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DRAFT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Future U.S. Role in the Phung Hoang (PH) Program

PURPOSE:

1. The objective of this paper is to ensure that the GVN PH Program continues to receive effective U.S. advisory support during the forthcoming 18-24 month period with an option for continuance if required.

2. Experience over the past four years in the Phung Hoang Program has pragmatically shown that anti-VCI activity breaks down in practice into three relatively distinct areas of activity. Any overall plan for support to the GVN anti-VCI effort should recognize these nuances:

(a) the intelligence effort against the higher levels of the VCI who possess intelligence information of value on enemy plans and intentions;

(b) the intelligence effort ~~divided~~ directed against the lowest level of the VCI mechanism -- the links with the populace. By and large, these VCI do not possess intelligence on the enemy's plans and intentions that is not already known, and they perform an essentially political function of relating the Communist party mechanism to the population; and

(c) an action effort to neutralize the targets in (a) and (b).

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BACKGROUND:

3. On 15 October 1971, COMUSMACV informed Washington of proposed major changes in the concept and operation of the PH Program involving accelerated Vietnamization to include:

a. On the Vietnamese side transfer of national level responsibility from the PHUNG HOANG Central Committee to the National Police Command.

b. On the Vietnamese side deactivation of the PHUNG HOANG committees and centers at all levels.

c. On the Vietnamese side increased emphasis on the anti-VCI responsibilities of province and district chiefs.

d. On the Vietnamese side use of National Police as the primary operational element of PHUNG HOANG.

e. On the U.S. side withdrawal of U.S. military advisory support as the National Police Command assumes responsibility.

4. On 27 November 1971 COMUSMACV advised Washington that the GVN Prime Minister had been briefed on the proposed changes to the PH Program. Following the briefing the Prime Minister stated that on the GVN side:

a. The PHUNG HOANG Centers and Committees will be retained.

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25X1

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b. The National Police will play the major role and eventually provide all staffing for the centers.

c. Province and district chiefs will be charged with implementation responsibility with the National Police as the primary operational agency.

d. A new Presidential Decree will be promulgated to upgrade the PHUNG HOANG Central Committee, which will be chaired by the Prime Minister.

e. A "National PHUNG HOANG Program" will be continued indefinitely.

f. Included in the highly publicized program will be a rewards program funded by the GVN.

5. The proposal to phasedown U.S. military advisory support through CORDS to the PH Program would, as currently planned, result in a complete withdrawal by end CY 1972.

REASONS TO DISENGAGE:

6. The major arguments offered, directly or indirectly, to support this proposal are that:

a. Shifting total responsibility for the conduct of the PH Program to the GVN and the withdrawal of U.S. military advisors is consistent with the Vietnamization policy. This argument does not support an abrupt draw down in U.S. effort as Vietnamization

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implies a phased and orderly turn over.

b. The PH Program has a number of serious, built-in deficiencies which will be compensated by a reorganization and shifting of responsibilities. Deficiencies include: lack of GVN coordination and cooperation, poorly qualified and poorly motivated GVN personnel, centers that lack secure repositories for intelligence information, lack of a direct line of GVN authority and responsibility and an overall "U.S. sponsored" atmosphere about the program that does not satisfy Vietnamese xenophobic inclinations. These arguments point toward a more effective advisory effort, but not total removal of the effort.

c. The PH Program is politically sensitive in the U.S. and is a potential source of adverse criticism such as the McCloskey/Reid allegations voiced in Washington on 19 July/ 5 August respectively.

REASONS TO STAY:

7. The need for an effort to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure remains as great as ever, or greater in view of the Viet Cong's increased emphasis on attacking pacification. The next 18-24 months will be crucial in reinforcing the political and economic stability which is at present still

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very fragile and vulnerable to concerted enemy subversive efforts. The enemy's administrative apparatus, the organization which implements Hanoi's will within the villages of South Vietnam, will remain a principal source of this threat, and hence remains a valid primary target for the allocation of GVN/U.S. resources.

8. The lower VCI echelons, by and large, are in a relatively weakened position currently. Indeed, they are in greater disarray than at any time during the past several years. Precisely for this reason, maximum pressure upon the VCI membership should be maintained in order to further limit its capabilities or otherwise neutralize its activities.

9. The GVN's recent announcement that it will continue the "National PHUNG HOANG Program" with renewed emphasis reflects a priority in program management that should be encouraged and which would benefit from continued U.S. support. Furthermore, care must be exercised that the manner of the U.S. drawdown in PHUNG HOANG not give the GVN the wrong signal -- i.e., what the Vietnamese could construe as an indication that the U.S. considers the effort not worth the allocation of resources.

10. The concept of the anti-VCI effort as a "program" and the titles PHOENIX and PHUNG HOANG advisors can and should be dropped on the U.S. side.

11. The proposed close-out of the U.S. military advisory effort impinges directly upon the GVN capability to neutralize the VCI. It is recognized by all sides that the National Police, institutionally are not yet strong enough to take over the full burden at this time.

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12. Given the continued importance of the anti-VCI effort, a central problem for the U.S. is one of providing resources, primarily advisors, to ensure adequate transition to an all-GVN program, and enable the U.S. to monitor GVN performance in this critical area.

13. To ensure an orderly draw down that does not of itself defeat one of our major objectives, it may become necessary to make adjustments in the current plan to phase out the Army PH advisors.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEAR TERM:

14. Current U.S. military advisory staffing levels of the PH Program are not necessary to maintain the necessary U.S. advisory input and monitoring role. Staffing at national, regional, and provincial levels would, as a minimum, be adequate to meet our requirements. Aggressive management by a province-level staff would permit relinquishing current U.S. monitorship efforts at the district level.

15. Staffing levels of U.S. military advisors to the PH Program should be continued at national, regional and provincial levels, although many of the province staff could conceivably be lowered to the irreducible minimum of one. The distribution of VCI throughout South Vietnam is not uniform and there appears to be compelling merit to the idea that our advisory ~~effort~~ commitment -- and the GVN's effort as well -- should parallel the VCI threat rather than ~~the political boundaries of~~ be an automatic allocation among the provinces. An equivalent logic should determine the level of PH advisory staffing at district level. That is, while most of the district PH advisory structure can be safely

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dismantled, those districts with a chronic problem of VCI activity should have continued U.S. support and advisory staff. In fact, if one adjusts the allied effort to the actual threat, there might be a small U.S. advisory presence in some key districts but none in certain largely secure or non-critical provinces.

16. The above structure -- Saigon, region, province, and district -- should provide the GVN with appropriate levels of support and in addition should provide the U.S. with a capability to monitor not only the GVN program but also to develop some semblance of an independent estimative capability. This latter capability could well be significant in the months to come as U.S. intelligence capabilities with respect to the GVN are dismantled.

17. The staffing levels for the U.S. side of the program are at this time difficult to predict, although clearly they can be expected to diminish along with the general reduction of U.S. presence. A minimum staffing level appears to be about thirty positions, which would provide coverage of the program at national, regional, and a few key provincial echelons. Although this number of slots has been proposed for CY 1972, there exists a strong possibility that the number is too low, given that the exact structure of the Vietnamese effort and their advisory/logistic needs has not yet shaken out. While it may be that much of the tasking presently directed to the Phung Hoang advisory staff can be shifted to the Provincial

The PH staff is a part of Prov + Dist Advisory staffs at those levels -

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and District Senior Advisory staffs, this is essentially a management problem for USMACV to resolve. Given the relatively small numbers involved and the state of organizational flux characterizing the National Police who are to be given the program eventually, it is probably advisable to count on a gradual reduction in advisor requirements rather than a precipitous drop to minimum level sometime in 1972.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LONG TERM:

18. Plans should be drawn up to have the normal U.S. advisory structure absorb anti-VCI advisory duties beyond the transitional period of the draw down.

19. An immediate survey of all anti-VCI training being conducted by the members of the Mission Council should be drawn up in order to project the long-term U.S. concentration of effort in supporting GVN performance in this vital area.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

17 Dec 1971

Memo For MR. CARVER, [redacted] 25X1

-- Attached is an edited version of your paper provided for that purpose to me.

-- Also attached are comments prepared by the OJCS which must be treated as unofficial, that is, not constituting an OJCS position.

-- The additional points/arguments in your paper provide "crunch" that should help retain the PH program.

DAVID E. FARNHAM
Colonel, USA
Vietnam Task Force

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Please See if we have problems with their proposed changes

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Remarks:

Geo — Thanks - Good luck — See minor scribbles — RHO

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