COPY NO. 26 Copy 01

10 July 1970

DRAFT

MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

MARITIME OPERATIONS

	Page
PART I - GENERAL	C-d-1
A. BACKGROUND - CIA	C-d-1
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLAN-34A	C-d-2
C. MAROPS - TASKS	C-d-6
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL	C-d-7
E. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS	C-d-13
PART II - RESOURCES	C-d-20
A. ORGANIZATION	C-d-20
B. FACILITIES	C-d-28
C. TRAINING	C-d-32
PART III - OPERATIONS	C-d-35
A. OPERATIONS - 1964	C-d-35
B. OPERATIONS - 1965	C-d-38
C. OPERATIONS - 1966	C-d-43
D. OPERATIONS - 1967	C-d-47
E. OPERATIONS - 1968	C-d-52
F. OPERATIONS - 1969	C-d-59
G. ENEMY COASTAL DEFENSE	C-d-64
PART IV - EVALUATIONS	C-d-68
A. GENERAL	C-d-68
B. AD HOC EVALUATION GROUP	C-d-69
C. NAD DRAFT RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD	C-d-79

DJS 808

TABS

TAB 1 - SAMPLE LEASE	C-d-81	2
TAB 2 - PROMULGATION OF PARBOIL DUTY OFFICER WATCH STANDING INSTRUCTION	C-d-84	3 4
TAB 3 - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) FOR USNAD OPERATIONS IN RVN (USNADOPSRVN .	C-d-113	5 6
TAB 4 - SAMPLE CONTRACT	C-d-123	7
TAB 5 - PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN FOR NAD AND CSS . . .	C-d-125	8
TAB 6 - DRAFT RECOMMENDATION - PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION	C-d-133	9 10

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

MARITIME OPERATIONS

PART I. GENERAL

A. BACKGROUND - CIA

1. Operations. Continuing small-scale covert maritime operations were conducted against North Vietnam DATA ↓ DATA ↓ in conjunction with the RVN Special Bureau. Primary objectives were the collection of intelligence and reconnaissance of the NVN coastal area. Harassment and short-term sabotage raids were introduced in 1962 as a limited response to the escalation of north-south hostilities and as preparation for the future establishment of resistance activity within NVN. The OPLAN-34A Maritime Operationl concept evolved from these small-scale operations and commando-type raids. DATA ↓ . Their operations were essentially passive surveillance and agent inserts, avoiding combat as practicable. (See Appendix B for additional detail

2. Facilities. DATA ↓ DATA Commencing in early 1963, a US Navy SEAL Team Detachment of two officers and 10 enlisted men, under cover of civilian technician advisor guise, assisted DATA ; in the recruiting and

training of a ready force of 45 Vietnamese personnel and third country crewmen (Chinese, Norwegian and German) for the PCFs and agent teams. Facilities included a headquarters with communications capability adequate to monitor and control operations, separate messing and berthing areas for all components, motor pool and maintenance facilities, limited pier space, target ranges, swimming tank, ammunition storage bunkers, and armory adequately stocked with sanitized weapons, demolitions and special purpose equipment. A value of $5,500,000 has been estimated DATA for the developed real estate, material and industry.*

B. IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLAN -34A

1. Organization and Control. In January 1964, with expansion of the scope of operations, DOD directed the transfer of responsibility for NVN covert operations to COMUSMACV.** Headquarters control was vested in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Special Operations Group (later changed to the cover name, Studies and Observations Group) with the maritime operations portion of the program under the direct supervision of the Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Danang. To augment the NAD staff personnel and Navy SEAL/Marine Corps reconnaissance advisors, Mobile Support Team (MST), Danang was established,*** constituted from selected members of the US crews who delivered the PTF craft to Danang. Under OPCON of NAD, the MST provided a Boat Training Team (BTT) to continue instruction, training and qualification of VN crews, and a Repair and Maintenance Team (RMT) to service and repair the boats and to assist the VNN toward development of an inherent maintenance capability. Engineering facilities in Vietnam were inadequate, requiring major overhaul of the craft to be done at Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.

---

* 1. (TS) History, MACSOG, Annex A to 1964 MACV C.H."
2. DATA
** (TS) Msg, Joint State-DOD DTG 162220Z Jan 64.
*** (TS) Msg, COMNAVBASESUBIC, DTG 190615Z Dec 63.

2. NASTY BOATS.


NASTY PTFs, constructed in Norway and propelled by British-made Napier Deltic engines, were in operation by several European countries and procurement by the US Navy had been negotiated for test and evaluation purposes. The NASTY-Class PTF is an 80-foot, 80-ton diesel-powered, mahogony hulled craft capable of speeds up to 40 knots, with cruising range of 860 nm at 38 knots and 1,050 miles at 20 knots. It was believed that this type craft could be operated as non-attributable to the United States, and would greatly improve the capability to conduct covert MAROPS. (See Figure CD-1.)

a. The requirement was reemphasized and approved with eight PTFs to be provided vice two,* for support of the joint/ DATA OPLAN-34A for the planned conduct of harassment, punitive and attritional action to be launched from the sea against NVN.

b. To induce the approval and support of the RVN in implementing the planned maritime and over-the-beach actions against NVN by RVN operators, as well as to minimize attributability to US sponsorship,**it was implied that the PTF craft were being turned over to RVN possession for unilateral actions in defense of their coastal waters against infiltration of hostile forces from NVN. Actual leases, Tab 1,**were negotiated with the RVN Joint General Staff representing the Republic of Vietnam and US Navy representing the United States of America. The termination clause could be effected by 30-day notice of the Lessee Government, or national emergency contingencies affecting the Lessor Government. The procedure provided support, at least initially, for the cover story of RVN

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC DTG 210313Z Jan 64.
** 1. (TS) Msg, CNO, DTG 071517Z May 64.
2. (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 021013Z Oct 64.

FIGURE CD-1



independent retaliatory actions against NVN and the deniability of US sponsorship and direct participation.* Credibility of the leases and ultimate ownership of the craft remained uncertain.

3. Personnel. DATA 45

Vietnamese Navy personnel came under operational control of SOG. An immediate request was submitted to VNN for 100 additional personnel to be trained for the first two boats expected in 1964. Later in January 1964, SOG was informed that six additional PTFs were to be delivered and an additional request for 90 personnel (in 30-man increments) was submitted.

> "On 12 February 1964, General Westmoreland dispatched a letter (MACSOG-0059-64) to General Khiem, Minister of Defense, outlining the same requirements as those forwarded to General Don with the additional requirement for 40 action team personnel... by 1965, an average of 148 Vietnamese military or civilian, and Chinese Landing Team personnel were operationally ready and in a constant state of training throughout the year."**

a. VNN crew personnel for the PTFs were not immediately provided, nor were they quickly responsive to orientation and training. VN leadership during this period has been subject to criticism. Motivation of assigned VN personnel was adversely influenced by variations in background of personnel selected and by the variable pay scales and incentive bonus arrangements that had been introduced DATA

DATA ***

b. US Navy crews, with engineering personnel, factory trained at D. Napier and Son, Ltd., London, England, brought the PTFs from CONUS to Danang via Subic Bay, Philippine Island where required hull and outfitting modifications were accomplished. Although previously uninformed of the intended advisory task vice operational status, the crews were converted effectively to Boat Training Teams who, man-for-man,

* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 292259Z May 64.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV 1964 C.H."
*** DATA

trained their VN counterparts in boat operations, gunnery and craft maintenance. Background and adaptability of assigned VN personnel influenced variable periods of basic training with six weeks to three months normally required. The limited practical experience of Oriental seamen with sophisticated engineering and propulsion systems prolonged their assimilation of preventative maintenance and major repair capabilities.

4. Base Deficiencies. Deficiencies of the Danang base for operations were soon apparent. Pier and maintenance facilities were inadequate; fuel storage was non-existent; training and operations could be supported only by tank truck delivery from the USMC Air Base, Danang to a washed out bridge and thence by LCM ferry. A floating drydock with ancillary tools and equipment was mandatory for even minor craft maintenance. Harbor dredging was an imminent and continuing requirement.* Extensive modifications were required for the new PTFs at US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, to accomodate previously unknown mission requirements, e.g., increased internal fuel and water capability for long operating ranges; removal of excess and US attributable equipment, including 40 mm forward mounts, ready service lockers, single side band radios, IFF and UHF transceivers, galley ranges, ovens, refrigerators, hot water heaters, and detachable tables, bunks and living space items; and installation of electrical power control for gun mounts which could not otherwise by manually operated by the Vietnamese sailors.

C. MAROPS - TASKS

Maritime Operations tasks, as stated in OPLAN-34A-64, were as follows:

1. Conduct small scale demolition operations, intelligence collection actions, capture of prisoners, and temporary interdiction of lines of communication.

---

* (TS) Report, MST Danang, weekly Report to COMNAOPSUPPGRUPAC, Mar-Oct 64.

** (TS) Msg, COMNAVBASE Subic, DTG 190615Z Dec 63.

2. Make DRV aware of opposition by causing interruption in movement of supplies which will necessitate an increased readiness posture of DRV forces.

3. Conduct small scale seaborne raids by small forces on important military and civil installations.

4. MT

5. Operations may support one or more of these objectives:

(a) Psychological resistance.

(b) Intelligence collection.

(c) Political pressure.

(d) Physical destruction.

6. US forces will not be used for operations within DRV or its territorial waters."*

D. COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Initial Approval Procedures. Approval of MAROPS missions was held closely at the Washington level during the first year of operations. The procedure in effect at this time was summarized in a CJCS memorandum as follows:

"a. COMUSMACV was required to submit a monthly program for approval by CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority.

"b. After receipt of the monthly program approval, COMUSMACV requested approval for execution of each individual maritime mission.

"c. Individual mission requests were coordinated for execution approval by the Special Assistant for Counter-insurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs then coordinated approval with the State Department and the White House. Consideration for approval of each mission was undertaken only after the results of the previous mission had been received and evaluated.**"

* DATA

** (TS) MSMO, CM-205-64,"OPLAN 34A - Maritime Operations" 8 Dec 1964.

2. Revised Procedures

a. The Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff pointed out in the memorandum * that the above procedures were cumbersome and restricted the mission frequency capability of COMUSMACV. The following proposed revision was approved by Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance:

"(1) COMUSMACV submits a 30-day program for approval by CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and higher authority.

"(2) Approval at the Washington level is forwarded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to COMUSMACV for planning purposes.

"(3) COMUSMACV subsequently submits packages of up to five missions from the 30-day program for execution approval by CINCPAC, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

"(4) Unless otherwise directed, approval of each package constitutes final approval for execution of the included missions at the discretion of COMUSMACV, in coordination with the American Ambassador, Saigon." *

b. Discretionary Authorities

(1) The first discretionary authority was granted to CINCPAC in January 1965.** CINCPAC was authorized to approve separate MT MT Mission approval at the Washington level was not required.

(2) The next discretionary authority was granted to CINCPAC in March 1965.*** JCS authorized CINCPAC to approve and execute the following missions:

(a) MT MT

(b) MT MT MT MT MT

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG, 131948Z Jan 65.
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 007776 Mar 65.

MT

MT

MT

MT

(3) In June 1965, CINCPAC was authorized to initiate

MT

MT

(4) CINCPAC was also authorized,** at his discretion to permit PTFs returning from unsuccessful psychological and intelligence operations to interdict and harass the following military targets by the use of Naval gun fire:

(a) CAP LAY RADAR

(b) MACH NUOC RADAR

(c) THUONG LUAT

(d) AP TAN DINH SECURITY POST

(e) DONG HOI O.P.

(f) LY HAO O.P.

(g) THANH YEN O.P.

(h) RON O.P.

(i) CAP VINH SON RADAR

(j) CAP MUI DAO O.P.

(5) Further extension of these authorities was granted in November 1965. CINCPAC was authorized*** to employ the PTFs in shipping interdiction missions up to 20°N latitude and to deliver psychological leaflets by 81mm mortar rounds at his discretion.

c. In March 1967, JCS consolidated the discretionary authorities that had been granted the previous two years and set forth the procedures which were then followed until the stand down on 1 November 1968.**** CINCPAC was authorized to approve for execution all missions whose concepts had

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 003610 Jun 65.
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 081458 Jul 65.
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 291649Z Nov 65.
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 101523Z Mar 67.

been previously approved at the Washington level. A twelve hour prior, mission intent message was required from MACV (SOG) to give higher authority (JCS, CINCPAC) a final opportunity for disapproval.

3. Coordination Within MACSOG

a. The first step in normal operational planning procedure was for NAD to submit a mission concept to MACSOG who, after review, submitted it to CINCPAC for approval. If approved by CINCPAC or higher authority NAD was informed and the mission was then scheduled at a future time.

b. Missions were scheduled on a weekly basis by NAD in conjunction with MACSOG.

c. Requests for special purpose missions were made by other MACSOG sections or by higher authority, usually CINCPAC. Necessary instructions for these missions were issued by the Maritime operations office, MACSOG to NAD who then completed the planning.

d. Initially there was virtually no mission planning coordination with any activity outside of MACSOG. Following the gulf of Tonkin attack on US destroyers continuing liaison was maintained with U.S. Seventh Fleet. Coordination within SOG was effected with the PSYOPS and Intelligence branches primarily.*

e. Messages giving information on mission intent (Track information), mission launch and mission cancelled or completed were transmitted to a number of addresses including 7th Air Force, 7th FLEET (includes SEA DRAGON), MARKET TIME, CINCPAC and JCS. Coordination with MARKET TIME and SEA DRAGON on recognition signals was additionally effected.*

f. Overall planning concepts were coordinated between STD and MACSOG; however, there was little or no coordination

* DATA

on proposed operations, their authorization and scheduling. CSS officers participated jointly with counterpart NAD personnel in the planning, briefing and debriefing of mission personnel.

4. Other Authorities and Constraints

a. In January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that "bombardment missions were considered primary in attaining objectives of OPLAN-34A MAROPS." *

b. In July 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized "Stop and Search" role for MAROPS PTFs. **

c. Later in July 1965, authorization was given to interdiction of small tonnage NVN shipping by the MAROPS PTFs, with proviso that no US personnel would be aboard and that operations be restricted to areas south of 19-00N. ***

d. In November 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized utilization of PTFs in Phase I interdiction of small tonnage NVN shipping and stated:

"US personnel will not repeat not be aboard PTFs." ****

e. In July 1966, CINCPAC established mission categories and assigned numerical series designations for each type, i.e.:

MINT	300-399
LOKI	400-499
CADO	500-599
MINT/PSYHAR	600-699
LOKI/PSYHAR	700-799
CADO/PSYHAR	800-899
SPECIAL PURPOSE (SAR, etc)	900-999 *****

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 1319482 January 1965
** (TS) Memo, JCSM-525-65, 3 July 1965 (Approved by DepSec Def 28 July 1965)
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 281530Z July 1965
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 281530Z November 1965
***** (TS) Msg, ADMINO CINCPAC, DTG 012347Z July 1966

f. In March 1967, CINCPAC set forth and consolidated PLOWMAN rules of engagement, and re-defined the three basic types of missions above 17°N upon which PLOWMAN craft could embark: MINT, LOKI, CADO. * (See concept of operations paragraphs for details.)

g. In August 1967, CINCPAC re-established 20°-00'N as the northern limit for PLOWMAN MINT missions. **

h. In April 1968, CINCPAC set forth directions governing the conduct of PLOWMAN operations north of 19°N, COMUSMACV was authorized to continue PLOWMAN operation to 19°N limited as described below:

(1) Firing or dilivery of ordnance in the area from 17°N to 19°N was specifically limited to that required for self-defense.

(2) Operations between 17°N and 19°N were limited to the stopping and searching of NVN watercraft, jettisoning/confiscation of military supplies discovered, the on-site interrogation of NVN crews, and the return of detainees.

(3) No prisoners were to be taken during the conduct of PLOWMAN operations north of 17°N.

(4) No PLOWMAN cross-beach operations were to be conducted north of 17°N. ***

i. The direction provided as stated above was subsequently modified as follows: In June CINCPAC authorized the conduct of PLOWMAN operations in the area south of 20°N and the destruction of enemy craft carrying military personnel or cargo, subject to the restrictions defined above. ****

---

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 192147Z August 1967
*** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 102038Z April 1967
**** 1. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 012257Z June 1968
2. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 161436Z June 1968

j. In July the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized, at CINCPAC's discretion, the continuance of PLOWMAN operations below 20-00N; and further authorized the re-institution of the maritime MT limiting operations to below 19-00N MT MT

k. On 1 November 1968, all PLOWMAN missions north of 17-00°N were discontinued. **

l. The MACSOG Duty Officer Watch Standing Instructions for PARBOIL (MAROPS), dated 1 April 1969, is at Tab 2. This instruction provides detailed procedure for actions to be accomplished in the coordination, clearance, launching and surveillance of MAROPS missions.

m. US Naval Advisory Detachment Instruction 003100.2B is at Tab 3. This instruction provides detailed guidance and basic policy pertaining to USNAD Danang responsibilities in preparation for, and conduct of MAROPS launched from the Danang base.

E. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. DATA



2. Operating Areas. The mission of MAROPS forces was to conduct maritime operations off the coast of NVN. The six

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011351 Z July 1968
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 010219 Z November 1968

overlapping areas of operation, extended from 17°N to 21°N latitude, and from the NVN coast line to approximately 30 miles off the coast (Figure CD-2) All NVN operations originated from the NAD Base, Danang East, SVN.

3. Missions. There were three basic types of operations conducted: interdiction, intelligence and cross-beach. Each of these missions could be combined with a PSYOPS mission to give a total of seven (six plus a special purpose mission). These were as noted in an earlier paragraph.

a. Series 300 Interdiction (MINT) Missions. The primary purpose of the series 300 missions was the interdiction of NVN small tonnage shipping up to the JCS approved limit of 20°N. CINCPAC further restricted 300 series missions to a northern limit of 19°30'N. NVN waterborne traffic encountered in the patrol area, or along the track to and from the patrol area, was stopped, boarded and searched. If the craft was carrying military cargo, military support cargo, or had such a transport capability, it was destroyed, disabled or captured as the tactical situation dictated. Selected crewmen were removed for intelligence and psychological exploitation. *

b.) MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

*(TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967

FIGURE CD-2

MARITIME OPERATIONS GROUP OPERATIONS AREAS




FIGURE CD-2

MT

MT

MT

[redacted]

MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

MT

4. Rules of Engagement - Summary*

a. Prisoners. Prisoners could be returned to NVN waters or released during any of the maritime missions.

b. Control of Fire. MAROPS craft were authorized to deliver fire against military targets on the NVN coast in self-defense when the safety of craft and action teams were endangered. MAROPS craft were authorized to fire against NVN aircraft and watercraft in self-defense and as necessary in order to ensure success of the mission.

c. Area Limitations. In order to lessen possibility of encounter with CHICOM patrol craft or aircraft, MAROPS craft could not approach the island of Hainan closer than 40nm.

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z March 1967 [redacted]

Due to the shortage of MAROPS craft and the inadequate PTF capability, 19°-30'N was set as the normal northern limit for MAROPS. Missions north of 19°-30'N were considered only on a highly lucrative and exceptional basis. (Modified in in August 1967 to 20° -00 N)

d. Personnel. US personnel were not embarked on craft proceeding on PLOWMAN missions above 17°00'N.

e. US Air and Surface Support. MAROPS forces were not normally supported by US ships or aircraft in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, when MAROPS forces were engaged by NVN aircraft or superior NVN surface forces, they were authorized to contact US ships and/or aircraft for assistance. Additionally, certain high risk missions proceeding above 19°-30'N required the support of prescheduled US air support. Such support was authorized provided it was included in the request for mission approval and was coordinated with PACFLT forces. MAROPS craft experiencing serious personnel casualties could also contact US surface forces for medical assistance and could rendezvous with these forces when out of sight of land.

f. Boarding. In carrying out MAROPS, mission craft occasionally encountered vessels of other than NVN or US origin. MAROPS forces were to make every effort to ensure that only vessels of NVN origin were boarded.

5. Mission Description - 1967

a. Each mission consisted of two NASTY (PTF) class boats , or three boats if the operation was either north of 19°N latitude or for across beach missions. For operations between 17°N and 19°N, boats proceeded on a predetermined track, normally outside of coastal radar range, to a specific operations area (OPAREA). Once inside the OPAREA there was no restriction on their track. No outside or additional support was

required for these operations. North of 19°N latitude, boats were required to adhere to a predetermined track and time schedule for the entire operation. Standby CAP support for these missions was normally provided by units of the 7th FLEET.*

b. DATA

Crews were briefed and debriefed by NAD and CSS personnel before and after each mission. Prisoners were brought back blindfolded, then transferred to junks or support craft outside of Danang for transport to Paradise Island. When prisoners were being returned (to NVN), the procedure was reversed. *

c. Once boats were launched on a mission, operational control shifted to MACSOG (maritime operations), Saigon. DATA

DATA ↓

d. Time of missions varied from 20 to 30 hours depending on the time to reach the operational area. Normally, six and one-half to seven hours were spent in the operational area, except on missions north of 20°N latitude during which the boats essentially stayed on a predetermined track. *

e. Maritime forces were authorized to request assistance from US forces in cases of emergency only, such as overwhelming enemy attack, need for medical assistance, and if sinking. This was normally requested DATA to MACSOG who, in turn, transmitted the request to 7th FLT liaison officer at Tan Son Nhut for transmission to the fleet. **

---

* (TS) Report, MACV J-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report", 14 February 1968

** (TS) Instruction, MACSOG-31, "MAROPS Duty Officer Watch Standing Inst.", 1 April 1969

6. Coordination with 7th Fleet. In March 1967, CTG 77.1 promulgated procedures for coordination between SEA DRAGON and PLOWMAN / units to prevent mutual interference. The following directions to SEA DRAGON units were included:

DATA

"If PLOWMAN missions are detected by SEA DRAGON forces outside of assigned opareas or more than one hour or ten miles from assigned track, the task unit commander will report the situation by FLASH precedence message to COMUSMACV, info various fleet units."

* (TS) Msg, CTG 77.1, DTG 250836Z March 1967

PART II. RESOURCES

A. ORGANIZATION

1. General.

a. Maritime operations were under the overall supervision of Chief MACSOG. Direct supervision was the responsibility of the MACSOG operations officer, and, under him Maritime Operations (MAROPS) Officer and his division which had staff planning responsibilities for the program, and operational control of forces when they were conducting a mission. Logistics support coordination, advisory effort, maintenance, training and local control of the MAROPS forces was vested in Officer In Charge, Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Danang, who reported to Chief, MACSOG.*

b. The Vietnamese counterpart organization to MACSOG was the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), located in SAIGON. The Coastal Security Service (CSS), located in Danang, was the Vietnamese counterpart organization to NAD and was responsible to STD for maritime operations.*

c. DATA ↓ .*

d. All maritime operations north of 17°N Latitude were conducted by Vietnamese personnel under the administrative control of CSS, using unmarked PTFs which were leased to GVN by the US Navy.*

2. Naval Advisory Detachment, Danang (NAD)


a. Purpose. Organization of the Martime Operations Group evolved during February-March 1964 with US and Vietnamese personnel functioning jointly, but under separate commands

* (TS) Report, C.O. NAD DANANG, "Historical Analyses of Maritime Operations Group, Danang," 3 Jan 69.

DATA

. The US Navy and Marine Corps personnel attached to USNAD served as advisers, to train and support their counterpart Vietnamese maritime operations forces assigned. DATA

DATA





In compliance with the concept of non-attributability to DATA , US assigned personnel were not permitted to accompany nor participate in actions north of the 17th parallel line of demarkation. Planning and operational control were retained by the United States Government. Operations included, but were not limited to: interdiction and harassment accomplished by interception, capture, interrogation and destruction, as appropriate, of North Vietnamse logistic craft and armed junks; bombardment of coastal targets and cross-beach operations involving "sea-commando" teams; and, delivery of psychological warfare material including propaganda leaflet, radios and gift kits.*

b. Mission.* The mission of the Maritime Operations Group (USNAD, Danang) was to provide policy guidance, supervision, coordination and administration for the MAROPS program.* Tasks in support of this mission included:

* (TS) Ibid.

(1) Exercise of operational and administrative command of the Maritime Operations Support and Training Base, Danang and all US personnel stationed there, as directed by Chief, MACSOG.

(2) Advise, assist and support the RVNAF to plan, coordinate and implement special operations against North Vietnam, as mutually agreed upon by the US Government and the RVN.

(3) Coordinate activities of USNAD with other US forces as directed by Chief, SOG.

(4) Promulgate policy guidance and implementing instructions for the internal physical security and management of the Maritime Operations Support and Training Base, Danang.

(5) Supervise, coordinate and assist RVN counterpart operational personnel in the recuriting, organization, training, preparation, briefing, staging and launching of operational forces engaged in MAROPS.

(6) Maintain Maritime Operations Group Headquarters, Operations/Training Support, and security branches as directed by Chief, MACSOG to perform the functions directed by COMUSMACV.*

c. Command and Organization.* Command of NAD was vested in an officer-in-charge whose title was Commander, Maritime Operations Group. He reported directly to Chief, SOG, USMACV. USNAD was organized into seven sections: Administrative, Operations/Training, Support, Public Works, Security, SEAL/RECON training, and Mobile Support Team (MST). Each section was headed by a section chief, except for the MST and SEAL/RECON sections which were administered by officers-in-charge of their respective TAD detachments.

* (TS) Ibid.

(1) Authorized allowance versus on-board strength of USNAD, on 31 December 1968, was as follows:*

	Officer	Enlisted	TOTAL
Authorized	15	33	48
On-Board	16	39	55[a/]

a/ One officer and nine enlisted SEAL Detachment ECHO personnel included (this number reduced from a previous allowance of two officers/12 enlisted).

(2) Allowance and on-board strength of MST, Danang (under CPCON of NAD Danang) on 31 December 1968, was:*

	Officer	Enlisted	TOTAL
Authorized	4	35	39
On-Board	4	34	38

(3) The procedure of providing US Navy personnel, MST and SEAL teams, on a TAD basis was developed originally because of the shortage of skilled personnel in these areas throughout the US Navy.** By 1968, many SEAL and MST personnel had been assigned as many as five rotated tours to Vietnam. As it evolved, there were advantages to this system, as compared to the normal one-year in-country tour. They were: high professional capability, familiarization with counterpart Vietnamese and their language, area orientation and understanding of the operational problem.*

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Msg, COMNAVBAS SUBIC, DTG 196615Z Dec 63.

3. Mobile Support Teams (MSTs). The MST was initially formed from the US Navy PTF crews who delivered the Norwegian NASTY-type craft to Vietnam, augmented by artificer rated men specially trained at the Napier Deltic factory in London, England. To insure continuity and avert loss of skills through transfer, these selected personnel were assigned to a parent command, Boat Support Unit ONE at USNAB Coronado, California, and were rotated on six-month, one-in-three, TAD basis to MACSOG (NAD Danang). The MST, under an officer-in-charge, was internally organized into a Boat Training Team (BTT) tasked to advise and train their Vietnamese counterparts in the tactics, gunnery, navigation, and detailed operations of PTFs; and a Maintenance Training Team (MTT) responsible for hull and engineering maintenance training.* The numerical strength of the MST varied from an initial requirement in 1964 of approximately 15 officers and 75 enlisted, when both training and maintenance requirements peaked, to a 1968 on-board allowance of four officers and 34 enlisted supporting seven PTFs. An additional US Navy officer and five enlisted with previous MST experience were assigned TAD by Boat Support Unit ONE to the US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay, P.I. to assume security custody and to assist with maintenance, major repair and overhaul of PTFs rotated from Danang.

4. Coastal Security Service (CSS). The CSS was conceived DATA for the Vietnamese maritime operational group conducting actions against NVN. Subordinate to the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), Vietnamese counterpart organization of MACSOG, the CSS was the operational parallel to NAD with all functions established in Danang.

* (TS) MSG, COMNAVBASSUBIC, DTG 191615Z, December 63.

a. Mission

(1) The defined mission of the CSS was:

> "... to exercise operational command over Naval Forces and Personnel assigned or attached to execute Naval Special Operations or conduct unconventional warfare as directed by the Strategic Technical Directorage or competent higher authority."*

(2) Capabilities tasked to the CSS include:

(a) Providing command and control of naval forces performing special maritime operations.

(b) Planning, coordinating and implementing those special maritime operations missions directed by STD/JGS.

(c) Preparing coordinated USN-VNN plans for special contingency or special emergency operations as directed by the STD/JGS developing capabilities to provide naval support for the accomplishment of such special contingency or emergency plans.

(d) Training those naval forces assigned for naval special operations.

(e) Supporting and repairing boats, craft and junks used in special maritime operations.

b. Personnel

(1) The Commander, CSS, exercised, under direction of Commander, STD, operational and administrative command functions of the Danang base facilities, VN military and contract civilian personnel stationed there. With the "advice" of the officer-in-charge, NAD, he planned, coordinated and implemented special operations and missions; coordinated activities with other VN commands; promulgated policy guidance, administered and exercised command

* (TS) CSS Standard Operating Procedures, 23 Jun 66.

authority for the internal management of the Danang base, its facilities and personnel (including Vietnamese military, mercenaries and civilian).*

(a) The importance of the Commanding Officer, CSS, is apparent. In this unusual situation of joint operations, with Vietnamese performing all combatant actions, the US counterpart maintained operational control and dominated planning guidance (to the extent of satisfying Washington level direction and restrictions) by virtue of its advisory position and logistic support. A compatible and cooperative relationship was essential between the officer-in-charge, NAD and commanding officer, CSS and their staffs to ensure training, readiness and effectiveness in operations.

(b) Such was not always the case. Periodically, during the development and expansion phases of the MAROPS program, the motivation and capabilities of VN-assigned personnel were frequently challenged; discipline was neither in accord with US standards nor remedied by CSS officers. Desertion rates were at critical levels; there was indifference to material damage and loss; attainment of military goals was distantly second to mercenary gain; and black marketing of US-provided resources was accepted. The lack of VN leadership during the early period was a much lamented US concern and joint relationships were degraded at times to letter writing protest exchanges vice coordinated efforts.**

* (TS) Ibid.

** (TS) Interviews, NAD officers, Cdr. Olson, LCdr Peterson, LT Williams, May 1969.

(2) Recruiting. The Commander, CSS, was also responsible for recruiting negotiation and security clearance for all VN civilian personnel supporting CSS and NAD. Recruiting of civilian team agents was culminated by a contract agreement between Commander, CSS and the "volunteer". A sample contract is at Tab 4. It delineates the basic pay, indemnities and incentive bonuses initially developed during the period/ DATA

The system was subject to criticism by DATA MACSOG as an undesirable stimulus to mercenary rather than patriotic motivation, but a workable alternative was not developed. Mission bonuses were paid, when appropriate, for meritorious mission upon receipt of a joint recommendation from NAD/CSS, subject to approval of Chief, MACSOG. Pay scales and bonuses in effect in July 1969, are on file.*

(3) A breakout of personnel, both US and VN, is at Tab 5.

* (TS) Provided by MACSOG-NAD-DANANG Finance Officer, 23 July 1969.

B. FACILITIES

1. Support Bases. By 1968 there were seven base areas used in the support of maritime operations. Figure CD-3 is a map of the area. The function of each of the bases was as follows:

Name	Use
a. Upper Base	Billeting for VN personnel
b. Naval Advisory Detachment (lower Base)	Headquarters for US and VN, operating and maintenance for PTFs
c. Camp Fay	Billeting for US personnel
d. Black Rock	Billeting and training for Action Teams
e. Spanish Beach and two smaller beaches	Training for action teams*

2. Description of Facilities

a. Early Facilities

(1) In January 1964, USNAD Headquarters were located, along with CSS, in the "White Elephant" building in Danang city. NAD personnel were billeted within Danang, with the exception of the SEAL and RECON advisors who inhabited a compound at My Khe, across the river and fronting the sea. Operations were conducted out of the VNN Naval base located at the end of the peninsula, near Monkey Mountain. Security was provided by a 75-man special police force (civilian), which had been recruited DATA for the protection of the White Elephant Building and the billeting areas of the motor pool, maintenance, supply and administrative personnel. Additionally, a Nung Security Company was located adjacent to the VNN naval base, a civilian indigenous

* (TS) Report, AD HOC Evaluation Group Report, 14 Feb. 1968.

defense guard (CIDG) Company at My Khe, and CIDG squads were required at Hai Nam and Bai Rac training areas.*

(2) In May 1965, the headquarters of CSS and NAD, along with the Security, Public Works and Supply sections moved into a newly constructed camp site, Camp Fay. In July, the NAD Headquarters moved to the present location, Lower Base, and personnel billeted in Danang city were moved into Camp Fay enabling the special guard force to be reduced to an authorized strength of 44.*

b. NAD. The NAD Command Post, known as The Tank, administrative offices and medical dispensary were located within the operating base compound, known as the Lower Base. The compound contained the administrative, industrial and support spaces of the MST and the CSS Command Post. Four permanent piers served the assigned afloat assets, including 14 PTFs (authorized), three SWIFT, two LCM pusher craft, one floating drydock and floating crane. A fuel farm was located at one end of the compound. On-board PTFs were reduced to seven, following the NVN bombing standdown and the restricted operations ordered in November 1968, with an additional six PTFs in stand-by availability at SRF, Subic Bay.*

c. Camp Fay. Camp Fay, located at the foot of Monkey Mountain in Danang East, was the billeting compound for all US personnel assigned to the MAROPS program with the exception of the SEAL team advisors, who were billeted at Black Rock. The SOG Command and Control Detachment north, part of the PRAIRIE FIRE program, was also billeted at Camp Fay until relocated to their own area, at which time

* (TS) Report, O-IN-C NAD, "Historical Analysis of Maritime Operations Group Danang 1969-1968", 3 January 1969.

the STRATA Supervisory personnel moved in. A BOQ building, three BEQ buildings, and a galley/mess hall were the principal structures. There were laundry facilities and various recreational facilities from a club to volleyball basketball court. Work spaces of the Support, Public Works and Security sections were contained within Camp Fay and included two buildings, two warehouses, a motor pool and various associated storage areas. Bunkers were situated adjacent to each quarters building and the security building.*

d. Camp Black Rock. Camp Black Rock provided billeting, messing, storage facilities and working spaces for the SEAL and RECON training sections, composed of SEAL Team ONE Detachment and USMC RECON personnel. Four Vietnamese action teams of 15-20 men each were quartered threre in separate BEQs. Camp Black Rock, the training base for the cross-beach (CADO) mission action teams, was located on the China Sea (eastern) side of Danang East peninsula. This area was approximately 50 acres in size and included approximately 18 buildings. The buildings consisted of living quarters both for VN and US personnel, a warehouse, a parachute rigging loft, messing facilities, CIDG guard force billeting and magazines. The base was constructed to accommodate 200. It was also used as an isolation area for STRATA teams.*

e. Other Camps. Additional camps of the NAD/CSS complex include the Upper Base, Camp Tran Hung Dao, which provides billeting and messing for approximately 200 Vietnamese assigned to boat crews and staff billets, and the Nung Camp, Camp Tieu Doan An Ninh, which housed the Vietnamese guards.

* (TS) Told

the Special Police and CIDG for NAD and CSS. An ammunition storage depot was located at nearby Spanish Beach. Three other training beaches were restricted for NAD/CSS use, one of which incorporated a firing range.*

f. Transportation. The various bases, such as Camp Fay and Lower Base, were located quite a distance apart which placed a heavy requirement on transportation facilities. The 89 vehicles assigned NAD in 1969 provided one vehicle for every 10 people.**

g. Photography. Photography of NAD base facilities is retained in the MACSOG files, JCS-SACSA.

C. TRAINING

1. Initial Problems. Because of a general shortage of VN personnel with a nautical or mechanical background, the VN Navy had difficulty supplying quality selectees for PTF training. Their responsiveness to training was relatively good considering these handicaps, and the fact that the Nasty Class PTF was a sophisticated combatant craft with a propulsion system that was complex even for US Navy personnel averaging 10-12 years experience. Periods of training necessary to attain minimum qualification and operational readiness varied from 2-4 months. Pressures to expediate activation of the program in many instances influenced reluctant acceptance of reduced standards of personnel effectiveness and capability. Damage attributable to VNN crew negligence, indifference or ignorance was commonplace. Repairs were accomplished, of necessity, by the supporting US Navy MTT. Unnecessary damage to craft and excessive maintenance and repair expenditures were tolerated as the overall level of competence continued to improve with the intensive schedule of operations.

* Ibid
** (U) Interview, O-IN-C NAD Danang, July 20, 1969.

2. Supervised Training. In October 1965, following more than one year with VNN personnel conducting a broad scope of actions into NVN, it was deemed advisable to revert to supervised tactical training including basic boat handling and maintenance on a continuing basis, restricted only by craft availability. In spite of sensitivities bordering on resentment on the part of some Vietnamese, this tactical training was commenced and continued with good results, particularly during periods of inactivity, such as holiday standdowns. The prohibition against US advisors participating in actions against NVN, eliminated the excellent potential training that could have been conducted on actual missions.*

3. Engineering Training

a. Training for VNN officers and crewmen, commencing in October 1965, was directed toward preventative maintenance with the ultimate objective of having VNN personnel assume responsibility for their own support and PTF repair and maintenance. Until this program was initiated, US personnel had accepted full maintenance, repair and logistic planning responsibilities. Training of VNN was, of necessity, concentrated upon improved operational capability.*

b. A VNN MST was established in April 1967 to further encourage VNN assumption of maintenance and repair responsibilities.** An ultimate strength of 73 men was authorized for fulfillment by September 1968. A LCDR, USN, officer-in-charge was designated and selected VNN engineering personnel were sent to US Navy Ship Repair

* (TS) Reports, O-IN-C MST Danang, Weekly Reports to CINCPACFLT and COMNAVOPSUPPGRPPAC, October 1965.
** (TS) Ltr, O-IN-C USNAD, "VNN MST, establishment of," 4 February 1967.

Facility, Subic Bay for advanced training during craft hull and engine overhauls. On-site training was conducted by US MST counterparts, both in classroom and on-the-job. By July 1969, all VNN enginemen and electricians, 30 in number, had been provided two weeks on-the-job training at Subic Bay; 52 personnel constituted the VNN MST. The officer-in-charge demanded thorough work and effected disciplinary action for UNSATISFACTORY accomplishment. Capability of the trainees was considered GOOD, with the eventual assignment of one PTF and the three PCF SWIFT boats to their responsibility. The major shortcoming resulted from the indifference of the VNN operational boat crews and their tendency to expect the maintenance crew to take over all upkeep, including dirty-work details. The officer-in-charge of US MST in July 1969, estimated that two more years of training on the present scale would be required to achieve a minimum VNN MST capability and reliability to risk the responsibility for maintenance of NAPIER-DELTIC engines.*

4. Training Material of File. The following documents concerning training are on file with JCS, SACSA.

a. "SEAL training schedule for Indigenous Personnel" 29 July 1969.

b. "Mobile Support Team Training Manual", 8 November 1968.

* (TS) Interview, O-IN-C MST, Danang, 20 July 1969.

[redacted]

PART III. OPERATIONS

A. OPERATIONS - 1964

1. Activities. Although the Special Operations Group-MACV was activated 24 January 1964, maritime operational capabilities were DATA assets transferred to military control at Danang. Operations were further inhibited by the political turmoil within the Vietnamese government that influenced both the assigned military and the civilian mercenaries previously assembled DATA. On 30 January, General Khanh replaced General Minh as head of the government after a bloodless coup d'etat that temporarily immobilized the VN military effort. Phase I of OPLAN 34A was approved for execution at the Washington level on 1 February 1964 but did not stimulate immediate reaction or support within the RVN. Neither military equipment from US sources nor additional personnel from VNN were immediately forthcoming. The initial harassment, interdiction and sabotage operations were launched in March 1964 on a limited basis with three PCF SWIFT craft available for action.

2. Washington Concern. By 3 April 1964, concern was directed at the Washington level to "the lack of success in the program to date."* CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were requested to evaluate the entire program and determine what was needed to put it on successful basis. A joint response included the following with respect to MAROPS:**

a. Limited time since activation - 2 months; lack of GVN support.

b. Lack of VNN motivation and dependence on civilian mercenaries.

* (TS) Memorandum, SACSA-M 227-64, 3 April 1964.
** Ltr, CINCPAC/MACV, ser 000149, 18 April 1969.

c. Extremely bad weather and heavy seas during period in question.

d. Non availability/delivery of major equipment items and support; PTFs due in-country 1 June.

e. Lack of adequate intelligence on NVN for target/objective planning.

f. Lack of security from VN observation of training, type and launchings of operations.

g. Prompt development of tighter NVN defense, alert and with mobilized effort.

h. Lack of US personnel support (JTD of 100 military not approved at Washington level until 1 April).

3. Phase II. CINCPAC was requested to prepare a plan* for Phase II 34A operations to "embody destruction operations of greater scope and intensity involving targets of greater criticality than those in Phase I - to encompass the period 1 June - 30 September 1964".

4. Early Cross Beach Operations. Commencing 14 January 1964, infiltration operations of cross beach action teams were attempted by MACSOG on the same basis. DATA DATA . Ten missions were launched during the year, prior to 5 August, with harassment actions varying from attempted bridge destruction to delayed firing fires to demolition raids. Only four of the ten were considered successful, although the overall effort was believed to have significantly pressured NVN to divert forces and attention to strengthen their coastal security. The number of missions in 1964 was restricted by the decision following the Gulf of Tonkin incident on 5 August to restrict operations north of 17° N.** Although MAROPS were

* (TS) MSG, JCS DTD 212340Z, March 1964.
** (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 051763Z, August 1964.

resumed in September,* emphasis was directed to PTF bombardment of shore targets. Cross Beach missions were not launched again until June 1965.

5. PTFs Operational. By June 1964, NAD/CSS had seven PTFs operational. Shore bombardment and combined boat/ sea commando operations for the first time were able to strike targets farther north and on a regular basis. VNN operators and PTF crews accomplished noteworthy progress and experience. Functioning of the NAD/CSS joint staff gradually improved as outfitting, base and facility construction, assembly and orientation of personnel moved ahead.

DATA



6. Operational Results. Between April 1964 and 31 December 1964, 32 missions were launched** including actions against such targets as security posts, bridges, island garrisions and radar stations. Twelve shore bombardments accounted for significant damage to enemy defense installations, barracks, buildings support facilities. Three enemy junks were captured and 27 prisoners were brought from NVN for intelligence collection purposes. It was apparent by mid-1964, that cross-beach operations and raids were both ineffectual and highly hazardous. NVN coastal and beach defense were rapidly increasing in resistance and capability, induced presumably by the more frequent presence of the PTFs threatening both shore line security and fishing craft operating offshore. A continuing psychological warfare program was introduced including leaflet bombardment and delivery of gift kits, supported by related

* (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 101804Z, September 1964.
** (TS) JCS-SACSA Redbook - a chronological report of MACSOG MAROPS-1964-68.

radio propaganda and news broadcasts, and thorough indoctrination of NVN prisoners to be later returned to NVN.

7. JCS Memorandum. In December 1964, JCS encouraged intensification of OPLAN 34A maritime operations,--"to accomplish repreated and unscheduled bombardment and harassment sweeps of selected targets such as Tiger Island and Capt Lay radar as additional effort while returning from other scheduled missions".* Additional harassment activity was introduced to include "SNARE" and kidnap actions against junks and encountered seacraft. Friendly casualties during 1964 totalled two KIA, two MIA and four WIA.

B. OPERATIONS, 1965

1. Summary. One hundred and seventy missions sortied from Danang over a period of 358 possible operational days during 1965. MAROPS missions effected the capture of 126 prisoners, the destruction of more than 50 enemy junks and damage to 19 enemy vessels, including three patrol craft. Forty-nine bombardment and 25 psychological harassment (PSYHAR) missions were considered successful; 13 deliveries of gift kits, radios and psychological warfare materials were fulfilled. One thousand radios were delivered, 28,742 gift kits dispensed, and 1,124,600 leaflets dispensed by 81 MM motar. MINT/LOKI operations were approximately 50 percent successful.**

2. Significant Developments. MAROPS during 1965 developed into the unconventional and special operations organization envisioned by OPLAN-34A.

a. At the beginning of the period, the MAROPS Group had eight PTFs and three SWIFT boats assigned. Four new PTFs were assigned in July/August 1965 and three more in early 1966. Two, however, were replacements for two prototype,

* (TS) Memo, JCSM 1042-64, 12 December 1964.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV 1965 C.H".

obsolete, gasoline-powered USN PTFs which were returned. Two PTFs were normally rotated to Subic Bay for routine overhaul and maintenance, leaving seven PTFs and three SWIFTs available for operational purpose. This was considered by MACSOG an unacceptably low level and caused COMUSMACV to request an increase boat strength as early as possible. Central to the problem was that no boat replacement program was authorized either for boats lost operationally or for boats that became unserviceable through normal use.

b. Operations through 1965 were restricted to areas south of latitude 20°N. However, within this restriction, MAROPS were conducted with increasing frequency in the more northern areas. In addition to causing harassment to NVN shipping and having a desirable psychological impact on the NVN population along the coast, the operations caused the NVN government to divert additional resources to protect its coastline.

c. Vietnamese action teams under MAROPS totalled 148 personnel (less trainees):*

13 VNN UDT (Parachute Qualified)
27 VNN
29 VNMC
20 Nungs
31 ARVN
28 RVN Civilians (Parachute Qualified)
120 ARVN in Training

Cross Beach operations were recommenced in June 1965. Sixteen missions were attempted during the remainder of 1965, six of which were considered successful. Hardening

* (TS) Study, "MACV 31-34A Project Staff Study", 8 Sept. 1965.

of NVN coastal defenses, both with physical security measures and electronic surveillance, continued to diminished the effectiveness of cross-beach tactics.

d. Figure CD-4 is a summary of mission types, primary and secondary for calendar year 1965.

3. Operational Support

a. Intelligence. Intelligence support for maritime operations was provided by the MACSOG Intelligence Branch, consisting of a collection section, a targeting section and a security section. In addition to providing intelligence to support MAROPS, it was responsible for dissemination to the intelligence community information collected as a result of all MACSOG operations. Support provided for operational purpose included:*

(1) Detailed MT analysis of operational areas to determine location of targets, defenses, landing and drop zones.

(2) Coordination with other agencies in obtaining MT of operational areas. The following MT programs were utilized.

(a) TROJAN HORSE. MT NVN and Laos, flown by SAC.

(b) BLUE TREE. MT NVN, flown by 7th Fleet and 7th Air Force.

(c) YANKEE TEAM. MT Laos, flown by 7th Fleet and 7th Air Force.

(d) TIGERHOUND. Visual reconnaissance flown by TIGERHOUND FACs.

(3) Maintaining complete order of battle information on North Vietnam and Laos.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV 1965 C.H.".

ANNEX D TO APPENDIX C

FIGURE CD-4

MAROPS SUMMARIES, 1965

Type Missions	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
LOKI MT	0	1	4	2	15	21	8	5	6	1	1	1
SNARE[a] MT	10	2	2	5	16	21	11	14	0	0	0	0
TRIDENT[a] MT	10	3	2	5	16	21	11	14	14	0	0	0
LANCE MT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PSYHAR MT	3	6	5	5	2	1	0	4	2	1	1	4
CADO MT MT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	2
DRIFT MT	7	4	0	1	2	5	3	6	2	0	0	0
SWALLOW MT	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	6	4	1	0	0
H/I	11	4	4	4	0	12	0	2	2	0	0	0
MIN MT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	8	8	16
TOTAL	41	20	17	22	51	85	36	53	50	12	10	23
PRIMARY	14	8	9	8	16	26	11	16	--	--	--	--
COROLLARY	27	12	8	14	35	59	25	37	--	--	--	--

a/ Corollary Missions - Scheduled after completion of primary mission or in conjunction with primary mission.
Example - Primary mission is LOKI. Upon reaching northern-most position and upon transit returning to base, SNARE/TRIDENT in effect.
Similarly, SWALLOW, DRIFT and CADO missions are sometimes dual missions.
H/I firing is presently a corollary opportunity mission. Prior to May, H/I was a primary mission.

NOTE: September-December statistics are inconsistent but representative of recorded activity, influenced by heavy weather and current political restrictions.

(4) Obtaining details of terrain, defenses, security and other factors from interrogation of MAROPS prisoners and SHINING BRASS reconnaissance teams.

b. Communications. MACSOG Communications Branch provided communications between SOG installations in RVN and with deployed operational teams. In-country communications were provided by tele-typewriter circuits between MACSOG Headquarters, Saigon, NAD, Danang, and 1st Fleet Detachment, Nha Trang. SHINING BRASS C&C Detachment at Danang utilized the NAD facilities, as required. The circuits were crypto-covered and were manned 24 hours a day. Communications between SOG Headquarters and 34-A operational elements

DATA

4. An Evaluation - 1965. As evaluated by a MACV Staff Study in September 1965, the MAROPS program was "currently the most productive of all 34-A programs and the one area in which an expanded program on a long-range basis appears to be desirable".* LOKI and SWALLOW MT operations were considered the most lucrative from the viewpoint of accomplishment. The operations were recognized as a "primary source of information on activities within the DRV and additionally were considered effective beyond actual damage created, in causing constant alert of NVN shore defenses and burdensome concern that an attack was imminent at any place along the coast south of the 20th parallel." It was concluded that MAROPS harassment missions complemented the concurrent and more

* (TS) Study, "MACV 31-34A Project Staff Study," 8 Sept. 1965.

devastating ROLLING THUNDER air strike operations and that graduated pressures against the DRV, an aim of our national policy, was being contributed by the program.

C. OPERATIONS - 1966

1. Summary

a. With a reduced number of possible operational days (287) available during 1966 because of various standdowns, a fewer number of missions were launched: 126 primary and 56 secondary. No MAROPS were conducted in 1966 until 17 February, at which time a 55-day holiday standdown was terminated. Coastal guns engaged MAROPS craft frequently, and combined with other enemy attacks influenced planned actions toward conserving the limited number of boats on hand. Five PTFs were lost for various causes. Significantly, however, missions were executed farther north and with greater frequency. More than one-half of the total MAROPS missions during the year were between 19-00 N. and 20-00 N. MAROPS accounted for:

MT

b. The most effective operations conducted by MAROPS in 1966 were PTF maritime interdiction missions. As reflected by the number of prisoners captured and enemy craft destroyed, the pressence of MAROPS craft created the type and degree of pressure upon the NVN coastal areas originally envisioned in OPLAN-34A. Maritime action team (Cross Beach) missions during the year did not attain the success anticipated.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV 1966 C.H.".

Figure CD-5 is a summary of 1966 Maritime Actions. It shows the trend of MAROPS toward shipping interdiction and intelligence collection through captured prisoners vice cross beach and harassment missions.

2. Cross Beach Operations

a. Actions in the North. Thirty-four cross beach (CADO) missions were attempted in 1966; only four were considered successful. Several factors contributed to the poor results: (1) adverse weather caused cancellations of missions that could not be promptly rescheduled, (2) lack of timely intelligence, primarily good pre-strike photography, (3) increased and more effective coastal defense, and (4) the reluctance of some team leaders to engage the enemy.*

b. Operations in the South. The decline in CADO activity against northern targets created an undesirable training environment for action team personnel. Loss of combat bonus pay caused dissatisfaction and increased AWOL rates. As a partial solution, action team personnel were utilized to augment PTF crews as gunners. In September 1966, Southern Training Operations (SOTROPS) were implemented against known or suspected VC infrastructure as well as VC/NVA military targets along the coast of I Corp Tactical Zone (CTZ). Action teams were accompanied on these operations by US advisors who observed the conduct of the team throughout the operations. This close observation assisted in developing improved techniques, and evaluating VN personnel capabilities. The concept, DATA of training, proved successful and was ultimately expanded to the II CTZ and MEKONG/BASSACK DELTA area for special actions in support of COMUSMACV conventional

* (TS) Ibid

OPLAN 34A Actions Attempted and Accomplished, 1966

Maritime Operations (By Mission)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Shipping Interdiction/ PSYOPS	a/	5 (1) b/	7 (2)	4 (1)	4 (1)	2 (2)	3	1	3	- (2)	2 (1)	3 (-)	34 (10)
Shipping Interdiction (Only)	a/	-	3 (1)	6	1 (6)	4 (4)	1 (3)	1 (7)	4 (3)	2 (6)	1 (1)	5 (3)	28 (34)
Junk Captures	a/	-	-	-	-	-	1	2 (1)	-	-	-	-	3 (1)
Team Landing Operations- Ambush/Kidnap Shore	a/	- (2)	2 (5)	- (6)	1 (2)	- (2)	- (2)	1 (1)	- (2)	- (4)	- (4)	-	4 (30)

a/ Political directed holiday standdown in January.
b/ Figures in parentheses indicate unsuccessful attempts in addition to the successful missions.

Figure CD-5

operations. Each SOTROP was scheduled and executed as a final rehersal for a future mission in NVN and as nearly as possible involved elements and techniques which the teams would experience in operations in NVN. In addition to beneficial action team training, intelligence information of value to the III MAF in the I Corps was furnished to G-2, III MAF.*

3. PTF and Personnel Losses. Operational problems in 1966 were compounded by boat losses: one to an enemy aircraft attack on 7 March; two by grounding and destruction during an unsuccessful CADO mission on 22 May; one by sinking from friendly gunfire on 17 June; and the loss of a fifth craft following collision with a friendly craft in company during a storm on 19 August. Twelve (12) new Nasty class PTFs were provided by US Navy in support of the MAROPS program during 1966. An average of 11 VNN crews and seven PTFs were operationally ready throughout the year. A total of 22 MAROPS missions received NVN coastal defense gunfire. Five were attacked by enemy aircraft and six by surface vessels. Personnel losses totalled 13 KIA, 31 WIA and six MIA.**

4. Coordination With SEA DRAGON. Operational areas available to the MAROPS craft became increasingly limited due in part to the commencement of SEA DRAGON, a US Navy interdiction operation employing USN destroyers to engage military cargo vessels and military coastal installations. By years end 1966, SEA DRAGON had extended north to 18-00N. Additional limitations were imposed by CINCPAC restricting MAROPS craft to areas south of 19-30N to avoid exposing PTFs to known operating areas of NVN air. PTFs without possessing adequate air defense weapons, were attacked in northern waters by enemy air in 1966.

* (TS) Report, MACV J-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report", 14 February 1968.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV 1966 C.H.".

5. REDEYE and Communications Proposals. Threat of air attacks prompted COMUSMACV with CINCPAC concurrence, to request authority to employ REDEYE missiles as defensive weapons aboard MAROPS PTF craft. The proposal was further justified by inadequacy of US air cover support because of time and space factors and the difficulty in maintaining the plausible deniability of such cover. Deficiencies of the REDEYE system, however, caused additional testing prior to service acceptance. In the interum, the enemy air threat diminished and the missiles were not installed. There was also concern at this time that communications between MAROPS craft and US Navy forces operating in proximity were inadequate for coordination of effort, safety and joint SAR activity. CINCPAC proposed employment of US radio operators aboard PTFs to insure communications and to offset language barriers. JCS disapproved the request* and referred to an earlier Joint State-Defense message:

MT

D. OPERATIONS, 1967

1. The tasking of the maritime missions during this period evolved into interdiction of waterborne craft, primarily fishing junks, and to detention of large numbers of fishermen for intelligence and psychological exploitation. The US Navy's

* (TS) Message, JCS, DTG 152033Z, December 1966.
** (TS) Message, State-Defense, DTG 272235Z, October 1964.

SEA DRAGON and MARKET TIME* operations influenced reduction of junk traffic, and targets became scarce in areas south of 19-00N. Figure CD-6 is a mission summary for 1967.

2. Intelligence gained through reports derived from maritime operations continued as the only human intellignece (HUMINT) sourced information on the NVN coastal area. CINCPAC** on 16 March 1967 emphasized that MAROPS concentrate primarily on intelligence collection actions. Scope of data pertinent to military interests at this time included:

a. NVN military order of battle.

b. Coastal defense installation information.

c. Paramilitary activities.

d. Air Defense.

e. Conscription.

f. Coastal sea transportation.

g. LOC data.

h. NVN population control policy.

i. Identification of dissident groups.

j. Air strike and naval gunfire results.

k. Government and popular reaction to psychological operations.

l. Effects of maritime mining operations, downing and disposition of US aircraft and pilots.

m. NVN interrogation and treatment of returned detainees.

n. NVN defensive measures against MAROPS activity.

---

* (TS) SEA DRAGON forces consisting of four to six destroyers or cruisers, operating in areas off the NVN coast with the primary mission of interdicting and destroying NVN waterborne logistics craft. An additional mission was naval gunfire on targets ashore.

MARKET TIME forces maintained a continuous barrier patrol at 17 N. All vessels entering this area were detained and brought into port.

** (TS) MSG, CINCPAC, DTG 160042Z, March 1967.

FIGURE CD-6

1967 MISSION SUMMARY - MAROPS

	OP AREAS						
	TOTAL	PURPLE	GREEN	BLUE	WHITE	YELLOW	RED
Missions Launched	151	10	13	60	61	0	7
Missions Aborted - Weather	19	1	1	7	9	0	1
Aborted - Casualties	7	0	0	3	3	0	1
Missions Completed	126	9	12	50	49	0	5
MINT (Series 300)	102	2	6	46	48	0	0
LOKI (Series 400)	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
CADO (Series 500)	12	5	6	1	0	0	0
MINT/PSYHAR (Series 600)	5	0	0	3	2	0	0
LOKI/PSYHAR (Series 700)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CADO/PSYHAR (Series 800)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Special (Series 900)	3	2	0	0	0	0	1
Enemy Craft Destroyed	102	7	1	29	65	0	0
Damaged	3	0	0	1	2	0	0
Captured	3	0	0	2	1	0	0
Prisoners Captured	328	0	10	117	192	0	9
Returned	329	3	4	98	224	0	0
On Hand	26	0	0	0	0	0	0
CD Fire Rcvd on Mission	54	2	0	19	32	0	1
A/C Attacks Rcvd on Mission	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Surface Tracks Rcvd on Mission	2	0	0	0	2	0	0
Personnel KIA	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
WIA	3	1	0	0	2	0	0
MIA	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

3. Two-thirds of the missions completed were in two operational areas: Blue and White. With six PTFs operational, it should have been possible to conduct 27 missions per month (16 two-boat missions and 11 three-boat missions). However, the highest number scheduled was 22; the highest conducted 16. Utilization of available craft in 1967 was estimated as 18 percent, indicating that number of craft was not the limiting factor in frequency of operations.*

4. The following data derived from an Ad Hoc Evaluation Group study of MACSOG effectiveness dated 14 February 1968 was assembled under direction of MACV J-3.**

a. Estimate of number of missions required.

(1) Based on MAROPS results during 1967, the following table was derived. (All figures for one month).

(a) Number of prisoners which can be expected to be captured:	30	54	96	108
(b) Number of successful missions required to capture prisoners in (a):	5	9	16	18
(c) Number of missions which will not be successful:	4	7	12	14
(d) Number of CADO missions which can be conducted:	3	3	3	3
(e) Number of times each area would be covered for number of missions in (b):	less than 1	1.5	2.6	3
(f) Number of missions which should be scheduled in order to complete missions in (b):	12	19	31	35

(2) The average number of prisoners processed each month during 1967, through Paradise Island, was 27.6 per month. The capacity of Paradise Island was being increased from 150 to 200 and during 1968 a goal of two month average processing time was being established. This

* (TS) MSG, COMUSMACV (MACSOG), DTG 030607Z, November 1967.
** (TS) Report, MACV-J-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report", 14 February 1968.

would require that 100 prisoners be captured per month, which would require 16 or 18 successful missions per month.

b. PTF's Required to Support Missions. Based on experience and data from 1967, the AD HOC Group devised a formula for determining the number of boats required to support a given number of missions. To support 31 missions, and the goal of taking 100 prisoners per month, the number of boats required was eight. This number was increased by two to account for one boat being in standby and one in overhaul. The total requirement recommended by the Group was 10 boats and 12 crews.*

5. Cross Beach Operations. DATA ↓

One of these was successful, but the prisoner was a fisherman who proved to be of little value as an intelligence source. Six teams did not reach the beach for various reasons; such as: gunfire, guards alerted, and rough weather. Action team personnel were additionally employed in a riverine, delta environment (Dong Tam Operations) in IV Corps during the period October 1967 - March 1968 with noteworthy success, as indicated by the following:

- Total Missions Conducted: 44 (57 patrols)
- Total Months Deployed: 4
- No Contact: 20 Missions (27 patrols)
- Contact: 24 Missions (30 patrols)
  - VC Observed/No Contact: 3 missions
  - VC Observed/Fire Fight: 10 missions
  - VC Weapons/Ordnance Uncovered: 4 Missions
  - Prisoners Taken: 16 Missions (19 patrols)

* (TS) Ibid

- Total Number of Prisoners: 34

- VC Casualties: 22 - 15 KIA (Body Count), 6 KIA (Probable)
1 WIA (Escaped)

- VN/US Casualties: 6 - 1 KIA (VN), 5 WIA (2 US/3 VN)*

E. OPERATIONS - 1968

1. 1968 Authority Review. Emphasis was shifted from traffic interdiction to support of psychological warfare operations in early 1968, as additional restrictions were introduced prohibiting MAROPS destruction of junks less than 10 meters in length, unless they were 'determined' to be carrying military supplies or an uncommon amount of foodstuff or cargo. Smaller junks obviously employed in fishing were thus spared. Detention of NVN fishermen was discontinued 3 April by JCS order** and 81mm leaflet distribution confined to south of 20°N. On 6 April leaflet bombs were further limited to 19°N by CINCPAC,*** and gift distributions were similarly restricted on 10 April.**** The 10 April message also curtailed MAROPS to permit only coastal reconnaissance south of 19°N and detainee return missions. Rules of engagement were eased on 1 June to permit destruction of waterborne logistic craft below 19°N and collection of detainees was again authorized in July with new parameters however, restricting junk targeting to selected actions south of 19-00N (preferably from known dissident groups). No more than 20 detainees at one time were authorized at the Paradise Island Camp with length of detention period reduced to 14 days. The last detainee was returned to NVN 22 October 1968. PTF interdiction and surveillance patrols were, however, permitted to proceed to 20-00N.# JCS suspended active PTF MAROPS missions into

---

* (TS) 1. Report, MACV J-3, "Ad Hoc Eval Report", 14 Feb 1968.
2. History, MACSOG, "Annex F to 1968 MACV C.H."
** (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 031792Z, Apr 1968.
*** (TS) CONCPAC 060230Z, Apr 1968.
**** (TS) CINCPAC 102038Z, Apr 1968.
# (TS) MSG, JCS, DTG 011351Z, July 1968.

NVN territorial waters at the time of the U.S. bombing halt announced 1 November 1968 and at the same time directed the maintenance in readiness of all MAROPS personnel and material assets for possible resumption of operations including the support of infiltration/exfiltration of agents, if directed.* No MAROPS north of 17-00N have since been launched.

2. Operational Summary. During the 1968 operational period of 300 days, the number of PTFs available varied from six to nine with an average of seven in readiness. Outstanding maintenance capability of the joint MST (US) and MTT (VN-CSS) insured operational availability of seven PTFs nearly 100 percent of the time. The months of August and September were critical for maintenance with peaks of 33 and 25 missions run, and supported the 1967 premise that with eight operational PTFs the 31 missions per month considered the desired level by the Ad Hoc Evaluation Group could be achieved. Figure CD-7 is a summary of MAROPS actions for 1967 and 1968.

3. Operational Areas

a. Operational statistics for 1968 show that the WHITE operation area (18-35N, 20-00N) daylight missions were the most lucrative in terms of detainees and vessels destroyed. Figure CD-8 portrays the designated operating areas and number of vessels destroyed.

b. Few missions were conducted in the GREEN and PURPLE operation areas because the preceding two years of constant pressure from air, PTFs and US Navy SEA DRAGON forces practically denuded the areas of fishing craft. The majority of missions conducted in the WHITE and BLUE area were within

* (TS) JCS 4651/010219Z, Nov 1968.

FIGURE CD-7

MAROPS ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED, 1967 AND 1968


Maritime Operations (By Mission)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
						1967						
PSYOPS (MINT/PSYHAR)	1 (2)[a]	3 (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
(MINT)	3 (5)	2 (5)	7 (8)	7 (6)	7 (5)	6 (5)	8 (6)	5 (6)	6 (4)	4 (5)	4 (4)	3 (4)
(LOKI)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (2)	- (-)	- (2)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	- (-)	- (-)
(CADO)	-	-	--	- (1)	- (1)	- (1)	1 (1)	- (2)	-- (2)	1 (1)	- (2)	- (1)
	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
						1966						
(MINT/PSYHAR)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	17 (-)	27 (-)	12 (-)	15 (3)	- (-)	- (-)
(MINT)	2 (6)	2 (5)	13 (4)	10 (3)	13 (-)	14 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
LOKI)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
(CADO)	- (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (3)	- (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
	2 (-)	- (-)	- (0)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)
Other	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)

a/ Numbers in parentheses indicate unsuccessful operation

FIGURE CD-8

MARITIME OPERATIONS GROUP OPERATION AREAS

1968



two areas of significant fishing activity; one, in the vicinity of Hon Matt and Hon Nieu Islands (18-50N); the other between 19-30N and 20-00N frequented by craft from fishing villages on Lach Yapp, Lach Chao and Cua Day. Waterborne logistic craft were encountered along this stretch of coast as well as armed junks usually running only at night and hugging the shoreline beyond pursuit capability of PTFs. The largest concentration of fishing cooperative activity was in the vicinity of Cap Falaise, 19-50N. At least 17 cooperatives were known to operate two or more protective junks.*

4. Cross Beach Operations - 1968. No Cross Beach (CADO) Operations against NVN were attempted in 1968.

a. BIFROST and DEWEY RIFLE. Cross beach operations conducted in areas south of 17-00N were known as BIFROST (formerly SOTROPS) when conducted in I Corps and as DEWEY RIFLE in II Corps. DATA

! BIFROST and DEWEY RIFLE operations were effectively conducted following political restriction of action team activities in NVN effected November 1968. An advantage of these actions was that they were considered as training operations" allowing US advisors to accompany the missions. On-the-spot appraisal of the action teams' performance improved the training and discipline of the teams.

b. RIVERINE Operations. In 1968, one action team (teams were rotated about every six weeks) was assigned to NAVFORV to work with the RIVERINE forces in the Delta. The agreement between MACSOG and NAVFORV provided action team training under combat conditions with US advisors in company and provided the RIVERINE force with a SEAL Team capability. This arrangement

* (TS) Report, O-in-C NAD Danang, "Hist Analysis of MAROPS, Danang 1964-68", 3 January 1969.

was designed for realistic training during the monsoon season when the weather in the North precluded CADO(C) operations. The action teams attained excellent results in Delta operations, and captured one very valuable prisoner who was chief of the VC intelligence in his sector. However, action teams were not organized for the purpose of providing a SEAL team capability to the RIVERINE force. Further, it appeared that a great deal of the success was due to the presence of US advisors with the teams, and friendly forces available to come to their aid.*

5. Statistical Summary. Figure CD-9 is a statistical summary of maritime and BIFROST operations from 1964 to 1969.

* (TS) Report, O in C DANANG, "Historical Analysis of Maritime Operations," 3 Jan 1969.

FIGURE CD-9

MAROPS AND BIFROST OPERATION STATISTICS

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	
MAROPS (NVN)						
PTFs (Danang)	7	7	7	7	7 4	NASTY OSPREY
PTF Losses	0	1	5	0	0	
Missions Launched	~~32~~ 37	~~105~~ 155	144	153 –	160	
Missions Aborted	Unk	Unk	8	82 –	32	
Missions Conducted	~~Unk~~ 37	~~16~~ 155	~~126~~ 127	~~125~~ 126	~~145~~ 140	
Enemy Craft Destroy/Capture	34	34	86/1	102/3	40/1	
Detainees Collected	--	126	353	328	185	
Intel Spot Reports	--	46	103	167	337	
Aircraft Attacks	--	5[a]	0	2	1	
Armd Surface Attacks	--	4[a]	8	2	6	
Coastal Defense Fire	--	5[a]	22	54	58	
Enemy KIA (Est)	--	--	--	--	80	
Personnel Casualties						
KIA	--	1[a]	15	1	6	
WIA	--	8[a]	31	3	10	
MIA	--	--	6	1	4	
BIFROST (RVN I CTZ)						
Missions Launched			10	10	38	
Missions Aborted			0	1	10	
Missions Conducted			10	9	28	
Detainees Collected			11	5	18	
Personnel Casualties						
KIA			0	1	1	
WIA			0	0	0	
MIA			0	0	2	

F. OPERATIONS - 1969 (WITHIN SVN)

1. BIFROST and DEWEY RIFLE. Following the moratorium placed on NVN MAROPS in November 1968,* an evaluation was undertaken by MACSOG to determine training and readiness requirements to maintain the MAROPS unconventional warfare capability. Stepped up coastal attacks and intelligence collection operations in I and II CTZ areas within a 250 mile operating range from the Danange base were considered appropriate for this purpose and were welcomed by field commanders to provide reconnaissance of areas inaccessible to ground forces, exploratory raids, and limited coastal bombardment.

a. Commencing 1 January 1969, a series of operations were commenced in the I Corps coastal area under code name BIFROST which by 2 June "contributed significantly to the war effort in SVN with 58 missions producing the following results: 84VC/VCl KIA: 4VC/VCl; WIA: 34 VC/VCl POW; 9 sampons or ferries destroyed; 3 extensive bunker systems destroyed or rendered unusable; 7,000 pounds of rice destroyed; and numerous documents, weapons and other war materials captured or destroyed."** US advisors accompanied action teams on these missions. Team casualties were 5 KIA and 9 WIA with no US losses.

b. Action teams were simultaneously deployed to the II CTZ under Operation DEWEY RIFLE with a six mile area known as the Southern Free Strike Zone, bordering Phan Thiet and Le Hong Phong Forest. MACSOG noted in February that

* (TS) Msg CINCPAC, DTG 010810Z Nov 68
** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 111436Z June 69

"the DEWEY RIFLE operations have been more productive than the BIFROST" and were recommended for continuance. Although fire support from PTFs provided good support action, distance from operating area to PTF logistic base created certain limitations and necessitated temporary movement of back-up support and personnel to Nha Trang.

b. On 3 June 1969 the code name BIFROST was changed to DODGE MARK. Fifteen missions were launched between 3 June and 20 July without US advisor accompanying the action teams. Results included only 2 enemy KIA, 1 WIA and 1 captured. US advisors were returned to the teams on 17 July with immediate improvement in team effectiveness. A summary of coordination and constraints for BIFROST operations follows:

(1) Coordination was accomplished through III MAF, both American and Vietnamese sides of I Corp, DATA and the Danang Coastal Surveillance Center (CSC) which controlled US Navy MARKET TIME forces and advised the Vietnamese Sunh force. Initial coordination was effected 72 hours prior to scheduled date of operations with senior commands, followed by NAD detailed coordination of call signs, communications, air cover, fire support, etc., with all friendly forces in the operating area.

(2) Monthly coordination/targeting staff visits were conducted with III MAF and I FFV to obtain suitable targets or areas of operation in these commands for MACSOG action teams. NAD was responsible for intelligence gathering necessary to evaluate the targets and plan specific operations to accomplish defined missions.* The operation plans were coordinated with Area of Operations commander and presented to MACSOG headquarters

* (S) A typical intelligence plan, including situation, enemy situation, and tactics, miscellaneous preparatory information and interrogation data is on file.

for approval not later than the Friday preceeding the week that the operations were scheduled. All operations were conducted cross-beach utilizing MACSOG assigned PTF/PCFs and action teams. The following restrictions were in effect:

(a) All operations were under MACSOG operational control and were not in conjunction with other operations. Coordination with friendly forces for the prevention of mutual interference and supporting arms was effected.

(b) Helicopters could not be used for insertion but could be used for reconnaissance and administrative lifts (and emergency extractions).

(c) Operations were coastal and not to be conducted in rivers.

(d) Maximum effort was to be made to conduct operations without US personnel.

(e) Specific operational intents were to be passed to MACSOG at least 24 hours in advance of the conduct of an operation.

(f) One of the four remaining MAROPS action (CADO) teams was to be conducting training and providing security on Paradise Island at all times.

(g) Operations were not to be conducted more frequently than three per week.

(h) Lucrative targets of opportunity could be optionally undertaken based on current intelligence and a target intent message submitted to MACSOG at least 24 hours prior to conduct of the operation.