
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Title: Guerrilla Warfare of the Chinese Communists

Source: Chinese books. Published in China 1937-1941.

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GUERRILLA WARFARE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

/Introduction by Foreign Documents Division

The present report on guerrilla warfare is the result of a comparison of eleven documents on this subject originally published in China in 1937-1941 (except one collection of lectures published in Saigon in 1954.)

The initial intent was to make selections from these documents of those parts which gave the best treatment to the various aspects of 1) the Theory of Guerrilla Warfare and 2) The Application of Guerrilla Warfare. It became evident very quickly, however, that most of the documents drifted back and forth within these two categories and were themselves frequently the results of selections from each other.

Two of these documents, however, stood out as fitting most appropriately the needs of this project. In the realm of theory "The Problem of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare" by Mao Tse-tung (pub by Pan-Pan Che, place not given, Nov 1938) projected six problems of strategy in guerrilla warfare and proceeded to answer them theoretically and practically. This is accompanied by some information on the basic principles of guerrilla warfare. The second document "The Utilization of Guerrilla Warfare" by Pian Tsu-chi'an (published by Chan-ti'i Tsu-chu, Shan-hsi, Feb 1941) was apparently compiled for textbook purposes since it gives minute details on all phases of practical application of guerrilla warfare, with sufficient theory to give it authenticity. The author also goes back into history, both European and Asiatic, to give examples of practical application. This document was also the latest in date of the Chinese sources (exception mentioned above).

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Consequently, it was decided to give a full presentation of these two documents. For purposes of comparison there is included, beginning page 311, the contents of the preceding two volumes.

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

CONFIDENTIAL

THE UTILIZATION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Part I: The Aims Duties and Organization

Chapter 1. Significance of Guerrilla Warfare [Historical]

Chapter 2. Guerrillas and Regular Troops [Comparison]

Chapter 3. Origin of Guerrilla Forces [From the people]

Chapter 4. Responsibility and Duty of Guerrilla Forces

A. Overall Responsibility

1. Political Strategy

2. Military Strategy

3. In Tactics

4. Miscellaneous

B. At the Front

1. During Enemy Movement

2. During the Fighting

3. While Enemy troops are Stationary

C. In Rear Areas

1. Wreck Communications Lines

2. Destroying Military Depots and Plants

3. Attacking Rear Service Troops

4. Murder Enemy Personnel

5. Recruiting Guerrillas

6. Instigate Disorders

7. Internal Security

8. Scorched Earth Tactics

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 5. Organization of Guerrilla Units

A. Types of Guerrilla Units

B. Organized [Military] Guerrilla Units

C. Basic Cadre Guerrilla Units

1. Company

2. Battalion

3. Others

4. Classification of Units

D. People's Guerrilla Units

Part II: Command Liaison and Communications

Chapter 6. Command of Guerrilla Forces

A. Operational Orders

B. Command Areas

Chapter 7. Liaison Between Guerrilla Forces

A. Principles of Liaison

B. General Principles

C. Contacts Within a Guerrilla Area

D. Air and Ground Liaison

1. Air-Land Liaison

2. Ground-Air Liaison

Chapter 8. Telecommunications of Guerrilla Forces

A. General Communications

B. Communications Within a Guerrilla Area

C. Communications in Rear of Enemy

Part III: Reconnaissance, Investigation and Security

Chapter 9. Intelligence in Guerrilla Warfare

A. Intelligence on Enemy Strength

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

CONFIDENTIAL

B. Terrain Intelligence

C. Intelligence on Roads

D. Types of Intelligence and Methods

1. Plainclothed Observers

2. Hiding Observers

3. Detection by Eavesdropping

4. Detection by the People

5. Interrogation of the Local People

6. Intelligence During Combat

Chapter 10. Reconnaissance and Interrogation

A. Reconnaissance

B. Interrogation

C. Examination and Search of Documents

Chapter 11. Guerrilla Security

A. Security During March

B. Security for Stationary Troops

C. Security During Combat

D. Individual Security

E. Indirect Security

F. Air Security

G. Gas Security

Part IV: Objectives and Principles of Guerrilla Warfare

Chapter 12. Objectives of Guerrilla Warfare

1. Military Objectives

2. Economic Objectives

3. Political Objectives

4. Cultural Objectives

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

CONFIDENTIAL

Chapter 13. Principles of Guerrilla Warfare

A. Principle of Striking First

B. Principle of Surprise Attack

C. Principle of Defense

D. Principle of Unity

E. Principle of Mobility

F. Principle of Endurance

Part V. Fighting Procedures and Tactics

Chapter 14. Fighting Sequence of Guerrillas

A. Preparation Before Combat

B. Deployment for Advance

C. Deployment During Attack

D. Political Works

Chapter 15. Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare

A. Surprise Attack

B. Ambush and Cutting-up Attack

C. Riots and Disturbances

1. Responsibility for Creating Riots

2. Time for Riot

3. Riot Tactics

4. Important Points for Coordinated Inside-Outside Attack

5. Deployment of a Riot

6. The Significance of Disturbances

7. The Tactics of Disturbances

1(a) Advance and Raid Separately

2(b) Maintaining Constant Contact

3(c) Deceptive Demonstration

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

CONFIDENTIAL

4(d) Swift Movement and Surprise

8. Operation After the Disturbance

D. Fortified Defense and Scorched Earth Policy

1. Operations of Scorched Earth Tactics

2. Scorched Earth in [Enemy] Occupied Areas

3. Scorched Earth Tactics in Fighting Zone

4. Significance of Fortified Defense

5. Tactics in Using Obstacles

6. Methods in Defending Key-points

Part VI: Directing Specialized Guerrillas

Chapter 16. Special Guerrilla Fighting

Section 1. Communications Guerrillas

A. Waterway Guerrillas

B. Railway Guerrillas

C. Highway Guerrillas

D. Airway Guerrillas

E. Posts and Telegraph Guerrillas

Section 2. Peasant Guerrillas

A. Intercepting Transport Teams

B. Intercepting Levy Teams

Section 3. Secret Troops

A. Tasks of Secret Guerrillas

B. Noting of Spies

C. The Meaning of Counter-espionage

D. Spotting of Counter-spies

E. Actions Causing Suspicion of Counter-espionage

F. Points to be noted in Counter-spying

G. Liaison Among Spies, and Superiors

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

Chapter 17. Warfare in Special Terrains

Section 1. Guerrilla Work in Hill-country

Section 2. Guerrilla Work among Streams

Section 3. Guerrilla Work Among Streams

Section 4. Guerrilla Work on Lakes and Ponds

Section 5. Guerrilla Work in Forests

Section 6. Guerrilla Work in Villages

Section 7. Guerrilla Work in Cities

Section 8. Guerrilla Work Against Fortresses

Chapter 18. Guerrilla Work Under Special Weather Conditions

Section 1. Night Guerrilla Work

Section 2. Guerrilla Work in Depth

Section 3. Guerrilla Work in Wind, Snow, Rain, Fog

Section 4. Guerrilla Work during Vacation or Festivals

Part VII: Supply, Sanitation and Bases

Chapter 19. Guerrilla Supplies

Section 1. Source of Supply

Section 2. Methods of Supply

Chapter 20. Guerrilla Health

Section 1. Attention to Health in Ordinary Times

Section 2. Care of Health during Fighting

Chapter 21. Guerrilla Bases

Section 1. The Meaning of Guerrilla Base

Section 2. Requirements for a Base

Section 3. Camouflage of Bases

Section 4. Fighting at a Base

Section 5. Education at a Base

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/18 : CIA-RDP82-00039R000100120080-0

Section 6. [illegible] at a Base

Section 7. Economy of a Base

Section 8. Government at a Base

Part VIII: Starting, Training, and Demands

Chapter 22. Starting of Guerrilla [illegible]

Section 1. Action with Cover

Section 2. Action without Cover

Section 3. Regrouping

Section 4. [illegible]

Chapter 23. [illegible]

Section 1. [illegible]

Section 2. Training in Skills

Section 3. Mental Training

Section 4. Training in Military Doctrine

Section 5. Rewards and Penalties

Section 6. Maneuvers

Chapter 24. Demands of Guerrilla Warfare

Section 1. Demand For Men

Section 2. Geographic Demands

Section 3. Demand for Skills

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Before the book was written, the author revised the whole manuscript and discarded much that [illegible] publication. But since the subject matter is [illegible], the author finally left it as its original form. The term guerrilla has become a very common term that we [illegible]. But the author feels that in fight or not fight [illegible], guerrilla warfare is [illegible] more important than the regular method of warfare. We all know that the latter has failed to end the war.

In this war of resistance, the most important needs are to mobilize the people to fight the enemy and to ferment revolt in the ranks of enemy troops. How can guerrilla warfare accomplish these? First we must have a guerrilla before we can further use our mobilization. According to Mr. Chiang Kai-shek: "In this Sino-Japanese war, victory depends on two things, technical power and manpower. In technical power, we are behind the enemy; in manpower, we are seven or eight times richer than the enemy." But he did not conclude that victory may be ours. It is simply because we lack organization to mobilize such great manpower. The enemy with a small population can mobilize quickly and easily. In this war, we have an organized forces, including the parties (political), the government, the military, the schools, and others, of not more than ten million men. The enemy while totally mobilized for her war effort outnumbers us by seven or eight to one.

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Before the book was written, the author revised the whole manuscript and discussed such that many revisions and modification. But, since the subject matter is inexhaustible material, the author is only left it at its original form. The name guerrilla has become a very common term but to lay or little attention. But the author feels that in this or total resistance, guerrilla warfare has become much more important than the regular method of warfare. We all know that the latter has failed to end the war.

In this war of resistance, the most important needs are to mobilize the people to fight the enemy and to ferment revolt in the ranks of enemy troops. How can guerrilla warfare accomplish these? First we must have a guerrilla before we can inaugurate our mobilization. According to Mr. Chiang Kai-shek: "In this Sino-Japanese war, victory depends on two points, technical power and manpower. In technical power, we are behind the enemy; in manpower, we are seven or eight times stronger than the enemy." But he did not conclude that victory may be ours. It is simply because we lack organization to mobilize such great manpower. The enemy with a small population can mobilize quickly and easily. In this war, we have an organized forces, including the parties (political), the government, the military, the schools, and others, of not more than ten million men. The enemy while totally mobilized for her war effort outnumbers us by seven or eight to one.

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It is true that we have never prepared for a mobilization. On the other hand, aggressor nations have engaged in full mobilization long before they start the fighting phase of the war. If we are not prepared for mobilization in peace, we should at least have the aim to mobilize for defense. Over half of the people's wars in history used this method. Take the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the French hero Gambetta used guerrilla warfare to mobilize the populace.

In our war of resistance, we are only utilizing about one fortieth of our manpower. But for three and one half years, we have worn out the enemy. If we are able to mobilize all of our 470 million people for the war effort, then we can be no doubt about our final victory.

How then can the guerrillas be mobilized? First, we should be organizing and training guerrilla leaders in the rear areas, to be used as a nucleus for future development. Organizing the people may proceed after that. Many problems such as food, conscription and price control may be readily solved through the establishment of organizations. Secondly, at the front or in occupied areas (with over 100 million people) we must use guerrilla warfare to mobilize. By using guerrilla tactics, we are able to penetrate through the country side to disrupt and raise havoc with collaborationists and traitors.

The whole guerrilla warfare is a warfare of attack. The guerrillas should hit the enemy constantly. Even though the regular army can carry out the attack just as well, they have to suffer losses from retaliatory enemy attack. At present, we have insufficient equipment to launch an all-out attack. When we use the term attack, we mean small scale attacks or raids by the guerrillas to throw the enemy off balance.

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A guerrilla unit may be formed simply by selecting a nuclear group of regular troops equiping them lightly and properly. They are to make swift attacks on enemy installations in the rear, promote disorder in occupied areas, assume leadership for patriots in that area, and to spread the idea of revolutionary war to the whole people. This is essentially what General Hu Chu-t'un termed the "small hitting the big", "scatter attack", and "enemy wins we run."

The chief advantage of the enemy is his mechanization -- airplanes, artillery, and tanks. With their superiority of firepower, mechanical power and maneuverability, they invariably choose a good terrain and defend it tenaciously. By doing that they are able to hold the strategic points along the front. Paradoxically, mechanization is also the weakness of the enemy. Mechanized troops usually make very rapid advances. Under these conditions however, their communication lines are extended beyond their power to consolidate immediately. They are very vulnerable. By using strong but small bands of guerrillas to infiltrate enemy vital points and to attack furiously from within, all their mechanical superiority can be nullified. The effectiveness of enemy observation planes is quite limited. A band of guerrillas, from a few up to even thirty men is not easily detectable in daylight hours not to mention night time. The enemy machine gun and artillery are not too effective in night operation. That is the ideal time to make guerrilla raids. Under the cover of darkness, our guerrillas armed with hand grenade and rifle or with hatchet and hoe used by the peasant guerrillas, are more effective than enemy artillery and machine guns.

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This book would try to show how guerrilla warfare is conducted.

The utilization of guerrilla warfare is effective only for those who are fighting in their own country. The enemy's idea of using "guerrilla against guerrilla" is useful temporarily, but not in the long run. The simple fact is that they are not fighting in their own soil. The enemy is now employing puppet and collaborationist troops for guerrilla work. The idea of "let the Chinese administer the Chinese" is a sound one.

These puppet guerrillas as a group have little nationalism or patriotic feeling. They work for the enemy in order to plunder their own people. The enemy take advantage of their knowledge of the locale and hire them. To counteract that, we must give proper training, leadership and high practice to our own guerrillas.

In the meantime we must strengthen our guerrillas and attack all puppet troops in order to soften and tempt them into our force for patriotic service. We must also guard against inflexibility and regard guerrilla warfare as the only means to combat the enemy.

The strengthened guerrilla forces would be able to facilitate revolt among the officers of the puppet troops. Those groups, because of the lack of political education, have become tools of the enemy. They have repudiated their own family to serve a base purpose. As time goes by their uneasy conscience must give them only torment. No matter how devoted they might be, they would never receive complete confidence from the Japanese. They were willing to sell themselves to the enemy; what assurance is there that they would not sell themselves again if the opportunity arises. For these reasons, all puppet troops

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are treated with suspicion. The ammunition is limited; heavy weapons are not allowed them. All key positions are staffed with Japanese advisers. Close watch is held on all personnel. Such puppet officers are subjected to constant tension and insecurity. When we show a sufficient guerrilla strength, all puppet troops regardless of rank would undoubtedly revolt. If not, would there be enough ships to transport them away when we secure final victory?

All the puppet troops realize this situation very well and would jump at the first opportunity to revolt before the Japanese withdraw. Therefore, we must increase our guerrillas in order to secure revolt.

The study on the relation of guerrillas to mobilization, on guerrillas and revolt of puppet troops, on guerrilla tactics and organizations, are in the following chapters of the book.

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