Joint Pub 2-0

Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations

5 May 1995



Intelligence plays a vital role in the conduct of successful joint operations. Proper deployment of collection and analysis assets is essential if joint force commanders are to gain and maintain intelligence dominance of the battlefield. Without this capability, our joint forces will lose the essential advantages of surprise, operational security, and flexibility.

As the 21st century approaches, we must also be cognizant of the changing roles and missions facing the Armed Forces of the United States and ensure that intelligence planning keeps pace with the full range of military operations. The future battlefield will demand high levels of joint interoperability and force enhancement, and the value of intelligence support as an exploitable multiplier cannot be overstated.

Joint force commanders, planners, and warfighters at all levels are encouraged to become thoroughly familiar with the doctrine in this publication and use it as a tool for meeting the Nation's future challenges.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Pub 2-0 is the keystone document of the joint intelligence support to joint operations series. This publication describes doctrine for intelligence support to joint or multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders, as cited in references, and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and guidance ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Nature of Intelligence
- Covers the Purposes of Intelligence
- Provides Joint Intelligence Principles and Assigns Joint Intelligence Responsibilities
- Discusses Intelligence Functions For Joint Operations
- Explains the Joint Intelligence Architecture
- Provides Guidance Concerning Intelligence For Multinational Operations

General

Intelligence support is critical to operational success.

All sides will attempt to determine **adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts.** All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operational security. Gaining and maintaining this **intelligence dominance** enhances the joint force commander's (JFC's) flexibility by opening additional operational options.

Sources of Intelligence and the Intelligence Cycle

There are three levels of intelligence support--strategic, operational, and tactical.

Strategic intelligence is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. **Operational intelligence** is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. **Tactical intelligence** is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

Intelligence sources are the means or systems used to observe, sense and record, or convey information.

There are **seven primary intelligence source types**: imagery intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence.

The intelligence cycle is a five step process that converts information into intelligence and is made available to users.

The US intelligence cycle has the following **five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.** It is important to recognize the clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence. **Information** is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence. The **application of analysis** transforms information into intelligence.

Intelligence Role

Intelligence provides the basis for action throughout the range of military operations.

Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to gather and analyze information on the environment of operations and the adversary. **During peacetime operations,** intelligence helps commanders make acquisition choices, protect technological advances, shape organizations, and design training to ready the joint force. **During operations other than war,** intelligence helps the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. At the strategic level, the **efforts** of strategic intelligence operations should be **focused in wartime** to make intelligence available to the operational and tactical levels, providing continuity and depth of coverage even while units are deploying.

Supporting the Campaign

Intelligence supports all aspects of the campaign.

J-2s at all command levels focus on **identifying adversary centers of gravity** and providing **timely, accurate intelligence** to the JFC necessary to execute the plan. The J-2 and intelligence organizations should be guided by fundamental intelligence purposes. The J-2 should:

Support the commander with complete and objective views of situations for timely and relevant decisionmaking.


Assist in identifying and determining objectives.

Provide intelligence for planning and conducting operations.

Secure operations by avoiding deception and surprise.

Secure operations through use of deception against the enemy.

Assist in evaluating the effects of operations and reorienting forces or terminating operations.



Joint Intelligence Responsibilities

National-level intelligence organizations support military instruments of policy that are being applied for national purposes.

National-level intelligence agencies and organizations that can support military operations should make that support available. Additionally, they should assist in **identifying other potential intelligence requirements** that may be addressable through their capabilities.

Commanders of combatant commands and subordinate joint force commanders define intelligence support needs.

The JFC is responsible for **identifying intelligence resources and establishing intelligence support procedures.** The scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, and composition of the force. The combatant command's **joint intelligence center (JIC)** ensures the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate joint force commands are satisfied.

Service component commanders provide intelligence support.

Service component commanders **develop component intelligence plans** based on the plans of the joint force; **plan reconnaissance operations** for the component operations, consistent with joint force plans; **ensure that feedback is provided to the JFC** on Service-related issues affecting the joint command; and **plan and develop implementing instructions** for wartime intelligence support including augmentation of joint forces.

Targeting

Target intelligence describes components of a target or target system and indicates their vulnerability and relative importance.

Targeting is the process of developing and selecting targets in response to the commander's guidance, objectives, commander's preparation of the battlespace and scenario, and matching the appropriate weapon system to them by taking into account existing operational requirements and capabilities. **The targeting cycle concludes with combat assessment** (battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, and reattack recommendation), which determines the effectiveness of operations in meeting combat or battle objectives and is the start of the retasking cycle.

Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force by operations and intelligence personnel. Targeting is sometimes complicated by the **need to deconflict or synchronize targeting** by different units within the joint force. Targeting should be based on campaign goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, the Law of Armed Conflict, and a thorough understanding of how the adversary state functions.

The J-2 provides critical support throughout the six-step targeting cycle: 1) National Command Authorities/ Commander's guidance and objectives, 2) target development, 3) weaponeering assessment, 4) force application, 5) execution planning and force execution, and 6) combat assessment.

Joint Intelligence Architecture

The joint intelligence architecture provides a multimedia communications network.

The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an **information network** with interoperable systems that link the theater JICs, joint task force (JTF) joint intelligence support elements (JISEs), deployed intelligence elements, Service intelligence, and national intelligence organizations in a **global grid.**

Joint Intelligence Center/Joint Intelligence Support Element

The joint intelligence center (JIC) and the joint intelligence support element (JISE) are the primary intelligence organizations providing support to joint warfighting at all levels.

The JIC concept **fuses** the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units into a **one stop shopping center for intelligence support.** While in reality, a particular JIC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every request for information, it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon.

The JIC can be used at the:

National level

At the national level, the **National Military Joint Intelligence Center** (NMJIC) is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities in support of joint operations and allows for **efficient access** to the entire DOD intelligence infrastructure in support of joint operations. The NMJIC serves the Washington, D.C. community, combatant commands, Services, and coalition partners and allies.

Theater/Regional level

At the theater/regional level, the **JIC is the principal element** for ensuring effective intelligence support for combatant commanders and theater forces.

The JISE supports the Joint Task Force level

At the joint task force level, the **JTF JISE** manages **collection, analysis, and fusion of intelligence and dissemination** up and down the echelon of intelligence and products for the joint operations area (JOA). The JISE is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA and is responsible for providing the JTF commander, JTF staff, and JTF components with the complete air, space, ground, and

maritime adversary situation by integrating and adding to the adversary situations developed by the combatant commanders' intelligence organization.

Multinational Intelligence Principles

For multinational doctrines, differences in cultural and national perspectives must be understood in order to adapt doctrines or forge new ones.

The principles used in multinational intelligence are: adjust national differences among nations, effort against the common threat, determine and plan requirements for intelligence special arrangements, coordinate intelligence sharing, provide for complementary intelligence operations, operate a combined intelligence center, and conduct intelligence liaison exchange activities.

CONCLUSION

The role intelligence plays in successful operations cannot be overstated. Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and determine when that end state has been achieved. The JIC and JISE are the primary intelligence organizations providing support to joint warfighting at all levels.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

"At the very heart of war lies doctrine. It represents the central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is of the mind, a network of faith and knowledge reinforced by experience which lays the pattern for the utilization of men, equipment, and tactics. It is fundamental to sound judgment."

General Curtis E. Lemay, USAF, 1968

1. General

This publication is one of the six keystone doctrine publications designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other joint keystone publications are personnel and administration (1-0); operations (3-0); logistics (4-0); plans (5-0); and command, control, communications, and computers systems (6-0). **Joint Pub 2-0 provides the overarching principles for intelligence support to joint operations.**

a. Joint intelligence doctrine **offers two perspectives. The first is the joint force commander's (JFC's) perspective** of the **uses of intelligence and** the **responsibilities and capabilities of J-2 and supporting intelligence organizations. Second is the J-2's perspective** of the **end toward** which **intelligence must work.**

b. From the moment joint operations are contemplated, the **JFC launches a continuing, interactive process** to develop and refine the commander's estimate of the situation. The **J-2 and J-2 staff have pivotal responsibilities** in this process, both in direct support of the commander and in interactions with the other J-staffs. At all stages, the J-2 and J-2 staff must contribute not only relevant intelligence but also a sophisticated understanding of how the adversary thinks.

c. **Critical to operational success is gaining intelligence dominance of the battlespace.** All sides will attempt to determine adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts. All sides will deploy their collection and analysis capabilities and will endeavor to conduct successful deceptions in attempts to gain surprise and provide operational security. Gaining and maintaining this intelligence dominance enhances the JFC's flexibility by opening additional operational options.

d. **Intelligence requirements are identified** based on the JFC's guidance and direction, estimate of the situation, and objectives. **The commander's requirements must be the principal driver** of intelligence system components, organization, services, and products. Ultimately, satisfying these requirements will depend on the ability of each J-2 and their intelligence staffs at all levels of command to (1) employ joint force organic intelligence resources; (2) identify and, when assigned, integrate additional intelligence resources such as the joint intelligence center (JIC) (see Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture"); and (3) apply national intelligence capabilities.

e. **The J-2 must integrate efforts** to develop and refine warfighting intelligence support capabilities into the commander's operation plans. The JFC's J-2 must work with other affected senior intelligence

officers (G-2, N-2, IN, and J-2) to develop a concept of intelligence operations tailored to the commander's operation plans. The intelligence annex must provide enough specific information for subordinate, lateral, and supporting commands to start doing what is expected without an extensive exchange of message traffic.

2. Supporting Doctrine

This document provides intelligence doctrine for joint operations. More detailed implementing methodology is under development in a **joint intelligence publication hierarchy** that includes:

a. Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Operations."

b. Joint Pub 2-01.1, "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Intelligence Support to Targeting."

c. Joint Pub 2-01.2, "Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Counterintelligence Support to Operations."

d. Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

e. Joint Pub 2-03, "JTTP for Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Support."

3. Purpose of Intelligence Doctrine

Intelligence doctrine provides principles of intelligence for effective support of JFCs and their forces. A **common doctrine**, shared by all elements of a joint force and supporting organizations, increases the probability that responsive intelligence systems will provide JFCs with accurate, timely, relevant, and adequate intelligence. The doctrine also includes what must be considered and what generally should be done. Its application requires an understanding of the situation and judgment. **The doctrine provides a framework** within which intelligence should be developed and used to support the JFC's conduct of military operations.

4. Sources and Methodology

a. The principles of war (Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations") are the basis for the principles of intelligence for joint operations. The **principles of intelligence** were developed from joint and Service doctrines, theory, history, and the lessons learned from the successes and failures of wars and operations.

b. In keeping with the Joint Pub 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," doctrine definition and intelligence principles are provided to transcend individual command, Service, and theater perspectives. The principles are presented in terms of military operations to avoid the error of addressing either operations or intelligence as having distinctly separate wartime and peacetime concepts. These principles apply across the range of military operations.

ULTRA
"Too Much Intelligence?"

Frederick the Great instructed his generals over two hundred years ago, "If you know the enemy's plans beforehand you will always be more than a match for him..." Seldom this century has this maxim proven more true than during the period 1939-1945 with ULTRA, the code name under which highly sensitive intelligence resulting from the solution of high grade codes and cyphers was passed between selected Allied individuals.

A decisive event in breaking the German cyphers and the subsequent evolution of ULTRA occurred when pre-war (1939) Polish intelligence officers, in concert with their government's attempts at defending against a German attack and therefore contributing to the cause of an Allied victory over Germany, turned over to the French and British duplicates of the German Enigma machine used for encoding messages.

Although the procurement of the German Enigma machine proved to be the most noted event in the development of special intelligence, other factors contributed as well. Material seized from German submarines and weather/ supply ships, material taken from Italian submarines and documents captured in the North African desert war proved valuable as did German diplomatic material provided to the OSS by individuals involved in the internal opposition to Hitler. In fact, by 1943 British cryptographers had also broken into the German "secret writing machine," (the geheimschreiter) a different encoding system from Enigma.

The specifics of the evolution of the special intelligence system notwithstanding, the ULTRA network proved highly reliable giving those trusted with the secret a clear view of the enemy's operations and intentions. Such capability was unprecedented in military history! — but also presented special problems. The historian, John Winton, summarizes this problem aptly;

"When one player consistently knows which cards his opponent holds, how much and how often dare he go on winning before his opponent begins to suspect and changes the cards or the game?"

Such was the dilemma of those read into the ULTRA secret. Consequently, their actions, at least in the early days, were fraught with caution. "Too much success could be dangerous," Winton's account surmises, "Too many U-boats sunk, for instance, at their remote refueling rendezvous might arouse the enemy's suspicions and cause him to change cyphers which had been only broken after much labour over a long period of time. Worse, it might even cause him to doubt the inviolability of the Enigma coding machine."

But, in spite of numerous events where the Allies felt certain that ULTRA would be compromised, Nazi planners stubbornly refused to doubt the inviolability of Enigma. Indeed, years passed before some German participants learned of the extent the Allies knew of their operations and intentions. Gerhardt Weinberg, in his general history of World War II, cites an international conference on signals intelligence held in the fall of 1978, where a number of participants who had played active roles in these events still found it hard to

believe that their machine codes had been read by the Allies. Of course, it is possible that a signals officer within the Reich, in view of the uncanny "luck" the Allies seemed to hold in thwarting some German campaign plans, might have become suspicious of the security of German secrets. However, if true, none was so convinced to compile the evidence and report it. Weinberg, somewhat insightfully, offers this explanation:

"...in the intellectual climate of Nazi Germany, and more particularly in the Byzantine atmosphere of intrigue and jealousy in Hitler's court, it would have been an exceptionally bold man who went to the Fuhrer's bunker and, like he who drew aside Praim's tent curtain at dead of night and told him half Troy was burned, informed Hitler that the Third Reich's communications system for all three services, world-wide, must now be considered insecure and should be entirely reconstituted, from the basic essential upwards, with fresh codes and procedures...a gross breach of security by the Allies would be needed to convince Hitler and the many intelligence officers whose careers (to say nothing of their lives) depended upon the continuing belief that the Enigma was invulnerable."

Hence, the ULTRA secret remained so. In fact by the end of the war, the information became so complete and comprehensive—not merely of military significance, but also political and economic—that the enemy could scarcely make a move without the Allies knowing of it and thereby enjoying the advantage of meeting him at a controlled time and place. Indeed, without Special Intelligence the war most certainly would have been much more costly in terms of lives lost in the defense of freedom.

SOURCES: Winton, John, Ultra at Sea, New York: Morrow & Co., 1988.
Weinberg, Gerhard L., A World at Arms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE

"One of the surest ways of forming good combinations in war should be to order movements only after obtaining perfect information of the enemy's proceedings. In fact, how can any man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?

"As it is unquestionably of the highest importance to gain this information, so it is a thing of the utmost difficulty, not to say impossibility, and this is one of the chief causes of the great difference between the theory and the practice of war."

Jomini, The Art of War, 1838

1. Introduction

This chapter defines intelligence and sources of intelligence and describes the processes of the intelligence cycle. Principles associated with each step of the intelligence cycle are also identified.

2. Definitions

a. **Strategic intelligence** is intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels.

b. **Operational intelligence** is intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations.

c. **Tactical intelligence** is intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations.

3. Intelligence Sources

Intelligence sources are the **means** or **systems** used to observe, sense, and record or convey information of conditions, situations, and events. As shown in Figure II-1, there are **seven primary source types:** imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and counterintelligence (CI).




Figure II-1. Intelligence Sources

4. The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle (Figure II-2) **is the process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users.** DOD users include the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), combatant commanders (CINCs), and all other commanders and forces. **The US intelligence cycle has the following five steps: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination.** The intelligence cycle is a highly simplified model of intelligence operations in terms of processes. As a model, it is important to note that **intelligence actions do not always follow sequentially through the cycle.** For instance, a request for imagery causes activity in the planning and direction step but may not involve new collection, going instead to a production facility where imagery is drawn from an archive. The intelligence cycle, however, presents intelligence activities as a structure for the discussion of intelligence doctrine. To better understand intelligence and its cycle, it is important to recognize the **clear and critical distinction between information and intelligence**. Information is data that have been collected but not further developed through analysis, interpretation, or correlation with other data and intelligence**. The application of analysis transforms information into intelligence.**




Figure II-2. The Intelligence Cycle

Both information and intelligence are important, and both may exist together in some form. They are not, however, the same thing, and thus they have different connotations, applicability, and credibility.

a. **Planning and Direction**

- **Planning and direction involve establishing the command relationships** between all intelligence elements within the joint force and **identifying, prioritizing, and validating intelligence and intelligence system requirements.** This step also includes preparing a collection plan, determining essential elements of information (EEI), issuing requests for information (RFI) collection and production, and continuously monitoring the availability of collected data.

- **Collection planning is normally conducted through the Collection Requirements Management (CRM) process.** CRM registers, validates, and prioritizes collection, exploitation, and dissemination requirements to meet the information needs of joint and component force commanders. Through the development of a comprehensive collection plan or strategy, **CRM tasks requirements** to appropriate organic, attached, and supporting external organizations and

agencies (Figure II-3). CRM also **monitors the overall satisfaction of these requirements** and assesses the effectiveness of the collection strategy to satisfy the original and evolving intelligence needs.

- **Planning and direction also includes identifying:** intelligence personnel augmentation requirements to the J-1, key logistical requirements to the J-4, lift and transportation requirements in the time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) to the J-5, and communications requirements for intelligence operations to the J-6. This step also includes **establishing and coordinating intelligence dissemination procedures and systems** with subordinate, lateral, and higher intelligence organizations and commands, and **identifying national-level support requirements.**

b. **Collection.** Collection includes both the **acquisition of information** and the **provision of this information** to processing and/or production elements.

"Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful character."

Clausewitz, On War, 1832

- **Collection Management Principles**

  •• Joint force collection management must be able to task any joint force collection asset and obtain the aid of external resources (e.g., theater and national) in acquiring needed intelligence.

  •• Economies realized from centralization must not diminish the collection management element's responsiveness to the requirements of the joint force.

- **Collection Guidelines**

  •• **Intelligence Collection Activities. Collection resources** supporting military operations **should be allocated or tasked** to satisfy anticipated and potential operational and tactical




Figure II-3. Types of Intelligence Support

intelligence requirements of all command levels and elements of the joint force. **Different types of collection capabilities may be needed** so information from one source type can be tested or confirmed by others in order to subject the full range of enemy activity to observation. **The collection system also needs some redundancy** so the loss or failure of one collection asset can be compensated for by duplicate or different assets capable of answering the intelligence need. To function effectively at the start of joint or multinational operations, responsibilities and procedures to optimize intelligence collection must be in existence and practiced during peacetime.

•• **EEI and Intelligence Requirements. The JFC is responsible for identifying and determining the EEI for the mission.** In turn, the J-2 is responsible for identifying the intelligence shortfalls, stating them in terms of intelligence requirements, and then tasking collection assets, conducting exploitation/production, and ensuring dissemination. Identification of pre-planned EEI greatly enhances intelligence support to the joint force.

•• **Intelligence Requirements.** At each level of command, **senior intelligence officers must be aware of their command's intelligence requirements, as well as those of the next higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands**. The collection or production capabilities of one component of a joint force may be able to satisfy another's requirements. Acting for the JFC, the J-2 (collection management) can task resources to collect, process, and exploit the information to fulfill the most important requirements of the joint force based on assigned or potential missions. See Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Operations," and Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for requirements management details.

•• **The J-2 Must be Knowledgeable of Available Collection Resources.** A corollary to the above is that the J-2 must be aware of the abilities, limitations, and leadtime required for tasking intelligence collection and production.

•• **Coordination of Collection Sources. Collection operations** (including data exchange) of all collection sources **should be synchronized and coordinated** to allow cross-cuing and tipoff among collectors. The data collected should be integrated and correlated in all-source analysis, as appropriate. Resulting overlapping, multisource collection capabilities should be used to reduce the effects of enemy denial and deception measures and to improve the accuracy and completeness of intelligence.

•• **Collection Opportunity and Command and Control Warfare Tradeoffs.** When determining intelligence operations, the JFC's staff and the components should **identify and compare the longer term value of continued intelligence collection against enemy elements, with the immediate tactical value of destroying or countering a source of intelligence**. The J-2 and J-2 staff should monitor collection results and provide feedback to the JFC to assist in determining when specific targets can be nominated for attack. **The J-2**,

in conjunction with national intelligence organizations and the components, **should nominate a "no strike" target list** to the J-3 and keep it updated. The JFC will determine when and if these targets are to be attacked.

- **Collection Operations Management (COM) Responsibilities. COM activities are driven by collection requirements.** COM provides authoritative and coordinated direction and tasking of the broad array of technical sensor operations and HUMINT collection operations and their associated processing and dissemination resources.

c. **Processing. Processing is the action of converting information to formats that can be readily used by intelligence personnel** in the analysis and production of intelligence. Processing includes data form and format conversions, graphics, art work, photographic developing, video production, printing, and computer applications.

d. **Production. Intelligence production is the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information** from single or multiple sources **into finished intelligence** for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. A term associated with production is "intelligence application." **Intelligence application is the direct extraction and tailoring of information from an existing foundation of intelligence and near-real-time reporting.** It is focused on and meets specific requirements, normally on demand. Examples are provided in Figure II-4.



Figure II-4. Examples of Intelligence Applications

- **Production Guidelines**

•• **Focus on the Purpose and Use of Intelligence.** To better understand the exact needs of the consumer•and the best way of answering the requirements, **the producer needs to know who will use the intelligence** at what level(s) of command, the user's mission, the general intelligence requirements and responsibilities, and purpose of the intelligence products.

•• **Objectivity.** Producers must be **objective, unbiased,** and **avoid any tendency toward preconceived ideas.** When conflicting information exists, efforts should be made to resolve the difference. If time or resources are inadequate to provide unambiguous intelligence, the JFC should be made aware of the ambiguity or uncertainty. Commanders need all available pertinent intelligence, including conflicting or contradicting information and opinion.

•• **Provide Integrated Products. Intelligence analysts** at JICs and other fusion centers **should use information available from multiple sources**, integrate it, and provide the decisionmaker with a clear picture.

•• **Coordinate Production Among Echelons. Intelligence production should be coordinated from national through tactical levels.** These production activities should **be directed and coordinated by the J-2** so they are mutually supporting and nonduplicative. (1) **Intelligence production** for joint operations **is accomplished** by units and organizations **at every echelon.** It includes Service-unique products at the component commands and operating forces. (2) **Intelligence produced at higher echelons** is derived from both collection assets organic to that echelon or higher and a refinement and compilation of intelligence received from subordinate units and external organizations. **Subordinate units**, in turn, use the intelligence products sent to them by the senior command to determine or adjust their mission and/or strategy.

- **Production Responsibilities. Higher echelons are responsible for ensuring subordinates are provided any required intelligence exceeding the subordinate's organic production capability.** Toward this end, higher echelon commanders and J-2s should identify organizations able to contribute, and take necessary actions to provide JFCs with required intelligence products and services.

- **Production Management. Production management** is a critical element in ensuring **effective and efficient military intelligence production** in support of joint operations. Within each production agency, production managers receive, review, validate, prioritize, and coordinate production requirements to determine the producer and schedule, the task, and editing requirements for intelligence products. Automated data processing (ADP) on-line updates are controlled by the production manager. **Strict controls should be applied to changing information in ADP systems** that can be accessed by other organizations. There must be a designated approving authority for such changes. Routinely, only one organization will have the authority to change a specific item (e.g., a data field in a record in an official data base).

e. **Dissemination. Dissemination is conveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form.** As shown in Figure II-5, **intelligence is disseminated in many forms**, using a variety of means. Dissemination means include personal contact, physical transfer or courier of hard copy textual and graphic materials, digital and analog media (magnetic tape and optical disks), video-teleconference, telephones, FAX transmissions, messages, briefings, remote terminal access to computer data bases, and direct data transfers. In addition, tactical intelligence can be disseminated via intercom, tactical data systems, tactical radio circuits, and tactical radio and satellite broadcasts. **Each intelligence dissemination method can be further categorized as secure or nonsecure, over dedicated or common-user communications, and/or raw or finished intelligence.** The diversity of forms and dissemination paths reinforces the need for interoperability among command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems.




Figure II-5. Forms of Intelligence Dissemination

- **Joint intelligence dissemination should be consistent with the C4I for the Warrior** concept that allows the warfighter to obtain functionally integrated or fused intelligence based on the warrior's requirements for intelligence exchange. **This concept allows intelligence organizations external to the joint force to satisfy joint force intelligence needs** to the maximum extent possible if they: (1) have sufficient knowledge of the joint force requirements through preplanned EEI (which involves tailoring data bases); (2) emphasize pushing intelligence to the warfighter (throug over-the-air updates); and (3) accom odate warrior pull on demand (allowi g automated access to theater and national data bases through such systems as the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS)). **This concept results in timely intelligence, makes maximum use of automation, and minimizes the flow of RFI messages and intelligence reports.** Broadcasts such as the tactical information broadcast service and the tactical related applications (TRAP) are examples of over-the-air updates that provide time-sensitive intelligence to tactical commanders. Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture," provides a more comprehensive discussion of the joint intelligence architecture.

- **An important consideration in the dissemination process is management of information transmitted over communications systems.** JFCs should ensure for provision of critical, time-sensitive intelligence for force protection and operations, using the "push-pull" system to receive finished intelligence products from higher or adjacent commanders and intelligence producers. JFCs should manage information dissemination in terms of the product, available communications paths through dynamic bandwidth management, and time sensitivity to ensure the joint force receives what is required to support joint operations. Intelligence dissemination should be continuously reviewed throughout the joint operation.

CHAPTER III
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

"The great military victory we achieved in DESERT STORM and the minimal losses sustained by US and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis."

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, Commander in Chief, US Central Command, 1991

1. Introduction

The role intelligence (including CI) plays in full-dimensional operations cannot be overstated. **Intelligence provides insights concerning exploitable opportunities to defeat the adversary and helps JFCs clearly define the desired end state and when that end state has been achieved.** "**Exploiting the information differential**," as called for in Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," occurs throughout the joint force as **fused and tailored intelligence helps synchronize multiple efforts and contributes to the success of the joint team.** Exploiting the information differential can be key to avoiding unnecessary and expensive operations in terms of lives and national resources. **Actions that JFCs are able to take prior to the initiation of hostilities can assist in determining the shape and character of future operations.** Most inclusive is "**preparing the theater**," which involves intelligence and CI operations to understand clearly the capabilities, intentions, and possible actions of potential opponents, as well as the geography, weather, demographics, and culture of the operational area. **Intelligence identifies and nominates relevant and attainable military objectives** through assessments of adversary capabilities, intent, and exploitable vulnerabilities**. Once military objectives are determined, they become the guidelines for defining intelligence requirements** to support subsequent operational decisionmaking.

2. Intelligence Is the Basis of Operations

Intelligence is fundamental to effective planning, security, and deception. Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to **gather and analyze information** on the environment of operations and the adversary. **Obtaining and synthesizing intelligence prior to beginning operations is a vital task.** Assembling an accurate picture of the battlespace requires centralized direction, simultaneous action at all levels of command, and timely distribution of information throughout the command. **Intelligence operations may employ any of the joint force's resources and may access collateral force, theater, and national resources.** Joint force resources include units in contact with the adversary, patrols, air defense elements, intelligence units, reconnaissance units, and attached liaison officers. **Collection and production** of SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, TECHINT, OSINT, along with CI services, **provide JFCs at all levels with the intelligence they need** to apply their available forces wisely, efficiently, and effectively. Intelligence also provides more specialized and detailed data to operators and staffs across the range of intelligence disciplines to enable them to fulfill the JFC's intent. **Intelligence provided to the**

commander must be clear, brief, relevant, and timely. Wartime support to the commander must be anticipatory and precise. The intelligence system should maximize and synchronize the support offered to the JFC while minimizing the demands it makes on the JFC. Figure III-1 illustrates aspects of intelligence efforts across the range of military operations.

a. **Intelligence Efforts During Peacetime Operations.** During peacetime operations, **intelligence helps commanders** make acquisition choices, protect technological advances, shape organizations, and design training to ready the joint force. **Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions** to identify threats to US interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively, efficiently, and in a manner consistent with US values. **Information shortfalls are identified and eliminated.** Intelligence units are employed or deployed as early as directed to support US initiatives and assist allies. Forces not deployed train for operations other than war and war.

b. **Intelligence Efforts During Operations Other Than War.** During operations other than war, **intelligence helps the JFC decide** which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. The often subtle, complex, and occasionally insoluble problems associated with operations other than war make this **an extremely demanding sphere for intelligence**. Profound area expertise and an understanding of the limits of military power in unique environments are essential. Although supporting the effort to reduce or eliminate sources of conflict, intelligence constantly prepares for escalation to war.

c. **Intelligence Efforts During War. At the strategic level, wartime intelligence efforts intensify.** The efforts of strategic



Figure III-1. Intelligence Efforts

intelligence operations should be focused in wartime to **make intelligence available to the operational and tactical levels.** The strategic level provides continuity and depth of coverage even while units are deploying. **Exchange of intelligence among all echelons and components of the joint force is essential. Intelligence identifies decisive points** for the optimum application of combat power, and when properly disseminated to the JFC, **reduces uncertainty** about the enemy and the environment. **Intelligence allows the JFC to focus and leverage combat power** and to **determine acceptable risk** to achieve powerful, dynamic concentrations where the enemy is vulnerable. Intelligence allows the JFC to **see to the maximum range of his organic weapon systems** and beyond. By helping the commander form the most authentic possible vision of future events across the battlespace, intelligence makes time an ally instead of an enemy. Normally, the greatest challenge for JFCs is to focus the intelligence effort and to gain dissemination of intelligence to the right place in time for key decisions.

"Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavour to penetrate the designs of the enemy."

Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses, 1517

3. Supporting the Campaign

As stated in Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," **a campaign is a series of related joint major operations** that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives**. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected** in time, space, and purpose. JFCs plan and conduct campaigns. **Campaigns are joint and serve as the focus for the conduct of war and often in operations other than war.** A wartime campaign is the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations—as well as interagency and multinational operations—in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives. **Intelligence supports all aspects of the campaign.** J-2s at all command levels focus on identifying adversary centers of gravity and providing timely, accurate intelligence to the JFC necessary to execute the plan.

4. Intelligence Purposes

Figure III-2 summarizes intelligence purposes.

a. **Supporting the Commander. The J-2 directly supports the JFC's responsibilities for determining objectives, directing operations, and evaluating the effects of those operations.** This J-2 function is coincident with, but separate from, responsibilities to support the mission planning and direction functions of the commander's staff, and responsibilities to lateral and subordinate commands. The J-2 analyzes the potential threat situation and provides assessments for friendly opportunities.

b. **Identifying and Determining Objectives. "Objective" is the first principle of war to be supported by intelligence. All other aspects of military operations are dependent on the determination of clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objectives.** In the process of identifying and nominating military objectives, the J-2 should understand the command's responsibilities; the JFC's mission and intent; means available, including multinational forces; opposing forces; weather; and characteristics of the operating area. **Intelligence should provide the**

commander with an understanding of the adversary in terms of the adversary's intent, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, and critical vulnerabilities. **The J-2 then nominates attacking those adversary capabilities and exploiting those adversary vulnerabilities** critical to both the JFC's and the adversary's likely courses of action as friendly objectives. Once objectives are determined by the commander, intelligence must continuously review them with respect to the adversary and the changing situation to see whether they remain relevant to the commander's intent.

c. **Planning and Conducting Operations. Intelligence should be provided at all**

INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

The J-2 and intelligence organizations should be guided by fundamental intelligence purposes.

- **SUPPORTING THE COMMANDER:** The J-2 should directly support commanders with complete and objective views of situations so that commanders can make decisions that are relevant to their responsibilities, missions, and to the situation as it is best understood. This intelligence function is coincident with J-2 responsibilities to support the commander's staff, forces, and other commands.
- **IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING OBJECTIVES:** The J-2 should advise and provide intelligence to commanders that will help them determine objectives that will attain or assist national security policy objectives and the derived and supporting military objectives.
- **PLANNING AND CONDUCTING OPERATIONS:** The J-2 should provide intelligence needed in developing, planning, and executing the operations as determined by the commander.
- **SECURITY OF OPERATIONS--AVOIDING DECEPTION AND SURPRISE:** Intelligence systems should be structured and operated to reduce the chance of being deceived or surprised. They should be flexible and able to recover if surprise does occur.
- **SECURITY OF OPERATIONS THROUGH DECEPTION:** Concurrent with determining and planning operations, the J-2 should provide the commander an understanding of the adversary's command and control and intelligence systems so deception and denial measures can be used against the adversary.
- **EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS AND REORIENTING FORCES OR TERMINATING OPERATIONS:** The J-2 should assist the commander and staff in evaluating operational results and determining when objectives have been attained so forces may be reoriented or operations terminated.

Figure III-2. Intelligence Purposes



The U-2 reconnaissance aircraft provides tactical intelligence to commanders at all levels.

command levels for planning, directing, and conducting operations once the objectives, nature, and scope of military operations have been determined by the JFC. This intelligence will be critical to commanders and staffs in identifying and selecting specific objectives and targets and in determining the means, operations, and tactics to be used in achieving the JFC's overall mission. **The J-2 then supports the execution of the plan with** the **combat intelligence** needed to sustain the operations, attain joint force objectives, and achieve force protection. To maintain the initiative**, the JFC will seek to get inside the adversary's decisionmaking cycle**; i.e., the JFC will seek to develop procedures and an organization in order to receive new and accurate intelligence and respond to the new situation faster than the adversary. The J-2 must help in identifying the adversary's decisionmaking cycle and identifying weaknesses that may be exploited.

d. **Security of Operations—Avoiding Deception and Surprise. The way J-2s and supporting intelligence organizations approach collection, analysis, and dissemination will determine, to a large extent, friendly force vulnerability to adversary deception efforts.** A focused, all-source analysis effort (e.g., What should be happening? How can we determine if it is or is not happening?) can test the viability of competing analytical hypotheses. Despite the apparent weight of evidence and decisionmaker predispositions, **intelligence analysts should remain sensitive to the possibility they are being deceived** and should keep alive any hypothesis that could prove viable. Similarly, **analytical approaches that attend to negative intelligence (e.g., activity that should be taking place but apparently is not) are particularly valuable.** JFCs deserve an up-front dialogue in which uncertainties are acknowledged and possible alternative explanations are discussed along with an assessment of currently assigned probabilities.

e. **Security of Operations Through Military Deception**

- Attacking the mind of the adversary—to mislead, delude, or create uncertainty—helps achieve the security and surprise principles of war. **Intelligence provides the two critical components** that are the basis for

effective friendly unit actions and effective psychological operations in support of deceptions that enhance operations security (OPSEC) and surprise. **The first component** is analysis of the adversary's susceptibility to deception and surprise**. The second component** is the feedback to operations on the adversary's actions and determining if they are responses to the deception. That is, just how successful is the ongoing deception? An effective approach is for the JFC to decide what the adversary should perceive (and for how long) as an integral part of identifying objectives and developing the operational plan. **The process of identifying deception objectives to complement operational objectives should be an interactive process** with the commander in a central role orchestrating the efforts of the operations, intelligence, and CI resources. In this process, **the J-2 should help the commander and the staff gain insights into the adversary's intelligence capability** to process, filter, ascribe meaning to, and use intelligence about the situation. This understanding is essential for all successful deception and OPSEC efforts. **These insights include:**

•• **Information sources at the adversary's disposal** (potential communications routes to the deception targets).

•• **How the adversary will process and evaluate information** (Who will see it? What will it be compared with? How long will it take? What will be considered relevant? What analytical models will be used? What is the adversary predisposed to believe? What organizational or cultural biases will influence the process?).

- **CI activities can provide valuable support to deception planning.** The joint force Counterintelligence Support Officer should be included in all deception planning (see Joint Pub 2-01.2, "JTTP for Counterintelligence Support to Operations").

f. **Evaluating the Effects of Operations and Reorienting Forces or Terminating Operations. Intelligence should assist JFCs in determining when objectives have been attained** so joint forces may be reoriented or operations terminated. **Intelligence evaluates military operations by assessing their effect on the adversary situation** with respect to the JFC's intent and objectives and those of the adversary. This process is called combat assessment (CA).

DECEPTION IN OPERATION DESERT STORM

The Chinese classical writer Sun Tzu maintains that all warfare is based on deception. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf exemplified this premise in leading the campaign to drive the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait in Operation DESERT STORM. Schwarzkopf's planners, mindful of Saddam Hussein's army being accustomed to fighting set-piece battles employing massed head on assaults against Iranian forces, observed that the Iraqis would probably be disposed to expect and prepare for such fighting against the coalition forces. Thus, CENTCOM strategists encouraged Saddam to expect a frontal attack by arraying the coalition forces during Operation DESERT SHIELD in a heavy double line where he was strongest, along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border.

Schwarzkopf's planners also took advantage of the limited observation capabilities of the Iraqis by applying the coalition's superior air power early in the conflict to systematically destroy the capabilities of the Iraqi Air Force, thus making it almost impossible for the Iraqis to observe the disposition of U.S. and coalition forces. After the Iraqi Air Force was neutralized, the redeployment of coalition assets began and the deception trump cards were played.

Several hours after the air operation had commenced, Schwarzkopf inaugurated a colossal movement of forces north-westward, away from the Kuwaiti border and along the Iraqi border. Some 100,000 troops and 1,200 tanks, in short, the whole second line of massed troops along the Kuwaiti border, including the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, moved 200 miles to the northwest. This movement began with the redeployment, by air and on the ground, of the XVIII Airborne Corps from the far right of the coalition line a distance of some 360 miles to fill the new western-most position. To elude Iraqi intelligence, the corps was held south of Tapline Road. Planners also feared that Bedouins in the area might report troop movements. To minimize this possibility, Saudi Arabian light units had been sent in beforehand to clear the area of as many Bedouins as possible.

The VII Corps likewise moved deftly from its old position to its new one, an average distance of 140 miles, placing its 1st Cavalry Division (transferred from XVIII Corps to VII Corps), the 1st Infantry Division, and the British 1st Armored Division conspicuously on line. The VII Corps deliberately left a gap on its left between itself and the XVIII Airborne Corps to encourage the Iraqis to believe that the coalition line ended with the VII Corps' position. The VII Corps' other armored elements, the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, were moved into line only later in the deployment where their presence intentionally surprised the Iraqis.

The VII Corps also achieved surprise through deceptive measures, leaving behind an entire decoy military base south of the Wadi al-Batin, with mock missiles, fuel dumps, radio traffic, trucks, and tanks, while at the same time making abundant use of multispectral close combat decoys. This deception made it harder for the Iraqis to realize that all of VII Corps' forces were being evacuated to the west. U.S. planners also fielded special teams along the Kuwaiti border to set up mock headquarters in the rear of would-be assault axes. These headquarters aired a high volume of encrypted radio messages

so that Iraqi listeners would have the impression that major forces were operating in the area. In fact, the headquarters consisted of only a few troops using portable equipment at otherwise deserted sites.

Meanwhile, coalition air bombardments continued to be directed at targets in Kuwait—not targets to the west—to suggest that Kuwait would be the object of the main ground attack. Skirmishing along the Kuwaiti border was also maintained to draw the Iraqi planners' attention. Similarly, just west of the Kuwaiti border in the VII Corps' sector, the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Infantry Division conducted counter-reconnaissance raids after 9 February.

An additional dimension of deception activity, besides masking the stealthy relocation of the coalition line was the demonstration of amphibious assault capabilities. As part of this ruse, an impressive amphibious assault task force was stationed conspicuously off the coast of Kuwait. This fleet was comprised of forty amphibious landing craft, the largest such force to be assembled since Inchon. The force contained the most up-to-date, equipment-laden amphibious ships, as well as aircraft carriers to provide preparatory air bombardments, close combat support, and helicopter airlift. Battleships provided offshore artillery support. For movement to the beach, these forces were equipped with new LVTP-7s (landing, vehicle, track, personnel), LCAC (landing craft air cushion) hovercraft, and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, among other things. In short, this was a powerful and credible force stationed threateningly close to the Iraqi defenses along the coast.

To solidify what must have been Saddam's prediction of the axis of attack, CENTCOM regularly made references to the press concerning the training capabilities, and presence of the amphibious force in the Persian Gulf and, later, off the coast of Kuwait. On 1 February, *Newsweek* magazine carried a feature article on the planned amphibious invasion. To keep the idea of a beach assault in the news, large-scale amphibious rehearsals were conducted, including, notably, the one held during the last 10 days of January in which 8,000 U.S. Marines landed on the coast of Oman. Moreover, during this period, Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams) carried out numerous missions along the Kuwaiti coast to gather information on the beach gradients and firmness of the sand, the nature and location of minefields, and the disposition of enemy forces. Carrier air and naval artillery missions were also executed throughout the period to support suspicions of a major coalition amphibious assault.

So that Iraqi commanders would continue to anticipate an amphibious attack, U.S. amphibious support vessels along the coast remained positioned as if threatening to attack, and the battleships *Missouri* and *Wisconsin* and carrier-based aircraft continued bombardments. The object was to fix the six Iraqi infantry divisions deployed along the shoreline, and this was achieved. Iraqi strategists made no early effort to withdraw their forces from the coastal defense works, with the consequence that those forces were rapidly pinned against the coast by the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, which had broken through the lines in the south.

Meanwhile, to the northwest, airmobile forces of the XVIII Airborne Corps air assaulted deep into Iraq, establishing forward staging areas. The French 6th Light Armored Division secured the Salmon airstrip. On the following day, the

101st Airborne Division blocked Highway 8. According to the original plan, the VII Corps was supposed to delay its advance for a day while the Iraqi forces were drawn into battle in the vicinity of Kuwait. Coalition forces, however, were so successful that the delay was unnecessary and Schwarzkopf ordered the VII Corps to advance earlier than planned, on the afternoon of 24 February. When Iraqi strategists finally realized that the major assault sector was in the northwest, they could do little in defense.

After the ground operation began Iraqi forces remained in their positions, crammed into a 200-mile-long wedge along the southern border and eastward shoreline of Kuwait. The thousands of men and guns arrayed along the Kuwaiti coast were wasted once the coalition attack began. At the same time, the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps, attacking across a 200-mile front on the Iraqi-Saudi border, were almost unopposed. In short, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi troops were enveloped in the trap sprung by the VII Corps.

Source: Huber, Thomas M., Deception: Deceiving the Enemy in Operation Desert Storm, published in Combined Arms Battle Since 1939, Roger J. Spiller, ed., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992, 59-65.

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CHAPTER IV
JOINT INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

"By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations."

Clausewitz, On War, 1832

SECTION A. THE CENTRAL PRINCIPLE

1. Purpose

This chapter incorporates intelligence theory, concepts, and operating experience into principles that will contribute to effective and successful joint operations. **The principles are offered as guidelines for developing intelligence and using it** in determining, planning, and conducting joint warfare. The principles also have implications for the preparation and readiness for operations other than war. They highlight the importance of interoperability among C4I technical capabilities, procedures, and information. Joint operations demand composite views of ongoing activity in or on land, sea, air, and space.

2. The Central Principle—Know the Adversary

a. **The fundamental responsibility of intelligence is to provide decisionmakers at all levels of command the fullest possible understanding of the adversary.** This understanding includes a sophisticated knowledge of the adversary's goals, objectives, strategy, intentions, capabilities, methods of operation, vulnerabilities, and sense of value and loss. The J-2 must understand the adversary's character, culture, social norms, customs and traditions, language, and history. Understanding how an adversary will conceptualize the situation, the options to be considered, and how the adversary will react to our actions should be an inextricable part of a continuing interaction of the intelligence staff with the JFC and other staff elements. **This comprehensive understanding is essential to** (1) recognizing challenges to our national security interest; (2) establishing security policy; (3) when appropriate, formulating relevant and attainable military objectives and strategy; (4) determining, planning, and conducting operations that will help attain US policy objectives, and (5) identifying the adversary's strategic and operational centers of gravity.

b. **The J-2 and intelligence staff must develop and continuously refine their ability to think like the adversary.** They must offer this particular expertise for the maximum benefit of the JFC, joint staff elements, and joint force components. The JFC should require the J-2 to assess all proposed actions from this perspective, "How will the adversary likely perceive this action, and what are the adversary's probable responses?" Carrying out these intelligence responsibilities calls for sound judgment as well as expertise.

INTELLIGENCE TACTICS IN 55 BC

Julius Caesar (101-44 BC) describes the intelligence gathering process he employed in preparation for his first landing in Britain in 55 BC:

Summer was now drawing to a close, and winter sets in rather early in these parts, as Gaul lies wholly in northern latitudes. Nevertheless I hurried on preparations for an expedition to Britain, knowing that Britain had rendered assistance to the enemy in nearly all my Gallic campaigns. Although it was too late in the year for military operations I thought it would be a great advantage merely to have visited the island, to have seen what kind of people the inhabitants were, and to have learned something about the country with its harbours and landing places. Of all this the Gauls knew virtually nothing; for no one except traders makes the journey with any regularity, and even their knowledge is limited to the sea coast immediately facing Gaul. Interviews with numerous merchants elicited nothing as to the size of the island, the names and strength of the native tribes, their military and civil organization, or the harbours which might accommodate a large fleet. Nevertheless it seemed essential to obtain this information before risking an expedition, and Caius Volusenus appeared to me the best man for the job. He traveled in a warship with orders to make a general reconnaissance and report back as early as possible. Meanwhile the whole army moved into Artois, where the mainland is nearest to the coast of Britain; and ships were ordered to assemble there from all neighbouring districts, including the fleet which had been built last year for the Venetian campaign. Meanwhile, however, some traders revealed our plans to the Britons, and a number of tribes sent envoys promising hostages and offering their submission. They were received in audience, promised generous terms, and urged to abide by their undertaking. They were accompanied on their return journey by Commius, whom I had appointed ruler of the Atrebates after the subjugation of that people, and of whose honour, discretion, and loyalty I had received abundant proof. Commius was greatly respected in Britain, and his orders were to visit all the states he could, impressing on them the advantages of Roman protection, and to announce my impending arrival. Volusenus completed his survey as far as he was able without disembarking and risking a hostile reception from the natives. Five days later he returned and made his report....

Source: Hastings, Max, ed., Military Anecdotes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, 41-42.

SECTION B. BASIC PRINCIPLES

3. JFC is Responsible for Intelligence Support to Operations

See Figure IV-1.

The JFC determines the strategic and operational objectives for the theater of operations. The J-2 determines the intelligence requirements and direction of the intelligence effort in support of the JFC's objectives. The intelligence effort is critical to the mission. Its nature, orientation, and scope depend on the commander's decision on the relative importance of intelligence in accomplishing the mission. The J-2 should refine the concept of intelligence operations to reflect changes in the commander's mission,




Figure IV-1. Basic Intelligence Principles

estimate of the situation, and objectives. JFCs, with their J-2s, must ensure that intelligence objectives are correct, adequately stated, understood, synchronized, prioritized, and translated into actions that will provide the intelligence needed to accomplish the mission. **Intelligence actions must be synchronized with other warfare disciplines** to ensure integrated and responsive support throughout all phases of the operation. **Acquiring intelligence is the responsibility of the commander.** Commanders, J-3s, J-2s, and intelligence staffs developing strategy and operations and assigning mission responsibilities have the earliest view of intelligence requirements and the intelligence efforts that must commence at the inception of operations and missions. **The determination of strategy and operations becomes the beginning point for intelligence needed to attain military objectives.** It is at these earliest determinations that **senior intelligence staffs must understand the combat intelligence requirements both for their commands and their subordinate commands**, identify the commands and forces' organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls, access theater and/or national systems to cover shortfalls, and ensure intelligence is provided or available to those who need it. This command responsibility also includes planning for logistic support to C4I, intelligence personnel, and equipment. Assignment of appropriate movement priority within the TPFDL is essential to ensuring that required intelligence support will be available when needed to support joint operations.

4. Synchronize Intelligence With Operations

The commander should require, and the J-2 should ensure, that all intelligence activities, assets, and disciplines are applied in time, space, and purpose to support optimally the JFC's

operation plan. This **synchronization process** occurs across the range of military operations to provide timely, objective, tailored, complete, accurate, and relevant intelligence to achieve assigned operational objectives. This **integration of intelligence and operations** ensures the totality of effort against the adversary's centers of gravity (see Joint Pub 1, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States," Joint Pub 2-01, "Joint Intelligence Support to Operations," and Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations"). The product of effective synchronization is maximum use of every resource, including intelligence assets, where and when it will make the greatest contribution to success. Appendix A, "Intelligence Synchronization," contains an illustrative example of intelligence synchronization with operations.

5. Use the Same Approach for Operations Other Than War and War

Military intelligence systems should be single structures for warfighting support and be able to provide intelligence support for any military operation throughout the range of military operations**. Warfighting intelligence structures** of resources, methodologies, and products **should be established, viable, exercised, and operational in peacetime to be available in any type of conflict and for any form of operation.** Although it is recognized that intelligence organizations, particularly JICs and JISEs, will expand according to need, the concept of dual peacetime and wartime structures does not support the principle of "readiness" for all potential operations. Dual intelligence structures for peace and war require difficult and time-consuming transitions in critical situations.

6. The J-2 Should Participate From the Outset

The J-2 should participate in decision and planning processes from the initial point when operations are contemplated or directed. **Effective intelligence support requires a two-way flow of essential information.** The J-2 should be collocated with the JFC and function as a full member of the staff to provide the commander with the best possible view of the situation and adversary and to identify, develop, and disseminate the intelligence needed to support operations. The J-2 should apprise the JFC whether adequate intelligence can be made available for the campaigns, operations, and courses of action being considered.

7. Ensure Unity of Intelligence Effort

a. For a particular area of interest, there should be **unity of intelligence effort** to ensure complete, accurate, and current intelligence to develop the best possible understanding of the adversary and the situation, and to reduce unnecessary redundancy and duplication.

b. **JFCs have the responsibility and authority to determine, direct, and coordinate all mission-related collection and analysis** through centralized or apportioned collection and production management efforts**. When liaison personnel are provided** by national intelligence and/or combat support agencies, **the J-2 should integrate their efforts with the JIC/JISE.** These liaison personnel are normally organized into a **national intelligence support team (NIST)** and support the JFC as an integral part of the J-2 organization (see Joint Pub

2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for NIST details). Access to intelligence capabilities to support mission responsibilities must be without regard to organization or command configurations. This approach allows the commander and J-2 to orchestrate pertinent intelligence activities to meet joint force intelligence requirements.

c. **The JFC should have assured access to all necessary national and theater intelligence capabilities.** If higher priority or competing tasks preclude optimum support to the JFC, that commander and the senior commander assigning the mission must be informed so they may make timely and alternative provision for intelligence or assess the effects of gaps in intelligence to the operation.

d. **Subordinate commanders employ organic intelligence capabilities to support their assigned missions.** At the same time, those capabilities must be available to assist the joint effort under the J-2's concept of synchronizing all forces' intelligence requirements. The J-2 must establish a flexible and tailored architecture of procedures, organizations, and equipment focused on the joint commander's needs. This intelligence system of systems complements and reinforces the organic capabilities at each echelon and, when necessary, provides direct support to subordinate commanders whose organic capabilities cannot be brought to bear.

e. **The keys to unity of intelligence effort for joint operations are ensured access to any needed mission-related intelligence capability and coordination of all intelligence efforts in or about the area of interest.** Cooperation of intelligence organizations is important, but it is not a substitute for a unified and coordinated effort.

f. **The JFC should ensure that the subordinate commands assist each other in collecting and evaluating intelligence needed** to the maximum extent compatible with the requirements of their respective commands and the joint force. This includes sharing intelligence sources, collection assets and operations, collection management, data bases, intelligence analysis, production, and communications. This principle of sharing also applies to other forces and to intelligence organizations that support the joint force. **Sharing is an affirmative responsibility of commands and organizations that have the ability to support joint operations.** Sharing and mutual support are essential to integrating all resources and capabilities into a unified system that will best fulfill the prioritized intelligence needs for joint operations. **The JFC will establish the command relationships for all assigned forces, including intelligence assets.** Normally, components having organic intelligence staffs and forces will remain the assets of that component commander. If the JFC wants organic intelligence assets of a component to support other units, the JFC will usually assign that intelligence support mission to the component commander. Separate intelligence units and organizations assigned to the joint force will receive one of the four standard support missions from the JFC. Support relationships are explained in Joint Pub 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces," and are shown in Figure IV-2.

8. Recognize CI as a Source of Information

CI is a discipline that is separate and distinct from foreign intelligence and supports military commanders, operational planners, and the traditional intelligence disciplines. **CI supports military operations and planning** during peacetime




Figure IV-2. Standard Support Missions

operations and at all levels of operations other than war and war. **The type and methods of CI support differ at various organizational levels within the DOD.** CI develops information on the threat posed to plans, strategies, resources, programs, operations, and systems by foreign intelligence services and intelligence collection by foreign groups, including terrorists and drug traffickers. CI is responsible for the identification, neutralization, and/or exploitation of this threat. CI also determines the ability and willingness of host-nation forces to protect DOD resources and personnel. **CI consists of four functions: operations, investigations, collection, and analysis.** As such, **CI plays a significant force protection role** as well as **conducting functions complementing intelligence** such as analysis and collection.

9. Prioritize Component Intelligence Requirements

The joint force J-2 should carefully manage the flow of intelligence to the joint warfighter. Critical, time-sensitive component RFI should be expeditiously answered at the lowest command level possible.

SECTION C. SUPPORTING PRINCIPLES

Supporting intelligence principles are shown in Figure IV-3.

"Tell me what you know . . . tell me what you don't know . . . tell me what you think . . . always distinguish which is which."

General Colin Powell, USA,
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff

10. Constitute a Joint Intelligence Staff

The joint intelligence staff should have intelligence experts from each of the components. The joint intelligence staff must provide the commander and J-2 an understanding of each component's intelligence capabilities, limitations, and requirements. **The JFC through the J-2 normally establishes a JIC/JISE** to centrally manage the joint intelligence effort.

11. View the Adversary as Joint or Unified

A joint force is potentially faced with adversary capabilities and operations of a joint nature. It is, therefore, essential that **intelligence on the adversary be jointly constructed and considered in its entirety**, not separately in its air, space, naval, and ground force aspects. Only by complete integration and analysis can the J-2 determine or estimate the whole of the adversary situation.

12. Establish Intelligence Capability Early

Intelligence capabilities and skills should be established in peacetime to be available for contingencies. This applies to all intelligence disciplines, but is especially true for HUMINT. HUMINT is not surged easily or with certainty. Relatively long leadtimes are required to establish human intelligence resources and systems. If HUMINT access to denied areas is to be available when needed, then the resources should be developed and operated in advance of anticipated operations. Also, **language capabilities** are an example of skills that should be developed in peacetime to be available for contingencies.

a. **Intelligence infrastructures must be constituted as soon as possible to allow for the preparation of intelligence for commanders and forces.** Intelligence for decisionmaking, operational planning, and conducting operations may not be adequate if intelligence activities are delayed until organic intelligence resources are available to fully constituted commands and forces. Theater and national intelligence resources can bridge the gap. The **joint force C4I requirements must be developed during the predeployment phase** to support the commander's concept of operations.

b. Where missions and objectives are contemplated for joint commands and forces yet to be constituted or still assembling, **intelligence staffs should be formed to coordinate the identification and fulfillment of the longer leadtime intelligence requirements as well as the intelligence needed for initial planning.** The Joint Staff J-2 and combatant command J-2 should orchestrate the efforts of existing intelligence organizations to provide essential support while the newly constituted joint command assembles an intelligence staff. Deliberate planning can facilitate a smooth transfer of responsibilities**. In developing the concept of intelligence operations for each CINC's operation and concept plans, the combatant command J-2 should address**




Figure IV-3. Supporting Principles

in detail the support desired during the initial stages of a crisis from national, theater, and supporting intelligence organizations. The intelligence annex for these plans should also identify specific criteria to be met before designated intelligence staffs assume responsibility for intelligence support initially provided by other organizations.

13. Ensure JFC Intelligence Requirements Are Completely Understood by the J-2

The J-2 should resolve discrepancies between the JFC's requirements and intelligence capabilities. If the J-2 does not understand fully how a stated intelligence requirement relates to the commander's objectives, intent, or plans,

the J-2 should ask the commander for clarification. In combat and other critical situations, **the JFC's intelligence needs should outweigh otherwise valid intelligence management efficiencies.** Although it may later be found that an operation received duplicate or more intelligence than was needed, for an operation to receive less than is needed, when available, is an intelligence failure. **If it is not possible to meet a commander's stated requirements, the commander must be notified immediately** so that alternative intelligence requirements can be developed or the risks to operations of not having pertinent intelligence can be assessed.

14. Use Operating Forces for Combat Reporting

> *"As in past conflicts, combat operations in the Persian Gulf again demonstrated the value of the individual Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine in conducting reconnaissance and surveillance . . . operational reports from units in contact with the enemy provided tactical commanders with valuable information on enemy capabilities."*
>
> **Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, April 1992**

Information from reconnaissance and surveillance units and elements in contact with the adversary should be integrated with intelligence from other sources. **Forward and engaged combat forces must be tasked to collect and report information.** They have unique opportunities to collect significant information. A lack of contact with the adversary may be just as significant as positive intelligence.

15. Analyze Intelligence in Context of Operations

Intelligence analysis is best done in a context of understanding the relative friendly-adversary situation. The commander and J-2 must provide the intelligence staff, all-source watch teams, and supporting intelligence organizations with a clear understanding of (1) the commander's mission, intent, objectives, and plans and (2) the unfolding conduct of operations. The exchange of information and intelligence among commanders, J-3s, intelligence staffs, and supporting intelligence organizations must be continuous. JFCs must weigh the pros and cons of providing this information and intelligence to supporting intelligence organizations outside the joint force area of operations (AOR)/joint operations area (JOA). Although OPSEC is a concern at all command levels, well-informed intelligence support organizations will be able to provide more tailored, timely, and operationally relevant intelligence.

16. Use the Chain of Command to Satisfy Requests for Information

a. **JFCs and their J-2s should use the chain of command to obtain intelligence required to support operations.** Using the joint intelligence architecture (see Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture,") which facilitates rapid, time-sensitive flow of intelligence throughout the chain of command, RFI should be answered at the lowest possible echelon of the joint force or supporting joint intelligence infrastructure, and then vertically and horizontally shared.

b. **Senior commanders should authorize skip-echelon direct intelligence support when necessary** to provide timely critical intelligence for operating forces being constituted, in transit, or engaged. **Analyst-to-analyst exchange is a form of skip-echelon support.** Intelligence analysts at all levels can contribute important perspectives to other intelligence organizations collecting, processing, and producing intelligence. Command authorization of skip-echelon intelligence support does not alleviate the requirement to provide the same intelligence to intermediate commands through the chain of command and to supporting commands and organizations.

17. Structure for Continuous Operations

Intelligence organizations should be structured for continuous day-night and all-weather operations. JFCs need this support to rapidly determine and exploit adversary vulnerabilities, to apply coherent and unrelenting force, and to protect operations and forces. The J-2 and J-3 should establish an around-the-clock, all-source watch team with appropriate intelligence and operations skills. **The J-2's concept of intelligence operations should provide for continuity of support** even if communications are severely stressed or temporarily lost. The J-2 should (1) develop concepts of intelligence operations for remote terminal access that incorporate prepositioned standard graphic data bases; and (2) designate backups for forward-deployed command elements and fusion centers, which should include procedures and means for the backup to monitor transactions, ensure the backup understands the supported commander's objectives, and is prepared to provide support when continuity is lost. **Supporting intelligence organizations** responsible for managing collections, exploiting sensor data, and analyzing and disseminating intelligence must also be postured to provide 24-hour-a-day services. Near-continuous surveillance may be effected by synchronizing the integrated use of different and complementary national, theater, and organic collection assets. Overlapping coverage by different collection resources and sensor types can operate against hostile denial and deception measures. **Intelligence resources, activities, and communications must be structured and operated to be sufficiently survivable to ensure required intelligence support is available to commanders and forces.** An important component of survivability is redundancy in critical C4I capabilities.

18. Maintain Flexibility

Intelligence structures, methodologies, data bases, and products need to be flexible to meet changing operational situations, needs, priorities, and opportunities. They should support all possible strategies and tactics. JFCs need timely intelligence products to identify, influence, and exploit opportunities. Intelligence organizations must be able to **rapidly adapt** to unforeseen events.

19. Make All Organic Intelligence Capabilities Available to the Entire Joint Force

All intelligence collection, production, and dissemination capabilities of the components and elements of the joint force **should be employable for any requirement of either the JFC or any force component or element.** The J-2 manages the employment of all organic intelligence assets for the JFC.



Ultralite satellite communications link joint forces to the world-wide intelligence systems.

20. National and Theater Intelligence Organizations Support for Joint Operations

a. **National and theater intelligence organizations should support joint operations.** They may make operations feasible that could not be accomplished without their access, capability, capacity, or expertise. **They must be responsive to military requirements** by providing rapid access to pertinent data bases, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities, analysis, and products (see Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations").

b. **National and theater organizations should be prepared to commit sufficient and appropriate resources** to ensure timely, complete, and accurate development and dissemination of required intelligence**.** They should be prepared to place the resources or liaison well forward, commensurate with requirements for security, to assist in the identification and development of intelligence requirements and the use of intelligence products.

21. Keep Intelligence Current

Intelligence must be kept current for all mission responsibilities, including ongoing, planned, and contingency operations**. New information must be correlated** with what is already known. The nature, purposes, content, location, and availability of intelligence data bases must be systematically evaluated for currency. EEI and other statements of intelligence requirements must be continually reviewed and evaluated against mission responsibilities.

22. Ensure Accessibility of Intelligence

a. **Intelligence must be readily accessible by those who need it, while still adhering to security standards** of need-to-know and protection of classified information and intelligence sources and methods. The JFC must have access to all intelligence available in the JFC's AOR/JOA.

b. Whenever possible, **the types of intelligence needed must be anticipated and arrangements made for personnel involved**, including the J-3 and other key staff personnel, **to have the appropriate clearances and access.** This should be done as a matter of routine before operations begin. Although some intelligence will require extraordinary protection (e.g., to protect sensitive sources and methods or the fact that certain knowledge is held), **all efforts should be made to ensure access to required intelligence**. Also, intelligence should always be produced at the lowest possible classification consistent with security to ensure the widest dissemination.

c. **Intelligence should be sanitized** when personnel who need it cannot be cleared for knowledge of its sources and methods, cannot meet the security requirements for that category of intelligence material, or the timeliness for application is jeopardized. Security by sanitizing is attained by effectively **separating intelligence from its sources and methods**.

d. **The policy for sanitizing intelligence must ensure timely access and application to operations.** The interpretation of this policy should be accomplished by the JFC who, with the J-2, has the best appreciation of the criticality, utility, and time sensitivity of the intelligence. **Establishment of sanitization policy should be accomplished by the chain of command prior to, or at the outset of, joint operations.** This is of particular importance for JFCs who will be operating with multinational forces.

e. **The reasoning used** in developing and applying the policies and guidelines for intelligence security and accessibility **should include consideration of the value of intended and potential uses** of the intelligence, **future value of intelligence sources and methods** in light of national and theater military strategies and operational objectives, and **situations of threat and opportunity.**

f. **Where the sources and methods of critical information cannot be protected** (i.e., the intelligence cannot be sanitized), **the senior commander assigned the military objective or mission and the J-2 should be apprised.** When the protection of the information sources and methods is paramount, the commander can then make a reevaluation of objectives in light of the probable outcome of operations without the intelligence.

23. Use an All-Source Approach

a. **Information and intelligence from all sources**, including CI, (Figure II-1) **must be evaluated, correlated, and integrated** into products that present the most complete, accurate, and objective views possible. Joint operations in particular require **complete** and **composite views** of the situation and an adversary's land, sea, air, and space forces.

b. **Having access to and using all sources of information and intelligence is essential to understanding the actual situation.** Single-source intelligence analysis may lead to incomplete assessments. Use of the all-source concept and methodology will **reduce the risks of deception**. It will also become the basis for the **nomination and development of countermeasures** against hostile intelligence and operations.

c. **All-source intelligence fusion must begin with collection and production planning.** Each source can provide useful information and cues for collection and exploitation through other sources.

24. Distinguish Between Knowledge and Assumptions

a. **The J-2 should distinguish between what is known with confidence** based on the facts of the situation and the adversary **and what are untested assumptions. Intelligence can be facts** that have been observed, **or it can be a conclusion** based on facts of such certainty that it is considered to be knowledge. **Intelligence can also be conclusions and estimates** deduced from incomplete sets of facts or induced from potentially related facts. **Where intelligence is used for operations, these distinctions should be made and maintained.** The commander's determination of appropriate objectives and operations may rest on knowing whether intelligence is "fact" or "assumption," and knowing the particular logic used to develop an intelligence estimate, as well as knowing the confidence level the J-2 places on the provided intelligence.

b. **The J-2's confidence-level scale** (Figure IV-4) **should be used** as often as necessary by all levels of command **to present intelligence analysis and conclusions to decisionmakers in a uniform, consistent manner.** Because these conclusions rely on both all-source input and the analyst's experience, judgment, and intuition, the confidence-level scale gives both a verbal and numerical value to be used as a shorthand assessment for the JFC. The numerical side of the scale should prove more useful in a multinational operations situation. The confidence level "doubtful" is included to permit reporting of all information gathered, even if the reporter has a low opinion of its accuracy.

25. Use Liaison

Intelligence liaison personnel should be employed on a basis designed to acquaint each force or element of the joint command with the intelligence requirements, responsibilities, capabilities, and operations of their intelligence units, and to help exchange or share fully all significant intelligence and information between commands.

26. Use Intelligence Lessons Learned

Intelligence and operations doctrines, architectures, plans, and activities should ensure a systematic identification, evaluation, and application of intelligence lessons learned. An important function of all intelligence echelons is to benefit from




Figure IV-4. Confidence Levels

significant operations, training, and intelligence experience. The **Joint Universal Lessons Learned System** should be used fully to document intelligence lessons learned.

SECTION D. ATTRIBUTES OF INTELLIGENCE QUALITY

"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If ignorant of both your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril."

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 400-320 BC

27. Introduction

Attributes of intelligence quality, as shown in Figure IV-5, offer qualitative objectives for intelligence used to support joint operations **and standards** against which intelligence activities and products are evaluated. A failure to achieve any one of these fundamental attributes may contribute to a failure of operations.

28. Timeliness

Intelligence must be available in time to be effective. Timely intelligence enables the commander to make sound decisions, use the principles of war, and to act decisively. **Timeliness is influenced by the intelligence process** of developing EEI, identifying and stating requirements, and collecting and producing intelligence. The commander must inform the J-2 of intent and the J-2 must identify intelligence requirements to supporting intelligence organizations in a timely manner.

29. Objectivity

For intelligence to be objective, it should be unbiased, undistorted, and free from political or other constraints. The methodology, product, and use of intelligence must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired result, preconceptions of a situation or an adversary, institutional position, predetermined objective, operation, or method of operations. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence.

30. Usability

The form in which intelligence is provided to the JFC should be tailored for particular applications or be suitable for general use without additional analysis or manipulation. As much as practicable, **intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received.** Intelligence production and the tailoring of particular materials for operational and tactical commanders must be done in the perspective of the JFC's need for timely application. Dissemination must be direct and concise with the command mission and the intelligence purpose in mind. **The commander should be able to quickly identify and apply relevant intelligence.** Common terminology and multimedia methods must be employed in the communication of intelligence so that it is understandable and useful given the capabilities and time constraints of the commander. **Provision of useful intelligence requires producers to understand the circumstances under which their products are used**, and implies the JFC's responsibility to communicate his operational intent or situation and any particular requirements of content, form, medium, or presentation.



Figure IV-5. Attributes of Intelligence Quality

31. Readiness

Intelligence structures, data bases, and products must be responsive to the existing and contingent requirements of commanders, staffs, and forces at all command levels. Intelligence assets and resources oriented to areas where there is a high probability of operations must be maintained in a high state of readiness, understand potential adversaries, and be capable of producing and disseminating intelligence usable by all joint force elements.

32. Completeness

JFCs should realize **complete intelligence** (e.g., the answers to all questions of adversary intent and capabilities) **is not possible. Commanders, staffs, and forces should receive all intelligence needed** to accomplish their missions and to protect their forces and operations. **Supporting**

intelligence organizations should provide all available relevant and essential intelligence to those who need it and concentrate collection, production, and dissemination efforts on unsatisfied critical requirements. **Intelligence requirements must be prioritized**, and intelligence collection and production should reflect the JFC's prioritization of intelligence needs.

33. Accuracy

a. **Intelligence must be factually correct**, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as they exist, and estimate future situations and courses of adversary action based on those facts and sound judgment.

b. It is not enough that intelligence is true; **to be accurate it should also describe what is known of the situation.** The attributes of complete, timely, and relevant intelligence bear on accuracy. If requirements are not accurately developed, intelligence products will probably be unsuitable for the operation.

c. **Objectivity** of intelligence also bears on accuracy. **If the intelligence product is skewed by institutional or personal bias** in collection, analysis, or dissemination, **the resulting erroneous or incomplete portrayals of situations may foster erroneous operational decisions.** Although the intelligence presented may be true or accurate in an absolute factual sense, it may fail the accuracy test by the omission of data and perspectives necessary for a complete understanding of the situation.

34. Relevance

a. For intelligence to be truly **relevant**, it must also meet the qualitative criteria of being **complete, accurate, timely, objective, and usable.**

b. **Intelligence should be relevant to determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations.** It must contribute to the JFC's understanding of the adversary and the JFC's own situation relative to the adversary. **Intelligence must be appropriate to the purposes for which it is needed** and how it will be applied for the operation.

CHAPTER V
JOINT INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES

"Great advantage is drawn from knowledge of your adversary, and when you know the measure of his intelligence and character you can use it to play on his weaknesses."

Frederick the Great, Instructions for His Generals, 1747

1. Introduction

This chapter identifies **responsibilities for intelligence support of joint operations**. There should be firm commitment to cooperation and shared purpose among intelligence organizations supporting JFCs and joint operations. **The cooperation and shared purpose must be based on requirements and capabilities**, with the objective of ensuring timely, pertinent, and adequate intelligence support to US commanders and forces. This chapter states responsibilities for intelligence used in (a) assisting commanders in identifying and determining objectives and strategy, (b) assisting staffs and forces in planning operations, (c) supporting the conduct of operations, and (d) evaluating the effects of operations.

2. All Intelligence Organizations

All intelligence organizations involved in support of joint operations **have certain common responsibilities.** They should each have the responsibility to:

a. **Provide intelligence to assist the JFC in the identification, nomination, and achievement of military objectives.** The objectives and the JFC's strategy to achieve these objectives give the perspective for intelligence requirements and intelligence operations and activities.

b. **Operate on the basis of sharing intelligence resources, expertise, and intelligence products.** Rarely will a command or intelligence organization be able to depend entirely on its own capabilities to collect and produce all the necessary intelligence.

c. **Identify at each echelon intelligence requirements that cannot be met by their organic capability.**

3. National-Level Intelligence Organizations

National-level intelligence and combat support agencies are shown in Figure V-1. **National-level intelligence agencies and organizations that can support military operations should make that support available.** A part of the responsibility of a national agency should be support of those military instruments of policy that are being applied for national purposes. Additionally, **they should assist in identifying other potential intelligence requirements** that may be addressable through their capabilities.

a. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

- **Provides direction and control of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)** for the purpose of ensuring that adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence and CI support is available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commands.




Figure V-1. National-Level Intelligence and Combat Support Agencies

- **Executes intelligence functions** through the Joint Staff Director for Intelligence, J-2.

b. **Joint Staff Director for Intelligence/J-2. The Joint Staff/J-2 is responsible for working with the other national-level organizations** to obtain intelligence available through those agencies that is required for joint operations. Unless otherwise determined, **the Joint Staff/J-2 should be the channel through which joint forces task national agencies.** This support is in addition to whatever arrangements may be established for direct support by those agencies to the joint commands. **To ensure the best possible support** while reducing unnecessary redundancy, duplication, and the potential for disruption, **all direct support arrangements** between national agencies and subordinate joint forces **should be coordinated through the concerned combatant command and the joint force J-2s.** The Joint Staff/J-2 should:

- **Keep the CJCS apprised** of foreign situations that are relevant to current and potential national security policy, objectives, and strategy.

- **Identify and nominate attainable military objectives** to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that will help attain national security objectives.

- **Assess the success of military operations** against an adversary's capability and intent and for accomplishment of national security objectives.

- **Tailor all-source intelligence support** for joint operations, including:

  •• **Validating and prioritizing** the requesting command's **intelligence requirements.**

  •• **Collection management** focused on intelligence to be produced by DIA

and other national intelligence organizations.

•• **Intelligence analysis and production of intelligence**, including order of battle, scientific and technical, estimative, threat, targeting, target and mission planning, CI, and strategic warning.

c. **Director, Defense Intelligence Agency**

- **Ensures that expeditious, tailored, all-source intelligence collection, production, and dissemination support is provided to DOD entities.** This support includes selected intelligence planning, programming, and policy in support of conventional, special, and nuclear operations; collection and collection management support; and analysis for strategic warning, order of battle, threat, scientific and technical, current, estimative, CI, and target intelligence.

- **Establishes standards of capability and interoperability** for Joint and Service intelligence activities.

- **Coordinates planning and programming of intelligence resources**, including those for selected ADP systems, telecommunications, and survivability.

- **Reviews proposed DOD intelligence programs** to ensure interoperability and satisfaction of requirements.

- **Provides DOD management of collection activities** (e.g., HUMINT, IMINT, MASINT, OSINT, TECHINT).

- **Plans and develops implementing instructions** for provision of intelligence support to joint organizations across the range of military operations with emphasis on special operations, crisis response, and war.

- When authorized during crises and wartime, **communicates directly with any military intelligence entity** for the purpose of assembling, validating, and prioritizing intelligence collection and production requirements; tasking collection assets; processing intelligence and information; disseminating intelligence data; and ensuring that intelligence is also provided through the chain of command.

- **Ensures that intelligence entities** of combatant commands and subordinate joint forces **are fully informed regarding the actual all-source national and Service unique intelligence capabilities** to prevent unnecessary duplicative tasking of intelligence resources and to ensure that they are aware of when new capabilities are projected to become available for planning or operational support.

- **Identifies critical intelligence needs** of departmental and national users that must be satisfied in a timely manner by operational forces.

- **Provides intelligence support** for joint exercises.

d. **Director, National Security Agency. The National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS)** (which includes the Service cryptologic elements (SCE) and the US SIGINT System (USSS)) **provides SIGINT and information systems security** (computer security and communications security) for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of

timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). **Specifically the NSA/CSS and the USSS will:**

- **Exercise SIGINT operational control** over all SIGINT activities of the United States, and **execute the SECDEF's authorities as executive agent for US information systems security**.

- **Respond** in a comprehensive, direct, and timely way to the validated and prioritized **peacetime information requirements** of military commanders.

- **Respond** immediately to the changing and time-sensitive **needs of military commands in operations other than war and war** in response to SIGINT requirements forwarded directly, or via other means, to NSA.

- **Provide SIGINT support** to command and control warfare.

- **Function as the SIGINT and information systems security advisor** to the SECDEF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commands, and provide advice and assistance to military commands through NSA's representational activities attached to the commands.

- **Develop Cryptologic Support Plans** to command operation and campaign plans.

- **Develop, test, and implement new concepts, plans, and procedures** to improve SIGINT support to military commands.

- **Provide SIGINT support** to US and multinational military commands in coordination with US and allied SIGINT activities.

- **Support US military operations** consistent with procedures defined in Joint Publications for support to conventional and special operations missions and consistent with functions herein.

- **Provide support to technical SIGINT operations** of military commanders.

- **Ensure that the capabilities of SIGINT activities**, designed for wartime and contingency deployment, **are productively used during peacetime** in support of appropriate CINC readiness requirements.

- **Provide systems development, engineering, and programmatic support** to Joint/Service tactical SIGINT initiatives.

- In the case of mobile military SIGINT platforms, **provide SIGINT support, and state movement requirements** through appropriate channels to the military commanders who will retain responsibility for military command of the platforms.

- **Conduct, participate in, and support both US and allied exercises** to facilitate the use of SIGINT in military operations.

- **Provide direct and dedicated SIGINT communications support** to facilitate delivery of perishable SIGINT to military commands, and provide for continued SIGINT support to emergency or rapid recovery and reconstruction teams.

- **Ensure that NSA and SCE personnel**, through the military commanders and in conjunction with the Services, **are adequately trained**

to fulfill cryptologic tasks across the range of military operations.

- **Determine**, in conjunction with combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders, **when SIGINT operational tasking authority should be delegated by NSA to an appropriate commander**.



RC-135 provides support to the US SIGINT System.

e. **Director, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can contribute significant support for joint operations** including intelligence used in (1) developing strategy, (2) determining objectives, (3) determining deception objectives, (4) planning operations, (5) conducting operations, and (6) in evaluating the effects of operations**. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has capabilities that are particularly relevant in supporting joint operations.** The DCI directs major technical intelligence collection systems that service both strategic and operational intelligence requirements. The DCI also has responsibility for coordinating all US (1) intelligence sharing arrangements with foreign governments, (2) HUMINT activities, and (3) CI operations outside the United States. In crisis, when requested by Department of Defense and approved by the DCI, **CIA can provide joint force commanders with tailored analytical and operational support through the CIA element of a NIST**. CIA can also augment existing CIA representation to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and/or to the JIC/JISE.

f. **Director, Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). The Director, DMA, is responsible for providing maps, charts, and geodetic support for operations.** DMA can provide specialized and tailored mapping, charting, and geodesy (MC&G) products in time of crisis especially for geographic areas where standard product coverage is unavailable or inadequate.

g. **The Department of State. The Department of State and the American Foreign Service overtly collect information relevant to US foreign policy concerns.** Senior Foreign Service Officers are assigned to each of the combatant commands where they serve as political

advisors to the commander. Through its **Bureau of Intelligence and Research**, the Department of State can support joint military operations with political and economic intelligence.

h. **Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The NRO is a DOD agency with the mission to ensure that the United States has the technology and spaceborne and airborne assets needed to acquire intelligence worldwide**, including to support such functions as monitoring of arms control agreements, indications and warning, and the planning and conducting of military operations. The NRO accomplishes this mission through research and development, acquisition, and operation of spaceborne and airborne intelligence data collection systems.

i. **Director, Central Imagery Office (CIO). The CIO manages national imagery collection requirements**; provides advisory tasking to other imagery collection assets; establishes policy and guidance, and develops architectures addressing the current and future applications of imagery tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination resources; develops requirements for future imagery systems; and sets imagery system standards to ensure compatibility and interoperability.

j. **The Chiefs of the Military Services:**

- **Provide intelligence support** for Departmental missions related to military systems, equipment, training, and support national intelligence activities in support of DOD entities, including combatant commands, subordinate joint commands, and Service components of those commands.
- **Forward intelligence collection and production requirements** to DIA and the Service component of the combatant command, as appropriate.
- **Ensure that Service IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT units plan for and develop implementing instructions** for crisis and wartime intelligence support, including the augmentation of joint forces.
- **Ensure intelligence support** for joint force exercises.
- **Train personnel** in required intelligence skills and languages.

4. Commanders of Combatant Commands and Subordinate Joint Force Commanders

As shown in Figure V-2, **the JFC is responsible for defining intelligence support needs, identifying intelligence resources, and establishing intelligence support procedures.** The scope of needs, resources, and procedures will depend on the mission, nature, and composition of the force. **The combatant command's JIC** ensures the intelligence needs of the command and subordinate joint commands are satisfied. Service component and Service intelligence capabilities will support the JFC. **The JFC should:**

a. **Establish plans, policies, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command**, ensuring that policies are in consonance with the national and DOD intelligence directives.

b. **Collect, process, produce, disseminate, and share intelligence.** Coordinate the intelligence plans and



Figure V-2. JFC Intelligence Responsibilities

operations of subordinate commanders. Ensure that the intelligence support structure enhances the secure, timely flow of tailored, all-source intelligence to higher or lower echelons and across component lines as required.

c. **Forward appropriate intelligence** promptly to the Joint Staff/J-2, to concerned Service organizations, and to other concerned JFCs.

d. Within command capabilities, **fulfill intelligence requirements** received from subordinate commands; validate, prioritize, and forward promptly to DIA those intelligence collection and production requirements that need to be satisfied by other than assigned resources.

e. **Implement necessary CI and security measures** in coordination with the CIA outside the United States and in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation inside the United States.

f. **Train for joint intelligence activities** across the range of military operations to ensure interoperability and responsiveness of the intelligence structure, including organic and other collection, processing, and dissemination assets and activities.

g. **Provide information** concerning all-source tactical intelligence capabilities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Military Departments.

h. **Review and monitor the status of intelligence priorities** throughout the program development process.

i. **Debrief defectors and refugees and interrogate prisoners of war.** Process captured documents, equipment, and other items of a technical nature.

j. **Identify required intelligence support** by revalidating or developing an intelligence plan in accordance with Joint Pub 5-03.2, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II (Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance)," which is documented in an operation or concept plan. The intelligence plan will provide a foundation for the procedures for intelligence support by joint forces.

- Responsibility for **specific intelligence support** within joint forces may be **assigned to the component best able to perform the function.**

- If no Service component within the joint force or subordinate command can perform a specific function, **the JFC may request that DIA assist** in obtaining the required collection, analysis, production, or dissemination support, or may establish an intelligence element. **Examples of such intelligence support are as follows:**

•• **Preparation and reproduction** of photographic mosaics, maps, charts, and graphic aids.

•• **Management of intelligence collection and production requirements** to include their monitoring to ensure satisfaction.

•• **Organization and direction** of joint interrogation teams and of joint document and equipment exploitation teams.

•• **Provision of CI support.**

k. **Identify specific intelligence resources** (e.g., target analysts and equipment) **required to support the operation.** To the extent possible, the commander should rely on assigned capabilities but should plan to use military reservist support during peace and must develop a plan for rapid integration of potentially available reserve augmentees across the spectrum of intelligence functions during crisis response and war.

l. **Identify intelligence resource shortfalls** critical to accomplishing assigned missions and submit in required operational capability format to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or via a comparable validation mechanism through Service channels.

5. Service Component Commanders

a. **Provide intelligence support** to meet the operational requirements of the component and the identified requirements of other components and the joint command.

b. **Develop component intelligence plans** based on the plans of the joint force.

c. **Plan reconnaissance operations** for the component operations, consistent with joint force plans.

d. **Ensure that feedback is provided to the JFC** on Service-related issues affecting the joint command.

e. **Plan and develop implementing instructions for wartime intelligence support** including augmentation of joint forces.

CHAPTER VI
INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

"No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story."

General Colin Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991

1. Introduction

This chapter defines intelligence functions that are performed to meet the requirements of JFCs**.** These functions are described using the components of the intelligence cycle discussed in Chapter II, "The Nature of Intelligence." The term "subordinate joint force" is used to describe any joint force at echelons below the combatant commander. Subordinate unified commands and joint task forces are the two types of subordinate joint forces.

2. Joint Intelligence Functions

a. **Planning and Direction.** See Figure VI-1.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Conducts long-range planning through the Joint Strategic Planning System, Council of Defense Intelligence Producers, General Defense Intelligence Program, National Foreign Intelligence Board, and Military Intelligence Board**.** Forms intelligence working groups and intelligence task forces in response to crises, and forms NISTs to augment subordinate joint force staffs.

- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Produces intelligence annex to concept/operation plans, develops the command intelligence architecture plan (CIAP) and theater tactics, techniques and procedures, identifies critical communications requirements to the J-6 to support anticipated and ad hoc intelligence requirements, provides the J-4 and command element with logistic and TPFDL requirements, tailors the JIC to meet crises requirements, and requests personnel augmentation.

- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Forms a JISE to manage intelligence operations, identifies personnel and C4I equipment augmentees and requirements, requests information disclosure or release authorization, and establishes subordinate joint force intelligence command relationships and collection and production responsibilities with components. Writes intelligence annex and/or concept of operations.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Support assigned forces and subordinate joint force JISE.

- **Military Services.** Provide trained personnel and interoperable C4I equipment per CIAP. Augments subordinate joint force JISE as directed.

b. **Collection.** See Figure VI-2.

- **Management**

  •• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Coordinates tasking of national technical reconnaissance systems and nationally subordinated manned reconnaissance platforms and sensors; as Consolidated Authority for central HUMINT tasking, coordinates and levies DOD




Figure VI-1. Planning and Direction

HUMINT tasking; coordinates with other agencies cognizant for SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT and other special overt and covert collection programs as required; and responds to subordinate RFI.

•• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Devises a theater collection plan, requests national tasking in support of collection management efforts, coordinates theater organic sensors, evaluates requests from subordinates and validates for fulfillment, fuses national and theater organic data, and maintains records of fulfillment and accomplishment.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Identifies, prioritizes, and validates requirements originated by components. Develops a subordinate joint force collection plan and tasks components for unique sensor collection efforts.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Identify and prioritize EEI and RFI, manage organic sensor capabilities, and provide collection capabilities to subordinate joint force when required.




Figure VI-2. Collection

•• **Military Services.** Ensure Service collection systems are interoperable and provide trained personnel.

- **Operations**

•• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Monitors the results of national systems tasking, conducts extensive liaison with cognizant agencies and offices for special programs, processes national systems data, fuses national systems results with theater sensors, incorporates all-source analytical strategy into the collection effort, conducts term analysis on national systems data, and responds to subordinate RFI.

•• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Processes national and theater-unique intelligence, coordinates theater organic sensors, coordinates and

deconflicts component EEI, tasks theater sensors, analyzes theater collected data, and communicates results to national-level agencies and offices.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Identifies, prioritizes, and tasks collection activity by components; filters, evaluates, and forwards data from organic collection assets.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Collect intelligence as tasked, conduct independent collection of opportunity as the situation warrants, and provide collection capabilities to subordinate joint force when required.

•• **Military Services.** Provide trained collection personnel and assets.

c. **Processing**. See Figure VI-3.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Establishes standards for C4I equipment to support joint operations. Provides personnel to support national intelligence processing centers.
- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Manages theater processing systems and capabilities. Ensures subordinate joint force commanders have required processing capabilities.




Figure VI-3. Processing

- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Operates deployable joint intelligence processing center. Oversees interoperability of systems and manages assignment of joint capabilities as required to support the subordinate joint force commander.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Use products from subordinate joint force processing center.

- **Military Services.** Field processing capabilities of designated joint processing systems. Train with, and ensure interoperability with, joint processing and dissemination systems.

d. **Production.** Intelligence production consists of indications and warning, current intelligence, general military intelligence, target intelligence, and scientific and technical intelligence. (Figure VI-4.)

"No operational skill can compensate for those severe consequences which can occur out of neglect or the shortcomings of an intelligence service."

Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy, quoted in "Voyenno istorichiski zhurnal," 2/1983

- **Indications and Warning.** Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied military, political, or economic interest or to US citizens abroad. Indications and Warning (I&W) includes forewarning of adversary actions or intentions; the imminence of nuclear or nonnuclear attack on the United States, its overseas forces, or allied nations; hostile reactions to US activities; terrorist attacks; and other similar events. The I&W process anticipates hostile operations and provides sufficient warning to enable US or allied efforts to preempt, counter, or moderate such actions. Warning notification is made to local commanders, US and allied military authorities at all levels, and the NCA. The Defense I&W System Operations Manual, J2W-001-01-92, January 1992, has Defense I&W System details.

  •• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Principal agent of worldwide I&W system. Provides backup to theater system.

  •• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Advises CINC and staff on I&W issues, operates the command I&W center, provides theater I&W products.

  •• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Monitors and reports I&W events as appropriate to the situation.

  •• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Monitor and report I&W events as appropriate.

  •• **Military Services.** Train Service personnel in Defense I&W System methodology.

- **Current Intelligence.** Current intelligence provides updated support for ongoing operations across the range of military operations. It involves the integration of current, all-source intelligence and information into concise, objective reporting on the current situation in a particular area. It usually contains predictive judgments on how the situation will develop and what the implications are for planning and executing military operations.

PRODUCTION

	INDICATIONS & WARNING (I&W)	CURRENT INTELLIGENCE	GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE	TARGET INTELLIGENCE	SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (S & T)
JOINT STAFF J-2 / DIA	PRINCIPAL AGENT; WORLDWIDE; THEATER BACKUP.	DOD FOCAL POINT FOR FUSED ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS AND REPORTING.	INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS. ALL-SOURCE ASSESSMENTS. MANAGES DIA DISTRIBUTION PROGRESS (DPP)	SUPPORTS CINC / JTF BDA CELL.	MANAGES DOD S & T CENTERS; COORDINATES TECHINT REQUIREMENTS WITH CINC; PROVIDES JCMEC PERSONNEL AUGMENTS.
COMBATANT COMMAND J-2	THEATER EXPERT; OPERATES I & W CENTER.	AUTHORITATIVE THEATER ESTIMATES; MAINTAINS DATA BASES.	THEATER ASSESSMENTS.; MAINTAINS DATA BASES; DPP PARTICIPANT.	TGT SYSTEM ANALYSIS; PRODUCES TGT VALIDATION MATERIALS; BDA VALIDATION TGT DVLP; TGT NOMINAL.	VALIDATES NATIONAL TECHINT REQUIREMENTS; COORDINATES MOVEMENT OF CAPTURED MATERIEL.
SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE J-2	I & W CONSUMER; MONITORS / REPORTS.	MISSION SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE; PRIORITIZES RFI.	USER OF GMI; TAILORS TO JTF FOCUS.	COLLATES OP BDA; TGT ANALYSIS; TGT DVLP; TGT NOMINAL.	EXECUTES TECHINT MSN IN JOINT OPERATIONS AREA.
SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE COMPONENTS	I & W CONSUMERS; MONITOR / REPORT.	CUSTOMERS; PROVIDE RFI TO JTF JISE.	IPS.	REPORT MSN BDA; TGT / ANALYSIS DECONFLICTION; TGT DEVELOPMENT; TGT NOMINAL; WEPONEERING.	PROVIDE TECHINT COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS TO FORCES.
MILITARY SERVICES	I & W CONSUMERS, TRAIN PERSONNEL IN DEFENSE I & W SYSTEM.	CUSTOMERS; AUGMENT MMJIC.	DPP PARTICIPANTS; AUGMENT JIC PRODUCTION.	TRAIN TGT PERSONNEL; PROVIDE SPECIALIZED FUNCTIONAL PRODUCTS.	MANAGE S & T CENTERS; PROVIDE PERSONNEL AUGMENTS TO JTF; PROVIDE SPECIALIZED ANALYSIS.

Figure VI-4. Production

•• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** DOD focal point for fused, national, all-source current intelligence analysis, production, and reporting and coordinating national- and Service-level intelligence resources. Responds to RFI from CINCs; coordinates for DOD national- and Service-level intelligence resources for timely analytical support to the NCA, CINCs, and JICs. May provide backup and augmentation to subordinate joint forces.

•• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Provides authoritative theater estimates, advises CINC and CINC staff, tailors basic data bases, and disseminates products and materials to forces assigned and the NCA and supporting commanders as required. Fuses national and theater intelligence into a single picture and provides analytical support to subordinate joint force and components.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Provides mission specific intelligence, assesses adequacy of current intelligence, provides prioritized RFI to JIC. Provides fused joint intelligence assessments.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Current intelligence consumers, monitor and report as appropriate, provide RFI to subordinate joint force J-2/JISE. Maintain tactical intelligence assessment; provide direct support to forces assigned; and report unique, real time data.

•• **Military Services.** Current intelligence consumers.

- **General Military Intelligence (GMI).** GMI is intelligence concerning the (1) military capabilities of foreign countries and organizations or (2) topics affecting potential US or allied military operations, relating to armed force capabilities, including order of battle and associated installations, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness; area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts, and landing beaches; meteorological, oceanographic, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; military material production and support industries; military and civilian command, control, and communications systems; military-political-sociological-religious intelligence; demographics; location, identification, and description of installations of military interest; government control; energy-related installations; escape and evasion; and threats and forecasts.

•• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Principal focus is to project and report adversary capabilities, trends, and intentions on the basis of all-source analysis; provides timely intelligence community-wide analytic estimates as the situation warrants.

•• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Provides authoritative theater assessments based on all-source analysis to national level, CINC, and subordinate joint force; develops and maintains data bases within region to support planning, operations, and targeting.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Using products from JISE, maintains knowledge of enemy leadership, command and control, order of battle, force readiness, mission, sustainability, and technical sophistication and of area and terrain intelligence.

RECONNAISSANCE ON THE UPPER SEINE RIVER IN 1944

Reconnaissance is one form of intelligence gathering that, in theory, can be performed, without violence or, conversely when a commander has to send an armed body to secure reliable information, with considerable violence. An illuminating example of reconnaissance that reflects a number of its facets was the combat between the U.S. Third and German First Armies southeast of the upper Seine River in mid-August 1944.

Strategically, by this point in time, Allied forces had complete command of the air, the active assistance of the French Resistance, and a wealth of intelligence sources on the enemy, including Ultra intercepts of top-secret German military radio messages. By contrast, German reconnaissance and intelligence measures were necessarily passive as a result of insufficient combat units and reconnaissance assets. For example, the German First Army's reconnaissance company consisted of twelve obsolete and road-bound French armored cars. German staff officers fluent in French systematically used the French national telephone lines, asking the locals if they had been liberated yet and where the Americans were. Since the First Army was equipped and organized for a static coastal defense, it depended largely on the French telephone system for its own command and control.

***Oberbefehlshaber West (OB West)*, the German headquarters in France, realizing the nature of the crisis and struggling to cope with what was essentially a hopeless situation in the area of the Seine directed the German First Army to construct a defensive front between Alencon and the Loire River to prevent any further U.S. advance toward the upper Seine River. OB West warned that the Americans could be expected to force a crossing of the lower Seine west of Paris in an attempt to complete the destruction of Army Group B, the last of the German force of any consequence in the area. The commander of the First Army, General Kurt von der Chevallerie, a 52 year-old former branch chief of the German General Staff faced a formidable challenge: the defense of some sixty miles of flat terrain without any major formations.**

In spite of the odds General von der Chevallerie managed to piece together a security screen in front of the Seine. The First Army's assault battalion held Dourdon, a Luftwaffe flak detachment defended Etampes, and a reinforced company of the 1010th Security Regiment held Malesherbes. In front of Paris, the remnants of the 352d Infantry Division held Limours. East of Malesherbes, the Loing River bisected the First Army front between Montereau and Melun. Von der Chevallerie named General Edgar Arndt commander of this Loing sector. Arndt commanded only weak security forces to defend a very wide front. He therefore placed his entire force in Montargis behind the river.

Patton was not particularly concerned with this front but, rather, with the remnants of German Army Group B, struggling to escape across the lower Seine. On 19 August, his XV Corps seized the first bridgehead across the Seine at Mantes. Over the following days, the US forces unsuccessfully attempted to drive forces down the west bank of the Seine. The XIX Tactical Air Command, attached to Patton's Third Army, conducted reconnaissance along the Loire river and between Paris and Orleans. The Third Army's indigenous cavalry groups and squadrons (mechanized) scoured the front,

identifying von der Chevallerie's delaying position. The day before, on 18 August, the U.S. 43d Cavalry Squadron had penetrated the German security screen and from the wooded banks gazed down on the winding Seine.

This aggressive reconnaissance was in the finest traditions of the cavalry and air corps, but it was in this instance also grand theater. Generals Bradley and Patton knew from intercepted German radio messages not only the weakness of the German First Army but the impotence of the German forces south of the Loire River. Armed with such knowledge, it was doubly important to use aggressive reconnaissance to protect the Ultra secret.

During the fighting for the Seine, reconnaissance took its more traditional form, with units and commanders moving forward to determine the strength and location of the enemy. On the morning of 23 August 1944, Major General Walton H. Walker, XX Corps commander, made a personal reconnaissance to observe the 7th Armored Division's attempt to cross the Seine at Melun. That same day, the XX Corps' other division, the 5th Infantry, pushed through the Foret de Fontainebleau on a two-regiment front, ably guided around the mine fields by members of the French Resistance. As the 11th Infantry emerged from the forest, the soldiers saw that the Seine bridge was still standing. As an American patrol approached it, however, the Germans blew up the bridge, sprinkling the patrol with debris. The lead battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly B. Lemmon Jr., remained undeterred and reconnoitered the river bank. He found five small boats and began to establish a bridgehead on the far side.

Patton's army had little difficulty crossing the Seine and breaking the German First Army's line. Instead of the scheduled two corps headquarters and five infantry divisions, von der Chevallerie received only the inexperienced 48th Infantry Division to defend a front of some fifty miles. The German infantry could not even observe much of the front, so German patrols had to reconnoiter the more inaccessible sectors. One such patrol discovered Lemmon's bridgehead near Fontainebleau.

At first appearance, Patton's overwhelming superiority on the ground, in the air, and in intelligence-gathering assets would suggest that such a campaign would merit perhaps only academic interest. The disparity in strength, however, makes the military work performed by the commanders and staffs all the more intriguing—particularly regarding their differing approaches to reconnaissance. We have already observed how the need to protect the Ultra source made it doubly important for the U.S. Army to pretend that it was not reading the German's radio messages by aggressively reconnoitering with its cavalry and air corps units.

Reconnaissance by the German First Army naturally differed in scope and purpose from that of the much more powerful U.S. Third Army. Von der Chevallerie lacked not only combat units but reconnaissance assets, air support, and the help of the local population. He consequently decided to disobey orders and erect a security screen with the few units that were available. Von der Chevallerie saw this gamble as the only way to gain time for reinforcements to reach the upper Seine. In German doctrine, security and reconnaissance were interdependent and, true to form, von der Chevallerie's security screen also provided ports from which his own meager reconnaissance forces could sally forth.

The fighting along the upper Seine demonstrated the ambiguity inherent in reconnaissance. It can be performed by one man on foot or by highly organized special organizations. While it is normally conducted to secure information on the enemy's location and strength, it can also be used to mask information identified by other sources. In the instance of the U.S. Third Army's and German First Army's combat on the upper Seine in mid-August 1944, Patton, von der Chevallerie, and their respective staffs demonstrated the broad applications possible in effective reconnaissance.

Source: Lewis, Samuel J., *Reconnaissance: Fighting on the Upper Seine River*, August 1944, published in Combined Arms Battle Since 1939, Roger J. Spiller, ed., Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992, 213-219.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Using JISE products, refine and update data bases with real time information and report changes up echelon. Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlespace in support of JFC plans and operations.

•• **Military Services.** Provide input to intelligence data bases as participants in DIA Distributed Production Program. Augment the DOD and combatant command JICs during crisis and war.

- **Target Intelligence.** Target intelligence describes components of a target or target system and indicates their vulnerability and relative importance. Intelligence support to targeting includes target system analysis, target development, target selection and nomination, weaponeering, CA, and target material production (see Joint Pub 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting," Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," Joint Pub 3-05.5, "Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures," and Joint Pub 3-56.1, "Command and Control for Joint Air Operations"). Targeting is the process of developing and selecting targets in response to the commander's guidance, objectives, commander's preparation of the battlespace and scenario, and matching the appropriate weapon system to them by taking into account existing operational requirements and capabilities. The targeting cycle concludes with CA which determines the effectiveness of operations in meeting combat or battle objectives, and is the start of the retasking cycle.

  •• Targeting occurs at all levels of command within a joint force by operations and intelligence personnel. Targeting is sometimes complicated by the need to deconflict or synchronize targeting by different units within the joint force. Targeting should be based on campaign goals, intent, guidance, military objectives, and the Law of Armed Conflict, and a thorough understanding of how the adversary state functions.

  •• As shown in Figure VI-5, the targeting process is cyclical. The J-2 provides critical support throughout this process, especially in the areas of target development and CA. The targeting cycle includes six steps: (1) NCA/commander's guidance and objectives, (2) target development, (3)

weaponeering assessment, (4) force application, (5) execution planning and force execution, and (6) CA. (1) **NCA/ Commander's Guidance and Objectives.** Guidance and objectives from the NCA, as well as joint force and component commanders, serve to initiate the targeting cycle. Objectives and guidance also drive targeting priorities, establish restrictions for force employment, drive intelligence requirements, and provide criteria to measure objective attainment. (2) **Target Development.** This phase focuses on knowing the adversary and identifying and nominating critical elements of adversary target systems for attack. The target development phase involves the systematic evaluation of all-source intelligence to identify potential target systems relevant to the commander's guidance and objectives. (3) **Weaponeering Assessment.** In this phase, targeting personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and nonlethal weapons employment against prioritized targets. (4) **Force Application.** Force application integrates the results of earlier phases with operations planning data. Force application is conducted at the command, component, and unit level to fuse target, weapon system, and munitions and nonlethal force options.




Figure VI-5. Targeting Cycle

The JFC is provided fused target intelligence and weapon system recommendations against a target system and its vulnerabilities. (5) **Execution Planning and Force Execution.** Following the commander's approval of force application recommendations, this next phase involves final tasking order preparation and transmission and specific mission planning and material preparation at the unit level. (6) **Combat Assessment.** CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Battle damage assessment (BDA) is one of the principal subordinate elements of CA. At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign or operation plan are being achieved by the joint force components to meet the JFC's overall concept. The intent is to analyze what is known about the damage inflicted on the adversary with sound military judgment to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have on the adversary's plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. (See Joint Pubs 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting," and 2-02 "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.")

•• With the advice of the subordinate commanders, **JFCs establish target priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the relative weight that should be provided to various operations**. JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. **Typically, JFCs organize Joint Targeting Coordination Boards (JTCBs).** If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity, comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. The JFC defines the role of the JTCB. Typically, the JTCB reviews target information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists. The JTCB should also maintain a complete list of restricted targets and areas where special operations forces are operating to avoid endangering current or future operations. Intelligence personnel at all echelons within the joint force support the targeting process.

•• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Supports CINC or subordinate joint force, when requested, with target system analysis, target development, physical vulnerability analysis, target nominations, target material production or production program management, and BDA. The NMJIC activates a dedicated interagency BDA cell to support targeting missions directly.

•• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** In theater operations, conducts target system analysis, target development, and target nomination. Under this scenario, the J-2 conducts target system analysis, manages and produces target materials and execution support materials for operating forces in the AOR, maintains fusion cell for all-source BDA to include the

integration of national-level reporting into theater level; act as overall BDA validation authority, and supports the CINC and J-3 in the CA process.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Conducts target development, nomination, and limited mission specific targeting material production at the operational level, requests target materials and unique execution support materials, collates and reports operational BDA, performs targeting analysis, and reports to the subordinate joint force commander and up echelon. Coordinates with intelligence agencies or units on priorities of targets.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Perform target analysis, development, nomination, and target material production at the force level, request target materials and execution support materials for assigned units, and report mission BDA.

•• **Military Services.** Train and equip personnel to perform targeting and augment JIC/JISE target materials as required.

- **Scientific and Technical Intelligence.** Scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence is intelligence on foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technologies with warfare potential. It includes S&T characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of all weapon systems, subsystems, and associated material; research and development related thereto; and the production methods employed for their manufacture. S&T intelligence also addresses overall weapon systems and equipment effectiveness and the foreign material program.

•• **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Manages DOD S&T analysis and production centers. Coordinates requirements for TECHINT support to the Subordinate Joint Force/J-2, and personnel augmentation for the Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC). Provides consolidated DOD requirements for captured materiel to the combatant command/J-2.

•• **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Validates national requirements for captured material for the AOR. Coordinates with J-3 and J-4 as required to manage the evacuation of captured material.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Executes the TECHINT mission in the JOA and has operational control of the JCMEC. Provides TECHINT feedback to subordinate joint force components and tactical commanders, as well as to the combatant command and national level.

•• **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Disseminate captured material requirements and handling procedures to tactical units.

•• **Military Services.** Provide S&T intelligence expertise and analysis, including personnel augmentation to the subordinate joint force/J-2 when required for TECHINT. Manage S&T production centers and foreign material exploitation centers.

e. **Dissemination.** See Figure VI-6.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Publishes worldwide soft or hardcopy and video formatted intelligence reporting, disseminates this via multimedia to worldwide command list, and

maintains archives; serves as DOD repository for basic data bases and materials. Manages the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS).

- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Publishes definitive theater assessments in hard and soft copy; provides video formatted intelligence, report production for theater-specific issues; disseminates up, down, and across echelon in multimedia format; maintains archives for theater intelligence; and provides tailored regional intelligence to supporting commands and subordinate joint force commander or components as required.

- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Disseminates tailored intelligence produced at other echelons, receives tailored intelligence support via multimedia, and directs intelligence support to components.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** As consumers of tailored intelligence, provide limited production for tactical use and report via available media. Ensure assigned units have timely and complete intelligence to perform tasked missions.



Figure VI-6. Dissemination

- **Military Services.** Provide information to NMJIC and ensure nondeployed forces are provided necessary information for readiness and training.

3. Infrastructure Support

There are a number of infrastructure and supporting functions that require the direct involvement or participation of the J-2 and intelligence staff to plan and conduct joint operations (Figure VI-7).

a. **Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy.** Maps and charts, digitized MC&G products, and precise geodetic coordinates are critical to mission planning and the execution of combat operations. Care must be exercised so that products requested and provided have an accuracy commensurate with the function or weapons system being supported, and that all references are on a common datum (World Geodetic System 84 is the DOD standard). Maps and charts also provide a medium for graphic correlation, summary, and presentation of intelligence and assessment of the relative positions and situations of friendly and enemy forces. Joint activities should understand that the DMA can provide specialized or tailored MC&G products during crisis situations but must be tasked to do so during the earliest stages of determining and planning operations. The J-2 works closely with the J-3 to determine MC&G requirements and priorities. DMA may have a liaison officer assigned to the joint command to assist the staff in obtaining required DMA support.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Coordinates own national-level MC&G requirements with DMA and coordinates with CINC and DMA on MC&G support to CINC- or theater-requested intelligence support and products.
- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Identifies theater MC&G area requirements and ensures availability of required products.
- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Identifies mission-unique MC&G requirements to geographic combatant commander and ensures components hold appropriate materials.
- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Ensure availability of required MC&G products to warfighters.
- **Military Services.** Identify content and format of MC&G requirements to DMA to support employment and operations of Service (component) provided systems to CINC or theater.

b. **Communications.** The joint intelligence architecture relies on early identification of communications channels to carry critical intelligence data to the JFC. Use of military and commercial communications capabilities may be required depending on the joint force mission, operations area, and competing CINC requirements.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Interfaces with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and Joint Staff/J-6 for national requirements. Supports CINC communications requirements.
- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** States theater or subordinate joint force communications requirements to DISA and the Joint Staff/J-6.
- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Refines subordinate joint force communications architectures and ensures interoperability among components.

INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT

	MAPPING, CHARTING, GEODESY	COMMS	AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING	TRAINING	ADMIN / SSO
JOINT STAFF J-2 / DIA	COORDINATES NATIONAL LEVEL REQUIREMENTS WITH DMA	DISA / JOINT STAFF / J-6 CINC LIAISON REQUIREMENTS	OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARCHITECTURE	GLOBAL EXERCISE SUPPORT	POLICY PROVIDER
COMBATANT COMMAND J-2	IDENTIFIES THEATER REQUIREMENTS; ENSURES AVAILABILITY	IDENTIFIES THEATER COMMS REQUIREMENTS	USES NATIONALLY PROVIDED EQUIPMENT	THEATER READINESS / WAR GAMES	COMMAND SECURITY PROGRAMS
SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE J-2	IDENTIFIES MSN UNIQUE REQUIREMENTS; ENSURES COMPONENTS HOLD MATERIALS	REFINES INTELLIGENCE COMMS ARCHITECTURE	REQUIREMENTS MSN SPECIFIC SOFTWARE	COMPONENT INTEGRATION	COMMAND READINESS
SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE COMPONENTS	ENSURES FORCES HAVE MC&G MATERIALS	IDENTIFIES REQUIREMENTS; PROVIDES EQUIPMENT / PERSONNEL	ENSURE SERVICE COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS	TACTICAL PROFICIENCY	FORCE READINESS
MILITARY SERVICES	IDENTIFIES CONTENT / FORMAT TO DMA	PROVIDES TRAINED PERSONNEL; INTEROPERABLE EQUIPMENT	TRAIN / EQUIP INTEROPERABLE FORCES	FORCE PROVIDER	READINESS AND PROFICIENCY

Figure VI-7. Infrastructure Support



Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), shown here with its mobile launch system, is an emerging unique collection system designed to provide commanders with near real-time tactical intelligence.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Identify communications requirements to subordinate joint force J-6 and provide interoperable equipment and trained operators.

- **Military Services.** Provide trained communications personnel equipped with interoperable communications capabilities.

c. **Automated Intelligence Data Bases and Information Systems.** Data bases and automated information systems should be used to enhance rather than replace human ingenuity in analyzing and producing intelligence. Intelligence data bases are used by analysts to assess a situation and reach conclusions, often in support of dynamic, near real time events. Data bases consist of information on orders of battle, characteristics of equipment, installations and facilities, and military geography. To be useful, automated systems need to provide data that are current, tailored, or adaptable to the missions, accessible, interconnected, and interoperable. These data bases should be accessible by a joint intelligence workstation.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Has primary responsibility for concept, development, testing, and fielding of intelligence ADP architecture and systems and enforces standards.

- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Uses nationally fielded systems and develops or requests development of command-unique software requirements.

- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Consumes national intelligence and requests mission-unique software applications.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Requests mission-unique software applications.

- **Military Services.** Provide forces with ADP equipment meeting joint interoperability standards and procedures. Ensure forces are trained in their application.

d. **Training and Exercises.** Support to training and exercises involves those command elements that serve to train incoming personnel in unique mission, area, ADP, procedural, command functions and organization, security, and intelligence oversight compliance. These elements plan and implement exercises to test and demonstrate command mission readiness, interoperability, and capability.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Provides global exercise support and participation; conducts training for internal, national, and international students and attaches; and ensures training and readiness, proficiency, and career progression for staff and agency.

- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Exercises operation plans, maintains interoperability, and provides training programs for theater readiness and capability.

- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Conducts component integration and training.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Maintain tactical proficiency.

- **Military Services.** Provide forces for joint exercises and training. Conduct intelligence training and provide trained intelligence personnel.

e. **Management, Plans, Special Security Office, and Administration.** Includes the intelligence support structure that facilitates and enables the command to accomplish the intelligence mission. Financial and personnel support, ADP, physical and personnel security matters, intelligence and CI oversight compliance, Inspector General issues, releasability and disclosure, and Freedom of Information Act are functions of administrative support.

- **Joint Staff J-2/DIA.** Provides guidance and leadership for policy issues related to intelligence and maintains command readiness and operations.

- **Geographic Combatant Command J-2.** Maintains command readiness.

- **Subordinate Joint Force J-2.** Maintains command readiness and proficiency and exercises operation plans.

- **Subordinate Joint Force Components.** Maintain readiness and proficiency.

- **Military Services.** Maintain readiness and proficiency.

CHAPTER VII
THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

"In establishing a JIC at each combatant command, we have improved the quality of intelligence support to the warfighter while decreasing the resources required to produce such support."

CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993

1. Introduction

This chapter describes the **joint intelligence architecture that provides a multimedia communications network with interoperable systems** that link the theater JICs, joint task force (JTF) JISEs, deployed intelligence elements, Service intelligence, and national intelligence organizations in a global grid.

2. C4I For The Warrior

The Department of Defense strategy for C4I is laid out in the Joint Staff/ J-6 developed **C4I for the Warrior concept.** This concept **envisions a global communications and information grid** into which all military information customers can plug interoperable systems. The joint intelligence architecture is an integral part of the C4I for the Warrior concept.

3. Joint Intelligence Architecture

a. **Overview**

- **The joint intelligence architecture provides the means to interconnect collectors, producers, and customers in an information network. All intelligence made available to the network** from any source **is stored and communicated as data** whether it is a text file, graphics, imagery, or formatted information. The data is stored on a standards compliant file server. The file server is the interface with the communications network.

- In keeping with the spirit of C4I for the Warrior, the **joint intelligence architecture is a dynamic, flexible structure providing global access to an information grid** that consists of all intelligence sources at all echelons. The architecture facilitates the capability of the Defense Intelligence community to focus on supporting the JFC and subordinate joint force components and to integrate support from non-Defense agencies and nongovernment organizations as needed. **The joint intelligence architecture is configured to provide access to all intelligence sources** from anywhere on the globe and to provide the baseline data that JFCs will need to support joint operations. This architecture conceptually describes equipment capabilities, information flow requirements, and responsibilities.

b. **Principles. The Services and DOD agencies** responsible for organizing, training, and fielding intelligence systems and personnel **must provide** the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, and subordinate commanders **as much flexibility as possible in assembling their intelligence support architectures.** JFCs should be able to assemble an optimum mix of intelligence capabilities (personnel,

procedures, and C4I), regardless of the source, and still receive adequate intelligence support. **Intelligence systems, concepts, products, and language must be sufficiently interoperable** for the exchange and use of data in any form and from any source among intelligence organizations and operating commands and forces. **Interoperability principles** are shown in Figure VII-1.




Figure VII-1. Intelligence Architecture Principles

- **C4I Interoperability. The J-2 should ensure command elements' and supporting organizations' intelligence systems and communications are compatible** for exchange of data, information, and intelligence products. If components' intelligence systems cannot receive or exchange intelligence data, the systems are not interoperable. Interoperability of systems also relates to intelligence data processing and related equipment.

- **Intelligence Product Interoperability. Intelligence organizations** producing joint intelligence **should ensure that intelligence products are in a form, content, and language usable by all components of the joint force** performing similar and related functions. For example, if one component requires maps with Military Grid Reference System (MGRS) (which also includes universal transverse mercator) coordinates while another cooperating component uses charts with geographic coordinates, location information should be expressed with both MGRS and geographic coordinates.

- **Common Terminology and Symbols.** Intelligence organizations should understand and use concepts, language, terminology, names, and symbols **common to all joint force components**.

- **Standards.** Factors that promote interoperability can be expressed in standards. **Standards are sets of guidelines and criteria for continuity and similarity** of data, protocols, formats, terminology, equipment, and signals **that promote the exchange, understanding, and application of intelligence requirements and intelligence products** among intelligence organizations and JFCs. **Standards for interoperability should be developed and incorporated into intelligence systems, equipment, and procedures** providing intelligence for joint operations. Standards need to be enforced in peacetime to facilitate transition to operations other than war or war.

- **Effective Training and Exercises.** Intelligence interoperability problems

reduce the ability of a joint force to attain unity of effort. Thus, an important concept is to **use realistic training, exercises, and rehearsals of operations to demonstrate, test, and evaluate the joint interoperability of intelligence systems and intelligence products.**

- **Data Bases. Ability of all echelons of the joint force to access archives and common data bases is key to successful intelligence operations.**

c. **Requirements**

"Military intelligence is not, in fact, the spectacular service of the common imagining, but a much more prosaic affair, dependent on an efficient machinery for collecting and evaluating every sort of item of information—machinery that extends from the front-line right back to Supreme Headquarters. When the mass of information has been collected, the art is to sift the wheat from the chaff, and then to lay before the commander a short clear statement."

Field Marshal Earl Alexander,
"The Alexander Memoirs,"
1940-1945

- **Organization. The joint architecture that provides the infrastructure for intelligence support is not hierarchical. Formal command and control relationships, however, exist** as shown in Figure VII-2. This relationship **facilitates RFI management** and **optimizes complementary intelligence functions** by echelon without obstructing the timely flow of critical intelligence up, down, or laterally. The national agencies maintain systems and organizations that respond directly, and provide intelligence, to any echelon for time-sensitive reporting (i.e., the TRAP broadcast). **The formal flow for intelligence RFI up and down echelons is through the NMJIC.**

- **Equipment**

•• **Figure VII-3 depicts the joint intelligence architecture as a network of integrated work stations, file servers, and communications links.** These three elements must work together, compliant with common standards, to create the interoperable information environment required to support military operations. The network includes **direct connectivity** by some communications or communications relay link (landline, radio, satellite, and others as appropriate) and **broadcast capability** to support time-sensitive and "sensor-to-shooter" needs. The **information grid concept allows data** collected by whatever means **to be communicated** directly to a user or to a processing site or platform **by the most efficient path**, then passed on or through to the user as appropriate. A critical aspect of the information grid is its ability to make all intelligence, including direct collector-to-user information, accessible via standardized file servers to standards compliant work stations.

•• **Some collected, unprocessed information can be transferred** to a headquarters, regional, or field processing site **directly via existing communications links that are outside the joint architecture**. Such information is not useful prior to processing (e.g., encrypted information), or requires very high bandwidths that would overwhelm the communications links. In these instances, the information is first processed or selectively captured prior to transferring or making




Figure VII-2. Formal Joint Intelligence Architecture

it available over the network (examples are certain raw SIGINT and some types of imagery or video).

•• In Figure VII-3, **collectors and producers process information before passing it on in the correct format to the standardized file servers. Where required, the data can be automatically passed to the standardized file servers without processing.** Processing and communicating information collected by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) provide a good example. Very high resolution video collected by the UAV can be viewed near real time at a downlink processing site, but communication of this video requires high bandwidth. The unprocessed video can be relayed directly by fiber-optic line or satellite to a JIC or headquarters element. At the same time, targeting information can be reported to tactical elements by voice communications or message. Selected video frames can be captured by JDISS and made available to all users over the joint architecture. Information processed by a headquarters element or JIC could, in turn, be transmitted or made available by Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and/or JDISS. In this example, all the capabilities linked to and by the joint architecture are exercised including both pull and push. The information is made available for a variety of users needs and is included in products and reports that serve multiple purposes for the tactical users.




Figure VII-3. Joint Intelligence Architecture

4. Connectivity

a. **General.** To maximize the utility of the architecture, **systems must meet standards of connectivity using standard communications protocols and standard encryption devices** that must be available at all echelons. The architecture has the flexibility to accommodate, not to replace, existing I&W and direct support systems. It is intended to overlay additional capabilities using existing communications carriers.

b. **Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System. The joint intelligence architecture uses JWICS and JDISS as the joint standard and foundation for commonality among support systems.** As shown in Figure VII-4, JWICS satisfies the requirement for secure, high-speed, **multimedia transmission services** for intelligence information. JWICS incorporates **advanced networking technologies** that permit greater throughput and capacity, making possible the use of




Figure VII-4. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System

applications that take advantage of multimedia technologies including video teleconferencing. Each JWICS node can create, receive, transmit, and store video images as well as voice, text, graphics, and data. **Information can be either broadcast or shared interactively** among JWICS subscribers on a point-to-point or multipoint basis. The JWICS circuit can be managed via allocation of bandwidth, allowing **simultaneous use of the link for multiple applications.** JWICS is an integral part of the sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information Systems Network.

- As shown in Figure VII-5, **JDISS provides the standard workstation server software configuration.** JDISS is the DODIIS reference model. The basic backbone for **the dissemination of intelligence to and from deployed JDISS nodes is via the JWICS network.** Where JWICS is not required or not available, **JDISS has a versatile communications capability that can be connected to whatever circuit is available.** The architecture optimizes flexibility to focus intelligence efforts efficiently and assure that support is maximized for a theater engaged in military operations.

- **All-source intelligence dissemination in support of joint operations** at the national, theater, and subordinate joint force levels **will be via JWICS and JDISS. These systems support the production, dissemination, and display of fused intelligence critical to theater battle management.** The architecture provides access to data from national, theater and tactical intelligence organizations and sources primarily from a **"push-pull" system.** A "pull" concept will result in JFCs receiving only high-quality, relevant intelligence based on their mission and phase of the operation. The "pull" capability is designed to prevent communications circuit saturation. In addition, time-sensitive intelligence will be "pushed" to JFCs and components via dedicated broadcasts




Figure VII-5. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

in response to preplanned EEI. **ADP interoperability with force level systems will be accomplished by JDISS integration.** Through JWICS connectivity, intelligence production at the national level can be shared in near real time with the JFC. **Automated processing** and **seamless connectivity** at all levels **allow intelligence analysts at all levels access to imagery and multiple data bases** while concurrently producing intelligence products in response to specific mission requirements. **This up, down, and across echelon interface among strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence organizations is the backbone for joint intelligence dissemination.**

5. The Joint Intelligence Center/Joint Intelligence Support Elements

Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991, "Strengthening Defense Intelligence," inter alia, established **the JIC as the primary intelligence organization** providing support to joint warfighting at all levels. **The JIC concept fuses the main support capabilities of all Service, Combat Support Agency, and combat units** into a one stop shopping center for intelligence support. Although in reality, a particular JIC cannot be expected to completely satisfy every RFI; it can coordinate support from other intelligence organizations above and below its echelon. A subordinate joint force is supported by a JISE, a tailored subset of a theater JIC.

a. **All JICs/JISEs provide intelligence support to operational forces and perform common functions.** Figure VII-6 provides a representative JIC organization wherein all major joint intelligence functional areas and liaison relationships are presented. As shown, **the JIC is the principal J-2 organization supporting joint operations.**

b. **The JIC/JISE is, by design, scalable and can expand to meet the needs of the JFC.** During noncrisis periods, JIC manning is normally retained at the minimum level required to perform essential functions such as I&W, current intelligence, collection management, delegated general military intelligence production, and support to the commander. **As crises develop, JICs at each echelon bring together personnel and equipment needed to manage intelligence support requirements.** JISEs are established to




Figure VII-6. Representative Joint Intelligence Center




Figure VII-7. JIC/JISE Personnel Augmentation Sources

meet the particular needs of subordinate joint forces. Collection, production, and dissemination resources are focused on the crisis. Liaison with intelligence production agencies and communications staffs identifies critical shortfalls, and action to correct deficiencies is accomplished. Because the JIC is the focal point for intelligence support to joint operations, **augmentation personnel are drawn from many sources**, including Reserves, as shown in Figure VII-7.

c. **At the national level, the NMJIC is the focal point for all defense intelligence activities** in support of joint operations. **Combatant commands have JICs** focused on their geographic or functional responsibilities**. A subordinate joint force**, when established**, also normally forms a JISE** as the focus for intelligence in support of the joint force commander, joint staff, and components.

d. **Functions.** The JIC/JISE allows for efficient access to the entire DOD intelligence infrastructure in support of joint operations**. JICs/JISEs perform common functions** although the degree to which they engage in specific functions varies according to command missions. **The command's J-2 and JIC/JISE are normally collocated, and it is the prerogative of command to define JIC functions and responsibilities**, particularly with respect to the J-2 staff. In many cases, a responsibility may be shared between the J-2 staff and JIC/JISE. For example, the J-2 staff may be responsible for setting forth collection requirements, while the JIC may have the duties of implementing those requirements and managing their fulfillment.

- **National Level. The NMJIC is the channel through which the JFC's intelligence and CI needs**,

normally routed through the combatant commander, **are tasked to appropriate national agencies** (see Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for details of national agencies such as CIA, NSA, CIO, DMA, and NRO). **The NMJIC serves as the Joint Staff/J-2 focal point for management and tasking of JFC national RFI** (see Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for RFI management details). **The NMJIC will expand as necessary**, establishing a Working Group, Intelligence Task Force, or in the case of a major crisis like Operation DESERT STORM, a contingency NMJIC.

•• The **NMJIC** serves the Washington, D.C. community, combatant commands, Services, and coalition partners and allies. **It is the DOD single point of entry for RFI and for accomplishing these intelligence functions:** (1) global I&W, (2) current intelligence, (3) situation summaries, (4) estimates, (5) special assessments, (6) national targeting support, (7) joint TECHINT support through a technical operational intelligence representative, and (8) national data bases. **The NMJIC participates in targeting and developing national-level target lists** as described in Joint Pub 2-01.1, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting." **The NMJIC supports the theater as requested in BDA.** The Joint Staff/J-2 will resolve tasking and production priority conflicts among competing combatant commanders, if required. (See Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," for NMJIC concept of operations.)

•• **The NMJIC has access to all DIA resources and is linked by automation to the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC)** located in the National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC), Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. **The OICC is the focal point for the NMJIC at the NMIPC, and it manages crisis-related military intelligence production** and, as appropriate, DIA imagery resources at the Washington Navy Yard. The OICC has access to DIA analytical expertise, including military capabilities, S&T intelligence, estimative intelligence, military production and geography, intelligence data bases, and operational support and targeting requirements for national, theater, and tactical units.

•• **The national support structure** (Figure VII-8) **also includes a DCI task force** established to focus CIA support for military operations. The DCI task force is made up of representatives from Defense and combat support agencies. **Also, NMJIC can access the Department of State.** NMJIC serves as the subordinate joint force or theater JIC point of contact for interaction with this DCI task force.

•• **Requirements for national collection** and support in collection coordination **are handled by the Defense Collection Coordination Center** collocated with the NMJIC.

•• **DIA coordinates** through the combatant command/J-2 augmentation to the subordinate joint force/**J-2 for captured materiel and document exploitation.** The support is usually




Figure VII-8. National Support Structure

tailored to the crisis situation and can range from a liaison officer to the subordinate joint force/J-2 to a robust joint staff element with a fully-staffed JCMEC and Document Exploitation team.

- **Theater/Regional Level. The National Military Strategy describes the JIC as "the principal element for ensuring effective intelligence support for combatant commanders in chiefs and theater forces."** Not all combatant commanders have JICs assigned to their commands, but they do receive general support from at least one regional JIC. **Theater JICs are organized in accordance with geographic combatant commander prerogatives** but normally perform the general functions described in Chapter VI, "Intelligence Functions for Joint Operations," and can expand or contract based on command intelligence

and CI support requirements (see Chapter VI of this publication, "Intelligence Functions for Joint Operations," Joint Pub 2-02, "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations," and specific combatant command intelligence TTPs publications for details). The "normal" regional JIC is the **single source for RFI processing and validation**, in **theater intelligence analysis, production, and dissemination.** Regardless of configuration, all JICs have the mission of **planning, training and providing direct support to deploying JTFs.** JFCs should refer all RFI to the regional or theater JIC that has geographic responsibility for the intended AOR as soon as the mission has been identified.

- **Subordinate Joint Force.** When a JISE is required to support a forward-deployed subordinate joint force, **personnel augmentation and C4I equipment and procedures can be tailored and deployed to fit the operating environment** based on identified subordinate joint force requirements**. The subordinate joint force JISE**, with the intelligence staff, **manages collection, analysis, and fusion of intelligence and dissemination** up and down echelon of intelligence and products for the JOA. **The JISE**, through the J-2, as the focus for intelligence support to joint operations, **is the hub of intelligence activity in the JOA** and is responsible for providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation by integrating and adding to the adversary situations developed by the combatant commanders' intelligence organization**. A NIST** made up of DIA, NSA, CIA, and other intelligence resources requested by the subordinate joint force J-2 **can deploy to support the subordinate joint force JISE**. If the geographic combatant commander desires, **the NIST can function as a core JISE. The core JISE capability can be further enhanced by national deployable intelligence capabilities that can be requested to expand a subordinate joint force JISE or to augment theater capabilities.** CIO and NRO personnel may augment the subordinate joint force JISE, as required. **The level of support required** by the theater, and the employment of the capabilities, **is determined by the geographic combatant commander.** Once determined by the geographic combatant commander, requirements are addressed by the Joint Staff J-2 for the combatant commander's J-2 through consultation with the Military Intelligence Board in Washington, D.C.

CHAPTER VIII
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

"Allied effectiveness in World War II established for all time the feasibility of developing and employing joint control machinery that can meet the sternest tests of war. The key to the matter is readiness, on highest levels, to adjust all nationalistic differences that affect the strategic employment of combined resources, and, in the war theater, to designate a single commander who is supported to the limit. With these two things done, success rests in the vision, the leadership, the skill, and the judgment of the professionals making up the command and staff groups; if these two things are not done, only failure can result."

General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower,
USA Crusade in Europe, 1948

1. Introduction

When the United States has common political or strategic objectives with allied and friendly nations, **some situations may require that their military capabilities act in concert as a single and seamless force or as one operable system against an adversary.** Military operations with coalition partners may take place under **bilateral**, **multinational**, or **United Nations (UN) auspices.** There may be situations where intelligence should be shared with nongovernmental organizations, outside usual politico-military channels, requiring policy and dissemination criteria and authority for each instance.

2. Doctrine for Multinational Operations

There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine. There are, however, **principles and concepts** that provide an initial position for developing the objectives and nature of multinational doctrines.

3. Multinational Intelligence Architecture

The single joint intelligence architecture discussed in Chapter VII, "The Joint Intelligence Architecture," **provides a framework to build the multinational intelligence architecture.** Figure VIII-1 provides an example of a multinational architecture that supports coalition forces and features JDISS as the core capability for disseminating released or approved for release US intelligence information. The multinational architecture portrayed in Figure VIII-1 was established to provide support to US and UN forces in Somalia as members of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) effort. As the figure shows, two levels of information (intelligence) were established: **Level 1** (can be shown to, but not retained by coalition/UN) and **Level 2** (intelligence that has been properly cleared for release to coalition/UN). Level 1 intelligence remains within US-only channels, while Level 2 flows to the UNOSOM II information center in Mogadishu either from the UN or via the US Intelligence Support Element in Somalia.




Figure VIII-1. Multinational Intelligence Architecture

4. Joint and Multinational Doctrine Relationship

There are close analogies between joint and multinational doctrines that stem from similar needs--to present an adversary a seamless force and for unity of effort of multiple force elements. Many of the principles, issues, and answers to joint operations will be the same or similar in multinational operations. For multinational doctrines, differences in cultural and national perspectives must be understood in order to adapt doctrines or forge new ones.

5. Multinational Intelligence Principles

The principles in Figure VIII-2 are offered as considerations for building intelligence doctrine for multinational operations in addition to the appropriate principles found in joint intelligence doctrine.

a. **Adjust National Differences Among Nations. A key to effective multinational intelligence is a readiness**, beginning with the highest levels of command, **to make required adjustments to national**



Figure VIII-2. Intelligence for Multinational Operations

concepts for intelligence support to make the multinational action effective. Areas that need to be addressed include designating a single Director of Intelligence (C-2) and adjusting those intelligence support differences that may affect the integrated employment of intelligence resources and the sharing of intelligence and information. With these things done, **successful intelligence support rests in the vision, leadership, skill, and judgment of the multinational command and staff groups.**

b. **Unity of Effort Against Common Threat. Intelligence officers of each nation need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives.** When the alliance or coalition is constituted against a common adversary, a threat to one element of an alliance or coalition by the common adversary should be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition elements.

c. **Determining and Planning Intelligence. The multinational command and national forces' intelligence requirements, production, and use should be agreed on, planned, and exercised well in advance of operations.** For anticipated situations and operations, **a prime objective should be attaining compatibility** of intelligence and operating doctrine and concepts, intelligence systems, intelligence-related communications, language and terms, and intelligence services and products. **Solutions to problems should be developed and tried before they are required for actual operations** so doctrines and procedures are not left to a trial and error methodology during combat.

Illustrations of multinational doctrine development and testing can be found in the concepts and exercise programs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command.

d. **Special Arrangements. Special arrangements unique to coalitions and alliances should be considered** for developing, communicating, and using intelligence where there are differences in nations' culture, language and terminology, organizations and structures, operating and intelligence concepts, methodologies, and/or equipment.



UN, Serbian and Croation officials observe preparations and exchange final information prior to launch of a relief airdrop into occupied Croatia.

e. **Full Exchange of Intelligence**

- **Intelligence. The nations should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence** about the situation and adversary to attain the best possible common understanding of threatened interests, determine relevant and attainable objectives, and achieve unified efforts against the adversary. **The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be conceived and exercised well before operations begin.** The exchange must be monitored and, when necessary, adapted during operations to meet better understood or changing circumstances. **The combatant command J-2s should have personnel knowledgeable in foreign disclosure policy and procedures** and should obtain necessary foreign disclosure authorization from the DIA as soon as possible. Assignment to the joint or multinational task force of personnel familiar with foreign disclosure regulations will facilitate the efficient flow of intelligence.

- **Sources and Methods. Sharing intelligence sources and methods**, including cooperative intelligence collection and production, **may help attain the common objectives of the alliance members or coalition partners. When**, however, **intelligence sources and methods cannot be shared among allied or coalition nations, the intelligence should be provided after it is sanitized** by effectively separating the information

from the sources and methods used to obtain it. This sanitizing process must also be exercised in peacetime for both known and probable allies. Intelligence production agencies should consider use of tear lines to separate that intelligence and/or information within a given report that may be immediately disclosed to alliance members or coalition partners.

f. **Complementary Intelligence Operations. Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary.** Because each nation will have intelligence system strengths and limitations or unique and valuable capabilities, **the sum of intelligence resources and capabilities of the nations should be available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem**. Host-nation CI capabilities, if available, can contribute significantly to force protection.

g. **Multinational Intelligence Center. When there is a multinational command, a multinational intelligence center should be established** so that the commander, the C-2, and staffs have the facility and capability for developing multinational intelligence requirements statements and for acquiring and fusing the nations' intelligence contributions. The Multinational Intelligence Center should include **a representative from all nations** participating in the multinational operation.

h. **Liaison Exchange. Intelligence liaison** among commands and among supporting and supported organizations **should be used to bridge problems** of understanding between cultures, languages and terms, doctrines and methodologies, and operational intelligence requirements.

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


Figure A-1 Intelligence Synchronization

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APPENDIX B
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating Section, Issuing Headquarters*
Place of Issue
Day, Month, Year, Hour, Zone

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER _____**

( ) REFERENCES: a. Maps and Charts.
b. Other relevant documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the assigned task and its purpose. The mission of the command as a whole is taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, or other statement.

2. ( ) Adversary Situation. State conditions that exist and indication of effects of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned mission. This paragraph describes the area of operations, the adversary military situation, and the effect of these two factors on adversary capabilities.

a. ( ) Characteristics of the Area of Operations. Discuss the effect of the physical characteristics of the area of operations on military activities of both combatants. If an analysis of the area has been prepared separately, this paragraph in the intelligence estimate may simply refer to it, then discuss the effects of the existing situation on military operations in the area.

(1) (9) Military Geography

(a) ( ) Topography

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe relief and drainage, vegetation, surface materials, cultural features, and other characteristics in terms of their effect on key terrain, observation, fields of fire, obstacles, cover and concealment, avenues of approach, lines of communications, and landing areas and zones.

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* When this estimate is distributed outside the issuing headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, and the ending of the estimate is modified to include authentication by the authoring section, division, or other official according to local policy.

**Normally, these are numbered sequentially during a calendar year.

2. ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effect of topography on broad adversary capabilities such as attack and defense, describing generally how the topography affects each type of activity. The effect on employment of nuclear and chemical and biologic (NBC) weapons; amphibious, airborne, or air-landed forces; surveillance devices and systems; communications equipment and systems; electronic warfare; psychological operations, OPSEC and military deception; logistic support; and other appropriate considerations should be included.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Course of Action. Discuss the effects of topography on friendly forces' military operations (attack, defense) in the same fashion as for adversary capabilities in the preceding subparagraphs.

(b) ( ) Hydrography

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the nature of the coastline; adjacent islands; location, extent, and capacity of landing beaches and their approaches and exits; nature of the offshore approaches, including type of bottom and gradients; natural obstacles; surf, tide, and current conditions.

2. ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad adversary capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action (COAs). Discuss the effects of the existing situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(c) ( ) Climate and Weather

1. ( ) Existing Situation. Describe temperature, cloud cover, visibility, precipitation, light data, and other climate and weather conditions and their general effects on roads, rivers, soil trafficability, and observation.

2. ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad adversary capabilities.

3. ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing climate and weather situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(2) ( ) Transportation

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe roads, railways, inland waterways, airfields, and other physical characteristics of the transportation system; capabilities of the transportation system in terms of rolling stock, barge capacities, and terminal facilities; and other pertinent data.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing transportation system and capabilities on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(3) ( ) Telecommunications

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe telecommunications facilities and capabilities in the area.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the existing telecommunications situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(4) ( ) Politics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the organization and operation of civil government in the area of operation.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Consider the effects of the political situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(5) ( ) Economics

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe industry, public works and utilities, finance, banking, currency, commerce, agriculture, trades and professions, labor force, and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the economic situation on broad COAs for friendly forces.

(6) ( ) Sociology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe language, religion, social institutions and attitudes, minority groups, population distribution, health and sanitation, and other related factors.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of the sociological situation on COAs for friendly forces.

(7) ( ) Science and Technology

(a) ( ) Existing Situation. Describe the level of science and technology in the area of operations.

(b) ( ) Effect on Adversary Capabilities. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad adversary capabilities.

(c) ( ) Effect on Friendly Courses of Action. Discuss the effects of science and technology on broad COAs for friendly forces.

b. ( ) Enemy Military Situation (Ground, Naval, Air, Other Service)

(1) ( ) Strength. State the number and size of enemy units committed and adversary reinforcements available for use in the area of operations. Ground strength, air power, naval forces, nuclear and NBC weapons, electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, surveillance potential, and all other strengths (which might be significant) are considered.

(2) ( ) Composition. Outline the structure of adversary forces (order of battle) and describe unusual organizational features, identity, armament, and weapon systems.

(3) ( ) Location and Disposition. Describe the geographic location of adversary forces in the area, including fire support elements; command and control facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and bases.

(4) ( ) Availability of Reinforcements. Describe adversary reinforcement capabilities in terms of ground, air, naval, missile, NBC forces and weapons, terrain, weather, road and rail nets, transportation, replacements, labor forces, prisoner of war policy, and possible aid from sympathetic or participating neighbors.

(5) ( ) Movements and Activities. Describe the latest known adversary activities in the area.

(6) ( ) Logistics. Describe levels of supply, resupply ability, and capacity of beaches, ports, roads, railways, airfields, and other facilities to support supply and resupply. Consider hospitalization and evacuation, military construction, labor resources, and maintenance of combat equipment.

(7) ( ) Operational Capability to Launch Missiles. Describe the total missile capability that can be brought to bear on forces operating in the area, including characteristics of missile systems, location and capacity of launch or delivery units, initial and sustained launch rates, size and location of stockpiles, and other pertinent factors.

(8) ( ) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft. Describe the total aircraft inventory by type, performance characteristics of operational aircraft, initial and sustained sortie rates of aircraft by type, and other pertinent factors.

(9) ( ) Operational Capabilities of Combatant Vessels. Describe the number, type, and operational characteristics of ships, boats, and craft in the naval inventory; base location; and capacity for support.

(10) ( ) Technical Characteristics of Equipment. Describe the technical characteristics of major items of equipment in the adversary inventory not already considered (such as missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels).

(11) ( ) Electronics Intelligence. Describe the adversary intelligence-gathering capability using electronic devices.

(12) ( ) NBC Weapons. Describe the types and characteristics of NBC weapons in the adversary inventory, stockpile data, delivery capabilities, NBC employment policies and techniques, and other pertinent factors.

(13) ( ) Significant Strengths and Weaknesses. Discuss the significant adversary strengths and weaknesses perceived from the facts presented in the preceding subparagraphs.

c. ( ) Enemy Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) ( ) Guerrilla. Describe the adversary capability for, policy with regard to, and current status in the area of guerrilla or insurgent operations.

(2) ( ) Psychological. Describe adversary doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of psychological operations in the area of operations.

(3) ( ) Subversion. Describe adversary doctrine, techniques, methods, organization for, and conduct of subversion in the area of operations.

(4) ( ) Sabotage. Outline adversary organization and potential for and conduct of sabotage in the area of operations.

3. ( ) Enemy Capabilities

a. ( ) Listing each adversary capability that can affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Each adversary capability should contain information on:

(1) ( ) What the adversary can do.

(2) ( ) Where they can do it.

(3) ( ) When they can start it and get it done.

(4) ( ) What strength they can devote to the task.

b. ( ) In describing adversary capabilities, the J-2 must be able to tell the commander what the enemy can do using its forces in a joint environment. First, of course, the J-2 must assess the adversary's ground, naval, and air forces. It is customary to enumerate separately the NBC and unconventional warfare capacities. Hypothetical examples follow:

(1) ( ) Ground Capabilities

(a) ( ) The enemy can attack at any time along our front with an estimated 6 infantry divisions and 2 tank divisions supported by 24 battalions of artillery.

(b) ( ) The enemy can defend now in its present position with 7 infantry divisions supported by 2 tank divisions and 16 battalions of medium and light artillery.

(c) ( ) The enemy can reinforce its attack (or defense) with all or part of the following units in the times and places indicated:

UNIT	PLACE	TIME
315th Airborne Div	Vic RESOGA	8 hrs after starting time
41st Motorized	Vic CARDINAL	6 hrs after starting time

(2) ( ) Air Capabilities

(a) ( ) Starting now, and based on an estimated strength of 300 fighters and 100 medium bomber aircraft, the enemy can attack in the area of operations with 240 fighter sorties per day for the first 2 days, followed by a sustained rate of 150 sorties per day, and 60 bomber sorties per day, for 1 day followed by a sustained rate of 48 sorties per day.

(b) ( ) Using airfields in the vicinity of ____, the enemy has sufficient transport sorties to lift one regiment in a single lift to airfields in the vicinity of ____, ____, and ____ within 4 hours flying time.

(3) ( ) Naval Capabilities. Starting now, the enemy can conduct sustained sea and air operations in the entire area with 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 1 CV, 7 SSNs, a mine force of 20 craft, and 70 gunboats and smaller craft now on station in the area.

(4) ( ) NBC Capabilities. The enemy can employ at any time and in any part of the area of operations an estimated 40 to 60 nuclear weapons of yields from 2 to 50 kt delivered by cannon and rocket artillery, guided missile, and aircraft. The enemy can employ the chemical and biological agents ____, _____, and ____ in the area of operations at any time delivered by air, cannon, and rocket artillery and by guided missile.

(5) ( ) UW Capability. The enemy can conduct UW operations in the area within 10 days after starting the operation using dissident ethnic elements and the political adversaries of the current government.

(6) ( ) Joint Capabilities. The enemy can continue to defend in its present position with 6 infantry divisions, supported by 16 artillery battalions, and reinforced by 3 mechanized divisions within 8 hours after starting movement. Enemy defense also can be supported by 150 fighter sorties daily for a sustained period and by continuous naval surface and air operations employing 6 DDs, 4 FFs, 7 SSNs, and 1 CV.

4. ( ) Analysis of Enemy Capabilities. Analyze each capability in light of the assigned mission, considering all applicable factors from paragraph 2 above and attempt to determine and give reasons for the relative order of probability of adoption by the adversary. Discuss adversary vulnerabilities. In this paragraph, examine the adversary capability by discussing the factors that favor or militate against its adoption by the adversary. When applicable, the analysis of each capability should also include a discussion of adversary vulnerabilities attendant to that capability; i.e., conditions or circumstances of the adversary situation that render the adversary especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. Finally, that analysis should include a discussion of any indications that point to possible adoption of the capability. For example, the following:

a. ( ) Attack now with forces along the forward edge of the battle area ....

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) ....

(b) ( ) ....

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Road and rail nets will not support large-scale troop and supply movements necessary for an attack in the area.

(b) ( ) Terrain in the area does not favor an attack.

(3) ( ) Adoption of this capability will expose the enemy's west flank to counterattack.

(4) ( ) Except for minor patrol activity in the ____ area, there are no indications of adoption of this capability.

b. ( ) Delay from present positions along the ____ River line ....

(1) ( ) The following factors favor the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) There are several excellent natural barriers between the ____ River and the ____ Mountains.

(b) ( ) The effectiveness of the water barriers will improve, and trafficability on the upland slopes of the terrain barriers will deteriorate with advent of the monsoon.

(2) ( ) The following factors militate against the enemy's adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) ....

(b) ( ) ....

(3) ( ) In the adoption of this capability, the enemy's lines of communications will be restricted by a limited road and rail net that can easily be interdicted.

(4) ( ) The following facts indicate adoption of this capability:

(a) ( ) Aerial photography indicates some preparation of barriers in successive positions.

(b) ( ) Considerable troop movement and pre-positioning of floating bridge equipment along the water barriers have been detected.

5. ( ) Conclusions. Conclusions resulting from discussion in paragraph 4 above. Include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite adversary vulnerabilities where applicable. This paragraph contains a summary of adversary capabilities most likely to be adopted, listed in the order of relative probability if sufficient information is available to permit such an estimate. If appropriate, it should also include a concise statement of the effects of each adversary capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Exploitable vulnerabilities should also be listed, where applicable.

a. ( ) Adversary Capabilities in Relative Probability of Adoption

(1) ( ) Defend in present locations with ....

(2) ( ) Delay from present positions along ....

(3) ( ) Reinforce the defense or delay with ....

(4) ( ) Conduct UW operations in the area ....

b. ( ) Vulnerabilities

(1) ( ) Enemy left (west) flank is open to envelopment by amphibious assault ....

(2) ( ) The enemy's air search radar coverage is poor in the left (west) portion of its defensive sector ....

(Signed)

_____

J-2

(The staff division chief signs the staff estimates produced by that division. If the estimate is to be distributed outside the headquarters, the heading and signature block must be changed to reflect that fact.)

ANNEXES: (By letter and title) Annexes should be included where the information is in graphs or of such detail and volume that inclusion makes the body of the estimate cumbersome. They should be lettered sequentially as they occur throughout the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION: (According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

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APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The laws, directives, policies, and procedures that provide the basis for development of this publication are:

1. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

2. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (10 USC 161 et. seq. PL 99-433).

3. Secretary of Defense memorandum, 15 March 1991, "Strengthening Defense Intelligence."

4. Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, "United States Intelligence Activities."

5. DOD Directive 5100.1, 25 September 1987, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components."

6. DOD Directive 5240.1, "DOD Intelligence Activities."

7. Joint Pub 1, 10 January 1995, "Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States."

8. Joint Pub 0-2, 24 February 1995, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

9. Joint Pub 1-01, 14 September 1993, Chg-1, "Joint Publication System Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program."

10. Joint Pub 3-0, 1 February 1995, "Doctrine for Joint Operations."

11. MJCS-51-88, 13 April 1988, "Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations."

12. CM-1502-92, 23 November 1992, "A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts."

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APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization) and writing and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Intelligence (J-2).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J2-J2P/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE NUMBER	COPY NUMBER	DATE OF CHANGE	DATE ENTERED	POSTED BY	REMARKS

4. Distribution

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GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACINT	acoustic intelligence
ADP	automated data processing
AOR	area of responsibility
BDA	battle damage assessment
C-2	multinational or combined Director for Intelligence; staff
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	combat assessment
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIAP	command intelligence architecture plan
CINC	commander in chief (i.e., commander of a combatant command)
CIO	Central Imagery Office
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COM	collection operations management
COMINT	communications intelligence
CRM	collection requirements management
CSS	Central Security Service, National Security Agency
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIN	Defense Intelligence Network
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DODIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
EEI	essential elements of information
ELINT	electronic intelligence
FISINT	foreign instrumentation signals intelligence
FS	file server
GMI	general military intelligence
HUMINT	human intelligence
I&W	indications and warning
IMINT	imagery intelligence
IN	Air Force component intelligence officer; staff
IRINT	infrared intelligence
ISE	intelligence support element

J-1	Director for Manpower and Personnel; joint staff
J-2	Director for Intelligence; joint staff
J-3	Director for Operations; joint staff
J-4	Director for Logistics; joint staff
J-5	Director for Plans; joint staff
J-6	Director for Communications; joint staff
JCMEC	Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center
JDEC	Joint Document Exploitation Center
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JFC	joint force commander
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIF	Joint Interrogation Facility
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JOA	joint operations area
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
LASINT	laser intelligence
LNO	liaison officer
MASINT	measurement and signature intelligence
MC&G	mapping, charting, and geodesy
MGRS	Military Grid Reference System
N-2	Navy component intelligence officer; staff
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NIST	national intelligence support team
NMIPC	National Military Intelligence Production Center
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NUCINT	nuclear intelligence
OICC	Operational Intelligence Coordination Center
OMA	Office of Military Affairs (CIA)
OPTINT	optical intelligence
OPSEC	operations security
OSINT	open-source intelligence
PHOTINT	photographic intelligence
RADINT	radar intelligence
RFI	request for information
RINT	unintentional radiation intelligence

SCE	Service Cryptologic Element
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGINT	signals intelligence
S&T	scientific and technical
TECHINT	technical intelligence
TELINT	telemetry intelligence
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TRAP	tactical related applications
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM	United Nations operations in Somalia
USSS	US SIGINT System

acoustic intelligence. Intelligence derived from the collection and processing of acoustic phenomena. (Joint Pub 1-02)

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, including, most frequently, human resource intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open source data, in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (Joint Pub 1-02)

application. 1. The system or problem to which a computer is applied. Reference is often made to an application as being either of the computational type, wherein arithmetic computations predominate, or of the data processing type, wherein data handling operations predominate. 2. In the intelligence context, the direct extraction and tailoring of information from an existing foundation of intelligence and near real time reporting. It is focused on and meets specific, narrow requirements, normally on demand. (Joint Pub 1-02)

architecture. A framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the elements of the subject force, system, or activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of intelligence responsibility. An area allocated to a commander in which the commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence within the means at the commander's disposal. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battle damage assessment. The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collection management. In intelligence usage, the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collection operations management. The authoritative direction, scheduling, and control of specific collection operations

and associated processing, exploitation, and reporting resources. Also called COM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

collection requirements management. The authoritative development and control of collection, processing, exploitation, and/or reporting requirements that normally result in either the direct tasking of assets over which the collection manager has authority, or the generation of single-discipline tasking requests to collection management authorities at a higher, lower, or lateral echelon to accomplish the collection mission. Also called CRM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendation. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force J-2. Also called CA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat intelligence. That knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. Command and control warfare is both offensive and defensive: a. counter C2—To prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2. b. C2 protection—To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander's estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander's estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions is called a commander's long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications intelligence. Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients. Also called COMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of intelligence operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a J-2's assumptions or intent in regard to intelligence support of an operation or series of operations. The concept of intelligence operations, which complements the commander's concept of operations, is contained in the intelligence annex of operation plans. The concept of intelligence operations is designed to give an overall picture of

intelligence support for joint operations. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency plan. A plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

data. Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic means. Any representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned. (Joint Pub 1-02)

data base. Information that is normally structured and indexed for user access and review. Data bases may exist in the form of physical files (folders, documents, etc.) or formatted automated data processing system data files. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

defense intelligence production. The integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of information from single or multiple sources into finished intelligence for known or anticipated military and related national security consumer requirements. (Joint Pub 1-02)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronics intelligence. Technical and geo-location intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. Also called ELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electro-optical intelligence. Intelligence other than signals intelligence derived from the optical monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum from ultraviolet (0.01 micrometers) through far infrared (1,000 micrometers). Also called ELECTRO-OPTINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called EEI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

estimate. 1. An analysis of a foreign situation, development, or trend that identifies its major elements, interprets the significance, and appraises the future possibilities and the prospective results of the various actions that might be taken. 2. An appraisal of the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and potential courses of action of a foreign nation or combination of nations in consequence of a specific national plan, policy, decision, or contemplated course of action. 3. An analysis of an actual or contemplated clandestine operation in relation to the situation in which it is or would be conducted in order to identify and appraise such factors as available and needed assets and potential obstacles, accomplishments, and consequences. 4. In air intercept, a code meaning, "Provide a quick estimate of the height/depth/range/size of designated contact," or "I estimate height/depth/range/size of designated contact is _____." (Joint Pub 1-02)

foreign intelligence. Information relating to capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fusion. 1. The process whereby the nuclei of light elements combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element, with the release of tremendous amounts of energy. 2. In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fusion center. In intelligence usage, a physical location to accomplish fusion. It normally has sufficient intelligence automated data processing capability to assist in the process. (Joint Pub 1-02)

general military intelligence. Intelligence concerning the (1) military capabilities of foreign countries or organizations or (2) topics affecting potential US or allied military operations, relating to the following subjects: armed forces capabilities, including order of battle, organization, training, tactics, doctrine, strategy, and other factors bearing on military strength and effectiveness; area and terrain intelligence, including urban areas, coasts and landing beaches, and meteorological, oceanographic, and geological intelligence; transportation in all modes; military materiel production and support industries; military and civilian C3 systems; military economics, including foreign military assistance; insurgency and terrorism; military-political-sociological intelligence; location, identification, and description of military-related installations; government control; escape and evasion; and threats and forecasts. (Excludes scientific and technical intelligence.) Also called GMI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information

collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

imagery intelligence. Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Also called IMINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

information. 1. Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the preparation and subsequent provision of intelligence to a commander and his staff to aid in planning and conducting military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence estimate. The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence operations. The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. Predominantly, it refers to either intelligence collection or intelligence production activities. When used in the context of intelligence collection activities, intelligence operations refer to collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting of information. When used in the context of intelligence production activities, it refers to collation, integration, interpretation, and analysis, leading to the dissemination of a finished product. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

intelligence requirement. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The

degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint captured materiel exploitation center. Physical location for deriving intelligence information from captured enemy materiel. It is normally subordinate to the joint force/J-2. Also called JCMEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint deployable intelligence support system. A transportable workstation and communications suite that electronically extends a joint intelligence center to a joint task force or other tactical user. Also called JDISS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence architecture. A dynamic, flexible structure that consists of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, the theater joint intelligence centers, and subordinate joint force joint intelligence centers. This architecture encompasses automated data processing equipment capabilities, communications and information flow requirements, and responsibilities to provide theater and tactical commanders with the full range of intelligence required for planning and conducting operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence center. The intelligence center of the joint force headquarters. The joint intelligence center is responsible for providing and producing the intelligence required to support the joint force commander and staff, components, task forces and elements, and the national intelligence community. Also called JIC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint intelligence doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the preparation of intelligence and the subsequent provision of intelligence to support military forces of two or more Services employed in coordinated action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint interrogation facility. Physical location for systematic interrogation of enemy prisoners of war to derive tactical intelligence in support of the joint force commander. It is normally subordinate to the joint intelligence center. Also called JIF. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System. The sensitive compartmented information portion of the Defense Information System Network. It incorporates advanced networking technologies that permit point-to-point or multipoint information

exchange involving voice, text, graphics, data, and video teleconferencing. Also called JWICS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

laser intelligence. Technical and geolocation intelligence derived from laser systems; a subcategory of electro-optical intelligence. Also called LASINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mapping, charting, and geodesy. Maps, charts, and other data used for military planning, operations, and training. These products and data support air, land, and sea navigation; weapon system guidance; target positioning; and other military activities. These data are presented in the forms of topographic, planimetric, imaged, or thematic maps and graphics; nautical and aeronautical charts and publications; and, in digital and textual formats, gazetteers, which contain geophysical and geodetic data and coordinate lists. Also called MC&G. (Joint Pub 1-02)

measurement and signature intelligence. Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydromagnetic) derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of the same. Also called MASINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

medical intelligence. That category of intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of interest to strategic planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical capabilities in both military and civilian sectors. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Military Intelligence Board. A decisionmaking forum which formulates Defense intelligence policy and programming priorities. The Military Intelligence Board, chaired by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, who is dual-hatted as Director of Military Intelligence, consists of senior military and civilian intelligence officials of each Service, US Coast Guard, each Combat Support Agency, the Joint Staff/J-2/J-6, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Intelligence Program Support Group, National Military Intelligence Production Center, National Military Intelligence Collection Center, National Military Intelligence Support Center, and the combatant command J-2s. Also called MIB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

national intelligence support team. A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from either Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or any combination of these agencies. Also called NIST. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Reconnaissance Office. A Department of Defense agency tasked to ensure that the United States has the technology and spaceborne and airborne assets needed to acquire intelligence worldwide, including support to such functions as monitoring of arms control agreements, indications and warning, and the planning and conducting of military operations. This mission is accomplished through research and development, acquisition, and operation of spaceborne and airborne intelligence data collection

systems. Also called NRO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

nuclear intelligence. Intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of radiation and other effects resulting from radioactive sources. Also called NUCINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

open source intelligence. Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public. Also called OSINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operational intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. See also intelligence. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operation plan. Any plan, except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan, for the conduct of military operations. Plans are prepared by combatant commanders in response to requirements established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by commanders of subordinate commands in response to requirements tasked by the establishing unified commander. Operation plans are prepared in either a complete format (OPLAN) or as a concept plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN can be published with or without a time-phased force development data (TPFDD) file. a. OPLAN. An operation plan for the conduct of joint operations that can be used as a basis for development of an operation order (OPORD). An OPLAN identifies the forces and supplies required to execute the CINC's Strategic Concept and a movement schedule of these resources to the theater of operations. The forces and supplies are identified in TPFDD files. OPLANs will include all phases of the tasked operation. The plan is prepared with the appropriate annexes, appendixes, and TPFDD files as described in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System manuals containing planning policies, procedures, and formats. Also, called OPLAN. b. CONPLAN. An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's Strategic Concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. Also called CONPLAN. c. CONPLAN with TPFDD. A CONPLAN with TPFDD is the same as a CONPLAN except that it requires more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

photographic intelligence. The collected products of photographic interpretation, classified and evaluated for intelligence use. Also called PHOTINT (Joint Pub 1-02)

priority intelligence requirements. Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decisionmaking. (Joint Pub 1-02)

radar intelligence. Intelligence derived from data collected by radar. Also called RADINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

scientific and technical intelligence. The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information which covers: a. foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and b. scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. (Joint Pub 1-02)

signals intelligence. 1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. Also called SIGINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

situation assessment. Assessment produced by combining military geography, weather, and threat data to provide a comprehensive projection of the situation for the decisionmaker. (Joint Pub 1-02)

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that is required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operational plan. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target acquisition. The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

targeting. 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

target materials. Graphic, textual, tabular, digital, video, or other presentations of target intelligence, primarily designed to support operations against designated targets by one or more weapon(s) systems. Target materials are suitable for training, planning, executing, and evaluating military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tear line. A physical line on an intelligence message or document which separates categories of information that have been approved for foreign disclosure or release. Normally, the intelligence below the tear line is that which has been previously cleared for disclosure or release. (Joint Pub 1-02)

technical intelligence. Intelligence derived from exploitation of foreign material, produced for strategic, operational, and tactical level commanders. Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize the adversary's technological advantage. Also called TECHINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

technical operational intelligence. A Defense Intelligence Agency initiative to provide enhanced scientific and technical intelligence to the commanders of unified commands and their subordinates through a closed loop system involving all Service and Defense Intelligence Agency scientific and technical intelligence centers. Through a system manager in the National Military Joint Intelligence Center, the technical operational intelligence program provides timely collection, analysis, and dissemination of area of responsibility specific scientific and technical intelligence to combatant commanders and their subordinates for planning, training, and executing joint operations. Also called TOPINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

telemetry intelligence. Technical intelligence derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry. Telemetry intelligence is a category of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence. Also called TELINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)


unintentional radiation intelligence. Intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of noninformation-bearing elements extracted from the electromagnetic energy unintentionally emanated by foreign devices, equipment, and systems, excluding those generated by the detonation of nuclear weapons. Also called RINT. (Joint Pub 1-02)

validation. 1. A process normally associated with the collection of intelligence that provides official status to an identified requirement and confirms that the requirement is appropriate for a given collector and has not been


previously satisfied. 2. In computer modeling and simulation, the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

weaponeering. The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. (Joint Pub 1-02)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Pub 2-0** is the keystone publication for the **Intelligence** series of the joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:




JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF