COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

BY

Name

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. . . the military problems associated with setting up a cross-border program, while great, are minuscule in comparison to the tremendous problem of obtaining the political authority to initiate and carry on programs.*

Looking first at military problems, you need to create an organization that is responsive to a relatively small number of people who, on a continuing basis, will take on very high risk missions in enemy areas behind enemy lines. To be successful on a continuing basis requires a highly responsive helicopter system. It requires a continuously responsive communications net; i.e., any time a team feels as though there is a need to communicate, it can do it with the assurance that its broadcast will be monitored by a Data .f necessary. There must be a

The third requirement of this system MT

)which will permit the introduction of sufficient force to gain temporary local superiority to permit a team to be MT a hot spot very quickly, i.e., before the enemy has a chance to react and to build up a significant strength in the area of a trapped team. Certainly, one of the clear lessons to us in this MT business is that the longer we permit the team to remain in a trapped position, the more difficult it is to MT

When a team is discovered, if you don't get them out in the ensuing [redacted] minutes, then your chances of getting them out at all [redacted] Data [redacted], the enemy has a chance to move weapons and forces into the area. They are able to throw up a huge volume of fire which will prohibit the helicopters [redacted] Data

Another problem associated with the cross-border program is the fact that you want to keep the presence of US personnel on your reconnaissance team to the irreducible minimum. This means that you must train indigenous type troops to an acceptable skill level. This means teaching them how to read maps, how to use compasses, how to navigate at night, how to use all the type weapons that will be in the environment -- both ours and the enemy's, how to call in artillery, how to adjust tactical air, how to communicate with the FACs and the gun ships, how to use first aid, how to talk enough English so that they can communicate in the event that the two Americans on the team are incapacitated. We've had any number of examples which have tended to strengthen our belief that the results obtained vary directly with the degree of proficiency that is obtained by your indigenous team members.**

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. . . senior military commanders in the field in Vietnam are the primary users of this tactical intelligence on enemy activity in Cambodia. I say that because often times you will hear from other agencies comments to the effect that they are

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* Ibid.
** Ibid., pp. 1-2.

not getting any significant intelligence from the DANIEL BOONE program. This faces up to the age-old problem of how far you want to disseminate intelligence without tipping the fact that such a program does exist. Frequently you will find agencies back here in Washington, particularly State Department, who question what we are getting out of DANIEL BOONE because they are making their judgments primarily on what of value they get out of the program. Of course, since the program is primarily tactical in nature, it does not deliver to the Washington arena intelligence which is primarily strategic in nature and would have interest to those people back here.*

- I think one of the keys that should be used in evaluating the program is the fact that there is no other acceptable alternative means of getting this type of information other than by ground reconnaissance patrols. Whatever the deficiencies of this program are and whatever the alleged shortcomings are, unless there is a viable alternative which is an improvement, then clearly we better stick with what we have.**

* Ibid., pp. 5-6.
** Ibid., p. 6.

COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

BY

[redacted] Name [redacted]

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. . . . During my time working with this operation, I worked with a total of 10 STRATA teams. Initially, we started out with four teams and used those up until the bombing halt. Then we had a buildup to 10 teams which we used on numerous operations. The first four teams had up to Four but we decided that was too many people for a reconnaissance type mission and we trimmed them down t. Four). The teams

leaders radio operator [redacted]

[redacted] ie

[redacted] MT

[redacted]

stop at night. Also, during their movement to their point of roadwatch, they would conduct a minor terrain analysis and then coming from a roadwatch site DATA they would do the same to give us an idea of the type of vegetation, what the terrain was like, if it was very hilly, how high the hills were, etc. Normally, we would insert the teams by a CH-3 helicopter.

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Due to problems encountered on this mission, it was decided to use the daylight helicopter type infiltrations. During my tour, I was involved in 19 infiltrations, mostly with the

four initial teams. There were somewhere around 30 operations in all conducted during the time that I was there.*

As concerns the effectiveness of the teams and the results, I felt that the teams usually were fairly effective in that, if nothing else, we could show the North Vietnamese that we could put teams into their territory whenever we like and come in and take them out. Usually the teams did a good job but we did have some problems getting them to complete the mission that they were assigned. However, the information that they picked up en route to their point of roadwatch such as the location of watch towers or control points was fairly good. I stated that we were proving to the North Vietnamese that we could put teams into their territory and take them out. We found out through OP 33 that the North Vietnamese knew this. OP 33 would get newspapers from North Vietnam or monitor their radio stations and get articles where the North Vietnamese stated that they had captured an agent or caught up with a team and killed all the members of the team. These teams were usually referred to as US ranger teams. This gave us an idea that they knew that the teams were there.**

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. . . . On the [redacted] DATE [redacted] from their operational area to our site at Danang. There the messages received would be sent on to Saigon where necessary decisions were made. These were sent to Danang and we'd take action there. For instance, if they requested a resupply of ammunition

[redacted] Interview of [redacted] Name [redacted], p. 4.

** Ibid., pp. 4-5.

or supply of demolitions, etc., we would ready this resupply in Danang and take it to Nakhon Phanom. It would be delivered to the team from there. The teams also had communications with the search aircraft or the forward air controller by the use of a Data which was used strictly for this purpose. For the long-range communications from the operational area to Danang, the team u: Data nich has both Data capability. However, it cannot net with the search, aircraft. The teams also carrie Data They sometimes had Data for inter-team communications if the team was expected to split up at any time during the mission.*

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When we sent a STRATA team on a mission, we would move them from Danang to Nakhon Phanom by C-130 or C-123 aircraft. From there we would move them on in by CH-3.

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Most times, however, if we had bad weather or problems with our helicopters or anything like this where the mission was a no-go, we would carry the team back to Danang. We would check the weather the next day early and, if possible, we would try the insertion one day late.**

* Ibid., p. 5.
** Ibid., p. 6.

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Most of our insertions v [redacted] DATA

When we did this, we would infiltrate or insert into very mountainous areas which usually had very heavy underbrush, thick jungle, etc., and very little population in the area. The teams would move from the infiltration LZ to their objective on foot.

[redacted] MT

and a team given away before they even got on the ground. To my knowledge, all the insertions that we had were good insertions and were undetected.*

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. . . . STRATA missions were designed to be covert operations. We tried as much as possible to use indigenous equipment; however, some equipment we couldn't get through

[redacted] Pate

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. . . . Their cover story was that they were recruited and trained in South Vietnam by Caucasians or Westerners and put into North Vietnam to/ [redacted] DATA

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. . . . STRATA teams were trained for [redacted] DATA and were given this as a secondary mission. We encouraged teams to take prisoners. If this were done before they reached the objective we would exfiltrate them at that time. During

* Ibid., p. 7.

my time there, we ran one mission that was strictly a Data . On this mission, the team members carried Data Data . Usually, on the missions, we would have one team member carrying the Data Data . . .*

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. . . . When I first arrived at Long Thanh and started working with the teams, they were carrying way too much equipment. I have never seen a man carrying as much as his own weight but I have seen one weighing 124 pounds soaking wet carrying as much as 80 pounds or a little better. This greatly impaired their ability to move. It was too much equipment for reconnaissance teams. It would wear them out. They would get tired early in the day due to the heat and everything in that country. We tried trimming their equipment down and taking away items of equipment that they didn't necessarily need to carry. I've seen times when they issued telescopes with tripods for long-distance observing which, as many times as I saw the teams operate, they never did any long-distance observing. Usually when they came back, they didn't have the telescope or the tripod. They lost it on the infiltration or the exfiltration or while being chased by the enemy. We decided to take away this piece of equipment. The homing beacons we took away when we stopped the parachute type infiltrations. Also, we took away the [redacted] that each member of the team carried for [redacted] The team DATA was retained.**

* Ibid., p. 7.
** Ibid., p. 8.

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. . . . the STRATA missions could be improved if we would . . . have Americans work directly with the teams and accompany the teams on their missions, either as leaders or advisors. During training and training operations the teams always have an American there. The American usually has more experience. He has been working at this for several years and he's a good man, he knows how to work the equipment, he knows how to think and how to react in an emergency situation. When the teams go in the north on a mission, all of a sudden they find themselves without the American. I think this causes some confusion at first . . . I think if the Americans were used along with the teams we'd definitely improve the results we get back from the missions. We could get more information and better information . . . Possibly for now we could use Americans and later on, after Americans had gone with a team three or four times, then we could put a team in on a mission without the Americans. They would be more familiar with the feeling of being someplace on their own and it wouldn't affect them the same as after training with Americans all the time, just dropping them off by themselves.*

* Ibid., pp. 8-9.

COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

BY

Name

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. . . . At the time that I was assigned to SOG, the 219th was tasked to support the SOG operations. The squadron was authorized 25 H-34s and had assigned 23. However, they were only able to fly between five and eight choppers per day. Chief, SOG directed the Deputy Chief, SOG, at that time, Name Name to take that as a special project and see what he could do to bring up the operational capability of the 219th. At about this same time, a Vietnamese Air Force major was assigned to STD as the liaison officer, Name Through the efforts of Name they were able in about three or four months to bring the operational count up to 10-12 choppers a day, and occasionally 15. However, there were two major problems that Name encountered: spare parts and the availability of aircraft. It appeared that the spare parts earmarked for the 219th were being diverted to other VNAF squadrons and that new H-34s earmarked for the 219th were diverted upon arrival and sent to other squadrons. This latter problem, Name was unable to solve; however, the operational capability of the 219th did come up and other aircraft were assigned to fill the shortage. The spare parts problem wasn't solved, but it was improved to a great extent. The improvement of the 219th was attributed to Name and Name, and this was a good example of how much can be done when the US and the Vietnamese counterparts work together on a problem. During this period, Name Name made numerous trips to They

jointly met with the USAF advisors and VNAF commanders and, through their mutual efforts, they were able to accomplish quite a bit.*

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After the STRATA concept and program was approximately six months old, various US officials were becoming quite critical of the results obtained. This was true; they were not doing too good a job. However, in the type of operation that STRATA was, it takes considerable time just to get men who are experienced, trained and motivated to accomplish the mission. In one instance, a STRATA team went in and one of the soldiers inflicted himself with a wound so that the whole team could be extracted. After investigation, it was determined that an Army lieutenant who was the team leader was the instigator of the action and that the man had indeed shot his foot so that they could all be extracted. . . . it takes some time to weed out the weak ones and find out which individuals are going to be strong. In this particular case, one of the men who turned the rest of them in at the investigation was later made a team leader. . . To insert people in hostile territory in very, very rugged terrain under very hazardous conditions, takes time to develop good individuals whom you can depend on to go in and do a good mission. So, I think that the impatience on the US side is not always warranted. To add to this, the THUNDER CLOUD operation was finally cancelled due to lack of results. I feel that had THUNDER CLOUD continued for some months that some very good results would have come of this concept which was using NVA ralliers as three-man agent teams in South Vietnam for combat

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pp. 4-5.

operations and intelligence gathering. However, the results were not coming forth as soon as the US counterparts felt they should, so the program was abandoned. Part of this, I believe, stems from the fact that an officer has one year to do in Vietnam and he must produce results; therefore, if he doesn't show results in the program, it's no good. Many of these programs take months and maybe even years to develop the expertise required to accomplish the mission.*

Let me eleaborate on the THUNDER CLOUD program. After Tet, /1968/ SOG was tasked more and more for in-country operations of reconnaissance teams and platoons and even up to company-size because there were very few cross-border operations being conducted. In-country operations were a necessity at the time; however, valuable assets, i.e., unconventional warfare, cross-border, were being utilized in-country rather than in the area for which they were originally intended. During this period, the THUNDER CLOUD concept was evaluated and it was determined that they were not doing a proper job. Each team consisted of two to three NVA ralliers who had volunteered to go back in NVA or in VC-held territory of South Vietnam posing as NVA soldiers for the purpose of collecting intelligence, conducting combat operations and capturing prisoners. In some cases, these teams were highly successful. They were able to walk up to another NVA soldier, convince the other NVA soldier that they were one of his comrades in arms and capture him. However, in some cases, in the extraction, a prisoner was killed or had to be killed because of other NVA units moving in the area. I believe that if this program had been allowed to run for six more months, it would have produced very, very outstanding results simply from the fact that the team could move right into NVA territory without being contested.**

* Ibid., pp. 7-8.
** Ibid., p. 8.

COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

BY

Name

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In the FOOTBOY Program, of course, they /high level political decisions and restrictions/ had a direct influence. The first vitiating factor occurred when restrictions, publicly announced, were placed on conventional forces. First, the restriction on bombing during certain periods or restriction on bombing above certain latitudes. We had similar if not identical restrictions placed on our FOOTBOY operation. This, of course, would directly associate the relationship of these two operations in anyone's mind. This would detract from FOOTBOY effectiveness. I hasten to add that we're not so naive as to think that the government of Hanoi was not aware of the origin and genesis of all the FOOTBOY operations. However, they were not the ones we were chiefly concerned with in our PsyOps programs. We know from interviews out of the detainee program that Hanoi would always hold to the fact that these were US run programs out of SVN. But there always seemed to be some doubt in the minds of the villagers whether or not Hanoi really knew. Then, after we started restricting our operations in conformity with other publicly announced restrictions, Hanoi could and we understand did come out with "I told you so" comments to substantiate what they had previously contended.*

There was another very important vitiating factor in my mind and this perhaps had the most tragic results. That was

termination of the support of the long-range in-place agent teams. There has always been a widely held conviction in both [redacted] and some US military circles that all of these teams in NVN are compromised and have been compromised for some time. The rationale then continues with the contention that there is no problem in stopping the resupply of those teams. This may or may not be the case. I think we've got to at least keep in the back of our minds the possibility that some of these teams are not compromised. What is most important, however, is that several of these teams are not compromised in the eyes of the Vietnamese Army who are personal friends of these people. They were induced to go into NVN with the guarantee that they would be supported by the United States. They are not up there and the support has been withdrawn because of the bombing and overflight restrictions. They feel betrayed. They will not accept the fact that the teams are compromised. They ask for proof that they are compromised and, of course, you cannot give proof. They also point out emotionally that this type of thing gets around SEAsia to include Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. In the future if the US tries to initiate programs of this type, these things will not be forgotten: the fact that the US trained their personnel, recruited their personnel, promised to support them, took them in, supported them for a while and then for non-tactical reasons, i.e., political restrictions, withdrew support for these teams. They pointed out that restrictions on overflights, in many cases, were in effect when these teams went in because, in many cases, they were infiltrated long before we started bombing the North. Why should they not be supplied and provided with necessities of life now that overflight restrictions are imposed. They feel strongly that these teams should continue to be supplied in spite of overflight restrictions.*

* Ibid., p. 4.

In other areas, in the MAROPS area, the PsyOps program was halted because of political restraints. This program would suffer, I'm sure, if ever started again. It may be required to come up with some other front besides the DMZ. I do think that some MAROPS could continue with acceptable political risks. It probably wouldn't be quite as credible in the eyes of the Vietnamese fishermen; perhaps not credible at all. But I think it would serve a purpose in giving these fishermen of the villages, especially those that feel resentful toward the regime, some outlet for expressing their resentment. Also, it would allow us to keep a thumb on the pulse of the enemy civilian populace as to the effect of the peace talks and bombing halts. This could be done very easily by continuing

...N. In other words, don't withdraw them into SVN for protracted periods for interviews. I think we have a lot of potential with a minimum of political risk. There will be some military risk because after a while I'm sure the North Vietnamese will get after our boats with aircraft and patrol boats. So, we would have to live with some type of military risk but I think the political risks would be minimal.*

I think the restriction on dropping leaflets into NVN is unreasonable and unrealistic. We still could get some good out of the black PsyOps leaflet program if the aircraft

...e direction. Again, I am referring to a minimum risk program with some return.**

* Ibid., pp. 4-5.
** Ibid., p. 5.

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As to how long this type of operation should continue, before evolving into a conventional operation, I will first address PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE operations. I think when the political decision is made to announce publicly that we are conducting ground operations of any magnitude into Laos and Cambodia and NVN, then the control of those forces could best be conducted through the field force commanders whose areas are contiguous to the area in Laos and Cambodia they are operating in. I see no reason for SOG to continue operations after it was common knowledge that reconnaissance teams or exploitation teams have been authorized for operation in Laos and Cambodia. Until that occurs, of course, SOG should run the operations. I think they could do it. But you have to depend on the field forces for helicopter support, facilities to operate, etc. As to the FOOTBOY operations, they have been terminated, except for the radio operations because of the bombing restrictions . . . I think some of these operations could be resumed, in a limited capacity. However, now it is time to look forward to turning them over to complete Vietnamese control with perhaps US advisory assistance of considerably less magnitude than at present.

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When they are well established, using FOOTBOY as a smoke screen, then FOOTBOY can be phased out. . . .*

* Ibid., p. 8.

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They are, in many cases . . . a type program that you can't always explain to the American public. I think it would be disastrous if some of the more sensitive PsyOps programs became public and were traced to the military. They are better off where they are,*

* Ibid., p. 11.

COMMENTS ON MACSOG'S OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

BY

[redacted]

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In discussing the subject of restraints and restrictions, I might break these down into the restraints and restrictions imposed on the various types of operations that we conduct. Going back before the first of November 1968 and considering our maritime operations against the coast of North Vietnam, the restrictions imposed, insofar as they covered the distance north of the 17th parallel that we could go, eventually resulted in the enemy's being able to pretty well ascertain our area of operation and, therefore, make boats more susceptible to interception. I recognized that there were political factors here . . . but, nevertheless these restrictions, considering them purely from an operational side, did restrict our capability.*

The restrictions imposed on us on 1 November which precluded the use of boats north of the 17th parallel resulted in an appreciable reduction, if not a total reduction, in the intelligence that we were

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N The restrictions which were imposed also at this time against our leaflet drops similarly restricted or reduced the effectiveness of ou

[redacted]terview DATA p. 3-4.

Date ;ram and those of us on the ground felt that these operations could have or should have been continued at least until such time as there was a specific reason to curtail them.*

In Laos and the SALEM HOUSE area, the restriction on depth of penetration, of course, allowed the enemy to pretty well put his observers and his antiaircraft weapons in such a position so that they could intercept our aircraft and, recognizing that we could not go deep to insert our teams and overfly these areas, it restricted the operations to a large extent. . . . in the SALEM HOUSE area, the restrictions against tactical air and using exploitation forces allowed the enemy to escape many times when a lucrative target could have been struck.*

The restrictions against using ethnic Cambodians in operations in SALEM HOUSE are contrary to all generally accepted agent-type or intelligence type operations where every effort should be made to utilize personnel and equipment which would allow our units or people to be undetected when penetrating Cambodian airspace or on the ground. Since we could not use Cambodians in our SALEM HOUSE teams, we ran into very obvious restrictions of not being able to put people on the ground who could blend in with and talk to Cambodians and, perhaps, otherwise escape detection. It is recognized, of course, that there were political reasons behand these restrictions; however, the nature of operations were such that we were supposed to be able to deny intelligence operations by using, initially, unmarked aircraft, and personnel with sterile uniforms. Yet, we were precluded from using the very individual that would allow us to deny an operation, that is the native Cambodian.**

* Ibid., p. 4.
** Ibid., pp. 4-5.

In the broadest sense, of course, our operations into Cambodia were generally easily detected insofar as determining the nationality of the intruder was concerned because the aircraft we were using were definitely of a US military manufacture and the Americans on the teams were easily distinguished from their teams' members. The cover story used if our teams were picked up was that the team had been on a reconnaissance in South Vietnam, had gotten lost, and had wandered into Cambodia. This cover story was, on the other hand, circumvented or contradicted by the requirement [redacted] This latter restriction was imposed, I believe, by the SALEM HOUSE operations order which simply stated that the operations should be conducted in such a fashion that it was plausibly deniable. The attempt to pin down this aspect of the operation was exceptionally difficult. [redacted] t, too logical and was certainly frowned on by commanders who provided us the aircraft. The Air Force aviation unit, the 20th Special Operations Squadron which was dedicated to SOG, [redacted]

In Laos we faced a somewhat similar situation in that the VNAF H-34 helicopters dedicated to SOG [redacted] s. After they had been observed a number of times over Laos, it is rather

* Ibid., p. 5.

certain that they were identified as a cross-border type of aircraft and wherever they moved in South Vietnam to the various launch sites and launch bases it can be assumed their presence there indicated that they were preparing to launch from that location across the border. The US aircraft the US Army used in Laos all carried US Army or US Air Force identification and were clearly identified as US Army or US Air Force aircraft.

In North Vietnam the operations were conducted by all indigenous teams called STRATA teams, and the STRATA teams were dressed either in black pajamas or the NVA uniform -- no US personnel accompanied them. On the other hand, they were inserted into the area by US Air Force helicopters and extracted in exactly the same way. If they were able to infiltrate undetected, they could very well deny any connection with the US Forces if they were captured. If they were detected upon insert, they were clearly identified as being sponsored and operated by US units.**

I think here it is important to underscore the fact that PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE operations, at least during my tenure, became more of an overt combat/intelligence type of exercise; in Laos, in many cases, these operations became a combat/raid type of exercise. Intelligence gathering became

*. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
** Ibid., p. 6.

a co-partner with the concept of exploitation. Therefore, we were inserting teams in a fashion which was more than covert. They were being inserted in daylight with US markings on the aircraft and it was obvious to personnel in South Vietnam as the aircraft left that it was a special type of operation and was rather easily detected.*

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. . . prior to TET of 1968, when the enemy launched a major offensive against the major cities of Vietnam, SOG forces were principally deployed out-of-country. Following TET, and because of the need for more reconnaissance units in-country, COMUSMACV allowed the field force commanders to target MACSOG units against in-country targets. This resulted in about 90 percent of the MACSOG effort, insofar as the cross-border operations in SALEM HOUSE/PRAIRIE FIRE were concerned, being turned to reconnaissance in-country in support of the field forces. The field force commander would task the command and control detachment directly for this mission. The command and control detachment would notify Headquarters, SOG which, if there were no objections, would concur and the operation would be run.**

This resulted in an appreciable degradation of the SOG recon capability in that the operation proved debilitating; many personnel were wounded or injured and, as a result, the capability of SOG to turn back across the border was to an extent limited following this in-country reconnaissance period. That perhaps is putting it a little strongly and I could not actually quantify this, but we did note that when we were

* Ibid., p. 6.
** Ibid., p. 9.

turned back across the border in about September or October 1968, that we had to do a great deal of re-equipping and retraining and preparing ourselves for cross-border operations because of the number of personnel who had been used up by in-country operations. In September or October, when COMUSMACV became concerned over the presence of North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos, the effort was turned from in-country operations to cross-border and Chief, SOG was again in full operational control of these elements.

One major problem encountered in cross-border operations in PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE concerned the utilization of helicopters for the insert of a team. MACSOG uses dedicated Vietnamese Air Force assets, H-34s, a dedicated US Air Force Huey Squadron, and helicopters provided by the field forces for our operations. The principal problem that I have found, operationally speaking, is that the helicopter personnel, the mission commander, and company commanders are prone to dictate the number of aircraft used for insert purposes. A pattern has, therefore, been established where if we are launching a reconnaissance team there will be two troop carrying helicopters carrying the team (the team being split between the two), a third Huey troop carrying helicopter being used as a chase ship and at least two and normally four gun ships for escort purposes. This aerial armada descending into either Laos or Cambodia easily identifies or triggers a fact that an operation of some magnitude is taking place and it is practically impossible to insert a team without having the aircraft detected either en route to the insert point or during the insert itself.*

* Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Attempts to insert these teams by utilizing one or two aircraft only have been generally unsuccessful in that the mission commanders and pilots will refuse to fly the mission without adequate gunship support. This issue remains unresolved and at the present time SOG is required to properly defend all inserting troop carrying aircraft inserting teams into operations areas by using COBRA gunships or HUEY gunships. There is full recognition on the part of SOG personnel that reconnaissance team members themselves would be placed in jeopardy by riding into an operational area unprotected by gunships, yet at the same time most of the recon personnel would be willing to accept this risk if they could get into an area undetected, and this is relatively difficult to do with so many aircraft assigned to each mission.*

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impossible insofar as SOG is concerned. The aircraft and/or the pilots (I am not sure which) have proven to be incapable either because of design limitation or of pilot training to land teams after dark in denied areas. Overcoming these limitations would appreciably reduce casualties and enhance immeasurably the chances of success of the reconnaissance mission. The lack of capability of ... to me

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In this area of aircraft support, also I should point out that a large number of the Army pilots are not instrument qualified in helicopters and, as a result, they are not capable

* Ibid., p. 10.
** Ibid., pp. 10-11.

of flying under conditions of limited visibility. On the other hand, we found that many Marine helicopter pilots had been so trained and were much more effective in employing our teams during periods of adverse weather when the Army helicopters or VANF helicopters could not be utilized. This, again, is a matter of training and if there is not some capability to work in poor weather, your reconnaissance operations all but cease.*

* Ibid., p. 11.