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10 July 1970

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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY

ANNEXES A-H

TO

APPENDIX B

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TASKER NUMBER _____

DUE DATE 31 DEC

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DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

Draft MACSOG Documentation Study, Annexes A-H to appendix B

PAGE(S)

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Annexes A-G may not be declassified per CIA

pages B-a-1 through B-g-2

Annex H

MACJ3

Analysis and recommendations regarding the present system of out-of-country operations from South Vietnam

ACofS, J-3 MACV | Chief, SOG
CO, 5th SFGp | 7 June 1966
jkf

1. References:

a. Memorandum for: Commanding Officer, 5th SFGp and Chief, Studies and Observation Group, Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3, dtd 30 May 1966 (TAB A)

b. Position Paper, Subject: Analysis and recommendations regarding the present system of out-of-country operations from South Vietnam , Headquarters, Studies and Observations Group, dtd 7 June 1966 (TAB B).

c. DF, Subject: Joint Report of Investigations to Determine Whether there is Duplication by 5th SFGp and SOG . CO, 5th SFGp, dtd 4 June 1966 (TAB C).

2. In compliance with reference a, the undersigned, at a meeting on 7 June, have agreed essentially to the contents of TAB B up to the recommendations in paragraph 5. However, the undersigned maintain their individual position as stated at TABs B and C insofar as the respective recommendations are concerned.

3. Request that the resolution of who should have responsibility where duplication of effort exists, be the decision of the Commander.

WILLIAM A. MC KEAN
Colonel, Inf
CO, 5th SFGp (Abn), 1st SF

JOHN K. SINGLAUB
Colonel, GS
Chief, SOG

3 Incl

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

MACJ3 30 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDING OFFICER, 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

CHIEF, STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

1. The observation has been made that there is duplication of effort on the part of the 5th Special Forces Group and SOG. It is, therefore, requested that the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group, and Chief, SOG, together prepare a report including, but not limited to, the following:

a. List the advantages and disadvantages of the present system of operations.

b. Outline the duplications that exist.

c. Recommend which agency should assume functions wherein duplication of effort is involved.

d. Recommendations for future operations.

2. This report will be submitted prior to Colonel McKean's departure from the theater to ACofS, J-3, MACV.

JOHN C. F. TILLSON, III
Major General, USA
ACofS, J-3

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATION GROUP
APO 96243

MACSOG 7 June 1966

POSITION PAPER

Subject: Analysis and recommendations regarding the present system of out-of-country operations from South Vietnam

1. References:

a. Memo, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, J3 MACV, dtd 30 May 66, to CO 5th SFGp and Chief, SOG

b. CINCPAC 290123Z Sep 65

c. MACV 010340Z Feb 66

d. MACV 190921Z Feb 66

e. Draft Annex X, to OPLAN 37-65, dtd 31 May 1966

f. JCS 282014Z Feb 66

2. This paper will concern itself with operational aspects of out-of-country operations. Administrative details as to where personnel are attached and their records are kept have not been a problem in duplication of effort.

3. The following facts bear on the question of out-of-country operations:

a. SOG's mission as approved by CINCPAC in November 1965, as directed by COMUSMACV and with the concurrence of AMEMB, Saigon:

(1) To advise, train and support counter-part forces in out-of-country UW and Psy War operations.

(2) Conduct unilateral planning as JUWTF designate for COMUSSEASIA.

(3) Activate and command JUWTF, when directed.

b. Since SOG's mission is out-of-country operations and since the JUWTF concept calls for 5th SFGp and CAS assets to be under JUWTF Commander, it appears that a policy has already been formulated by higher authority.

c. Per references c and d, COMUSMACV proposed assignment of responsibilities for cross-border operations into CAMBODIA to 5th SFGp utilizing the same concept of operations presently in use in LAOS by SOG.

d. Per reference e, which is presently being staffed within MACV, SOG has been tasked to prepare plans for conduct of MAROPS from SVN along the CAMBODIAN coastline. 5th SFGp has been tasked to prepare plans for conduct of cross-border operations into CAMBODIA from SVN.

e. SOG has provided training, advice, and support to RVN forces in UW and Psy War operations in out-of-country operations. Limited scale operations are being successfully executed in LAOS (SHINING BRASS) and in North Vietnam (34A).

f. Unilateral planning by SOG as JUWTF designate for COMUSSEASIA is well under way towards completion.

g. A revised SOG JTD was recently approved as a result of SHINING BRASS expanded operations.

h. SOG's JTD is presently being revised to conform to a JUWTF TD. Once the proposed JTD is approved, it will put SOG in a posture which will facilitate rapid assumption of JUWTF SEASIA should the implimentation be directed.

i. Per reference f, JCS questions the rationale of assigning the CAMBODIAN mission to 5th SFGp, preferring that it be assigned to SOG, stating that "It appears that the separate development of a program for CAMBODIA under 5th SFGp will require an expensive duplication of training and logistics base, operational facilities to include communications, funding procedures and personnel".

j. 5th SFGp is not a covert organization. Its operations in SVN are not covert or clandestine.

k. Out-of-country operations presently being conducted by SOG are supported by MT. These facilities are presently physically associated with SOG.

4. Since there are three possibilities for out-of-country operations by ground forces from SVN, i.e. LAOS under SOG, CAMBODIA under 5th SFGp; both under 5th SFGp; both under SOG; it seems appropriate to examine all three:

a. LAOS UNDER SOG, CAMBODIA UNDER 5TH SFGp.

(1) Advantages accruing to MACV.

(a) The apparent advantages of having complete operational control over CAMBODIA operations held by MACV through 5th SFGp has not materialized because JCS/OSD/State have not given up the jurisdiction and controls over CAMBODIAN matters to MACV. The State Department will probably not give up control of military activities against CAMBODIA.

(b) The advantage of having SOG operate in LAOS is significant because SOG is covert organization and is operating under clandestine rules in LAOS in order to make the operation deniable by US and SVN. This was the primary condition levied by the US State Department in authorizing SHINING BRASS operations in LAOS because such operations are in violation of the Geneva Accords.

(c) By having SOG handle out-of-country operations in LAOS, MACV has been able to comply with political restrictions, and retain the deniable character of the operations.

(2) Disadvantages accruing to MACV:

(a) 5th SFGp assets and energies will be required to support the vast counter-insurgency mission within SVN while at the same time operating and supporting an increasing out-of-country effort in CAMBODIA. SOG has no in-country missions to divert its attention and resources from out-of-country operations.

(b) SOG has in being the command and control organization to accomplish all out-of-country operations, 5th SFGp does not.

(c) Under para 3.i. above it was noted that CJCS in a message to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC questions the rationale of assigning CAMBODIAN mission to 5th SFGp, preferring that it be assigned to SOG. During the recent visit of JCS representatives, it was stated that this CJCS position has not changed. It is well known that CINCPAC is generally of the same opinion.

(d) As noted in para 3.a. and b., SOG has the mission approved by CINCPAC, for out-of-country operations, and has considerable

experience in this theatre in such operations. 5th SFGp has limited to no experience in out-of-country operations in this theatre.

(e) SOG has been assigned responsibility for CAMBODIAN MARKOPS recently. The present division of responsibility will create two agencies working in out-of-country military operations against CAMBODIA, SOG in MARKOPS and 5th SFGp in cross-border.

(f) The 5th SFGp will have difficulty satisfying the clandestine/covert nature of operations which will be required in CAMBODIA in order to gain political approval.

(g) There will be considerable difficulty getting political approval from State Department for reconnaissance and intelligence collection patrols in CAMBODIA unless they are of covert nature. At the present time the political atmosphere will not permit any other type operation. State Department will be most reluctant to approve a sensitive operation such as this, to be conducted by an untried overt military organization. This reluctance may delay approval to such an extent that the time for optimum action may pass. On the other hand, it seems that if State Department is assured that the same techniques and experienced organization used for SHINING BRASS will be used for this new area, the chances of approval will be enhanced.

(h) There will be duplication of the recruiting effort, staff planning, training bases, instructors, helicopter lift and other air support required for two separate organizations to operate reconnaissance patrols and exploitation forces in LAOS and CAMBODIA. If under one command there would be economy of forces and resources. Consequently operational forces could be shifted from one area to another and training assets could be used for support of operations in both areas.

b. BOTH OPERATIONS UNDER 5TH SFGp.

(1) Advantages accruing to MACV:

(a) The operational element would be with the unit which holds their personnel records.

(b) 5th can operate from CIDG Camps which they control already.

(c) One command and control system could be used for both operations and assets could be shifted to either area for efficient utilization of forces.

(d) Responsiveness to operational requirements of MACV may be greater in cases where additional SF personnel might be required on short notice.

(2) Disadvantages accruing to MACV:

(a) Diversion of interests and resources from counter-insurgency mission with SVN to the out-of-country mission in CAMBODIA.

(b) Lack of experience on the part of the 5th in out-of-country operations.

(c) Lack of experience in political negotiations frequently required for out-of-country operations.

(d) Less experience in performing covert missions than SOG.

(e) Higher degree of risk of compromising highly sensitive operations.

(f) Over-extension of span of control. It is estimated that expansion to more than six "C" detachments would be required.

c. BOTH OPERATIONS UNDER SOG.

(1) Advantages accruing to MACV:

(a) All out-of-country operations under the organization designated by CINCPAC to have this mission, reference b.

(b) The operations would be under the command considered most desirable by CJCS, and CINCPAC, reference f.

(c) SOG assets in being and command and control system in being can be used in LAOS and shifted to CAMBODIA if and when such operations are approved whereas the 5th must build teams and exploitation forces which may not be used for an indefinite period or may never be used. This is not efficient utilization of forces. SOG could transition while expanding to the new mission by additional recruiting.

(d) SOG, by its highly successful operations in LAOS, has gained the confidence of higher authority, the State Department -- MT that it can carry on covert operations across a hostile border, without compromise of the program.

(c) SOG is more likely to get early political approval for CAMBODIA cross-border operations because of its covert nature. Once approved SOG would not be subject to the same veto power held for its LAOTIAN operation by the Embassy Vientiane because the U.S. has no embassy in CAMBODIA. Therefore SOG would be just as responsive to MACV direction as 5th SFGp would be, as MACV has OPCON of SOG.

(2) Disadvantages to MACV:

(a) SOG would require augmentation by Special Forces operations personnel to form the advisory force for additional recon teams. 5th SFGp may not require as much augmentation.

(b) SOG would stage from CIDG Camps which are operated by 5th SFGp.

5. Recommendations:

a. That SOG which has an out-of-country, politically approved deniable, clandestine operation already in being, be given the additional task to prepare for CAMBODIAN recon, exploitation operations and such other UW functions as may be directed. That a similar pattern be used as was developed for LAOS for both the political negotiations with AMEMB and the UW operations.

b. That 5th SFGp continue to operate in-country (SVN) unconventional warfare operations of a military nature in VC war zones in SVN which offers a significant challenge.

c. That all resources, presently allocated to 5th SFGp for the preparation to conduct ground operations in CAMBODIA, be re-allocated to SOG.

d. That in the future such out-of-country operations of covert military nature as may arise be assigned to SOG, while in-country (SVN) military operations employing UW be the mission of 5th SFGp.

AVSF-C

Joint Report of Investigation to Determine Whether there is Duplication by 5th SFGA and SOG

A C of 5, J3

CO, 5th SFGA

4 June 1966
Col McKean

1. This report has been prepared jointly by the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group and the Chief, Studies and Observation Group. The purpose of the report is to record the results of an investigation to determine whether there is significant duplication between the missions of 5th SFGA and those of SOG. Where duplication is deemed to exist appropriate recommendations for solution are offered.

2. The advantages and disadvantages of the present system of operations are as follows:

a. Advantages:

(1) SOG is relieved of the burden of personnel administration for those SOG personnel assigned to SHINING BRASS duties. Presently these matters are handled by the 5th Group.

(2) SOG is relieved of the task of processing supply requisitions for the Counterinsurgency Supply Office on Okinawa. This is consolidated and coordinated by the 5th Group.

(3) There is no requirement for the establishment of dual facilities for the issue of individual clothing and equipment. This is all handled by the 5th Group.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) The 5th Group is tasked with an ever growing administrative task for SOG personnel over which the 5th Group exercises no control. As such the 5th Group is responsible for administrative matters for all SHINING BRASS Personnel to include:

(a) All personnel management to include the awarding and withdrawal of proficiency pay, assignments, reassignments, requisitioning of qualified officer and enlisted personnel and AOR processing; all personnel actions, and affairs to include reenlistment, casualty reporting, officer proficiency reports, ordinary leave, R&R, extension and curtailment of foreign service tours, security clearances, OCS, Warrant Officer, and direct commission applications, and dependent affairs; all military pay to include request for pay actions, travel and TDY; records management, awards and decorations, and obtaining of all security clearances.

(b) Problems arise in the area of displinary actions. A SOG soldier may be relieved of his duties and sent to the 5th Group. Reasons for the soldier's relief are not always clearly relayed to CO 5th Group so that he may take appropriate action. Meanwhile SOG expects an immediate replacement from the 5th Group. In this manner, CO, 5th SFGA is frequently placed in the awkward position of operating a holding and house-keeping detachment for SOG. CO, 5th Group has responsibility for personnel matters but not been granted commensurate authority to control SOG personnel. A hypothetical case in point: A SOG NCO gets drunk and disorderly and causes serious trouble in a Saigon bar. Technically, Colonel Mc Kean is responsible, yet he has no authority or daily control of the man's activities. Normally, CO, 5th SFGA sees this man only when he arrives and departs VN.

(2) Casualty reporting presents a problem in that CO, 5th Group

has this responsibility, but SOG communications system is separate from that of the 5th Group.

(3) SOG has personnel assigned to two different headquarters. Approximately 200 are assigned to MACV and another 200 to 5th SFGA (SHINING BRASS).

(4) Promotions in the upper enlisted grades have been slowed almost to a stand still because of the large number of high ranking SOG NCO's which must be carried against 5th Group promotion allocations.

(5) SOG personnel operate from existing Special Forces camps. This places two operational units under the same roof but they work for entirely independent agencies. This is not conducive to good relations or maximum productive effort and violates elementary good management practice.

3. The duplications which exist are:

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These are not consolidated under one headquarters for most efficient use.

b. SOG and 5th SFGA also operate separate training centers with very similiar missions. Duplication exists.

c. Because of the separate organizations and missions the skills of certain critical specialists cannot be utilized to the maximum. Additional specialists are required in order to provide the same capability to both major units.

4. Recommendation as to which agency should assume functions therein

OU CONTROL

duplication of effort is involved:

a. CO, 5th SFGA should assume responsibility for the SHINING BRASS portion of the SOG mission. The personnel in SHINING BRASS are all SF prefix 3 qualified personnel and therefore must remain assigned to a Special Forces Unit. This plan is in keeping with COMUSMACV considerations of four months ago as stated in MSG from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, (TS) 05405, 190921Z Feb 66:

"QUOTE - 5. We do not wish to transfer SHINING BRASS to the 5th Special Forces Group at this time, but we anticipate such a recommendation will be forthcoming within the next six months based to some extent upon the development within the 5th Special Forces Group of the capability for operations into Cambodia. Recognizing that present authority includes only clandestine intelligence operations, we intend for the present to use this new capability for operations just inside the border on the Vietnamese side. - UNQUOTE"

b. CO, 5th SFGA already has responsibility for the special operations of Project Delta and Det C-5. Det C-5 (Project Horse) is scheduled to expand. C-5 is operating both in VN and across the border. It is more logical to consolidate special operations under 5th Group than SOG because 5th Group already has responsibility on both sides of the border. Further Det C-5 is presently operating a clandestine agent net which is an area in which SOG is not operating.

c. To consolidate in country activities of Det C-5 and Project Delta under SOG is not feasible under present circumstances because a major revamping of SOG would be necessary in order to provide the means to coordinate missions within

South Vietnam. This coordination is a relatively simple matter for the 5th Group because of the existing communications and camp facilities.

d. The reaction force companies would be consolidated under the 5th Group for more effective utilization and training. The force can be used to reinforce a SF camp or, alternately, to react to a contact or to intelligence gathered by any one of the special operational units.

5. For future operations it is recommended that DATA SHINING BRASS portion of SOG be assigned and controlled by CO, 5th SFGA, subject to the approval of Colonel Kelly, incoming Commander, 5th SFGA. This shift of SHINING BRASS will result in minimum turbulence since all the key positions, facilities, and the reconnaissance teams themselves, are manned by personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group.

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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

ANNEXES I - M

TO

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ANNEX I

to

APPENDIX B

COMMENT BY THESE INTERVIEWEES ON MACSOG'S MISSION

(In Chronological Order)

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Clyde R. Russell, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jan 1964 - Jun 1965	A
LTC David H. Arno, USAF	Staff Officer, Air Operations, MACSOG Jan 1964 to Mar 1964 (assigned to HQ PACAF and TDY with MACSOG)	B
	Staff Officer, Special Air Operations Branch, Plans Directorate, HQ PACAF (Monitored MACSOG Activities) Apr 1964 - April 1966	
Col John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	C
LTC Jonathon D. Carney, USA	Deputy Director, Operations-35 (SHINING BRASS/ PRAIRIE FIRE, DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE, IGLOO WHITE) Aug 1966 - Jul 1967	D
	Chief, Operations-34 (TIMBERWORK) July 1967 - March 1968	
	Chief, Operations-30 (FOOTBOY) Mar 1968 - Aug 1968	
Capt Bruce B. Dunning, USN	Special Operations Division, OSACSA, Staff Officer & Division Chief Aug 1966 - Nov 1969	E

COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

COLONEL CLYDE R. RUSSELL, USA

...I don't feel that the objectives of OPLAN-34A were clearly spelled out, so we didn't know exactly what we were trying to do. If we were trying to convince the North Vietnamese that they could not operate from a sanctuary because the South Vietnamese were capable of hitting their beaches and their coastline, we were successful but there is a limit to how much success you can have in that type of operation. Once we got the maritime operations going, I am confident that we could have done anything along the coast. The North Vietnamese gave us no trouble whatsoever with regard to chasing our boats with SWATOW's. Their shore artillery did bother us but we were able to plot it and stay out of its way with few exceptions. We had access to the entire coast and could have done anything along that coast that was required. I don't know what the objective of that type of operation is unless it is to go up and destroy people and let them know they are not operating from a sanctuary. The LOKI operations

MT

MT gave us some extremely good intelligence of what was going on in North Vietnam.

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MT You are not going to get in on government secrets by talking to MT but at least you can determine the feeling of the people by talking to these types.*

* (TS) Interview of Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, pp. 4-5.

COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

LT. COLONEL DAVID H. ARNO, USAF

The basic mission of SOG could have probably been better stated. The mission indicated four categories of action which SOG could take; harassing, attritional, punitive, and aerial attacks. For all practical purposes, SOG did not get beyond the harassing and intelligence collection type of actions. On the whole, these actions were also to be accomplished without development of any type of indigenous base in North Vietnam. As a result, the teams that were inserted were required to spend practically all of their time either hiding or otherwise trying to survive. If the mission had been stated so that the initial teams could have been oriented toward developing an indigenous base of support, then the other types of actions (in particular harassing, attritional, and punitive) could have been accomplished and these unconventional warfare operations could have possibly posed a major threat to the North Vietnamese regime. It is realized that the development of indigenous bases would have been a much longer term type of action and not one which would have developed an immediate effect on the North Vietnamese regime. However, it is a characteristic of unconventional warfare that the effect of such warfare does develop or must be developed over a period of time and cannot be developed in the short time period for immediate effect.*

. . . . . .

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* (TS) Interview of Lt. Colonel David H. Arno, USAF, p. 6.
** Ibid., p. 9.

COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

...the SOG mission was not always completely clear because it was misinterpreted by some of the individuals who were in a position to provide support or to pass on our plans and programs at CINCPAC level. In this connection, it must be remembered that the mission was subject to some changes and modifications as time went by and, of course, new missions were added to the original mission. *

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* (TS) Interview of Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, p. 6.

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* Ibid.
** Ibid, pp. 6-7

COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

LT. COLONEL JONATHON D. CARNEY, USA

. . . . we were, by charter, essentially prohibited from utilizing or attempting unilateral operations. We had no base we could use for unilateral operations. We were, therefore, forced into a partnership with our South Vietnamese counterparts who, I don't believe, ever believed in the ——— program to start with. Certainly, by the time I got there, after 20 or 30 failures, they had reason not to believe in the program. In the future, if we are going to conduct Asian operations we should do it on the basis of unilateral, not allied, operations. . . DATA

My statement that the military should withdraw from Asian operations into denied areas refers specifically to considerations of pure intelligence collection missions. The basic concept of the establishment of guerrilla bases, the activity within a denied area of either establishing a subversive movement or a guerrilla-type operation is still entirely sound. But we were, of course, in SOG forbidden from any consideration of this kind of activity by a White House level decision and we were reduced then to these extremely low-

:k operations which were finally essentially intelligence

nd-largely unsuccessful.*

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:erview of Lt Colonel Jonathon D. Carney, USA, p. 9.

COMMENT ON MACSOG'S MISSIONS

BY

CAPTAIN BRUCE B. DUNNING, USN

If I had to point out one major observation based on my experience in Washington and in the FOOTBOY Program, it is that the US military Services do have a definite responsibility to participate in US covert actions. Further, it is my strong conviction that this aspect of unconventional warfare is a specialized one requiring a rather specialized viewpoint which, in turn, certainly requires organizational concepts that are different from conventional military organizational concepts....*

.... I think, in the MACSOG context, that physical harassment by itself seldom achieves much of anything. There are cases where physical destruction missions obviously can achieve a legitimate military objective. In many cases, however, if you are just going in with limited resources to harass the enemy, to blow this and that up, you discommode him a bit but you are not going to really bring any heavy pressure to bear on the opposing regime unless physical harassment is tied into some large, perhaps psychological, objective or unless it is of such a nature and conducted in such a way that it is going to make the enemy think that he is politically threatened.**

. . . I am not convinced that . . . the real objectives of this program (FOOTBOY) were adequately spelled out by Washington and that the program was backed by a really well thought out concept. I have the feeling that, during the

* Interview of Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, p. 1.
** Ibid.

early part of operations against North Vietnam, we were operating there simply for the sake of doing something. In making such critical statements, I feel very strongly that the people in SOG were doing a tremendous job. My criticism is aimed primarily at the Washington level. I think this is a very important point because I'm afraid that our approach to unconventional warfare is essentially still the same.*

In about mid-1965, it was becoming apparent that the type of physical harassment operations SOG was conducting in the North was not achieving tremendous results and, of course, the bombing was started at about that time. . . . The FOOTBOY Program was then rather informally reoriented toward an emphasis on intelligence collection. I have reservations about how well thought out the decision to emphasize intelligence collection was. Certainly, unconventional assets operating in a denied area do have a definite intelligence collection potential and this potential should be exploited. Anybody in a denied area should collect all the information available and steps should be taken to insure this information is properly put into the national intelligence channels. However, I feel that, despite this informal reorientation, intelligence collection was never properly SOG's primary function. In mid-1965, I think that this reorientation toward intelligence collection was an attempt to justify the program and that the true value of the program still hadn't been identified.**

. . . . . .

. . . . To my knowledge, there was no really formal or

* Ibid, p. 4.
** Ibid, p. 5.

intensive reevaluation of the program when the bombing started .... A case can be made that the original mission ... was no longer valid once the bombing started. Actually, I'm not sure that SOG ever had a really clear-cut mission assigned in the first place. To be sure, CINCPAC, in 1965, published a mission statement or a list of objectives but, as I recall, that list included physical harassment, intelligence collection, shipping interdiction, conduct of psychological warfare, conduct of economic warfare, and several other things. It was a rather shotgun approach and, in my mind, didn't really give SOG a statement as what the program was intended to achieve and what SOG should do. So, I don't think that there was any really clear-cut reevaluation when the bombing started and, as a matter of fact, although I may be doing a disservice to the original planners, my impression has always been that the conceptualization of the original program was rather shallow. It was an idea of, "Damn it, we've got to do something up there, so let's do something. Let's conduct some unconventional operations." This is not an uncommon approach in the United States. "We've got some fancy boats so let's run some maritime operations. Let's get some agents up there. We'll figure out later what they are going to do." *

. . . . . .

. . . Intelligence collection, I do not believe, was ever really the proper primary mission of this program. If intelligence was to be the primary mission, then the program should have been put under an intelligence agency. Certainly, if intelligence collection was the real primary mission, I think we would have gone about it in an entirely different way. **

* Ibid, p. 8.
** Ibid, p. 12.

. . . . . .

Though we did not seem to be getting much in the way of intelligence and we certainly weren't conducting any physical destruction operations, it was becoming increasingly apparent to us in SACSA that we were somehow hurting Hanoi because they were increasingly sensitive to our operations. Hanoi's screams were getting louder and louder, and they seemed to be giving us credit for doing a lot more than we actually were doing. They were seeing a lot of ghosts in their backyard, they were chasing so-called "spy commandos" all over the countryside. We had several cases come up where apparently innocent North Vietnamese were tossed in the hoosegow for dealing with spy commandos who actually were never even there. So that it began to look as though by the mere presence of a certain number of our elements in North Vietnam that we were causing grave concern on the part of Hanoi. At about that time, General DePuy told us to start looking much more closely at the possibility of maximizing this psychological impact on Hanoi, an exploitation of what was obviously some sort of a vulnerability, but without such a high cost in friendly human resources. We were beginning to cast around for ways to do this, and came up with the idea of deceptive operations.*

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* Ibid, p. 13.

DATA

Then, in November 1967, we organized a joint survey team consisting of members of the Services, a SACSA representative (myself), a DIA representative, DATA This team went to CINCPAC, picked up some CINCPAC people, and to SOG to take an overall look at the SOG programs. After discussing these programs with the SOG people, we saw that they had already made considerable progress, under Colonel Bowen's guidance, in developing concepts for deceptive operations and in breaking down some of the compartmentation and thus getting better integration between the operators and the PSYOPS people. We began to think seriously about reorienting this whole effort toward essentially a psychological impact on North Vietnam. Following return from that trip, we continued to look at the situation and, in late 1967, General DePuy directed Special Operations Division to do a study on the impact of covert operations and to determine some of the vulnerabilities. This study was done; it was probably a rather amateurish one. We tried to get DIA to do it, but they fell flat on their face. We did this study as best we could and, in the process, came up with a strong feeling that all of these operations were having quite an impact in the North. DATA

DATA and that one of the cadre system, particularly the cadres at the hamlet and village levels. If we could continue to drive a wedge between the people and the cadres, it would seriously threaten Hanoi's control of the population or at least cause them to think that their control was threatened.**

* Ibid, pp. 13-14.
** Ibid, p. 14.

Shortly after we completed and published that study, we discovered that the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) had been working on a study on North Vietnamese vulnerabilities. CRESS had identified as the major vulnerability the North Vietnamese population control system. Based on this, we began to try to articulate a central single concept for FOOTBOY operations; this concept would use all, or at least most, of the FOOTBOY assets in an integrated effort to exploit Hanoi's almost paranoid fear of any perceived threat to their control of the population. We considered that, if Hanoi perceived a really serious threat to their control of the population, they had two alternatives, both of them undesirable from the Hanoi standpoint: to take repressive measures against the population and this would be counter-productive; to realize that it was the Hanoi war effort that was causing them to lose their grip on the population and, therefore, they either had to risk a greater loss or change their war policy. I don't imply that we could have caused Hanoi to change its war policy all by ourselves, but a good program directed at this vulnerability, combined with all the other things going on, had a good chance of major impact.*

SOG, meanwhile, was really going along this line. Our effort in Washington was to formalize this as a single concept for SOG and, hopefully, to get it validated at a very high level. We prepared a paper outlining the concept and planned to submit it to a very high-level committee.

DATA - SOG was given an opportunity to contribute to the paper. We had it all ready to go and, unfortunately, the 1 April (1968) standdown came. Then it was just not feasible to seek approval of the paper. By that time, however, SOG had reoriented their program into

* Ibid, pp. 14-15.

a rather highly integrated effort, employing all of their UW

MT

This would cause Hanci to think that there was actually a lot going on in their backyard than was actually the case and to perceive SOG's actions as a real threat.*

MT

Even though Hanoi recognized that we were actually behind it, the fact that we were leading the population to behave in a manner not completely responsive to Hanoi's control would achieve the desired effect on Hanoi, i.e., it would be perceived as a threat. This effort, of course, did have to be completely covert vis-a-vis the target population in order to be credible. It is fairly well established that the people in the coastal areas would be responsive to guidance and leaderhip by what they thought to be an indigenous movement. If those people, the low-level population, realized that this was actually being done by the United States and the GVN then they would not be responsive. The other main thrust of this was to make Hanoi believe there was, in fact, a lot going on in their

* Ibid, p. 15.

backyard and to think that they had a real security problem. This would be done largely by deceptive operations.*

. . . . . .

The evaluation of Hanoi's actual feelings toward these operations is, of course, rather difficult. You are getting into a highly subjective area here. About the only thing we had to go on were the pronouncements, sometimes rather vague, in the various press organs of the Hanoi regime and VNA (the Hanoi radio service). Occasionally we'd get indications of physical reactions by the Hanoi regime. Obviously, they were putting out an awful lot of propaganda and you had to read between the lines. You just had to draw impressions from both the level and the content of the pronouncements.**

During the period from about early 1967 to the first few months of 1968, in our view, both the quantity and the intensity of the Vietnamese reaction was steadily increasing. We began to see a shift from little short blurbs in the paper or the radio, e.g., that commando boats were fired on and set ablaze on the night of such and such, to very long and sometimes vitriolic diatribes against the foul psychological plots of the American imperialists. A lot of these diatribes were in great detail and similarly described some of our operations. This indicated to us that NVN was becoming increasingly sensitive to our operations, that we were getting deeper and deeper under their skin.**

We began to see articles in the security organs and the psychological warfare organs to their cadres on how to counteract this type of thing. Their instructions as to how

* Ibid, pp. 15-16.
** Ibid, p. 17.

to counteract our activities were very superficial. It was rather apparent that they really didn't know what to do about them, e.g., after going through page after page of gobbledygook, they would end up telling their cadres that, in response to leaflets, about the best thing they could do was to scoop them all up as soon as they landed and to keep them out of the hands of the people.*

The North Vietnamese were obviously having trouble knowing exactly how to keep this from having some impact on the people. In this regard, governmental pronouncements reached a climax in about March 1968. At that time, a government decree from the central committee which, dated in October 1967 but not surfaced outside of Hanoi until March 1968, decreed the death penalty for 21 offenses against the State. Some 19 of them could be tied almost directly into the type of thing we were doing. This decree was spotted by the American Embassy in Saigon as an extremely significant happening in North Vietnam without any reference to SOG operations. It was picked up first by the Embassy analysts who are not aware of SOG operations but who saw it as an extremely significant development in Hanoi. Of course, this was one danger of which we had to be aware. There was a tendency by some people who didn't know what was going on to view this as an indication that there was actual real resistance possibly developing in North Vietnam. Of course, this was not the case.**

. . . . . .

The point I had started to make was that eventually, toward the end, the FOOTBOY Program was evolving into a

* Ibid, p. 17.
** Ibid, p, 18.

rather well integrated one employing all of the UW techniques in what was essentially a subversion mission. We were really trying to subvert the population and to draw it away from the regime, thereby achieving some significant impact on the regime itself. Unfortunately, this program was just getting cranked up and we were just in the process of trying to document and articulate this as a formalized concept approved at a high level when the standdown came in April 1968, and almost everything stopped. We then gradually built up operations again until, by October 1968, they were almost back up to where we had been before. We were just getting ready to process our conceptual paper up to the top again when 1 November arrived. The standdown then pretty much finished us.*

During the FOOTBOY Program, we had three stages of evolution. The first, when it was primarily a physical harassment program, I think largely oriented itself toward the frustration syndrome. In the second stage, the orientation was said to be primarily intelligence collection but I rather interpret this as being a justification for continuing the program rather than as a real mission. Finally, FOOTBOY began to move into the area where we were developing a missions statement that was really predicated on North Vietnamese vulnerabilities and on our real capabilities or assets.**

I think the FOOTBOY evolution is interesting because it is extremely important for future operations of this type that we not just undertake unconventional warfare operations for the sake of doing something. There is a big tendency to do this. If you have UW forces, if you have SEALs or Special Forces or special operations squadrons and

* Ibid, pp. 22-23.
** Ibid, p. 23.

you are in a contingency situation, somebody says, "Boy, we've got these assets. Let's use them." It doesn't make sense to me to go ahead and use them unless you have a well conceived mission.*

. . . it is my personal feeling that the MACSOG missions were not clearly defined in the beginning of the program nor were they clearly defined for sometime. I have the feeling that the program was initiated largely as a result of what I would call a frustration complex, the desire to do something in North Vietnam in order to exert "pressure on the regime." I feel that there was too little assessment of North Vietnamese vulnerabilities and too little thought given to how these vulnerabilities could be exploited. In my mind, physical harassment, physical destrution per se, seldom does much good. It has to be tied to some well defined objective that is, in turn, tied to an identified vulnerability.**

. . . in 1965, CINCPAC issued a mission statement for MACSOG for the FOOTBOY Program but it was stated in terms of a wide variety of objectives: physical harassment, interdiction of shipping, economic warfare, intelligence collection, and a number of others. This type of disparate grouping of objectives, I think, served largely to diffuse the MACSOG effort and to confuse the minds of the people in MACSOG as to just what they were supposed to do and to accomplish.**

In a more general sense, I think that, in approaching any unconventional warfare planning, you have to proceed from a very detailed assessment of the area in question and

* Ibid, p. 23.
** Ibid. p. 24.


this assessment has to include not only classic military intelligence, EEI's of terrain, climate, population, etc., but a very detailed assessment of the population stratification of the political and psychological dynamics. You have to identify the particular personalities of various population groups. First, of course, you must determine what the national objectives are. In UW planning, this may require the development of alternative plans because you may in one case have as a national objective the support of the incumbent regime and in another case you may be trying to attack the incumbent regime. Obviously, your target population elements are going to be different in each of these two cases. Therefore, you have to identify very carefully your target elements in the population and know a great deal about their characteristics before you can know how to get at them. Your UW objectives and missions must be based on the national objectives as they apply to the various areas. There is a very strong tendency in UW planning to state missions in terms of broad generalities that bear very little relationship to the actual situation and that provide very little guidance to the UW unit.*

With respect to MACSOG as an entity, I think it is rather difficult to state a single mission for the organization. I say this because, with respect to the FOOTBOY program, obviously you had one mission. When the crossborder operations were added to MACSOG's responsibility, you have a different type of mission. You are no longer engaged solely in covert operations but in politically sensitive operations that, you hope, will have low visibility. However, the latter are

* Ibid, pp. 24-25.

essentially classic military reconnaisance operations. For example, PRAIRIE FIRE includes what I would call conventional unconventional operations: raids, interdiction, reconnaissance and physical harassment. After assuming the responsibility for cross-border operations, MACSOG was assigned the mission of OATH . In each of these different types of operations (operations in the North, cross-border operations and JPRC operations), you may in a good many cases use similar techniques, techniques that are peculiar to the Special Forces or for which the Special Forces are particularly suited. However, the missions are really quite different from each other. So, this makes it very difficult to develop a single mission statement for MACSOG as an organization. You can, however, set forth a mission statement or derive mission statements for each of the types of operations. In my opinion, the missions, as they evolved, were feasible of accomplishment but they were never very clearly stated and this led to a lot of wheel spinning.*

* Ibid, p. 25.



UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO San Francisco 96222

MACSOG-10 20 June 1969

SUBJECT: Organization and Functions Manual (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (U) This manual prescribes the organization and functions of the Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG). Each division and group will evaluate its respective organization and functions as necessary to ensure that the organizational structure and functions statements set forth in this manual reflect current responsibilities.

2. (U) Amendments to this manual will be published in the form of numbered pages. Amended pages will bear a change number and date of the change.

3. (U) Proposed revisions will be forwarded to the Comptroller who is responsible for reviewing such proposals and for effecting staff coordination prior to submission for approval.

FOR THE CHIEF, SOG:

E. D. DURAN
Major, USA
Chief, Pers & Admin Div

DISTRIBUTION:
MACSOG-00 (cy 1-2
MACSOG-05 (cy 3)
MACSOG-10 (cy 4-
(Continued)

[redacted]

20 June 1969

MACSOG-10
SUBJECT: Organization and Functions Manual (U)

MACSOG-20 (cy 10)
MACSOG-30 (cy 11)
MACSOG-31 (cy 12)
MACSOG-32 (cy 13)
MACSOG-33 (cy 14)
MACSOG-34 (cy 15)
MACSOG-35 (cy 16)
MACSOG-36 (cy 17)
MACSOG-37 (cy 18)
MACSOG-38 (cy 19)
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MACSOG-40 (cy 21)
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MACSOG-60 (cy 23)
MACSOG-75 (cy 24)
MACSOG-80 (cy 25)
MACSOG-90 (cy 26)
CCN (C) (cy 27)
CCC (C) (cy 28)
CCS (C) (cy 29)
MACJ2 (cy 30)
MACJ3 (cy 31)

[redacted]

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

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
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
MISSION

(U) To conduct classified studies for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, and Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Studies and Observations Group information is distributed on a strict need-to-know basis.


CHIEF
CO
DEPUTY
01
EXECUTIVE OFFICER
02
SPEC ASST
03
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SOS
LEGEND:
COMMAND
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OPEN ACTIVITIES

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

HEADQUARTERS



1.1

OFFICE OF [redacted] (MACJ3C-00)

MISSION

To execute special operations missions as directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority; to provide advice, assistance and support to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and its Armed Forces in planing, coordinating and implementing those special operations missions mutually agreed to between the United States Government and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam; to coordinate with other US Forces and agencies; to prepare unilateral US and coordinated US-GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; to develop GVN capabilities to provide support for US Forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency emergency operations; to act as Headquarters (designate) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) for Southeast Asia and to act as the responsible headquarters for development and implementation of plans for unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia.

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF (MACSOG-00)

FUNCTIONS

CHIEF, SOG (MACSOG-00)

1. Exercises, under COMUSMACV, operational command over US forces and personnel assigned or attached to SOG to execute special operations missions directed by COMUSMACV or higher authority.

2. Advises, assists, and supports the GVN and RVN Armed Forces to plan, coordinate and implement those special operations missions mutually agreed to between the US Government and GVN.

3. Coordinates activities of SOG with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern.

4. Prepares unilateral US and coordinated US-GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; develops GVN capabilities to provide support for US forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency emergency operations.

5. Acts as Commander (designate) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) for Southeast Asia; responsible for developing, for implementation under order, plans for unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia

DEPUTY CHIEF, SOG (MACSOG-01)

1. (U) Assists and advises the Chief in fulfilling his responsibilities; acts for the Chief when directed or in the event of his absence.

2. (U) Directs and coordinates the work of the SOG staff and is responsible for its efficient functioning.

3. (U) Consults with and assists the Chief in the formulation of policies, provision of guidance and transmission of orders to the SOG staff as required.

SPECIAL ASSISTANT (MACSOG-03)

1. (U) Assists and advises t[redacted]g his responsibilities by providing advice on the f[redacted]ities of other agencies of the US Government.

[redacted] DATA

1.3

2. (U) Acts as coordinator for SOG with other agencies in all matters of mutual concern.

LIAISON OFFICER, STD (S) (MACSOG-04)

1. (U) Acts as liaison between Chief, SOG and CO, STD (S) to provide coordination of the advisory, administrative and operational effort.

2. (U) Assists the Deputy in fulfilling his responsibilities.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER (MACSOG-02)

1. (U) Assists the Chief and Deputy Chief in fulfilling their responsibilities.

2. (U) Acts for the Chief and Deputy Chief within policy limits as defined by the Chief and Deputy Chief.

3. (U) Exercises supervision over the Personnel and Administrative Division.

4. (U) Exercises supervision over the Administrative Section, Office of the Chief, and the Headquarters Support Branch.

5. (U) Performs other duties as defined by Chief and Deputy Chief.

SERGEANT MAJOR

1. (U) Assists the Chief in fulfilling his responsibilities, acting as chief, enlisted assistant to the Chief.

2. (U) Acts for the Chief within policy limits as defined by the Chief.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Performs stenographic and secretarial duties for the Chief, Deputy Chief and Special Assistant.

HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT BRANCH (MACSOG-05)

1. Chief.

a. (U) Advises the Chief, SOG concerning health, morale, welfare and discipline pertaining to personnel assigned to this headquarters.

b. (U) Provides supply support for the headquarters and various staff agencies of this command.

1.4

c. (U) Hires, trains and supervises the Vietnamese drivers, guards and maids authorized the headquarters and various staff agencies.

d. (U) Provides for the local security of the headquarters and transient hotel. Coordinates compound defense with other MACV agencies occupying space in the MACV I Compound.

e. (U) Supervises the operation of the transient hotel. Utilizing these facilities and the vehicles available to him, he provides billets, transportation and minimal messing service for transient personnel assigned to or associated with this command.

f. (U) Provides vehicle maintenance support for all elements of MACSOG.

g. (U) Provides building and utilities maintenance for all Saigon/Cholon/TSN area facilities of MACSOG. This is accomplished by utilization of both USARMAC Post Engineer support and the assets available with MACSOG.

h. (U) Provides generator maintenance support for all elements of MACSOG.

i. (U) Provides and supervises a mail delivery system.

j. (U) Maintains duty rosters as required.

2. Supply Section.

a. (U) Advises the Chief, Headquarters Support Branch on all matters pertaining to supply, building maintenance and related matters.

b. (U) Receives and analyzes requirements for supplies and equipment and determines source for requisition or purchase.

c. (U) Responsible for requisitioning, receipt, storage and issue to using staff agencies all items of supply and equipment required for support of the headquarters.

d. (U) Receives and processes repairable items and equipment from using staff agencies for repair and return to user or to military supply channels.

e. (U) Administers local purchases of supplies and equipment as required.

f. (U) Maintains accountability documents for all supplies drawn for and issued to the various staff agencies.

1.5

g. (U) Receives requests from the [illegible] elements for engineer support. Advises the Chief, Headquarters Support Branch on priorities, prepares and processes work orders through USMACV Post Engineer or utilizes available MACSOG assets to accomplish the required repairs or improvements.

h. (U) Supervises USMACV indigenous utilities and cleanup crews assigned duty at MACV I Compound.

i. (U) Supervises carpenters, electricians, plumbers, hotel maids and other employees in the maintenance of facility and transient hotel.

3. Maintenance Section.


a. (U) Advises the Chief, Headquarters Support Branch on all matters pertaining to vehicle and power plant maintenance.

b. (U) Provides maintenance support for all MACSOG vehicles and generators.

c. (U) Maintains necessary spare parts.

d. (U) Supervises local national drivers and maintenance personnel.

1.6


PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION DIVISION
MACSOG-10
DIRECTOR
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES BRANCH
PERSONNEL SERVICES BRANCH

2.1

PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION DIVISION (MACSOG-10)

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (U) Advises and assists Chief, SOG on all matters pertaining to administration and personnel, both military and civilian.

2. (U) Formulates, implements and disseminates MACSOG personnel and administrative policies, directives and procedures. Interprets personnel and administrative personnel policies and directives from higher headquarters.

3. (U) Exercises staff responsibility for and coordinates administrative facilities.

4. (U) Directs and supervises all personnel matters and procedures, including requisition and assignment of personnel.

5. (U) Supervises and coordinates activities of subordinate branches and exercises staff supervision of the personnel and administrative activities of units or agencies subordinate to MACSOG.

6. (U) Maintains liaison with other US military organizations or government agencies on general personnel and administrative matters.

7. (U) Directs and supervises preparation of plans and orders pertaining to personnel and administration.

PERSONNEL SERVICES BRANCH

1. (U) Recommends, prepares and disseminates MACSOG personnel policies and procedures from guidance received from the Director, Pers & Admin.

2. (U) In-processes and allocates personnel resources in accordance with operational priorities and policies.

3. (U) Recommends personnel policies pertaining to local national civilian labor forces, maintains local national civilian table of distribution and case files of local national employees.

4. (U) Processes all personnel actions to include: awards and decorations, extensions, rest and recuperation leaves, verification and initiation of security clearances, officer efficiency/effectiveness/fitness reports.

5. (U) Processes requests for TDY, emergency and ordinary leave for military personnel assigned to MACSOG.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE BRANCH

1. (U) Recommends, prepares and disseminates MACSOG administrative services policies with guidance provided by Director, Pers & Admin.

2. (U) Provides administrative procedures guidance to the staff and specifically to the administrative personnel assigned to each staff activity.

3. (U) Publishes and distributes MACSOG administrative publications and provides reproduction services support to MACSOG activities.

4. (U) Processes incoming correspondence, and processes and authenticates outgoing correspondence.

5. (U) Receives, processes and distributes electrically transmitted messages. Processes outgoing messages from headquarters staff activities for transmission

6. (U) Operates the headquarters distribution center to receive, process and control all incoming and outgoing correspondence.

7. (U) Formulates procedures to handle and control classified documents, and serves as the MACSOG classified control office.

8. (U) Maintains a reference library of military publications.

9. (U) Provides forms control for the headquarters. Consolidates requisitions for publications and forms required by staff activities.


10. (U) Provides records management support and inspects all MACSOG activities on the MACV Records Management Program. Maintains the Headquarters files plan.

11. (U) Provides technical supervision on unit mail postal matters to the support section.

2.3

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

MACSOG-20



[redacted]

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (MACSOG-20)

MISSION

To provide targeting information and intelligence collection guidance for SOG operations and to collate and disseminate intelligence information collected as a result of these operations. In addition, the Intelligence Division has the responsibility for providing internal command security, to include physical, technical and personnel security, as well as the counter-intelligence functions incident thereto.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. (U) Advises Chief, SOG on all intelligence matters, including plans, policies, and directives from higher headquarters, as well as intelligence aspects of SOG activities. Advises Chief, SOG on security and counter-intelligence matters.

2. (U) Develops and supervises preparation of intelligence targeting, collection guidance, and intelligence information dissemination.

3. (U) Maintains appropriate liaison with counterpart US/FWMAF intelligence staffs and agencies which can provide intelligence support to MACSOG.

4. Directs and coordinates the activities of the subordinate branches of the Intelligence Division and exercises staff supervision of the intelligence activities of SOG field units.

5. Insures that in all operational planning, full coordination is given to the potential of operations for intelligence collection purposes either in support of, or in conjunction with other US Agencies whose missions involve intelligence functions.

DEPUTY

1. (U) Assists and avises the Director, Intelligence Division, in fulfilling his responsibilities; represents and acts for the Director, Intelligence Division as required.

2. (U) Manages and coordinates the efforts of the Intelligence Division to assure its efficient functioning.

3. (U) Consults with and as[redacted]igence Division in the formulation of policies, in [redacted] transmitting instructions to the Operations, Ad[redacted] Photo Analysis Branches.

[redacted]

3.2

[redacted]

OPERATIONS BRANCH [redacted]

1. Provides intelligence targets, intelligence collection guidance (including essential elements of information), and information on target areas for SOG operational elements.

2. Receives reports from SOG operational elements and analyzes, collates, and disseminates appropriate information thereby as Intelligence Information Reports.

3. Conducts coordination and liaison with counterparts in the US intelligence community and with SOG counterpart Vietnamese organization.

PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE STUDY SECTIONS

1. Receives monthly and weekly MACV J-2 recommended targets and researches additional targets for integration into a recommended SOG target list.

2. Chairs the SOG PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE Target Panel to which the recommended target list is presented for reconciliation of intelligence collection requirements with SOG operational capabilities.

3. Maintains ground OB information on enemy and friendly military forces operating within the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations. Maintains current and background intelligence files on enemy activity and friendly situations in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations. Provides intelligence information on approved targets in support of SOG operational elements.

4. Assures that all intelligence collection requirements levied by higher authorities or developed by the Intelligence Division are appropriately reflected as essential elements of information (EEI) or as standing guidance for SOG operations elements and their briefers, debriefers and reporters in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations.

5. Receives, collates, and disseminates information collected by SOG assets in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area of operations.

6. Provides an evaluation service pertaining to SOG intelligence collection activities in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE area.

FOOTBOY STUDY SECTION

1. Serves as the point of c[redacted] for intelligence support required by the Maritime, A[redacted] logical operations elements of SOG

[redacted]

[redacted]

2. Assures that all in[redacted] requirements levied by higher authorities or developed by the Intelligence Division are appropriately reflected as essential elements of information or collection guidance for action by the Maritime and Airborne operational elements.

3. Maintains ground and naval OB information on enemy forces operating within the FOOTBOY areas of operations. Maintains current and background intelligence files on enemy activity in the FOOTBOY area of operations.

4. Receives, screens, files and routes intelligence documents and periodical reports pertinent to FOOTBOY operations.

5. Receives, collates, and disseminates intelligence information collected by SOG assets in the FOOTBOY areas of operations.

6. Provides an evaluation service pertaining to SOG intelligence collection activities in FOOTBOY areas of operations.

AIR/ANTI AIR STUDY SECTION

1. Develops and maintains graphic displays, and disseminates to SOG operational elements all information applicable to:

a. (U) Surface to air missile order of battle (SAMOB).

b. (U) Anti-aircraft Artillery and Automatic Weapon order of battle (AAAOB).

c. (U) Aircraft and Airfield order of battle (AOB).

d. (U) Electronic-Radar order of battle (EOB).

2. Monitors and disseminates SAFE and Special E&E Area information.

3. Receives, collates, and disseminates air/anti-air intelligence information collected by SOG assets.

EXPLOITATION SECTION

1. Coordinates with all concerned elements of SOG and Headquarters, MACV, to insure the timely handling, for tactical exploitation purposes, of prisoners (PW) captured during SOG operations, to include any documents or material in possession of [redacted] time of capture.

2. Provides on-site in[redacted] assistance for subordinate SOG elements as required.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. Assures that prisoners and [redacted] and material are turned over to the appropriate military interrogation/exploitation facilities as soon as practicable after [redacted] and that the security of SOG operations.

4. (U) Assures that all intelligence collection requirements levied by higher authorities or developed by the Intelligence Division are appropriately reflected as essential elements of information or standing guidance for application by SOG interrogators.

5. Assures that intelligence information resulting from the tactical exploitation of prisoners captured by SOG elements is properly collated and disseminated.

6. Provides such other assistance to SOG elements as required and approved by the Director, Intelligence Division.

PHOTO ANALYSIS BRANCH

Produces target materials in direct support of SOG operational elements by obtaining timely aerial photography, and performing MT of specified target areas. Conducts SOG hand-held photography program. Prepares special materials based on MT as required in support of SOG elements.

MT SECTION

1. Produces detailed studies of areas nominated as SOG operational targets, or otherwise required in response to special requests approved by the Director, Intelligence Division.

2. Maintains a current aerial reconnaissance file library providing coverage of SOG areas of operations.

PHOTO LAB SECTION

1. (U) Provides copies and prints and annotated maps, processes 35mm photography and produces selected negatives for distribution.

2. (U) Produces and processes miscellaneous photography in both color and black and white to include photographs for ceremonial occasions, briefings and ID/passport type photographs.

3. (U) Provides a course of instruction in photo processing to selected SOG personnel and renders [redacted] to other SOG photographic laboratories. Provides a [redacted] in hand-held photography for selected SOG personnel [redacted]

3.5

[redacted]

[redacted]

SECURITY BRANCH

1. (U) Interprets security policy and directives from higher headquarters, established SOG security directives and SOP and exercises staff supervision of their implementation throughout SOG.

2. (U) Maintains a roster of all personnel assigned to or utilized by SOG; provides or arranges documentation of clearances of SOG personnel and briefs and debriefs all SOG personnel regarding security.

3. (U) Maintains an access roster of all personnel of other organizations who are cleared for access to SOG information.

4. (U) Conducts periodic security inspections of all SOG Headquarters and subordinate elements, including periodic technical security surveys.

5. Prepares and initiates all security checks and clearances on Civilian Personnel Offices and operational local national personnel assigned to SOG subordinate units.

6. Provides a lock picking capability for locked out safes and combinations.

7. Conducts personnel suitability investigations as required on all personnel assigned or attached to SOG.

8. Maintains liaison with all civilian and military counterintelligence units in the Saigon area.

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

1. (U) Interprets administrative policies and directives for Director, Intelligence Division and is responsible for the formulating and disseminating of Division administrative policy, directives and SOP.

2. (U) Receives, processes, prepares and controls all incoming and outgoing correspondence and publications, and acts as the initial control point of the Intelligence Division for classified material, insuring proper distribution and control.

3. (U) Maintains Division administrative and personnel files.

4. (U) Provides and arranges services for division personnel to include mail delivery and the processing and maintenance of duty rosters as required.

5. (U) Supervises and co[redacted]lligence Division Illustrator.


[redacted]

3.6

[redacted]

OPERATIONS & TRAINING DIVISION

MACSOG-30



[redacted]

OPERATIONS & [redacted] (MACSOG-30)

MISSION

To assist CINCPAC, SOG is capable of conducting unconventional warfare operations, organizational and training.

FUNCTIONS

DIRECTOR

1. Operations.

a. Provides staff supervision for all air, ground, maritime and psychological operations.

b. Makes recommendations, during planning and operations, concerning Task Organization and priorities for use of resources including personnel, supplies and equipment.

c. Supervises preparation of operations plans and orders.

d. Integrates support from all services, US agencies and counterpart organizations with SOG operations.

e. Designates general locations for fixed installations.

f. (U) Prepares reports.

g. (U) Maintains liaison with other in-country agencies and commands.

h. (U) Supervises the MACSOG Status and Analysis Section.

2. Organization.

a. Develops and maintains the troop basis to insure assignment of the service components needed to support and accomplish the mission.

b. Organizes and equips units of all service components.

c. Assists counterpart headquarters in the organization of unconventional warfare units.

3. Training.

a. (U) Plans and conducts [redacted]

[redacted]

STATUS AND ANALYSIS SECTION

1. Operates an information service for the purpose of informing the Director, O&T, and Chief, SOG of the status of current operations, combat units and major items of operational equipment.

2. Maintains current operations maps and information relative to ongoing operations and operations scheduled for the immediate or near future.

DATA

4. (U) Maintains information concerning current and projected training programs.

DATA

6. (U) Operates a VIP briefing facility.

7. (U) Prepares and presents VIP briefings to include the weekly COMUSMACV wrap-up briefing.

8. (U) Maintains a library of standardized briefing aids.

DATA

10. Coordinates the use of MACV automatic data processing systems by the operations branches and functioning as a repository for the storage of the operational information data bank in ADP form.

MARITIME STUDIES BRANCH (MACSOG-31)

1. Advises the Director, O&T on matters concerning maritime and cross the beach operations.

2. Advises the Director, O&T, of the status of plans and operations and of the results of completed operations.

3. Provides staff supe[redacted] of the Maritime Operations Group at Danang, RVN, and [redacted] DATA [redacted] ng bases.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. Provides advisory [redacted] to counterpart personnel engaged in planning and execution of maritime operations.

5. Coordinates and provides [redacted] to counterpart personnel in recruiting, organizing, training, staging and staging of operational forces engaged in maritime operations.

6. Coordinates all planned maritime operations with other friendly forces to prevent mutual interference of forces.

7. Prepares and submits to higher authority for approval, plans for all planned activities and concepts of the Maritime Operations Group.

8. Provides liaison with the military establishment for the development and procurement of naval equipment for employment in maritime operations.

AIR STUDIES BRANCH (MACOSG-12)

DATA

2. Prepares detailed plans for the conduct of the operations in support of U.W. activities, to include aerial delivery, close air support and air reconnaissance missions.

3. Coordinates and controls the employment of VNAF aircraft and crews in support of SOG.

4. Determines number and type of aircraft required to provide effective and economical air support for SOG operations.

DATA

6. Provides staff officers for temporary assignment at forward operating bases to supervise the execution of Special Air Warfare Missions.

7. Exercises control over launch, movement and recovery of aircraft operation in support of SOG.

8. Performs post combat mission analysis to identify factors which affect successful execution of [redacted] take necessary corrective action as required.

9. Prepares and maintains [redacted] target folders with