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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

COMMAND HISTORY
1968
ANNEX F

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

7 MAR 1969

MACSOG

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Annex F, 1968 Command History (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Inclosed is Annex F (Special Operations) to the 1968 Command History.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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ANNEX F (SPECIAL OPERATIONS) to MACV 1968 COMMAND HISTORY

1. GENERAL.

a. This annex gives detailed information on activities of the Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG) during calendar year 1968. The various programs and activities are covered at length in appendices to this annex.

b. Calendar year 1968 was marked by increased requirements, improved procedures, development of new concepts, tighter controls and added restrictions on some programs and lifted restrictions on other activities of MACSOG. Programs against North Vietnam (NVN), the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) elements in Laos and Cambodia and support of Field Forces in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) continued and increased within parameters issued by higher headquarters.

c. Internal reorganization, new installations and facilities, improved techniques, and new equipment have enhanced the functioning of the many facets of MACSOG and aided greatly in mission accomplishment.

2. MISSION.

The Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group mission is stated as follows:

a. As directed by COMUSMACV and with concurrence of the US Embassy, MACSOG will advise, train and support counterpart forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare operations.

b. MACSOG will conduct unilateral planning for unconventional warfare activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be prepared when directed to activate and command the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Southeast Asia.

This mission statement is taken from COMUSMACV Msg TSLD 37284/ 210229Z Oct 65 and approved by CINCPAC Msg 182128Z Nov 65.

3. ORGANIZATION.

a. Headquarters MACSOG began 1968 operating under a Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) dated 30 October 1967. Authorized strength of the organization was 155 officers, 251 enlisted men and 10 civilian personnel for a total of 416. On 15 August 1968, the 44 spaces of 1st Flight Detachment were transferred from the MACSOG JTD to 7th Air

Force jurisdiction, and the Detachment was placed under MACSOG operational control. On 3 October 1968 MACV directed a reduction of 11 other positions which placed the end of year strength at 361: 125 officers, 226 enlisted men and 10 civilians.

b. Chief, MACSOG directed a reorganization of the headquarters in September into a more clearly defined line and staff organization. The organization of MACSOG through November is shown at TAB A. The reorganization took effect on 7 December and is shown at TAB B.

4. (U) COMMAND.

Colonel John K. Singlaub, 037040, USA, commanded MACSOG from 14 May 1966 until 3 August 1968. Colonel Singlaub was succeeded on that date by Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, Jr., 036485, USA.

5. (U) PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION (APPENDIX I).

Primary effort during CY 68 was to establish an administrative program for the headquarters which encompassed all-inclusive instructions for the entire spectrum of administrative functional areas. The program minimized training time of newly assigned administrative personnel, increased efficiency of paperwork management, and improved the quality of documents generated by this headquarters.

6. INTELLIGENCE (APPENDIX II).

Throughout 1968 requirements for intelligence support of MACSOG operations and dissemination of intelligence derived therefrom increased and varied markedly from requirements of past years. This presented a challenge to the Intelligence Division to increase output while simultaneously maintaining and improving the quality of its product. Through initiation of new concepts, development of new techniques and employment of new programs, the Intelligence Division not only increased production of intelligence but improved timeliness, substantive content and tactical utility of the product. In addition, improved targeting and collection techniques employed by MACSOG operational elements has insured a well-rounded intelligence collection and dissemination effort.

7. OPERATIONS: FOOTBOY (APPENDIX III).

a. Maritime Operations--PLOWMAN (Sec 1, App III).

(1) One hundred forty (140) PLOWMAN missions were completed in 1968 targeted against NVN for the purposes of maritime interdiction, prisoner capture and general disruption of NVN coastal areas. MINT

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8. CROSS-BORDER GROUND OPERATIONS (APPENDIX IV).

a. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) operations continued in Laos throughout 1968, although a large number of missions were conducted in SVN in support of the Field Forces. Total number of missions doubled over 1967, but cross-border missions increased by only 16%. The SLAM concept was continued in 1968, adding considerably to the overall results for the year. Search, Locate, Annihilate, Monitor (SLAM) is a concept where Recon Teams are employed to search for and locate the enemy. Platoons are then inserted for the annihilation. Finally, stay-behind teams monitor the area.

b. DANIEL BOONE (DB) operations continued throughout 1968. Some restrictions were lifted and assets increased which afforded a 100% increase in number of operations conducted. In response to tactical situations caused by the enemy's Tet Offensive, 57% of the DB effort was directed in SVN. In late September, DB forces reverted to their primary mission of cross-border operations with 95% of the overall program being directed into Cambodia. The DB effort revealed that the enemy has increased its presence in Cambodia sharply and is making increased use of Cambodian border area sanctuaries.

9. AIR OPERATIONS STUDIES (APPENDIX V).

a. The Air Operations Studies Branch (OP-32) coordinates responsive air support for MACSOG covert and clandestine combat operations in NVN, nicknamed MIDRIFF , and schedules airlift support for MACSOG activities within Southeast Asia. The branch also coordinates with 7AF on support for PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE operations.

b. MIDRIFF operations are covered in detail in Appendix III under FOOTBOY Operations.

c. PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE. Operations in Laos and Cambodia averaged over 49 missions per month in the combined areas of operation. This activity was supported by an average of 28 troopcarrier and 20 gunship helicopters per day throughout the year.

d. Airlift. During CY 68, OP-32 coordinated and scheduled the movement of 8,888,447 pounds of cargo, both classified and general, and 40,915 passengers. This was accomplished using 4,895 sorties and 6,384.5 flying hours from the four C-130 and four C-123 aircraft assigned to the Air Operations Group, Nha Trang AB, RVN, and the two aircraft contracted from China Air Lines.

10. LIAISON (APPENDIX VI).

Three Liaison Officer (LNO) assignments exist in MACSOG; one maintaining close and continuous contact between MACSOG and STD, and one each with I and II Field Forces, Vietnam. The two Field Force LNOs provide liaison between MACSOG, the Field Forces, Command and Control Centers, major tactical units in the Corps Tactical Zones, and between other elements of MACSOG. Responsiveness in the use of MACSOG assets and reaction to information gained by MACSOG assets has been greatly enhanced as a result of functions of the LNOs.

11. LOGISTICS.(APPENDIX VII).

Logistic activities during 1968 were centered on development of procedures and expansion of activities to provide more positive response in meeting the logistic requirements of a wide range of MACSOG operations. At year's end the Logistics Division had been reorganized along more functional lines to insure increased capability and greater efficiency in executing the expanding requirements of the many elements of MACSOG.

12. COMPTROLLER (APPENDIX VIII).

On 21 October 1968 Comptroller Branch was removed from Logistics Division and made a separate division. During the 2d quarter of FY 69, MACSOG unclassified annual funding plan of $525,000 was reduced by 25% to $394,000. Classified funds received through the first half of FY 69 were $14,777,000.

13. PLANS (APPENDIX IX).

The Plans Division continued throughout 1968 to provide current, long-range and contingency planning for MACSOG and JUWTF operations,

as well as providing input to the plans of higher headquarters. Post-Hostilities planning was the major effort in the last half of the year.

14. COMMUNICATIONS (APPENDIX X).

Communications activities expanded significantly during 1968 to support establishment of the STRATA FOB at Da Nang and NAD FOB at Phan Thiet. A program to educate personnel in use of MACSOG codes was implemented to improve transmission security.

15. JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (APPENDIX XI).

a. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) (OP-80) mission is to provide a capability within USMACV for personnel recovery operations. In accomplishment of this mission JPRC was involved in 45 attempted recovery operations during 1968.

MT

b. In addition JPRC engaged in pertinent Evasion and Escape Program activities to include: MT and periodic briefings for Army, Air Force and Navy aircrews on the mission and capabilities of JPRC.

c. MT and supported this program with Psychological Operations as appropriate.

APPENDIX I

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

1. (U) GENERAL.

The Personnel and Administration Division performs the functions of G-1 and Adjutant General staff organizations, therefore acts in the capacity of both a coordinating and special staff agency.

2. (U) MISSION.

The Personnel and Administration Division:

a. Advises and assists the MACSOG Commander on matters pertaining to personnel and administration.

b. Interprets personnel and administrative policies and directives from higher headquarters. Formulates, implements and disseminates MACSOG personnel and administrative policies, directives and procedures.

c. Exercises overall staff responsibility for, and coordinates the personnel and administrative functions within MACSOG. Directs and supervises all personnel matters and procedures including requisition and assignment of personnel.

d. Supervises and coordinates activities of subordinate branches of the Personnel and Administration Division, and exercises staff supervision of personnel and administrative activities of units or agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

e. Maintains liaison with other US military organizations or government agencies concerning all administrative matters.

3. (U) ORGANIZATION.

The Personnel and Administration Division is organized with two sub-elements: the Personnel Services Branch and the Administrative Services Branch (see TAB A). Assigned strength on 31 December 1968 was 4 officers and 15 enlisted men.

4. (U) ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

a. During CY 68 the Personnel and Administration Division established an administrative management program for the headquarters en-

compassing how to do it" instructions for all personnel and administrative functional areas. The program was implemented by writing and publishing appropriate MACSOG Directives, which prior to this time were non-existent, and by holding a seminar for all administrative personnel assigned to the staff activities.

b. The major areas selected for improvement included how to staff papers through the command section, how to prepare correspondence, requisitioning publications and blank forms, in- and out-processing personnel, how to originate MACV and MACSOG dedicated circuit electrically transmitted messages, how to initiate a directive for publication, procedures to request Temporary Duty travel orders, Officer Efficiency/Effectiveness Report preparation and rating schemes, and strength accounting and reporting procedures. The program has minimized training time for newly assigned administrative personnel from the various component services.

c. In addition, the majority of other MACSOG Directives were reviewed, edited and updated to insure clarity and accuracy. A "Staff Digest" was introduced as a basis to impart information on a timely basis to the staff. A numbered series of MACSOG Policies with a distinctive letterhead also was introduced. The purpose of the series is to insure that announced policies of Chief, MACSOG are made a matter of record and are disseminated quickly to the headquarters staff and subordinate activities.

d. New office machines were requisitioned to replace obsolete typewriters and reproduction copiers. A Xerox 914 Office Copier was acquired which has substantially reduced the time necessary to duplicate documents and orders, and has made Personnel and Administration Division more responsive to needs of the other staff agencies.


5. (U) PERSONNEL.

A listing of officers assigned to key positions and their periods of tenure through 1968 is included at TAB B.

TAB A

ORGANIZATION CHART

PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION DIVISION



TAB B


KEY OFFICERS, 1968

	POSITION	DATES	INCUMBENT
1.	Chief, SOG	1 Jan 68- 2 Aug 68	COL J.K. Singlaub
		3 Aug 68-31 Dec 68	COL S.E. Cavanaugh
	a. Deputy	6 Mar 68-31 Dec 68	COL R.L. Gleason
	b. Special Asst	1 Jan 68-31 Dec 68	NAME
2.	Personnel and Administrative Officer	1 Jan 68- 5 May 68	CPT L.E. Young, Jr.
		5 May 68-31 Dec 68	MAJ G. Anthony
3.	Chief, Intel Div	1 Jan 68-16 Dec 68	LTC P. Carretta, Jr.
		17 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LTC R.D. Bradshaw
4.	Chief, Ops Div	1 Jan 68-26 Jul 68	LTC J.D. Carney
		1 Aug 68- 4 Dec 68	COL M.J. Slominski
		5 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	COL J.G. Hayes
	a. Chief, MAROP Sec	1 Jan 68-14 Mar 68	CDR J.P. Smith, Jr.
		15 Mar 68-31 Dec 68	CDR G.F. Rogers
	b. C, Abn Ops (34)	1 Jan 68-31 Dec 68	LTC R.D. McKnight
	c. C, Psyops Br (33)	1 Jan 68-14 Jul 68	MAJ J.H. Spear
		15 Jul 68-31 Dec 68	MAJ J.R. McGavin
	d. C, Air Ops Br (32)	1 Jan 68-21 Oct 68	LTC H.C. Van Dyke
		22 Oct 68-31 Dec 68	LTC H.V. Hopkins, Jr.
5.	Chief, Log	1 Jan 68-15 Dec 68	LTC C.W. Zuppann
		16 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LTC D.F. Friend
	Chief, Medical Sec	1 Jan 68-13 Aug 68	LT R.R. Remuzzi
		14 Aug 68-31 Dec 68	LT R.A. Gross
6.	Chief, Commo	1 Jan 68- 2 Apr 68	CDR T.E. Vines
		3 Apr 68-31 Dec 68	CDR S.C. Montgomery
7.	CO, MAROP Gp	1 Jan 68- 5 Jul 68	CDR N.H. Olson
		6 Jul 68-19 Dec 68	CDR A.G. Merget
		20 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LCDR C.T. Edson
8.	Chief, Psyops Gp	1 Jan 68-17 Apr 68	LTC T.W. Bowen
		18 Apr 68-28 Jun 68	Vacant
		29 Jun 68-16 Nov 68	LTC L.S. Bush
		17 Nov 68-31 Dec 68	Mr. H.F. Robbins

9. CO, 1st Flt Det	1 Jan 68- 6 May 68	LTC J. Deas
	7 May 68-31 Dec 68	LTC J.R. McCarthy
10. Chief, Plans Div	1 Jan 68-22 Apr 68	LTC C.S. Zoukis
	23 Apr 68-27 Jun 68	MAJ G.D. Tollerud
	28 Jun 68-31 Dec 68	LTC R.M. Johnson
11. Chief, Compt Br	1 Jan 68-21 Aug 68	LCDR T.B. Potter
	22 Aug 68-31 Dec 68	LCDR D.J. Brunner
12. Chief, JPRC	1 Jan 68-12 Mar 68	COL B.S. Keller
	13 Mar 68-29 Jun 68	LTC Reisner
	30 Jun 68-18 Aug 68	LTC F.K. Sloan
	19 Aug 68-30 Nov 68	CDR D. Prentiss
	1 Dec 68-31 Dec 68	LTC I.T. McDonald

TAB A

MACSOG ORGANIZATION THROUGH NOVEMBER 1968



APPENDIX II

INTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL.

a. The goals set forth by MACSOG Intelligence Division for CY 68 were continued improvement in both quality and quantity of intelligence produced from MACSOG operations and continued improvement in timeliness, substantive content and tactical utility of operational intelligence support and guidance provided to MACSOG assets for accomplishment of their mission.

b. Through initiation of new concepts, refinement of existing techniques, and aggressive exploitation of all available intelligence resources, MACSOG Intelligence Division continued to improve it position with respect to the goals set forth above. Initiation and development of the Targeting Panel concept achieved a coordinated intelligence collection and dissemination program responsive to the needs of all command components concerned. Continued refinement in Photo Intelligence support and collection techniques has insured not only thorough mission planning support for the Recon Team but improved quality and content of mission results. The Intelligence Division has maintained its active use of data handling systems and continues to explore methods of adapting new technology to increase support of the intelligence mission. Throughout the year, the Intelligence Division has vigorously pursued the exploitation of all intelligence resources available to provide the most complete, up-to-date product possible to the man in the field.

2. MISSION.

The basic mission of the Intelligence Division is to collect, collate and disseminate intelligence information to MACSOG staff agencies in support of MACSOG operational elements and to receive, collate and disseminate the intelligence information derived from those operations to the intelligence community. This basic mission is broken out into six main functions, as follows:

a. Advise Chief, MACSOG concerning intelligence matters and develop intelligence estimates, summaries and studies.

b. Prepare documents pertaining to collection and use of intelligence by MACSOG, including dissemination to other staff agencies and personnel.

c. Advise Chief, MACSOG on matters of security and prepare necessary directives.

d. Exercise staff supervision of intelligence activities of units and agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

e. Maintain liaison with other military organizations and government agencies concerning intelligence matters.

f. Insure operational plans give full consideration to the potential of intelligence collection either in support of, or in conjunction with, other U.S. agencies whose mission involves the collection of intelligence.

3. ORGANIZATION.

At the close of 1968 the Intelligence Division was organized into four branches and had an authorized as well as actual strength of 35 personnel. (See TAB A) The four branches under the Intelligence Division are as follows:

a. Operations Branch: The Operations Branch is composed of five sections: Laos Study Section (handles all intelligence matters involving Prairie Fire operations), Cambodian Study Section (deals with all Daniel Boone intelligence matters), Vietnamese Study Section (divided into two subsections, one for all matters related to the MACSOG Agent program and the other for all maritime operations), the Air/Anti-Air Study Section (maintains all air intelligence information for NVN, Laos and Cambodia), and the Exploitation Section (responsible for exploitation of MACSOG prisoners/detainees obtained from MACSOG operations). There were 13 personnel assigned to the Operations Branch at the end of 1968 versus 15 authorized.

b. Photo Analysis Branch: The Photo Analysis Branch provides photo intelligence assistance to MACSOG staff agencies through the respective Operations Branch sections for support of MACSOG operational elements. It is composed of two sections: the Imagery Interpretation Section provides photo intelligence reports on all MACSOG targets as well as special studies while the Photo Lab Section provides film processing facilities in support of the MACSOG "hand-held Photograph" program. At the end of 1968, Photo Analysis Branch had eleven assigned personnel against ten authorized, of which two were in the Photo Lab Section.

c. Security Branch: The Security Branch advises the Chief, Intelligence Division on all matters of security and prepares the necessary directives. The Branch had five personnel authorized and six assigned.

d. Administrative Branch: This branch provides administrative support to the Intelligence Division. Three personnel were authorized for the Branch, three were [illegible]

4 INTELLIGENCE DIVISION IMPROVEMENTS.

The following improvements were made during 1968 to provide a more qualitative and timely intelligence product in support of the MACSOG mission and goals set forth by the Intelligence Division:

a. Reorganization of the Division: Significantly increased targeting operations and continuing expansion of operational activities throughout the year with commensurate increase in staff work, required a thorough review of the Intelligence Division organization to [illegible] of personnel under existing manpower restrictions and changing requirements, a reorganization of staff functions was accomplished to support those areas of increased operations. This reorganization is depicted in TAB A. Among improvements was establishment of a Photo Lab Section within the Photo Analysis Branch to provide more timely support on high priority items formerly rendered by the 69th Signal Battalion.

b. Intelligence Reporting: The Intelligence Division made a concerted effort to improve quality, quantity and timeliness of intelligence reported to MACV J2 and the intelligence community. These efforts included the following:

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and MACV J2 to insure MACSOG's intelligence information consumers continue to receive quality products. These evaluation reports are closely monitored and serve as basis for improvements in the reports.

(4) Personal Contacts. The Division has encouraged all Desk Officers to make frequent visits with MACV J2 counterparts in the various divisions. Closer working relationships have developed as a result of these visits.

(5) Briefings. Part of the reporting system used by the Intelligence Division is the weekly MACSOG COMUSMACV Wrap-up, attended by COMUSMACV and his senior staff. Copies of the briefings, which contains significant intelligence information produced from the latest MACSOG operations, are provided MACV J2 representatives beforehand. MACV J2 representatives are invited to attend the pre-brief for Chief, MACSOG. Weekly briefings are provided MACV J2 on results of Target Panel meetings. These two briefings provide weekly updates to all MACV staff agencies on results of MACSOG operations, target scheduling and significant intelligence produced.

c. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF) Operations:

(1) The Target Panel concept was initiated in October. This new concept enabled the Intelligence Division for the first time to maintain continuing coordination and agreement among all concerned elements of MACSOG and COMUSMACV on identification, selection and assigned priority of intelligence targets for MACSOG missions. Designated representatives of pertinent components of MACV J2 and MACSOG meet weekly and conduct an all-source review and assessment of the status of pending requirements, target schedules and mission results. The Target Panels have proven highly effective in providing improved, focused intelligence support and guidance to achieve effective employment of MACSOG operational assets as well as providing timely dissemination of mission results.

(2) The cumulative, systematic input during CY 68, of information on the PF area, derived from a wide variety of sources, has resulted in the most comprehensive ADP data base of those areas available in the theater. It has proven to be an invaluable research tool for intelligence support and operational planning.

(3) The SLAM/Recon-in-Force concept continued to provide excellent results. Intelligence Division continued to exploit and develope the intelligence potential of this program.

(4) To assist in gaining more timely collection of intelligence from the Recon Team in addition to improving intelligence support, six TDY personnel were obtained from the 1st Special Forces Group to conduct on-the-spot debriefings of exfiltrated Recon Teams at the FOB.

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d. DANIEL BOONE (DB) Operations:

(1) The Target Panel concept was initiated for DB operations as well and has proven equally effective here as in PF.

(2) The Cambodian Study Group continued to exploit the potential of ADP with systematic inputs, providing for a solid data base which has been a valuable tool in mission planning and intelligence support.

(3) Three IDY personnel were assigned from 1st Special Forces to assist the C&C in collection of intelligence from Recon Teams and provide timely dissemination.

e. PLOWMAN Operations:

(1) During 1968 conversion of the PLOWMAN data base from an ADP filing system to an Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS), utilizing a magnetic tape file was completed. The new system permits a more flexible format for storage and retrieval of data in support of target planning and dissemination of Intelligence for PLOWMAN operations.

MT

f. Air Intelligence Operations:

(1) In order to display more accurately the increased enemy air defense capability in NVN, Laos and Cambodia and thus provide more complete and detailed intelligence to MACSOG operational units, graphic displays of all enemy aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, SAM and electronic order of battle were replotted on large scale maps. Additional graphic displays were added to include all available reports on ground fire received by friendly aircraft and reports of aircraft shot down. Missile order of battle information was expanded to include dates each missile site was last occupied. All display information is updated on a daily basis, providing one of the most conclusive and current displays on the air intelligence picture available.

(2) No effort was spared during the year to increase timeliness of air intelligence received by the operational units. Helicopter assets became increasingly vulnerable during the latter part of the year as the enemy shifted a large number of his air defense assets into the PF AO. A new system of support was initiated. Copies of the comprehensive graphic displays of air intelligence were made and distributed to the field. A new system of transmission was initiated to update the displays providing for immediate transmission of air intelligence reports as they are received by the Intelligence Division.

(3) In response to the increasingly heavy volume of fire received by MACSOG air assets, the Air Intelligence Section initiated a program of visits and briefings to operational units to present the enemy's air defense posture and insure all personnel are thoroughly familiar with information available to them.

g. Photo Analysis Operations:

(1) A significant improvement in intelligence support of MACSOG operational teams was achieved with introduction of a new, supplemental two-part Photo Intelligence Report package for team tactical field use. The new format consists of (1) a currently updated annotated photo map of the target area and (2) a narrative target area description and terrain analysis.

(2) As the high intelligence value of ground photography derived from Recon Team operations became increasingly apparent, a program was undertaken to expand MACSOG collection efforts and capabilities. New equipment was acquired and evaluated and training provided for all operational teams.

(3) To increase the timeliness of photo support to MACSOG operations and dissemination of the intelligence to all agencies involved, a two-step program was initiated. Facilities for MACSOG in-house photo processing and print-out were activated. By eliminating the need to send high priority items to the 69th Signal Battalion, a saving of 7-10 days was realized. The facility is still not complete and the number of photo lab personnel is insufficient to handle all high priority items; however, every effort is being made to alleviate the situation in 1969. The second step was initiation of a program to establish photo lab facilities at the C&C level. This will decrease some of the workload on the headquarters facility and increase timeliness of intelligence reporting from, in many cases, 3-4 weeks to 2-3 days. Action was initiated in late 1968 to begin the procurement of necessary equipment in CY 69.

(4) The Photo Analysis Branch became a participant in the RT Leaders' School at Camp Long Thanh Instruction is being provided in ground photography, aerial reconnaissance programs over Laos and Cambodia, and in development of the Photo Analysis Branch product.

5. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

a. PRAIRIE FIRE (PF)

(1) Intelligence Information Report (IIR)

(a) During the period 1 January 1968 to 31 December 1968, 410 IIRs were submitted on enemy activity and terrain in the PF AO. A total of 277 were writen in 1967.

(b) Following the Tet Offensive of January 1968, PF assets were utilized extensively to support in-country missions, with a resultant decrease in operations in Laos until late September, when normal operations resumed. No IIRs were written on these in-country missions.

(2) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) An Intelligence Annex to OPLAN 37B-68 (Phase II PRAIRIE FIRE Intelligence Net) was prepared.

(b) A study was conducted for THUNDERCLOUD operations in the Tri-border Area.

(c) A study of enemy activity and plans along the Ho Chi Minh Trail (road and trail complex in eastern Laos used for infiltration of men and materiel from NVN to SVN) was accomplished and disseminated via IIR 6 799 0099 68. This report received an extremely laudatory evaluation by DIA as "one of the few" concise but complete studies of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

(d) A study of all LOCs in Laos was conducted to determine main VC/NVA logistic routes.

(e) A briefing on LOCs in Laos was prepared for the Graham Committee.

(f) An analysis of all ARC LIGHT Strikes in BA 613 was made.

(g) Photographic studies were made of routes 92, 922 and 548 in support of IGLOO WHITE activities.

(h) The PF section initiated a comprehensive study of the results of all ARC LIGHT strikes conducted in Laos An important input to this study were bomb damage assessment reports from MACSOG Recon Teams on ARC LIGHT strikes conducted as a result of MACSOG intelligence collection efforts. It is believed this is the first comprehensive study of its kind on out-of-country ARC LIGHT missions. The study has been disseminated to MACV.

(3) Target Selection and Development:

(a) During the year 600 targets were selected and developed with 235 of these on a recurring basis.

(b) Two new targets were developed and added to the PF target inventory.

(4) Wiretap Operation: MT

MT

(b) Six missions were conducted successfully, two in-country and four in the PF AO. The remaining eight missions were aborted due to enemy activity. Only one was exploitable.

(5) Significant Intelligence Produced During 1968:

(a) PF teams confirmed the existence of an enemy stronghold and cache site on CO ROC Mountain southwest of Khe Sanh. As a result, an ARC LIGHT strike was conducted, resulting in continous secondary explosions over a two-hour period.

(b) Intelligence gathered from BA 607 was instrumental in obtaining approval for an ARC LIGHT strike which produced a large number of secondary explosions, destroyed one PT-76 tank, and cut route 548 in several places.

(c) A number of personal letters from relatives and friends in NVN to NVA soldiers in the Tri-border Area were captured in an NVA Regimental Headquarters Area. They contained pertinent information on conditions in NVN and were disseminated to the intelligence community.

(d) Numerous infiltration activities, including old and new bivouac areas of Company/Regimental size, well used trails, and rest areas, truck parks and storage areas were located and many of them photographed.

(e) Numerous sightings of communications lines.

(f) Important information on VC/NVA vehicular movement, including trucks, tanks and APCs, was obtained on major motorable routes.

(g) The enemy's use of trucks to infiltrate troops through Laos was first confirmed by a PF team operating in the Tri-border Area on route 96/110 during February

(h) Intelligence information produced by PF teams in the Tri-border Area resulted in it being designated a SLAM Area (SLAM VII). In November, BA 613 was exploited as a revision of the SLAM VII concept, with teams locating targets to be exploited by larger forces and TAC Air. This operation resulted in the [illegible] of way stations, bivouac areas, truck parks, and storage areas. This information together with that of a knowledgeable POW captured during the operation, shed much light on the enemy's use of BA 613 and led to targeting of 9 successful ARC LIGHT missions in this Base Area.

(6) IGLOO WHITE (MUSCLE SHOALS) Intelligence Activities: The nickname MUSCLE SHOALS was changed to IGLOO WHITE during the year. The IGLOO WHITE desk continued to monitor project developments and to collect ground intelligence on the AO.

b. BANIEL BOONE.

(1) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs):

(a) During the calendar year 418 IIRs were written on enemy activity and terrain in the DBAO, compared with 155 for the last six months of 1967.

(b) In a message dated 13 Feb 68, COMUSMACV made DB assets responsive to in-country requirements. As a result, the number of out-of-country missions peaked in February, suffered a slight drop in March and were drastically cut back from April through June, with a corresponding drop in intelligence production from the DB AO. The in-country program continued to the end of September, when normal operations were resumed. No IIRs were written for these in-country missions. Despite the cutback, intelligence produced in 1968 from the DB AO increased significantly.

(2) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) In January, a VESUVIUS committee was formed with MACV J2 to formulate targets of hard intelligence to be made into packets to demonstrate the VC/NVA use of Cambodia to Prince Sihanouk. Two targets were submitted for an initial package in February. Input was also provided for six other VESUVIUS packets. The amount of MACSOG input to the VESUVIUS program dropped significantly when DB assets were diverted to in-country use.

(b) A study of population distribution in Cambodia, with emphasis on the DB AO, was conducted.

(c) A study was completed on various indigenous organizations in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

(d) Lines of communication (LOCs) within Cambodia were studied to determine the major routes used in support of the VC/NVA logistic system. A briefing on these LOCs was prepared for presentation to the Graham Committee.

(e) The Intelligence Annex to the new DB OPLAN was written.

(f) An implementing directive in response to the BLACK BEARD Collection Program was prepared.

(3) Target Selection and Development:

(a) A total of 300 targets was selected and developed/updated during the year.

(b) A new operations order was received in December lifting certain restrictions and greatly increasing the scope of DB operations, with a concomitant increase in intelligence production. Plans are being developed to fully exploit this new order.

(4) Wiretap Operations: Four wiretap operations were conducted under the MT Program with two of these producing exploitable results.

(5) Significant Intelligence Produced during 1968:

(a) 807 targets were located.

(b) 272 active and inactive bivouac areas and way stations were discovered.

(c) 27 sightings of communications wire.

(d) 2 POWs of significant intelligence value were captured.

(e) 478 sightings of enemy troops were reported.

(f) Photographs were taken of roads, trails, bridges, storage and bivouac areas, enemy fortifications and terrain.

c. PLOWMAN

MT

(a) Effects of aerial mining of waterways.

(b) Effects of airstrikes.

(c) Reaction of the populace and NVN officials to bombing restrictions and peace negotiations.

(d) Economic conditions

(e) Order of battle.

(f) Status of LOCs.

(2) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs): Based on the interrogation of detainees, 199 IIRs were written These reports covered subjects listed above plus the following:

(a) Effects of Naval Gunfire.

(b) Paramilitary Forces.

(3) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) Continuing studies and reports were published on the increasing volume and accuracy of hostile costal defense fire received by PLOWMAN missions.

(b) A study of capabilities, construction and tactics of armed junks was completed.

(c) The feasibility of waterway reconnaissance operations in Cambodia was examined and results published.

(4) Target Selection and Development: A total of 50 targets were selected of which 20 were developed in support of CADO missions. Five of these were in support of a new concept MT Seven of the 20 targets were approved and executed prior to the standdown on 1 November. Five missions developed under the new concept were never run due to the operational standdown.

(5) Problem Areas: A total of 352 IIRs and Spot Reports were disseminated during Calendar Year 1968. This represents a decline from 463 in 1967. The decline resulted from operational restrictions in effect for five months during the year. Only "at sea" interrogations were permitted from April through June and no operations were authorized subsequent to 1 November.

d. TIMBERWORK

(1) Spot Reports: Information received from the remaining MT in NVN was under continual evaluation for dissemination to the intelligence community. As a result of this

evaluation and studies produced DATA and MACV J2, there was little doubt that the teams had been compromised. Therefore, spot reporting was discontinued in July 1968 and the teams converted to diversionary assets.

(2) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). Information from STRATA team operations was received and evaluated for dissemination during the year. Eleven IIRs were produced between March (the initiation of STRATA operations) and the operational standdown on 1 Nov.

(3) Studies, Estimates, Annexes:

(a) Five area studies for Singleton Agent operations were conducted.

(b) A buildup of all available pertinent intelligence data on North Vietnam was undertaken as a standby data base to support any future operations.

(c) Support to the post-standdown movement of the Long-Term Black Agent Teams out of NVN by foot was provided.

(4) Target Selection and Development:

(a) During the year 100 targets of various types were selected and developed.

(b) Studies were conducted and data collected in support of target selection for STRATA team operations.

(c) Targets were developed and a data base established in support of the Singleton Agent Program.

(d) Participation in the development of the new Strategic Intelligence Team (SIT) concept and selection of suitable targets was provided. Due to the standdown no SIT teams were inserted.

(e) Intelligence support was also provided to the Notional Team concept in 18 notional areas of NVN.

(f) With cessation of operations against NVN, all assets were shifted for use in Laos and Cambodia, with intelligence support provided by respective intelligence sections in coordination with the TIMBERWORK(C) Section.

e. Air Intelligence:

(1) The Air Intelligence Section maintained all aircraft, AAA, SAM, and electronic order of battle for Laos, NVN and Cambodia for use by MACSOG and its subordinate units.

(2) Spot Reports: Although reports were not normally required of the Air Intelligence Section, three Spot Reports were disseminated on ground fire received by aircraft supporting MACSOG missions

(3) Studies, Estimates, Annexes: Air order of battle studies were provided in support of PF, DB, PLOWMAN , and TIMBERWORK operations. In addition, studies and graphic displays were provided to OP-30 for mission planning

f. Photo Analysis Activities:

(1) Target Studies:

(a) During the year 1,050 target studies were accomplished in support of PF, DB, PLOWMAN , and TIMBERWORK operations; almost double the output of 1967.

(b) The format of target studies was changed from an annotated high altitude photograph to an annotated photo blowup of a 1:50,000 chart with an accompanying photo analysis of the target area keyed to the chart. High altitude photographs of some targets are still being provided. Further refinement of target studies is planned.

(2) Target Selection and Development: With the advent of the Targeting Panel concept, Photo Analysis Branch realized the opportunity to insure more effective utilization of aerial reconnaissance/photo analysis capabilities and resources in selection and development of targets. Undesirable targets have been eliminated, target coordinates changed to more suitable locations, and LZs and routes of advance selected. In future, manpower permitting, Photo Analysis Branch will become more involved in target development.

(3) Projects: To insure a more reliable and productive ground photography program, Photo Analysis Branch initiated a project to standardize and coordinate the entire program. Selection of equipment, instruction in its use, and photo processing guidance as well as interpretation of photography are included in the project. At present, the Pen EES-2 and the Ashai Pentax Spotmatic with 55mm and 200mm lenses have been selected along with a variety of suitable film Equipment and film will continue to be tested to insure the best equipment is available to the field.

(4) Library Services: The library currently contains approximately 286,000 feet of film and more than 30,000 feet are processed by the Photo Analysis Branch each week. This is a vastly significant increase over 1967 when only 100,000 feet was stored and 10,000 feet processed each week.

(5) Problem Areas: Under the JTD of 1967, ten military personnel and one [DATA] were authorized This number was found to be

inadequate to meet the requirements levied on the Branch. A request has been forwarded to change one authorized officer position to a Photo Lab Technician billet in order to man the new Photo Lab Facility. Additional Photo Imagery Interpreter and Photo Lab personnel will be requested.

g. Security Activities : The following is a listing of major activities accomplished by the Security Section during CY 68:

(1) The following directives were prepared:

(a) MACV SOG Dir 380-7 with change, subj: Military Security,Access to MACSOG Information (U).

(b) MACV Staff Memo 380-7, subj: Access to MACSOG Information(U).

(c) MACSOG Dir 380-5, subj: Security Directive (U).

(2) The relocation of MACSOG from MACV II Compound to MACV I Compound was planned and executed.

(3) Dossiers on Operational Personnel: Security Section continued the program of maintaining dossiers on operational personnel. As of 30 December 7,870 of these dossiers had been established.

(4) Biographic Files: Security continued control of all counterpart biographic files. During 1968 a requirement was established for all MACSOG Detachment Commanders to maintain a personnel file on all counterparts. Security maintains master files while the Detachment Commanders maintain duplicate dossiers.

(5) DATA

(6) MACSOG Conference Room: Security Section established security procedures for the MACSOG Top Secret Conference Room in Building #2 and technically sweeps the conference room before each conference.

(7) Indigenous Personnel Checks.

(a) The system for background investigations of indigenous personnel was completely revised. Information now received is more complete and turnover time has been reduced from 2-4 months to 3-4 weeks.

(b) Security checks are being accomplished on all indigenous personnel employed by MACSOG Security presently has 2,800 completed dossiers filed.

(8) IBM Printout of MACSOG Access Roster: The IBM printout of the MACSOG Access Roster is now produced by IDHS, thus cutting the receipt time by 7-10 days.

(9) Polygraph/Technical Services: Security Section coordinated with MACV J2 and 525th MI Group for improved polygraph and technical services. Arrangements were made for MACSOG to receive these services on a priority basis and is now receiving vastly improved and essential services from these organizations.

(10) Liaison: Liaison visits to various intelligence agencies in the Saigon area were continued and contact with other agencies throughout RVN was established

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APPENDIX III

FOOTBOY OPERATIONS

Appendix III contains the 1968 historical summaries of the operational aspects of the FOOTBOY program. Histories of the sub-programs are presented in sections as indicated below:

Section 1 - Maritime Operations

Section 2 - Air Operations

Section 3 - Psychological Operations

Section 4 - Airborne Operations

APPENDIX III

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Section 1 - Maritime Operations

Section 2 - Air Operations

Section 3 - Psychological Operations

Section 4 - Airborne Operations

a. Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang. The assigned strength of the Maritime Operations Group averaged 14 officer, 29 enlisted, and nine Filipinos throughout the year. No serious problems were encountered in filling assigned billets. A 65-man Mobile Support Team is attached on temporary duty to provide boat maintenance support. In September MACSOG was directed to eliminate those personnel who were considered excess-in-country, since they were not filling authorized JTD billets. The solution was to reduce the team by 26, reduce SEAL and Marine advisors by half and increase the CSS capability to provide maintenance support. This adjustment was still taking place at the end of 1968.

b. Maritime Studies Branch. The strength of the Maritime Studies Branch remained constant at four officers and two enlisted throughout the year.

4. PLOWMAN OPERATIONAL ASSETS.

a. Three Swift boats, for local logistic support, and seven Nasty Class PTFs were in the inventory at the beginning of 1968. In July this figure was increased to nine PTFs and further increased in September to eleven by addition of four new aluminum hulled boats. This level was maintained for the remainder of the year. Prior to July there were an average of six PTFs operational and one in Subic Bay Ship Repair Facility, Philippines, for overhaul. After arrival of the four new craft there were normally nine operational with two in Subic for overhaul.

b. Twelve PTF crews and three Swift crews were operational throughout the year. Action team strength at the beginning of the year was 69, organized into three teams. Recruiting efforts were initiated to attain a level of four twenty-man teams. Action team strength reached a high of 94 in August when it was determined that the quality of team personnel was in some cases unsatisfactory and that for the type missions envisioned twenty-man teams were too large. It was determined to reduce the size of teams to fifteen and maintain four teams. The reduction was to be made through attrition and the selecting out of unproductive personnel. This action continued for the remainder of the year.

c. A total of 157 PLOWMAN missions were launched in the first ten months of 1968. Of these, 140 were completed, 11 were aborted due to weather and six were aborted due to boat materiel problems. Six VN were killed in action and ten were wounded in action. No PTFs were [illegible] enemy KIA. 40 craft destroyed and 184 detainees taken and processed at "Paradise".

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the weather was most favorable and with sufficient PTFs in the inventory, this goal was attained. Subsequent to that time the weather gradually deteriorated, reducing operations slightly, until the complete standdown was effected on 1 November. In 1967, 125 PLOWMAN operations were completed. The increased temp of 1968, however, permitted 140 completed missions in only the first ten months of the year with a proportionate increase in NVN watercraft contacts and intelligence reports. Restrictions on conduct of cross-beach operations above 17° N severely hampered employment of action teams and prevented their presenting a significant threat to the DRV itself. With eight exceptions (six Special missions and two cross-beach missions directed against Tiger Island) all operations north of 17° N were maritime interdiction. As in 1967, the WHITE AO (18° 40' N to 20° 00' N) remained the most lucrative for PLOWMAN operations from the standpoint of NVN craft encountered. It was in this area that most of the detainees were obtained, and where most of the enemy craft were destroyed. This area was also the most heavily defended. Although the effect of these operations on the DRV is not completely quantifiable, indications of their impact include the heavy buildup of coastal defense weapons along the coastline and resultant heavy fire received during conduct of missions in 1968. Approximately 40% of all PLOWMAN missions received coastal defense fire in 1968, suggesting some form of radar control (See TAB C). At the time of most concentrated effort, the NVN regime employed armed junks of a specially configured metal hull design that were obviously built to engage SSPL PTFs. Their construction and crew training indicated an extensive effort to thwart the effectiveness of the PLOWMAN program. All armed junks encountered were sunk. Although interpreted as an isolated incident probably generated by fortuitous presence of NVN aircraft, the PLOWMAN mission of 6 October was attacked by a jet aircraft which made two unsuccessful firing runs. This was the only incident of air opposition in 1968. Of prime significance in program results, was the generation of 337 intelligence reports to higher authority, obtained during PLOWMAN operations.

(2) The high rate of activity and inability of the DRV to thwart operations is best illustrated by the complete freedom with which operations were conducted. The only significant limiting factor to maritime operations during the year were PTF availability and weather.

(3) The only two cross-beach operations conducted during the year were unprofitable and action teams contributed to the PLOWMAN program to only a limited degree.

6. ACTION TEAM OPERATIONS.

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6. ACTION TEAM OPERATIONS.

the coastline of Binh Thuan Province has heretofore been considered a relatively safe haven by the enemy. (See TAB F-Mission Summary)

7. TRAINING.

a. Maintenance Team Training. Formal training for the Vietnamese counterpart of the US Mobile Support Team commenced at Ships Repair Facility, Subic Bay 18 November with a six-week training course in engine maintenance, electronics, electricity and gunnery. This course will continue for three classes through March 1969 and will partially offset the loss of the US MST personnel reduction noted in paragraph 1a above.

b. On-the-job Training. Intensive on-the-job training is being conducted in supply, public works, and operations planning in order to facilitate the orderly turnover of responsibility and accountability for maritime operations to CSS.

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January Recap:

Missions	9
Detainees captured	14
Detainees returned	30
Craft destroyed	2

b. February.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
17	MINT		None
27	MINT		10 detainees taken, 2 craft destroyed.
29	MINT		2 detainees taken.

February Recap:

Missions	3
Detainees captured	12
Detainees returned	0
Craft destroyed	2

c. March.

03	MINT		14 detainees taken, 7 craft destroyed.
05	MINT		14 detainees taken, 6 craft destroyed.
07	MINT		9 detainees returned.
08	MINT		None.
10	MINT		None.
11	MINT		5 detainees taken.
13	MINT		5 detainees taken.
14	MINT		6 detainees taken.
15	MINT		None.
17	MINT		None.
18	MINT		None.
19	MINT		12 detainees taken.
21	MINT		None.
23	MINT		10 detainees taken.
27	MINT		None.
29	MINT		5 detainees taken.

March Recap:

Missions	16
Detainees captured	71
Detainees returned	9
Craft destroyed	13

d. April.

January Recap:

Missions	9
Detainees captured	14
Detainees returned	30
Craft destroyed	2

b. February.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
17	MINT		None
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07	MINT		9 detainees returned.
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11	MINT		5 detainees taken.
13	MINT		5 detainees taken.
14	MINT		6 detainees taken.
15	MINT		None.
17	MINT		None.
18	MINT		None.
19	MINT		12 detainees taken.
21	MINT		None.
23	MINT		10 detainees taken.
27	MINT		None.
29	MINT		5 detainees taken.

March Recap:

Missions	16
Detainees captured	71
Detainees returned	9
Craft destroyed	13

d. April.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
06	MINT		None.
07	MINT		None.
09	MINT		None.
11	MINT		2 fishermen interrogated.
12	Special		1 defector released.
13	MINT		None.
15	MINT		4 fishermen interrogated.
18	MINT		5 fishermen interrogated.
21	MINT		11 fishermen interrogated.
22	MINT		None.
24	MINT		12 fishermen interrogated.
26	MINT		10 fishermen interrogated.
28	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.

June Recap:

Missions	15
Detainees captured	0
Detainees returned	1
Craft destroyed	0
Fishermen interrogated	52

g. July.

01	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.
03	MINT		None.
05	MINT		2 detainees taken, 15 fishermen interrogated.
07	MINT		4 detainees taken.
09	MINT		4 detainees taken, 5 fishermen interrogated.
10	MINT		15 fishermen interrogated.
12	MINT		4 detainees taken.
14	MINT		2 fishermen interrogated.
15	MINT		3 detainees taken.
17	MINT		11 fishermen interrogated.
18	CADO		None.
19	MINT		2 detainees taken, 2 returned.
21	MINT		4 detainees returned, 2 fishermen interrogated.
23	MINT		1 detainee taken, 4 returned.
27	MINT		6 detainees taken, 4 returned; 1 craft destroyed; 4 weapons captured. Enemy KIA 2, WIA 1; 26 fishermen interrogated.
30	CADO		None.
31	MINT		3 detainees taken.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
06	MINT		None.
07	MINT		None.
09	MINT		None.
11	MINT		2 fishermen interrogated.
12	Special		1 defector released.
13	MINT		None.
15	MINT		4 fishermen interrogated.
18	MINT		5 fishermen interrogated.
21	MINT		11 fishermen interrogated.
22	MINT		None.
24	MINT		12 fishermen interrogated.
26	MINT		10 fishermen interrogated.
28	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.

June Recap:

Missions	15
Detainees captured	0
Detainees returned	1
Craft destroyed	0
Fishermen interrogated	52

g. July.

01	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.
03	MINT		None.
05	MINT		2 detainees taken, 15 fishermen interrogated.
07	MINT		4 detainees taken.
09	MINT		4 detainees taken, 5 fishermen interrogated.
10	MINT		15 fishermen interrogated.
12	MINT		4 detainees taken.
14	MINT		2 fishermen interrogated.
15	MINT		3 detainees taken.
17	MINT		11 fishermen interrogated.
18	CADO		None.
19	MINT		2 detainees taken, 2 returned.
21	MINT		4 detainees returned, 2 fishermen interrogated.
23	MINT		1 detainee taken, 4 returned.
27	MINT		6 detainees taken, 4 returned; 1 craft destroyed; 4 weapons captured. Enemy KIA 2, WIA 1; 26 fishermen interrogated.
30	CADO		None.
31	MINT		3 detainees taken.

i. September.

DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
01	MINT		None.
02	MINT		None.
03	MINT		2 detainees returned.
08	MINT		1 detainee taken; 2 craft destroyed.
09	MINT		1 detainee returned.
11	MINT		2 detainees returned.
12	MINT		None.
14	MINT		None.
15	MINT		4 detainees taken.
17	MINT		13 fishermen interrogated.
18	MINT		None.
19	MINT		6 detainees returned.
25	MINT		3 detainees taken, 10 returned; 1 craft destroyed.
26	MINT		1 detainee taken; 1 fisherman interrogated.

September Recap:

Missions	14
Detainees captured	9
Detainees returned	21
Craft destroyed	3
Fishermen interrogated	14

j. October.

02	MINT		None.
03	MINT		None.
04	MINT		4 detainees returned.
06	MINT		6 detainees taken; 1 craft damaged. Enemy air strike, no damage. 3 fishermen interrogated
07	MINT		1 craft destroyed.
08	MINT		None.
10	MINT		None.
21	MINT		9 detainees returned.
22	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.
23	MINT		None.
24	MINT		None.
26	MINT		None.
27	MINT		3 fishermen interrogated.
29	MINT		16 fishermen interrogated.

i. September.


DATE	TYPE MISSION	OPAREA	RESULTS
01	MINT		None.
02	MINT		None.
03	MINT		2 detainees returned.
08	MINT		1 detainee taken; 2 craft destroyed.
09	MINT		1 detainee returned.
11	MINT		2 detainees returned.
12	MINT		None.
14	MINT		None.
15	MINT		4 detainees taken.
17	MINT		13 fishermen interrogated.
18	MINT		None.
19	MINT		6 detainees returned.
25	MINT		3 detainees taken, 10 returned; 1 craft destroyed.
26	MINT		1 detainee taken; 1 fisherman interrogated.

September Recap:

Missions	14
Detainees captured	9
Detainees returned	21
Craft destroyed	3
Fishermen interrogated	14

j. October.


02	MINT		None.
03	MINT		None.
04	MINT		4 detainees returned.
06	MINT		6 detainees taken; 1 craft damaged. Enemy air strike, no damage. 3 fishermen interrogated
07	MINT		1 craft destroyed.
08	MINT		None.
10	MINT		None.
21	MINT		9 detainees returned.
22	MINT		8 fishermen interrogated.
23	MINT		None.
24	MINT		None.
26	MINT		None.
27	MINT		3 fishermen interrogated.
29	MINT		16 fishermen interrogated.



TAB B

PLOWMAN

OPERATING AREAS


102
108
CHINA
CHINA
22
22
LAOS
RED
YELLOW
WHITE
GULF
OF
TONKIN
BLUE
GREEN
PURPLE
20
18
18
16
VIENTIANE
THAILAND
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
SOUTH
VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
TAB B
PLOWMAN
OPERATING AREAS

TAB D

DONG TAM DEPLOYMENT
MISSION SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
22	11 VC KIA/WIA
	17 VC prisoners captured
	5 firefights
	Numerous documents captured
	10 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

TAB D

DONG TAM DEPLOYMENT
MISSION SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
22	11 VC KIA/WIA
	17 VC prisoners captured
	5 firefights
	Numerous documents captured
	10 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

TAB F

DEWEY RIFLE MISSION
SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
22	8 VC KIA
	12 known VC Cadre captured
	13 persons with no ID captured
	Numerous documents captured
	700 lbs rice, 40 lbs fish, medical supplies captured
	10 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

TAB F

DEWEY RIFLE MISSION
SUMMARY 1968

Number of Successful Missions	Results
22	8 VC KIA
	12 known VC Cadre captured
	13 persons with no ID captured
	Numerous documents captured
	700 lbs rice, 40 lbs fish, medical supplies captured
	10 ambushes/area sweeps conducted, no enemy contact

TAB A

CHRONOLOGY OF MIDRIFF[illegible] MISSIONS

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
5 Jan	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Jan	USAF	C-130	
15 Jan	USAF	C-130	
21 Jan	USAF	C-130	
24 Jan	USAF	C-130	
28 Jan	USAF	C-130	
10 Feb	USAF	C-130	
16 Feb	USAF	C-130	
6 Mar	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Mar	USAF	C-130	
16 Mar	USAF	C-130	
17 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
18 Mar	USAF	F-4D	
20 Mar	USAF	C-130	
23 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
24 Mar	USAF	F-4	
24 Mar	VNAF	A-1G	
28 Mar	USAF	C-130	
29 Mar	USAF	F-4D	
31 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
5 Apr	VNAF	A-1G	
6 Apr	VNAF	A-1G	
7 Apr	USAF	CH-3	
15 Apr	USAF	CH-3	
1 May	USAF	C-130	
5 May	VNAF	A-1G	
6 May	USAF	C-130	
7 May	GRC	C-123	
14 May	USAF	CH-3	
15 May	USAF	CH-3	
17 May	USAF	C-130	
19 May	USAF	C-130	
22 May	USAF	CH-3	
26 May	GRC	C-123	
29 May	USAF	CH-3	

TAB A

CHRONOLOGY OF MIDRIFF[illegible] MISSIONS

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
5 Jan	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Jan	USAF	C-130	
15 Jan	USAF	C-130	
21 Jan	USAF	C-130	
24 Jan	USAF	C-130	
28 Jan	USAF	C-130	
10 Feb	USAF	C-130	
16 Feb	USAF	C-130	
6 Mar	VNAF	A-1G	
10 Mar	USAF	C-130	
16 Mar	USAF	C-130	
17 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
18 Mar	USAF	F-4D	
20 Mar	USAF	C-130	
23 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
24 Mar	USAF	F-4	
24 Mar	VNAF	A-1G	
28 Mar	USAF	C-130	
29 Mar	USAF	F-4D	
31 Mar	USAF	CH-3	
5 Apr	VNAF	A-1G	
6 Apr	VNAF	A-1G	
7 Apr	USAF	CH-3	
15 Apr	USAF	CH-3	
1 May	USAF	C-130	
5 May	VNAF	A-1G	
6 May	USAF	C-130	
7 May	GRC	C-123	
14 May	USAF	CH-3	
15 May	USAF	CH-3	
17 May	USAF	C-130	
19 May	USAF	C-130	
22 May	USAF	CH-3	
26 May	GRC	C-123	
29 May	USAF	CH-3	

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
21 Aug	VNAF	A-1G	
21 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
24 Aug	GRC	C-123	
24 Aug	USAF	C-130	
27 Aug	USAF	C-130	
31 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
9 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
12 Sep	GRC	C-123	
14 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
15 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
22 Sep	USAF	C-130	
22 Sep	GRC	C-123	
23 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
24 Sep	GRC	C-123	
26 Sep	GRC	C-123	
26 Sep	USAF	C-130	
28 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
2 Oct	GRC	C-123	
2 Oct	USAF	C-130	
3 Oct	GRC	C-123	
4 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
5 Oct	GRC	C-123	
6 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
11 Oct	USAF	C-130	
15 Oct	GRC	C-123	
23 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
25 Oct	GRC	C-123	
28 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
26 Nov	USAF	C-123	

Date	Sponsor	Aircraft	Mission
21 Aug	VNAF	A-1G	
21 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
24 Aug	GRC	C-123	
24 Aug	USAF	C-130	
27 Aug	USAF	C-130	
31 Aug	USAF	CH-3	
9 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
12 Sep	GRC	C-123	
14 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
15 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
22 Sep	USAF	C-130	
22 Sep	GRC	C-123	
23 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
24 Sep	GRC	C-123	
26 Sep	GRC	C-123	
26 Sep	USAF	C-130	
28 Sep	USAF	CH-3	
2 Oct	GRC	C-123	
2 Oct	USAF	C-130	
3 Oct	GRC	C-123	
4 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
5 Oct	GRC	C-123	
6 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
11 Oct	USAF	C-130	
15 Oct	GRC	C-123	
23 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
25 Oct	GRC	C-123	
28 Oct	USAF	CH-3	
26 Nov	USAF	C-123	

TAB C

USAF C-130E

15th SOS, Nha Trang AB, RVN

Month	Resupply Sched	Resupply Comp	Psyops Sched	Psyops Comp	Canx Weather	Canx Maint	Neg TmCont	Other
Jan	8	1	6	4	5	3	1	0
Feb	4	0	3	2	4	0	0	1
Mar	3	1	5	3	4	0	0	0
Apr	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
May	0	0	6	5	1	0	0	0
Jun	1	1	4	2	2	0	0	0
Jul	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	0
Aug	1	1	3	3	0	0	0	0
Sep	0	0	7	2	5	0	0	0
Oct	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	0

(1 November bombing halt cancelled missions remainder of the year)

TOTAL	21	5	38	24	23	4	2	1

TASKER NUMBER MACSOG TS000 1024-69

DUE DATE 12-24-92 ~~Annex F~~ '68 CMD HISTORY

REDACT _____ DECLASSIFY ✓

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

PP. F-III-3-1 thru F-III-3-H-2

DOCUMENTS REMOVED

CIA

NOT DECLASSIFIED

c. STRATA Operations. In April 1967, JCS approved the infiltration of STRATA teams into selected areas of the panhandle of NVN with the mission of installation of seismis wiretap devices, roadwatch of critical LOCs, reconnaissance and pinpointing of selected enemy installations, and target acquisition for air strikes. Only two STRATA teams were infiltrated in 1967 and only one of these was recovered. The STRATA program was at a low ebb by the end of 1967 due to a number of factors; principally the weather in the operational area and lack of trained and motivated teams. In 1968, management of the STRATA program was the responsibility of OP-34B until the 1 November bombing halt suspended operations in NVN.

d. Diversionary Operations. Diversionary operations, designated by the CINCPAC code word FORAE , were conceived in late 1967, approved by Chief, MACSOG on 29 November 1967, and by COMUSMACV on 14 March 1968. The objectives are to divert main force NVN resources to defense and internal security, divert them away from actual clandestine operations, increase strain on control of the populace, create opportunities for friendly psychological operations exploitation, harass the enemy in his rear, and collect intelligence where possible. The last objective is accomplished by giving other agencies greater freedom of movement and, in a very limited degree, through the recovery of diversionary assets. FORAE is divided into three sub-programs; OODLES , URGENCY(, and BORDEN . The development and conduct of diversionary operations in 1968 was the responsibility of OP-34C (redesignated in December as Special Section of the Airborne Studies Group).

e. Authorities: See TAB A.

4. AGENT TEAM OPERATIONS.

a. Agent Teams.

(1) In January 1968, there were eight in-place TIMBERWORK teams operational in NVN. Since that time two teams, DATA and DATA , have been surfaced by NVN and one team, DATA , stopped radio transmission and is now being carried as MIA.

(2) During March and April, 1968, US case officers assigned to agent teams were tasked with the writing of histories and preparing a security analysis of their respective teams. This resulted in one team, DATA being declared probably not under hostile control; five teams, DATA , DATA , DATA , DATA and DATA being declared under NVN control; and two teams, DATA and DATA , being declared as doubtful. As a result of the case officers' analysis controversy

problem, the decision was made by Chief, MACSOG to request a counter-intelligence survey team consisting of MACV J-2 and personnel.