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13 July 1970

MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

ANNEXES I - M

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ANNEX I

to

APPENDIX B

COMMENT BY THESE INTERVIEWEES ON MACSOG'S MISSION

(In Chronological Order)

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Clyde R. Russell, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jan 1964 - Jun 1965	A
LTC David H. Arno, USAF	Staff Officer, Air Operations, MACSOG Jan 1964 to Mar 1964 (assigned to HQ PACAF and TDY with MACSOG)	B
	Staff Officer, Special Air Operations Branch, Plans Directorate, HQ PACAF (Monitored MACSOG Activities) Apr 1964 - April 1966	
Col John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	C
LTC Jonathon D. Carney, USA	Deputy Director, Operations-35 (SHINING BRASS/ PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE, IGLOO WHITE) Aug 1966 - Jul 1967	D
	Chief, Operations-34 (TIMBERWORK) July 1967 - March 1968	
	Chief, Operations-30 (FOOTBOY) Mar 1968 - Aug 1968	
Capt Bruce B. Dunning, USN	Special Operations Division, OSACSA, Staff Officer & Division Chief Aug 1966 - Nov 1969	E

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

COLONEL CLYDE R. RUSSELL, USA

...I don't feel that the objectives of OPLAN-34A were clearly spelled out, so we didn't know exactly what we were trying to do. If we were trying to convince the North Vietnamese that they could not operate from a sanctuary because the South Vietnamese were capable of hitting their beaches and their coastline, we were successful but there is a limit to how much success you can have in that type of operation. Once we got the maritime operations going, I am confident that we could have done anything along the coast. The North Vietnamese gave us no trouble whatsoever with regard to chasing our boats with SWATOW's. Their shore artillery did bother us but we were able to plot it and stay out of its way with few exceptions. We had access to the entire coast and could have done anything along that coast that was required. I don't know what the objective of that type of operation is unless it is to go up and destroy people and let them know they are not operating from a sanctuary. The LOKI operations where we picked up prisoners from the fishing fleets and brought them back for interrogation gave us some extremely good intelligence of what was going on in North Vietnam. We could have picked these prisoners up at will every place they were fishing up and down the coast. You are not going to get in on government secrets by talking to a bunch of fishermen but at least you can determine the feeling of the people by talking to these types.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, pp. 4-5.

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COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

LT. COLONEL DAVID H. ARNO, USAF

The basic mission of SOG could have probably been better stated. The mission indicated four categories of action which SOG could take; harassing, attritional, punitive, and aerial attacks. For all practical purposes, SOG did not get beyond the harassing and intelligence collection type of actions. On the whole, these actions were also to be accomplished without development of any type of indigenous base in North Vietnam. As a result, the teams that were inserted were required to spend practically all of their time either hiding or otherwise trying to survive. If the mission had been stated so that the initial teams could have been oriented toward developing an indigenous base of support, then the other types of actions (in particular harassing, attritional, and punitive) could have been accomplished and these unconventional warfare operations could have possibly posed a major threat to the North Vietnamese regime. It is realized that the development of indigenous bases would have been a much longer term type of action and not one which would have developed an immediate effect on the North Vietnamese regime. However, it is a characteristic of unconventional warfare that the effect of such warfare does develop or must be developed over a period of time and cannot be developed in the short time period for immediate effect.*

. . . . . .

. . . I feel that a truly covert operation probably should be conducted by CAS.**

* (TS) Interview of Lt. Colonel David H. Arno, USAF, p. 6.
** Ibid., p. 9.

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COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

...the SOG mission was not always completely clear because it was misinterpreted by some of the individuals who were in a position to provide support or to pass on our plans and programs at CINCPAC level. In this connection, it must be remembered that the mission was subject to some changes and modifications as time went by and, of course, new missions were added to the original mission. *

There were some agencies and activities (CAS, Army and Air Force intelligence units) that considered they had the charter and the right to conduct operations in North Vietnam without coordination with MACSOG. It was my understanding, based upon briefings in Washington and consultation with Clyde Russell and others who were instrumental in establishing the MACSOG organization, that MACSOG would have the total responsibility for the conduct of covert operations into North Vietnam and that they would have the responsibility for coordinating any other operations into that area.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

In this regard, I employed [redacted] a Southeast Asia war planner,

* (TS) Interview of Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, p. 6.

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as my primary assistant in contact other US agencies who were attempting to run intelligence as well as other covert operations into North Vietnam and later into Laos and Cambodia. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Ibid.
** Ibid, pp. 6-7

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COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

LT. COLONEL JONATHON D. CARNEY, USA

. . . . we were, by charter, essentially prohibited from utilizing or attempting unilateral operations. We had no base we could use for unilateral operations. We were, therefore, forced into a partnership with our South Vietnamese counterparts who, I don't believe, ever believed in the ——— program to start with. Certainly, by the time I got there, after 20 or 30 failures, they had reason not to believe in the program. In the future, if we are going to conduct Asian operations we should do it on the basis of unilateral, not allied, operations. . . . . it is my opinion that this activity would probably be best left to CIA and that the military should get out of it entirely.*

My statement that the military should withdraw from Asian operations into denied areas refers specifically to considerations of pure intelligence collection missions. The basic concept of the establishment of guerrilla bases, the activity within a denied area of either establishing a subversive movement or a guerrilla-type operation is still entirely sound. But we were, of course, in SOG forbidden from any consideration of this kind of activity by a White House level decision and we were reduced then to these extremely low-level black operations which were finally essentially intelligence oriented and largely unsuccessful.*

* (TS) Interview of Lt Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA, p. 9.

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COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

CAPTAIN BRUCE B. DUNNING, USN

If I had to point out one major observation based on my experience in Washington and in the FOOTBOY Program, it is that the US military Services do have a definite responsibility to participate in US covert actions. Further, it is my strong conviction that this aspect of unconventional warfare is a specialized one requiring a rather specialized viewpoint which,in turn, certainly requires organizational concepts that are different from conventional military organizational concepts....*

. . . . I think, in the MACSOG context, that physical harassment by itself seldom achieves much of anything. There are cases where physical destruction missions obviously can achieve a legitimate military objective. In many cases, however, if you are just going in with limited resources to harass the enemy, to blow this and that up, you discommode him a bit but you are not going to really bring any heavy pressure to bear on the opposing regime unless physical harassment is tied into some large, perhaps psychological, objective or unless it is of such a nature and conducted in such a way that it is going to make the enemy think that he is politically threatened.**

. . . I am not convinced that . . . the real objectives of this program (FOOTBOY) were adequately spelled out by Washington and that the program was backed by a really well thought out concept. I have the feeling that, during the

* Interview of Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, p. 1.
** Ibid.

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early part of operations against North Vietnam, we were operating there simply for the sake of doing something. In making such critical statements, I feel very strongly that the people in SOG were doing a tremendous job. My criticism is aimed primarily at the Washington level. I think this is a very important point because I'm afraid that our approach to unconventional warfare is essentially still the same.*

In about mid-1965, it was becoming apparent that the type of physical harassment operations SOG was conducting in the North was not achieving tremendous results and, of course, the bombing was started at about that time. . . . The FOOTBOY Program was then rather informally reoriented toward an emphasis on intelligence collection. I have reservations about how well-thought out the decision to emphasize intelligence collection was. Certainly, unconventional assets operating in a denied area do have a definite intelligence collection potential and this potential should be exploited. Anybody in a denied area should collect all the information available and steps should be taken to insure this information is properly put into the national intelligence channels. However, I feel that, despite this informal reorientation, intelligence collection was never properly SOG's primary function. In mid-1965, I think that this reorientation toward intelligence collection was an attempt to justify the program and that the true value of the program still hadn't been identified.**

. . . . . .

. . . . To my knowledge, there was no really formal or

* Ibid, p. 4.
** Ibid, p. 5.

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intensive reevaluation of the program when the bombing started .... A case can be made that the original mission ... was no longer valid once the bombing started. Actually, I'm not sure that SOG ever had a really clear-cut mission assigned in the first place. To be sure, CINCPAC, in 1965, published a mission statement or a list of objectives but, as I recall, that list included physical harassment, intelligence collection, shipping interdiction, conduct of psychological warfare, conduct of economic warfare, and several other things. It was a rather shotgun approach and, in my mind, didn't really give SOG a statement as what the program was intended to achieve and what SOG should do. So, I don't think that there was any really clear-cut reevaluation when the bombing started and, as a matter of fact, although I may be doing a disservice to the original planners, my impression has always been that the conceptualization of the original program was rather shallow. It was an idea of, "Damn it, we've got to do something up there, so let's do something. Let's conduct some unconventional operations." This is not an uncommon approach in the United States. "We've got some fancy boats so let's run some maritime operations. Let's get some agents up there. We'll figure out later what they are going to do." *

. . . . . .

. . . Intelligence collection, I do not believe, was ever really the proper primary mission of this program. If intelligence was to be the primary mission, then the program should have been put under an intelligence agency. Certainly, if intelligence collection was the real primary mission, I think we would have gone about it in an entirely different way. **

* Ibid, p. 8.
** Ibid, p. 12.

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Though we did not seem to be getting much in the way of intelligence and we certainly weren't conducting any physical destruction operations, it was becoming increasingly apparent to us in SACSA that we were somehow hurting Hanoi because they were increasingly sensitive to our operations. Hanoi's screams were getting louder and louder, and they seemed to be giving us credit for doing a lot more than we actually were doing. They were seeing a lot of ghosts in their backyard, they were chasing so-called "spy commandos" all over the countryside. We had several cases come up where apparently innocent North Vietnamese were tossed in the hoosegow for dealing with spy commandos who actually were never even there. So that it began to look as though by the mere presence of a certain number of our elements in North Vietnam that we were causing grave concern on the part of Hanoi. At about that time, General DePuy told us to start looking much more closely at the possibility of maximizing this psychological impact on Hanoi, an exploitation of what was obviously some sort of a vulnerability, but without such a high cost in friendly human resources. We were beginning to cast around for ways to do this, and came up with the idea of deceptive operations.*

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Ibid, p. 13.

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(b)(1)
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[redacted]

This team went to CINCPAC, picked up some CINCPAC people, and to SOG to take an overall look at the SOG programs. After discussing these programs with the SOG people, we saw that they had already made considerable progress, under Colonel Bowen's guidance, in developing concepts for deceptive operations and in breaking down some of the compartmentation and thus getting better integration between the operators and the PSYOPS people. We began to think seriously about reorienting this whole effort toward essentially a psychological impact on North Vietnam. Following return from that trip, we continued to look at the situation and, in late 1967, General DePuy directed Special Operations Division to do a study on the impact of covert operations and to determine some of the vulnerabilities. This study was done; it was probably a rather amateurish one. We tried to get DIA to do it, but they fell flat on their face. We did this study as best we could and, in the process, came up with a strong feeling that all of these operations were having quite an impact in the North, that the SSPL did have a good image with the coastal population, and that one of the cadre system, particularly the cadres at the hamlet and village levels. If we could continue to drive a wedge between the people and the cadres, it would seriously threaten Hanoi's control of the population or at least cause them to think that their control was threatened.**

* Ibid, pp. 13-14.
** Ibid, p. 14.

Shortly after we completed and published that study, we discovered that the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) had been working on a study on North Vietnamese vulnerabilities. CRESS had identified as the major vulnerability the North Vietnamese population control system. Based on this, we began to try to articulate a central single concept for FOOTBOY operations; this concept would use all, or at least most, of the FOOTBOY assets in an integrated effort to exploit Hanoi's almost paranoid fear of any perceived threat to their control of the population. We considered that, if Hanoi perceived a really serious threat to their control of the population, they had two alternatives, both of them undesirable from the Hanoi standpoint: to take repressive measures against the population and this would be counter-productive; to realize that it was the Hanoi war effort that was causing them to lose their grip on the population and, therefore, they either had to risk a greater loss or change their war policy. I don't imply that we could have caused Hanoi to change its war policy all by ourselves, but a good program directed at this vulnerability, combined with all the other things going on, had a good chance of major impact.*

SOG, meanwhile, was really going along this line. Our effort in Washington was to formalize this as a single concept for SOG and, hopefully, to get it validated at a very high level. We prepared a paper outlining the concept and planned to submit it to a very high-level committee. It was coordinated formally with CIA. SOG was given an opportunity to contribute to the paper. We had it all ready to go and, unfortunately, the 1 April (1968) standdown came. Then it was just not feasible to seek approval of the paper. By that time, however, SOG had reoriented their program into

* Ibid, pp. 14-15.

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a rather highly integrated effort, employing all of their UW assets, organized around the central psychological theme of the existence of the SSPL and its efforts to lead the people toward passive resistance. This would cause Hanoi to think that there was actually a lot going on in their backyard than was actually the case and to perceive SOG's actions as a real threat.*

With respect to the SSPL, we were reasonably sure that Hanoi knew we were doing it, and how. The attempt to cause the SSPL to guide the people toward non-cooperative behavior really didn't have to be covert vis-a-vis Hanoi. It had to be covert vis-a-vis the target population otherwise it would not be credible, even if Hanoi knew that the SSPL was really notional. In-actuality, we had a two-pronged thrust. The first, just mentioned, was to use the SSPL to build a sort of passive, non-cooperative dissidence on the part of the people the SSPL was able to reach. Even though Hanoi recognized that we were actually behind it, the fact that we were leading the population to behave in a manner not completely responsive to Hanoi's control would achieve the desired effect on Hanoi, i.e., it would be perceived as a threat. This effort, of course, did have to be completely covert vis-a-vis the target population in order to be credible. It is fairly well established that the people in the coastal areas would be responsive to guidance and leadership by what they thought to be an indigenous movement. If those people, the low-level population, realized that this was actually being done by the United States and the GVN then they would not be responsive. The other main thrust of this was to make Hanoi believe there was, in fact, a lot going on in their

* Ibid, p. 15.

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backyard and to think that they had a real security problem. This would be done largely by deceptive operations.*

. . . . . .

The evaluation of Hanoi's actual feelings toward these operations is, of course, rather difficult. You are getting into a highly subjective area here. About the only thing we had to go on were the pronouncements, sometimes rather vague, in the various press organs of the Hanoi regime and VNA (the Hanoi radio service). Occasionally we'd get indications of physical reactions by the Hanoi regime. Obviously, they were putting out an awful lot of propaganda and you had to read between the lines. You just had to draw impressions from both the level and the content of the pronouncements.**

During the period from about early 1967 to the first few months of 1968, in our view, both the quantity and the intensity of the Vietnamese reaction was steadily increasing. We began to see a shift from little short blurbs in the paper or the radio, e.g., that commando boats were fired on and set ablaze on the night of such and such, to very long and sometimes vitriolic diatribes against the foul psychological plots of the American imperialists. A lot of these diatribes were in great detail and similarly described some of our operations. This indicated to us that NVN was becoming increasingly sensitive to our operations, that we were getting deeper and deeper under their skin.**

We began to see articles in the security organs and the psychological warfare organs to their cadres on how to counteract this type of thing. Their instructions as to how

* Ibid, pp. 15-16.
** Ibid, p. 17.

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to counteract our activities were very superficial. It was rather apparent that they really didn't know what to do about them, e.g., after going through page after page of goobledygook, they would end up telling their cadres that, in response to leaflets, about the best thing they could do was to scoop them all up as soon as they landed and to keep them out of the hands of the people.*

The North Vietnamese were obviously having trouble knowing exactly how to keep this from having some impact on the people. In this regard, governmental pronouncements reached a climax in about March 1968. At that time, a government decree from the central committee which, dated in October 1967 but not surfaced outside of Hanoi until March 1968, decreed the death penalty for 21 offenses against the State. Some 19 of them could be tied almost directly into the type of thing we were doing. This decree was spotted by the American Embassy in Saigon as an extremely significant happening in North Vietnam without any reference to SOG operations. It was picked up first by the Embassy analysts who are not aware of SOG operations but who saw it as an extremely significant development in Hanoi. Of course, this was one danger of which we had to be aware. There was a tendency by some people who didn't know what was going on to view this as an indication that there was actual real resistance possibly developing in North Vietnam. Of course, this was not the case.**

. . . . . .

The point I had started to make was that eventually, toward the end, the FOOTBOY Program was evolving into a

* Ibid, p. 17.
** Ibid, p, 18.

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rather well integrated one employing all of the UW techniques in what was essentially a subversion mission. We were really trying to subvert the population and to draw it away from the regime, thereby achieving some significant impact on the regime itself. Unfortunately, this program was just getting cranked up and we were just in the process of trying to document and articulate this as a formalized concept approved at a high level when the standdown came in April 1968, and almost everything stopped. We then gradually built up operations again until, by October 1968, they were almost back up to where we had been before. We were just getting ready to process our conceptual paper up to the top again when 1 November arrived. The standdown then pretty much finished us.*

During the FOOTBOY Program, we had three stages of evolution. The first, when it was primarily a physical harassment program, I think largely oriented itself toward the frustration syndrome. In the second stage, the orientation was said to be primarily intelligence collection but I rather interpret this as being a justification for continuing the program rather than as a real mission. Finally, FOOTBOY began to move into the area where we were developing a missions statement that was really predicated on North Vietnamese vulnerabilities and on our real capabilities or assets.**

I think the FOOTBOY evolution is interesting because it is extremely important for future operations of this type that we not just undertake unconventional warfare operations for the sake of doing something. There is a big tendency to do this. If you have UW forces, if you have SEALs or Special Forces or special operations squadrons and

* Ibid, pp. 22-23.
** Ibid, p. 23.

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you are in a contingency situation, somebody says, "Boy, we've got these assets. Let's use them." It doesn't make sense to me to go ahead and use them unless you have a well conceived mission.*

. . . it is my personal feeling that the MACSOG missions were not clearly defined in the beginning of the program nor were they clearly defined for sometime. I have the feeling that the program was initiated largely as a result of what I would call a frustration complex, the desire to do something in North Vietnam in order to exert "pressure on the regime." I feel that there was too little assessment of North Vietnamese vulnerabilities and too little thought given to how these vulnerabilities could be exploited. In my mind, physical harassment, physical destruction per se, seldom does much good. It has to be tied to some well defined objective that is, in turn, tied to an identified vulnerability.**

. . . in 1965, CINCPAC issued a mission statement for MACSOG for the FOOTBOY Program but it was stated in terms of a wide variety of objectives: physical harassment, interdiction of shipping, economic warfare, intelligence collection, and a number of others. This type of disparate grouping of objectives, I think, served largely to diffuse the MACSOG effort and to confuse the minds of the people in MACSOG as to just what they were supposed to do and to accomplish.**

In a more general sense, I think that, in approaching any unconventional warfare planning, you have to proceed from a very detailed assessment of the area in question and

* Ibid, p. 23.
** Ibid. p. 24.

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this assessment has to include not only classic military intelligence, EEI's of terrain, climate, population, etc., but a very detailed assessment of the population stratification of the political and psychological dynamics. You have to identify the particular personalities of various population groups. First, of course, you must determine what the national objectives are. In UW planning, this may require the development of alternative plans because you may in one case have as a national objective the support of the incumbent regime and in another case you may be trying to attack the incumbent regime. Obviously, your target population elements are going to be different in each of these two cases. Therefore, you have to identify very carefully your target elements in the population and know a great deal about their characteristics before you can know how to get at them. Your UW objectives and missions must be based on the national objectives as they apply to the various areas. There is a very strong tendency in UW planning to state missions in terms of broad generalities that bear very little relationship to the actual situation and that provide very little guidance to the UW unit.*

With respect to MACSOG as an entity, I think it is rather difficult to state a single mission for the organization. I say this because, with respect to the FOOTBOY program, obviously you had one mission. When the crossborder operations were added to MACSOG's responsibility, you have a different type of mission. You are no longer engaged solely in covert operations but in politically sensitive operations that, you hope, will have low visibility. However, the latter are


* Ibid, pp. 24-25.

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essentially classic military reconnaisance operations. For example, PRAIRIE FIRE includes what I would call conventional unconventional operations: raids, interdiction, reconnaissance and physical harassment. After assuming the responsibility for cross-border operations, MACSOG was assigned the mission of prisoner recovery which he exercised through the JRPC. In each of these different types of operations (operations in the North, cross-border operations and JPRC operations), you may in a good many cases use similar techniques, techniques that are peculiar to the Special Forces or for which the Special Forces are particularly suited. However, the missions are really quite different from each other. So, this makes it very difficult to develop a single mission statement for MACSOG as an organization. You can, however, set forth a mission statement or derive mission statements for each of the types of operations. In my opinion, the missions, as they evolved, were feasible of accomplishment but they were never very clearly stated and this led to a lot of wheel spinning.*

* Ibid, p. 25.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO San Francisco 96222

MACSOG-10 20 June 1969

SUBJECT: Organization and Functions Manual (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) This manual prescribes the organization and functions of the Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG). Each division and group will evaluate its respective organization and functions as necessary to ensure that the organizational structure and functions statements set forth in this manual reflect current responsibilities.

2. (U) Amendments to this manual will be published in the form of numbered pages. Amended pages will bear a change number and date of the change.

3. (U) Proposed revisions will be forwarded to the Comptroller who is responsible for reviewing such proposals and for effecting staff coordination prior to submission for approval.

FOR THE CHIEF, SOG:

E. D. DURAN
Major, USA
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MACSOG-10 20 June 1969
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
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
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MISSION


(S) To execute special operations missions as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority; to provide advice, assistance and support to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and its Armed Forces in planing, coordinating and implementing those special operations missions mutually agreed to between the United States Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam; to coordinate with other US Forces and agencies; to prepare unilateral US and coordinated US-GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; to develop GVN capabilities to provide support for US Forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency emergency operations; to act as Headquarters (designate) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) for Southeast Asia and to act as the responsible headquarters for development and implementation of plans for unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia.

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SECRET



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (MACSOG-00)

FUNCTIONS

CHIEF, SOG (MACSOG-00)

1 (S) Exercises, under COMUSMACV, operational command over US forces and personnel assigned or attached to SOG to execute special operations missions directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.

2. (S) Advises, assists, and supports the GVN and RVN Armed Forces to plan, coordinate and implement those special operations missions mutually agreed to between the US Government and GVN.

3. (S) Coordinates activities of SOG with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern.

4. (S) Prepares unilateral US and coordinated US-GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; develops GVN capabilities to provide support for US forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency emergency operations.

5. (S) Acts as Commander (designate) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) for Southeast Asia; responsible for developing, for implementation under order, plans for unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia

DEPUTY CHIEF, SOG (MACSOG-01)


1. (U) Assists and advises the Chief in fulfilling his responsibilities; acts for the Chief when directed or in the event of his absence.

2. (U) Directs and coordinates the work of the SOG staff and is responsible for its efficient functioning.

3. (U) Consults with and assists the Chief in the formulation of policies, provision of guidance and transmission of orders to the SOG staff as required.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT (MACSOG-03)

1. (U) Assists and advises the Chief in fulfilling his responsibilities by providing advice on the functions and responsibilities of other agencies of the US Government.



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2 (U) Acts as coordinator for SOG with other agencies in all matters of mutual concern.

LIAISON OFFICER, STD (S) (MACSOG-04)

1 (U) Acts as liaison between Chief, SOG and CO, STD (S) to provide coordination of the advisory, administrative and operational effort.

2. (U) Assists the Deputy in fulfilling his responsibilities.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER (MACSOG-02)

1. (U) Assists the Chief and Deputy Chief in fulfilling their responsibilities

2. (U) Acts for the Chief and Deputy Chief within policy limits as defined by the Chief and Deputy Chief.

3 (U) Exercises supervision over the Personnel and Administrative Division.

4. (U) Exercises supervision over the Administrative Section, Office of the Chief, and the Headquarters Support Branch.

5. (U) Performs other duties as defined by Chief and Deputy Chief

SERGEANT MAJOR

1. (U) Assists the Chief in fulfilling his responsibilities, acting as chief enlisted assistant to the Chief.

2. (U) Acts for the Chief within policy limits as defined by the Chief.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Performs stenographic and secretarial duties for the Chief, Deputy Chief and Special Assistant.

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT BRANCH (MACSOG-05)

1. Chief.

a. (U) Advises the Chief, SOG concerning health, morals, welfare and discipline pertaining to personnel assigned to this headquarters.

b. (U) Provides supply support for the headquarters and various staff agencies of this command

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c. (U) Hires, trains and supervises the indigenous drivers, guards, and maids authorized the headquarters and various staff agencies

d. (U) Provides for the local security of the headquarters and transient hotel. Coordinates compound defense with other MACV agencies occupying space in the MACV I Compound.

e. (U) Supervises the operation of the transient hotel. Utilizing these facilities and the vehicles available to him, he provides billets, transportation and minimal messing service for transient personnel assigned to or associated with this command.

f. (U) Provides vehicle maintenance support for all elements of MACSOG.

g. (U) Provides building and utilities maintenance for all Saigon/Cholon/TSN area facilities of MACSOG. This is accomplished by utilization of both USAHAC Post Engineer support and the assets available with MACSOG.

h. (U) Provides generator maintenance support for all elements of MACSOG.

i. (U) Provides and supervises a mail delivery system.

j. (U) Maintains duty rosters as required.

2. Supply Section.

a. (U) Advises the Chief, Headquarters Support Branch on all matters pertaining to supply, building maintenance and related matters

b. (U) Receives and analyzes requirements for supplies and equipment and determines source for requisition or purchase.

c. (U) Responsible for requisitioning, receipt, storage and issue to using staff agencies all items of supply and equipment required for support of the headquarters.

d. (U) Receives and processes repairable items and equipment from using staff agencies for repair and return to user or to military supply channels.

e. (U) Administers local purchases of supplies and equipment as required.

f. (U) Maintains accountability documents for all supplies drawn for and issued to the various staff agencies.

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g. (U) Receives requests from the [illegible] elements for engineer support. Advises the Chief, Engineering Support Branch on practicality, prepares and processes work requests through USMACV Pers Engineer, or utilizes available SOG assets to accomplish the required repairs or improvements.

h (U) Supervises USMACV indigenous utilities and cleanup crews assigned duty at MACV I Compound.

i. (U) Supervises carpenters, electricians, plumbers, hotel maids and other employees in the maintenance of facility and transient hotel.

3. Maintenance Section.

a. (U) Advises the Chief, Headquarters Support Branch on all matters pertaining to vehicle and power plant maintenance.


b. (U) Provides maintenance support for all MACSOG vehicles and generators.

c. (U) Maintains necessary spare parts.

d. (U) Supervises local national drivers and maintenance personnel.

1.6

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UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION DIVISION (MACSOG-10)

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (U) Advises and assists Chief, SOG on all matters pertaining to administration and personnel, both military and civilian.

2. (U) Formulates, implements and disseminates MACSOG personnel and administrative policies, directives and procedures. Interprets personnel and administrative personnel policies and directives from higher headquarters.

3. (U) Exercises staff responsibility for and coordinates administrative facilities.

4. (U) Directs and supervises all personnel matters and procedures, including requisition and assignment of personnel.

5. (U) Supervises and coordinates activities of subordinate branches and exercises staff supervision of the personnel and administrative activities of units or agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

6. (U) Maintains liaison with other US military organizations or government agencies on general personnel and administrative matters.

7. (U) Directs and supervises preparation of plans and orders pertaining to personnel and administration.

PERSONNEL SERVICES BRANCH

1. (U) Recommends, prepares and disseminates MACSOG personnel policies and procedures from guidance received from the Director, Pers & Admin.

2. (U) In-processes and allocates personnel resources in accordance with operational priorities and policies.

3. (U) Recommends personnel policies pertaining to local national civilian labor forces, maintains local national civilian table of distribution and case files of local national employees.

4. (U) Processes all personnel actions to include: awards and decorations, extensions, rest and recuperation leaves, verification and initiation of security clearances, officer efficiency/effectiveness/fitness reports.

5. (U) Processes requests for TDY, emergency and ordinary leave for military personnel assigned to MACSOG.

2.2

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ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE BRANCH

1. (U) Recommends, prepares and disseminates MACSOG administrative services policies with guidance provided by Director, Pers & Admin.

2. (U) Provides administrative procedures guidance to the staff and specifically to the administrative personnel assigned to each staff activity

3. (U) Publishes and distributes MACSOG administrative publications and provides reproduction services support to MACSOG activities.

4. (U) Processes incoming correspondence, and processes and authenticates outgoing correspondence.

5. (U) Receives, processes and distributes electrically transmitted messages Processes outgoing messages from headquarters staff activities for transmiss

6. (U) Operates the headquarters distribution center to receive, process and control all incoming and outgoing correspondence.

7. (U) Formulates procedures to handle and control classified documents, and serves as the MACSOG classified control office.

8. (U) Maintains a reference library of military publications.


9. (U) Provides forms control for the headquarters. Consolidates requisition for publications and forms required by staff activities.

10. (U) Provides records management support and inspects all MACSOG activities on the MACV Records Management Program. Maintains the Headquarters files plan.

11. (U) Provides technical supervision on unit mail postal matters to the support section.

2.3

SECRET


INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MACSOG-20
DIRECTOR INTEL DIV
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OPERATIONS BR
ADMIN BR
PHOTO ANALYSIS BR
SECURITY BR
FOOTBOY (C) STUDY SECTION
AIR/ANTI AIR STUDY SECTION
EXPLOITATION SECTION
PHOTO LAB SECTION

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (MACSOG-20)

MISSION

(S) To provide targeting information and intelligence collection guidance for SOG operations and to collate and disseminate intelligence information collected as a result of these operations. In addition, the Intelligence Division has the responsibility for providing internal command security, to include physical, technical and personnel security, as well as the counter-intelligence functions incident thereto.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (U) Advises Chief, SOG on all intelligence matters, including plans, policies, and directives from higher headquarters, as well as intelligence aspects of SOG activities. Advises Chief, SOG on security and counter-intelligence matters.

2. (U) Develops and supervises preparation of intelligence targeting, collection guidance, and intelligence information dissemination.

3. (U) Maintains appropriate liaison with counterpart US/FWMAF intelligence staffs and agencies which can provide intelligence support to MACSOG.

4. (S) Directs and coordinates the activities of the subordinate branches of the Intelligence Division and exercises staff supervision of the intelligence activities of SOG field units.

5. (S) Insures that in all operational planning, full coordination is given to the potential of operations for intelligence collection purposes either in support of, or in conjunction with other US Agencies whose missions involve intelligence functions.

DEPUTY

1. (U) Assists and avises the Director, Intelligence Division, in fulfilling his responsibilities; represents and acts for the Director, Intelligence Division as required.


2. (U) Manages and coordinates the efforts of the Intelligence Division to assure its efficient functioning.

3. (U) Consults with and assists [redacted] Intelligence Division in the formulation of policies, in preparation [redacted] and in transmitting instructions to the Operations, Administrative Security and Photo Analysis Branches.

3.2

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OPERATIONS ELEMENT

1. (S) Prepares intelligence targets, intelligence collection guidance, coordinates external elements of [illegible], and information on target areas for SOG operational elements.

2. (S) Receives reports from SOG operational elements and analyzes, collates and disseminates appropriate information therein as Intelligence Information Reports.

3. (S) Conducts coordination and liaison with counterparts in the US intelligence community and with SOG counterpart Vietnamese organizations.

PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE STUDY SECTIONS

1. (S) Receives monthly and weekly MACV J-2 recommended targets and researches additional targets for integration into a recommended SOG target list.

2. (S) Chairs the SOG PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE Target Panel to which the recommended target list is presented for reconciliation of intelligence collection requirements with SOG operational capabilities.

3. (S) Maintains ground OB information on enemy and friendly military forces operating within the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations. Maintains current and background intelligence files on enemy activity and friendly situations in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations. Provides intelligence information on approved targets in support of SOG operational elements.

4. (S) Assures that all intelligence collection requirements levied by higher authorities or developed by the Intelligence Division are appropriately reflected as essential elements of information (EEI) or as standing guidance for SOG operations elements and their briefers, debriefers and reporters in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations.

5. (S) Receives, collates, and disseminates information collected by SOG assets in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations.

6. (S) Provides an evaluation service pertaining to SOG intelligence collection activities in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area.

FOOTBOY (S) STUDY SECTION

1. (S) Serves as the point of [illegible] for intelligence support required by the Maritime, Airborne [illegible] psychological operations elements of SOG

3.3

[redacted]

7. (S) Assures that all intelligence collection requirements levied by higher authorities or developed by the Intelligence Division are appropriately reflected as essential elements of information or collection guidance for action by the Maritime and Airborne operational elements.

8. (C) Maintains ground and naval OB information on enemy forces operating within the FOOTBOY (C) areas of operations. Maintains current and background intelligence files on enemy activity in the FOOTBOY (C) area of operations.

4. (C) Receives, screens, files and routes intelligence documents and periodical reports pertinent to FOOTBOY (C) operations.

5. (C) Receives, collates, and disseminates intelligence information collected by SOG assets in the FOOTBOY (C) areas of operations.

6. (C) Provides an evaluation service pertaining to SOG intelligence collection activities in FOOTBOY (C) areas of operations.

AIR/ANTI AIR STUDY SECTION

1. (S) Develops and maintains graphic displays, and disseminates to SOG operational elements all information applicable to:

a. (U) Surface to air missile order of battle (SAMOB).

b. (U) Anti-aircraft Artillery and Automatic Weapon order of battle (AAAOB)

c. (U) Aircraft and Airfield order of battle (AOB).

d. (U) Electronic-Radar order of battle (EOB).

2. (C) Monitors and disseminates SAFE and Special E&E Area information.

3. (S) Receives, collates, and disseminates air/anti-air intelligence information collected by SOG assets.

EXPLOITATION SECTION

1. (S) Coordinates with all concerned elements of SOG and Headquarters, MACV, to insure the timely handling, for tactical exploitation purposes, of prisoners (PW) captured during SOG operations, to include any documents or material in possession of the prisoner at the time of capture.

2. (S) Provides on-site interrogation [redacted] and assistance for subordinate SOG elements as required.

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3. (S) Assures that prisoners of war, enemy defectors and material are turned over to the appropriate military intelligence interrogation facilities as rapidly as practicable after tactical exploitation in support of SOG operations.

4. (U) Assures that all intelligence collection requirements levied by higher authorities or developed by the Intelligence Division are appropriately reflected as essential elements of information or standing guidance for application by SOG interrogators.

5. (S) Assures that intelligence information resulting from the tactical exploitation of prisoners captured by SOG elements is properly collated and disseminated.

6. (S) Provides such other assistance to SOG elements as required and approved by the Director, Intelligence Division.

PHOTO ANALYSIS BRANCH

(S) Produces target materials in direct support of SOG operational elements by obtaining timely aerial photography, and performing imagery interpretation of specified target areas. Conducts SOG hand-held photography program. Prepares special materials based on imagery interpretation as required in support of SOG elements.

IMAGERY INTERPRETATION SECTION

1. (S) Produces detailed studies of areas nominated as SOG operational targets, or otherwise required in response to special requests approved by the Director, Intelligence Division.

2. (S) Maintains a current aerial reconnaissance file library providing coverage of SOG areas of operations.

PHOTO LAB SECTION

1. (U) Provides copies and prints and annotated maps, processes 35mm photography and produces selected negatives for distribution.

2. (U) Produces and processes miscellaneous photography in both color and black and white to include photographs for ceremonial occasions, briefings and ID/passport type photographs.

3. (U) Provides a course of instruction in photo processing to selected SOG personnel and renders technical assistance to other SOG photographic laboratories. Provides a course of instruction in hand-held photography for selected SOG personnel.

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SECURITY BRANCH

1. (U) Interprets security policy and directives from higher headquarters, established SOG security directives and SOP and exercises staff supervision of their implementation throughout SOG

2 (U) Maintains a roster of all personnel assigned to or utilized by SOG; provides or arranges documentation of clearances of SOG personnel and briefs and debriefs all SOG personnel regarding security.

3. (U) Maintains an access roster of all personnel of other organizations who are cleared for access to SOG information.

4. (U) Conducts periodic security inspections of all SOG Headquarters and subordinate elements, including periodic technical security surveys.

5 (S) Prepares and initiates all security checks and clearances on Civilian Personnel Offices and operational local national personnel assigned to SOG subordinate units.

6. (C) Provides a lock picking capability for locked out safes and combinations.

7. (C) Conducts personnel suitability investigations as required on all personnel assigned or attached to SOG.

8. (C) Maintains liaison with all civilian and military counterintelligence units in the Saigon area.

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

1. (U) Interprets administrative policies and directives for Director, Intelligence Division and is responsible for the formulating and dissemination of Division administrative policy, directives and SOP.

2. (U) Receives, processes, prepares and controls all incoming and outgoing correspondence and publications, and acts as the initial control point of the Intelligence Division for classified material, insuring proper distribution and control.


3. (U) Maintains Division administrative and personnel files.

4. (U) Provides and arranges services for division personnel to include mail delivery and the processing and maintenance of duty rosters as required.

5. (U) Supervises and controls [illegible] Intelligence Division Illustrator.

3.6

SECRET


OPERATIONS & TRAINING DIVISION
MACSOG-30
DIRECTOR
ADMIN SECTION
STATUS AND ANALYSIS SECTION
GROUP STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-31)
POWER STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-32)
AIR SUPPORT BRANCH (MACSOG-33)
COMBAT STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-34)
TRAINING
SPECIAL PROJ
AGENT
CAMBODIA
LAOS
4.1

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~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONS & TRAINING DIVISION (J-3/SOG-30)

MISSION

(S) To assist Chief, SOG in command and control matters pertaining to operations, organization and training.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. Operations.

a. (S) Provides staff support for all air, ground, maritime and psychological operations.

b (S) Makes recommendations, during planning and operations, concerning Task Organization and priorities for use of resources including personnel, supplies and equipment.

c. (S) Supervises preparation of operations plans and orders.

d. (S) Integrates support from all services, US agencies and counterpart organizations with SOG operations.

e. (S) Designates general locations for fixed installations.

f. (U) Prepares reports.

g. (U) Maintains liaison with other in-country agencies and commands.

h. (U) Supervises the MACSOG Studies and Analysis Section

2. Organization.

a (S) Develops and maintains the troop basis to insure assignment of the service components needed to support and accomplish the mission.

b. (S) Organizes and equips units of all service components.

c. (S) Assists counterpart headquarters in the organization of unconventional warfare units.

3. Training:

a. (U) Plans and conducts [redacted].

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b. (U) Assists combat [illegible] in training matters.

STATUS AND ANALYSIS SECTION

1. (S) Operates an information center for the purpose of informing the Director, O&T, and Chief, SOG of the status of current operations, combat units and major items of operational equipment.

2. (S) Maintains current operations maps and information relative to ongoing operations and operations scheduled for the immediate and long future.

3. (S) Maintains information concerning current status of operational units (reconteams, agent teams, reaction forces, aircraft crews, boat crews, etc.) and major items of operational equipment (aircraft, vessels, etc.)

4. (U) Maintains information concerning current and projected training programs.

5. (S) Coordinates operational briefings for the Director, O&T, Chief, SOG, and visitors to the SOG Headquarters.

6. (U) Operates a VIP briefing facility.

7. (U) Prepares and presents VIP briefings to include the weekly COMUSMACV wrap-up briefing.

8. (U) Maintains a library of standardized briefing aids.

9. (S) In conjunction with the operations branches, perform operational analysis as directed by the Director, O&T.

10. (C) Coordinates the use of MACV automatic data processing systems by the operations branches and functioning as a repository for the storage of the operational information data bank in ADP form.

MARITIME STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-31)

1. (S) Advises the Director, O&T on matters concerning maritime and cross the beach operations.

2. (S) Advises the Director, O&T, of the status of plans and operations and of the results of completed operations.

3. (S) Provides staff supervision [illegible] of the Maritime Operations Group at Danang, RVN, and [illegible] operating bases.

4. [illegible]

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4. (S) Provides advisory support and assistance to counterpart personnel engaged in planning and execution of maritime operations.

5. (S) Coordinates and provides assistance to counterpart personnel in recruiting, organizing, training, planning and staging of operational forces engaged in maritime operations.

6. (S) Coordinates all planned maritime operations with other friendly forces to prevent mutual interference of forces.

7. (S) Prepares and submits to higher authority for approval, plans for all planned activities and concepts of the Maritime Operations Group.

8. (S) Provides liaison with the military establishment for the development and procurement of new equipment for employment in maritime operations.

AIR STUDIES BRANCH (MACOSG-32)

1. (S) Prepares and maintains plans for the employment of air assets in support of unconventional warfare as directed by COMUSMACV or JCS and for the direction, coordination and monitoring of missions in support of unconventional warfare.

2. (S) Prepares detailed plans for the conduct of air operations in support of U.W. activities, to include aerial delivery, close air support and air reconnaissance missions.

3. (S) Coordinates and controls the employment of VNAF aircraft and crews in support of SOG.

4. (S) Determines number and type of aircraft required to provide effective and economical air support for SOG operations.

5. (S) Requests and coordinates air support from 7th AF, 7/13AF, III MAF and VNAF sources.

6. (S) Provides staff officers for temporary assignment at forward operating bases to supervise the execution of Special Air Warfare Missions.

7. (S) Exercises control over launch, movement and recovery of aircraft operation in support of SOG.

8. (S) Performs post combat mission analysis to identify factors which affect successful execution of assigned missions, and take necessary corrective action as required.

9. (S) Prepares and maintains [illegible] detailed target folders with

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suitable mission profiles for [redacted] aircraft.

10. (S) Evaluates all available information on research and development of Special Air Warfare material and recommend procurement of needed items of equipment.

11. (S) Supervises and coordinates operational tests to improve the techniques employed by air units operating in support of SOG. Assists in developing new concepts, tactics and techniques for the employment of air assets in support of U. W.

12. (S) Provides staff supervision of the Air Operations Group.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-33)

1. (S) Advises and assists the Director, O&T on all matters pertaining to covert psychological operations.

2. (S) Advises Director, O&T on unilateral combined and joint operational activities, and the control, analysis and recording of data pertaining to the HUMIDOR (C) program.

3. (S) Provides staff supervision of the Psychological Operations Group.

4. (S) Maintains operational control of sensitive unilateral efforts in addition to those combined and joint efforts designated by Director, O&T.

5. (S) Maintains operational control of Air Operations within HUMIDOR (C) to include Project JENNY.

6. (S) Provides conceptual guidance of the HUMIDOR (C) program.

7. (S) Develops, coordinates and recommends operational concepts, studies plans and position papers in response to Director, O&T requirements.

8. (S) Coordinates and provides liaison with the US Embassy and Hq MACV on all matters pertaining to covert psychological operations.

9. (S) Provides staff supervision of the Radio Studies Group.

GROUND OPERATIONS BRANCH (MACSOG-34)

1. (S) Advises and assists the Director, O&T in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations, training and special projects.

2. (S) Develops, coordinates [redacted] concepts and techniques for

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the conduct of airborne and air [illegible], ground operations and diversionary operations, to include associated specified psychological operations within the assigned areas of responsibility.

3. (S) Evaluates plans and operations prepared by the ground commander.

4. (S) Provides staff supervision for the conduct and management of specialized training required for mission accomplishment.

5 (S) Evaluates operational techniques and results in order to improve training and operational readiness.


6. (S) Provides staff supervision of the Ground Operations Group, Airborne Operations Group and Training Group.

7. (S) Supervises, coordinates and controls the activities of the Laos, Cambodia, Agent, Training and Special Projects studies sections.

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LOGISTICS DIVISION

MACSOG-40



5.1

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LOGISTICS DIVISION (J-4/MACSOG-29)

MISSION

1. (S) To advise and assist Chief, SOG in all logistics matters relating to base master planning and construction, logistics policies, plans, systems, organization, procedures, and facilities relative to the successful employment of MACSOG operational forces.

2. (S) Provide logistical support to all MACSOG activities.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (S) Acts as principal advisor to Chief, SOG in all matters relating to base master planning and construction, logistic policies, plans, organization and procedures pertaining to employment of forces assigned to MACSOG.

2. (S) Supervises and directs MACSOG logistics staff in the initiation, development and presentation of matters pertaining to logistic studies, systems, organization, plans, policies, procedures and facilities for the support of forces assigned to MACSOG.

3. (S) Supervises the preparation and maintenance of the logistic portion of unconventional war plans, emergency plans and current plans for the employment of forces assigned to MACSOG.

4. (S) Recommends logistic priorities to support MACSOG operations and ensures allocation of supplies in accordance with established priorities.

5. (U) Monitors and exercises staff supervision over the utilization, employment and effectiveness of logistic resources made available to MACSOG.

6. (U) Prepares directives pertaining to logistic activities of MACSOG to include requisitioning, procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment.

7. (U) Maintains necessary liaison and coordinates logistics activities with other US commands and/or agencies.

DEPUTY (PLANS)

1. (S) Prepares logistic plans [illegible] individual operations and forecasts requirements on the basis of [illegible] operations within guidelines established by the Director, Logistics. [illegible] operations to determine unforeseen logistic requirements.

5.2

SECRET B-J-29

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2 (U) Responsible for the internal [illegible] of the logistics staff and monitors the operation and activities of the Supply Branch (House 50).

ADMINISTRATION BRANCH

1 (U) Supervises and routes all incoming and outgoing correspondence and publications, including classified materials.

2. (U) Prepares correspondence for the Logistics Division.

3. (U) Responsible for the requisition and distribution of supplies and office equipment for support of the Logistics Division.

OPERATIONS SUPPORT BRANCH

1. Chief (Research and Development).

   a. (U) Coordinates with the R&D community on all matters pertaining to new weapons and items of equipment.

   b. (Ø) Ensures that new developments are made available to the field for test and operational use with minimum delay.

2. Material Section.

   a (Ø) Responsible for staff surveillance of supply functions of subordinate activities.

   b. (Ø) Responsible for determining proper channels for obtaining non-standard or limited availability items and furnishing this information to subordinate commands.

3. Logistics Section.

   a. (U) Responsible to Director, Logistics for staff surveillance of all transportation matters within MACSOG.

   b. (U) Provides advice and assistance on all transportation matters to MACSOG staff elements as appropriate.

   c. (U) Monitors and reviews all MACSOG movement systems and programs.

SUPPLY BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

1. (U) Receives and analyzes requirements for supplies and equipment and determines source for requisitioning or purchase.

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2. (U) Responsible for requisitioning, receipt, storage and issue to using activities of all items of supply and equipment required for support of MACSOG activities.

3. (U) Receives and processes repairables from using activities for repair and return to user, or to military supply channels.

4. (U) Administers local purchases of supplies and equipment as required.

CONSTRUCTIONS AND UTILITIES BRANCH

1. (U) Provides staff assistance for base master planning.

2. (C) Provides staff surveillance over MACSOG construction program.

3. (U) Provides staff assistance for negotiating leases and real property use agreements.

MEDICAL BRANCH

1. (U) Monitors and supervises medical care and sanitation of all MACSOG units.

2. (U) Advises the Director, Logistics of medical factors which may affect current and proposed operations.

3. (S) Collects and evaluates medical intelligence of interest to MACSOG.


4. (U) Plans medical support for MACSOG operations.

5. (U) Advises Chief, MACSOG on the status of the health of the command.

AIR RESUPPLY BRANCH

(S) Provides support packages and air resupply packages for aerial delivery to airborne operations teams, agents, and reconnaissance teams. Advises, trains and supervises RVN counterparts in the techniques and procedures of air delivery packaging, and the rigging, maintenance and packing of personnel and cargo parachutes required for support of airborne operations.

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PLANS DIVISION (MACSOG-50)

MISSION

1. (U) To advise and assist Chief, SOG and other SOG staff sections on all matters pertaining to unilateral and combined contingency plans.

2. (S) To conduct long range planning in the fields of operations, force requirements and policies as they relate to the mission of MACSOG and recommendations to counterpart Vietnamese in force structure.

3. (S) To develop, coordinate and recommend operational concepts, studies, plans, and position papers, both in response to Chief, SOG and on initiated basis from high, lateral or lower level headquarters.

4. (S) To conduct Unconventional Warfare Planning and to serve as a focal point for coordination of all Unconventional Warfare Planning within MACSOG while assisting Vietnamese counterpart in Unconventional Warfare Planning, training, structure and overall operational concepts.

5. (U) To research, plan, coordinate and advise Chief, SOG on all other matters pertinent to contingency planning as directed.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (S) Advises Chief, SOG on all matters pertaining to capabilities of available US and allied forces to implement JUWTF plans, and when directed, coordinates with RVN and other allied counterparts on combined contingency planning.

2. (U) Advises Chief, SOG on all matters pertaining to SOG planning responsibilities concerning COMUSMACV and COMUSSEASIA contingency plans and other such special planning requirements as may be directed.

3. (S) Directs and controls the research and study of OPLANS, planning directives, policies from higher, lateral, and subordinate headquarters and formulates planning recommendations, policies, priorities and guidance.

4. (S) Directs, coordinates, and supervises the preparation of OPLANS and contingency plans within the Plans Division and provides direction and tasks other SOG staff activities and such other headquarters as necessary to ensure that required supporting plans are prepared in essential detail, in a timely manner, and that their current [illegible]

b.2

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5. (S) Maintains close and continuous liaison with higher headquarters, staff division, SOG staff activities, and subordinate headquarters for the purpose of exchanging ideas and current information and providing planning assistance.

6. (U) Supervises the preparation of and presents briefings on OPLANS, planning status, and assigned special projects and conducts such planning conferences and meetings as required and directed.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. (U) Receives, processes and controls all incoming, outgoing correspondence and publications, including classified materials.

2. (U) Provides initial point of division's control for classified material and insures proper distribution and further control.

3. (U) Maintains files of correspondence, directives and plans.

4. (U) Maintains suspense file to insure timely dispatch of all required correspondence.

5. (U) Maintains proper control of expendable supplies and blank forms on hand, and requisitions depleted supplies or blank forms as required for operational efficiency.

6. (U) Supervises control of all vehicles assigned to plans division for maintenance and proper dispatch.

7. (U) Supervises one clerk typist for the required typing done by plans division for proper format, spelling, grammar and neatness.

8. (U) Performs other duties as directed by Director, Plans.

ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE PLANNERS

1. (S) Advises Director, Plans Division on all matters pertaining to capabilities of available Army, Navy or Air Force assets to implement JUWTF plans, and when directed, coordinate with RVNAF and other allied counterparts on combined contingency planning.

2. (U) Advises Director, Plans Division on all matters pertaining to Army, Navy and/or Air Force planning responsibilities concerning COMUSMACV and COMUSSEASIA contingency plans and other such special planning requirements as may be directed.

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
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3. (U) Conducts research and studies of OPLANS, planning directives, Army, Navy or Air Force policies from all levels of command and formulates planning recommendations for presentation to Director, Plans Division.

4. (U) Prepares OPLANS and contingency plans for presentation to Director, Plans Division, coordinating closely with other SOG staff activities and such other headquarters as necessary to ensure that supporting plans are prepared in detailed and timely manner.

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COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION (MACSOG-10)

MISSION

(S) Chief, CVI, Communications Group on all matters pertaining to communications and electronics and provide communications support to Headquarters, Special Operations Group Activities.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (S) Advises Chief, SOG on all matters pertaining to communications and electronics.

2. (S) Formulates and implements communications/electronics policies to include interpretation and implementation of directives promulgated by higher headquarters.

3. (S) Responsible for the operation of the MACSOG Communications Center.

4. (S) Maintains liaison with communications and electronics staff elements of other commands and agencies.

5. (S) Monitors all phases of communications security in coordination with appropriate agencies.

6. (S) Coordinates the installation, operation, and maintenance of MACSOG communications equipment to include validation of circuit requirements.

OPERATIONS BRANCH

1. (S) Conducts communications/electronics system planning in support of MACSOG communications requirements.

2. (S) Prepares communications/electronics annexes and appendices to MACSOG operations plans.

3. (S) Coordinates with MACSOG staff sections and agencies in planning communications systems.

4. (S) Provides for, allocates and maintains records pertinent to radio frequency management.

5. (S) Coordinates with, and [redacted] Officer in planning and operations.

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5. (S) Maintains files of communications-electronics directives pertaining to communications/electronics systems/nets.

7. (S) Conducts communications system planning in support of long range communications requirements.

8. (S) Maintains records of all cryptographic material and equipment to include receipts, transfer, destruction, and custody of all such materials.

9. (S) Provides for distribution, management, and control of all unique SOG codes throughout MACSOG and subordinate units.

MATERIAL BRANCH

1. (S) Provides maintenance for radio, teletype, and cryptographic equipment located in MACSOG Headquarters.

2. (S) Advises MACSOG staff sections and activities on communications equipment and maintenance.

3. (S) Assists and advises STD Signal Officer on communications equipment and maintenance.

4. (S) Advises Logistics Division of decisions concerning procurement of communications/electronics equipment.

5. (S) Maintains a limited radio repair and modification facility in support of MACSOG.


6. (U) Provides staff liaison between MACSOG and telephone installation/maintenance agencies.

7. (S) Maintains liaison with appropriate agencies involved in communications-electronics development and advises MACSOG agencies on new and developmental equipment.

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CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF, SOG (MACSOG3-6C)

MISSION

[redacted]

FUNCTIONS

DEPUTY

1. (C) Advises the Chief on financial and economic matters.

2. (C) Conducts continuous review of SOG organization in order to recommend more effective improvements.

3. (C) Maintains liaison and coordinates financial transactions with US, Republic of Vietnam and third country agencies.

4. (C) Has [redacted] responsibility for command wide Comptroller activities in budget, fund utilization, budget preparation and execution, and financial aspects of sales and acquisition and personnel contracts.

LEGAL BRANCH

1. (C) Advises the Comptroller in all matters pertaining to budget control, [redacted] and obligation actions, and financial aspects of leases and commercial contracts.

2. (C) Prepares SOG budget, cost estimates, and fiscal reports.

3. (C) Responsible for maintaining fiscal accounting records which provide the current fund status.

4. (C) Performs, processes and records expenditure and obligation reports from all SOG activities.

5. (C) Administers SOG contracts for US and third country national technicians.

FINANCE BRANCH

1. (C) Advises the Comptroller [redacted] pertaining to cash disbursements and financial [redacted] Republic of Vietnam nationals.

[redacted]

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2. (U) Acts as [illegible] SOG.

3. (S) Maintains liaison with US Embassy finance branch for issue and [illegible] of SOG funds.

4. (S) Issues funds and [illegible] for all of SOG finance agent officers.

5. (S) Advises, assists, trains and audits all SOG agent officers on a continuing basis.

6. (U) Prepares monthly accountings of all SOG cash expenditures.


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[redacted]

RECOVERY STUDIES DIVISION (RSD) (U)

MISSION

1. (S) To [redacted] and [redacted] coordinating with the [redacted] and other plans and operations for the recovery of captured [redacted] and other [redacted] and conducting [redacted].

2. (S) To maintain [redacted] concerning all recovered personnel.

3. (S) To provide DIA briefing data to component commands and interested agencies.

FUNCTIONS

DEFENSE:

1. (S) Advise the Chief on all matters pertaining to the recovery of US and allied personnel.

2. (S) Supervise the operations of the Recovery Studies Division.

3. (S) Develop plans and procedures for search and recovery operations and [redacted] and develop programs within the Defense [redacted] operations.

4. (S) Act as coordinator during recovery operations involving air, ground and naval recovery forces.

INTELLIGENCE SECTION:

1. (S) Develop requirements for collection of timely and accurate intelligence and other data required for personnel recovery operations.

2. (S) Collate, analyze, evaluate and maintain intelligence files concerning downed and missing personnel.

3. (S) Develop operational intelligence and prepare studies of areas of interest to the Recovery Studies Division to determine the feasibility of initiating personnel recovery operations.

4. (S) Brief other intelligence agencies on the mission, operations and intelligence requirements of the Recovery Studies Division.

5. (S) Provide DIA with [redacted] collection of intelligence and other data in excess of [redacted] pertinent DIA with information developed, relative to [redacted] missing personnel.

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6. (S) Maintains close and [illegible] with other US intelligence agencies to insure the flow of information and intelligence pertaining to escaped or missing personnel.

OPERATIONS SECTION

1. (S) Formulates, coordinates and supervises operational procedures and plans for the recovery of escaped US or allied personnel.

2. (S) Coordinates and establishes liaison with US and allied departments and agencies to ensure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for launching recovery operations.

3. (S) Acts as coordinator/liaison to US and allied forces conducting recovery operations.

4. (S) Studies and evaluates E&E equipment, survival equipment and related items. In conjunction with air and Naval Forces make recommendations for the procurement and use of new equipment or the modification of existing equipment.

5. (S) Briefs tactical unit Commanders and operations personnel on the mission and operation of the Recovery Studies Division and advises them on the feasibility and techniques of prisoner recovery operations.

6. (S) Develops and exploits new tactics and techniques applicable to prisoner recovery operations.

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
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GROUND STUDIES GROUP

MACSOG-35



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GROUND STUDIES GROUP (GSG)

MISSION

(S) To plan, coordinate and direct, employ assigned forces to [illegible] operations.

FUNCTIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE LOGISTICS BRANCH

1. (U) Advises and assists the Ground Studies Group Commander on matters pertaining to personnel, administration & logistics.

2. (S) Organizes, directs and supervises all matters pertaining to personnel and administration within the Ground Studies Group and OPCON units.

3. (U) Maintains liaison with VII Liaison Service, STD Counterparts on administrative & logistical matters.

4. (U) Processes recommendations for Awards & Decorations of personnel assigned to the Ground Studies Group, and other miscellaneous personnel actions, such as extensions, R&R and leaves.

5. (S) Maintains a suspense file for timely submission of all required reports.

6. (U) Supervises the preparation of all Ground Studies correspondence.

7. (S) Receives, processes and distributes incoming electrically transmitted messages. Processes outgoing messages to higher & OPCON units.

8. (U) Operates the briefcase and distribution system to receive, process and control all incoming and outgoing communications.

9. (S) Provides staff supervision for Ground Studies Group's assigned and OPCON units, Logistics Staff, in the initiation, development and presentation of matters pertaining to Logistics, Organization, Plans, Policies and procedures for the support of directed operations.

10. (S) Recommends logistics priorities to support Ground Studies Group operations and exercises determination in accordance with approved priorities.

11. (S) Exercises staff supervision over the preparation of assigned and OPCON TOE, TA & TD.

12. Prepares and coordinates [illegible] air movement of personnel, equipment & supplies.

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SECRET

[redacted]

[redacted] conducted by the [redacted]

[redacted] construction at OPCON [redacted]

(U) [redacted] by CO, Ground Studies Group.

[redacted]/G-3 BRANCH

1. [redacted] Develop, evaluate, promulgate, coordinate, and monitor [redacted] and projects for PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL, SALEM HOUSE, IRON WHITE, COMMANDO HUNT, FOLK SONG and other such programs as may be directed.

2. [redacted] Advise the Commander, Ground Studies Group of the current status of all operations.

3. [redacted] Liaison to MACSOG for the procurement of air and related support for the conduct of operations.

4. [redacted] Provide liaison to III MAF and the Field Forces for both the CO, Ground Studies Group and CTF 70.3.

5. [redacted] Provide operational intelligence and guidance to the field elements of the Ground Studies Group.

6. [redacted] Prepare studies, briefings and messages pertaining to PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL, SALEM HOUSE, IRON WHITE, COMMANDO HUNT and FOLK SONG programs.

7. [redacted] Coordinate and monitor all training activities conducted by OPCON and at CoC Detachment locations.

8. [redacted] Provides the point of contact for coordination of Agent, Prisoner and other current activities planned for employment in the PRAIRIE FIRE or SALEM HOUSE areas.

9. [redacted] Evaluate plans and operations prepared and conducted by the field elements of the Ground Studies Group.

10. [redacted] Act as liaison to the AFVN Liaison Service for the conduct and coordinating of current & planned operations.

11. (U) Perform other duties [redacted] CO, Ground Studies Group.

[redacted]

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FORWARD OPERATIONAL BASE

1. (U) Administratively & logistically supports assigned US & VN personnel.

2. (U) Provides liaison with VN counterparts.

3. (U) Schedules & conducts training as required to accomplish assigned mission.

4. (U) Briefs and stages assigned recon teams.

5. (U) Directs operations of deployed recon teams.


6. (U) Debriefs recon team member upon completion of mission.

7. (S) Maintains continuous communications with Ground Studies Group and other units as directed.

8. (U) Submits required records and reports.

9. (U) Performs other duties as directed by CO, Ground Studies Group.

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AIRBORNE STUDIES GROUP (MACSOG-36)

MISSION

1. (S) To advise and assist Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations in assigned area of responsibility.

2. (S) To develop, coordinate, and recommend concepts and techniques for the conduct of airborne and airmobile operations, ground operations, and diversionary operations, to include associated specified psychological operations, with assigned area of responsibility.

FUNCTIONS

COMMANDER

1. (S) Exercises command and operational control over assigned and attached US personnel; and provides advisory assistance to RVNAF personnel.

2. (S) Evaluates plans and operations prepared and conducted by elements of Airborne Studies Group; and informs SOG O&T Studies Division of all current and projected activities.

3. (S) Acts as staff coordinator for all activities involving the Airborne Studies Group.

PLANS BRANCH

1. (S) Coordinates and monitors activities of all operations.

2. (S) Coordinates operations with SOG O&T Studies Division.

3. (U) Insures that communication procedures are coordinated with SOG Communications Division.

4. (U) Develops and researches plans and concepts for future contingencies.

5. (U) Maintains the Airborne Studies Group SOP.

6. (U) Coordinates and prepares the Weekly Activities Report and Monthly Summary.

7. (U) Reviews all incoming and outgoing message traffic. Recommends appropriate action.

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8. (U) Coordinates with [redacted] the planning and supervision of radio training of indigenous operational personnel.

9. (S) Coordinates signal plans for indigenous teams and indigenous personnel operating as individuals.

10 (S) Supervises the maintenance of signal equipment utilized by indigenous personnel.

AGENT OPERATIONS

1. (S) Conducts covert/clandestine singleton agent operations.

2 (S) Performs detailed mission and target analysis based on intelligence requirements and studies.

3. (S) Prepares a detailed Clandestine Intelligence Operational Proposal (CIOP) and operation plan for each operation.

4. (S) Coordinates spotting, assessment and recruiting of personnel in support of mission requirements.

5. (S) Supervises the conduct of specialized training and operational testing.

6. (S) Responsible for equipping, briefing, dispatching, recovering and debriefing of agent personnel.

7. (S) Responsible for all administration in support of agent personnel.

TEAM OPERATIONS

1. (S) Performs detailed mission and target analysis based on intelligence requirements and studies.

2 (S) Coordinates spotting, assessment and recruiting activities in support of mission requirements.

3. (S) Prepares detailed operational orders for the conduct of operations

4. (S) Conducts specialized training.

5. (S) Equips, briefs, dispatches, controls, recovers and debriefs indigenous operational personnel.

6. (S) Records and reports [redacted] on target and collection results.

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7. (S) Conducts operational training which includes the security status of all indigenous operational personnel.

8. (S) Coordinates the management, payment and disposition of operational indigenous personnel.

9. (S) Maintains mission/target folder and operational files.

FORAE (Ø) OPERATIONS

1. (S) Performs detailed mission and target analysis based on intelligence requirements and studies.

2. (S) Plans and conducts a diversionary program (Code name BORDEN (Ø) designed to allude to a successful defection program targeted toward NVA infiltrators.

3. (S) Screens and selects NVA PW from US Division and MAF detention facilities.

4. (S) Transports selected PW to Camp Long Thanh for further processing and program activities.


5. (S) Screen PW, relearing controlled information of the success of the program and return selected individuals to PW channels.

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MARITIME STUDIES GROUP

MACSOG-37



[redacted]

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MARITIME STUDIES GROUP (MACSOG-37)

FUNCTIONS

COMMANDER

1. (S) Exercises under direction of Chief, SOG operational and administrative command functions of the DaNang Base facilities and US personnel stationed there.

2. (S) Advises, assists and supports the GVN and RVN Armed Forces to plan, coordinate, and implement special operations and missions.

3. (U) Coordinates activities of the SOG with other US forces as decided by Chief, SOG.

4. (U) Promulgates policy guidance and implementing instructions for the internal management of the DaNang Base, its facilities and personnel.

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING BRANCH

1. (S) Prepares detailed maritime plans to implement missions and outline plans as promulgated by SOG.

2. (S) Recommends policies and doctrine and formulates guidance and SOP under which operational elements will train and conduct operations.

3. (S) Coordinates operations and exercises with Seal/Recon and Boat Training and Repair Branches.

4. (S) Provides advisory support and assistance to the operational and planning offices of other US commands and agencies.

5. (U) Maintains permanent files of the Operations and Training Branch.

6. (S) Maintains liaison with the operational and planning offices of other US commands and agencies.

7. (S) Anticipates, requests, collects, collates and disseminates required intelligence necessary for operational planning.

8. (S) Promulgates overall training requirements for RVN and mercenary boat crews.

9. (S) Ensures mission coordination [redacted] and crew personnel.

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10. (S) Conducts team operational briefings and debriefings.

11. (S) Establishes training requirements, ensures operational security, and provides for health and welfare of agent personnel.

SEAL/RECON BRANCH

1. (S) Trains agent and team personnel in the Seal/Recon mission for operational employment as OIC US Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) may direct.

2. (S) Schedules training exercises, maintains direct supervision over training of agent personnel.

3. (S) Plans and conducts training, dress rehearsals, selects and forms teams, with concurrence of Chief, Operations and Training Branch motivates agent personnel.

4. (U) Submits training schedule to NAD Chief, Operations and Training Branch.

5. (U) Provides advisory support and assistance to RVN counterparts.

6. (S) Assists in operational briefings and debriefings.

7. (S) Prepares detailed operation orders for teams to implement missions assigned.

8. (U) Ensures pertinent training records are maintained reflecting operational status of teams.

9. (U) Ensures team training curricula are designed to maintain operational readiness of teams.

SUPPORT BRANCH

(U) Responsible for all supply administration and support of the DaNang Base. This involves finance, logistics and subsistence of US military, third country nationals and VN civilian personnel.

SECURITY BRANCH

1. (S) Arranges for the compartmentation of US, third country and Vietnamese personnel as well as [illegible] facilities and billets.

2. (S) Arranges for security [illegible] and maintenance of files for specified personnel [illegible] of a pass system.

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3. (S) Ensures operational security, [illegible] and facilities and for the protection of crash, equipment and facilities to ensure security of special communications equipment.

4. (U) Establishes professional liaison with local Vietnamese and US military security units.

5. (S) Provides for the establishment of a duty officer system; established communications security measures for various types of communications-systems.

6. (S) Briefs selected US personnel PCS or TDY in DaNang area; assists in the briefing and debriefing of various types of personnel departing on or returning from operational missions.

7. (S) Assigns aliases as required.

PUBLIC WORKS BRANCH

(U) Responsible for the administration of the DaNang Base in matters relating to motor transport, utilities, facility maintenance and coordination. Maintains liaison and coordinates with other Public Works activities in the area.

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH


(U) Exercises, promulgates and processes administrative matters pertaining to personnel and organization of NAD. Supervises medical personnel assigned.

BOAT TRAINING AND REPAIR BRANCH

(U) Provides training teams for Vietnamese boat crews. Maintains and repairs all assigned waterborne assets. Coordinates with other repair activities for major repairs and overhauls.

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12.4

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PSYCHOLOGICAL [illegible] (MACSOG-32)

MISSION

1. (S) To plan, develop and conduct covert psychological operations against North Vietnam

2. (S) To plan, develop and conduct psychological operations in support of MACSOG/STD activities.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (S) Advises the Chief on matters pertaining to covert psychological operations.

2. (S) Plans, develops, and conducts covert psychological operations agains North Vietnam.

3. (S) Plans, develops and conducts covert psychological operations in support of MACSOG/STD operations.

4. (S) Monitors and evaluates covert psychological programs conducted by MACSOG/STD

5. (S) Provides logistical and financial support for all covert psychological operations.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH

1. (S) Acquires psychological intelligence data on NVN from US/GVN agencies, overt publications of the free world and communist nations, and interrogations of NVA prisoners of war and ralliers.

2. (S) Studies, analyzes and extracts psychological vulnerabilities of NVN for use by MACSOG/STD.

3. (S) Monitors North Vietnamese reactions to MACSOG/STD psychological operations.

EXPLOITATION BRANCH (See Note 1)

1. (S) Interrogates, and indoctrinates captured personnel.

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2. (S) Provides MACSOG and other US/GVN agencies with current military and psychological intelligence of activities in North Vietnam.

3. (S) Supports defection of captured personnel and other special operations utilizing detained persons.

PRINTED MEDIA BRANCH (See Note 2)

Provides covert leaflet, pamphlet, and document support for psychological operations conducted by MACSOG/STD.

MAIL OPERATIONS BRANCH

1. (S) Analyzes psychological vulnerabilities with NVN which are provided by the Research and Analysis Branch and other US/GVN agencies.

2. (S) Writes covert letters to North Vietnam and members of the North Vietnamese community residing outside of North Vietnam.

3. (S) Coordinates delivery of covert letters through third country postal systems to North Vietnam.

RADIO OPERATIONS BRANCH

1. (S) Analyzes psychological vulnerabilities within NVN which are provided by the Research and Analysis Branch and other US/GVN agencies.

2. (S) Monitors major free world and communist radio media to develop current exploitable trends in NVN.

3. (S) Writes and produces covert radio broadcasts directed at North Vietna

4. Controls broadcast of covert radio programs from a fixed transmitter site in SVN.

5. (S) Coordinates, through the Operations and Training Studies Group, the broadcast of covert radio programs from airborne transmitter facilities.

Note 1 - Operations suspended November 1968.


Note 2 - During suspension of printed media delivery to prime target are (NVN) this section supports other US/GVN agencies through selective job-printing of materials related to the war effort.

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SECRET

RADIO STUDIES GROUP (RSG) (MACSOG-70)

MISSION

1. (S) To advise and assist Chief, SOG in all matters pertaining to Radio Operations including operational policies, program content, fiscal support, logistical support, and engineering and technical support of both short and medium wave radio operations.

2. (S) To advise and assist the Vietnamese staff of the Voice of Freedom in all aspects of radio operations including operating policies, program content, fiscal support, logistical support, and technical and engineering support.

3. (S) To provide fiscal and logistical support to the Voice of Freedom radio station.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (S) Advises the Chief on all matters pertaining to radio operations.

2. (S) Provides advisory assistance to Vietnamese nationals in the supervision and operation of the Voice of Freedom radio station.

3. (S) Ensures continuous and effective coordination between the Voice of Freedom and JUSPAO and other interested US agencies.

4. (S) Supervises the logistical and fiscal support provided by MACSOG to the Voice of Freedom.

5. (S) Supervises and coordinates all MACSOG advisory efforts toward the Voice of Freedom.

ADMINISTRATIVE ADVISORY SECTION

1. (S) Advises the Chief on all aspects of radio station, personnel, fiscal, and logistical administration.

2. (S) Provides advisory assistance to administrative personnel of the Voice of Freedom radio station, personnel, fiscal, and logistical administrati

3. (S) Coordinates the fiscal and logistical support provided by MACSOG to the Voice of Freedom radio

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4. (S) Provides Chief [illegible] to the Voice of Freedom [illegible].

5. (S) Provides [illegible] technical personnel assigned to the Voice of Freedom.

PROGRAM EVALUATION

1. (S) Advises the Chief on all aspects of radio program evaluation.

2. (S) Provides advisory assistance to Vietnamese personnel of the Voice of Freedom program evaluation section.

3. (S) Monitors Voice of Freedom program material to insure it does not violate USIA/PAO policy guidance.

TECHNICAL AND ENGINEERING ADVISORY SECTION

1. (S) Advises the Chief on technical and engineering aspects of radio station operations.

2. (S) Provides advisory assistance to Vietnamese personnel of the Voice of Freedom engineering department in all technical fields, including equipment operation and maintenance, studio operations, and the operation and maintenance of short and medium wave transmitters.

3. (S) Provides advisory and technical assistance to the Vietnamese personnel of the Voice of Freedom in the training of technical personnel.

4. (S) Coordinates with the Administrative Advisory Section for the logistical support of material of a technical nature.

[illegible]

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ANNEX K

to

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY THESE INTERVIEWEES

ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

(In Chronological Order)

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col William R. Becker, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Jan 1964 - Dec 1964	A
LTC David H. Arno, USAF	Staff Officer, Air Operations, MACSOG Jan 1964 to Mar 1964 (assigned to Hq PACAF and TDY with MACSOG)	B
Col Edward A. Partain, USA	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Section Jul 1964 - Jun 1965	C
Col John J. Windsor, Jr., USMC	Chief, MACSOG Operations Jun 1965 - Jun 1966	D
Col Donald D. Blackburn, USA	Chief, MACSOG June 1965 - May 1966	E
Col John T. Moore, Jr., USAF	Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, MACSOG Jun 1965 - Jun 1966 Chief, Special Plans Office Directorate of Plans, Headquarters, USAF Jun 1966 - to date: Jul 1969	F
LTC Vincent W. Lang, USA	Chief, Plans and Senior Advisor, Long Thanh Dec 1965 - Nov 1966	G
Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	H
Capt Bruce B. Dunning, USN	Special Operations Division, OSACSA, Staff Officer & Division Chief Aug 1966 - Nov 1969	I
Col Benton M. Austin, USA	Chief, Operations-35 (SHINING BRASS) Chief, MACSOG Operations Sep 1966 - Sep 1967	J

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Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Robert C. Kendrick, USA	Chief, Special Operations Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (J-3) Headquarters PACOM Dec 1966 - to date: Jul 1969	K
Col Eugene A. Wahl, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Section Dec 1966 - May 1967 Deputy Operations Officer Jun 1967 - Dec 1967	L
Col George A. Maloney, USA	Chief, Operations Branch Special Operations Division, OSACSA Jun 1967 - Apr 1969	M
Col Harold K. Aaron, USA	Commander, 1st SFG Jun 1967 - May 1968 Commander, 5th SFG Jun 1968 - May 1969	N
Col Robert L. Gleason, USAF	Deputy Chief, MACSOG March 1968 - March 1969	O
Col Herbert O. Graeser, USA	Staff Officer Special Operations Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (J-3), Headquarters PACOM (Jan 1969 - to date: Jul 1969)	P
LTC James R. McCarthy, USAF	Commander, 1st Flight Detachment - under MACSOG operational control (May 1968 - May 1969)	Q
Col Stephen E. Cavanaugh,	Chief, MACSOG (Aug 1968 - to date: Jul 1969)	R

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM R. BECKER, USAF

. . . I think it is a simple matter acknowledging that you do wish to conduct covert operations. Having once acknowledged that you want to conduct them and so to commit part of your national resources for this purpose, and that the military should have such a capability, I think it is then necessary simply to follow through on what the acknowledgment implies. Obviously we need experienced people and equipment designed specifically to carry out the mission, . . . and an organization to conduct these covert operations. . . . . We have organized to carry out other missions in the past and the conduct of covert operations need not be any more difficult than some of our other missions.*

. . . The SOG organization started out rather loosely and grew rapidly in a lot of different directions, none of which had been originally predicted, I believe, when the SOG operation initially started. It did go into many directions that the original organization was not particularly adapted to and it had to be constantly changed, added to and amended. This sounds as if the whole thing was rather disorganized from the standpoint of having an existing organization to start out with. I would suggest that it was rather the contrary and let me contrast this now with the organization the last time I saw a proposal for the JUWTF. The JUWTF at that time was proposed to be an organization with a set JTD that

* (TS) Interview of Colonel William R. Becker, P. 21

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would come into existence whenever a SOG-type operation was needed in a particular area or theater. It consisted of a set JTD of so many people from the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy. It included operations sections, divided up into what was visualized to plan and conduct air, naval and land-type operations. . . . Any . . . future SOG operation is going to have to be tailored exclusively to the theater and the operating conditions under which it comes into being. I just cannot visualize any two SOG operations ever being the same. I could not at the time I was there or subsequent to that see that SOG was the same in concept or organization even within any one three or four-month period. The emphasis on types of missions and operations was subject to being shifted.

The organization itself has simply to be flexible and adaptable to the changing situations. It has to be adaptable to the point where people with a background and experience in the general area can put together enough of an organization to get the operations started. Then it must be responsive to the overall needs of the theater and of the political situation at the time. These needs include taking on new missions and operating under new concepts, entirely different than those of the previous six months. . . . What I am suggesting is most of the things that the SOG engaged in are common military skills with the exception of the clandestine cover that is pulled over the top of SOG. If you take away that cover, for example, most of the skills . . . and . . . knowledge . . . required to conduct an operation are, generally speaking, common military skills: the air dropping of troops, resupply, small air raids, small boat operations -- all these things are common military skills so that the SOG operation then

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needs to be able to put together common military skills and pull them under the collective blanket of a clandestine or cover-type operation.*

The organization then that is basically needed to start out with is one that can successfully organize a clandestine or covert operation and then be flexible enough to call upon various and sundry existing military skills compatible with the mission and concept of operation and to be responsive to the changing needs of the theater. The idea of starting out with a set organization and then saying that this is the way SOGs will be operated in the future is ignoring the fact that no two SOGs will ever be the same and any one SOG that is in existence is probably never the same thing that it was six months ago.**

* Ibid., pp. 22-23.
** Ibid., p. 23.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

LT. COLONEL DAVID H. ARNO, USAF

. . . it had been CINCPACAF's recommendation, beginning with the first review group of the 34A plan and continuing formally a number of times in the next two years, that, in lieu of the type of organization that SOG had, a JUWTF be established with appropriate representation from the various interested components.*

. . . . . .

Prior to conducting covert operations there should be a clear understanding at the national level as to what the operations are to accomplish so that the individual operations themselves can be tailored to this end and the necessary authority and resources given to the operating agency. I feel that a covert operation should be conducted by a clearly defined joint task force or command. It is only in this way that the Services can provide the necessary personnel and resources to the operation . . . .**

. . . . . .

. . . Although the JUWTF has not, to my knowledge, been tried in large-scale operations as yet, from the theoretical point of view I think this would be the desirable method of organizing for unconventional warfare both in Southeast Asia and in Europe. It is only by forming such an organization that you can obtain readily the necessary support from the various Services that is required. The SOG would certainly

*(TS) Interview of Lt Colonel David H. Arno, USAF, p.1.
** Ibid., pp. 7-8

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have operated more efficiently had it been so organized. The clearly designated components of a JUWTF and their channels back to the Services are the only way that maximum support can be provided to a UW or covert mission. Although a truly covert mission is difficult for a uniformed Service to do, it can be done provided there is clear understanding of the mission, what its covert operations necessitate, and the special funding arrangements, and personnel arrangements that have to be made if the operation is to be covert. . . .*

* Ibid., p. 9.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL EDWARD A. PARTAIN, USA

. . . I arrived in SOG in July 1964 and it had been in operation some six-seven months. There was definitely then the effect of still growing, still organizing and on the basis of what I was told by people who had been involved at the outset, there was a great . . . pressure to become operational like yesterday. Accordingly, people, uniformed types, were pulled out of various MACV agencies, and I know at least in one case, directly from the field, and were thrown together, some of them without any significant experience in the entire subject area, and told to get to work. . . whether or not the armed forces should be involved in such operations . . . I do not know. But if we are directed to, then definitely there should be an organization approved and personnel designated who would set up and complete their plans before attempting to start operating. One example that comes to mind, of course, is the CMTF.

In this connection, I think that there should definitely be CAS representation. I believe if a highly qualified, dedicated senior CAS official could be found, it would not be objectionable were he a deputy. Short of that, however, I would object to them being in a chain of command. I would have them there as liaison, advisory and planning assistants.*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Edward A. Partain, USA., p. 1.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL JOHN J. WINDSOR, USMC

. . . . . .

I recommend that an organization like SOG be task organized exactly as it was. This task organization has the capability to operate in areas other than Vietnam. In other words, have task elements that can be added like building blocks to your task force in order to suit the needs of the types of operations which you are going to conduct. Of course, in order to operate this building block principle, the Services must maintain a training base and trained personnel within each of the areas which could be called upon to build the joint task force in a manner which might be needed in any particular theater of war. If the Services give more attention to training, when the need arises, the personnel can be mustered in a task force form to accomplish the mission.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel John J. Windsor, p. 13.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL DONALD D. BLACKBURN

. . . . . .

. . . organization and operations in accord with the JUWTF concept were not accepted at the various higher echelons. I had to use the basic organization as it existed although I felt that the appreciation of a true JUWTF operational concept would have enabled us to produce better results, particularly, if an effort had been made to select better qualified officers for the staff. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA, p. 3.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL JOHN T. MOORE, USAF

. . . . . .

The JUWTF organization, as presently constituted, recognizes just what I have been talking about, I think, and that is direct access to the top decision maker. The way we are constituted now, as in the case of SOTFE in Europe, for example, the JUWTF comes directly under the theater commander. I think this is appropriate. We are faced with a problem in the JUWTF organization, however, in that during peacetime the force is not organized as such and, therefore, we have difficulty operating on a day-to-day basis. This is one of the problems facing MACSOG, which has never been designated as a JUWTF. There was opposition to this, apparently both in MACV and CINCPAC, perhaps even in the Joint Staff. Exactly what the opposition is or the reason for it, I have never been able to determine. I have always felt that MACSOG should have been organized and operated as a JUWTF even if it was called by some other name. This has been a particular sore point with the Air Force insofar as the way the air forces have been utilized. What I mean is that the MACSOG Staff is fine, i.e., the headquarters; whether it is called SOG or whether it is called a JUWTF is immaterial to me. What I am talking about are the forces that are assigned to MACSOG for MACSOG to operate with. There never has been a clear-cut organization of these forces and the relationship between the Services and those forces. It has been kind of a patch-up job the way they were organized.*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel John T. Moore, USAF, pp. 20-21.

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I think that the organization, as it stands right now, is poor. The lines of support are not clearly defined between the Services and the forces supporting MACSOG. However, in a JUWTF, you have your component forces and your component commanders of those forces who are responsive directly to the JUWTF commander as any joint task force is. The way MACSOG is set up there are no real forces, there are no components. It is just not set up as a JUWTF. I think that it should be. On the air side, there should be a unit, it could be a composite squadron because of the small numbers of aircraft involved, or it could be two or three squadrons organized under a group. That group should be commanded by an Air Force commander and he should have aircraft and crews assigned to him. These should be assigned from the theater forces and committed to the JUWTF commander in much the same way as in our contingency plans in which we organize a JUWTF for theater operations. If this were so, we wouldn't have the problem, that we had for a long period of time, of MACSOG directly fragging the air assets. The way we have it right now, these assets are not completely dedicated to MACSOG because they are flying other missions. For example, the Air Force helicopters are not completely dedicated to MACSOG. They also support CIA operations and even some MACV in-country operations. If this were done properly, we would have had those assets set aside and assigned to the JUWTF and they would be utilized solely for that purpose.*

At such time as the requirements change, then the sizes of the forces should be changed. The way it is now, MACSOG

* Ibid., pp. 20-21.

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is directly fragging, as I understand it, the air assets to facilitate the operation with an information copy to 7th Air Force. In effect, 7th Air Force is exercising veto power -- silence means assent and if they object to the operations they, of course, say so. We have a similar arrangement in Europe but different in that to task the special operations squadron providing the air assets for the JUWTF, the theater commander frags the Air Force involved (in this case, 17th Air Force) and the Air Force Headquarters is given an information copy of the order and the understanding is that the 17th Air Force goes ahead and executes the order without question unless the Air Force Headquarters intervenes. This is a cumbersome arrangement, in my opinion. I don't know why we can't go ahead and set up a task force and allocate to it from the theater assets those forces that are required to conduct the operation and let the JUWTF commander run it.*

With respect to the qualifications of the personnel to be assigned to the JUWTF and even to the forces supporting the unconventional warfare operations, I think that these people have to be specially trained. I think it is practically a career field of its own. The types of operations encompassed within the term unconventional warfare are of such a specialized nature that you just don't automatically acquire the right people from your conventional forces. I know this is true in the Air Force and I strongly suspect it is true in the Army and Navy as well. All the Services have recognized this and have taken steps to organize and train people especially for this type of operation. Whether you call them special forces or special operations personnel, etc., they are still people specially trained for this type of an operation. I think we need this. These are the sort of people that should be allocated to and assigned to the forces conducting unconventional warfare.**

* Ibid., pp. 21-22.
** Ibid., p. 22.

* Ibid., pp. 21-22.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

LT. COLONEL VINCENT W. LANG, USA

. . . . . .

Shortly after we started work on the SEAsia plans, General Blackburn directed that I and my staff come up with the organization of a JUWTF for Southeast Asia. The principal staff officer working for me on this was a LCdr Case. He completed the entire staff study. We staffed it through MACSOG and got all of our approvals on it and the same day that Colonel Blackburn left Saigon at the end of his tour, he signed off on it. It was then processed through all of the J staff with everyone concurring with the exception of J-1 who had some questions concerning some of the specific enlisted MOSs listed in the JUWTF organization. There were no major problems. We concurred with J-1's recommendations, modified the staff paper and I gave it back to Colonel Singlaub who at that time decided that the time was not right to staff a JUWTF through MACV and it was filed and, as far as I know, forgotten.*

. . . . The JUWTF, as we had recommended, had a top rank of a one star general, so that in itself would have given us far more power in competition with the other J Staff members in MACV. A JUWTF organization provides for your multi-Service participation. You would have an ARCOM commander, a NAVCOM, and AIR; you'd get better participation and support I'm sure from your various Services. It provides a command

* (TS) Interview of Lt. Colonel Vincent W. Lang, USA, p. 4.

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structure which is far more suited for control and supervision of the various Services and also the control of operations which SOG was tasked with. I can't really think of any disadvantages. I think one of the major advantages would be that if you had an approved JUWTF with everyone chopping on it, it would require the proper horsepower in all slots, including CIA. The caliber of the CIA representatives we had while I was in SOG was not the best in the west, cut by having a JUWTF and requiring grade levels to be filled, would force CIA to provide highly qualified personnel.*

* Ibid., p. 5.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

. . . . . .

. . . I am not completely sold that the JUWTF organization, as taught in our Service schools, is the most efficient way of performing the missions of UW. The part that I object to is the effort to retain Service components within the JUWTF concept. It is my feeling that unconventional warfare should be conducted as a national effort and should lose the identities of the Services doing it. I believe that all US operations are, by their nature, joint and I recognize that this joint organization requires people with particular skills that could only be produced as a result of duty in one of the Service components. However, I see no real advantage to retaining component identity and organization within the JUWTF concept. It is my view that this should be a task force that is tailored in each case for the particular area of operations. It should include those Services needed to provide the skills to be used but it should not have a Service component which is supported by one of the military departments and represents the concepts and doctrines of a particular Service.*

. . . . A joint task force is really what we have in the present SOG. It is a task force that is commanded by an officer and has members of the military departments, plus CIA and USIA. This, from my point of view, makes it a joint

* (TS) Interview of Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, p. 45.

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task force. Parenthetically, I might add that General Johnson, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, made that quite clear in his initial briefing to me for my assumption of command in SOG. In this connection, when one talks to a JUWTF in SEAsia, the useful implication is that a joint task force would take over the running of all of the US operations in SEAsia, i.e., those now being conducted in and from SVN and Laos, and those being conducted from Thailand. I believe that the whole war in SEAsia could be conducted more efficiently from a military standpoint if there were a theater commander and a single representative of the State Department as his political advisor rather than the three Ambassadors we now have. I fully recognize that there are political considerations which militate against this. It would mean, for example, that Thailand and Laos would have to give up a certain amount of their sovereignty if they accepted the idea of a US military command that was operating across several borders which might militate against the adequate representation of national views in Washington through accredited Ambassadors.*

If a theater of operations were to be established in which a single commander exercised the total control over all of the Service forces participating in the war against the enemy, then I think it would be appropriate to try out the JUWTF. If I were given that mission I would like to make modifications in the organization but I feel that the establishment of a JUWTF of the type listed in our manuals and in some of the war plans should be tied to the establishment of a theater of operations rather than trying to do it under the present unusual command relations existing in Vietnam operations.**

* Ibid., pp. 45-46.
** Ibid., p. 46.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

CAPTAIN BRUCE B. DUNNING, USN

. . . . . .

. . . I am opposed to the JUWTF organization insofar as it is applied to a program like FOOTBOY, which developed into essentially an integrated subversion program employing a good many UW techniques. The reason for my opposition is that I see it as an extension of the conventional military organizational concepts and of Service parochialism. These extend down to the lowest operating level by the inclusion of component commanders. It is the inclusion of component commanders which makes the JUWTF concept so understandable to most military people and so desirable from the individual Service standpoints. They want to have their man in the headquarters and to have their direct channel into the UW headquarters. Where you are working or trying to achieve a fully integrated program, you should be organized functionally. Your resources should be assigned to fulfill the required functions regardless of the Service. The organization must be completely integrated or, if it is compartmented, it should be compartmented along functional lines and not Service lines. It just seems to me that, in carrying out the JUWTF concept, you are going to have the Navy people in there saying, "well, we run maritime operations and we are the maritime experts and this is the way we are going to do it." You have your ground people saying, "we're the ground people and this is where we're going and this is the way we're going to do it" You tend to set a Service-oriented fragmentation of your operations unless you have a particularly strong and sharp commander who can whack these people over the heads and pull them together.*

* (TS) Interview of Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, pp. 34-35.

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This feeling is reinforced in my mind when I look particularly at some of the unconventional warfare annexes in a number of the contingency plans that are in existence now. These plans in many cases are, in my mind, very shallow and almost completely sterile. What you have in so many of these plans is either a JUWTF or a JSTF to be established when the contingency starts. The Navy is tasked to provide naval UW assets, the Air Force is tasked to provide air UW assets, and the Army is tasked to provide ground UW assets. In most cases, you will find a statement to the effect that, if and when implemented, CIA will provide a CIA liaison element; further, you will find that CIA is tasked to conduct covert psychological warfare. If you put together this type of an organization on a contingency basis, when the gun goes off, and you suddenly ship all of these units to a forward base, with each component having its links direct to its parent Service, it is going to take, in my mind, one hell of a long time before you get your planning and concepts integrated to the point where you are really conducting mutually supporting operations. I'm afraid that you are going to have each component going off and again conducting the type of direct action, physical harassment missions, which are peculiar to the Service element but which really don't contribute too much to the overall objectives. This ties right back again to planning. I think the other facet to this problem is that to do it right, we have to do a lot more substantive planning in advance and this has to be done in great detail jointly by the military and the CIA. You must know what you are going to do, where you are going, what your objectives are, who the personalities of your units are going to be, your national organizations, etc., before the contingency ever starts and before you get on the

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scene. This is going to be hard to do where you are establishing a JUWTF or JSTF after the gun goes off.*

I think the JUWTF concept does have advantages, particularly in the more conventional unconventional operations. If you are using either US forces primarily or purely direct action-type forces (for instance, commando types) on raids, military reconnaissance, or more conventional UW operations, the JUWTF may offer advantages simply because it is an understandable organizational concept. It keeps the Services happy. It does offer some advantages insofar as logistic support involving conventional items is concerned. As you move across an unconventional warfare spectrum from this relatively conventional type of UW toward the sexier, more sophisticated types of UW (for instance, subversion) in the covert action field, I simply don't think that the JUWTF concept is appropriate. I think you have to go to a fully integrated, functionally organized unit. I think it could be done a lot more smoothly and effectively than SOG but I think SOG sets the prototype.**

* Ibid., p. 35.
** Ibid., p. 36.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL BENTON M. AUSTIN, USA

. . . . . .

. . . Knowing how the SOG organization got started, although that was over two years before I arrived in-country, I am sure that there are better ways to organize this effort than what was done. I'm not saying this in any intentionally critical or, at least, adversely critical way. I know that the organization was formed under the pressure of a war and, therefore, was based on expediency.

I feel that perhaps the distribution of Service representation within the organization was not balanced as well as it could be. I believe, too, that if some sort of an operational base were established so they could support all of the effort, they might have operated more efficiently within the existing resources. However, I don't think that we suffered from any lack of support. I think that the budget and logistical support was very generous.

Specifically, regarding the assignment of personnel to SHINING BRASS,* the intention of General Westmoreland had been to have one group of Special Forces personnel conducting the out-of-country and, therefore, more sensitive operations directly under his control through the Chief, SOG, and the remainder of the Special Forces operations in-country conducted by the field force or corps commanders through the 5th Special Forces Group. All Special Forces personnel assigned to the

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Benton M. Austin, USA, pp. 8-9.

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C&C Detachment, however, which was the organization that conducted the SHINING BRASS operation, were assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group. When the pace of operations stepped up, when political restraints began to be relaxed, additional personnel were not made available to SOG to C&C Detachment at the same rate and so we had personnel problems. In addition, the personnel assigned to C&C Detachments took a higher percentage of casualties than did the personnel assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group. As a result of this, a message was sent to Washington requesting people to be assigned to 5th Special Forces Group, but coded in such a way as to indicate that they were specifically for the C&C Detachments for operations controlled by MACSOG. These personnel arrived in-country but were diverted by the commander of the 5th Special Forces Group to his own detachment based on the argument that the same percentage of manning should exist throughout all of the 5th Group. Chief, SOG, took exception to this stating that his operations needed to be manned at 100 percent because it was a small organization in which a percentage loss was bigger bite than it would be out of the 5th Special Forces Group. What I'm saying is, this was a problem that would never have come up had we had an organization tailored to do the job to begin with.*

I think the JUWTF organization with its own Special Forces operational base and equivalent air and naval units assigned to this same operational base would have given us a chance to use personnel with common military occupation specialties or AFSCs or the similar term in the Navy. We could have used people from various Services as long as they had the requisite skills throughout across-the-board in SOG. . . .**

* Ibid., p. 9.
** Ibid., p. 10.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL ROBERT C. KENDRICK, USA

. . . . . .

On the organization of SOG, I saw nothing wrong with our current staff setup. I think that it would be simpler for Colonel Cavanaugh if he had assigned to him the people who conduct his programs. However, that might cause more administrative headaches. I have often wondered why MACSOG and the 5th Special Forces Group were not put under one central headquarters or one control agency. It would certainly give both of them one central chain of command or one boss. Now, the people who support MACSOG or run MACSOG's programs out in the field actually belong to the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) whose boss is US Army, Vietnam, while SOG works directly for COMUSMACV. If you have two bosses -- Chief, MACSOG and the Commander, 5th SFG -- who don't get along together, the coordination is tedious and less than desirable. It just seems to me that it would simplify the operations and the support and coordination of both organizations if they were under one central head. I also think that had both SOG and the 5th SFG been under one central command and worked for the same boss that it could have saved people and streamlined and cut out similar logistical systems.*

SOG is organized in such a manner than it can accomplish its mission. . . One thing about the current organization, Colonel Isler, who now commands the ground operations group

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA, p. 12.

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which runs the SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE Programs, should move out of Saigon and establish his headquarters closer to his operations, probably at Kontum (that is the central base). This would facilitate coordination among his three launch sites and his Command and Control Detachments (North, South and Central). It would save time on coordination and give better eyeball-to-eyeball contact with his subordinates. . . .*

* Ibid.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL EUGENE A. WAHL, USAF

. . . . . .

I definitely feel that there is a place in this overall military establishment for an organization such as SOG. It is my personal opinion that regardless of the world situation (whether we are in a situation in Korea or Vietnam) we should have this organization operating. When we stopped bombing up north, we should have operated stronger up north if we were, in fact, a true covert type of organization. This is when we should have really started pouring it on. . . . The need for intelligence is such that we know where we need this type of an organization and it should be expanded to actually perform the mission that was originally designed for it . . . .*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Eugene A. Wahl, USAF, pp. 7-8.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL GEORGE A. MALONEY, USA

. . . . . .

. . . . Cross-border operations require a large, highly-trained, and very responsive organization to succeed. They require the dedicated use of a lot of assets and it does tend to wind up as a top-heavy organization. That is to say the cutting edges are not as they are with conventional forces. Your cutting edge on a cross-border operation is your two US and four indigenous small reconnaissance team and, in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, your platoon-size reaction forces. This appears to be a very small cutting edge in comparison with the size of the organization that is necessary to make this thing function effectively in a semi-clandestine manner.*

It has been our experience that you should not try to maximize the efficiency of the equipment, such as helicopters, by having them perform dual roles of supporting simultaneously special operations and conventional operations. You tend to lose the classified nature of the mission. Your operation soon becomes well-known and is being bantered around in the papers. This defeats the whole purpose of a covert program -- it should be plausibly deniable by the United States. Further, your extraction helicopters must be immediately available.**

* (TS) Interview of Colonel George A. Maloney, USA, pp. 4-5.
** Ibid., p. 5.

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COMMENTS ON MACSGO'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL HAROLD K. AARON, USA

. . . . . .

. . . I was made aware of the proposal by General Palmer to create two Special Forces groups: one for operations in-country, and another group for operations out-of-country in the cross-border operations. These two groups would be responsible largely for tactical organizations and advice, and they would be controlled by a brigadier general who would have a staff and would be responsible for budgetary, fiscal, and logistical support, and the overall guidance and direction of the two groups. As I look back on it now, I think that this organization had tremendous possibilities and I do not know exactly why it was discarded or rejected. If I were to set up this organization tomorrow, I would tend more towards the Palmer approach to the organization than what we have now. I do feel that Chief, SOG had so many operations of such varied scope that his span of control far exceeded his capabilities. I felt that had he confined himself to the operations in North Vietnam and the maritime operations, this would have been more than sufficient for the staff he had and for his capabilities.*

Some people have also proposed the establishment of a JUWTF. I think that this has also a tremendous potential in which one individual heads the JUWTF. You would have the subordinate Navy element, for example, which would be responsible for the maritime operations, and you could possibly have one SF

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA, pp. 7-8.

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group which would be responsible for the UW operations in North Vietnam, another group for the cross-border operations, and another for the [redacted] I think this would have been handled by the JUWTF Staff and perhaps to a certain extent by the staffs of the groups. We have played with this JUWTF concept off and on. We have got hot and cold about it. However, we have very little doctrine that has been formally prepared in the Services on it. I do feel that the JUWTF is a good concept. I have seen it work in exercises and it has worked quite well. It certainly does bear some consideration.*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Ibid., p. 8.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL ROBERT L. GLEASON, USAF

. . . . In October 1968, Col Cavanaugh, the new chief who replaced Col Singlaub, reviewed the organization. He believed there were certain changes that would improve the effectiveness and the operation of MACSOG. His basic thoughts were to establish or continue the trend toward operational groups backed up by equivalent staff sections in MACSOG Headquarters. The major change evolved around OP-35, the cross-border operations group. Previously, OP-35 had acted as both a staff agency and a command agency under Chief, SOG. They not only ran the command and control detachments in the field but they were also the only agency that did staff work in cross-border operations for Headquarters, MACSOG. The main operations were PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE. Under the new organization we established a Ground Studies Group (Ground Operations Group). This continued to serve the same operational function as the old OP-35 shop, running all the operations for Chief, SOG, through CCN, CCS and later CCC (Command and Control Central). However, the OP-30 agency which had always existed but had never addressed itself to the staff supervision of cross-border operations, was reorganized into the Operations and Training Studies Section (still OP-30) and expanded its activities to include this staff function. Now we had a clear delineation of responsibility. The Operations and Training Studies shop did the staff work for cross-border operations and the Ground Studies Group actually carried out and executed the missions through their command and Control detachments.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, p. 1.

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Another significant change was the elevation of the Comptroller Division to a major staff section. This was done to provide much tighter financial administration than previously. Much of the financial management had a direct impact in the logistics area. Therefore, leaving the Comptroller under the logistical officer would compromise his position in trying to tighten up that aspect of financial management. The Recovery Studies Group (the old JPRC) stayed as the major staff section. Now, there are some philosophic or conceptual changes here but not in mission or organization. The reason the name was changed was to establish a direct link between the JPRC and MACSOG. To do otherwise would imply that MACSOG was an operational agency. This would attach a secret classification to any document so reflecting this relationship. Additionally, we took the JPRC off our non-classified organizational chart. We divorced it from MACSOG in phone directories and merely called it the MACV JPRC.*

The psychological organization was also somewhat changed. Previously, we had a PsyOps Group which included all the radio facilities, studios, etc., with an equivalent PsyOps staff section. Under the new organization, we had two PsyOps type operational groups. One was still called the PsyOps Studies Group; however, it contained only the black PsyOps programs. Established separately as a Radio Studies Group was the VOF (Voice of Freedom) organization. This agency received its policy guidance from USIA and JUSPAO [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Ibid., pp. 1-2.
** Ibid., p. 2.

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We retained a PsyOps staff section which monitored both the PsyOps Group and the Radio Operations Group, but it became part of the Operations and Training Staff Section. Also newly established was the Training Studies Group. Previously this was called Camp Long Thanh, and operated as a sub-section of the old CF-30 staff agency. Under the new concept, the training group would do all the training for the command, both for the cross-border people as well as the field type training for agent type training. A key training program recently established in the training group is the team leaders course for newly assigned US team leaders. Finally, there was established what we referred to as a Status and Analysis Section. This was placed under the Operations and Training Directorate staff agency. This is no more than an abbreviated version of a command post containing all the status boards which showed the status of boats, aircraft, teams, etc. This section also did analyses of sorts for special projects as designated by Chief, SOG, also, most significantly, the weekly SOG briefing given to COMUSMACV.*

. . . . . .

I think SOG could operate as a JUWTF. I also think it's effectively operated the way it is now. Right now we get some of our air support, helicopters primarily, through MACV tasking of the field forces. I presume under JUWTF they would somehow be brought together and assigned to SOG on a more steady basis. They can vary quite a bit now depending on what operation the field forces have going versus what SOG needs, etc. I would certainly not recommend a radical change at this stage of the game. I think we've gone through the

* Told.

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war this way. It's certainly not the most understandable organization but neither is it the most understandable mission. There are some other differences between the SOG operations and what one might expect under JUWTF, e.g., our relationship with the Vietnamese. In all the programs, with the exception of the cross-border operations, we are basically the advisor. The Vietnamese run the programs or presumably so. I think to a great extent they do contribute significantly. OP-35 is still a US led, US commanded operation. So you have this dichotomy of funtion of SOG: advisory on one hand, operational on the other; quasi operational in the case of the AirOps Group; completely operational in the case of OP-35; advisor and support in the MAROPS program, i.e., we advise them on the operational tactics and maintain and support boats for them. So you have several distinct differences between what SOG is doing and what one would normally expect a JUWTF to do. In my opinion, good men could reorganize themselves 15 ways to get the job done; I think SOG could too. Had it been set up initially as a JUWTF, there may have been some advantages to it; also there may have been some problems we did not envision.*

. . . . . .

. . . I think it is vital that in an operation like MACSOG, we should have our own helicopter resources. These can be either dedicated as the 20th Helicopter Squadron (USAF) and the 219th VNAF Squadron are today or actually assigned to SOG as are the C-123 aircraft and crews. The problem we ran into was that the vast majority of helicopter support given SOG came from the US Army or USMC. This was assigned on a random basis and not only detracted from the security of the operation by exposing an unnecessary number of aircrews

* Ibid., pp. 5-6.

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to our operations but also complicated the tactical harmony between the aircrews and the flight crews. During a helicopter seminar held by SOG in January 1969, and attended by helicopter pilots from all Services, this was a unanimous recommendation.*

* Ibid., p. 13.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL HERBERT O. GRAESER, USA

. . . . . .

With regard to the structure of this type of organization, as far as I was able to determine, it sort of grew in the area like topsy. Perhaps there was no way of foreseeing what type of organization was eventually going to come of this. However, to have a staff element of MACV controlling an operation with US personnel furnished by the Services to the staff element's operational control appears to me to be a less than perfect way of doing this. While I realize that the staff designation of MACSOG is designed as a cover for an operational unit, the cover activities and the actual activities have not meshed too well and cause some confusion. The net result is a bastardized JUWTF set-up with the commander operating directly for COMUSMACV, but without any component commanders under JUWTF control. Theoretically, of course, this is possible and has been done in the past and is being done right now. Almost anything can be made to work. However, there are built-in problems that have caused some friction in these programs. When a unit such as the 5th SFG, which has a separate mission of its own, is directed to furnish personnel on a permanent basis to an element of MACV which does not control the 5th SFF (which is under USARV), the question of the caliber of the individual who is furnished, the question of timely replacement, and the question of augmentation on a short notice of additional personnel have caused some problems. Not that this cannot be worked out by two rational individuals. Of course, it can and has been, but it does not appear necessary to build

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in this kind of a problem if the control of the resources and the operation can be placed under a single decision point rather than under a multiple one that now exists.*

The arrangement as it now exists between SOG MACV and the 5th AFG also raises some problems on the reverse side of this question: Chief, SOG, as an operator, could very easily (and has in some cases) considered himself a commander working directly for COMUSMACV and, as such, is somewhat of a privileged character. This is not helped, of course, by the fact that the personnel that do most of the running of this operation are Special Forces or unconventional warfare qualified which, in their minds, puts them automatically in a special category. This type of arrangement sometimes leads MACSOG to ignore the normal coordinations which should occur with field forces or other elements in the dissemination of their intelligence. . . .**

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Herbert O. Graeser, USA, pp. 5-6.
** Ibid., p. 6.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

LT. COLONEL JAMES R. McCARTHY, USAF

. . . . . .

. . . . One of the problems we found in Vietnam was that the lessons we should have learned from Korea, we had to learn all over again. What we need to do is form an outfit, maybe a JCMEC, and each Service provide a package as required, then go operate. Organize then operate instead of vice versa.*

* (~~TS~~) Interview of Lt. Colonel James R. McCarthy, USAF, p. 7.

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COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

BY

COLONEL STEPHEN E. CAVANAUGH, USA

The organization of MACSOG, both in staff and command elements, was the first area that I felt needed some modification. I found that the organization was designed to insure maximum security and to guarantee that personnel in one operation area were not cognizant of and aware of operations in another area. This is both geographically speaking and functionally speaking. While this provided for good security, it had been applied to such an extent that there was no overall staff that functioned for Chief, SOG with cognizance over all operations. I found, therefore, that if I was interested in OP-35 and the cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia that I did not have a J-3 or an operations type on the staff that was fully cognizant with all of the cross-border type operations which OP-35 was running. OP-35 (Ground Studies) had its own operational type staff or G-3 that ran his operations and OP-35 reported directly to Chief, SOG. This became a problem since there were cross-border agent operations being run by OP-34 (previously Airborne Studies), maritime operations, certain air operations, etc., and none of them falling under the overall responsibility of one operations-type section, such as J-3. OP-30, as it existed at that time, was both a staff and an operations unit and was focused into maritime, agent and air operations but did not have the total broad responsibility for all operations and training. Similarly, the Intelligence Division was simply a channel through which intelligence from the field was passed to MACV J-2. It did not have an overall staff responsibility for evaluating and analyzing intelligence from the various operational units in

the field, whether it be maritime or cross-border operations. As a result, there was no cohesive intelligence analysis being accomplished to provide MACV J-2 with any sort of comprehensive picture of what was occurring in any of the areas in which SOG operations were being conducted. Personnel and administration was handled similarly in that the personnel people were interested purely in the personnel assigned to MACV SOG by the JTD and they felt no real obligation towards monitoring the personnel situation that existed in the field in the operational units. OP-35, which was the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE operation, used personnel in the field from 5th Group and the MACV SOG personnel officer had little concern about the status of these personnel. They remained focused upon the JTD personnel only. OP-35, operating semi-independently, dealt with the 5th Group for filling the various positions within the command and control detachments in the field. The result was that the command and control detachments drew only on personnel coming in from USARV assigned to 5th Group and SOG seldom used the MACV personnel pipeline to select people for key field assignments; this remained a 5th Group responsibility. The only staff section which functioned across the board was the Logistics Division.*

The subsequent reorganization which took place in December 1968 was designed to provide a complete joint and special staff and reorganized the various staff and operating elements such as OP-35 and 34, 31, and 32 into actual field commands. Prior to December, these were independent staff agencies under Chief, SOG who translated Chief, SOG's directives into action documents which were then transmitted to the operational units in the field which were directly under Chief, SOG. For example, each command and control

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA, pp. 1-2.

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detachment was considered to be a command reporting to Chief, SOG. He rated the commanders of the command and control detachments, for example, and CP-35 functioned as a staff section for Chief, SOG for cross-border operations, but did not function as a command element. In December, when a SOG staff was organized, the operational staffs which existed in MACSOG such as OP-35, PSYOPS, etc., were changed into headquarters for subordinate commands and their heads became operational commanders. There were some exceptions; OP-31 which was the staff element of MACSOG that dealt with the maritime operation located at Danang became a staff element of the new Operations and Training Division (J-3) and the maritime command in the field, the Naval Advisory Detachment, became the direct command under Chief, SOG. This similar reorganization resulted in seven field commands, a number of which were located in Saigon and the creation of a complete staff section with the Operations and Training staff section of MACSOG absorbing some of the operational sections that had previously functioned independently of one another. The compartmentization that existed previously provided a greater degree of security but I felt lacked responsiveness and could have led to a lack of coordination. Above all, it did not produce for COMUSMACV the type of coordinated intelligence effort which I felt was essential. When dealing with a large number of varied and complex operations, and with a budget as large as it is, I think it is essential to have some type of central staff organization capable of overseeing and supervising the total effort.*

* Ibid., pp. 2-3.

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Concerning the subject of broad organization in South Vietnam for conduct of cross-border covert and clandestine type operations, my personal view is that an organization such as SOG is essential, the organization must be joint in that there are Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine type functions which must be pulled together. The consideration that the mission be assigned to the 5th Group, I think would be erroneous in that 5th Group under the current term of reference has an exceptionally broad responsibility for an in-country counterinsurgency type of effort, that this effort is a major one, exceptionally important, and it would be difficult to add on to the current 5th Group mission the broad responsibilities currently assigned to SOG for running covert and clandestine operations. I think, in reality, that the 5th Group should be divorced completely from SOG and that SOG should have been provided some years ago with its own organic reconnaissance capability. The current troops used by MACSOG, the indigenous type, are not [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) they are employed and recruited by SOG, not 5th Group; they are under a different pay scale and different employment scheme and do not relate [redacted] Therefore, the reason (b)(1) (b)(3) for using 5th Group personnel is principally one of cover, in that by using 5th Group personnel and calling the current indigenous soldier "su" (phonetic for SCU - Special Commando Unit) cover has been established for the activity. Yet, on the other hand, the problem areas previously discussed, administrative control, etc., occur and it appears to me that an organic special forces unit should have been organized and assigned to SOG under Chief, SOG's complete command and control.*

* Ibid., p. 3.

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. . . . . .

. . . I personally feel the 5th Group did an outstanding job in providing support; I do feel, however, that a basic error was made in establishing MACSOG without its own organic reconnaissance-type unit to perform this operation. My personal views are that there should have been a Special Forces unit organized and provided to MACSOG for this type of operation not only from a security point of view but for control and administration. The problem that Chief, SOG faced was that he was dependent upon another command, that had a big job to do also, to get qualified people to run the SOG operation. When these people were assigned, he had operational control of them but did not maintain their records, SOG was not the final approving authority for decorations, and was not in a position to administer to the individual personally insofar as his finances and personal requirements were concerned, and this to a large extent denied the Chief, SOG one of the principal tools of command.*

. . . . . .

. . . in an operation such as the type MACSOG is currently involved in, it is essential that helicopter assets, both troop carrier and gun ships, be organically assigned and dedicated to the mission. Seventy percent of the assets currently used by SOG are fragged by MACV from helicopter units of the general support type or are organic to US divisions. These aircraft and their crews are generally rotated by their parent units into the SOG mission approximately every two or three weeks. Therefore, the Command and Control

* Ibid., pp. 6-7.

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Detachment personnel in the field are habitually training new pilots and their crews in the techniques of insertion and extraction, and in briefing the crews on the rules of engagement which apply in the various operational areas. The lack of dedicated aircraft has resulted in numerous aircraft accidents and losses of team members and has, on one occasion, precipitated an incident which reached international proportions due to the lack of familiarity with the operational area and lack of training of the crews.*

Of equal importance is the fact that the security of the cross-border program is being constantly and consistently endangered by having a large number of personnel involved in the operation on an ever-changing basis, which is a further reason that an organization of this type should have dedicated assets both in aircraft and personnel or else have these assets organically a part of the organization. Currently MACSOG has two dedicated units, a VNAF H-34 squadron and an Air Force Huey Squadron. Both have done an outstanding job in operations but the total aircraft available has been far below that needed to support the entire SOG program.**

. . . . . .

During my tenure as Chief, SOG I found that the working relationships with the 5th Group were close and effective, and I do not believe that I could have had any better support from any other unit except one that was directly assigned to SOG for complete control, administration, etc. Our relationship with MACV was good; the greatest difficulty I faced was that for cover purposes, SOG was a Studies and Observations Group which was a part of the MACV Staff. Even though the majority of the

* Ibid., p. 13.
** Ibid., p. 14.

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key MACV staff recognized that SOG was an operational unit, the tendency was to regard MACV as a staff agency and very often the problems inherent to command were overlooked. I found that much effort was being devoted to staff-type work in compliance with staff requirements and that operational supervision and control were sometimes hindered. This was resolved generally by a personal contact with the MACV personnel involved. I found that when this dual relationship of being a staff agency and a true command was explained that there was a ready understanding and willingness to assist in overcoming any difficulties, but with the large personnel turnover that occurred in MACV, this type of explanation was one which was required continually. I hasten again to add, however, that the difficulties were overcome once the explanation had been given. This type of problem is probably inherent to an organization of this kind, attempting to establish itself with a cover in a large staff organization such as MACV.*

* Ibid., p. 7.

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ANNEX L

to

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY THESE INTERVIEWEES

ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

(In Chronological Order)

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Clyde R. Russell, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jan 1964 - Jun 1965	A
Col William R. Becker, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Jan 1964 - Dec 1964	B
Cdr Kenneth N. Bebb, USN	Staff Officer, Special Plans, MACV J-5 Apr 1965 - May 1966 Chief, PsyOps Office, Special Operations, J-3, Hq PACOM June 1963 - Apr 1965	C
Col John J. Windsor, Jr., USMC	Chief, MACSOG Operations Jun 1965 - Jun 1966	D
Col Donald D. Blackburn, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jun 1965 - May 1966	E
Col John T. Moore, Jr., USAF	Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, MACSOG Jun 1965 - Jun 1966 Chief, Special Plans Office Directorate of Plans, Headquarters, USAF Jun 1966 - to date: Jul 1969	F
Col John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	G
LTC Jonathon D. Carney, USA	Deputy Director, Operations-35 (SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE, IGLOO WHITE) Aug 1966 - Jul 1967	H
Col Robert C. Kingston, USA	Chief, Operations-34, MACSOG Mar 1967 - Aug 1969	I
Col Robert L. Gleason, USAF	Deputy Chief, MACSOG Mar 1968 - Mar 1969	J

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL CLYDE R. RUSSELL, USA

. . . . I was . . . the original . . . Chief, SOG. . . . Orders were published in January 1964 and . . . designated me as the Chief with four officers and two enlisted assistants. Upon receipt of the orders, I went to MACV #2 Compound. The operations at that time were being conducted by CAS. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) I found the rest of the people uncooperative. I was not provided with a desk or an in-and-out box or anything else without demanding same. It was a much different setup than had I gone into a military organization as the commanding officer; I'm sure I would have been treated with more courtesy and cooperation in getting the job done. . . .*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, p. 1.

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM R. BECKER, USAF

. . . another principal problem that we started out with was an almost total lack of cooperation with the people in CAS that we were taking the operation over from. There was a certain amount of reluctance on their part to provide us with any information and help. I think the reluctance concerning the information stemmed partially from the fact that they just were not really quite sure in their own minds, regardless of whatever else was said, that we were cleared for access to this type of information. They were a little bit reluctant to uncover any information on the particular projects they had been concerned with for fear that it might uncover other projects that they were working on that they felt we were not cleared for access to. The other part of their lack of cooperation, I think also overflowed into the first. It would be less than candid to say that they certainly had their noses pushed out of joint by their apparent failure to be able to accomplish their mission or apparently they thought, at least on the part of the higher reviewing authorities, that they were unable to accomplish their mission; therefore, turning the job over to the military apparently bothered them. They seemed to feel that they were turning over the job to the military under some cloud, implying their lack of quality or their lack of ability to get on with the task itself. So, they were left with a rather unfortunate job of turning over the operation to a group of people whom they were less than enthusiastic to see take it over and under circumstances which made it a little bit less than pleasant for them to turn it over.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel William R. Becker, USAF, pp. 1-2.

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COMMANDER KENNETH M. BEBB, USN

. . . . An important problem that I worked on in MACV had to do with the decrease on the SOG allowance list of CAS personnel assigned [redacted] CAS was reluctant to provide qualified personnel to SOG and there was obvious friction in SOG because of the military-CAS relationships.*

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(b)(3)

* (TS) Interview of Commander Kenneth M. Bebb, USN, p. 5.

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL JOHN J. WINDSOR, USMC

. . . . I think that when CIA turned over to SOG the major part of the operation, CIA sort of pulled out all support. We didn't have much real CIA planning or activity within SOG by the Deputy Chief of SOG, a position which CIA manned under Colonel Blackburn. Although this CIA position carried the title of Deputy Chief, the incumbent operated primarily in [redacted] When Colonel Blackburn would be gone, he would leave the operation of SOG to me as his Deputy and I would carry on other SHINING BRASS. . . . [redacted] I think that about the time I left, this was changing and CIA was participating more. They were asked to at any rate.*

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(b)(1) (b)(3)

In 1965, our relationships with the [redacted] was not very good. . . . I don't mean to be unduly hard on CIA, but I contrast this with our relationship with the State Department there. Our missions were under final control of the US Ambassador. Our direct contact while I was there was Mr. Habib, a foreign service officer. Whenever we went to talk to him, there was complete cooperation and we had little difficulty. . . .**

(b)(1) (b)(3)

* (TS) Interview of Colonel John J. Windsor, USMC, p. 7.
** Ibid., pp. 7-8.

Tab D to

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL DONALD D. BLACKBURN, USA

. . . . CIA was opposed to providing a deputy in the full sense of the word. I wanted a deputy who could give me assistance with CAS assets. However, the civilian deputy was a black psyops man rather than an operational-type with military experience. Further, prior to going to Saigon, I was told at Langley that the CAS man assigned was in an advisory position. In fact, CAS was never fully integrated into SOG nor was there a willingness on their part to participate as equal members.*

Also of significance were the following general proolems. Certain Staff Heads at Hq MACV wanted to integrate SOG within the staff. General Stilwell was MACV J-3 when SOG was organized and had a full appreciation for the sensitivity of the operation. When he went from J-3 to C/S, he retained control over the operation in the interest of security and maintaining its cover. However, on his departure, attempts were made to put SOG fully under control of the Staff. I managed to maintain my position as a subordinate commander but had to try using the MACV staff system. One of the first papers tried was the Front Organization. This paper was supposed to be properly staffed by a specially designated staff member-cleared for the purpose. It wound up being handled in a routine manner and was brought to the surface in some staff officer's basket in JUSPAO. CIA was horrified and pointed out that this was just why they did not want to participate. They were concerned that their operations would be compromised.**

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA, pp. 2-3.
** Ibid., p. 3.

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. . . . . .

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Ibid., p. 3.

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TOP SECRET

COMMENTS ON THE CSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL JOHN T. MOORE, JR., USAF

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Our relationships with [redacted] during the time I was out there can be summarized with one word UNCOOPERATIVE. I think this was due primarily to the personalities involved and not so much to official hostility.*

CIA was apathetic toward the MACSOG mission with one exception. That was in the area of [redacted] and there was a tremendous amount of interest shown by them in accomplishing this aspect of the MACSOG mission.**

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[redacted]

I know for a fact that there were highly qualified CAS people who could have made a very definite contribution to the

* (TS) Interview by Colonel John T. Moore, Jr., USAF, p. 13.
** Ibid, pp. 13-14.
*** Ibid, p. 14.

SOG mission and probably would have helped us to improve it had they been assigned. For example, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) He limited or confined his area of interest only to MACSOG's collateral mission of preparing contingency plans for unconventional warfare in the Southeast Asia area. A person of his qualifications, had he been assigned [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) I think would have greatly assisted us and might have helped us considerably in overcoming some of our weaknesses in the US military experience in conducting these types of operations.*

With respect to coordination, the primary problems that we had was the [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) We thought that we should be operating in the same areas that they were operating in and we never seemed to be able to get a real meeting of the minds on this. There was some very definite foot dragging on their coordination on proposals for new and increased operations in the areas in which they also had teams operating. This is one of the points I think I mentioned earlier -- [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

* Ibid., p. 14.

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Over the years, as these operations progressed, some of these cumbersome procedures were eventually eliminated and I would say that today most of these coordination problems on specific targets for both the cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia have been pretty well resolved.*

* Ibid., p. 14.

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

. . . . the CAS Chief of Station changed about the time that I arrived and the new Chief was an old personal friend. . . . I had no problem in my relationship to the Saigon Station once [redacted] took over as its Chief. This relationship continued after he departed and was replaced. I had good relations with the people in the headquarters at Langley, having served with the Agency previously, and I utilized some of these personal contacts to improve the quality of the personnel assigned to SOG from CAS. Not only did I insist upon an improvement in the quality but an increase in the quantity of personnel assigned and had very fine response to that request in terms sending out personnel. Some of them did not work out. I then asked [redacted] to replace them. He replaced them because he recognized that those I complained of, in fact, did not have the qualifications for the job. To summarize, the relationships with headquarters and with the station at Saigon were truly outstanding. I could not have asked for better support.*

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

I should then go on to say that this same type of relationship existed between the [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (U) Interview of Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, pp. 31-32.

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We had a good relationship with [redacted]

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[redacted]

* Ibid., p. 32.


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[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

* Ibid., p. 32.
** Ibid., p. 33.


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* Ibid., pp. 34-35.


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* Ibid., p. 35.

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Ibid., p. 36.


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[redacted] We would use the (b)(1) (b)(3) intelligence personnel assigned in our intelligence shop including the photo interpreters to work on the intelligence that was available at the time in processing it or reading the photographs and some of these would logically be for the SHINING BRASS operation. It soon became no longer a problem but it definitely was a problem for Colonel Blackburn and it may be one of the factors which led to the assignment of a separate staff for the conduct of the cross-border operations as opposed to making them a part of the other operations, i.e., the establishment of OP-35 not subordinate to the Chief of Operations of SOG.*

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

* Ibid., pp. 33-34.

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(b)(1)
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* Ibid., p. 34.

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL JONATHON D. CARNEY, USA

. . . At one time we were attempting to recruit people out of North Laos, who had been indigenous to the area of North Vietnam contiguous to North Laos, and to bring them out through Vientiane down into South Vietnam for training. In the recruiting arrangement, one of the tribal chieftans was a resident of Saigon and subsidized by SOG. He acted as our intermediary with his brother, who remained in Vientiane, and recruited for us. As time passed, this pair lost their influence with their people to some degree and because of the distance involved were no longer able to bring in qualified people, if they ever did bring in qualified people. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

The military has pursued its role of black psychological operators since SOG/MACV took over the prime thrust of UW/SO in SVN. We have maintained a staff of about a dozen officers and a few enlisted men in the PsyOpsGp in SOG and have performed creditably in this role. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted] throughout this period and, in general, a workable and effective team effort has resulted. A very gross description of the team composition would be that the

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA, p. 11.

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Army has injected drive and aggressiveness while [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

In the period of several years, the Services trained several dozen officers and gave them invaluable experience at this very esoteric art. However, I doubt that any have since been placed in assignments to allow them to retain a grasp of this specialty and, further, doubt that there are positions within the DOD that would enhance them in any way. In view of the CAS charter for the conduct of all black psyops, there does not appear to be any meaningful way for Service practice of this specialty, except through detail to CAS for selected individuals.**

For future wars and future SOGs, I recommend that the military depend on CAS for the preponderant input to black psyops with military support as required and as can be drawn from those areas wherein we have a charter. There would be leaflet delivery, radio broadcast station operations, printing, or intelligence analysis as examples. The management of the effort and thematic control, again in my opinion, more properly belong to long term practitioners which is the forte of CAS.**

Another consideration in this matter is perhaps semantic but generally in line with the policy reviewing thinking now beginning. Psychological operations by Service definition is not an included element of unconventional warfare, although it can be defined to be a part of special operations when we

* (TS) Memorandum for the Record by Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA, "Lessons Learned in SOG (U)," 26 November 1968, pp. 7-8.
** Ibid., p. 8.

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choose to do so. And yet our experience in Vietnam has proven conclusively that black and gray psychological operations are a, if not the, most potent weapon in the arsenal for UW/SO for subversion. It would appear that a basic readjustment of some nature is necessary if the mission of UW is to be assigned to the military in future wars. Some variations on that theme would be:*

The military accepts the fact that CAS will provide the bulk of the manning for black/gray psyops, with the CAS staffers at least as subordinate to the military as is now the case in SOG.

The military devises means to develop and maintain true, ready proficiency for the initiation of black/gray psyops on very short notice.

The military abrogates its role of performing subversion of enemy governments and people.

* Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Tab H to

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL ROBERT C. KINGSTON, USA

After I took over OP-34 . . . [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

[redacted]

Anything that we asked for in the way of communications security checks from the communications that the different teams had sent back, specific peculiar items of radio equipment, bugging of safe houses to check our own security, and things like that, this CAS officer did willingly and with no problems to us. I found no area in which I asked them for assistance or operational training that they were hesitant in the least to give to us. [redacted] This, again, is just another example of the cooperation that they gave to OP-34. . . .* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2

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(b)(3)

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Robert C. Kingston, USA, pp. 5-6.

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COMMENTS ON THE MACSOG - CAS RELATIONSHIP

BY

COLONEL ROBERT L. GLEASON, USAF

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, pp. 2-3.
** Ibid., p. 3.

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. . . . . .

. . . on . . this program of documentation. There is an awful lot of good to be done here.. On several occasions, we came in from Saigon with requests to SACSA for background information on operations similar to ones we were going to implement; for instance on similar operations conducted in Korea. Invariably, we got the answer that there was no precedent, the people who were established in those jobs at that time were no longer available, the Service has no record of them, etc. We in SOG were very sensitive toward this mission. We hope we did a little bit to initiate this documentation. This was our program. We held our helicopter symposium out there and tried to capture all the tactics and doctrine used by all the Services in support of SOG. My only hope is that this effort will receive sufficient interest and support that it can fulfill the JCS decision on this subject. I think if the US military doesn't do this, it will not be done. I don't believe CAS intends to. They are already showing some lack of vital interest in the program. This was typified by their refusing to supply a replacement engineer for their CAS radio engineer, [redacted] who was leaving there this spring. Normally, there are two engineers authorized to support four radio transmitters involved; one is a DOD engineer and one is a CAS engineer. This is logical because [redacted] the programs are VOF which is DOD managed and funded, [redacted] However, they decided to withdraw their replacement engineer, [redacted] and required DOD to come up with another engineer to fill that gap. I think it is one indication of their lack of vital concern for the immediate future of the entire operation.*

(b)(1) (b)(3)

(b)(1) (b)(3)

* Ibid., pp. 12-13

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ANNEX M

to

APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY THESE INTERVIEWEES

ON

COMMAND AND CONTROL

(In Chronological Order)

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Clyde R. Russell, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jan 1964 - Jun 1965	A
Col William E. Becker, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Jan 1964 - Dec 1964	B
Cdr Kenneth M. Bebb, USN	Staff Officer, Special Plans, MACV J-5 Apr 1965 - May 1966 Chief, PsyOps Office, Special Operations, J-3, Hq PACOM Jun 1963 - Apr 1965	C
Col Donald D. Blackburn, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jun 1965 - May 1966	D
Col John T. Moore, Jr., USAF	Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, MACSOG Jun 1965 - Jun 1966 Chief, Special Plans Office Directorate of Plans, Headquarters, USAF Jun 1966 - to date: Jul 1969	E
Col John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	F
LTC Jonathon D. Carney USA	Deputy Director, Operations-35 (SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE, IGLOO WHITE) Aug 1966 - Jul 1967	G
Capt Bruce B. Dunning, USN	Special Operations Division OSACSA, Staff Officer and Division Chief Aug 1966 - Nov 1969	H

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Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Robert C. Kendrick, USA	Chief, Special Operations Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (J-3) Headquarters PACOM Dec 1966 - to date: Jul 1969	I
Col Robert C. Kingston, USA	Chief, Operations-34, MACSOG Mar 1967 - Aug 1969	J
Col Harold K. Aaron, USA	Commander, 1st SFG Jun 1967 - May 1968 Commander, 5th SFG Jun 1968 - May 1969	K
Col Robert L. Gleason, USAF	Deputy Chief, MACSOG Mar 1968 - Mar 1969	L
Col Herbert Q. Graeser, USA	Staff Officer, Special Operations Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (J-3), Hq PACOM Jan 1969 - to date: Jul 1969	M

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL CLYDE R. RUSSELL, USA

. . . . We had to take OPLAN 34A and draw up our operations for the next 90 days at one stage, 60 days for another stage. 30 days for another stage, depending upon the . . . powers that be. . . . Then we had to get them in-country concurrence; we had to get with the [redacted] the Ambassador or his Deputy, then military approval. By the time we got a program out of country, it had been whittled quite a bit. That program then would go to CINCPAC and they would whittle it some more, then it would go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff where it would be further sniped at. By the time we got it back, we were out of implementation time and the restraints were too many and too frequent. I feel that we should have given COMUSMACV, General Harkins or General Westmoreland, broad guidance and let them do what they saw fit with the concurrences of the Ambassador and CIA. I don't feel that everything needed to be cleared with CINCPAC and with Washington officials. . . .*

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

It was a tremendous operational handicap to have to get these missions cleared all the way, in some instances, to the White House. The restraints were numerous. We had a mine plan to close Haiphong harbor with dummy mines. It was a good operation and we never got off the ground; papers and repapers, and it was always disapproved and we never knew who or why except the mission was disapproved. In the early days,

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Clyde R. Russel, USA, p. 9.

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we couldn't get permission to shoot from off the boat unless we were fired upon. This didn't really make a lot of sense when you're off a man's coast and you have to go in and draw his fire before you can shoot back. If we were going to shoot, we should have been given permission to shoot from a position of safety instead of almost running the boats aground before we could shoot. It seems that everybody had different ideas on how to run these operations.*

We were never restrained in the PsyOps Program. This is the one program that we knew was getting to all the North Vietnamese people on their radio system. We knew the beam was getting through and yet we were never restrained nor ever encouraged in the PsyOps Program, although we asked for guidance on several occasions, but it never came through. So, we didn't know what to say and we didn't use one of our most valuable weapons in the program.**

Unfortunately, we didn't have a program to present to the North Vietnamese. We couldn't present guerrilla warfare to them; we couldn't present a front to them; we couldn't present eventual unification of the country; we just had no national aims to present to them. We couldn't tell them anything of our aims or desires in the time frame of 1969 and 1970. . . Had we been able to put that out in 1964-1965, I'm sure we would have been in a better position at the bargaining table today.***

Maybe some of the problems that I pose here are beyond the realm of solution out I don't feel that they are.

* Ibid., pp. 9-10.
** Ibid., p. 10.
*** Ibid.

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Guidance must come from the national level. I feel that it is essential that the military have such guidance in the future. However, the military must be given freedom in implementation. We could have done anything that we were directed to do, but we could not operate in a vacuum without guidance. This was what we were forced to do in the early days of SOG. I felt that had we been able to get the country team together more frequently and come up with a unified country plan, we would have been better off. This happened on very rare occasions during my time in Vietnam.* 1

I'd like to talk about how to put a program of operations of this type together. We had to put a 30-day program, a 60-day program, a 90-day program together and then run around to get the concurrence of the individual members of the country team. This was a method of operation that couldn't function. If we had a nonconcurrence from one member of the country team, then we had to take that nonconcurrence to the other members. I felt that those representatives were much more capable of presenting their nonconcurrences than we. We were caught in the middle. I would have preferred that State present their nonconcurrences to CIA and vice versa, and I am sure it would have speeded up operations. I hope that we represented their nonconcurrences in all cases, but you're bound to be biased when you put together a program and a man says, "I don't buy it;" you're bound to be biased in your presentation to the other members of the country team. I felt that had we been able to get these busy, busy men together to go over this thing for the next two or three months or for 90 days in advance, we would have had much smoother sailing. Unfortunately, it didn't work that way during my time in Vietnam.** 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3

* Ibid.
** Ibid. pp. 10-11.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM R. BECKER, USAF

In regard to a national level planning and coordinating agency, I think we obviously need one, and one should be called into existence once we have acknowledged the fact that we do wish to participate in clandestine type operations. The organization itself has to be responsive to the needs of the people in the field. It does have to be relied upon by the people in the field to coordinate the mission. It is quite obvious that the people in the field do not, nor should they, have full knowledge of all of the associated operations. This does require then that there be a place secure within the United States that can coordinate and make sure that all of the other operations being conducted within a particular area are coordinated. The other principal use of a high-level agency or interdepartmental agency is to secure the necessary high-level approval for the type of operation you wish to conduct. I am a firm believer that high-level approval, in principle and in some cases on specific missions, is absolutely essential if you are going to conduct successfully this type of operation. So, I would see then that the high-level coordinating office here would be a coordination and approval agency and one that is responsive to the needs of the field. A single agency within Washington to conduct the planning for operations I don't think is necessarily useful. The planning, I feel, is still more adequately accomplished by the field under the direction of the Ambassador. . . . I think that the actual planning of the operation is much more effective in the field and that high-level organizations here within the Washington area should be primarily the coordinating agencies necessary to make sure that we are not interfering with other operations being conducted in the area.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel William R. Becker, USAF pp. 23-24.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

BY

COMMANDER KENNETH N. BEBB, USN

. . . It was extremely frustrating for the Naval officers [redacted] in Danang to run delicate missions with people who were inexperienced and yet the Americans were responsible for the success of these operations. This frustration extended all the way to Washington, D. C.*

The planning for the maritime missions in North Vietnam was carried out by the Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD) in Danang. All of the proposed missions had to be worked out in detail and submitted to MACV. Then these requests for proposed missions were forwarded to CINCPAC for approval, disapproval or modification and then all the way up to Washington, SACSA, and other agencies in town. It is obvious that this long, extended chain of command affected current operations of such a small nature. It was extremely frustrating to the NAD operations people who planned some of these missions in detail only to have them rejected by CINCPAC or JCS. It is my personal opinion after monitoring this program and working with it at CINCPAC for a little over a year. . . that the approval system and the extended chain of command caused a certain amount of lack of motivation to SOG planners. They lost incentive to plan in detail after they were shot down so many times. Under Admiral Felt we supported SOG as much as possible and most of the time we would approve the mission if it appeared at all feasible. We then forwarded it to higher command for final approval in Washington.**

* (TS) Interview of Commander Kenneth N. Beob, USN, p. 2.
** Ibid., pp. 2-3.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL DONALD D. BLACKBURN, USA

Tight control from Washington "hamstrung" the operation. I can appreciate the problems faced in Washington. However, this stringent control affected timeliness. It seemed strange that authority to conduct some particular operations had to come directly from the White House. Sometimes it took three to four weeks for decisions. However, I don't know how to avoid the necessity for tight control of clandestine operations in view of the political aspects. An agency is needed in Washington which could provide direction, and effect coordination and support between State, CIA, DOD and other pertinent government agencies.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Donald D. Blackburn, USA, p. 2.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL JOHN P. MOORE, JR., USAF

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

. . . . . .

. . . the restraints put on the cross-border operations . . . severely limited them in Laos and Cambodia. [redacted] there was a separate entity running each of these operations and this was an impediment to both.*

Attempts to have all these operations under one authority, of course, were never realized and probably could not have been realized considering the political factors involved. As long as the American Ambassador to Laos was running the operations in Laos and as long as MACV was running the operations in South Vietnam, with CINCPAC in the middle and responsible for both operations but having very little to say about the Laotian ones, the command relationship was such that I don't think you would have ever been able to have a single authority to conduct these operations, even though they were geographically on top of one another.**

. . . . . .

There is another factor concerning the military's capability to conduct covert operations. This falls in the area of being organized both in the Joint Staff and in the Services to acquire covert assets, the ability to handle this highly

* (TS) Interview by Colonel John T. Moore, Jr., USAF, pp. 8-9.
** Ibid., p. 9.

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sensitive-type materiel, to budget for it, to justify the funds for it, all done in such a manner that the whole setup can be truly deniable. One thing about a covert operation is that it is only going to be covert as long as you can protect the cover because, by nature, every covert operation has to have cover. The more you proliferate the information or knowledge that the military is conducting a covert operation or even supporting one being run by CIA, the more susceptible the operation becomes to compromise. There are just too many people who become involved in it following the normal channels of communication. Sooner or later you are going to spring a leak and then you will blow the cover. When you blow the cover, you blow the operation. There has to be a system to provide safeguards against this. We do have a system in existence today but it is only for communicating with one another. In my opinion, there should be an office other than SACSA (SACSA is not in a position to do this) at the DOD level made up of the necessary military expertise across-the-board. We should have comptroller type people in it; we should have logistics type people, communications people, and all the other various experts needed so that approvals for budgeting and funding, and for exercise of operational control can be handled in such a way that the operation is not subject to compromise. The Services should have a comparable staff to carry out their functions*.

As to the interdepartmental machinery needed at the national level to plan for, conduct and coordinate covert

* Ibid., pp. 17-18.

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operations, I think you have to go back to where the requirement for a covert operation comes from. As I see it, there are only two possible sources. One emanates from some trouble spot in the world, now we are talking about a country, presumably a country with which the United States has friendly relations. Something is wrong. We are either with the ruling government or we are with the dissidents. We either want to support our side to take over the government or we want to preserve the government in power against subversion. We could be called upon then to conduct some kind of a covert operation in that country to support whichever party we are taking sides with. There, then, the requirement would stem, as I see it, from the country team, from the Ambassador. If we had military forces stationed in that country, it could come from the theater commander of that area, and if we had military assistance in there, it could come from the military assistance commander or from a military mission that might be in that country. These groups of people making up the country team would generate a requirement for the United States to conduct covert operations in that country. The only other source that I know of for a covert operation is connected with intelligence. Many times the collection of intelligence required the use of covert means. It may involve either the covert introduction of agents into a country or the introduction of some device for intelligence collection. This is addressed to peacetime and is the province of the CIA with the DOD in a supporting role.*

Assuming that a requirement for a covert operation is generated from one of these sources, CIA—or the country team,

* Ibid., p. 18.

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the nature of the operation itself requires that it have complete interdepartmental coordination. This is done now, of course, there is already an organization set up to do this. We sometimes call it the Special Group and at other times the 303 Committee. It consists of the deputy departmental heads of CIA, DOD, State, and Bureau of the Budget. This is adequate, in my opinion, for getting the approval from the White House to run a covert operation. However, I don't believe that we have a good capability in the DOD and Military Services for conducting and planning covert operations which involve more than one Service. The reason for this is, as I pointed out previously, that a covert operation demands the utmost in security. The requirements for staffing the support needed for these, getting the funds, equipment, etc., to support such an operation are not compatible with the requirement for confining access to this information to the limited number of people that security requires. Therefore, a prerequisite, in my opinion, for any organization created for this purpose would be that the people who are doing the planning and the coordinating of the operation must have timely access to the decision authority. The decision authority himself, if you take it to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense in whom it is now vested, needs to have a small staff to review this for him. At the present time, this is SACSA. However, SACSA, as presently organized, has no capability to fund the project, contract procurement, or establish the cover arrangements. So, one of the first requirements has to be access into the OSD Comptroller and eventually into the Bureau of the Budget.

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This means that you can either do this in one of two ways. You can specially clear certain people in the OSD Comptroller shop and in the Bureau of the Budget to deal on a so-called action officer level. Then the action officers who are working this thing out should bypass everybody in between themselves and the decision authority. This is the only way you can keep any kind of security on a project. This is what is actually being done unilaterally, at least in the Air Force. For coordination and for funding of the project, for example, we go directly to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). We also have specific individuals in the Bureau of the Budget who are specially cleared. Because of the supporting role relationship between the Air Force and the CIA, in the Bureau of the Budget we deal with the same people who worked the approval of the agency's request for funds. So, we have the same people, in other words, cleared for both sides of the operation. You have to have this personal direct access to the people who are in a position to review your programs, funding requests, and your operation, and who are also in a position to satisfy the decision maker. This means that you have to be dealing directly with the top men.*

* Ibid., pp. 19-20.

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TOP SECRET

COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

A . . . problem area that was a direct result of the overall organization for the command and control of SOG was the security problem of keeping limited the knowledge of SOG activities and operations. The nature of the command and control arrangements required that certain staffing be performed at MACV and CINCPAC. This required individuals, perhaps points of contact, to be pretty well briefed on SOG operations. In most cases, you could not get a coordination chop from that individual unless his senior boss was also completely knowledgeable.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, p. 12.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

LT. COLONEL JONATHON D. CARNEY, USA

. . . this kind of business has to have a more simple and more responsive authorization route than the one we used in SOG. The necessity to obtain CINCPAC approval to be followed by obtaining JCS approval was a procedure which would frequently take three to four months. Repeated correspondence back and forth attempting to justify and explain, etc. I fully understand the sensitivity and the considerations involved in the operation, but when you have an agent and have trained him and he is ready to go, you cannot let him sit there for four months waiting for the time to go. You are going to lose him, particularly if he is a Southeast Asian, he will leave you and many of them did. . . .*

* (TS) Interview of Lt. Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA, p. 8.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

CAPTAIN BRUCE B DUNNING, USN

. . . Beyond the . . . /CIA/ charter and NSAI 57, the missions, tasks and organization within DOD, including OSD and CJCS, for covert actions are very, very vague. The Secretary of Defense has assigned to SACSA and DIA certain staff responsibilities and functions incident to the Washington level management and direction of covert action matters. The split between SACSA and DIA poses no problem. For a long time, a DIA element has been colocated with SACSA and the system works very well. We have a problem, however, in that the SACSA action division for these SecDef assigned responsibilities is the Special Operations Division. This is a very small division at the lowest level of the Joint Staff and it has, by terms of the functions assigned by the Secretary of Defense, a dual role in serving both as a normal Joint Staff element at the lowest level and as a highly specialized element reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Conceivably, such a dual role could work all right provided that the entire Joint Staff hierarchy understood and recognized it as a legimate dual role. Further, the hierarchy should understand and recognize that those people way down at the bottom of the Joint Staff do have responsibilities to the Chairman, Deputy Secretary, and Secretary in highly sensitive matters which cannot be, and should not be, handled administratively within the normal Joint Staff bureaucratic machinery. This does not mean that certain actions should never be coordinated; they should but, in such cases, coordination must be on a close hold need-to-know basis.

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Therefore, the hierarchy must have confidence in the judgment of the Special Operations Division in SACSA to determine what coordination is necessary.*

Another problem faced by the Special Operations Division is one of staffing. The division, with a total of nine officer-level personnel and four administrative personnel, is looked upon by the UW planners in most of the CINC staffs and by a lot of Joint Staff people as the central focal point for all UW special operations matters worldwide. This is an appalling situation when you have such an ill-staffed, tiny, lowly-placed organization functioning as a central focal point for the highly complex problems of worldwide unconventional warfare and covert actions planning. The problem right now is one of organizational placement, of vagueness of charter, and of under staffing.**

As to whether anybody in ISA gets involved in our daily activities, the answer is no. In the field of covert actions, ISA has not been involved. In the FOOTBOY Program, ISA is aware, on a very limited basis, of the covert actions and has not participated in the staffing process. We have had our own direct channel into the State Department. In the case of the cross-border operations which, of course, are not covert actions, ISA is in the channel and they serve as the liaison link between DOD and State. By and large, however, ISA simply acts as a mail drop between State and DOD.**

I've painted an exceedingly grim picture and I mean that. It is very disturbing. The question then arises as to what we should do about it. I'm basing this largely on my experience

* (TS) Interview of Captain Bruce B. Dunning, pp. 39-40.
** Ibid., p. 40.

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in the management of SOG operations, combined with the handling of a great number of day-to-day problems which have arisen in the UW planning field with a lot of the CINCs. I don't have all the answers. We have done some studies in the division and have come up with some alternative plans for a Special Operations Directorate and various other types of entities. We've done some studies on possible staffing. I'm not sure that our answers to these studies are the right ones yet. I think a lot more work needs to be done but it is a start. In essence, I think there are several characteristics necessary in any effective organizational entity for the management and direction of covert actions and the broader field for unconventional warfare. First of all, the entity must be highly enough placed in the organizational structure. The entity must be headed by an individual of sufficient rank so that he can have prompt access to the decision-making level. He simply cannot do his job if he has to go through layer after layer of conventional hierarchy. I emphasize that it is the word CONVENTIONAL hierarchy which causes the problem. Secondly, this organization has to be appropriately staffed, both in terms of number and rank of personnel, to handle the workload on a worldwide basis. In terms of functional capability, the UW and Special Operations planning assets must, in my opinion, be consolidated into one organization. This means that, if you are going to be professional in such operations, you not only have to have some operational planners but such people as a comptroller, security personnel, logistic personnel, personnel managers and communicators. All of these must be super-specialists in the field of covert actions within their functional fields. In other words, logisticians must be experts in covert logistic support. They must have experience in covert procurement.

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The comptroller must have expertise in the management of covert funds and covert funding systems, and so on down the line. This need for functional capabilities is not only to enable the development of comprehensive and detailed UW plans and guidance but to provide a reservoir of expertise. That expertise can be used to provide the initial guidance for organizations established in the field in contingency situations so that those organizations can get started off on the right foot. The mistakes that are so often made in the field, and the rush to begin operations could be avoided.*

Another characteristic of an effective organization for management and direction of covert actions is, of course, that it be secure. It must be compartmented and have the capability to handle actions in a secure manner outside of the automatic functioning, wide dissemination characteristic of most actions within the Joint Staff and the joint arena. I think that this type of entity, properly placed, is an absolute necessity if we are going to get professional in the covert actions business to the point that we can effectively use these actions to influence conflict situations without major risks of embarrassment to the US Government. I see this as a requirement which is not generally recognized. We still go about this business as kind of a toy to play with in a rather superficial manner. There is too much of the World War II analogy of guerrilla operations, too much tendency to think of unconventional warfare, special operations, including covert actions, in terms of really nothing but small military actions conducted by rather unreliable and hair-brained individuals. This is not the case. If we are going to meet this requirement, we are going to have to get good at it. We are going to have to put grease into it to

* Ibid., pp. 40-41.

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support it properly In this respect, I would emphasize that I am not proposing that the military get into the covert actions business in competition with CIA. I see the requirement for most covert actions as being JS requirements and US operations, without necessarily being labeled as military, CIA or DOD. They are US national actions, US national requirements. In this field, it is almost inevitable that the operations developed will be joint at one level or another.*

Going back to the subject of the CIA charter and NSAM 57, I think you have a situation wherein both CIA and DOD must have thoroughly professional complementary capabilities. There is no question of one side trying to get into the other side's charter. It is a matter of the development of a national capability in which both agencies must participate on a complementary basis. A corollary problem insofar as DOD is concerned is that all too often the JCS do not have a good idea of what CIA is about. (As a matter of fact, this is one of the functions assigned to SACSA. SOG keeps the JCS informed.) If CIA enters into a covert actions program which may grow to such a size that the DOD may have to take it over, certainly the DOD and the JCS should know about it well in advance. They aren't going to know about it unless CIA has sufficient confidence in the security consciousness of DOD to inform them of their operations. CIA simply does not have such confidence in DOD at this time. This confidence depends on the development within DOD of professional management.**

* Ibid., pp. 41-42.
** Ibid., p. 42.

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. . . . . .

Essentially, the policy making and coordinating machinery at the top national level is probably all right. You have an existing high level committee at almost the highest level of government which approves covert action proposals. This is fine. CIA, State, and DOD, among others, participate in the committee. It has functioned well for a long time I think the breakdown comes immediately below that level. This breakdown is primarily because DOD hasn't properly configured its internal organization to handle this type of action. . . Partially as a result of this inadequate organization within DOD, the channel from the military-covert action planners (SACSA/SOD) to this high-level committee has broken down completely. There is virtually no link between SACSA/SOD, and the committee. The link should operate through the Deputy Secretary of Defense but, because of the increasing isolation of SACSA and SACSA/SOD, at the bottom of the Joint Staff insulated by layer after layer of conventional thinking, it is practically impossible to get anything on covert actions up to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or to the committee. The channel from that committee to CIA is functioning every day. That same type of every day functioning should exist between the committee and the planners in DOD, wherever they are placed. At the top level, the coordinating machinery is probably very good but on the DOD side the link between the top level and the action officers has broken down completely. It is virtually non-existent. There again, I think the answer to the problem lies in developing a professional staff and placing it organizationally at an appropriate level so that it can work with full confidence laterally with the CIA people and also have relatively direct access to the committee through the Deputy Secretary of Defense.*

* Ibid., p. 43.

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. . . too few of the hierarchy in the Joint Staff understand exactly what SACSA/SOD is charged with. In fact, the whole Joint Staff tends to see SACSA/SOD as simply another very small, very low-level, little Joint Staff entity down there that damned well ought to heel and get in line like everybody else. When we try to get a paper up to the appropriate level of government for approval of a significant covert action, we have to go to the J-3 (probably the Deputy J-3), then to the Director, Joint Staff, then to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, finally, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. In most cases, at each of those levels, and despite all kinds of sensitive labels, the paper gets lateral distribution to all sorts of action officers who may or may not have a real need-to-know. It gets spread out all over the place and you end up with a great number of people having access to it. Also, you have the worst situation where a great many conventional planners and conventional action officers are hacking at your concept from a purely conventional standpoint. It either gets stopped enroute or by the time the paper gets to the top, it's so waffled as to be meaningless.*

I can give specific examples of this. Sometime ago, a requirement was levied by a very high level of the government asking what was our capability to conduct guerrilla-type warfare in North Vietnam. The first problem was that nobody was quite sure whether this high-level authority knew what he was talking about when he said guerrilla-type warfare. Nonetheless, the requirement was passed out to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC. COMUSMACV came in with a list of about a dozen capabilities, all using SOG assets. Listed, for example, were capabilities of this type: the capability to conduct a heloborne raid on the

* Ibid., p. 44.

coast of North Vietnam utilizing resources drawn from the PRAIRIE FIRE Program, the capability to conduct maritime cross-beach raids using the CADO teams from the FOOTBOY Program. This apparently was the closest COMUSMACV could come to what he thought the requiring authority meant in regard to guerrilla-type operations. In listing these capabilities, COMUSMACV expressed the opinion that none of them would be likely to produce results worth the cost, with the possible exception of maritime operations along the coast. This answer went to CINCPAC. CINCPAC discussed these capabilities and generally agreed that we had the capability to do these things, but he said that none of them was really worth the cost in his opinion and he expressed the additional opinion that none of them would achieve anything more than a very short-range and limited impact on the Hanoi regime.*

This paper from CINCPAC was sent to the Joint Staff and actioned to SACSA/SOD, as I recall at about 0200 hours. We concurred in CINCPAC's evaluation. Our feeling was that these would be largely harassment operations, a repetition of 1964 all over again. They were a reflection of a frustration syndrome at the highest levels of the government. This type of hit-and-run raid and harassing operation would not have any long-range or significant impact on the Hanoi regime unless tied to a larger objective aimed at the exploitation of identified vulnerabilities. We said in our response that we concurred with CINCPAC and that we did not believe these operations would really pay off. Then we added a "however," saying that we do have the capability to develop a broadly based program designed to exploit identified psychological vulnerabilities through the use of covert actions. Essentially, we outlined a couple of alternative concepts similar to those that had been developed in FOOTBOY just prior to the

* Ibid, p 44

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standdown. Characteristically enough, our response, despite the fact that it was on a highly sensitive subject and a highly specialized one, was required to be consolidated into a massive J-3 paper which covered a wide spectrum of capabilities against the enemy. Consequently, our work was just an input to a J-3 paper and did not go directly to an entity responsible for approving covert actions or considering covert actions J-3 looked at the input and immediately eliminated our "however" on the grounds that it was not responsive to the specific question that had been asked. Essentially, what went to this high authority as an answer was that we have a capability to conduct certain specific operations against North Vietnam (rather low-level and elemental types of operations), but none of these will pay off, period. In other words, we were telling them, "There is not a damned thing you can do up there." This simply was a misleading answer.*

We have run into this sort of situation on several occasions. What we are getting is the wrong questions: specific questions being asked from a high level, the wrong questions being asked and a lack of willingness on our part to say, "Here is the specific response to your question but we think you asked the wrong question, and here are some other things you should consider." In this regard, I am convinced that the decision-makers are getting some very, very bad information.*

A side-comment here. Not too long ago we were, on occasion, able to talk with people of pretty high level. For instance, I was called in on a couple of occasions to talk with

* Ibid., p. 45.

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Mr. Rostow. This was not an "end run." I was called in along with some OSD people and with the full knowledge of the Director and others to discuss certain ideas with Mr. Rostow. This never happens now and, moreover, it is highly unlikely to happen because the special warfare, special operations, and unconventional warfare people are more and more being kept out of sight, put back in the corner and forced to screen everything they do through a conventional sieve. We are not going to get anywhere on this basis.*

* Ibid., pp. 45-46.

Tab H to

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TOP SECRET

COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL ROBERT C. KENDRICK, USA

As far as we are concerned here at CINCPAC, once we send a concept or proposal requesting approval or disapproval, etc., to SACSA, that office has handled it fast and timely; we at CINCPAC are completely satisfied with their support and help. Here at CINCPAC, the different concepts and proposals have to be staffed like any other action. I actually see nothing wrong with this. Staffing is accomplished pretty fast. I do feel very strongly that once these concepts are approved at CINCPAC, and Washington, the JCS and CINCPAC should not hang on to any strings or control and try to run operations from either here or from Washington. Once the plan or concept is approved, MACV should be allowed to conduct operations under approved rules. Unless they violate these rules, they should be left alone. Of course, when the situation changes, then rules would change. As long as the rules do not change and the concepts do not change, MACV should be left alone and allowed to run operations and just keep our headquarters and Washington informed.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Robert C. Kendrick, USA, p. 16.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL ROBERT C. KINGSTON, USA --

We did one insert while I was there. It was in North Vietnam along the Laotian border. A team was sent into what we thought was a relatively secure uninhabited area. They were detected almost immediately. We made an exfiltration after several days. Upon investigation, we determined that they may have been bugged by the presence of a friendly team operating from the Laotian side of the border into the area. The possibility of two such teams running into each other was established. The actuality of the two teams running into one another never came out, of course. This again brings up a requirement for coordination in this type business much more than is being conducted., i.e., more than visits cross-border between the people in Laos and SOG personnel. This again brings in the whole business of intelligence operations controlled on a worldwide basis. I am not trying to suggest that anybody superimpose a control over an American ambassador or an American field commander, particularly in Laos or South Vietnam, but there is, in my opinion, a requirement to establish in the intelligence field a national interagency command headquarters staffed by the military, State and CIA in which coordination of intelligence operations can be conducted to insure no overlap, no duplication, and proper and adequate control of assets, particularly when these assets are limited. Due to their charter, I believe CIA should have the controlling chairman of this group at the national level. Command in operational areas can be worked out. If this is ever taken as a suggestion, the details could be worked out later.*

* (TS) Interview of Col Robert C. Kingston, USA, pp. 2-3.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL HAROLD K. AARON, USA --

. . . . in the development of national policy which would enhance MACSOG covert operations, I received the impression while I was in SACSA that it was a rather laborious process. I think that in the Joint Staff area and in the Services the process was pretty well streamlined and a position could be forumlated. The problem was to get the position accepted, particularly by State, as it pertained to cross-border operations in Cambodia and Laos for example. Here was where we encountered the greatest difficulty. It would appear to me that there should be a covert committee established that would deal with such operations that would be on a high level that could address policy questions and take them up rapidly, perhaps on a weekly or ad hoc basis.*

* (TS) Interview of Col Harold K. Aaron, USA, p. 12.

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COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL ROBERT L. GLEASON, USAF --

I think we always have to look at unique command and control problems in UW operations. Here again, when you start moving up through various military commands with these UW programs, decisions that must be made in conjunction with them, it's only a matter of time until you run into what I refer to as the conventional military mind. The individual may be a general, regardless of Service, who has bever been associated with UW in his entire career. He immediately tries to evaluate the situation in light of conventional risks both military and political, and conventional returns, both military and political, and doesn't understand the new odds. Therefore, you are going to get either negative decisions where positive ones are warranted, or else you're going to end up with some type of a large-scale discussion or donnybrook that really isn't worth the effort until you can get above him to another commander who probably has a better feel for the effort. This is particularly true in the MACV Staff at the J-2 or J-3 level. When you get up into J-2 or J-3 themselves, in some cases, you had no problem out quite often you had trouble getting up there and even when you did in the more sensitive programs, the appreciation wasn't there and the end result was that you had to go over their heads to the Chief of Staff-or to the COMUSMACV himself. You evoke hostility and hard feelings doing this.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, p. 11.

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I think we should go back to something like the old OSS where you had military technicians, the operators, actually military people on loan to some other agency, whether it be CAS or a special agency formed for this purpose. But the policy guidance would be other than through DOD. The military heads, generals in the Pentagon, CINCPAC, MACV would not be asked to put their careers on the line by endorsing a lot of these programs and making the necessary decisions that are required to keep them going. This is not always fair to them. You would have a rapid reaction chain of command that would rapidly get you to the highest authorities whether it be the Joint Chiefs of Staff or this other agency and you would be able to take advantage of the military knowhow as far as the operators go, the doers, with an organization which can take a much greater political risk than maybe DOD can. This is probably not too practical to pursue because it is probably not within the realm of possibility. I, therefore, advocate as an alternative a streamlined military chain where you go direct from the Chief, UW, whether it be a JUWTF or a MACSOG type operation, up to the theater commander and from him directly to the next higher authority, whatever it may be, and then to the Washington level. In this regard, I think the establishment of SACSA did a tremendous amount of good in having a place in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest purely military level, where their whole purpose in being is to promulgate, disseminate, pursue and support UW programs.*

* Ibid., pp. 11-12.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMENTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL

BY

COLONEL HERBERT O. GRAESER, USA

. . . In any event, the lines of intelligence dissemination and command and control need to be clearly delineated; this has not always been the case in the past. The operation has been run along personality rather than organizational lines.

Another aspect of the operation which I think needs clarification in the field is that of the responsibilities in the operational areas. The MACSOG-controlled teams live in Special Forces bases which are within the areas of some other commander, either US or Vietnamese. Because of the closely held programs, it is not clear in many cases as to what the command lines are. For example, if one of these camps comes under attack, to whom can the commander go for help? The Vietnamese say, "No, these are US mercenaries." Americans say, "No, these are Vietnamese mercenaries." Unless this is clearly delineated, then it may be too late to make this kind of an arrangement after the particular installation comes under attack. This has occurred in the past. It has probably been worked out by now but it is a lesson which needs to be heeded in case we go into this sort of thing again.*

* (~~S~~) Interview of Col Herbert O. Graeser, USA, pp. 6-7.