNCHER

RIOT CONTROL DISPENSERS

- M5 HELICOPTER- OR VEHICLE-MOUNTED DRY DISPENSER
- M33A1 PORTABLE DRY AND LIQUID DISPENSER

SLIDE 14-9

SMOKE SYSTEMS

- M157 SMOKE GENERATOR
- PROJECTED SMOKE
- ABC-M5 HC SMOKE POT
- AN-M8 HC SMOKE GRENADE
- XM TRAINING SMOKE POT
- XM TRAINING SMOKE GRENADE
- COMMERCIAL FOGGERS

COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY

- PASSIVE:
  - FLUORESCENT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
  - FOGGERS
  - PAINT GUNS
  - FOAM DISPENSERS
- ACTIVE:
  - OC DISPENSERS
  - STUN DEVICES
  - WATER CANNONS
  - RUBBER BULLETS
  - RUBBER GRENADES
  - SMOKE GUNS

SLIDE 14-11


EMPLOYMENT SCENARIOS


- CONTROL CROWDS
- SUPPORT RESCUE OPERATIONS
- BREAK CONTACT
- SUPPORT RAIDS OR ATTACKS
- DENY ACCESS TO BUILDINGS
- MARK AREAS AND TRACK INDIVIDUALS


CROWD CONTROL


- GENERAL:
  - COMBINATIONS OF RCAs, SMOKE, AND COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
- GUIDELINES:
  - EXPLOIT ADVANTAGES GAINED
  - PROVIDE CROWD ESCAPE ROUTES
  - PLAN WITHDRAWAL ROUTES
- RCAs:
  - USE SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES TO PRODUCE IMMEDIATE OR DECISIVE EFFECT—COVER ENTIRE CROWD

SLIDE 14-13


DISPERSE CROWDS WITH
RIOT CONTROL AGENTS
ESCAPE
ESCAPE
RELEASE POINT
US FORCE
WIND
ESCAPE
ESCAPE
RELEASE POINT
US FORCE
WIND
SLIDE 14-14


BREAK CONTACT
HOSTILE FORCE
RCA & SMOKE
HOSTILE FORCE
US FORCE
HOSTILE FORCE
WITHDRAWAL ROUTE
SLIDE 14-15


SUPPORT RESCUE OPERATIONS
HOSTILE FORCE
RCA & SMOKE
US FORCE & RESCUE FORCE
RCA & SMOKE
HOSTILE FORCE
RCA & SMOKE
HOSTILE FORCE
WITHDRAWAL ROUTE
RCA & SMOKE
HOSTILE FORCE
SLIDE 14-16


SUPPORT RAIDS OR ATTACKS
US FORCE
SMOKE
HOSTILE FORCE
RCA &
SMOKE
HUMAN
SHIELD
ESCAPE
ROUTE
SLIDE 14-17

DENY ACCESS TO BUILDINGS

- BUILDINGS IN THE VICINITY OF UNITED STATES COMPOUNDS PROVIDE COVER AND CONCEALMENT TO HOSTILE FORCES, ALLOWING THEM TO FIRE INTO THE COMPOUND.
- FORCES EMPLOY CS/CR IN THE BUILDINGS TO MAKE THEM TEMPORARILY UNUSABLE.


MARK AREAS

- APPLY FLUORESCENT PARTICLES TO SELECTED AREAS (PERIMETERS, BUILDINGS)
- AS INDIVIDUALS MOVE THROUGH THE AREAS, THEY PICK UP THE PARTICLES

SLIDE 14-19

TRACK INDIVIDUALS

- CODES A, B, C = MARKED BUILDINGS
- CODES A_1, B_1, C_1 = LOCATION/DETECTION
- INDIVIDUALS ARE LINKED TO ACTIVITIES IN MARKED BUILDINGS



SLIDE 14-20

LESSON 15. MILITARY POLICE OPERATIONS

SLIDE 15-1. MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Military police have answered the nation's call across the full range of operations, but particularly in stability and support operations consistently since 1980.

SLIDE 15-2. MILITARY POLICE BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS

Military police operations in support of stability and support operations missions usually mirror military police battlefield missions in support of combat forces. The military police battlefield missions are battlefield circulation control, area security, enemy prisoner of war operations, and law and order. MP operations in performance of these missions emphasize the human dimension and attitude needed to de-escalate potentially violent situations. This mind set forms the foundation for military police training. It applies forces during stability and support operations or in peacetime law enforcement operations.

SLIDE 15-3. BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL

In stability and support operations, the MP battlefield circulation control mission provides the following capabilities to the supported commander: route reconnaissance and surveillance, MSR regulation enforcement, straggler control, refugee control, intelligence collection reporting, and information dissemination. These capabilities enable the commander to maintain control on main supply routes with the knowledge that this control is accompanied by forces accustomed to performing this mission under restrictive rules of engagement.

SLIDE 15-4. AREA SECURITY

Area security in stability and support operations is essential for sustained operations. Military police perform these functions in area security missions. Military police project a protect, assist, and defend force signature that has proven to be politically acceptable to the international community. This force signature enables the military police to perform area security without projecting a hostile appearance to the populace or potentially hostile forces, while at the same time possessing sufficient firepower to deter aggression.

SLIDE 15-5. ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE OPERATIONS (or INTERNEE/RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS)

Stability and support operations can generate prisoners or detainees that require segregation to protect them from each other and outside forces. At the same time, dislocated civilians can place unexpected additional operational burdens on the success of the peace enforcement mission. Military police are trained in war to comply with Geneva Convention regulatory guidance concerning the handling of enemy prisoners of war and civilian detainees, and military police possess the battlefield automation system required to maintain proper accountability. When dislocated civilians interfere with the peace enforcement mission, the military police assist the civil affairs, logistical support, and security forces in their mission to shelter, sustain, protect, and account for dislocated civilians by performing area mobile security and redirecting dislocated civilians to keep main supply routes open.

SLIDE 15-6. LAW AND ORDER

In stability and support operations, the breakdown of social structure and law and order often leads to the requirement to recreate a police system. Military police provide the commander an already established and trained law enforcement organization that can work with local authorities to restore law and order operations. In addition, military police investigative assets (criminal investigation division and military police investigator) provide the commander with vital criminal intelligence, logistical security operations and, if necessary, serious incident investigation capabilities. The importance of the military police law and order mission was clearly focused in Panama.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: Slides 15-7 through 15-9 identify the abilities of military police units to shoot, move, and communicate as a force multiplier to the combat-arms brigade or battalion task force commander.

SLIDE 15-7. MILITARY POLICE UNIT CAPABILITIES—SHOOT
An MP battalion at full strength with four combat support companies has 609 9-mm pistols, 580 M16A2 rifles, 180 M203 grenade launchers, 182 M249 light machine guns, 188 MK 19 grenade machine guns.

SLIDE 15-8. MILITARY POLICE UNIT CAPABILITIES—MOVE
An MP battalion at full strength with four combat service support companies has 11 commercial utility cargo vehicles, 8 cargo HMMWVs, 176 HMMWVs with armament, 15 cargo trucks (2 1/2-ton), 4 wreckers (5-ton), 4 cargo trucks (5-ton), 1 truck van expansion, 60 armored security vehicle.

SLIDE 15-9. MILITARY POLICE UNIT CAPABILITIES—COMMUNICATE
An MP battalion at full strength with four combat support companies has 1 AN/VRC-88, 10 AN/VRC-89s, 5 AN/VRC-90s, 172 AN/VRC-91s, 6 AN/VRC-92s, 21 AN/VRC-213s.

SLIDE 15-10. ESSENTIAL COMPETENCIES
The essential competencies of MP training instill in military police a firm appreciation for the requirements of the MP battlefield missions across the full range of operations. Stability and support operations missions do not detract from the military police war-fighting capabilities; instead, such missions hone military police war-fighting skills that are trained and performed daily in the military police career field. These essential competencies in military police training enable military police and their leaders to handle the human dimension and attitude in their daily missions. This becomes critical in stability and support operations where US forces are faced with increased contact with civilians interlinked to ultimate mission success. The compassion, patience, and fairness that is instilled in military police training and mission accomplishment provides a soldier trained to handle stress, conflict, and conflict resolution with an appreciation for core human values.

SLIDE 15-11. BRIGADE AND BATTALION PLANNING

A variety of military police specific functions help the commander build and sustain combat power needed for peace enforcement missions. Specific considerations that need to be included in the planning process are battle command, intelligence, maneuver, logistics, mobility and survivability, nonlethal technology, and transition and termination.

SLIDE 15-12. BATTLE COMMAND

In battle command, the military police provide support for the ability of the commander to make decisions and provide the leadership needed for mission success. Effective and well-planned police operations enable the commander to visualize the current and future state of belligerents and to form concepts of operations to accomplish the peace enforcement mission. Police operations, by their very nature, provide a local sensor and an important means to effect control.

SLIDE 15-13. INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is fundamental to effective planning, security, and deception. The military police are the commander's only source for criminal intelligence in peace enforcement operations. As outlined in Joint Pub 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, military police is the central point for antiterrorism operations and, if necessary, trained terrorism counteraction forces. Military police have immediate access to international police data systems to identify wanted criminals and terrorists. These individuals are often encountered in peace enforcement operations. Without this information, the commander's ability to know the enemy is adversely affected. The lead agencies for terrorism against US personnel and facilities not in the US are the Department of State and the host nation in accordance with international laws and applicable SOFAs. INSCOM is the lead Army agency for counterintelligence activities against terrorism. Military police serve as a major source of information in support of terrorism counteraction. In peace and war, MPs deter, deny, delay, and respond to terrorist acts. As part of their area security and law enforcement missions, MPs help protect units and facilities against level I and II threat of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and other enemy forces.

SLIDE 15-14. MANEUVER

Commanders maneuver their forces to create the conditions for tactical and operational success. Military police help create the conditions for mission success by assisting the commander in maneuvering forces on the main supply routes. Circulation control provides the commander the means to track maneuver forces and ensures the commander's highway traffic headquarters has timely information on main supply route status and problem areas.

SLIDE 15-15. LOGISTICS

Logistics provides the physical means with which forces operate. Military police provide mobile reaction forces for logistical bases and secure movement of critical assets over main supply routes. Investigative assets also provide the commander with logistics security operations to ensure critical supplies are not diverted by criminal elements.

SLIDE 15-16. MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

Mobility operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces. The military police use their robust movement and communications capabilities to provide engineers with timely main supply route status, enabling rapid coordination for area damage control and combat engineer support for mobility operations. At the site of the damage, military police control movement to enable the engineers to repair the damage with minimum interference.

SLIDE 15-17. NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGY

Nonlethal technologies provide the commander the potential to prevent aggression without inflicting serious injury or loss of life. For instance, military police working dogs provide a nonlethal means to control crowds and protect US forces. In addition, military police are trained in civil disturbance operations and use of riot control equipment. MP training stresses nonlethal force as the primary means for dealing with the situation.

SLIDE 15-18. TRANSITION AND TERMINATION OPERATIONS

The final element of success in stability and support operations, such as peace enforcement, is the successful transition to a peacekeeping force. Military police have traditionally been among the last forces to leave an operational area. The law and order mission and the need for continued area security make MP an integral part of successful transition operations.

SLIDE 15-19. MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

The planner's tool to ensure successful police operations is the military police brigade headquarters. By including the MP brigade headquarters in the task organization for a stability and support operations mission, the planner is ensured that the right police structure is in place. The headquarters structure has the assets needed to perform the functions of command and control, planning, operations, personnel management, logistics, and liaison to coordinate with staff judge advocate, civil affairs, psychological operations, civil authorities and supported commands. These assets ensure the commander that he has the means to build and sustain police operations even if hostile forces are encountered. The military police brigade commander, based on the mission and task analysis, identifies the subordinate unit requirements.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Coordinate and Monitor Convoy Security
T&EO, Prepare Traffic Control Plan

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

DEPLOYABLE

FLEXIBLE

VERSATILE

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

JTF LA, 1992
ATLANTA PRISON, 1987- 1988
RESTORE HOPE, 1992-On Going
JTF ANDREW, 1992
QUANTANAMO, 1991-On Going
PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991
HAWKEYE, 1989
CUBAN RESETTLEMENT, 1980-1982
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 1994

CONFLICT

NIMROD DANCER, 1989
JTF PANAMA, 1988-1989
GOLDEN PHEASANT, 1988
PROMOTE LIBERTY, 1990-On Going
JTF BRAVO, 1984-On Going
ISLAND BREEZE, 1983-1986
MAINTAIN DEMOCRACY, 1995-On Going

CAPABLE

ACCEPTABLE

WAR

DESERT SHIELD/STROM, 1990-1991
JUST CAUSE, 1989-1990
URGENT FURY, 1983

SUSTAINABLE

SUITABLE

TACTICAL AGILITY

DISCIPLINED

LETHAL

SLIDE 15-1

MILITARY POLICE BATTLEFIELD MISSIONS

- BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL
- AREA SECURITY
- ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR OPERATIONS
- LAW AND ORDER

SLIDE 15-2

BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL

- ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
- MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE REGULATION ENFORCEMENT
- STRAGGLER CONTROL
- REFUGEE CONTROL
- INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND REPORTING*
- INFORMATION DISSEMINATION*

**COMMON TO ALL MISSIONS*

AREA SECURITY

- AREA RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
- SECURITY OF DESIGNATED ASSETS
- SECURITY OF SPECIAL AMMUNITION
- BASE RESPONSE FORCE
- COUNTER INCURSION
- AIR BASE DEFENSE
- AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
- NBC DETECTING AND REPORTING*

COMMON TO ALL MISSIONS

SLIDE 15-4

ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEE OPERATIONS

(or INTERNEE/RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS)

- COLLECTION
- EVACUATION
- INTERNMENT
- RELIEF OPERATIONS

SLIDE 15-5

LAW AND ORDER



- LAW ENFORCEMENT
- CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
- CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE
- TERRORISM COUNTERACTION
- LOGISTICAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
- COMBATING TERRORISM
- AREA SECURITY



SLIDE 15-6

MILITARY POLICE UNIT CAPABILITIES—SHOOT

WEAPON	HHD, MP BN	MP CS COMPANY	HHD, MP BN w/4 CS Co
PISTOL, 9-MM	21	147	609
RIFLE, M16A2	60	130	580
M203 GRENADE LAUNCHER	4	44	180
M249 LIGHT MACHINE GUN	2	45	182
MK 19 GRENADE MACHINE GUN	4	46	188

MILITARY POLICE UNIT CAPABILITIES—MOVE


SYSTEM	HHD, MP BN	MP CS COMPANY	HHD, MP BN w/4 CS Co
CUCV	11		11
HMMWV CARGO		2	8
HMMWV ARMAMENT		44	176
TRUCK CARGO 2 1/2-TON	3	3	15
WRECKER 5-TON		1	4
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON		4	4
TRUCK VAN EXPANSION	1		1
ARMORED SECURITY VEHICLE		15	60

SLIDE 15 -8

MILITARY POLICE UNIT CAPABILITIES—COMMUNICATE

SYSTEM	HHD, MP BN	MP CS COMPANY	HHD, MP BN w/4 CS Co
ANVRC-88	1		1
ANVRC-89	2	2	10
ANVRC-90	5		5
ANVRC-91		43	172
ANVRC-92	2	1	6
ANVRC-213	1	5	21

SLIDE 15 -9


ESSENTIAL COMPETENCIES
TRAINING FOCUS
DEALING WITH PEOPLE ACROSS CULTURAL SPECTRUM
HUMAN DIMENSION AND ATTITUDE
COMPASSION PATIENCE FAIRNESS
PROVEN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
CORE HUMAN VALUES
STRESS CONFLICT CONFLICT RESOLUTION
SUCCESS
SLIDE 15-10

BRIGADE AND BATTALION PLANNING

MILITARY POLICE CONSIDERATIONS:

- BATTLE COMMAND
- INTELLIGENCE
- MANEUVER
- LOGISTICS
- MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY
- NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGY
- TRANSITION AND TERMINATION

SLIDE 15-11

BATTLE COMMAND

- COORDINATE POLICE OPERATIONS
- CONTROL CIVIL DISTURBANCE
- PROVIDE ACCURATE POLICE REPORTS
- HANDLE SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORTS
- CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATION
- SECURE DISPLACED CIVILIANS

SLIDE 15-12

INTELLIGENCE

- PROVIDE CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE
- FOCUS ANTITERRORISM CONSIDERATIONS
- CONDUCT TERRORISM COUNTERACTION
- ACCESS INTERNATIONAL POLICE DATA SYSTEM

SLIDE 15-13

MANEUVER

- PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY
- CONDUCT CIRCULATION CONTROL
- ENHANCE FORCE ACCOUNTABILITY
- AUGMENT CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS
- SUPPORT CHECKPOINTS AND ROADBLOCKS
- PROVIDE MOBILE PATROLS

SLIDE 15-14

LOGISTICS

- CONDUCT LOGISTICS SECURITY OPERATIONS
- PROVIDE CONVOY SECURITY
- PROTECT LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

SLIDE 15-15

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

- CONDUCT ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
- EVALUATE THE SERVICEABILITY OF THE ROAD NETWORK
- MONITOR THE FLOW OF REFUGEES
- RE-ROUTE MOVEMENT TO ALTERNATE ROAD NETWORKS
- PREVENT SABOTAGE AND LOOTING IN DAMAGED AREA(s)

SLIDE 15-16

NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGY

- SUPPORT CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS WITH MILITARY WORKING DOGS
- TRAIN CIVILIAN POLICE
- FOCUS HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS

SLIDE 15-17

TRANSITION AND TERMINATION OPERATIONS

- PROVIDE LAW AND ORDER
- COORDINATE POLICE OPERATIONS
- INTERACT WITH GOVERNMENTAL, LEGAL, AND MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
- SECURE UNITED STATES FORCES

SLIDE 15-18

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

- **FLEXIBLE:**
  - — DEPLOYMENT:
    - WITH INFANTRY COMBAT TASK FORCE
    - WITH INFANTRY SUPPORT TASK FORCE
    - AS TASK FORCE LEAD
  - — ORGANIZATION:
    - BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
    - BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS (-)
  - — EMPLOYMENT:
    - INITIAL MAXIMUM CAPABILITY ON THE GROUND
    - SIZE UP OR DOWN TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS
    - MULTIFUNCTIONAL ROLES
- **ROBUST CAPABILITIES:**
  - — COMMAND AND CONTROL
  - — MOBILITY
  - — COMMUNICATIONS
  - — LETHALITY
  - — SENIOR MP LEADERSHIP
  - — SJA, S5, AND LIAISON

SLIDE 15-19

LESSON 16. CHECKPOINTS

SLIDE 16-1. CHECKPOINT

Checkpoints are manned locations used to control movement and to enforce circulation control measures and other laws, orders, and regulations.

SLIDE 16-2. ROADBLOCK

Roadblocks limit the movement of vehicles along a route or deny access to certain areas or roads. Roadblocks are used with checkpoints to channel vehicles and personnel to the search area.

SLIDE 16-3. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Separate search and assault elements are used. This allows soldiers to focus on specific tasks and also helps the image of the search element in the eyes of the population. Leaders must ensure that soldiers know the rules of engagement.

SLIDE 16-4. CHECKPOINT PLANNING

Checkpoints are vulnerable. Checkpoints require enough soldiers to prevent ambush and surprise. One element of the force is positioned and concealed away from the checkpoint to prevent escapes. Checkpoint personnel search vehicles, drivers, and cargos. Checkpoint rest plan must designate and position resting soldiers to act as a reserve.

SLIDE 16-5. SITE SELECTION

To prevent bypass or avoidance, an area where the terrain restricts the traffic should be selected. However, the area should not be so restrictive as to present a safety hazard.

SLIDE 16-6. ESTABLISHING A CHECKPOINT

Two parallel obstacles are placed (each with a gap) across the road. The distance (in meters) between obstacles depends on the amount of traffic that is held in the search area. The blocked section of road can be used as the search area. If possible, an area adjacent to the road is used to search large vehicles without delaying the flow of the traffic. Areas are required for searching female suspects and detaining persons for further interrogation. If possible, the personnel manning a checkpoint should include a member of the civil police, an interpreter, and a trained female searcher.

SLIDE 16-7. STATIC SECURITY POST

In 1993, the Joint Readiness Training Center and the 6th Infantry Division conducted an exercise to test various peace enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures. Largely as a result of this exercise, many units have begun to refer to "static security posts" as part of the checkpoint terminology. A static security post is the search area and the immediate security around it.

SLIDE 16-8. SIGNS

Portable signs in the native language and in English should be available. Signs should denote the speed limit of approach, vehicle search area, vehicle parking area, male and female

search areas, and dismount point. (The 10th Mountain Division recognized the need for artificial lighting in Somalia and had to purchase several large searchlights.)

SLIDE 16-9. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
Lighting is needed for the search area at night. Communication is required between the units supporting the checkpoint. Barbed-wire obstacles should be provided across roads and around the search area. Soldiers must have adequate firepower to withstand an attack or to halt a vehicle attempting to flee or crash through the checkpoint.

SLIDE 16-10. OBSTACLES
Reinforcing obstacles should funnel the traffic into a single lane. FM 5-114 provides technical and design information for obstacles useful in checkpoint operations. The spacing of the obstacles is governed by the desired allowable speed of vehicles.

SLIDE 16-11. PASSIVE VEHICLE BARRIER
A passive vehicle barrier is permanently emplaced. Obstacles should defeat the vehicle, not the driver. For example, a cable-reinforced chain link fence can stop a 5,000-pound vehicle traveling at 45 miles per hour and a 4,000-pound vehicle traveling at 50 miles per hour. (FM 5-114.)

SLIDE 16-12. ACTIVE VEHICLE BARRIER
An active vehicle barrier must be manually or automatically deployed in response to a threat. For example, a cable-beam barrier can stop a 10,000-pound vehicle traveling at 15 miles per hour. (FM 5-114.)

SLIDE 16-13. HASTY CHECKPOINT
The hasty checkpoint is mobile and can be quickly positioned where needed. While more adaptable, the hasty checkpoint does not send the constant visual reminder the deliberate checkpoint does.

SLIDE 16-14. DELIBERATE CHECKPOINT
These checkpoints are pre-positioned. They are useful deterrents and send a strong law and order message.

SLIDE 16-15. FLYING CHECKPOINT
One type of hasty checkpoint used in Operation Provide Comfort was the flying checkpoint. Mobile units of mounted infantry, combat engineers, and TOW vehicles moved to key intersections where armed Iraqis were known to operate. The mobile units setup hasty roadblocks to disrupt the threat.

SLIDE 16-16. FLYING CHECKPOINT CONSIDERATIONS
The flying checkpoint must have enough soldiers to search and detain intruders. The checkpoint must have an overwatch element, air cover on station, mobile mortar support, and quick reinforcement of TOW and infantry carriers that could extract or reinforce the checkpoint.

SLIDE 16-17. ORGANIZATION

All checkpoints should have a headquarters or control element, a security element, a search element, an interrogation element, and an assault element.

SLIDE 16-18. HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT

The headquarters element is responsible for the checkpoint. The politically sensitive nature of stability and support operations makes good communication a must.

SLIDE 16-19. SECURITY ELEMENT

The security element acts as an OP to provide early warning of approaching traffic. Battalion snipers are well suited for this role. If an unmanned aerial vehicle is available, it can enhance observation of approaching traffic.

SLIDE 16-20. SEARCH ELEMENT

The search element conducts the search in the search area. It refers suspicious vehicles and personnel to the interrogation element. If MPs are available, they should be part of this element. The search element should maintain a record of all traffic that passes through the checkpoint. A video record is best, but a written log is sufficient.

SLIDE 16-21. MP MOBILE AREA SECURITY PATROL ELEMENT

The MP mobile area security patrol element acts as a "mobile screen" around checkpoints to prevent infiltration and surprise attack. The MP patrols detect and defend against the threat before it reaches the direct-fire range of the checkpoint. The MP mobile area security patrol element maintains surveillance, provides early warning, impedes and harasses the enemy reconnaissance elements within the MPs' capabilities.

SLIDE 16-22. SEARCHING

The searching element must be cautious. It works in buddy teams to provide security. Searchers approach vehicles from an angle at the rear; this gives the searchers an observation advantage over the driver. Based on METT-T, the searchers should have the occupants dismount.

SLIDE 16-23. SEARCHING A VEHICLE

The driver should observe the search to alleviate misunderstandings. If sufficient searchers are available, occupants can be searched simultaneously. (A checklist from the Joint Readiness Training Center and 6th Infantry Division exercise is in Figure 16-1.)

PURPOSE: To prevent smuggling and infiltration of armed elements, and to protect coalition personnel and property.

PROCEDURES:

1. Allow only one vehicle at a time at the static security post.
2. Have all other vehicles remain 50 meters from the static security post with engines off.
3. Keep all stopped vehicles under surveillance.
4. Inspect a vehicle as follows:
   - Have all personnel get out of vehicle.
   - Have the driver open all doors, hood, and trunk.
   - Check all identification papers against the black/gray list from S2.
   - Have all personnel face away from the security element.
   - Start on the end of the engine compartment and work to the other side of the compartment.
   - Look for new wires.
   - Use mirrors to observe hard to see areas.
   - Pay special attention to sun visors and glove compartments.
   - Look under seats and feel seat backs for packages.
   - Feel headliner for packages.
   - Feel door panels for packages.
   - Inspect area behind rear seat for packages or wires.
   - Inspect under dashboard.
   - Look under carpet for wires.
   - Never touch wires or switches.
   - Give suspicious objects to EOD personnel.
   - Look at and under spare tire.
   - Inspect all luggage and packages.
   - Be suspicious of innocent looking items (for example, newspaper, envelopes).
   - Inspect bumpers, wheels, and covers.
   - Inspect complete chassis with mirrors.
   - Inspect spare gas tank closely.
5. Inspect personnel as follows:
   - Feel along clothing, pay extra attention to arm pits and lower back.
   - Check boots, hats, and so forth.
   - Search using a metal detector over whole body.
   - Search all personnel away from the vehicle.
   - Conduct searches in a concealed position behind cover.
   - Provide security for the element conducting the search.
   - Separate searched from nonsearched personnel.
   - Have the person stand facing a wall, lean over at a 45-degree angle with his feet spread, one hand behind his head.
   - If wall is not available, have the person lie on the ground with his arms outstretched and his legs crossed.
   - If available, have a woman search the women.

NOTES:

1. Mechanics from brigade or battalion should be used to assist in vehicle search.

2. Static security posts should have limited maintenance capability to move disabled or broken vehicles to a safe area.

3. Not every vehicle or person will be searched to the degree listed above. The black and gray lists should identify vehicles and people to be thoroughly searched. The chain of command modifies the search checklist, based on the threat, for all others.

Figure 16-1. Search operations checklist.

SLIDE 16-24. INTERROGATION ELEMENT

This element does a detailed search of anything the search element considers suspicious. Its composition should cover as many contingencies as possible. (Both the 82d Airborne Division in the Dominican Republic and the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia recognized the requirement for language capability.) As in all stability and support operations situations, the requirement for liaison is intense.

SLIDE 16-25. ASSAULT ELEMENT

The assault force has a clear combat mission aimed at vehicles that violate the checkpoint. It is separate from other elements to allow proper focus. To take into account misunderstandings and panicking drivers, universally understood check-fire signals are necessary.

SLIDE 16-26. HEAVY/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS

Tanks, BFVs, LAVs, and APCs are useful as part of the headquarters, security, and assault elements. These vehicles also can be a reserve or reaction force to respond to threats to checkpoints. Mechanized units (sections, platoons) are ideal for flying checkpoints. The vehicles can carry large amounts of barrier materials, especially when towing trailers. For hasty checkpoints, the vehicles can be positioned on the roadway to act as vehicle barriers. Rules of engagement must take into account the weapon systems carried by the tracked vehicles.

SLIDE 16-27. TRACKED VEHICLES AS PART OF A HASTY CHECKPOINT

The tracked vehicles are used to slow and canalize approaching vehicles.

SLIDE 16-28. CHECKPOINT ISSUES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Some of the problems US forces faced in the Dominican Republic were—

- Guns placed in automobile gas tanks.
- Hearses and ambulances were loaded with weapons instead of bodies and patients.
- Rebels created a diversion or mounted a sniper attack to allow vehicles to run a roadblock.
- Women wearing loose fitting dresses or maternity clothes smuggled contraband through the checkpoints; female inspectors were unavailable.
- Rebels tried to bypass checkpoints by using the sewer system.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTES: 1. See Appendix A for STX, Establish and Operate a Checkpoint.
2. See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Establish a Checkpoint
T&EO, Operate a Checkpoint

CHECKPOINT

PLACE WHERE A UNIT CHECKS VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC TO ENFORCE CIRCULATION CONTROL MEASURES AND OTHER LAWS, ORDERS, AND REGULATIONS

SLIDE 16-1

ROADBLOCK

A BARRIER OR OBSTACLE (USUALLY COVERED BY FIRE) USED TO BLOCK OR LIMIT THE MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES ALONG A ROUTE

SLIDE 16-2

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

- ENSURE SOLDIERS KNOW THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- USE MINIMUM INTRUSION NECESSARY
- HAVE SEPARATE SEARCH AND ASSAULT ELEMENTS
- ALLOW A VEHICLE ESCAPE ROUTE, BUT HAVE A PLAN TO THEN DESTROY THE VEHICLE
- CONSIDER THREAT, MISSION, AND TERRAIN WHEN SELECTING LOCATION
- LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE OPERATION
- EMPLOY TANKS AT CHECKPOINTS
- IF IN TASK ORGANIZATION, INCLUDE MPs IN PLANNING AND EXECUTION

SLIDE 16-3

CHECKPOINT PLANNING

- CHECKPOINTS REQUIRE ENOUGH SOLDIERS TO PREVENT AMBUSH AND SURPRISE
- CHECKPOINTS REQUIRE EMPLACING AND CONCEALING ONE ELEMENT OF THE FORCE AWAY FROM THE CHECKPOINT TO PREVENT ESCAPES
- CHECKPOINT PERSONNEL SEARCH VEHICLES, DRIVERS, CARGOS, AND PASSENGERS
- CHECKPOINTS INCLUDE A REST PLAN; RESTING SOLDIERS ARE A RESERVE FORCE


SLIDE 16-4


SITE SELECTION

- CONCEALMENT IS DESIRABLE, BUT OFTEN IMPOSSIBLE
- LOCATION SHOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR A PERSON TO TURN BACK OR REVERSE A VEHICLE WITHOUT BEING OBSERVED
- CULVERTS, BRIDGES, OR DEEP CUTS
- POSITIONS BEYOND SHARP CURVES DO NOT LET THE DRIVER SEE THE CHECKPOINT IN TIME TO AVOID INSPECTION; SAFETY MAY BE AN OVERRIDING FACTOR
- AREAS WITH SCARCE ROAD NETWORKS ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHECKPOINTS


SLIDE 16-5

PHYSICAL LAYOUT





SLIDE 16-6


STATIC SECURITY POST
SLIDE 16-7
PEDESTRIAN LANES
WSC PSN
MP VEH
STRAGGLER/ DETAINEE HOLDING AREA
EPW HOLDING AREA
TURNING BARRIER
VEHICLE LANE
VEHICLE SEARCH / HOLDING AREA
MAINTENANCE AREA
COMMAND POST w/OE-254
CASUALTY COLLECTION AREA w/FLA
MAINTENANCE HOLDING AREA
LEGEND
FEMALE SEARCH
MALE SEARCH

SIGNS

- PORTABLE SIGNS IN THE NATIVE LANGUAGE AND ENGLISH SHOULD BE AVAILABLE
- SIGNS SHOULD DENOTE SPEED LIMIT OF APPROACH, VEHICLE SEARCH AREA, VEHICLE PARKING AREA, MALE AND FEMALE SEARCH AREAS, AND DISMOUNT POINT

SLIDE 16-8


SPECIAL EQUIPMENT


- LIGHTING FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS
- COMMUNICATION
- BARBED WIRE
- ADEQUATE FIREPOWER (INCLUDE SHOTGUNS AND PISTOLS)
- BULLHORNS
- DOGS
- MIRRORS
- RESTRAINTS (FLEXIBLE CUFFS)

SLIDE 16-9

OBSTACLES


OBSTACLES SHOULD BE EMPLACED AT AN OBLIQUE ACROSS A ROAD SO THAT TRAFFIC IS FUNNELED INTO A SINGLE LANE





SLIDE 16-10


PASSIVE VEHICLE BARRIER



MAXIMUM SPEEDS FOR VEHICLES OF DIFFERENT WEIGHTS THAT SELECTED OBSTACLES CAN WITHSTAND.

SLIDE 16-11

ACTIVE VEHICLE BARRIER



MAXIMUM SPEEDS FOR VEHICLES OF DIFFERENT WEIGHTS THAT SELECTED OBSTACLES CAN WITHSTAND.

SLIDE 16-12

HASTY CHECKPOINT

- HIGHLY MOBILE
- QUICKLY POSITIONED IN A TOWN OR IN THE OPEN COUNTRY
- LOCATED TO ACHIEVE QUICK SUCCESS

SLIDE 16-13

DELIBERATE CHECKPOINTS

- POSITIONED IN A TOWN OR IN THE OPEN COUNTRY, OFTEN ON A MAIN ROAD
- USEFUL DETERRENT TO UNLAWFUL MOVEMENT

SLIDE 16-14

FLYING CHECKPOINT

- TYPE OF HASTY CHECKPOINT USED BY 3D BATTALION, 325TH INFANTRY DURING OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
- MOBILE UNITS OF MOUNTED INFANTRY, COMBAT ENGINEERS, AND TOW VEHICLES MOVED TO KEY INTERSECTIONS WHERE ARMED IRAQI OR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS WERE KNOWN TO OPERATE
- THE MOBILE UNITS SET UP HASTY ROADBLOCKS TO DISRUPT UNWANTED ACTIVITY

SLIDE 16 - 15

FLYING CHECKPOINT CONSIDERATIONS

- SOLDIERS TO SEARCH AND DETAIN INTRUDERS
- SIZABLE ELEMENT TO OVERWATCH THE HASTY CHECKPOINT
- AIR COVER ON STATION
- MOBILE MORTAR SUPPORT
- QUICK REINFORCEMENT OF TOW AND INFANTRY CARRIERS THAT COULD EXTRACT OR REINFORCE THE CHECKPOINT

SLIDE 16-16

ORGANIZATION

- HEADQUARTERS OR CONTROL ELEMENT
- SECURITY ELEMENT
- SEARCH ELEMENT
- INTERROGATION ELEMENT
- ASSAULT ELEMENT

SLIDE 16-17

HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT

- IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHECKPOINT
- EXERCISES COMMAND AND CONTROL
- MAINTAINS COMMUNICATION WITH SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

SECURITY ELEMENT

- CONTAINS AT LEAST A 2-MAN TEAM
- PROVIDES EARLY WARNING TO THE SEARCH AND ASSAULT ELEMENTS
- WATCHES FOR AND REPORTS SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
- MONITORS TRAFFIC FLOW UP TO AND THROUGH THE CHECKPOINT

SLIDE 16-19

SEARCH ELEMENT

- HALTS VEHICLES AT CHECKPOINT
- GUIDES VEHICLES TO DESIGNATED SEARCH POINT
- CONDUCTS PRESCRIBED PERSONNEL AND VEHICLE CHECKS
- DIRECTS CLEARED VEHICLES ON THROUGH CHECKPOINT
- KEEPS ASSAULT ELEMENT INFORMED

SLIDE 16-20

MP MOBILE AREA SECURITY PATROL ELEMENT

- CONDUCTS, ASSISTS, AND MAINTAINS SURVEILLANCE
- PROVIDES EARLY WARNING OUTSIDE IMMEDIATE CHECKPOINT AREA
- IMPEDES AND HARASSES THE ENEMY
- DESTROYS ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS (WITHIN MP CAPABILITY)

SLIDE 6-21

SEARCHING

- ONE SUBELEMENT MAINTAINS LOCAL SECURITY AROUND ENTIRE SEARCH ELEMENT
- VEHICLES ARE DIRECTED ONE AT A TIME INTO THE SEARCH AREA
- SEARCHERS APPROACH A VEHICLE AT AN ANGLE FROM THE REAR
- WHILE TWO SOLDIERS SEARCH A VEHICLE, TWO MORE SOLDIERS PROVIDE COVER FROM THE REAR AND FLANK OF THE VEHICLE
- SEARCHERS ARE ARMED WITH PISTOLS INSTEAD OF RIFLES TO ALLOW MANEUVERABILITY

SEARCHING A VEHICLE

- ALL OCCUPANTS GET OUT AND STAND CLEAR
- DRIVER OBSERVES SEARCH
- SEARCHER IS ALWAYS COVERED BY AN ASSISTANT
- SEARCHERS ARE POLITE AND CONSIDERATE
- VEHICLES OCCUPANTS CAN BE SEARCHED SIMULTANEOUSLY

SLIDE 16-23

INTERROGATION ELEMENT

- CONDUCTS DETAILED SEARCH OF PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES DEEMED SUSPICIOUS BY SEARCH ELEMENT
- IS ADJACENT TO BUT ISOLATED FROM SEARCH ELEMENT (OUT OF VIEW OF MEDIA AND ONLOOKERS)
- HAS TWO SOLDIERS PROVIDE COVER, TWO SOLDIERS SEARCH AND INTERROGATE
- INCLUDES MPs, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, ORDNANCE EXPERTS, AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF POSSIBLE

ASSAULT ELEMENT

- ENGAGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ANY ELEMENT THAT HAS FORCED ITS WAY PAST THE SEARCH ELEMENT
- LOCATES IN FORTIFIED POSITIONS BEHIND COMMAND-DETONATED OBSTACLES
- HAS HEAVY AUTOMATIC AND ANTITANK WEAPONS
- HAS CLEAR FOCUS ON COMBAT MISSION
- KNOWS CHECK-FIRE SIGNALS

SLIDE 16-25


HEAVY/LIGHT CONSIDERATIONS FOR CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

- TANKS AND BFVs HAVE SUPERIOR OPTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS THAT MAKE THEM IDEAL AS PART OF THE SECURITY AND HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT
- TANKS AND BFVs HAVE EXCELLENT PROTECTION AND FIREPOWER THAT MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE AS THE ASSAULT ELEMENT
- TANKS AND BFVs HAVE RAPID MOBILITY (ON- AND OFF-ROAD) THAT MAKE THEM USEFUL AS A RESERVE AND REACTION FORCE TO REINFORCE A THREATENED CHECKPOINT (THIS MOBILITY MAY BE RESTRICTED BY OBSTACLES AND WEATHER)
- MECHANIZED UNITS CAN CONSTITUTE HASTY (FLYING) CHECKPOINTS
- TRACKED VEHICLES CAN CARRY LARGE AMOUNTS OF CLASS IV SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY BARRIER MATERIALS. THEIR HAULING CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED WHEN THEY TOW TRAILERS
- TANKS AND BFVs CAN ACT AS ROADBLOCK AND VEHICLE BARRIERS AT HASTY (FLYING) CHECKPOINTS
- CHECKPOINT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MUST INCLUDE INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF TANK AND BFV WEAPON SYSTEMS

SLIDE 16-26

TEMPORARY CHECKPOINT

A–COMBAT VEHICLES TO SLOW AND CANALIZE TRAFFIC
B–SENTRY TO STOP APPROACHING VEHICLES
C–COVERING SENTRY
D–COMMANDER OF CHECKPOINT
E–SEARCHER
F–SIGNALLLER
G–SECTION SECOND IN COMMAND
H–RESERVE



SLIDE 16-27

CHECKPOINT ISSUES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

SITUATION 1: GUNS PLACED IN AUTOMOBILE GAS TANKS; HEARSES AND AMBULANCES LOADED WITH WEAPONS INSTEAD OF BODIES

UNITED STATES RESPONSE: VIGOROUS SEARCHES OF ALL VEHICLES

SITUATION 2: REBELS CREATED A DIVERSION OR MOUNTED A SNIPER ATTACK TO ALLOW VEHICLES TO RUN THROUGH A ROADBLOCK

UNITED STATES RESPONSE: MOBILE EMERGENCY BARRICADES WERE EMPLACED DURING THE DISRUPTION TO HALT SPEEDING VEHICLES AND OCCASIONALLY FIRED M79 GRENADES ACROSS THE VEHICLES' PATH

SITUATION 3: WOMEN WEARING LOOSE FITTING DRESSES OR MATERNITY CLOTHES SMUGGLED CONTRABAND THROUGH THE CHECKPOINTS; FEMALE INSPECTORS WERE NOT AVAILABLE

UNITED STATES RESPONSE: MINE DETECTORS WERE USED TO SEARCH WOMEN

SITUATION 4: REBELS TRIED TO BYPASS CHECKPOINTS BY USING THE SEWER SYSTEM

UNITED STATES RESPONSE: SEWERS WERE RECONNOITERED AND ENGINEERS EMPLACED OBSTACLES. SOLDIERS ABOVE GROUND REMOVED MANHOLE COVERS, LOWERED LIGHTS ON WIRES AND MAINTAINED 24-HOUR SURVEILLANCE

SLIDE 16-28

LESSON 17. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT

SLIDE 17-1. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

ARSOF consists of special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations. They have a wide range of skills that encompass the entire spectrum of military operations. They are especially well suited for stability and support operations. Their organization, training, and force packages (as well as their tasking procedures) do not change in this environment. An independent brigade operating in a stability and support operations environment, such as peace enforcement, has assets available that it normally does not have. One of these assets may be ARSOF.

SLIDE 17-2. SPECIAL FORCES ROLE IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Special forces (SF) have been involved in stability and support operations for more than 40 years. Organized in small, independent operational detachments, SF are prepared to conduct special operations in areas that are normally denied to conventional forces due to political, tactical, environmental, or geographical constraints. Their special training is ideal in these operations. Language training, interpersonal skills, level of maturity, and an area awareness contribute to their value in stability and support operations, particularly in terms of theater and host nation familiarization.

SLIDE 17-3. SPECIAL FORCES IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Some SF capabilities include items such as initial assessments, close air support (CAS), ground truth report, information gathering, hostage rescue, coalition support, liaison, and surgical strike operations. They are ideal at providing liaison for coalition forces and nonmilitary agencies, due to their language and cultural expertise. Special forces are especially suited to conduct initial assessments for the deploying force. Due to their unique training, they can provide cultural, medical, engineering, civil-military operations, intelligence, tactical, communications, and environmental analysis of the area. This analysis assists in the planning assessment for both the task force organization and deployment package. Special forces missions are special reconnaissance and direct action. Direct-action includes hostage rescue and counterterrorism and combat search and rescue. Special forces are also well suited for liaison between the general-purpose force and the host nation or coalition force, and they can aid handoff procedures.

SLIDE 17-4. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION

SOF aviation normally provides lift, strike, information gathering, and command and control capabilities for the deployed ARSOF.

SLIDE 17-5. RANGERS

Rangers can provide surgical strike capability on a larger scale than SF. They are also rapidly deployable into denied areas.

SLIDE 17-6. LINKING GENERAL-PURPOSE FORCES AND ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Command and control (OPCON) of ARSOF elements is normally exercised by the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander through a special operations command and control element (SOCCE). The SOCCE comes with its own communications package and may interface not only with ARSOF, but joint SOF assets as well. They normally support a general-purpose force in a tactical control role and remain under control of the ARSOF mission planning agent.

SLIDE 17-7. RECEIPT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT

These assets are normally provided by the joint task force without having to be requested, based on the theater commander in chief's analysis of the situation. Likely situations that require special operations forces assets involve infiltration and exfiltration corridors, fire support integration, forward area resupply points, emergency resupply points, and interrogation. If SF or ranger assets are not initially offered, but the unit's analysis identifies a possible need for them, then a nomination process must be initiated. This is done by identifying the possible need through the division to the special operations coordination element (SOCOORD) at corps. The SOCCE is responsible for conducting a mission analysis to determine if an SOCCE is the appropriate element. If so, they recommend to the corps commander that a request be forwarded for these assets. This request goes through the theater commander in chief. If it is determined that this is an appropriate ARSOF tasking, the theater SOC will make the assets available if they are in theater or will request required assets from US Special Operations Command. SOCCE or SOCOORD integration is critical.

SLIDE 17-8. CIVIL AFFAIRS

Civil affairs are *any* activities that involve a military relationship with civilians in an area of operation, including direct military involvement in a foreign civilian government. (Joint Publication 3-57.)

SLIDE 17-9. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

Civil-military operations are those activities conducted by units during military operations that enhance the military effectiveness of the operation, support national objectives, and reduce the negative aspects of military operations on the civilian populace in an area of operation. (Joint Publications 3-57.)

SLIDE 17-10. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

Civil-military operations include the following mission activities:

- Populace and resources control.
- Foreign nation support.
- Humanitarian support.
- Military civic action.
- Civil defense.

During peace enforcement operations, brigades and battalions conduct or participate in populace and resources control, humanitarian assistance, and military civic action activities.

a. *Populace and resources control* programs include establishing curfews, movement restrictions, licensing, ration controls, and inspection of facilities. They also include

dislocated civilian operations and noncombatant evacuation operations. These last two operations require extensive planning and are often manpower- and equipment-intensive.

b. *Humanitarian assistance* programs reduce the impact of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. US forces normally conduct humanitarian assistance to augment the programs and initiatives of the host nation and of international relief organizations (nongovernment organizations and private voluntary organizations).

c. *Military civic action* projects gain popular support for the government and the military. Military civic action employs predominantly local forces as the work force and is planned as short-term projects. US forces may support mitigating military civic action projects associated with humanitarian assistance operations. These projects usually involve activities in the fields of education, public health, agriculture, public works, and basic construction.

The staff officer responsible for planning and coordinating civil affairs and civil-military operations is the S5. The ranger regiment is authorized S5s at both the battalion and regiment staff levels. Some separate brigades are authorized S5s on the brigade staff but not at the battalion staff level. The rest of the brigades and battalions of the Army generally are not authorized this staff position. Often, S5 functions are additional duty responsibilities of the S1, S4, or other staff officer. However, the absence of a formal staff position does not relieve the commander and the unit of the responsibility to plan and conduct civil-military operations.

In addition to planning, civil-military operations generally require organization, manpower, materials, and equipment. These are the basic inherent capabilities brigades and battalions bring to peace enforcement operations. Once the mission is identified, the commander must weigh his military requirements with his civil-military requirements and determine the appropriate allocation of forces. Civil-military operations require just as much if not more emphasis as military operations.

SLIDE 17-11. CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECT-SUPPORT TEAM FUNCTIONS

If an S5 section is not an organic part of the TOE, brigades will generally have a civil affairs direct-support team attached to them to provide S5 staff capabilities. The members of this direct-support team are civil affairs generalists who are part of the civil affairs battalion (general-purpose) that supports the division. They are trained to provide the following functions:

Recommending command policy and guidance concerning the conduct of military units toward civilians in the area of operations—for example, rules of engagement, populace and resource control measures, dislocated civilian operations, humanitarian assistance, military civic action projects, and the purchase of local goods and services.

Identifying facilities, supplies, labor, and other material resources available from the local civil sector to support military operations.

Planning, coordinating, and supervising dislocated civilian operations and other populace and resources control measures to minimize local population interference with military operations. This includes coordination with civil agencies or authorities and with military units who will conduct the dislocated civilian plan and/or implement the populace and resources control measures.

Supporting and coordinating humanitarian and disaster relief in concert with DOD elements, other US government agencies, foreign or host nation authorities, and international

relief organizations to reduce serious threat to health, life, and property, and to project positive US influence in the area of operations.

Assisting commanders in planning and coordinating noncombatant evacuation operations, involving other DOD elements, US government agencies, and foreign or host nation authorities in receiving, screening, and relocating threatened civilians.

Coordinating civil and/or indigenous resources support to force and rear-area protection plans.

Coordinating military support to civil defense and civic action projects (for example, medical, engineer) in the area of operations.

Observing and analyzing, with the psychological operations officer, trends and public opinion; planning positive and continuing community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding and support of military operations.

If the brigade is the senior Army element of a joint task force, the commander should request a civil affairs tactical planning team. This team assists in the initial civil affairs planning for the mission and identifies additional civil affairs assets, such as one or more civil affairs direct-support teams and/or specialist teams, needed to support the mission.

SLIDE 17-12. RECEIPT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT

If the requirement for civil affairs support to brigade and below has not been identified during the planning process of the division or joint task force conducting the peace enforcement operation, this is the process to obtain civil affairs support:

a. The request for civil affairs support goes through the division the same as any request for other nonorganic requirement. The division G5 participates in the validation process with the division G3, who forwards the request to corps. Ultimately, the requirement ends up at the US Army Special Operations Command, which tasks the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) for the assets. After validating the requirement, USACAPOC tasks subordinate civil affairs units oriented to the region in which the operation is taking place. This ensures that the civil affairs personnel are familiar with the culture, language, and environment of the operational area.

b. Depending on METT-T, the unit may receive support from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), the Army's only Active Component civil affairs unit (or from any of the 38 civil affairs units in the Reserve Component) or a combination of both. Oftentimes, the 96th CAB (A) is used as a "quick fix" to provide assessments or other general civil affairs support until the appropriate specialist teams from the reserves are activated and deployed.

SLIDE 17-13. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PSYOP units require no special training for peace enforcement, as the techniques are consistent with all other missions. PSYOP derives its major impact from being an integral, synergistic part of the total operation. It is not a substitute for force. Employment of PSYOP as an active ingredient or an "offensive" weapons system increases the chances of success in military operations. For example, feints, ruses, military demonstrations, or show of force in either peacetime or war have been integral parts of military operations throughout history. In addition, all military operations have a psychological effect on their participants (willing and otherwise), observers, and sponsors. Nowhere is this truer than in peace enforcement. Psychological operations may be defined as planned programs of products and actions that *channel target audience behavior* in support of national policy and the commander's intent.

SLIDE 17-14. MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Military PSYOP are a supplementary "weapons system" that can increase the relative combat power of friendly forces and adversely affect the combat power of the opponent. This may be accomplished by attacking the identified vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of opposing forces through a planned and coordinated PSYOP campaign, PSYOP units develop and coordinate the employment of programs of products in concert with selected political, economic, or military actions. They are consistent with national policy, integrated with strategy and tactics, and are essentially an offensive weapon aimed at the mind of man to achieve attitudinal and behavioral change in a manner favorable to a friendly cause. PSYOP require consistent cohesive national policy for best results and constant presence in the objective area. Additionally, PSYOP may be used to counter or neutralize opponent propaganda.

Psychological operations create in neutral, friendly, or hostile foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or desired behavior that supports the achievement of national objectives and the military mission. In this endeavor, PSYOP influence not only policy and decisions but also the ability to govern, the ability to command, the will to fight, the will to obey, and the will to support.

SLIDE 17-15. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

The main target audiences of PSYOP in peace enforcement are the belligerent military forces, including both regular and irregular formations; key communicators or people who have influence among their community, such as the clergy, clan leaders, and media personalities; participants or other people in the operational area; and observers, such as neutral parties not directly involved in hostilities. (An example is nongovernmental organization relief workers).

SLIDE 17-16. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Examples of probable PSYOP objectives for a peace enforcement operation include—

- Diminishing the belligerent force's will to fight
- Providing alternatives to continued combat.
- Projecting a favorable image of US operations.
- Facilitating cooperation in the US area of responsibility.
- Obtaining the cooperation of our allies and neutral parties in achieving US objectives.
- Affecting belligerent decisions by influencing their perception of the situation (command and control warfare).
- Winning the information war by getting our message to our target audiences effectively and discrediting the messages of our opponent (gain the information high ground).
- Providing a channel for the commander to project his intent to audiences in the area of operations.
- Minimizing US casualties and saving lives.

SLIDE 17-17. SAMPLE BRIGADE TASK FORCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AUGMENTATION

The brigade task force can expect PSYOP augmentation. Here is a sample joint task force where the Army component is a brigade task force. As the Army force, the brigade exercises command (less OPCON) of a PSYOP task force. The PSYOP task force is OPCON to the joint task force. The PSYOP task force is a subcomponent of the joint task force and works for the joint task force commander. The brigade receives a brigade PSYOP support element. As a minimum, this consists of a three- to four-man element similar to a fire-support element for PSYOP. It will control the operations of three to five mounted tactical PSYOP teams equipped with a variety of loudspeakers and other audiovisual equipment.

SLIDE 17-18 TYPICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

The PSYOP task force is organized based on mission requirements. It usually consists of elements of a regional PSYOP battalion reinforced with other PSYOP assets. These may include Reserve Component enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee support units, print assets, radio and television broadcast platforms, and tactical assets that are attached to the maneuver force. A PSYOP task force can range from 25 to 250 personnel.

SLIDE 17-19. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

In PSYOP planning, the overall PSYOP campaign is developed by the regional commander in chief. That plan is approved by the National Command Authority, and approval of products and actions is normally delegated to the theater or joint task force commander in chief. Legal considerations are worked out at the theater/joint task force level. PSYOP planning and execution must begin early in the mission planning process. H-hour is too late. Commanders execute PSYOP, and planning responsibility is a G3/S3 function (the PSYOP support element commander needs the same access to the S3 as the fire support officer has. Not just leaflets and loudspeakers, PSYOP is employment of forces, too. PSYOP unit transportation requirements must also be considered in predeployment movement planning because all Active Component PSYOP is at Fort Bragg.

SLIDE 17-20. TARGETING PROCESS EXAMPLE

Leaflet targets can be nominated through two chains. The first is through the close air support and fire support system. Leaders request a leaflet air strike on a target using the same procedures for requesting immediate close air support. The maneuver commander determines the target priority; the joint targeting board determines how it will be served. The air component commander determines who will service it.

SLIDE 17-21. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAUTIONS

PSYOP is a force multiplier. It cannot replace soldiers. Used properly, it can assist in maximizing forces. Deeds must match words. PSYOP must be integrated into the overall effort, and the overall effort should support the PSYOP theme. If the joint task force says one thing but does another, the trust of the target audience will be lost. To ensure this does not happen, the joint task force and Army force public affairs officers must coordinate with the PSYOP task force to ensure consistency and continuity between press releases and the approved PSYOP themes. For PSYOP to be effective, national policy must be a clear and cohesive. The PSYOP campaign is built on that policy. When there is no clear or cohesive US national policy in a military operation, PSYOP will be ineffective. As the executor of the

national will, the commander must know what the US national policy is. In operations such as peace enforcement, where every act can have far-reaching consequences, every leader should know why the US is there. Tactical PSYOP teams are similar to ground surveillance radar teams where support is concerned. They are attached to the maneuver unit, and their requirements include rations, fuel, and common maintenance support. They should be employed with maneuver elements for mutual support.

SLIDE 17-22. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS LIMITATIONS

US commanders can conduct PSYOP only in support of US national objectives. They can support United Nations, other multinational organizations, allied states, or coalition partners only in those areas where their objectives overlap US national objectives. Cultural mores, security, and media problems must also be considered. Can the target audience be reached? Do they have televisions and radios? Can they read? Is our equipment operational? Are there sufficient supplies such as paper and ink?

Another important consideration is personnel requirements and equipment. Is there sufficient airlift and sealift allocated for the assets necessary to do the mission? PSYOP units are small in terms of manpower; however, radio, television, and print equipment may require movement to the area of operations if local assets are not available. PSYOP personnel are in high demand because there is only one Active Component PSYOP group, and other contingencies may overtax available resources.

SLIDE 17-23. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

The principles of PSYOP, like the principles of war, are not set in concrete.

a. PSYOP must be consistent with national policy.

b. PSYOP must be timely.

c. PSYOP must empathize with the target audience.

d. Soldiers must avoid an attitude of superiority.

e. PSYOP must address the needs perceived as most important by the target audience. In essence, target the heart first and then the mind. The messages should be compatible.

f. The message or product must be kept simple to avoid misinterpretation. The information and facts must be credible, and they must be based on timely and accurate information supported by proof. Honesty is the only policy. The positive should be emphasized and the negative minimized.

g. PSYOP must offer a reasonable alternative course of action. The target's perspective must be considered: "Why should I do what this product message tells me to do?"

h. PSYOP seeks to achieve the goal of modifying behavior.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for T&EO, Employ Psychological Operations.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

- SPECIAL FORCES
- RANGERS
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION
- CIVIL AFFAIRS
- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

SLIDE 17-1

SPECIAL FORCES ROLE IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

40 YEARS OF REAL-WORLD EXPERIENCE:

- LANGUAGE TRAINING
- INTERPERSONAL SKILLS
- CULTURAL AWARENESS
- REGIONAL ORIENTATION
- IN-COUNTRY EXPERIENCE

SLIDE 17-2

SPECIAL FORCES IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

INITIAL ASSESSMENT

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

INFORMATION GATHERING

HOSTAGE RESCUE

COALITION SUPPORT

LIAISON

GROUND TRUTH

SEARCH AND RESCUE

SLIDE 17-3

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AVIATION

SUPPORT TO ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES—

- INSERT, RESUPPLY, AND EXTRACT PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES IN DENIED AREAS
- MEDICAL EVACUATION
- ARMED RECONNAISSANCE
- LIMITED STRIKE/ATTACK
- COMMAND AND CONTROL


SLIDE 17-4

RANGERS

- RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE
- ESTABLISH CREDIBLE AMERICAN PRESENCE
- INSERT AND EXTRACT BY LAND, SEA, OR AIR
- CONDUCT DIRECT-ACTION OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT INFANTRY OPERATIONS

SLIDE 17-5


LINKING GENERAL-PURPOSE FORCES AND ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES



DEPLOYED SOF

SLIDE 17-6

RECEIPT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES SUPPORT



SLIDE 17-7

CIVIL AFFAIRS

- RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY FORCES, CIVIL AUTHORITIES, AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION
- FACILITATE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
- INCLUDE INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS NORMALLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
- OCCUR BEFORE, DURING, OR SUBSEQUENT TO OTHER MILITARY ACTIONS
- IF DIRECTED, OCCUR IN THE ABSENCE OF OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS

SLIDE 17-8

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

- PLANNED ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
- ENHANCE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY FORCES, CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES, AND THE POPULATION
- PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAVORABLE EMOTIONS, ATTITUDES, OR BEHAVIOR IN NEUTRAL, FRIENDLY, OR HOSTILE GROUPS

SLIDE 17-9

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

- POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL
- FOREIGN NATION SUPPORT
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
- MILITARY CIVIL ACTION
- CIVIL DEFENSE


SLIDE 17-10

CIVIL AFFAIRS DIRECT-SUPPORT TEAM FUNCTIONS

- RECOMMEND COMMAND POLICY AND GUIDANCE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
- IDENTIFY RESOURCES FROM LOCAL CIVIL SECTOR
- PLAN, COORDINATE, AND SUPERVISE CIVIL DEFENSE OPERATIONS AND OTHER POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL MEASURES
- SUPPORT AND COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF
- ASSIST IN PLANNING NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS
- COORDINATE MILITARY SUPPORT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE AND CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS
- OBSERVE AND ANALYZE TRENDS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

SLIDE 17-11

RECEIPT OF CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT



SLIDE 17-12

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

ARE PLANNED PROGRAMS (PRODUCTS AND ACTIONS) THAT CHANNEL FOREIGN TARGET AUDIENCE BEHAVIOR IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES' NATIONAL OBJECTIVES* AND THE COMMANDER'S INTENT

*UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ONLY SUPPORTS UNITED NATIONS, MULTINATIONAL, AND OTHER OBJECTIVES WHERE THEY OVERLAP WITH UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES.

SLIDE 17-13

MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

- ARE SUPPLEMENTARY WEAPONS SYSTEMS
- COORDINATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR MILITARY ACTIONS
- PROVIDE AN OFFENSIVE WEAPON AIMED AT THE MIND OF MAN
- ARE CONSISTENT AND INTEGRATED WITH NATIONAL POLICY, STRATEGY, AND TACTICS
- REQUIRE CONSISTENT COHESIVE NATIONAL POLICY FOR BEST RESULTS
- REQUIRE CONSTANT PRESENCE IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA
- MAY BE USED TO COUNTER OPPONENT PROPAGANDA

SLIDE 17-14

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

TARGET AUDIENCES ARE—

- BELLIGERENT MILITARY FORCE
- KEY COMMUNICATORS AND PARTICIPANTS
- OBSERVERS IN THE OPERATIONAL AREA


SLIDE 17-15

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT

- TARGET BELLIGERENT FORCES TO DIMINISH MORALE OR WILL TO RESIST
- GIVE BELLIGERENT FORCES AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUED CONFLICT
- PROJECT A FAVORABLE IMAGE OF UNITED STATES' OPERATIONS
- FACILITATE COOPERATION AND CONTROL IN UNITED STATES' ZONE OF OPERATIONS
- OBTAIN COOPERATION OF ALLIES AND COALITION MEMBERS AND NEUTRALS IN ACHIEVING UNITED STATES' OBJECTIVES
- GAIN CONTROL OF BELLIGERENT FORCES DECISION-MAKING CYCLE (COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE)
- WIN THE INFORMATION WAR
- PROJECT THE UNITED STATES COMMANDER'S INTENT TO FRIENDLY, NEUTRAL, AND HOSTILE AUDIENCES (TRUTH PROJECTION)
- MINIMIZE CASUALTIES AND SAVE AMERICAN LIVES


SLIDE 17-16

SAMPLE BRIGADE TASK FORCE PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AUGMENTATION



SLIDE 17-17

TYPICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE




SLIDE 17-18

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- THE OVERALL PSYOP CAMPAIGN IS DEVELOPED BY THE REGIONAL COMMANDER IN CHIEF. THAT PLAN IS APPROVED BY THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY. APPROVAL OF PRODUCTS AND ACTIONS IS NORMALLY DELEGATED TO THE THEATER COMMANDER IN CHIEF OR JTF COMMANDER.
- LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE WORKED OUT AT THE THEATER/JTF LEVEL.
- PSYOP PLANNING AND EXECUTION MUST BEGIN EARLY IN THE MISSION PLANNING PROCESS. IT IS TOO LATE AT H-HOUR.
- COMMANDERS EXECUTE PSYOP. PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY IS A G3/S3 FUNCTION.
- PSYOP IS NOT JUST LEAFLETS AND LOUDSPEAKERS; EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES IS PSYOP TOO.
- PSYOP UNIT TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENTS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN PRE-DEPLOYMENT MOVEMENT PLANNING (ALL AC PSYOP ARE AT FT BRAGG).

SLIDE 17-19


TARGETING PROCESS EXAMPLE
SLIDE 17-20
POTF
BPSE
TPT
Normally under the command less OPCON of the AFFOR and OPCON to the JTF
Leaflet Mission Request
(C)
(C)
(C)
Leaflet Target Nomination
(D)
(D)
ATTACHED
ATTACHED
FSE
ALO/TALO
FSCOORD
TACP
JTF
J3
JOINT TARGET BOARD
Leaflet Mission Tasking
WING
SQUADRON
TARGET

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CAUTIONS

- PSYOP IS ONLY A FORCE MULTIPLIER
- DEEDS MUST MATCH WORDS
- FOR PSYOP TO BE EFFECTIVE, THERE MUST BE A NATIONAL POLICY. TO EXECUTE IT, THE COMMANDER NEEDS TO KNOW WHAT IT IS DOWN TO PLATOON LEVEL.
- FOR PSYOP TO BE EFFECTIVE, THE COMMANDER HAS TO SUPPORT THE TACTICAL PSYOP TEAMS (FOR EXAMPLE, RATIONS, FUEL, SECURITY WHILE EMPLOYED). THE TACTICAL PSYOP TEAM IS SIMILAR TO A GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR TEAM.

SLIDE 17-21

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS LIMITATIONS

- POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS
- CULTURAL MORES
- SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
- MEDIA PROBLEMS
- PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

SLIDE 17-22

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

- BE CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL POLICY
- BE TIMELY (CONSIDER PRODUCT LIFE SPAN)
- EMPATHIZE; NOT SYMPATHIZE
- AVOID AN ATTITUDE OF SUPERIORITY
- ADDRESS NEEDS THAT THE TARGET AUDIENCE PERCEIVES AS IMPORTANT
- TARGET THE HEART FIRST, THEN THE MIND
- BE SIMPLE (TO AVOID MISINTERPRETATION)
- USE CREDIBLE INFORMATION AND FACTS
- EMPHASIZE THE POSITIVE; MINIMIZE THE NEGATIVE
- OFFER ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
- ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF MODIFYING BEHAVIOR

SLIDE 17-23

SLIDE 18-1. CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

In many stability and support operations situations, the military operation on urbanized terrain techniques in FM 90-10-1 will be sufficient to accomplish the mission. These serve as a basis for all military operations on urbanized terrain actions. However in some cases, METT-T may force the unit to use close quarters combat techniques. The 10th Mountain Division found this to be the case in Somalia. Close quarters combat requires extensive training using the crawl-walk-run method. This lesson provides close quarters combat familiarization for a four-man clearing team. Based on it, the unit can decide if it wants to invest the time and resources required to achieve close quarters proficiency.

SLIDE 18-2. REFLEXIVE SHOOTING

Reflexive shooting includes the techniques of stance, aim, double tap, and immediate action.

SLIDE 18-3. STANCE

The feet should be about shoulder width apart. The toes should be pointed straight to the front (direction of movement). The firing side foot is slightly staggered to the rear of the nonfiring foot. Knees are slightly bent. The upper body leans slightly forward. Shoulders are squared. The weapon is held with the buttstock in the pocket of the shoulder.

- *Low-carry technique.* The buttstock of the weapon is placed in the pocket of the shoulder. The barrel of the weapon is pointed down at the ground at a 45-degree angle. This technique is safest, and it is recommended for use by the clearing team once inside the room.
- *High-carry technique.* The buttstock of the weapon is held in the armpit. The barrel is pointed slightly up and the front sight post in the peripheral vision of the soldier. The soldier pushes out on the buttstock to assume the firing position. This method is best suited for the lineup outside of the door.

SLIDE 18-4. AIM

Soldiers use the slow-aim fire, rapid-aim fire, aimed quick kill, or instinctive fire techniques when aiming.

Slow-aim fire technique is the most desirable. It consists of using a good sight picture when time permits. It is used mainly for distant engagements.

Rapid-aim fire (flash sight picture) technique features an imperfect sight picture where windage is critical and elevation is of lesser importance. When the front sight post is in line with the target, the soldier squeezes the trigger. It is used from 0 to 25 meters and at a fast rate of fire.

Aimed quick kill technique consists of placing the front sight post flush on top of the rear peep sight. It is used for quick shots from 0 to 11 meters. Again, windage is important, elevation is not critical in relation to the target.

Instinctive fire technique is the least desirable. The soldier focuses on the target and points the weapon in the general direction using muscle memory to fire.

SLIDE 18-5. DOUBLE TAP

There is a natural arc of the front sight post after the round is fired and the recoil kicks in. The soldier lets the barrel go with this arc and immediately brings the front sight post back on target and takes a second shot. The soldier does not fight the recoil. In combat, soldiers shoot until the enemy goes down. For multiple targets, each target should receive a double tap. After all targets are engaged, soldiers engage the targets again as needed.

SLIDE 18-6. IMMEDIATE ACTION

If a malfunction occurs during close quarters combat training and the soldier is in the doorway, he must first clear the door so that he will not interrupt the flow into the room. Once he is sure he has cleared the doorway, the soldier can kneel on one knee to conduct immediate action. Once the malfunction is cleared, he does not stand up to engage targets. Precious seconds can be saved by continuing to engage targets while on one knee. When other members of the team see a firer on one knee, they automatically clear his sector of fire. As in any other military operation, the assault that takes place in a confined space must be planned and executed with care. The principles and fundamentals of close quarters combat and clearing must be closely observed during this type of operation for it to be successful. Rehearsals on how to move through a room or building, getting accustomed to the feel of it, and experiencing the problems associated with it, help soldiers to be prepared to conduct this type of operation. Close quarters combat must be practiced over and over again, just as immediate action drills are repeated again and again. Close quarters combat SMEs are responsible for conveying this information, and unit commanders are responsible for the unit reaching the desired level of proficiency.

SLIDE 18-7. PRINCIPLES OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

The three principles of close quarters combat are surprise, speed, and violence of action.

Surprise is the key to the assault. The element of surprise ensures that the clearing team has the advantage of preparedness before entering a room. Not only does this benefit the clearing team, it startles and throws the enemy off guard.

Speed in close quarters combat often acts as security, just as in patrolling. It enables the clearing team to use the first few vital "surprise seconds" to their maximum potential. Speed of movement is best described as a "careful hurry."

Violence of action can be described as a sudden and explosive force that eliminates the threat with the least chance of compromise. When coupled with speed, it enables the clearing team members to maintain their element of surprise. Then, they can prevent the opponent from delivering any coordinated or planned reaction. Violence of action is not limited merely to massive firepower, it also includes a mental condition or mind set. The clearing team members' mind set is one of complete domination and total control of a given situation. This domination is achieved through the principles of room clearing.

SLIDE 18-8. FUNDAMENTALS OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

The fundamentals of close quarters combat include dominate the room, eliminate the threat, control the situation and personnel, search the dead, search the room, evacuate personnel, and mark the cleared room.

Dominate the room by moving to points that will allow control of the room by proper fields of fire.

Eliminate the threat through the use of accurate discriminating fire.

Control the situation and personnel by ensuring that no one resists or maintains the means to resist and by ensuring that all instructions are followed by both enemy and friendly personnel.

Search the dead in accordance with the unit SOP. Use the "eye check" to ensure that the person is dead. This check is done by thumping the eye lids and looking for responses.

Search the room to identify personnel or equipment for extraction. The room may or may not need to be searched. This depends on the mission and time available.

Evacuate personnel when there are personnel or equipment to be evacuated. If no personnel or equipment are to be evacuated, the clearing team withdraws.

Mark the cleared room in accordance with the marking SOP.

SLIDE 18-9. APPROACHING THE BREACH POINT

The order of march to the breach point is determined by the method of breach and intended actions at the breach point. The order of march for a shotgun breach should have the firer up front, followed by the No. 1 man, the No. 2 man, and the No. 3 man (team leader). After the door is breached, the firer falls into the end of the line up and acts as the No. 4 man. The order of march for a demolition breach should be 3, 2, 1, 4. The No. 3 man (team leader) is door security, the No. 2 man is the breacher and places the charge on the door, and the No. 1 man carries the blast shield. After the charge is placed, the No. 2 man falls in behind the No. 1 man and then the No. 3 man falls in behind the No. 2 man, giving the order of 1, 2, 3, 4. The order of march is developed and rehearsed by each clearing team for each technique. Security near the breach point (rear, lateral, upward, if applicable) is maintained by the team. When passing windows, each team member must move stealthily while avoiding enemy observation.

SLIDE 18-10. ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE POINT OF ENTRY

Door position and individual weapon positions are important. The clearing team members should stand as close to the entry point as possible, staying in a crouched position. Their weapons are held in either the high- or low-carry position. They must ensure that the muzzle is not pointed toward a team member. They keep the weapon on SAFE until a target is identified, and they keep their fingers outside the trigger well. All clearing team members must signal to one another that they are prepared before entering the room. This communication is accomplished by having the last man tap or grab the man in front of him, passing the signal along. They avoid the use of audible signals, because it may alert the enemy. As in other combat operations, all equipment is carefully selected and prepared to ensure that it is quiet and is not cumbersome. Only essential items are taken on the mission.

SLIDE 18-11. ACTIONS UPON ENTRY

Clearing the doorway occurs as the entire team enters. Failure to quickly clear the doorway may result in team casualties, since the doorway is the focal point of attention for anyone in the room. By moving quickly into the room, the team reduces its chances of being hit by fire directed at the door. The clearing team then moves away from the door and takes up a position inside the room that allows them to completely eliminate the threat. The No. 1 man to enter must move in a straight line toward the corner for which he is responsible. He may turn and move deep into the far corner of the room. The depth of his movement is determined by METT-T. The No. 2 man moves in the opposite direction, following the wall,

but not next to it. The No. 3 man buttonhooks inside the room at least 1 meter from the door, but in between the No. 1 man and the door. The No. 4 man moves in the direction of the No. 2 man and buttonhooks in a likewise fashion between the door and the No. 2 man. All team members stop movement after they have cleared the breach point. Sectors of fire must be known to make the assault work effectively. The No. 1 man and the No. 2 man are initially concerned with the area along the wall on either side of the door or entry point. This area is also the path or direction in which they are moving. It is their primary sector of fire. Their alternate sector of fire is the wall that they are moving toward, sweeping back to the far corner. The No. 3 man and the No. 4 man starts at the center of the wall opposite their point of entry and sweeps to the left if moving toward the left or to the right if moving toward the right, stopping short of the respective team member (No. 1 man or No. 2 man). The sectors of fire are collapsed to within 1 meter of the muzzle of the opposite man's weapon.

SLIDES 18-12. IMMEDIATE THREAT

Any immediate threat is engaged as soon as possible. A target must meet the following criteria to be classified as an immediate threat: If it blocks movement to a dominating position; if it is so close that it cannot be ignored; engagement of the threat cannot slow an assaulter's movement down; if it is 3 to 5 feet from the breach point.

SLIDE 18-13. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

After the room has been dominated, the team must move on to another room or conduct a search of the room just assaulted. If a follow-on mission of entering another room is necessary, then one of the team members may be required to stay behind and secure the room just cleared. If the room just cleared is empty, then it is possible to leave the room unsecured, as long as some measure is taken to prevent access to cleared rooms by enemy personnel (for example, security at hallway intersections). Rooms are never entered with less than two men. A four-man clearing team is the normally used. Team members must exercise fire control and discriminate between hostile and noncombatant targets. If the room is known to contain only enemy personnel, the room can be dominated in a less discriminating manner. A stun or fragmentation grenade can be used in this case. Stun grenades are used if there are noncombatants in the room. Not all walls provide sufficient protection to friendly forces against the effects of fragmentation grenades. The type of grenade used is METT-T dependent.

SLIDE 18-14. INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT AND WEAPON CONTROL

When moving, the clearing team member holds his weapon with the muzzle pointed in the direction of travel. He places the butt of the rifle or carbine into the pocket of his shoulder and points the muzzle slightly down to allow for unobstructed vision. Shooting is done while moving toward the point of domination. Shots are taken as close to the target as 1 or 2 inches; longer shots are preferable. Because shots are taken while the clearing team member is moving, he must use a"careful hurry" as opposed to rushing in with total disregard to any obstructions that may litter the floors. Team members keep weapons on SAFE (safety engaged and finger out of trigger well) until a hostile target is identified and engaged. He makes the weapon safe again after his sector is cleared of all targets. The clearing team members must avoid leading with the weapon when working around windows, doors, corners, or areas where obstacles are negotiated. Leading with the weapon gives

anyone looking in the team member's direction advanced warning. It also makes it easy for someone to grab the weapon. Soldiers keep weapons under control. Soldiers never let the muzzle of the weapon cover anything they are not willing to destroy. In close quarters combat environment, there is little that can be done to provide adequate cover. Even the walls in a standard house are easily penetrated by most handgun rounds. Clearing team members must know that after stealth is lost, concealment is all that furniture and walls can provide. Team members must be on the alert for rounds that hit a wall or floor and travel along the wall or floor for 12 to 18 inches.

CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

- PROFICIENCY IN FM 90-10-1 REQUIRED
- METT-T ANALYSIS A MUST
- EXTENSIVE CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT TRAINING REQUIRED

SLIDE 18-1

REFLEXIVE SHOOTING

- STANCE
- AIM
- DOUBLE TAP
- IMMEDIATE ACTION

SLIDE 18-2

STANCE

- LOW-CARRY TECHNIQUE
- HIGH-CARRY TECHNIQUE

SLIDE 18-3

AIM

- SLOW-AIM FIRE
- RAPID-AIM FIRE
- AIMED QUICK KILL
- INSTINCTIVE FIRE

SLIDE 18-4

DOUBLE TAP

- DO NOT FIGHT THE RECOIL
- IMMEDIATELY BRING THE FRONT SIGHT POST BACK ON TARGET
- TAKE A SECOND SHOT

SLIDE 18-5

IMMEDIATE ACTION

- WEAPONS MALFUNCTIONS ARE CORRECTED IN THE KNEELING POSITION
- THIS REDUCES EXPOSURE AND SIGNALS FELLOW SOLDIERS OF THE MALFUNCTION
- ONCE MALFUNCTION IS CORRECTED, SOLDIER CAN SAVE TIME BY FIRING FROM THE KNEELING POSITION

SLIDE 18-6

PRINCIPLES OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

- SURPRISE
- SPEED
- VIOLENCE OF ACTION

SLIDE 18-7

FUNDAMENTALS OF CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

- DOMINATE THE ROOM
- ELIMINATE THE THREAT
- CONTROL THE SITUATION AND PERSONNEL
- SEARCH THE DEAD
- SEARCH THE ROOM
- EVACUATE PERSONNEL
- MARK THE ROOM

SLIDE 18-8

APPROACHING THE BREACH POINT


- ORDER OF MOVEMENT
- SECURITY

SLIDE 18-9


ACTIONS OUTSIDE THE POINT OF ENTRY

- CLEARING THE DOORWAY
- POSITIONING INSIDE THE ROOM
- CLEARING SECTORS OF FIRE

SLIDE 18-10


ACTIONS ON ENTRY, CORNER DOOR
NUMBER 1 MAN
NUMBER 2 MAN
NUMBER 3 MAN
NUMBER 4 MAN
INTERLOCKING SECTORS
SLIDE 18-11

ACTIONS ON ENTRY, CENTER DOOR (continued)



SLIDE 18-11 (continued)

IMMEDIATE THREAT

- BLOCKS MOVEMENT
- IS TOO CLOSE TO IGNORE
- DOES NOT SLOW ASSAULT BY ENGAGEMENT
- IS NEAR THE BREACH

SLIDE 18-12

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

- SECURITY
- TEAM SIZE
- GRENADES

INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT AND WEAPON CONTROL

- PLACE WEAPON BUTT IN POCKET OF SHOULDER
- PLACE WEAPONS ON SAFE
- USE "CAREFUL HURRY"
- DO NOT LEAD WITH THE WEAPON
- WATCH FOR RICOCHETING ROUNDS

SLIDE 18-14

LESSON 19. LOGISTICS

SLIDE 19-1. LOGISTICS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Combat service support in peace enforcement operations (PEOs) uses the same principles as logistics planning for war. Basic CSS, health services, and personnel service support functions are universal. Logistics functions and resource use for brigades/battalions are addressed in FM 100-5, FM 100-10, FM 100-23, FM 63-6; and their use is IAW the stability and support operations deployment checklist in Figure 19-1.

Prerequisites for CSS in PEO are adaptability and flexibility. CSS units must adjust to environmental conditions, tactical and nontactical situations, and unplanned support requirements. PEO by US forces usually relies heavily on CSS resources to resolve problems. CSS units can support a variety of humanitarian, civic, security assistance programs. State Department representatives and joint task force commanders determine the levels and amount of support to be provided.

PEO require the logistics planner to consider a task organized CSS force instead of the traditional division support structure. The requirement to task-organize makes it imperative to include logistics planners in the earliest stages of planning operations. Additionally, the opportunity to obtain or maintain a high state of personnel and materiel readiness requires the earliest possible deployment of CSS personnel.

SLIDE 19-2. ENVIRONMENT

Environmental factors influence CSS operations. Many areas that US military forces are deployed to may lack—

- Adequate logistics and health services infrastructure.
- Compatible US military equipment specifications and standards.
- Required supplies, maintenance and storage facilities, utilities, or an adequate transportation system.

Logistics planners should consider these potential problem areas before deployment.

SLIDE 19-3. LOGISTIC PLANNERS

Logistics preparation of the theater plan should be the basis for negotiating host nation support agreement, pre-positioning of supplies and equipment, civilian support contracts, and humanitarian and civic assistance program. This planning enhances the development and cooperative solidarity of the host country and provides infrastructure compensation should deployment of forces to the target country be required. These actions provide resources available in the area of operation to achieve a desired end state.

a. **Mission Analysis:** The mission analysis is the first step to sustainment preparation. It consists of the commander and staff actions related to gathering facts on the mission statement, end-state objective, density to support, and task organization.

b. **Area Studies:** CSS planners must conduct area operation studies to identify potential problems with sustainment support. Planners must realize that if certain key elements of infrastructure are inadequate or nonexistent, the force will either have to bring assets or be prepared to build facilities in theater. Some of the first US Army assets deployed in peace operations may be specialized teams to provide critical and timely information to assist in overall logistics planning, force development, and development of plans for time-phased

arrival of resources in the area of operations. Key studies and assessment elements may include seaports, airports, fuel storage and distribution facilities, storage facilities, supplies routes, and utilities.

c. **Terrain Analysis:** CSS planners must conduct terrain analysis to identify the availability, accessibility, trafficability, and force protection of logistics resources to ensure continuity of support.

d. **Weather Analysis:** Weather analysis must be conducted to determine the climatological effects on sustainment operation to include light data, ground fog, rain, heat, humidity, and dust. The effects may have significant impact on sustainment operations.

e. **Intelligence Gathering:** Collecting logistics intelligence is a critical element for planning. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence gathering techniques may well determine success or failure of a peacetime contingency operation. Intelligence operations are the first step necessary for any viable response associated with a peace enforcement operation. As the logistician focuses on a specific country, a comprehensive logistics essential elements of information (LOGEEI) data file should be developed. LOGEEI file should contain information pertaining to the following:

(1) *Geography.* Collect information on climate and terrain in the area of operation. Determine if current maps are available.

(2) *Supply.* Collect information on supply items that are readily available in the area of operation. Determine which of these can be used in support of US forces. Subsistence, bulk petroleum, and barrier materials are most common. Collect information on the supply system of the armed forces of supported country. Is it compatible with US forces? Are major equipment items compatible? Has the host nation purchased, through foreign military sales, repair parts supporting current US systems? Answers to these questions will help CSS planners decide if host nation support negotiations are possible.

(3) *Facilities.* Collect information on warehousing and cold storage facilities, production and manufacturing plants, reservoirs, administrative facilities and sanitation capabilities.

(4) *Transportation.* Collect information on road networks, truck availability, rail nets, bridges, ports, cargo handlers, petroleum, and materials handling equipment. Also collect information on traffic flow, choke points, and potential control problems.

(5) *Maintenance.* Collect information on maintenance facilities that could support US and coalition equipment. Examine the supported country's armed forces. Could they supplement US capability? Is there a commonality between equipment and repair parts? Does the country have adequate machine works for possible use in the fabrication of repair parts, facilities, transportation, and maintenance?

(6) *General skills.* Collect information on the general population of the supported country. Is English commonly spoken? Are personnel available for interpreter/translator duties? Will a general labor pool be available? What skills are available in-country that can be translated to our use? For instance, can the host nation provide drivers, clerks, materials handling equipment operators, food service personnel, guards, mechanics, and longshoremen?

f. **Threat Evaluation:** CSS planners must request and receive frequent intelligent updates to properly plan logistic support operations. Threat evaluation for convoy operations, resupply of checkpoints, Logistics package operations and pre-positioning of supplies forward must be considered during PEOs to ensure continuity of support.

g. **Threat Integration:** CSS planners must integrate threat actions and activities into their logistics support concept to ensure force protection considerations are met. The potential attacks and ambushes on logistical convoys and logistics bases by belligerent forces will require security assets.

h. **Communication Network System:** The means and languages of international communication in support of PEOs, to include the weight and measures system for support operation, must be well-established in advance. Communications must be carefully planned or could conceivably cripple or defeat force's support. This is an area in which standardization and commonality are imperative. Distributed communications networks and enhanced command, control, communication, and automation will increase the ability to conduct dispersed operations over greater distance without degrading effectiveness in support of PEOs.

SLIDE 19-4. SUPPLY

Supplies are the commodities needed to equip, maintain, and operate a military and civilian force structure. Some of the critical planning considerations for supply include the following.

a. **Early Sustainment Supplies and Mission-specific Equipment:** Early sustainment supplies and mission-specific equipment that exceeds the peace operation force's authorization must be met from wholesale supply assets, pre-positioned Army reserve stocks, and operational project stocks. For example, pre-position afloat assets could be quickly positioned and serve as a logistics base to bridge the gap during initial deployment phase. Logistics plan must be self-sufficient. Pre-positioned assets may or may not be used. Release of these supplies and equipment must be in accordance with existing regulations and controls.

b. **Automation System:** Automated systems must communicate both up and down the supply system and laterally within the area of operations to allow the supported units to place their demands on the system rapidly and to assist in providing supplies in a timely manner. Automated logistics systems that may be employed in stability and support operations include—

(1) Assuring adequate computers and peripherals and associated repair parts and supplies are available to support PEOs.

(2) Arranging for a contingency or float computer, if only a portion of a unit deployed, so both the deployed and remaining portion can continue operations.

(3) Contacting the automated logistics assistance team to assist in assuring automated systems are deployed ready.

c. **Compatibility:** Compatibility of automated systems is key to the link among the requesting, direct support, materiel management, and financial management organizations. This applies not only to US Army units but also other members of coalition.

d. **Clear Command Lines and Open Communications Network:** Clear command lines and open communications network are essential to establishing support relationships and implementing sustainment operations. CSS planners must establish early "who supports whom for what."

e. **Centralized Control and Accountability of Classes of Supplies:** CSS planners must ensure that a single theater management and requisitioning system is used to support peace enforcement operations. This system provides a single channel for requesting supplies

and accountability procedures for the receipt and distribution of supplies making cost capturing easier for obtaining reimbursements from UN forces in accordance with the term of reference or written agreements. CSS planner must ensure that their subordinate leaders understand the requirements and procedures for end survey management.

f. **Central Receiving Point:** CSS leaders and staffs must ensure that a central receiving point (CRP) is established at or near the major port of entry to the area of operations for accurate processing of incoming personnel, supplies, and equipment. The personnel needed to operate the CRP depends on its mission. CSS leaders should furnish sufficient supply personnel, equipment, and transportation capability along with adequate personnel and facilities to support the CRP. If the CRP is designated as a reception area for personnel arriving in the area of operations, the force provider helps to furnish many essential services to help maintain them in a readiness posture.

g. **Liaison Support:** CSS planner must establish an early liaison team for logistics coordination. A robust liaison team facilitates logistics understanding, requisitioning procedures, coordination among interservices and other interagencies, and overall mission accomplishment for PEOs. CSS planner must ensure that linguists are part of the liaison team. Linguists must communicate logistic concepts and requirements among forces of diverse cultures. Also, additional communication equipment may be required for non-US forces to enable interoperable communication.

h. **Resupply Methods:** Personnel and high priority supplies and equipment are moved by air, while general supply items and routine follow-on supplies are generally shipped by sea.

i. **Rehearsals:** Rehearsing key logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation. Specifically, convoy operations, retrograde and recovery operations, evacuation procedures, flow of requisitions and materiel and medical evacuation procedures.

SLIDE 19-5. CLASS I SUPPLY

The commander plans to have US Army veterinary inspectors in-country early to ensure host nation support for perishable food meets and passes US standards.

- Requirements for helping to feed the host nation civilian and military populations are considered.
- Sundry packages, both type I and II, are on hand or available.
- Reefer requirements for unit dining facilities and Class I supply point are identified.
- Operational rations are grouped for ease of handling and accountability of supplies.
- Sufficient corps or echelon of corps reverse osmosis water purification units are deployed to provide sufficient potable water.

SLIDE 19-6. CLASS II SUPPLY

CSS units should consider deploying with limited centralized exchange capability to replace damaged or destroyed items as follows—

- Organizational clothing and individual equipment.
- Central Issue Facility.
- Self-service supply center:
  - Contract support is also a viable option.
  - Maps are available of the area of operation.

- Supplies are on hand or available for laundry, bath, hospital, water purification, chemical and test kits.

SLIDE 19-7. CLASS III SUPPLY

Fuel testing capability and availability needs to be in theater early and at the lowest possible level. Specific guidance and policy for disposition of contaminated fuel are established. Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability of fuel among host nation, allied, and coalition forces are considered early on during the mission analysis process. Additive requirements for the use of commercial fuel and the procedures for obtaining such items identified. Ordering and accountable officer requirements considered for interservice support billing and reimbursement procedures.

SLIDE 19-8. CLASS IV SUPPLY

Initial push package for force protection. Pre-position of material is the preferred method. Establishment of priority that includes force protection, quality of life, and field sanitation. The commander must ensure guidance and policy for command and control.

SLIDE 19-9. CLASS V SUPPLY

A theater material maintenance center type cell for management is established. Stockage objectives are established. A nonstandard unit basic load is established. The leaders ensure quality control personnel are in theater early for surveillance and inspections. A control supply rate is established. Special permits are requested. Policy and procedures are identified for obtaining training ammunition for rehearsals. A theater ASP with corps ammunition unit is established.

SLIDE 19-10. CLASS VI SUPPLY

The commander provides guidance to deploying personnel on personal demand items. If a tactical field exchange is required, the commander ensures headquarters Army and Air Force Exchange Service (plans) has been notified. The commander ensures the tactical field exchange staffing, stock assortment, security, facility, transportation, and communications requirements have been identified and coordinated. The commander ensures that finance support had been identified. He also ensures that the policy on rationing and check cashing has been determined.

SLIDE 19-11. CLASS VII SUPPLY

The commander ensures that issues and exchange policies and procedures have been identified (for example, operational readiness float stocks). All up front to-accompany-troop items are identified. Distribution priorities and distribution requirements and procedures are identified. Guidance and policy is addressed for loaning equipment to foreign contractors. Procedures for replacement of salvage equipment is specified.

SLIDE 19-12. CLASS VIII SUPPLY

Policies and procedures are identified for—

- Disposal of contaminated waste.
- Disposal of damaged or salvaged supplies.

- Local purchase of supplies.
- Blood requisitioning.
- Communication link established with wholesale system.

Categories and incident rates of endemic diseases are determined—

- Waterborne.
- Insect borne.
- Animal borne.
- Environmentally caused.

SLIDE 19-13. CLASS IX SUPPLY

The commander plans and considers providing repair parts to support coalition or allied forces. He considers support assets from out of theater. He establishes policy and procedures for disposal of hazardous materials. He tailors the deployed prescribed load list and authorized stockage list by type and density of equipment to support. He establishes a single repair part supply system to ensure accountability, visibility, and command and control management. He ensures that automation hardware is compatible among services, host nation, allies, and coalition forces. Fire support base establishes and coordinates communication link between depots and national inventory control points in conjunction with main support battalion and division materiel management center. Procedures are addressed for cannibalization operations. Reconstruction of push packages is based on force structure density.

SLIDE 19-14. KEY ORGANIZATIONS FOR COORDINATING LOGISTICS SUPPORT

Civil Affairs Team: CA teams play a large role in obtaining available resources by establishing contact with local authorities and or organizations. The CA team serves as a point of interface between the host nation support coordination team and host country military or civilian authorities or organizations.

United Nations Logistics Headquarters: UN Headquarters has the largest responsibility for support to UN-sponsored force. Key organizations responsive to the UN Headquarters and their responsibilities are as follows:

- ***Field Operation Division:*** FOD plans the support structure and coordinates contributions from member states. It negotiates local purchase agreements and transportation assets in the area of operations.
- ***Chief Administration Officer:*** CAO has overall control of UN support to the operation. His responsibilities include local purchases, host support, financial arrangements, prioritizing lift, and passing requirements to FOD at UN Headquarters. All logistics requirements, once validated by chief logistics officer, are passed to the CAO for funding and procurement.
- ***Chief Logistics Officer:*** CLO controls day-to-day logistics functions. He establishes and operates the logistics base, often called the field maintenance area. He coordinates receipt of stocks and movement to forward bases as well as the sustainment of the force. Additional support includes services such as postal or morale, welfare, and recreation operations.

- ***Humanitarian Assistance:*** HA programs will probably be conducted simultaneously in almost every peace enforcement operation. CSS planners' understanding of HA organizations active in the area of operations is imperative to increase opportunities for success. Organizations that may be providing HA should be included in the commander's assessment falls into one or two categories:

1. *Nongovernmental Organizations:* NGOs coordinate international activities and perform specialized functions. NGO include numerous agencies of the UN that are involved in broad spectrum of operations from relief through reconstruction, rehabilitation to development. Examples of NGOs are UN Children Fund and World Food Program.
2. *Private Voluntary Organizations:* PVOs are structured like NGOs and are not government sponsored. PVOs may be professional associations, foundations, multinational business or supply group with a common interest in HA. Examples are Catholic Relief Services, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), and International Reserve Committee.

SLIDE 19-15. NONSTANDARD SUPPORT FOR LOGISTICS

Nonstandard support for logistics is effective when supporting PEOs in an immature, austere, or remote area of operations. Rapid and assured communication, small computer, and ALOC are the basis for nonstandard support. This type of support is used for deployment of 90 days or less. Types of nonstandard support are contingency, contracting, logistics civilian augmentation program, host nation support, and direct requisitioning concept.

a. **Contingency Contracting:**

(1) Purchasing, renting, leasing, or acquisition of supplies or services from nonfederal sources. Contingency contracting takes full advantage of available resources in the operational base.

(2) It is an effective CSS force multiplier for deployed forces and serves to bridge the gaps that may occur before initial resources or logistics civilian augmentation program can be mobilized.

(3) It is valuable in areas where host nation agreements are nonexistent or insufficient by reducing dependence on the logistics system, improving response time, and freeing scarce airlift and sealift for other priority needs.

(4) Coordination must be made through the appropriate command channels to ensure that contingency contracting is analyzed and integrated in the CSS OPLAN, OPORD, and logistics support concept.

(5) Contracting personnel should precede the arrival of the main body of US forces during deployment in support of PEOs. CSS planners must develop readily deployable contracting kits (for example, forms, software, portable hardware).

(6) Contracting may replace or augment some of the following functions:

- Supplies (for example, Class I, II, III, IV, and VI).
- Labor services.
- Mortuary services.
- Clothing exchange and bath.
- Transportation.
- Maintenance.

- Field sanitation.

b. **Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program:**

(1) It is a form of contracting that provides myriad services and supplies to augment CSS assets, to include—

- Water-well digging
- Laundry
- Power generation
- Crane and port support for coalition forces

(2) It is primarily used in areas where no multilateral or bilateral agreement or treaties exist. However, LOGCAP applies to areas with formal host nation support agreements or where contractors are involved.

c. **Host Nation Support:**

(1) Host nation support is civilian and or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis and emergencies, or war based upon agreements mutually concluded between the nations.

(2) The availability and organization of host nation resources may reduce or increase the need for front loading of logistic assets. The logistics system will capitalize on host nation and coalition support, but only when available and reliable.

d. **Direct Requisitioning Concept:**

(1) This concept allows the supply support activity to send requisition data directly to the defense automatic addressing system, which forwards the data to the CONUS wholesale source of supply.

(2) This concept decreases the requisitioning processing time and order of shipment time for supplies. The goal is to have an average order shipment time of 9 to 13 days.

(3) A Tactical Army Combat Service Support Computer System operating the interim Standard Army Retail Supply System is a prerequisite for direct requisitioning.

SLIDE 19-16. TASK ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

During PEOs, forces are likely to be multinational and joint in composition and will require extensive offensive capability. Therefore, logistic support assets and units must be flexible and responsive. This requires CSS planners to develop a support concept using the following characteristics:

a. There is no standard CSS organization in support of PEOs. The CSS planners tailor the force to meet the needs of the supported forces and mission requirements. The number, type, and mixes of CSS units varies depending on the commander's concept of operation-type and quantity of combat and combat support units. CSS organization will also depend on the availability of host nation, contractor, and allied capability.

b. Two key types of potential force structure concepts and or designs that may be used during PEOs are split operations and modularity of support.

(1) *Split Base Operations:* The intent is to do CSS management with fewer resources in theater. A smaller, more easily deployed logistics force structure functionally operating out of different locations in support of deployed forces.

(2) *Modularity of Support:* The modularity concepts consist of incremental elements of an organization, constructed to emulate functions and capabilities of the whole organization. This modular design allows CSS units to task-organize to support the rapidly changing situations associated with PEOs. However, if CSS planners decide to use the modular

deployment concept, they must ensure that the modules have capability to function forward of the parent organization without reducing home station support.

SLIDE 19-17. CRITICAL PLANNING PHASES

The three planning phases for logistics are peacetime, sustaining and transition. Peacetime and transition operations are planned in sufficient detail to provide for support of PEOs until the sustaining phase has begun. These phases are critical in planning PEOs due to the intense factors involved which could easy escalate to war. Provisions must be made for transitioning to war with little or no warning.

SLIDE 19-18. TRANSPORTATION

Transportation is considered the "connecting link" between other functions of the sustainment system that enables the system to operate. Early deployment of transportation assets in the area of operations critical to the mission success includes—

- Transportation planners.
- Port opening package(for example, personnel and equipment).
- Movement control staff (for example, departure airfield control group or alternate departure control group).

a. **Key Planning Functions:** The transportation functions in support of PEOs are divided into three functional areas:

- Modal operations.
- Terminal operations.
- Movement management.

b. **Civilian Contracting:** Civilian contracting for transportation is a vital part of logistics.

c. **Transportation Support:** During UN-operated base operations, transportation support may be provided by UN, allied, and coalition forces.

d. **Key Planning Factors:**

- Materials handling equipment requirements for port operations identified and coordinated.
- Host nation and other services support identified and coordinated.
- Guidance and policies established for marking and identifying containers (for example, government owned or leased). Total asset visibility, combined with in-transit visibility and assured communications, will produce a logistics system that is disciplined, reliable, and responsive to support PEOs.
- Engineer support identified and coordinated for sustainment of main supply routes and infrastructure development.
- Potential convoy restrictions and refugee traffic considered on the main supply route and alternate supply route.

SLIDE 19-19. FIELD SERVICE

Field services include laundry, bath, textile repair, food service, airdrop, provision of general labor, and water and mortuary affairs. They may be provided by individual force elements to their own units or on an area basis in support of other peace forces. US peace operation forces may also have a specific mission requirement to provide field service to foreign nationals. Predetermined agreements aid in providing economy of force. Plans must also respect the different social mores, customs, and standards of health and welfare of the host nation as well as the peace operation participants. Logistics planners should consider and determine the following items:

- Workloads.
- Force structure.
- Water requirement.
- Supply and equipment stockage levels.
- Force requirement and its positioning on the appropriate time-phased force deployment list are critical to early support of US and coalition forces as well as the local populace when so directed.
- Maximum use of services that are available in the area of operations or those provided by other forces must be used to reduce the required force structure.
- Contract support is used for most installation type functions, such as trash or garage removal, portable latrine, area cleanup, and laundry and or bath support services.
- Early deployment of force provider—the Army's force provider will offer a stand-alone, increased quality of life for soldiers, both male and female, or for civilian personnel when employed in response to requests from US civil authorities. Currently, the CSS structure can perform the force-provider mission only on a task force basis. Force provider can support up to 3,300 soldiers by providing quality of life enhancements associated directly to the areas of feeding, hygiene, laundry, and sleeping facilities. All facilities are climate controlled with priority to sleeping, medical, dining, shower and toilet, and other facilities.

SLIDE 19-20. MAINTENANCE

Maintenance support for PEOs does not differ greatly from maintenance support of any other operation. However, CSS planners should consider the following factors and unique training aspects.

a. **Factors:**

(1) Coordinate and establish early on plans and policies for—

- What will or will not be repaired in area of operations.
- Retrograde system for equipment.
- Equipment loan to other services.
- Maintenance repair for equipment under warranty.
- Reparable maintenance, operational readiness float, and equipment cannibalization and control exchange operations.
- Formalize readiness reporting (DA Form 2406) for the diverse units by establishing clear command channels and support relationships.
- Density list.

(2) Civilian contract (LOGCAP or logistics assistance representative) is vital to the successful accomplishment of PEOs.

(3) CSS planners must plan for and be prepared to support civilian and other military forces.

(4) Interoperability among systems and supplies must be planned and considered in the developmental process of logistics support concept.

(5) Repair of computers, automation equipment, and communication security equipment are critical for maintaining fluent and viable automation and communication capabilities that are essential to PEOs.

(6) Recovery operations must be well-rehearsed.

(7) TMDE calibration support properly planned and integrated in the support concept.

(8) Cable and electrical supply firm.

b. **Unique Training Aspects:**

(1) Training on non-US equipment.

(2) Training host nation personnel on US equipment.

(3) Training host nation personnel on US and non-US equipment.

(4) Training coalition and UN on US equipment.

SLIDE 19-21. PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT

The personnel service support mission is to enhance the combat capability of the soldier through sustainment. Whether committed to PEOs or war, PSS organizations are tailored to satisfy the operational requirement of the theater independently or in conjunction with allied forces. PSS is the management and execution of six personnel-related functions: personnel services, resource management, finances services, legal services support, chaplaincy activities, and command information. The personnel services and manning functions critical at the tactical and operational levels are as follows:

a. **Personnel Service:** The requirements of joint and combined operations mean that commanders need to maintain accountability for all personnel under their control. The personnel system may be asked to account for joint, allied, or host nation personnel. PSS of PEOs encompasses the following.

(1) *Personnel Information Management:* The mission of the personnel information management system is to collect; validate; process; and store critical information about soldiers, civilians, and units. The Army maintains personnel information in two forms manual (personnel record) and electronic (personnel data base).

(2) *Personnel Data Base Management:* PDBM consolidates current and projected personnel information on soldiers and units in a number of command data bases such as Standard Installation/Division Personnel System. The information serves as the basis for command decisions, policy and procedures' decisions, and projected requirements. The primary means of data transmission is through electronic communication. If electronic communication is not available, updates within the theater will be made by courier. Real-time communication is essential to provide commanders with needed information in a timely fashion. As a back up, extensive courier network is required, and the resources come from the functional community.

(3) *Postal Operations Management:* The mission of postal operations is to operate a network to process mail and provide postal services within a theater of operations. Processing mail involves receiving, separating, sorting, dispatching, and redirecting ordinary

and accountable mail. Postal services involve selling stamps; cashing and selling money orders; providing registered, insured, and certified mail; processing postal claims and inquiries; and handling casualty and contaminated mail. The postal management includes the following actions:

(a) The flow of ordinary and accountable mail starts with the transporting unit from a theater seaport or airport to military mail terminal (MMT). It ends with a unit mail clerk delivering the mail to the addressee.

(b) The lead personnel group commander analyzes the operational situation and determines postal unit structure necessary to support the operation and where to place military mail terminal.

(c) The senior PSS command establishes mail polices for theater. It establishes and maintains the theater mail routing scheme, casualty mail, and directory mail processing area. It also directs subordinate general support postal units.

(d) The FORSCOM Adjutant General must coordinate with Military Postal Service Agency to activate preassigned contingency Army Post Office numbers for deploying forces. Military Postal Service Agency coordinates with the US Postal Service to activate additional numbers as necessary. During the early stages of an operation, the theater commander may need to restrict personnel mail to cassette tapes, first class letters, and postcards. As the theater matures and postal personnel become available, the CINC may lift restrictions and permit parcels of limited size and weight. The CINC may also recommend to the Secretary of Defense free mail services during peace enforcement operations. Free mail services depend on Secretary of Defense approval, and it must meet statutory criteria.

(4) *Morale, Welfare, Recreation, and Community Support:* MWR is a mission-essential activity. Commanders at all levels are responsible for MWR support provided for their soldiers and Army civilians. These services improve individual readiness by promoting fitness, building morale, and cohesion, increasing family wellness and self-reliance, and enhancing soldier and Army civilian quality of life. These services are in the form of unit recreation, sport programs, library book kits, unit lounges, and rest areas at brigade and higher. These activities are staffed by military and civilian MWR personnel. The facilities provided by the MWR network depends on the theater or corps command policies and the operational and tactical situation. During PEOs, the senior commander establishes policy and provides funding guidance for MWR programs. Force provider should be considered for early deployment to support MWR requirements. Some of the key players, agencies and external support available include the following.

(a) US Community and Family Support Center (USA CFSC): The senior commander plans and coordinates external support with the USA CFSC.

(b) American Red Cross: Provide emergency communication and case management services that support and supplement those activities of the military that effect the health, welfare, and morale of the soldiers and families. American Red Cross representatives are available at division and higher levels to assist family emergencies and emergency communication between family members and deployed personnel.

(c) Army and Air Force Exchange Services: The theater command in coordination with AAFES and the US Army Community and Family Support Center plan for and support exchange services.

- **Direct Retail Operations:** AAFES establishes retail operations in coordination with the theater Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and corps G1. AAFES

may establish these activities using AAFES employees, contract operators, third country national employees, or vendors.

- **Tactical Field Exchange:** Tactical field exchanges serve soldiers and Army civilians as forward as the brigade support area and as the tactical situation allows. These exchanges provide merchandise and services in areas where permanent exchange activities are not present.
- **Army Imprest Funds Activities:** Army Imprest Fund Activities is operated basically the same as a tactical field exchange. The differences are initial supply of goods is purchased with an AAFES Nonappropriated Fund imprest check from AAFES general manager, and the Army Imprest Funds Activities is managed by officer-in-charge, staff sergeant or above, from the local command. Should commanders choose to employ Army Imprest Funds Activities, they must select and train personnel from their units to operate these activities.

(d) External Support:

- Supplies.
- Equipment.
- American Red Cross.
- Family Support.
- MWR personnel.
- Rest and recuperation centers.

b. **Personnel Manning Functions:** The manning challenges are to ensure uninterrupted flow of soldiers in area of operations and to provide the necessary services to sustain those soldiers.

(1) *Personnel Readiness Management:* Personnel readiness management involves analyzing personnel strength data to determine current capabilities and future requirement in support of PEOs. Personnel readiness managers must focus efforts in establishing new requisition accounts in the total officer management information system and enlisted distribution system to reflect the configuration of the deployed force and establishing a theater personnel requirement reporting system. Personnel readiness manager's sustainment in support of PEOs through the command and control strength reporting system.

(2) *Replacement Management:* Replacement management sustains the force by providing replacement personnel (individual, crews, teams, or packages) based on existing and projected losses. The personnel replacement system must be responsive to the combat commander's priorities to provide the right replacements, to the right place, at the right time. The replacement management coordinates support and delivery of military replacements, civilians, and return-to-duty soldiers. Replacement management is also responsible for order issuance, reception, personnel accounting, processing and coordination for logistical support, and transportation.

(a) Replacement management depends on an assessment of personnel operational power and plans for future operations. It provides for individual replacements and grouping of individuals up to company level. Unit replacement will normally deploy directly from their home or mobilization stations. Individual teams, small unit packages and Army civilians will proceed through CONUS-based Replacement Center where administrative actions necessary for immediate in-theater assignments will be completed.

(b) The replacement network serves as the conduit for soldiers and Army civilian personnel returning to duty from hospitals. Personnel leaders must maintain liaison with medical treatment facilities and provost marshal authorities to ensure that all return-to-duty soldiers are accounted for and return to the replacement system. Personnel strength managers must also assist military police to ascertain the duty status of stragglers and their subsequent disposition through legal or replacement channels.

(3) *Casualty Management:* Casualty management includes coordinating the logistical processes involved in casualty management at all levels. Casualty operation's record, report, and account for casualties in an expeditious manner to include notifying and assisting the next of kin, family members, and supporting the personnel accounting and strength report function.

(4) *Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting:* Personnel accounting and strength reports are two of the most critical PSS tasks performed in the area of operations, including accounting for soldier and civilians, reporting other strength-related information and updating command data bases at all levels. Data communications are essential to real-time personnel information flow. FM 12-6 provides detailed guidance.

(5) *Civilian Personnel Management:* In support of PEOs, policy and guidance will be developed and coordinated by Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel for expansion of DA civilian and military manpower to meet the mission requirements.

(6) *Essential Personnel Services:* In support of PEOs, some of the essential personnel services are as follows:

- Religious services.
- Finance services.
- Legal services.
- Health services.

SLIDE 19-22. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

In an austere environment with limited transportation and communications capability, the Unit Ministry Team extends the commander's ability to sustain soldier through providing or performing for the free exercise of religion. Peace operations require a diverse religious support capability. Without augmentation, commanders must share religious support assets. Several unit ministry teams must work together to form a religious support system with diverse cultural and religious capabilities. Unit ministry teams serve several roles in addition to their traditional support functions. The teams—

- Determine what impact the religions and religious practices prevalent in the area may have on the mission and US personnel.
- Provide pastoral counseling and moral leadership guidance for deployed soldiers. Ensure that soldiers' family members have access to pastoral counseling and leadership as well.
- Conduct unit religious preference assessment to determine religious preference and denominational capabilities.
- Coordinate religious support with host nation and other allied religious leaders.
- Coordinate resupply operations for ecclesiastical supplies.
- Advise the commander on area of operations religious groups and factions.

- Gather and disseminate all applicable information concerning religions or cultural practices that affect US personnel or liaisons with local religious leaders and the population.
- Advise the commander on how the deployment will affect soldiers.

SLIDE 19-23. FINANCE SUPPORT

The overall mission of finance in support of PEOs is to sustain the Army, joint, and combined operations by providing timely commercial vendor and contractual payments, various pay and disbursing services, and all essential accounting. The finance detachments provide this support on an area basis to a brigade size unit. It can support up to 6,000 soldier advanced development objectives with a 19-man unit. It is assigned to a finance battalion (advanced development objective) but can be deployed separately to support operations of limited size and scope. It provides support by sending finance support teams forward to a unit's location. Some of the different individual and organizational functions that should be considered during PEOs are as follows:

a. **Individual Support Functions.**

(1) *Military Pay:* This entails the process of ensuring that the soldiers' pay is maintained correctly and in a timely manner. During a deployment, soldiers may be entitled to more pay (for example, family separation, imminent danger pay, foreign duty pay). It may be declared a tax withholding exclusion zone; no taxes withheld from enlisted pay and no taxes withheld from officers pay up to a certain amount. The biggest problem in the military pay arena is timeliness because of communication problems. Assured communication is a vital link to the mission success of PEOs.

(2) *Travel Pay:* Travel and deployed finance elements will provide limited check cashing support to soldiers and civilian personnel.

(3) *DOD Civilian Support:* The Army may need to deploy DOD civilian in support of PEOs. They require the same pay support as military. Additionally, contract civilians (Red Cross, AAFES, press, contract workers) in support PEOs require some financial support (cashing checks, exchanging currency).

b. **Organizational Support Functions:**

(1) *Procurement and Contract Support:* Long-term service or need. Formalized contract with vendor. Examples are for equipment, food, transportation, day labor, real estate. The vendor is paid when the service is completed or equipment and material is delivered.

(2) *Finance Advice and Guidance:* The finance commander provides financial advice and guidance to the operational commander. The finance commander provides finance guidance and determinations from US, UN, State Department, Embassy, or local government. He also provides advice on the economic situation, black marketing considerations, and for control and uses of currencies.

(3) *Accounting/Resource Management:* The ability to report to Congress and the American people on the use of appropriated and nonappropriated funds is critical in meeting the Army's responsibility for stewardship of public resources. Regardless of the reason or length of employment; there must be an itemization of how much was spent by the US government and what service, equipment, and materials were procured. Accounting requirements for an operation are immense, and they begin before data leaves the theater. The quality of accounting records totally depends on the timely receipt and accuracy of cost data.

(4) *Non-US Pay:* The Army must be prepared to pay foreign workers who perform work for US during an operation.

(5) *Detain, Refugee, and Displaced Person Support:* The Army must pay EPWs a monthly pay and for any work performed according to the Geneva Convention. Any monies found on EPWs must be counted and secured. Although this is an MP mission, finance units are always required to assist.

c. **Unique Considerations:**

(1) *Mandate/Directives:* US, UN, NATO: Are there special US, UN, NATO, or other mandates or directives that will impact finance considerations?

(2) *Economic Situation of Country:* This can affect what type of currency US forces use (for example, US, host nation, military pay script). It can affect what type of contracting, host nation support, banking support US forces can do in the country. It can affect how much money soldiers are allowed to have.

(3) *Logistic Support:* What kind of logistical support will be performed? Will it be mostly contracting in the country? Will US forces be supporting other coalition forces? Joint forces? Do all the units have contracting officers assigned? What is their obligation limit; does it need to be raised? Do the units have class A agents assigned; are they on orders to finance; are they trained?

(4) *EPW/Counterintelligence Detainees:* Who will control them? Who will pay for them? Who determines? What about refugees? Do US forces support them? Who pays for it?

(5) *Banking/Civil Affairs:* What if during fighting US forces take over a town and its banks? What about captured money? Seized property? Who controls it; who decides? What about different types of civil affair programs? Weapons for cash? Intelligence operations? What type of funds will be required?

(6) *Funding Requirements:* What are the funding requirements? What type of currency will be used? Special funds for intelligence operations? How much cash will be needed? Where will funds be procured in the country? Who is paying for the operation? Who can authorize payments? For US forces? For coalition forces? Who determines rate of exchange? What rule do we use; US or the UN or NATO? Who determines rates for foreign national pay? What funds are used up front to pay for mission before being reimbursed? Mission funds?

(7) *Reimbursement Requirements:* Who is paying for the operation? UN, US, NATO, other? What is required for reimbursement? What if other nations are supported? Who determines accounting rules to use? Who authorizes/approves contracts? UN requires letters of agreement before reimbursement for different things; are those in place? Different rule-depending on who has lead for the operation.

SLIDE 19-24. LEGAL SERVICES

The legal services support package must be tailored to the particular peace operation. Peace operations present many legal service support issues that may not be present in other types of operations. Some of the planning considerations for legal services may include, but are not limited to the following.

a. **Rules of Engagements:** Assisting in the preparation and review of ROEs. Ensuring that ROEs are consistent with national policy, international, foreign and domestic laws, higher headquarters ROEs, and with operational plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD).

b. **Combined Task Force Office:** Staffing a combined task force law office designed to support the operations of many nations and the UN. Coordinating the effort of attorneys from many nations, ensuring quality and consistency of advice.

c. **Foreign Claims:** Coordinating foreign claims authority and sufficient assets to investigate and adjudicate claims. Specifically, reviewing agreements that address the host nations and US personnel obligations to pay for damages caused by or to US personnel and property.

d. **Conflict of Law Issues:** Conflict of law issues when there is no existing government or legal system and procedures for reestablishing a government or legal system.

e. **Contracts:** Review and validation of contracts.

f. **Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction Agreements:** Review and processing of criminal law issues.

g. **Legal Issues Involved With NGOs and PVOs:** Collateral operations with nongovernmental organizations and logistics units may be required to work with UN multinational units and NGOs or PVOs who provide international humanitarian assistance. The chain of command must know and adhere to those legal questions involving logistic support.

SLIDE 19-25. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

Planning for Health Service Support (HSS) in support of PEOs is the same process used for HSS operations in the more traditional roles. However, planners must take into account expanded options not accomplished during the more traditional HSS operations (such as assessment of the medical infrastructure). Planners for peace operations must consider the following characteristics and functional systems:

a. **Characteristics of the Area of Operations:** Included in this is geographical barriers and political borders.

(1) *Terrain:* Special considerations include the effect of terrain on limiting access to and availability of health care services for the general population; regionalization of the population that does not have access to improved roads; effects on camouflaging, protecting insurgents or guerrillas considerations, and requirements.

(2) *Weather:* Include seasonal weather and its potential effect upon access to patients or any other significant role that it may play in the operation.

(3) *Civilian populace:* The civilian population takes on added importance in planning the mission for peace operations. The requirement for prosthetics, orthotics, and training of alternative daily living activities and skills of civilian victims of lane mines or other combat-related traumatic injuries should be considered. The estimate of civilian casualties resulting from PEOs requiring medical attention, the impact and number of refugees requiring medical care, preventive medicine, and veterinary support should be included.

(4) *Flora and Fauna:* CSS personnel and planners must be familiar with the particular plants, animals, and arthropods that are in the operational environment. In PEOs, this is important, as the resources to control arthropod and rodent populations may not be available. This results in exposing the deployed forces to a greater incidence of disease and injury. The

animal populace of the region may play a significant role in the economic development of the region and may be the focus of the operation.

(5) *Other:* This includes, but is not limited to, the following planning considerations:

- Language capability and requirements.
- Morbidity and mortality infrastructure for both the host nation and the military.
- Primary care capabilities.
- Adequacy of secondary and tertiary hospital facilities.
- Access to the health care delivery and the availability of prosthetic and orthotic devises.
- Education and training rehabilitation programs.
- Adequacy of sanitation facilities.
- Acclimation of troops and deployed personnel.
- Increase in disease nonbattle injuries because of potential endemic diseases. Deploying forces may not be immune and the incidence may increase with disruption of services. The status of potable water and water sources should be evaluated.
- Status of immunization before deployment.
- Status of nutrition, fatigue, and morale of personnel in area of operations.
- Possibility of mass patients because CSS units are lucrative targets, areas experiencing an epidemic, or locations of population density in disaster relief operations.

b. **Army Forces Medical Intelligence Center:** AFMIC is the key medical communication network system for obtaining real-time information concerning the host nation medical threat. PEOs may generally be under strict troop-size constraints and operate with austere logistical support structure. A complete analysis of medical threat must be accomplished to prevent shortfalls in the provision of adequate health service support. These could include terrorist groups, insurgents, host nation forces, or other opposition groups or political factions in a particular host nation.

c. **Central Receiving Point:** This includes coordinating and implementing a central receiving point for supply distribution and management. This includes the availability of safe blood supply for US forces or establishing a blood procurement, processing, and banking system for the host nation or US backed group.

d. **Host Nation Support:** The availability of resources in the host nation plays a significant role in shaping CSS requirements of deployed force. Coordination with the host nation to support in the treatment of civilian casualties resulting from military operations should also be included.

e. **Evacuation Policy:** When limited US, allied, or coalition forces' health service elements are deployed in the area of operations, thorough planning and coordination is required to ensure medical evacuation resources are available for routine care and mass casualty. The evacuation policy (that is, ground, aeromedical, naval off-shore, and out-of-country) drives the evacuation and medical regulating systems. Consideration must also be given to assessing the medical evacuation system within the host nation. The theater evacuation policy must be established and coordination must be made to facilitate movement of patients out of the theater.

f. **Preventive Medicine:** These services are important in protecting deployed US forces as well as tools used to increase the quality of life of the host nation population or US-backed groups. Command emphasis on preventive measures should include the following:

- Monitoring and inspecting water production and distribution.
- Environmental health surveys and inspections conducted.
- Field sanitation inspection conducted.

g. **Veterinary Services:** The care and treatment of government-owned animals, food procurement, food inspection, and health care administration programs to increase the productivity and value of host nation livestock can be included.

h. **Medical Laboratory Services:** For US operational forces in support of PEOs, medical laboratory services may be provided outside the area of operations; therefore, coordinations for transportation of specimens and resulting reports must be established. Within the host nation, the considerations may include developing a medical laboratory system within the host nation military, or expanding the functions of existing laboratories to process environmental specimens or suspected chemical or biological agents.

i. **Dental Services:** CSS planners should ensure that emergency and sustaining dental care assets are task organized as part of health service support package. Dental support for allied and coalition forces may require additional dental assets due to differences in endemic diseases and dental care of these forces.

j. **Medical Supply, Optical, and Maintenance:** Medical supply and maintenance of biomedical equipment are crucial considerations in developing nations. Health service support planners must ensure that the medicines being used will be available to the people once US support is withdrawn. Additionally, the host nation must have trained technicians to operate medical equipment and must replace the equipment once it malfunctions.

k. **Command, Control and Communication:** Clear and concise lines of command must be established and military assistance must be provided in consonance with other agencies involved in the operation. In assessing the host nation military needs, the establishment of both command and technical channels for medical operations is essential. The availability and accessibility of communication equipment for health service support must be addressed up front during the mission analysis and estimate building processes. Health service support personnel may require additional radios or communication assets for unilateral and joint communication capabilities among difference forces (for example, allied, alliance, host nation) for medical support. Additionally, the availability of radios, televisions, and other forms of communications is a significant factor in developing training and educational programs focused on the populace.

SLIDE 19-26. FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection functions affect every aspect of PEOs. The ultimate objective of the CSS commanders is to accomplish the mission with no loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies. In PEOs, legitimacy is maintained by enforcing the policies of the sponsoring international organization with an even hand. However, peace agreements offer little protection from renewed factional fighting, random acts of violence, lawlessness, or terrorism. Soldiers face the prospect of confronting armed belligerents who only respond to the threat force. Because of this, CSS planners must ensure that the key functions of force protection are integrated and synchronized in their mission analysis, war-gaming and concept development processes. Because CSS units are normally the units least capable of

self-defense, they are also the targets of enemy actions. Time and effort used to defend themselves and support the total force degrades their ability to perform their primary mission. Coordination and clear lines of authority for force protection are crucial to the support for PEOs. Some of the critical functions that should be considered during PEOs include—

- Survivability of personnel and equipment.
- Battlefield hazard protection.
- Identification, friend or foe.
- Operational security.
- Physical security.
- Safety.
- Intelligence reporting and dissemination.
- ROE.

These functions play critical roles in the responsiveness and timeliness of logistics support for forces deployed for PEOs.

SLIDE 19-27. TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

Because of the political implications, intensity level of the factions, and possible transition to war, CSS units must be prepared to refocus training priorities. CSS commanders and staffs must be proactive and innovative in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for handling unique training requirements based upon METT-T. The subsequent list of training considerations is only a recommended list. It should be used as a reference only.

- Mines and booby traps.
- Reinforcing of vehicles.
- Convoy operations.
- Crew-served weapons.
- Negotiation procedures.
- ROE.
- Application of law.
- Field sanitation procedures.
- Media tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Training with NGOs and PVOs.
- Advanced communication systems.

SLIDE 19-28. TRANSITION OF SUPPORT

The Army, supported civilian, host nation, or coalition forces must agree up front on exactly when and how the Army will transfer responsibility for specific logistic functions. Because PEOs have well-defined goals and end-state objectives for maintenance and restoration of peace, logisticians must be proactive in planning transition functions for logistics operations. The key to successful end-state mission accomplishment requires a comprehensive, but flexible hand-off mission among the various logistics services and agencies.

a. Logistic functions performed by US Army elements may shift to—
- Another US service.
- An ally.
- UN or a regional alliance.
- Civilian authorities or contractors.

b. Transfers of functions require careful coordination among the parties. The following questions must be answered:
- What functions are involved?
- When the transfer is to take place?
- Whether any assets will accompany transfer?
- What are the standard requirements for support functions?
- Are there any other items peculiar to the particular situation?

c. CSS units accepting functions cannot assume equipment and supplies on hand will remain behind for their use.

SLIDE 19-29. LOGISTICS IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) evacuate civilian noncombatant and nonessential military personnel from locations in foreign (host) nation to a safe haven, preferably the United States.

The logistics support for NEO depends on the composition of the deployed force, number of personnel to be evacuated, time limitation, nature of the threat, and geographical aspect of the mission area. An NEO involves a force swiftly intervening to temporarily occupy an objective and follow with a planned rapid withdrawal; therefore, CSS operations are limited in scope and duration. The primary efforts of logistics support to an NEO is in preparing the strike force and strategic lift, intermediate staging bases or safe havens, and postevacuation operations.

Logistics units supporting NEOs are primarily organic to the supported forces and augmented by specific capabilities as required. Augmentation forces should provide specific medical, transportation, supply, service, or maintenance requirements that logistics unit organic to the deploying force base cannot provide.

SLIDE 19-30. PLANNING ASSISTANCE

In planning for NEOs, logisticians must use two essential documents for conducting their logistical preparation of area of operations. The first is the operation plan or contingency plan for emergency evacuation of citizens from the country or region in question. The document provides valuable background information about the geography and demography of the host nation. The second major document is the emergency action plan. This plan provides key information and answers the logisticians need to develop their logistics support concept. It has information on routes, assembly areas, helicopter landing zones, and a checklist for military assisted evacuation. These documents must be coordinated with commanders and staff leaders to develop a comprehensive, but flexible logistics support concept. During NEOs, all support operations are coordinated through a command and control cell called the evacuation control center.

Logistics planning in support of NEOs usually consists of the following phases:
- Predeployment.

- Deployment.
- Evacuation.
- Safe haven.
- Withdrawal.

SLIDE 19-31. PREDEPLOYMENT

The predeployment phase is a period of intense planning and preparation. Logistics planning during this phase consists of providing liaisons for the advance guard. Liaison consists of personnel, logistic, contracting, and transportation officers. The mission of the liaison team is to determine and coordinate the availability of medical facilities, host nation assistance, supplies (such as water and rations), and transportation assets, particular vehicles to transport the evacuees from assembly area to evacuation site. Because the advance party may be split into two groups (for example, embassy party and evacuation site party) during deployment, logisticians must tailor their assets to provide sustainment support. Sustainment support consists of limited medical (that is, combat life saver), maintenance, and transportation assets. Commercial or host nation transportation should be used when possible. However, the threat level may dictate the use of military aircraft that allows the advance party to carry additional equipment they need in setting up evacuation site and establishing communication and liaison.

SLIDE 19-32. DEPLOYMENT

Use of an intermediate staging base (ISB) during deployment provides the commander many advantages over deploying directly from home station. During this phase, logisticians are providing sustainment support to the ISB and assembly areas. Early deployment of liaison, logistics teams, and linguistic personnel in the area of operations are critical to achieve readiness and expedite sustainment operations. Logisticians supporting an ISB must know the size of the evacuation force, composition, mode of travel, itinerary before setting up support operations. The ISB force's composition depends on what support is required and what is already on-site at the ISB. This support consists of providing adequate facilities for billeting; messing; sanitation requirements; facilities for perishables; petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL); medical supplies; transportation and ammunition, if needed. Personnel service functions are critical during this phase. These functions consist of providing recreation facilities (for example, morale, welfare, and recreation) and religious support services use by ISB and evacuation forces (and evacuees if used as safe haven). Contracting for local services and supplies should be used to the maximum extent possible. However, the deploying forces and the logistics support elements should be self-sustaining. Maintenance repair and services for aircraft and communication equipment are critical during this phase. As established, modern military base is an ideal location for an ISB. Minimum considerations for an ISB include—

- Maintenance and services facilities for specific type of equipment.
- Security to include liaison with host nation police.
- Interpreters.
- Expanding facilities to house, feed, and process evacuees as well as any strike force units.

- Communication with the JTF, embassy, DOD, Department of State, and evacuation force.
- Medical support (US and host nation).
- Sanitation and comfort stations.
- Locations for rigging.
- Local transportation.
- Materials handling equipment.
- POL.
- Additional sources of electrical power.
- Laundry.
- Cots, bedding, crib.

Sample pallet configuration for NEO deployment is in Figure 19-2.

SLIDE 19-33. EVACUATION

Key planning for the evacuation phase consists of providing transportation assets to support the marshalling teams and evacuees; maintenance support teams for convoy operations; medical stations to support reception and marshalling teams operations and supply and services for the evacuees. The logistics officer must arrange, at a minimum, for the transportation from home base of the supplies critical to the evacuation. Contracting supplies and equipment should be used to the fullest extent possible. The logistics officer designates and supervises a purchasing officer, who locally procures any items the evacuation force needs but did not bring, or any item designated for local procurement as an economy measure.

SLIDE 19-34. SAFE HAVEN

The safe haven is a location designated by Department of State in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. It consists primarily of combat service support units with limited security forces to provide necessary internal and perimeter security. Five typical safe haven elements are—

- Command group.
- Reception team.
- Processing team.
- Comfort team.
- Scheduling team.

The key logistics organization and functions of these elements are as follows.

- The *command group* normally consists of the commander, executive officer, sergeant major, signal officer, chaplain, and interpreters. The commander is responsible for the operation of the safe haven. The XO, as his executive agent, commands the advance party (if used) and supervises the operation of the safe haven stations. The sergeant major advises the commander on all matter pertaining to enlisted soldiers to include their interaction with evacuees. The chaplain ministers to the spiritual needs of the force and evacuees and helps soldiers to deal with the stress and hardship created by the evacuation. The liaison officer or interpreters assist by maintaining contact with the embassy and host government.

- The *reception team* consists of a briefing section and a public affairs section. The briefing section briefs the evacuees on their arrival concerning the situation in the host nation, the description and operation of safe haven, further travel options and arrangements, customs requirements, and project departure times. The public affairs section provides information to the media if the embassy does not reserve this duty for itself. It exercises the following control over media activity in the safe haven:
  - Protect the privacy of evacuees.
  - Restrict the media from billeting areas.
  - Escorts media personnel in the safe-haven area.
- The *processing team* is organized into an administrative section; a legal section; a transportation section; and a medical section; and if required by the safe-haven government, a customs section. The administrative section registers and accounts for evacuees. It ensures all information required by the commander has been collected. The legal section advises evacuees on claims procedures and assists in relations between evacuees, soldiers, and safe haven country nationals. The transportation section arranges transport for DOD personnel and dependents to their final destination. The medical section examines evacuees and their records in enough detail to detect communicable diseases or other conditions requiring immediate medical attention. The section advises the commander on hygiene and preventive medicine and also inspects any food or water obtained from local sources. The section should be prepared to perform emergency surgery or coordinate with local hospitals for this eventuality.
- The *comfort team* provides logistics support for the safe haven operation. It is responsible for supplies, food, and transportation of the evacuees and the safe haven force.
- The *scheduling team* plans the departure of the evacuees from the safe haven. It coordinates with the transportation section for arrangements already made and comfort team for transportation to the point of embarkation. Logistics support during this phase consists of providing adequate supplies, billeting, rations, potable water, sanitation facilities, food, and local transportation for both the evacuees and the task force. A contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to assist in these responsibilities. Billeting is ideally accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or contracted from the save haven country. The force may be required, however, to establish a tent city. In this event, the safe haven force must arrive early enough to accomplish this before evacuees begin arriving and to contract locally for labor and sanitation facilities. Some of the critical logistics functions during this phase consist of providing personnel service support, civilian evacuee support, transportation, and medical support to evacuees and task force.

SLIDE 19-35. WITHDRAWAL

During the withdrawal phrase, the support element should depart first with all nonessential equipment. If the situation deteriorates, the commander can decide to leave nonessential equipment on the ground and evacuate the force.

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING CHECKLIST

This checklist is provided to assist logistics planners in preparing to meet the potential requirements of the mission. It applies to any mission including stability and support operations.

CONCEPT OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

How will supply, maintenance, transportation, personnel service support, health service support, and field service support be provided?

Which CSS elements provide the support? Are they adequate? Is there any excess capability?

Has the CSS planner developed the support to complement the tactical planning?

Have the terrain and enemy intelligence been analyzed to determine the impact on CSS?

Has the deployment flow been analyzed to determine the time-phasing for introduction of CSS elements?

Have request procedures for the initial phase of the operation been determined and identified?

Have procedures to centrally control resupply (both requests and receipts) been determined and identified for the second phase of the operation?

Have host nation support and logistics civilian augmentation program availability and its assurance of support been considered and identified? What support will host nation provide?

Has the host nation combat service support requirement been determined and is it available?

Are there provisions for local procurement and contracting service?

What support may be required for allies, other services, civilians, refugees, and detainees?

Have assets been designated for protection of the logistics base?

Is adequate supply and procedural guidance provided?

Is the flow of requisitions and materiel described?

Is a project code required: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Department of Army?

Is a temporary Force Activity Designator upgrade required?

Are in-country Department of Defense activity address code required such as "ship to" address (supply support activity or unit level)?

Is the Defense Automatic Addressing System aware of the communications routing identifier and Department of Defense activity address code to be used for processing direct requisitions and direct supply status?

Are direct support system or air lines of communication procedures described?

Are provisions made for contracting, local purchase, credit card support?

Is there a known or estimated order ship time?

Will automated or nonautomated procedures be used?

Do automated systems of supported units and task-organized CSS units have interface?

Have procedures for communication been established so that supply organizations can interface with the wholesale system?

Have the interservice support requirements been identified and coordinated with the applicable service?

What support is to be provided by the host ration, allies, or other services?

What intra-theater support is required?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist.

Are retrograde procedures for excess and unserviceable items spelled out?

Are provisions made for emergency resupply?

Have initial preplanned supply support and Army Materiel Command emergency support packages been considered?

Is the communications transceiving capability provided and compatible with the automated systems being deployed?

Are procedures described for cancellation or diversion of materiel in process or in transit at the termination of the operation or exercise?

Are chill and freeze reefer requirements for unit dining facilities and Class I supply point addressed?

Are EPW capture rates included in substance plans?

Is EPW field feeding available?

Are the sources of water fresh, brackish, or salty?

Is the source of local water systems surface or wells?

What are the well drilling requirements? Are there any existing wells? What is the quality of water from existing wells?

What type of water purification unit is required?

Are preventive medicine personnel available to approve water standards?

Are containers available in the event water is to be air dropped?

Will host nation provide ice?

What is the water planning factor in gallons per person per day?

What are the treatment or storage or distribution requirements? Are they satisfied by deploying unit capability?

What is the minimum residual storage required for units?

Are potable ice considerations covered? What is the requirement planning factor? Have the medical planners provided for certification of ice as potable?

Are requirements for individual clothing, CTA 50-900 items, and mission-essential consumables addressed?

Have provisions been made for the replacement of damaged personal clothing and chemical protective clothing?

Which self-service supply centers listing will be used as the basis for the Class II stockage?

How will the support element replenish organizational clothing and individual equipment and self-service supply center items?

Is there covered storage in the area of operations to protect supplies from the elements? If not, are shipments packed for outdoor storage?

Are material handling equipment requirements provided?

Has the Army Air Clearance Authority been advised of cargo tonnage projected for movement through the designated aerial port of embarkation?

Are provisions made for logistics support of civilians and prisoners of war? Has handling of EPWs and detainees been considered in terms of medical treatment, Sunday packs, security, holding areas, and evacuation?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

LOGISTICS

Supply

CLASS I:

Are the ration cycles proposed and described by phase?

Have fresh eggs; fresh fruits and vegetables; fresh meats; juices; unhomogenized milk; and canned soft drink supplements to the meals, ready-to-eat; T, B, and medical B ration meals been considered?

Do local fresh fruits and vegetables meet US standards and pass US Army veterinary inspection?

What method of distribution will be used (unit distribution or supply point distribution)?

Have unitized operational rations been considered for ease of handling and accountability?

What procedures have been set up for cash collection from VIPs, visitors, and personnel authorized separate rations?

Are bakery supplements to MRE, T and B ration meals considered?

Is the number of available veterinary personnel adequate for the subsistence support requirements?

Are hospital rations addressed?

Are food service support procedures covered?

Are there any items that require special consideration, such as tentage, tentage repair kits?

Folding cots?

Insect bars with mosquito netting?

Banding material and tools?

Water purification chemicals, test kits?

Insect repellent, sunscreen?

Laundry or bath supplies, hospital laundry supplies?

Dining facility supplies, paper and plastic items?

Trash disposal supplies?

Pest management equipment and supplies?

Latrine supplies?

Batteries?

Cold weather clothing and equipment?

NBC protection and decontamination equipment?

EPW enclosures (tentage, barriers, and building materials for towers)?

Have distribution procedures for maps been addressed?

CLASS VI:

Are the deploying personnel provided guidance on personal demand items?

Are sundry packs available?

If tactical field exchange support is required—

Has headquarters AAFES (Plans) been notified?

Have the tactical field exchange staffing, stock assortment, security, facility, transportation, and communications requirements been identified and coordinated?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

Is finance support for the tactical field exchange identified?

Has the policy on rationing and check cashing been determined?

Field Services

Are laundry, clothing exchange and bath, and renovation requirements addressed?

Have graves registration support and evacuation channels in and out of theater been planned commensurate with the expected requirement?

Has service executive agent for mortuary affairs support been identified?

Is fire protection provided at aviation, ammunition, and petroleum sites?

Are field bakery services required? Can the host nation satisfy the requirement?

Are procedures for trash collection and disposal covered?

Are there provisions for local procurement or contracting of field services?

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

Medical Operations

Has the information from the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center been requested concerning the host nation medical threat?

Has medical planning been integrated into overall operational planning?

Are medical tasks, functions, and responsibilities clearly identified?

Have contingency blood requirements been identified?

Have medical professional filler system requirements been identified?

Have medical evacuation policy and procedures been identified and disseminated down to company level?

Have aeromedical evacuation aircraft been considered in the aviation logistics support planning?

Have requirements and procedures for theater and strategic aeromedical evacuation been arranged? Have primary and secondary aeromedical airfields been identified?

Have health service support requirements for US nationals, prisoners, detainees, refugees, and other indigenous personnel been considered and identified?

Have medical base development requirements been identified in accordance with FM 8-55?

Have "out-of-country" medical evacuation resources and requirements been identified?

When appropriate, have naval off-shore surgical and medical capabilities been considered and coordinated to augment land-based force requirements?

Have joint communications and flight navigation aid frequencies been coordinated to allow aeromedical aircraft to locate and operate with naval off-shore medical and surgical capabilities?

Have host nation support medical capabilities been considered and support requirements coordinated?

Are preventive medicine personnel available to monitor water production and distribution? Are they available to perform environmental health surveys and inspections?

Are veterinary service personnel available to perform inspections of Class I supplies and storage facilities?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

CLASS VIII:

Are procedures unique to medical supply (Class VIII) described?

Are Class VIII resupply procedures established?

Have communications procedures been established so medical supply organizations may interface with the wholesale system?

Are maintenance parts lists or prescribed load lists requirements specified?

Are Class VIII authorized stockage list objectives addressed?

Are special medical equipment and supply requirements identified based on medical mission and the area of operations?

Are provisions and medical standby equipment program procedures addressed?

Are special storage requirements for Class VIII satisfied?

Is the disposal of damaged or salvaged medical supplies addressed?

Have procedures for disposal of contaminated waste been identified?

Are medical oxygen and other medical gases requirements, such as anesthesia, identified and resupply procedures established?

Is local purchase an option?

PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT

Personnel

Are all authorized personnel spaces filled? If not, has action been taken to fill spaces?

Have nondeployable soldiers been reassigned?

Does the deploying unit require personnel augmentation?

Have all soldiers completed preparation for overseas movement?

Have family care plans been completed?

Are sufficient quantities of forms and office supplies on hand?

To what extent will personnel administration services be provided within the area of operations?

Have provisions for handling mail been established?

What morale, welfare, and recreation support will be provided?

Finance

Are provisions made for the types of finance support required? What unit will provide support?

Have Class A agents been appointed? Has the servicing finance officer been informed of the appointments?

Have all soldiers completed preparation for overseas movement to include check address, provisions for support of family members while deployed and receipt of information concerning impact of deployment on their pay?

Is finance support available to the contracting officer?

Have contracting and ordering officers and advanced pay fund cashiers received instructions concerning interface and coordination with the servicing finance unit or element?

Are combat payments authorized? Has dollar value been established by task force commander?

Public Affairs

Has support of public affairs office staff been coordinated?

Has coordination with civil affairs element taken place?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

Has relationship with other staff members been established?

What communication systems will be used?

Is religious support available?

Are unit ministry teams deployed with unit supported?

Is the unit ministry team adequately staffed to support all denomination services of soldiers deployed?

Do unit ministry teams have information on local religion?

Is legal support available?

INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW:

Have soldiers received law of war training as required by regulation and treaty?

Have soldiers and commanders received training on rules of engagement and code of conduct?

Have operations and contingency plans been reviewed for compliance with domestic and international law?

Are there any international agreements that need to be negotiated before deployment of US forces?

CLAIMS:

Are members for foreign claims commissions available for appointment by the Commander, US Army Claims Service?

Do any international agreements govern claims responsibilities for the country to which forces will deploy?

LEGAL ASSISTANCE:

Has coordination been made with the G4 to ensure that provisions are made for disposition of personal property, including automobiles, for those that are deploying?

Have all deploying soldiers and their family members had their personal legal affairs addressed by a legal assistance officer? Do they have all necessary legal documents including wills and powers of attorney?

CONTRACT LAW:

Do all operation plans provide for the procurement of necessary supplies and services from local sources?

Is adequate legal support available to the contracting officer?

Are there or should there be status of forces agreements, mutual support agreements, or other base right agreements that address procurement of locally available goods and services or host nation support?

CRIMINAL LAW:

Are all deploying soldiers assigned or attached to a deploying unit for Uniform Code of Military Justice purposes?

Does a status of forces agreement exist or have arrangements been made for exclusive criminal jurisdiction over United States personnel?

Have necessary arrangements been made with accused, respondents, witnesses, and court members in cases affected by deployment?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS
Transportation

GENERAL:

Is there a requirement for the area oriented depot to arrange for special assignment airlift mission to expedite cargo distribution to the area of operations?

Are there transportation support systems for Direct Support System or air lines of communication described?

Does the deploying force have the authorized, assigned, and available trained personnel and equipment to accomplish its mission?

Do the deploying forces require augmentation?

What are sea lines of communication requirements? Can containers be used with carrier delivery direct to supply support activity?

Are staging areas adjacent to the seaport of debarkation or airport of debarkation available to support port clearance operations?

What type and number of terminal transfer and movement control units will be required (rail, highway, port, airfield)?

Have material handling equipment requirements been addressed?

What ports are available? What is the access to and from ports? Is oceanographic data available? What special port clearance requirements apply?

Will engineer port construction company augmentation be required?

Are the transportation movement priority and account codes provided?

What is the weather impact on ports, airfields, and highway nets?

What is the availability of Defense Intelligence Agency data and analysis regarding the country and area transportation infrastructure?

What are the transportation funding arrangements?

Are transportation account codes requirements specified?

Are in-country highway, rail, air, and inland waterway mode requirements addressed?

Are seaport of debarkation and embarkation and airport of debarkation and embarkation specified?

Is a movement system for personnel and cargo specified? Intratheater? Intertheater? In-country?

Has coordination been made with United States Transportation Command for personnel and equipment movements?

Has the Major Army Command Special Assignment Airlift Mission validating headquarters been specified?

Has the use of foreign flag sealift or airlift been addressed?

Is a cutoff date for changes to automated unit list or automated unit equipment list specified?

Have movement control responsibilities been clearly delineated?

Will a movement control center or joint movement control center be deployed?

Have sufficient movement control assets been provided early in deployment flow?

Are there any special transportation requirements; for example, Army aircraft to self-deploy?

Are procedures for shipping supplies and equipment that arrive at home station after the unit(s) have deployed addressed?

What support can be provided by the host nation and other services?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

Have nonmedical transportation assets been designated or included in the plan to supplement dedicated medical evacuation resources?

Have movement requirements been identified by mode?

Have transportation priorities been identified for each phase of operation?

LOGISTICS OVER THE SHORE:

Will a logistics over the shore operations be required?

What shorelines are conducive to logistics over the shore operations?

What are the characteristics of the shorelines?

What type of roads access the shorelines?

What type of railroads access the shorelines?

What contract civilian or host nation personnel, equipment assets, and repair facilities are available to assist in logistics over the shorelines operations?

INLAND WATERWAYS:

What inland waterways are available?

What are the characteristics of the inland waterways?

What inland terminals are along the waterways?

What are the characteristics and capabilities of the inland terminals?

What is the present usage of the inland waterways?

What effect does the weather have on the inland waterways?

How accessible are the inland waterways to roads and rail lines?

What are the capabilities and limitations of the inland waterways?

INTERCOASTAL SHIPPING:

What intercoastal shipping assets are available to support military operations?

What intercoastal shipping routes are currently in use?

Are coastal lines of communication required? Army freight ship? landing craft? barges?

Are there coastal restrictions?

CONTAINERS:

What is the container policy?

What contract civilian or host nation personnel and equipment assets are available to assist intermodal operations?

What is the capability of units to handle container shipments?

What is the capability of ports to handle containers?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

FIXED PORTS:

What fixed ports are available to support military marine terminal operations?

What are the characteristics and capabilities of the fixed ports?

What type and quantities of material handling equipment are available for use in support of military marine terminal operations?

How many berths and anchorages will be available for use in support of military marine terminal operations?

What kind of port security measures are in use?

What is the port's capability to handle containerized cargo?

What is the port's capability to handle roll on and roll off cargo?

What routes access the ports? Is oceanographic data available? Are there any special port clearance requirements?

What land routes and inland waterways access the port?

What is the current throughput capability of the port?

What are the characteristics and capabilities of the port's warehouse facilities and storage area?

What effect does weather and the sea have on port operations?

What contract civilian or host nation marine terminal personnel and equipment assets are available to support military terminal operations?

What is the present level of usage of the ports?

What capability do the government or local civilian contractors have to repair damage to port facilities?

AIRFIELDS:

What airfields are available to support military operations? What are their capabilities?

Have the departure airfield control group or alternate departure airfield control group requirements been satisfied?

Has a coordinating headquarters been designated for CSS airlift support?

Has support been planned for USAF Mobile Aeromedical staging facilities?

What are the personnel and cargo reception capabilities of the airfield?

What contract civilian or host nation personnel and equipment assets are available to assist in departure airfield control group or alternate departure airfield control group operations?

Has a military organization been specified for departure airfield control group or alternate?

What airfield facilities are available for military use during departure airfield control group or alternate operations?

Does the airfield have published instrument flight rules approaches?

Have the Military Airlift Command channel airlift requirements been specified?

MAIN SUPPLY ROUTES AND ALTERNATE SUPPLY ROUTES:

Is the highway net described? What are the capabilities and limitations?

What are the convoy restrictions?

What routes are available to support military operations?

What are the most likely routes for refugee traffic?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

What are the characteristics and capabilities of the routes available to support military operations?

What are the dimensions of tunnels along the routes?

What are the dimensions and classifications of bridges along the routes?

What capabilities does the government have to repair damaged segments of routes?

What engineer support is required to maintain the main supply routes?

What segments of the routes are heavily used by the civilian populace?

What is the best source for additional information on the routes?

RAIL:

What rail lines are available to support military operations? What are schedules and capability?

What is the gauge of the tracks?

What effect does the weather have on rail operations?

What rail assets will be available to support military operations?

What is the condition of the rail lines?

What capability does the government or local civilian contractors have to repair damaged track, bridges, and tunnels?

What are the characteristics and capabilities of the rail terminals and marshalling yard?

What is the present level of usage of the rail lines?

What is the description (model number, wheel arrangement, horsepower, weight, tractive effort, and type coupler) of typical line haul locomotives and switch engines currently in service in the area of operations?

Is the track profile of the main line indicating the location, percent, and length of ruling grade available?

Is a view of the plan that shows the location and length of minimum radius curves together with any sections of multiple mainline track available?

What are the location and length of passing tracks on the main line?

What is the current level of traffic (trains per day) using the main line in the area of operations?

What are the location, type, and capacity of rail yards in the area of operation?

What is the length of track in each yard?

What are the location; description (type, construction, length, clearances, and cooper rating); and condition of rail, bridges, and tunnels on the main line?

What are the location, storage capacity, and condition of locomotive fueling facilities in the area of operations?

What are the location and quality of water supply on the main line?

What type of communications and signals are in use for train operation?

What are the type and location of the power sources required for operation of communications and signal?

What are the location, description, and condition of station facilities supporting the operation of the main line?

Are loading ramps available at rail yards and terminals?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

What are the location, capacity, and condition of engine houses and car repair shop facilities in the area of operations?

What type of wheel bearings are predominantly used on rolling stock?

What are the location and lifting capacity of railway cranes in the area of operations?

What are the weight (pound per yard) of mainline rail and the predominant type of crossties used in the area of operations?

AIRDROP:

Are any airdrop requirements identified?

Are there other provisions for strategic airdrop resupply?

Has an airdrop support unit been identified?

Are prerigged (airdrop) supplies available from the CONUS base?

Are units familiar with contents of the prerigged supplies and call-forward procedures?

Are procedures established for the Air Force to identify and report on loads not dropped in the drop zone and their disposition?

Is sufficient rigging material available for airdrop?

SUPPLY

CLASS III:

Will a single fuel concept be made?

Are the service(s) requirements by location in gallons per day for each type product established for each phase of the operation?

Is the use of contractor provided bulk fuels considered?

Have the Defense Fuel Supply Center and US army General Materiel Petroleum Activity been notified of the requirement?

Are ordering or accountable officer requirements addressed?

Has aircraft refueling been considered?

Have fuels available in the deployment area been identified?

Will fuel changes require equipment filters to be changed?

Are existing pipeline distribution systems available? What are the pipeline and storage capabilities?

Are port facilities available?

Are Army oil analysis program laboratories addressed?

Are remote refueling sites required? What are their capabilities?

Are interservice support billing and reimbursement procedures specified?

Are quality assurance representative responsibilities established?

Are petroleum, oils, and lubricants quality surveillance procedures specified? Are required test kits on hand?

Is there a petroleum laboratory available?

Are any unique fittings required?

Are additives required for commercial fuels? Who will provide?

Are any unique package product requirements addressed?

Are industrial gasses addressed?

Are containers available in the event Class III must be airdropped?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

CLASS IV:

Are unique requirements for construction and security materiels addressed?

Is in-country procurement considered?

Have Army Class IV data sources been queried on preexisting data bases and studies describing locally available construction materiels?

Are basic loads to be deployed?

Do the nonengineer units have basic loads? Will they be deployed?

Will the use of pre-positioned materiel stocks (if available) be permitted?

CLASS V:

Is unit basic load deployment adequately addressed?

Is the Class V support structure prescribed?

Are there special requirements (flares, mines, demolition, or ADA missiles)?

Are requirements identified by category of munitions (conventional, missile, chemical, or nuclear)?

Have site improvement and construction of ammunition storage facilities been included in the engineer planning?

What are the required supply rate and controlled supply rate?

Have equipment support procedures been addressed?

Have the storage, handling, shipping, security, and safety requirements been reviewed and addressed in the planning?

Are consumption rates of munitions for each phase of the operation addressed?

Are special permits needed or provided?

Have unit configured loads been considered?

Have procedures for retrograde of unserviceable US and captured ammunition items been established? Have packing materials to support this operation been planned for?

Have training ammunition requirements for reconstruction been ordered?

CLASS VII:

Does the plan specify the equipment level for deploying units?

Are equipment redistribution requirements specified? Have distribution priorities been identified for each phase of the operation?

Are procedures for replacement of salvage equipment specified?

Are special equipment requirements addressed?

Are equipment issue and exchange procedures from operational readiness float stocks addressed?

CLASS IX:

Are prescribed load list requirements specified? Logistical resupply vehicle requirements?

Are authorized stockage list requirements including equipment specified?

Have transfer of accountability for authorized stockage list been addressed?

Will density of equipment drive augmentation package?

Will reconstruction of push packages be necessary?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

Are support for low-density equipment addressed?

Are cannibalization procedures addressed?

Are requirements for special nonexpendable components addressed?

What are the Aviation Intensive Management Items requirements and procedures?

Is the control of aviation intensively managed items addressed?

Is a stockage of major assemblies addressed?

Have special storage requirements been addressed for dry batteries, classified repair parts, or high-dollar pilferable?

Is procedure for disposal of hazardous materiels, such as lithium batteries and radio active residue, specified?

Has coordination for communication with depots and national inventory control points been provided?

MAINTENANCE

Who and where will the logistics assistance officer be?

Does the plan describe how unit, direct support, and general support maintenance will be performed?

Are special medical maintenance requirements addressed?

Are aviation intermediate maintenance or aviation unit maintenance aspects addressed?

Is missile maintenance support available in the area of operations?

Are test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment repair and calibration addressed?

Are procedures for Army Oil Analysis Program specified? How will equipment be classified for the program?

Are there provisions for Army Materiel Command logistics assistance representative support?

Are reparable maintenance, operational readiness float, and equipment cannibalization procedure addressed? Is authorization for cannibalization and controlled exchange addressed?

Have extreme weather aspects been considered (heat, cold, humidity, or dust)?

Are special power requirements for maintenance facilities identified (voltage, phase, frequency, stability, and anticipated load in kilowatts)?

Are building suitability screening factors identified by type of maintenance facility (minimum height and width for doors, floor load-bearing requirements, environmental control necessities)?

Have equipment density lists for the planned operation been reviewed to determine proper task organization of maintenance resources and to meet low-density equipment maintenance requirements?

How will repairs under warranty be performed in the area of operations?

Is the evacuation of unserviceable reparable equipment addressed?

Have procedures for replacing maintenance tools and equipment been specified?

Have site security and storage requirements been identified and included in engineer plans?

SUSTAINMENT ENGINEERING

What area restoration is required?

Is fire protection available or needed?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

What lines of communication construction and repair are required?

What construction support is required?

What are the facilities requirements to support the CSS systems?

Have requirements been incorporated into the engineer planning?

Can any of the facility requirements be satisfied by host nation facilities?

Is site preparation required?

Are site security and storage requirements identified and included in engineer plans?

MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT

What is the status of refugees or detainees in the host nation?

What type of military police support is required?

MISCELLANEOUS

Are host country military personnel with experience in US military service schools identified?

Have arrangements been made with customs?

Is lice removal support required?

Is transportation and waste disposal covered?

What are the funding aspects of the support to be provided?

Have all requirements been priced?

Has an account processing code been established?

What is the electrical power or cycles of the country? Are transformers required?

Are the communications to support CSS operations provided for in the communications planning?

Have communication frequencies been declared with the host nation?

Are there adequate provisions in the plan for contracting and local purchase support?

Has an adequate number of contracting officers with a warrant been provided?

Have all appropriate CSS units appointed ordering officers?

Are linguists available to support the contracting and local purchase requirements?

Are there provisions in the plan for maneuver damage resulting from CSS operations? Are phone books for the country or local area available?

Are special Department of Agriculture cleaning requirements for retrograde equipment identified?

Have EOD requirements been considered in training, personnel, and equipment?

Are EOD control, reporting, and support procedures addressed?

AUTOMATION SUPPORT

Are automated systems procedures addressed?

Have backup master files been established and prepared for shipment separate from the primary master files? Have site selection and preparation for automated equipment been considered for accessibility, location, terrain, and security requirements?

Has a continuity of operations plan been established?

Are sufficient copies of user manuals on hand and are they current?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

Are repair parts on hand and up to required levels for the computer hardware including generators and other subsystems?

Have provisions been made for backup support for repair parts, hardware maintenance, and the receipt of software change packages and emergency change messages?

Have arrangements been made for telephonic assistance (functional and technical) after deployment?

Has coordination been made with the next higher supply support activity for catalog update, reconciliation schedule, and loading of supported unit Department of Defense activity address codes?

Have details been worked out for transmission of documents to higher echelons?

Have appropriate parameter changes been made in the automated system(s)?

Will customer units require training and are customer user manuals available for automated system support?

Has the terrain manager been established for each phase of the operation?

Has internal security been addressed?

Who provides security response force?

Are procedures specified and do units have the equipment necessary for cleaning of equipment for redeployment to meet US Department of Agriculture requirements to enter CONUS?

Are procedures for salvage collection and evacuation identified?

Figure 19-1. Deployment planning checklist (continued).

SAMPLE PALLET CONFIGURATIONS FOR NEO DEPLOYMENT

Pallets are configured to support deployment and initial needs for a small evacuation and follow-on requirements for an extended evacuation.

Three pallets (first echelon) deploy with the evacuation force. They build the evacuation control center, allow a self-sufficient ECC to rapidly set up and perform its mission for 12 hours, and provide personal support for 100 evacuees for up to 12 hours.

Two pallets (follow-on) are on call. They allow the ECC to process, support, and hold up to 2,900 personnel (no more than 500 at one time) over a six-day period. The pallets are configured as follows.

PALLET 1 (First Echelon)

QUANTITY	ITEM
3	General-purpose medium tents with poles and pegs
8	Six-foot tables
6	Sledge hammers
12	Mattocks
6	Axes
6	D-handle shovels
6	Machetes
10	Rolls engineer tape
40	Rolls concertina
3,000	Sandbags
100	Long pickets
100	Short pickets
3	Picket pounders

PALLET 2 (First Echelon)

QUANTITY	ITEM
3	General-purpose tents with poles and pegs
1	Box of blank forms
	500 Evacuee data cards
	5 Boxes, manila folders
	500 Waivers of Evacuation Opportunity
	500 Waivers of Claims for Damages and Injury
	500 Baggage tags
	100 Suspected Law of Land Warfare Violation Reports
	500 Evacuee Information Cards
	100 ECC evacuation registers
1	Box of office supplies:
	5 Boxes, magic markers
	10 Rolls, 1,000 feet per roll tape
	5 Boxes, pens (dozen each)
	5 Boxes, pencils (dozen each)
	10 Staplers with staples
	10 Three-hole punches
	5 Rulers
	2 Boxes, felt tip pens
	5 Clipboards
	1 Receipt book
16	Lanterns, propane
2	Metal detectors (handheld)
4	Bullhorns
24	Cone flashlights
1	Package, construction paper
50	Boxes, chemical lights
1	SB-22 switchboard
8	TA-312 field phones
2	Commercial telephones

Figure 19-2. Sample pallet configurations for NEO deployment.

PALLET 2
(First Echelon) (continued)

QUANTITY	ITEM
8	Reels, DR-8 wire
10	Boxes, BA-3030 batteries
5	Five-gallon fuel cans
1	1.5-kw AC generator
1	Light set
1	Roll, acetate
2	Map boards
10	Boxes, Rimtex heavy-duty oil and solvent wipers
100	Trash bags
2	VS-17 panels
2	Footlockers
32	Propane bottles, 14-ounce

PALLET 3
(First Echelon)

QUANTITY	ITEM
50	Cots
50	Poly pads
100	Blankets
10	Cases, baby formula
10	Disposable baby bottle kits
5	Boxes, disposable diapers
50	Rolls, toilet paper
10	Boxes, feminine hygiene pads
2	Cases, paper cups (1,000 each case)
25	Five-gallon water cans
20	Cases, MREs
50	Folding chairs

PALLET 3
(First Echelon)(continued)

QUANTITY	ITEM
10	Hygiene packets:
	Toothpaste (1 tube)
	Toothbrush (1)
	Comb (1)
	Bar, soap (1)
	Wash cloth (1)
	Wash basin, small (1)
5	Toilets, small portable
250	Earplugs (pairs)
20	Handcuffs, string
1	Carpenter's tool kit
1	Box, nails (5 pounds)
1	Roll, canvas (2 yards x 20 yards)

PALLET 4
(Follow-up)

QUANTITY	ITEM
400	Poly pads
400	Blankets
10	Cases, baby formula
20	Boxes, disposable diapers
200	Rolls, toilet paper
10	Cases, paper cups (1,000 each case)
25	Five-gallon water cans
250	Folding chairs
20	Hygiene packets:
	Toothpaste (1 tube)
	Toothbrush (1)
	Comb (1)

Figure 19-2. Sample pallet configurations for NEO deployment (continued).

PALLET 4

(Follow-up) (continued)

QUANTITY	ITEM
	Bar, soap (1)
	Wash cloth (1)
	Wash basin, small (1)
5	Toilets, small portable
2,750	Earplugs (pairs)
1	Field sanitation kit
20	2-in x 4 x 9 6-in lumber
1	Roll, canvas (2 yards x 20 yards)

PALLET 5

(Follow-on)

QUANTITY	ITEM
5	General-purpose medium tents with poles and pegs
1	Box of blank forms
2,500	Personnel data cards
25	Boxes, manila folders (100 each)
2,500	Liability waivers
2,500	Baggage tags
1	Box of office supplies
5	Boxes, magic markers (dozen each)
10	Rolls, 1,000 feet per roll tape
5	Boxes, pens (dozen each)
5	Boxes, pencils (dozen each)
2	Boxes, paper tablets (dozen each)
10	Staplers with staples
10	Three-hole punches
5	Rulers
2	Boxes, felt tip pens (dozen each)
5	Clipboards
1	Receipt book

PALLET 5

(Follow-on) (continued)

QUANTITY	ITEM
10	Lanterns
50	Boxes, chemical lights (blue, green, red)
10	Boxes, Rimtex heavy-duty oil and solvent wipers (150)
500	Trash bags
20	Propane bottles, 14-ounce

Figure 19-2. Sample pallet configurations for NEO deployment (continued).

LOGISTICS IN PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

- BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS AND PRINCIPLES SAME AS WAR
- CHARACTERISTICS MAY BE DIFFERENT BUT THE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS ARE UNIVERSAL
- KEY PREREQUISITES IN RESPONSE AND SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE ADAPTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY
- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PRINCIPLE PLAYERS
- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNERS ARE KEY TO MISSION SUCCESS
- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNERS MUST BROADEN THEIR FOCUS—TACTICAL LEVEL OF SUSTAINMENT AND ENCOMPASS BOTH OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC LEVELS
- KEY CHALLENGE FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IS READINESS

SLIDE 19-1

ENVIRONMENT

- POTENTIAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRICTIONS
- INADEQUATE LOCAL LOGISTICS AND HEALTH SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE
- LOCAL AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE DIMINISHED CAPABILITIES:
  - SUPPLIES
  - FACILITIES
  - UTILITIES
  - SERVICES
  - TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
- EXISTING LOCAL FACILITIES MAY NOT MEET UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS
- PORTS
  - AIRFIELDS
  - COMMUNICATION NETWORK SYSTEMS

SLIDE 19-2

LOGISTIC PLANNERS

- IDENTIFY CLEAR COMMAND LINES AND OPEN COMMUNICATION LINES
- IDENTIFY AND PREPARE BASES OF OPERATION
- SELECT AND IMPROVE LINES OF COMMUNICATION
- IDENTIFY POTENTIAL SUPPLY SOURCES
- NEGOTIATE HOST NATION AGREEMENTS
- FORECAST AND BUILD OPERATIONAL STOCK ASSET FORWARD AND AFLOAT
- PLAN LOGISTICS BASE LINES OF COMMUNICATION SECURITY
- DEVELOP REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACT SUPPORT
- IDENTIFY MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT/ROUGH TERRAIN CARGO HAULER EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS
- CONDUCT MISSION ANALYSIS:
  —GATHER FACTS ON MISSION STATEMENT
  —END-STATE OBJECTIVE
- DENSITY OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
- TASK ORGANIZATION
- CONDUCT AREA OPERATION STUDIES:
  —DEMOGRAPHICS
  —AIRFIELD
  —RAIL AND PORT
  —INFRASTRUCTURE
- CONDUCT TERRAIN ANALYSIS TO IDENTIFY THE AVAILABILITY, ACCESSIBILITY, TRAFFICABILITY, AND FORCE PROTECTION OF LOGISTICS RESOURCES
- CONDUCT WEATHER ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS ON SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING (CRITICAL ELEMENT FOR PLANNING)
- DETERMINE ENEMY ACTIONS AND ACTIVITIES
- ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION NETWORK SYSTEM

SLIDE 19-3

SUPPLY

- EARLY SUSTAINMENT OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
- AUTOMATED SYSTEM IMPERATIVE
- COMPATIBILITY OF SYSTEMS IS KEY TO LINK
- CLEAR COMMAND LINES AND OPEN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK ARE ESSENTIAL—"WHO SUPPORT WHOM FOR WHAT"
- CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF CLASSES OF SUPPLIES
- EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF LIAISON AND LINGUIST SUPPORT
- RESUPPLY METHODS
- REHEARSING KEY LOGISTICS ACTIONS AND FUNCTIONS ARE ESSENTIAL TO MISSION SUCCESS

CLASS I SUPPLY

- PLAN TO HAVE UNITED STATES ARMY VETERINARY INSPECTORS IN-COUNTRY EARLY TO ENSURE HOST NATION SUPPORT PERISHABLE FOOD MEETS OR PASSES UNITED STATES STANDARDS
- PLAN REQUIREMENTS FOR HELPING TO FEED THE HOST NATION CIVILIAN AND MILITARY POPULATIONS
- ENSURE SUNDRY PACKAGES ARE AVAILABLE (THAT IS, TYPE I AND II)
- IDENTIFY REEFER REQUIREMENTS FOR UNIT DINING FACILITIES AND CLASS I SUPPLY POINT
- DIVIDE THE OPERATIONAL RATIONS IN UNITS FOR EASE OF HANDLING AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF SUPPLIES

SLIDE 19-5

CLASS II SUPPLY

- ORGANIZATIONAL CLOTHING AND INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT: DEPLOY WITH LIMITED CENTRALIZED EXCHANGE CAPABILITY TO REPLACE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED ITEMS
- CENTRAL ISSUE FACILITY: DEPLOY WITH LIMITED CENTRALIZED EXCHANGE CAPABILITY TO REPLACE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED ITEMS
- SELF-SERVICE SUPPLY CENTER: DEPLOY WITH CENTRALIZED EXCHANGE CAPABILITY TO REPLACE CONSUMED ITEMS
- MAPS AVAILABILITY
- LAUNDRY AND BATH SUPPLIES, HOSPITAL LAUNDRY SUPPLIES
- WATER PURIFICATION, CHEMICAL, TEST KITS AVAILABILITY

CLASS III SUPPLY

- FUEL TESTING CAPABILITY AND AVAILABILITY NEEDS TO BE IN THEATER AT THE LOWEST LEVEL
- SPECIFIC GUIDANCE AND POLICY FOR DISPOSITION OF CONTAMINATED FUEL
- RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND INTEROPERABILITY OF FUEL AMONG HOST NATION, ALLIED, AND COALITION FORCES
- ADDITIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE USE OF COMMERCIAL FUEL AND THE PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING SUCH ITEMS
- ORDERING AND ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERED FOR INTERSERVICE SUPPORT BILLING AND REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES
- SINGLE CLASS III MANAGER IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

SLIDE 19-7

CLASS IV SUPPLY

- PRE-POSITION PREFERRED METHOD
- ESTABLISH PRIORITIES:
  - FORCE PROTECTION
  - QUALITY OF LIFE
  - FIELD SANITATION

CLASS V SUPPLY

- ESTABLISH A THEATER MATERIEL MANAGEMENT CENTER TYPE CELL FOR MANAGEMENT
- ESTABLISH STOCKAGE OBJECTIVES
- ESTABLISH A NONSTANDARD UNIT BASIC LOAD
- ENSURE QUALITY CONTROL PERSONNEL ARE IN THEATER EARLY FOR SURVEILLANCE AND INSPECTIONS
- ESTABLISH CONTROL SUPPLY RATE AND REQUIRED SUPPLY RATE
- ESTABLISH POLICIES FOR STORAGE, HANDLING, SHIPPING, SECURITY, AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
- REQUEST ANY SPECIAL PERMITS REQUIRED
- IDENTIFY POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING TRAINING AMMUNITION FOR REHEARSALS

SLIDE 19-9

CLASS VI SUPPLY

- GUIDANCE PROVIDED TO DEPLOYING PERSONNEL ON PERSONAL DEMAND ITEMS
- TACTICAL FIELD EXCHANGE REQUIRED
- AAFES COORDINATION MADE
- POLICY ON RATIONING AND CHECK CASHING ESTABLISHED

CLASS VII SUPPLY

- IDENTIFY ISSUES AND EXCHANGE POLICY AND PROCEDURES
- IDENTIFY UP FRONT TO-ACCOMPANY-TROOP ITEMS
- IDENTIFY DISTRIBUTION PRIORITIES AND REDISTRIBUTION REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES
- ADDRESS GUIDANCE AND POLICY FOR LOANING EQUIPMENT TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND CONTRACTORS

SLIDE 19-11

CLASS VIII SUPPLY

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IDENTIFIED FOR—

- DISPOSAL OF CONTAMINATED WASTE
- DISPOSAL OF DAMAGED AND SALVAGED SUPPLIES
- LOCAL PURCHASE OF SUPPLIES
- BLOOD REQUISITIONING
- ADDITIONAL STOCKAGE OF SUPPLIES

CLASS IX SUPPLY

- PLAN AND CONSIDER PROVIDING REPAIR PARTS TO SUPPORT COALITION OR ALLIED FORCES
- CONSIDER SUPPORT ASSETS FROM OUT OF THEATER
- ESTABLISH POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
- TAILOR DEPLOYED PRESCRIBED LOAD LIST AND AUTHORIZED STOCKAGE LIST TO THE TYPE AND DENSITY OF EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT
- ESTABLISH A SINGLE REPAIR PART SUPPLY SYSTEM
- ENSURE AUTOMATION HARDWARE IS COMPATIBLE
- ESTABLISH COMMUNICATION LINK WITH DEPOTS AND NATIONAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINTS
- ADDRESS CANNIBALIZATION PROCEDURES
- RECONSTRUCT PUSH PACKAGES BASED ON FORCE STRUCTURE DENSITY

SLIDE 19-13

KEY ORGANIZATIONS FOR COORDINATING LOGISTICS SUPPORT

- CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM SERVES AS A POINT OF INTERFACE OR LIAISON OFFICER WITH COUNTRY MILITARY OR CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION
- UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS HAS THE LARGEST RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT TO AN UNSPONSORED FORCE
- KEY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS
- FIELD OFFICER OF THE DAY:
  - NEGOTIATES LOCAL PURCHASE AGREEMENT
  - NEGOTIATES FOR TRANSPORTATION ASSETS
  - PLANS THE SUPPORT STRUCTURE
- CHIEF ADMINISTRATION OFFICER:
  - LOCAL PURCHASE
  - FINANCE ARRANGEMENTS
  - LIFT PRIORITY
- CHIEF LOGISTICS OFFICER:
  - OPERATES AND CONTROLS THE LOGISTICS BASE
  - COORDINATES RECEIPT AND MOVEMENT OF STOCKS TO FORWARD BASES
  - PROVIDES POSTAL, MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION SERVICES
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE:
  - CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALMOST EVERY PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION
- KEY PLAYERS:
  - NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
  - PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
  - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SLIDE 19-14

NONSTANDARD SUPPORT FOR LOGISTICS

- EFFECTIVE IN SUPPORTING FORCES IN AN IMMATURE, AUSTERE, OR REMOTE AREA OF OPERATIONS
- SUPPORT DEPLOYED FORCES FOR 90 DAYS OR LESS
- RAPID AND ASSURED COMMUNICATION, SMALL COMPUTERS, AND AIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION
- KEY TYPES OF NONSTANDARD SUPPORT INCLUDE—
  - CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING
  - LOGISTICS CIVILIAN AUGMENTATION PROGRAM
  - HOST NATION
  - DIRECT REQUISITIONING

SLIDE 19-15

TASK ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

- TAILORED FORCE TO MEET MISSION REQUIREMENTS
- NO STANDARD COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION
- KEY TYPES OF SUPPORT STRUCTURE:
  - SPLIT BASE OPERATIONS
  - SUPPORT IN MODULES

CRITICAL PLANNING PHASES

- PHASE I: PEACETIME
- PHASE II: SUSTAINMENT
- PHASE III: TRANSITION

SLIDE 19-17

TRANSPORTATION

- CONNECTING LINK BETWEEN OTHER FUNCTIONS OF SUSTAINMENT
- EARLY DEPLOYMENT IS CRITICAL FOR—
  - —TRANSPORTATION PLANNERS
  - —PORT OPENING PACKAGE
  - —MOVEMENT CONTROL STAFF (DEPARTURE AIRFIELD CONTROL GROUP/ALTERNATE AIRFIELD CONTROL GROUP)
- KEY PLANNING FUNCTIONS:
  - —MODAL OPERATIONS
  - —TERMINAL OPERATIONS
  - —MOVEMENT MANAGEMENT
  - —CIVILIAN CONTRACTING PLAYS A VITAL LINK
- TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT MAY BE PROVIDED BY—
  - —UNITED NATIONS
  - —ALLIED
  - —COALITION FORCES
- AREA STUDY CONDUCTED OF THE COUNTRY:
  - —HIGHWAYS
  - —RAILWAYS
  - —AIR WAYS
  - —INLAND MODES
- MATERIAL HANDLING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PORT OPERATIONS IDENTIFIED
- HOST NATION AND OTHER SERVICES SUPPORT IDENTIFIED AND COORDINATED
- GUIDANCE AND POLICES ESTABLISHED FOR MARKING AND IDENTIFYING CONTAINERS
- SECURITY MEASURES FOR PORT OPERATIONS IDENTIFIED AND COORDINATED
- ENGINEER SUPPORT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AND MAINTAIN MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE
- CONVOY RESTRICTIONS AND REFUGEE TRAFFIC CONSIDERED

SLIDE 19-18

FIELD SERVICES

- DIRECT SUPPORT OR AREA BASIS
- SPECIFIC MISSION REQUIREMENT AND PREDETERMINED AGREEMENTS
- PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
- PLANNERS DETERMINE:
  - WORK LOAD
  - FORCE STRUCTURE
  - WATER REQUIREMENT
  - SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT STOCKAGE LEVELS
  - MAXIMUM USE OF SERVICES IN AREA OF OPERATIONS
  - USE OF CONTRACT SUPPORT
  - EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF FORCE PROVIDER

SLIDE 19-19

MAINTENANCE

- COORDINATE AND ESTABLISH EARLY PLANS AND POLICIES FOR—
  - —WHAT WILL OR WILL NOT BE REPAIRED IN AREA OF OPERATIONS
  - —RETROGRADE SYSTEM
  - —EQUIPMENT LOAN TO OTHER SERVICES
  - —MAINTENANCE REPAIR FOR EQUIPMENT UNDER WARRANTY
  - —REPARABLE MAINTENANCE, OPERATIONAL READINESS FLOAT, AND EQUIPMENT CANNIBALIZATION AND CONTROL EXCHANGE OPERATIONS
  - —FORMALIZE READINESS REPORTING (DA FORM 2406)
  - —DENSITY LIST
- COORDINATE FOR CIVILIAN CONTRACT FOR MAINTENANCE (LOGISTICS CIVILIAN AUGMENTATION PROGRAM/LOGISTICS ASSISTANCE REPRESENTATIVE)
- PREPARE TO SUPPORT CIVILIAN AND OTHER MILITARY FORCES
- CONSIDER AND PLAN FOR INTEROPERABILITY AMONG SYSTEMS
- PLAN FOR REPAIR OF COMPUTERS, AUTOMATION EQUIPMENT, AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY EQUIPMENT
- REHEARSE RECOVERY OPERATIONS
- PROVIDE TEST, MEASUREMENT, AND DIAGNOSTIC EQUIPMENT CALIBRATION SUPPORT
- COORDINATE WITH CABLE AND ELECTRICAL SUPPLY FIRMS
- PLAN FOR UNIQUE TRAINING ASPECTS:
  - —TRAINING ON NON-UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT
  - —TRAINING FOR HOST NATION PERSONNEL ON UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT
  - —TRAINING FOR HOST NATION PERSONNEL ON NON-UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT
  - —TRAINING FOR COALITION AND UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL ON UNITED STATES EQUIPMENT

SLIDE 19-20

PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT

- ORGANIZATIONS ARE TAILORED TO SATISFY THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
- KEY PERSONNEL SERVICES AND FUNCTIONS:
  - ACCOUNTABILITY FOR JOINT, ALLIED, OR HOST NATION PERSONNEL
  - PERSONNEL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
  - PERSONNEL DATA BASE MANAGEMENT
  - POSTAL OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
  - MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION
- KEY MANNING FUNCTIONS:
  - PERSONNEL READINESS MANAGEMENT
  - REPLACEMENT MANAGEMENT
  - CASUALTY MANAGEMENT
  - PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING AND STRENGTH REPORTING
  - CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT

SLIDE 19-21

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

- UNIT MINISTRY TEAM; IN ADDITION TO RELIGIOUS CAPABILITIES:
  - ESTIMATES HOW THE LOCAL RELIGIOUS CUSTOMS IMPACT THE MISSION
  - PROVIDES PASTORAL COUNSELING AND MORAL LEADERSHIP GUIDANCE
  - CONDUCTS MISSION ANALYSIS OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURE TO DETERMINE RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE AND DENOMINATIONAL CAPABILITIES
  - COORDINATES RELIGIOUS SUPPORT WITH HOST NATION AND OTHER ALLIED RELIGIOUS LEADERS
  - COORDINATES RESUPPLY OPERATIONS FOR ECCLESIASTICAL SUPPLIES
  - ADVISES THE COMMANDER ON HOST NATION RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND FACTIONS
- DIVERSE RELIGIOUS SUPPORT CAPABILITY

FINANCE SERVICES

- INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS:
  - MILITARY PAY
  - TRAVEL PAY
  - FAMILY SUPPORT
  - DOD CIVILIAN SUPPORT
- ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT FUNCTIONS:
  - PROCUREMENT AND CONTRACT SUPPORT
  - RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
  - FINANCIAL ADVICE AND GUIDANCE
  - ACCOUNTING
  - NON-UNITED STATES PAY
  - DETAINEE, REFUGEE, AND DISPLACED PERSON SUPPORT
- UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS:
  - MANDATE: UNITED STATES, UNITED NATIONS, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATYORGANIZATION
  - DIRECTIVES: UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT, HOST NATION
  - ECONOMIC SITUATION OF COUNTRY
  - LOGISTIC SUPPORT
  - ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR OR CI DETAINEES
  - BANKING AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
  - FUNDING REQUIREMENTS
  - REIMBURSEMENT REQUIREMENTS

SLIDE 19-23

LEGAL SERVICES

- TAILORED SUPPORT PACKAGE
- UNIQUE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS:
  - COMBINED TASK FORCE LAW OFFICE
  - FOREIGN CLAIMS
  - CONFLICT OF LAW ISSUES
  - REVIEW AND VALIDATION OF CONTRACTS
  - FOREIGN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION AGREEMENTS
  - LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED WITH NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
  - PREPARATION AND REVIEW OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
  - INTERPRETER SUPPORT

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

- ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER IS KEY TO MEDICAL THREAT ANALYSIS
- CENTRAL RECEIVING POINT IS COORDINATED FOR SUPPLY DISTRIBUTION AND MANAGEMENT (FOR EXAMPLE, BLOOD, LABORATORY SPECIMENS)
- HOST NATION SUPPORT CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERED
- EVACUATION POLICY ESTABLISHED TO DRIVE THE MEDICAL REGULATING SYSTEM—SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ESTABLISHES POLICY
- COMMAND EMPHASIS ON PREVENTIVE MEDICINE MEASURES
- VETERINARY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE FOR CLASS I INSPECTIONS OF SUPPLIES AND STORAGE FACILITIES
- MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR ALLIED AND COALITION FORCES MAY REQUIRE ADDITIONAL ASSETS
- AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT FOR UNILATERAL AND JOINT MEDICAL SUPPORT

SLIDE 19-25

FORCE PROTECTION

- FORCE PROTECTION PLAYS CRITICAL ROLES IN RESPONSIVENESS AND TIMELINESS OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT
- FORCE PROTECTION KEY FUNCTIONS:
  - SURVIVABILITY OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT
  - BATTLEFIELD HAZARD PROTECTION
  - IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE
  - OPERATIONAL SECURITY
  - PHYSICAL SECURITY
  - SAFETY
  - INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION
  - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS

- METT-T DEPENDENT
- TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE—
  - MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS
  - REINFORCING OF VEHICLES
  - CONVOY OPERATIONS
  - CREW-SERVED WEAPONS
  - NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES
  - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
  - APPLICATION OF LAW
  - FIELD SANITATION PROCEDURES
  - MEDIA TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

SLIDE 19-27

TRANSITION OF SUPPORT

- KEY FOR SUCCESSFUL END-STATE MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
- KEY LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS MAY SHIFT TO—
  - — ANOTHER UNITED STATES SERVICE
  - — UNITED NATIONS OR A REGIONAL ALLIANCE
  - — NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION OR PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATION
  - — CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES OR CONTRACTORS
- FUNCTIONS TRANSFERRED REQUIRE CAREFUL COORDINATION BETWEEN TWO PARTIES SUCH AS—
  - — WHAT FUNCTIONS ARE INVOLVED
  - — WHAT TRANSFER IS TO TAKE PLACE
  - — WHETHER ANY ASSETS WILL ACCOMPANY TRANSFER
  - — WHAT IS THE STANDARD REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPORT FUNCTION
  - — WHAT ARE THE OTHER PECULIAR REQUIREMENTS TO THE SITUATION
- KEY POINT—UNITS ACCEPTING FUNCTION CANNOT ASSUME EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES ON HAND WILL REMAIN BEHIND FOR THEIR USE

SLIDE 19-28

LOGISTICS IN NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

MISSION: EVACUATE CIVILIAN NONCOMBATANT AND NONESSENTIAL MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM LOCATIONS IN FOREIGN (HOST) NATION TO A SAFE HAVEN

- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS DEPEND ON—
  - — COMPOSITION OF THE DEPLOYED FORCE
  - — NUMBER OF PERSONNEL TO BE EVACUATED
  - — TIME LIMITATION
  - — NATURE OF THE THREAT
  - — GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE MISSION
- PRIMARY EFFECTS:
  - — PREPARING THE STRIKE FORCE
  - — SUPPORTING STRATEGIC LIFT
  - — SUPPORTING INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE OR SAFE HAVEN
  - — POSTEVACUATION OPERATIONS
- SUPPORTED BY—
  - — UNITS ORGANIC TO THE DEPLOYED FORCE
  - — AUGMENTED BY SPECIFIC CAPABILITIES AS REQUIRED
- AUGMENTATION FORCE SHOULD PROVIDE—
  - — MEDICAL
  - — TRANSPORTATION
  - — SUPPLY
  - — SERVICES
  - — MAINTENANCE

SLIDE 19-29

PLANNING ASSISTANCE

- KEY DOCUMENTS:
  - OPERATION PLAN
  - CONTINGENCY PLAN
  - EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN
- COMMAND AND CONTROL CELL:
  - EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER
- FIVE OPERATIONAL PHASES:
  - PREDEPLOYMENT
  - DEPLOYMENT
  - EVACUATION
  - SAFE HAVEN
  - WITHDRAWAL

PREDEPLOYMENT

- PERIOD OF INTENSE PLANNING AND PREPARATION
- LIAISON SUPPORT FOR THE ADVANCE GUARD CONSISTING OF—
  - — PERSONNEL OFFICER
  - — LOGISTICS OFFICER
  - — CONTRACTING OFFICER
  - — TRANSPORTATION OFFICER
- SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT:
  - — MEDICAL
  - — MAINTENANCE
  - — TRANSPORTATION
- COMMERCIAL AND HOST NATION TRANSPORTATION WHERE POSSIBLE

SLIDE 19-31

DEPLOYMENT

- EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF LOGISTIC PERSONNEL CONSISTING OF—
  - LIAISON PERSONNEL
  - LOGISTICS TEAMS
  - LINGUISTIC PERSONNEL
- LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE CONSISTING OF—
  - BILLETING
  - MESSING
  - SANITATION REQUIREMENTS
  - PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS
  - MEDICAL SUPPLIES
  - TRANSPORTATION
  - AMMUNITION
  - PERSONNEL SERVICE FUNCTIONS
- CONTRACTING FOR LOCAL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES WHERE POSSIBLE

EVACUATION

KEY LOGISTICS PLANNING FACTORS:

- TRANSPORTATION
- MECHANICS SUPPORT TEAM TO SUPPORT CONVOY
- MEDICAL STATIONS TO SUPPORT RECEPTION AND MARSHALLING TEAMS
- SUPPLIES AND SERVICES TO SUPPORT EVACUEES
- CONTRACTING FOR SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

SLIDE 19-33

SAFE HAVEN

- LOCATION DESIGNATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- COMPRISES PRIMARILY OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS WITH LIMITED SECURITY FORCES
- FIVE TYPICAL SAFE HAVEN ELEMENTS:
  - COMMAND GROUP
  - RECEPTION TEAM
  - PROCESSING TEAM
  - COMFORT TEAM
  - SCHEDULING TEAM
- LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONSISTS OF—
  - SUPPLIES
  - BILLETING
  - RATIONS
  - POTABLE WATER
  - SANITATION FACILITIES
  - LOCAL TRANSPORTATION

WITHDRAWAL

- SUPPORT ELEMENT DEPARTS FIRST
- DEPENDING ON THE THREAT—NONESSENTIAL ITEMS ARE LEFT BEHIND

SLIDE 19-35

LESSON 20. ENGINEERS

SLIDE 20-1. ENGINEERS IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
The eight stages of contingency operations are mobilization, predeployment activity, deployment, entry operation, decisive combat, postconflict operations, redeployment operation, and demobilization.

SLIDE 20-2. MOBILIZATION—FORCE ACTIVITIES
Mobilization is the process in which the armed forces augment the Active Component capability in preparation for war or other national emergencies. Mobilization includes activating all or part of the reserve force as well as assembling and organizing personnel, equipment and supplies, and certifying individuals and units.

SLIDE 20-3. MOBILIZATION—ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS
Engineer considerations during the mobilization stage include construction of lodging for reserves and preparation and construction of training areas.

SLIDE 20-4. PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY—FORCE CONSIDERATIONS
Predeployment is the critical planning phase. During predeployment, intelligence gathering is critical to mission planning. Also, planning for all types of deployment is done including air, sea, and rail.

SLIDE 20-5. PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY—ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS
Engineer responsibilities during the predeployment phase include planning and assistance to the maneuver force. Engineer priority intelligence requirements is critical during this stage to achieve an appropriate force tailoring.

SLIDE 20-6. DEPLOYMENT
The different types of deployment for the force and engineers include rail, sea, and air. Early deployment of engineer command and control is critical to engineer operations.

SLIDE 20-7. ENTRY OPERATIONS—FORCE ACTIVITIES
The initial mission of the early entry operation force focuses on airhead/beachhead seizure and lodgement expansion as follow-on forces arrive.

SLIDE 20-8. ENTRY OPERATIONS—ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS
Engineer missions and responsibilities during entry operation include rapid runway clearance or repair, breaching or clearing obstacles, and initial defense and force protection operations.

SLIDE 20-9. OPERATIONS—FORCE ACTIVITIES
Decisive combat or the operations stage is when force buildup takes place and relief of the assault echelon. Focus includes securing tactical objectives and defeating the enemy center of gravity.

SLIDE 20-10. WAR TERMINATION OR POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS—ENGINEER ACTIVITIES

Engineer focus is on nation assistance and nation building. This includes constructing hospitals and refugee centers, clearing mines, and removing rubble.

SLIDE 20-11. REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS—FORCE ACTIVITIES
Force protection is integrated in all stages of redeployment. Habitually supporting combat engineers redeploy with the maneuver force.

SLIDE 20-12. ENGINEERS IN SUPPORT OF FORCE PROTECTION
Engineers must keep abreast of the threat level in the area of operations. Techniques for force protection include:

- Visual surveillance protection.
- Ballistics protection.
- Stand-off protection.
- Blast protection.
- Obstacles and barriers.
- Forced entry protection.
- Command and engineer estimates.

SLIDE 20-13. COVER FROM VIEW
The different types of cover available are A-frame screens, scaffold screens, and chain mesh with timber slats.

- A - frame screens:
  –16-foot height
  –Timber, corrugated metal
- Scaffold screens
- Chain mesh with timber slats

SLIDE 20-14. BALLISTICS PROTECTION
Ballistics protection can be used.

SLIDE 20-15. NONMETALLIC MATERIALS
The effects of small-arms rounds on nonmetallic materials are penetration, perforation, and scabbing.

SLIDE 20-16. METALS
The effects of small-arms rounds on metals are petalling, plugging, and flaking. Plugging occurs in armor plate.

SLIDE 20-17. SMALL-ARMS WEAPON EFFECTS
(See chart on slide.)

SLIDE 20-18. WEAPON EFFECTS–COMBINATION REINFORCED CONCRETE SLAB AND METAL

A metal plate on the interior wall, firmly attached or used to form a metal box that is structurally sound (and 10 mm or more in thickness), gives complete protection against concrete scabbing.

SLIDE 20-19. ANTITANK WEAPONS - MAIN THREAT—RPG-7

The main antitank threat is the Russian-made RPG-7. It can penetrate mild steel. It has two fuzes—one triggered on impact and one time delay for self-destruct. Round velocity at rocket burnout is 300 meters per second.

SLIDE 20-20. ANTITANK WEAPONS PROTECTION

Predetonation screens provide protection from antitank weapons. The screens also provide secondary protection against stoning, petrol bombs, small parcel bombs, and satchel charges.

SLIDE 20-21. ROCKET SCREENS

The various types of rocket fences provide different protective properties.

- Chain link fences.
- 3-inch by 3-inch weld mesh.
- 3-inch by 6-inch weld mesh.

SLIDE 20-22. TYPES OF ROCKET SCREENS

The 3-inch by 12-inch weld mesh is the largest effective mesh size to use. With such a large mesh size, there is a stoning threat problem.

SLIDE 20-23. ROCKET PROTECTION

The four main factors that affect rocket protection are—

- Screen size.
- Stand off.
- Alignment. (90-degree to attack angle. Different from small-arms weapons in which soldiers try to get maximum obliquity.)
- Layout.

SLIDE 20-24. LOW- AND HIGH-LEVEL PROTECTION AND LOW-SEVERITY THREAT

Engineers provide the layout of low-level protection for low-severity threat and high-level protection for low-severity threat.

SLIDE 20-25. MORTAR/GRENADE PROTECTION–BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION

Engineers help with stand-off weapon protection, and mortar and grenade protection including the concerns with blast and fragmentation. For the mortar, the following are considered—

- Manufactured and home made.
- Kinetic energy effect (impact and fragmentation).

- Sacrificial structures.
- Isolate areas (dwarf walls and sand grid walls).
- Alarm systems (when baseplate is sighted—reaction to be taken; take cover drills).

SLIDE 20-26. ROOF MORTAR PROTECTION

Engineers help with roof mortar protection.

SLIDE 20-27. GRENADE PROTECTION

Engineers help with grenade protection.

- Blast not as great.
- Fragmentation and isolation.
- Cover from view, if possible.
- Screen to block trajectory—test by trial throwing.
- Typical fragment characteristics.

SLIDE 20-28. LEVELS OF BLAST PROTECTION

Engineers consider the categories of blast protection.

- Damaged repairable.
- Design space to sustain high-degree damage without collapse.
- Will require subsequent demolition and replacement.
- Occupants injured.
- Assets damaged.

SLIDE 20-29. BLAST DEFENSIVE MEASURES

Engineers consider blast defensive measures:

- Keep vehicles and potential bombs as far away as possible.
- No parking under buildings under any circumstances, even if there is little or no threat now, the situation can change very quickly.
- Minimize vehicle access points. Eliminate perpendicular lines of approach - why?
- Minimum of 170 feet between facility and installation boundaries.
- Have controlled vehicle movement and parking with blast and secure zone.

SLIDE 20-30. BLAST ZONE

Controlled area surrounding a facility.

- Keep vehicles a set distance away.
- Limits structural damages.
- Only deliver/maintenance/handicapped inside zone, then only after detailed searching.
- Use for all three severity levels.
- Stand-off distance function of—
  - –Facility construction.
  - –Weight of threat explosive.
- Need vehicle barriers.

- Control of access needs operational measures:
  –Remember to use the battlefield operating systems and a rigorous estimate procedures even if this is only a mental estimate process.

SLIDE 20-31. DISTANCE SELECTION

Discuss distance selection.

- Function of explosive weight and level of protection.
- Consider walls, doors, windows, roofs, exposed columns, and frames.
- Discuss the critical structural items to avoid major failure.

SLIDE 20-32. EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS

Show drawing of masonry wall design for explosive effects.

SLIDE 20-33. EXPLOSIVES DETECTION

Discuss explosives detection.

- Guards.
- Explosives detection dogs.
- Explosives detection equipment:
  – Need operators.
  – Only works for specific explosives (IPB).
- Gate design.
- Guard protection.

SLIDE 20-34. VEHICLE SEARCHES

Discuss vehicle searches. Assume only greater than about 50 pounds of explosives will be found. This is why the blast zone concept is so important. The three levels of search are—

- Visual observation.
- Basic visual/physical search.
- Comprehensive vehicle search.

SLIDE 20-35. VEHICLE PROCESSING RATE

Discuss vehicle searching rate and the implications for checkpoint layout.

SLIDE 20-36. BLAST PROTECTION

Using blast walls, discuss the options:

- Sandbags.
- Reinforced concrete walls.
- Reinforced concrete slab in universal beams.
- British rapid assembly protective wall.
  – 4 meters high, 2 meters lengths.
  –Each meter run weighs 3,000 kilograms.
- Sand grid wall.
- Barbican.

Note the rock filled gabion on top of the rapid assembly protective wall to give extra mass and hence extra blast protection.

SLIDE 20-37. BARBICAN—TYPICAL LAYOUT
Discuss barbican and its features. Designed to allow detailed searches and handle the premature detonation of the explosives in the vehicle while minimizing damage to adjacent structures. Note guard protection near entry to the barbican.

SLIDE 20-38. FORCED ENTRY PROTECTION
Discuss the basic design strategy.

- Integrate both defensive and detection measures.
- The delay must equal the response time.
- Delay is based on the time it takes to make a 96-square inch (man sized) opening using a given set of tools (for example, the threat severity).

SLIDE 20-39. FORCED ENTRY—DEFENSIVE MEASURES
Continue design—

- Determine response time.
- Identify defense layers.
- Determine component delay ratings.
- Determine layer delay ratings.
- Compare to response time.

SLIDE 20-40. THE ENGINEER ESTIMATE
Discuss the logic behind performing a systematic estimate. A thought process for engineer tactical planning. An integrated extension of the command estimate, which is conducted concurrently with other staff estimates. It is continuously refined with the situation and the mission. Stress the need for refinement and integration.

SLIDE 20-41. COMMAND ESTIMATE AND ENGINEER ESTIMATE
Show the comparison of the command and engineer estimate.

SLIDE 20-42. MISSION
Discuss the engineer mission and its derivation.

SLIDE 20-43. FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Discuss how facts and assumptions are used and are critical to planning. Show how the engineer *must* be a part of the IPB and conduct an engineer battlefield assessment. Continuous process; assumption confirmed, denied. The plan modified accordingly.

SLIDE 20-44. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Discuss the IPB process. Systematic analysis of terrain, weather, and enemy doctrine that helps to determine enemy capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. Need engineer intelligence collection needs into the S2's reconnaissance, surveillance plan, and priority of intelligence requirements.

SLIDE 20-45. ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT
Discuss the three components of engineer battlefield assessment:

- Terrain analysis (OCOKA).
- Enemy mission and capability.
- Friendly mission and capability.

SLIDE 20-46. TERRAIN ANALYSIS
Discuss the terrain analysis and its impact using the OCOKA. The advantages and disadvantages.

SLIDE 20-47. ENEMY MISSION/CAPABILITY
Discuss the enemy mission and capability. Template enemy activity and select activities that must be countered.

SLIDE 20-48. FRIENDLY MISSION/CAPABILITY
Discuss friendly mission and capability.

SLIDE 20-49. CONDUCT ASSET VALUE RATING
Consider—

- Criticality to forces mission.
- Criticality to Army's mission.
- Replaceability.
- People value.
- Monetary value.

SLIDE 20-50 CONDUCT ENEMY VALUE RATING
Consider—

- Asset profile.
- Asset usefulness to threat.
- Publicity value.
- Asset accessibility.
- Asset vulnerability.

SLIDE 20-51. CONSIDER PROTECTION POLICY
Match protection to threat. Balance probability of attack versus consequences of inadequate protection versus cost of acceptable protection. Protection from what? Priorities? Temporary/semi-temporary/permanent? Priorities for assets:

- Own force troops.
- Own force equipment.
- Other forces and equipment.
- Local assets and infrastructure.
- Populace.

SLIDE 20-52. MISSION ANALYSIS
Discuss the engineer mission analysis.

SLIDE 20-53. SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS
Discuss the specified and implied tasks.

SLIDE 20-54. ASSETS AVAILABLE
Discuss the assets that are available. The assets developed during the engineer battlefield assessment. Consider all these assets. Also, remember the political situation.

SLIDE 20-55. CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRICTIONS
Discuss the constraints and restrictions.

SLIDE 20-56. TIME ANALYSIS
Discuss the time analysis and continually refine these time lines.

SLIDE 20-57. COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE
Discuss the commander's guidance and the importance for the engineer to be aware of the need to focus the commander's attention on force protection. Use and synchronize the battlefield operating systems.

SLIDE 20-58. SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS
Discuss how it is vital to integrate the scheme of engineer operations into each of the maneuver courses of action and that this is coordinated with all other appropriate staff members.

SLIDE 20-59. WAR-GAME AND REFINE ENGINEER PLANS
Discuss the analysis of courses of action. War-game and refine the engineer plan.

SLIDE 20-60. COMPARISON
Discuss the comparison of courses of action.

SLIDE 20-61. DECISION, ACTIONS, AND ORDERS
Discuss how the implications of the decision on which a course of action is chosen and the need to make sure the commander knows the full implications of his decision from a force protection perspective.

SLIDE 20-62. FINALIZE THE ENGINEER PLAN
Discuss finalizing the engineer plan. Remember coordination and dissemination.

ENGINEERS IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

- MOBILIZATION
- PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY
- DEPLOYMENT
- ENTRY OPERATIONS
- OPERATIONS OR DECISIVE COMBAT
- WAR TERMINATION OR POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS
- REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS
- DEMOBILIZATION

SLIDE 20-1

MOBILIZATION FORCE ACTIVITIES

ACTIVATE RESERVE FORCE (OPTIONAL)

- ASSEMBLE AND ORGANIZE PERSONNEL
- PREPARE EQUIPMENT FOR MOVEMENT
- GATHER SUPPLIES AND MATERIALS

PLAN AND PREPARE FOR MOVEMENT TO MOBILIZATION SITE

- BOTH ROAD AND RAIL

MOVE TO MOBILIZATION SITE

ACTIVATE FORCE

- ALERT NOTIFICATION
- ASSEMBLE UNIT PERSONNEL
- MOVE TO MARSHALLING AREA
- BEGIN PREPARATION

SLIDE 20-2

MOBILIZATION
ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS

- PREPARE AND CONSTRUCT LODGEMENT AREA FOR MOBILIZED RESERVE FORCES
- ASSIST AT MOBILIZATION SITE
- ASSIST IN TRAINING RESERVE FORCES
- PREPARE AND CONSTRUCT TRAINING AREAS

SLIDE 20-3

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

- CRITICAL PLANNING STAGE
- GATHER INTELLIGENCE
- PLAN AND PREPARE FOR STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT
  - AIR
  - SEA
  - RAIL
- TAILOR FORCE TO THE MISSION:
  - ASSAULT FORCE (SEIZE LODGEMENT, BEGIN COMBAT OPERATIONS)
  - FOLLOW-ON (EXPAND LODGEMENT, DECISIVE COMBAT)
  - REAR (SUSTAINMENT FOR EXTENDED OPERATIONS)

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS

- ALLOCATE ENGINEERS BASED ON MISSIONS THROUGHOUT ALL STAGES
- ENSURE COLLECTION ASSETS HAVE DETAILED PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS:
  - —TYPE HOST NATION ENGINEER EQUIPMENT
  - —DETAILS OF PORTS, AIRFIELDS, ROADS, BRIDGES
  - —ENEMY OBSTACLE CAPABILITY
  - —ACCURACY OF MAPS
  - —CRITICAL ASSETS AND FACILITIES THAT MUST BE MADE SURVIVABLE
- TOPOGRAPHICAL SUPPORT AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS (CRITICAL)
- CONSTRUCT MOCK FACILITIES
- AVAILABLE HOST NATION SUPPORT
- CHECK LOAD PLANS
- DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS DEPLOY TO SUPPORT ASSAULT ECHELON
- IDENTIFY AND DEPLOY CRITICAL MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT
- CORPS AND SPECIALTY ENGINEERS DEPLOY TO SUPPORT FOLLOW-ON AND REAR ECHELON—CONSIDER SPECIALTY TEAMS (UTILITIES, WATER)
- SECURITY FOR ENGINEER HEAVY DEPLOYMENTS—DISASTER RELIEF
- SUSTAINMENT ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS:
  - —IN THEATER AND INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE
  - —CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS
  - —UTILITIES
  - —MATERIAL

SLIDE 20-5

DEPLOYMENT FORCE AND ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS

- PROCESS OF GETTING TO AREA OF OPERATIONS
  - RAIL LOAD TEAMS
  - AIR LOAD TEAMS
  - SHIP LOAD TEAMS
- DEPLOY ENGINEER C2 ELEMENTS EARLY

ENTRY OPERATIONS
FORCE ACTIVITIES

BEGIN WHEN DOORS OPEN

INSERTION INTO LODGEMENT AREA:

- FORCED—
  - — AIR ASSAULT
  - — AMPHIBIOUS
  - — AIRBORNE

- NONFORCED
  - — PORT
  - — AIRLAND

AIRFIELD SEIZURE (ESTABLISH AIR OR BEACHHEAD)

DEFEND AIR OR BEACHHEAD FROM COUNTERATTACK

PREPARE AIRHEAD OR PORT TO SUPPORT FORCE BUILDUP

SLIDE 20-7

ENTRY OPERATIONS
ENGINEER CONSIDERATIONS

RAPID RUNWAY CLEARANCE:

- DOZERS, LOADERS, GRADERS, COMPACTION
- MINE-DETECTOR TEAMS AND DEMOLITION TEAMS
- HOT-WIRE TEAMS

BREACHING AND CLEARING OBSTACLES WITHIN AIRHEAD OR BEACHHEAD

CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS:

- AVAILABILITY OF CLASS IV, V, FASCAM
- BASED ON THREAT—MOUNTED OR DISMOUNTED, ANTITANK OR ANTIPERSONNEL

RAPID RUNWAY REPAIR:

- MAY REQUIRE SPECIALIZED ENGINEER TEAMS
- LIGHT-EQUIPMENT COMPANY

ESTABLISH AND IMPROVE FACILITIES:

- LOW-ALTITUDE PARACHUTE EXTRACTION SYSTEM ZONES
- FLIGHT LANDING STRIPS
- AIR OR SEA PORTS

FORCE PROTECTION (SURVIVABILITY):

- ROUTE CLEARANCE
- C2 FACILITIES
- LOGISTICS
- CLEARING FACILITIES OF BOOBY TRAPS

EARLY DEPLOYMENT OF ENGINEERS IS ESSENTIAL

SLIDE 20-8

OPERATIONS
FORCE ACTIVITIES

- DECISIVE COMBAT
- FORCE BUILD-UP
- EXPAND LODGEMENT (OUT OF IDENTIFICATION FIRE RANGE)
- MAY INCLUDE RELIEF IN PLACE OF ASSAULT ECHELON
- SECURE TACTICAL OBJECTIVES
- DESTROY OR NEUTRALIZE ENEMY CENTER OF GRAVITY
- MAY INCLUDE LIGHT AND HEAVY OR HEAVY AND LIGHT MIX

SLIDE 20-9

WAR TERMINATION OR POSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS ENGINEER ACTIVITIES

- MINEFIELD CLEARING
- UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
- FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION (HOSPITALS, EPW CAMPS)
- UTILITIES RESTORATION (WATER, ELECTRICITY)
- RUBBLE CLEARANCE
- ROAD REPAIR
- FORCE PROTECTION

SLIDE 20-10

REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS FORCE ACTIVITIES

- OCCURS WHEN FORCE ACCOMPLISHES MISSION
- ELEMENTS REDEPLOY WHILE MAINTAINING A VIABLE SECURITY FORCE
- FOCUS IS SHIFTED TO NATION ASSISTANCE

SLIDE 20-11

ENGINEERS IN SUPPORT OF FORCE PROTECTION

- THREAT
- TECHNIQUES:
  - VISUAL SURVEILLANCE PROTECTION
  - BALLISTICS PROTECTION
  - STAND-OFF WEAPON PROTECTION
  - BLAST PROTECTION
  - OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS
  - FORCED-ENTRY PROTECTION
- COMMAND AND ENGINEERS ESTIMATES

COVER FROM VIEW


- A-FRAME SCREENS:
  - 16-FOOT HEIGHT
  - TIMBER, CORRUGATED METAL
- SCAFFOLD SCREENS
- CHAIN MESH WITH TIMBER SLATS

BALLISTICS PROTECTION


- LOW LEVEL - COVER FROM VIEW
- HIGH LEVEL - REINFORCED STRUCTURES
  - LAYOUT
  - WALLS
  - DOORS
  - WINDOWS
  - ROOFS
  - FRAMES
- OBSERVATION POSTS

NONMETALLIC MATERIALS


THE EFFECTS OF SMALL-ARMS ROUNDS STRIKING A NONMETALLIC MATERIAL MAY BE CONSIDERED UNDER THREE HEADINGS:



1. **PENETRATION:** The round completely penetrates the material.



2. **PERFORATION:** At a striking velocity just less than that needed for penetration, the material may be perforated by a round producing front and back craters which "meet."




3. **SCABBING:** When a round strikes a material with insufficient energy to perforate, but with enough energy to eject material from the back crater, injury may be caused by this "scabbing" alone.


SLIDE 20-15

METALS

METALS MAY SUFFER PETALLING, PLUGGING, OR FLAKING DURING FAILURE.



1. **PETALLING:** In light armor where a round strikes at an angle of 90 degrees, and does not deform, it produces a clean hole and causes petals to form on the front and back surfaces.



2. **PLUGGING:** On heavy armor plate, plugs may vary in size from 1/3 to full projectile caliber.

3. **FLAKING:** Attacks at energies below those needed for penetration could cause "disking" or "flaking" of a material that is then thrown off the rear face of the plate.

SMALL-ARMS WEAPON EFFECTS


WEAPON	RANGE (METERS)	THICKNESS IN INCHES			
		PEN	CONCRETE PERF	SCAB	MILD STEEL
9 mm Pistol	50	1.0	1.6	2.0	0.2
M16 5. 56-mm	100	3.2	4.4	4.7	0.7
SLR/FN 7 .62- mm	100	4.1	5.7	6.1	0.8
0. 5-Browning AP Round	200	7.2	10.0	10.7	1.3

WEAPON EFFECTS
COMBINATION REINFORCED CONCRETE SLAB AND METAL

Combination reinforced concrete slab and armor plate or steel walls: The calculation of material thicknesses where a combination of concrete and armor plate or mild steel is concerned is more complicated. The use of metal plate on the interior will, if firmly attached or used to form a metal box that is structurally sound (and 10-mm or above in thickness), give complete protection against concrete scabbing. The thicknesses of each material should then be determined by—

1. Choosing the thickness of concrete required to prevent perforation.
2. Selecting a thickness of metal plate and based on the graphs below, subtracting the equivalent thickness of concrete from the overall figure reached.

If the resulting concrete thickness is too thin or too thick for convenience in construction, an alternative metal plate is selected and the process is repeated.



SLIDE 20-18

ANTITANK WEAPONS
MAIN THREAT RPG-7

- 85-MM CALIBER
- VELOCITY AT ROCKET BURNOUT 300 METERS PER SECOND
- CHARGE WEIGHT 0.4 KILOGRAMS
- PENETRATION MILD STEEL 300 MM (1 FT)
- FUZES—TWO BUILT-IN
  - 21-MM DIAM PIEZO ELECTRIC FUZE, TRIGGERED ON IMPACT
  - 4.5-SEC TIME-DELAY FUZE FOR SELF-DESTRUCT

SLIDE 20-19

ANTITANK WEAPONS PROTECTION

PREDETONATION SCREENS—

- DETONATES
- DUDS RPG-2, -7, -9
- STAND-OFF DISTANCE
- KINETIC EFFECTS—PENETRATES 10 INCHES REINFORCED CONCRETE

ALSO PROVIDES SECONDARY PROTECTION

- STONING
- PETROL BOMBS
- SMALL PARCEL BOMBS
- SATCHEL CHARGES

SLIDE 20-20

ROCKET SCREENS

- 50-MM (2-IN) CHAIN LINK FENCE:
  - REALLY ONLY PREDETONATING; DUD TO DETONATION RATIO 29:71
- 75-MM X 75-MM X 5-MM WELD MESH (3 IN X 3 IN):
  - COMMON FOR URBAN AREAS; DUD TO DETONATION RATIO 42:58
- 75-MM X 150-MM X 5-MM WELD MESH (3 IN X 6 IN):
  - BETTER ROCKET SCREEN, ALLOWS SMALL STONES THROUGH; DUD TO DETONATION RATIO 53:57

SLIDE 20-21

ROCKET SCREENS


- 75-MM X 300-MM X 5-MM WELD MESH (3 IN X 12 IN):
  - MAX PRACTICE SIZE; ANY LARGER THAN MESH TOO FLEXIBLE TO SQUEEZE ROCKET; ANY SMALLER THAN DUD TO DETONATION RATIO IS WORSE; DUD TO DETONATION RATIO 58:42
- IF THERE IS STONING THREAT, PROBLEMS BECAUSE LARGE MESH OPENING.

ROCKET PROTECTION


- SCREEN SIZE
- STAND OFF
- ALIGNMENT - 90 DEGREES TO ATTACK ANGLE
- LAYOUT

SLIDE 20-23

LOW-LEVEL PROTECTION LOW-SEVERITY THREAT



HIGH-LEVEL PROTECTION LOW-SEVERITY THREAT



SLIDE 20-24


MORTAR AND GRENADE PROTECTION BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION

MORTAR

- MANUFACTURED OR HOME MADE
- KINETIC ENERGY EFFECT—IMPACT, FRAGMENTATION
- SACRIFICIAL STRUCTURES
- ISOLATE AREAS
  - — DWARF WALLS
  - — SAND GRID WALLS
- ALARMS SYSTEMS
  - — SIGHT BASE PLATE
  - — TAKE COVER

SLIDE 20-25

ROOF MORTAR PROTECTION



SLIDE 20-26

GRENADE PROTECTION

- BLAST—NOT AS GREAT
- FRAGMENTATION
- COVER FROM VIEW, IF POSSIBLE
- SCREEN TO BLOCK TRAJECTORY—NEEDS TO BE HIGH; TEST BY TRIAL THROWING
- TYPICAL FRAGMENTS: 0.25 GRAMS AT 2,230 METERS PER SECOND
- PENETRATES—43-MM CONCRETE, 3-MM MS PLATE, 70-MM TIMBER

SLIDE 20-27

LEVELS OF BLAST PROTECTION
LOW LEVEL OF PROTECTION

- DAMAGED UNREPAIRABLE
- DESIGN SPACE TO SUSTAIN HIGH-DEGREE DAMAGE WITHOUT COLLAPSE
- REQUIRE SUBSEQUENT DEMOLITION AND REPLACEMENT
- OCCUPANTS INJURED
- ASSETS DAMAGED

BLAST DEFENSIVE MEASURES
SITE LAYOUT AND PLANNING


- VEHICLES AND POTENTIAL BOMBS AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE
- NO PARKING UNDER BUILDING UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES; EVEN IF NO THREAT NOW
- MINIMIZE VEHICLE ACCESS POINTS
- ELIMINATE PERPENDICULAR LINES OF APPROACH
- MINIMUM OF 170 FEET BETWEEN FACILITY AND INSTALLATION BOUNDARIES
- HAVE CONTROLLED VEHICLE MOVEMENT AND PARKING WITH BLAST AND SECURE ZONE

SLIDE 20-29

BLAST ZONE

- CONTROLLED AREA SURROUNDING FACILITY
- KEEPS VEHICLES A SET DISTANCE AWAY
- LIMITS STRUCTURAL DAMAGES
- ONLY DELIVERY, MAINTENANCE, HANDICAPPED INSIDE ZONE, THEN ONLY AFTER DETAILED SEARCHING
- USE FOR ALL THREE SEVERITY LEVELS
- STAND-OFF DISTANCE FUNCTION OF—FACILITY CONSTRUCTION AND WEIGHT OF THREAT EXPLOSIVE
- NEED VEHICLE BARRIERS
- CONTROL OF ACCESS NEEDS OPERATIONAL MEASURES—BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS AND ESTIMATE

EXAMPLE BLAST ZONE



BLAST ZONE (Moving Vehicle)

SLIDE 20-30

DISTANCE SELECTION

FUNCTION OF EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT AND LEVEL OF PROTECTION REQUIRED

*WALLS

DOORS

WINDOWS

ROOFS


*EXPOSED COLUMNS

FRAMES

*KEY ITEMS

SLIDE 20-31

EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS
MASONRY WALL DESIGN



EXPLOSIVES DETECTION

- GUARDS
- EXPLOSIVES DETECTION DOGS
- EXPLOSIVES DETECTION EQUIPMENT
  - OPERATORS
  - SPECIFIC EXPLOSIVES
- GATE DESIGN
- GUARD PROTECTION

SLIDE 20-33

VEHICLE SEARCHES

- ASSUME ONLY GREATER THAN 50 POUNDS WILL BE FOUND
- VISUAL OBSERVATION—PASSENGERS REMAIN IN VEHICLES
- BASIC VISUAL AND PHYSICAL SEARCH:
  - PASSENGERS OUT
  - SEARCH MORE DETAILED (GLOVE BOX, DASHBOARD)
  - SEPARATE VEHICLE HOLDING AREA
- COMPREHENSIVE VEHICLE SEARCH
  - MORE DETAILED
  - ONLY BUILT-IN BOMBS WILL ESCAPE DETECTION
  - SEPARATE VEHICLE HOLDING AREA

VEHICLE SEARCH PROCESSING RATE


SEARCH PATTERN	RATE (VEHICLE / HOUR / LANE)	TIME MINUTES PER VEHICLE
NONE	600 to 800	- - - -
VEHICLE DECAL ID	400 to 600	:06 to :09
DRIVER ID	200 to 400	:09 to :18
VISUAL OBSERVATION OF PASSENGER AND CARGO AREA	150 to 300	:12 to :24
BASIC PHYSICAL/VISUAL SEARCH OF PASSENGER AND CARGO AREA	50 to 150	:24 to 1:12
COMPREHENSIVE VEHICLE SEARCH	12 to 24	2:30 to 5:00

BLAST PROTECTION
BLAST WALLS

- SAND BAGS
- REINFORCED CONCRETE WALLS
- REINFORCED CONCRETE SLAB IN UNIVERSAL BEAMS
- BRITISH RAPID ASSEMBLY PROTECTIVE WALL
  - 4 METERS HIGH, 2 METERS LONG
  - EACH METER RUN WEIGHS 3 TONS
  - SAND GRID WALL
  - BARBICAN

BARBICAN
TYPICAL LAYOUT

MINIMUM DAMAGE IF BLAST OCCURS DURING SEARCH



SLIDE 20-37

FORCED-ENTRY PROTECTION

BASIC DESIGN STRATEGY

- INTEGRATE BOTH DEFENSIVE AND DETECTION MEASURES
- DELAY = RESPONSE TIME
- DELAY BASED ON TIME TO MAKE 96-SQUARE-INCH (MAN-SIZE) OPENING USING A GIVEN SET OF TOOLS (THREAT SURVEY)

FORCED-ENTRY DEFENSIVE MEASURES

- DETERMINE RESPONSE TIME
- IDENTIFY DEFENSE LAYERS
- DETERMINE COMPONENT DELAY RATINGS
- DETERMINE LAYER DELAY RATINGS
- COMPARE TO RESPONSE TIME

SLIDE 20-39

THE ENGINEER ESTIMATE

- A THOUGHT PROCESS FOR ENGINEER TACTICAL PLANNING
- AN INTEGRATED EXTENSION OF THE COMMAND ESTIMATE
- CONDUCTED CONCURRENTLY WITH OTHER STAFF ESTIMATES
- CONTINUOUSLY REFINED WITH THE SITUATION AND MISSION
- HAS A SPECIFIC PURPOSE:
  - EARLY INTEGRATION OF ENGINEER MISSIONS
  - FOCUSES ENGINEER COORDINATION WITH OTHER STAFF MEMBERS
  - DRIVES TIMELY DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEER PLANS, ORDERS, AND ANNEXES

COMMAND ESTIMATE AND ENGINEER ESTIMATE

COMMAND ESTIMATE	ENGINEER ESTIMATE
MISSION	ENGINEER MISSION
FACT AND ASSUMPTIONS	INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD AND ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT
MISSION ANALYSIS	**ENGINEER MISSION ANALYSIS**
COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE	
DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION	DEVELOP A SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS
ANALYZE COURSES OF ACTION	WAR-GAME AND REFINE ENGINEER PLAN
DECISION	RECOMMEND A COURSE OF ACTION
ACTION AND ORDERS	FINALIZE THE ENGINEER PLAN AND ISSUE ORDERS

SLIDE 20-41

MISSION

ENGINEER RECEIVES MISSIONS IN—

- HIGHER HEADQUARTERS OPERATION ORDER
  - — COMMANDER'S INTENT (TWO LEVELS UP)
  - — SCHEME OF MANEUVER
  - — OBSTACLES, MINES, AND FORTIFICATIONS
  - — SUBUNIT INSTRUCTIONS
  - — COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
  - — SERVICE SUPPORT
  - — COMMAND AND SIGNAL
- ENGINEER ANNEX

FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

- THE COMMANDER AND STAFF DEVELOP FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE SITUATION THAT ARE CRITICAL TO PLANNING
- THE ENGINEER ASSISTS IN DEVELOPING THE SITUATION BY—
  - PARTICIPATING IN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD
  - CONDUCTING AN ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT
- CONTINUOUS PROCESS; ASSUMPTIONS ARE CONFIRMED OR DENIED AND PLAN REFINED ACCORDINGLY

SLIDE 20-43

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

- IPB IS A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND ENEMY DOCTRINE THAT HELPS DETERMINE ENEMY CAPABILITIES, INTENTIONS, AND VULNERABILITIES
- THE ENGINEER PARTICIPATES IN ALL PHASES OF IPB
- TO EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY FORCE PROTECTION, THE ENGINEER RELIES ON THE S2's ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY'S POSSIBLE PLANS OF ATTACK
- INTEGRATES ENGINEER INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION NEEDS INTO THE S2's RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE PLAN, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS, AND PRIORITY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT

- DEVELOPS FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT—
  - ENEMY'S WEAKNESSES
  - CRITICAL FRIENDLY MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS
- MUTUALLY SUPPORTS THE S2's IPB
- MAKES BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT:
  - TERRAIN ANALYSIS
  - ENEMY MISSION AND CAPABILITY
  - FRIENDLY MISSION AND MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY
  - SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITY

SLIDE 20-45

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

- ANALYZE THE TERRAIN'S IMPACT USING THE OCOKA FRAMEWORK:
  - OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE
  - COVER AND CONCEALMENT
  - OBSTACLES
  - KEY TERRAIN
  - AVENUES OF APPROACH
- ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TERRAIN
- CONCLUSIONS ON THE IMPACT THE TERRAIN HAS ON ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION AND ON FORCE PROTECTION

ENEMY MISSION AND CAPABILITY

- ANTICIPATE ENEMY OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SITUATION
- CONSIDER THE ENEMY'S MISSION AND DOCTRINAL ACTIONS
- ESTIMATE ENEMY ENGINEER CAPABILITY BASED ON—
  - — S2's ORDER OF BATTLE
  - — MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT CAPABILITIES
  - — RECENT ACTIVITIES
- TEMPLATE ENEMY EFFORT BASED ON—
  - — S2's SITUATIONAL TEMPLATE
  - — DOCTRINAL FORCE EMPLOYMENT
  - — CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT
- SELECT ENEMY ACTIVITIES THAT MUST BE COUNTERED. IF POSSIBLE CONFIRM OR DENY BY RECONNAISSANCE OR SURVEILLANCE EFFORTS.

FRIENDLY MISSION AND ENGINEER CAPABILITY

- EVALUATE FRIENDLY CAPABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON ACCOMPLISHING THE MISSION
- CONSIDER THE FRIENDLY MISSION
- CONDUCT ASSET VALUE RATINGS
- ESTIMATE THE ASSETS AVAILABLE BASED ON TASK ORGANIZATION OF—
  - — MANEUVER FORCES
  - — ENGINEER FORCES
  - — HIGHER ENGINEER HEADQUARTERS
- CONSIDER ADJACENT ENGINEER UNITS
- CONSIDER THE AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL RESOURCES INCLUDING THOSE LOCALLY AVAILABLE

SLIDE 20-48

ASSET VALUE RATING

CONSIDER:

- CRITICALITY TO FORCE'S MISSION
- CRITICALITY TO ARMY'S MISSION
- REPLACEABILITY
- PEOPLE VALUE
- MONETARY VALUE

SLIDE 20-49

ENEMY VALUE RATING

CONSIDER:

- ASSET PROFILE
- ASSET USEFULNESS TO AGGRESSOR
- PUBLICITY VALUE
- ASSET ACCESSIBILITY
- ASSET VULNERABILITY

PROTECTION POLICY

- MATCH PROTECTION TO THREAT
- BALANCE PROBABILITY OF ATTACK VERSUS CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE PROTECTION VERSUS COST OF ACCEPTABLE PROTECTION
- PROTECTION FROM WHAT? PRIORITIES?
- TEMPORARY, SEMITEMPORARY, PERMANENT?
- PRIORITIES FOR ASSETS—
  - OWN FORCES?
  - OWN FORCE EQUIPMENT?
  - LOCAL ASSETS AND INFRASTRUCTURE?
  - POPULACE?

SLIDE 20-51

MISSION ANALYSIS

- THE ENGINEER PARTICIPATES IN THE OVERALL MISSION ANALYSIS BY IDENTIFYING TASKS CRITICAL TO PLANNING
- THE ENGINEER'S MISSION ANALYSIS HAS TWO GOALS:
  - INTEGRATE MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS INTO THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE
  - IDENTIFY ENGINEER MISSION REQUIREMENTS
- ENGINEER MISSION ANALYSIS USES THE SAME ANALYSIS PROCESS AS THE MANEUVER COMMANDER, BUT FOCUSES ON SPECIFICS:
  - SPECIFIED
  - IMPLIED
  - ASSETS AVAILABLE
  - CONSTRAINTS
  - RESTRICTIONS
  - RISK
  - TIME ANALYSIS
  - ESSENTIAL TASKS

SPECIFIED AND IMPLIED TASKS

- SPECIFIED TASKS AND MISSIONS DIRECTLY STATED IN—
  - WARNING ORDER
  - OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN
  - GRAPHICS
  - ENGINEER ANNEX

- IMPLIED TASKS NOT SPECIFIED THAT MUST BE DONE TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION:
  - READ BETWEEN THE LINES
  - CONSIDER ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT
  - CONSIDER THE COMMANDER'S INTENT
  - CONSIDER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SITUATION

SLIDE 20-53

ASSETS AVAILABLE

- DEVELOP DURING ENGINEER BATTLEFIELD ASSESSMENT
- CONSIDER ALL ASSETS:
  - SCOUTS
  - ARMOR AND INFANTRY
  - ENGINEER
  - MORTARS
  - HAUL ASSETS
  - COMMAND AND CONTROL
  - LOCALLY AVAILABLE RESOURCES
- CONSIDER THE LINK BETWEEN MISSION AND FORCE ALLOCATION (COMMANDER'S INTENT)
- REMEMBER POLITICAL SITUATION

CONSTRAINTS AND RESTRICTIONS

- CONSTRAINTS: SPECIFIED TASKS THAT LIMIT FREEDOM OF ACTION. THE ENGINEER LOOKS AT THE IMPACT CONSTRAINTS HAVE ON MISSION PLANNING. EXAMPLES:
  - LIMITS ON LEVEL OF INTERFERENCE WITH DAILY LIFE OF POPULACE
  - IMPLICATIONS OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
  - FORCE PROTECTION POLICY

- RESTRICTIONS: LIMITATIONS PLACED ON THE COMMAND THAT PROHIBIT SPECIFIC ACTIONS. ENGINEER MUST UNDERSTAND ALL RESTRICTIONS, NOT JUST ENGINEER RELATED. EXAMPLES:
  - MEN ARE NOT TO SEARCH OR TOUCH WOMEN
  - LINES OF VEHICLES WAITING TO BE SEARCHED ARE NOT TO EXCEED "X" MINUTES IN TIME DURING RAMADAN IN A MUSLIM COUNTRY
  - FASCAM EXECUTION CRITERIA
  - FORCE-PROTECTION POLICY

SLIDE 20-55

TIME ANALYSIS

- A TACTICAL TIME MANAGEMENT TOOL BASED ON ENEMY AND FRIENDLY EVENTS
- A CRITICAL TOOL FOR THE ENGINEER
- TIME AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING, PREPARATION, AND EXECUTION IS DETERMINED
- THE DECISION CYCLE OF BOTH ENEMY AND FRIENDLY COMMANDERS MUST BE KNOWN
- TIME CENTERED AROUND CRITICAL MANEUVER AND ENGINEER EVENTS (TIME LINE) IS ALLOCATED
- THE TIME LINE IS CONTINUALLY REFINED

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

- INITIALLY FOCUSES ON THE USE OF MANEUVER FORCES AND COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
- AFTER OR DURING COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT, COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE TURNS TOWARD SYNCHRONIZING COMBAT MULTIPLIERS IN THE FIGHT
- ENGINEER MAY NEED TO FOCUS THE COMMANDER'S ATTENTION ON FORCE PROTECTION
- THE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM IS SYNCHRONIZED AND USED

SLIDE 20-57

SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS

- TIE THE ENGINEER MISSION REQUIREMENTS, FORCE ALLOCATION, AND MANEUVER PHASES OF THE OPERATION INTO A SINGLE CONCEPT
- TASK-ORGANIZE ENGINEERS BY MISSIONS AND FORCE ALLOCATION INTO GENERIC ENGINEER HEADQUARTERS
- DEVELOP HOW (SCHEME) SUBORDINATE ENGINEER UNITS ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/ SURVIVABILITY TASKS (SUBUNIT INSTRUCTIONS)

WAR-GAME AND REFINE ENGINEER PLAN

- WAR GAMING: A SYSTEMATIC VISUALIZATION OF THE ENEMY ACTIONS AND REACTIONS TO A COURSE OF ACTION
- THE ENGINEER PARTICIPATES IN WAR GAMING TO—
  - ENSURE THE SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS SUPPORTS THE MANEUVER PLAN AND IS INTEGRATED WITH OTHER STAFF PLANS
  - FURTHER IDENTIFY WEAKNESSES IN HIS PLAN AND MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IF NECESSARY
- INTEGRATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS IS KEY
- ADDITIONAL OPTIONS AND EQUIPMENT (PERHAPS NOT NORMALLY AVAILABLE) MAY SURFACE AS VIABLE ALTERNATIVES

SLIDE 20-59

COMPARISON

- EACH COURSE OF ACTION IS COMPARED USING THE COMMANDER'S EVALUATION CRITERIA; THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES ARE HIGHLIGHTED
- THE ENGINEER ENSURES THAT THE COMMANDER IS AWARE OF THE TRADE OFFS BETWEEN COURSES OF ACTION
- THE ENGINEER KEEPS TABS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF OTHER STAFF MEMBERS; HE MAY HAVE TO GIVE GREATER CONSIDERATION TO AT LEAST DESIRABLE COURSE OF ACTION
- THE ENGINEER'S ADVICE ON RISK IS VITAL
- THE ENGINEER CONSIDERS SAFETY OF FORCES DURING CONSTRUCTION

DECISION, ACTIONS, AND ORDERS

- NORMALLY, THE STAFF MAKES A UNIFIED RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMANDER ON THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION
- THE COMMANDER MAY SELECT OR MODIFY A DEVELOPED COURSE OF ACTION OR CHOOSE HIS OWN
- THE ENGINEER MAKES SURE THE COMMANDER KNOWS THE TRADE OFFS INVOLVED IN HIS DECISION
- THE ENGINEER REFINES THE SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS BASED ON THE COMMANDER'S DECISION
- THE ENGINEER DEVELOPS THE SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS INTO A FINALIZED ENGINEER PLAN
- THE ENGINEER ENSURES THE COMMANDER IS AWARE OF RISK INHERENT IN COURSES OF ACTION

SLIDE 20-61

FINALIZED ENGINEER PLAN

- TASK-ORGANIZE UNITS BASED ON THE FORCE ALLOCATION IN THE SCHEME OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS
- ASSIGN MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY TASKS TO MANEUVER AND ENGINEER FORCE AS SUBUNIT INSTRUCTIONS
- REFER BACK TO MISSION ANALYSIS TO ENSURE ALL TASKS ARE COVERED
- COMPLETE COORDINATION WITH OTHER STAFF MEMBERS
- DISSEMINATE THE PLAN TO SUBORDINATES THROUGH—
  - BASIC OPERATION ORDER
  - ENGINEER ANNEX
  - ENGINEER UNIT ORDERS
- PREPARE OPERATION ORDER BRIEFING TO COMMANDERS

SLIDE 20-62

LESSON 21. FIRE SUPPORT

SLIDE 21-1. TASKS

This lesson is based on the information provided by units and individuals with recent stability and support operations experience. The lesson is organized by the infantry common tasks: environment considerations, targeting considerations, planning target acquisition assets, operations, sniper and countersniper, close quarters combat, force protection, and rules of engagement considerations. First, the stability and support operations environment presents unique challenges to the commander and fire support coordinator.

The task force must always have available and plan continuously for the employment of a joint or combined force suite of fire support systems. A credible operational fires and tactical fire support capability deters aggression and increases the options available to the commander to accomplish his mission and protect the force. The commander must know what both lethal and nonlethal fire support can do to help accomplish his mission. The fire support coordinator must provide the commander with the capabilities and limitations of fire support in the stability and support operations environment, based on the rules of engagement.

Some stability and support operations activities do not require planning and execution of fires. However, activities such as NEO, arms control, support to domestic authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, combating terrorism and counterdrug operations may require the assistance of fire support units. Field artillery and other fire support unit TOEs provide capabilities that may be used to augment the command and control functions of other units or agencies tasked with these responsibilities. This lesson does not address how the artillery supports these types of operations. This lesson focuses on stability and support operations activities that may require planning, coordination, and execution of fire support.

SLIDE 21-2. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Research and analysis reflects that doctrine for fires and the seven basic tasks of fire support do not change during stability and support operations. However, the stability and support operations environment presents unique challenges that affect tactics, techniques, and procedures for fires, and which require the meticulous attention of planners.

- Nonlinear operations are typical unless the threat is capable of conducting larger military operations to seize and hold terrain.
- Diverse threats, often indistinguishable from friendly activities, test friendly targeting processes.
- Threats appear anywhere, anytime, and they are fleeting.
- All friendly forces are vulnerable; there is no safe or secure rear area.
- Threats normally have the luxury of time and knowledge of the terrain in their favor.
- The prevalent threat is hostile terrorist, guerilla, or partisan activity.
- Threat activities range from deception and psychological warfare to embarrass and demoralize friendly forces to hit and run tactics including attacks and raids.
- External support to threat activities elevates the problem within international politics, usually increasing restrictions and constraints on friendly action.

SLIDE 21-3. OTHER STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The stability and support operations environment presses the following considerations on fire support planning and execution.

- Integrated base defenses are necessary, with mutually supporting 24-hour fires capability.
- Fires must be planned to support both position defense and movement.
- Planners must recognize the restrictions and constraints imposed by rules of engagement (ROE) on application of force.
- ROE must be written with consideration of indirect and nonlethal fires as well as direct fire.
- ROE should address appropriate response to various expected threat actions and provide for force protection.
- ROE must consider the diversity of weapons available and munitions selection.
- Forces must be prepared with all-round fire planning.
- Forces must provide real-time target acquisition and identification capability.
- Forces must establish near real-time sensor-to-shooter links.
- Forces provide and establish liaison with joint, combined, and coalition force operations, intelligence, and fire support agencies to ensure interoperability.
- Planners coordinate fire support activities with domestic civil authorities.
- Forces must enforce existing and coordinate necessary standardization agreements like Standard NATO Agreements (STANAG) and Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAG).
- The above make predeployment planning and task organization considerations critical.

FA battalions participating in stability and support operations regardless of the level of fire support automation commonly in use must be prepared to revert to manual operations. Shipping requirements for heavy tactical fire make it almost certain that manual procedures will be used at least initially. The FSCOORD, FSOs, FDC, and FIST personnel should be considered for early deployment to plan fires essential to force lethality, deterrence, and force protection.

SLIDE 21-4. COORDINATE TARGET ACQUISITION

Coordinating targeting requirements begins with threat analysis to determine the extent and nature of the threat. This is accomplished using the basic methodology presented in FM 6-20-10. This process does not change in stability and support operations. However, the traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield process from which high-value targets are developed must be modified to meet the unique characteristics of the stability and support operations environment. See, also FM 34-130 for more information on IPB for stability and support operations.

There will likely be a void of detailed information, such as that provided by the fire support mission area analysis, to support identification of high-payoff targets. The situation makes doctrinal templating difficult to impossible. Therefore, the planner must—

- Build a picture of the enemy and how he conducts operations.
- Determine what the enemy requires to sustain operations.

- Refine the enemy picture and determine operational patterns.

The planner must also be aware of critical and vulnerable friendly activities. These present potential and likely targets to the enemy. Targets should be planned against possible avenues of approach to fixed facilities and against possible ambush sites of moving units.

SLIDE 21-5. ATTACK RESOURCES

The majority of fire support lethal attack systems may be air platforms due to requirements for eyes-on and precision munitions to preclude damage to nonmilitary targets. The USMC may provide rotary-wing aircraft in support of CAS missions tasked by the joint force air component commander. Army rotary-wing aircraft may also provide CAS even though they are a maneuver system. The Air Force AC-130 Specter gunship is an excellent fire support for night operations. Other CAS systems require close coordination with ground forces and positive control of target attack by air or ground tactical air control parties.

Naval gunfire's trajectory limits its use in a stability and support operations situation.

Artillery fire is available from various sources, provided considerations for interoperability have been met. These include target location and reporting procedures, communications, positive control, automated and nonautomated integration, and consideration of ballistic differences of multinational or multiservice shell fuze combinations.

Nonlethal attack systems include air- and ground-based electronic countermeasures, smoke and obscurants, psychological and deception operations, and other temporary disabling techniques and technology. The brigade task force FSCOORD must integrate or support any of these options to meet the needs of the task force commander.

The FSCOORD should know about electronic countermeasures operations executed by higher headquarters and exploit them when possible. Illumination, smoke, and obscurants may be used according to existing doctrine for support of ground tactical operations. However, potential fire and environmental hazards from some munitions should be considered in the rules of engagement. A fire support element can be formed from the division artillery and fire support element personnel. Corps assets may also be required to provide requisite communications links to distant higher headquarters C2 nodes, target acquisition assets and attack assets. Again, the brigade task force is not staffed to provide a joint task force coordination capability, while simultaneously performing its tactical responsibilities.

Use of air power in a joint force requires close interface with the battlefield coordination element, the Army force commander's liaison to the JFACC, and an understanding of the air tasking order cycle established by the JFACC. A brigade task force must establish links through higher headquarters or directly to the battlefield coordination element or its equivalent. Emphasis of this link is on coordination of airspace management with ground-based fire support systems, sharing air and ground intelligence, and sharing battle damage assessment.

SLIDE 21-6. BRIGADE JOINT FORCE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT

Joint fires, regardless of echelon, consist of essentially three parts—C3, target acquisition and battlefield surveillance, and attack resources. In stability and support operations as in any military operation, employment of fires is a joint function requiring coordination of the

joint suite of these systems. The brigade task force must plan and coordinate joint fires with or without a higher headquarters joint fires support cell. Considerations for establishing a brigade joint fire support element are as follows.

- Augmentation from division or corps to perform the increased joint liaison and coordination functions must be considered. Field artillery intelligence officers, FSE, and ANGLICO and TACP personnel from higher headquarters are likely candidates. Personnel security clearances are also a consideration. In coalition operations and most OCONUS operations, addition of personnel with appropriate language skills is essential.
- The joint FSCOORD must be the single POC for the planning and integration of all fires within the joint area of operations. The leader provides for the exchange of compartmentalized intelligence information between joint, combined, and coalition partners.
- The leader ensures signal operating instructions are available for higher and adjacent units, including combined forces, coalition, and other services. Jointly recognized fire support specific formats are also in FM 90-20.
- The leader considers integration of the direct-support artillery battalion TOC with the JTF TOC. This increases efficiency by reducing the number of C2 nodes for information flow and coordination.

SLIDE 21-7. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES AND AIRSPACE COORDINATION MEASURES

Fire support coordination measures and airspace coordination measures should be limited to doctrinal measures only. While the establishing nondoctrinal local measures may seem useful, the joint and combined nature of the battlefield, coupled with rotation of units in and out of country may lead to confusion. In areas where nonbilateral standardization agreements exist, the assistance of government agencies may be required. Stability and support operations may limit the use of fire support coordination measures to restrictive measures such as no-fire areas, restricted fire areas, and restricted fire lines. Restricted fire lines are useful in limiting type of weapons or ordnance to be used in a specific area and should be considered when total restriction of fires is not desired. Permissive measures may be useful in some cases; for example, if the rules of engagement permit, a free-fire area is designated to permit jettisoning of ordnance or fire registration. Permissive measures should not be used to facilitate fires that do not have positive control and definite target identification.

Effective battle tracking of friendly forces, civilians, and governmental organizations by the joint force can have a positive impact on the delivery of indirect fires by reducing the time required to clear fires. By tracking the location of friendly forces and persons, the commander reduces the response time for the delivery of fires against fleeting targets, while maintaining positive control of fires. Close coordination with the battlefield coordination element permits coordination of military and civilian airspace use with surface-based fire support. While informal airspace coordination measures are preferred, stability and support operations will likely require adherence to formal airspace coordination measures due to the number and nature of airspace users involved.

SLIDE 21-8. PLANNING TARGET ACQUISITION ASSETS

After potential high-payoff targets are determined, the process of acquiring, locating, and identifying them begins. These tasks are assigned using the intelligence collection plan. The intelligence collection plan's ability to support a commander's mission depends on assets available to the force.

The assets organic to a brigade task force are insufficient for the target acquisition needs in stability and support operations. The brigade must be supported with assets from higher headquarters. Real-time human intelligence and imagery intelligence systems assist positive target identification and expedite clearance of fires. The commander should consider adding unmanned aerial vehicles and OH-58 reconnaissance helicopters to the troop list.

Employment of nontraditional assets (such as civil affairs, military police, civilian police, and irregular forces) may augment limited capability. However, procedures must be established for nontraditional assets to report and authenticate target information.

Corps and division electronic intelligence systems (such as Quicklook, Quickfix, and Guardrail) should be considered. However, they require time to process target information, and target identification may still require verification before clearing fires.

The addition of joint and national systems requires the deployed force to have the requisite ground stations to receive, process, and disseminate target intelligence.

Augmentation by corps target acquisition detachment or division target acquisition battery personnel and equipment will be necessary. These are sources for Q36 and Q37 countermortar and counterbattery radars. These systems provide reactive counterfire capability and intelligence information.

SLIDE 21-9. CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

FSO coordinates fire support.

- Coordinates available fires with the supported task force commander. Advises him of ROE impact on available fires.
- Ensures checkpoint personnel know call-for-fire procedures.
- Determines minimum safe distances from the checkpoint.
- Plans fires along avenues of approach to the checkpoint. Considers illumination for night visibility, smoke for obscuration, and checkpoint evacuation.
- Designates observers for target identification and clearance of fires procedures.

FSO acquires targets.

- Executes the intelligence collection plan.
- Expedites calls for fire from checkpoint personnel.

SLIDE 21-10. CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

Fire support to cordon and search operations must be closely coordinated with the task force commander's scheme of movement or maneuver.

- Plan fires to protect movement of forces. Use IPB products to determine possible ambush sites. Plan fires to support immediate-action drills in ambush situations.
- Plan fires against likely avenues of approach into friendly areas of operation.
- Consider integration of combat aviation assets for immediate fire support needs. Other assets include AC-130 gunships, mortars, and artillery support.

- Provide responsive near real-time sensor-to-shooter links.

SLIDE 21-11. CONVOY OPERATIONS

Fire support to convoy operations must be closely coordinated with the task force commander's scheme of movement or maneuver.

- Plan fires to protect movement of forces. Use IPB products to determine possible ambush sites. Plan fires to support immediate-action drills in ambush situations.
- Plan fires against likely avenues of approach into friendly areas of operation.
- Consider integration of combat aviation assets for immediate fire support needs. Other assets include AC-130 gunships, mortars, and artillery support.
- Provide responsive near real-time sensor-to-shooter links.
- Provide fire support teams to convoys.
- Consider use of an unmanned aerial vehicle and remotely piloted vehicle to observe areas along and ahead of convoy routes to increase security and reduce danger to ground forces.
- Plan suppression of enemy air defenses fires for air movements. Plan fires to support air landing and possible ground tactical operations.
- Use a battle tracking matrix to track movement of convoys and to expedite clearance of fires. Plan priority targets that can be shifted as convoy progresses. HF radios may be needed for long-distance communication with fire support assets, especially in mountainous terrain.

SLIDE 21-12. SNIPER AND COUNTERSNIPER OPERATIONS

FSO coordinates fire support.

- Coordinates available fires with the supported task force commander. Advises him of ROE impact on available fires.
- Ensures sniper and countersniper personnel know call-for-fire procedures.
- Determines minimum safe distances from sniper positions.
- Plans fires along avenues of approach to the sniper positions. Considers illumination for night visibility and smoke for obscuration and position evacuation. Considers airbursts for countersniper operations in tree lines and rooftops.
- When appropriate, uses snipers as observers.

FSO acquires targets.

- Executes the intelligence collection plan.
- Expedites calls for fire from snipers.

SLIDE 21-13. CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

Fire support to close quarters combat must be closely coordinated with the task force commander's scheme of movement or maneuver.

- Plan fires to protect movement of forces. Use IPB products to determine possible ambush sites. Plan fires to support immediate action drills in ambush situations.
- Plan fires against likely avenues of approach into friendly areas of operation.
- Consider integration of combat aviation assets for immediate fire support needs. Other assets include AC-130 gunships, mortars, and artillery support.

- Provide responsive near real-time sensor-to-shooter links.
- Plan final protective fires and fires on friendly defensive positions.

SLIDE 21-14. FORCE PROTECTION

FSO plans force protection:

- Plans mutually supporting fires for base defense.
- Plans fires to support patrols and activities outside base perimeters.
- Plans fires to support friendly movement.
- Establishes observation plans as appropriate.
- Establishes communications in support of protective fires to include authentication procedures.

SLIDE 21-15. REINFORCING STATIC POSITION

When maneuver elements conduct search and attack operations, convoys must be protected. Local air assaults on the nonlinear battlefield must be conducted. The artillery may not always follow to provide support. Firing batteries may remain in dispersed reinforced positions for long periods—perhaps days—to provide fires over a large area.

As the commander analyzes METT-T, he must be sure that reinforcing a static position best supports the maneuver commander, and he must consider several critical factors. Will maneuver forces move out of artillery range if the position is static? Will the reinforced site aid the defense of maneuver forces when they are not conducting operations? Is reinforcing the fire bases the best use of engineer assets? Security is enhanced and duplication of effort is reduced if maneuver and fire support are collocated.

The tendency to always reinforce positions should be avoided. Large amounts of firepower must mass in support of maneuver and not be tied to area protection or fire bases. In addition, employing incorrect survivability techniques, such as unnecessary reinforcing, can waste Class IV assets without increasing survivability.

SLIDE 21-16. REINFORCED BATTERY POSITION AND GUN POSITION

Once the decision to reinforce a position has been made, preparation of the position depends on METT-T. Planning and execution details for this operation are in FM 5-15 and FM 5-34.

SLIDE 21-17. CONSIDERATIONS

Battery defense SOP, tools and materials, training with engineers, and knowledge of weapon systems tasks must be accomplished to construct and occupy a reinforced battery position. The battery defense SOP must be complete, and then it must be well rehearsed. The commander must recognize that static defense of a battery position is manpower-intensive and will significantly effect battery operations. Soldiers must have the tools needed to construct defenses and clear fields of fire. Training with the supporting engineers is critical. While each position is unique, validation of technique and time required increases the efficiency of the operations. The artillery soldier must be equally capable of defending the battery with the crew-served and individual weapons as he is with the howitzer.

SLIDE 21-18. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The task force commander may require advice for developing or recommending establishment of ROE. Frequently, commanders do not understand the impact of ROE on the use of indirect fires.

While ROE vary for each theater of operations, three basic requirements for the use of force remain constant. These are—

- Force protection.
- Use minimum essential force.
- Limit collateral damage.

The fire support coordinator should review all ROE as they impact joint fire support. He should ensure ROE address indirect and nonlethal fires.

Effective ROE should provide specific and detailed guidelines with respect to the following issues:

- What exactly is the required target description in a call for fire?
- When may adjust fire versus fire for effect be used as a method of fire?
- What are minimum safe distances for indirect fires from built-up areas or protected civilian facilities?
- Are restrictions on certain shell-fuze combinations appropriate?
- Who has authority to approve fires of specified shell-fuze combinations?
- What is an acceptable level of response with regard to volume of fire?
- What are the ROE constraints for fires used to protect forces?

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for T&EO, Provide Fire Support.

TASKS

- ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS
- TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS
- PLANNING TARGET ACQUISITION ASSETS
- OPERATIONS
- SNIPER AND COUNTERSNIPER
- CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT
- FORCE PROTECTION
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

SLIDE 21-1

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- DOCTRINE FOR FIRES AND BASIC TASKS OF FIRE SUPPORT DO NOT CHANGE
- NONLINEAR OPERATIONS
- DIVERSE THREATS
- THREATS APPEAR ANYWHERE, ANYTIME
- THREAT HAS LUXURY OF TIME AND KNOWLEDGE OF TERRAIN
- PREVALENT THREAT—TERRORIST, GUERRILLA, OR PARTISAN
- THREAT ACTIVITIES
- MORTARS ARE THE FIRE SUPPORT WEAPON OF CHOICE FOR THREAT FORCES IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

SLIDE 21-2

OTHER STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATIONS

- INTEGRATED BASE DEFENSES
- PLANNERS MUST RECOGNIZE RESTRICTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONSIDERATION OF DIRECT, INDIRECT, AND NONLETHAL FIRES
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT PROVIDE FORCE PROTECTION
- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT CONSIDER WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS AVAILABLE
- ALL-ROUND FIRE PLANNING
- REAL-TIME TARGET ACQUISITION CAPABILITY
- REAL-TIME SENSOR TO SHOOTER LINK
- COORDINATION WITH DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITIES
- STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT AND QUADRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT ENFORCED

SLIDE 21-3

COORDINATE TARGET ACQUISITION

- PLANNER BEGINS WITH THREAT ANALYSIS
- PLANNER USES BASIC METHODOLOGY IN FM 6-20-10 AND FM 34-130
- PLANNER MUST—
  - BUILD A PICTURE OF ENEMY AND HIS OPERATIONS
  - DETERMINE WHAT ENEMY REQUIRES TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS
  - REFINE THE ENEMY PICTURE AND DETERMINE PATTERNS
  - BE AWARE OF CRITICAL FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES

ATTACK RESOURCES

- MAY RELY ON AIR PLATFORMS DUE TO EYES-ON TARGET REQUIREMENT
- CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MAY BE PROVIDED BY MARINES AND ARMY ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT, AIR FORCE AC-130 (NIGHT)
- NAVAL GUNFIRE LIMITED IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
- NONLETHAL ATTACK SYSTEMS
- PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS, BOTH FIELD ARTILLERY AND AERIAL DELIVERED MAY PREDOMINATE

SLIDE 21-5

BRIGADE JOINT FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT

- CONSIDER AUGMENTATION FROM DIVISION OR CORPS
- ADD PERSONNEL WITH APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE SKILLS
- DESIGNATED JOINT FSCOORD AS SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT FOR FIRES IN JTF AREA OF OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT SIGNAL OPERATIONS FOR HIGHER HEADQUARTERS AND ADJACENT UNITS INCLUDING COALITION AND OTHER SERVICES
- INTEGRATE DIRECT-SUPPORT FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION WITH JTF TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER
- AUGMENT WITH FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT FROM DIVISION ARTILLERY AND DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT PERSONNEL
- INTERFACE WITH BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION ELEMENT

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION MEASURES AND AIRSPACE COORDINATION MEASURES

- LIMITED TO DOCTRINAL MEASURES ONLY
- MAY BE LIMITED TO NO-FIRE ARES, RESTRICTED-FIRE AREAS, AND RESTRICTED-FIRE LINES
- LIMITED PERMISSIVE MEASURES MAY BE HELPFUL
- BATTLE TRACKING
- CLOSE COORDINATION WITH BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION ELEMENT, FORMAL AIRSPACE COORDINATION MEASURES

SLIDE 21-7

PLANNING TARGET ACQUISITION ASSETS

- PLAN TO ACQUIRE POTENTIAL HIGH-PAYOFF TARGETS
- ASSIGN TARGETS BY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PLAN
- CONSIDER ASSETS AVAILABLE TO BRIGADE TASK FORCE ARE INSUFFICIENT
- AUGMENT WITH PERSONNEL FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

CHECKPOINT OPERATIONS

- COORDINATE FIRE SUPPORT
- ACQUIRE TARGETS

SLIDE 21-9

CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

- MUST BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH TASK FORCE COMMANDER'S SCHEME OF MANEUVER
- PLAN FIRES TO PROTECT MOVEMENT OF FORCES, IMMEDIATE-ACTION DRILLS
- PLAN FIRES AGAINST LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH
- CONSIDER COMBAT AVIATION, MORTARS, ARTILLERY SUPPORT AC-130s

CONVOY OPERATIONS

- CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH SCHEME OF MANEUVER
- RESPONSIVE NEAR-TIME SENSOR-SHOOTER LINK REQUIRED
- PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT TEAMS FOR CONVOYS
- CONSIDER UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES ON CONVOY ROUTES TO INCREASE SECURITY
- PLAN SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSES FOR AIR MOVEMENTS, AIR LANDING, GROUND TACTICAL OPERATIONS

SLIDE 21-11

SNIPER AND COUNTERSNIPER OPERATIONS

- ENSURE PERSONNEL KNOW CALL-FOR-FIRE PROCEDURES
- DETERMINE MINIMUM SAFE DISTANCE FROM SNIPER POSITIONS
- WHEN APPROPRIATE, USE SNIPER AS OBSERVERS
- PLAN FIRES ALONG AVENUE OF APPROACH TO SNIPER POSITIONS, CONSIDER AIR BURSTS, ILLUMINATION, AND SMOKE

CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

- FIRE SUPPORT CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH COMMANDER'S SCHEME OF MANEUVER
- PROTECT MOVEMENT OF FORCES, SECURE AMBUSH SITES
- PLAN FIRES AGAINST AVENUES OF APPROACH
- CONSIDER INTEGRATING COMBAT AVIATION, MORTARS, AC-130s, GUNSHIPS
- PROVIDE RESPONSIVE NEAR REAL-TIME SENSOR-SHOOTER LINKS
- PLAN FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES ON FRIENDLY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

SLIDE 21-13

FORCE PROTECTION

- PLAN MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FIRES FOR BASE DEFENSE
- SUPPORT PATROLS AND ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE BASE PERIMETERS
- SUPPORT FRIENDLY MOVEMENT
- ESTABLISH OBSERVATION PLANS AS APPROPRIATE
- ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PROTECTIVE FIRES

REINFORCING STATIC POSITION

MISSION—

- DOES A STATIC FIRING POSITION SUPPORT THE COMMANDER'S INTENT?
- IS THERE A REQUIREMENT FOR 6400-MIL FIRING CAPABILITY?
- ARE THERE IMPLIED TASKS THAT REQUIRE A REINFORCED POSITION (PROTECT TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER, Q36)?

ENEMY—

- HOW WILL THE ENEMY ATTACK?
- IN WHAT STRENGTH WILL THE ENEMY ATTACK? WHAT WEAPON SYSTEMS WILL THE ENEMY USE?

TERRAIN—

- ARE SUITABLE POSITIONS AVAILABLE?
- ARE THERE RESTRICTIONS ON POSITIONS?
- WILL THE SOIL SUPPORT THE WEAPON SYSTEMS?
- WILL THE POSITION ALLOW MUTUALLY SUPPORTING FIRES?
- WHAT IS THE CLIMATE?


TROOPS—

- ARE ENGINEER ASSETS AVAILABLE?
- HAVE ADDITIONAL DEMANDS ON SOLDIERS BEEN CONSIDERED?
- WHAT IS THE OPERATIONAL TEMPO OF THE MISSION?
- ARE MANEUVER AND FIRE SUPPORT COLLOCATED TO INCREASE SECURITY AND AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORT?


TIME—IS THERE TIME FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE POSITION?

SLIDE 21-15

REINFORCED BATTERY POSITION (STAR)



REINFORCED GUN POSITION



SLIDE 21-16

CONSIDERATIONS

BATTERY DEFENSE SOP—DEVELOP AND TRAIN

TOOLS AND MATERIALS—

- BASIC ISSUE ITEMS IS NOT SUFFICIENT, CONSIDER A SECTION CONSTRUCTION KIT:
  - —2 LONG-HANDLE SHOVELS
  - —ADDITIONAL MATTOCK
  - —CLAW HAMMER
  - —BINDING WIRE
  - —ROPE
  - —550 CORD
  - —WIRE HANDLING GLOVES
  - —MACHETE, SWING BLADE
  - —PILE DRIVER, CHAIN SAW (BATTERY LEVEL)

TRAINING WITH ENGINEERS—

- VALIDATE CONSTRUCTION PLAN WITH ENGINEERS
- COORDINATE FOR PRIORITY OF ASSETS
- VALIDATE TIME AND EFFORT REQUIREMENTS

KNOWLEDGE OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS—

- KNOW EMPLOYMENT OF CREW-SERVED WEAPONS AND MINES
- KNOW EMPLOYMENT OF ANTITANK AND GRENADE LAUNCHERS

SLIDE 21-17

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- BE PREPARED TO ADVISE THE COMMANDER ON THE IMPACT OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ON THE USE OF INDIRECT FIRES
- KNOW THREE BASIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS
- HAVE FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATOR REVIEW ALL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR FIRE SUPPORT IMPLICATIONS

LESSON 22. SNIPER EMPLOYMENT AND COUNTERSNIPER MEASURES

SLIDE 22-1. PRINCIPLES OF SNIPER EMPLOYMENT

These are the principles of sniper employment that remain the same in stability and support operations.

Snipers are used in pairs or larger elements for security and for maintaining an overwatch of an area for a long duration. Snipers must be used in pairs, at a minimum, so that they can rotate duties between the sniper and his observer. Use of high-power optics and the concentration necessary to acquire intelligence calls for the observer to be relieved at frequent intervals. Rear security and reaction forces may add to the size of the element employed in sniper operations.

- To be effective, snipers must remain undetected. This requirement can call for inventiveness on the part of the snipers and commander alike. Since the majority of stability and support operations missions will be conducted in foreign countries, inserting a sniper element into an effective firing position may require them to wear native garments. At the least, they will have to plan a route that keeps them out of high traffic areas. The team may leave a larger element on a normal patrol route. They may need a diversion created by the parent unit to allow them to occupy a position unnoticed. The commander should keep in mind that any method required to insert a sniper team may also be necessary to extract them.
- Snipers could be compromised by friendly units unaware of their mission and by civilians who live in an area and are not necessarily unfriendly to US forces. To avoid compromise, snipers may have to move frequently. On extended operations, snipers need a relief procedure that can be accomplished without compromise.
- To avoid compromise, snipers must move slowly, slower than regular infantry forces. Commanders must either provide this additional time to work snipers into position or provide a way to speed up their movement such as including snipers as a stay-behind element in preliminary operations in a target area. As a last resort, positions can be picked through ground, air photo, and map reconnaissance and occupied just before any operation.

SLIDE 22-2. SNIPERS IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Although snipers are thought of primarily as shooters, they spend 95 percent and more of their time looking at their assigned sector. Normal SOP calls for the sniper to maintain a logbook of events and observations. In a stability and support operations, the sniper's observation abilities, combined with organic optical equipment, make him a prime source of up-to-the-minute tactical intelligence that should be given directly to a commander. (This was true recently in Somalia where snipers provided precise reports of Somali activity over dependable communication, in a timely basis.)

The sniper's primary function, that of shooter, can also be critical in stability and support operations where the rules of engagement are so restrictive that the only offense allowed is one or two precision shots at specifically identified targets. This is not a mission that a rifleman can accomplish nor can a commander place a telescope on an M16 rifle and always get the desired result.

SLIDE 22-3. CONVENTIONAL VERSUS STABILITY AND SUPPORT

OPERATIONS

Three differences between conventional sniper operations and stability and support operations must be considered:

1. Observation capability can become just as important as shooting as a reason to employ snipers. The information gained through this should be channeled either to the S2 or at critical stages of an operation to the commander directly.
2. Range to prospective targets may be considerably shorter than in conventional operations (under 200 meters). Snipers should be prepared for differences in their operations such as narrow fields of view through optics and fleeting nature of targets, especially in a MOUT environment.
3.Target identification may become more important than in conventional operations, because the sniper must identify civilians from enemy even though they may dress similarly. The only obvious difference may be a weapon.

SLIDE 22-4. CHECKPOINTS

Snipers overwatch the checkpoint area to protect against any attacking force wishing to overwhelm or shut down the checkpoint. Snipers should report traffic numbers and types of vehicles approaching the checkpoint. They may provide some information on how many occupants there are in a vehicle. Snipers can provide protection for those searching vehicles by orienting on the search area, or they can be prepared to seal off the checkpoint from vehicles or personnel either entering or exiting. Some considerations for locating snipers at checkpoints are—

1. They should never be decisively engaged or pinned down by someone attacking the checkpoint, so they must overwatch the checkpoint, but not be in it.
2. Sniper teams should have a clear line of sight or clear shot down the avenues leading to a checkpoint, especially where they can observe any obstacles.
3. Snipers should have at least as a secondary sector any restricted terrain around the checkpoint. The main armament of checkpoint forces is going to be focused on the roads leading into it. Snipers should at least partially guard the rest.
4. Snipers should have direct communication with the command element at the checkpoint.
5. Snipers should be prepared to fire on command or to defend US forces. Commanders should know that depending on the situation firing at some portion of a vehicle and stopping it may be preferable to shooting the occupants.
6. A plan for the extraction, relief in place, and relief from encirclement of sniper teams should be known to all members of the checkpoint and rehearsed if necessary.
7. If available, a Barretta caliber .50 sniper weapon system provides snipers an antivehicle capability as well as enabling them to out range their enemy. A sniper weapon system is also excellent for countersniper situations and for penetrating barriers such as cinder block, bricks, or adobe walls. These weapons are deployed with special operations forces and Marines.

a. In cordon and search operations, snipers are a part of the cordon or security force.

1. Snipers should move into position with the rest of the security forces and assist in sealing off the area being searched. Snipers should be positioned on key terrain allowing overwatch of the search area and the approaches leading into it. They should report any movement into or out of the search area. Their primary targets should be dismounted troops. Their primary sectors should be restricted terrain and obstacles. As a secondary mission, snipers could focus on the area inside the cordon but not under direct observation or control of the search element. Their job would be to report threatening movement within the cordon either toward the cordon attempting a breakout or toward the search element attempting to overwhelm it. In any instance, under the normally restrictive rules of engagement of stability and support operations, the sniper's first action should be to make timely, precise reports on a frequency that is not busy with transmissions. These reports can be made by using the SALUTE format with information. Identifying who is doing what is critical.

2. In preliminary training, snipers must learn to make clear, concise reports of activity observed including facts that the commander can use to base plans and action on. In some stability and support operations situations, shooting is the last resort. The sniper should be required to have the discipline to observe and report, while at the same time being ready to shoot on command. An emphasis should be on dependable communication equipment and radio discipline. The sniper's radio is second only to his rifle in importance.

b. In search and attack operations, sniper teams have two areas of interest. They could be placed to overwatch the find force, or they could be used to assist in sealing off the entire search area as part of the fix force.

(1) In an attack, snipers focus their efforts on leaders and on crew-served weapons. When an area has been identified and an attack is being planned, snipers should go into the target area in advance of the main body and observe for key positions and weapons. Snipers should also focus attention on the enemy's routine such as when they change sentries, eat, drill. Snipers should look for how many enemy there are, who is in charge, what kind of weapons and equipment they have, what is their condition, and who comes and goes from the site. The snipers should note the avenues of approach and any obvious obstacles or areas that the enemy avoids, which could be mined or booby trapped. All this information should be relayed in scheduled messages or communicated directly to the main body at the ORP. When the assault force has consolidated on the objective, snipers can be shifted to cover the approaches to the objective area.

(2) Snipers can assist in protecting convoys by being placed in overwatch positions on the convoy route in advance of the convoy and joining a rear guard as the convoy passes out of their sector. If the convoy halts for an extended period, overnight for example, snipers could redeploy to the next portion of a route. Snipers may also be taken in more limited numbers along with the convoy to assist if the convoy comes in contact with a hostile force. Before doing this, commanders should remember that to be effective, a sniper has to be out of the part of the convoy in direct contact and cannot fire accurate shots from a moving vehicle. A sniper could assist reaction forces employed to clear ambushes from a convoy route.

c. Snipers in close quarters combat can be employed to seal off avenues of approach to areas where close quarters combat is anticipated such as in a raid of a specific installation or encampment. Snipers can pass intelligence about the enemy situation before close quarters combat is initiated, eliminate exposed enemy as close quarters combat starts. After the battle is initiated, snipers can block entrances or exits from the engagement area. Close quarters combat calls for dependable communication links between snipers and supported soldiers. It also calls for signals that have been coordinated and rehearsed between the two elements. An example is a signal to let snipers know when a building is cleared and friendly forces are about to exit. Snipers may also fire on command, and their shots will initiate a larger action such as a raid. In these instances, the commands leading to their firing should be rehearsed.

d. In most stability and support operations situations rules of engagement severely limits authority to use deadly force, while the situation itself may limit the necessity for it. In spite of this, the sniper can become an increasingly important member of the infantry company due to his observation ability and expertise in camouflage. Additionally, the precision shooting of the sniper may be the only deadly force response that can be authorized because of the need to eliminate collateral damage. For these reasons, snipers should be integrated into operational plans during planning and be under control of the commander. Commanders faced with stability and support operations will need information on the local situation and options, many that are short of traditional infantry responses. The sniper offers at least part of the answer to these needs.

SLIDE 22-5. COUNTERSNIPER MEASURES

Unit actions on entering area of operation—

- **Maintain a large number of OPs.** To be effective, a sniper must get into a firing position without detection. Establishing OPs and briefing observers to watch for anyone with a weapon, pointing out obvious positions a sniper may fire from, and making sure that each OP is equipped with binoculars, NVDs, and thermal sights (when available) so that they have 24-hour capability. This helps reduce the chance of an enemy sniper working into position.
- **Maintain active patrols.** Active patrols should be maintained especially in areas covering OP dead space. These patrols should not only watch for obvious armed personnel but also evidence that people have moved into or fired from positions. This involves watching for tracks, cartridge cases, discarded equipment, food scraps, and trash as evidence that a position was used. If such a place is found, friendly snipers can overwatch to see if the enemy returns.
- **Do not establish obvious routines.** These would include holding formations at standard times, issuing equipment or rations in a manner that causes soldiers to line up for extended periods, grouping large portions of the chain of command in one area. Other helpful actions include not saluting, removing rank insignia, camouflaging, and operating during limited visibility conditions. The unit should not do anything that allows an enemy sniper to have an easy or predictable target.
- **Perform actions to defeat enemy snipers.** The biggest problem in dealing with an enemy sniper is in finding him. To have a better chance of finding him, a friendly sniper should be employed to assist and coordinate efforts. US snipers observe the local situation to find the most likely firing locations for enemy snipers. They use the following sources of information to narrow options to a manageable level:

1. Analyze ground as if they were the enemy and look at areas they would use as firing positions.
2. Interview local unit asking questions on when and where sniper incidents have occurred, who was the target, how many shots were fired, was the enemy seen, what equipment was he or she carrying, was any evidence left behind such as pieces of camouflage, expended casings.
3. Use aerial photographs, map reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, and patrol debriefs to narrow the prospective firing locations of the enemy sniper.
4. If in a friendly country with army, police, civilian populace behind US efforts, local civilians could be interviewed for information as well.
5. Use other US forces (locally deployed unit) to establish OPs and ambushes on suspected sniper firing positions. The most likely positions or ones known to have been used will be overwatched by the US snipers.
6. Establish hide sites or firing positions both overwatching the area that US soldiers are stationed in and inside the friendly positions. They should construct decoys of different types to provide realistic targets for enemy snipers, while being ready to respond if the enemy engages the decoy.

Engage the enemy sniper. The first and last rule of engaging the enemy is to use the maximum force against the sniper allowed under the existing rules of engagement. Second is to coordinate different aspects of defense. OPs, patrols, ambushes, friendly snipers, fire support, close air support, and deception measures should all be brought together at the moment that the enemy sniper is spotted either in his position or moving into or out of position. The least acceptable method of engaging the enemy sniper is to use only US snipers versus enemy ones, because this throws away inherent advantages usually enjoyed by US military in terms of firepower. The friendly sniper team or other element that spots the enemy sniper may have to be the controlling element of initial US response; so all personnel involved in the operation should be briefed on the rules of engagement. The enemy sniper must be pinned down, at a minimum, to allow time to bring other US forces into operation.

1. Once spotted, the enemy sniper must be forced to surrender or be killed. Anything short of this allows the enemy sniper to come back and harass US forces at another time and place. Weapons not normally considered as countersniper ones should definitely be thought about as such. MK 19 grenade launchers, Dragons, or TOW (especially if there is no antiarmor threat), caliber .50 machine guns in single-shot mode allow US forces to out range the enemy sniper. Another option, if the rules of engagement allow, is to mine known firing locations. Also, artillery TRPs could be preregistered on these sites. Still another option is to use main battle tanks and BFVs or LAV-25 if in a combined OP with the Marines.
2. In a stability and support operations situation, military police, local police, or infantry may also have to be used to cordon off the sniper's kill zone and areas around his suspected position to limit casualties. Helicopters can be used to keep surveillance over the area suspected to be occupied by the sniper. In a large-scale countersniper operation, a helicopter can also be used for command and control purposes. The TOW, HELLFIRE, 30-mm cannon, and other helicopter-mounted weapons should be considered as countersniper weapons.

Confirm results regardless of what weapon is used. The next step of the operation is to confirm that the enemy sniper is dead. This step is necessary so that forces committed to the

operation can be released. Confirmation is also required to make sure that enemy is not going to return at some future date to cause more casualties or embarrass US policy and objectives. This step is the most hazardous to US forces. A large overwatching force should cover a search team going into the enemy sniper's last known position. Suppressive fire may be allowed to cover their advance. Members of this team should wear bullet-proof body protection. The team's approach should be from a direction other than the sniper's known kill zone. Additionally, smoke could be used to screen the movement of the search team. The team covers the objective area looking for physical evidence that the enemy sniper is neutralized (a body and weapon). After this step, the countersniper operation can be considered complete.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for T&EO, React to Sniper.

PRINCIPLES OF SNIPER EMPLOYMENT

- SNIPERS ARE USED IN PAIRS OR LARGER ELEMENTS
- SNIPERS MUST REMAIN UNDETECTED
- SNIPERS MUST MOVE SLOWLY, CAUTIOUSLY
- SNIPERS MUST HAVE DEPENDABLE COMMUNICATION
- SNIPERS MUST BE TIED INTO THE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN

SLIDE 22-1

SNIPERS IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

- SNIPERS AS OBSERVERS
- SNIPERS AS SHOOTERS

CONVENTIONAL VERSUS STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

- OBSERVATION
- RANGE
- TARGET IDENTIFICATION

SLIDE 22-3

SUPPORT OF CHECKPOINTS

- CORDON AND SEARCH
- SEARCH AND ATTACK
- CONVOY OPERATIONS
- CLOSE QUARTERS COMBAT

COUNTERSNIPER MEASURES

- MAINTAIN A LARGE NUMBER OF OBSERVATION POSTS
- MAINTAIN ACTIVE PATROLS
- DO NOT ESTABLISH OBVIOUS ROUTES
- PERFORM ACTIONS TO DEFEAT ENEMY SNIPERS
- ENGAGE THE ENEMY SNIPER
- CONFIRM RESULTS

SLIDE 22-5

LESSON 23. CIVIL DISTURBANCE

SLIDE 23-1. CIVIL DISTURBANCE OVERVIEW

This is a basic introduction to civil disturbance. The US Army Military Police School has a trained mobile training team (MTT) to train non-MP units to perform civil disturbance operations in stability and support operations missions. Crowd violence is a spontaneous emotional eruption or a planned event. In the latter case, its purpose is to draw police or soldiers into a target area or away from some other event. Crowd violence may also involve violence within the crowd or from opposing groups. Crowd violence is characterized by excitement and violence; both are highly contagious. Riot control aims to restore order with minimum use of force. The general approach is to reduce or disrupt the crowd's unifying influences and reorient the participants to concerns for personal vulnerability and welfare.

INSTRUCTOR'S NOTE: See Appendix B for—
T&EO, Conduct Platoon Riot Control Formations
T&EO, React to Civil Disturbance

SLIDE 23-2. PRINCIPLES OF CROWD CONTROL—FRACASS

The principles of riot control can be remembered by using the term FRACASS:

- **F**lexibility in changing tactics to meet the situation.
- **R**ehearsals ensure success.
- **A**ppearance of being able to do damage is often more effective than actually having to resort to force.
- **C**ontrol by positioning soldiers and presenting the image of having and maintaining full control even if the situation deteriorates.
- **A**ll-round defense of assigned sectors of observation and fire. Able to observe and fire 360 degrees around control force.
- **S**peed in deployment, arrest, and reaction to change.
- **S**urprise keeps the crowd off balance.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE OVERVIEW

- CROWD VIOLENCE . . . UNPREDICTABLE
- RIOT CONTROL AIMS TO RESTORE ORDER WITH MINIMUM FORCE

SLIDE 23-1

PRINCIPLES OF CROWD CONTROL

FRACASS

- **F**LEXIBILITY
- **R**EHEARSALS
- **A**PPEARANCE
- **C**ONTROL
- **A**LL-ROUND DEFENSE
- **S**PEED
- **S**URPRISE

APPENDIX A
SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES

Section I. STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS 7- DAY PLAN

Introduction Types of Stability and Support Operations Doctrinal phrases and characteristics	ROE Checkpoints Cordon/search Enter/clear buildings	Media Negotiation Countersniper Road marches Convoys	Collective tasks at squad level progressing to platoon	Tng Co-- A STX 1 - 1plt STX 2 - 2plt STX 3 - 3plt	Spt Co-- B 1 plt 2 plt 3 plt	Tng Co-- B STX 1 - 1plt STX 2 - 2plt STX 3 - 3plt	Spt Co-- C 1 plt 1 plt 1 plt	Tng Co-- B STX 1 - 1plt STX 2 - 2plt STX 3 - 3plt	Spt Co-- C 1 plt 1 plt 1 plt

1. INTRODUCTION

A. Types of stability and support operations with definitions:
- Peace Operations
- Peace Making
- Peacekeeping
- Peace Enforcement

B. Doctrinal Phrases, Abbreviations, Terminology, Definitions.

C. Principals and Characteristics.

2. CLASSROOM WORK

A. Rules of Engagement
B. Cordon and Search
C. Media
D. Countersniper
E. Checkpoints
F. Enter and Clear a Building/Room
G. Negotiation
H. Road Marches and Convoys

3. COLLECTIVE TASKS

Field environment where the platoons are issued a set of rules of engagement and collective tasks are presented at squad and platoon levels in support of the STX training plan.

4. STX CORDON AND SEARCH

Platoon level.

5. STX ROUTE SECURITY AND CONVOY ESCORT

Platoon level.

6. STX NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Platoon level

NOTE 1: This training plan is one example that may used to conduct stability and support operations training. It incorporates collective, leader, and individual tasks at platoon level; and exercise the company command and control in a stability and support operations environment.

NOTE 2: To conduct night STX iterations, the 7-day training plan needs to be increased 3 evenings.

Section II. STX PLANNING

STX lanes based on scenarios that are likely to be encountered in a stability and support operations environment are outstanding to prepare for deployment. To achieve realism, the amount of domestic personnel (role players) must be equal if not greater than the size of the force training.

Mission descriptions for the role players are important to provide counter task guidance for the soldiers playing domestic personnel. (OPFOR is not an appropriate term for stability and support operations scenarios.)

Nonorganic weapons application should be considered: guns, knives, ax handles, mace, cayenne pepper, dogs. These weapons should be considered for use by the training unit and domestic personnel.

Nonorganic equipment considerations: Radios, infrared, flashlights, spot lights, flexible cuffs, 100-mph tape, 550 cord, rubber gloves, surgical masks.

Media role players from outside the unit (post PAO) could conduct realistic interviews and provide published results to the unit.

Domestic personnel situation descriptions: Civilian role playing can be planned based on information available about the possible area of deployment. Role playing and other situation training should be directed by the S3 and controlled by a separate leader.

1. **Local Authorities.** Leaders speak English. Others understand a few English words. The more English one knows, the more important his position is. Leaders try to take charge of the situation and give orders to the US forces on the ground. The leader tries to have the US forces take every mission that needs to be accomplished in the town. Local authorities normally have security personnel with them; they blatantly expose their weapons. Their dress should be local; weapons should be tailored to the situation. (Dictated by the training unit.) The authority figure should be dressed formally; that is, white shirt and tie.

2. **Media.** The media try to interview soldiers in the village as the soldiers try to accomplish their mission. The media take footage of the civilians and try to get to footage of US soldiers making mistakes. Media should also be present around the unit base camp. Reporters are dressed neatly, have a microphone or something similar, and have credentials exposed. Cameramen are dressed casual. They have a camera (camcorder); and they have their credentials exposed.

3. **Designated Officials.** Officials speak English, but cannot move safely through the country without being escorted due to ties with an unpopular political party. The dress of these personnel depends on the setting; that is, city or rural.

4. **Car Bomb.** Car with explosives in the back drives into town and parks near the building. If no action is taken after 5 minutes, the bomb explodes and casualties assessed. (The time frame can be adjusted according to the situation.) A make shift bomb needs to be placed on the vehicle in the event it is approached and searched. Not all vehicles need to have bombs. If car bombs are used by the threat force, domestic personnel should establish a pattern that remains constant throughout the STX.

5. **Civilians.** Local populace can fall into two categories—friendly and unfriendly—based on host nation atmosphere. Eight (or more) civilians are moving around taking care of daily business.

6. **Convoy.** At least two trucks with boxes in the back will be located at a link up point. The drivers take instructions from the escorting unit and replicate a relief convoy of food and

medical supplies. All drivers are members of nongovernmental organizations. These vehicles need to be marked with identifications to include the cargo within the vehicles.

7. **Belligerent Checkpoint.** One person speaks broken English, the others do not speak English. They are armed with various small-arms weapons, and they are positioned to overwatch the checkpoint. The leader insists on inspecting every vehicle, but can be persuaded to do a less thorough inspection if the US forces give them cigarettes and food. If no deal is made, the inspections will continue. Ammunition for the weapons is critical. If snipers are employed here, US forces do not affiliate them with the checkpoint personnel. When snipers' fire, checkpoint personnel drop their weapons and put their hands in the air stating "not my men."

8. **Ambush.** This is an on-order mission that is executed if the US forces cause relations with the local populace to worsen. The ambush site is located after the unit has been in contact with local personnel to set the tone. The ambush team initiates the contact and attempts to loot the convoy. When an overwhelming force is displayed, they will disperse. The ambush team does not speak English.

9. **Sniper.** The sniper is positioned in a place where he can overwatch the belligerent checkpoint. When negotiations are taking place, the sniper fires one round every 30 seconds until detected or five rounds have been fired. The sniper flees the area and does not speak English. Casualties may be assessed at the checkpoint. They are in no way affiliated with the checkpoint personnel. (Snipers may be located anywhere not just at checkpoints.)

10. **Demonstration.** A gathering of the local populace for political, ideological, or religious purposes that can escalate into violence if not handled properly by US or UN forces.

STX 1. CORDON AND SEARCH (MOUT)

React to Sniper



MOUT Site

C. CONDUCT CORDON & SEARCH
1. Liaise w/local authorities
2. Search
3. Civil disturbance
4. Casualty play
5. React to media
6. Process captured documents/ equipment/personnel

B. MOVE TACTICALLY
(Tactical road march/convoy operation)



React to media at the gate area

BN LODGEMENT

A. TLPs
1. Liaise with local authorities and or support agencies.

D. CONDUCT AAR



STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS SUPPORT MATRIX STX 1

	VEHICLES			ROLE PLAYERS								
	2½-Ton	HMMWV	POV	Reporters	Cameraman	Local Authorities	Designated officials	Civilian Male	Civilian Female	Belligerants	Demonstrators	Sniper
TASKS												
PREPARE FOR COMBAT				1	2						8	
LIAISE w/LOCAL AUTHORITIES							2					
REACT TO MEDIA			1	1	2							
MOVE TACTICALLY	2	2										
REACT TO SNIPER												1
CORDON AND SEARCH			2	2	4	2						
REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE								20	5	6		

WEAPON/AMMUNITION	AMMO PER TNG UNIT	AMMO PER ROLE PLAYER
M16 5.56 BLANK	210 RDS EACH RIFLE	20 RDS EACH RIFLE
M249 5.56 BLANK (LINKED)	600 RDS EACH M249	NONE
M60 7.62 BLANK (LINKED)	600 RDS EACH M60	
HAND GRENADE, SMOKE (HC)	4 EACH SQUAD	

NOTE 1: All training/personnel/equipment should have MILES attached; that is, SAAF, transmitter, receiver, controller guns, casualty cards.
NOTE 2: The FLA participates in casualty play and is available for medical support.
NOTE 3: Specific barrier equipment needs are METT-T dependent.

STX 2. ROUTE SECURITY AND CONVOY ESCORT



React to Sniper

C. NEGOTIATE BELLIGERENT CHECKPOINT
1. React to sniper
2. Casualty play
3. Process captured documents/equipment/ personnel

B. MOVE TACTICALLY
1. Tactical road march/convoy operations
2. Link up with convoy



React to media at the gate area

BN LODGEMENT

A. TLPs
1. Liaise with local authorities and or support agencies.

D. REACT TO AMBUSH

E. CONDUCT AAR



STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS SUPPORT MATRIX STX 2

	VEHICLES			ROLE PLAYERS								
TASKS	2½-Ton	HMMWV	POV	Reporters	Cameraman	Local Authorities	Designated officials	Civilian Male	Civilian Female	Belligerants	Demonstrators	Sniper
PREPARE FOR COMBAT												
LIAISE w/LOCAL AUTHORITIES			1				2					
MOVE TACTICALLY	2	2										
LINK-UP WITH CONVOY	3		2					10				
REACT TO SNIPER												2
NEGOTIATE BELLIGERANT CHKPT							1		6			
REACT TO AMBUSH									4			


WEAPON/AMMUNITION	AMMO PER TNG UNIT	AMMO PER ROLE PLAYER
M16 5.56 BLANK	210 RDS EACH RIFLE	20 RDS EACH RIFLE
M249 5.56 BLANK (LINKED)	600 RDS EACH M249	NONE
M60 7.62 BLANK (LINKED)	600 RDS EACH M60	400 RDS
HAND GRENADE, SMOKE (HC)	4 EACH SQUAD	2 EACH

NOTE 1: All training/personnel/equipment should have MILES attached; that is, SAAF, transmitter, receiver, controller guns, casualty cards.
NOTE 2: The FLA participates in casualty play and is available for medical support.

STX 3. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (UNCERTAIN)

B. MOVE TACTICALLY
Tactical road march/
convoy operation

C. CONDUCT NEO
1. Search
2. React to disturbance
3. React to media
4. Evacuate
5. React to contact
6. Break contact
7. Process captured documents/equipment/
personnel



React to media at the
gate area

BN LODGEMENT

A. TLPs
1. Liaise with local authorities and or
support agencies.

D. SAFE HAVEN OPERATION
(personnel search/
process contraband)

E. CONDUCT AAR



STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS SUPPORT MATRIX STX 3

	VEHICLES			ROLE PLAYERS								
	2½-Ton	HMMWV	POV	Reporters	Cameraman	Local Authorities	Designated officials	Civilian Male	Civilian Female	Belligerants	Demonstrators	Staff S1, S2, S3, S4 Chaplain
TASKS												
PREPARE FOR COMBAT												
LIAISE w/LOCAL AUTHORITIES			1			2						
MOVE TACTICALLY	6	4										
CONDUCT NEO							2	25	11			
REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE										7		
REACT TO CONTACT								5				
CONDUCT SAFE HAVEN OPS												9

WEAPON/AMMUNITION	AMMO PER TNG UNIT	AMMO PER ROLE PLAYER
M16 5.56 BLANK	210 RDS EACH RIFLE	20 RDS EACH RIFLE
M249 5.56 BLANK (LINKED)	600 RDS EACH M249	
M60 7.62 BLANK (LINKED)	600 RDS EACH M60	
HAND GRENADE, SMOKE (HC)	4 EACH SQUAD	

NOTE 1: All training/personnel/equipment should have MILES attached; that is, SAAF, transmitter, receiver, controller guns, casualty cards.
NOTE 2: The FLA participates in casualty play and is available for medical support.

Section III. EXERCISES

INFANTRY COMPANY
SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISE
CONVOY OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATE A BELLIGERENT CHECKPOINT

1. **Objective**. This STX trains an infantry rifle company on conducting convoy operations and negotiating a belligerent checkpoint. This exercise provides practice for the company commander, platoon leaders, and squad leaders in planning, coordinating, and conducting stability and support operations.
2. **Interface**. This STX is supported by the following collective tasks:
   a. ARTEP 7-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company.
      - Prepare for Combat (7-2-1046).
      - Take Action on Contact (7-2-1001).

   b. ARTEP 7-8-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
      - Overwatch/Support by Fire (7-3/4-1012).
      - Breach Obstacle (7-3/4-1014).

   c. ARTEP 19-77-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Corps Military Police Platoon.
      - Perform Security of Designated Convoys (19-3-0018).

   d. ARTEP 7-8-DRILL. Battle Drills for the Infantry Platoon and Squad.
      - React to Contact (Battle Drill 2).
      - React to Ambush (Battle Drill 4).
      - Secure at Halt (Crew Drill 4).

3. **Training**. The trainer should review the leader and collective tasks that are performed during the STX. Emphasis should be on tasks conducted by platoon and squad size elements to help focus training of this STX. Safety must be stressed throughout this training both from the soldier and civilian role player standpoint.

   a. *Leader Training.* Leader training should be conducted before the exercise to ensure all leaders know the new requirements involved with the nonstandard T&EOs. Subordinate elements can be conducting training at the same time on the collective and individual tasks that support this STX. Leader training should use the "crawl-walk-run" method to develop the leaders before the exercise. The following are suggestions for training.

   (1) For classroom instruction, do a complete review of the above listed collective tasks to gain an understanding of the tasks to be performed. Have the military police help with this instruction since they have a better base of knowledge for conducting these tasks.

   (2) Conduct a terrain board or sand table exercise that allows the leaders to apply the knowledge gained from the classroom instruction. During this period, focus on the basic principles for execution of convoy operations and dealing with belligerent checkpoints.

   (3) Conduct a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) to allow the leaders the opportunity to train on the ground, submit reports, and react to possible threats that may be encountered during a convoy or at a belligerent checkpoint.

b. *Training Tips.* Tips to enhance training and prepare for the STX are as follows.

(1) Conduct realistic training, establishing the environment that best reflects what the unit may encounter. Incorporate safety into all aspects of the training.

(2) Review the standards for the T&EOs that support the exercise. Refer to ARTEP 7-10-MTP and ARTEP 7-8-DRILL.

(3) Use MILES and blank ammunition to add realism to the exercise.

(4) Once proficiency has been attained on the STX, the leader can add numerous additional tasks and situations for the units to perform. The following is a list of possible tasks/situations that can be added:

- Control a crowd or mob.
- React to civilians begging for food or medicine.
- React to civilian vehicular accident (treat civilian casualties).
- Civilians volunteering information on belligerent activities.
- Handling civilian detainees.

(5) Have the OPFOR replicate the possible situations the unit could encounter. The OPFOR must be given tasks, conditions, and standards for their actions/activities to provide a realistic training event.

(a) Assign one sergeant first class or lieutenant for each event in the STX to serve as the OPFOR controller to ensure standards are met to accomplish the desired training.

(b) Have the OPFOR and civilian role players dress in civilian clothing.

4. **General Situation.** The battalion is currently involved in a multinational peace enforcement operation. Your company will conduct convoy escort for a humanitarian relief organization trying to assist the civilians in the outlying areas of the host nation. The company must be prepared to deal with possible belligerent checkpoints on the various routes.

5. **Special Situation.**

a. The battalion commander has assigned the company with the first convoy escort mission. In the battalion commander's briefing, he told the company to be prepared to encounter both friendly and belligerent checkpoints.

b. You now begin your planning process for the convoy escort mission. The exercise ends when your company completes the hand-off of the convoy to the host nation representative and your company returns to the battalion assembly area.

6. **Sequence of Events.** Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the sequence of events. Table 1 provides a sequence of events with suggested time limits for each event.

7. **Support Requirements.**

a. *Minimum trainers/evaluators:*

(1) This exercise should be conducted for practice by the company commander as the trainer for his platoons before the STX.

(2) The battalion may conduct the STX using company and platoon evaluators.

b. *Vehicles/communications.* All organic to the company. Additional 5 to 10 (5-ton or 2 1/2-ton) trucks to serve as the convoy. Additional medical evaluation coverage may be required to support the convoy participants.

c. *Trainers/controllers/evaluators.* The platoon leaders and platoon sergeants are the primary trainers during the initial training. The company commander, executive officer, and first sergeant as well as the platoon leadership act as the trainers during the company

collective training. Battalion assets to serve as controllers/evaluators must be at critical locations (Figure 1) to observe actions. They must not interfere with the conduct of the operation, except to halt operations for safety violations or to conduct AARs.

d. *Role players.* The role players should be a mix of civilian role players and belligerents (include females as both civilians and belligerents). One infantry platoon can cover all tasks required of role players to include: friendly checkpoint, belligerent checkpoint, ambush squad, and civilian beggars. Additional personnel may be required if additional tasks are included in the STX (especially crowd/mob activity).

e. *Maneuver area.* A training area of at least 2 x 15 kilometers with a built-up area (if possible) is desired for this exercise.

f. *Consolidated resource list.*

ITEM	BASIC LOAD
5.56-mm, Blank	60 rounds each rifle
5.56-mm, Blank (Linked)	200 rounds each M249
5.56-mm, Blank (Linked)	200 rounds each M60
Hand grenade, smoke (HC)	4 each squad
Simulator, hand grenade (observer/controller control)	10 each exercise
MILES M16	1 each Individual 1 each OPFOR (minus head harness) 1 each civilian role player (minus head harness)
M249	1 each M249
M60	1 each M60
Small-arms alignment fixture	2 each company
Controller gun	1 each observer-controller

8. **T&EO Sequence.**
   - Prepare for Combat, ARTEP 7-10-MTP (7-2-1046).
   - Perform Link-up, ARTEP 7-10-MTP (7-2-1064).
   - Perform Security of Designated Convoy, ARTEP 19-77-10-MTP (19-3-0018).
   - Take Action on Contact, ARTEP 7-10-MTP (7-2-1001).
   - Overwatch/Support By Fire, ARTEP 7-10-MTP (7-2-1007).
   - Defend a Convoy, Appendix B.
   - Negotiate a Belligerent Checkpoint, Appendix B.

EVENT	ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
1	Develop/Issue Company OPORD	4 hours
2	Link-up with Convoy	1 hour
3	Negotiate Friendly Checkpoint	30 minutes
4	React to Civilians Begging for Food	1 hour
5	React to Enemy Ambush	1.5 hours
6	Negotiate Belligerent Checkpoint	1 hour
7	Conduct AAR	1 hour
		Total = 10 hrs *

* The time required to train the event varies based on METT-T and the training proficiency of the unit. Time for intermediate AARs is not included in the total time requirement. Additional time is required if conducted during limited visiblity.

Table 1. Sequence of events and time for infantry company STX.




Figure 1. Convoy escort infantry company STX diagram.

INFANTRY BATTALION
SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISE
CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

1. **Objective**. This STX trains an infantry battalion on the collective and leader tasks that support a cordon and search operation.
2. **Interface**. This STX is supported by the following collective tasks:
   a. ARTEP 7-20-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion.
      - Command and Control the Battalion (7-1-1901).
      - Command Group Operations (7-1-1908).
      - Perform S2 Operations (7-1-1911).

   b. ARTEP 7-10-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company.
      - Prepare for Combat (7-2-1606).

   c. ARTEP 7-8-MTP. Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
      - Clear a Building (7-3/4-1110).

   d. ARTEP 7-8-DRILL. Battle Drills for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.
      - React to Contact (Battle Drill 2).
      - Enter and Clear a Building (Battle Drill 6).

   e. TC 7-98-1, Appendix B.
      - Emplace/Construct Barricades/Roadblocks (Appendix B).
      - Perform a Cordon and Search (Appendix B).
      - Search a Building (Appendix B).
      - Apprehend and Detain Noncombatants (Appendix B).
      - Identify and Process Detainees (Appendix B).
      - Handle Captured Insurgents or Belligerents (Appendix B).
      - Process Captured Documents and Equipment (Appendix B).

3. **Training**. The trainer should review the leader and collective tasks that are performed during the STX and determine which tasks require initial or refresher training.

a. ***Guidance.*** Leaders should ensure subunits are proficient in the leader and collective tasks associated with standard military operations on urbanized terrain offensive operations. This should include urban movement techniques and building entrance and clearing techniques. The STX requires subunits and leaders to use restraint while conducting combat operations in an urban environment in a stability and support operations scenario with numerous civilians and noncombatants on the battlefield. Subunits and leaders should also know how to deal with and handle noncombatants and detainees during stability and support operations.

(1) *Staff Training.* The time to plan and develop the battalion order is included in the STX but may not occur without brigade's help. The plan calls for brigade issuing an OPORD or FRAGO to the battalion. Should this be unfeasible, the battalion staff can develop their OPORD in a separate map exercise or CPX to make the best use of time spent on executing

the mission. The S2 (brigade or battalion) is instrumental in developing the enemy situation for the STX so that it resembles the desired insurgent or belligerent scenario.

(2) *Collective Training.* Collective training should focus on the critical collective tasks required for this STX. Infantry platoons should focus on squad or platoon battle drills for room or building entry and clearing and reaction to enemy contact. Mounted element collective training should focus on checkpoint or roadblock construction or operation and on reaction drills.

(3) *Leader Training.* Leader training should be completed on the leader tasks required for the exercise. Some options for the leader training include the following:

(a) Classroom discussion on searching buildings versus clearing buildings, checkpoint principles, and a review of vignettes (what if) that cover numerous possible scenarios and situations that may be encountered during this type of operation.

(b) Terrain board exercises that allow the leaders to walk through scenarios or conduct a rehearsal from a three dimensional perspective. The cordon and search operation should take place in a military operations on urbanized terrain environment, so a model replicating the military operations on urbanized terrain site that the unit will train on is ideal. An alternative is to conduct a map exercise using large-scale drawings of the military operations on urbanized terrain site.

(c) Tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) can be executed on the military operations on urbanized terrain site to allow leaders to train on the actual site the STX will be executed. This can exercise movement techniques, reporting, reaction to contact and incidents, and synchronization of the cordon and search operation. The TEWT can also be used to develop or refine unit SOPs for this type of operation.

b. ***Training Tips.*** Tips for training and general instructions on how to prepare for and accomplish the STX.

(1) This exercise is graphically portrayed in Figure 1.

(2) Subunits should be proficient in collective and individual tasks associated with military operations on urbanized terrain offensive operations.

(3) A detailed scenario that sets up the entire operation should be developed with brigade's help. Particular attention should be devoted to the enemy situation and noncombatant actions. A specific belligerent agenda should be tied to the scenario.

(4) A specific rule of engagement must be developed, disseminated, and rehearsed. This is critical for subunits in determining their responses to belligerent activities. The unit JAG representative should provide input and review the rules of engagement before dissemination.

(5) If possible, a videotape should be made of the exercise. This is a low-cost (time and money) method of providing the most accurate feedback to unit leaders and soldiers. A good scenario or script can ensure the video recorder is in the critical places at the critical times.

(6) Safety should be emphasized due to the hazards encountered in military operations on urbanized terrain training.

(7) This STX should be trained using the crawl-walk-run method of training. The crawl phase should emphasize the emplacement of the cordon and security element and the search of buildings. Limited belligerent activity should be included here. The walk phase should include increased belligerent activity and greater interaction with the civilian role players (greater civilian movement, activity, traffic). The run phase should have much greater belligerent activity directed against US forces. Additionally, civilian activity should be mix

of pro- and anti-US factions. Anti-US faction activity should be directed at misinforming US forces about belligerent activity and possible hostile crowd and mob activity.

(8) Opposing force and belligerent activity should replicate anticipated courses of action for the belligerents in the area of operation of the unit's contingency plan. The belligerent cell should follow a specific pattern of activity that allows the battalion S2 to conduct pattern analysis. The intelligence package should include detailed information on key belligerent and friendly civilian leaders.

(9) One observer-controller should be assigned to control OPFOR activities. He is responsible for controlling OPFOR actions, ensures realism, and stresses safety. The commander may assign additional OPFOR observer-controllers to be at critical places in the town to control specific OPFOR actions. During the run phase of training, additional observers-controllers may be needed to ensure OPFOR and civilian role players are conforming to the scenario. The entire OPFOR scenario should be rehearsed by all OPFOR players.

(10) During the walk and run phases, female belligerents and role players may be included. This adds to the realism and replicates situations that will be encountered during actual stability and support operations situations. Female MPs may be included as part of the Army forces unit at this time.

(11) When determining the use of the media interview, the commander must be creative. The media interview should be immediately following the mission (on site). As proficiency increases, the commander may want to insert the media personnel during the operation to evaluate subordinate leaders' responses. Several media crews may be used with one crew attempting to generate negative media coverage. An option is to ask the local news stations and personnel to participate as the media crews. In all cases, the commander provides a specific list of topics for the media to address during their interviews.

(l2) A recommended sequence of the tasks and estimated time for each task is in Table 1.

c. ***Training Enhancers.*** The brigade staff can enhance the training value of the STX by being major contributors to the scenario development and control of OPFOR activities. The less the battalion S2 and S3 are involved in the scenario development, the more they will exercise their personnel. An alternative is to have the battalion executive officer or headquarters and headquarters company commander develop and control OPFOR activities. This ensures the staff activities performed by the battalion S2 and S3 replicate those executed during actual operations.

(1) Units should execute this STX during limited visibility only after demonstrating proficiency during daylight hours.

(2) Squads and platoons can train on building search and clearing techniques in garrison (using their own barracks and no ammunition) before executing the STX with blank ammunition and MILES equipment in the military operations on urbanized terrain site.

d. ***General Situation.*** Brigade is participating in a peace enforcement operation as part of a multinational force.

(1) Your unit has been in country for six weeks and has been conducting convoy escorts and routine security patrols as part of the ARFOR quick-reaction force. A moderate level of belligerent activity has been directed against both US forces and against rival factions in the area. The activity directed against US forces has been mostly sniping at vehicle convoys, theft of US supplies, and occasional mortar and RPG attacks on US compounds. To date,

large-scale (squad-size or larger) direct-fire fights have not be used against the unit, and the unit has not had any combat casualties.

(2) This exercise begins with the receipt of the brigade FRAGO by the battalion commander and ends when the unit returns to its compound or assembly area. An AAR should be conducted at the conclusion of the operation. Table 1 provides the recommended sequence of T&EOs and estimated time for each portion of the STX.

e. ***Special Situation.***

(1) The unit compound received a heavy mortar or RPG attack the previous night. The battalion has received a FRAGO to conduct a cordon and search of the area suspected of housing the belligerents who took part in the attack on the compound.

(2) The portion of the city the unit is searching is a mix of pro- and anti-US civilians and noncombatants. The rules of engagement restricts the unit from using indirect fires during this operation.

4. **Support Requirements.**

a. ***Minimum trainers/evaluators.*** This exercise should be conducted by the brigade commander. He is assisted by the brigade executive officer, S2, S3, command sergeant major. Company commanders and platoon leaders from a sister battalion may act as observer-controllers as well as the brigade commander and his staff. If the selected military operations on urbanized terrain site does not support using the entire battalion to execute the cordon and search, the battalion commander can conduct the exercise with limited brigade participation. The battalion commander can curtail the ARFOR size and use the nonparticipating elements as OPFOR, civilian role players, and observers-controllers and rotate units through the ARFOR role.

b. ***Opposing force.***

(1) The opposing force should be a mix of belligerents and civilian role players (pro- and anti-US factions). The number of active belligerents should be small during the crawl and walk phases and can increase as the unit becomes proficient in the mission. The total size of the OPFOR is also dependent on the size of the military operations on urbanized terrain site. A minimum of 20 to 30 personnel should be used to portray civilian role players and belligerents. A maximum of 40 to 50 OPFOR personnel can be used (especially for the walk and run phases).

(2) All OPFOR personnel should be dressed in civilian and wear MILES equipment. An OPFOR scenario should be developed with specific OPFOR actions that cause reactions from the ARFOR unit consistent with the STX training objectives and tasks.

(3) Use of civilian vehicles (transportation motor pool vehicles) by the OPFOR can enhance the training effect of the STX. They can be used to hide OPFOR weapons, equipment, and intelligence, and can be inserted into the problem at numerous times and places.

(4) OPFOR task list:

- Resist a search.
- Snipe against US forces.
- Perform as a crowd or mob.
- Perform as a violent uncontrolled mob.

c. ***MILES.*** All personnel (ARFOR and OPFOR) should wear MILES gear to enhance the training and provide better feedback to the soldiers. ARFOR vehicles should also be equipped with MILES.

d. ***Vehicles/communications.*** Vehicles and communications organic to the battalion should be used. Mortar and support platoon vehicles are not required for this STX and may be used to augment the cordon and security element. Additional transportation motor pool vehicles may be used to replicate civilian vehicles for the exercise.

e. ***Training area.*** A military operations on urbanized terrain site is necessary to conduct this STX. The surrounding area can be used as storage and hiding places for belligerent weapon and ammunition caches. The military operations on urbanized terrain site should be augmented with additional furniture and household items to provide areas to conceal belligerent intelligence, ammunition, and weapons.

f. ***Consolidated resource list.***

ITEM	BASIC LOAD
5.56-mm, blank	80 rounds each rifle
5.56-mm, blank (linked)	300 rounds each M249
7.62-mm, blank (linked)	200 rounds each M60
Hand grenade body (blue practice)	5 each squad
Hand grenade fuzes (practice)	5 each squad
Simulator, hand grenade	20 each exercise (observer-controller control)
Hand grenade, smoke(white)	4 each squad
OTHER ITEMS	
Motor pool vehicles	3 to 6
Furniture	Augment MOUT site
Barrier material	As applicable for checkpoints

g. ***Additional ARFOR task list.***

- Enter and Clear a Building (ARTEP 7-8-DRILL, Battle Drill 6).
- Overwatch/Support by Fire (ARTEP 7-10-MTP, 7-2-1007).
- Control Crowds or Mobs (Appendix B).
- Treat and Evacuate Casualties (ARTEP 7-20-MTP, 7-1-1924).
- Employ Psychological Operations (Appendix B).
- Negotiate (Appendix B).

EVENT	ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
1	Battalion Operation Order (Produce and Brief) *	4 hours
2	Prepare for Combat **	4 hours
3	Establish Cordon	15 minutes
4	Perform Cordon and Search 4A. Search a Building 4B. Identify & Process Detainees 4C. Handle Captured Insurgents or Belligerents 4D. Process Captured Documents and Equipment 4E. React to Contact 4F. Command Group Operations 4G. Perform S2 Operations	6 hours
5	Conduct Media Interview	30 minutes
6	AAR (On site)	1 hour
	Total time = 15 hours, 45 minutes	
* Required if brigade briefs an operation order to the battalion. If no brigade participation, battalion produces the operation order using a map exercise or CPX before the start of this STX. ** Time for commanding officers and platoon leaders to conduct TLPs and issue operation orders.		

Table 1. Sequence of events and time for infantry battalion STX.




Figure 1. Cordon and search infantry battalion STX diagram.

INFANTRY PLATOON
SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISE
ESTABLISH AND OPERATE A CHECKPOINT

1. **Objective**. This STX trains individual, leader, and collective tasks in support of the platoon mission: Establish and Operate a Checkpoint.
2. **Interface**. This STX is supported by the following battle drill:
    - React to Contact

3. **Training**. The trainer should review the individual, leader, and collective tasks that are performed during the STX. The trainer determines which tasks may require additional or refresher training.

a. ***Individual Training.*** Individual training should be on the critical soldier tasks that support this STX. These tasks are in the appropriate Soldier's Manual and ARTEP 7-8-MTP. As a minimum, following tasks should be incorporated and assessed against the established standard set in the commander's evaluation.

- Report Enemy Information (071-331-0803)
- Neutralize Booby Trap (051-193-1013)
- Perform Movement Techniques During MOUT (071-326-0541)
- Identify Threat Weapons/Vehicles (071-331-0808)
- Engage Targets with Individual Weapons (071-311-2007)

b. ***Collective Training.***

(1) The following is a list of collective tasks taken from ARTEP 7-8-MTP and this manual used to develop the STX:

- Prepare for Combat (7-3/4-1047)
- Perform Tactical Road March (7-3-1035)
- Control Crowds or Mobs (Appendix B)
- Establish a Checkpoint (Appendix B)
- Operate a Checkpoint (Appendix B)
- React to Vehicle Running Through a Checkpoint (Appendix B)
- Emplace/Construct Road Block (Appendix B)
- Move Tactically (7-3/4-1025)

(2) Listed below are the countertasks for role players and OPFOR personnel:

- Maintain OPSEC
- Perform as a Crowd or Mob
- Penetrate an Area Under ARFOR Control
- Snipe Against US Forces
- Run Through a Checkpoint with a Vehicle

c. ***Leader Training.***

(1) Leaders conduct classroom discussion on the handling of different types of contingencies. They include the following subjects:

(a) Technical or paramilitary vehicles.

- Recognition and method for search.
- Vehicle attempts to run through checkpoint.

- Vehicle sees checkpoint and turns away.

(b) Receiving hostile fire.
(c) Method for handling nonhostile crowds.
- Begging for food.
- Attempt to sell items to US soldiers.
- Crowd turns against itself (civilian casualties).

(d) Method of handling hostile crowds.
- Crowd throws items at US soldiers.
- Crowd threatens US soldiers with weapons (knives or clubs).

(e) Interaction with the media.
(f) Civilians requesting medical assistance.
(g) Civilians volunteering information on belligerent activities.
(h) Handling civilian detainees.
(i) Conduct a relief in place.

(2) Leaders plan the locations of an overwatch element and the construction of obstacles and barriers with leaders. Additionally, they walk through vehicle searches for contraband items.

d. ***Training Tips.***

(1) See Figure 1.

(2) Know the requirements for performing the listed individual and collective tasks. Also develop draft SOPs that address the contingencies as a result of the discussions during leader training.

(3) Use the crawl, walk, run method of training for the STX. Ensure that task standards are reviewed before execution.

(4) Conduct a leader's reconnaissance of the training area with squad leaders. This is a must to ensure that leaders do not make time-consuming mistakes.

(5) Use blank ammunition and MILES for the STX. Ensure everyone is wearing the MILES equipment (including role players and OPFOR).

(6) Use the following instructions:

(a) Use personnel to replicate civilians. Ensure that sufficient numbers are on hand to add to the realism. Also, designate OPFOR to replicate belligerent personnel. Ensure these personnel are dressed in civilian clothing.

(b) Coordinate for female soldiers to participate as role players or OPFOR.

(c) Use civilian vehicles to replicate civilian traffic. (Motor pool vehicles may be ideal.)

(d) Use at least one evaluator to control OPFOR and role player activities. The evaluator evaluates their actions and ensures realism, stresses safety, and assesses loss and damage.

(e) Use Table 1 for a recommended sequence of events and estimated time for each task.

e. ***Training Enhancers.*** This STX exercises a platoon in both a low and high probability of violence stability and support operations environment.

(1) The OPFOR and civilian role players execute tasks associated with a low probability of violence toward US forces first. The OPFOR evaluator then decides the subsequent tasks depending on the response from the ARFOR.

(2) The STX is conducted in an area that includes a choke point where civilian traffic travels during normal conditions. A MOUT site is ideal.

(3) Subsequent platoons executing the STX may relieve the preceding platoon if the trainer wishes to train relief in place of rather than establish a checkpoint.

f. ***Consolidated Resource List.***

AMMUNITION	BASIC LOAD
5.56-mm blank	150 rounds per weapon
5.56-mm blank (linked)	400 rounds per M249
7.62-mm blank (linked)	300 rounds per M60
Hand grenade body (blue practice)	1 per rifleman
Hand grenade fuzes (practice)	1 per rifleman
Hand grenade, smoke (HC)	1 per squad leader
ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT MILES Equipment	
M 16	1 per weapon 1 each OPFOR 1 each role player (minus head harness.)
M249	1 per M249
M60	1 per M60
SAAF	1 per platoon
Controller Gun	1 each OC
BARRIER MATERIAL	
METT-T dependent	

EVENT	ACTION	ESTIMATED TIME
1	Develop/Issue OPORD and Prepare for Combat	4 hours
2	Perform Tactical Road March	30 minutes
3	Establish/Operate a Checkpoint Control Crowd/Mob React to Vehicle Running Checkpoint React to Enemy Contact	7 hours
4	Deal with Press	30 minutes
5	Move Tactically Conduct Final AAR	1 hour

Table 1. Sequence of events and time for infantry platoon STX.

g. ***General Situation.***

(1) The company is currently occupying a portion of the brigade assembly area. Your platoon has just been ordered to establish a checkpoint well outside the assembly area. The civilians have been attempting to solicit your soldiers for food and medicine. Belligerent personnel are mixed in with the noncombatants and are attempting to gather intelligence on US forces in the area.

(2) This exercise begins with the receipt of an OPORD to establish the first checkpoint and ends when the platoon reenters the assembly area. An option is to conduct the training exercise so that the initial platoon executing the STX establishes the checkpoint and each subsequent platoon conducts a relief in place at the checkpoint. This is an effective use of available training time and focuses the training exercise on actions at the checkpoint.

h. ***Special Situation.***

(1) Your platoon has just received the mission to establish a checkpoint to prevent weapons and contraband from being brought into the local town.

(2) You are responsible for preparing a request for barrier materials based on the METT-T situation. This request is forwarded to the company commander.




Figure 1. Checkpoint infantry platoon STX diagram.

APPENDIX B

TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINES

CONTENTS

Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations B-2
Establish an Evacuation Control Center/Conduct Evacuation Control Center Operations B-4
Conduct Marshalling Force Operations B-5
Interdict Smuggling Operations B-10
Disarm Belligerents B-12
Defend a Convoy B-13
Negotiate a Belligerent Force Checkpoint B-17
Plan a Media Visit B-19
React to a Media Interview B-22
Protect the Force B-24
Perform a Cordon and Search B-25
Search a Building B-28
Process Captured Documents and Equipment B-30
Handle Captured Insurgents or Belligerents B-32
Identify and Process Detainees B-33
Apprehend/Detain Noncombatants B-35
Negotiate B-37
Establish a Checkpoint B-41
Operate a Checkpoint B-44
Employ Psychological Operations B-46
Provide Fire Support B-48
Demonstrate a Show of Force B-55
Deliver Supplies or Humanitarian Aid B-58
React to Civil Disturbance B-59
Collect and Disseminate Information B-61
Link Up With a Convoy B-63
React to a Sniper B-66
Supervise Minefield Clearance B-67
Control Civil Movement B-68
Conduct Platoon Riot Control Formations B-70
Restore Law and Order B-74
Coordinate and Monitor Convoy Security B-75
Prepare Traffic Control Plan B-76

TASK: PERFORM NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (FM 90-29)

CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to perform a noncombatant evacuation of US personnel in an uncertain environment. Updated plans for the evacuation are at the embassy. Sufficient maps of the area are available. An intermediate staging base for the operation is available in a secure friendly nation. Communication between the US Embassy and the prospective evacuees is unreliable and notification of all evacuees is not assured. There are a variety of host nation governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations in the area. Civil war and the threat of invasion from another country has placed the host nation in a position where it cannot guarantee protection of the evacuees nor noninterference with the evacuation force. The joint task force (JTF) has published the rules of engagement. A minimum of two evacuation assembly areas are to be used.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The plan is conducted IAW the US Embassy's emergency evacuation plan for the country.
2. The advance party coordinates with the US Embassy and host nation officials. The advance party prepares the evacuation site.
3. The main body is inserted into the evacuation site and receives interpreters and an information update from the advanced party.
4. The marshalling force is inserted into the evacuee assembly area by air and or ground and secures the assembly areas and PZ (if air evacuation).
5. The marshalling force receives the evacuees and processes them IAW US Embassy's instructions, if the situation permits. Search teams hunt for evacuees IAW US Embassy instructions. Evacuees are moved by air or ground to the evacuation site.
6. The evacuation control center (ECC) conducts operations at the evacuation site. Security of the aerial port of embarkation or sea port of embarkation is maintained. The evacuees are moved by air or sea to the intermediate staging base. The advance party and the main body withdraw by air or sea.
7. Forces adhere to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. The unit plans a noncombatant evacuation operation in accordance with guidance and plans from the US Embassy and the JTF.		
2. The advance party performs on-ground coordination with Embassy personnel, JTF personnel, and host nation officials. a. Receives an update on the situation. b. Exchanges liaison officers as required. c. Performs quartering party operations from the main body. d. Establishes and maintains communications with the main body and updates them on information as received. e. Upon arrival of the main body, updates the main body on the current information.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

3. The main body arrives at the evacuation site.
   a. Secures the evacuation site as required.
   b. Performs force protection operations.
   c. Receives the attachments of interpreters as required.
   d. Receives host nation trucks and drivers if required.
   e. Performs PMCS and rehearsals as required.
   f. Performs reconnaissance, situation permitting.

4. The unit moves to the evacuee assembly areas by air IAW ARTEP 7-30-MTP, T&EO 7-6-1011, Perform Air Assault; or IAW T&EO 7-6-1007, Conduct a Tactical Road March.
   a. Maintains security and ensures the force is not surprised.
   b. Arrives at the evacuee assembly on time IAW the battalion OPORD.
   c. Establishes security at each evacuee assembly area.

5. The unit links up with the evacuees at the evacuee assembly areas. a. Identifies evacuees and checks off their names on the State Department's evacuee list.
   b. Evacuee assembly area commanders ensure that evacuees have no more baggage than what is authorized in the Embassy Evacuee Plan.
   c. Ensures immediate needs of the evacuees are met (medical, food, shelter, if required).
   d. Employs search teams to hunt for missing evacuees depending on METT-T and the US Embassy requirements.
   e. Ensures evacuees are loaded on the appropriate transportation for movement to the marshalling area.
   f. Depending upon the situation, searches for evacuees failing to arrive at the evacuee assembly area.

6. The evacuees are moved to the marshalling areas by air IAW ARTEP 7-30-MTP, T&EO 7-6-1011, Perform Air Assault; or IAW T&EO 7-6-1007, Conduct a Tactical Road March.
   a. Maintains security and ensures the force is not surprised.
   b. Arrives at the marshalling area on time IAW the OPORD.
   c. Maintains security at the marshalling area.
   d. Withdraws IAW ARTEP 7-30-MTP, T&EO 7-6-1005, Withdraw Not Under Enemy Pressure; or T&EO 7-6-1006, Withdraw Under Enemy Pressure.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

7. The evacuation control center processes evacuees in the marshalling area for movement to the designated intermediate staging base.
   a. Provides food, shelter, medical support, legal support, and chaplain support for the evacuees.
   b. Inspects baggage and personnel for contraband IAW the State Department's directives.
   c. Maintains security at the marshalling area.

8. The evacuees are transported by boat or helicopter to the US Naval vessels offshore or by air to the designated intermediate staging base.

TASK: ESTABLISH AN EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER/CONDUCT EVACUATION CONTROL CENTER OPERATIONS (FM 90-29)

CONDITIONS:

1. Evacuation site (ECC is part of the evacuation site) has been selected by higher headquarters IAW the following criteria:
   a. Proximity to airstrip.
   b. Isolated, but in the same city as the US Embassy.
   c. Good for communications of all type.
   d. Shelter is available for evacuees.
   e. Cover and concealment are available.
   f. Defensible.
2. Advance party has reconnoitered and quartered the ECC area.
3. US Department of State has placed a team of four personnel in the ECC to assist evacuation operations.
4. ECC representatives and marshalling force representatives have conducted detailed coordination on hand-off procedures.
5. A representative from the unit responsible for the safe house is present.
6. Support unit functions identified in the stability and support operations tactical SOP are performed by the division ready-force 1 and its attachments.
7. Once the embarkation station is established, division ready- force 1 personnel assist the JTF, US Embassy, and US Department of State officials perform the functions identified in the stability and support operations tactical SOP (evacuation control center operations); embarkation processing is controlled by JTF headquarters personnel.
8. Terrain management responsibilities and obligations are clearly identified. (Because many types of forces and agencies are likely to be near the evacuation site, identifying responsibilities and obligations will be difficult.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. ECC forces and stations are structured to replicate the organization shown in Slide 2-1-14 (allowing for METT-T factors).
2. Division ready-force 1 and its ECC element are prepared for the possible noncombatant evacuation operations dilemmas.
3. ECC maintains communications with all headquarters and agencies IAW the OPORD.
4. Evacuees are processed and prepared for departure IAW the schedule received from higher headquarters.
5. Evacuees sustain no serious injuries.
6. Forces adhere to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Division ready-force 1 establishes ECC. a. Advance party briefs ECC personnel on ECC set up. ECC is setup IAW the stability and support operations tactical SOP. b. ECC forces and stations are structured IAW the stability and support operations tactical SOP.		
2. ECC rehearses its duties. a. Rehearsals are conducted at day and night. b. Special emphasis is given to handling possible noncombatant evacuation operations dilemmas.		
3. ECC conducts operations IAW the stability and support operations tactical SOP.		

TASK: CONDUCT MARSHALLING FORCE OPERATIONS (FM 90-29)

CONDITIONS:

1. Marshalling forces arrive at evacuee assembly area by air, foot movement, or ground transport.
2. Marshalling forces, unless METT-T dictates otherwise, have the following special equipment, personnel, and administrative capabilities.
   a. Female soldiers to assist, if necessary, in searching female evacuees.
   b. Metal detectors to assist, if necessary, in search procedures.
   c. A clear definition of contraband.
   d. Sufficient noncombatant evacuation operations forms: Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity, Evacuee Information Cards, and ECC Evacuee Register.
   e. Updated copies of the black, grey, and white lists.
   (1) Black list. These evacuees are guarded and held in the confinement area.
   (2) Grey list. These evacuees need to be evaluated, because of uncertain identities or eligibility for evacuation.
   (3) White list. The evacuees have been identified and are on a State Department list for evacuation.
   f. Interrogator, prisoner of war, and or counterintelligence personnel.

g. MPs to assist in searches and handling of detainees.

h. Medical capability equal to physician's assistant or medical doctor.

i. If necessary, chaplain or chaplain's assistant to assist evacuees experiencing psychological trauma (loss of home, loss of loved ones, and so forth).

3. US Embassy has already issued a notification to evacuees to report to evacuee assembly area.

4. A warden is available at two of the three evacuee assembly areas to help in processing.

5. Marshalling force has instructions to screen all evacuees unless prohibited by the enemy situation.

6. Marshalling force and ECC have coordinated hand-off procedures.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Marshalling force occupies and secures the evacuee assembly area.

a. Moves all personnel and essential equipment into their assigned positions not later than the time specified in the order.

b. Ensures main body is not surprised by the enemy.

c. Forces the enemy squad-size or smaller probes to withdraw without allowing penetration of the evacuee assembly areas.

d. Sustains not more than 15 percent casualties from attacking enemy units.

e. Completes preparations as specified by the OPORD IAW the commander's intent.

2. If necessary, and if authorized, search squads leave assembly area to locate evacuees who fail to show up. These evacuees are moved to the assembly area.

3. Marshalling force is prepared for possible noncombatant evacuation operations dilemmas.

4. All evacuees are searched unless otherwise specified (for example, selected and identified VIPs may be exempted from this search).

5. Evacuees are debriefed for information of military value and of unlisted potential evacuees' locations.

6. Marshalling force maintains communications with division ready-force 1 headquarters.

7. No evacuee is seriously injured during marshalling operations.

8. Forces adhere to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Marshalling force occupies and secures evacuee assembly area.		
a. Marshalling force commander selects an area that provides—		
(1) Concealment and space for dispersion.		
(2) Adequate entry and exit routes.		
(3) Defense and security.		
b. Marshalling force OPORD—		
(1) Designates areas for each subordinate element.		
(2) Gives quartering party instructions for quartering the assembly areas.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(3) Specifies an order of march that allows rapid occupation.
(4) Provides for defense.
(5) Designates priority of work and provides for maintenance and supply.
(6) If possible, has the occupation accomplished during limited visibility.

c. Quartering party divides the evacuee assembly area into four parts.
(1) Establishes initial security.
(2) Reconnoiters the area.
(3) Clears area of mines, booby traps, and obstacles.
(4) Selects sites that support the occupation and execution of the assembly area mission.

- Marks CP location.
- Marks sectors for subordinate elements.
- Marks mortar location.
- Marks evacuee in-brief area.
- Marks evacuee search area.
- Marks evacuee screening area.
- Marks evacuee rest area.
- Marks detainee area.

(5) Lays communication wire as needed.
(6) Checks for NBC contamination.

d. Marshalling force elements occupy evacuee assembly areas.
(1) Main body moves into position without halting or blocking routes.
(2) Noise, light, and camouflage discipline is maintained.

e. Marshalling force performs assembly area operations IAW established priority of work (may vary by unit SOP and mission):
(1) Maintains security.

- No OPFOR squad-size element can move to within small-arms direct-fire weapons range without detection.
- OPs are established and patrols are performed IAW METT-T factors.

(2) Detects enemy aircraft.
(3) Maintains concealment.
(4) Makes the best use of time to prepare for marshalling:

- Receives intelligence, operations, and logistics updates from the quartering party.
- Finalizes coordination with any joint and combined forces, and with any US Embassy.
- If necessary, performs leader reconnaissance.
- If necessary, issues FRAGOs.
- Updates contingency plans as required.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

- Updates white, grey, and black lists.
- If appropriate, continues troop-leading procedures.
- Performs PMCS on all equipment.

2. Search squads locate evacuees; all evacuees are accounted for at the assembly area.

a. Leaders do not become disoriented during search for evacuees.

b. Maintain security at all times.

c. Treat all evacuees courteously; keep family groups together as much as possible.

d. Leaders have decision flow charts that cover—

(1) What to do for each of the possible noncombatant evacuation operations dilemmas.

(2) If designated evacuee is not at appointed address—

- Search squad leaves instructions in a clearly observable location at the appointed address (unless the enemy situation makes this an OPSEC violation). Squad uses US Embassy Alternate Evacuation Orders.
- Search squad tries to locate him.

(3) If designated evacuee is at appointed address—

- Search squad informs him of the situation.
- Search squad determines if he will go or stay.

(4) If evacuee decides not to go with search squad—

- Search squad reiterates US Embassy's warning.
- Search squad requests that individual sign waiver of evacuation opportunity.
- If individual refuses to sign, search squad takes note of date-time group of circumstances.

(5) If evacuee decides to go with search squad—

- Search squad identifies him.
- Search squad reiterates the following information from the US Embassy evacuation notice:
  –Baggage limitations.
  –Pet limitations.
  –Disposal of privately owned vehicles and household goods.
- If necessary for the search squad's safety, they conduct a hasty search of evacuee (males do not search females).
- Search squad collects contraband and weapons.

(6) If evacuee desires to go to the evacuation site on his own—

- Search squad does not prevent him.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

- Search squad notes individual's name, the date-time group, and the individual's intent.

(7) If evacuee requests that others be evacuated with him (for example, servant, close friends)—

- Search squad explains that the military cannot make that decision, only the US Embassy or State Department can.
- Search squad does not bring anyone to the evacuee assembly area who is not on the list. However, if unsure of the evacuation status of an individual, they evacuate him.

(8) Upon return to the evacuee assembly area, search squad leader—

- Debriefs his immediate supervisor.
- Reports missing evacuees.

3. Marshalling force elements provide for the safety of all evacuees during all phases of the marshalling operation.

4. Evacuees are processed.

a. If not previously accomplished, evacuees are identified by passport or other official documentation.

(1) Identification discrepancies are resolved IAW contingency plans.

(2) VIPs are identified, and they are processed separately.

b. Evacuees are in-briefed.

(1) The reason for the evacuation is explained.

(2) Assembly area processing events and procedures for each event are explained; this must include their departure time and arrangements. A quick synopsis of the ECC is also given.

(3) Supplies and services available are mentioned.

(4) Reasons for the searches are explained.

(5) Rules of conduct are explained.

(6) Measures taken to ensure the safety of the evacuees are outlined.

(7) Contraband is defined and collected.

(8) Questions are solicited and answered.

c. Evacuees and their baggage are searched to determine if any items are present that may harm other evacuees or the marshalling force; to confiscate contraband; and to collect unauthorized weapons and firearms.

(1) Female soldiers or "cleared and supervised" female evacuees search female evacuees.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
(2) Military police are used to the maximum extent possible. If available, counterbomb and counternarcotics canine teams are employed. (3) Searchers know what contraband is. (4) Search methods— • Metal detectors are the preferred method for searching evacuees. • Pat searches are authorized if metal detectors are not available. • Strip searches require a clear and compelling reason (probable cause); otherwise, they are not authorized. d. Evacuees are medically screened to determine if there are any urgent or priority medical or health problems. e. Evacuees are debriefed to determine— (1) If they have any information of military value. (2) If they know the locations of any more potential evacuees. f. Evacuees are moved to the ECC. (1) By air whenever possible. (2) During limited visibility, whenever possible. (3) At least one soldier must be present with each aircraft or vehicle. g. Marshalling force maintains accurate journal (DA Form 1594, Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log) on marshalling force operations.		

TASK: INTERDICT SMUGGLING OPERATIONS (FM 7-10, FM 7-20, FM 7-98, FM 90-8)

CONDITIONS: The unit is conducting operations during a peacekeeping mandate. The local authorities have requested assistance in reducing smuggling activities. The force commander has made a list of contraband and prohibited items and the unit has a copy of it. The unit has established checkpoints, roadblocks, and patrols as a function of their peacekeeping duties. The unit has been specifically tasked to interdict or deny smuggling operations in their area of operations.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Smugglers are detected, apprehended, and turned over to local civil or police authority.
2. A positive chain of custody is maintained for seized property.
3. Local laws are not violated in the unit's conduct of search and seizure.
4. Friendly force or noncombatant casualties are not incurred during apprehension, detention, or transfer of suspect personnel.
5. Forces adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. All personnel are briefed on prohibited items and contraband.

2. Search authority is explicit. Procedure for seizure of contraband, criminal evidence, intelligence material, military supplies is briefed and rehearsed.

3. Leader conducts liaison with local civil authorities to determine type of items being smuggled and assesses transportation and delivery methods.
   a. Analyzes the type of products being smuggled.
   b. Determines transportation assets required, available, or known.
   c. Determines likely entry points.
   d. Determines probable drop points.
   e. Determines possible delivery sites, hand over or transship locations.
   f. Determines routes leading to or near drop points, delivery sites, hand over or transship locations.
   g. Prepares patrol plans based on above IPB; provides SIR to focus patrol acquisition efforts.

4. Intensity and frequency of vehicle searches at checkpoints are increased.

5. Mobile checkpoints are employed with greater frequency, especially on minor roads.

6. Search teams are organized and trained to perform searches.
   a. Host nation or local civil authority present.
   b. Means available to record search for future legal action.
   c. Search team knows its jurisdiction and authority.
   d. Detailed list of controlled or prohibited items on hand.
   e. Interpreter available.

7. Passive detection devices or stratagems are employed to compensate for limited personnel and large sectors.
   a. Helicopters and liaison aircraft diverted from routine flight plans.
   b. REMBASS and other sensor systems employed.
   c. Surveillance patrols remain in place (covert positions).
   d. Mounted (light-wheeled vehicle) patrols increased.
   e. Illumination planned (for example, flares, searchlights).

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

8. Detained persons and materiel are turned over to host nation authorities at earliest opportunity.

TASK: DISARM BELLIGERENTS (FM 7-98, FM 33-1, FM 90-8)

CONDITIONS: The unit is required to supervise the disarmament of belligerent forces. The unit has guidance developed from the terms of reference, status of forces agreement, and the rules of engagement, which define those actions that the peacekeeping force is authorized to take. Local civil authorities may or may not be available to assist. The unit may or may not be supported by a psychological operation element.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Disarmament is conducted in a nonhostile manner.
2. Unit actions rigidly adhere to treaties, agreements, or directives from higher headquarters.
3. Weapons, explosives, and armaments are safeguarded to prevent theft.
4. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Unit provides liaison teams to belligerent forces.
   a. Coordinates or negotiates separation of belligerent forces beyond each other's effective direct- and (if feasible) indirect-fire weapon ranges.
   b. Establishes routine means for critical information exchange between belligerent force leaders and unit commander.
   c. Negotiates prisoner exchange between belligerents.
   d. Negotiates free passage for noncombatants.

2. The unit identifies demands belligerent forces need to meet to establish conditions for separation, cantonment, or protection to surrender military materiel.
   a. Establishes conditions to provide humanitarian support to belligerent forces willing to separate and cease hostilities.
   b. Maintains interposition patrols in the buffer zone established between or around a formerly belligerent force.
   (1) Dispatches interposition patrol immediately on indication of termination of hostilities.
   (2) Coordinates with all patrol routes, times, reporting procedures.
   (3) Ensures patrols are equipped for anticipated duration of mission.
   c. Uses psychological operations element to reinforce the correctness of the belligerent forces' decision to disarm and cease hostilities.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
3. The unit specifies what military materiel must be surrendered and what may be retained.		
4. The unit designates military materiel collection point or cantonment site. a. Provides 24-hour guard element for collected equipment. b. Establishes accountability of materiel collected, stored, transferred, or destroyed. c. Maintains a log accounting of personnel or units surrendering materiel. d. Designates and marks weapon, ammunition, and vehicle turn-in points. e. Establishes checkpoints, OPs, and patrols to secure the area and control movement.		
5. The unit prepares and issues receipts for materiel received from belligerents. a. Receives and segregates materiel into major categories. b. Secures materiel in accordance with appropriate regulations, SOPs, or directives. c. Ensures materiel is made safe before acceptance or provision of receipt.		
6. The unit establishes appropriate security measures for the type or quantity of military materiel received.		
7. The unit destroys materiel in accordance with SOP or directives. The unit forwards destruction reports as required.		
8. The unit uses psychological operations element to persuade local population to coerce belligerents into disarmament.		

TASK: DEFEND A CONVOY (FM 7-98, FM 19-15)

CONDITIONS: The unit is escorting a convoy of humanitarian relief supplies or internal resupply during the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The convoy consists of an unspecified number (no more than 25) of civilian trucks under the control of a representative from the UN High Commission for Refugees. The military elements of the convoy may consist of wheeled and tracked vehicles, recovery assets, indirect-fire support (mortars), dismount units, communication and reconnaissance. Other elements possibly included in the convoy might be members of private voluntary organizations and nongovernment organizations traveling with the convoy for security, members of the media, UN military observers, regional civil/military authorities, and displaced civilians that infiltrate the convoy for security.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The convoy reaches the release point or the delivery destination without incident.
2. The convoy maintains unit integrity throughout the movement.
3. The convoy does not lose cargo or supplies before delivery at destination.
4. Nonmilitary members of convoy element are afforded protection during attack. The convoy prevents loss of life or serious injury to civilian drivers or aid workers.
5. Use of force in defense of convoy is consistent and proportional to the threat, and it is the minimum necessary.
6. No more than 5 percent of the escort element is wounded or injured defending the convoy.
7. No supplies, disabled vehicles, or casualties are left behind.
8. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Leader task-organizes the element to accomplish the mission. Vehicles are prepared with added protection for movement. a. Advance guard. b. Main body. c. Rear guard.		
2. Composition of escort element based on METT-T. a. Advance guard task-organized to provide forward security, firepower forward, land navigation, and mobility. b. Main body task-organized to provide local security and command and control.		
3. Leader considers and uses march planning factors in developing plans and contingencies.		
NOTE: During the critical planning task, the leader must know the pass time when negotiating a checkpoint or anticipated danger area. A typical convoy has 25 to 35 vehicles moving 25 to 50 meters apart at a speed		
4. Armed and armored escort vehicles are positioned in appropriate intervals to provide protection for the convoy. a. Consideration given to the ability to see the portion of the convoy the vehicle commander is responsible for (five to seven vehicles).		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

b. Consideration given to provision of protected space for convoy vehicle drivers in the event of attack.

5. Escort vehicle crews assigned sectors of observation and for protective fires in the event of attack.

a. Turret operators use visual observation techniques during movement.

b. At halts, turret operators divide duties of optical scanning and use of visual techniques.

c. Other vehicle occupants assigned observation tasks during movement and halts.

6. Convoy takes appropriate action in response to direct or indirect fire.

a. If possible, increases speed to leave the affected area rapidly.

b. If convoy too long or impact area too close, leader opts to halt, seek cover, and provide maximum protection for all personnel.

c. Leader may assess fires as harassment only and continue mission or turn convoy around to reorganize at a safe location.

d. Escort does not allow drivers or cargo vehicles to be separated or left behind.

7. Convoy reacts to a mechanical break down.

a. Leader informed, directs all elements to halt, security established.

b. Emergency repairs conducted on site, vehicles retain march interval.

c. Emergency repairs not possible, vehicle towed to next destination.

d. Towing is impossible; cargo is distributed, critical vehicle parts are removed, and vehicle is moved off the road to avoid traffic.

8. Convoy reacts to a break in contact.

a. Subelement leader (vehicle commander) reports break in contact.

b. Serial commander notifies convoy commander and higher headquarters.

c. Convoy is halted; an armored vehicle is sent out (forward or back as appropriate) to determine the problem.

d. Vehicle march interval shortened within halted elements, and local security is posted.

e. Link up of reconnaissance vehicle and element out of contact complete; reports to the commander.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
f. Escort commander assesses the situation; if possible, reports to higher headquarters.		
g. Convoy resumes movement.		
9. Convoy reacts to casualties that require evacuation.		
a. Evacuee is accompanied by another member of the escort unit until return to the unit, a military medical facility, or the convoy destination.		
b. Report forwarded to higher headquarters at earliest opportunity.		
c. All reasonable attempts made to return evacuee to military control as soon as practical.		
d. In the event of death, the remains will remain with the convoy until it can be delivered to a military installation.		
10. Convoy performs maintenance at scheduled halts.		
a. Halts are planned to remain on hard or paved surfaces.		
b. Vehicle interval is maintained, unless halt is to remain overnight.		
c. Local security is posted.		
(1) Arming order allows magazines fixed on safe, weapons carried at ready.		
(2) If possible, OPs are dispatched to vantage points.		
(3) Turret weapon systems remain manned. However, escort vehicles require maintenance attention as well.		
(4) Personnel not involved in maintenance activities are allowed to move about but do not get off of paved or hard-surfaced areas.		
11. Convoy reacts to roadblock and illegal search demands.		
a. Roadblock or vehicle control point encountered by security patrol, or it is hastily erected after security patrol passes. Escort commander informs convoy commander or higher headquarters as appropriate.		
b. Unit leader uses UN High Commission for Refugees representative and or UN military observer and interpreter to negotiate passage without response to search demands.		
c. If search of cargo vehicles is unavoidable (least offensive measure, avoids escalation of hostility, may facilitate passage further along route), leader keeps the loss of time to a minimum.		
d. Leader does not permit search of UN vehicles.		
e. UN High Commission for Refugees representative may authorize distribution of humanitarian aid to ease passage. Escort commander should advise against and does not recommend bribery as a viable course of action.		
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**

f. Escort commander ensures convoy personnel refrain from comments or actions that may be inflammatory.
g. Commander posts dismounted guard elements to secure cargo trucks until they are past roadblock and ready to resume movement.

12. Convoy reacts to attack by unarmed mob.
a. Escort elements immediately establish a cordon around cargo trucks.
(1) Vehicles reduce interval to ease security.
(2) Dismounts establish perimeter.
(3) Armored escort vehicle(s) close on mob for show of force or intimidation effect.
b. Escort commander notifies convoy commander and higher headquarters; uses interpreter to issue warnings to mob.
c. Subordinate leaders issue arming order to fix bayonets.
d. Escort commander considers use of riot control agents or to drive out of mob situation or both.
e. Dismount elements use physical restraint to prevent pilferage of cargo.
(1) Physical restraint complies with use of proportional force.
(2) Leader in charge of security element makes decision to increase arming order, if physical measures will not prevent harm to guards or theft of cargo.
(3) Leader informs his superior of his decision immediately.
f. Escort commander alerts higher headquarters of anticipated use of force.
(1) Commander and security detail use any and all means to warn mob to desist and disperse. Continue any attempt to disengage.
(2) Escort commander authorizes the discharge of weapons as final warning. Security element leader orders a soldier to fire a warning shot. All weapons are oriented on the mob.
(3) If needed, security element leader directs detail to discharge one round each to disable only.
(4) Security element is prepared to continue single-shot disabling fire until mob stops, or it is ordered to cease fire.
(5) Medical personnel administer first aid.
g. Escort commander reports to higher headquarters.

TASK: NEGOTIATE A BELLIGERENT FORCE CHECKPOINT

CONDITIONS: The unit is escorting a convoy of humanitarian supplies or conducting internal unit resupply operations. The convoy may include an armed escort for security, UN military observers, members of nongovernment organizations and private voluntary organizations, and a representative from the UN High Commission for Refugees who is

nominally the convoy commander. One of the parties in conflict (an armed belligerent military force recognized by the UN) has established a checkpoint on the convoy route and will deny free passage. The advance guard from the convoy has already encountered the checkpoint and notified the escort commander of the situation. The convoy is 10 minutes travel time from the checkpoint. The checkpoint is composed of a wire serpentine obstacle, reinforced with mines and at least one heavy machine gun. The belligerents are known to use RPGs for close-in antiarmor protection. A light-armored vehicle has been reported in the vicinity by the security patrol. The status of forces agreement is unquestionably clear providing the peacekeeping operations element the right to freedom of movement on this specific route.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The convoy passes through the checkpoint without incident.
2. Contents of convoy cargo trucks are not bartered to allow passage.
3. Security of the cargo vehicles is continuous, no break in contact between elements is allowed during passage at the checkpoint.
4. Absolute right of passage is maintained, no search of vehicles is allowed, and all parties maintain positive control of means of identification.
5. Use of force to dismantle checkpoint or continue the mission is proportional and is used as the last resort.
6. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Convoy commander plans halt of the convoy elements before arrival at the scene of the checkpoint to attempt to inform higher headquarters.		
2. Convoy commander briefs convoy of the situation. Advance guard leader disposes of security elements.		
3. Advance guard leader and convoy commander move forward to conduct negotiation at the checkpoint.		
4. Negotiations are conducted at lowest level possible.		
5. Leader assesses degree of negotiation. If needed, calls convoy commander forward to continue negotiation with appropriate documents.		
6. Negotiations are focused on a central theme with firm resolve.		
a. All passengers can and will identify themselves as UN employees.		
b. Interior of vehicles will not be searched by belligerents.		
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
c. Convoy members will not comply with the orders of belligerent checkpoint sentries.		

d. Doors of vehicles will remain secured from the inside while making passage of the checkpoint.

e. Actions of belligerents will be monitored and tolerated, unless the belligerents appear able to dominate the vehicles of the convoy. Then, appropriate countermeasures may be taken to demonstrate the military capability of the convoy escort.

f. The military escort and their convoy have freedom of movement.

7. The leader (escort commander) enters the negotiating process only if the UN representative is unsuccessful. Ultimately his options are—

a. Warn the belligerent and issue an ultimatum for continued movement and passage.

OR

b. Prevent the loss of life and abort the mission.

8. The leader demonstrates the resolve to continue the mission by—

a. Ordering reconnaissance to locate a bypass.

b. Intimidation by the maneuver of combat forces or weapon systems.

c. Requesting nonlethal indirect fire (illumination), overflight by attack helicopters, or deployment of convoy quick-reaction force.

d. As a last resort, shooting and wounding belligerents securing the checkpoint except the belligerent leader.

9. Report of passage or of mission abort sent to higher headquarters at the earliest possible opportunity.

a. Location of belligerent checkpoint.

b. Context of belligerent demands.

c. Actions of UN representative.

d. Extent and result of negotiation.

TASK: PLAN A MEDIA VISIT (FM 46-1)

CONDITIONS: The element is given orders to plan for civilian media coverage of a news event in its area of operations.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Element is prepared for visit not later than the time specified in the order.
2. Staff assesses the nature and impact of the event.
3. All aspects of the news media event are considered in the planning process.
4. Key personnel are briefed before the event.
5. News event is executed not later than the time specified in the order.
6. After-action requirements are completed.

7. Unit adheres to rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Staff assesses the nature and impact of the event in four areas.
   a. How will it affect the public—internal, external, regional, national, special? Pinpoint the public(s) most affected by or interested in the event.
   b. What are the objectives of the event? Clarify the objectives.
   c. How must the element plan and prepare for the media coverage?
   d. How will the element execute the plan?

2. Commander and staff plan the news media event.
   a. Media coverage. How will the media be able to cover the news event? If it is an equipment demonstration, will the media be required to be stationary, perhaps shooting from a cordoned-off media area? Or will they be allowed to move about freely, but with individual escorts?
   b. Clearance from higher headquarters is not always required, but when it is, make sure approval is given.
   c. Day/date/time factors. Watch for conflicts or conditions not conducive to media coverage. Use common sense, a calendar, and a schedule of events when setting a date.
   d. Location.
      - Is the location suitable or practical?
      - Can the site be secured?
      - Is the site accessible to the media, buses, and other commercial vehicles?
      - Does the site allow for the transmission of microwave signals to area radio and television stations?
      - If it rains, will mud present a major obstacle?
      - Is there shelter for the media?
      - Is there an inclement weather plan?
      - Inclement weather preparations, outdoors versus indoors: A lack of light is usually the big difference between indoors and outdoors. Parts of the event may have to be altered or canceled if conducted indoors. Additional power generation may be required if conducted indoors.
   e. Time lines and tie-ins with other events. Consider host country sensitivities.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

f. Advance releases and personal invitations to the media. Carefully scrutinize both for errors in spelling, grammar, and format.

g. Press kit preparation, if needed. Carefully check each piece of information. Make sure only essential information is contained in the press kits. Make sure a point of contact is on each item in the press kit.

h. Transportation requirements for the media.

- Make sure the transportation meets the terrain and environmental challenges.
- Ensure there are suitable parking facilities for the media.

i. Advance clearance of media. Provide the gate guards or MPs a list of media attending the event and instructions on how to refer other unconfirmed media to the public affairs officer or registration site, or place a public affairs officer representative at the gate to verify credentials and issue press badges.

j. Press center facilities, if required. Consider power, typewriters, commercial telephones, and rest rooms.

k. Advance arrangements for interview, photography or shooting sessions, if required.

l.. Advance briefing for photographers. Discuss photographic considerations, that is, how close they can get to the action and the ground rules.

m. Escorts, if required.

- Brief escorts on the event and terrain and media considerations.
- Use senior NCOs close to the subject matter or event as escorts.

n. Copies of speeches or remarks. Do not give the media advance copies of speeches or remarks, since many commanders change them or ad lib. Give the media a hard copy of a speech or remarks only after it is given and a public affairs office staffer has verified the contents.

o. Keep the public affairs officer oriented and prepared to brief on the event. He should know who from the media is attending.

p. Establish a checklist and milestones.

- Closely supervise all facets of the media event's preparation. Troubleshoot the preparation.
- Keep in touch with all of the key people involved with the media event.

3. Brief the key people before the event. Go over the itinerary of events, who is coming, what to expect, whom to contact if problems arise, what to do if someone arrives late, and so forth.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

4. Execute the news event.
   a. Register all media representatives. Give them press badges (if required) and press kits, and introduce them to their escorts (if required).
   b. Ensure S1 constantly checks all facets of the news event and works closely with the public affairs office to solve problems quickly and quietly.

5. After the news media event, the commander and staff—
   a. Debrief the key personnel involved.
   b. Monitor print media, radio, and television for coverage.
   c. Write an after-action report.

TASK: REACT TO A MEDIA INTERVIEW (FM 46-1)

CONDITIONS: A soldier of the command is approached for an interview by media representatives who appear to be legitimate. The soldier is participating as part of a stability and support operation. The interview will not materially affect his ability to conduct his assigned tasks.

SITUATION A: Press is unescorted and not accredited by the force headquarters.

SITUATION B: Press is escorted by a unit public affairs representative.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Interviews are not conducted with nonaccredited media representatives.
2. Unit public affairs representative provides guidance to both interviewer and soldier to be interviewed.
3. Soldier interviewed does not speculate, nor does he express opinions beyond the scope of his experience or duties.
4. Operational information is not discussed.
5. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Soldier asks to see accreditation certification.

2. Soldier asks where the escort is if reporter appears to be unescorted.

3. If all details are in accordance with instructions received from briefings, soldier participates in the interview. (See subtask 6 below if reporter is not escorted.)

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
4. Unit public affairs representative remains nearby during the interview.		
5. Soldier responds to interviewer's questions.		
a. Listens to the question, asks for clarification if needed.		
b. Thinks about answer before responding.		
c. Is honest in replies, says "I don't know" if answer is beyond scope.		
d. Explains if he cannot answer a question due to operations security.		
e. Does not respond to hypothetical situations used by correspondent to elicit a response.		
f. Terminates interview if he becomes uncomfortable with the questions being asked, or if questioning becomes provocative.		
g. Does not allow himself to be "baited" into a response by a controversial or so-called "investigative reporter."		
h. Avoids saying "No comment."		
6. If press representative is unescorted, soldier—		
a. Determines if escort is in the area. Asks for a specific name and unit rather than accepting a general wave "over there."		
b. Requests person or team to accompany the reporter to headquarters element location, or calls for superiors to come to the location.		
c. Uses tact in dealing with media team.		
7. Leader attempts to verify identity of media team.		
a. Notifies higher headquarters unit public affairs representative or public affairs officer.		
b. Advises media team to depart area of operations to make contact with higher headquarters unit public affairs representative or public affairs officer. Provides location and recommends route.		
8. If media team is in an area under direct US force control (for example, compound, protected area, buffer zone), soldier detains them to maintain positive control.		
a. Informs media team that they are in a controlled area.		
b. Informs media team that detention is for security reasons and will continue until released by higher headquarters.		
c. Uses restraint consistent with authorized methods.		
d. Leader considers that a ploy may be engineered to portray US force unfavorably.		
e. Keeps higher headquarters informed of all actions taken.		

TASK: PROTECT THE FORCE (FM 7-20, FM 7-98, FM 100-5, FM 100-20)

CONDITIONS: The unit is participating in peacekeeping operations where all parties in conflict have not consented to the imposition of a peacekeeping force. The belligerents have military and paramilitary organizations capable of employing all implements of war including high-performance aircraft and chemical weapons. The unit has guidance from the rules of engagement (ROE) and the status of forces agreement (SOFA) that specify limitations and constraints. Additionally, the force headquarters has issued a theater-wide SOP that defines some aspects of force protection.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Unit conducts risk assessment to manage risks.
2. Unit defines threats, determines attack probability, and develops effective countermeasures.
3. Unit develops, disseminates, and updates force protection policy.
4. Unit leaders recognize force protection as the most importance element of the peacekeeping mission.
5. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Unit develops a force protection policy that balances— a. Attack probability. b. Cost of adequate protection. c. Cost of inadequate protection.		
2. Unit concentrations, compounds, sites, and facilities are evaluated. Evaluations should include— a. Protection against vehicle-delivered explosives. b. Protection against exterior attack. c. Protection from stand-off weapons attack. d. Protection from covert entry or insider compromise attack. e. Electronic and acoustical eavesdropping denial. f. Visual surveillance denial. g. Prevention of mail- or supply-truck-delivered explosives.		
3. Unit develops plans to react to belligerent demands to search vehicles.		
4. Unit OPSEC measures (active and passive) are consistent with higher headquarters policy.		
5. Unit establishes and sustains a situational awareness program (for example, mine awareness, regional political and military, and contingency force posture [TOR, SOFA, ROE]).		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
6. Unit establishes and enforces requirements for local security.		
7. Unit ensures that guards are prepared to perform their duties. All guard posts have special instructions for that certain post. It may include special ROE instructions.		
8. Unit develops and enforces safety guidelines. It includes high-risk countermeasures. a. Weapons handling and clearing procedures. b. Use of stoves, fuels, combustibles in soldiers areas. c. Driving. d. Weather extremes.		
9. Unit considers weapon effects and fratricide reduction measures in base defense planning.		
10. Unit provides adequate field hygiene and sanitation resources.		
11. Commander determines arming posture for soldiers in execution of duties and when in compound. a. Arms must be secured when not in possession of soldier to prevent theft. (1) Weighs effect of centralized security (arms room) versus decentralized (squad hut weapon rack) on defense reaction time. (2) Considers soldier sense of vulnerability. b. Unit develops procedures for ammunition storage and authority for issue.		
12. Commander designates and assigns security and safety duties to specific individuals.		

TASK:PERFORM A CORDON AND SEARCH (FM 90-8, FM 7-20)

CONDITIONS: The battalion is operating as part of a peace enforcement force in a MOUT environment. The battalion is ordered to conduct a search of a built-up area for insurgent and paramilitary forces, their sympathizers and their equipment. The joint task force commander has published a list of restricted and prohibited items. The local population is in the area, and the battalion is supported by the local police. Governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations are in the area. If available, the battalion may be augmented with two linguist and interrogators, two psychological operations/civil affairs augmentation teams, two scout dog teams, two scout teams, an MP squad with at least two female MPs. The battalion is provided with the rules of engagement (ROE).

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The battalion establishes a cordon of the area designated in the OPORD without being detected by the insurgents before the operation.
2. The battalion captures all belligerents and their materiel in the cordon.
3. The battalion minimizes the inconvenience to the complying members of the populace.
4. The battalion adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. The battalion staff develops the plan in accordance with ARTEP 7-20-MTP, T&EO 7-1-1910, Perform S3 Operations.		
a. Designs the cordon to prevent the escape of individuals to be searched.		
b. Divides the battalion into a search element, a security (cordon) element, and a reserve.		
c. Plans the positions to ensure the protection of the forces conducting the operation.		
d. Disseminates the rules of engagement.		
e. Divides the cordoned area into zones.		
f. Plans for control of fires.		
g. Incorporates local leaders in search, where appropriate.		
h. Coordinates with local police.		
i. Numbers or letters all buildings.		
j. Plans for control of crowds.		
k. Plans for withdrawal from the search area (both opposed and unopposed).		
2. The battalion prepares for the search.		
a. Prepares for the search in accordance with unit SOP, preparation for combat.		
b. All subordinate commanders brief their soldiers on the rules of engagement.		
c. Conducts rehearsals in accordance with the OPORD.		
d. Avoids a physical reconnaissance of the area just before the search (uses aerial photographs if available).		
3. The security (cordon) element moves to the area to be searched and establishes the cordon.		
a. Rapidly moves into position.		
b. Surrounds the area at once to prevent escape of the belligerents or paramilitary forces and to block any reinforcements.		
c. Establishes checkpoints.		
d. Patrols between checkpoints, as necessary.		
e. Uses observed fire to cover gaps.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

4. The search element conducts the search.
   a. Conducts the search with the appropriate inconvenience to the populace using one of the three following methods:
      - Central assembly.
      - Restriction to homes.
      - Control of heads of households.
   b. Organizes the search elements into special teams (based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available).
      - Handlers of prisoners.
      - Interrogation teams.
      - Documentation teams (using a camera or other recording device).
      - Demolition teams.
      - Psychological operations/civil affairs team.
      - Mine detection team.
      - Fire support team.
      - Tunnel reconnaissance.
      - Dogs.
      - Interpreters.
      - Female searchers (if available).
   c. Searches all underground and underwater areas.

NOTE: Suspect any freshly excavated ground; it could be a hiding place. Use mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater. When possible, use heads of households to assist in the search.

5. The battalion searches the perimeter area. If the security (cordon) element has not been detected, the search element performs the perimeter area search.

6. The battalion processes captured insurgents or paramilitary forces and materiel.
   a. Handles in accordance with ARTEP 7-10-MTP, T&EO 7-2-1503, Process Enemy Prisoners of War/Captured Materiel.
   b. Uses the least force to detain the insurgents.
   c. Turns the insurgents over to the local police as soon as the situation allows.

7. The battalion controls the rate of search and directs reorganization as needed.
   a. Employs the reserve to assist the other two elements as the situations requires.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

b. Reports the progress of the search to the brigade.

c. Reorganizes the battalion in accordance with ARTEP 7-20-MTP, T&EO 7-1-1031, Reorganize.

d. Enforces the rules of engagement.

e. Continues the mission as directed by brigade.

f. Designates collection points.

- Casualties.
- EPWs.
- Detainees.
- Civilians.

TASK: SEARCH A BUILDING (FM 7-10, FM 7-20, FM 7-98, FM 90-8, FM 90-10-1)

CONDITIONS: The unit is designated as a search element and has selected one of the three methods for conducting the search. The search objective of a specified building is to locate contraband, to seize prohibited items, or to detain persons suspected of criminal or unlawful actions. The unit has available guidance developed from the terms of reference (TOR), status of forces agreement (SOFA), and rules of engagement (ROE), which define those items that the peacekeeping force is authorized to confiscate. Local civil authorities are on site with the US element or are immediately available. The area around the building has been secured. The building may range from a cinder- block hut to a modern multistory structure.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Entry and search techniques are in accordance with the rules of engagement.
2. Procedures for search, seizure, and detention are rigorously adhered to.
3. No unnecessary physical damage to building. No harm to noncombatants.
4. Unit sustains no casualties.
5. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The search element attempts to enter the building.

a. Leader, with civil authority (or interpreter), and one escort approach building.

b. Knock on door and wait for a response from inside.

c. Announce authority to conduct search, request compliance from inhabitants. If no response from inside after two attempts, leader directs search team to establish an entry point.

(1) Element establishes entry point where subsequent entry after departure will be difficult for locals (for example, second story window, trap door in roof).

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
(2) Damage caused in gaining entry is the minimum necessary to accomplish the task. Use of explosives is considered as last resort and only on authority of unit commander.		
2. Entry team conducts initial room clearance.		
a. First soldier provides security.		
b. Second soldier conducts checks for hidden persons, weapons, booby traps.		
c. Entry team does not proceed past first room.		
d. Entry team announces room clear to search element leader.		
e. Entry team emplaces signal device visible to security and support elements to indicate the floor on which search team is working.		
3. Search team enters through entry point.		
a. Announces coming in.		
b. Conducts visual survey of floor plan of building, announces search pattern to be used, (follow walls to left, enter rooms on left, until whole floor is clear).		
c. Determines access to upper or lower floors.		
4. Search team conducts floor search.		
a. Entry team secures entry point and monitors passage or hallway.		
b. Search team moves to next room.		
(1) Personnel scan their assigned areas during movement. (Scan area is in three dimensions).		
(2) Point man checks for trip wires.		
(3) Point man opens doors and pauses behind wall before entry.		
(4) Team enters room using a high-man, low-man technique with weapon muzzles tracking where they look.		
c. Team conducts room search.		
(1) Search is in three dimensions. (Checks for false ceilings, in closets, under furniture, carpets, in wardrobes.)		
(2) Search should be for specific items, therefore the team does not waste time on objects that will not accommodate the dimensions of items searched for. (Search for a person does not require opening drawers in a dresser, search for automatic rifles does not require opening shoe boxes.)		
d. Team continues search pattern until floor plan is completed.		
5. Team monitors entry and exit points to the floor they have cleared.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO

6. Two teams enter to search floor above and below simultaneously.

7. Search elements find hidden persons or prohibited items.
   a. Persons are initially addressed by civil authority or interpreter to make an initial identification.
   b. Persons are kept under surveillance (or guard) until civil-police, military police, military intelligence, or civil affairs personnel assume responsibility for them.
   c. Detainee tags or details of circumstances are prepared and turned over with the persons to designated detention authority.
   d. Prohibited items are initially checked for booby traps.
   e. Weapons are examined by knowledgeable personnel, cleared or otherwise made safe for transportation.
   f. A tag is attached or documentation of circumstances of discovery are turned over with the item to collection authority. Description, serial numbers or quantity listing should be retained by the finding unit for inclusion in reports. A receipt is made available before hand over of item.

8. Search team encounters a barricade, booby trap, trip wire, or suspected explosives.
   a. Engineer team or explosive ordnance disposal team (preferred) is brought to site.
   b. Search activity on floors above and below are suspended until demolition device is cleared or deemed safe.
   c. Search team vacates floor unless needed to provide security.
   d. Engineer team disables barricade piece by piece, disarms booby trap, or otherwise makes site safe to continue search.

9. Search of building is complete.
   a. Element leader reports completion to headquarters element.
   b. Building exterior marked to indicate search is complete.
   c. If building was vacant, search element secures entry points.
   d. Building exterior is kept under surveillance until search operation is terminated.

TASK:PROCESS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (FM 19-40, FM 7-98)

CONDITIONS: The unit has detained persons suspected of criminal or unlawful actions, or have captured persons in the commission of acts that are within the unit's jurisdiction to prevent as peacekeepers. Persons apprehended, detained, or captured are clearly in violation of local rules, laws, or agreements. They possess prohibited or controlled items (contraband), as well as documents or equipment of informational value to the peacekeeping force. The unit has available guidance developed from the terms of reference (TOR), status of forces

agreement (SOFA), and rules of engagement (ROE), which define those items that the peacekeeping force is obligated to confiscate. Local civil authorities are not on site with the peacekeeping element, nor are they immediately available.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. All items confiscated, seized, or detained are accounted for, recorded, and receipted from the detainee.
2. Unit adheres to procedures for recording property and maintaining chain of custody.
3. Unit forwards information and or captured items to higher headquarters for further analysis and storage.
4. Improperly seized items that are not prohibited are returned to the detainee.
5. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Unit leaders ensure soldiers know what specific items or categories of items are considered prohibited.		
2. Confiscation or seizure of prohibited items is accomplished in a firm, impartial manner, accompanied by an explanation.		
3. The detaining unit tags confiscated materials at the scene to accurately describe the circumstances of seizure. a. Photographic or video documentation is the preferred technique. b. Written tag is physically attached to article. c. Copy is given to or maintained in detainee file as a receipt for detained person.		
4. Qualified personnel ensure weapons are clear and safe before acceptance. a. Explosive or destructive devices are checked by explosive ordnance disposal personnel or engineers before transport or movement into soldier areas. b. Large or nontransportable items rendered inoperative, in place without destruction.		
5. S2 team conducts initial analysis of materials to discern information of immediate value to the force.		
6. All items are logged. Weapon serial numbers are recorded and forwarded to higher headquarters, especially if weapons are not normally found in the area.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

7. Witness statements are prepared for submission to higher headquarters to coincide with the hand over of captured, confiscated, or seized material.

8. Provision is made for the security and safeguard of captured material both in temporary unit storage and during transport to higher headquarters.

TASK: HANDLE CAPTURED INSURGENTS OR BELLIGERENTS (FM 19-40, FM 7-98)

CONDITIONS: The unit is required to detain persons suspected of criminal or unlawful actions or to capture persons in the act of committing acts that are within the unit's jurisdiction. Persons apprehended, detained, or captured are clearly in violation of local rules, laws, or agreements. They may possess prohibited or controlled items (contraband), have discharged weapons or otherwise violated the security of the peacekeeping force. The unit has guidance developed from the terms of reference (TOR), status of forces agreement (SOFA), and rules of engagement (ROE), which define those activities that the peacekeeping force is obligated to prevent. Local authorities are not on site with the peacekeeping element, nor are they immediately available.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Capture or apprehension is with minimal force necessary to establish control of the individual(s).
2. The unit adheres to procedures for search, segregation, and security.
3. Persons are classified as detainees until evacuation out of the task force control.
4. Detainees are protected from violent acts.
5. The unit adheres to rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Unit leaders ensure soldiers know that persons captured or otherwise detained, even following commission of a violent act against the unit are not handled or treated as enemy prisoners of war.

2. Captured or detained persons are handled with and treated in a firm, humane impartial manner.

3. The five S's are used as a standard for handling and evacuation.

4. Search techniques used are effective and thorough.
   a. Frisk search is used for quick weapons or evidence check. Use of metal detection wand and or female searcher used if available and necessary because of female detainee.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

b. Wall search is used for a more thorough weapons or evidence check before transporting.

5. All reasonable attempts are made to constantly communicate the intentions and actions that are taking place to the detained person.

6. Detainee tags are initiated at the place of apprehension or capture.

7. Witness statement is prepared for higher headquarters to coincide with the hand over of detainee.

8. Leader considers ethnicity of detainees before transporting through a contested area of separation.

TASK:IDENTIFY AND PROCESS DETAINEES (FM 19-40, FM 41-10; AR 90-57)

CONDITIONS: The unit is required to screen detained persons before their movement to displaced civilian camps, internment centers, or hand over to host nation authorities. Detainees are being delivered to a temporary holding area by different sources from throughout the sector. All detainees were tagged before arrival at the holding area. The unit has access to an interpreter from a nearby town. An MP squad is available to assist in segregation and security of the detainees. A civil affairs team may or may not be available.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. Unit provides humane treatment and conditions in the holding area consistent with capabilities.
2. Unit adheres to procedures for search, interrogation, segregation, and security.
3. Persons are identified and classified as rapidly as possible.
4. Detainees do not remain in the unit holding area longer than 24 hours.
5. Detainees are protected from violent acts and physical harm from belligerent forces or other noncombatants.
6. Unit adheres to rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Designated personnel (usually from the S2 section), in conjunction with MPs prepare to receive detainees.
   a. Determines space available in the holding area.
   b. Checks water supply, availability of rations, and latrine facility.
   c. Alerts medical team.
   d. Prepares documents for processing.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
2. Detainee(s) arrives. a. Delivering unit remains on site until hand over is complete. Unit leader of delivering unit hands over existing documentation to MP or designated receiving unit personnel. b. Detainee(s) remains under observation in the screening area. Interpreter announces actions that will take place.		
3. Designated person conducts interview or interrogation. a. Questioning conducted in private (tent or hut in screening area). b. Always three people in the questioning area: interviewer, interpreter, guard. c. Interview follows established format: (1) Examine and log data from identity papers. (2) Identify from where the person is coming or going to. (3) Determine religious preference, ethnic identity, or political affiliation. (4) Identify where the closest family or relatives are located. (5) Determine any special skills, training, or occupation. (6) Identify medical conditions or requirements. (7) Collect any information about belligerent activity observed. (8) Clarify why they were detained by the US force. (9) Assess impressions about the effectiveness or need for the US force.		
4. Detainee is issued an identification tag (field-expedient, dog tag, acetate card with a code or number attached). a. Holding area rules explained. (1) Tag remains in detainee's possession. Used to draw rations and comfort items as required. (2) Holding area configuration and limitations on movement. b. Moved to medical screen area.		
5. Detainee receives medical screen. a. Aidman checks for obvious medical problems. b. Aidman provides aid and releases to guard for movement into holding area or recommends movement into medical facility.		
6. S2 or NCOIC correlates information collected. a. Establishes a file on each person or family group. b. Analyzes information from interview to determine need for further questioning to satisfy commander's critical intelligence requirements, priority intelligence requirements, or intelligence requirements.		
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**

c. Reads witness statements and or reports submitted that relate to the apprehension or detention of each individual. Includes statements or reports in the file.
d. Attempts to determine appropriate classification.
(1) Civilian internee (commission of criminal act, insurgent activity).
(2) Dislocated civilian (displaced person, refugee, or war victim).
(3) Innocent victim.

7. S2 or NCOIC informs higher headquarters of number of personnel in holding area, by category or classification.

8. S5 conducts coordination with nongovernment organizations or private voluntary organizations to provide assistance and aid.
a. List of names forwarded (especially of displaced civilians) to International Red Cross representative.
b. Medical or humanitarian aid organizations allowed access to holding area.

9. Host nation police or UN civil police notified of detainees categorized as requiring internment due to criminal or insurgent activity.

10. S4 or transportation officer arranges transportation within next 12 hours to appropriate destination; brigade holding area, displaced civilian camp, or internment facility.

11. Except for those released, records forwarded to next destination.

12. Unit prepares closeout report on disposition of each detainee to higher headquarters for subsequent submission to force headquarters. Report is completed and submitted within 24 hours of departure from unit holding area.

TASK: APPREHEND/DETAIN NONCOMBATANTS (FM 19-15, FM 19-40, FM 7-98)

CONDITIONS: The unit is required to detain persons suspected of criminal or unlawful actions or have detained persons in the commission of acts that are within the unit's jurisdiction in accordance with higher headquarters orders. Persons apprehended or detained may be in violation of local rules, laws, or agreements. They may possess prohibited or controlled items (contraband), have discharged weapons, or otherwise violated the security of the peacekeeping force. Detention may be required to ensure the safety of the person(s). The unit has available guidance developed from the terms of reference (TOR), status of forces agreement (SOA), and rules of engagement (ROE), which define those activities that

the force is obligated to prevent. Local civil authorities are not on site with the US element, nor are they immediately available.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Unit apprehends with minimal force to establish control of the individual(s).
2. Unit adheres to published procedures for search, segregation, and security.
3. Unit treats individuals as detainees until evacuation out of the unit's control.
4. Unit protects detainees from violent acts.
5. Unit adheres to rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Unit leaders ensure soldiers understand that persons detained are not handled or treated as enemy prisoners of war.		
2. Detained persons are handled with and treated in a firm, humane impartial manner.		
3. The five S's are used as a standard for handling and evacuation.		
4. Search techniques used are effective and thorough. a. Frisk search used to secure weapons or evidence check. (Leaders consider use of metal detector wand and search personnel for women). b. Wall search used for more thorough weapons or evidence check before transportation.		
5. All reasonable attempts are made to constantly communicate the intentions and actions that are taking place to the detained person.		
6. Detainee tags are initiated at the place of apprehension or detention.		
7. Witness statements prepared for submission to higher headquarters to coincide with the hand over of detained persons.		
8. Leader considers ethnicity of detainees before transport or movement through a contested area of separation.		
9. Unit leaders continue to make valid efforts to gain assistance of civil police.		
10. Military intelligence assisted by civil affairs personnel classify detainees upon receipt.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

a. Classify by type (displaced person, refugee, evacuee, stateless person, war victim, or indigenous local civilian).
b. Arrange holding arrangements until control can be established by appropriate authority required by virtue of classification.
c. Maintain segregation to extent capabilities allow.
d. Continue to provide adequate humane conditions until turnover can be completed.

11. Unit leaders work quickly to affect turnover to—
a. Nongovernment organizations and or private voluntary organizations that are better equipped to provide humanitarian assistance.
b. UN civil police or local authorities (host nation civil or military police) for those involved in illegal activity.
c. To higher headquarters designated dislocated civilian collection point.

TASK: NEGOTIATE (FM 7-98, FM 19-15)

CONDITIONS: The unit is part of a multinational peacekeeping operation. Liaison officers of the unit, in conjunction with local UN military observers, have established rapport with local leaders of warring factions. The force commander has directed renewed efforts to conduct negotiations at the sector level. The factions within the unit sector still engage in armed conflict whenever the opportunity presents itself, and rumor of the new initiative has raised tensions in the sector. The unit has available guidance developed from the peacekeeping mandate, the terms of reference (TOR), status of forces agreement (SOFA), and the rules of engagement (ROE) that define the desired end state, as well as the limits of concession for the unit.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. Resolution of conflict is not win or lose.
2. Disputes resolved with the agreement of all parties concerned.
3. The negotiator retains the normal "high ground," defends principles of human rights and fairness.
4. The unit does not use force.
5. The negotiator plans follow-up and preventive actions to avoid recurrence of dispute.
6. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The unit prepares to conduct negotiations.
a. Unit commander ensures unity of effort by forming a negotiation team. Team consists of—

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
(1) Designated team leader. May or may not be the chief negotiator. Supervises the teams's efforts. Ensures team preparations are free from distractions and interference.		
(2) Negotiation/resource coordinator. Serves as the link to the unit staff. Procures and requests information. Ensures availability of equipment and materiel necessary to conduct negotiations.		
(3) Recorder. May lead a subordinate recording team element. Maintains chronological record of all conversations between parties and negotiating team. Compiles information in form of separate lists or databases that indicate demands, deadlines, agreements, or disputes. Maintains a separate listing of all promises made by the negotiating team.		
(4) Interpreter. An additional interpreter may be required if the accuracy of the primary interpreter is questioned.		
b. Negotiating team collects all available information. The team is included in routine message and report flow from the tactical operations center.		
(1) Identifies the problem or source of contention.		
(2) Analyzes any previous attempts at resolution and their outcome.		
(3) Analyzes existing agreements or understandings that may be part of the problem.		
(4) Knows the constraints and limitations of the peacekeeping force.		
c. Negotiating team requests or seeks additional information.		
(1) Makes or issues queries to liaison officers.		
(2) Questions local UN military observers.		
(3) Queries are included as SIRs in reconnaissance and security tasks.		
d. Team recommends, negotiates, selects meeting place.		
(1) Ensures meeting place is a neutral location or is acceptable to all parties.		
(2) Ensures communications assets are adequate for all parties, but especially for the negotiating team.		
(3) Ensures site is surveyed for security requirements. Security elements tasked and positioned to prevent attack or sabotage.		
(4) Ensures availability and use of same map editions and scales by all parties.		
(5) Coordinates for videotape or other electronic media recording.		
e. Team arranges meeting place.		
(1) Organizes tables, chairs, maps, cameras, and so forth.		
(2) Designates an area for guards, support personnel, drivers, and so forth, to wait.		
(3) Establishes parking area.		
SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**

(4) Posts signs or designates locations for various activities.
(5) Establishes communications center.
(6) Establishes and designates break areas.
(7) Ensures latrine facilities are adequate.
(8) Makes arrangements for negotiation attendees to rapidly pass through security checks.

2. Team conducts negotiations.
a. Performs greeting functions, salutations, and exchange of courtesies.
b. Makes formal introductions, by name and position, of all attendees.
c. Encourages informal small talk among participants while offering refreshments.
d. Discusses layout and configuration of site before starting formal portion of meeting.
e. Discusses an agreed upon agenda or establishes one.
f. Allows each participant to establish or present their case without interruption.
(1) Serves as mediator between multiple parties.
(2) Corrects inaccurate information or misrepresentation by the presentation of facts supported by evidence.
(3) Does not argue to win a point.
(4) Records all positions, opinions, and issues.
(5) Avoids making judgments or becoming bogged down with complaints presented by parties. Recorder makes notes for investigation and further actions.
g. Presents the peacekeeping force preferred solution (if there is one). Otherwise works to achieve a solution.
(1) Isolates what each party desires or will be satisfied with.
(2) Identifies a common middle ground.
(3) Encourages small concessions to get parties in the habit of agreement.
(4) Uses previous agreements or understandings as a framework for accord (unless those are the basis of contention).
(5) Facilitates the process by making commitments without exceeding the limits imposed by the mandate or higher headquarters.
h. Concludes session at agreed time, or when no further action is possible.
(1) Recorder summarizes results of session, acknowledging agreements and concessions made. Reviews issues requiring investigation and tentative agenda for follow-up meetings. If possible, provides written copy of record to participants.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(2) Requests copies of other parties' records if they were taking notes.
(3) Prepares agreements for signature before parties depart.
(4) Team leader or chief negotiator makes concluding remarks that point out the positive aspects or results of the session.
(5) Ensures clear and positive understanding of any actions agreed on. Fully defines coordination measures.
(6) Makes arrangements for future meetings; coordinates dates, times, locations, and means of communication.
(7) Speaks pleasantly to each party during their departure, regardless of results of the session.

3. Team reports results of negotiation to higher headquarters.
   a. Team leader ensures team consolidates all notes and other raw data.
   b. Team leader uses debrief format to prepare report. In conjunction with recorder, debriefs all team members or other participants (unit personnel or representatives of nongovernment organizations and private voluntary organizations).
   c. Identifies key points or issues that require investigation or immediate attention.
   d. Posts and updates chronological logs and information databases.
   e. Prepares formal written report listing circumstances, issues, and recommendations.
   f. Prepares documents to implement any agreed upon peacekeeping force actions.
   g. Prepares information summary to brief unit leaders, liaison officers, and UN military observers. Considers inclusion of local or regional nongovernment organizations and private voluntary organizations.
   h. Briefs unit public affairs representative on results, publicity issues, or necessity to maintain close hold on results.

4. Team begins preparations for subsequent negotiations.
   a. Updates and disseminates new information requirements.
   b. Updates or creates personality profiles of counterpart negotiating team.
   c. Conducts rehearsals to improve negotiating a position or resolving a dispute.

TASK: ESTABLISH A CHECKPOINT (FM 7-10, FM 7-20, FM 7-98, FM 90-8)

CONDITIONS: The unit must construct or emplace a checkpoint at a given location that will meet the requirements for either a hasty or deliberate checkpoint. The unit uses whatever resources are available and at their disposal. If available and coordinated for, civilian equipment, materials, and personnel may be used to construct the checkpoint. Warring factions or parties in conflict will not initially interfere with the establishment of the checkpoint.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Checkpoint is established in a location and at the time specified in the order.
2. Checkpoint can accommodate both pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
3. Checkpoint can quickly transition to an effective roadblock.
4. Checkpoint is illuminated, marked, and constructed in accordance with force SOP.
5. Checkpoint cannot be easily bypassed, nor overrun by a speeding vehicle.
6. Checkpoint is manned to allow adequate searches to prevent the smuggling of contraband or prohibited items.
7. Command and control facilities allow checkpoint to serve as an OP for integration in the unit observation plan.
8. Unit adheres to rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Leader task-organizes unit to accomplish assigned task. Task organization includes— a. Headquarters or control element. b. Security element. c. Search element. d. Interrogation element. e. Assault element.		
2. Unit leaders organize reconnaissance to determine location for checkpoint or to verify area configuration if site location is directed by higher headquarters. Reconnaissance tasks include— a. Routes leading to and around checkpoint. b. Nature of terrain on checkpoint and in vicinity. c. Size of area suitable to the scope of checkpoint operations.		
3. Leader ensures resources are available to conduct checkpoint operations: a. Vehicles for transport of personnel and supplies, minimum of two vehicles, three vehicles preferred. b. Warning signs to indicate a checkpoint ahead in native language and English. c. Barricade materials.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

d. Aids to conduct search, mirrors, lights, military working dogs, and so forth.

4. Leader analyzes task and assigns priorities of work.

5. Leader briefs personnel on requirements and limitations of mission.

6. Unit conducts a rehearsal before execution of the task. Rehearsal includes—

a. Specific limitations on use of lethal force to stop charging vehicle or fleeing pedestrian.

b. Specific authority and methods to search vehicles and personnel.

c. Methods of stopping vehicle(s) and conducting questioning and or search.

d. Authority and technique for apprehension and detention of civilian personnel.

7. Security element dispatched to secure site before arrival of the main body.

8. On arrival, work starts immediately in accordance with designated priorities of work.

a. Traffic barricades are positioned perpendicular to the road to slow traffic.

b. Protective, defensive positions are constructed.

c. Vehicle search area is constructed, earthen berm raised to provide protection from car bomb blast.

d. Pole barricade, sliding gate, or other barrier is constructed to block the roadway.

e. Protective wire perimeter is established or natural obstacles reinforced to force pedestrian traffic to checkpoint and to protect against dismounted assault.

f. Other roads and possible bypasses are barricaded, blocked, posted with signs, or placed under observation.

g. Containment or isolation area is established for segregation of directed detainees.

h. Personnel search area is established. Separate area established for search of females.

i. Command post and aid station are established. Wire communications is installed to all positions.

j. Soldier rest area is established.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

k. Rotation schedule is established to aid the rest plan and guard against complacency.

l. Light set is emplaced with two sources of electricity. Illumination shows obstacles, signs, and barriers without illuminating the security elements.

m. The following multilingual signs are posted at all designated areas:

(1) Warning, prepare to stop (25 to 50 meters from sentry and barrier).

(2) UN checkpoint, prepare to stop, have ID ready, and so forth (at barrier).

(3) Contraband warning sign.

(4) Stop, follow orders of sentry (at pole barrier).

(5) Vehicle search area.

(6) Driver and passengers dismount, open doors and hoods and trunks (in vehicle search area).

(7) Personnel search area.

(8) Aid post.

(9) Command post.

(10) Detention and holding area.

n. Pedestrian walkway and checkpoints are established within the confines of the checkpoint without interfering with vehicular operations.

9. The assault element is positioned to engage in accordance with the rules of engagement any vehicle that forces its way past the search element.

a. Assault element has a clear combat focus.

b. Assault element is in fortified positions.

c. Assault element has command-detonated obstacles to halt vehicles.

d. Assault element is equipped with automatic and antitank weapons.

e. Assault element knows check-fire signals.

10. Rehearsals are conducted of vehicular and pedestrian traffic to ensure construction of site serves the purpose.

11. Communications to higher headquarters are tested. Land line is laid or tested.

12. Improvements are continuously planned and constructed.

a. Permanent guard house is at the roadblock.

b. Command post, aid post, and soldier rest area are improved.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

c. Latrine facilities are improved.

TASK: OPERATE A CHECKPOINT (FM 7-10, FM 7-20, FM 7-98)

CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to occupy and operate checkpoint(s). The checkpoint had been established. The checkpoint is situated on a major route that bisects a buffer zone.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. The checkpoint denies passage to armed personnel, prevents smuggling of arms and explosives in accordance with prohibited items and contraband directive.
2. The checkpoint controls entrance into the buffer zone to those authorized by the instrument (or headquarters) establishing the buffer zone.
3. Checkpoint personnel searches vehicles or personnel in frequency specified in order or command post SOP.
4. Suspect personnel are detained as directed.
5. The checkpoint secures and blocks route to all traffic within 5 minutes of notification by higher headquarters.
6. The checkpoint sends accurate reports within 5 minutes of an incident.
7. Personnel adhere to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. Leaders conduct reconnaissance of checkpoint, coordinate to execute a relief in place with the occupying unit. a. Assess any additional equipment required. b. Determine quality of barriers and protective measures. c. Account for number of weapons positions and any OPs to be manned. d. Determine if civil police are available to conduct searches and measures to search females. e. Check quality and quantity of hygiene facilities.		
2. Leader briefs personnel and task-organizes to accomplish assigned tasks.		
3. Leader coordinates for or requests additional assets to accomplish improvements to the checkpoint.		
4. Unit executes relief in place. a. Leader or designated representative accept and acknowledge receipt of— (1) Fixed facilities and assets. (2) Ammunition stockpiles.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
b. Outgoing unit personnel brief incoming personnel on specific duties.		
c. Incoming unit conducts an on-site rehearsal of stop and search procedures under the scrutiny of the outgoing unit.		
5. Unit commences checkpoint operation.		
a. Shifts established.		
b. Shift personnel inspected before assuming duties (similar to guard mount).		
(1) Check proper uniform and equipment.		
(2) Review rules of engagement and checkpoint SOP.		
6. Unit executes routine operations.		
a. Vehicle approaches, security reports.		
b. Barrier sentry moves into position to stop vehicle.		
c. Barrier sentry allows vehicle to pass forward into checkpoint on signal from checkpoint NCOIC. No more than one vehicle is allowed into the checkpoint at one time.		
d. NCOIC or designated sentinel inquires purpose of vehicle, examines papers, identification, registration, trip authorization, and so forth.		
e. NCOIC or designated sentinel is covered by security elements. Another guard is looking into the interior of the vehicle for suspicious objects.		
f. NCOIC or designated sentinel allows vehicle to pass.		
7. Unit conducts a stop and search.		
a. Repeats steps 6a to 6c, above.		
b. NCOIC or designated sentinel directs vehicle into vehicle search area.		
c. Search team begins search:		
(1) Occupants of vehicle (except driver) moved to a personnel search area.		
(2) Driver directed to provide papers to NCOIC for examination.		
(3) Driver asked to open all doors, trunk and engine covers, and other compartments as needed.		
(4) Driver remains nearby to observe search of vehicle, covered by a guard.		
(5) Searcher (armed with pistol) uses mirrors and flashlight to check vehicle undercarriage first. Searcher looks for new electrical wiring, unusual configurations, strapped on or taped packets.		
(6) Searcher examines interior of vehicle.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

8. Search of personnel or vehicle identifies contraband or prohibited items.
   a. Searcher announces discovery.
   b. NCO informs personnel that they will be detained for questioning and their prohibited items will be confiscated.
   c. Detained persons moved to detainee holding area until arrival of military police or civil police. (See Appendix B, T&EO, Apprehend and Detain Noncombatants.)
   d. Vehicle is moved out of search area and checkpoint, but is kept in a place where it can be observed.

9. Unit reacts to an attempt to run through the checkpoint.
   a. Sentry normally cautious on approach of single-operator vehicle.
   b. The sentry's shouts to halt the vehicle fail. Sentry alerts checkpoint personnel of run through attempt.
   c. Checkpoint assault element engages in accordance with the rules of engagement.
   d. Leader orders driver or occupants to dismount and move away from vehicle. If driver is injured and unable to comply, leader keeps all personnel in protective positions for at least 15 minutes in event of a delayed action explosive device.
   e. Leader and aidman (with security) move to vehicle.
   f. First aid administered. Leader surveys vehicle.
   g. Leader reports action to higher headquarters.
   h. Leader posts new shift, shift on duty during incident prepares witness statements and waits for investigation team from higher headquarters.

TASK: EMPLOY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (FM 7-98, FM 33-1)

CONDITIONS: The unit is participating in a stability and support operations. It is a new unit entering the sector. The commander wants to create a positive, impartial, and neutral image to facilitate the unit's mission. The unit has only a command assessment team available for PSYOP support and advice.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The commander develops a consistent message for dissemination through multiple media (leaflets, radio, audio).
2. The commander prepares and delivers an information and education program for soldiers and local personnel.
3. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The commander determines assets available to produce PSYOP products.

2. The unit leader coordinates with other staff officers to share information and determine needs.
   a. S2 coordinates collection tasks.
   b. Civil affairs team assists with area study updates.
   c. Medical personnel and chaplain assess soldier concerns and perceptions.
   d. Nongovernmental and private voluntary organization liaison members provide insight on populace perceptions.

3. The unit leader develops methodology to conduct area assessment in conjunction with unit S2 to—
   a. Identify key leaders.
   b. Determine location, size, and intent of key groups.
   c. Assess local sensitivities and susceptibilities to specific media and information venues.

4. The commander develops an area-oriented information program for the unit. Focus on—
   a. History of the conflict.
   b. Population, ethnic groupings, identities and religions.
   c. Cultural issues and images, as well as social mores and values.

5. The commander conducts PSYOP target analysis.
   a. Selects target.
   b. Determines conditions affecting target.
   c. Analyzes target audience vulnerabilities.
   d. Delineates target susceptibilities.
   e. Formulates psychological objective.
   f. Determines target effectiveness.
   g. Assesses campaign impact indicators.
   h. Conducts analysis process as a continuous cycle.

6. The unit leader briefs the unit commander on PSYOP campaign. Focus of the brief is on—
   a. Target.
   b. Message.
   c. Medium.
   d. Extent of unit involvement.
   e. Assets required to support or execute.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

7. The unit leader plans and executes dissemination.
   a. Uses patrols, checkpoints, and OPs to distribute posters, leaflets, pamphlets, and novelties.
   b. Has aircraft drop leaflet.

8. The unit monitors attempts at propaganda or disinformation by belligerents.
   a. Assesses sudden changes in attitudes of local personnel or belligerents.
   b. Coordinates with civil affairs and public affairs personnel to assess public and media opinion.

TASK: PROVIDE FIRE SUPPORT (FM 6-20, FM 7-98)

CONDITIONS: The unit requires fire support in a peacekeeping environment. The unit may or may not have the traditional complement of fire support assets and may be limited to organic assets only. The unit has available guidance for the employment of indirect fires or fire support assets developed from the terms of reference, the status of forces agreement, and the rules of engagement. Belligerent factions have the ability to employ indirect fires against the unit from a variety of assets.

NOTE: Fire support assets may be limited. Participation in a peacekeeping operation under United Nations guidance may limit the unit to organic fire support assets of 81-mm or less.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The leader focuses fire support efforts primarily on force protection.
2. The leader gives clear and explicit guidance for the use of fire support in the commander's intent for fires.
3. The leader develops and distributes additional rules of engagement for the use of fire support to supplement the operational rules of engagement.
4. The leader specifies delegation of authority for employing fire support assets for each operation.
5. The leader includes the hostile act initiating any request for fire support assets for each operation.
6. The unit does not incur collateral damage from the use of fire support.
7. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The fire support element conducts planning and coordination to support the peacekeeping mission.
   a. Planning begins early and is updated continuously.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(1) Acquire commander's guidance and intent for fire support early in planning process.
(2) Analyze rules of engagement and refine for fire support considerations.
(3) Establish restrictions for certain types of munitions.
(4) Consider all fire support assets available in mission planning.
(5) Plan to exploit all targeting assets.
(6) Avoid duplication of fire support asset allocation.
(7) Consider airspace coordination; consider civil aircraft and flight routes.
(8) Develop clearance procedures for requested fire support.
(9) Anticipate decentralized operations and widely dispersed assets to provide fire support coverage throughout the area of responsibility, at a minimum in and around the lodgement.

b. Coordination is rapid and effective.
(1) Disseminate clearance procedures and refined fire support rules of engagement to the lowest level.
(2) Monitor and update fire support coordination measures continuously.
(3) Maintain continuous coordination with liaison teams on situation, changes to procedures, and fire support rules of engagement.
(4) Communications are established and maintained with host country authorities and area control centers.

c. Plans provide flexibility.
(1) Indirect fires provide mutual support.
(2) Indirect fire assets are positioned for 6400-mil capability.
(3) Redundant communications plans and facilities are considered.
(4) Fire support assets are integrated into operating base defense plans.
(5) No-fire areas and restrictive-fire areas are used to provide additional safeguards.

2. The fire support element uses the commander's guidance to develop target guidance and conduct fire planning.

a. In addition to restrictions on munitions and minimal collateral damage, consider the following.
(1) Range and deflection probable errors.
(2) Munitions bursting radius (as well as canister dump for nonlethal munitions).
(3) Target location error.
(4) Target verification.
(5) Response time.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(6) Gun-target line.
(7) Minimum safe distance.
b. Develop procedures for establishing targets. These should include—
(1) Purpose.
(2) Target location.
(3) Trigger (requires a two-step process; initial action to orient the fire support system, with the commission of a hostile act as the actual trigger).
(4) Observer and backup observer.
(5) Designated communications net.
(6) Rehearsal.
c. Observers are well briefed on the following:
(1) Refined fire support rules of engagement, and what constitutes a hostile act.
(2) Caliber and type munitions that can be used.
(3) Minimum safe distances from built-up areas and concentrations of noncombatants.
(4) Adjust fire and fire-for-effect procedures.
(5) Dedicated nets to be used for call for fire.
(6) Special procedures or requirements for allied or host nation fire support assets.
(7) Requirements for controlling CAS, Army aviation assets, or other contingent force air or helicopter assets.

3. The fire support element develops a detailed, but simple standing operating procedure to address the following, as a minimum.
a. Clearance of fires.
(1) Clearly delineate responsibilities and authority.
(2) Establish as a TOC battle drill.
b. Establishment of fire control measures.
(1) Require close coordination with the S2 and civil affairs personnel.
(2) Require close coordination with host nation authorities.
(3) Require close coordination with adjacent and allied units.
c. Standardize and complete fire support planning for recurring operations.
(1) Convoy operations (humanitarian relief aid and internal resupply).
(2) Checkpoints and roadblocks.
(3) Show of force demonstrations.
d. Integrate mortars, CAS, and Army aviation in fire support planning.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

e. Use position azimuth determining system for survey missions. Consider the survey of the following to aid rapid, accurate fire support without registration.
(1) Artillery and mortar firing points.
(2) Targets.
(3) Observation posts, checkpoints, roadblocks, and other static positions.
(4) Shrines, cemeteries, inhabited buildings, and other no-fire areas or restricted fire areas.
f. Use of fire finder radars.
(1) Integrate in the unit information collection plan.
(2) Use in adjust fire procedures.

4. The fire support element anticipates fire support planning requirements for peacekeeping missions.
a. *Secure a Lodgement*:
(1) Integrate howitzers, radars, and artillery TOCs into defense plans.
(2) Integrate fire support plan into defense plans.
(3) Plan extensive use of nonlethal munitions.
(4) Integrate radars into the information collection plan.
(5) Establish a fire support drill for react to ambush and react to sniper situations.
b. *Separate Belligerents*:
(1) Plan for the use of nonlethal munitions.
(2) Plan to support psychological operations.
c. *Secure a Facility and Secure an Urban Area*:
(1) Fire plan the area around the secured asset.
(2) Plan for both lethal and nonlethal munitions.
(3) Consider collateral damage and the use of precision munitions to limit it.
(4) Consider the use of creeping fires.
(5) Maintain close coordination with S2 and host nation officials.
(6) Position assets to provide adequate area coverage.
d. *Secure Border*:
(1) Prepare and refine fire plans for border areas within the unit area of responsibility.
(2) Prepare and refine fire plans on quick-reaction force routes to blocking positions and on blocking positions.
(3) Position assets to provide adequate coverage.
(4) Integrate radars into collection plan.
(5) Coordinate fire support with adjacent units along the border.
e. *Secure Route and Escort a Convoy*:
(1) Plan and refine fires on the route.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(2) Position assets to provide adequate and continuous coverage.
(3) Use maneuver checkpoints as priority targets.
(4) Coordinate with supporting air units or in supporting observation aircraft.
(5) Position FOs with the moving unit or in supporting observation aircraft.
(6) Mark strip maps with planned targets.
(7) Coordinate with FDCs of units along route to ensure FOs can enter net, send routine location reports, and request and adjust indirect fires.
(8) Coordinate call signs, frequencies, authentications, areas of possible employment, schedule of movement, and target numbers.
f. *Secure a Checkpoint*:
(1) Plan and refine fires on the area around the checkpoint.
(2) Develop fire support plan for show of force demonstration or quick-reaction force blocking position.
(3) Position assets to ensure adequate coverage.

5. Escort vehicle crews assigned sectors of observation and for protective fires in the event of attack.
a. Turret operators use visual observation techniques during movement.
b. At halts, turret operators divide duties of optical scanning and use of visual techniques.
c. Other vehicle occupants assigned observation tasks during movement and halts.

6. Convoy takes appropriate action in response to direct or indirect fire.
a. If possible increases speed to leave the affected area rapidly.
b. If convoy too long or impact area too close, leader opts to halt, seek cover, and provide maximum protection for all personnel.
c. Leader may assess fires as harassment only and continue mission or turn convoy around to reorganize at a safe location.
d. Escort does not allow drivers or cargo vehicles to be separated or left behind.

7. Convoy reacts to a mechanical break down.
a. Leader is informed; he directs all elements to halt and establish security.
b. Emergency repairs are conducted on site, while vehicles retain march interval.
c. If emergency repairs are not possible, vehicle is towed to next destination.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

d. If towing is impossible, cargo is distributed, critical vehicle parts are removed, and vehicle is moved off the road to avoid traffic.

8. Convoy reacts to a break in contact.
   a. Subordinate element leader (vehicle commander) reports break in contact.
   b. Serial commander notifies convoy commander and higher headquarters.
   c. Convoy is halted; an armored vehicle is sent out (forward or back as appropriate) to determine the problem.
   d. Vehicle march interval shortened within halted elements, and local security is posted.
   e. Link up of reconnaissance vehicle and element out of contact is complete and reported to the commander.
   f. Escort commander assesses the situation; if possible, reports to higher headquarters.
   g. Convoy resumes movement.

9. Convoy reacts to casualties that require evacuation.
   a. Escort commander confers with UN High Commission for Refugees representative and UN military observer to determine closest adequate civilian medical facility if military facility is not close enough.
   b. Evacuee is accompanied by another member of the escort unit until return to the unit, a military medical facility, or the convoy destination.
   c. Report forwarded to higher headquarters at earliest opportunity.
   d. All reasonable attempts are made to return evacuee to military control as soon as practical.
   e. In the event of death, the remains will remain with the convoy until it can be delivered to a military installation.

10. Convoy performs maintenance at scheduled halts.
    a. Halts are planned to remain on hard paved surfaces.
    b. Vehicle interval is maintained, unless halt is to remain overnight.
    c. Local security is posted.
    (1) Arming order allows magazines fixed on safe, weapons carried ready.
    (2) If possible OPs are dispatched to vantage points.
    (3) Turret weapon systems remain manned. However, escort vehicles require maintenance attention as well.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(4) Personnel not involved in maintenance activities are allowed to move about but do not get off of paved or hard surfaced areas.

11. Convoy reacts to roadblock and illegal search demands.
    a. Roadblock or vehicle control point encountered by security patrol or is hastily erected after security patrol passes. Escort commander informs convoy commander or higher headquarters as appropriate.
    b. Unit leader uses UN High Commission for Refugees representative and or UN military observer and interpreter to negotiate passage without response to search demands.
    c. If search of cargo vehicles is unavoidable (least offensive measure, avoids escalation of hostility, may facilitate passage further along route), keep the loss of time to a minimum.
    d. Leader does not permit search of UN vehicles.
    e. UN High Commission for Refugees representative may authorize distribution of humanitarian aid to ease passage. Escort commander should advise against, and does not recommend bribery as a viable course of action.
    f. Escort commander ensures convoy personnel refrain from comments or actions which may be inflammatory.
    g. Commander posts dismounted guard elements to secure cargo trucks until past roadblock and ready to resume movement.

12. Convoy reacts to attack by unarmed mob.
    a. Escort elements immediately establish a cordon around cargo trucks.
    (1) Vehicles reduce interval to ease security.
    (2) Dismounts establish perimeter.
    (3) Armored escort vehicle(s) close on mob for show of force or intimidation effect.
    b. Escort commander notifies convoy commander and higher headquarters. Uses interpreter to issue warnings to mob.
    c. Subordinate leaders issue arming order to fix bayonets.
    d. Escort commander considers use of riot control agents or drive out of mob situation, or both.
    e. Dismount elements use physical restraint to prevent pilferage of cargo.
    (1) Physical restraint complies with use of proportional force.
    (2) Leader in charge of security element makes decision to increase arming order, if physical measures will not prevent harm to guards or theft of cargo.
    (3) Leader informs superior of decision immediately.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

    f. Escort commander alerts higher headquarters of anticipated use of force.

(1) Commander and security detail use any and all means to warn mob to desist and disperse. Continue any attempt to disengage.
(2) Escort commander authorizes the discharge of weapons as final warning. Security element leader orders a soldier to fire a warning shot. All weapons are oriented on the mob.
(3) If needed, security element leader directs detail to discharge one round each to disable only.
(4) Security element is prepared to continue single-shot disabling fire until mob stops or are ordered to cease fire.
(5) Medical personnel administer first aid.
g. Escort commander reports to higher headquarters.

TASK: DEMONSTRATE A SHOW OF FORCE

CONDITIONS: While participating in a multinational peacekeeping operation, the unit has a specified task to provide mobile combat forces on short notice to demonstrate a show of force both in its own sector as well as in separate unit sectors. The unit must maintain a reserve to accomplish this task.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. The unit starts force movement within 1 hour of notification.
2. The unit moves rapidly, on open visible routes and arrives at the designated location.
3. The unit executes task in concert with multinational elements to demonstrate collective determination.
4. The unit's action deters belligerent action or defuses tense situation between belligerents.
5. The unit does not incur casualties.
6. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The unit commander and staff task-organize a quick-reaction force in accordance with METT-T.

2. In coordination with higher headquarters, the commander and staff conduct the mission planning to determine probable deployment locations.

3. The unit conducts intelligence preparation of the area of operations.
a. Evaluate area.
(1) Determine maps in use by force headquarters and adjacent units (different grid designations, place names, and so forth).

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

(2) Evaluate scope of area of operations. Determine probable time and distance factors and reaction times.
b. Evaluate terrain.

(1) Complete military aspects of the terrain assessment.
(2) Determine if demonstration location is defensible.
(3) Determine if the force can be seen. (An essential condition for a demonstration.)
(4) Identify key or favorable terrain to belligerents.
c. Conduct weather analysis.
(1) Determine effects of weather on the unit's operations and the belligerent's operations.
(2) Consider effects on mobility, trafficability, and reaction time.
d. Evaluate the threat-belligerent factions information.
(1) Evaluate and distribute all known information on belligerent parties and various factions.
(2) Evaluate and distribute information on uniforms, markings, insignia, vehicles, and equipment.
(3) Plot, keep current, all known locations of weapons holding areas, staging areas, or encampments.
(4) Evaluate and distribute known information about belligerent faction leaders, and headquarters.
e. Determine threat-belligerent integration.
(1) Describe typical or anticipated belligerent actions based on recent significant activities and available equipment.
(2) Designate named areas of interest and target areas of interest, as appropriate.

4. The unit conducts reconnaissance of potential or anticipated demonstration sites.
a. Within the unit sector, this includes—
(1) Checkpoints.
(2) Unit compounds, operation bases, or key facilities.
(3) Towns or villages in or near buffer zone or within sector.
b. Designated sites by higher headquarters or where information suggests rising tensions.
c. Reconnaissance tasks should include—
(1) Routes available and time factors.
(2) Potential vehicle and weapon position.
(3) Adjacent unit coordination.
(4) Casualty evacuation routes and treatment locations.
(5) Limited visibility factors considered.
(6) Indirect-fire target identification and verification.

5. The unit assesses the need for liaison and translators.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

6. The unit maintains radio contact with adjacent units at specified intervals.

7. The quick-reaction force rehearses all aspects of the mission.

a. Rehearses link up with all elements that make up demonstration element.
b. Checks internal communications and compatibility.
c. Rehearses movement.
d. Reviews rules of engagement limitations on use of force.
e. Rehearses casualty evacuation, rearmament, and resupply.

8. Quick-reaction force is alerted to execute the demonstration.
a. Unit leadership confirms mission plan, ensures personnel are briefed on and know the following before commitment:
(1) Rules of engagement and use of force.
(2) Purpose of operation and desired outcome.
(3) Inherent risks of the operation.
(4) Reaction to provocation.
(5) Command relationship and controlling headquarters.
(6) Authentication procedures for order of fire.
(7) Weapon control status and orientation.
b. The unit moves rapidly with lights on, UN markings and colors prominently displayed.

9. The unit conducts link up with area commander.
a. Conduct initial recognition by radio (direct to commander or through liaison officer).
b. Conduct face-to-face coordination on arrival.
c. Occupy positions as planned or as directed by the commander.

10. The unit monitors situation.
a. Weapon systems are not aimed directly at belligerents, but oriented on their direction.
b. Subordinate leaders are prepared to react proportionally to escalation.
c. Leader conducts negotiations if not currently on-going.
d. Unit is prepared to attack or defend as necessary within the scope of all applicable directives.

TASK: DELIVER SUPPLIES OR HUMANITARIAN AID

CONDITIONS: The unit has completed transportation of humanitarian supplies in military vehicles, and it is required to deliver supplies to a town of starving people near the release point.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. Delivery is completed without incident.
2. Distribution is not allowed until delivery is complete.
3. Accountability is maintained and receipt is acknowledged.
4. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. The convoy halts in a covered, concealed site short of the delivery destination.		
2. The convoy commander confirms the location for delivery.		
3. The commander conducts liaison with authorities for drop-off point.		
4. The commander organizes the unit to maintain security during delivery. a. Security elements posted at intersections or choke points en route from the halt site to the delivery site. b. Security element posted at delivery site. c. Security is maintained at halt site.		
5. Supply vehicles moved in manageable numbers (dependent on off-load timing) to delivery site. a. En route security prevents diversion of vehicles. b. Site security prevents infiltration and attempts to loot.		
6. The commander ensures receipt of supplies is acknowledged by relief organization or local authority.		
7. Security collapses onto and around the delivery site when all vehicles complete unloading.		
8. Security remains on site until local authorities assume control or distribution is completed.		
9. The convoy commander reports mission complete to higher headquarters.		

TASK: REACT TO CIVIL DISTURBANCE

CONDITIONS: The unit is participating in peacekeeping operations when it is required to assist in the containment of a civil disturbance by itself or as part of a larger unit. All soldiers are armed and equipped with face shields, bayonets, and loaded magazines are carried in ammunition pouches. By itself, the disturbance threatens nothing, but the potential for destruction of critical property and the loss of supplies or other peacekeeping assets demands upgraded security measures. The civilians are unarmed, but if agitated may use sticks, rocks, and bottles as weapons. Access to small-arms weapons by noncombatants is possible. Local civil authority is insufficient to contain or restrain the civil demonstration or disturbance.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The unit does not provoke civilians.
2. Peacekeepers are used to protect key installations and to enforce the law only as a last resort with specific guidance for apprehension and detention, and limits on use of force to dissuade criminal activity.
3. Soldiers protect facilities or contain disturbance without resorting to the use of force.
4. Peacekeeping forces resume normal operations and allow local authority to establish control.
5. Forces adhere to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**
1. The unit is initially tasked to establish passive control and isolate an area. a. Establish a hasty cordon of personnel. b. Erect barriers. c. Decision to use concertina wire for barrier is made by the battalion/task force commander.		
2. Command elements establish liaison with local law enforcement authorities. a. Determine the scope and severity of the disturbance. b. Advise higher headquarters of possible necessity to implement arming orders, and request assistance from other organizations (MPs or UN civil police). c. Alert higher organizations quick-reaction force.		
3. Key facilities affected by the disturbance identified and prioritized for protection.		
4. Forces apportioned as needed to control disturbance and protect facilities.		
5. Fixed security posts augmented, while a mobile response force remains centrally located to respond to threats at other likely targets.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	**GO**	**NO GO**

a. Fixed security posts implement rigid entry and exit controls; only one used.
b. Facility occupants moved to interior safe room or escorted out of danger area.

6. The unit leader assesses the situation if tasked to exert control over the civilians.
a. What is the intensity level of the disturbance?
b. Recent trend in local public opinion.
c. Crowd mood, composition, activity, and perceived intent.
d. Unit capabilities and readiness.
e. Immediate and long-term effects if lethal force is required.
f. Weather, terrain, and time of day.

7. Commander selects or recommends a course of action.
a. Monitor.
b. Contain.
c. Block.
d. Disperse.

8. Unit leaders select and employ control formations to best accomplish the task assigned.

9. Soldiers respond with strict discipline to orders to help demonstrate firm resolve.

10. Soldiers resist provocation and deliberate attempts to humiliate them.

11. Leaders consider rotation scheme for soldiers in perimeter, especially those closest to civilians.

12. Commander uses all available resources to help reduce tensions.
a. Psychological operations assets are used for recording unlawful activities, communicating to crowd, identification of covert direction or leadership.
b. Civil affairs assets are used to aid in communication and liaison.
c. Private volunteer organizations and other nongovernmental agencies identify the real cause of the disturbance and potential means to end confrontation.

13. Soldiers are required to review rules for use of lethal force before employment in the perimeter.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

a. Rules of engagement may have been made more restrictive in the situation by higher headquarters or the commander.
b. Soldiers must be able to react immediately to every threat.
c. Soldiers rehearse all physical restraint options to be used in escalating situation before the use of deadly force before assuming duties on the perimeter.
d. Leaders ensure that soldiers on the perimeter can hear orders, and soldiers are kept informed of the situation.

14. Apprehension and detention of civilians is consistent with specific guidance issued for the current operation.
a. Apprehension and detention limited to serious offenses involving death or injury, or property theft or destruction.
b. Frisk searches are used for quick checks for weapons or evidence.

15. Leader considers use of patrols and visible mobile checkpoints after cessation of the disturbance to assist the resumption of control by the local civil authorities.

16. Leader uses video equipment to tape disturbance and unit's actions to document accuracy of activities and preclude incorrect reporting of force response.

TASK: COLLECT AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION

CONDITIONS: The unit is participating in a multinational peacekeeping operation. Information is needed by the unit commander and his subordinate commanders to assist them in their decision making. The peacekeeping force has issued an SOP. It defines information collection and dissemination responsibilities as well as limitations on the collection means used. The SOP is prescriptive in the collection, distribution, or sharing of information about belligerents in the host nation. The unit has limited access to national strategic collection assets due to the nature of the operation. The unit is expected to satisfy both force headquarters and the unit's higher headquarters requests for information.

NOTE: Information is the term used instead of intelligence in peacekeeping operations.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. Adhere to published regulations and force SOPs governing collection including means, storage, and distribution of information.
2. Ensure no accidental disclosure of information about opposing belligerent activity to other belligerents.
3. Satisfy all information requirements from higher headquarters.
4. Distribute information to subordinate and adjacent units in accordance with approved distribution policies.

5. Commander and subordinate units receive information updates at least daily.
6. Adhere to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. S2 completes and updates intelligence preparation of the area of operations. Uses templates and overlays to graphically depict critical information.

2. Specifies, distributes, and updates PIR and IR to support commander's intent and concept of the operation. Forwards and monitors feedback on requests for information to higher headquarters.
   a. Information received by all staff activities that support PIR and IR is processed through a single activity (section or person) in the operations center.
   b. Status on each request for information is monitored and updated when answered.
   c. Status on each PIR and IR is monitored and answered as required.
   d. Higher headquarter PIR and IR is answered through the unit reconnaissance and security plans.
   e. New PIRs are published and distributed as required.

3. Multiple mediums are used for redundant distribution of information. (Courier, FM radio, telephone, facsimile, and radiotelephone.)
   a. Technical coding or secure devices are not used for information updating.
   b. Ensure every reporting element (from patrol to observation post to command post) has a means to receive and transmit information.

4. Provide regular military force updates. Updates include—
   a. Deployments and adjustments in deployment of all forces.
   b. Military strength, organization, and equipment.
   c. Defense positions and preparation of new positions.
   d. Minefields and other obstacles.
   e. Relief force rotation schedule.
   f. Supply operations schedule.
   g. Communications systems locations and capabilities.
   h. Changes in unit evacuation plans.

5. Provide regular civil population and political operations updates; includes—

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

   a. Political parties, affiliations, intentions, and orientation.
   b. Decisions by local authorities.

c. Economic and humanitarian problems.
d. Religious matters, holidays, schedules, needs.
e. Attitudes of local civilians and their military and political orientations.
f. Characteristics of local leaders or important or influential persons.

6. Identify rumors being spread and develop appropriate responses.

7. Ensure UN military observers working in the unit sector remain under operational control of the unit and are integrated into the collection plan.

NOTE: Sensitive issue is UN military observers are in frequent contact with belligerents and must remain impartial to the extreme, even to the detriment of the local unit collection effort.

8. Verify all subordinate units in the sector receive military, political, and civil updates; including units operating in the sector that may not be attached, OPCON, or in support.

9. Share relevant or appropriate information with nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations in sector to aid their mission or safety.

TASK: LINK UP WITH A CONVOY

CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to meet a convoy at a predetermined time and place. The unit leader is responsible for the security of the convoy; however, he is not the convoy commander. There is a representative from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees who will accompany the convoy. The representative from the UNHCR is responsible for the delivery of supplies, and he is the nominal convoy commander. The convoy consists of trucks of various configurations. Each truck has a driver and a co-driver. There is no requirement to transport humanitarian supplies in military vehicles. All convoy vehicle operators have valid UN identification and respond to the directives of the UNHCR representative. Some trucks have enclosed cargo space with locked doors that are sealed, while others are stake body trucks with canvas covered cargo space. Bills of lading and manifests are available. This is the initial link up, not a hand-over from another escorting unit.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. Linkup conducted at time and place specified.
2. Command relationships briefed and understood by all elements of the convoy and higher headquarters elements.
3. Security (escort commander) leader verifies accuracy of bills of lading and manifests.
4. All elements of the convoy are briefed on pertinent aspects of convoy operations.
5. Security element (escort force) takes charge and remains in control from time of convoy arrival until mission completion.
6. Unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Unit sends a small element from escort force to linkup point to secure site, and or conduct leader's reconnaissance.

2. Leader task-organizes escort force before arrival at linkup site.
   a. Perimeter security element.
   b. Ground guides and vehicle search element.
   c. Support element (reinforce where needed).
   d. Command and liaison element.

3. Unit arrives at linkup site not later than 1 hour before linkup time. Organize site for arrival of convoy and establish security.

4. Leader conducts rehearsal with other assets provided by higher headquarters.
   a. Military police working dogs.
   b. Explosive ordnance disposal technicians.
   c. Civil affairs and or legal representatives.
   d. Representatives of local authorities.
   e. Public affairs officer or media representatives.
   f. Representatives of other nongovernmental organizations or private volunteer organizations supporting the transporting element or associated with the convoy and or its cargo.

5. Assume control of convoy on arrival by execution of rehearsed actions rather than by directives and coordination with the UNHCR representative.

6. Escort force leaser reports to convoy commander (UNHCR representative) and advises on specific details of security for the convoy.

7. Identification of drivers verified and cargo inspected.

8. Convoy transports inspected.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

a. General mechanical (tires, oil, water, canvas covers, doors, fuel tanks).
b. Bills of lading, locks, security seals.
c. Lights, wipers, heaters, other safety features.

9. All elements of convoy briefed on route.
a. Formation, interval, rate of march.
b. Lines of separation, buffer zones, local "hot spots."
c. Areas of poor trafficability—hills, downgrades, broken pavement, tunnels, choke points, mud, snow, ice, dust, fog, narrow bridges, dangerous curves.

10. All elements briefed on actions and responsibilities during convoy.
a. Procedures at checkpoints (UN and belligerent).
b. Rules of engagement and use of weapons.
c. Actions required or anticipated:
(1) Ambush or hostile action.
(2) Break in contact or separation of convoy elements.
(3) Vehicle breakdown, accident, or personnel injury.
(4) Planned halts.
(5) Demands for inspection by belligerents.
d. Casualty treatment and evacuation procedures.
e. Operating at night.
f. Specific security measures and proscribed activities.
g. Communications and signals.
h. Safety.

11. Dependent on time and asset availability, vehicles are prepared against land-mine threat.
a. Sandbag floor and sides (priority to troop carriers).
b. Rubber matting or ballistic nylon blanket laid over sandbags.

12. Soldiers are dispersed among convoy vehicles. Maintain unit integrity, avoid more than one squad per vehicle.

13. Convoy elements position for movement before start point or convoy elements are guided into position from staging area.

14. Time permitting, leader conducts rehearsals of critical actions.

15. Lead security patrol departs not earlier than 15 minutes ahead of convoy.

TASK:REACT TO A SNIPER (FM 23-14, FM 90-8)

CONDITIONS: The unit is operating in a static position in a peacekeeping environment. The arming order of the rules of engagement does not allow most weapons to be loaded, unless on patrol or security watch or sentry duty. The attack may occur during daylight or during limited visibility.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. The unit determines the extent of the sniper threat.
2. The sniper is captured or eliminated.
3. The unit has no casualties as a result of fratricide.
4. The unit has no additional casualties to sniper fire following identification of the threat.
5. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The leader assesses the situation.
   a. Reports indicate unusual camouflaged troops.
   b. Patrols report observing one- to three-man groups.
   c. Observation of telltale glimpses of telescope glint.
   d. Notable absence of civilian activity before and during shooting.
   e. Single-shot reduction of key targets (officers, antennas, generators).

2. Leader dispatches an infantry squad to trap the shooter.
   a. Squad identifies armed noncombatant in the area, not apparently acquiring targets in the unit area.
   b. Noncombatant informed of potential threat to own line when armed and in the area of the peacekeeping unit.
   c. Squad identifies sniper or is engaged by sniper.

3. The sniper team is alerted to commence countersniper operations.

4. The unit implements passive sniper security measures.
   a. Blankets or ponchos are hung over windows.
   b. Personnel wear helmet and protective vest while in base camp or lodgement area.
   c. Personnel reduce movement in large open areas and stay near cover.
   d. The unit continues operations as normally as possible to conceal countersniper operation.
   e. The unit protects, covers, or conceals key or critical equipment.
   f. The unit increases OPs and frequency of security patrols.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

5. The leader coordinates before providing release authority to countersniper team.

a. The leader determines location of patrols in the vicinity.
b. The leader clarifies authority to engage belligerent sniper if he or she is not actively acquiring or engaging a target.
c. Patrols cooperating with countersniper team are prepared to apprehend the sniper.

TASK: SUPERVISE MINEFIELD CLEARANCE

CONDITIONS: The unit liaison teams negotiate with the host nation to remove minefields in the unit's section.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. The unit recognizes that existing minefields belong to the laying party.
2. Engineers do not become directly involved in mine removal operations.
3. A separate peacekeeping element provides security at the work site.
4. No casualties to the peacekeeping force result during the clearance operations.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Engineers participate in zone reconnaissance to identify extent of mines and obstacles within the unit sector.
   a. Engineers establish and maintain a master obstacle map for the sector.
   b. Efforts to record or mark minefields by previous units in the sector are used and updated by the current unit.
   c. Suspected minefields are marked initially with field-expedient means during reconnaissance.
   d. Initial effort and focus is along routes, around unit compounds, and anticipated protected areas or buffer zones.

2. Liaison teams negotiate with belligerent parties to clear mines from critical areas.
   a. Host nation provides existing minefield records. (Accuracy will always be suspect.)
   b. Host nation provides work parties to clear mines.
   c. Host nation will be secured by peacekeepers so they will not require weapons after link up.
   d. The number of personnel required to provide security is agreed to.

3. Engineers coordinate with belligerent counterpart at work site.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

a. Minefield record is examined, safest approach for work party is determined.

b. Host nation element leader leads security element into positions.

c. Engineers direct marking method to be used if field will not be removed within the work day.

d. Engineers observe the removal, disarming, or destruction of mines.

4. Engineers report preparation and initiation of destruction of mines before giving detonation authority.

5. Medical evacuation capability for peacekeepers and host nation forces is on site or close.

6. Unit is prepared to deploy a quick-reaction force to protect work party if opposing factions resist mine clearance operations.

a. Host nation forces working the site and secured by peacekeepers are accorded the same protection as the peacekeeping force.

b. Security element and belligerent work party are prepared to depart the area under quick-reaction force security if threatened by a superior opposing force.

TASK: CONTROL CIVILIAN MOVEMENT

CONDITIONS: The unit has established operating based throughout the area of operations. Site selection has avoided placing bases at or near the locus of road networks; however, they are both accessible and visible. The unit must provide for its own security as well as have access to routes adequate for large convoys of humanitarian supplies and internal resupply operations. The road net in the area of operations is sufficiently developed to accommodate both civilian and military traffic.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. Civilians are not permitted access to controlled areas without escort.
2. Routine civilian traffic and support of commerce are not unduly hindered by peacekeeping operations.
3. Routes selected for peacekeeping support operations are clearly marked.
4. Routes are not exclusively reserved for peacekeeping troop movement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS	GO	NO GO
1. Anticipate the "magnetic effect" (movement of civilian populace to vicinity of peacekeeper lodgements for security) before establishing operating bases in the area of operations.		
a. Establish security as the first priority task.		
b. Dispatch liaison officers or civil affairs teams to nearby inhabited areas to encourage them to remain in their areas and wait to be approached by peacekeepers.		
c. Direct psychological operations to produce leaflets or broadcasts informing the populace of the peacekeeping unit mission and purpose.		
2. Establish hasty checkpoints on routes leading from inhabited areas to operations base.		
3. Evaluate routes in area of operations.		
a. Determine best routes to support convoy traffic. Designate as a main supply route.		
b. Use temporary checkpoints to assess amount of civilian traffic using routes.		
c. Select sites for roadblocks and permanent checkpoints needed to eliminate civilian traffic on a specific route for a limited time. Designate alternate routes that will accommodate detoured civilian traffic.		
4. Designate off-limits areas and disseminate locations to local populace.		
5. Establish a pass system to ease movement of nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations in the area of operations.		
6. Impose and enforce a curfew if allowed by peacekeeping mandate, terms of reference, Status of Forces Agreement, or mission directives.		
7. Open or improve alternative routes for civilian movement.		
a. Clear traditional routes blocked by mines or obstacles.		
b. Repair or improve destroyed roads or bridges within capability of unit. Routes may be nominated for improvement as a civic action project to higher headquarters.		
8. Deny movement on a route to aid movement of quick-reaction force to critical event.		

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

a. Establish checkpoints and roadblocks directed by higher headquarters orders to deny access to route planned for quick-reaction force movement.

b. Establish hasty roadblocks on minor routes adjoining quick-reaction force route as directed by higher headquarters.

TASK: CONDUCT PLATOON RIOT CONTROL FORMATIONS

CONDITIONS: Given a riot control situation and a platoon of soldiers fully equipped with riot control gear.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The formation that will best help control or disperse the crowd must be selected.
2. The platoon must be formed into the selected formation.
3. The platoon must be reassembled from the formation after the crowd has been controlled or dispersed.
4. The platoon adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

NOTE: The platoon formation is selected depending on the crowd structure and temperament. Any size squad, platoon, or larger unit may be employed, and a crowd control formation can be adapted to fit the unit's organization. For these formations such as the three-squad platoon, see FM 19-15, Chapter 8.

1. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a platoon line.

a. Simultaneously uses arm-and-hand signals while giving the preparatory command PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS. Raises both arms straight out to his side, arms and hands extended, palms down.

b. Gives the execution command MOVE and at the same time, points to the place for the platoon formation.

c. Squad leaders of the first and fourth squads must give the command FOLLOW ME, while the fourth squad forms a line to the right of the base member. The first squad forms a line to the left.

d. The No. 2 member of the fourth squad is the base member of the formation. The rest of the fourth squad forms a line to the right of the base member. The first squad forms a line to the left.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

e. After the first and fourth squads have assumed their positions, the squad leaders of the second and third squads command FOLLOW ME.

f. The second squad forms a line to the left of the first squad, and the third squad forms to the right of the fourth squad.

NOTE: All squads dress on the fourth squad.

2. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a line with two squads in general support.

a. Gives the command PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS, SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS SUPPORT.

b. The leaders of the first and fourth squads command FOLLOW ME, and the leaders of the second and fourth squads command STAND FAST.

c. Gives the command MOVE, and points to the place for the formation. The first and fourth squads move forward to their appointed places. (The No. 2 member of the fourth squad is the base member for the formation.)

3. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a line with two squads in lateral support.

a. Gives the command PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS, SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS IN LATERAL SUPPORT.

b. Gives the command MOVE, and points to the place for the formation.

c. After the first squad forms a line to the left of the base member, the fourth squad forms a line to the right of the base member.

4. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a line with two squads in lateral support.

a. Gives the command PLATOON AS SKIRMISHERS, SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS IN CLOSE SUPPORT. The first and fourth squads execute a line.

b. Leaders of the second and third squads command STAND FAST.

c. After the first and fourth squads move to the appointed place and execute the line, the second and third squads execute a similar line to the rear of the leading line. The second squad is on the left, and the third squad is on the right.

NOTE: Make sure the second and third squads close and cover the intervals between the elements in the leading line.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

5. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a platoon echelon right (or left).

a. Gives the command PLATOON ECHELON RIGHT (or PLATOON ECHELON LEFT).

b. Gives the command MOVE, and points to place for the formation.

c. Uses hand signals with his voice commands. Extends one arm 45 degrees above the horizon and the other arm 45 degrees below the horizon, arms and hands extended. (When facing the platoon, his upper arm indicates the direction of the echelon.)

d. The first squad leader commands FOLLOW ME, and the squad executes an echelon right.

e. The second, third, and fourth squad leaders command STAND FAST.

f. As each squad clears the column, the next squad moves to extend the echelon formed by the preceding squad.

NOTE: For an echelon left, fourth squad executes echelon left with the rest of the squads following.

6. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a platoon echelon right (left) with two support squads. The second and third squads may be used in general, lateral, and close support the same as with the line.

7. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a wedge.

a. Gives the command PLATOON WEDGE, followed by the command MOVE. Then points to the place for the formation.

b. The first and fourth squad leaders command FOLLOW ME, while the second and third squad leaders command STAND FAST.

c. Uses hand signals with his command. Extends both arms down to his sides at a 45-degree angle below the horizon, palms down and toward his body.

d. The first and fourth squads move to the front and when the last element of the squads have cleared the front of the second and third squads, the second and third squad leaders command FOLLOW ME, and the squads move to the left and right, respectively.

e. The fourth squad executes an echelon to the right of the NO. 2 member (the base member), and the first squad executes an echelon left.

f. The second squad forms an echelon left on the rear element of the first squad, and the third squad forms an echelon right on the rear element of the fourth squad.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

8. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a wedge with two squads in general support.

a. Gives the command PLATOON WEDGE, SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS IN SUPPORT, MOVE.

b. The first and fourth squads execute the wedge, and second and third squads remain in column formation.

9. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a wedge with lateral support.

a. Gives the command PLATOON WEDGE, SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS IN LATERAL SUPPORT, MOVE.

b. The first and fourth squads execute the wedge, while the second and third squads stand fast.

c. After the first and fourth squads have cleared the column, the second and third squad leaders command FOLLOW ME, and move out to the left and right, respectively.

d. The second squad forms in column behind the last member of the first squad, and the third squad forms in column behind the last member of the fourth squad.

e. To move the second and third squads from general support to lateral support, the platoon leader commands SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS, LATERAL SUPPORT, MOVE.

f. To have the second and third squads join the wedge from either general support or lateral support—

(1) The platoon leader commands SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS, EXTEND THE WEDGE, MOVE.

(2) The second and third squad leaders command FOLLOW ME, and move out to the left and right, respectively, to extend the wedge on the first and fourth squads.

10. The platoon leader orders the platoon to form a wedge with close support.

a. Gives the command PLATOON WEDGE, SECOND AND THIRD SQUADS IN CLOSE SUPPORT, MOVE.

b. The first and fourth squads execute a wedge. The second and third squads also execute a wedge and close in on the leading wedge.

c. The members in the supporting wedge cover the intervals between members in the leading wedge. To do this, the squad leaders of the second and third squads command STAND FAST.

d. After the first and fourth squads are in position, the second

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

11. The platoon leader reassembles the platoon from a formation. This step is basically the same as assembling from a line.
    a. Moves to the rear of the platoon where the platoon members will form and gives the command PLATOON ASSEMBLE, MOVE, while making a circular motion above his head with his right hand.
    b. The No. 2 member (base member) of each squad does an about face and all other squad members do a facing movement toward their No. 2 member.
    c. The platoon comes to port arms on hearing the command PLATOON ASSEMBLE.
    d. On the command MOVE, the fourth squad leader commands FOLLOW ME. The first and second squad leaders command STAND FAST.
    e. As the fourth squad leader clears the formation, the third squad leader commands FOLLOW ME. The first and third squads follow moving at double time and dress to the right of the fourth squad.

TASK: RESTORE LAW AND ORDER

CONDITIONS: The element is operating as part of a peace enforcement. It is ordered to restore law and order in the area of operations. The threat consists of possibly armed civilians and gangs that may be well organized and freely committing crimes.

TASK STANDARDS:

1. The element restores law and order as designated by the operation order.
2. The element maintains local security.
3. The local police successfully take control of the area from the element.
4. The element adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. The commander and staff prepares the plan.
    a. Conduct liaison with local police and government officials.
    b. Establish rules of engagement, if necessary, and disseminate. The ROE must specifically address the following:
    (1) React to armed belligerents.
    (2) Disposition of belligerents and contraband.
    (3) Use of CS and other nonlethal means of crowd control.
    (4) Arming order level.
    c. Determine periods of authorized local activity in the area and necessary paperwork of people to be out during unauthorized times.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

d. Establish a curfew, a time at which no local personnel may be outside.
e. Zone area and assign responsibilities.
f. Plan for control of fires.
g. Develop a brief set of rules that the local populace must abide by. Publish and distribute the rules.
h. Determine size and activity of friendly forces necessary to enforce published rules, activity times, and curfew.
i. Determine criteria for the transition of operations to the local police and mission complete standards.

2. Unit collocates operations center with the local police station, if possible.

3. Unit integrates local police into operations.

4. Unit establishes checkpoints and roadblocks as necessary to control access into and out of the area.

5. Unit establishes OPs to monitor activity and curfew.

6. Unit uses sniper teams as necessary and in accordance with the ROE.

7. Unit conducts aggressive patrolling in the area.
a. Patrols react to disturbances in accordance with ROE and OPORD.
b. Patrols enforce published rules, activity times, and curfew.

8. Unit transitions all operations to the local police as determined in the OPORD.

9. Unit continues to occupy the area to monitor the situation.

10. Unit exits the area after mission complete standards have been met.

TASK: COORDINATE AND MONITOR CONVOY SECURITY

CONDITIONS: A combat support military police company in support of a corps has been directed by the battalion commander to provide convoy security. The various convoys are conducting resupply and special ammunition operations. The company commander directs the company operations center to coordinate and monitor the platoon's conduct of convoy security operations.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. The operations center ensures designated convoys are provided security.
2. The operations center provides updated information to the battalion.
3. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Operations sergeant coordinates with the platoon to implement convoy security operations.
   a. Establishes communication (primary and alternate frequencies).
   b. Ensures platoon conducts route reconnaissance of primary and alternate routes.
   c. Establishes checkpoints.
   d. Specifies start and release point.
   e. Develops overlay of convoy route.
   f. Determines emergency actions to be taken during ambushes, air attacks, artillery attacks, and so forth.
   g. Coordinates medical support.
   h. Coordinates air support requirement.
   i. Coordinates artillery support requirements.

2. Operations center monitors the platoon's conduct of convoy security operations.
   a. Receives situation and spot reports from the platoon.
   b. Consolidates information into situation map.

3. Operations center forwards current information to higher headquarters.
   a. Forward situation and spot reports.
   b. Forward updated overlay.

TASK: PREPARE TRAFFIC CONTROL PLAN

CONDITIONS: A combat support military police company in support of a corps is directed by the battalion commander to prepare a traffic control plan. The company commander directs the operations center to coordinate the platoons' activities and to prepare a traffic control plan.

TASK STANDARDS:
1. The operations center forwards completed plan to battalion.
2. The unit adheres to the rules of engagement.

SUBTASKS AND STANDARDS **GO NO GO**

1. Operations sergeant coordinates with the platoons for the preparation of traffic control plan.

a. Directs platoons to conduct a route reconnaissance of the area of operations.
b. Specifies routes to be reconnoitered.
c. Directs platoons to prepare and submit a traffic control overlay.
d. Ensures overlays include holding areas, roadblocks, checkpoints, defiles, straggler posts, straggler collection points, and traffic control posts.

2. Operations center maintains the company overlay.
a. Receives situation reports and spot reports from platoons.
b. Ensures correct military symbols are used.
c. Consolidates platoon overlays into the company overlay.
d. Ensures traffic control posts at critical points on the main supply route are identified.

3. Operations center develops traffic control plan.
a. Identifies placement of control operations.
b. Updates company overlay to show location of tactical command posts, mobile patrol areas, and other MP control functions.
c. Ensures plan also shows alternate routes and where new control functions will be needed if the main supply route is interdicted.

4. Operations center forwards updated overlay to battalion for inclusion in highway traffic division's traffic circulation plan.
a. Updates traffic control plan when main supply routes and or control functions change.
b. Sends updates to battalion to keep highway traffic division's traffic circulation plan current.

GLOSSARY

AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AAR	after-action review
AC	Active Component
ADA	air defense artillery
AFFOR	Air Force forces
AFMIC	Army Forces Medical Intelligence Center
AID	Agency for International Development
ALO	air liaison officer
ALOC	air lines of communication
AM	amplitude modulation
ammo	ammunition
ANGLICO	air and naval gunfire liaison company
AO	area of operations
AP	armor-piercing
APC	armored personnel carrier
AR	Army regulation
ARC	Army Red Cross
ARFOR	Army forces
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARSOF	Army special operations forces
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
aslt	assault
ASP	ammunition supply point
bde	brigade
BFV	Bradley fighting vehicle
blvd	boulevard
bn	battalion
BSA	brigade support area
CA	civil affairs
CAB	civil affairs battalion
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CAO	chief administration officer
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CAS	close air support
CAT	commercially available technology
CFSC	Community and Family Support Center
CG	commanding general
chkpt	checkpoint
CI	counterintelligence

CINC	Commander in Chief
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLO	chief logistics officer
cmd	command
co	company
commo	communications
CONUS	continental United States
CP	command post
CPX	command post exercise
CQC	close quarters combat
CRP	central receiving point
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
CTA	common tables of allowances
CTS	Commodity Tracking System
CUCV	commercial utility cargo vehicles
DA	Department of the Army
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
DOB	date of birth
DOC	Department of Commerce
doc	document
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOEd	Department of Education
DOI	Department of Interior
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOL	Department of Labor
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
EAC	echelons above corps
ECC	evacuation control center
ECP	entry control point
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPW	enemy prisoner of war
equip	equipment
ESF	emergency support functions
ext	extensive
FA	field artillery
FALD	Field Administration and Logistics Division
FASCAM	family of scatterable mines
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission

FDC	fire direction center
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIST	fire support team
FLSG	force logistics support group
FM	field manual; frequency modulation
FO	forward observer
FOD	field operation division
FRACASS	flexibility, rehearsals, appearance, control, all-round defense, speed, and surprise
FRAGO	fragmentary order
FSCOORD	fire support coordinator
FSE	fire support element
FSO	fire support officer
ft	foot
G1	Assistant Chief of Staff (Personnel)
G2	Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)
G3	Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans)
G4	Assistant Chief of Staff (Logistics)
G5	Assistant Chief of Staff (Civil Affairs)
GP	general-purpose
GSA	General Services Administration
HA	humanitarian assistance
HE	high explosive
HELLFIRE	heliborne fire and forget missile
HF	high frequency
HHD	headquarters and headquarters detachment
HMMWV	high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HQ	headquarters
hr	hour
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IAW	in accordance with
ICC	Interstate Commerce Commission
ID	identification
in	inch
INSCOM	United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
insurg	insurgents
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IR	information requirements
ISB	intermediate staging base
JAG	Judge Advocate General
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPOTF	joint psychological operations task force

JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JTF	joint task force
kw	kilowatt
L	logistics element
LA	Los Angeles
lab	laboratory
LAV	light-armored vehicle
LAW	light antitank weapon
lb	pound
LIC	low-intensity conflict (obsolete) (new terminology—stability and support operations)
LOC	lines of communication
LOGCAP	logistics civilian augmentation program
LOGEEI	logistics essential elements of information
LTG	lieutenant general
m	meter
maint	maintenance
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
METL	mission-essential task list
METT-T	mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available
MG	major general
MILES	multiple-integrated laser engagement system
mm	millimeter
MMT	military mail terminal
MOPP	mission-oriented protection posture
MOS	military occupational specialty
MOUT	military operations on urban terrain
MP	military police
MPA	mission planning agent
mph	miles per hour
MRE	meals, ready-to-eat
MSC	Military Staff Committee
msn	mission
MSR	main supply route
MTP	mission training plan
MTT	mobile training team
MWR	morale, welfare, and recreation
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treat Organization
NAVFOR	Navy forces
NBC	nuclear, biological, chemical

NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
NCS	National Communications System
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NG	National Guard
NGO	nongovernmental organization
no.	number
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSN	national stock number
NVD	night vision device
OC	observer-controller; Oleoresin Capsicum or Oil of Pepper
OCOKA	observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain, and avenues of approach
OCONUS	outside continental United States
OIC	officer in charge
OP	observation post
OPCON	operational control
OPFOR	opposing forces
OPLAN	operation plan
OPM	Office of Procurement and Materiel
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operational security
ORP	objective rally point
PAHOP	Pan American Health Organization
PAO	public affairs office
PD	police department
PDBM	personnel data base management
pen	penetration
PEO	peace enforcement operations
perf	perforation
pers	personnel
PIR	priority intelligence requests
plt	platoon
PMCS	preventive maintenance checks and services
POC	point of contact
POL	petroleum, oil, lubricants
POTF	psychological operations task force
POV	private-owned vehicle
POW	prisoner of war
psn	position
PSS	personnel service support
PSYOP	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization

PZ	pickup zone
QSTAG	Quadripartite Standardization Agreement
RATELO	radiotelephone operator
RC	reinforced concrete; Reserve Component
RCA	riot-control agent
rd	round
REMBASS	remotely monitored battlefield sensor system
req	requirement
ROE	rules of engagement
RP	release point
RSC	Reimbursement Source Code
S1	Adjutant
S2	Intelligence Officer
S3	Operations and Training Officer
S4	Supply Officer
S5	Civil Affairs Officer
SAAF	small-arms alignment fixture
SALUTE	size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SATCOM	satellite communication
sec	second
SF	special forces
SINCGARS	single-channel ground and airborne radio subsystem
SIR	special intelligence requests
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SME	subject matter expert
SOC	special operations center
SOCCE	special operations command and control element
SOCOORD	special operations coordination element
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status of forces agreement
SOI	signal operation instructions
SOP	standing operating procedures
SP	start point
spt	support
STANAG	Standard NATO Agreement
STX	situational training exercise
TACP	tactical air control party
TALO	tactical air liaison officer
T&EO	training and evaluation outline
TB	technical bulletin
TC	training circular
TDTT	temporarily disabling techniques/technology

TDY	temporary duty
tech	technical
TEWT	tactical exercise without troops
TF	task force
TLP	troop-leading procedures
TM	technical manual
TMDE	test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment
tng	training
TOC	tactical operations center
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TOR	terms of reference
TOW	tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (missile)
TREASUS	US Treasury
TRP	target reference point
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
tvl	travel
U	unclassified
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	United States
USACAPOC	United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAF	United States Air Force
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USPS	United States Postal Services
VA	Veterans Administration
veh	vehicle
VHF	very high frequency
VIP	very important person
w	with
wpn	weapon
XO	executive officer

REFERENCES

Documents Needed

These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.

*AR 350-30.	Code of Conduct/Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) Training. 10 December 1985.
*AR 500-51	Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources—Support to Civilian Law Enforcement. 1 July 1983.
*AR 500-60.	Disaster Relief. 1 August 1981.
*ARTEP 7-8-DRILL	Battle Drills for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 3 November 1993.
*ARTEP 7-8-MTP.	Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 30 September 1988.
*ARTEP 7-10-MTP.	Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company. 29 September 1994.
*ARTEP 7-20-MTP.	Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion. 27 December 1988.
*ARTEP 7-30-MTP.	Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Brigade (Command Group/Staff). 17 February 1989.
*ARTEP 19-77-10-MTP.	Mission Training Plan for the Corps Military Police Platoon. 30 September 1987.
*DA Form 1594.	Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer's Log. November 1962.
*DA Form 2406.	Materiel Condition Status Report. April 1993.
DA Pam 350-38.	Training Standards in Weapons Training. 9 September 1988.
*DD Form 2585.	Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet. February 1992

*This document was also used to develop this publication.

*DOD 3025.1-M.	Manual for Civil Emergencies. January 1994.
FM 3-3.	NBC Contamination Avoidance. 30 September 1986.
*FM 5-15.	Field Fortifications. 22 June 1972.
*FM 5-34.	Engineer Field Data. 14 September 1987.
FM 5-36.	Route Reconnaissance and Classification. 10 May 1985.
*FM 5-103.	Survivability. 10 June 1985.
*FM 5-114.	Engineer Operations Short of War. 13 July 1992.
*FM 6-20.	Fire Support in the AirLand Battle. 17 May 1988.
*FM 6-20-10.	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. 29 March 1990.
*FM 7-10.	The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990.
*FM 7-20.	The Infantry Battalion. 6 April 1992.
*FM 7-98.	Operations in a Low-Intensity Conflict. 19 October 1992.
*FM 8-55.	Planning for Health Services Support. 9 September 1994.
*FM 12-6.	Personnel Doctrine. 9 September 1994.
*FM 19-15.	Civil Disturbances. 25 November 1985.
*FM 19-40	Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons, 27 February 1976.
FM 20-32.	Mine/Countermine Operations. 9 December 1985.
FM 21-31.	Topographic Symbols. 19 June 1961.
*FM 23-14.	M249 Light Machine Gun in the Automatic Rifle Role. 26 January 1994.

*This document was also used to develop this publication.

*FM 25-100.	Training the Force. 15 November 1988.
*FM 25-101.	Battle Focused Training: Battalion Level and Lower. 30 September 1990.
*FM 33-1.	Psychological Operations. 18 February 1993.
*FM 34-3.	Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990.
*FM 34-7	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low-Intensity Conflict Operations. 18 May 1993.
*FM 34-130.	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994.
*FM 41-10.	Civil Affairs Operations. 11 January 1993.
*FM 46-1.	Public Affairs Operations. 23 July 1992.
*FM 63-6.	Combat Service Support in Low-Intensity Conflict. 21 January 1990.
*FM 90-8.	Counterguerrilla Operations. 29 August 1986.
*FM 90-10-1.	An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas. 12 May 1993.
*FM 90-20.	(J-Fire) Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower. 11 February 1994.
*FM 90-26.	Airborne Operations. 18 December 1990.
*FM 90-29.	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 17 October 1994.
*FM 100-5.	Operations. 14 June 1993.
*FM 100-10.	Combat Service Support. 18 February 1988.
*FM 100-19.	Domestic Support Operations. 1 July 1993.
*FM 100-20.	Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict. 5 December 1990.

*This document was also used to develop this publication.

*FM 100-23. Peace Operations. 30 December 1994

*FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols. 21 October 1985.

*Joint Pub 3-07.2. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. 25 June 1993.

*Joint Pub 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. 21 January 1995.

*Joint Pub 4-0. Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 25 September 1992.

READINGS RECOMMENDED

These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

Joint Pub 3-09-1. Joint Laser Designation Procedures. 1 June 1991.

TM 3-1310-255-10. Launcher and 35-mm Cartridges: Tactical CS, 16-Tube, E8. 31 August 1966.

TM 3-1040-220-12. Operator's and Organizational Maintenance Manual: Disperser, Riot Control Agent, Helicopter or Vehicle Mounted, M5. 21 May 1963.

TM 3-1040-251-15. Operator's, Organizational, Direct Support; General Support and Depot Maintenance Manual for Test Set, Flame Thrower – Riot Control Agent Disperser, Hydrostatic and Volumetric, 6,000 psi, M5. 15 June 1967.

*This document was also used to develop this publication.

INDEX

antiterrorism measures, 2-106, 2-392, 2-399
air movement, 2-396, 2-415
checklist, 2-397, 2-416
code of conduct, 2-397 thru 2-398, 2-419 thru 2-423
commander's responsibility, 2-392, 2-400
convoys, 2-395, 2-412
defense, 2-394, 2-408
DOD policy, 2-397, 2-418
DOD guidance, 2-397 thru 2-398, 2-419 thru 2-423
estimate of the situation, 2-392, 2-402
for brigade and battalion operations, 1-2, 2-2, 2-10, 2-106, 2-392
fortification, 2-393, 2-404
guard duties, 2-394, 2-409
guidance, 2-397, 2-417
obstacles, 2-393, 2-405
planning, 2-393, 2-403
protecting forces, 2-392, 2-401
rail movement, 2-396, 2-413
road movement, 2-394, 2-410
sea movement, 2-396, 2-414
security, 2-394, 2-406
equipment, 2-394, 2-407
vehicle protection, 2-395, 2-411
arms control, 1-1, 2-12, 2-43, 2-44
Army special operations forces, 2-552, 2-559, 2-560
aviation, 2-552, 2-562
civil affairs, 1-2, 2-553, 2-566
direct-support team, 2-554, 2-569
receipt of support, 2-555, 2-570
civil-military operations, 2-553, 2-567
activities, 2-553, 2-568
linking with general-purpose forces, 2-553, 2-564
military psychological operations, 2-556, 2-572
peace enforcement, 2-552, 2-561
psychological operations, 1-2, 2-555, 2-571
cautions, 2-557, 2-579
considerations, 2-558, 2-581
in peace enforcement, 2-556, 2-573 thru 2-576
limitations, 2-558, 2-580
planning, 2-557, 2-577
targeting process, 2-557, 2-578
rangers, 2-552, 2-563

receipt of support, 2-553, 2-565
role, 2-552
support, 1-2, 2-89, 2-126, 2-127, 2-158, 2-172, 2-553
military psychological operations, 2-556
targeting process, 2-557
attacks and raids, 1-1, 2-12, 2-198, 2-199

checkpoints, 1-2, 2-11, 2-49, 2-94, 2-109, 2-116, 2-129, 2-172, 2-519, 2-524, 2-754, 766
assault element, 2-523, 2-548
deliberate, 1-2, 2-520, 2-537
establishment, 2-519
flying, 1-2, 2-520, 2-538, 2-539
hasty, 1-2, 2-520, 2-536
tracked vehicles as part of, 2-523
headquarters element, 2-521, 2-541
heavy/light considerations, 2-523, 2-549
interrogation element, 2-523, 2-547
MP mobile patrol element, 2-521, 2-544
obstacles, 2-520, 2-533
operations checklist, (Figure 16-1) 2-522
organization, 1-2, 2-521, 2-540
planning, 2-519, 2-527
principles, 2-519, 2-526
roadblock, 2-519, 2-525
search element, 2-521, 2-543
searching a vehicle, 2-521, 2-546
security element, 2-521, 2-542
security post, 2-519, 2-530
signs, 2-519, 2-531
site selection, 1-2, 2-519, 2-528
layout, 2-529
snipers at, 1-3
special equipment, 2-520, 2-532
temporary, 2-550
vehicle barrier
active, 2-520, 2-535
passive, 2-520, 2-534
civil affairs, 2-74
civil disturbance *(see also crowd control)*, 1-3, 2-787
overview, 2-787, 2-788
principles of riot control, 1-3, 2-787, 2-789
close quarters combat (CQC), 1-2, 2-49, 2-128, 2-172, 2-582, 2-587, 2-755, 2-770
aim, 2-582, 2-590
breach point, 2-584, 595
double tap, 2-583, 2-591
entry, 2-584, 2-585

center door, 2-598
corner door, 2-597
fundamentals, 2-583, 2-584, 2-594
immediate action, 2-583, 2-592
immediate threat, 2-585, 2-599
individual movement, 2-585, 2-586, 2-601
other considerations, 2-585, 2-600
point of entry, 2-584, 2-596
principles, 1-2, 2-583, 2-593
reflexive shooting, 1-2, 2-582, 2-588
snipers in support of, 1-3
stance, 2-582, 2-589
weapon control, 2-585, 2-601
combat power, 2-3
combat service support, 2-57, 2-61, 2-68, 2-602
combating terrorism, 1-1, 2-12, 2-106, 2-107
antiterrorism, 2-106, 2-107
counterterrorism, 2-106, 2-107
command and control, 2-44, 2-57, 2-58, 2-116
command, control, communication (C3), 2-56, 2-61, 2-64, 2-620
contraband, 2-15, 2-33
convoy operations, 1-1, 2-11, 2-16, 2-42, 2-57, 2-116, 2-325, 2-754, 2-767
analysis of courses of action (war-game), 2-332, 2-352
commander's checklist, 1-2
comparison of courses of action and decision, 2-333, 2-353
courses of action, 2-331, 2-351, 2-353
defense, 2-333, 2-334, 2-337, 2-361, 2-362
enemy, 2-326, 2-348
estimate process, 2-326, 2-345
main body, 2-337
mission analysis, 2-325, 2-345
operation order, 1-2, (Figure 7-2) 2-338 thru 2-341
organization, 1-1, 2-333 thru 2-336, 2-354, 2-355, 2-356, 2-357, 2-358
advance guard, 2-333, 2-354
convoy commander, 2-333, 2-355, 2-361
main body, 2-334, 2-354, 2-362
rear guard, 2-335, 2-336, 2-355
planning, 1-1, 2-336, 2-360
reserve, 2-336, 2-359, 2-362
security force, 2-337, 2-361
snipers in support of, 1-3
terrain, 2-326, 2-349
troops and time available, 2-327 thru 2-331, 2-350
coordination, 2-58
cordon and search operations, 1-2, 2-49, 2-94, 2-129, 2-172, 2-424, 2-432, 2-438, 2-440, 2-753, 2-766

command and control, 1-2, 2-424, 2-431
considerations, 2-424, 2-429
heavy/light considerations, 2-426, 2-448
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 2-424, 2-430
methods, 2-425, 2-432, 2-441
central assembly, 2-425, 2-441, 2-442
control heads of households, 2-426, 2-441, 2-444
restriction to homes, 2-425, 2-441, 2-443
organization, 1-2, 2-425, 2-437
CA/PSYOP augmentation team, 2-425
demolition team**,** 2-424
fire support team, 2-425
interrogation team**,** 2-425
mine-detector team, 2-425
prisoner team, 2-425
scout dog team, 2-425
search team, 2-425
tunnel reconnaissance team, 2-425
perimeter area search, 2-425, 2-445
purposes, 2-424, 2-432
search party, 2-424, 2-434
reserve element, 2-434
search element, 2-434
security element, 2-434
search team, 2-439
security element, 2-424, 2-435
snipers in support of, 1-3
special teams, 2-424, 2-436
counterdrug operations, 1-4, 2-93
Army special operations forces support, 1-4, 1-5, 2-94
checkpoints, 1-4, 1-5, 2-94
combating terrorism, 1-4, 2-94
cordon and search operations, 1-4, 2-94
engineer support, 2-93, 2-103
intelligence, 2-94, 2-104
IPB process for
battlefield environment, 2-93, 2-99
battlefield effects, 2-93, 2-100
threat evaluation, 2-93, 2-101
threat courses of action, 2-93, 2-102
legalities, 2-93, 2-96
search and attack, 1-4, 1-5, 2-94
smuggling operations, Appendix B
support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 1-4, 2-94
support to, 2-12, 2-93, 2-95
temporarily disabling techniques and technology, 1-4, 2-94

countersniper measures, 1-3, 2-754, 2-768, 2-775, 2-778, 2-785
counterterrorism, 2-106, 2-107
crowd control *(see also civil disturbance)*, 2-474, 2-488, 2-786, 2-788

disaster relief, 1-1, 1-4, 2-12, 2-45, 2-50, 2-57, 2-75, 2-77
domestic, 2-75
engineers support for, 1-4, 2-75, 2-76, 2-82, 2-83, 2-84
IPB process for, 2-75
battlefield effects, 2-79
battlefield environment, 2-78
threat courses of action, 2-81
threat evaluation, 2-80
logistics operations for, 1-4, 2-76
military police operations for, 1-4, 2-76
overseas, 2-75
domestic organizations, 1-1, 2-10, 2-106, 2-201, (Table 3-1) 2-2-203
American Red Cross, 2-201, 2-204, 2-206
Department of Agriculture, 2-201, 2-204, 2-205
Department of Commerce, 2-204
Department of Defense, 2-01, 2-204
Department of Education, 2-204
Department of Energy, 2-204
Department of Health and Human Services, 2-204
Department of Interior, 2-204
Department of Justice, 2-201, 2-204, 2-208
Department of Labor, 2-204
Department of State, 2-201, 2-204, 2-209
Department of Transportation, 2-204
Department of Treasury, 2-204
Environmental Protection Agency, 2-201, 2-204
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2-201, 2-204, 2-207
General Services Administration, 2-204
National Communications System, 2-204
National Weather Service, 2-204
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2-204

EEC *(see evacuation control center)*
Engineers, 1-3, 2-13, 2-22, 2-48, 2-53, 2-57, 2-58, 2-59, 2-63, 2-75, 2-76, 2-103, 2-108, 2-121, 2-127, 2-148, 2-169, 2-170, 2-179, 2-329, 2-679
antitank weapons protection, 2-681, 2-706
assets available, 2-686, 2-740
asset value rating, 2-685, 2-735
ballistics protection, 2-680, 2-700
barbican, 2-684, 2-723
battlefield assessment, 2-685, 2-731
blast defensive measures, 2-682, 2-715

blast protection, 2-683, 2-714, 2-722
blast zone, 2-682, 2-716
civic assistance, 2-48, 2-53
commander's guidance, 2-686, 2-743
compare courses of action, 2-686, 2-746
constraints, 2-686, 2-741
contingency operations, 2-679, 2-687
cover from view, 2-680, 2-699
damage assessment, 2-75
deployment, 2-679, 2-692
disaster relief support, 2-75
distance selection, 2-683, 2-717
enemy mission/capability, 2-685, 2-733
enemy value rating, 2-685, 2-736
entry operations, 2-679, 2-693, 2-694
estimate
    command, 2-684, 2-727
    engineer, 2-684, 2-726, 2-727
explosive effects, 2-683, 2-718
explosive detection, 2-683, 2-719
finalize plan, 2-686, 2-748
force activities, 2-695
force protection, 2-680, 2-698
forced-entry protection, 2-684, 2-724, 2-725
friendly mission/capability, 2-685, 2-734
grenade protection, 2-682, 2-713
high-level protection, low-severity threat, 2-681, 2-710
humanitarian support, 2-48, 2-53
intelligence preparation of the battlefield, 2-684, 2-730
low-level protection, low-severity threat, 2-681, 2-710
metals, 2-680, 2-702
mission, 2-684, 2-728
mission analysis, 1-3, 2-686, 2-738
mobilization, 2-48, 2-679, 2-688, 2-689
mortar/grenade protection, 2-681, 2-711
noncombatant evacuation support, 2-13
nonmetallic materials, 2-680, 2-701
post conflict, 2-679, 2-695
predeployment, 2-679, 2-690, 2-691
protection policy, 2-685, 2-737
reception, 2-48
redeployment, 2-48, 2-680, 2-697
refine plans, 2-686, 2-745
restrictions, 2-686, 2-741
rocket protection, 2-681, 2-709
rocket screens, 2-681, 2-707, 2-708

roof mortar protection, 2-682, 2-712
scheme, 2-686, 2-744
specified and implied tasks, 2-686, 2-739
terrain analysis, 2-685, 2-732
time analysis, 2-686, 2-742
training, 2-48
vehicle processing rate, 2-683, 2-721
vehicle searches, 2-683, 2-720
war termination, 2-680, 2-696
weapons effects
antitank weapons, 2-681, 2-704, 2-705
small-arms weapon, 2-680, 2-703
evacuation control center, 2-14
evacuation plan, 2-14
evacuation site, 2-14
battalion TOC, 2-14
civilian authorities, 2-14
comfort area, 2-14
confinement facility, 2-14
entry control point, 2-14
holding and interrogation area, 2-14
in-processing and interview station, 2-14
medical treatment area, 2-14
operations, 2-29
pet holding area, 2-14
sample of, 2-30
search area, 2-14
security personnel area, 2-14

federal agencies *(see domestic organizations)*
fire support, 1-3, 2-58, 2-61, 2-129, 2-172, 2-327, 2-329, 2-749
airspace coordination, 2-752, 2-763
attack resources, 2-751, 2-761
brigade joint force, 2-751, 2-762
checkpoint, 2-753, 2-765
close quarters combat, 2-754, 2-769
considerations, 2-755, 2-773
convoy, 2-754, 2-767
coordination, 2-752, 2-763
cordon and search, 2-753, 2-766
countersniper, 2-7554, 2-768
environment, 2-750, 2-758, 2-759
force protection, 2-755, 2-770
reinforced battery position, 2-755, 2-772
reinforced gun position, 2-755, 2-772
reinforcing static position, 2-755, 2-771

rules of engagement, 2-756, 2-759, 2-774
sniper, 2-754, 2-768
target acquisition, 2-750, 2-760
planning, 2-753, 2-764
tasks, 2-749, 2-757
force protection, 2-7, 2-58

guerrillas
aims, 2-171, 2-186
goals, 2-171, 2-186
strengths, 2-171, 2-187
weaknesses, 2-171, 2-188

hot box, 2-15
human intelligence, 2-3, 2-16, 2-56, 2-62, 2-74, 2-109, 2-123
humanitarian assistance, 1-1, 1-4, 2-12, 2-45, 2-48, 2-50, 2-56, 2-60, 2-61, 2-75, 2-77, 2-126, 2-553, 2-608
combat service support, 2-57, 2-61, 2-68
command, control, and communication, 2-56, 2-61, 2-64
where no government exists, 2-57, 2-65
engineers support for, 1-4, 2-43, 2-56, 2-63
countermobility, 2-58, 2-70
mobility, 2-58, 2-70
survivability, 2-58, 2-70
external coordination, 2-58, 2-61, 2-73
fire support, 2-58, 2-61, 2-69
force protection, 2-58, 2-61, 2-71
information dissemination, 2-58, 2-61, 2-72
intelligence, 2-56, 2-61, 2-62
logistics operations for, 1-4, 2-59
maneuver, 2-58, 2-66
rules of engagement, 2-58, 2-65, 2-71, 2-74
security, 2-57, 2-66

information dissemination, 2-58, 2-61, 2-72, 2-502
insurgency, 2-170, 2-181
development, 2-170, 2-185
other required conditions, 2-170, 2-184
prerequisites, 2-170, 2-183
intelligence, 2-44, 2-48, 2-52, 2-56, 2-61, 2-62, 2-109, 2-123, 2-128, 2-155, 2-157, 2-502
intelligence analysis, 1-1, 2-11, 2-52, 2-272
analytical methods, 2-279, 2-319
area study file, 2-275, 2-299
association matrix, 2-276, 2-303
biases, 2-278, 2-317
collection planning, 2-273, 2-785

considerations, 2-272, 2-281
coordinate register, 2-276, 2-305
courses of action, 2-274, 2-290
credibility, 2-278, 2-315
current propaganda file**,** 2-274, 2-95
evaluating information, 1-1, 2-277, 2-312
host nation security file, 2-275, 2-301
hot file, 2-274, 2-294
incident file, 2-275, 2-298
incident map, 2-277, 2-307
information files**,** 2-274, 2-292
information processing, 2-273, 286
information requirements, 2-272, 2-282, 2-284
integration, 2-278, 2-316
interpretation, 2-278, 2-318
journal file**,** 2-274, 2-293
link diagram, 2-279, 2-322
link analysis, 2-279, 2-321
order of battle workbook, 2-277, 2-310
organizational file**,** 2-275, 2-297
pattern analysis, 2-279, 2-320
personalities and contacts map, 2-277, 2-309
personality/activity matrix, 2-276, 2-304
personality file, 2-275, 2-296
priority intelligence requirements, 2-272, 2-282, 2-283
recording information, 1-1, 2-274, 2-291
references, 2-277, 2-311
reliability, 2-278, 2-314
risk assessment, 2-279, 2-323
chart, 2-279, 2-324
threat analysis work sheet/matrix, 2-276, 2-302
threat base/encampment files**,** 2-275, 2-300
threat situation map, 2-277, 2-308
time-event chart, 2-276, 2-306
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), 1-1, 2-11, 2-13, 2-48, 2-75, 2-104, 2-157, 2-169, 2-245, 2-51, 2-750, 2-751
checklists, 1-1
engineers in support of, 2-13
steps of, 2-13
define battlefield environment, 2-13, 2-18, 2-75, 2-78, 2-99, 2-108, 2-140, 2-144, 2-160, 2-169, 2-175, 2-245, 2-246, 2-252
describe battlefield effects, 2-13, 2-19, 2-75, 2-79, 2-100, 2-108, 2-118, 2-145, 2-157, 2-161, 2-169, 2-176, 2-246, 2-253, 2-265
cover and concealment, 2-247, 2-257, 2-258
key facilities, 2-248, 2-263
lines of communication, 2-247, 2-259, 2-260

logistics sustainability, 2-248, 2-261, 2-262
population status, 2-247, 2-256
target, 2-248, 2-263
terrain analysis, 2-246, 2-254, 2-255
weather analysis, 2-248, 2-264
determine threat courses of action, 2-13, 2-22, 2-75, 2-81, 2-102, 2-109, 2-120, 2-147, 2-157, 2-163, 2-169, 2-178, 2-249, 2-267
decision support template, 2-249, 2-270
dissemination, 2-250, 2-271
event template, 2-249, 2-269
situation template, 2-249, 2-268
evaluate the threat, 2-13, 2-21, 2-75, 2-80, 2-101, 2-109, 2-119, 2-140, 2-157, 2-162, 2-169, 2-177, 2-248, 2-266
international organizations, 1-1, 2-3, 2-11, 2-106, 2-201, (Table 3-1) 2-203
Country Team, 2-201, 2-210
United Nations, 2-201, 2-211
IPB (*see intelligence preparation of the battlefield*)

legitimacy, 2-1
lesson plans, 1-1, 2-1, 2-11
groupings, 1-3, 2-48, 2-58, 2-59, 2-76, 2-94, 2-108, 2-109, 2-128, 2-152
overview, 1-1
lessons learned, 2-557, 2-58, 2-74, 2-93, 2-98, 2-154, 2-167, 2-397, 2-447
logistics, 1-3, 2-44, 2-58, 2-76, 2-329, 2-602
critical planning phases, 2-610, 2-660
environment, 2-602, 2-645
deployment checklist, (Figure 19-1) 2-626 thru 2-640
field service, 2-611, 2-662
finance services, 2-616, 2-666
force protection, 2-620, 2-669
health service support, 2-618, 2-668
in peace enforcement operations, 2-602, 2-644
in noncombatant evacuation operations, 2-622, 2-672
deployment, 2-623, 2-675
evacuation, 2-624, 2-676
planning assistance, 2-622, 2-673
pre-deployment, 2-623, 2-674
safe haven, 2-624, 2-677
withdrawal, 2-625, 2-678
legal services, 2-617, 2-667
maintenance, 2-611, 2-663
nonstandard support, 2-608, 2-658
organizations for coordinating, 2-607, 2-657
civil affairs team, 2-607
United Nations logistics headquarters, 2-607
Chief Administration Officer, 2-607

Chief Logistics Officer, 2-607
Field Operation Division, 2-607
Humanitarian Assistance, 2-608
personnel service support, 2-612, 2-664
planners, 2-5602, 2-646
religious support, 2-615, 2-665
supply, 2-604, 2-647
Class I, 2-605, 2-648
Class II, 2-605, 2-649
Class III, 2-606, 2-650
Class IV, 2-606, 2-651
Class V, 2-606, 2-652
Class VI, 2-606, 2-653
Class VII, 2-606, 2-654
Class VIII, 2-607, 2-655
Class IX, 2-607, 2-656
task organization, 2-609, 2-659
training, 2-5621, 2-670
transition of support, 2-621, 2-671
transportation, 2-611, 2-661

marshalling force operations, 2-15, 2-31
marshalling team, 2-15, 2-32
command group, 2-15
interpreter, 2-32
process section, 2-15, 2-35
comfort, 2-16, 2-35, 2-41
debriefing, 2-16, 2-35, 2-38
embarkation, 2-16, 2-35, 2-40
medical, 2-16, 2-35, 2-39
reception, 2-15, 2-35, 2-36
registration, 2-16, 2-35, 2-36
team commander
search squad, 2-15, 2-32, 33
security squad, 2-15, 2-32, 2-33
media strategy, 1-2, 2-11, 2-116, 2-363
coordination, 2-363
organization, 2-363
planning, 2-363
public affairs, 2-364
environment, 2-364, 2-369
goals, 2-364, 2-371
guidance, 2-364, (Figure 8-1) 2-367, 2-373
mission, 2-364, 2-370
training, 2-366, 2-376
interview guidelines, 2-364, (Figure 8-3) 2-368

dos, 2-364, 2-374
do nots, 2-365, 2-375
military police (MP)
area security, 2-496, 2-503
battle command, 2-498, 2-511
battlefield circulation control, 2-496, 2-502
battlefield missions, 2-496, 2-501
brigade and battalion planning, 2-498, 2-510
brigade, 2-499, 2-518
capabilities
communicate, 2-497, 2-508
move, 2-497, 2-507
shoot, 2-497, 2-506
civilian internee operations, 2-496, 2-504
enemy prisoners of war operations, 2-496, 2-504
essential competencies, 2-497, 2-509
intelligence, 2-498, 2-512
law and order, 2-497, 2-505
logistics, 2-498, 2-514
maneuver, 2-498, 2-513
mobility and survivability, 2-499, 2-515
nonlethal technology, 2-499, 2-516
operations, 1-2, 2-15, 2-48, 2-76, 2-172, 2-496
support, 2-46, 2-496, 2-500
transition and termination operations, 2-499, 2-517
mission analysis, 1-2, 1-3, 2-11, 2-45, 2-56, 2-325, 2-377
bottom-up sequence, 2-378, 2-389
force tailoring, 2-378, 2-391
main effort, 2-377, 2-380
mission creep, 1-2, 2-377, 2-384
mission-essential task, 2-377, 2-382
mission matrix, 2-377, 2-385
objective, 2-377, 2-383
operation, 2-378, 2-387
supporting effort, 2-377, 2-381
task, 2-378, 2-386, 2-388
mission creep, 1-2, 2-45, 2-56, 2-64, 2-153, 2-377

nation assistance, 1-1, 2-12, 2-90, 2-91
goals, 2-90, 2-92
natural disaster, 2-13
negotiation, 1-2, 2-11, 2-65, 2-73, 2-83, 2-109, 2-116, 2-125, 2-129, 2-154, 2-172, 2-462, 2-465
arrangement of meeting, 2-462, 2-468
beginning of, 2-463, 2-469
end of, 2-464, 2-471

middle of, 2-463, 2-470
preparation, 2-462, 2-467
settlement of disputes, 2-462, 2-466
noncombatant evacuation operations, 1-4, 2-12, 2-13, 2-17
Army special operations forces support, 1-4
close quarters combat, 1-4
comfort, 2-16, 2-35, 2-41
cordon and search operations, 1-4
debriefing, 2-16, 2-35, 2-38
Department of State program, 2-15, 2-34
embarkation, 2-16, 2-35, 2-40
engineer support for, 2-13, 2-22
environments of, 2-14, 2-23
permissive, 2-14, 2-24
uncertain, 2-14, 2-25
hostile, 2-14, 2-26
heavy/light considerations for, 2-16, 2-42
IPB process
battlefield effects, 2-13, 2-19
battlefield environment, 2-13, 2-18
threat courses of action, 2-13, 2-21
threat evaluation, 2-13, 2-20
marshalling force operations, 2-15, 2-31
marshalling team, 2-15, 2-32
command group, 2-15
search squad, 2-15, 2-33
security squad, 2-15
medical checks, 2-16, 2-35, 2-39
military police operations, 1-4
parts of, 2-14
administrative element, 2-14, 2-29
command and control element, 2-14
logistic element, 2-14, 2-29
marshalling force, 2-14, 2-29
security force, 2-14, 2-29
phases of, 2-14
deployment, 2-27
evacuation, 2-27
pre-deployment, 2-27
safe haven, 2-27
withdrawal, 2-27
plan, 2-15, 2-34
process section, 2-15, 2-35
reception, 2-15, 2-35, 2-36
registration, 2-16, 2-35, 2-37
search squads, 2-15, 2-33

site operations, 2-14, 2-29
sample of, 2-15, 2-30
wire diagram, 2-14, 2-28
non-government agency, 2-3, 2-74, 2-327, 2-608

peace enforcement operations, 1-4, 2-12, 2-125, 2-130, 2-131
activities
military support for diplomacy, 2-125, 130
peace enforcement, 2-125, 2-130
peacekeeping, 2-125, 2-130
alternatives, 2-125, 2-134
area preparation, 2-126, 2-137
Army special operations forces support, 1-4, 2-125, 2-139
characteristics, 2-125, 2-132
attainability of political settlement, 2-132
balance, 2-132
competent authority, 2-132
concurrent action, 2-132
freedom of action and movement, 2-132
presence of a mandate, 2-132
checkpoints, 1-4, 2-129
close quarters combat, 1-4, 2-129
communication, 2-128, 2-156
cordon and search operations, 1-4, 2-129
definition of, 2-131
end state, 2-127, 2-141, 2-142, 2-143
engineers, 1-4,2-127, 2-148
environment, 2-125, 2-135
fire support, 1-4, 2-129
framework, 2-126, 2-136
heavy integration, 2-128, 2-149
advantages, 2-128, 2-150
disadvantages, 2-128, 2-151
in built-up areas, 2-128, 2-152
intelligence, 2-128, 2-155
IPB process
battlefield effects, 2-127, 2-145
battlefield environment, 2-127, 2-144
threat courses of action, 2-127, 2-147
threat evaluation, 2-127, 2-146
key aspects, 2-125, 2-133
force protection, 2-125, 2-133
rules of engagement, 2-125, 2-133
training, 2-125, 2-133
use of force, 2-125
lodgement, 2-126, 2-138

negotiation, 1-4, 2-125, 2-135
planning, 2-127, 2-141
rules of engagement, 2-128
search and attack, 1-4, 2-129
show of force, 2-125
temporarily disabling techniques and technology, 1-4, 2-125, 2-129
transition to peacekeeping, 2-126, 2-140
use of force alternatives, 2-134
peacekeeping operations, 1-4, 2-11, 2-12, 2-108, 2-111, 2-219
checkpoints, 1-4,2-109
engineer support, 2-109, 2-121
intelligence, 2-109, 2-123
IPB process
battlefield effects, 2-108, 2-118
battlefield environment, 2-108, 2-117
threat courses of action, 2-109, 2-120
threat evaluation, 2-109, 2-119
logistics, 1-4
negotiation, 1-4,2-108, 2-109
mandate, 2-108, (Figure 2-10-1) 2-110, 2-113
objectives, 2-108, 2-115
organizations
military area command, 2-108, 2-114
military peacekeeping command, 2-108, 2-114
political council, 2-108, 2-114
principles, 2-108, 2-112
security, 2-109, 2-124
tasks, 2-108, 2-116
Posse Comitatus Act, 2-45, 2-49, 2-50, 2-76, 2-87, 2-93, 2-96
psychological operations, 2-72, 2-127, 2-555, 2-556, 2-557, 2-571
cautions, 2-557, 2-579
considerations, 2-558, 2-581
in peace enforcement, 2-556, 2-573, 2-574
limitations, 2-558, 2-580
military, 2-556, 2-572
objectives, 2-556
planning, 2-557, 2-579
task force, 2-557, 2-575, 2-576

quick-reaction force, 2-2, 2-56, 2-361

restraint, 2-1
riot control *(see also civil disturbance and crowd control)*
MP mobile training team, 1-3
principles of, 1-3

rules of engagement (ROE), 1-1, 2-1, 2-6, 2-11, 2-25, 2-26, 2-33, 2-45, 2-51, 2-65, 2-71, 2-74, 2-128, 2-129, 2-219, (Figure 4-1) 2-224, 2-226, 2-231, 2-429, 2-749, 2-756, 2-759, 2-774
based on METT-T, 2-219, 2-232
considerations, 2-220, 2-235
discipline, 2-223, 2-244
guidelines, 2-220, 2-234
restrictions, 2-223, 2-242
tactical, 2-223, 2-239
training, 1- 1, 2-221, 2-236
methods, 2-222, 2-237

search and attack, 1-2, 2-94, 2-172, 2-454, 2-455
circular pattern, 2-454, 2-458
decisive point, 2-454, 2-460
fire support, 2-454, 2-461
linear pattern, 2-454, 2-459
organization, 2-454, 2-457
purposes, 2-454, 2-456
snipers in support of, 1-3
security, 2-2, 2-7, 2-57, 2-109, 2-124
force protection, 2-7, 2-57, 2-109
security assistance, 1-1, 2-12, 2-88, 2-89
show of force, 1-4, 2-12, 2-157, 2-159, 2-171
Army special operations forces support, 1-4, 2-158
IPB process
battlefield effects, 2-157, 2-161
battlefield environment, 2-157, 2-160
threat courses of action, 2-157, 2-162
threat evaluation, 2-157, 2-162
key points, 2-158, 2-168
support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 2-158
situational training exercise (STX), 1-2, 2-337, 2-426, 2-523, A-1
Convoy Operations and Negotiate a Belligerent Checkpoint (infantry company), 2-337,
A-1
Cordon and Search (MOUT), 2-426, A-5
support matrix, A-6
Cordon and Search Operations (infantry battalion), A-16
Establish and Operate a Checkpoint (infantry platoon), 2-522, A-23
Noncombatant Evaluation Operations (uncertain), A-9
support matrix, A-10
Route Security and Convoy Escort, A-7
support matrix, A-8
Planning, A-2
sniper employment, 1-3, 2-754, 2-768, 2-775, 2-781

at checkpoints, 1-3, 2-776, 2-784
conventional employment, 2-776, 2-783
in cordon and search operations, 1-3
in search and attack operations, 1-3
in stability and support operations, 2-775, 2-782
in support of close quarters combat, 1-3
in support of convoy operations, 1-3
principles, 2-775
stability and support operations
activities, 1-1, 2-11, 2-12
arms control, 2-12
attacks and raids, 2-12
combating terrorism, 2-12
disaster relief, 2-12
humanitarian assistance, 2-12
nation assistance, 2-12
noncombatant evacuation operations, 2-12
peace enforcement, 2-12
peacekeeping operations, 2-12
security assistance, 2-12
show of force, 2-12
support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 2-12
support to counterdrug operations, 2-12
support to domestic civil authorities, 2-12
plan, A- 1
principles of, 1-1, 2-1, 2-4, 2-11
legitimacy, 2-1, 2-5
objective, 2-3, 2-9
perseverance, 2-2, 2-8
restraint, 2-1, 2-6
security, 2-1, 2-7
unity of effort, 2-3, 2-9, 2-10, 2-201
rules of engagement, 2-1, 2-6
support for insurgencies and countersurgencies, 1-4, 2-2, 2-12, 2-94, 2-158, 2-169, 2-173
Army special operations forces support, 1-4, 2-172
checkpoints, 1-4,2-172
close quarters combat, 1-4, 2-172
cordon and search operations, 1-4, 2-172
engineers, 1-4, 2-169, 2-179, 2-180
fire support, 1-4, 2-172
foreign internal defense, 2-170, 2-182
indirect approach, 2-169, 2-171, 2-174, 2-191
IPB process
battlefield effects, 2-169, 2-176
battlefield environment, 2-169, 2-175

threat courses of action, 2-169, 2-178
threat evaluation, 2-169, 2-177
logistics, 1-4
military police operations, 1-4, 2-172
negotiation, 1-4,2-172
search and attack, 1-4, 2-172
support to counterdrug operations, 2- 11
support to domestic civil authority, 1-3, 2-12, 2-45, 2-50
checkpoints, 1-3,2-49
close quarters combat, 1-3, 2-49
cordon and search operations, 1-3, 2-49
by engineers, 2-48, 2-53
by Marines, 2-45, 2-51
arming status, 2-45, 2-47
mission matrix, 2-45, 2-46
military police operations, 1-3, 2-49
rules of engagement, 2-45, 2-51
special equipment, 2-48, 2-54
temporarily disabling techniques and technology, 1-3, 2-49

temporarily disabling techniques and technology (TDTT), 1-2, 2-49, 2-94, 2-125, 2-129, 2-472
break contact, 2-474, 2-490
commercially available technology, 2-472
active, 2-474, 2-486
passive, 2-473, 2-486
crowd control, 474, 2-488
deny access to buildings, 2-475, 2-493
employment, 2-472, 2-477
scenarios, 2-474, 2-487
mark areas, 2-475, 2-494
riot control agents, 2-473, 2-478, 2-479, 2-482, 2-483, 2-489
dispensers, 2-473, 2-474, 2-484
smoke, 2-473, 2-480, 2-481
systems, 2-473, 2-485
support raids and attacks, 2-474, 2-492
support rescue operations, 2-474, 2-491
track individuals, 2-475, 2-495
training and evaluation outlines (T&EO's), 2-16, 2-94, 2-129, 2-337, 2-426, 2-427, 464, 2-523, 2-558, 2-756, 2-780, 2-786, B-1
Apprehend/Detain Noncombatants, 2-427, B-35
Collect and Disseminate Information, 2-109, B-61
Conduct Marshalling Force Operations, 2-16, B-5
Conduct Platoon Riot Control Formations, 2-786, B-70
Control Civilian Movement 2-109, B-68
Coordinate and Monitor Convoy Security, 2-499, B-75

Defend a Convoy, 2-337, B-13
Deliver Supplies or Humanitarian Aid, 2-337, B-58
Demonstrate a Show of Force, 2-157, B-55
Disarm Belligerents, 2-129, B-12
Employ Psychological Operations, 2-558, B-46
Establish a Checkpoint, 2-523, B-41
Establish an Evacuation Control Center/Conduct Evacuation Control Center Operations, 2-16, B-4
Handle Captured Insurgents or Belligerents, 2-427, B-32
Identify and Process Detainees, 2-427, B-33
Interdict Smuggling Operations, 2-94, B-10
Link Up With a Convoy, 2-337, B-63
Negotiate, 2-463, B-37
Negotiate a Belligerent Force Checkpoint, 2-337, B-17
Operate a Checkpoint, 2-523, B-44
Perform a Cordon and Search, 2-426, B-25
Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 2-16, B-2
Plan a Media Visit, 2-366, B-19
Prepare Traffic Control Plan, 2-499, B-76
Process Captured Documents and Equipment, 2-427, B-30
Protect the Force, 2-109, B-24
Provide Fire Support, 2-756, B-48
React to a Media Interview, 2-366, B-22
React to a Sniper, 2-780, B-66
React to Civil Disturbance, 2-786, B-59
Restore Law and Order, 2-129, B-74
Search a Building, 2-426, B-28
Supervise Minefield Clearance, 2-109, B-67

United Nations
Charter, 2-201, 2-211
Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), 2-202, 2-218
logistics headquarters, 2-607
organization, 2-202, 2-212
security council, 2-202, 2-212, 2-213
secretary general, 2-202, 2-212, 2-214
general assembly, 2-202, 2-212, 2-215
military staff committee, 2-202, 2-212, 2-216
secretariat, 2-202, 2-212, 2-217
field operations directorate, 2-202, 2-212

volunteer agency, 2-608

TC 7098-1
5 JUNE 1997

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
03447

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number 115385, requirements for TC 7-98-1.

PIN: 075404-000