
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MAC-V-SOG COMMAND HISTORY ANNEX B:

1971





1972

Volume II

The Last Secret of the Vietnam War

by

Charles F. Reske

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MAC-V-SOG 1971-72 Command History ANNEX B:
The Last Secret of the Vietnam War
Volume II
by Charles F. Reske

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MAC-V-SOG 1971-72 COMMAND HISTORY ANNEX B:
The Last Secret of the Vietnam War
by
Charles F. Reske

DECLASSIFIED

At last the whole truth can be told about America's shadow war, the clandestine operations of the MACV Studies and Observations Group.

WHAT IS ANNEX B?

Until recently one of the most highly classified documents of the Vietnam War, Annex B was produced by MACVSOG for a highly select audience. Only thirty-two numbered copies are known to have existed, and those were restricted to the President and a few priviledged officials. Most government and military personnel were not permitted access to the MACSOG "Big Picture."

Now available to the general public, this awesome two-volume set contains secrets buried since the beginning of the Vietnam War. Annex B is not a book about MACVSOG, it *is* MACVSOG!

Virtually everything you ever wanted to know about the *Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group* (MACVSOG) is contained in this comprehensive two-volume set. Finally, an inside account of how our intelligence agencies worked throughout S.E. Asia after striking a Devil's bargain with the MACV Command hierarchy and the elite of America's fighting forces. The highs and lows, victories and defeats, successes and failures . . . all are open to the reader.

Each chapter is summarized and subjected to thorough analysis by the author, a former member of the Top Secret U.S. Naval Security Group whose own work is still highly classified.

The Annex is enhanced by 58 organizational flow charts and several maps showing the range and scope of SOG's operations in Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and the DMZ, together with an insightful historical introduction to the Vietnam conflict. Included are MACVSOG's history and detailed reports on each of the 18 sections and sub-sections that comprised the Studies and Observations Groups, most of them unknown and unsuspected . . . until now.

Was MACVSOG the success hoped for? Was it a failure? Or did it achieve an uneasy middle ground? The facts of the case are here; you be the judge.

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[redacted]

DEDICATION

(Specific)

To all my shipmates in NAVSECGRUDET "Mondo" Bravo and the Project: ALPHA support team. You know who you are.

DEDICATION

(General)

To whom it may concern.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO ANNEX B: THE COMMAND HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM, STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

by

CHARLES F. RESKE

You hold in your hand what was, until quite recently, one of the most highly classified documents of the Vietnam War. TOP SECRET LIMDIS NOFORN is milspeak for Top Secret, Limited Distribution, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. The classification meant exactly what it said. Access to Annex B was contingent upon possession of a Top Secret clearance and a proven "Need to Know."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff define Need to Know as: "a criterion used in security procedures which requires the custodians of classified information to establish, prior to disclosure, that the intended recipient must have access to the information to perform his official duties."[1]

Possession of a Top Secret clearance has never constituted a broad authorization for access to any and all classified material. Research outside of one's narrowly defined area of expertise was and is prohibited.

Top Secret information "requires the highest degree of protection, and unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."[2]

Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" are armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptographic and communications intelligence systems; and the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations.[3] With a few exceptions, everything in Annex B was classified Top Secret.

Most classified documents, including Top Secret, have a limited life expectancy in any one classification. In other words, documents are reviewed periodically and downgraded from Top Secret to Secret to Confidential on a fairly regular schedule. Annex B was excluded from automatic regrading. The U.S. government (in 1972) never thought that detailed information concerning MACVSOG would ever see the light of day.

They were almost right. Prior to Annex B's release the sum total of MACVSOG material available to the public amounted to a few extracts from the Pentagon Papers and perhaps ninety pages of "I Was There" stories in several popular magazines. All things considered, seventeen years of classification is quite respectable.

In the jargon of the intelligence community, Annex B was the Big Picture, a document the average member of a SPIKE or HATCHET Team never saw in its unedited form. The need to know rule applied just as much to a colonel as it did an E-4. A glance at the distribution list in the appendix to this work shows that only thirty-two numbered and authorized copies of the Annex existed at any one time. Interestingly enough, the South Vietnamese were

excluded from the distribution list. It was strange, though ultimately justifiable, treatment of an ally.

Most of the 1971-72 Command History is here, and represents MACVSOG's finale. By far the most comprehensive of the Command Histories, it was intended to sum up SOG's activities and display the organization's accomplishments in a positive light. As careful analysis reveals, there wasn't a great deal about the Vietnam War in general and Vietnamization in particular for SOG to be positive about.

Ironically, all of the problems so hastily addressed by MACVSOG and it's successor, Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team #158, were foreshadowed at the very beginning of the war.

While conflict throughout Southeast Asia was nothing new, it was World War II that set the stage for what would become America's longest running war. The United States, bowing to the military and political realities of the middle and late 1940's, found itself in the position of supporting two diametrically opposed policies.

On the one hand the U.S. government was reassuring a militarily humiliated France that its colonial possessions would be returned to their control after the war, while on the other hand the U.S. was committed, in principle, to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter which supported national self-determination.

President Roosevelt, a strong advocate of self-determination and independence for Indochina, regarded the French control of Southeast Asia as a perfect example of all that was wrong with colonialism. It was his belief that the region should be placed

under a trusteeship after the war, rather than being returned to France outright.

Roosevelt's trusteeship concept disintegrated in March of 1943 when the British declared themselves unwilling to join in any declaration of national independence or trusteeship which extended beyond the ambiguously worded Atlantic Charter's provisions to: "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

In deferring to the British, Roosevelt effectively consigned resource rich Indochina to the same status as post-war Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia: free territories that would be returned to colonial control as soon as feasibly possible.

When President Truman entered office the United States quickly re-affirmed it's commitment to restoring French sovereignty over Indochina which, Truman maintained, had never really been in question. With the Russians establishing themselves throughout Eastern Europe and the Western wartime alliances hanging by threads, there was little else Truman could do without jeopardizing the cooperation of post-war France and Britain in containing Soviet expansionism.

Thus, while the United States might press the French to implement progressive measures throughout their colonial empire, there was no schedule for the implementation of the highly problematic measures.

With the cooperation and assistance of the British, French military forces re-established themselves in Indochina in September of 1945. Almost immediately guerrilla warfare broke out between the

French and the Viet Minh (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi--League for the Independence of Vietnam). French claims to the loyalty and devotion of the population dissolved within a matter of weeks.

Through the fall and winter of 1945-46 Ho Chi Minh made at least eight requests to the President and Secretary of State for U.S. aid against the French. Through OSS channels he proposed that Vietnam be accorded the same status as the Philippine Islands for an undetermined period prior to full independence. While his requests were officially ignored, the United States pointedly refused to assist the French military effort in Vietnam.

This state of affairs soon changed as the United States began to preoccupy itself with the growing Communist threat in Europe and Asia. Abstracted with Ho's apparent Communist nature and the fear that once established he would set up a Kremlin-controlled Communist state, he was allowed to drift further from American control and into the waiting arms of the Chinese Red Army.

U.S. Indochina policy in the late 1940's demonstrated the same kind of timid indecision that had been displayed throughout World War II whenever U.S. strategic interests had run up against those of our allies.

We had not hesitated to act against the colonial interests of the Dutch and the Netherlands in Indonesia simply because the British fully supported the action. The Netherlands were a less significant ally in Europe than the British or French, thus when they refused to condone similar actions in Indochina, U.S. reaction was to meekly concur.

Ho Chi Minh, for his part, had completely misjudged the extent of U.S. commitment to national independence movements. That is, he chose to believe the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter, and a speech by President Truman in 1945 that endorsed national self-determination. He wouldn't make the same mistake twice.

Ho Chi Minh and the French signed an accord on March 6, 1946 in which he apparently acceded to French re-entry into North Vietnam on the condition that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam be recognized as a free state, part of the French Union. Almost immediately he was attacked by pro-Chinese elements within the DRV for his dealings with the hated colonialists. He replied:

"You fools! Don't you realize what it means if the Chinese stay? Don't you remember your history? The last time the Chinese came, they stayed a thousand years!

The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying out. Nothing will be able to withstand world pressure for independence. They may stay for a while, but they will have to go because the white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never leave.

As for me, I prefer to smell French shit for five years, rather than Chinese shit for the rest of my life."

Ho's words were both colorful and prophetic.

In 1946, U.S. military equipment was being used by the French against the Viet Minh, with the United States arranging credit for

France to purchase $160 million worth of vehicles and miscellaneous industrial equipment for use in Indochina.

With the collapse of the Chinese Nationalist government in 1949, the United States was faced with what appeared to be virtually unchecked Communist expansion in the Far East. In response, the U.S. brought into play those instruments that were apparently succeeding in Europe, namely collective security organizations, economic aid, and military assistance.

Ho Chi Minh had his back to the wall. Unwilling to consider further deals with the French and wary of the Red Chinese giant within arm's reach on his northern border, Ho officially embraced Communism in 1950, declaring that his was the only legal government of the Vietnamese people. Promptly recognized by Red China and the Soviet Union, his machinations had obtained recognition and aid for the struggle against the French while defusing a potentially dangerous confrontation with the equally hated Chinese.

By April of 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informing the Secretary of Defense that the situation in Southeast Asia was deteriorating rapidly, and would continue to do so without a massive infusion of U.S. aid. The overall assessment of the French military situation held little good news.

Viet Minh forces were in control of approximately half of South Vietnam, and while the French enjoyed a superiority in equipment, the Viet Minh were rapidly catching up thanks to Chinese assistance and a seemingly bottomless pit of available manpower.

The Viet Minh were highly mobile, while the French were essentially roadbound and dug in. French strategy was lacking in

aggression, and instead persued a defensive strategy that was of doubtful value.

The status of the Vietnamese National Army was nearly zero, and there was only the slightest chance that the French could maintain their military position long enough to build the VNA into an effective fighting force.

The assessment concluded with a dire prediction that the French were in danger of suffering a major military defeat by the Viet Minh in Tonkin within six to nine months, which would jeopardize the French position throughout the remainder of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and de-stabilize the entire region (the Domino Theory). The only possible remedy to this situation was a massive infusion of U.S. aid. At the height of the French-Indochina conflict the United States was paying for approximately 78% of the war effort.

The military situation had apparently achieved a degree of stability when, on 7 May 1954, the fortress of Dien Bien Phu fell.

The United States was quick to back off on the Domino Theory, which had been avidly persued since the late 1940's. It was concluded that the loss of Tonkin, and even Indochina, was no longer considered to inevitably lead to a massive loss to Communism throughout SEA.

Secretary Dulles, speaking four days after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, observed that, "Southeast Asia could be secured even without perhaps Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." He characterized Laos and Cambodia as "important but by no means essential" because they were poor countries with meager populations. 4

Despite these admissions, the United States was not in a conciliatory mood, and subsequently refused to sign the Geneva Accords that divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel. Had an election been held in Vietnam in 1956 between Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem---as called for in the Accords---it was widely believed that Ho would have won with nearly 80% of the vote.

The deadlines for consultations and elections passed without any international action to implement those provisions of the settlement. Diem's state, while attempting to pass itself off as an American-style government, remained a one party, highly centralized family business in which democracy did not exist.

In 1956 the My-Diem (a derogatory term used by the Viet Minh in describing Diem as a tool of the Americans) government accorded itself the power to detain individuals considered a danger to the state to re-education centers. Any act performed for any organization that had been designated Communist was punishable by death. The state of affairs in South Vietnam was described in the January 1957 edition of Foreign Affairs:

"South Vietnam is today a quasi-police state characterized by arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, strict censorship of the press and the absence of an effective political opposition...All the techniques of political and psychological warfare, as well as pacification campaigns involving extensive military operations have been brought to bear against the underground." 5

When John F. Kennedy assumed office in 1961, support for the Saigon government among South Vietnam's peasants---who constituted 90% of the population of SVN---was weak and in serious decline.

By 1960-61 U.S. economic aid to South Vietnam amounted to $156.8 million annually, and the ten thousand U.S. military advisors stationed in SVN thought they had determined the true nature of the conflict in which they found themselves. This was an unconventional war of counterinsurgency to win hearts and minds, rather than a war devoted to taking ground from the enemy and holding it.

The biggest battles would revolve around the monolithic South Vietnamese governmental system and its conversion from a remote, autocratic business to a service-providing political structure that would link it---in terms of legitimacy---with its mostly rural subjects.

Despite the aid and troops, the military situation failed to improve measurably. In 1963 South Vietnamese forces operating 30 miles outside of Saigon in the village of Ap Bac, engaged the Viet Cong.

ARVN troops had the VC outnumbered at least six to one, yet managed to lose the battle along with 100 SVN soldiers killed or wounded, three American KIA's, and five helicopters shot down. In after action reports U.S. advisors, who had observed the performance of the Vietnamese on the battlefield, placed the blame for the defeat squarely on the shoulders of the SVN commanders, whom they accused of poor coordination/leadership and a decided lack of aggressiveness.

In response to the deteriorating situation, President Kennedy dispatched Secretary McNamara and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Maxwell Taylor to investigate the Diem regime. Their reports confirmed most of the suspicions of the State Department, and in November of 1963 Diem and his brother were captured by elements of the SVN Army and Marines. The Diem brothers later died in custody, their deaths officially described as "accidental suicide."

The Diem government was replaced by a Military Revolutionary Council headed by Major-General Duong Van Minh and Premier Nguyen Ngoc Tho. In August of 1964 Minh himself was replaced by Lieutenant-General Nguyen Khanh, who assumed the presidency. Tran Van Huong, the ex-mayor of Saigon, became the Premier of South Vietnam.

After the fall of the Diem and Minh governments the United States indulged itself in a period of wishful thinking and unjustified optimism. It was hoped that the Khanh government would be more responsive to U.S. advice than its predecessor. These unfounded hopes were short lived. In 1964, following a decision to expand the U.S. advisory role, the Viet Cong were still scoring military victories and the GVN was still unstable.

In response to the ever increasing possibility that South Vietnam might fall to the Communists, the U.S. government began to discuss "spin control" options. These were:

(1) To hold the situation together as long as possible, so that we (the U.S.) have time to strengthen other areas of Asia.

(2) To take forceful enough measures in the situation so that we emerge from it, even in the worst case, with our standing as the principal helper against Communist expansion as little impaired as possible.

(3) To make it clear to the world, and to nations in Asia particularly, that failure in South Vietnam, if it comes, was due to special local factors---such as a bad colonial heritage and a lack of will to defend itself---that do not apply to other nations we are committed to defend---that, in short, our will and ability to help those nations defend themselves is not impaired.6

The fall back scheme was further elaborated on in February of 1965 in a memorandum for Robert S. McNamara from John T. McNaughton. Techniques discussed in this Annex to the memo (entitled: Techniques To Minimize Impact of Bad Outcomes) were:

(1). Publicize uniqueness and congenital impossibility of SVN case (e.g., Viet Minh held much of SVN in 1954, long, sieve-like borders, unfavorable terrain, no national tradition, few administrators, mess left by French, competing factions, Red LOC advantage, late U.S. start, etc.).

(2). Take opportunity offered by next coup or GVN anti-U.S. tantrum to "ship out" (coupled with advance threat to do so if they fail to "shape up?")

(3). Create diversionary "offensives" elsewhere in the world (e.g., to shore up Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, India, Australia; to launch an "anti-poverty" program for underdeveloped areas.).

(4). Enter multi-nation negotiations calculated to shift opinions and values.7

Further, U.S. aims in South Vietnam were defined as:

70%---To avoid a humiliating US defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).

20%---To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.

10%---To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer, way of life.

Also---to emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods used.

Not---To "help a friend," although it would be hard to stay in if asked out.8

To achieve these ends the United States would help SVN defeat the Viet Cong by means short of the "unqualified commitment of U.S. forces." The National Security Council, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Commander in Chief Pacific, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs considered U.S. actions so modest that they were believed unlikely to have "any significant effect on the rest of the world."

Administration insiders knew that while the above explanations might play successfully at home, internationally they would be seen as the patent rationalizations they were. Insofar as the "Aims" are concerned, the numbers themselves speak volumes about our priorities in SEA.

But no one was suggesting they give up the game just yet. A number of measures that might have changed the U.S. advisory role, in relation to their South Vietnamese counterparts, were discussed and dropped in mid-1965 as the U.S. attempted to generate a cohesive policy in Vietnam.

President Johnson supported the notion of encadrement of U.S. troops in ARVN units, but was opposed by General Westmoreland, mostly on the grounds of language difficulties and the logistics involved. More to the point, it would have had much the same effect on ARVN as placing Vietnamese units under the command of U.S. advisors. The whole idea was to train the South Vietnamese to fight and win their own war.

Inevitably, to shore up the Vietnamese command hierarchy, U.S. advisors eventually found themselves serving in advisory positions from the Joint General Staff to the battalion level, with enough men at the lower levels to provide advice on a "when needed" basis. In mid-1965 the concept was put to the test.

On 11 May 1965 the Viet Cong attacked and overran Song Be, the capital of Phouc Long Province, and a U.S. advisory compound in the city with more than a regiment of friendly troops in residence. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese took heavy casualties.

Before the end of May, a VC force of undetermined size ambushed and decimated the ARVN 51st Regiment near an outpost named Ba Gia, which was a few kilometers west of Quang Ngai City in I Corps. The ARVN commander rushed reinforcements to the battlefield and ran into the same ambush that had destroyed the 51st Regiment.

The battle lasted several days and ended in total defeat for the South Vietnamese. When it was over, two battalions were completely decimated and the ARVN commanders were shown to have demonstrated incredible tactical stupidity and cowardice.

The following week the VC launched an attack on a new Special Forces camp and district headquarters at Dong Zoai on the northwest corner of War Zone D. The battle lasted five days, during which the ARVN forces were obliterated by more than two regiments of enemy troops.

So devastating were the ARVN losses, that by the end of May two ARVN regiments and three battalions were rated as combat ineffective by MACV standards. By June, MACV was forced to rate 5 ARVN regiments and 9 battalions ineffective. The loss of manpower was so staggering that 11 of 15 ARVN training battalions had to be broken up to provide fillers for the line units.

In most instances the ARVN units were their own worst enemy, defeating themselves by tactical ineptitude, cowardice, and general lack of leadership rather than by weight of numbers or inferiority of firepower. Most observers predicted the imminent collapse of South Vietnam without an infusion of American troops. Mid-1965 marked the effective end of the U.S. advisory phase.

With additional American troops committed to the growing conflict, a false sense of optimism began to dominate U.S. thinking, the most notable (and ultimately wrong) being the general assessment of the war effort and Viet Cong determination up to 1968.

Presumably, the enemy was suffering massive defeats and losses of manpower, right up until the Tet Offensive of 1968, when the VC/NVA launched a series of massive attacks against the cities and surrounding pacification forces in South Vietnam.

In the aftermath of Tet the U.S. announced that more emphasis would be placed on training the South Vietnamese to take over a larger share of the war effort. No one seemed surprised to learn that this was the same policy we had ostensibly been persuing since 1961.

Despite the fact that the VC had lost 60% of their manpower in Tet, they had long since captured the nationalist movement. The government of South Vietnam, on the other hand, was perceived as the last refuge of those Vietnamese who had supported the hated French in the battle for independence.

This was the historical backdrop against which OPLAN 34A and the Studies and Observations Group took shape.

The original concept for a program of covert action had been discussed as early as May of 1963, and OPLAN 34-63 had been a major topic of conversation during the Vietnam Policy Conference held at Honolulu on November 20, 1963.

This plan, essentially identical to the final 1964 draft version, had as its stated goals provisions for harassment; diversion, political pressure; capture of prisoners; physical

destruction; acquisition of intelligence; the generation of intelligence; and the diversion of Democratic Republic of Vietnam resources.[9]

OPLAN 34A was signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson on 24 January 1964. Thus was born the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group under a blanket of highly classified, though clearly mixed, enthusiasm. The military liked the idea because it implied a certain degree of flexibility outside the normal constraints of the Vietnam War, though many intelligence professionals thought the plan unworkable. The professionals were ignored.

As originally conceptualized, OPLAN 34A would be implemented with a relatively modest increase in tempo to produce positive effects on the DRV. Positive was defined as surrender or economic/political collapse leading to peace in the region.

Policy guidance for the conduct of special operations, received from Washington in March of 1964, was based on the philosophy that such covert operations were desirable, but only on a non-competitive basis with respect to resources allocated to counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam. MACVSOG would have a relatively free hand as long as it didn't get in the way of more conventional solutions.

General Order 6, Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, set the stage for one of the most complex and ambitious covert operations ever mounted by the United States since World War II. Unlike WWII, MACVSOG wouldn't find

itself working within a more or less familiar western cultural milieu.

Originally called the Special Operations Group, MACVSOG was under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff, MACV, and was designated as a separate staff section under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) with J-5 (Plans) having special cognizance of all actions.

MACVSOG's stated mission was divided into three phases. The first phase, which would run from February through May 1964, called for intelligence collection through U-2 and communications intelligence missions and psychological operations involving leaflet drops, propaganda kit deliveries and radio broadcasts. It also provided for approximately "20 destructive undertakings, all within...early prospective (GVN) capabilities...(and) designed to result in substantial destruction, economic loss, and harassment." [10]

Additionally, joint military action by the government of SVN and the United States against the DRV, including border actions, retaliatory actions, bombing strikes, commando raids, and aerial mining, were discussed. [11]

The second and third phases of the plan were essentially similar to the first, though of increased intensity and specifically directed against North Vietnam. These phases were designed to cover direct destructive action against North Vietnamese targets that had been identified with North Vietnam's economic and industrial well-being. More importantly, the entire campaign would be under the operational command of USMACV, not the South Vietnamese Government.

Initial manning for MACVSOG was austere, and depended largely on TDY augmentation. CINCPAC established TDY Naval support for the U.S. Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang (NAD) as follows:

A. Repair and Maintenance Team:

(1). First increment - Two officers, 11 enlisted.

(2). Second increment - (for support of four boats) - Seven additional enlisted.

(3). Third increment - (for support of six boats) - Five additional enlisted.

(4). Fourth increment - (for support of eight boats) - Six additional enlisted.

B. Boat Training Team: Strength was to vary depending on the number of boats and the rate at which the Vietnamese crews completed training, based on an allowance of two officers and ten enlisted men per PTF (Fast Patrol Boat).

C. SEAL Training Team: Composed of two officers and ten enlisted.

D. Marine Recon Team: Composed of one officer and three enlisted. 12

By March of 1964 the JCS had increased SOG's manpower to an interim 100 man Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), consisting of ninety-seven military and three civilians. 13

The Army's initial contribution was equally austere, consisting of one officer and fifteen enlisted men to assist in the training of Vietnamese at Camp Long Thanh, the Airborne and

Unconventional Warfare/Counter-Insurgency training center in IV Corps.[14]

In March the curriculum consisted of survival techniques, river and obstacle crossing techniques, advanced first aid, and methods of instructing in all the above subjects plus tactics, weapons, airborne training and field exercises.

From those humble beginnings MACVSOG expanded into an organization consisting of more than two thousand Americans and ten thousand indigenous personnel.

But now it is 1971. The Tet Offensive is history and the Pentagon Papers, print media, and open Congressional hearings have begun to expose MACVSOG to public view through the detailed testimony of former SPIKE team members.

The controversial Phoenix Program has undergone a name change, and Jack Anderson has compromised the top secret nicknames for U.S. operations in Cambodia and Laos.

U.S. troop withdrawals are beginning to highlight serious deficiencies in the RVNAF, problems uncorrected since they were first addressed in 1961. There is very little good news about Vietnam.

MACVSOG is racing against the clock to shore up the superstructure of the Strategic Technical Directorate, South Vietnam's version of SOG. Careers and promotions are on the line. With luck, South Vietnam might hold together long enough to put some time and distance between MACV's senior officers and the disaster predicted in the early 1960's.

We begin at the end.

C.F.X. RESKE

August, 1989

[1] "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military (and Associated) Terms," by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1988, ARCO Publications.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Senator Gravel Edition of The Pentagon Papers--The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam--Beacon Press, 1971 (hereafter referred to as Pentagon Papers), volume I, page 106, "Reappraisal of Domino Theory After Dien Bien Phu."

[5] Pentagon Papers, volume I, page 325.

[6] Pentagon Papers, Volume III, Document 241, page 657. Revised paper by Wm. Bundy and McNaughton, "Summary: Courses of Action in Southeast Asia---U.S. Objectives and Stakes in South Vietnam and Southeast Asia," 26 November 1964.

[7] Pentagon Papers, Volume III, Document 253, page 694. Memorandum for Robert S. McNamara from McNaughton, "Proposed Course of Action re: Vietnam," (Techniques to Minimize Impact of Bad Outcomes) (draft), 24 March 1965.

[8] Ibid

[9] Pentagon Papers, Volume III, page 150, "Origins and Development: Presidential Support and Approval."

[10] Pentagon Papers, Volume III, page 150, "Covert Action Program: Scope and Character."

[11] JCS SACSA 181522Z March 1964 (SOG 00188-64).

[12] CINCPAC msg 292126Z and 15212362 Jan 1964.

[13] CINCPAC ltr 00589 of 24 Apr 1964.

[14] MACSOG msg 140130Z Feb 1964.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER ONE

By 1971-72 the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group found itself operating under almost impossible constraints and not a few dark clouds. With the exception of crash site inspections or personnel recovery operations, American-led Recon Teams into Cambodia and Laos were a thing of the past. Thus, in persuit of its goals, SOG found itself forced to rely on the less than dependable Vietnamese-led Recon Teams fielded by the Strategic Technical Directorate, SOG's problematic equal and successor.

As SOG prepared to stand down, air support became almost impossible to obtain, and by mid-February of 1972 critical operations were being handled on a case-by-case basis. By the end of March, MACSOG was no longer capable of conducting operations. MACSOG ceased all operations on 31 March 1972, and was de-activated on 30 April 1972.

Almost immediately the slack was taken up by the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team #158, a drastically scaled down, post-SOG operation designed to shepherd the Vietnamese STD into full operational readiness.

One hundred and fifty-five former SOG personnel formed the core of STDAT #158. Charged with the nearly impossible task of preparing the Vietnamese to assume their share of the covert war, on paper the task appeared insurmountable.

The Special Mission Advisory Group (SMAG), an adjunct of STDAT #158 composed of residual 5th Special Forces personnel, would have

to step up implementation of the Improvement and Modernization (I&M) program, train the STD in areas of unconventional warfare, strategic reconnaissance, and maritime warfare.

In other words, SMAG would be instructing the STD in techniques that should have been learned in 1967 when they changed their name from the Special Exploitation Service to the Strategic Technical Directorate. If anyone in the STDAT or SMAG experienced a sense of deja vu at this "new," circa 1961-type mission, his observations have gone unreported in Annex B.

In its final days SOG found itself faced with a number of internal problems they had previously believed themselves exempt from. Security Branch, MACSOG-21, found it appropriate to attend a background briefing by the MACV Provost Marshal concerning drug abuse among American Servicemen in Vietnam, and breeches of security, decreasing morale and slipping discipline began to haunt SOG.

Prior to disestablishment, SOG still looked STRAC[1] on paper, sporting 24 separate divisions, branches, and groups. In reality, they were seriously hampered by a decrease in the number of billets and tight Congressional and Presidential restrictions on their operations.

One of the greatest liabilities was the gradual collapse of security. The Pentagon Papers, open Congressional testimony by disgruntled former Recon Team members, and the print media were methodically stripping away the layers of security SOG had

[1]Strategic, Tough, and Ready Around the Clock.

laboriously constructed since it's inception in 1964. Security Branch worked steadily throughout 1971-72 in a more or less futile attempt to plug the leaks.

In the area of document security, regulations were drawn up to further restrict access to SOG material by elements of MACV. Owing to the American withdrawal, units were disappearing from the order of battle or being re-aligned with little regard for the final disposition of classified material. Normal security procedures mandated the strict accounting of all classified documents, including a record of their physical destruction.

MACSOG Directive 420-2 (Unclassified) was written specifically to stress the responsibilities and procedures for the use of the MACV incinerator, including a strict accounting system. This strongly suggests that a good deal of classified material was adrift throughout MACV, its whereabouts unknown.

In the area of physical security, SOG tightened the Headquarters Access Pass System to more efficiently monitor the admission of personnel during and after duty hours. Insofar as personnel security was concerned, MACSOG Directive 612-1 (Unclassified) was revised to provide for a more thorough screening of prospective SOG personnel, a clear case of shutting the barn door after the horse has bolted.

Despite the fact that Security Branch participated in 25 Annual Inspector General Inspections; 14 Counterintelligence Inspections, and 25 after-hours Counterintelligence Inspections, a serious breach in security was consistently overlooked and ignored until May of 1971.

Counterintelligence Directorate, USARV G2, Office of Special Investigations, Air Force 525th Military Intelligence Group, and members of their staffs.

(S) On 13 Mar 71, Security Branch conducted a Counterintelligence Survey at the Liaison Bureau (LB) in anticipation of the proposed move of MACSOG-35 from MACV I to LB. The survey included perimeter security to include perimeter lighting, and facilities. MACSOG-21 monitored the renovation of existing buildings to insure that the buildings met required security and operational standards as outlined in current security regulations and directives. Security Branch acted as liaison between MACSOG-35 and the Provost Marshal's office for Military Police escort for vehicles containing classified material. The move was completed on 4 Sep 71.

(U) On 21 Mar 71, MACSOG-21 was realigned and removed from operational control of MACSOG-20 and placed under operational control of the Deputy Chief to provide more command emphasis to security matters.

(U) On 24 Apr 71, MACV I Compound was declared as restricted area IAW USARV Regulation 380-20(C), Restricted Areas(U).

(S) On 30 Apr 71, Security Branch provided security escort for a NVA Master Sergeant who was of operational interest to the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC).

(U) The staff elements of the command were designated as divisions and encompassed all of the major areas required to effectively supervise the activities and operations of MACSOG.

1. Personnel and Administrative Division, MACSOG-10 (Appendix 1)
2. Intelligence Division, MACSOG-20 (Appendix 2)
3. Operations and Training Division, MACSOG-30 (Appendix 3). MACSOG-30 was further divided into five sub-elements:
   a. Maritime Studies Branch (MACSOG-31)
   b. Air Studies Branch (MACSOG-32)
   c. PSYOP Studies Branch (MACSOG-33)
   d. Ground Studies Branch (MACSOG-34)
   e. Statistics and Analysis Section (SAS)
4. Logistics Division, MACSOG-40 (Appendix 4)
5. Plans Division, MACSOG-50 (Appendix 5)
6. Communications Division, MACSOG-60 (Appendix 6)
7. Recovery Studies Division, MACSOG-80 (Appendix 7)
8. Comptroller Division, MACSOG-90 (Appendix 8)

OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS

(TS) There were eight operational elements with the mission of executing the special operations and training assigned to MACSOG. On 1 Oct 71, the Airborne Studies Group was combined with the Ground Studies Group.---SENTENCE DELETED

1. Ground Studies Group, MACSOG-35 (Appendix 9). The principal efforts expended by the Ground Studies Group were directed against specified areas of Cambodia and Laos, which served as NVA/VC sanctuaries or base areas. These areas were identified by the nicknames THOT NOT (TN) formally SALEM HOUSE for Cambodia, and PHU DUNG (PD) formally PRAIRIE FIRE for Laos. Subordinate elements of the Ground Studies Group were the Task Force Advisory Elements, referred to as TFAE's formally known as Command and Control (C&C) elements. Each TFAE detachment usually had two launch teams for control of operations launched from any of several sites located along the South Vietnamese border. A security company provided security for the forward operating bases and any forward launch sites established. Nine exploitation companies were available to exploit targets uncovered by the reconnaissance teams (RTs) - the basic units and work horses of the TFAEs. The TFAEs were authorized 20-35 RTs of 12 men each, and each team was made up of three US or three ARVN, plus nine indigenous Special Commando Unit (SCU) personnel. After 8 Feb 71 US led RTs were restricted to conducting only in-country reconnaissance. There were three TFAE's:

1. TF1AE, formally Command and Control North, located in Da Nang had primary interest for the Northern PHU DUNG AO and the DMZ (NICKLE STEEL) AO.

2. TF2AE, formally Command and Control Central at Kontum, operated in both the THOT NOT and PHU DUNG AO's.

(12)

3. TF3AE, formally Command and Control South at Ban Me Thuot, had primary interest in the Southern THOT NOT AO.

2. Airborne Studies Group, MACSOG-36 (Appendix 10). The Airborne Studies Group was responsible for agent operations which complimented other cross-border intelligence and Psychological warfare programs. Originally, the groups assets were targeted against North Vietnam, but with the bombing halt, in Nov 68, most activities against North Vietnam ceased. MACSOG-36 was, however, charged with maintaining the capability to go north, and re-oriented its assets to other MACSOG cross-border areas of operations. MACSOG-36 was incorporated into MACSOG-35 on 1 Oct 71. The major projects under its auspices were---SECTION DELETED.

3. Maritime Studies Group, MACSOG-37 (Appendix 11). The Maritime Studies Group was responsible for covert maritime operations conducted by the Vietnamese Coastal Security Service (CSS). The capability to carry out missions against North Vietnam was maintained through extensive training at Da Nang and by conducting operational missions against selected targets in South Vietnam. ---SENTENCE DELETED--- CSS had progressed to such a point by Jul 71 that they assumed all responsibility from the US for planning and carrying out missions. ---SECTION DELETED---

4. Training Studies Group, MACSOG-38 (Appendix 12). The Training Studies Group was located at Long Thanh and conducted the

necessary training to insure qualified personnel were available for MACSOG and STD. MACSOG-38 was under the operational control of the Director, Operations and Training Division.---SECTION DELETED---

7. Air Studies Group, MACSOG-75 (Appendix 15). The Air Studies Group provided and coordinated aircraft from the US Air Force, US Marine Corps, US Army, Vietnamese Air Force, and third-country contracted sources for all MACSOG programs. Approximately one-hundred aircraft of various types were fragged daily to support SOG operations. In addition, FAC pilots supporting SOG teams could and did call for additional emergency TACAIR when needed. Three Air Force operating units, which employed specially modified aircraft, were dedicated for MACSOG use.

a. First Flight Detachment was located at Nha Trang consisting of four C-123Ks, HEAVY HOOK.

b. 90th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) (formally the 15th SOS) was located at Nha Trang and consisted of four specially configured C-130Es, COMBAT SPEAR.

c. 20th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) was located at Cam Ranh Bay, consisting of 23 UH-1P helicopters.

8. Special Mission Advisory Group, (SMAG (Appendix 16). The Special Mission Advisory Group was officially formed on 24 Feb 71 from residual 5th SFGA personnel. The purpose of SMAG was to train and advise the Special Mission Service of the STD in the techniques of unconventional warfare.

g. Use of US transport aircraft was authorized for airborne insertion and re-supply in Cambodia.

h. US leaflet operations were authorized against the NVA/VC wherever US airstrikes are authorized in Cambodia.

SPECIAL

(TS) The insertion of US-led BRIGHT LIGHT recovery teams into Cambodia was a supplemental authority granted only when there appeared to be a reasonable chance for the successful recovery of UW evadees/PWs. Use of US helicopters and TACAIR in support of these operations was authorized in accordance with JCS message 5220/0514522 Nov 70(TS), Subject: Air Operating Authorities(U) and CINCPAC message 0606472 Nov 70(TS), Subject: SALEM HOUSE/BRIGHT LIGHT Operating Authorities(TS); and extended by CINCPAC message 0608312 May 71 (SPECAT TS), Subject: THOT NOT Authorities. Notification to CINCPAC, with info the JCS, was required for each US-led BRIGHT LIGHT force inserted into Cambodia under this authority, together with support intelligence evaluation which generated the operation and results of the operation.

LAOS

(TS) PHU DUNG, formerly PRAIRIE FIRE, originally known as SHINING BRASS, was the unclassified nickname assigned to MACSOG

covert cross-border operations in Laos. The basic concept of the PHU DUNG operations was one of reconnaissance and interdiction. These operations were to counter infiltration of enemy forces through Laos. The basic operating authorities for PHU DUNG were established by CINCPAC message 310138Z Mar 67(TS), Subject: PRAIRIE FIRE OPERATION ORDER(U). JCS message 9117/262226Z Oct 71 (SPECAT TS); CINCPAC message 272336Z Oct 71 (SPECAT TS) and COMUSMACV message 300028Z Oct 71 (TS), Subject: Southeast Asia Operating Authorities (U) extended the current standing, supplemental, and additional operating authorities until 15 Nov 71. JCS message 7120/1316002 Nov 71 (SPECAT TS) and CINCPAC message 132251Z Nov 71 (SPECAT TS), Subject: Southeast Asia Operating Authorities(U) further extended the aforementioned authorities until 1 Dec 71. JCS message 1929/2301312 Nov 71 (SPECAT TS), Subject: Southeast Asia Operating Authorities(U) further extended the aforementioned authorities until 1 Jan 72. JCS message 6980/3021502 Dec 71 (SPECAT TS) and CINCPAC message 311052Z Dec 71 (SPECAT TS), Subject: Southeast Asia Operating Authorities(U) extended these authorities through 31 Jan 72. JCS message 6228/2917372 Jan 72 (SPECAT TS) and CINCPAC 292008Z Jan 72 (SPECAT TS), Subject: Southeast Asia Operating Authorities(U) extended these authorities through 29 Feb 72. JCS message 7048/2819002 Feb 72 (SPECAT TS), Subject Southeast Asia Operating Authorities(U) extended these authorities through 31 Mar 72. JCS message 6432/2419142 Mar 72 (SPECAT TS), Subject: Southeast Asia Operating Authorities(U) extended these authorities through 1 May 72.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

(TS) The PHU DUNG Area of Operations (PDAO) in Laos as defined in CINCPAC message 310138Z May 67 was from UTM grid coordinate XD 430400, to XD 700000, to XC 800950, to YC 030890, to YB 496801, to YB 497380, to YB 400380, to YB 400020, thence along the Laos, Cambodian border to SVN (See figure B-13).

OPERATING RESTRICTIONS

(TS) On 8 Feb 71, all US personnel were prohibited from participating in cross-border operations in Laos and all ground operations had to be conducted by ARVN and/or indigenous personnel in accordance with JCS message 3360/052332Z Feb 71 (SPECAT TS), Subject: US Participation in PRAIRIE FIRE Operations (TS). The restriction, however, did not include US personnel on LEGHORN Radio Relay Site, GOLF-5 (YB 604355) tasked to provide support for the Explorer II facility in that location. In emergency situations, US personnel were authorized to defend GOLF-5 until destruction of equipment and evacuation could be accomplished. There were no restrictions as to the number of personnel that could comprise any given reconnaissance team. All forces indigenous to Southeast Asia (SEA) under OPCON to COMUSMACV were authorized to be employed in the PHU DUNG AO.

Multi-platoon exploitation operations in the PHU DUNG AO were limited to the commitment of three platoons against any single target.---SECTION DELETED---

(TS) US/VNAF aircraft were authorized to infiltrate, exfiltrate and resupply PHU DUNG forces. US transport aircraft with US aircrews or unmarked transport aircraft with third-country crewmen were authorized for insertion of PHU DUNG forces and their resupply. US Forward Air Controller aircraft (FACs) were authorized for control of strike aircraft supporting PHU DUNG operations and for communications relay between PHU DUNG operational ground forces and helicopter trooplift ships and helicopter gunships during infiltration and exfiltration in the PHU DUNG AO.

(TS) US tactical air, fixed and rotary-wing gunships were authorized to be employed within the full depth of the PHU DUNG AO to exploit targets of opportunity, interdict lines of communications and to support the insertion and extraction of PHU DUNG ground elements.

(TS) There were no restrictions by area or time frame as to the number of reconnaissance teams that could be inserted within the PHU DUNG AO. Reconnaissance teams could also be inserted outside the PHU DUNG AO boundaries for operations inside Laos in accordance with JCS message 5401/032012Z Apr 68 (TS), Subject: PRAIRIE FIRE Operating Limit (U) subject to the concurrence of AMEMB Vientiane, on a case-by-case basis.

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES

(TS) Additional authorities were granted to increase the effectiveness of PHU DUNG operations and aid the reconnaissance teams.

1. Mining. There were no stipulations restricting the use of mines within the PHU DUNG AO. M-14 anti-personnel mines were employed to reduce the aggressiveness of enemy trackers. The locations of emplaced mines were reported as soon as possible through channels in eight digit coordinates.

2. Artillery Support. MACV Rules of Engagement for Laos in accordance with COMUSMACV message 2211492 Dec 69 (TS), Subject: Rules of Engagement - Laos (U) authorized PHU DUNG forces to employ artillery from gun positions in South Vietnam against valid military targets in Laos.

3. Sensors. Sensors could be emplaced in the PHU DUNG AO under authorities granted in the IGLOO WHITE Program. IGLOO WHITE operations were conducted in Laos in support of the personnel/vehicular anti-infiltration system, primarily by US Air Force elements.

---PARAGRAPH DELETED---

5. JCS message 5957/092218Z Apr 68 (TS) and CINCPAC message 140045Z Apr 68 (TS), Subject: PRAIRIE FIRE (U) authorized MACSOG to recruit cooperative indigenous personnel for intelligence collection and to establish intelligence nets in the PHU DUNG AO.

---PARAGRAPH DELETED---

7. COMUSMACV BROWN STALLION OPORD 1-71 (S) dated 18 Apr 71 with Change 1 dated 30 Jun 71 authorized aerial delivery of PSYOP material to Laos in support of US PW reward programs.

8. US troopllft medevac and logistical helicopters were authorized in support of PHU DUNG operations by JCS message 5200/181538 Jun 71 (SPECAT TS), Subject: US Support of Future Vietnamese Cross-border Operations (C).

9. Employment of US-maned aerial reconnaissance, including escort and other necessary support, throughout the PHU DUNG AO was authorized by JCS message 3130/300049Z Apr 71.

DEMILITARIZED ZONE

(TS) MACSOG operations conducted in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line (PMDL) were assigned the unclassified nickname NICKLE STEEL by JCS message 6319/142123Z Jan 67 (TS), Subject: Change of NICKNAMES (U). The basic concept for operations was reconnaissance to counter

infiltration of enemy forces and provide early warning for use of other agencies and military units.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

(TS) The NICKLE STEEL AO was further defined by COMUSMACV message 42037/141145Z Dec 68 (TS), Subject: PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKLE STEEL/IGLOO WHITE/COMMANDO HUNT/DANIEL BOONE OPERATIONS (U) as that area west of the north-south grid line YD-00 (See Figure B-14). In Sep 70, Task Force 1 Advisory Element, Da Nang, made direct coordination with the Headquarters First Military Region and Headquarters XXIV Corps and developed a verbal agreement to extend the NICKLE STEEL AO for MACSOG operations east ten kilometers to the north-south grid line YD-00.

AUTHORITIES

(TS) Basic operating authorities for the NICKLE STEEL AO were established by JCS message 2865/201835Z Oct 69. This message cancelled all previous authorities and contained all current authorized authorities for the conduct of friendly operations in and neat the Vietnam DMZ. The following supplementary rules of engagement were established for MACSOG operations in the NICKLE STEEL AO.

1. Employment of US-led, squad-size, reconnaissance elements in that area of the DMZ south of the PMDL, east of the Laotian border and west of the YD-00 grid line.

2. Employment of appropriate (multi-platoon) infantry unit backup to assist in extraction of reconnaissance elements if required.

3. Employment of artillery, naval gunfire, TACAIR and B-52 strikes in that area of the DMZ south of the PMDL as required by the situation.

4. Enemy small arms/artillery/mortar/rocket fire from north of the PMDL could be countered with heavy ground or naval gunfire and TACAIR until the enemy weapons and ancillary facilities were neutralized.

5. Sensors could be implanted south of the PMDL.

6. No ground forces were authorized north of the PMDL.

7. Employment of US air assets as outlined in the authorities concerning PHU DUNG operations.

PW RECOVERY/CRASH SITE INSPECTION AUTHORITIES

(TS) In accordance with JCS message 5354/092308Z Jun 71 (TS), Subject: PW Recovery Efforts in SVN, Laos, Cambodia (S) BRIGHT LIGHT authorities included the authority to:

1. Employ US and allied forces numbering up to three hundred personnel with helicopter support as necessary in BRIGHT LIGHT operations within Laos and Cambodia which include: Post-SAR recovery operations; raid operations against known or suspected PW camps or PWs in transit; and rescue operations to recover evadees/escapees. Approval for larger operations was required on a case-by-case basis.

2. Launch BRIGHT LIGHT operations at COMUSMACV discretion in those circumstances when there was not time to seek Washington approval. Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and the White House were required to be addressed on the intent messages.


3. (TS) JCS message 2518012 Aug 71 (TS) and CINCPAC message 2602322 Aug 71 (TS), Subject: PW Recovery Efforts in SEA (S) were the authorities to employ US and allied forces in the conduct of crash-site inspections in Laos and Cambodia when there was reasonable assurance of no contact with enemy forces and when there was minimal risk of incurring casualties.

---REMAINDER OF OPERATING AUTHORITIES DOCUMENT DELETED---



SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE 12



SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE 13

Rouges.[1] Security for SOG mining operations was problematic at this point.

Other, more modest, undertakings consisted of the placement of sensors and leafleting operations in the Rice River region of Cambodia.

Operations in Laos, a country at least as politically chaotic as Cambodia due to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Army, were equally constrained. On 8 February 1971 U.S. forces were prohibited from participating in cross-border operations in Laos, and all ground operations had to be conducted by ARVN and/or indigenous personnel. No more than three platoons could be directed against any single target. The only exception to the rule involved U.S. personnel on LEGHORN Radio Relay Site GOLF-5 that was tasked to provide support for the Explorer II facility in that location.

Re-supply of ARVN missions was accomplished by U.S./VNAF aircraft with U.S. aircrews or third-country crewmen, such as Air America or Bird and Sons. With few exceptions, U.S. participation in operations throughout Laos was restricted to Forward Air Control, re-supply, or aerial reconnaissance.

SOG still enjoyed a relatively free hand in the DMZ, where the basic concept was reconnaissance to counter infiltration of enemy forces and provide early warning for the use of other agencies and military units.

[1] "Political Handbook of the World: 1976, Governments and Intergovernmental Organizations as of January 1, 1976." Edited by Arthur S. Banks. Published for the Center for Comparative Political Research of the State University of New York at Binghampton and for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER THREE

By 1971, a combination of political and social factors in the United States had seriously diminished MACSOG's capacity to function in Cambodia and Laos. Before the end of the year, US-led reconnaissance teams operating in the PHU DUNG and THOT NOT AO's would be the exception, rather than the pre-1971 rule. Confined primarily to PW rescue operations and crash site inspections, SOG found itself depending on ARVN-led RTs for hard intelligence in the PDAO and TNAO. The results were generally less than spectacular.

One of the first problems to surface was the abrupt shift in stay times, which had declined by as much as one third when the US ceded it's cross-border activities to the Vietnamese. RTs that had once measured their time on the ground in days were now measuring it in terms of hours or minutes. Another serious concern was the drop in the enemy KIA to friendly KIA/MIA ratio from a high of ten to one to five to one.

SOG supplied one half of the answer, attributing these statistical shifts to an alleged improvement in the counter-raider tactics of the VC/NVA. The unspoken second half is simpler to deduce. When US-led Reconnaissance Teams were withdrawn from the equation, their successes could no longer be used to influence or mask the overall statistical "curve."

The overall success and aggression of ARVN-led RTs can be best illustrated by the following example.

One ARVN-led team observed the headlights of 2 1/2 ton trucks spaced at ten minute intervals. The team leader failed to call in TACAIR support to exploit the target. When questioned about this unusual procedure he replied that it "would have endangered his personnel and compromised his position." He failed to justify this statement and the SOG de-briefer apparently let it pass unchallenged. In another instance, an ARVN team leader, posing as a VC, simply ran away when challenged by a genuine Viet Cong sentry, leaving his second in command to face the enemy and complete the mission.

Another important thread running through chapter three is the almost routine way RTs were being anticipated by the VC. SOG attributed this change of fortunes to increased enemy manpower and better counter-raider techniques, which were both true. However, viewed in context with the SCU dossier incident, it becomes apparent that after 1970 SOG raids were no longer a big surprize to the enemy. Someone was tipping off the VC/NVA exactly where and when to expect a raid. SOG failed to realize, or simply refused to admit, that it's security had been seriously compromised.

While chapter three is basically a litany of shortened stay times and truck traffic, there were a few bizarre and unusual incidents noted by the ARVN-led RTs.

One STRATA (Short Term Reconnaissance And Target Acquisition) team operating near Base Area 351 observed an estimated twenty personnel moving west on Rte 14. The first three persons were 18-19

year old females with blonde hair and fair complexions. They were followed by two boys 14-15 years of age who carried small rucksacks, but were unarmed. At the rear of the column were fifteen enemy pushing bicycles and armed with AK and SKS rifles. The STRATA team opened up on them and no explanation was ever offered.

One other observation made by several RTs was the sighting of a man standing well over six feet tall who accompanied enemy forces. Eastern Bloc advisor or foreign journalist, his identity remained a mystery.

During 1971 SOG was also testing a 15,000 pound Commando Vault bomb capable of clearing a 5 helicopter landing zone in the Dak Rolong Valley. A US-led reconnaissance team was inserted to conduct bomb damage assessment and locate a possible storage area. The bomb landed on a hillside and cleared a 50-70 meter area from the point of impact. Extensive damage was observed for at least 300 meters, and would have been greater had the bomb struck the valley floor.

Somewhat later, SOG was surprised to learn that a high number of slightly wounded enemy PWs had died before receiving medical treatment. Consultation with medical personnel suggested that the mental conditioning the enemy was receiving about the consequences of capture was causing undue shock or lack of will to survive, thereby contributing to the deaths of PWs.

On the debit side of the column was news that the Vietnamese Special Forces were being reorganized and placed under the command of the STD on 1 January 1971. MACSOG, hoping to enhance the STD, decided to send three


outstanding STD officers to the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg for a course in Special Forces Orientation.

Those selected to attend were the Commanding Officer of the VN Special Forces, the STD Director of Operations and Intelligence and his Deputy.

The full course lasted all of one week.

Ironically, the most successful Vietnamese RTs were those composed primarily of former VC/NVA who had rallied to the SVN government under the Chieu Hoi program. They demonstrated time and again their ability to merge undetected with enemy troops and complete their assignments.

The most telling lesson learned in chapter three concerns the enemy. After fighting a war that began in the late 1940's, after losing more than 60% of his personnel in the Tet Offensive, the VC/NVA were still capable of finding apparently highly motivated recruits to fill out their ranks.



SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE B-16

second team in this target area from 1 Jan 71 through the 8th reported negative significant enemy activity.

A US-led RT was inserted west of Ben Het on 27 Dec 70. Shortly after departing the LZ, the team heard voices and movement of ten to twenty enemy. The team directed one OV-10 and two helicopter gunships against the enemy positions with unknown results. A short time later, the team made contact with four enemy, resulting in one enemy killed in action. The team then moved to its insertion LZ where it continued to receive enemy fire from the south, southwest, and northwest. Two A-1's and two helicopter gunships wee directed against the enemy positions, silencing the enemy fire and causing one secondary explosion. The team was then extracted after spending two hours and thirty-five minutes in the target area.

BASE AREA 611

On 24 Dec 70, a US-led RT was inserted into the northeastern portion of BA 611. On the 28th, at noon, the team heard an OV-10 FAC aircraft flying approximately 100 meters to their southwest. The aircraft made a low pass into the valley to the immediate north in an apparent effort to get under the cloud cover. Approximately one minute later, the team heard two muffled explosions about three kilometers to the northwest. On the 8th, a FAC, flying in support of MACSOG observed the wreckage of the OV-10. A MACSOG Bright Light Team was inserted into the crash site on the 8th. Two hours later,

the reaction team and the bodies of both crewmembers were recovered. There were no indications that the enemy had been at the scene of the crash. The cause of the crash is not known.

DMZ AND WEST OF THE DMZ

On 22 Dec 70, an ARVN-led RT was inserted near Rte 103 west of the DMZ. On the 26th, the team heard an estimated ten enemy moving approximately 30 meters to its northwest. At this time, the team also heard a previously implanted M-14 mine explode and several of the enemy started yelling. Three and one half hours later, the team made contact with an enemy squad, resulting in no friendly and unknown enemy casualties. The team was extracted while helicopter gunships provided suppressive fires.

A US-led RT was able to spend only two hours and thirty minutes west of the DMZ, in Laos, on the 27th of Dec 70. The team heard enemy activity 125 meters northwest of the LZ, and after directing two helicopter gunships against the enemy position with unknown results, was extracted.

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC)

---SECTION DELETED---

There is also an alleged PW camp near Kak which contains four US prisoners.

Just to the southwest of Phan Rang, a 525th MI Group agent reported on 3 Jan 71 that a large stone cave contains a number of prisoners, including four white and two black Americans. The 525th MI agent relates that the VC allow prisoners to go outside the cave in the morning to plant and to gather plants. They sleep at night with their legs bound. As of 9 Jan 71, the JPRC has had a representative conferring with the 173rd ABD BDE on this alleged camp.

---SECTION DELETED---

Effective 1 Jan 71, the Vietnamese Special Forces were reorganized and placed under the command of the Strategic Technical Directorate or STD. In view of the critical mission that awaits STD and the VN Special Forces, preliminary arrangements have been made to send three outstanding STD officers to the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for a one week Special Forces Orientation Course. The VN selected to attend, include Lt Col Linh, Commanding Officer of the VN Special Forces, Lt Col Tien, STD Director of Operations and Intelligence, and his Deputy, Major Thai.

WRAP-UP: 9 JAN - JAN 71

SALEM HOUSE

During the period covered buy this wrap-up, thirty-five teams spent a total of one hundred thirty-nine operational days in the SALEM HOUSE AO. Ten riverwatch operations were on the Tonle Kong and Tonle San Rivers. One raid was conducted against a suspected checkpoint on Rte 13 north of Kratie and one team was inserted to interdict sampan traffic on the Prek Smang River, a tributary of the Tonle Kong. Area reconnaissance missions concentrated on defining enemy activity and intentions in Base Areas (BA) 740 and 701.

QUAN LOI LAUNCH SITE

Command and Control Detachment South inserted ten teams from its Quan Loi launch site. One roadwatch was conducted on Rte 13 north of Kratie by a STRATA team inserted on 14 Jan. On the first night the team observed five motorcycles and one military type truck on Rte 13. Traffic moved in both directions. During the day of the 15th the team observed a total of seventeen enemy in six separate sightings on the highway. South of this team, an ARVN-led team conducted a raid against a structure which had previously been reported by a MACSOG team to be a traffic checkpoint. The team was inserted on 15 Jan, found the structure to be abandoned, destroyed it, and was extracted without incident on 18 Jan.

Four teams conducted roadwatch operations on Rte 13 south of Kratie during the reporting period. The operational dates of these

teams overlapped, and continuous coverage was maintained. An ARVN-led team, active from 4 to 12 Jan. observed an enemy platoon with dogs moving north along the highway. Later the same evening, the team observed four trucks moving north on the highway. Farther north, on the 14th, a team twice observed an estimated platoon of enemy searching in its vicinity. The team was not observed on either occasion. On the 15th, the team heard five or six tracked vehicles moving south approximately 200 meters east of its location. The movement of the vehicles could be hears for approximately fifteen minutes. As the vehicles passed, the team heard an estimated company of enemy personnel singing and speaking in Cambodian and Vietnamese. On the 17th, the team observed five trucks, driving with low beam lights, pass its location. There was a 50 meter interval between the vehicles and they sounded heavily loaded. Just behind these vehicles, the team observed two additional tanks. An ARVN led RT with a mission of roadwatch on Rte 132 was inserted on 14 Jan. On 18 Jan, the team made contact with an estimated two platoons of enemy. The team broke contact, evaded, and was subsequently extracted. A STRATA team in BA 351 observed four GMC type trucks moving east on Rte 14 on the night of 12 Jan. On the morning of 15 Jan, the team observed an estimated twenty personnel moving west on the road. The first three persons were 18-19 year old females with blonde hair and fair complexions. They were followed by two boys 14-15 years of age who carried small rucksacks, but were unarmed. At the rear of the column were fifteen enemy pushing bicycles and armed with AK and SKS rifles. The team engaged the enemy killing four. The team broke contact and evaded to an LZ where it was extracted.

JPRC

On 13 Feb, the Province Senior Advisor, Kien Tuong Province, reported that a VN agent reported the location of a PW camp containing five ARVN and one US. The agent was targeted to go back and confirm the location of 14 Feb. JPRC liaison with DMAC resulted in an operation previously scheduled for the area incorporating investigation of the PW camp and a possible PW rescue. The operation was conducted by the 67th ARVN Ranger Battalion. On 22 Jan, a message was sent to the Commanding General, XXIV Corps, requesting a PW recovery operation be initiated as soon as possible against a suspected PW camp containing eight US PW's. This request was based on the debriefing of three US PW's released by the VC on 25 Oct 69, and an NVA who rallied on 14 Apr 70. On 2 Feb, the NVA Master Sergeant, while on a VR flight over the suspected area saw approximately twelve personnel moving, with one person identified on two passes as a blond Caucasian. The 23rd Infantry Division conducted a PW rescue operation, but it was delayed by weather. Results were negative.

---SECOND PARAGRAPH OF JPRC DELETED---

MARITIME OPERATIONS

A NEWPORT CASINO operation with the mission of interdicting enemy shipping off the North Vietnamese coast in the vicinity of

The First was the approval to reinsert US-led recon teams into the PHU DUNG AO. These teams would provide a fully trained and immediately available resource with the capability to conduct intelligence collection and on the spot personnel recovery operations.

Secondly, to promote a general intensification of PW oriented intelligence efforts in all government echelons.

Third, standing authority to employ such allied assets as deemed necessary by COMUSMACV to accomplish the required recovery task.

Fourth, standing authority to use riot control agents (CS) in the conduct of crash site inspections and BRIGHT LIGHT operations.

And last, standing authority to implement recovery operations at the Commander's discretion upon notification of intent by OPREP-1 to CINCPAC, JCS, and the appropriate American Embassy.

High level interest in this area was expected to continue. Rear Admiral Epps, selected as Director PW/MIA Task Force OSA, is expected to visit MACV from 1 to 4 May for the purpose of discussing the entire PW problem.

WRAP UP: 24 APR - 21 MAR 71

THOT NOT

During this twenty-eight day reporting period, fifty-two elements spent a total of 274 operational days in the THOT NOT AO. Roadwatch missions were run to the north and southeast of Kratie on Rte 13, Rte 131, Rte 132, Rte 14, Rte 19, and Rte 613. Two trailwatch missions were conducted to the east of Kratie. In addition, two ARVN-led platoons conducted roadmining, one along Rte 132, and the other on Rte 14. Several platoon and multi-platoon

One team during insert had three of its members on the ground when they began receiving small arms fire. The three were extracted and the mission was aborted.

On 29 Apr, two attempts were made to insert southeast of BA 607. In both cases, three of the team members were on the ground when the enemy opened up with small arms fire. In both extractions, A-1's struck the enemy positions. Another team in this area on 13 May made no significant sightings after helicopter doorgunners killed three enemy during insertion. While departing the target area, helicopters received an undetermined amount of suspected 23mm AAA from two positions.

Nearby, a US-led reconnaissance team was inserted on 3 May. Radio contact was made with the team ten minutes after insertion. From that time on, no further contact was made with the team. All attempts to communicate failed. On the 7th a body recovery mission was aborted because of enemy activity around the intended LZ. Three US and five SCU are carried as MIA. Continuous area coverage was in effect to locate these personnel. There were indications that they may have been captured.

A US-led roadwatch team was inserted to monitor Rte 548 on 14 May. The team reported that five trucks had stopped on Rte 614 to the north of their location. The team also reported enemy movement 360 degrees around its position. At 0135 hours on the 15th, the team directed one AC-119 against the trucks, resulting in five

secondary explosions and a cessation of enemy movement. On 17 May another AC-119 was directed against enemy truck locations, resulting in five secondary explosions. This team also had one contact with three enemy and killed one. On the 19th, the team sighted an estimated fifteen enemy trucks. Due to poor weather, TACAIR could not be called in. At midnight on the 19th, the team reported receiving small arms fire and grenades from an unknown size enemy force. The team then observed an undetermined number of trucks. A fixed wing gunship was on station, but was unable to expend because of low cloud ceilings. When the gunships go below the ceilings, pre-set computer inputs make it impossible to fire because of the angle of bank required. On the 20th, the team reported monitoring a VC conversation that stated that they were going to take the hill occupied by the team and that the VC had four US captured in action from recon teams. This team remained in position and interdicted the road for ten days. This had been the longest stay time on the ground in this area for several months. The team was resupplied at its own request to continue operations. A flip-flop took place on the 22nd. They carried one 57mm recoilless rifle and retained one 81mm mortar.

BA 611

An ARVN-led team on a roadwatch mission along Rte 926 reported that during the night of the 16th an unknown size AAA weapon fired throughout the night. On the 17th, at 1915 hours, this team reported observing on enemy tank.

On 7 May, a US-led four man reconnaissance team was parachuted in, using HALO techniques at night. During the insertion two team members were injured and subsequently extracted. The two remaining team members continued their mission throughout their four day stay in the area. The team was targeted against a storage area which they could not locate. The HALO insert was apparently undetected.

Northeast of BA 611, there was one team insertion and two WACO CITY body recovery missions. The team was inserted on a roadwatch mission along an unnumbered road on 15 May. On the 17th, contact was made with an enemy force, resulting in one US KIA, two US and five SCU WIA. During an attempted extraction two helicopters were shot down, resulting in three US crewmembers MIA. One helicopter was destroyed and one was recovered on the 18th. A WACO CITY body recovery team was inserted and made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in one SCU KIA, one SCU and one US WIA. The recovery team was then extracted. A second WACO CITY team was inserted and recovered the bodies of two US and one SCU KIA. The team also located and extracted two US crewmembers who were WIA. One additional crewmember was observed to be KIA and pinned under the aircraft wreckage. The remaining one US team member and one US crewmember were not found and continued to be carried as MIA.

inserted met stiff enemy resistance. MACSOG employed a variety of diversionary actions to aid insertions.

PHU DUNG OPERATING AUTHORITIES

On 10 Apr, MACV requested authority to reinsert US-led reconnaissance teams in the PHU DUNG AO. On 19 May, JCS transmitted a set of questions from OSD which reflected their desire to use only ARVN-led teams. MACV responded to the JCS message by outlining the MACSOG Improvement and Modernization Program which seeks to completely Vietnamize operations in the PHU DUNG AO by 1 Jul 72. The impracticality of greatly accelerating this program was pointed out. Moreover, the requirement to use US-led reconnaissance teams in the PHU DUNG AO to provide needed quantity and quality of effort was reiterated.

JPRC

Primary JPRC efforts concentrated on locating Lieutenant Butcher who reportedly escaped and was evading. Collateral intelligence indicated the enemy still had not recaptured him. Friendly efforts to locate him continued with extensive FAC coverage and aerial broadcasts. MACSOG teams were prepared for reinsertion should it be appropriate.

In response to a JCS request, MACV submitted a proposed concept for a PW recovery force in MACSOG. This concept envisioned

company size forces at the Task Force Advisory Elements, Da Nang, Kontum, and Ban Me Thout. These forces would be prepared to carry out PW recovery operations in their present areas of responsibility with boundaries extended to the east and west. Force size would be approximately one hundred personnel.

---REMAINDER OF JPRC SECTION DELETED---

WRAP UP: 22 MAY - 10 JUL 71

THOT NOT

During this fifty day reporting period eighty-nine elements spent a total of 484 operational days in the THOT NOT area.

Roadwatch missions were targeted against Rte 13 north and southeast of Kratie, and Rte's ---DELETED---, 131, 132, 19, 141, and 142. Two Cedar Walk teams were active in the Lomphat area, while four rivers were monitored; the Tonle Kong, Tonle San, Srepok and the Prek Chhlong. Other missions included the normal area, linear, and point reconnaissance missions.

SOUTHERN THOT NOT

In this area efforts were directed primarily at obtaining data on enemy transportation and logistics activities. Much of this was accomplished through extensive employment of the FORD DRUM program.

while one river was monitored, the Xe Lange. The remaining missions were tasked with area reconnaissance.

BASE AREAS 609/613

In BA 613 one team was inserted without incident, but on the third day of team activity an OV-10 flying in support nearby crashed from unknown causes. The team reported hearing an explosion northwest of its location. Two US crewmembers were MIA despite FAC efforts to locate the crash site. Weather on that particular evening was marginal. Teams in BA 613 experienced intense ground fire during extraction.

Ten US-led reconnaissance teams were active north of BA 609. None had contact with the enemy. On 2 June, one team observed a recently built, well maintained way station consisting of hootches and bunkers with overhead cover. The station had been occupied within the previous twenty-four hours. No action was taken against this target with a view to observe it at a later date.

BASE AREA 614

The majority of teams reported extensive enemy activity around their positions and each made contact with unknown size enemy forces. Two teams reported two enemy killed in action. A third team engaged a group of twenty enemy, yelling in the Bru dialect. Friendly losses were one KIA and three WIA. On OV-10, directed

against enemy positions, forced the enemy to break contact. Enemy losses could not be determined.

BASE AREA 607

South of BA 607, on 2 July, a team directed two AH-1G's against enemy positions resulting in five enemy KBA. The enemy was observed attempting to recover the bodies of the KBA and two F-4's were called, effecting one secondary explosion.

A low level parachute insertion was conducted on 29 May. The following day the team made contact with an enemy squad resulting in two enemy KIA. On 31 May a FAC observed an estimated twenty enemy moving toward the team. Four Cobras were directed against the enemy with unknown results.

On 22 June another team was inserted employing the HALO technique. One team member reported by radio that he was injured during landing. When a WACO CITY team reached his reported area his weapon, radio, maps, etc., were all located, however, the team member was gone. There were no enemy signs in the area. We surmise that he may have wandered off, disoriented by injury. Daily FAC overflights of the target area continued.

From 14 May to 3 June a total of three teams in the A Vuong Valley interdicted Rte 614 to the southeast of BA 607 for twenty-one days. During the entire operational period, an estimated fifty-six

One team south of the DMZ was inserted twice in its target area. Contact made on the first day resulted in two enemy KBA, and three enemy KIA. The team remained on the LZ only ten minutes the following day, but escaped without casualties.

During six insertions within the DMZ, the enemy was encountered during, or very soon after insertion. Enemy strength was apparent throughout this entire area.

On 3 June, Hickory Radio Relay Site, in existence since June 1968, came under siege by the enemy. Initially, long range, indirect fire was employed in an effort to weaken the defenses. On 4 June, five US and ten SCU with minor wounds were extracted leaving two US and twenty-three SCU on the site. Weather closed in on 5 June and precluded further air efforts. At 0450 hours the last radio communication was made. Fifteen SCU returned to friendly control. Two US and eight SCU continue to be listed as MIA. While we were unable to give a report on enemy losses, debrief of all knowledgeable personnel indicated that the enemy paid a high price for the capture of Hickory. During the four days of evasion the SCU covered some twenty-one kilometers to Camp Carroll and observed at least two NVA company size elements and numerous small groups of NVA moving throughout the area.

A detailed debrief of all personnel, reports of enemy sightings, uniforms, and equipment, indicated that the enemy element

was NVA of up to reinforced battalion size. Further indications wee that the element consisted of a heavy weapons section and a communications section. The attacking force consisted of approximately two companies as well as a reserve element.

All classified equipment on the site was destroyed utilizing built-in self-destruct devices, where possible, and thermite grenades. Defensive positions were adequate except against a large size enemy force willing to pay the price. All requested help and material was provided. Air support, of all kinds, was provided during periods of even marginal weather.

Very simply, it was estimated that the enemy decided that our presence on this key terrain feature was no longer acceptable and decided to exercise his capability to remove it. There is one other similar site known as Golf-5. All feasible and practical precautions are being taken to prevent the loss of that critical area. It must be emphasized however, that three US and thirty to thirty-five SCU cannot defend Golf-5. When the situation so dictates, extraction of personnel and equipment is the only solution. Here again, weather is most important.

OVERVIEW

Due to adverse weather, mission aborts have occurred frequently since 28 May. During this period one hundred fifty-five mission inserts were aborted due to unworkable weather.

PHU DUNG SUMMARY

The enemy maintained a forceful presence in the eastern panhandle of Laos. His primary area of interest in the Republic of Vietnam centered on an area just south of the DMZ in military region one. All reconnaissance teams inserted in this area met stiff enemy resistance.

North of BA 611, enemy activity remained at a moderate level, although four of the five teams had contact with the enemy.

The enemy also strengthened his positions throughout the central portion of the PHU DUNG AO, and in the Republic of Vietnam between BA's 607 and 614. Trails in an area approximately twenty kilometers southeast of BA 607 were encountered. No significant enemy activity was noted to the north of BA 609, but teams inside 609 and 613 made contact with the enemy.

JPRTF PLAN

The Joint Recovery Task Force Plan was well received at CINCPAC and forwarded to JCS on 25 Jun. ---SENTENCE DELETED---. There was no official coordination pending JCS approval of the plan, however, all responses were enthusiastic.

resulting in two known enemy KIA and one friendly KIA. The team was forced to withdraw from the area, leaving the sample ammo behind.

To the east of BA 702, American-led teams confirmed a continued lack of enemy activity. Only three enemy were observed in fifteen days on the ground.

The US-led reconnaissance team in southeastern BA 609 encountered tracker activity and enemy jamming. FAC's flying cover for the team observed enemy activity in adjacent areas as well. Two other teams received jamming in this same vicinity.

PHU DUNG

In the PHU DUNG and DMZ areas, sixty elements spent a total of 122 operational days on the ground. Average stay time was two days per team, compared with 6.4 days in THOT NOT. This difference resulted from several factors: A higher level of enemy presence, LZ watchers employed against a limited number of desirable LZ's, and effective counter-raider tactics to channelize teams and force extraction.

BASE AREA 609

North of BA 609, twelve US-led reconnaissance teams, one ARVN-led team, and one ARVN-platoon were employed in trailwatch, area, and point reconnaissance missions.

A similar number of teams worked this area in the last reporting period from 22 June to 10 July but none made contact with the enemy. There were four contacts this period, during one of which an enemy soldier estimated to be 6'2" was observed. This was the third report in six months of physically large enemy personnel operating in the area north of BA 609. Three security patrols of platoon size strength were encountered. Enemy aggressiveness appeared to be increasing here. Two teams experienced communications jamming, as was noted in southern 609.

Two teams discovered new east to west oriented roads of hard-packed clay and gravel. One of the roads was very well maintained, camouflaged, and not visible from the air. Bunkers along the road were 75-100 meters apart and appeared to be two to four weeks old. Lateral visibility was limited to 1-15 meters by dense vegetation. FAC photography of Rte 96/110 indicated light use of the road between BA's 609 and 613, although it appeared to be in fairly good condition along most of the road.

In between BA's 614 and 607, nine elements made eleven contacts with aggressive enemy security patrols and confirmed the enemy's strong presence. Three of the teams were in contact within one hour of insertion.

A total of one hundred sixty-four enemy were observed. There were eight confirmed and forty estimated KBA as a result of TACAIR

FORD DRUM also photographed a newly constructed anti-aircraft site near the village of Praphat. The soil ringing the site had been recently uncovered. In a route reconnaissance of highway 7, over two hundred loaded bicycles, Honda's and Lambretta's were counted. FORD DRUM turned on Rte 15 and counted an additional ninety to ninety-five bicycles and Honda's.

One team was active in southern THOT NOT since the initiation of ARVN operations the first of October. Only one of the three remaining teams, all of which were active in September, made contact. The enemy unit terminated that engagement; but two other enemy were subsequently killed in an ambush operation.

CENTRAL THOT NOT

In central THOT NOT a total of six teams were targeted against Rte 13 north and south of Kratie. Although none of these elements established a conclusive long-term road watch, earlier reports of shuttle movement of five to six trucks per night still appeared to be accurate. An independent, possible confirmation of this general rate of traffic was received from a detainee captured near Lomphat who reported movement of five trucks per night moving supplies from Kratie through the town of Bung Lung.

An EARTH ANGEL team near Rte 13 was tasked with locating a suspected enemy headquarters, and PW camp. They approached to

within 500 meters of their assigned center of target. They observed a thatched hut from which small groups of one to two soldiers were seen entering and leaving.

Armed individuals were photographed moving down a nearby trail. A group of fifteen were observed; four of who were unarmed. sickly in appearance, and walked dejectedly, heads lowered and shoulders stooped. The armed members of the group were young, energetic, and dark complected; as compared with the yellow complexion of the unarmed four. This element came in contact, and was forced to extract after five days. It is doubtful if any element other than these ex-NVA could have penetrated this closely into so heavily populated an area.

We had come to expect low enemy presence in and around BA 712. During this reporting period, however, all teams except the one nearest Rte 132 made contact with the enemy. Two company size and three platoon size units were observed; as were several squad size elements. This entire area appeared to be a bivouac zone, quite possibly being used as an infiltration route into South Vietnam. Base camps and bivouac sites were well prepared and useable, but generally showed no signs of recent use.

West of BA 740, teams reported more contacts with enemy units that had usually been the case. As many as ten teams had spent over a hundred operational days in this area without engaging the enemy. However, during the reporting period, five teams made contact: Two

Regiment, which may have meant an extension of the unit's LOC deeper inside the Quang Da Special Zone. There was no indication of an altered enemy posture in the vicinity of BA 607. Harassing attacks by our forces still revealed a substantial number of enemy personnel tied up with local security operations. Finally, the area north of BA 611 continued to be unworkable because of adverse weather.

COMSEC

During the month of November, over 12,000 telephone and radio communications by all SOG elements were monitored for communications security by the 509th Radio Research Group. Preliminary analysis revealed a significant improvement over previous surveys. The improvement noted reflected a continuing command and staff emphasis throughout the year, including a special interim survey in July requested by SOG.

---REMAINING TWO PARAGRAPHS OF 'COMSEC' DELETED---

JPRC

There were four PW recovery attempts in November. Two operations had good possibilities for success. A 21 November operation began with Air Force's interrogation of a Hoi Chanh, and his report of a PW camp. With the Hoi Chanh acting as a guide, DRAC launched a recovery force. The Hoi Chanh led the eighty-nine ARVN troops and two US advisors into the camp. Three VC were killed in

the operation. The camp appeared to have been abandoned approximately three hours earlier.

The second operation was based on information provided by one of six escapees from a VC prison camp. A Joint Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) and SOG SEA Commando Team operation was launched. Shortly after landing, the SEA Commando team captured a VC tracker within two hundred meters of the camp. The VC thought he was among friends and told the team that a U.S. PW had been moved from the camp after six Vietnamese had escaped. When the team pressed the VC for information on the new camp he became aware of the ruse, and refused to cooperate further. Shortly thereafter the team was attacked by a VC element, three of whom were killed, and the team was extracted, along with the VC tracker. The VC was taken to CMEC, and later to the bright lights of Saigon. On 18 November he was reinserted with a mission of returning with the U.S. PW by the 10th of November. The carrot was a $5,000 reward for the safe return of the PW. The stick was a leaflet drop of his hand written agreement with American officers and the threat of his parents being picked up as VC sympathizers if he does not return.

These two cases illustrated the possibilities and the inherent difficulties of these operations.

of 225 creation sheets a week were submitted to maintain and update the SOG holdings.

(C) On 5 Nov 71, a basic Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) Course was initiated for two STD Officers and one Non-commissioned Officer (one of the Officers was later dropped due to reassignment). The training curriculum included intelligence data processing techniques, procedures and completion of related reports. The course was completed on 4 Feb 7 and insured an effective Vietnamese carry-on capability in the IDHS operations.

(C) Much of the air intelligence was held in computerized form, therefore an Air Intelligence Element was established under the IDHS Section in Feb 71. This allowed for the computerized files to be centralized and better controlled.

(S) Computer products consisted of three basic printouts:

1. VC/NVA Use of Laos Vol. I: This volume was a CONFIDENTIAL monthly listing of items of intelligence reported exclusively by MACSOG assets. Selective distribution of Vol. I was made to non-SOG units.

2. VC/NVA Use of Laos Vol. II: This volume was a CONFIDENTIAL monthly listing of items of intelligence derived from both SOG and non-SOG assets. It was distributed to MACSOG operational units.

3. VC/NVA Use of Cambodia: This printout was a CONFIDENTIAL monthly listing of SOG and non-SOG derived intelligence and was a most comprehensive intelligence file on the eastern portion of Cambodia. Distribution of this printout was supplied to all SOG operational units, J2, and other units requiring knowledge of this area.

(S) Monthly printouts gave a six-month history of the complete TN and PD AOs and were arranged in UTM coordinate sequence. The printouts were classified CONFIDENTIAL because SOG connected operational data was included and the source of information was indicated by number only. The source code key was classified TOP SECRET/LIMDIS and disseminated on a strict need to know basis.

(TS) Special Data Handling included:

1. Target Mission Packages: A TOP SECRET/LIMDIS printout, and when requested, a CONFIDENTIAL machine plotted overlay, were provided for each target approved by COMUSMACV. This printout contained all SOG operational data as well as a compilation of all intelligence data in the MACSOG file for the past six months. If requested, acetate overlays were keyed to 1:50,000 AMS sheets and graphically displayed the material listed in the printouts. Distribution of this product was limited to SOG operational units.

2. From 14-21 May 71 and 25-29 Aug 71 an FOB was established at Coastal Group 13, VINH LOC District, THUA THIEN Province. Eleven operations were conducted with negative results.

3. From 15 Aug to 16 Sep 71, an FOB was established on board the USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1170) and the USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) off the coast of MR4. Four PTFs and two SCTs were used to interdict coastal transshipping and disrupt enemy logistic units. No results were obtained.

4. BRIGHT LIGHT 71-2 was executed on 8-9 Nov 71, from an FOB on board the USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166) off the coast of MR4. A reinforced SCT was inserted into the DAM DOI District, AN XUYEN Province to search for a camp site believed to hold a US PW. The team launched in rubber boats, inserted cross-beach, and traversed 3000 meters of mangrove swamp to the vicinity of the camp. They captured a VC and found that the PW had been moved to a new camp. After determining the location of the new camp they extracted by helicopter. Three VC were killed while trying to prevent their withdrawal.

5. BRIGHT LIGHT 71-4 was a one SCT mission on 18-19 Nov 71 that was launched from AN TRACH 4 in GIA RAI District, BAC LIEU Province. One agent was reinserted into DAM DOI District, AN XUYEN Province, to gather specific US PW information.

6. From 29 Nov to 4 Dec 71 an FOB was established at HOI AN in HIEU NHON District, QUANG NAM Province. Two operations were conducted with negative results.

7. BRIGHT LIGHT 72-1 was conducted 6-13 Feb 72 in DAM DOI District, AN XUYEN Province, from an FOB on board the USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161). Two SCT conducted three cross-beach inserts to gather PW information. Results included two VC killed.

8. BRIGHT LIGHT 72-2 was conducted 20-27 Feb 72 on CA MAU Island, NAM CAN District, AN XUYEN Province, from the USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161). Three SCT conducted three cross-beach inserts to gather PW information. Results were five VC suspects captured and significant information concerning US and ARVN PW activity obtained. The 21st ARVN Div conducted a three day operation to exploit this information.

9. BACH DANG Operation was conducted 13-27 Mar 72 in THOI BINH, SONG ONG DOC and DAM DOI Districts, AN XUYEN Province, from the Vietnamese Navy ship MY THO (AGP 800). The objectives of this operation were to identify targets for the 21st ARVN Div, and to conduct the final operational phase of the Improvement and Modernization Program to enable CSS forces to conduct operations supported totally by Vietnamese assets. Three SCTs executed nine cross-beach missions, killing four VC and capturing six. Information concerning US and ARVN PW movement was obtained.

10. A BRIGHT LIGHT mission was conducted 10-13 Apr 72 from an FOB located at CAM LO, CAM LO District, QUANG TRI Province. The purpose of the operation was to rescue two downed US flyers, LTC Neal C. Hambleton and 1st Lieutenant Mark C. Clark. Based upon information provided by JPRC a recovery operation consisting of five Sea Commando's and one U.S. SEAL officer was launched. The concept, which was employed successfully, was to have the evadees make their way to the DONG HA River and float downstream to be intercepted by the recovery team. The concept was modified in the case of LTC Hambleton in that the recovery team had to make their way to him and float him downstream because of injuries he sustained. Both flyers were returned to friendly control.

CRASH SITE INSPECTION

(S) Two crash site inspections were conducted in 1972.

1. On 16-18 Mar 72, CSS divers operating with the NAD Mobile Support Team crane barge, succeeded in recovering a helicopter with three bodies, including a Vietnamese General and a US Colonel, from Da Nang Harbor.

2. On 29 Mar-72, SCT divers searched for the body of a US PW, allegedly dumped into a canal in THUAN HOA District, BA XUYEN Province in 1971, with negative results.

GLOSSARY (Expanded)

Note: MAC(V)SOG glossary entries that appeared at the end of the Annex are prefaced with an asterisk (*). Entries garnered from the text by the author will not be marked with an (*). The reader will note that a number of (*) words in the SOG glossary are not reflected in the actual text. These words deal with the deleted sections, and the reader is invited to draw his own conclusions from them.

AAAOB	Anti-Aircraft Order of Battle.
AAG	Army Advisory Group.
*ABCCC	Airborne Command and Control Center (Laos, BARREL ROLL Area).
*ABLE MABEL	Tactical Reconnaissance in South Vietnam.
AIA	Air Interdiction Area.
*AIZ	Air Interdiction Zone. PHU DUNG through THOT NOT.
*ALASKA	Thu Duc (SOG-33).
*ALLEY CAT	Call sign for ABCCC during night time in BARREL ROLL Area.
AMA	Air Material Area.
AMEMB	American Embassy. Ex. AMEMB Phnom Penh. Certain MACSOG operations required approval/coordination with U.S. consular officials (CIA).

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*ANGRY TALKER	Secure word for GOLF-5 Radio Relay Site.
AO	Area of Operations.
*ARC LIGHT	B-52 strike.
*ARIZONA	Cambodia (SOG-33).
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
*AIK	Assistance-in-Kind - Military (USAID Civilian) assistance, VN supplies labor, AIK material.
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications. Area and world-wide secure communications net. A world-wide, switched, secure voice network developed to fulfill DOD long-haul, secure voice requirements.
BA	Base Area. Ex: BA 609.
*BARREL ROLL	Northwest Area of Laos (SOG-32).
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment.
*BENSON SILK	NVA script inserts (discontinued Aug 70) (SOG-33).
*BI FROST	Cross-beach missions in-counrty in support of CSS, 3MAF, and XXIV Corps in the IFFV/I Corps area. Originates from NAD (now DODGE MARK) (SOG-31).

*BLACKBEARD	Intel collection plan for DANIEL BOONE AO (both obsolete).
*BLUE CHIP	7th AF Command Post (TSN) (SOG-60).
*BLUE TREE	Tactical Reconnaissance over NVN (SOG-20).
*BRIGHT LIGHT	JPRC (Joint Personnel Recovery Center) recovery mission (SOG-80). Nickname applied to teams tasked with the recovery of Unconventional Warfare evadees and prisoners of war.
BROWN STALLION	Nickname for air-dropped Psychological Warfare Operations material offering cash rewards for the recovery or information leading to the recovery of prisoners of war.
*BUFFALO HUNTER	Drone photography flown by SAC over NVN, also known as BUMPY ACTION (SOG-20).
CAC	Counter Intelligence Advisory Committee.
*C&C (SOG-35)	Command and Control Detachment (Ground Studies Group).
*CCC - TF2AE	C&C Central located at Kontum (Task Force 2 Advisory Element).
*CCN - TF1AE	C&C North located at Da Nang (Task Force 1 Advisory Element).
*CCS - TF3AE	C&C South located at Ban Me Thuot (Task Force 3 Advisory Element).
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific.

CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
CISO	Counter-Insurgency Support Office.
*CLT - TCAE	Camp Long Thanh, MACSOG-38 Training HQ (Training Center Advisory Element).
*CALIFORNIA	Russia (SOG-33) (discontinued SOG word).
CANALIZED	Directed into a pre-planned position through the use of troops and booby traps.
*CIRCUS ACT	Wire-tap operations run by SOG-35/38.
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center.
*CLSC-V	COMSEC Logistic Support Center-Vietnam (SOG-60).
CMEC	Combined Material Exploitation Center.
*COMBAT APPLE	Specially configured C-123.
*COMBAT SPEAR	C-130's assigned to 90th SOS.
*COMMANDO HUNT	7th AF program for enemy interdiction in Laos.
COMMANDO VAULT	10-15,000 pound SOG bomb used to blast LZs out of the jungle.
COMSEC	Communications Security. Monitoring of friendly circuits/frequencies for errors in procedure or breeches in security.

COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
COMUSTHAI	Commander U.S. Thailand.
CONFIDENTIAL	(C) Third lowest security classification. Release of confidential information could be harmful to the defense interest of the nation. Ex. Battle reports, transport systems, training manuals, or information about defense factories.
CONFIDENTIAL MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED	Lowest security classification. Training manuals fall into this classification.
COVER STORIES	Officially sanctioned lies and half-truths designed to cover and protect classified operations.
*COVEY	PRAIRIE FIRE FAC call sign.
CPX	Command Post Exercise. Simulated the conduct of a PW recovery operation through the use of canned msg. traffic.
*CRICKET	Daytime call sign for ABCCC in BARREL ROLL Area.
CSI	Crash Site Inspections.
*CSS	Vietnamese counterpart organization of Maritime Studies Group (Coastal Security Service).

*DANIEL BOONE	Replaced by SALEM HOUSE and now known as THOT NOT.
*DCPG	Defense Communications Planning Group.
DEROS	Date Eligible for Rotation Stateside.
*DEWEY RIFLE	Nickname referring to cross-beach missions conducted in-country (SOG-31).
*DIAMOND HEAD	Use of people sniffers.
DIRLAUTH	Director, Liaison Authority.
*DODGE MARK	Cross-Beach operations in-country (SOG-31).
DODSPECREP	Department of Defense Special Repeater. Device that monitors communications lines by induction rather than a physical splice. Information is then transmitted to an airborne receiver. The device reads variations in magnegtic fields and interprets them as valid signals.
*DORSAL FIN	Tactical reconnaissance photography over Cambodia run by 7th AF (now FACE VALUE) (SOG-20).
*DOUBLE CROSS	RT operations into DMZ under control of 3rd MAF.
DRAC	Delta Regional Assistance Command responsible for PW recovery.
*DTE	A technical control facility that performs maintenance, circuit analysis and repairs

	voice circuits. Planned turn over to civilian contractor but unable to support contract without military personnel.
*DUEL BLADE	Replaced nickname DYE MARKER. Ground obstacle system to impede infiltration into RVN. Compatible with IGLOO WHITE.
*DUEL SPEAR	A ground obstacle to infiltration.
*DUFFLE BAG	Employment of DCPG resources in SEA for purposes other than to impede infiltration from NVN to SVN.
*DUMP TRUCK	Air supported anti-personnel sub-system of IGLOO WHITE program.
*DUST COVER	Modular transportable sensor data collection and processing system.
ECC or ECCI	Eastern Construction Company. Philippine-based corporation supplying technical assistance throughout SEA. ECC personnel were either WWII guerrilla fighters or had experience fighting the Philippine Huks. ECC helped RVN to write its constitution in the fifties, and was closely tied to MACSOG.
E&E	Escape and Evasion.
*ELDEST SON	Relating to introduction of contaminated ammunition in enemy hands. Also known as ITALIAN GREEN and POLE BEAN. (Discontinued) (SOG-33).

*EL PASO	COMUSMACV OPLAN for overground operations across Rte 9 in Laos.
EST	Estimated.
*ETHER REPORT	KIA.
EXDIS	Security classification meaning Exclusive (high level) distribution.
*EXPLOITATION FORCE	Indigenous quick reaction force.
FAC	Forward Air Controller. Spotters for troops, artillery, or bombers.
*FACE VALUE	Tactical recon in Cambodia.
FANK	Forces Armee Nationale Khmer. Changed from UITG, or US Army Vietnam Individual Training Group. UITG/FANK was established in RVN by the US Special Forces to train troops of the Republique Khymer, or Cambodia.
*FLAMING ARROW	Unclas name for in-country recon operations conducted by 5th SFGA under the control of Senior Corps Advisors using assets (teams, etc) programmed for SALEM HOUSE. (Discontinued).
*FLYING HORSE	Now known as SALEM HOUSE.
FOOTBOY	Covert action programs directed against NVN designed to increase the credibility of a current national resistance movement

	within NVN. Intelligence collection and covert physical destruction missions. Very limited implementation because of the possibility that NVN would accuse the United States of attempting to bring about the downfall of the government of NVN.
*FORD DRUM	Low level, hand held aerial photography over the SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE AO's. (SOG-20).
*FOUNTAIN PEN	High altitude leaflet drop along RICE RIVER, Cambodian-SVN borders. (SOG-32).
FRAGGED	(1) Terminal resolution of a dispute between an enlisted man and an NCO or officer. Usually settled by the improper use of an explosive fragmentation device. (2) Flights scheduled. Ex. Fragged: 210. Flown: 198.
*FRANTIC GOAT	High altitude leaflet drop along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos, Cambodia (SOG-32).
*FREEDOM RUNNER	A nickname to planned, unilateral FANK Special Forces Operations in NW Cambodia. (CINCPAC 260231Z May 71 (PASEP).
*FREEDOM DEAL	Nickname for AIZ. That area of Cambodia bounded by the RVN border on the East, the Laotian border on the North.
*FRESH MANDATE	Nickname for CONPLAN (Concept) - calls for activation of a Brigade to counter NVA/VC activity during US deployment. Brigade from 25th Inf Scoffield Barracks.

FRIAR REPORT	Slightly wounded in action report.
*FTX	Field Training Exercise involving an actual combat mission.
*FULL CRY	Unclas name for MACV plan to conduct large-scale military operations in S. Laos.
FWMAC	Free World Military Assistance Command. ANZUS, Korea, and the Philipines.
*GAME WARDEN	Inland waterways patrols interdicting VC shipping.
*GIANT NAIL	High altitude photography (U-2) over SEA.
*GIANT SCALE	High altitude photography over SEA (other than U-2).
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic. Government of Cambodia.
*GOLDEN EARRING	Unclas name for TACAIR missions (strikes) in support of RTs.
*HAILSTONES	M4A resupply containers.
HALO	High Altitude, Low Opening. A type of parachute insertion.
*HATCHET FORCE	OP-35 platoon size exploitation force. No longer used.
*HAVOC FORCE	OP-35 multi-platoon size exploitation force. No longer used.

*HAYMAKER FORCE	Battalion-size force. No longer used.
*HEAVY HOOK	SOG C-123's - 4 A/C assigned to 1st Flight Detachment in support of aerial resupply, psychological warfare, JPRC and LOG support.
*HICKORY	OP-35 Hill 950 Radio Relay Site (overrun).
*HILLSBORO	Call word for ABCCC during the day (STEEL TIGER).
*HORNET FORCE	Platoon-size force.
HOUSE-50	SOG warehouse in Saigon housing unconventional warfare material.
*IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System.
*IGLOO WHITE	Sensors placed on LOC's.
*IGLOO WHITE/ DUFFLE BAG	IGLOO WHITE in-country.
*IGLOO WHITE/ COMMANDO HUNT	IGLOO WHITE operations in Laos or DMZ and NVN.
IIR	Intelligence Information Reports.
*INSISTENSE (S)	SOG MAROPS in coordination with MARKET TIME (NAVFORV) to prevent infiltration by sea into SVN.
IOH	Imminence of Hostility.

*ITALIAN GREEN	Introduction of contaminated ammunition in enemy hands. Also ELDEST SON and POLE BEAN (discontinued). (SOG-33).
J-5	Plans Division.
*JGS	Joint General Staff, RVNAF.
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution.
JUWTF	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force.
KBA	Killed by Air.
KIA	Killed in Action.
KIA (BC)	Killed In Action (By Claymore).
LB	Liaison Buerau.
LEGHORN	Radio Relay Site.
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution.
LLHH	Low-level, Hand-held aerial photography.
*LEAPING LENA	Superceded nickname for cross-border operations in Laos.
*LIAISON SERVICE	Counterpart to SOG-35. Subordinate element of the STD. It is the operational element of the STD which provides personnel for conducting cross-border intelligence gathering missions into Laos and Cambodia. Consists of 30 ARVN-led recon teams. Ten teams at each Task Force.

LOC	(1) Logistical Operations Center. (2) Lines of Communication (roads, bridges, rail, etc.).
LTTD	Long Thanh Training Detachment. SOG base 35 miles from Saigon that trained US and ARVN special warfare personnel. Name changed to Camp Yen The when SOG was phasing down.
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.
MACJ2	Military Assistance Command Center-Intelligence Directorate.
*MAP	Military Assistance Program - statutory appropriation of funds for a program.
MATTLO	MACV Military Attache Liaison Office.
*MEDTC	Charged with supplying material to Cambodia.
*MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT	Praiseworthy accomplishment, with an easily discernable beginning and end, carried through to completion. The length of time involved is not a consideration but speed of accomplishment may be a factor in determining the worth of the enterprise.
*MERITORIOUS SERVICE	Praiseworthy execution of duties over a long period of time normally not less than

	six months in duration. Service differs from achievement in that service concerns a a period of time while achievement concerns an enterprise having a definite beginning and end, but not necessarily connected with a specific period of time.
MLS	Mobile Launch Site.
*MOON BEAM	Call sign of ABCCC at night (STEEL TIGER).
*MUD RIVER	Air supported anti-vehicular sub-system of the IGLOO WHITE program.
*NAD	Naval Advisory Detachment. Operates base for MAROPS.
*NKP	Nakhon Phanom. Classified SOG launch site along Thai border.
NODIS	Security classification meaning No Distribution (beyond Addressee).
NOFORN	Not releasable to foreign nationals. Information in this category was restricted to properly cleared American personnel
*NASTY PTF's	Craft employed by MAROPS on missions north of 17.00N.
*NEW YORK	Word for NVN (SOG-33).
*NICKEL STEEL	SOG operations in the DMZ.
O.B.	Order of Battle.

OPCON	Operational Control.
*PANAMA	Call sign for GCI radar at Da Nang AB.
*PARBOIL (C)	MAROPS in support of FOOTBOY (C) operations in NVN. Formerly PLOWMAN (C).
*PASEP	Passed Separately. Not included with the message or package. Not under a TAB.
*PATIO (C)	TACAIR strikes in support of SALEM HOUSE.
PDAO	PHU DUNG Area of Operations.
PDO	Parachute Delivery Operator.
PINK TEAM	Teamed helicopters, usually a Loach to draw enemy fire followed by a helicopter gunship to engage and destroy the enemy.
PMDL	Provisional Military Demarcation Line. Line dividing North and South Vietnam established 22 July 1954.
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
*POLE BEAN	Program by which various types of Soviet Bloc ammo are contaminated and inserted into NVA/VC areas of Cambodia, Laos, and RVN. Also known as ELDEST SON and ITALIAN GREEN (discontinued 23 Feb 70). (SOG-33).
*PHU DUNG	Nickname replacing PRAIRIE FIRE, X-Border in Laos.

*PRACTICE NINE	Unclas name for a series of plans concerning the establishment of barriers in the vicinity of the DMZ and augmented by air interdiction, mining and recon in Laos.
*PRAIRIE FIRE	Cross-border operations into SOG's Laotian AO. Old nickname.
*PROJECT ATHENS	COMUSMACV operations to cut Rte 110 in Laos.
*PROJECT BUFFALO	COMUSMACV operations to cut Rte 547 A Shau Valley.
PTF	Patrol Boat, Fast. Type of boat used by USN and VNN forces. "Nasty" Class.
*RED EYE	Anti-aircraft heat seeking missile.
*RED ROCKET	Special alerting message originated at JCS level.
*ROLLING THUNDER	Area in NVN north of TALLY HO Area.
RON	Remain Over-Night (position).
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force or Armed Forces.
*RUB DOWN	Unclas name for MACV plans to conduct large-scale operations into Cambodia.
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
SACSA	Special Assistant (to the JCS) for Counterinsurgency and Special Covert Activities.
*SALEM HOUSE	Cross-border operations into Cambodia. Old nickname.

*SAR	Search and Rescue. OPCON to 7AF. Authority is listed in 7AF OPLAN 7-15 or 7-30.
*SCT	Sea Commando Team - CSS special operations team (SOG-37).
*SCU	Special Commando Unit. Term normally applied to Montagnard mercenaries.
*SEA DRAGON	USN intediction of NVN coastal shipping 17.00N to 18.00N.
*SEAL	Sea Air Land - the term applies to specially qualified Naval personnel.
SECRET	Second highest security classification. Unauthorized disclosure of secret material could result in serious damage to the nation. Examples include improvements to weapons or the release of codes.
SHAO	SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations.
SHINING BRASS	Nickname preceeding PRAIRIE FIRE, which in turn preceeded PHU DUNG. Laos.
*SLAM	Search, Locate, Annihilate and Monitors special missions often performed by the C&C detachments.
SMAG	Special Mission Advisory Group. Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team #158 formed from remnants of 5th SFG to advise STD.

*SNOW FLAKES	SOG word for MA6 containers.
*SOAP BUBBLES	Indigenous RT members.
*SOAP CHIPS	Psyops booklets in Laos and Cambodia.
SPECAT TS	Special Category, Top Secret.
*SPECIAL ACTION TEAMS	UW trained SMS teams selected for recon. Attend ARVN recon course.
*SPECIAL ACTION FORCE	Specially configured force configured for specific task.
*SPIKE TEAM	Twelve man exploitation team. Applied to short term operation concept to exploit an identified situation (SOG-35).
*SRU	Special Reconnaissance Unit.
*SSO	Special Security Office.
STD	Strategic Technical Directorate. The presumed RVN counterpart to MACVSOG.
*STEEL TIGER	Panhandle of Southern Laos.
*STRATA	Short term reconnaissance and target acquisition teams.
*STRAW HATS	US RT members.

*STRAY GOOSE	Now known as COMBAT SPEAR.
SURVEYED	Naval term meaning inspected and scrapped/ scavenged.
*SWIFT POPS	A 50 foot American built patrol boat craft capable of 25 knots, used mostly for logistic support.
TACAIR	Tactical Air. Usually means on call or standby air support for infantry or SOG operations.
*TALLY HO	Area extending from south of the DMZ to the northern border of Route Package One. (Vicinity of Vinh, NVN).
*TAR HEELS	Incapacitating gas.
*TASK FORCE ALPHA	AF organization that operates IGLOO WHITE (NKP--Nakhon Phanom).
TCTO	Time Compliance Technical Orders. Maintenance support regulations.
TDY	Temporary Duty, usually less than six months.
TF1AE	Task Force One Advisory Element. CCN located at Da Nang and responsible for Northern PHU DUNG AO, the DMZ, and NICKEL STEEL.
TF2AE	Task Force Two Advisory Element. CCC located at Kontum and responsible for operations in both THOT NOT and PHU DUNG AO.

TF3AE	Task Force Three Advisory Element. CCS located at Ban Me Thuot and responsible for operations in Southern THOT NOT AO.
*THOT NOT	Last nickname for Cambodia referring to a type of mangrove that grows there. Pron. TOTE NOTE. Nickname replacing SALEM HOUSE. Cross-border operations in Cambodia.
*TIGER HOUND	Southern portion of Laos panhandle. (SOG-35A).
TNAO	THOT NOT Area of Operations.
TOC	Tactical Operations Center.
TOP SECRET	Highest security classification. Disclosure of top secret information could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation. Examples are war plans, new weapons, or the identification of intelligence agents in an area.
*TOTEM POLE	Identification of wire tap equipment.
*TRAFFIC COP	Destroyer operations against coastal shipping of NVN 17.00N to 18.00N. Also known as SEA DRAGON.
*TROJAN HORSE	High level U-2 photography, now known as GIANT NAIL.
*USAID	US Agency for Internal Development - "Economic Support Plan" with a FY budget to $150 million from $250.

USARV	US Army, Vietnam.
UW	Unconventional Warfare.
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force.
VNSF	Vietnamese Special Forces.
VR	Visual Reconnaissance.
*WACO CITY	Reaction teams inserted at sites of enemy contact or downed A/C to recover bodies or survivors.
*WATERBOY	Call sign for GCI at Dong Ha, SVN.
*WILD WEASEL	Aircraft employing electronic detection equipment used to detect and destroy SAM sites.
*YANKEE STATION	Term used to describe TASK FORCE 77; that unit of 7th Fleet that conducts air operations against NVN. Team is made up of CVAs and associated destroyers providing screening support and SAR support and also protection to MAROPS when requested.
*YANKEE TEAM	Tactical recon over Laos.
*YOUNG TIGER	SAC program for re-locating KC-135s to Taiwan in support of an increased B-52 effort.
ZONE ALFA	Northern zone in Cambodia bounded by Laotian border to the North, Route 13 to the South, to a uniform depth of 50 km from RVN.

ZONE BRAVO	Southern zone in Cambodia extended from a line drawn West from Lo Go, RVN to the Mekong River at a uniform depth of 30 km; and from the Mekong River to the Gulf of Thailand at a uniform depth of 20 km.
ZONE CHARLIE	The central zone which extended from Route 13 Lo Go, RVN at a uniform depth of 30 km.

(volume II)

MAC-V-SOG 1971-72 Command History ANNEX B:
The Last Secret of the Vietnam War
Volume II
by Charles F. Reske

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COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER ELEVEN

GROUND STUDIES BRANCH

The Ground Studies Branch, MACSOG-34, provided staff support and supervision for the activities of the Airborne Studies Group, Ground Studies Group and the Training Studies Group in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations, agent operations, and training and diversionary operations.

The last consisted essentially of Field Training Exercises (FTX) wherein Vietnamese trainees from Camp Long Thanh (renamed Camp Yen The) participated in actual, but relatively safe, operations prior to graduation to the STD. Diversionary operations were just that, notional operations designed to draw the enemy away from actual Landing Zones.

The Ground Studies Branch was divided into three organic sections. The Special Studies Section---which monitored the sensor program and maintained liaison with the MACV scientific and technical offices---the Field Studies Section, and the Training Studies Section.

The Special Studies Section was responsible for such military innovations as people sniffers, sensors that could detect human presence by scent alone. Operations utilizing these devices were nicknamed DIAMOND HEAD, no doubt a reference to the rattlesnake that detects it's prey by smell.

The Field Studies Section, which administered the PHU DUNG/NICKLE STEEL and THOT NOT programs, had been in existence since 1965 under the nickname SHINING BRASS, and was accorded the distinction of being uncovered by investigative journalist Jack Anderson, who compromised the nicknames PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE on 8 April 1971.

The Field Studies Section was responsible for running Reconnaissance Teams into Cambodia and Laos. A number of these were Earth Angel Teams dressed as NVA and composed primarily of Chieu Hoi's, and Pike Hill Teams, which referred to Cambodian intelligence collection teams wearing Khmer Rouge uniforms.

Ground operations across the border had been authorized as early as 1964 under OPLAN 34A, but they had gotten off to an inauspicious start. Several 8-man reconnaissance teams were parachuted into Laos as part of Operation Leaping Lena. With the exception of four survivors who somehow made it back to friendly control, the RTs disappeared without a trace.

By 8 February 1971, there were no U.S.-led Recon Teams operating in either Cambodia or Laos. The rare exceptions to this rule were the BRIGHT LIGHT PW rescue/recovery teams, but they operated under such tight constraints that their efforts were rendered mostly useless.

Despite Vietnamization and the Improvement and Modernization Program, both of which were designed to prepare the Vietnamese to take on a larger share of the war effort, in the first month of 1971 MACSOG was still running 60 U.S.-led reconnaissance teams into Laos

and along the RVN/Laotian border, and 30 U.S.-led RTs from TF2AE along the RVN/Cambodian border.

Dedicated Vietnamese assets amounted to 20 ARVN-led RTs in Cambodia and 20 ARVN-led RTs in Laos. Clearly, even at this late stage of the game, the United States was bearing most of the responsibility for covert operations and intelligence gathering.

Elements peripheral to LAM SON 719 point to the STD's continued dependence on SOG assets. While LAM SON 719 was an ARVN cross-border operation, MACSOG was obliged to provide notional team insertions and platoon operations to distract the enemy from a superior ARVN force. It should be remembered that part of the MACV/MACSOG strategy was to task the Vietnamese with only those operations we thought they might have a chance of completing successfully. Actual challenges that might have succeeded in developing their abilities apparently extended to Camp Yen The's Field Training Exercises and no further.

One event not directly attributable to South Vietnamese inefficiency was the loss of the Hickory Radio Relay Site, a National Security Agency listening post in Laos that had existed since 1968. SOG's rather dry assessment of the loss concluded with the observation that the enemy apparently got tired of the site and just decided to get rid of it.

Other problems SOG encountered were the enemy's improved counter-raider capabilities, improved intelligence, improved communications, and breeches in SOG's security. All of these factors contributed to shortened stay times on the ground and, consequently, less recent and reliable intelligence on an area.

The Training Studies Section monitored and issued guidance for MACSOG training programs. Through the Training Studies Group, MACSOG-38, courses were conducted at Vung Tau, Okinawa, and CONUS.

As was the case with other SOG departments, the Training Studies Branch found itself forced to closely monitor the activities of its STD counterpart to insure that only the highest caliber of instruction was being presented. In other words, without MACSOG looking over its shoulder, the STD Training Center[1] would have cut corners even further.

On 30 April 1972 the Ground Studies Branch died a merciful death and enjoyed a brief resurrection within Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team #158.

For further exploration of the training theme, see the chapter entitled: TRAINING STUDIES GROUP.

[1] The STD Training Center was a Byzantine, bureaucratic nightmare composed of 29 separate divisions, sections and sub-sections, each of which provided someone a comfortable billet. By comparison, MACSOG's Training Studies Branch and Training Studies Group together possessed only 12 sections and sub-sections.

-CHAPTER ELEVEN-

GROUND STUDIES BRANCH

GENERAL

(S) In 1971 the Ground Studies Branch, MACSOG-34, continued to provide staff support and supervision for the activities of the Airborne Studies Group, Ground Studies Group and the Training Studies Group in the conduct of covert and clandestine ground operations, agent operations, training and diversionary operations. On 1 Oct 71 Airborne Studies Group was deactivated and its assets and functions consolidated with Ground Studies Group. The early months of 1972 saw a continuation of this support and supervision until MACSOG-34 was deactivated on 30 Apr and phased into the Plans, Operations and Training section of the STD Assistance Team (STDAT), 158.

ORGANIZATION

(S) The Ground Studies Branch consisted of the Office of the Chief and three organic sections: Special Studies, Field Studies and Training Studies (Figure B-3-6).

1. The Special Studies Section administered the ---WORD DELETED--- program, monitored the MACSOG sensor program, and maintained liaison with MACV scientific and technical assets.

2. The Field Studies Section administered the PHU DUNG (PRAIRIE FIRE)/NICKEL STEEL and THOT NOT (SALEM HOUSE) programs.

3. The Training Studies Section administered the training program to support ---WORD DELETED--- PHU DUNG, and THOT NOT.

SPECIAL STUDIES SECTION

---MOST OF SPECIAL STUDIES SECTION IS DELETED---

SPECIAL PROGRAMS

(S) The Special Studies Section continued to exercise staff supervision over the MACSOG sensor program to provide advice and guidance on employment of unattended ground sensor devices in support of various MACSOG tasks.

(U) The section continued as the MACSOG contact office for coordination and liaison with the MACSOG Science Advisor.

(S) This section was disestablished in Nov 71 and responsibilities were absorbed by MACSOG-20.

FIELD STUDIES SECTION

GENERAL

(TS) MACSOG cross-border operations began in Sep 65 under the nickname SHINING BRASS and continued with various changes in operational areas and rules of engagement. Two separate cross-border ground programs were operational; the PHU DUNG/NICKEL STEEL

program in Laos/DMZ, which was formerly named PRAIRIE FIRE/NICKEL STEEL, and the THOT NOT program in Cambodia, which was formerly named SALEM HOUSE. Both programs were under the staff supervision of Field Studies Section, MACSOG-34. Actual operations were conducted by the Ground Studies Group (Appendix 9) and Airborne Studies Group (Appendix 10) which was consolidated with Ground Studies Group on 1 Oct 71. On 8 Apr 71, the nicknames SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE were renamed with Vietnamese language nicknames THOT NOT and PHU DUNG, respectively, due to a Washington Post news article dated Tuesday 30 Mar 71, "Pentagon's Messages Beg Denial," by Jack Anderson which compromised MACSOG's cross-border operations in Cambodia and Laos. THOT NOT, pronounced "TOT NOTE," is a type of mangrove in abundance in Cambodia. PHU DUNG, pronounced "FOO YOUNG," is the name of the illusion appearing to opium smokers, a widely produced commodity in Laos.

OPERATIONS

(TS) During the year 1971 the tempo was maintained at almost the same level as 1970 even though US withdrawals continued. This, however, did not preclude the introduction of new concepts and the refinement of previous operational techniques. The unique capability of PHU DUNG/THOT NOT forces stems from MACSOG's mandate for unconventional operations. SOG PHU DUNG/THOT NOT elements were the only US unconventional warfare ground forces authorized to

operate in Laos, Cambodia and the DMZ. As a result, these forces provided vital intelligence concerning VC/NVA intentions. The MACSOG ground elements harassed and interdicted the enemy LOCs, way stations, and base areas, which denied the enemy vital supplies and spoiled his operational preparations. In addition, the ground elements forced the diversion of large numbers of the enemy's forces from a primarily offensive role, to provide rear area security.

1. Programmed mission duration for all RT operations was normally six days, but was extended if the situation permitted resupply of the team. The ideal level of operations was generally accepted to be three missions every two months. Assuming all authorized RTs to be operational, the cross-border and in-country program was capable of launching 145 RT missions per month. Possible missions included:

a. Linear, area, point and route reconnaissance.

b. Road, trail and river watch.

c. Route mining interdiction and ambush.

d. PW snatch/capture.

e. Bomb damage assessment (BDA).

f. Ground photography.

g. Wiretap.

h. Direction of artillery, TACAIR and gunship strikes against targets of opportunity.

i. Limited direct ground combat as an adjunct to the reconnaissance mission.

j. Crash Site Inspection.

k. US Prisoner Recovery.

2. Exploitation or reaction forces were capable of rapid engagement of RT-developed targets by direct ground combat. The exploitation force organization permitted commitment of tailored elements ranging from one platoon to three platoons in size to perform the following:

a. Reconnaissance-in-force.

b. Route interdiction.

c. Ambush and raid.

d. Establishing and securing temporary patrol bases to support wide area RT operations.

e. Short-term area denial (when resupplied).

f. Cache destruction.

g. US prisoner recovery.

RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

(TS) Geographic restrictions affected both the PHU DUNG and THOT NOT programs. In the northern two-thirds of the PHU DUNG Zone, the spine of the Annamite cordillera dominates the RVN/Laos border. During the northeast monsoon (Oct - Apr) precipitation, cloud build-up and air turbulence above the eastern slopes of the Annamites

severely restricted helicopter operations into the PHU DUNG AO from RVN. In the southern portion of the THOT NOT AO large expanses of generally flat and relatively open terrain made it extremely difficult to operate undetected. These same areas became inundated during the southwest monsoon and were virtually impassable to foot troops operating off established trails and roads.

(TS) Because of the inherent political sensitivity, JCS imposed procedural limitations upon conduct of cross-border operations. In this respect, operations into the designated PHU DUNG AO were relatively unrestricted, with the exception that all US-led reconnaissance team operations ceased on 8 Feb 71, not more than three exploitation platoons could be employed on any given target at the same time and all operations had to be coordinated with CINCPAC and AMEMB Vientiane 24 hours in advance. On the other hand, population density and political sensitivity dictated that THOT NOT operations in Cambodia be closely controlled and all operations had to be coordinated with CINCPAC and JCS, 48 hours in advance.

AIR SUPPORT

(TS) Operations required a high level of air support and corresponding coordination. The majority of operations, both reconnaissance and exploitation, were helicopter inserted and extracted. Light fixed wing aircraft were used to provide FAC, visual reconnaissance, and radio relay coverage for active elements.

(TS) The basic element of PHU DUNG operations was the RT, which had a flexible organization. US-led RTs generally consisted of three US and six to nine Special Commando Unit (SCU) indigenous personnel, usually Montagnards and the ARVN-led RTs generally consisted of two ARVN officers (ARVN lieutenant and/or ARVN aspirant) and six SCU. The ARVN-led commando companies consisted of three ARVN-led platoons of six ARVN and 42 SCU. Conversion from US to ARVN leadership of each commando company was completed in Jan 71 and the commando companies were trained and operational for cross-border deployment by Oct 71.

(TS) MACSOG assets dedicated for PHU DUNG operations were ten ARVN-led RTs and two ARVN-led commando companies from TF1AE, Da Nang, and two of four ARVN-led commando companies from TF2AE, Kontum. Thirty US-led RTs from TF1AE conducted operations in PHU DUNG prior to 8 Feb 71 and in RVN contiguous to the northern portion of PHU DUNG AO subsequent to 8 Feb 71. Thirty US-led RTs and ten ARVN-led RTs from TF2AE, Kontum conducted operations in southern PHU DUNG and northern THOT NOT and in RVN contiguous to the southern portion of the PHU DUNG AO and the northern portion of the THOT NOT AO respectively. The US-led RTs were also employed in the southern portion of the PHU DUNG AO prior to 8 Feb 71. Nine ARVN STRATA teams from Monkey Mountain Forward Operating Base (MMFOB), Da Nang, and five EARTH ANGEL teams from the Special Operations Detachment (SOD), Saigon were also available for targeting the PHU DUNG AO.

---ONE PAGE DELETED---

(TS) PHU DUNG Operations were conducted using the Mobile Launch Site (MLS) concept in the same manner as in 1970. Two Task Force Advisory Elements (TFAE), one at Da Nang (TF1AE) and one at Kontum (TF2AE) exercised field control of operations in the PHU DUNG Area of Operations. In the northern PHU DUNG AO under TF1AE, RTs and exploitation forces were launched from Phu Bai (MLS-1), Quang Tri MLS-2, ---WORDS DELETED---. In the southern PHU DUNG Area of Operations, under TF2AE, operations were launched from Dak To and Kontum ---REMAINDER OF SENTENCE DELETED---. When adverse weather conditions and other operational priorities prohibited or hindered such helicopter insertions, additional emphasis was placed on overland infiltration from friendly forward units, patrol base operations and the static surveillance positions established adjacent to the NSA Radio Relay Site (HICKORY and GOLF-5).

(TS) From 1 Jan 71 through 31 Mar 72, PHU DUNG elements mounted 474 operations, of which 196 were cross-border missions and 278 were in-country missions. This resulted in an average of 32 missions per month for CY 71 and an average of 31.6 missions per month for the entire period. A complete statistical summary of these operations is depicted in Figure B-3-10.

(TS) PHU DUNG teams contributed a major portion of the hard intelligence on VC/NVA use of Laos as an infiltration/staging area and missions were conducted throughout the PHU DUNG Base Areas (BAs) and the DMZ (See Figure B-3-8 and B-3-9).

1. There were 178 missions directed into the tri-border areas of Laos and RVN (BA 609/613) along routes 96 and 100, yielding a considerable quantity of valuable hard intelligence.

2. Further north, in BA 614 and in RVN contiguous to the Base Area/Route 165/966 complex 59 missions were conducted. Adverse weather conditions and high elevation added to the extremely hostile environment in this area.

3. A total of 93 missions were conducted in and around BA 607.

4. Further north in the vicinity of BA 611 in RVN to include the Laotian salient, 44 missions were conducted. The number of missions actually conducted within BA 611 itself was extremely small as was the case in 1970, due to the extremely high density of enemy troops and of defense in that area.

5. There were 25 missions conducted in the BA 604 complex.

6. Of the remaining 75 missions, 36 were conducted in the northernmost area of the PHU DUNG Area of Operations and in MR1

contiguous to the Laotian border, 20 were conducted in the NICKEL STEEL Zone of the DMZ and the remainder were inserted into the western portion, or outside the PDAO ---WORDS DELETED---. A substantial decrease in operations in the DMZ (from 48 in 1970 to 20 in 1971) was due to increased enemy activity and anti-aircraft threat to helicopter operations.

7. ---SENTENCE DELETED---. However, there were only two safe helicopter crossing points located in the southern panhandle of Laos which were not a high AAA threat to the CH-53 troopllft.

(TS) The only major material losses attributable to PHU DUNG operations consisted of aircraft downed and destroyed. Twenty aircraft were lost.

(TS) The following were significant operational aspects of PHU DUNG/NICKEL STEEL operations during 1 Jan 71 through 31 Mar 72.

1. Of major significance was the receipt of JCS message 3360/052332Z Feb 71 (SPECAT TS) subject: US Participation in PRAIRIE FIRE Operations (TS) which directed that US personnel participating in PRAIRIE FIRE (PHU DUNG) operations be extracted NLT 8 Feb 71. It also stated that this restriction did not include US personnel on LEGHORN Radio Relay Site, GOLF-5 (YB-604355) tasked to provide support for the Explorer II facility at that location. The message allowed continued use of indigenous forces. The moratorium on US participation in PHU DUNG operations was directed as a temporary

measure for the duration of LAM SON 719 as a result of public speculation concerning US ground forces in Laos. The authority was not reinstated for US participation in PHU DUNG Operations.

2. An especially noteworthy trend was the continued coordination ---WORDS DELETED--- that resulted in a greater exchange of information and also one major operation in January west of Base Area 611. In January, MACSOG supported the ---WORDS DELETED--- west of BA 611 with notional and actual insertions of ARVN-led RTs.

3. In February, MACSOG supported the ARVN cross-border operation LAM SON 719 in BA 604 with notional and actual platoon operations.


4. Operations in the northern portion of the PHU DUNG AO were minimal during the months of February and September due to the withdrawal of air assets to support ARVN Operations LAM SON 719 and LAM SON 810 respectively. Additionally, adverse weather has been a major factor in operations. During the latter part of May and the first half of June some 155 missions were aborted due to adverse weather. During the months of November and December, 339 missions were aborted due to adverse weather. The accelerated drawdown of air assets severely curtailed PHU DUNG operations during the first three months of 1972.

5. From 3 to 5 Jun 71, a determined enemy force, estimated to be battalion size, assaulted and overran the HICKORY Radio Relay

Site. The loss of HICKORY had an adverse effect on MACSOG intelligence collection capabilities in the northern portion of the PHU DUNG AO. The LEGHORN Radio Relay Site, GOLF-5, however, continued to be supported by MACSOG ground elements positioned on the site in a static surveillance role. Enemy activities in the vicinity of LEGHORN Radio Relay Site were monitored closely to prevent a recurrence of the events at HICKORY. MACSOG activities in and around LEGHORN were kept to an absolute minimum so as not to attract increased attention.


6. The AMEMB in Vientiane concurred in several insertions west of the PHU DUNG AO. These insertions allowed teams to take advantage of being inserted up to five kilometers outside the PHU DUNG AO and approaching selected target areas in the area of operations from new directions, thereby increasing the security and surprise factors. One EARTH ANGEL team was inserted 43km west of the PHU DUNG AO.

7. The enemy's counter-raider capability greatly improved. Mobile tracker teams were strategically placed along all significant high point observation sites. This plus a more sophisticated communications system, allowed the enemy to monitor the insertion of teams and direct the trackers into the area. This resulted in a short stay time, particularly in the northern PHU DUNG AO. As a countermeasure to the enemy's mobile tracker teams, RTs made an increased use of 10,000 pound bombs, COMMANDO VAULT, to clear LZs to permit insertion away from known LZs. This technique was successful




SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE B-3-8



SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE B-3-9



SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE B-3-11

95



SOURCE: SAS

FIGURE 8-3-12

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

PLANS DIVISION

The Plans Division, MACSOG-50, developed and prepared combined and joint long-range, intermediate, and contingency unconventional warfare/special operations plans for Southeast Asia. Additionally, the Plans Division participated in special projects, such as the preparation of the Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force concept and the OPLAN and MACSOG Reduction Plan.

As was the case with the rest of the MACSOG organization, Plans was tasked with preparing the STD for its post-SOG role. Ideally, as the last of MACSOG's operational elements phased out, the Staff Assistance Element, Strategic Technical Directorate would assume an advisory role to the STD. The RVNAF would, in turn, provide "significant logistical, communications, and fiscal support for VN/Special Operations."

An alternate plan (OPLAN J203) was proposed to COMUSMACV and termed "Plan for the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam." Classified secret, neither plan was implemented, most likely because the "significant support" dedicated by the RVNAF never materialized.

Plans Division also assisted MACJ3-03 in the evaluation and preparation of Cover and Deception Plans to support the supposedly all-Vietnamese operation named LAM SON 719. In planning for this hypothetically all-Vietnamese operation, SOG was prepared to commit all of its ground, air, maritime, and psychological operational assets to the mission. In other words, MACSOG forces would find

-CHAPTER FOURTEEN-

APPENDIX 5

PLANS DIVISION

(TS) During 1971 and the first four months of 1972, Plans Division, (MACSOG-50), continued to develop and prepare combined and joint long-range, intermediate, and contingency unconventional warfare (UW)/special operations plans for Southeast Asia. In addition, the Plans Division participated in special projects, such as preparing the Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force concept and OPLAN and MACSOG Reduction Plan, as directed by Chief, SOG.

(S) Coupled with planning, the division ensured that Chief, SOG and appropriate staff elements were kept advised on all matters pertaining to UW contingency plans, US and allied forces capabilities for implementation of current UW plans, and STD capabilities for assumption of MACSOG activities.

(S) Plans for the STD Improvement and Modernization (I&M) and for the transfer of MACSOG responsibilities, missions and capabilities received primary emphasis in order to ensure proper and efficient turnover. MACSOG-50 made maximum efforts to insure that all parties concerned were aware of the rapid changes taking place in this area and to ensure that all contingencies were covered.

ORGANIZATION

(C) The Plans Division was authorized a Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel as Director, assisted by three O4s of the other three respective services, and two enlisted men. This situation, however, changed as drawdown commenced. In Oct 71 the Air Force billet was deleted. By 1 May 72, the Plans Division was reduced to one officer billet, an Army Major, which was incorporated into the Plans, Operations and Training Advisory Division of the STDAT.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(TS) Accomplishments and projects completed by the Plans Division during 1971 and the early months of 1972 included:

1. Appendix to Annex C to COMUSMACV OPLAN J203, UW Appendix to "Plan for the Vietnam Assistance Command (VAC)" (U). This separately distributed appendix was submitted in Feb 71, revised, and resubmitted in May 71. It was to establish the VAC UW/Special Operations advisory element to the STD after the STD had assumed most of the MACSOG missions and responsibilities. MACSOG was to assume an advisory role under the title of Staff Assistance Element, Strategic Technical Directorate (STDAT). Significant logistical, communications, and fiscal support for VN/Special Operations was to be provided by RVNAF. OPLAN J203 was an alternate proposal to COMUSMACV OPLAN J198, "Plan for the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam" (S). Neither plan was implemented.

Forces action teams coupled with aggressive PSYOPS to develop further government controls over the area. The study, however, stated that due to the enemy's position in the NE section of Cambodia it would be virtually impossible to employ SF units in the area. Rather a strong intelligence network would have to be developed to identify potential forces for recruitment, identify targets, establish a government presence, and conduct psyops.

28. PRTF Conference. At the direction of Chief, SOG, Director of Plans and COMJPRTF attended a conference in Okinawa to provide advice and assistance to the First Special Forces Group in the formulation of OPLANS, SOP's and training schedules regarding prisoner recovery operations.

29. 1971/72 MACSOG Historical Summary. The Plans Division completed, staffed, edited and published the 1971/72 MACSOG Command History (Annex B to USMACV 1971/72 Command History). This was the final wrap up of MACSOG's activities as contained herein.

maritime operations which could feasibly support the strategy options.

11. Appendix 3 to Annex C to COMUSMACV OPLAN J206, "Accelerated Redeployment Under Ceasefire Conditions" (TS). This appendix was published and distributed separately on 18 Apr 71. It provided the guidelines for the accelerated redeployment of US Unconventional Warfare/Special Operations advisors to the RVNAF under cease fire conditions.

12. Problem Areas: On 19 Apr 71, MACV requested MACSOG to identify any problem areas which should be brought to the attention of the MACV command group. Plans Division was responsible for assembling the problem areas submitted by the various MACSOG sections. Of the problem areas submitted only one was determined to be of sufficient importance to receive command attention.

The one major unsatisfactory area involved communications support in regard to the operations of Da Nang DET, and Tiger DET, Saigon, by the contractor, Federal Electric Corporation (FEC). The recommended solution was that MACJ6 coordinate this problem and that the contractor be required to fulfill the requirements of the contract.

13. COMJPRTF OPLAN 1-71, "PW Recovery Operations." JCS msg 8551/052246Z May 71, requested a general concept for a dedicated and immediately responsive task force for SVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

Plans Division prepared MACV's response (COMUSMACV msg 150630Z May 71) which proposed a concept for a Joint Recovery Task Force (JPRTF) employing existing MACSOG units with US leaders and advisors who could be rapidly organized for any given tactical situation on a mission dedicated basis. This concept was approved by JCS msg 270017Z May 71 and a detailed plan was requested to implement the concept. COMJPRTF OPLAN 1-71 was written by Plans Division and approved by COMUSMACV at a decision briefing on 17 Jun 71. JCS msg 070021Z Aug 71 approved the plan for implementation. JCS msg 092308Z Jun 71 had previously authorized the use of US forces in PW recovery, BRIGHT LIGHT and operations in Cambodia and Laos. This OPLAN was to be effective only as long as MACSOG maintained an operational capability.

14. Cambodia Conference, 14 May 71. CINCPAC convened a planning conference in Saigon from 14-18 May 71 for the purpose of developing recommendations for continued US support to Cambodia. Conferees included representatives from COMUSMACTHAI, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CG MEDTC, AMEMB PHNOM PENH, and the JCS. Director, Plans and Director, Operations and Training represented MACSOG at the conference. Agenda items included strategy studies, FANK training, assessment of enemy and friendly situations, military and economic aid, UW training, US air support and impact of continued US redeployments on the SEA situation. SOG's primary interest was in the development of the UW program for Cambodia, and in particular, the implementation of special agent teams nicknamed CEDAR WALK in NE Cambodia.

15. IG Inspection. In May, an IG Inspection was conducted on the Plans Division. No major discrepancies were noted and all minor ones were corrected on the spot. The Admin NCOIC, an E-5, received considerable praise for his preparations for the inspection. This was exceptionally noteworthy since he was filling an E-7 billet.

16. COMJPRTF OPLAN 2-71, "Tactical Operations Center Command Post Exercise (CPX.)" COMJPRTF OPLAN 2-71 was developed to provide for the conduct of a CPX to test the coordination command, control, and communications of the JRTF Tactical Operations Center. The CPX which simulated the conduct of a PW recovery operation through canned message traffic was successfully conducted on 31 Aug 71. A number of shortcomings were identified in the communications area but were eliminated thru publication of the SOP.

17. ISLAND TREE Conference. Representatives from the Plans Division and Ground Studies Branch participated in the ISLAND TREE Conference convened by CINCPAC from 26 Jul to 2 Aug 71 in Saigon. The conference developed a CINCPAC interdiction plan for the Winter-Spring dry season and studied several proposals to improve the capabilities of the RVNAF.

18. JPRTG. CINCPAC msg 2405382 Aug 71 requested that MACV submit a proposed TOE to support CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100, Joint Personnel Recovery Task Force (U), in the post-July 72 time-frame.

It also was to include an estimate of MACV's capability to staff the proposed organization. Plans Division was tasked to prepare a reply to this message and on 22 Sep 71, three proposed options were briefed to COMUSMACV, with their supporting TOEs. These proposals were then forwarded to CINCPAC with a statement that MACV could not support the organization in the Post-July 72 time frame. CINCPAC concurred and requested that MACV propose another concept. COMUSMACV msg 020150Z Nov 71 to CINCPAC forwarded a JPRTF concept utilizing MACSOG assets in the Post-July 72 time frame. The basic concept was to augment the STDAT by 105 spaces in order to provide the leadership for an indigenous force of three Special Commando Unit (SCU) companies (375 people) and forty-five Sea Commando Team (SCT) personnel. It also required that certain aircraft, namely the 20th, 90th and 21st SOSs remain in SEA to support JPRTF operations as well as other TACAIR. The concept was basically approved by CINCPAC and a working meeting was held there. The Director of Plans, Chief, SOG and representatives of MACJ2/3 and JPRC represented MACV's interests at the meeting. The result was the submission of msgs to JCS and a revised CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100 which promulgated the concept. Plans Division subsequently prepared and coordinated a JPRTF OPLAN to support the CONPLAN. This plan, however, was never activated because the concept was not approved by JCS. The concept was ultimately dropped in favor of an out-of-country concept under CINCPAC control to reduce in-country headspace problems.

organization, and phasedown. The other was prepared for JCS/CINCPAC and covered the proposed JPRTF (Ref para 18 above). Both packages together consisted of over 120 slides with their respective narratives. The slides were produced in conjunction with SAS.

23. Force Structure Review, FY 73 (FSR-73). Representatives of Plans and STD attended a variety of meetings at MACV and JGS during the months of November and December in conjunction with increasing the force levels of STD, General Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD), and VNAF. The proposed change in force levels incorporated an additional 1224 personnel for STD, 40 personnel for VNAF (ASS) and 86 for GPWD (VOF), all of which fell under STD's proponency. After careful review by the joint JGS/MACV committee, the request was forwarded recommending approval of 180 spaces to replace the SCU in the Reconnaissance Companies, 40 spaces for VNAF to be used in conjunction with the Air Support Service and 86 spaces allocated to VOF. The 1044 spaces desired by STD to replace the SCU in the Exploitation Companies were disapproved. This latter request was not supported by MACSOG due to the lack of success gained in exploitation operations and the continued decline in the necessary air assets.

24. COMUSMACV OPLAN J-190, Repatriation of US/Allied Prisoners of War (U). A representative of Plans Division and JPRC attended briefings/working meetings at MACV to assist in the revision of subject plan. From the working meetings a change was produced and subsequently forwarded to MACSOG for consideration.

Plans Division concurred in the change and submitted additional information that should be changed. Every requested change or revision was included in Change 1 to subject OPLAN published in Dec 71.

25. Code Words and Nicknames. MACSOG Directive 380-1, Code Words, Nicknames, SOG Words, Code Names and Call Signs was revised and updated in December to ensure that proper procedures were being followed in obtaining and deactivating nicknames, code words, and SOG words in order to avoid any possible compromises or conflicts in names and words utilized.

26. Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). Through coordination with other MACSOG elements, a Joint Table of Distribution was established for the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team (STDAT), into which MACSOG was to transition by 1 May 72. The JTD was forwarded to MACV on 10 Jan 72 and subsequently approved and forwarded to JCS for final approval. The JTD provided 155 spaces to the advisory team; two Navy, two Air Force, and one hundred fifty-one Army. The JTD was further modified in Mar 72 to add fifteen spaces in order to provide security support for GOLF-5 Radio Relay Site.

27. Concept for employment of UW forces in Cambodia. A study was produced at the request of MACJ3 as to the best way to employ SF units in Cambodia. The study basically found that the NW areas of Cambodia (were) conducive to the utilization of Special

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

RECOVERY STUDIES DIVISION

One of the most humane aspects of the MACSOG organization, and conversely one of the most ineffective, was the Recovery Studies Division, MACSOG-80. The Recovery Studies Division was the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), and functioned as the focal point for information and activities related to U.S. and Free World Military Assistance Command (FWMAC) missing and captured personnel.

The JPRC acted as a staff agency and joint coordinating authority within MACV for Search and Rescue (SAR). The JPRC utilized the basic MACSOG-80 cover for status, usually when dealing with the South Vietnamese, who were often called upon to dedicate assets for SAR and recovery operations, which were code named BRIGHT LIGHT.

Though active since 1964, the JPRC never recovered a single, live American POW from inception to disestablishment. To their credit, they traced every rumor and followed every lead.

One of the reasons out-of-country recovery operations were so unsuccessful was due to the fact that they required coordination with the very highest military and diplomatic levels. Cambodian operations were coordinated with COMUSMACV, the JCS, CINCPAC, the American Embassy Saigon, and American Embassy Phnom Penh. Operations in Laos were coordinated with the American Embassy in Vientiane, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC. By the time intelligence worked its way through the Byzantine maze of bureaucracy and diplomatic complications, any POWs or downed airmen were long gone.

A significant part of the JPRC strategy was the offer of cash rewards to indigenous civilians for information leading to the recovery of live Americans or their remains. During 1971 a total of $1925.00 was paid for the return of remains or information. The JPRC's own internal study indicated that much of the information offered by VC/NVA PWs or South Vietnamese civilians was pure fabrication for monetary gain.


Despite the air dropping of 130,536,000 leaflets in 1971-72, no one collected the $5000.00 U.S. dollars for return of a live American POW.

The JPRC technique for investigating reported U.S. POW sightings by Hoi Chanh (Chieu Hoi ralliers) was slightly unorthodox. After writing out his contract with the Americans---and learning that he could receive up to $5000.00 U.S. dollars---the Hoi Chanh was re-inserted near the area of his initial capture.

If he returned to the ranks of his former comrades, the JPRC threatened to duplicate and air drop his hand written contract throughout the area, virtually assuring his death. Additionally, he was informed that his family would be arrested and interned as VC sympathizers. SOG called this the Carrot and Stick approach.

The final 1972 JPRC figures were not encouraging. Between 1964 and 1972 a total of 492 South Vietnamese were rescued, 101 U.S. remains were recovered, $16,041.00 in rewards were paid out, and 354 million leaflets were dropped throughout Southeast Asia. Thus, while the JPRC program was undoubtedly a failure, it was a failure that arose from the highest of motives.

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER



RECAPITULATION: 3 OFFICERS
3 ENLISTED MEN

SOURCE: MACSOG JPRC

FIGURE B-7-1

-CHAPTER SIXTEEN-

APPENDIX 7

RECOVERY STUDIES DIVISION

GENERAL

(S) The Recovery Studies Division, MACSOG-80, was the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). This office continued throughout 1971 and the early months of 1972 to function as the focal point for information and activities related to US and Free World Military Assistance Command (FWMAC) missing and captured personnel in Southeast Asia.

(S) The JPRC acted as the staff agency and joint coordinating authority within MACV for post search and rescue (SAR) personnel recovery operations. In this capacity, it continued to:

1. Develop requirements for collection of intelligence and other data concerning detained and missing personnel.

2. Coordinate and maintain liaison with US and Allied entities to insure maximum utilization of available resources and to achieve minimum reaction time for launch of rescue/recovery operations.

3. Maintain complete files on missing and detained personnel.

4. Monitor and coordinate rescue operations with participating agencies during planning and execution.

5. Assist in debriefing of recovered personnel.

6. Supervise Evasion and Escape Kit maintenance and development.

(S) Within MACSOG, the JPRC was known as the Recovery Studies Division, or MACSOG-80, and consequently utilized the basic MACSOG cover for status. Outside of MACSOG, the JPRC was a separate staff section under MACV. JPRC's relationship with MACSOG was classified SECRET. On 15 Mar 72 JPRC moved from MACSOG to MACJ2 and was assigned as J212-3.

ORGANIZATION

(S) The JPRC organization was changed on 12 Sep 71 to meet changing mission trends. Basically the change was required to allow for greater involvement in information and intelligence collection activities. This new organization was comprised of a Director (O-5), a Deputy (O-4), an Administrative Section (E-6), Biographic Branch (O-4, E-6, E-5), and Operations Branch (O-3, E-6) (Figure B-7-1).

RECOVERY OPERATIONS

(TS) During 1971 there were twenty-four PW recovery operations in Southeast Asia, while up to 15 Mar 72, there was one PW recovery operation in which the JPRC either planned and coordinated the operations or monitored the efforts of subordinate US and ARVN commands. Twenty-three of the recovery operations ended with negative results while one recovery operation resulted in nine ARVN/RVN PWs being recovered. In addition, remains of thirteen US personnel were recovered by WACO CITY recovery teams, six of which resulted in rewards. One US PW and several third nation civilians were released as follows:

1. The US PW released by the Viet Cong on 8 Oct 71 was SP4 Sexton who had been captured during enemy contact on 12 Aug 69 in the vicinity of An Loc, SVN.

2. The German civilian released by the Viet Cong on 8 Nov 71 was Peter Schrader-Rottmers, who had been captured on 14 Aug in Quang Ngai Province, RVN.

3. The Australian released by the Viet Cong on 31 May 71 was Miss Kate Webb, who had been captured on 7 May 71 in Cambodia.

4. Francis Bizot, a French civilian, was captured near Oudong Cham in Cambodia in early Oct 71. He was released in late Dec 71.

5. Ten Filipino civilians who had been captured on or about 21 Nov 71 were released on 11 Feb 72. The individuals were the crew of a tug boat wrecked off Phu My District, Binh Dinh Province, RVN.

6. An Australian free-lance photographer named John Everingham was released by the Pathet Lao on 11 Mar 72. He was allegedly captured twenty-nine days earlier (approximately 11 Feb 72) in the vicinity seventeen miles southeast of the royal capitol of Luang Prabang.

IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS

(S) In-country PW recovery operations were the responsibility of the respective Military Region Tactical Zone Commander, as set forth under COMUSMACV OPLAN J201 - BRIGHT LIGHT, which provided guidance for local commanders in planning PW recovery operations. A sanitized copy of this plan was provided to the Joint General Staff (JGS) for ARVN operations.

OUT-OF-COUNTRY OPERATIONS

(TS) Out-of-country recovery operations required coordination at the highest military, government and diplomatic levels.

1. Cambodian operations were coordinated by COMUSMACV with the JCS, CINCPAC, American Embassy (AMEMB) Saigon, and AMEMB Phnom Penh. CINCPAC msg DTG 0606472 Nov 70, modified by JCS msg DTG

0923082 Jun 71 authorized the use of US-led recovery forces and US air assets for PW recovery operations in Cambodia until 30 Jun 72 with the direct approval of COMUSMACV. In Jan 71 the sole PW related operation conducted in Cambodia was an attempt to recover a US PW. Results wee negative.

2. To conduct recovery operations in Laos, JPRC was required to coordinate with American Embassy Vientiane and CINCPAC due to a special joint Memorandum of Agreement of Nov 69. This was modified by JCS msg DTG 0923082 Jun 71 which authorized the use of US forces for PW recovery operations in Laos, Cambodia, and RVN until 30 Jun 72 with direct approval of COMUSMACV. There were only two JPRC operations conducted in Laos during 1971 and 1972. On 8 Jan 71 a MACSOG BRIGHT LIGHT team recovered two US remains. Ann operation on 9 May 71 achieved negative results.

3. Crash site inspections (CSI) in Laos and Cambodia were authorized by JCS message 2518012 Aug 71.

4. No JPRC sponsored operations have been authorized or attempted in North Vietnam since the bombing halt of 1968.

NEGOTIATIONS

(S) In addition to actual recovery operations conducted during 1971 and early months of 1972, the JPRC continued to be involved in negotiations for the return of several US PWs by ransoming them from opposing forces. To date, these efforts have met with negative results.

REWARD PROGRAM

(S) The program for immediate monetary rewards to indigenous civilians was continued. Recipients were those who helped US captured or missing personnel return to friendly control, providing information, returned equipment or other evidence that revealed the status of US personnel, or returned remains of US personnel. During 1971 a total of $1925.00 was paid for the return of remains or information that led to the return of remains and help in recovery operations. The early months of 1972 saw $400.00 paid for similar actions.

(S) JPRC briefings, leaflets, and other PSYOP media continued to be used to apprise the target audience of the reward program. Approximately 98,336,000 leaflets were dropped over South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1971 to advertise the rewards program (See Figure B-7-2). A new series of reward leaflets were designed in 1971 and also dropped. Approved for use in SEA, these leaflets were Brown Stallion, Buffalo Track and Elephant Walk. They were printed in three languages, Lao, Vietnamese, and Cambodian with "pointee-talkee" pictures for illiterates. Examples of leaflets utilized are shown in Figure B-7-3. Revised Brown Stallion leaflets were dropped for the first time on 16 May 71, while Buffalo Track and Elephant Walk leaflets were first dropped in late Nov 71. In the early months of 1972, 32,200,000 leaflets were dropped as indicated in Figure B-7-4.

(U) The following monetary rewards were authorized to indigenous civilians who helped US PW or MIA, or returned remains during 1971-72.

1. $5,000 US - For returning US personnel to friendly forces control.

2. $500 US - For information leading to the return of US personnel to friendly forces control.

3. $400 US - For return of a body to friendly forces control.

4. $150 US - For authenticated information on status or location.

EVASION AND ESCAPE PROGRAM

CODE LETTERS

(S) The JPRC published a yearly listing of primary and backup E&E code symbols to be utilized by aircrew members in a downed status. JPRC was notified immediately of any E&E code symbol sightings. Photo interpreters and pilots throughout Southeast Asia were aware of this program and were constantly on the alert for

possible code symbols. Several possible code symbol sightings were made during 1971. However, on further investigation by visual reconnaissance and aerial photography most sightings proved to be negative.

(S) Beginning in Oct 70, a new set of E&E code symbols replaced the previously used letters of the alphabet (Figure B-7-5). These symbols were basic letters with slight modifications which made them unique to the E&E program. Previously, regular letters caused some ambiguity because other elements also used letters to mark different ground areas. In Oct 71, the E&E code symbols were again changed to the set shown in Figure B-7-6. On 15 Nov a new back up symbol was promulgated after possible compromise. The new symbol was a capital Greek letter Delta (or equilateral triangle).

EVASION AND ESCAPE/SURVIVAL KITS

(S) The JPRC maintained Large E&E (LEE) survival kits with low and high speed delivery capability ---WORDS DELETED, POSSIBLY A REFERENCE TO NAKHON PHANOM--- and Da Nang, RVN. In addition, Small E&E (SEE) kits were maintained at Da Nang, Pleiku, Nha Trang, and Bien Hoa in SVN.

(S) Th SEE kit was developed by JPRC at a cost of $350.00 in Jul 70 for immediate deployment on probably code letter sightings by Forward Air Controllers (FAC). The LEE kit offered complete E&E

aids such as radio, food and water, weapon and ammunition, clothing, signal devices and medical supplies; whereas, the SEE kit contained the primary aids (ten items) of radio, food and water, and signalling devices. The JPRC monitored E&E kit deployment on a case-by-case basis.

AIRCREW BRIEFINGS

(C) JPRC representatives presented briefings on the JPRC mission, organization and personnel recovery capabilities to aircrew members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and E&E personnel in Southeast Asia. In addition, live demonstrations of the Fulton Recovery System (Sky Hook) in the Philippines continued through August 1971. Upon the recommendation of 90th SOS, live demonstrations were discontinued after that time.

PW IDENTIFICATION BOOK

(C) The JPRC developed and distributed in Sep 71 a PW Identification Book of 1881 photographs of US PW and MIA for use in debriefings and interrogations. The album was disseminated to all intelligence collection agencies, interrogation teams, military region commanders, American Embassies in SEA and other agencies and organizations requiring it. Additionally, copies were sent to DIA, CINCPAC and each service for information purposes. A revised edition was published and distributed in Mar 72.

PRISONERS OF WAR REPATRIATION PLAN

(S) COMUSMACV OPLAN J190 (EGRESS RECAP), dated 30 Nov 71, was a coordinated MACV staff effort that delineated the procedures to be followed in the reception, processing, and evacuation of recovered US prisoners of war. In addition, it provided guidance to US military forces in Vietnam concerning their responsibilities during the repatriation of GVN/PW personnel and third country nationals. The JPRC was tasked to monitor debriefings to apprise MACV and higher headquarters of information pertaining to the status of PW who remained in enemy custody, and to maintain current PW/MIA dossiers. JPRC worked closely with MACSOG-50 and MACV J5 to ensure that the plan contained the proper tasking requirements needed to support JPRCs mission.

JPRC STATISTICS

(S) Results of JPRC sponsored programs are shown in Figure B-7-7.

RESULTS OF JPRC SPONSORED PROGRAMS

	1971	1972	CUMULATIVE
Vietnamese PW Rescued	9	0	492
US Remains Recovered	11	2	101
Rewards Paid	$1925.00	$400.00	$16,041.00*
Leaflets Dropped (Millions)	98	32	354

* This cumulative total corrects the 1970 total.

Figure B-7-7

(C) Figure B-7-8 provides JPRC's statistical summary of US Military and Civilian Personnel and FWMAF military personnel returned to military control. For clarification of terms utilized, the glossary contains a definition of each.

(C) Figure B-7-9 lists JPRC's statistical summary of Missing in Action (MIA) and Prisoner of War (PW) personnel for Southeast Asia as of 15 Mar 72.

CRASH SITE INSPECTION

(C) COMUSMACV directed that the JPRC establish a Crash Site Inspection (CSI) program to inspect all known crash sites where personnel have not been recovered. This effort was coordinated with the Joint Central Graves Registration Office (JCGRO) so that all technical and tactical assets could be combined to make a detailed, one-time reconnaissance to determine the status of the personnel on board. Statistics as of 15 Mar 72 are shown in Figure B-7-10. See Glossary for definitions of terms.

(C) A Crash Site Inspection (CSI) conference was held on 6 Oct 71 to coordinate between Graves Registration Officer, US Army Mortuary as Tan Son Nhut AB, Military Region contact officers and the JPRC. The purpose was to establish standard procedures, including the assignment of specialized personnel trained in CSI to accompany search teams.

(C) Figure B-7-10 lists JPRC's CSI Data Summary as of 15 Mar 72. See Glossary for terms.

CSI AREA	TOTAL CS	TRIED LOC	LOC	GO IN	REMNS REC
MR I/RVN	127	48	12	15	2
MR II/RVN	46	32	12	12	3
MR III/RVN	31	24	12	17	1
MR IV/RVN	18	3	3	4	0
RVN	222	107	39	48	6
Cambodia	8	3	3	3	0
China	5	0	0	0	0
Laos	162	3	3	3	0
NVN	262	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	659	113	45	54	6

SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B-7-10

(C) The above conference resulted in better coordination between Graves Registration, US Army Mortuary at Tan Son Nhut AB, Military Region (MR) contact officers and JPRC. The resultant plan to satisfy Project Compassion and CSI is as follows:

1. Each MR directs assets to reconnoiter its AO and report crash sites to JCGRO.

2. JCGRO checks records at Mortuary and JPRC to confirm remains still at wreckage.

3. Where possibility of remains still exists, the MR requests technical personnel for inspection operation.

4. JCGRO forms team of ID specialists EOD and engineer personnel.

5. The MR provides security elements and transportation assets.

6. The Inspection Team Officer (assigned by the MR) has responsibility for security and recovery of remains, and exercises control of the operation.

JPRC MISSION ACTIVITIES SUMMARY

(TS) A brief synopsis of JPRC missions and activities during 1971 and the early months of 1972 are contained in Figure B-7-11. Figures B-7-12 and B-7-13 indicate the mission locations within SEA; locations correspond to mission numbers shown in Figure B-7-11.

(S) IN order to better explain the missions/events conducted during 1971 and 1972, a brief summary was prepared of some of the major ones. The mission/event numbers are located directly above each paragraph for easy reference to Figure B-7-11.

MISSION 3

Operation Dai Phong was conducted on 17 Jan 71 by ARVN troops helo lifted 20 km into Cambodia and commanded by the late General Tri. A source was able to show a JPRC representative where a village and house allegedly contained four US PWs. The reaction and plan for this operation were noteworthy, but no prisoners were recovered.

MISSION 5

A 14 year old Hoi Chanh provided information on a US PW who was in the source's camp six weeks prior to his rallying. A ground reconnaissance of the suspected VC camp by 11th ACR resulted in the location of sleeping areas and cooking facilities which had been occupied within the last 24 hours.

MISSION 6

On 12 Feb 71 the 23rd Infantry Division conducted a well planned and executed raid and recovered 9 VN PWs. No Americans were recovered.

MISSION 7

The picture of a civilian, John J. Fritz, was identified by a Hoi Chanh. 1st Air Cav made several insertions to make contact with the moving VC detainee group. No contact was made and no further intelligence was developed.

MISSION 9

Navy SEALs conducted a PW raid for two US and thirteen VN PWs. The Hoi Chanhs who provided information were willing to lead a recovery team to the suspected PW location which was in the vicinity of Tra Cu. Using small boats, the force entered the camp but found it had been recently vacated.

MISSION 12

In Mar 71 six companies from two battalions of 1st ROK Regiment, Capitol Division conducted a combat assault into three objective areas. The operation was prepared from information supplied by OSI. Negative results.

MISSION 13

At 081525 a recon team was inserted at ZC089434, found a small base camp (NFI), moved to AT062407, made contact and a firefight resulted. The team then moved to AC061414 and found seven grass huts and a tunnel. Subsequent search of the tunnel revealed documents only. A second recon team moved to ZC04941 is BAD posit and found huts, bunkers and food. Then the team moved to AC055406 and found more equipment. No prisoners were found.

MISSION 14

A 525th MI GP agent discovered a VC regiment base area in Cambodia where two US airmen were being detained. MACSOG inserted an RT into the area to confirm the location and did find a regimental size base area, but it had been abandoned for five months to one year.

MISSION 15

III MAF conducted a BRIGHT LIGHT operation as one of their last operations before standing down. A recon team was inserted southwest of Da Nang and found a small base camp. A second recon team was put into the same general area and found grass huts, tunnels and documents. Numerous weapons, food, huts and bunkers were found by both teams and also evidence that the area could have been a PW camp.

MISSION 16

A SEAL team with a Hoi Chanh guide located a camp in the Delta but the camp had been recently evacuated.

MISSION 17

7th Air Force TACC requested that a SOG team be inserted at a downed F-100 position because of a possibility that the pilot was evading. The team inserted and recovered the pilot's body near the wreckage.

MISSION 18

In early May, intelligence was received that a US OV-10 pilot, who was being held as a prisoner, had escaped from a position near Tchephone, Laos. Photo and visual coverage commenced immediately with the mission of looking for an E&E symbol of signal. A code symbol was sighted that matched the symbol for the month the pilot was downed. SEE kits were dropped into the area but were not picked up. Two SOG teams were inserted and searched the area. The code letter was constructed of rocks. The team could not locate the evadee and was extracted under heavy ground fire. Air search was resumed. On 30 May 71 intelligence indicated that the evadee was recaptured so the mission was terminated.

MISSION 19

Two sources furnished information on a PW camp location containing two US PWs and twenty VN PWs. The camp was located in Western MR 4 near the Cambodian border. Seven battalions were helo-lifted into the area, but only located a hospital which had been evacuated 3-5 days before the operation.

MISSION 20

On 23 Jun 71, PSA, AN XUYEN Province reported that a VN agent knew the location of a PW camp located in the vicinity of WQ410860 that contained 270 prisoners of which five were US. The agent was interrogated by US Navy SEALs on 26 Jun and it was learned at this time that there were actually three camps in the area. One camp held the five US prisoners as well as twenty VN female and fifty-five VN male prisoners. A PW recovery operation involving US SEALs

was planned for the morning of 29 Jun 71. The operation was cancelled when the informant related new information about guard posts and mines in the canal. In a revised operation on 1 Jul 71 the SEAL team was enroute from the Naval Surface vessel when its sampan experienced buoyancy problems and sank. It was decided that the noise in rescuing the survivors compromised the operation, so it was terminated. It was believed this compromise resulted in the PWs being moved.

MISSION 21

On 12 Aug 69, then SP4 Sexton was captured during enemy contact in the vicinity of An Loc, SVN. He was carried for three days on a stretcher through the jungle. At this point his wounds were medically treated. For the next 27 months until his release 8 Oct 71, SSG Sexton was moved to about ten different PW camps and saw or heard ten other US PWs, none of which he could positively identify. On approximately 30 Aug 71 the camp Political Officer informed SSG Sexton that he was going to be released. He was moved to several sites where the VC said a release point had been arranged. Finally he was told to keep walking on the main road and he would meet friendly units. At approximately 081130H Oct 71 he arrived at an ARVN outpost and was subsequently returned to US control.

MISSION 22

A HALO team of one ARVN and three SCU (Special Commando Unit) was inserted on 090159H Oct 71 into an area 25 km northeast of

Kratie, Cambodia. The team's mission was to conduct point-recon of a suspected enemy major headquarters and possible PW detention camp. During the insert from a C-130 at 10,000 feet the team became separated into three groups and were not able to assemble. Team members were extracted from three separate LZs at about 091850H Oct 71. The team was not successful in accomplishing the mission because of separation, injury and compromise. A four man EARTH ANGEL team was prepared and inserted by a CH-34 on a touchdown LZ northeast of Kratie, Cambodia at 191700H Oct 71. The team's mission was to conduct point-recon into the same location that HALO team had entered. The touchdown point was 9 km east-southeast of the target area. After 5 days of effort the team managed to move within 800 meters of the specified point, but were challenged and compromised by an NVA patrol, armed with AK-47s.

MISSION 23

An Air Force FAC sighted a long letter, small L (Lima); small I (India) dotted and capital A (Alpha) made of dry grass material, some of which was still green. At 270915H Oct 71, the Joint Recovery Task Force (JRTF) was activated in response to the sighting of the possible E&E code symbols in the area of BQ624435. The insertion of ground troops was delayed due to weather until 281155H Oct 71. After being inserted near the area in a sitdown LZ, the eleven US and twenty-six SCU made a thorough search of the area before being extracted at 281333H Oct 71. The search revealed 8-10 footprints (size 9) made from someone wearing US boots two to three days before. Also it was noted that the E&E code symbol had been disarranged within the last 24 hours.

MISSION 24

Based on information received from two Hoi Chanhs in Vinh Binh Province, RVN, JPRC was notified that two US PWs had been tentatively located in the vicinity of XR652625. At approximately 300816H Oct 71 initial elements were inserted into the area. The youngest Hoi Chanh led the force directly into the first camp which consisted of three detention buildings and several other living quarters. Partially cooked meals and miscellaneous equipment had been left behind. The second camp was basically the same in layout but better camouflaged and more developed with a sampan canal network of natural and man-made canals. A search of the area produced an abandoned detention facility, rice mill, platoon size base camp and storage facility. Warm rice indicated that the camp had been vacated only 2-3 hours before.

MISSION 25

7th Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) reported to JPRC on 30 Oct 71 the sighting of an E&E code symbol in vicinity XD026405. The symbol appeared to be man made of plastic material found in survival gear but no beeper or voice contact developed during friendly overflights. An A-1 aircraft delivered an E&E kit on the symbol at 020620H Nov 71. A strong beeper was received for 10 seconds from the area on 030700 Nov 71. Again, an A-1 delivered two more kits to the same target on 040300Z Nov 71. 7AF reported

this area to be a high AAA threat and logistics area, though no hostile fire was directed against aircraft working the area. Efforts were terminated on 10 Nov when neither beeper or voice contact were detected after 3 Nov 71. X-Ray was the back up code letter for 1971, but because of possible compromise and numerous false sightings, the backup letter was changed subsequently to the Greek letter Delta or equilateral triangle.

MISSION 26

Two Vietnamese reported into Long Toan District, Vinh Binh Province and advised the US TOC that at 060630H Nov 71 they had escaped from a VC prison containing two US PWs. A Cav Pack (one C&C, three slicks, four LOHs and two gunships) of 7th ARVN Division scrambled to Vinh Binh by 061143H Nov 71. At 061405H Nov 71 an insertion of 33 troops, including two US advisors, was made at XR667618, followed by two additional insertions of thirty-three men each at XR682603 and XR683604. Only scattered individual VC were encountered; however, at 1838H the force discovered a VC camp, estimated capacity of thirty people at XR692606. The camp had been vacated for approximately 15-20 minutes. The camp was semi-permanent in nature. Small cooking fires were still warm. Cooking pots, sleeping mats, food and a sampan were scattered about the area which indicated a hasty and recent evacuation. The operation continued through 7, 8 and part of 9 Nov. Only small way-stations, workshops and caches were found and there was no indication of PW holding areas.

MISSION 27

On 13 Oct 71 ---WORDS DELETED--- information of the sighting of twelve US PWs vicinity YT488418. A woodcutter saw Americans on two different occasions at a reported rice taxation point vicinity YT543382. Two SOG RTs departed from the perimeter of FB Nancy at 071935H Nov 71 enroute to a planned ambush site. Movement in the areas was extremely difficult because of undergrowth, population, logging operations and LOCs. The teams reached the ambush site but were compromised and requested extraction which was completed from a sitdown LZ at 121013H Nov 71 vicinity YT539391. A subsequent 1st Cav sweep of the area was successful in capturing 2500 pounds of rice and locating the possible VC shelter area.

EVENT 28 (TSNF)

Peter Schrader-Rottmers, a German civilian, was captured by five VC (four male and one female) on 14 Aug 71 in Quang Ngai Province, RVN vicinity BS543744. He was released and returned to friendly control on 8 Nov 71 vicinity BS512778. JPRC debrief of Rottmers revealed that he was Chief of the German International Refugee Service in Quang Ngai City. After capture he claimed that the group traveled west and north for six days. He was then moved after four days to a second camp that was five to six days journey to the west and north and remained there for forty-five days. The captors told him that fifteen Americans had been in the camp at one time and he was shown a letter written by one of the Americans. Location of the camp could not be determined from debriefings of Rottmers.

MISSION 29

One of the six ARVN escapees, Nguyen van Nguyen, gave an accurate description and location of a camp in vicinity WQ377834. A joint Delta Regional Assistance Command (DRAC) and SOG Sea Commando Team (SCT) operation began at 082105H Nov 71. SCTs were launched in rubber boats 5000 meters from the beach and radar vectored to the insertion point. Rain showers covered the SCT movements to the beach. Some hours later a VC tracker was captured in the immediate vicinity of the PW camp. A spot interrogation began because the captured VC believe the SCT personnel were VC from a trawler. Interrogation revealed the US PWs had been moved the day after the six Vietnamese ARVN had escaped from the camp, and that the camp was probably mined and booby trapped. At 091540H Nov 71, the VC initiated contact with the SCT and three VC were KIA. Gunships and naval gunfire were used to keep the LZ clear for a subsequent safe extraction.

MISSION 30

7AF JRCC reported that FAC ---WORD DELETED--- sighted on 15 Nov 71 the possible E&E code symbols of "C" and "L" on a sand river bank vicinity WV248692. An OV-1 aircraft was launched with photo equipment and an E&E kit into the area. This mission revealed that the letters covered an area 20′ by 30′ in size and definitely were man-made. Photographs were taken and the kit was dropped. No voice or beeper signals were transmitted from location and the vigil was terminated on 18 Nov 71.

MISSION 31

The VC prisoner, who was taken during the SCT attempt to penetrate the DAM DOI Secret Zone, revealed that he was a VC courier and traveled extensively within the Province. He reported hearing from fellow VC that two Americans were being held PW (one possibly being SSG Arroyo-Baez, USA). After more debriefing sessions he revealed he would, for the standard JPRC reward, attempt to reenter the DAM DOI Secret Zone and secure the release of Sergeant Arroyo-Baez. Accordingly on 18 November, equipped with a waterproof URC68 radio, two small high durability flares and a note written in Spanish to Arroyo, the subject was reintroduced into the area by a SOG SCT. The mission was still considered to be active by middle March although results were nil.

MISSION 33

Air Force Interrogation of a Hoi Chanh revealed that a PW camp was located in vicinity WR984995. An operation was launched at 210830H Nov 71 to attempt recovery. Initial HELO lift into the suspected area drew heavy ground fire which resulted in a ship going down in vicinity WR9685. This aircraft was extracted at 210930H. The operation was reinitiated at 211115H Nov 71 when eighty-nine ARVN soldiers and two US advisors were placed on the ground. The Hoi Chanh led the force into the camp which had been evacuated approximately three hours earlier. No PWs were recovered.

MISSION 34

On 7 Dec 71 a recon team of three US and three SCU was inserted into a ladder-type LZ to inspect a crash site. The crash site was located at YU376520 and additional team members (two US and four SCU) were inserted. Special recovery equipment and digging tools could not be inserted into the restricted area of the LZ. The team was extracted.

MISSION 35

On 17 Dec 71 another team was inserted to complete the above inspection. Using helo assistance, the team moved the wreckage. Ashes and debris were screened thoroughly, but no evidence of human remains could be recovered.

MISSION 36

On 25 Dec 71 a recon team was inserted by parachute from a C-123 aircraft at YU140954. The team assembled and moved toward a point recon target at YU064991 to confirm a reported PW camp. On 27 and 28 Dec the team found group meetings of 50 to 100 people. At the second meeting the team was challenged and received heavy automatic weapons fire. The team extracted by helo on 29 December.

MISSION 37

On 28 Dec 71 a Spectre AC-130 gunship monitored strobe light flashes, hand-held flares and a possible E&E code symbol on airborne video systems. The location was under friendly control in vicinity WC436812. Subsequently ---WORD DELETED--- checked out the area by

helo and talked with the local area commander on the ground. No E&E code symbol or downed airman could be confirmed.

MISSION 39

On 5 Dec 71 a Kit Carson Scout for information that San Nhan buried an American and Le Van Bon observed the body. On 2 Jan 72 Le Van Bon led a coordinated recovery operation.

MISSION 41

On 7 Feb 72 a SOG SCT was targeted against the DAM DOI Secret Zone in An Xuyen Province, SVN. The SCT was launched from the USS Vernon County (LST) and was vectored to an insertion point at WQ408843 to develop exploitable intelligence on US PWs in the area. On 8 February, the team was sighted by VC in a sampan. The team withdrew and returned to the LST.

MISSION 42

On 10 Feb a SCT was inserted again into the vicinity WQ381759 and moved into an ambush position. The team made contact with two VC in a sampan and attempted to capture them. The VC were killed in an escape attempt, but deep water and swift current precluded recovery of any weapons and documents. The team evaded to the coast and extracted by helo.

MISSION 43

On 11 Feb 72 ten Filipino civilians were released in Binh Khe (D), Binh Dinh (P), SVN. Individuals were the crew of a tug boat

wrecked off Phu My (D), Binh Dinh (P) on or about 21 Nov 71. Personnel were captured sometime after this event. Upon release by the NLF, the repatriates were put under Filipino Embassy control.

MISSION 44

Continuing SCT operations were conducted from 20 to 27 February in DAM DOI Secret Zone and NAM CAN area of An Xuyen (P). Two SCTs were launched on 21 February to conduct recon and personnel snatch operations in vicinity VQ930549. On 22 February the teams captured four persons at VQ930549.

MISSION 45

Based on intelligence developed from the SCT operation above, a 21st ARVN Division task Force inserted into a suspected PW camp. The objective area was inhabited, but was not a PW camp. While on related visual recon, Air Cav unit A/7/1 located a possible site east of the initial objective in vicinity VQ8650. Forces inserted into the area which had been a VC camp. No PW structures or activities were found.

MISSION 46

On 14 Mar 72, another SCT operation was launched. The mission of this operation was a sustained reconnaissance along the littoral of An Xuyen Province IV CTZ to develop timely and credible intelligence on the location and movements of US PWs. This was the first SCT operation that launched from a Vietnamese LST for the purposes of obtaining BRIGHT LIGHT information.

MISSION 47

ON 12 March John Everingham, an Australian journalist, arrived in Vientiane after allegedly spending 29 days in northern Laos as a captive of the Pathet Lao. He was captured supposedly in vicinity 17 miles SE of the royal capitol of Luang Prabang. This case was considered highly suspicious due to various facts. It appeared he may not have been a prisoner at all, but rather just gathering information.

PROBLEM AREAS/LESSONS LEARNED

(C) The problem of communicating the mission objectives of JPRC was addressed in 1971 and 1972. The JPRC briefing program was continued throughout Southeast Asia to insure that all commands were aware of the mission, organization, function and requirements of JPRC. Locally, briefings were given to the 525th MI Group orientation course, all in-processing personnel at MACV Annex, and MACCOORDS Senior Advisor Course.

(S) JPRD SICR (D-7CX-49018) was updated again in November 1971. This SICR outlined essential elements of information required by JPRC and required all major commands to appoint a JPRC contact officer. These contact officers were responsible to forward to the JPRC any and all PW related information.

(S) Reaction times in planning and conducting a PW recovery operation continued to present problems. Planning usually began with the evaluation of a single PW information report or with the comparison of two or more recent PW information reports. However, current and accurate information on PW camp locations continued to be a major problem, since the enemy constantly moved his camps to preclude compromise or he moved his camps whenever compromise was suspected.

(S) Source validation presented a continuing problem to the JPRC. In the past year, numerous sources offered information on US PWs. Unfortunately, very little information proved useful in the planning of PW recovery operations. Some information was valid, but was up to five years old. Often information was completely fabricated in the interest of monetary reward.

(S) The method of entry into the DAM DOI Secret Zone allowed forces to clandestinely enter and move inland some 3000 meters over difficult terrain undetected. This method of entry is believed applicable for targets within 3000 meters of the beach.

(S) The release of several foreign nationals who had been interned by the enemy for short periods discloses the necessity for close liaison with foreign embassies through the US Consular Office. An informal inquiry to the governments of Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, France, Philippines, Switzerland, Japan and Thailand revealed over twenty foreign nationals missing in

SEA, about which the JPRC had no prior knowledge. A working relationship with Mr. Frank Sieverts, Under Secretary of State for PW Affairs, was initiated in February 1972 to exchange information on US civilians missing or detained in SEA.

(S) CSI problems were experienced with inadequate data on site location or last known position, rapid recovery of vegetation which obliterated the signature of the site and wreckage and traditional use of the debris by natives and opposing forces. The problem of marking a site before or after an inspection was not solved. Hence, a site could be re-inspected needlessly. Also it might not be found again after the initial incident.

(S) JPRC developed the BRIGHT LIGHT Special Collection Program (SCP) and a supporting Automatic Data Processing (ADP file during 1971 and 1972. This effort began in September 1971 and continued through 15 Mar 72. The problem was that previously used 1410 ADP files (PW camp, biographic sightings) were not integrated nor fully developed, and therefore were not flexible enough to support JPRC data needs. All files were integrated into a Modular Data System (MODS) ADP file, using the BRIGHT LIGHT SCP as a foundational plan. The results of this effort were that JPRC could completely automate its data activities, as well as provide ADP listings and plots to users on a global scale.

SUMMARY OF RECOVERY ACTIVITIES

	1971	1972	CUMULATIVE* (Total (MIL/CIV))
US/FWMAF Captured Personnel Rescued	0	0	9 (7/2)
US/FWMAF Escapees Recovered	0	0	22 (21/1)
US/FWMAF Evadees Recovered	0	2	8 (8/0)
US/FWMAF Personnel Released	1	0	73 (57/16)

* Totals differ from those in the previous history. Differences result primarily from redefinition of above categories.

SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE 8-7-8

US MILITARY AND CIVILIAN (MIA/PW)

COUNTRY	ARMY	NAVY	AF	USMC	ALL MIL	US CIV
SVN	261/71	1/1	55/5	59/17	376/94	6/33
NVN	3/0	73/143	258/231	12/9	346/383	0/1
Laos	61/0	12/2	246/8	13/0	332/10	5/1
Cambodia	19/5	0/0	3/0	0/0	22/5	3/0
China	0/0	7/1	0/1	0/0	7/2	0/0
Other	5/0	19/0	12/0	5/0	41/0	0/0
TOTAL	349/76	112/147	574/245	89/26	1124/494	14/35

FWMAF (MIA/PW)

COUNTRY	AUS	KOR	THAI	PHIL	NEW Z
SVN	2/0	7/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
NVN	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Laos	0/0	0/0	5/1	0/0	0/0
Cambodia	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
China	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
TOTAL	2/0	7/0	5/1	0/0	0/0

THIRD NATION CIVILIANS (MIA/PW)

COUNTRY	AUS	KOR	THAI	PHIL	NEW Z	FRENCH
SVN	0/0	7/0	0/0	2/2	0/0	0/0
NVN	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Laos	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Cambodia	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	15/0
China	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
TOTAL	0/0	7/0	0/0	2/2	0/0	15/0

COUNTRY	JAP	GER	BRIT	CANA	AUSTRIAN	SWISS
SVN	0/0	0/2	1/1	0/1	0/0	0/0
NVN	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Laos	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
Cambodia	9/0	1/0	0/0	1/0	1/0	1/0
China	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0
TOTAL	9/0	1/2	1/1	1/1	1/0	1/0

SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE 8-7-9

JPRC MISSION ACTIVITIES SUMMARY

A brief synopsis of JPRC missions and activities during 1971 and the early months of 1972 are contained in Figure B-7-11. Figures B-7-12 and B-7-13 indicate the mission locations within SEA; locations correspond to mission numbers shown in Figure B-7-11.

SUMMARY OF JPRC MISSIONS/ACTIVITIES

MISSION/ EVENT	DATE	OPERATION/GRID	UNIT	COMMENTS
1	6 Jan	PW Identification XU066257	Hoi Chanh	Reward Paid
2	8 Jan	Body Recovery, Laos XD805133	SOG BL Team	2 Remains
3	17 Jan	PW Camp Raid, Cambodia XU0726	ARVN	No Recoveries
4	22 Jan	PW Camp Raid SVN WR040653	ARVN	No Recoveries
5	31 Jan	PW Camp Raid SVN XT385624	11 ACR	No Recoveries
6	12 Feb	PW Camp Raid SVN AT991251	23 Inf Div	9 VN Nationals
7	16 Feb	Body Recovery SVN YS8591	1st Cav	1 Remains
8	19 Feb	PW Camp Raid SVN BR502897	173rd Abn Bde	No Recoveries
9	24 Feb	PW Camp Raid SVN XR413563	US SEALs	No Recoveries
10	4 Mar	PW Camp Raid SVN VR897053	US SEALs	No Recoveries
11	6 Mar	Body Recovery SVN XS 717406	KILO & GR pers	1 Remains
12	7 Mar	PW Camp Raid SVN BR7953	1st ROK Rgt	No Recoveries
13	9 Mar	PW Camp Raid SVN BS119779	198th Inf Bde	No Recoveries
14	8 Apr	PW Search SVN XU896344	SOG RT	No Recoveries
15	9 Apr	PW Camp Raid SVN AT052407	III MAF	No Recoveries
16	24 Apr	PW Camp Raid SVN XS946169	US SEALs	No Recoveries
17	28 Apr	Body Recovery SVN BR585593	SOG RT	1 Remains
18	9 May	PW Escapee XD3245	SOG RT	No Recoveries
19	15 Jun	PW Camp Raid SVN VS900575	9th ARVN Div	No Recoveries
20	29 Jun	PW Camp Raid SVN WQ410860	US SEALs	No Recoveries
21	8 Oct	Sexton Release SVN XU725125	None	Walked Out
22	9-19 Oct	PW Camp Raid XU171916	SOG RT	No Recoveries
23	29 Oct	E&E Code Site SVN BQ624435	SOG RT	No Recoveries
24	29 Oct	PW Camp Raid SVN XR657625	ARVN/US	No Recoveries
25	2 Nov	E&E Code Site SVN XD026405	7th AF	No Recoveries

SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B-7-11

SUMMARY OF JPRC MISSIONS/ACTIVITIES (CONT)

MISSION/ EVENT	DATE	OPERATION/GRID	UNIT	COMMENTS
26	6 Nov	PW Camp Raid 71-5 XR677618	ARVN/US	No Recoveries
27	7 Nov	JRTF 71-3 Long Khanh SVN YT690605	SOG RT	No Recoveries
28	8 Nov	Rottmers Release SVN BS512558	None	Walked Out
29	8 Nov	JRTF 71-2 Delta SVN WQ377834	SOG-SCT	No Recoveries
30	15 Nov	E&E Code Site WV248692	7th AF	No Recoveries
31	18 Nov	JRTF 71-4 WR4397	SOG-SCT	No Recoveries
32	18 Nov	Recovery 2 Pilots at Sea BN8545	Fishermen	2 Recoveries
33	21 Nov	Recovery Raid SVN WR984995	ARVN/US	No Recoveries
34	7 Dec	Body Recovery SVN YU376570	SOG RT	No Recoveries
35	17 Dec	Body Recovery SVN YU376570	SOG RT	No Recoveries
36	25 Dec	PW Camp Recon Cambodia YU064991	SOG RT	No Recoveries
37	28 Dec	E&E Code Site Laos WC436812	7th AF	No Recoveries
38	29 Dec	Body Recovery SVN AN8565	JPRC	No Recoveries
39	2 Jan	Body Recovery SVN XS427300	DRAC	1 Recovery
40	9 Jan	Recovery Recon SVN WR910570	JPRC	No Recoveries
41	7 Feb	PW Camp Recon SVN WQ408843	SOG-SCT	No Recoveries
42	10 Feb	PW Camp Recon SVN WQ381759	SOG-SCT	No Recoveries
43	11 Feb	PW Release SVN Binh Dinh (P)	State	10 Filipinos Released
44	21 Feb	PW Camp Recon SVN VQ930549	SOG-SCT	No Recoveries
45	25 Feb	PW Camp Raid SVN VQ8654	21 Div ARVN	No Recoveries
46	14 Mar	PW Camp Recon SVN VR8436	SOG-SCT	No Recoveries
47	12 Mar	PW Release Vientiane	State	1 Aust Released


SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B-7-11

(S) In order to better explain the missions/events conducted during 1971 and 1972, a brief summary was prepared of some of the major ones. The mission/event numbers are located directly above each paragraph for easy reference to Figure B-7-11.


Mission 3

Operation Dai Phong was conducted on 17 Jan 71 by ARVN troops helo lifted 20 km into Cambodia and commanded by the late General Tri. A source was able to show a JPRC representative where a village and house allegedly contained four US PWs . The reaction and plan for this operation were noteworthy, but no prisoners were recovered.




SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B 7 2




SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B 7 4



SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B 7 12



SOURCE: JPRC

B-7-13

E & E CODE SYMBOLS

(OCTOBER 1970 – SEPTEMBER 1971)

MONTH	E & E CODE SYMBOL	IDENTIFIER
1. OCTOBER		ROMEO
2. NOVEMBER		DELTA
3. DECEMBER		MIKE
4. JANUARY		INDIA
5. FEBRUARY		QUEBEC
6. MARCH		ECHO
7. APRIL		TANGO
8. MAY		CHARLIE
9. JUNE		OSCAR
10. JULY		FOXTROT
11. AUGUST		UNIFORM
12. SEPTEMBER		GOLF

BACK UP  XRAY

△ IS NEW BACK UP WAS COMPROMISED

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT AUSTRALIA,
THAILAND AND RVNAF BY
AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV
DATE 18 AUGUST 1971 DOCUMENT
NOT RELEASABLE

SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE B-7-5

E & E CODE SYMBOLS

(OCTOBER 1971 – SEPTEMBER 1972)

MONTH	E & E CODE SYMBOL	IDENTIFIER
1. OCTOBER		PAPA
2. NOVEMBER		ALPHA
3. DECEMBER		YANKEE
4. JANUARY		SIERRA
5. FEBRUARY		LIMA
6. MARCH		NOVEMBER
7. APRIL		ZULU
8. MAY		KILO
9. JUNE		HOTEL
10. JULY		XRAY
11. AUGUST		WHISKEY
12. SEPTEMBER		YANKEE

BACK UP  XRAY

SOURCE: JPRC

FIGURE 2-7-6







AVN POW REWARD LEAFLETS

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

COMPTROLLER DIVISION

Separated from the Logistics Division (MACSOG-40) in 1968, the Comptroller Division (MACSOG-90), was one of the most powerful MACSOG elements, controlling as it did, the purse strings of the entire operation. SOG-90 was the principal economic and financial advisor to the Chief of SOG, and was directly responsible for the financial management of MACSOG.

As the highly classified division of a highly classified organization, SOG-90 did have several interesting problems.

Since inception, SOG had received a token $160,000.00 per year from CINCPAC through MACV. This fund was abruptly discontinued in 1971 because CINCPAC comptrollers were having a difficult time keeping the special budget a secret.

On paper, MACSOG was a staff element of MACV, yet unlike other MACV staff elements, it had been receiving $160,000.00 unclassified dollars annually. The money had originally been intended to pay for cover stories---read dis-information---about MACVSOG. There was a happy ending. When the unclassified funds were discontinued, SOG's classified funds were adjusted upwards accordingly.

SOG had a 1971 budget of $21,080,000.00, down from the requested 1969 budget of $24,901,200.00. The revisions were designed to reflect the declining US presence in South Vietnam. Rough computations based on the lowest figure suggest that SOG's cumulative budget---from 1964 through 1972---amounted to approximately $147,560,000.00.

Though the above sum was rather small by modern standards (slightly more than one quarter the price of a single Stealth Bomber), it should be remembered that these were fat 1960's dollars that could buy more 'bang for a buck' than a like amount in the 1980's. As covert operations went, MACSOG was on the high priced side.

$4,015,000.00 was alloted to THOT NOT operations, $8,130,000.00 to PHU DUNG, and $416,000.00 to IGLOO WHITE, a sensor laying/monitoring operation in and out of country. This totals $12,561,000.00, leaving $8,519,000.00 for paperclips and other unconventional warfare odds and ends. Additionally, SOG made a series of budget decisions that illustrated the degree to which MACSOG was supporting the South Vietnamese military.

Cross border pay for the VNAF (Vietnamese Air Force) was terminated, all mission pay to ARVN ended in December of 1971, PTF-PCF crew pays were readjusted, and in-country operational mission pay of 150$VN per day for all RTs and EFs, regardless of enemy contact, was initiated. The last item was a bribe to keep the Vietnamese Recon Teams and Exploitation Forces happy, especially since the latter constituted the bulk of the JPRC's dedicated BRIGHT LIGHT recovery assets.

A tour of duty with MACSOG didn't always mean action and high adventure.

and Two assumed an in-country mission of reconnaissance/interdiction along the Laotian RVN border. The authority to conduct US-led operations in the NICKEL STEEL AO was retained.

(TS) Because of the loss of HICKORY Radio Relay Site, on 5 Jun 71, enemy activities in the vicinity of LEGHORN Radio Relay Site (GOLF-5) were closely monitored to preclude another overrun by the NVA.

BRIGHT LIGHT

(TS) MACSOG OPLAN 1-71, Joint Recovery Task Force (JRTF) required that a force, under US leadership, be trained and programmed against targets developed by the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC). This requirement was fulfilled by the formation of Combat Ranger Platoons (CRPs) at Task Forces One and Two. The formation of these units was accomplished by combining a command and control element with three US-led reconnaissance teams, thus producing a highly mobile element with added firepower and the capability of small unit independent action. The TF1AE and TF2AE each prepared three such elements of three teams each.

JRTF BRIGHT LIGHT OPERATION 71-1

(TS) On 251705H Oct 71, a message from the 483 TAW stated that a pilot had sighted a suspected E&E code symbol on 251230H. COMUSMACV directed MACSOG to activate the Joint Recovery Task Force

(JRTF) and conduct a recovery operation ASAP to locate and recover one or more US PW/evadee/escapee in the vicinity BQ 625435. On 260930H a JRTF representative from Ban Me Thuot (BMT) conducted visual reconnaissance in an O-2 aircraft to confirm the sighting. Two O-1 aircraft accompanied the O-2 and provided photographic coverage of the target area. On 261120H Oct, the sighting was confirmed and photos were taken. On 261305H Oct, Combat Ranger Platoon-1 arrived at BMT from TF2AE. On 261430H Oct a COMUS tasking message was dispatched directing JRTF to conduct the BRIGHT LIGHT Operation. The launch was delayed from 261630H to 271630H because of unworkable weather. The assault force searched the target area for one and a half hours with negative results. Numerous footprints were observed with one set identified as having been made by boots with lug soles. The E&E symbol appeared to have been disarranged. No contact was made with enemy forces. Presence of the PW/evadee/escapee was neither confirmed nor refuted. The weather was a major determining factor in the accomplishment of this particular mission. Had the assault force been able to launch when ready, the confirmation and recovery of the PW/evadee/escapee perhaps could have been effected.

WIRE TAP

---SECTION DELETED---

mounts 4-37mm guns (two twin mountings) and 4-25mm (twins) and is capable of speeds of 30 knots.)

1 Friendly KIA.

SOURCE: MACSOG-37 Figure B-11-4

DODGE MARK

(TS) DODGE MARK missions consisted of cross-beach covert landings in South Vietnam. They were conducted under actual combat conditions in VC controlled or influenced areas to maintain proficiency for operations in North Vietnam and to prepare for subsequent operations. A total of fifty-six DODGE MARK missions were launched from and recovered to Da Nang in 1971 and the first four months of 1972. Forty-one missions were launched from five separate forward operating bases.

FORWARD OPERATING BASES

(TS) Forty-one DODGE MARK missions were conducted from five forward operating bases (FOB) during the period. Five BRIGHT LIGHT missions, conducted in cooperation with JPRC and with the planning assistance of MACSOG-31, were also launched from FOBs.

1. From 9 Feb to 19 Mar 71 at Cau Viet, RVN, sixteen DODGE MARK missions were conducted resulting in two enemy KIA, one friendly WIA, six grenades captured, and one water mine destroyed.

2. From 14-21 May 71 and 25-29 Aug 71 at Coastal Group 13, Vinh Loc, RVN, eleven DODGE MARK missions were conducted with negative results.

3. From 15 Aug to 16 Sep 71 aboard USS WINDHAM COUNTY (LST-1170) and USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) in MR4 three DODGE MARK missions were conducted with negative results.

4. From 809 Nov 71 aboard USS WASHTENAW COUNTY (LST-1166) at An Xuyen Province, RVN, BRIGHT LIGHT 71-2 was conducted. The team traversed 3 km of mangrove swamp in an attempt to locate a camp site in which US PWs were being held. They captured a prisoner. He had signed a contract 9 Nov 71. Through interrogation it was determined that the US prisoner had been moved to a new camp.

5. From 18-19 Nov 71 in Dam Doi District, An Xuyen Province, RVN, the prisoner mentioned above was reinserted in the vicinity of his capture. He had signed a contract to assist in the location of the PW and was given a radio for communication. The insert was made to look like an escape from the SCT. Shots were fired in the air by the SCT as the VC departed the area. The SCT was extracted with no further incidents. (See Appendix 7 for additional information).

6. From 29 Nov to 4 Dec 71 at Coastal Group 14, Hoi An, RVN, two DODGE MARK missions were conducted with negative results.

7. From 6-13 Feb aboard USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) at An Xuyen Province, RVN, BRIGHT LIGHT 72-1 was conducted. Two SCT cross-beach inserts were made to gather intelligence on US PWs, but none was obtained. Two VC were encountered and killed in action.

8. From 20-27 Feb 72 aboard USS VERNON COUNTY (LST-1161) at Ca Mau Peninsula, An Xuyen Province, RVN, BRIGHT LIGHT 72-2 was conducted. Three SCT cross-beach inserts were made to gather PW information. This resulted in five VC suspects being captured and information being obtained which led to an operation by the 21st ARVN Div.

9. From 13-27 Mar 72 aboard VNN ship MY THO (AGP-800) at An Xuyen Province, RVN, operation BACH DANG was conducted. Nine DODGE MARK missions resulted in four VC KIA and twelve suspects captured. This operation was conducted in cooperation with the 21st ARVN Div. and marked the final phase of I&M of CSS.

10. From 10-13 Apr 72 at Cam Lo, Quang Tri Province, RVN, a BRIGHT LIGHT mission resulted in the successful recovery of two downed US flyers (See News Section). The flyers, in accordance with instructions dropped in E&E kits, were to make their way to the Dong Ha River and enter the water to float downstream. 1LT Clark was able to fulfill these instructions, however, LTC Hambleton, who was injured upon exiting the aircraft, was only able to make it to the river bank. In the latter case the rescue team located the aviator and assisted him down stream in a sampan.

ORGANIZATION

(TS) MACSOG-38 was redesignated from Detachment B-53 (Special Operations Augmentation), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces to Training Center Advisory Element (TCAE) (Long Thanh Training Detachment) on 4 Mar 71. The JTD remained in effect authorizing 9 officers and 39 enlisted men with an organization as depicted in Figure B-12-2. In addition to TCAE personnel, Task Force Advisory Elements (TFAE) provided instructors who were combat experienced in cross-border operations on an as required basis to assist in training. During the early months of 1972 US strength was reduced to 3 officers and 5 enlisted men. At this strength the US retained no operational capability and assumed an advisory role only.

(S) Since LTTD was nominally ARVN and was in a restricted area, the detachment maintained a camp repair and utility section (construction, electrical power, sewage lines, etc), a camp motor pool and motor maintenance shop (maintaining 33 vehicles varying from road graders and earth moving equipment to 1/4 ton trucks), and a civilian work force of 140 authorized personnel (involving an average monthly payroll of approximately 2,500,000$VN). Two Filipinos (ECCI personnel) were under contract, one as a motor maintenance supervisor and one as armorer.

Author's note---According to the four volume Pentagon Papers, the ECCI, or Eastern Construction Company, was a private, Filipino-

run public service organization similar to an employment agency and used primarily for unconventional warfare. It furnished approximately 500 trained, experienced Filipino technicians to the Governments of Vietnam and Laos under the auspices of MAAGs (Military Assistance Advisory Group) and USOMs (US Operations Mission), which were CIA activities. Most of the ECCI personnel augmented the US military logistics program and instructed local military personnel in ordnance, quartermaster, etc., maintenance, storage, and supply procedures.

The head of ECCI was "Frisco" Johnny San Juan, former National Commander, Philippines Veterans Legion, and former close staff assistant to President Magsaysay of the Philippines. Most of ECCI's cadre were either former guerrillas against the Japanese in WWII or former Philippine Army personnel. Most of the cadre had extensive combat experience against the Communist Huk guerrillas in the Philippines. ECCI was a mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional operations, usually under cover of a public service organization having a contract with the host government. Its personnel helped write the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, trained Vietnam's Presidential Guard Battalion, and were instrumental in founding and organizing the Vietnamese Veterans Legion. Another organization, Operation Brotherhood (started by the International Jaycees), operated in Laos under a certain measure of CIA control. They were closely coordinated with Vietnamese Army operations which cleaned up Viet Minh stay-behinds and started stabilizing rural areas in the mid-1950s.

APPENDIX D: Chief, SOG Preface/Dedication.

PREFACE

The true saga of MACVSOG has not been, and cannot be, told fully in Command Histories, for this story is carried only in the hearts and minds of those men who were MACVSOG. The myriad of missions and tasks performed by SOG personnel since its activation are reflected only as statistics which have a way of being dry and impersonal. Some of SOG's tasks were glamorous and self rewarding, while others were tedious and uneventful; but all were essential to help stem the tide of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

Professional, well-trained, exceptionally dedicated personnel have been the key to SOG's many successes. Five Medal of Honor awardees, two of whom made the supreme sacrifice, exemplify the type of men that made up SOG, and attest to their courage and dedication. The personnel of SOG are extremely proud of these men and of the many other unsung and unheralded heros who have also given their lives. It is to these men that this final history is dedicated---to those courageous Montagnards, Vietnamese and Americans who gave their lives that others might live in freedom. To those personnel we owe so much that can never be repaid. All we can ask is that God in his almighty wisdom will care for our departed comrads in arms.

MACVSOG has made no attempt to judge the extent of its success or the overall value of its contribution. The statistics and as much of the record as can be put on paper are in the Command Histories for others to evaluate and judge.

JOHN F. SADLER
Colonel, USA
Chief, SOG

APPENDIX E: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.

(S) The 1 January 1971 - 30 April 1972 historical report for the United States Military Assistance Command, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG), is published and distributed separately as Annex B to the 1971 MACV Command History due to the high sensitivity of MACSOG's operations. It is intended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the operations and problems faced by MACSOG during 1972 and the first four months of 1972. The history, normally an annual compilation of the activities, major decisions, and other significant accomplishments that occured during the year, was extended four months to include the phase down of MACSOG and the transition to an advisory role.

(S) This history encompasses the organization, functions and activities of the various commands and staff elements within MACSOG. Efforts have been made to include problems and accomplishments involved with the Improvement and Modernization Program.

---PARAGRAPH DELETED---

(U) This history has truly been a coordinated effort. It could not have been prepared as thoroughly without the cooperation and assistance of all members of the MACSOG staff.

JOHN D. SKIDMORE
Major, USA
Director, Plans

GLOSSARY (Expanded)

Note: MAC(V)SOG glossary entries that appeared at the end of the Annex are prefaced with an asterisk (*). Entries garnered from the text by the author will not be marked with an (*). The reader will note that a number of (*) words in the SOG glossary are not reflected in the actual text. These words deal with the deleted sections, and the reader is invited to draw his own conclusions from them.

AAAOB	Anti-Aircraft Order of Battle.
AAG	Army Advisory Group.
*ABCCC	Airborne Command and Control Center (Laos, BARREL ROLL Area).
*ABLE MABEL	Tactical Reconnaissance in South Vietnam.
AIA	Air Interdiction Area.
*AIZ	Air Interdiction Zone. PHU DUNG through THOT NOT.
*ALASKA	Thu Duc (SOG-33).
*ALLEY CAT	Call sign for ABCCC during night time in BARREL ROLL Area.
AMA	Air Material Area.
AMEMB	American Embassy. Ex. AMEMB Phnom Penh. Certain MACSOG operations required approval/coordination with U.S. consular officials (CIA).

*ANGRY TALKER	Secure word for GOLF-5 Radio Relay Site.
AO	Area of Operations.
*ARC LIGHT	B-52 strike.
*ARIZONA	Cambodia (SOG-33).
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
*AIK	Assistance-in-Kind - Military (USAID Civilian) assistance, VN supplies labor, AIK material.
AUTOSEVOCOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications. Area and world-wide secure communications net. A world-wide, switched, secure voice network developed to fulfill DOD long-haul, secure voice requirements.
BA	Base Area. Ex: BA 609.
*BARREL ROLL	Northwest Area of Laos (SOG-32).
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment.
*BENSON SILK	NVA script inserts (discontinued Aug 70) (SOG-33).
*BI FROST	Cross-beach missions in-counrty in support of CSS, 3MAF. and XXIV Corps in the IFFV/I Corps area. Originates from NAD (now DODGE MARK) (SOG-31).

*BLACKBEARD	Intel collection plan for DANIEL BOONE AO (both obsolete).
*BLUE CHIP	7th AF Command Post (TSN) (SOG-60).
*BLUE TREE	Tactical Reconnaissance over NVN (SOG-20).
*BRIGHT LIGHT	JPRC (Joint Personnel Recovery Center) recovery mission (SOG-80). Nickname applied to teams tasked with the recovery of Unconventional Warfare evadees and prisoners of war.
BROWN STALLION	Nickname for air-dropped Psychological Warfare Operations material offering cash rewards for the recovery or information leading to the recovery of prisoners of war.
*BUFFALO HUNTER	Drone photography flown by SAC over NVN, also known as BUMPY ACTION (SOG-20).
CAC	Counter Intelligence Advisory Committee.
*C&C (SOG-35)	Command and Control Detachment (Ground Studies Group).
*CCC - TF2AE	C&C Central located at Kontum (Task Force 2 Advisory Element).
*CCN - TF1AE	C&C North located at Da Nang (Task Force 1 Advisory Element).
*CCS - TF3AE	C&C South located at Ban Me Thuot (Task Force 3 Advisory Element).
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific.

CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
CISO	Counter-Insurgency Support Office.
*CLT - TCAE	Camp Long Thanh, MACSOG-38 Training HQ (Training Center Advisory Element).
*CALIFORNIA	Russia (SOG-33) (discontinued SOG word).
CANALIZED	Directed into a pre-planned position through the use of troops and booby traps.
*CIRCUS ACT	Wire-tap operations run by SOG-35/38.
CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center.
*CLSC-V	COMSEC Logistic Support Center-Vietnam (SOG-60).
CMEC	Combined Material Exploitation Center.
*COMBAT APPLE	Specially configured C-123.
*COMBAT SPEAR	C-130's assigned to 90th SOS.
*COMMANDO HUNT	7th AF program for enemy interdiction in Laos.
COMMANDO VAULT	10-15,000 pound SOG bomb used to blast LZs out of the jungle.
COMSEC	Communications Security. Monitoring of friendly circuits/frequencies for errors in procedure or breeches in security.

COMUSMACV	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
COMUSTHAI	Commander U.S. Thailand.
CONFIDENTIAL	(C) Third lowest security classification. Release of confidential information could be harmful to the defense interest of the nation. Ex. Battle reports, transport systems, training manuals, or information about defense factories.
CONFIDENTIAL MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED	Lowest security classification. Training manuals fall into this classification.
COVER STORIES	Officially sanctioned lies and half-truths designed to cover and protect classified operations.
*COVEY	PRAIRIE FIRE FAC call sign.
CPX	Command Post Exercise. Simulated the conduct of a PW recovery operation through the use of canned msg. traffic.
*CRICKET	Daytime call sign for ABCCC in BARREL ROLL Area.
CSI	Crash Site Inspections.
*CSS	Vietnamese counterpart organization of Maritime Studies Group (Coastal Security Service).

*DANIEL BOONE	Replaced by SALEM HOUSE and now known as THOT NOT.
*DCPG	Defense Communications Planning Group.
DEROS	Date Eligible for Rotation Stateside.
*DEWEY RIFLE	Nickname referring to cross-beach missions conducted in-country (SOG-31).
*DIAMOND HEAD	Use of people sniffers.
DIRLAUTH	Director, Liaison Authority.
*DODGE MARK	Cross-Beach operations in-country (SOG-31).
DODSPECREP	Department of Defense Special Repeater. Device that monitors communications lines by induction rather than a physical splice. Information is then transmitted to an airborne receiver. The device reads variations in magnegtic fields and interprets them as valid signals.
*DORSAL FIN	Tactical reconnaissance photography over Cambodia run by 7th AF (now FACE VALUE) (SOG-20).
*DOUBLE CROSS	RT operations into DMZ under control of 3rd MAF.
DRAC	Delta Regional Assistance Command responsible for PW recovery.
*DTE	A technical control facility that performs maintenance, circuit analysis and repairs

	voice circuits. Planned turn over to civilian contractor but unable to support contract without military personnel.
*DUEL BLADE	Replaced nickname DYE MARKER. Ground obstacle system to impede infiltration into RVN. Compatible with IGLOO WHITE.
*DUEL SPEAR	A ground obstacle to infiltration.
*DUFFLE BAG	Employment of DCPG resources in SEA for purposes other than to impede infiltration from NVN to SVN.
*DUMP TRUCK	Air supported anti-personnel sub-system of IGLOO WHITE program.
*DUST COVER	Modular transportable sensor data collection and processing system.
ECC or ECCI	Eastern Construction Company. Philippine-based corporation supplying technical assistance throughout SEA. ECC personnel were either WWII guerrilla fighters or had experience fighting the Philippine Huks. ECC helped RVN to write its constitution in the fifties, and was closely tied to MACSOG.
E&E	Escape and Evasion.
*ELDEST SON	Relating to introduction of contaminated ammunition in enemy hands. Also known as ITALIAN GREEN and POLE BEAN. (Discontinued) (SOG-33).

*EL PASO	COMUSMACV OPLAN for overground operations across Rte 9 in Laos.
EST	Estimated.
*ETHER REPORT	KIA.
EXDIS	Security classification meaning Exclusive (high level) distribution.
*EXPLOITATION FORCE	Indigenous quick reaction force.
FAC	Forward Air Controller. Spotters for troops, artillery, or bombers.
*FACE VALUE	Tactical recon in Cambodia.
FANK	Forces Armee Nationale Khmer. Changed from UITG, or US Army Vietnam Individual Training Group. UITG/FANK was established in RVN by the US Special Forces to train troops of the Republique Khymer, or Cambodia.
*FLAMING ARROW	Unclas name for in-country recon operations conducted by 5th SFGA under the control of Senior Corps Advisors using assets (teams, etc) programmed for SALEM HOUSE. (Discontinued).
*FLYING HORSE	Now known as SALEM HOUSE.
FOOTBOY	Covert action programs directed against NVN designed to increase the credibility of a current national resistance movement

	within NVN. Intelligence collection and covert physical destruction missions. Very limited implementation because of the possibility that NVN would accuse the United States of attempting to bring about the downfall of the government of NVN.
*FORD DRUM	Low level, hand held aerial photography over the SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE AO's. (SOG-20).
*FOUNTAIN PEN	High altitude leaflet drop along RICE RIVER, Cambodian-SVN borders. (SOG-32).
FRAGGED	(1) Terminal resolution of a dispute between an enlisted man and an NCO or officer. Usually settled by the improper use of an explosive fragmentation device. (2) Flights scheduled. Ex. Fragged: 210. Flown: 198.
*FRANTIC GOAT	High altitude leaflet drop along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos, Cambodia (SOG-32).
*FREEDOM RUNNER	A nickname to planned, unilateral FANK Special Forces Operations in NW Cambodia. (CINCPAC 260231Z May 71 (PASEP).
*FREEDOM DEAL	Nickname for AIZ. That area of Cambodia bounded by the RVN border on the East, the Laotian border on the North.
*FRESH MANDATE	Nickname for CONPLAN (Concept) - calls for activation of a Brigade to counter NVA/VC activity during US deployment. Brigade from 25th Inf Scoffield Barracks.

FRIAR REPORT	Slightly wounded in action report.
*FTX	Field Training Exercise involving an actual combat mission.
*FULL CRY	Unclas name for MACV plan to conduct large-scale military operations in S. Laos.
FWMAC	Free World Military Assistance Command. ANZUS, Korea, and the Philipines.
*GAME WARDEN	Inland waterways patrols interdicting VC shipping.
*GIANT NAIL	High altitude photography (U-2) over SEA.
*GIANT SCALE	High altitude photography over SEA (other than U-2).
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic. Government of Cambodia.
*GOLDEN EARRING	Unclas name for TACAIR missions (strikes) in support of RTs.
*HAILSTONES	M4A resupply containers.
HALO	High Altitude, Low Opening. A type of parachute insertion.
*HATCHET FORCE	OP-35 platoon size exploitation force. No longer used.
*HAVOC FORCE	OP-35 multi-platoon size exploitation force. No longer used.

*HAYMAKER FORCE	Battalion-size force. No longer used.
*HEAVY HOOK	SOG C-123's - 4 A/C assigned to 1st Flight Detachment in support of aerial resupply, psychological warfare, JPRC and LOG support.
*HICKORY	OP-35 Hill 950 Radio Relay Site (overrun).
*HILLSBORO	Call word for ABCCC during the day (STEEL TIGER).
*HORNET FORCE	Platoon-size force.
HOUSE-50	SOG warehouse in Saigon housing unconventional warfare material.
*IDHS	Intelligence Data Handling System.
*IGLOO WHITE	Sensors placed on LOC's.
*IGLOO WHITE/ DUFFLE BAG	IGLOO WHITE in-country.
*IGLOO WHITE/ COMMANDO HUNT	IGLOO WHITE operations in Laos or DMZ and NVN.
IIR	Intelligence Information Reports.
*INSISTENSE (S)	SOG MAROPS in coordination with MARKET TIME (NAVFORV) to prevent infiltration by sea into SVN.
IOH	Imminence of Hostility.
*ITALIAN GREEN	Introduction of contaminated ammunition in

	enemy hands. Also ELDEST SON and POLE BEAN (discontinued). (SOG-33).
J-5	Plans Division.
*JGS	Joint General Staff, RVNAF.
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution.
JUWTF	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force.
KBA	Killed by Air.
KIA	Killed in Action.
KIA (BC)	Killed In Action (By Claymore).
LB	Liaison Buerau.
LEGHORN	Radio Relay Site.
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution.
LLHH	Low-level, Hand-held aerial photography.
*LEAPING LENA	Superceded nickname for cross-border operations in Laos.
*LIAISON SERVICE	Counterpart to SOG-35. Subordinate element of the STD. It is the operational element of the STD which provides personnel for conducting cross-border intelligence gathering missions into Laos and Cambodia. Consists of 30 ARVN-led recon teams. Ten teams at each Task Force.

LOC	(1) Logistical Operations Center. (2) Lines of Communication (roads, bridges, rail, etc.).
LTTD	Long Thanh Training Detachment. SOG base 35 miles from Saigon that trained US and ARVN special warfare personnel. Name changed to Camp Yen The when SOG was phasing down.
MACCORDS	Military Assistance Command, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.
MACJ2	Military Assistance Command Center-Intelligence Directorate.
*MAP	Military Assistance Program - statutory appropriation of funds for a program.
MATTLO	MACV Military Attache Liaison Office.
*MEDTC	Charged with supplying material to Cambodia.
*MERITORIOUS ACHIEVEMENT	Praiseworthy accomplishment, with an easily discernable beginning and end, carried through to completion. The length of time involved is not a consideration but speed of accomplishment may be a factor in determining the worth of the enterprise.
*MERITORIOUS SERVICE	Praiseworthy execution of duties over a long period of time normally not less than

	six months in duration. Service differs from achievement in that service concerns a a period of time while achievement concerns an enterprise having a definite beginning and end, but not necessarily connected with a specific period of time.
MLS	Mobile Launch Site.
*MOON BEAM	Call sign of ABCCC at night (STEEL TIGER).
*MUD RIVER	Air supported anti-vehicular sub-system of the IGLOO WHITE program.
*NAD	Naval Advisory Detachment. Operates base for MAROPS.
*NKP	Nakhon Phanom. Classified SOG launch site along Thai border.
NODIS	Security classification meaning No Distribution (beyond Addressee).
NOFORN	Not releasable to foreign nationals. Information in this category was restricted to properly cleared American personnel
*NASTY PTF's	Craft employed by MAROPS on missions north of 17.00N.
*NEW YORK	Word for NVN (SOG-33).
*NICKEL STEEL	SOG operations in the DMZ.
O.B.	Order of Battle.

OPCON	Operational Control.
*PANAMA	Call sign for GCI radar at Da Nang AB.
*PARBOIL (C)	MAROPS in support of FOOTBOY (C) operations in NVN. Formerly PLOWMAN (C).
*PASEP	Passed Separately. Not included with the message or package. Not under a TAB.
*PATIO (C)	TACAIR strikes in support of SALEM HOUSE.
PDAO	PHU DUNG Area of Operations.
PDO	Parachute Delivery Operator.
PINK TEAM	Teamed helicopters, usually a Loach to draw enemy fire followed by a helicopter gunship to engage and destroy the enemy.
PMDL	Provisional Military Demarcation Line. Line dividing North and South Vietnam established 22 July 1954.
POL	Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants.
*POLE BEAN	Program by which various types of Soviet Bloc ammo are contaminated and inserted into NVA/VC areas of Cambodia, Laos, and RVN. Also known as ELDEST SON and ITALIAN GREEN (discontinued 23 Feb 70). (SOG-33).
*PHU DUNG	Nickname replacing PRAIRIE FIRE, X-Border in Laos.
*PRACTICE NINE	Unclas name for a series of plans concerning

	the establishment of barriers in the vicinity of the DMZ and augmented by air interdiction, mining and recon in Laos.
*PRAIRIE FIRE	Cross-border operations into SOG's Laotian AO. Old nickname.
*PROJECT ATHENS	COMUSMACV operations to cut Rte 110 in Laos.
*PROJECT BUFFALO	COMUSMACV operations to cut Rte 547 A Shau Valley.
PTF	Patrol Boat, Fast. Type of boat used by USN and VNN forces. "Nasty" Class.
*RED EYE	Anti-aircraft heat seeking missile.
*RED ROCKET	Special alerting message originated at JCS level.
*ROLLING THUNDER	Area in NVN north of TALLY HO Area.
RON	Remain Over-Night (position).
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force or Armed Forces.
*RUB DOWN	Unclas name for MACV plans to conduct large-scale operations into Cambodia.
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
SACSA	Special Assistant (to the JCS) for Counterinsurgency and Special Covert Activities.
*SALEM HOUSE	Cross-border operations into Cambodia. Old nickname.

*SAR	Search and Rescue. OPCON to 7AF. Authority is listed in 7AF OPLAN 7-15 or 7-30.
*SCT	Sea Commando Team - CSS special operations team (SOG-37).
*SCU	Special Commando Unit. Term normally applied to Montagnard mercenaries.
*SEA DRAGON	USN intediction of NVN coastal shipping 17.00N to 18.00N.
*SEAL	Sea Air Land - the term applies to specially qualified Naval personnel.
SECRET	Second highest security classification. Unauthorized disclosure of secret material could result in serious damage to the nation. Examples include improvements to weapons or the release of codes.
SHAO	SALEM HOUSE Area of Operations.
SHINING BRASS	Nickname preceeding PRAIRIE FIRE, which in turn preceeded PHU DUNG. Laos.
*SLAM	Search, Locate, Annihilate and Monitors special missions often performed by the C&C detachments.
SMAG	Special Mission Advisory Group. Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team #158 formed from remnants of 5th SFG to advise STD.

*SNOW FLAKES	SOG word for MA6 containers.
*SOAP BUBBLES	Indigenous RT members.
*SOAP CHIPS	Psyops booklets in Laos and Cambodia.
SPECAT TS	Special Category, Top Secret.
*SPECIAL ACTION TEAMS	UW trained SMS teams selected for recon. Attend ARVN recon course.
*SPECIAL ACTION FORCE	Specially configured force configured for specific task.
*SPIKE TEAM	Twelve man exploitation team. Applied to short term operation concept to exploit an identified situation (SOG-35).
*SRU	Special Reconnaissance Unit.
*SSO	Special Security Office.
STD	Strategic Technical Directorate. The presumed RVN counterpart to MACVSOG.
*STEEL TIGER	Panhandle of Southern Laos.
*STRATA	Short term reconnaissance and target acquisition teams.
*STRAW HATS	US RT members.

*STRAY GOOSE	Now known as COMBAT SPEAR.
SURVEYED	Naval term meaning inspected and scrapped/ scavenged.
*SWIFT POPS	A 50 foot American built patrol boat craft capable of 25 knots, used mostly for logistic support.
TACAIR	Tactical Air. Usually means on call or standby air support for infantry or SOG operations.
*TALLY HO	Area extending from south of the DMZ to the northern border of Route Package One. (Vicinity of Vinh, NVN).
*TAR HEELS	Incapacitating gas.
*TASK FORCE ALPHA	AF organization that operates IGLOO WHITE (NKP--Nakhon Phanom).
TCTO	Time Compliance Technical Orders. Maintenance support regulations.
TDY	Temporary Duty, usually less than six months.
TF1AE	Task Force One Advisory Element. CCN located at Da Nang and responsible for Northern PHU DUNG AO, the DMZ, and NICKEL STEEL.
TF2AE	Task Force Two Advisory Element. CCC located at Kontum and responsible for operations in both THOT NOT and PHU DUNG AO.

TF3AE	Task Force Three Advisory Element. CCS located at Ban Me Thuot and responsible for operations in Southern THOT NOT AO.
*THOT NOT	Last nickname for Cambodia referring to a type of mangrove that grows there. Pron. TOTE NOTE. Nickname replacing SALEM HOUSE. Cross-border operations in Cambodia.
*TIGER HOUND	Southern portion of Laos panhandle. (SOG-35A).
TNAO	THOT NOT Area of Operations.
TOC	Tactical Operations Center.
TOP SECRET	Highest security classification. Disclosure of top secret information could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation. Examples are war plans, new weapons, or the identification of intelligence agents in an area.
*TOTEM POLE	Identification of wire tap equipment.
*TRAFFIC COP	Destroyer operations against coastal shipping of NVN 17.00N to 18.00N. Also known as SEA DRAGON.
*TROJAN HORSE	High level U-2 photography, now known as GIANT NAIL.
*USAID	US Agency for Internal Development - "Economic Support Plan" with a FY budget to $150 million from $250.

USARV	US Army, Vietnam.
UW	Unconventional Warfare.
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force.
VNSF	Vietnamese Special Forces.
VR	Visual Reconnaissance.
*WACO CITY	Reaction teams inserted at sites of enemy contact or downed A/C to recover bodies or survivors.
*WATERBOY	Call sign for GCI at Dong Ha, SVN.
*WILD WEASEL	Aircraft employing electronic detection equipment used to detect and destroy SAM sites.
*YANKEE STATION	Term used to describe TASK FORCE 77; that unit of 7th Fleet that conducts air operations against NVN. Team is made up of CVAs and associated destroyers providing screening support and SAR support and also protection to MAROPS when requested.
*YANKEE TEAM	Tactical recon over Laos.
*YOUNG TIGER	SAC program for re-locating KC-135s to Taiwan in support of an increased B-52 effort.
ZONE ALFA	Northern zone in Cambodia bounded by Laotian border to the North, Route 13 to the South, to a uniform depth of 50 km from RVN.

ZONE BRAVO	Southern zone in Cambodia extended from a line drawn West from Lo Go, RVN to the Mekong River at a uniform depth of 30 km; and from the Mekong River to the Gulf of Thailand at a uniform depth of 20 km.
ZONE CHARLIE	The central zone which extended from Route 13 Lo Go, RVN at a uniform depth of 30 km.