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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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DIST 12 MAY 1969

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI NOVEMBER 1968 - MARCH 1969 (F) SVN: Phoenix

SUBJECT VIET CONG REACTION TO THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON /23 APRIL 1969/ FIELD NO.

STATINTL [redacted]

SOURCE THIS IS AN ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT PREPARED IN THE FIELD BY A CAS RESEARCH UNIT. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AS WELL AS SPECIFIC ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE VIET CONG FROM LATE NOVEMBER 1968 TO LATE MARCH 1969 INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ PACIFICATION AND PHOENIX PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN MAJOR COMMUNIST TARGETS. WHILE THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE HAS SET BACK THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN CERTAIN PROVINCES, ITS OVERALL EFFECT ON SUCH EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN SLIGHT. THE FAILURE TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE GVN EFFORTS WOULD APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE

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YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF VC WEAKNESS AND INABILITY TO MATCH ACTIONS WITH PLANS, EVEN AGAINST A RELATIVELY VULNERABLE TARGET. END SUMMARY.

1. THE VIET CONG REACTION TO THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND ITS COMPONENT, PHUNG HOANG DONG TIEN, /STEPPED-UP PHOENIX PROGRAM/ HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A RELATIVELY WIDE GAP BETWEEN CALLS FOR COUNTERACTION AND ACTUAL MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE PROGRAMS. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON 1 NOVEMBER 1968 REFERENCES TO IT APPEARED IN CAPTURED VC DOCUMENTS. /FIELD COMMENT. THE TERM ""ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM"" IS NOW PREFERRED TO THE INITIAL TITLE ""ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN."" INITIATED ON 20 OCTOBER 1968, THE PHUNG HOANG DONG TIEN WAS INCORPORATED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE INCREASED PACIFICATION EFFORT./ DURING THE NOVEMBER 1968-JANUARY 1969 PERIOD, SEVERAL COMPREHENSIVE VC DIRECTIVES WERE PROMULGATED AND INCLUDED COUNTERMEASURES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ PROGRAM. AN ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES DATED 25 NOVEMBER WAS BROADCAST OVER THE VC LIBERATION RADIO THREE DAYS LATER. A CIRCULAR, APPARENTLY ISSUED BY VC SUBREGION 3 /SR-3/ ON 26 NOVEMBER AND BY SUBREGION 5 /SR-5/ ON 10 DECEMBER, DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE

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PHOENIX STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES. A DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY SR-5 ON 12 DECEMBER ALSO DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM. DOCUMENTS PICKED UP IN VC MILITARY REGION 2 /MR-2/ AND APPARENTLY PUBLISHED THROUGHOUT THIS NOVEMBER-JANUARY PERIOD MENTIONED A VC ANTI-PACIFICATION PROGRAM WHICH HAD TWO STAGES, "RANG DONG 1 AND 2." SPECIAL EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON USING TACTICAL MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES.

2. THE DOCUMENTS INDICATE FOUR GENERAL KINDS OF COUNTERMEASURES.

A. MILITARY ATTACKS, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON GUERRILLA WARFARE TECHNIQUES, ON ALLIED UNITS CONDUCTING SWEEP OPERATIONS, ON REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES /RF-PF/ INVOLVED IN PACIFICATION TASKS, AND ON THE PACIFICATION TEAMS THEMSELVES.

B. TERRORIST ACTIVITY, STRESSING ASSASSINATION OF GVN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND RETURNEES, PLUS THE DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PACIFICATION EFFORT.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS DIRECTED AT UNCOVERING GVN INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS AND ELIMINATING THEIR MEMBERS, INSERTING VC AGENTS INTO THE NETWORKS AND INCREASING OTHER DEFENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES.

5 4 3 2 1 D. PROPAGANDA EFFORTS DIRECTED AT IMPROVING THE VC MORALE, RE-EDUCATING CAPTIVES RELEASED BY THE GVN, 5 4 3 2 1

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MOTIVATING THE MASSES TO CONDUCT POLITICAL STRUGGLE, ENCOURAGING SOUTHERN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE VILLAGES AND ENCOURAGING THE DEFECTION OF GVN MILITARY PERSONNEL, PACIFICATION CADRES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

3. THE DEFENSE, CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF VC LIBERATED AREAS WERE THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF VC COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORTS. WHILE DOCUMENTS REFER TO DAMAGE DONE BY THE PHOENIX AND PACIFICATION PROGRAMS, GVN EFFORTS ARE DESCRIBED AS A FRENZIED "LAST GASP," DOOMED TO FAILURE.

4. VC PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PLANS PROVIDE FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THE ANTI-PACIFICATION PROGRAM. GUERRILLAS IN QUE SON DISTRICT OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE REPORTEDLY WERE ORDERED IN JANUARY 1969 TO CONCENTRATE ON SNIPING AND THE USE OF MINES IN THWARTING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THE VC IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE WERE DIRECTED IN EARLY FEBRUARY TO MAKE ASSASSINATION LISTS OF GVN VILLAGE AND HAMLET CADRES, PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT MEMBERS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT /RD/ PERSONNEL. REPORTS FROM TRAN ON DISTRICT, VINH LONG PROVINCE, INDICATED THAT THE VC WERE ARRANGING TO BRIBE HAMLET AND OUTPOST CHIEFS, AND LOW-LEVEL GVN SECURITY PERSONNEL AS OF DECEMBER 1968.

5. PRIOR TO LAUNCHING THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE ON 22 FEBRUARY

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1969, THE VC APPEAR TO HAVE BEGUN IMPLEMENTING SOME OF THEIR ANTI-PACIFICATION PLANS. THE PHOENIX 1968 YEAR-END REPORT NOTED A GENERAL INCREASE IN VC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. ASSASSINATIONS AND INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION SHOWED A STEADY INCREASE BETWEEN LATE NOVEMBER 1968 AND LATE FEBRUARY 1969. THESE ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED UNEVENLY, HOWEVER, AND APPEAR NOT TO HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON THE SCALE PLANNED, WHICH PRESUMABLY WAS THE RESULT OF VC WEAKNESS. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A NOTABLE INCREASE OF TERRORISM IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ESPECIALLY DIRECTED AGAINST LOW-LEVEL GVN OFFICIALS, DURING DECEMBER AND JANUARY. A SHARP INCREASE IN TERRORISM OCCURRED IN III CORPS IN EARLY FEBRUARY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE PHUOC THUY PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN ATTACKS ON RD TEAMS IN THUA THIEN, VINH LONG AND BA XUYEN PROVINCES JUST PRIOR TO THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE, AND MORE THREATS OF ASSASSINATION AGAINST PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE CADRES, GVN OFFICIALS AND RF/PF MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY DURING THE DECEMBER-FEBRUARY PERIOD. ONE INNOVATION WAS THE ACTIVATION IN JANUARY 1969 OF A COUNTER-PACIFICATION COMMITTEE IN CHAU THANH DISTRICT IN VC SR-5. THE COMMITTEE INCLUDED PERSONNEL FROM YOUTH, WOMEN'S, FINANCE-ECONOMY, SUPPLY COUNCIL, MILITARY AFFAIRS, MILITARY PROSELYTING,

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TRAINING AND PROPAGANDA AND SECURITY SECTIONS.

6. FOLLOWING THE ONSET OF THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE, LIBERATION RADIO BROADCASTS CLAIMED THAT SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE WAS INFLICTED TO THE GVN PROGRAM BY THE OFFENSIVE. COVERT REPORTING FROM BINH DINH PROVINCE REFERS TO A CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM INSTRUCTION WHICH STATED THAT THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS TO ATTACK THE PROGRAM. A NORTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT IN VIENTIANE ALLEGEDLY STATED IN EARLY MARCH THAT THE CHIEF MISSION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS TO HELP DESTROY THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM. BUT A REVIEW OF THE TARGETS ACTUALLY HIT DURING THE OPENING STAGES OF THE OFFENSIVE AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE GVN PACIFICATION EFFORT WAS NOT THE IMMEDIATE OR MAJOR TARGET OF THE OFFENSIVE.

7. THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE DID HARM THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM TO SOME EXTENT, ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL EFFECT WAS NOT GREAT AND THE DAMAGE WAS LOCALIZED. BY MARCH, THERE WERE MORE ATTACKS ON THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING AN INCREASE IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL. AS OF 1 MARCH, CORDS REPORTED THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE OFFENSIVE, THE MOMENTUM OF PACIFICATION HAD SLOWED IN QUANG NAM, THUA THIEN, GIA DINH AND DINH TUONG PROVINCES AND THAT ITS MOMENTUM HAD BEEN

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HALTED IN THE RURAL AREAS OF QUANG TIN, KONTUM AND HAU NGHIA PROVINCES. FURTHER, PACIFICATION HAD BEEN SET BACK IN PHUOC THUY WHEN THE GVN SUFFERED MORE THAN A FIVE PERCENT LOSS IN POPULATION CONTROL. THE GVN DEFENSE EFFORT APPEARED TO HAVE COLLAPSED IN THE PROVINCE AND WAS ATTRIBUTED, IN PART, TO THE LOWER CALIBER OF GVN LEADERSHIP THERE. AS A RESULT, THE PHOENIX PROGRAM WAS LARGELY SUSPENDED AND THE RD EFFORT REDUCED TO A SECURITY ROLE.

8. BY MID-MARCH, KONTUM PROVINCE HAD MOVED INTO THE **PACIFICATION SET-BACK** CATEGORY AND THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SITUATION IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE HAD DETERIORATED. CORDS IN ITS EARLY MARCH TABULATION NOTED THAT QUANG NGAI PROVINCE HAD MORE RD TEAMS WITHDRAWN FOR SECURITY REASONS THAN ANY OTHER PROVINCE. AS THE MONTH PROGRESSED, PACIFICATION IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE WAS DAMAGED SINCE THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAMLETS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN HIT ESPECIALLY HARD BY THE VC.

9. THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM /HES/ STATISTICS FOR 31 MARCH INDICATED THAT THE FOLLOWING PROVINCES HAD SUFFERED OVER A ONE PERCENT DECREASE IN **RELATIVELY SECURE, GVN-CONTROLLED** POPULATION DURING THE MONTH--QUANG NGAI FROM 62.2 TO 59.3 PERCENT, PHU YEN FROM 89.4 TO 87 PERCENT, KONTUM FROM 92.4 TO 90.4 PERCENT.

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PHUOC LONG FROM 90.1 TO 88.3 PERCENT AND QUANG NAM FROM 65.6 TO 64.2 PERCENT. PHUOC LONG AND KONTUM WHICH WERE HARDEST HIT AT THE ONSET OF THE FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE CONTINUED TO DECLINE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT, ALBEIT AT A LOWER RATE. IN QUANG NAM WHERE PACIFICATION ENCOUNTERED TROUBLE SINCE DECEMBER 1968 AND IN QUANG NGAI WHERE DIFFICULTIES BEGAN IN LATE FEBRUARY, THE SITUATION APPARENTLY CONTINUES TO DECLINE. ACCORDING TO THE 31 MARCH STATISTICS THE SITUATION HAS BEEN STABILIZED IN QUANG TIN, HAU NGHIA, THUA THIEN, GIA DINH AND DINH TUONG PROVINCES INITIALLY AFFECTED BY THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE AND IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE WHERE SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN REPORTED DURING MARCH. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS SET OF HES STATISTICS SHOWS AN OVERALL INCREASE FOR THE WHOLE COUNTRY IN THE PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN THE **RELATIVELY SECURE, GVN-CONTROLLED** CATEGORY ON 31 MARCH AS COMPARED TO THE SITUATION ON 28 FEBRUARY.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USARV 7TH AIR FORCE USAID DIR/JUSPAO /MR. NICKEL ONLY/ USARV NAVFORV CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF /ALSO SENT

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