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10 July 1970 MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY
ANNEX S
TO
APPENDIX B

COMMENTS BY THESE INTERVIEWEES

ON

LOGISTICS

(In Chronological Order)

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Clyde R. Russell, USA	Chief, MACSOG Jan 1964 - Jan 1965	A
Col William R. Becker, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Operations Jan 1964 - Dec 1964	B
Col Leroy V. Grossheusch, USAF	Chief, MACSOG Air Section Jul 1964 - Jul 1965	C
Lt Terry K. Lingle, USN	Supply Officer, MACSOG Nov 1964 - Nov 1965	D
Cdr Kenneth N. Bebb, USN	Staff Officer, Special Plans, MACV J-5 Apr 1965 - May 1966 Chief, Psy Ops Office, Special Operations, J-3, Hq PACOM Jun 1963 - Apr 1965	E
Col John J. Windsor, USMC	Chief, MACSOG Operations Jun 1965 - Jun 1966	F
Col John K. Singlaub, USA	Chief, MACSOG May 1966 - Aug 1968	G
Capt Bruce B. Dunning, USN	Special Operations Division OSACSA, Staff Officer & Division Chief Aug 1966 - Jul 1967	H
LTC Kenneth W. McNiven, USAF	Assistant Air Operations Officer, MACSOG Sep 1966 - Sep 1967	I

Name	Association with MACSOG	Tab
Col Robert C. Kingston, USA	Chief, MACSOG Operations-34 Mar 1967 - Aug 1969	J
Col Harold K. Aaron, USA	Commander, 1st SFG Jun 1967 - May 1968 Commander, 5th SFG Jun 1968 - May 1969	K
Col Robert L. Gleason, USAF	Deputy Chief, MACSOG Mar 1968 - Mar 1969	L
Col Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA	Chief, MACSOG Aug 1968 - to date: Jul 1969	M

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

COLONEL CLYDE R. RUSSELL, USA

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. . . If you go back to 1964, . . . we did not have a logistics system in-country. A Navy Captain was the headquarters commandant of Saigon and he procured all supplies. The bulk of the equipment came in as MAG equipment and was turned over to the Vietnamese. . . . we set up a separate logistics system out of ~~Okinawa.~~ Logistics are important and we should have had a plan to supply this operation before we implemented it. It would have made life a lot simpler had we thought about this in advance.*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Clyde R. Russell, USA, p. 4.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

COLONEL WILLIAM R. BECKER, USAF

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. . . . The inception of SOG was not the first time the US Government had engaged in covert operations. However, none of the equipment we were using was designed specifically for that type of mission. Carrying out the mission does have its peculiar requirements which include those involving state-of-the-art, i.e., things that are far out technologically. These requirements generally can be handled with the equipment and knowledge that we have now. . .*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel William R. Becker, USAF, p. 22.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

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COLONEL LEROY V. GROSSHEUSCH, USAF

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. . . . the program called for the aircraft /C-G123s/ and the crews to arrive on 1 August. We had a great delay in getting the aircraft ready for their combat job. We had to have them painted and to have quite a bit of the equipment put on board at Clark Airfield. This required frequent trips back and ~~forth from~~ Saigon to Clark. The crews also arrived very late. This was caused, as far as we could tell, by political problems in Washington. As far as we knew, the problem was between our government and DATA . The United States was holding out for the maintenance of the aircraft. We wanted the aircraft to be maintained by the Air Force; the DATA insisted that the maintenance be performed by the DATA . The negotiations dragged on week after week. During this period, the crews lost their proficiency so that they arrived completely unqualified - or not current. In our concern over getting the aircraft and the crews, we continually pressed through SOG channels and Air Force channels where we could have this problem resolved. MACSOG at that time was very anxious to have the DATA do the maintenance because the maintenance that we had seen performed on their own aircraft appeared to be excellent. As it turned out, they finally agreed to allow the DATA to perform the rear echelon maintenance and the Air Force performed the flight line maintenance. The maintenance that we received from the DATA was far superior to the maintenance that we had been receiving from Clark AFB. I believe now in looking back that it would have been to our advantage to turn the entire maintenance

function over to the DATA early in the game so that we could have received the aircraft and the crews. . . .*

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In reviewing the entire problem we had with the aircraft and the crews, we arrived at the conclusion that we would be unable to operate from Tan Son Nhut. It was congested; we had very little space; we had no crew quarters or buildings that were suitable and there was absolutely no chance of retaining our cover at Saigon. Because of this, we decided to move to Nha Trang. ~~This~~ required quite a bit of negotiating with the Vietnamese. They finally agreed and provided us with a buidling that was suitable. It did require that we build quarters for DATA and eventually we built quarters for our American crews. The Vietnamese were provided quarters in the same building and as far as we were concerned these quarters were far superior to anything that any of the other Vietnamese had. They were never satisfied with these quarters.**

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Leroy V. Grossheusch, USAF, pp. 2-3.
** Ibid., p. 3

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

- BY

LIEUTENANT TERRY K. LINGLE, USN

. . . . I don't believe that supply discipline, as such, actually existed in MACSOG. There were minimal attempts but with no support from above, it was very difficult and at times impossible. An attitude prevailed throughout, I believe carried over ~~DAYA~~, that no one was required to account for anything or sign for anything. So, the whole operation was pretty loose. It was hard to correct once people adopted this attitude. It was very hard for anyone to attain firm control because you met with opposition not only from the people you were trying to support but the people you worked for.*

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At the time we reported to SOG, there was no actual control over any of the supplies as far as I could tell other than the fact that they were in a locked warehouse. Even then, all of the American personnel, both officer and enlisted, had access to the keys and to the warehouses. Very few items were either on hand receipt or stock record cards; even those that were, were mostly out of date.*

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Accountability for materiel was practically impossible. One of the reasons was that I didn't have personnel sufficiently trained in technical supply to be able to maintain an inventory and accountability or control on the materiel. Probably the worst problem was the fact that from top to bottom the distribution of items to friends for favors was condoned, permitted or indulged in by numerous personnel in SOG from top to bottom.**

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* (TS) Interview by Lieutenant Terry K. Lingle, USN, p. 1.
** Ibid., p. 3.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

- BY

COMMANDER KENNETH N. BEBB, USN

The initial problems in the 34A program were many. As the program grew, as we got more PT boats into this system, the logistics problems were nightmarish. As in all operations, conventional and unconventional, the operators were ahead of the logistics system.*

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Washington was interested in expanding the tempo of operations and the only way they could do this was to increase the number of people and boats to do the job. During one of his visits at CINCPAC, Mr. McNamara made a command decision (I was a backup for Adm Felt during these discussions) to increase the number of boats. This decision was made before the logistics was established, .e., fuel, piers, warehouses, and trained personnel. Therefore, the boats began to arrive in Vietnam and the operators weren't prepared to really get the maximum use out of them.**

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. . . . Equipment /psychological warfare/ was sent to Vietnam; radio equipment, transmitters, generators, everything under the sun. They had a difficult time keeping track of this equipment in Vietnam. Much of it was lost and a workable, satisfactory supply system in my opinion was not established. Funding was a problem. Who was going to pay for it,

DATA . . .***

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* (TS) Interview by Commander Kenneth N. Bebb, USN, p. 1.
** Ibid., p. 2.
*** Ibid., p. 4.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

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COLONEL JOHN J. WINDSOR, USMC

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. . . . We had no problems in the supply and procurement of weapons, parachutes, and things of that nature needed for our operations. The only real difficulty we had in all the time I was there was trying to get especially equipped C-123 replacement aircraft and permission to convert to C-130 type aircraft properly equipped to do our drops for PsyOps material up North. One other problem comes to my mind. Although the Services have given a lot of attention to a parachute retarded receptacle for dropping from high-speed aircraft at a low altitude, so that it is not going to be destroyed when it hits the ground, we could not locate any. Finally, as I recall, we got from the Marine Corps a few suitable containers which we dropped. These were limited in number. They are just not around as a generally available supply item. They have never been manufactured in large numbers. We had to use them sparingly and only in special cases to resupply certain . I think those two things, aircraft and the drop containers, were our principal problems. . . .*

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. . . . Because we were trying to operate without the use of Americans, both in Laos and North Vietnam, we used South Vietnamese helicopters to transport our teams. I am referring to the patrols going into Laos and the patrols that we put into North Vietnam using helicopters from the VNAF. The South Vietnamese Air Force was painfully short on helicopters. They

* (TS) Interview by Colonel John J. Windsor, USMC, p. 10.

cooperated with us to the fullest extent. From my recollection, they were supposed to have 48 and they were down to about 22 of which they graciously gave us the services of six almost full-time while I was there. The helicopters were old and in bad shape. They were old H-34 types . . . and had seen a lot of service. It would have helped us a lot if we could have gotten some better equipment at that time. . . .*

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We made great strides, starting about the time I was leaving, on new equipment. At the time, in 1965, that we entered the war in strength, we were definitely not making use of our technological capabilities. I have already mentioned the absence of airdrop containers in the theater. We had to send back to the States for drop containers for high-speed aircraft. We knew the limitations of the boats that we were using on the MAROPS operations. Although that was a pretty fine boat, we didn't have enough of them and they didn't have the radios at first to communicate with friendly aircraft. We had to put VHF/UHF radios on them. We undoubtedly could have made considerably more use of infrared photography or infrared and acoustic-type detectors on the Ho Chi Minh trail much earlier had we been better prepared for this type of warfare. . . .**

About the time I left, ARPA and several other agencies were frantically developing tests for new types of equipment to detect enemy movement, count them, etc. Our preparation for this type of war between the end of the war in Korea in 1953 and the time we entered this one in strength in 1965 had not accomplished as much as it should have in the R&D area.***

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* Ibid., p. 11.
** Ibid., pp. 11-12.
*** Ibid., p. 12.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

COLONEL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, USA

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I found . . . that the logistical support arrangements for MACSOG had been overtaken by the changing environment; i.e., SOG had a logistical support arrangement which was established before the large logistical complex had been established in Vietnam. I made some significant changes in the MACSOG logistical support procedures by establishing interservice support agreements so that logistical support could be drawn locally rather than centrally procured and centrally distributed. I reduced inventories because the order to shipping time had been considerably reduced as a result of the changing environment. Other logistical support changes were made that perhaps have been covered by SOG members dealing specifically with logistics.*

I found that it was necessary to establish a planning cycle for MACSOG because we were becoming more complex. Our procedures for financing needed to be supported so I established a definite planning, programming and budgeting cycle in which the operational plan for the next fiscal year was written by the staff at MACSOG. Then, specific programs were developed by the subordinate commands to execute the plan and, based upon these programs, a detailed budget was prepared and submitted through MACV to CINCPAC and Washington. Such a cycle had not existed prior to this time because it was considered unnecessary.*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel John K. Singlaub, USA, p. 2.

Any organization of the type we are discussing must have a funding procedure which would enable the organization to obtain from the Military Services anything that they have that can be used in the conduct of covert operations. In addition, there must be a procedure established which will permit the purchase of new items of equipment or the design and fabrication of new equipment for this particular type of activity. During the time that Dr. McMillan was the scientific advisor to General Westmoreland, he finally obtained an open ended contract with an electronics firm which permitted him to send a request directly from his office to this electronic firm to design a given piece of equipment to do a specific job. This was invaluable in that particular area. Comparable arrangements should be made for other items of hardware that might be useful in the conduct of covert operations.

DATA

This is essential. The very formal process of writing out military characteristics and having the requirement justified at every echelon and modified because it does not meet the normal military characteristics that all items of government equipment seem to need should be set aside. By the time a request for a very small item is massaged through all of the levels today its nature is changed. It is ruggedized and given characteristics that are not needed in the specific circumstances for covert use.*

Of course, an important part of this dealing with weapons or other types of equipment is that the item is not attributable to the US Government.*

* Ibid., pp. 38-39.

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. . . . I do not feel that we are using our technological capability to the maximum advantage of MACSOG or the others who are involved in the conduct of covert operations. We have been forced, in most cases, to use items that are on the shelf in the military inventory for very special purposes. I consider that these are special operations and they require, in many cases, very specialized equipment. I feel that there should be a procedure which enables the commander of MACSOG to direct a ~~request for~~ the design and fabrication of a special piece of equipment directly to DDR&E or some laboratory that is prepared to build this equipment immediately. We need to have good scientific brain power concentrate in solving some of the technological problems that individuals in the SOG activity are involved with.*

As I have mentioned before, I consider it absolutely shameful that we have not been able to produce for the commander of MACSOG an incapacitating weapon which will enable him to knock out an individual (incapacitate him) and, therefore, save him for later interrogation rather than having to kill him in an ambush. I consider it unwise policy decision not to permit us to use some chemicals to contaminate the rice rather than being forced to create a great fuss in trying to destroy it. Some progress is being made in improving the wiretap capabilities of MACSOG. This took far too long before we got people involved in it but eventually NSA sent a scientist to us and with his help they are building some better wiretap equipment, but this is an ad hoc arrangement and it should be formalized by having a direct link into some laboratory or to DDR&E where the laboratories can be asked to produce the item of equipment.*

* Ibid., p. 40.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

CAPTAIN BRUCE B. DUNNING, USN

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A fairly large portion of the support for SOG-type operations is conventional support which can be provided from Service sources through some coordinating mechanism such as the Counterinsurgency Supply Office (CISO). However, in my mind, and this is the important point, there are requirements for special support and special items which cannot be provided through Service resources. This is particularly true in the covert actions field.*

If you are going to operate covertly and to use equipment, it has to be covert. You simply cannot, in most cases, procure equipment through Service channels and expect it to be covert or to stay covert. A prime example is the PTFs, both the original NASTYs used in the FOOTBOY Program and the later ones which we started procuring around 1967. The original NASTYs were procured by the Navy from Norway. Theoretically, they have been sanitized by removing name plates, etc. While these boats are foreign built, it doesn't take any genius to open Jane's Fighting Ships and see that in 1964 the US Navy procured 13 Norwegian NASTY Class PTFs and that so many of them were later transferred for use in Southeast Asia. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that those PTFs are the PTFs that are driven North out of Danang. When we went to procure new PTFs, because of the funding system and of the bureaucratic procedures in DOD, we had to fight our way through the SecDef not only for authority to procure PTFs for use in FOOTBOY but for authority to change the Navy's PTF force level. We were successful in obtaining these authorities. But then the SecDef directed the Secretary

* (TS) Interview by Captain Bruce B. Dunning, USN, p. 48.

of the Navy to procure the additional PTFs. In doing this, the Navy, of course, has to include the PTFs in the Navy ship-building budget. Ultimately, the requirement is levied on the Naval Ships System Command. Such a procedure means that hundreds of people in the Naval Ships System Command know that the Navy is procuring some peculiar type boats that have not been in the fleet before.*

We had six NASTYs built by Trumpey Boat Yards, on a Norwegian license, in Annapolis, Maryland, and some other different types built in Louisiana by Seward Sea Craft. They were all contracted for by the Navy. All of the contracts were very neatly stamped and this supposedly made everything all right. But, if you look in the January edition of Naval Ships System Command Technical News and again in the July edition of the Naval Ships System Command Technical News (an unclassified publication), you will see very nice pictures of the NASTY-class PTFs and a nice little article that says that, on such and such a date, PTFs 17, 18 and 19 were delivered to the US Navy and, on such and such a date, PTFs 20, 21 and 22 were delivered to the US Navy. I don't care how much stripping of those boats you do, it doesn't take a genius to trace that on through to where they ultimately end up. This is probably an extreme case. An item of equipment as big as a boat is a pretty tough nut to crack in this covert procurement thing, but there a lot of other items of a similar nature, smaller perhaps, and that are more manageable.**

The point is that for these types of programs, there should be funding directly from the SecDef, not funding by

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* Ibid.
** Ibid., p. 49.

Service, out of a contingency fund of some sort that can be properly covered. This is why we need a comptroller in the management organization. You have to keep it out of Service channels. This may mean going through some sort of a cover commercial organization to do the procurement for you. It can be complicated and this is why you need logisticians experienced in covert procurement. It can be complicated but it can be done. CIA has been doing it for years. The present conventional manner of authorizing a covert program and then directing a Service to assume budgetary and funding responsibility for that program is simply unsatisfactory.*

Certainly, problems like funding and procurement should be handled by an entity, the Special Operations Division (SOD) successor, if you will. Whatever entity is established, if it is properly established and staffed, one of its functions would be to organize and undertake this type of procurement or, at least, to oversee it. This is why I say we need a comptroller and logisticians in the organization. Another need for the comptroller is to supervise the management of funding by our field organizations.

Nobody at the Washington level scrubs out the SOG budget. Navy has the funding responsibility and, because of the manner in which SOG is set up, Navy puts on a "sponsored by SACSA" label. Navy has always taken the position that when SOG submits a budget, all they can do is fulfill it, that they are not in a position, because of need-to-know, to judge the validity of the budget or the justification. Therefore, it

* Ibid., p. 49.

falls on us down in SACSA to go before Congress every year and justify that budget -- which we do. On the other hand, the Navy isn't looking at it from the standpoint of a comptroller. The Navy is saying, "Okay, here is the requirement, we will fill it." Then they plug it into the Navy budget. We, in SOD, are not scrubbing out that budget once it comes in from CINCPAC because we don't have the capability. We don't have a comptroller capability. We presumably could convert one of us into a comptroller-type except, again, we are up against a personnel shortage. We just don't have time. As a result (incidentally the House Appropriations Armed Forces Subcommittee staff members are aware of this because I was very frank to them on this point), the SOG budget presentation is not scrubbed out at any level higher than CINCPAC. It is not scrubbed out at all in Washington. We just take it the way it is submitted and hope we get the money.*

* Ibid., pp. 49-50.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

LT. COLONEL KENNETH W. McNIVEN, USAF

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When I first arrived in the MACSOG complex, there was a tremendous backlog of logistical supplies to be moved in order to construct barracks, etc., in the Vietnamese/US Special Forces camps which were under operational control of MACSOG. Much of the cargo could be airlifted by 7th Air Force outfits. However, because of the classification problems with some of the cargo, it was very difficult to have the materiel people at that point in time make a complete switch into the 7th AF system. As a result, MACSOG hauled tremendous tonnages with MACSOG available aircraft; for example, the C-123s that were assigned to MACSOG out of Nha Trang. When the MACSOG C-130s arrived, they were utilized to a great extent in hauling some of the tonnages to these facilities in order to reduce the backlog. Then in cooperation with the materiel people, we were able to identify cargo that was incoming to be handled strictly by 7th AF. However, all special cargo continued to be handled with C-123 and C-130 aircraft that were strictly MACSOG aircraft or under MACSOG control. Although this seemed to be a tremendous routine-type airlift activity, the number of teams that MACSOG had in work at that time was minimum and the aircraft were used only for training and very few combat missions were assigned to C-123s and C-130s.*

* (TS) Interview by LTC Kenneth W. McNiven, USAF, pp. 1-2.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

COLONEL ROBERT C. KINGSTON, USA

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. . . . the supply and support, including certain finances that went to support OP 34, should be handled in a manner befitting clandestine support procedures. We have such procedures. They could easily be implemented. What I am getting at is the supply or support personnel treating OP 34 operations as if they were a paramilitary type operation rather than a clandestine type operation. Some of their actions and procedures helped, if not to compromise the personnel involved in the operations, at least to bring suspicion or undue notice to both indigenous and US personnel involved in OP 34 operations.*

With regard to the procurement of DATA the requirements for receipts for certain monies, if the project officer or the case officer or the OP 34 chief isn't trustworthy then, by God, you shouldn't have them in the operation. I'm not suggesting doing away with all accountability.

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The requirement to do this, I think, would enhance OP 34 operations and I think that a knowledge of these or the general knowledge of these type operations within SOG is too great and should be more of a close hold even within SOG itself.**

*(TS) Interview by Colonel Robert C. Kingston, USA, p. 7.
** Ibid., pp. 7-8.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

- BY

COLONEL HAROLD K. AARON, USA

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. . . I felt there was a great deal of duplication in our operations. The 5th Group had probably (and this has been attested to by many logistical experts who visited our installations) the most efficient logistical system for the amount of people utilized than anywhere else in-country. We had about 200 ~~US, 208~~ Filipinos, and 1,200 civilians engaged in establishing five forward supply points at Danang, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, Bien Hoa and Can Tho. We also had a Logistical Support Center at Nha Trang. Usually from Nha Trang with our dedicated Caribou aircraft (either in number) and with sealift and also with road convoys, we moved in the order of about 17,000 short tons of supplies a month to the "A" Detachments all over Vietnam from the DMZ down to the Gulf of Siam. In other words, the structure of an efficient supply system was there. After the 30th of June 1968, SOG established its own supply installations and its own supply system. Very little in their system that they required we did not have in our system. We used the same radios, indigenous uniforms and rations, ammunition, concrete, etc. I feel that with very little effort or extra people we could have supplied the SOG C&C Detachments and even their FOBs with all classes of supplies that they needed and with equal efficiency, if not better, than the way they were supplying their own people. During my tenures in the 1st Group and the 5th Group, I was constantly informed of the tremendous supply shortages and supply problems of the SOG units. This solution also applies as well in the maintenance side. In other words, our third country or Filipino technicians were available at

Danang and the other forward supply points. They were capable of repairing generators, electrical systems, radios, vehicles and everything else.*

The logistical problem did not pertain solely to Vietnam, but it also involved the Counterinsurgency Support Office (CISO) on Okinawa which had to deal with two separate entities, both SOG and ourselves in the CIDG program. For example, CISO would procure the indigenous rations for both. That office would determine requirements from SOG. Then it would add up the totals and go ahead and procure on that basis. The same thing applied to uniforms for the indigenous personnel: tiger fatigues, boots, etc.**

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Harold K. Aaron, USA, pp. 9-10.
** Ibid., p. 10.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

BY

COLONEL ROBERT L. GLEASON, USAF

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I suppose one of the most troublefree areas in the entire SOG operation, at least from the command section viewpoint, was our logistical support. We had quite a bit of latitude in our budget, what we could buy and how we could get it. We had our own dedicated C-130 aircraft which we could use occasionally for ~~the purpose~~ of bringing things in from Taipei or Okinawa. We had the capability to move things around the country by ourselves when required. We did depend to some extent on the airlift system. All in all logistic resupply and logistic problems were minor problems. The Services were doing a lot to help us and, therefore, kept logistical support from becoming a problem. By far and large I saw no problem area involved there, almost everything that we needed within reason we got and, in most cases, relatively timely. There may have been some parts that perhaps MAROPS couldn't get for the boats as rapidly as they wanted to; some parts perhaps that the Air Force couldn't get for specially configured C-123 occasionally. But this was an exception and it affected us much less than any other tactical organization in SVN.*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Robert L. Gleason, USAF, pp. 7-8.

COMMENTS ON LOGISTICS

- BY

COLONEL STEPHEN E. CAVANAUGH, USA

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I should mention the procurement methods used by SOG in securing equipment peculiar to the business which SOG is involved in. This is the CISO program for quick procurement. The CISO office is located in Okinawa and has provided, as far as I am concerned, the very effective means by which SOG can procure peculiar items of equipment. An organization of this kind could not depend upon a traditional Army, Navy or Air Force requisitioning system to procure items of equipment which are required. It is important first that there be a special procurement channel which exists and that the funds be provided without regard to whether they are being purchased in an inventory someplace or were manufactured in the United States or any particular area.*

* (TS) Interview by Colonel Stephen E. Cavanaugh, USA, p. 9.