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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. In the USSR, it is primarily the higher staff and reserve officers of guerrilla groups who are organized and trained in military camps in peacetime. Guerrilla mobilization plans are drawn up and supplies, including weapons and ammunition, are stored in key areas. The organization is chiefly in the hands of the Party rayon committees. The attitude of the population is a decisive factor in the selection of areas for the preparation of guerrilla warfare. Thus, preparations are made in the Eastern Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine, and in Southern Belorussia, where the population can be counted on to cooperate with guerrilla groups. Certain areas near the Chinese border, notably Mongolia, are also believed to be favorably disposed.

2. In wartime, all guerrilla groups of brigade strength operate under the control of the Central Staff for Guerrilla Warfare (sic), which is subordinate to the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. This central staff selects guerrilla officers and, in some instances, enlisted men, preferably those born in areas under consideration, and sends them to guerrilla units, where they take charge of organization and operations. Liaison is established and maintained between the guerrilla unit and Moscow. If necessary, supplies may be drawn from other areas where control has been similarly established. There also may be an exchange of officer personnel between different regions.

3. Once the guerrilla group is organized, it will receive its orders for combat and will be absorbed into the general armed forces' structure. Combat orders for guerrilla groups are general; details of execution are necessarily left to the officers on the spot. If a guerrilla unit is stationed far from the front, its orders will emanate directly from Moscow; if it is close to the front, it may receive its orders through the appropriate army or corps commander.

4. Security measures within guerrilla groups include extensive secrecy even in the preparation of guerrilla warfare. Soviet propaganda media, including motion pictures, radio, and books, give extensive accounts of guerrilla

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STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FBI	AEC				
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operations during World War II but never allude to future operations. Military manuals may contain a paragraph or two on guerrilla fighting but limit themselves to statments of general principles and mention no details. Preparations which must take place in peacetime are camouflaged even as to designation. Assignment of officers to posts where arrangements for future guerrilla warfare are made are officially explained as "measures for the protection of the Communist Party", or with similar nondescript designations.

5. In wartime, security in partisan groups is enforced through extremely strict discipline, aided by the institution of semi-military courts which deal severely with any and all offenders. Even though the population is expected to be well disposed toward the guerrillas and is persuaded to help them, civilians are kept silent by the threat of retaliation against any one who may give information about the guerrillas to the enemy. Assassination awaits those who disregard the threat. Thus, the guerrillas use the weapons of persuasion and terror to protect themselves. Finally, source believes that among the officers and staffs assigned to guerrilla units by Moscow there are intelligence agents who know how to apply military security measures to guerrilla groups.

6. Source believes that at least a skeleton of the Central Staff of Guerrilla Warfare in Moscow operates in peacetime, selects future officers, and charts their functions. There is no doubt that the primary criterion for selecting a guerrilla officer is his political reliability. From past experience it can be stated that guerrilla officers are of excellent caliber. In addition to being politically reliable, they are well trained, have good area knowledge, and know how to act independently. The total guerrilla effort is undoubtedly guided by professional military men. On the level of the brigade-size guerrilla group, professional military men are in charge, but political officers play a major role. On the lower level, such as in the guerrilla troops, political officers predominate. Although some of them may be reserve officers in the Soviet Armed Forces, their main qualification is experience as Party functionaries. It is thought that political education among partisan fighters is meant to be a substitute for the strict military discipline in regular army units.

7. It is certain that the leaders are trained at the Voroshilov, the Frunze, or the Lenin Academies. Military leaders may be trained at Frunze, political leaders at Lenin, and both at the Voroshilov Academy. Other courses which may be applicable to guerrilla training may take place within the framework of DOSAAF and within the Komsomol groups, possibly without the student's realization that participation in a course will qualify them for partisan warfare. While source could give no first-hand information on the contents of the courses, he believes from extensive study of the general subject that the following may be included: Firing and repair of Soviet and American rifles and other small weapons; use and repair of Soviet and foreign combat and other vehicles; use and improvisation of signal equipment of all kinds; reconnaissance; camouflage; first-aid; identity and use of Soviet and foreign mines and other explosives; recognition of enemy units and equipment; reading of Soviet and foreign maps; orientation under adverse conditions; and guerrilla tactics.

8. Source believes that partisans will play a major role in a nuclear war involving the USSR. They will be used to disturb and harrass occupying units, force them to maintain their strength, and thereby reduce the number of enemy troops available for combat. The USSR covers a large territory which atomic weapons cannot destroy, and modern US army units are smaller in size than they were in the past. This will mean that a large number of US units will have to be assigned to occupation duty. In addition, partisan units would be employed to attack supply routes which, owing to the complexity of the equipment and supply requirements of a modern army, have gained in importance. Finally, the guerrilla forces would constitute an underground arm of the central Communist government in any area which

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had been cut off, especially if the inhabitants tried to rebuild the region under the sponsorship of an occupying power. The guerrillas would use terror and political persuasion to foster resistance and prevent pacification. Thus, their activity could counteract enemy advantages gained through nuclear attack.

9. Guerrillas may be charged with the protection of installations during retreat, as well as with the establishment of depots and similar installations during attack. Installations to be protected by guerrilla units may include ammunition dumps, bridges, and other important points. In the past, guerrillas have also been assigned such tasks as the removal of important documents and their transfer to a safer destination, as well the protection of gold reserves of the Soviet National Bank. In rehabilitating an area after destruction by the enemy, partisans can draw upon storage facilities prepared for them in peacetime, and on supplies available locally which, if necessary, can be requisitioned. This is supplemented by supplies brought in by parachute or air transport, and with goods and supplies obtained from the enemy. Among the articles primarily sought after have usually been medical necessities and clothing, both notoriously in shorter supply in guerrilla units than weapons or ammunition.

10. Both ground and air forces cooperate directly with partisan forces. The ground forces deliver supplies and provide specialists, such as technical troops. The air force supports them by bombing certain areas, providing aerial photographs, giving parachute and aircraft support, and furnishing courier service. It is assumed that in coastal areas the Soviet Navy could similarly be called upon to provide assistance. Such activities are undoubtedly coordinated through the Central Staff for Guerrilla Warfare in Moscow.

11. The primary motivation for partisans in the Soviet Union was, and undoubtedly would be in the future, patriotism. This motivation of the partisan fighter is supported in peacetime by constant political and patriotic appeals to the population. Inhabitants of the USSR in general have a feeling of belonging together against an attacking enemy. In addition to this, the Slavic population has great national pride coupled with a special tradition, going back to the Napoleonic wars, of using guerrilla tactics against invaders. Individually, a guerrilla fighter is also motivated by the knowledge that his government is behind him and will recognize his contribution after the war, when he will be entitled to a pension, to free university study, and to other priviledges exceeding those of an army veteran. Finally, a member of a partisan unit will be kept in line by the intensive discipline and by the fear of stern punishment against those who are believed to have lost courage and motivation.

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