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APPENDIX I

MACSOG INTELLIGENCE

PART I. INTRODUCTION

A. (TS) BACKGROUND

When MACSOG was formally organized on 24 January 1964, one of its missions included the acquisition of intelligence. For documentation purposes, therefore, this Appendix traces the development of MACSOG's internal intelligence organization.

B. (TS) SCOPE

Included in this Appendix is the evolution of the intelligence organization as recorded in the COMUSMACV Command Histories. In 1967 and 1969 three separate study groups evaluated the MACSOG intelligence apparatus. Results of these comprehensive reviews are also provided.

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PART II. 1964 HISTORY

A. (TS) INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

1. (TS) As a means of accomplishing the task of acquiring intelligence as part of its mission, an Intelligence Branch was established within MACSOG in March 1964. When formed, the branch consisted of the following sections: Collections, Targets, and Productions and Estimates.

a. The Collections Section provided basic intelligence materials utilized by the Branch. This material was obtained from three sources: COMUSMACV J-2 sources, Navy and Air Force photo reconnaissance missions, and Maritime Operations (MAROPS) intelligence collection operations.

b. The Target Section, in June 1964, commenced producing Detailed Photo Intelligence Reports (DPIRs). The DPIRs included analyses and measurements of target areas and landing beaches, and terrain and climatic conditions.

c. The Production and Estimates Section prepared and maintained wall maps and charts depicting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Laos Order of Battle.*

* (TS) Annex A to 1964 COMUSMACV Command History.

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PART III. 1965 HISTORY

A. (TS) PLOWMAN OPERATIONS

1. (TS) Prior to June 1965, the target selection for PLOWMAN missions was based primarily on map and limited photographic study. As photographic interpretation (PI) personnel became available to the SOG Intelligence Branch, and with the acquisition of photography of the North Vietnam (NVN) coast, a full time PI effort towards developing lucrative Maritime Operations (MAROPS) targets was realized. Also, in 1965, an NVN Coastal Shipping/ Inland Waterways Study was initiated in order to determine coastal shipping patterns, high probability choke-point areas, and inland waterways used in transporting supplies to South Vietnam (SVN).

2. (TS) Based on the Defense Intelligence Requirements Manual (DIRM) and COMUSMACV Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR), a MAROPS Collection Plan was published in December 1965. This plan included the basic Essential Elements of Information (EEI) and a standard operating procedure for interrogating prisoners captured during Maritime Operations.

3. (TS) During this period, MACSOG established a spot reporting system to disseminate information in a timely manner. Based on data obtained from MAROPS prisoners, these reports described general conditions existing in the coastal provinces of NVN.

B. (TS) OPLAN 34A OPERATIONS

1. (TS) In support of OPLAN 34A Agent Team operations, the Intelligence Branch began to prepare detailed photo interpretation studies of selected areas for personnel and resupply drop zones, helicopter landing zones, possible road watch/ambush sites, and targets of opportunity.

2. (TS) An Intelligence Collection Plan tailored to agent team intelligence gathering capabilities was prepared in October 1965. Individual agent teams were tasked with specific intelligence requirements based on SICR's from COMUSMACV and higher headquarters.

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3. (TS) Significant and perishable information received from 34A agent teams were disseminated to higher authority by MACSOG using a spot reporting system similar to that established for MAROPS.

C. (TS) SHINING BRASS OPERATIONS

1. (TS) In support of SHINING BRASS operations, an Intelligence Annex for the operation order establishing this program was published. Resultant support for this operation included the preparation of team targets and the dissemination of intelligence collected by SHINING BRASS operational teams.

D. (TS) AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY

With the enlargement of MACSOG's mission, it was determined that the Intelligence Branch needed a better photo interpretation capability. To make improvements in this area.

1. (TS) Additional photo interpretation personnel were assigned.

2. (TS) Arrangements were made to have duplicate positive aerial film of SHINING BRASS and OPLAN 34 areas of interest delivered to MACSOG.

3. (TS) A film library was established and additional photo interpretation equipment was procured.*

* (TS) Annex N to 1965 COMUSMACV Command History

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PART IV. 1966 HISTORY

A. (TS) INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION

1. (TS) To provide a more qualitative intelligence product in support of MACSOG operational responsibilities, the Intelligence Branch was reorganized in 1966 as follows.

a. The Collection, and Plans and Estimates Sections were combined into the Operations Sections, and Country Desks were established.

b. The Targeting Section was consolidated by placing all photo interpreters in one location, and it was redesignated the Photo Analysis Section.

c. An Administrative Section was established. This addition provided an officer familiar with intelligence to assign tasks and coordinate the administrative efforts of the Branch.

2. (TS) Figure I-1 is the organization of the Intelligence Branch as of September 1966.

B. (TS) PLOWMAN OPERATIONS

1. (TS) In October 1966, an intelligence officer, with a Vietnamese language capability, was assigned to Camp DODO to supervise exploitation and collection efforts concerning the interrogation of PLOWMAN detainees.

2. (TS) Interrogation of MAROPS detainees provided intelligence concerning the military order of battle and coastal defense installations in NVN. Other information obtained included political, economic, and social activities in the villages and hamlets of the NVN coastal region.


C. (TS) SHINING BRASS OPERATIONS

1. (TS) As the SHINING BRASS program progressed, the results of all SHINING BRASS missions were plotted in an attempt to pinpoint North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) base areas and activities. Information derived from this analysis was then made to support the targeting of subsequent missions in Laos.

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FIGURE I-1 (TS)

INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION - 1966 (U)



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2. (TS) Intelligence information derived from SHINING BRASS operations included·

a. Activities of enemy and indigenous personnel.

b. Location and descriptions of installations, fortifications, and structures.

c. Terrain information.

d. Crops and livestock.

e. Results of friendly airstrikes.

f. Results of US/SVN psychological operations.

D. (TS) AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

The OPLAN 34A agent teams in NVN provided roadwatch type information and general area observations during this period. Other subjects reported on were shipping at Haiphong, Hon Gay, and Cam Pha; results of friendly air strikes; treatment of downed US pilots; and general economic and political information.

E. (TS) DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS

In anticipation of approval of DANIEL BOONE operations, the Intelligence Branch commenced selecting possible targets in Cambodia. Target selection was determined by photo interpretation of high-altitude photography.

F. (TS) AIR/ANTIAIR INTELLIGENCE

The air/antiair element of the Operations Section maintained all AAA, Air, SAM, and Radar intelligence for Laos, NVN and SVN. This information was provided to the First Flight Detachment, Airborne Operations, Joint Personnel Recovery Center and MAROPS, in order that these activities might have the locations and identification of enemy air and antiair defenses in their areas of operation.*

* (TS) Annex M to 1966 COMUSMACV Command History

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PART V. 1967 HISTORY

A. (TS) PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATIONS

1. (TS) Special Intelligence Reports (SIRs) were replaced with Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) in March 1967. This change allowed for wider dissemination of PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence information. The new reports cited a "Friendly Guerrilla Unit" as the source, and in no way connected MACSOG or the United States with operations in Laos.

2. (TS) Significant intelligence produced by the PRAIRIE FIRE operations in 1967 included the following:

a. During February, 500,000 pounds of rice and several tons of ammunition were located in the PRAIRIE FIRE operating area.

b. A major supply cache was found on Route 922 during April. This included Soviet RPG-7 ammunition, which previously had not been available for analysis.

c. Active and inactive bivouac areas were located, as well as infiltration routes, way stations and motorable roads.

d. Photographs were taken of roads, trails, bivouac areas, storage areas, trucks and enemy fortifications.

e. Seventy tons of rice were found during November which pinpointed a major storage area.

f. Two enemy trucks were found and photographed along with several tons of truck parts.

g. A number of areas of suspected enemy dispositions were either confirmed active or inactive.

h. Tactical and ARC LIGHT strikes resulted from intelligence information obtained during PRAIRIE FIRE operations.

B. (TS) DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS

1. (TS) Significant intelligence produced as a result of DANIEL BOONE operations in Cambodia included the following in 1967.

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a. One-hundred and fifty-one routes and trails were located.

b. Seventy-six enemy troop sightings indicated the use of Cambodia by the NVA/VC.

c. Ninety-nine active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were identified.

d. Four NVA communications wires were observed in Cambodia.

e. Photographs were taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage areas, enemy fortifications and terrain.*

C. (TS) MACSOG INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION

1. (TS) CINCPAC Joint Survey Team

a. In November 1967, a CINCPAC Joint Survey Team convened to undertake a review of MACSOG programs.

b. Significant MACSOG intelligence problem areas identified by the Survey Team and recommend actions made to correct these problem areas are provided below:

(1) "PROBLEM: Intelligence interface between J2 MACV and MACSOG.

(a) "DISCUSSION During discussions with the J2 MACV Staff and the MACSOG Intelligence Branch, it became apparent that the J2 MACV Staff was not completely aware of MACSOG's intelligence collection capabilities and limitations. Further, the Intelligence Branch of MACSOG did not clearly understand the MACSOG role in intelligence collection in support of COMUSMACV. As a result of this lack of clear definition of operational relationships, MACSOG was not being tasked by J2 MACV in accordance with its collection potential nor was MACSOG receiving evaluations of that intelligence information provided to J2 MACV. The existing degree of cooperation and coordination between the J2 MACV Staff and the MACSOG Intelligence Branch is the direct result of the personal initiative of the staff action officers involved.

(b) "RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate terms of reference be developed between J2 MACV and MACSOG to provide for:

1. "Definition of policies, procedures and responsibilities for intelligence targeting, collection requirement tasking, reporting, dissemination and

* (TS) Annex G to 1967 COMUSMACV Command History

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evaluation of Intelligence Information Reports (DD Form 1396) and intelligence collection operations in order to achieve adequate intelligence support of COMUSMACV. As an example, provision should be made for dissemination of PLOWMAN (C) PW Knowledgeability Briefs to the appropriate offices within J2 MACV, CINCPAC and DIA to elicit SICR submissions.

2. "Identification of a single point of contact for each directorate within J2 MACV Personnel acting as these "points of contact" must possess detailed knowledge of MACSOG activities, to include capabilities and limitations, to ensure appropriate coordination, mission support, tasking, reporting, dissemination, and evaluation of reports and activities.

3. "Representation of the Intelligence Branch of MACSOG at the J2 MACV daily intelligence briefings.

(2) "PROBLEM: Increase the capability of the MACSOG Intelligence Branch in consonance with the increased emphasis on the intelligence mission.

(a) "DISCUSSION: There has been an increase in the number and scope of MACSOG programs and a corresponding increase in emphasis on its intelligence collection mission. This increase in programs and intelligence mission has not been reflected in an appropriate increase in the Intelligence Branch force structure nor its influence on operations. The proposed JTD has provided for limited augmentation to the Intelligence Branch and for the assignment of qualified intelligence collection specialists to the operational elements of MACSOG. However, this increase is not sufficient to ensure adequate intelligence support to MACSOG operations nor for the security of the organization, facilities, and operations. Photo interpretation is the primary method of target identification, analysis, and mission planning. To accomplish this, the interpretation of topographic data must be done in greater detail than that performed by any other photo interpretation resources available to MACSOG.

(b) "RECOMMENDATION: The Intelligence Branch of MACSOG be expanded as follows:

1. "The Intelligence Branch Chief should be upgraded to Colonel, O-6.

2. "The Intelligence Operations Section should be enlarged to provide more intelligence support to mission planning, targeting, and exploitation.

3. "An Intelligence Training Section should be established to provide adequate training for the many and varied intelligence collection programs.

4. "The Security Section should be expanded to provide adequate security support services and to increase the security protection afforded the organization, operations, and facilities.

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5. "Specific recommendations include

a. "The Admin Officer of the Intelligence Branch should have a 9300 Intel MOS, vice 9668 Operational Intelligence MOS

b. "The Operations Officer of the Intelligence Branch should have an Intelligence MOS, 9300 or 9668 vice 2162 Operations and Training Staff Officer G3.

c. "The Security Section should be enlarged to provide adequate counterintelligence and security support to both the headquarters elements and to operational units and facilities in the field.

d. "Photo interpretation support is so important that 100% manning should be maintained at all times.

(3) "PROBLEM: Compromise of MACSOG cover.

(a) "DISCUSSION: Continued speculation and commentary on MACSOG by the public communications media has either exposed its true mission or focused undesirable attention on the organization. The cover designation of MACSOC has been in existence for several years without change. The duration of this cover coupled with the existing short-tour policy has resulted in an increasingly large number of people officially and unofficially becoming aware of MACSOG's cover. Due to the sensitive nature of MACSOG's mission, its security should receive continuous emphasis. The impending move of MACSOG's Headquarters would be an appropriate time for re-structuring the existing MACSOG cover apparatus, i.e., new cover designation, cover mission, changes in vehicles and license plates, etc. To minimize the potential compromise of any new cover for MACSOG, the need-to-know principle should be adhered to. Requests for access to MACSOG information should continue to be fully justified and the access roster should be purged on a periodic basis.

(b) "RECOMMENDATION: That the MACSOG cover apparatus be re-structured in conjunction with its move.

(4) "PROBLE". Downgrading the classification of MACSOG activities and communications.

(a) "DISCUSSION: Since the inception of MACSOG with its original mission of unconventional warfare actions in North Vietnam, the war has been expanded to include overt military actions. The aerial interdiction of the infiltration routes throughout the panhandle of Laos has been publicized in overt news media. This has reduced the sensitivity and increased the public knowledge of military activities in North Vietnam and Laos. The TOP SECRET LIMDIS classification requires a continuous receipt system within offices at every echelon. This delays

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communications and increases its cost. The exposure of military activities cited above may well have obviated the necessity for continued use of the TOP SECRET LIMDIS classification for some MACSOG activities. As an example, MACSOG agent team operations in North Vietnam are classified TOP SECRET LIMDIS, while military clandestine agent intelligence collection operations against Communist and Neutral Countries are normally classified SECRET LIMDIS.

(b) "RECOMMENDATION: MACSOG conduct a continuous review of its classification requirements for each program with a view toward downgrading where possible to achieve a proper balance between operational efficiency and security in addition to reducing the administrative workload and cost.

(5) "PROBLEM: Integrating J2 MACV and MACSOG post-hostilities planning.

(a) "DISCUSSION: During discussions within the Staff of the J2 MACV Directorate of Combat Intelligence, it was learned that the post-hostilities planning for intelligence collection was not inclusive of MACSOG.

(b) "RECOMMENDATION: That the J2 MACV post-hostilities planning include integration with MACSOG post-hostilities planning.

(6) "PROBLEM. Continuing requirement for an 'in-depth' review and analysis of the intelligence aspect of MACSOG and for providing assistance to MACSOG in implementing the foregoing recommendations.

(a) "DISCUSSION: Approximately five days was allotted for the on-site phase of the MACSOG survey. This was not sufficient time to accomplish an in-depth review and analysis of all facets of MACSOG's intelligence involvements. The survey team is satisfied that those findings and recommendations rendered are valid in those areas where time and circumstance permitted. However, due to the shortage of time and the scope of MACSOG's intelligence involvement, several fundamental and significant areas were not addressed. These include Intelligence Information Report (IIR's) dissemination, counterpart intelligence support and collection activity, coordination and relationships with other in-country intelligence collection organizations, MACSOG's organizational structure and possible re-direction of the intelligence effort. For example, several Army and Navy activities advised the team that they were not receiving MACSOG's IIR's. This will require a complete IIR trace or audit to determine IIR dissemination and to learn where the IIR's are diverted, if indeed they are. Only after this audit could appropriate corrective action be taken. At present, MACSOG personnel are working 12 or more hours seven days per week. The amount of time required to accomplish existing functions will make it extremely difficult for them to plan for and implement the survey team's recommendations.

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(b) "RECOMMENDATIONS

1. "That an intelligence assistance team be formed for the purpose of continuing the in-depth review and analysis of the MACSOG intelligence structure.

2. "That if believed necessary and if requested by J2 MACV, the team include representatives from the National level and CINCPAC.

3. "That the team be placed on TDY to MACSOG for a 30 to 60 day period for the purpose of identifying problem areas and developing specific guidance to improve the intelligence functions and interrelationships.

4. "That the team membership include expertise in the fields of clandestine intelligence, counter-intelligence, prisoner of war interrogation, intelligence training, image interpretation, and IIR production and dissemination."*

2. (TS) Ad Hoc Evaluation Group. Subsequent to the Joint Survey Team Review of MACSOG, COMUSMACV formed an Ad Hoc Evaluation Group (AHEG) in December 1967, to examine the operations of SOG and to determine whether the results achieved were commensurate with the resources committed to its support. All MACSOG programs were analyzed by the AHEG. Following are comments and recommendations made by the AHEG concerning the intelligence aspects of these programs.

a. PLOWMAN Operations

(1) The intelligence reports derived from PLOWMAN operations provided the only human intelligence coming from the coastal areas of the coastal provinces of NVN.

(2) PLOWMAN spot intelligence reports were derived from debriefing the PTF crews following completion of missions. These reports contained information on what the crew observed, such as coastal batteries which fired on them, ship sightings and what the crew learned from interrogating fishing boat crewmen.

(3) IRRs were derived from the interrogation of prisoners at Paradise Island. These prisoners included those captured from fishing boats and during cross-beach operations in NVN.

* (TS) CINCPAC ltr serial 0001 of 2 January 1968, Subj: Report of Review of MACSOG Programs (C)

captured from fishing boats and during cross-beach operations

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(4) Review and analysis of the PLOWMAN intelligence product for the period October-December 1967 revealed that:

(a) PLOWMAN intelligence reports had been distributed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, ARPAC, and to the 7th Fleet.

(b) Information gathered from interrogation of fishermen was of considerable significance to the 7th Fleet and higher headquarters, and rarely was it of interest to MACV current intelligence. Further, a number of these interrogation reports responded to a request by CINCPAC concerning results of river mining along the coast of NVN.

(c) Reports by the PTF officer in tactical command on enemy reactions were of value to SOG mission planning and of strategic interest elsewhere.

(d) Seventy-seven IIRs were published concerning coastal defense, cave construction, economics, military training, hydrography, bomb damage assessment (BDA), air defense, radar, tunnel and road construction, military activities and dissident Catholic groups. The AHEG considered that this information was generally of strategic and planning value; however, the geographic coverage was restricted.

(e) Prisoner interrogation provided information on the layout of villages, and the identity of cadre and other village leaders.

(5) The AHEG also agreed with the Joint Survey Team that PLOWMAN operations had provided significant intelligence in the past through the detention of fishermen; however, better geographic coverage should be obtained. The AHEG also agreed that the collection of intelligence was a valid objective for PLOWMAN.

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b. TIMBERWORK

(1) Concerning the long-term TIMBERWORK agent teams in NVN, the AHEG observed that:

(a) The intelligence was collected by these teams from the local area in which the team operated or from subsources developed. If subsources were not developed by the teams, then the information reported was limited to visual reconnaissance only. The teams might remain in their safe areas or roam far afield, depending on the environment in which the teams had to survive.

(b) The reports received from the agent teams revealed no information of any great significance to MACV. The information appeared to the AHEG to be of greater value to agencies and activities responsible for collection of strategic intelligence, but this did not indicate that MACV had no requirement for strategic intelligence.

(c) Since the consensus of opinion was that most of the long-term teams had been compromised, the nature of the information produced by this program was highly questionable. Team ARES, who produced the most intelligence was assumed to be under enemy control. The product of ARES appeared to be a mix of insignificant facts mixed with propaganda. Only two of the teams, EASY and EAGLE, were given any degree of reliability, both being rated as "B" sources. The remaining teams were given reliability ratings of E and F.

(d) The AHEG concluded that the reliability of most intelligence produced by the long-term agent teams was questionable.

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c. PRAIRIE FIRE

(1) In evaluating the intelligence obtained as a result of PRAIRIE FIRE operations, the AHEG discussed the PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence product with MACV J2 personnel and field commands within the CTZ adjacent to the target area. Results of these discussions are briefed below.

(a) MACV J2

1. The current intelligence section of MACV J2 indicated that an estimated 80 percent of the intelligence obtained on the PRAIRIE FIRE area came from SOG sources. SOG produced information was primarily used to indicate or verify enemy activity. Although MACV J2 could not place a specific value on the information gained, since it formed many pieces of a larger picture, it was the only source available, and, therefore, had to be considered of high value.

2. In reviewing intelligence produced by PRAIRIE FIRE during the period October-December 1967, it appeared to the AHEG that MACV J2's intelligence interests were served only secondarily by the PRAIRIE FIRE effort. The primary use of this intelligence was used to provide targets for SOG from which effective Seek, Locate, Annihilate, and Monitor (SLAM) operations were developed

(b) III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). Intelligence provided the III MAF by PRAIRIE FIRE operations consisted of spot and after action reports citing contacts, installations, defenses, enemy activity, description of the enemy, description of trails and lines of communication (LOC), isolated vehicle movements, and the location of enemy sensitive areas. Representatives from the III MAF

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indicated that they had kept abreast of the tenor of activity across the Laotian border largely through the MACSOG effort, and that reduced SOG operations there would undoubtedly cause some void in the collection capability with a possible serious threat to the ICTZ.

(c) I Field Force Vietnam (I FFV). The I FFV indicated that the intelligence gained from MACSOG operations contributed, in a general way, to tactical operations. Of all the collection agencies operating out of country, I FFV representatives felt that MACSOG provided the only reliable intelligence which could be correlated with other intelligence available to them. Further, MACSOG was the only source which provided accurate information on enemy installations and detailed descriptions of terrain. A decrease in this source of intelligence would, correspondingly, reduce the quantity of "hard" intelligence provided I FFV on enemy activities in Laos and Cambodia adjacent to II CTZ.

(d) 4th Infantry Division. A unique relationship existed between MACSOG and the 4th Infantry Division because of the Division's tactical area which extended along a large portion of the Cambodian and Laotian boundaries. MACSOG had direct dealings with the 4th Division on matters relating to SOG operations from the 4th Division area of operations. Generally, the SOG output was considered to be valuable to the Division in the conduct of their operations.*

(2) Not withstanding the observations made above, the AHEG, in reviewing the results obtained versus the cost of PRAIRIE FIRE, deduced that:

*(TS) COMUSMACV J-3 ltr serial 0001187-68 of 14 Feb 1968, Subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation Group

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(a) "While intelligence gathered by PRAIRIE FIRE operations has been useful for many purposes, it appears that more useful intelligence for the Field Forces and for MACV could be gained without detriment to the effectiveness of PRAIRIE FIRE interdiction efforts. Results obtained in the provision of intelligence generally have not been of great significance to MACV components. MACSOG collection generally is not viewed by Field Forces as being sufficiently responsive to their need, particularly in view of resources provided for support. According to 7AF, SOG produced intelligence has been of minor value to 7AF development of tactical air and ARC LIGHT targets. With the exception of PRAIRIE FIRE location of a truck repair facility in the southeast sector which resulted in an ARC LIGHT, and the provision of initial information of the Santa Fe trail net, information has been limited to minor troop concentrations, trail nets, and storage facilities. It appears, however, that the PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence contribution to ARC LIGHT targeting is greater than indicated by 7AF representatives.

(b) "The PRAIRIE FIRE area in LAOS is a part of the CTZ's tactical battle area from which the field forces are excluded because of the international boundary. Field forces need current, responsible, ground-gained intelligence from LAOS. The prime means to accomplish this is through MACSOG. PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence gathering appears to be oriented insufficiently toward gaining priority information for J2 and the Field Forces. The operations need to be oriented more toward meeting MACV components' needs if the resources expended are to be considered well spent.

(c) "The operation is expensive in terms of scarce resources; however, the value of the results obtained is not subject to a cost-effectiveness analysis in terms that would be meaningful. Since the effort is expensive but necessary, means must be identified to gain the greatest possible results from the investment. On balance, it appears that PRAIRIE FIRE has achieved effective results for the assets committed but that greater results could be obtained with the same resources through better coordination of MACV and component intelligence requirements in LAOS with PRAIRIE FIRE interdiction requirements." *

(3) Based on consideration of the information obtained, the AHEG arrived at the following conclusions concerning the intelligence collecting aspects of PRAIRIE FIRE.

(a) "PRAIRIE FIRE assets presently provide the only ground reconnaissance and combat capability for use in LAOS by MACV and that such a capability is required to gain intelligence and assist in countering enemy infiltration into SVN....

(b) "In the area of PRAIRIE FIRE operations, liaison and coordination between MACSOG elements, and other elements of MACV have not been adequate to permit MACV to gain the most from PRAIRIE FIRE capabilities or from the resources provided. This has resulted

* (TS) COMUSMACV J-3 ltr serial 0001187-68 of 14 Feb 1968, Subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation Group

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mainly from insufficient numbers of commander and staff members being aware of PRAIRIE FIRE capabilities; the lack of a specific well-defined arrangement, whereby, MACV J2 and the Field Forces can task the PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence capability, and the lack of a specific well-defined arrangement whereby intelligence can be responsively passed to the Field Forces, and continuous liaison and coordination of operations between Field Forces and MACSOG be assured."*

(4) The AHEG recommended that specific terms of reference be established providing for intelligence tasking of MACSOG by MACV J2 and Field Forces and other MACV components through MACV J2.

d. DANIEL BOONE (SALEM HOUSE)

(1) In analyzing DANIEL BOONE operations, the AHEG noted that the primary mission of DANIEL BOONE operations was to conduct a reconnaissance of areas in Cambodia to verify suspected enemy locations, infiltration routes and bases of supply. Thus, the AHEG reasoned, the mission was one of gathering intelligence and the principal measure of results obtained by the operation was in the amount, quality, and applicability of information provided. Further, the location of the DANIEL BOONE area of operations, adjacent to the CTZs in RVN, made the gathering of information relative to operations within RVN of the greatest significance to the Field Forces and to MACV J2. The AHEG also conceded that the value of this information to levels of command above MACV could not be disregarded either.*

(2) In analyzing DANIEL BOONE operations, the AHEG reported the following:

(a) "Intelligence Gained.

1. DB operations have been underway for a period somewhat in excess of six months. During the period 1 June - 31 December 1967, there were

* (TS) COMUSMACV J-3 ltr serial 0001187-68 of 14 Feb 1968, subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation Group

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155 DB Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) submitted. Beginning in September 1967, two IIR's were submitted on each DB mission, one report on terrain and one report on enemy activity in the target area. Nineteen spot reports on matters considered to be of immediate interest to the Field Commanders were also provided during the six month period.

2. "During the six month period the following was reported.

a. "Locations of 151 possible infiltration routes and trails.

b. "Seventy-six enemy troop sightings, mostly small units, that indicated the use of CAMBODIA by VC/NVA forces.

c. "Ninety-nine active or inactive bivouac areas and way station locations.

d. "Low quality photographs of limited utility taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage areas, enemy fortifications, and terrain.

3. "A further review and analysis of the DB intelligence product for the period of October - December 1967 reveals:

a. "Forty-nine targets were reconnoitered, several of them more than once. Twenty-seven of the 49 were in the extreme northern Area 1, seven were in Area 2, nine were in Area 3, and one was in the extreme southern Area 6. Each mission produced at least one terrain IIR and one enemy activity IIR. Approximately 30% of the terrain IIR's were evaluated by DIA. Almost without exception, these reports were evaluated as 'moderate usability, probably true reliability,' The limitation on the terrain intelligence evaluation was that the area covered was too small.

4. " I FFORCEV had the following comments on the usefulness of DB intelligence and on intelligence relationships:

a. "SOG has provided general information on enemy activities in CAMBODIA. Although the information has been of little value to current operations, it along with other sources, provides a valuable data base for contingency planning.

b. "I FFORCEV receives all final mission reports on DB missions in areas adjacent to the II CTZ seven to ten days after the fact. On occasion, SOG provides a spot report on significant information obtained by a reconnaissance team. IFFV also receives the sterilized DB reports (Confidential version) two to three weeks after the fact.

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c. "DB information was of value to IFFV in formulating operation plan EDDY (Tri-border Area). SOG scheduled almost continuous reconnaissance of significant targets in this area during December 1967. Coordination was handled on a direct basis with SOG by secure telephone and backchannel message.

d. "Some debriefings of DB teams are attended by G2, 4th Inf Div representatives and information is passed to IFFV.

e. "DB provides the bulk of 'hard' intelligence provided IFFV on enemy activities and installations in CAMBODIA adjacent to II CTZ.

f. "IFFV would like to see greater emphasis placed on capturing prisoners, documents and material, or other means which will assist in identification of enemy units, plans, and capabilities.

g. "IFFV would like to have an arrangement whereby they could task DB for specific priority intelligence and believes some liaison arrangement from SOG to IFFV is desirable for better coordination.

5. "IIFFV had the following comments on usefulness of DB intelligence and on intelligence relationships.

a. "The provision of DB intelligence to IIFFV has been very limited. The principal gain from DB resources was obtained by IIFFV when in-country (BU GIA MOP) patrols were conducted specifically for IIFFV during the January 1968 stand down of DB operations in CAMBODIA. This one activity was highly beneficial to IIFFV operations.

b. "There is little or no staff coordination between MACSOG and IIFFV as regards DB, except for SOG requests for AO's for launching cross-border operations frim III CTZ. There are no formal arrangements for intelligence read-outs of DB reconnaissance to IIFFV or its units.

c. "IIFFV G2 indicated he had an urgent need for intelligence in Cambodia opposite III CTZ in several areas but was not certain as to how he would go about asking SOG to help him get it.

d. "There was a general concensus in IIFFV staff that it would be highly desirable for IIFFV to have an arrangement for tasking DB for specific priority intelligence missions in CAMBODIA, that immediate team debriefs should be provided IIFFV, and for SOG to maintain liaison with IIFFV or vice versa.

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6. "SA IV CTZ representatives indicated the following on DB:

a. "They are aware of no intelligence received from DB sources.

b. "To date, there have been no DB operations from IV CTZ. The results of SOG missions with the Riverine Force have not been made available to SA IV CTZ.

c. "It was considered desirable by IV CTZ representatives that DB operations conducted from IV CTZ be responsive to their intelligence requirements, but in a secondary role to those tasked by MACV.

7. "From a qualitative analysis viewpoint, DB reports have been of some value to DIA (and to MACSOG for mission planning). They appear on the whole; however, to have been of very little significance to MACV J2 or to Field Force Commanders. It appears that DB has the potential to be of greater value to in-country forces, but improvement along these lines is a function of targeting by MACV for specific EEI. MACV's 'NANTUCKET' plan provides many collection agencies including MACSOG, with a list of broadly stated tasks for intelligence needs from CAMBODIA. Specific and current requirements within that framework are required to focus DB operations on J2 interests."*

(3) Concerning the intelligence collecting aspects of DANIEL BOONE, the AHEG concluded that:

(a) "Under the present restrictions, DB assets provide the only ground reconnaissance capability for use in CAMBODIA by MACV, and that the full potential of this capability should be exploited.

(b) "Although intelligence collection is the sole mission of the DB operations, intelligence results to date have been generally fragmentary and low-level and have not been particularly useful to the adjacent Field Force commanders or to MACV J2.

(c) "Liaison and coordination between MACSOG elements and other elements of MACV have not been adequate to insure that the full potential of DB capabilities is realized. The three principal causes are: lack of a specific, well-defined arrangement whereby MACV J2 and the Field Forces can task DB for priority intelligence required; lack of a specific well-defined arrangement whereby intelligence can be passed responsively to the Field Forces, and continuous liaison and coordination of operations be assured between Field Forces and MACSOG; and by an inadequate number of commanders and their staffs being aware of DB capabilities."

* (TS) COMUSMACV J-3 ltr serial 0001187-68 of 14 February 1968, Subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation Group

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(4) The evaluation group noted that certain recommendations made by them concerning PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence applied equally to the DANIEL BOONE operation. In addition, they recommended that

(a) "Measures be taken to direct DB operations to ard targets that will provide intelligence of greater use to MACV J2 and the Field Forces in areas of RVN adjacent to the DB area of operations.

(b) "Liaison and coordination between MACSOG and its subordinate elements and other elements of MACV be improved to include specific terms of reference for tasking of DB capabilities by MACV J2 and by Field Forces; the immediate passing of information from team debriefings to MACV elements concerned, and that increased numbers of personnel be cleared for access to DB information."

(5) While the AHEG reviewed the intelligence considerations peculiar to each major MACSOG project in detail, the group also addressed SOG intelligence matters across-the-board in a separate section of their report. This comprehensive review, which includes comments on intelligence-related problems outlined in the CINCPAC report, is reproduced as Tab 1 to this Appendix.*

* (TS) COMUSMACV J-3 ltr serial 0001187-68 of 14 February 1968, Subj: Ad Hoc Evaluation Group

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PART VI. 1968 HISTORY

A. (TS) ORGANIZATION

1. (TS) Because of increased targeting operations and expansion of operational activities in 1968, a reorganization of the Intelligence Division was accomplished. This reorganization is depicted in Figure I-2. At the close of 1968, the Division was organized into four branches and had an authorized allowance of 35 personnel. The four branches were organized as follows:

a. Operations Branch. The Operations Branch was composed of five sections.

(1) Laos Study Section. (Handled all intelligence matters involving PRAIRIE FIRE operations.)

(2) Cambodian Study Section. (Dealt with all DANIEL BOONE intelligence matters.)

(3) Vietnamese Study Section. (Divided into two sub-sections, one for all matters related to the MACSOG agent program and the other for maritime operations.)

(4) Air/Antiair Study Section. (Maintained air intelligence information for NVN, Laos and Cambodia.)

(5) Exploitation Section. (Responsible for exploitation of prisoners/detainees obtained from MACSOG operations.)

b. Photo Analysis Branch. This branch was composed of two sections. The Imagery Interpretation Section provided photo intelligence reports on MACSOG targets, and the Photo Lab Section provided film processing facilities in support of the MACSOG "hand-held photography" program.

c. Security Branch. The Security Branch advised the Chief, Intelligence Division on matters of security and prepared the necessary directives.


d. Administrative Branch. This branch provided administrative support to the Intelligence Division.*

* (TS) Annex F to 1968 COMUSMACV Command History

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FIGURE I-2 (TS)

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION- MACV SOG (U)



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E. (TS) MACSOG - CIA INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIP

1. (TS) A problem area reported on by the CINCPAC Joint Survey Team during their review of MACSOG programs in 1967 related to the apparent lack of an intelligence interface between MACV J2 and MACSOG. Development of appropriate terms of reference were recommended to alleviate this situation. Consequently, in May 1968, a memorandum agreement was drawn up by MACV J2 and MACSOG which set forth policy and prescribed responsibilities for coordination between these two MACV staff organizations on intelligence matters. Tab 2 contains a reproduction of this agreement.

2. (TS) A further definition of the J2-SOG relationship was set forth in a memorandum to MACSOG by MACV in December 1968. The pertinent sections of this memorandum are quoted as follows.

> a. "The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence will coordinate intelligence requirements from all sources, consolidate them into a single J-2 priority list and pass to Chief, MACSOG for execution. The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-2 will assign monthly intelligence targets and priorities for this headquarters, to include field and CAS requirements. He will maintain cognizance of tasking accomplishment through weekly target conferences and adjust priorities as required. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence will provide MACSOG with substantive intelligence support and evaluate intelligence information derived from operations.
>
> b. "Chief, MACSOG will advise J-2 of major changes in his capabilities to execute collection operations and will give total priority to the J-2 target list in the intelligence aspects of MACSOG operations. Based on J-2 priorities and the capabilities and status of MACSOG Teams/Agents and supporting assets, Chief, MACSOG will determine final target selection and schedule. MACSOG will present for J-2 information a weekly up-date of programmed SOG collection activities for the coming week. MACSOG coordination with either MACV Staff elements on the operational aspects of MACSOG Programs will continue as required."*

* (S) Chief of Staff-MACV Memorandum of 20 December 1968, Subj: MACSOG-MACV J2 Relationships

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C. (TS) INTELLIGENCE TARGETING PANEL

1. (TS) In October 1968, a new targeting system for MACSOG was initiated. Through the promulgation of standard operating procedures Targeting Panels were established for the DANIEL BOONE, PRAIRIE FIRE, TIMBERWORK, Short-Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) and PLOWMAN programs. This new concept enabled the Intelligence Division to maintain continuing coordination and agreement among all concerned elements of MACSOG and COMUSMACV on identification, selection, and assigned priority of intelligence targets for MACSOG missions.

2. (TS) The panels considered all available intelligence and operational information concerning their respective programs in order to:

a. Recommend specific targets which would have a high probability of producing significant results.

b. Recommend the relative order of target priority based on intelligence collection requirements.

3. (TS) So that operations could be correlated with the overall intelligence collection requirements, the panels gave priority consideration to the tasking from MACV J2 and appropriate Field Force commanders. Tabs 3, 4, 5 and 6/ hereto contain the targeting panel standard operating procedures for MACSOG's major intelligence collecting programs.*

D. (TS) INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

During 1968, the intelligence produced from MACSOG operations increased significantly over that of 1967. Following is a summation of this production and significant activities:

1. (TS) A total of 410 IIRs were submitted on enemy activity and terrain in the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations. Successful ARC LIGHT targeting and bomb damage assessment (BDA) were accomplished as a result of PRAIRIE FIRE intelligence contributions and operations.

* (S) Chief, MACSOG Intelligence Division DF of 13 October 1968, Subj: MACSOG Tasking and Targeting, Concept and SOP

(S) Chief, MACSOG Intelligence Division DF of 13 October 1968,

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2. (TS) During the calendar year 418 IIRs were written on enemy activity and terrain as the result of DANIEL BOONE operations. Through Project VESUVIUS, information on NVA/VC trails, road networks, supply areas, and military buildups in Cambodia were forwarded to the Cambodian Government.

3. (TS) Based on the interrogation of detainees and PLOWMAN mission intelligence, 153 spot reports and 199 IIRs were submitted. These reports included information on aerial mining, effects of air strikes, NVN reaction to bombing restrictions and peace negotiations, order of battle, engagements with steel-bottomed armed junks, and effects of naval gunfire.

4. (TS) The Photo Analysis Section produced 1,050 target studies in support of MACSOG operations during 1968. A new photo-map was devised with photo-interpretation annotations for use by cross-border team leaders.

5. (TS) Spot reports concerning TIMBERWORK agent teams activities were discontinued in July 1968, when it became apparent to CAS and MACV J-2 that these teams had been compromised.*

6. (TS) In addition to information obtained from team leaders, intelligence was produced from ground photography, captured documents and material, prisoners of war, and wire taps.

* (TS) Annex F to 1968 COMUSMACV Command History

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PART VII. 1969 HISTORY

A. (TS) INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES

As the result of staff meetings and published directives, the working relationship between MACV J2 and MACSOG in matters relating to intelligence collection were clarified in late 1968. This relationship, and, more specifically, the intelligence gathering procedures, initiated in 1968, were defined in 1969 as follows:

1. (TS) By the means of a tasking message, collection requirements from the Field Force commanders were received by COMUSMACV on a monthly basis. The Director of Intelligence Production (DIP), at COMUSMACV, reviewed these requirements along with other J2 requirements and incorporated them into a consoldiated target list for the coming month.* The other J2 requirements included:

a. Targeting EEI listed in the BLACKBEARD Collection Plan for Cambodia.

b. Targeting EEI listed in the BENT AXLE Collection Plan for Laos.

c. Special requirements as necessary.**

2. (TS) The consolidated target list was then forwarded, via the Director of Intelligence Collection (DIC), to Chief, MACSOG for operational planning and execution.

3. (TS) When received by MACSOG, the target list was reviewed by a Joint Panel of representatives from DIP, DIC, and MACSOG intelligence and operations divisions. This panel finalized the priorities target list.* When finalized Chief, MACSOG advised J-2 of major changes in his capabilities to execute the collection operations.***

* (TS) MACVJ212-2 Fact Sheet of 18 July 1968, Subj: MACSOG Collection Tasking
** (TS) MACSOG Intelligence Procedures Briefing dated 19 March 1969
*** (S) Chief of Staff-MACV Memorandum of 20 December 1968, Subj: MACSOG-MACVJ2 Relationships

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4. (TS) Follow up action on the monthly targeting list was taken by the Weekly Target Panels. (Tabs 3 through 6 contain the standard operating procedures for these panels.) Membership in these panels was essentially the same as for the Joint Panel except that they were split by the PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE areas of operation. The Weekly Target Panels regularly reviewed the targeting status for the current month, and updated, confirmed, rescheduled or revised the targets for the subsequent week's operations. The weekly targets were then presented to Chief, SOG.* Based on the J2 priorities and the capabilities and status of MACSOG Teams/Agents and supporting assets, Chief, MACSOG determined the final target selection and schedule. Finally, MACV J2 was provided a weekly update of programmed collection activities for the coming week.**

5. (TS) Upon nomination of a target, MACSOG intelligence reviewed their photo reconnaissance holdings of the target area. If the coverage of the area was less than 90 days old, and of good quality, it was considered to be still usable. However, if the coverage was over 90 days old, or of poor quality, or if special circumstances surrounded the proposed operations, special photo reconnaissance of the area was requested. The results of this effort was a photo-map with highly detailed annotations of everything seen in the photo imagery of the target area, together with a detailed narrative description of the target area. The map itself was sanitized in order to be used during the operation.

6. (TS) For each mission, the intelligence gathering requirements were defined and broken down into a specific EEI for the target concerned. Some requirements were recognizable as

* (TS) MACSOG Intelligence Procedures Briefing dated 19 March 1969

** (S) Chief of Staff-MACV Memorandum of 20 December 1968, Subj MACSOG-MACJ2 Relationships

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common to many missions and were issued as a standing EEI or interrogators/debriefers guide. Other requirements were peculiar to the target and were, therefore, separately included in the mission frag order, or specifically levied in accordance with the dictates of the circumstance.

7. (TS) In addition to targeting and issuing EEI, MACSOG provided, within the limit of their capabilities, the best possible collection and operational guidance for their teams. Upon request, MACSOG received in-depth intelligence support from subordinate elements of MACV J2. These elements included the current Intelligence and Indications Branch, the Air Reconnaissance Section, the Strategic Research and Analysis Division, the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, the Combined Document Exploitation Center, and the Combined Military Interrogation Center.

8. (TS) The final result of the intelligence research, was either a complete package of a new target, or updated material on target areas previously exploited. The target dossiers were maintained at the command and control (C&C)/detachments for use in pre-mission briefings of teams.*

9. (TS) In the area of intelligence reporting, teams in the field radioed back to their command and control center information deemed of such significance to be reported immediately. In turn, this information was transmitted electronically, and on a priority basis, to SOG Headquarters. The Current Intelligence Branch of MACV J2 was then made aware of this intelligence by use of a secure telephone circuit. Concurrently, if the information was of immediate field significance, the C&C detachments transmitted a spot report directly to the local field commander.

* (TS) MACSOG Intelligence Procedures Briefing dated 19 March 1969

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10. (TS) When the teams returned from their mission, they were immediately debriefed, and an advance intelligence report was sent to Chief, MACSOG. Following this, a detailed After Action Report was written. To permit direct dissemination of intelligence to the local field force commander, a Field Intelligence Report was developed from the After Action Report.

11. (TS) When received by SOG Intelligence, the intelligence content of the After Action Reports were built into two IIRs. One of these dealt with target area military activity and the other provided terrain intelligence. The Intelligence Information Reports were then distributed to the intelligence community. They were not superficially identifiable with MACSOG; however, their report numbers were coded to the originator, in this case - MACSOG. In addition, the source was, in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, "a friendly guerrilla unit," and in the case of DANIEL BOONE, "a controlled source."

12. (TS) In addition to the above reporting procedures, Chief, MACSOG provided COMUSMACV and MACV J2 a weekly update briefing on SOG activities.*

13. (TS) Intelligence information received from SOG by MACV J2 was first coordinated by direct liaison with other interested staff elements within DIP. The information was then consolidated with other intelligence and analyzed by various current intelligence desks before incorporation into an intelligence product. The intelligence product then took the form of a Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update, a Daily Intelligence Summary, and various intelligence fact sheets.*

B. (TS) COMPUTER DATA BASE

1. (TS) A MACV-SOG Computer-Retrievable Data Base was designed in 1967-1968 to facilitate rapid retrieval and correlation of selected data which was of recurring interest to higher headquarters, targeters, and mission planners. The file was limited (as of May 1969) to operational and intelligence information on the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE programs.

operational and intelligence information on the PRAIRIE FIRE

* (TS) MACSOG Intelligence Procedures Briefing dated 19 March 1969

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2. (TS) Information in the data base was arranged in eight "sets." These sets are described in general terms in Tab 7 hereto. The Sets A through D incorporated all SOG-generated individual inputs to the file. The reamining sets were bulk-input SOG material from previously automated files and material from outside-source inputs.*

C. (TS) PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE EVALUATION

1. (TS) As the result of increased helicopter and personnel losses sustained beginning in October 1968, COMUSMACV, in January 1969, directed that the PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE operations be examined to determine the value of SOG out-of-country operations to the MACV mission in relation to the increased losses sustained, the reaons for the increased losses, and the forces required for mission accomplishment. In relation to these operations, the following specific actions were asked by COMUSMACV:

a. "Has the environment or targeting changed?"

b. "Determine if the environment is getting too severe for the kind of forces being used."

c. "What is the value obtained from MACSOG operations?"

d. "What force is required to accomplish the required missions?"

2. (TS) MACV J2, in coordination with MACV J3 and MACSOG, evaluated SOG operations for calendar year 1968. Specific emphasis was placed on a mission-by-mission analysis of PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE operations conducted during the fourth quarter of that year. This period was selected since it provided for complete documentation during a period incurring possible increased losses.

* (TS) MACSOG Electronic Data Processing Instruction Manual of 31 May 1969

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3. (TS) As a result of the study findings, MACV J2 examined the 1 January - 28 February 1969 period to determine if there had been any significant changes in either the cost or results of these operations. The review indicated that the ratio of friendly to enemy losses had remained relatively constant, and the intelligence collection product had improved, however, the intelligence derived was still of marginal value.

4. (TS) Conclusions and recommendations emanating from the study were as follows:

"a. CONCLUSIONS:

"(1) That the operating environment has changed in both the DANIEL BOONE and PRAIRIE FIRE AO's, becoming more hostile as a result of increased enemy activities within Laos and Cambodia.

"(2) That, although the operating environment has increased in severity, the degree of change does not warrant increasing forces or curtailing currently authorized missions.

"(3) That targeting was more definitive during the study period, resulting in increased missions in priority areas of known enemy activities and predictable enemy density.

"(4) That MACSOG out-country intelligence and operational missions resulted in the following losses:

"(a) United States - 11 KIA, 68 WIA, 4 MIA and 7 helicopters

"(b) South Vietnamese - 23 KIA, 113 WIA, 7 MIA and 3 helicopters

"(5) That the cost to the enemy was an estimated 1400 casualties, 13 trucks, 455 secondary exploisions, 100 sustained fires and considerable war-making materiel.

"(6) That the appreciable enemy losses, when compared to U.S. KIA's, reflect a significant economy of applied U.S. force.

"(7) That while the study indicates that MACSOG's intelligence contribution, when related to the total collection spectrum, has not been significant, it is the only MACV ground asset authorized to conduct surface collection missions in most of the DANIEL BOONE areas.

"b. RECOMMENDATIONS:

"(1) That MACSOG operational missions within the PRAIRIE FIRE AO continue at the present level with available forces.

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"(2) That J2/ -3000 determine if more effective means of collecting intelligence, such as PW snatches, alternatives to daylight insertions and employment of sophisticated equipment, can be devised which will be of value and responsive to J2 requirements."

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TOP SECRET

TAB 1

AD HOC EVALUATION GROUP
MACSOG INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

1. (C) Intelligence considerations peculiar to each SOG Project are covered in the Project discussion. This Tab addresses intelligence matters across-the-board.

2. (S) SOG produces or has the potential to produce two categories of intelligence. It now produces limited strategic or data-base intelligence which is of value to SOG itself in operational planning and/or to higher headquarters. Of more immediate interest to MACV is the category of current or tactical intelligence.

3. (S) The group analysis of this second category tends to indicate that the output to date which has been of interest to MACV has been largely an incidental bonus-effect from operations conceived internally by SOG for other purposes. It appears that the SOG staff reviews MACV and other requirements in the mission planning process and includes them where they fit the mission. Even here, however, J2 has exerted little or no direct influence. Informal J2 efforts to coordinate on requirements have not been successful.

4. (TS) The mechanism for MACV J2 tasking of SOG is unclear. The annual intelligence collection plan (ICP) is provided to SOG. SOG has prepared a response to a 29 December 1967 J2 letter which requests SOG "take appropriate action within. . . capabilities against EEI/OIR contained in the plan" and asks for collection capabilities report (CCR) against ICP tasks. It is unclear at this time what subsequent action J2 will take on receipt of the CCR. In tasking by SICR, J2 provides information copies to SOG and where it is believed by J2 that SOG has a capability to collect against the requirement, a separate letter is sent direct to SOG with substantially the same language as was used in the case of the ICP. However, if the requirement is in an area outside the boundaries of SVN, the SICR must be validated by CINCPAC. When the monthly compendium of SICR's is published by MACV, the requiring authority is then shown as the validating "higher headquarters" even though the requirement is actually MACV's. Moreover, J2 staff officers can cite few instances of CCR response by SOG. Thus there seems to have arisen a belief that SOG cross-border operations are in response to

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CINCPAC requirements. This seems to have had an inhibiting influence on J2 illustrated by J2's solicitation of the Chief of Staff's signature on a request to SOG dated 5 January 1968 to gather information west of the I Corps boundary. When the fact of CINCPAC validation authority is coupled with operational approval authority held outside MACV Headquarters, it is not surprising that a body of opinion has arisen holding SOG as somehow separate and apart from MACV, not subject to direct tasking by J2.

5. (TS) It is imperative that the full intelligence potential of SOG be applied in the overall MACV interest, most importantly in DANIEL BOONE, PRAIRIE FIRE, and STRATA. This dictates some reorientation of the mission of PRAIRIE FIRE coupled with clear authority for coordination of SOG intelligence collection efforts by J2. What is required is essentially J2 MACV direction of SOG tactical intelligence collection, perhaps optimally effected by a detailed collection program tailored to SOG's collection capabilities and coordinated by J2 with the rest of the collection effort. This issue has not been pressed by J2 since the SOG product to date has not been judged by them to be significant. While overriding considerations may continue to require approval outside COMUSMACV's authority of some SOG operations, the fundamental purposes of SOG intelligence collection operations must still be enunciated by MACV J2.

6. (TS) The CINCPAC Study discussed the problem of interface between MACV J2 and SOG, citing lack of a clearly defined operational relationship. It recommended development of appropriate terms of reference between MACV J2 and MACSOG to provide for: Definition of policies, procedures and responsibilities for intelligence targeting, collection requirement tasking, reporting, dissemination and evaluation of Intelligence Information Reports (DD Form 1396) and intelligence collection operations in order to achieve adequate intelligence support of COMUSMACV. As an example, provision should be made for dissemination of PLOWMAN (C) PW Knowledgeability Briefs to the appropriate offices within J2 MACV, CINCPAC and DIA to elicit SICR submissions.

7. (TS) This group concurs in the CINCPAC recommendation and in addition recommends that.

Appendix I

a. A program be established to prepare specific collection plans based on MACSOG's Collection Capability Report (CCR) responding to MACV J2's annual Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP).

b. A system of monthly review of the guidance and plan be established to mesh with MACSOG's operational planning cycle, this to insure sharp focus on MACV needs on a regular basis.

c. Evaluation reports be provided by MACV J2 on all MACSOG intelligence reports of whatever form.

d. MACSOG routinely respond to MACV SICR's with a modified CCR, omitting assets contemplated for use in fulfilling the requirement.

e. COMUSMACV seek a change in policy to acquire validation authority for intelligence collection requirements within DANIEL BOONE and PRAIRIE FIRE areas.

8. (TS) The CINCPAC report outlined intelligence-related problem areas which lie outside the charter of this group. These included:

a. Improvement of SOG Intelligence Branch. CINCPAC concluded that the MACSOG JTD did not provide for a sufficient increase in intelligence personnel. It recommended that COMUSMACV take the following personnel action:

(1) Upgrade the Intelligence Branch Chief to O-6;

(2) Enlarge the Intelligence Operations Section,

(3) Enlarge tne Security Section;

(4) Establish an Intelligence Training Section;

(5) Maintain 100% manning of Photo Interpretation personnel;

(6) Other specific personnel actions as set forth in the CINCPAC study. It appears on superficial review that the SOG Intelligence Branch was structured to produce intelligence for internal consumption; i.e., mission planning. Not only has the complexity of that task increased manifold but a growing list of consumers of intelligence produced has placed this small branch heavily in the analysis and production

business. The branch seems clearly to be beyond its depth. This group concurs in the CINCPAC recommendations to include study of the feasibility of closer relations between the branch and J2 to permit J2 to assume a large share of the burden. Depending on the outcome of that study it is possible that the Branch Chief should remain an O-5.

b. Restructuring of the MACSOG Cover Apparatus. The CINCPAC study concluded that SOG cover was either broken or that an undesirable degree of attention had been focused on the organization. It recommended that the entire cover apparatus be restructured in conjunction with its move to MACV 1. That move is now complete without change in SOG cover. It is doubtful that changing SOG's name would remove it from suspicion.

(1) The CINCPAC report recommended integration of SOG into MACV J2 post-hostilities planning.

(2) MACV J2 post-hostilities planning to date has been inhibited by lack of requested CINCPAC guidance. It has thus far contemplated in-country stay-behind operations controlled externally and employing nets to be organized during hostilities by Air Force, Army and Navy effort coordinated by MACV J2. Detachment 6, 6499th SAF, USAF, the 525th MI Group and Naval Field Operations Support Group have the capacity for participation in this effort. USARPAC has proposed introduction of elements of the 500th MI Group to the same end.

(3) MACSOG-type post-hostilities operations would probably be under CIA control. However, planning and preparation for such operations must be undertaken before the end of hostilities. It should involve MACSOG, CIA, and MACV J2.

(4) This Group concurs in the CINCPAC recommendation.

c. Continuing Requirement for In-depth Review of Internal Intelligence Processing and Dissemination. The CINCPAC Report listed problem areas which required attention but were not addressed due to lack of time. These included IIR dissemination, counterpart intelligence support and collection activity, MACSOG's organizational structure, possible redirection of the intelligence effort and coordination and relationships with other in-country intelligence collection organizations. The latter two topics are addressed elsewhere in this report. The CINCPAC report recommended:

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(1) That an intelligence assistance team be formed for the purpose of continuing the in-depth review and analysis of the MACSOG intelligence structure.

(2) That if believed necessary and if requested by MACV J2, the team include representatives from the national and CINCPAC levels.

(3) That the team be placed on TDY to MACSOG for a 30 to 60 day period for the purpose of identifying problem areas and developing specific guidance to improve the intelligence functions and inter-relationships.

(4) That the team membership include expertise in the fields of clandestine intelligence, counterintelligence, prisoner of war interrogation, production and dissemination.

d. This group concurs in the CINCPAC recommendations with the stipulation that every effort be made to study and solve problems in the above areas by a locally formed team before requesting outside assistance.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJ212 10 May 1968

SUBJECT: Terms of Working/Coordinating Agreement (U)

MACSOG/J2 MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

1. (U) PURPOSE: This memorandum announces policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for coordination between MACJ2 and MACSOG.

2. (SNF) GENERAL: Inter-relationships between MACJ2 and MACSOG, including tasking for specific data/targets, have increased in importance and intensity requiring improved, coordinated operating procedures.

3. (SNF) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. MACV J2 (IOD) will:

(1) Act as a point of contact between MACSOG and MACJ2 for all matters concerning specific intelligence collection requirements and tasking procedures.

(2) Consolidate priority requirements received from Directorate of Intelligence Production for forwarding to MACSOG as specific tasking.

(3) Provide MACSOG with information copies of Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) and collection plans containing out-of-country requirements.

(4) Tabulate evaluations of MACSOG reports as received from Directorate of Intelligence Production and periodically advise MACSOG of results.

b. MACV J2 (Directorate of Intelligence Production) will:

(1) Furnish requirements (i.e., areas and EEIs) for MACSOG operations upon request from IOD. Requirements will be listed by priority.

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(2) Provide evaluations of IRs and spot reports resulting from MACSOG operations on request of ICD or MACSOG.

(3) Provide intelligence information from current holdings to MACSOG as requested.

c. MACSOG will:

(1) Furnish MACJ2 (IOD) with intentions concerning future operations as far in advance as practicable.

(2) Include MACJ2 (DIP) in the distribution of all intelligence/spot reports resulting from intelligence collection activities.

(3) Integrate specific requirements as received from MACJ2 (IOD) into appropriate operations.

(4) Incorporate the current MACV Intelligence Collection Plan for the Combined Campaign Plan (ICP - CCP), Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) and out-of-country collection plans into monthly targeting schedules.

(5) Provide intelligence information from current holdings to MACV J2 (DIP) as requested.

4. (S) PROCEDURES:

a. EEI for MACSOG operations:

(1) Each month a listing of priority areas/EEIs for MACSOG operations for the succeeding month will be forwarded to MACSOG to arrive not later than the 8th of each month.

(2) Priority requirements which develop during the month as identified by DIP will be immediately passed to MACSOG by DCI/IOD for integration into planned operations.

(3) MACSOG, after receipt of tasking will indicate to DCI/IOD their collection capability by Collectors Capability Report (CCR), omitting assets.

b. Information resulting from MACSOG operations

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SUBJECT Terms of Working/Coordinating Agreement (U)

(1) MACSOG will report results of intelligence collection activities and debriefings of teams to DIP (CIIB) in accordance with normal reporting procedures.

(2) DIP will evaluate selected MACSOG reports using DD Form 1480, Intelligence Evaluation Report and forward to DCI/ICD for tabulation.

c. Requests received from MACSOG for Intelligence.

(1) Routine. MACSOG will submit a written request to DIP for intelligence studies, estimates and similar products. DIP will task appropriate elements of CICV or CIIED. Responses will be coordinated between CICV and CIIED prior to submission to DIP for transmission to MACSOG.

(2) Urgent.

(a) MACSOG representatives will request intelligence support through the appropriate point of contact within DIP (See Para. 4f).

(b) The point of contact will maintain a record of the date information was provided, name of MACSOG contact, intelligence provided and the general purposes for which the intelligence is to be used. A copy of the contact record will be forwarded to the Operations Section DIP.

d. Requests made to MACSOG for intelligence:

(1) The point of contact within MACJ2 for levying all requirements for collection action on MACSOG will be DCI/ICD.

(2) Requests for routine information by CICV or CIIED will be submitted in writing to DIP for transmittal to MACSOG. Replies will return through same channel.

(3) Requests to/from MACSOG requiring personal contact will normally be cleared through points of contact within appropriate organizations (See Para. 4f).

3. When required by operational necessity, direct liaison and coordination between MACV J2 and MACSOG personnel is authorized. In all cases of personal contact between representatives of SOG and personnel of J2, where intelligence is received by either party informally rather than in written form through the chain of command, the SOG/J2 representatives will prepare a memorandum for record and forward it to their immediate supervisor, giving the details of the information received or transmitted.

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f. Points of Contact:

(1) MACV J2

(a) Director, Combat Intel

(b) Chief, Intel Op Div

(c) Chief, Field Activities Br

(d) Director, Intel Pdn

(e) Director, Combined Intel Center, Vietnam (CICV)

(f) Chief, Current Intel, Indications & Estimates Div (CIIED)

(2) MACSOG:

(a) Director, Op 35

(b) Chief, Intel Div

/s/

PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

/s/

JOHN K. SINGLAUB
Colonel, USA
Chief, SOG

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TAB 3

PLOWMAN (C) TARGETING PANEL SOP (S)

1. (S) PURPOSE: This SOP outlines the objectives of the PLOWMAN (C) targeting panel, provides guidance for its conduct and establishes the PANEL's composition.

2. (S) GENERAL:

a. The objective of the PANEL is to consider all collection, interdiction and psywar requirements commensurate with PLOWMAN (C) capabilities to insure effective tasking of available assets by:

(1) Recommending specific PLOWMAN (C) targets which have a reasonable probability of producing significant results.

(2) Recommending relative priority of targets.

b. The PANEL will maintain a standing list of recommended targets by priority to be updated with new targets and adjusted in priority at each meeting in response to emergent requirements and operational considerations.

3. (S) CONDUCT OF PANEL:

a. The PLOWMAN (C) Intelligence Desk Officer will chair the PANEL. In his absence, Deputy Chief, Intel will be chairman.

b. The targeting panel will meet on the first and third mondays each month at 1500 hours, and will convene in the PLOWMAN (C) Intel Office.

c. Special sessions will be held as necessary to consider emergent requirements and make spot recommendations to Chief, OP-31.

4. (S) PANEL COMPOSITION: The PANEL will have a representative from each of the following offices:

a. PLOWMAN (C) Intel Officer

b. OP-31

c. OP-33

d. SSO/SSG

e. PI

f. Recorder (PLOWMAN (C) Intel NCO)

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c. Representatives from additional offices/organizations or on an as desirable basis as sponsored by permanent members of the panel. (i.e. OP-3[illegible], CNO, NAVTORV, G-2.)

5. (S) ACTION/DIG: The target list, completed by the recorder, will be typed and delivered by Intelligence Division to Chief, OP-31 for his approval.

/s/

PETER BARBERIA, JR.
LTC, USAF
Chief, Intelligence Division

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TAB 4

TIDEWORK (C) & STRATA TARGETING PANEL SOP (S)

1. (S) PURPOSE: This SOP is designed to provide guidance and to delineate the responsibilities of the Strata Targeting Panel.

2. (S) GENERAL:

a. The objective of the panel is to consider all available intelligence and operational information to:

(1) Recommend specific STRATA Targets which have a high probability of producing significant intelligence results under the STRATA concept of operation.

(2) Recommend the relative order of target priority based on intelligence collection requirements.

b. In order to insure STRATA operations are correlated with the overall intelligence collection and interdiction efforts, the panel will give priority consideration to requests/tasking from J-2 MACV. However, the relative priority of targets will take into consideration those targets which will provide for the greatest survival potential and mission accomplishments.

3. (S) CONDUCT OF PANEL:

a. The NVN-A Intelligence Desk Officer will act as the chairman of the panel.

b. The targeting panel will meet at 0900 the second and fourth Thursday of each month. Meetings will be conducted as follows:

(1) The meeting held on the second Thursday will be for the purpose of targeting nominations and target priorities for the following month.

(2) The meeting held on the fourth Thursday will be for updating all targets which were selected for the monthly target list. This will include the changing of established priorities and the inclusion of new targets in accordance with any developed change in intelligence emphasis or operational considerations.

c. The targeting panel will hold special sessions at any time deemed necessary to consider important new information and make spot recommendations to Chief, OP-34.

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4. (U) PANEL COMPOSITION. The panel will be composed of representatives of the following offices/organizations.

a. Chief, CP-345

b. NVN-A Intelligence Desk Officer

c. NVN PI-CAS

d. Weather Officer

e. SSO/SSG Representative

f. Recorder-NVN-A Specialist

5. (U) ADMINISTRATION. Results of panel meeting will be published and disseminated to all members for information/action required by each officer.

FOR THE CHIEF INTELLIGENCE DIVISION:

/s/
RICHARD T. HENRY
Major, USMC
Deputy Chief, Intelligence Division

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TAB 5

DANIEL BOONE TARGETING SOP (S)

1. (S) PURPOSE. This SOP is designed to provide guidance in the conduct of and to delineate the responsibilities of the DANIEL BOONE Targeting Panel.

2. (S) GENERAL.

a. The objective of the panel is to consider all available intelligence and operational information in order to:

(1) Recommend specific DANIEL BOONE targets which have a high probability of producing significant results.

(2) Recommend the relative order to target priority based on Intelligence Collection requirements. Targets and priorities will be listed in refcrence to the FOB they will be run from.

b. In order to ensure that DANIEL BOONE operations are correlated with the overall intelligence collection requirements, the panel will give priority consideration to requests/tasking from IACVJ2, IITV, and IIIFV. However, the relative priority of targets will take into consideration those targets which will provide the greatest survival potential and mission accomplishment.

3. (S) CONDUCT OF PANEL:

a. The DANIEL BOONE Intel Desk Officer will act as the Chairman of the panel meetings. In his absence, the panel will be chaired by the Intel Operations Officer.

b. The Targeting Panel will meet weekly at 0900 hours on each Wednesday. This meeting will normally begin in the SSO/ESS Office and will then move to the DANIEL BOONE Intel Office. Each meeting will be conducted as follows

(1) Second week of each month - receipt of targeting nominations from the panel members and discussion of targets in order to produce an initial target schedule for the following month.

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(S) Subsequent [illegible] all targets [illegible] selected for the combat target list. This [illegible] the emphasis of established priorities and the inclusion of new targets in accordance with any developed change of intelligence objectives or operational considerations.

c. The Targeting Panel will hold special sessions at any time desired to consider new information and make spot recommendations to Director, OP-35.

4. (S) PANEL COMPOSITION. The panel will be composed of representatives of the following officer/organization.

a. DANIEL BOONE Intel Officer

b. DANIEL BOONE Operations Officer

c. SSO/SSG

d. Weather Officer (Monthly)

e. PI Officer or NCO

f. Recorder

g. MACJV2-CIIB

h. MACVJ2-SRA

5. (S) ADMINISTRATION: Results of the panel meetings will be published and disseminated to all members for information/action required by each representative.

/s/

PETER BARRETTA, JR.
LTC, USAF
Chief, Intelligence Division

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Tab 6

PRAIRIE FIRE TARGETING PANEL SOP (S)

1. (S) PURPOSE. This SOP is designed to provide guidance in the conduct of and to delineate the responsibilities of the PRAIRIE FIRE Targeting Panel and to define the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Panel.

2. (S) GENERAL:

a. The objective of the panel is to consider all available intelligence and operational information in order to.

(1) Recommend specific PRAIRIE FIRE targets which have a high probability of producing significant results.

(2) Recommend the relative order of priority of targets.

(3) Provide a basis for sound tactical planning.

b. In order to ensure that PRAIRIE FIRE operations are properly correlated with the overall intelligence collection and interdiction efforts, the panel will give priority consideration to mission requests from J-2 MACV, III MAF and IFFORCEV. The panel meeting held the second week of each month will set forth the subsequent months relative priority of targets which will take into consideration those targets which will provide for the greatest survival potential and mission accomplishment.

c. The panel is responsible for producing and regularly updating a recommended list of targets within MACSOG capabilities.

3. (S) CONDUCT OF PANEL:

a. The PRAIRIE FIRE Intel Desk Officer will act as the Chairman of the panel meetings. In his absence, the panel will be chaired by the Asst PRAIRIE FIRE Desk Officer or the Intel Operations Officer.

b. The Targeting Panel will meet weekly at 0900 hours on each Tuesday. This meeting will normally begin in the SSO/SSG Office and will then move to the PRAIRIE FIRE Intel Office. Each meeting will be conducted as follows.

(1) Second week of each month - receipt of targeting nominations from the panel members and discussion of targets in order to produce an initial target schedule for the following month.

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(2) Subsequent weekly meetings - updating of all targets that were selected for the monthly target list. This will include the changing of established priorities and the inclusion of new targets in accordance with any developed change of intelligence emphasis or operational considerations.

c. The Targeting Panel will hold special sessions at any time deemed necessary to consider important new information and make spot recommendations to Director, OP-35.

4. (S) PANEL COMPOSITION: The panel will be composed of representatives of the following offices/organizations (J-2 representation will be requested):

a. PRAIRIE FIRE Intel Officer

b. PRAIRIE FIRE Opns Officer

c. SSO/SSG

d. Weather Officer (monthly)

e. PI Officer or NCO

f. Recorder

g. Special members as arranged by the chairman.

5. (S) ADMINISTRATION:

The target list completed by the recorder will be typed and delivered to the Chairman of the Panel for subsequent delivery to the Director, OP-35 for his approval.

/s/

PETER BARRETTA, JR.
LTC, USAF
Chief, Intelligence Division

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TAB 7

CONTENTS OF FILE ( )

SET	DESCRIPTION	CONTENTS OF FILE
A	Operational History/Intelligence. Mission identification data on all complete PF/SH missions. Includes date, location, units, missions, insert/extract methods and cross reference to IIR file.	Complete Listing Selected Listing Overlay
B	Operational History/Intelligence. Enemy contact data on all contacts with enemy forces. Includes basic description of enemy unit(s) in contact, personnel casualties on both sides and friendly aircraft losses.	Complete Listing Selected Listing Overlay
C	Operational History. Equipment utilization (Primarily Mines and AIR/ARTY Support) plus selected tactical results other than personnel casualties.	Complete Listing Selected Listing Overlay
D	Intelligence. Includes items reported by PF/SH elements plus other sources such as SLAR, PI, CAS, etc. Effective for all inputs dated 1 Jun 69 or later. PF/SH reports held continuously. Other source reports held for 6 months only.	Complete Listing Selected Listing Overlay
E	Intelligence. Bulk addition of all source PF holdings dated 31 May 69 or earlier. PF reports held continuously. Other source reports held for 6 months only. Outside source holdings will be purged from this file O/A 1 Dec 69.	Complete Listing Selected Listing (By date/location only)
F	Intelligence. Same as Set E, substituting SH for PF.	Same as Set E
G	Intelligence. 7th Air Force holdings of interest to PF area of operation. Photo-readout for enemy installations plus AAA data. IR and FAC reports. Renewed monthly. Contains current month's holdings only.	Selected Listings Overlay

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[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	Intelligence. Tell War Plans to publish narrative of events during date. Include [illegible] ec c, [illegible] AF, Israel an. Dragonboat [illegible] Programs to predict past, present, or future status of secret emulsions.	(arly