Paradise Island.

2.) On 1 May 1969, MACSOG assumed responsibility for the full support of the Paradise Island prisoner and interrogation center. DATA Inactivation, prompted by the moratorium of VNV MAROPS and termination of prisoner source, was a natural economy action. Property and supplies, with exception of excess weapons, were inventoried and transferred to NAD Danang for storage and safe keeping. A garrison force was assigned consisting of a camp commander (MSgt, CSS), three assistants, and one Sea Commando team to be rotated for combined training/security duty responsibilities.

3.) Re-Evaluation of PTF Requirements

a. Four OSPREY Class PTFs (aluminum hull, US construction) were deleted from MACSOG allowance on 15 January and were returned to US Navy control. Six 17 class NASTY PTFs (US constructed, Trumpy) were placed in reserve status, to be maintained in readiness at US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Subic Bay. In recommending the deletion of the 17 class craft, the CINCPAC position was that the remaining seven operational PTFs at Danang constituted an adequate force to satisfy foreseeable future requirements including resumption of operations against NVN, if directed.*

b. In May 1969, MACSOG re-evaluated the need for the thirteen PTFs, seven of which are on lease to the GVN and stationed at NAD Danang and six held in reserve status at SRF, Subic Bay, P.I. The following conclusions were reached:**

(1) Current operating restrictions obviated the need for such an extensive inventory.

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 52253Z Jan 69.
** ( ) COMUSMACV 1930 180229Z May 69.

(2) The lengthy standdown period had diluted the credibility of the SSPL presence in the Northern Tonkin gulf.

(3) If MAROPS against NVN were resumed they would initially be conducted at a reduced tempo, probably restricted to surveillance inserts and exfiltrations.

(4) The seven PTFs leased to the GVN were adequate to conduct a sustained mission capability of fifteen missions per month, in addition to training operations, MAROPS/then being conducted in SVN waters. Additionally, a higher tempo could be sustained for a limited period while effecting a PTF build-up at Danang.

(5) Under current and projected conditions little justification could be found to hold the PTF 17 class at SRF Subic in reserve for MACSOG.

(6) COMUSMACV recommended* that the six PTF 17 class craft be released to the fleet for employment in the Pacific theater, with the provision that if high priority commitments were established by higher headquarters beyond the capability stated above, sufficient additional PTF 17 class craft would be made available to meet commitments; and that the MACSOG PTF allowance be reduced to seven. (As of 1 July 1969, no action had been taken by JCS).

4. Review of MAROPS Future. A review of current and future plans for the continuance of MAROPS and the NVN (FOOTBOY) operations in the new political military environment influenced by the stand down of activity and the Paris Peace talks was conducted at CINCPAC on 5 November 1968. It was concluded that MACSOG should retain

* (TS) COMUSMACV 1930 180229Z May 69.

its personnel and material assets in order to resume operations against the North should the decision be made to do so.*

a. In accordance with this prospect, MACSOG during the first half of 1969 developed a comprehensive plan to create a self-sustaining NV capability to maintain a MAROPS unconventional warfare (UW) capability after phase out of major US support.** the program included two concepts:

(1) That a capability within the realistic abilities, needs and size of a future RVN military force be established.

(2) That such a capability be evolved through a succession of gradual steps that would minimize any reduction of present US capabilities and prevent any significant impact at the time of US withdrawal.

b. To carry out this plan the following post-withdrawal goal was established: An all VN Navy UW MAROPS organization consisting of four Nasty-Class PTFs, Two Twenty-Man action teams, and Support Forces, with a two-fold mission of northern territorial waters protection and surveillance and a limited UW capability.

G. ENEMY COASTAL DEFENSE

1. Statistics. Ananlysis of NVN coastal defenses related to MAROPS indicate that the North Vietnamese Armed Forces employed a variety of weapons to support coastal security and to provide nominal protection for the country's fishing industry. Weapons varied from light, short range artillery and mortars, to heavy caliber guns (130 MM and greater) with maximum range up to 15 nm. Figures CD-10 and CD-11 presents comparative statistics and areas of 1966, 1967 and 1968 firing

* (TS) Report, Conference on MACSOG Programs, MACV TS 000-6274, 6 Nov 1968.
** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 111436Z June 1969.

FIGURE CD-11


CD FIRE STATISTICS

	1966	1967	1968
No Missions Conducted	144	153	160
No Missions Received Fire	32	54	58
Estimated Total No RDS	1000	3600	2600
Percent Missions Received Fire	22%	35%	36%
Estimated Average No RDS per Mission received Fire	31	66	44
Average Closest RDS	Occasionally <10M or >1000M, but mostly 100-200M	Occasionally <10M or >1000M, but mostly 100-200M	Occasionally <10M or 1000M, but mostly >100-200M
Average Maximum Range	7-10 nm	7-10 nm	7-10 nm

a/Data in these two columns is highly valuable. Figures shown are the result of visual examination of the available date and more closely represent a model rather than a mean value

FIGURE [illegible]

CD FIRE STATISTICS



incidents experienced and reported from MAROPS activity. The percentage of missions receiving fire increased significantly in 1967 from 22 to 35 percent. This increase in frequency of firings could be attributed to a general intensification of the war with an attendant increase in number of weapons available to the NVN coastal defense forces.*

2. Patterns. Firing incidents directed at MAROPS craft reveal certain patterns in the deployment of enemy weapons which remained almost unchanged from 1966 thru 1968. Areas of greatest concentration (e.g. the HON MATT, HON NIEU and MUI GA area) were prime fishing areas and lucrative target areas for MAROPS missions. The concentrations may have been designed primarily to limit the effect of MAROPS, or simply placed in these areas because these same areas are of large populations and adjacent fishing grounds. Shore battery fire had a limiting effect on missions in these areas and PTF craft often were forced to depart an area with many fishing craft untouched. Statistics reflecting accuracy and range of weapons were variable; however, extremely accurate fire at ranges in excess of 10 miles was received on a few occasions. There was no substantive evidence to show that radar controlled fire was utilized.

* (TS) Report, OIC NAD DANANG, "Historical Analyses of MAROPS Danang 1964-1968" 3 Jan 69.

PART IV. EVALUATIONS

A. GENERAL

A detailed study of maritime operations was conducted in late 1967 and early 1968 by two committees: the CINCPAC survey and the MACV Ad Hoc Evaluation groups. These evaluations were particularly timely because they came at the height of MACSOG maritime activity against NVN. The restrictions imposed in April and November 1968 limited and then terminated all operations against the North.

B. AD HOC EVALUATION GROUP

Included in this report are the conclusions of the CINCPAC survey group.

* * *

"10. AD HOC Evaluation Group Conclusions:

"a. There is no conflict between PLOWMAN mission and MARKETTIME mission.

"b. There is a conflict between the PLOWMAN mission and the SEA DRAGON mission of interdiction and destruction of NVN vessels.

"c. Harassment (or destruction) of NVN shore installations is a mission for SEA DRAGON and is not feasible for PLOWMAN forces due to the vulnerability and light armament of PTF's.

"d. Intelligence derived, while generally low-level, has included some of significance and represented the only HUMINT from the coastal provinces of NVN.

DATA

"f. The mission of PLOWMAN should be revised to take into consideration similar missions being performed by other forces and those missions from which PLOWMAN has had or can expect to have the best results.

"g. DATA

"h. Although PTF crews are required to interrogate crewmen of NVN fishing vessels in order to determine lucrative intelligence sources, glean intelligence and potential SSPL supporters, the PTF crews are not trained in interrogation methods or in PSYOPS methods.

"i. While CADO operations did not produce any significant results during 1967, the potential for obtaining significant results, i.e. capture of military prisoners, warrants their retention as part of PLOWMAN However, the present number of teams should not be increased.

"j. Action teams are qualified and are trained on a regular basis for parachute jump qualification. There is no requirement for them to be parachute jump qualified since the concept of operations is to insert/extract them via water.

"k. The system of payment of a bonus to action teams for crossing 17° North Latitude, whether or not the CADO mission is actually successful in getting ashore does not appear to be conducive to successful operations.

"l. While the results obtained by Action Teams in the Delta have, in general, been excellent. operation within SVN is not within the mission of PLOWMAN Further, the type of operation in the Delta, owing to environment both by terrain and friendly support, is not typical of operations in NVN and hence is of limited value as a training vehicle. Training exercises across the beach in I CTZ against known VC strong points should produce a better quality of training.

"m. DATA



"n. Training of the CSS Staff to take over planning and control of PLOWMAN has not been effective owing to the small number of officers on the CSS Staff. If the policy has been established that SVN will continue to conduct covert operations in NVN with US assets upon the withdrawal of US forces, then the CSS staff needs to be enlarged. If such a policy has not been approved, then such efforts should be limited to the capability of the CSS Staff.

"o. Training of NV personnel in the maintenance and repair of PTF's is not practical owing to an insufficient number of VN personnel in the present training program. As in the training of the CSS staff, this program should be very limited, unless it is required to meet a US policy objective then the number of VN personnel must be significantly increased.

"p. The increase in NVN coastal surveillance, coastal defense batteries, and retrenchment of the fishing fleet in the Southern provinces appears to be related more to SEA DRAGON operations than to PLOWMAN However, the indicated increase in NVN internal security in the coastal provinces and a resentment by the populace in these areas against the NVN government is directly and solely attributed to PLOWMAN

"q. The US organization for the PLOWMAN program is satisfactory except for the following:

"(1) MACSOG OP-31 required one additional officer in order to effectively carry out all their staff responsibilities.

"(2) The NAD organization of three separate groups each with an OIC and with two groups TAD (TDY) is unwieldy and not conducive to proper control and efficient accomplishment of their mission.

"(3) The requirement that officers in the command, operations and plans section be UDT qualified, as recommended in the proposed JTD for NAD, is not in consonance with the operations to be performed in that less than 10% of the missions conducted are UDT missions. These officers should be experienced in either PTF's or similar type boats or in surface tactics and should have a background in seamanship such as damage control, gunnery, etc.

"r. Financial management of the PLOWMAN program requires improvement.

"s. While cost effectiveness if not a practical means of evaluating operations of this nature, the cost and the current and projected resources devoted to PLOWMAN are considered to be excessive for the results obtained or potential results to be obtained.

"t. There is no specific, detailed long-range planning for PLOWMAN operations.

"u. Planning coordination with activities such as STD, and 7th FLT outside MACSOG is adequate.

"v. The success of the PLOWMAN operations is dependent on the training of the Vietnamese personnel. However, training of PTF crews in operational tactics is insufficient to insure the most optimum results from each mission.

"w. Although PLOWMAN operations are covert, launching of a mission is easily visible to anyone and tracks to the OP areas are not always outside radar range of the NVN coast.

"x. Facilities for PLOWMAN forces and personnel are excellent, and are adequate for an increased tempo of operations.

"y. Operational and Logistics support required from other activities in RVN, outside of SOG, are minimal.

"z. Utilization of PTF's on operational missions during 1967 averaged approximately 20% for each PTF which is considered to be very low.

"aa. Losses sustained by PLOWMAN forces during 1967 were minimal. Only one PTF was damaged and none were lost.

"bb. Restraints imposed on PLOWMAN do not significantly affect PLOWMAN operations. However, better results could be expected if PTF's were permitted to operate freely in areas north of 20° North Latitude rather than be required to adhere to a predetermined track.

"cc. Use of Boston Whalers in conjunction with PTF's will have to be limited to calm seas. However, their use in conjunction with PTF's should permit operations closer to the shore and provide an element of surprise in boarding fishing vessels.

"dd. In 1967, a total of 101 missions were conducted for the purpose of capturing prisoners. A total of 328 prisoners were captured on 56 missions. Thus, an average of approximately 6 prisoners were captured per mission and approximately 56% of the missions were successful. Therefore, in order to furnish 100 prisoners per month to paradise Island, which is the number expected to be processed each month, a total of 16 successful missions per month should be conducted (16 x 6 = 96 prisoners per month). Only 56% of the missions can be expected to be successful. To arrive at the total number of missions which should be scheduled: 16 successful missions = .56 (total missions to be scheduled) or 28 missions per month. Additionally, 3 CADO missions (one per team) per month should be scheduled. Thus a total of 31 missions per month should be scheduled.

"ee. The number of boats required to conduct 31 missions per month is based on the following formula:

$$N = \frac{BDT}{AE}$$

"Where: B = Number of boats per mission. Based on equal coverage of all areas plus 3 CADO missions, for 31 missions this averages 2.2 boats per mission.

D = Average mission duration. For computation purposes the duration of the longest mission 30 hours is used.

T = Total number of missions to be conducted, 31.

A = Boat availability or 0.88 as obtained from MACSOG.

E = Engine hours per month. Based on 50% utilization with 20% of this time for training, 288 hrs per month available for operational missions.

"Therefore, to conduct 31 missions per month requires:

$$N = \frac{(2.2)\ (30)\ (31)}{(.88)\ (288)} = 8.07 \text{ boats}$$

"This number should be increased by two in order to have one boat in stand by and one boat in overhaul. The total number of PTF's required is ten. If normal utilization is 50% for a short period, a 30% increase in the number of missions which could be conducted would be possible by increasing utilization to 66% or 475 engine hours per month. The number of PTF crews required to conduct 31 missions per month, based on 3 days rest between missions is 10. (31 missions x 2.2 boats per mission = 68 boats msns per month: crew availability 7 missions per month [720 ÷ (72 + 30)]. Two additional crews should be provided to allow for injuries, sickness, etc., thus 12 crews should be ample for 31 missions per month. For a short period, the number of missions could be increased by 30% by rotating crews every 48 hours vice 72 hours.

"(NOTE: Information on which to base attrition by battleloss, unexpected hull damage, etc. was not available, hence an attrition factor was not considered in computing the number of PTF's required. MACSOG should collect data for this purpose so that attrition rates can realistically be applied.)

"11. Cincpac Report:

"a. Conclusions made by the Joint Survey Team on MACSOG programs are listed, together with the AD HOC Evaluation Groups (AHEG) comments, in the following paragraphs.

"b. Team Conclusions: The current SOG organization for the conduct of PLOWMAN operations is adequate.

AHEG Comment: Concur except as recommended in AHEG recommendation numbers 12c and e.

"c. The current availability of seven PTF's has limited the conduct of PLOWMAN operations in both frequency and in area and type of operation conducted. The assignment of additional PTF's would provide not only for greater mission frequency but in better geographic coverage of the NVN coast. This in turn would improve the opportunities to obtain intelligence sources knowledgeable in areas not adequately covered in the past.

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur. The AHEG concluded that 80% of the missions conducted in 1967 were in two areas; that with six boats operational it should have been possible to conduct a minimum of 27 missions per month (16 two boat missions and 11 three boat missions). However, the highest number scheduled was 22; the highest number conducted was 16. Further, the utilization of PTF's on operational missions during 1967 was approximately 20%. Therefore, do not concur that the number of boats assigned limited operations either as to frequency or coverage.

"d. In addition to restraints related to the shortage of PTF's there is a JCS imposed restraint on the employment of PLOWMAN) detainees for intelligence/defection operations. The requirement to obtain JCS approval for such employment, in cases where large scale defection operations are not involved, is unrealistic and limits the effectiveness of PLOWMAN) operations. --

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur that the effectiveness of PLOWMAN) operations have been limited by this JCS imposed restraint. A JCS decision can be acquired in sufficient time to plan the return of detainees for intelligence or defector operations. Once these personnel are ear-marked for this type operation additional training is required. Decisions from JCS should be expected in less time than it takes to provide this required training.

"e. PLOWMAN) operations have provided significant intelligence in the past) DATA DATA . However, better geographic coverage should be obtained. The collection of intelligence is a valid objective for PLOWMAN) .

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur that better geographic coverage should be obtained and that collection of intelligence is a valid objective for PLOWMAN).

"f. CADO missions have achieved a low success rate in the past. However, there is no guarantee that the inclusion of US personnel in CADO teams would increase the quality of the intelligence take of such operations. Conversely, the use of US personnel in such missions could compromise the psychological objective of PLOWMAN) operations.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"g. PLOWMAN) operations are ineffective in impeding the infiltration of enemy resources in NVN by direct interdiction of enemy coastal shipping. Such interdiction can better be accomplished by overt means (SEA DRAGON). Interdiction is not a valid objective for PLOWMAN)

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"h. PLOWMAN) operations have achieved a significant psychological impact in NVN by providing the coastal fishing population with evidence of an alternative to communist suppression, exacerbating strains between the population and the government/party structure, and varying degrees and modes of concern at the several levels of NVN leadership as to the existence of dissident elements in the NVN population. Significant opportunities for even more effective psychological impact exists in achieving a closer integration between PLOWMAN operations and psychological operations DATA DATA)

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"i. PLOWMAN operations have caused significant diversion of NVN resources to coastal and internal security. This effect is resultant from the conduct of all types of PLOWMAN operations and should continue as long as PLOWMAN Forces operate in close proximity to the NVN coastline, whatever the specific objectives of the operation.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur. (SEA DRAGON forces also contribute significantly)

"j. DATA DATA has produced an adverse effect on the economy of NVN. This effect has been incidental to the achievement of other objectives and in the case of DATA, probably has been counter-productive from the psychological standpoint.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"k. Recommendations made by the Joint Survey Team on MACSOG Programs, including CINCPAC comments on those which CINCPAC non-concurred are listed below together with the AHEG comments.

"1. Team recommendations(Page C-II-12, para 7). It is recommended that:

"(1) The PLOWMAN mission be restated essentially as follows:

"(a) DATA DATA.

"(b) Obtain human intelligence from detainees and prisoners, and from cross-beach reconnaissance.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"(2) PLOWMAN operations be closely integrated with HUMIDOR in order to achieve the objectives states in 1(1) (a) above.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur.

"(3) PLOWMAN operations in pursuit of both the intelligence and psychological objectives be conducted at a frequency consistent with operational requirements and as permitted by a SOG Force level of 12 to 14 PTF's (including boats in overhaul at Subic).

"AHEG COMMENT: See AHEG comment number 11 h (1).

"(4) Concomitant with the assignment of a revised mission, as stated, above, the administrative procedures be revised to permit COMUSMACV at his discretion:

"(a) To conduct PLOWMAN operations appropriate to the original mission in NVN coastal waters south of 20 degrees 30 minutes North Latitude.

"(b) To employ PLOWMAN detainees as intelligence agents or as defection organizers.

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur. The AHEG does not consider that the current approval procedures impose any undue restraint on operations. However, the AHEG recommends that MACSOG submit on a monthly basis for approval a detailed plan covering a period of one month. Approval of this plan would permit day to day operations at COMUSMACV discretion without obtaining approval for each individual mission on a case by case basis.

"(5) US Advisors not be employed with the CADO teams for the time being.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur that US Advisors not be employed with CADO teams in operations north of 17° North Latitude. DATA ↓

"(6) Continued emphasis be given to developing the SVN capability to conduct covert maritime operations unilaterally or with a minimum of covert US control following a stand down.

"AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur. At the present time CSS has only six officers and it does not appear that this number will be increased. This number and their background preclude an effective, realistic training program for SVN to unilaterally assume the conduct of PLOWMAN Therefore, the AHEG recommends instead that MACSOG request STD to assign an adequate number of officers to the CSS to permit a realistic training program for this purpose. This recommendation is valid only if policy has been approved to permit RVN to conduct covert operations in NVN after US withdrawal.

"m. Team Recommendations:

"(1) That an on board allowance level of ten PTF be maintained for NVN operation in the PLOWMAN program, with an additional four craft manned by US Navy crews to be assigned to the PLOWMAN program, to be utilized for joint operations as appropriate and for conventional US Navy support operations as required.

"AHEG COMMENT: See AHEG comment number 11n(1).

"(2) That authorization for utilization of US Navy crews on PLOWMAN PTF's be reviewed by higher authority with realistic presentation that their activity in NVN waters can be more appropriately utilized and controlled from the MACSOG command than from another base of operations (COMSEVNTH FLEET or COMNAVFORV) which is currently under proposal and consideration.

"AHEG COMMENT: See AHEG Comment 11n(2).

"n. Team Recommendation: (Page 7, para 3d(5)) COMUSMACV should request confirmation that 14 PTF's, to be manned by indigenous crews, will be assigned for use in PLOWMAN . (The OPNAV representative on the Survey Team has placed, in the record, a recommendation that the PLOWMAN PTF force consist of ten PTF's manned by indigenous crews and four PTF's manned by US Crews.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: To support the expansion of the SSPL and maintain the covert aspects of PLOWMAN , a force level of 14 PTF's should be manned by indigenous crews.

"AHEG COMMENT: These comments are addressed to team recommenations c, l, and m.

"(1) First, the number of PTF's. The AHEG does not concur that a level of 12-14 PTF's is required. Ten PTF's is considered sufficient to conduct 31 missions per month which AHEG recommends for this program. (See AHEG recommendations numbers 12i and 12p)

"(2) While the AHEG agrees that operation of PTF's by US personnel might enhance the productivity of the PLOWMAN program, such is not certain and it is not considered consistent to recommend greater participation of PLOWMAN DATA same program. If the US personnel participation is to exclude participation in SSPL operations, then the only remaining operations are intelligence collection and the destruction of NVN vessels. The destruction mission is being adequately carried out by SEA DRAGON forces and is not considered a valid mission for PLOWMAN . The intelligence collection mission of PTF crews is primarily based on interrogation. DATA DATA . Therefore, the AHEG does not concur in the use of US personnel in PLOWMAN operations north of 17° North Latitude. While the AHEG is not cognizant of the plan to operate PTF's with US Navy crews in NVN waters the following comments based on information derived during this study are submitted for consideration:

"(a) The AHEG does not concur that if US Navy crews for PTF's are authorized that they should be under MACSOG command.

"(b) Such operations should be separate from PLOWMAN in order to enhance the support of SSPL being recommended for PLOWMAN . The AHEG further considers that if the US Navy should be authorized to operate PTF's under US Navy Command, that the lower base and other facilities at DA NANG East, and support personnel should be utilized since these bases and support personnel are more than adequate to support an increased number of PTF's and to construct duplicate facilities and to provide duplicate supporting personnel would not be economical. However, if such is done, there should be one base commander, under US Navy command, responsible for support, including maintenance, and two separate operational staffs, one for PLOWMAN under MACSOG control and one for US Navy operations under US Navy control.

"o. Team recommendation: (Page 3, para 3a(3)) That COMUSMACV request that the BACKDROP program be continued until determination is made at the Washington level pertaining to inclusion of DATA material support for FOOTBOY PRAIRIE FIRE programs under FLAGPOLE; meanwhile MACSOG Logistics screen all BACKDROP support requests with their requisition to Navy constituting authorization for billing procedures to be established by CNO, US Navy through Chief Naval Material (PM-12) as Navy Action Agent.

"CINCPAC COMMENT: The FLAGPOLE system under its charter is not considered to be the proper vehicle to replace BACKDROP. CINCPAC INST 4000.5 of 13 January 1967, which formalizes and establishes the criteria for the FLAGPOLE reporting system pertains.

"AHEG COMMENT: Concur with CINCPAC Comment that FLAGPOLE system is not proper vehicle to replace BACKDROP. However, recommend that BACKDROP system be thoroughly examined and purpose redefined; that all requisitions be thoroughly reviewed and screened to ensure items are essential to PLOWMAN needs and that limitations be placed on R and D requirements (See AHEG incl 8).

"(1) Team Recommendation: That US Navy Captain (O-6) be assigned to head the PLOWMAN operations on MACSOG staff and to thus add Navy participation and experience gain in the command/control area uf U.W. afloat operations.

AHEG COMMENT: Do not concur with need to have a Navy Captain in PLOWMAN program. Present and recommended level of operations does not warrant an O-6 in this position. Head of OP-31 is a Navy Commander and the overall program is under supervision of the Operations Officer, MACSOG, O-6, Army which is working satisfactorily.

"12. AHEG Recommendations:

"a. It is recommended that the mission of PLOWMAN be to maritime operations with RVN personnel in the coastal waters of NVN in order to:

"(1) Support the HUMIDOR and TIMBERWORK programs.

"(2) Collect intelligence.

"(3) Conduct small scale cross the beach operations in NVN in support of (a) and (b) above.

"(4) Train RVN personnel to eonduct PLOWMAN operations.

"b. That specific tasks for PLOWMAN be:

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U

"(2) Intelligence collection, including photography, by PTF crews as tasked by SOGINTEL.

"(3) Insertion and extraction of detainees, defectors and agents in support of HUMIDOR and TIMBERWORK programs.

"(4) Conduct, on a limited scale, cross beach operations in NVN for the purpose of capturing selective prisoners DATA or as specifically tasked through SOGINTEL by higher authority such as MACV, CINCPAC or JCS. Additionally, small scale sabotage in support of DATA.

"(5) Destroy or capture NVN vessels only in self defense, except targets of opportunity that are definitely identified as directly supporting the NVN war effort may be destroyed, providing such action does not jeopardize the primary mission.

"(6) Train and advise RVN personnel how to conduct the above listed tasks.

"c. That OP-31 be increased by one officer, Navy O-3; that the plans officer be a US Navy officer and that the Marine officer in OP-31 be UDT qualified.

"d. That in regards to the organization of NAD:

"(1) All officers in command, operations, and plans sections be qualified or experienced in either small boats (PTF size) or surface ship tactics and not necessarily UDT qualified and that the operations officer be a US Navy officer.

"(2) The Marine officer assigned be UDT qualified.

"(3) All MST and SEAL (MARRECON) personnel be assigned PCS and under the command of the officer in charge of NAD. Further the OIC should have NJP authority over all personnel in his command.

"(4) That MACSOG formally request STD to increase the number of officers and men assigned to CSS in order that training of CSS to unilaterally conduct and plan PLOWMAN operation can be effectively accomplished. (This recommendation is valid only if policy has been established that RVN will continue to conduct such operations after US withdrawal.)

"e. That the number of VN action Team personnel remain at the present level (three teams - 72 personnel) and that presently assigned personnel be screened to eliminate those unsuited or unproductive.

"f. That an analysis be conducted to ascertain economy measures which can be made and that a financial management system be instituted in the PLOWMAN program. That concerted effort be made to reduce the cost of PLOWMAN operations. Actions that appear feasible are:

"(1) Reduction in number of vehicles.

"(2) Reduction in number of programmed PTF's.

"(3) Reduction in construction and improvement in present facilities (e.g. paving roads at BLACK ROCK does not appear to be necessary).

"(4) Elimination of per diem by assigning personnel PCS.

"(5) Reduction in NUNG-Guard force.

"(6) Reduction in VN civilian work force.

"(7) Reduction in MST and SEAL Detachment personnel.

"(8) Reduction in Backdrop program.

"g. That 31 missions per month be scheduled and that not more than ten PTF's, 12 PTF crews and three Action Teams be assigned PLOWMAN which is considered adequate to launch 31 missions per month.

"h. That an analysis of operations completed, and results achieved be conducted with the purpose of providing for planning purposes, adequate coverage of the areas of operation, times to conduct operations and objective to be derived from each mission.

"i. That operational planning be on a long-range basis with specific objectives to be accomplished. It should be broken down as to seasons, the objectives to be accomplished, night/day operations and the number of missions required.

"j. That a specific formal training program for PTF and action teams be established which would provide for instruction and practice in tactics, methods of operations, interrogation, intelligence collection (including photography) and PSYOP. Additionally, that PTF crews be trained in damage control procedures, avoidance of gunfire, and tactics on approaching fishing vessels in order to minimize or avoid damage from satchel charges or other explosive devices.

"k. That methods of operating, in order to maintain an element of surprise in PLOWMAN operations, be investigated such as launching missions from a covert site and having tracks to operation areas outside of visual and radar range of the NVN coast.

"l. That COMUSMACV submit to CINCPAC for approval on a monthly basis, a detailed plan (covering a period of one month) so that COMUSMACV could carry out day to day operations at his discretion. Changes, modifications, new or special operations not included in the approval plan would require specific CINCPAC approval. Further, that approval be requested to operate freely in areas North of 20° North Latitude rather than have to adhere to a predetermined track."

C. (U) NAD DRAFT RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD. At Tab 6 is the recommendation for Presidential Unit Citation prepared for NAD.

TAB 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Intergovernmental Lease of Defense Article)

1. Operation and Use. Except as may be otherwise authorized by the Lessor Government and except during transfer from the United States and return to the place of redelivery, the Lessee Government shall keep the Defense Article in its own possession, custody and control.

2. Initial Condition. The Defense Article is leased to the Lessee Government on an "as is, where is" basis without warranty or representation concerning the condition or state or repair of the Defense Article or any part thereof and without any agreement by the Lessor Government to alter, improve, adapt or repair the Defense Article or any part thereof.

3. Maintenance. The Lessee Government shall maintain the Defense Article in good order, repair and operable condition and shall upon expiration or termination of this Lease return the Defense Article in operable condition and in as good condition as when received, normal wear and tear excepted.

4. Loss of or damage to Defense Article. In the event of loss or of substantial damage to the Defense Article, due to or attributable to causes not the fault of the Lessee Government, the Lessee Government will not be responsible for the loss of or damage to the Defense Article.

5. Indemnification. The Lessee Government renounces all claims against the Lessor Government, its officers, agents, and employees for any such claims of third parties.

6. Place of Redelivery. Upon expiration or termination of this Lease, the Defense Article shall be returned at a place and time to be mutually agreed upon.

7. Title. Title to the Defense Article shall remain in the Lessor Government. The Lessee Government will, however, place the Defense Article under its Flag and mark the Defense Article in accordance with the Lessee Governments' procedures and practices.

8. Covenant Against Contingent Fees. The Lessee Government warrants that it has not employed any person to solicit or secure this Lease upon any agreement for a commission, percentage, brokerage or contingent fee.

9. Officials Not to Benefit. No Member of or Delegate to Congress of the United States, or Resident Commissioner of the United States, shall be admitted to any share or part of this Lease or to any benefit that may arise therefrom.

10. Inconsistent Terms. In case of any conflict between these General Provisions and any other terms and conditions of this Lease, such other terms and conditions shall control.

LEASE OF FAST PATROL BOAT (PTF)

BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

THE LEASE, made as of the 9th day of October 1965, between the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (hereinafter called the "Lessor Government") represented by its Department of the Navy and the GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (hereinafter called the "Lessee Government") represented by the Logistics Command of the Government of Vietnam.

WITNESSETH:

WHEREAS, The Secretary of the Navy of the Lessor Government (hereinafter called the "Secretary") has determined that the Fast Patrol Boat built by Westermoen, Mandal, Norway in 1965, Hull Number 520, eighty feet four inches overall length, and twenty-four feet seven inches beem width (hereinafter referred to as the defense article) is not excess to the needs of the Department of the Navy of the Lessor Government within the meaning of Section 472 of Title 40 of the United States Code, but is not for the time being required for public use, and

WHEREAS, The Secretary has determined that it will be in the public interest to lease the defense article without cost to the Lessor Government upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, and

WHEREAS, This lease is made under the authority of Section 2667 of Title 10 of the United States Code (70A Stat. 150).

NOW THEREFORE, The parties do mutually agree as follows:

1. In consideration of the maintenance and other obligations assumed by the Lessee Government, the Lessor Government hereby leases to the Lessee Government and the Lessee Government hereby leases from the Lessor Government the defense article for a term of five years from the date of delivery thereof to the Lessee Government and under the terms and conditions set forth in the General Provisions hereto annexed.

2. The Lessor Government shall deliver the defense article to the Lessee Government at such time and place as may be mutually agreed upon. Such delivery shall be evidenced by a certificate of delivery.

3. By mutual agreement, this lease may be extended for additional terms, not to exceed five years each, if the Secretary determines any such extension will promote the national defense or be in the public interest.

4. This lease may be terminated:

(a) By mutual agreement of the parties;

(b) By the Lessee Government on 30-days' written notice.

(c) By the Lessor Government (i) during any national emergency declared by its President or Congress or (ii) upon immediate written notice to the Lessee Government.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Each of the parties hereto has executed this lease as of the day and year first above written.

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

BY_____
Bui Huu Nhon, General
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
High Command Vietnam Armed Forces

Representative of the
Government of Vietnam

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY_____
J.N.Malnerich, Commander, USNavy
Commanding Officer Acting, Headquarters Support Activity, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Representative of the Government of the United States of America

TAB 2

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP
APO 96222

MACSOG-31 1 April 1969

SUBJECT: Promulgation of PARBOIL Duty Officer Watch Standing Instruction

TO: All OP-31 Staff Section Officers

1. The PARBOIL Duty Officer Watch Standing Instructions present in detail pertinent instructions to those officers qualified by the Chief, OP-31, to stand PARBOIL Duty Officer watches at SOG Headquarters. This instruction will be maintained in the PARBOIL Duty Officers' Notebook which will be in the custody of Duty Officer at all times during his tour of duty.

2. This Watch Standing Instruction, in addition to containing guidance for the conduct of the PARBOIL Duty Officer Watch, also contains examples of messages to higher authority to be transmitted to certain addees to insure the safety of all PARBOIL missions. It must be borne in mind by all Duty Officers that all possible contingence cannot be covered by these instructions and nothing in these instructions shall limit the Duty Officer from exercising his own initiative in a timely manner to insure the safety of a PARBOIL mission.

3. These instructions contain information affecting the security of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794. Transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1 Incl
(See List of Effective Pages)

JOHN F. BAUMGARDNER
Commander, U.S. Navy
Chief, OP-31

PARBOIL DUTY OFFICER INSTRUCTIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

SUBJECT	EFFECTIVE PAGES	PAGE NUMBER
Letter of Promulgation	ORIGINAL	i
Table of Contents and List of Effective Pages	ORIGINAL	ii
Record of Changes	ORIGINAL	iii
Chapter I	ORIGINAL	I-1 thru I-3
Appendix A	ORIGINAL	1-A-1
Appendix B	ORIGINAL	I-B-1
Appendix C	ORIGINAL	I-C-1 thru I-C-2
Chapter II	ORIGINAL	II-1 thru II-3
Appendix A	ORIGINAL	II-A-1
Appendix B	ORIGINAL	II-B-1
Appendix C	ORIGINAL	II-C-1 thru II-C-4
Appendix D	ORIGINAL	II-D-1
Chapter III	ORIGINAL	III-1 thru III-3
Appendix A	ORIGINAL	III-A-1
Appendix B	ORIGINAL	III-B-1 thru III-B-5
Appendix C	ORIGINAL	III-C-1 thru III-C-2

(All pages typed on one side. Reverse Blank)

COPY NO.____
HEADQUARTERS
MACSOG 31
SAIGON VIETNAM
1 April 1969

CHAPTER I

MISSION COMMAND & CONTROL

1. GENERAL.

a. Introduction. MACSOG concepts PARBOIL missions north of 17-OON to CINCPAC/JCS for approval. Upon receipt of approval of these missions MACSOG transmits detailed mission tracks to JCS/CINCPAC and to US Fleet/Air Force addees in order that all who have a need-to-know are aware of an impending PARBOIL mission. Forty-eight hours prior to a mission launch MACSOG will promulgate an Intent to Launch Message to ALCON which schedules the actual launch date of an impending mission. Upon the transmission of this intent all required coordination messages have been sent and the mission is cleared for execution.

b. Mission Sequence of Events. Twenty-four hours prior to launch time. the OIC NAD, Danang will transmit to SOG Headquarters, Info DATA , a detailed Comm Plan Message (Appendix A). This Comm Plan message will contain:

(1) Mission code to be used.

(2) Mission craft and crews to be embarked.

(3) Check-in times that OTC is to report mission progress to SOG Headquarters.

(4) Pertinent details such as mission OTC and PTF COs.

(5) DTG of mission launch.

The OP-31 Operations Officer will verify the contents of this Comm Plan message, particularly the DTG of launch to insure it is consistent with mission information promulgated previously. After verification of the Comm Plan the Operations Officer will prepare and complete the Mission Check-in Sheet (Appendix B), and the Mission Check-off List (Appendix C). On the day of the mission, the launch message will be prepared by the OP-31 Operations Officer and reviewed by the Chief OP-31 to insure correctiveness .

USNAD will announce the launch to SOG Headquarters, Info, DATA DATA via FLASH message when the PTFs actually depart the base at Danang. The Duty Officer will complete the launch message and deliver it to SOG Communications for transmission. (Refer to Chapter II) The PARBOIL Duty Officer will then monitor the progress of the mission, maintaining a file of check-in reports as received. When the mission recovers at the base in Danang, the Duty Officer will complete the recovery message and deliver it to SOG Communications for transmission.

II. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARBOIL DUTY OFFICER

a. Prior to Mission Launch.

(1) The PARBOIL Duty Officer shall insure that he is completely familiar with the intended mission details as to track and scheduled ETAs along the track.

(2) He shall insure that the effective edition of AKAC 273 and the ADAC 273 Brevity Code are available in the PARBOIL Duty Officers Notebook.

b. During the Mission.

(1) When the launch message is received from USNAD complete MACSOG launch message and insure it is transmitted from SOG Headquarters Communications. Insure that DATA and SSG have also been notified of the launch.

(2) In the event that the mission OTC fails to send his required check-in messages, the Duty Officer shall query the mission OTC utilizing the applicable AKAC 273 and AKAC 273 Brevity Code (See Chapter II and Appendix A to Chapter I). This message will be sent to the OTC no later than one hour later than the missed scheduled check-in time.

(3) Immediately notify the Chief, OP-31, and Chief, Operations, of any incident affecting the safety of the mission or any event that represents a departure from the mission as planned.

(4) The Duty Officer shall keep himself continuously informed during the period the mission is underway as to the following:

(a) Status of communications necessary for the support of the mission.

(b) Last reported position of the mission craft and current estimated position.

c. Upon Mission Recovery.

(1) Immediately complete and file for transmission the recovery message.

(2) Insure that DATA and SSG are informed of the mission recovery.

d. Other Pertinent Information.

(1) The PARBOIL Duty Officer shall be physically present within SOG Headquarters whenever a mission is underway. The Duty Watch shall be stood in the OP-31 Office or in SSG OP Center.

(2) Liaison shall be maintained with the Seventh Air Force Command Center and the Seventh Fleet LNO whenever there is a departure from the mission as planned. The Seventh Air Force Command Center may be reached by secure phone at drop number 3401. The Seventh Fleet LNO can be reached by secure phone at drop number 3311.

APPENDIXES

A - Sample Comm Plan Message (Annotated)
B - Mission Check-in Sheet
C - Mission Check-off List

APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER I

SAMPLE COMM PLAN MESSAGE

FM NAVADVDET DANANG

TO CHIEF SOG
DATTA

SECRET LIMDIS/TIGER FOR OP-31/OP-33/INTEL/SSG

TIGER OP-31/11_____SLUG LINE

MSN 501_____MSN NUMBER

1. BRIM 05 ALFA: PTF/CREW 25/4, 26/6_____Comm Plan, PTF/CREW

BRAVO: PTF/CREW 11/7, 3/8

PTF 11 Contact Central 1815-0640

PTF 25 Contact Central Entire Mission

PTF 3 Monitor Central Base - 1815, 0245-0915

2. 291143Z May 69_____Launch DTG

3. 12 hrs and 31 min_____Duration of msn

4. a. Interdict Shipping, intel collection___Objective

b. Tm Assault Objective and Capture Male Adult Prisoner

5. AKAC 273 Number_____Page Beginning_____

Check-in times: 0710, 0950, 1235_____etc.

6. For OP-31: Crews:

ALFA: 4 (LT DIEP OIC) and 6 (LT THINH)

BRAVO: 7 (LT HAO OIC) and 8 (LTJG DANG)

NIMBUS will conduct tm msn. Req no friendly air vic tgt night this msn.

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER I

SAMPLE PARBOIL CHECK-IN SHEET

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APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER I

PARBOIL MISSION CHECK-OFF LIST

CURRENT MSN: _____ MSN DETAILS MSG: _____

NEXT MSN: _____ MSN DETAILS MSG: _____

The OP-31 Staff Officer, as indicated will ensure that this form is completed for each mission. A copy of this sheet will be included in each mission folder as it is prepared. (OPS)

NO.	REQUIREMENT	COMPLETED	INITIALS
1.	Man concept msg to JCS/CINCPAC and approval received.	_____	_____
2.	Msn details msg to 7th Flt and 7th Air Force Addees (OPS)	_____	_____
	(The following must have taken place at least 48 hours prior to scheduled execution)		
3.	Coordination Papers delivered to 7th Air Force (OPS)	_____	_____
4.	Msn Sequence Msg Promulgated (OPS)	_____	_____
	(At least 24 hours prior to scheduled execution)		
5.	USNAD next Action Comm Plan received OP-31	_____	_____
6.	Launch time of 5 above verified (OPS)	_____	_____
7.	Proper AKAC 273 No. and Page No. Listed in 5 of above	_____	_____
8.	Proper FISH CODE listed in 5 above (OPS)	_____	_____
9.	Man Track (on check-in card) to SSG (OPS)	_____	_____
10.	Launch or Notification of Non-execution to ALCON (Duty Officer)	_____	_____

NO.	REQUIREMENT	COMPLETED	INITIALS
11.	Spot Report filed if required and apporved by Chief OPS or Chief SOG (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
12.	Recovery msg and intent to launch next man sent after recovery made at USNAD. In the event of a cancellation/abort this msg must contain a statement of completion or intent to reschedule mission (Duty Offier)	_____	_____
13.	Ensure SSG informed of cancellation/abort of msn (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
14.	Ensure Project SSG informed of recovery (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
15.	Ensure DATTA informed of recovery (Duty Officer)	_____	_____
16.	Ensure DATTA notified in case of cancellation	_____	_____
17.	USNAD debrief of msn received SOG (maximum delay of six hours after recovery) (OPS)	_____	_____
18.	After Action Report prepared and submitted to Chief, OP-31 (OPS)	_____	_____

COPY NO._____
HEADQUARTERS
MACSOG 31
SAIGON, VIETNAM
1 April 1969

CHAPTER II

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN IN SUPPORT OF PARBOIL MISSION

I. GENERAL.

The success of a PARBOIL mission depends to a great degree on the ability of the mission craft to communicate effectively with SOG Headquarters. DATA



tional traffic between the mission craft and SOG Headquarters. (See Appendix A to this Chapter).

II. SOG HEADQUARTERS TO MISSION CRAFT COMMUNICATIONS.

a. DATA



b.
that the mission OTC or Duty Officer may employ to report on, request status of, or obtain information concerning the mission. The mission OTC will utilize these signals DATA when transmitting check-in reports to SOG Headquarters. Check-in times are prescribed for each mission in the USNAD Communications Plan (See Appendix A to Chapter I). The Duty Officer will query a mission if this check-in is not received within one hour of the check-in time.

c. DATA



(1) Format Considerations. Messages for the OTC are drafted by the Duty Officer and released in the rough. It is therefore important that the Duty Officer carefully prepare these messages, particularly when encoding the message to be transmitted. Examples of these messages are contained in Appendix B to this Chapter.

(2) Procedures. In most instances these messages will be transmitted DATA

(3) Circuit Failure Procedure. Whenever a mission is in progress and the SOG DATA circuit fails, SOG Communications personnel will effect courier runs to the American Embassy to pickup traffic from the mission OTC. This courier will also be utilized if it becomes necessary to transmit a message to the mission OTC.

III. COMMUNICATIONS: SOG HEADQUARTERS/USNAD.

a. General. Communications with the PTF base at NAD is provided through a secure teletype net from SOG Communications to the Command Post at USNAD. All messages concerning the mission in progress are passed to USNAD for information. The Duty Officer, should, from time to time, monitor this circuit to insure it's functioning and that the SOG Communications watch-stander is passing all message traffic in a timely manner. It is particularly important that information on prisoners taken is passed to the USNAD Duty Officer. This information is necessary in order that a SWIFT craft may be sent to rendezvous with mission PTSs for prisoner transfer at BAI BAC.

b. Single Sideband Radio Communications.) DATA
located in OP-35.)
cating with USNAD Danang.)
ever passing traffic over this voice radio circuit. NAD will guard this circuit on a continuous basis whenever the secure teletype net from SOG Communications to the Command Post at USNAD is inoperative.

IV. COMMAND AND CONTROL MESSAGES TO HIGHER AUTHORITY AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES.

a. General. Friendly units, both surface and air, will be encountered by PARBOIL craft on every mission. Recognition procedures are in effect to prevent mutual interference of PARBOIL craft and these friendly units. As detailed in the OP-31 SOP, on file in OP-31 staff office, each mission, prior to its launch, is thoroughly coordinated with Seventh Fleet and Seventh Air Force commands having a need-to-know. This coordination is effected through the promulgation of detailed mission tracks, liaison visits to Seventh Air Force Headquarters and the promulgation of intent to launch messages.

b. Launch Procedures. Once the launch of a mission is scheduled, launch message is prepared on the scheduled execution day (AppendixB). This message is completed by the Duty Officer and transmitted by FLASH precedence direct from SOG Headquarters. USNAD Duty Officer will transmit the actual launch of the mission when it gets underway from Danang. This message will also indicate the craft going on the mission. The Duty Officer will transfer this information to the launch message, obtain a cite number and deliver the message to SOG Communications Center for transmission (Appendix C).

c. Delays in Launch of Mission. A delay in launch of one hour or less will require no adjustment to the detailed track message previously promulgated. If the delay in launch is in excess of one hour the launch message must so indicate the amount of delay and request addees to adjust ETAs along track. An example of a delay in launch is contained in Appendix C.

d. Cancellation and Abort Procedures. Procedures to be followed by the Duty Officer in the event a mission is cancelled, aborted, or a portion is aborted, are contained in Chapter III to these instructions.

e. Recovery Procedures. Recovery procedures are the same as for launch. When all craft have returned to base at Danang the recovery message is filed. This message will also contain the intent to launch paragraph which schedules the next PARBOIL mission (Appendix C).

f. Mission Deviations. Whenever a mission underway deviates more than ten miles from track, or one hour from planned ETAs of the track, the Duty Officer shall prepare and release a message to all launch message addees setting forth all known details (Appendix C).

V. IMMEDIATE ACTION COMMUNICATIONS. MT

The Seventh Air Force Command Center (DROP 3401) and the Seventh Fleet LNO (DROP 3311) may be contacted at any hour. Duty Officers at the Air Vorce Command Center and the Seventh Fleet LNO are fully cognizant of the current PARBOIL mission underway and can take immediate action to prevent mutual interference in the event there is an unplanned departure from the published track of the mission.

APPENDIXES

A - Chief SOG ltr of 29 Mar 69, Subj: SOG PTF/SWIFT Communication Procedure and one-time Operations Codes; forwarding of
B - Sample messages DATTT
C -
1. Launch Message
2. Delay in launch message
3. Recovery Message
4. Mission Track Deviation Message
D - Amplifying Instructions for use of AKAC 273 Brevity Codes

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER II

SAMPLE REQUEST FOR SITREP MESSAGE DATA

EXAMPLE ONE: PRECEDENCE: FLASH

FROM: CHIEF, SOG

TO: DATA

INFO: USNAD

SECRET

TIGER OP-31/ _____(Slug Line)

MSN _____(Insert Mission Number)

1. COD _____(Insert Comm Plan) PTF _____

2. QRP-X (Report situation immediately)

GP- __(Insert Grouping)

BT

NOTE Each coded signal that is to be sent will be in a separate numbered paragraph.

EXAMPLE TWO: PREDEDENCE: FLASH

FROM: CHIEF, SOG

TO: DATA

INFO: USNAD

SECRET

TIGER OP-31/

MSN 501

1. COD 20 PTF-12

2. QRP-X

3. QXX-QZR

GP-3

BT

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER II

LAUNCH MESSAGE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMEDIATE (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG (Cite No)

SUBJ: PARBOIL/ Mission _____ Launch/

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Mission Details Message DTG) (NOTAL)(TS)

PARBOIL (No.) (Number spelled out) Consisting of PTFs _____, _____ and _____ launched Danang _____Z. Code Word for this mission is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Ref A.

EXAMPLE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)
IMMEDIATE (INFO ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049

TIGER JPCO MACSOG (Cite No)

SUBJ: PARBOIL/ Mission 610 Launch/

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 2716 DTG 290215Z Aug 66/

MT

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER II

DELAY IN LAUNCH MESSAGE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG (Cite No)

SUBJ: PARBOIL Mission 610 Launch

Ref: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 2716 DTG 290215Z Aug 66

1. PARBOIL Mission 610 (Six One Sero) consisting of PTFs 5, 7 and 11 launched Danang 230715Z Oct 66. DATA

2. Mission launched 2 hours and 15 minutes late; request addees adjust ETAs along track contained Ref A accordingly.

NOTE Ref A is Details Message

Tab 2 to
Annex D to
Appendix C

APPENDIX C. TO CHAPTER II

RECOVERY MESSAGE

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCD: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG _____

SUBJ: PARBOIL Mission 610 Recovery

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 27116 DTG 290215Z Aug 68

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG 2672 DTG 240734Z Aug 68 (NOTAL)(TS)

1. PARBOIL Mission 610 (Six One Zero) recovered Danang _____Z. Mission details contained RefA.

2. Intend launch PARBOIL Mission 331 (Three Three One) 21 Oct.

DATA

NOTE Paragraph 2 of the Recovery Message is utilized to indicate the upcoming mission to be launched. If another mission is in process this paragraph will state:

PARBOIL Msn (No) (No spelled out) launched IAW Ref B currently in process. Code word for this mission is "_____" repeat "_____". Mission details contained Ref C. (Ref B in this case will be the launch msg of the msn in process and Ref C will be the applicable details msg.

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER II

MISSION TRACK DEVIATION MSG

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG

SUBJ: PARBOIL Mission 610

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG 3435 DTG 230716Z Oct 68

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG 2716 DTG 290215Z Aug 68

1. PARBOIL Mission 610 (Six One Zero) launched IAW Ref A at 16-12N/108-15E at 230715Z Oct 68. Msn craft position at 1015Z 17-30N/107-45E. Msn delayed due (high seas) (engine casualty) (battle damage) (other), enroute base on course _____, speed _____knots, ETA _____Z.

2. Request addees adjust ETAs along track contained Ref B accordingly.

GP-1

NOTE Ref A is the launch message DTG for this mission. Ref B is the Details Message. It is important to show the current time/position of the mission craft.

APPENDIX D

AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS FOR / MT

1. The absence, / MT of specific codes for "Enemy KIA" and "Friendly KIA" necessitates the use of spares.

a. /

b. /

2. / MT

Tab 2 to
Annex D to
Appendix C

CHAPTER III

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

I. GENERAL.

Procedures contained in this chapter pertain to actions to be taken by the Duty Officer in the event the mission, once launched, is not executed as planned. Such incidents as the abort of one or more mission craft, the abort of the entire mission, enemy attack upon the mission craft, or the operational loss of one or more mission craft are discussed in this chapter. Such happenings are broadly classified as emergency procedures and require a specific IMMEDIATE ACTION to be taken by the Duty Officer. Unusual occurrences such as the loss of a PTF, enemy action, or the loss of an action team, will be immediately reported to higher authority via the "Spot Report" (Appendix A). A "Spot Report" will be a FLASH message to CINCPAC and JCS giving the known details of the incident, what is being done in the way of any required assistance and will also contain guidance concerning future "Spot Reports" or whether the final report of the action will be contained in the "After Action Report", filed after the mission recovers at Danang. "Spot Reports" will be approved for release by either the Chief, Operations and Training or Chief, SOG. Preparation of a "Spot Report" will be under direct supervision of Chief, OP-31. Basically, the "Spot Report" should contain the WHO, WHERE, WHEN and HOW of any incident reported.

II. MISSION ABORTS AND CANCELLATIONS:

a. Mission Abort. Any portion or all of a mission may be aborted. For example one PTF may abort due to engine failure. The OTC has authority to abort any portion or all of a mission.

(1) When information is received from the mission OTC that he is aborting the mission, a message will be prepared and released to all launch addees as shown in Example One of Appendix B. In all cases a reason for abort of the mission will be included. The Duty Officer will also include the estimated position of the PTFs, their course and speed to base and ETA at base.

(2) When information is received that one or more of the PTFs is aborting the mission, a similar message will be prepared and released. In this case the entire mission is not aborted but just one or two boats of the mission. (See Example Two, Appendix B)

(3) When an entire mission is aborted and subsequently recovered at Danang, the recovery mesage must indicate whether or not that

mission is considered to have been completed or not. A statement to the effect that the mission number is being retained and will be rescheduled at a later date will suffice. (See Example Three, Appendix B)

b. Mission Launch Cancellation:

(1) A mission that has been scheduled may be cancelled completely. This is especially true of a 500 Series mission wherein the selected target has become hardened by a buildup of NVN coastal defense subsequent to its selection as a target for cross-beach operation. Example Four, Appendix B gives a sample message to be prepared and released when an entire mission is cancelled.

(2) A mission launch may be cancelled due to adverse weather or due to lack of mission ready PTFs. In this case, a mission not launched message is transmitted. This message will always contain the phrase that the mission will be rescheduled at a later date. (See Example Five, Appendix B) It is not possible to delay the launch of a PARBOIL mission for twenty-four hours. The required coordination necessary with Seventh Air Force makes it mandatory that 48 hours advance notice be given all intended actions by PARBOIL

III. BATTLE/OPERATIONAL DAMAGE.

a. General. Mission PTFs operate in enemy waters at a level of about fifteen missions per month. Past experience has shown that mission craft are subject to loss or damage from enemy action or miscalculation by one or more PTF commanding officers that result in an operational loss. Enemy action will nearly always result in seriously wounded PTF crewmembers who require immediate medical attention. There are units of TF 77 operating in the Tonkin Gulf who are capable of rendering assistance when requested.

b. Friendly Forces Available. The Yankee Team operating in the Tonkin Gulf consists of two CVAx, screening destroyers, SEA DRAGON destroyers, and SAR destroyers. The SEA DRAGON and SAR destroyers are the primary assistance units to help a PARBOIL mission requiring assistance while deep in NVN waters. The task unit designation of the SAR unit is TU 77:0.1. This SAR unit consists of four destroyers. Two units man a station at 19-52N/106-45E and two units man a station at 18-37N/106-15E. The northern SAR unit will remain on station at all times. The southern SAR unit will patrol a line of 18-37N between 106-15E and 106-31E. Yankee Team CVAs will operate within a circle of 35 nautical miles radius centered about 18-25N/107-30E.

A copy of the current Seventh Fleet Task Organization is maintained in the Duty Officer's Notebook in order that an updated list of units

assigned is always available. Yankee Team operations are under the operational control of CTF 77 and exercised through the Yankee Team Commander (CTG 77.0). All message traffic to Yankee Team units requesting assistance will include both CTF 77 and CTG 77.0 as either action or information addees. It is also important to include CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT on all requests for assistance. However, the SAR Unit Commander (CTU 77.0.1) should almost without exception be action addee. A recent addition to operating units in the Tonkin Gulf is TU 77.1. This unit operates as Operation SEA DRAGON. It consists of four DDs conducting interdiction operations off the NVN coast from the DMZ north to 20-OON. If mission PTFs require assistance, this force of four destroyers can be called upon to render the needed assistance. In this instance the message would be addressed to CTU 77.1 for action, info CTU 77.1.1 and CTU 77.1.2. The current SEA DRAGON weekly Planning Message is available in the OP31 Duty Officer's Book.

c. Battle Damage. The first information that the Duty Officer will receive concerning an enemy attack will normally come from the mission OTC via DATA The message will report the enemy attack by air or surface units and may request immediate assistance. If the enemy attack has been repelled without personnel or material casualties the OTC will not request assistance. However, if the enemy attack has inflicted personnel/material casualties the OTC will request assistance. Upon receipt of this request the Duty Officer should immediately prepare a FLASH message (Example One, Appendix C) to Yankee Team units givingbrief details of the attack and requesting their assistance. After message is released notify the mission OTC with a suitable FLASH message. Then immediately call Chief, OP-31 requesting his presence in Headquarters. The Duty Officer will then prepare the "Spot Report" for release at a later time. Do not request USN assistance unless the mission OTC has first requested it.

d. Operational Losses/Damage. The Duty Officer may get a message from the mission OTC that he has suffered a collision, grounding, fire or sinking. Again, if the OTC requests assistance, request Yankee Team units to provide. (Example Two, Appendix C) In the case of a grounding in shallow water indlude in the request a request for a visual recce over the grounded PTF and an air strike if necessary to insure complete destruction of the PTF to prevent its capture by the enemy.

e. All message requests for assistance transmitted to Seventh Fleet units should be immediately paralelled on KY-3 to Seventh Fleet Detachment "C", who will retransmit on Fleet Flash Net.

APPENDIX A TO CHAPTER III

SPOT REPORT

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH

TO: CINCPAC

JCS

INFO: CTF 77/COMSEVENTHFLT/CINCPACAF (elete info addees if msg of no interest to them)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL Spot Report,

REF: A. (Mission Details Message)

1. PARBOIL Mission (No.) (No, Spelled out) position_____N/ _____E at_____Z, under attack by enemy aircraft. Mission OTC reports PTF-16 heavily damaged by enemy fire and has sunk.

2. Assistance has been requested from TU 77.0.1. Destroyer GURKE has made rendezvous with mission PTFs and has removed all wounded PTF crewmembers FFT to Carrier KITTY HAWK. PTFs 5 and 10 enroute base on course_____, speed_____knots.

3. Further details of air attack will be contained in the after action report. This is first and final spot report of the incident.

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE I

MISSION ABORT

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____.

SUBJ: PARBOIL Mission_____Abort

REF: A. (Mission Details Message)

1. PARBOIL Mission (No.) (Spell Out) position_____N/

_____E at_____Z aborting due weather/engine failure/ radar failure/enemy contact returning to base on course_____ degrees, speed_____knots, ETA base_____Z.

2. Details of mission contained Ref A.

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE 2

PTF OF MISSION ABORTING MISSION

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDESS)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL Mission_____PTF Abort

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG_____DTG_____Z (Mission Details Msg)

1. PARBOIL Mission (No.) (Spell Out) position_____N/

_____E at_____Z. PTF_____aborting due gyro failure/ engine failure/radar failure returning to base on course_____degrees, speed_____knots. ETA base_____Z. PTF_____and_____ continuing on mission.

2. Details of mission contained Ref A.

Tab 2 to
Annex D to
Appendix C

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE 3

RECOVERY MESSAGE ON AN ABORT MISSION

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCD: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL Mission_____Recovery

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG_____DTG_____Z(Msn Details on current msn)

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG_____DTG_____Z (Msn Details intended msn)

1. PARBOIL Mission_____(Spell Out) recovered Danang_____Z. Mission Details contained Ref A.

2. Intend launch PARBOIL mission_____(Spell Out) (Day/Month). Code word for this msn is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Reg B.

3. Msn_____will be/will not be rescheduled/at a later date/and is considered complete.

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

EXAMPLE 4

CANCELLATION

(MSN NOT TO BE RESCHEDULED)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDEES)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL Msn_____

REF: A. (Msn Details Msg - Cancelled Msn)

B. (Msn Details Msg - Intended Msn)

1. PARBOIL Msn_____(Spell Out) cancelled due enemy build-up in area/coastal defense batteries in area/non-receipt pre-strike photography will not be rescheduled. Details of msn contained Ref A.

2. Intend launch PARBOIL Msn_____(Spell Out) (Day/Month). Code word for this msn is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Ref B.

APPENDIX B TO CHAPTER III

CANCELLATION

(MSN TO BE RESCHEDULED)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH (ACTION ADDEES)

TO: AIG 7049 IMMED (INFO ADDESS)

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL Msn_____Cancellation

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details - Cancelled Mission)

B. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details - Intended Mission)

1. PARBOIL Msn_____(Spell Out) launch cancelled due adverse weather/non-availability of PTFs. Msn will be rescheduled at a later date. Msn details contained Ref A.

2. Intend launch msn_____(Spell Out) (day/month). Code word for this msn is "_____" repeat "_____". Msn details contained Ref B.

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

(BATTLE DAMAGE/LOSS)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH

TO: CTU 77.0.1 ----------CDR SAR Unit DDs

CTE 77.0.1.1---------Northern SAR Unit DDs

CTE 77.o.1.2---------Southern SAR Unit DDS

CTG 77.0----------Yankee Team CDR

CTG 77.1----------SEA DRAGON OTC

CTG 77.1.1----------SEA DRAGON DDs

CTG 77.1.2----------SEA DRAGON DDs

INFO: CTF 77/CINCPACFLT/CINCPAC/JCS/CTE 70.2.1.1./COMSEVENTHFLT/CTE 70.2.1.2

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL/ Msn_____Request for assistance/

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details Msg)

1. / PARBOIL/ Msn_____(Spell Out) under attack by enemy aircraft position_____N/_____E at_____Z. PTFs damaged and crew wounded. Request SAR unit rendezvous with msn craft and render assistance.

2. / Msn proceeding on course_____degree, speed_____knots.

Msn details contained Ref A.

APPENDIX C TO CHAPTER III

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

(OPERATIONAL LOSS)

FROM: COMUSMACV PRECEDENCE: FLASH

TO: CTG 77.0

CTE 77.0.1

CTU 77.1.1

INFO: CTF 77

COMSEVENTHFLT

CINCPACFLT

CINCPAC

JCS

CTE 70.2.1.1

TIGER JPCCO MACSOG_____

SUBJ: PARBOIL/ Msn_____Request for Assistance

REF: A. COMUSMACV MACSOG (Msn Details Msg)

1. PARBOIL Msn _____(Spell Out) has one PTF aground position_____N/_____E at_____Z. Crew removed to other msn craft. Msn proceeding to base on course_____ speed_____ knots. Msn details contained Ref A.

2. Request first light visual recce of aground PTF to insure destruction complete. If craft is visible req air strike to insure destruction.

TAB 3

U. S. NAVAL ADVISORY DETACHMENT
Drawer 19
APO San Francisco 96337

USNADINST 003100.2B
10
19 July 1969

USNAD INSTRUCTION 003100.2B

From: Officer in Charge, U. S. Naval Advisory Detachment, Da Nang
To: Distribution List

Subj: Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for USNAD Operations in RVN (USNADOPSRVN)

Encl: (1) USNADOPSRVN - Standard Operating Procedures
(2) USNADOPSRVN - Communications
(3) USNADOPSRVN - Coordination
(4) Special Orders for CPDO FOR USNADOPSRVN

1. Purpose. To promulgate the SOP containing standard guidance and basic policy for the composition, operation and adminstration of USNADOPSRVN.

2. Additions and Changes. Additions and changes to this SOP will be published as required. Recommendations for changes are solicited and will be submitted to the OIC USNAD via Chief of Operations and Training, USNAD.

3. Scope. This SOP provies basic guidance for the conduct of operations in RVN by USNAD. It is a single source reference document for operational personnel whose duties require the information contained herein.

4. Action. All USNAD personnel are responsible for carrying out the policies and procedures set forth in this SOP.

C. T. EDSON

Distribution: (2 cys)
MACV (SOG)
OIC SEAL/RECON
CG III MAF

NAD CONTROL #0099-69

USNADINST 003100.2B
19 July 1969

USNADOPSRVN - STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

MISSION, CONCEPT AND ORGANIZATION

1. Purpose. The purpose of USNAD Operations in the Republic Vietnam under the direction and operational control of OIC USNAD Da Nang and with the full cognizance of Chief, SOG, CG III MAP and CG, I Corps, is to provide training in RVN under actual combat conditions in preparation for subsequent operations.

2. Mission. USNAD Action Teams are capable of performing the following type missions:

a. Capture of adult, male prisoners.

(1) Capture of predesignated prisoners.

b. Combat patrols.

(1) Limited scale raids.

(2) Limited scale ambushes.

c. Intelligence gathering missions.

3. Concept of Employment.

a. Action Teams will be employed based on intelligence gathered from multi-sources which indicate a target of opportunity within the capability of one or more action teams and when the target is approved by OIC NAD.

b. Action teams will generally be employed only in over-beach type operations utilizing the afloat assets of USNAD to insert and extract. Action teams will receive sufficient training to insure they are prepared for alternate methods of insertion, extraction, i.e., helicopter, foot, and parachute should these methods be utilized.

c. When action teams are employed in conjunction with afloat assets, insertion and extraction will generally be accomplished as follows: (Exact method depends of tactical situation.)

(1) PTF/Swift will close the beach to approximately 5000 meters. Teams will be launched in RB-12's (Point ALFA) and radar vectored toward a predesignated landing point. RB-12's will close to 1000 meters using