ANNEX B
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APPENDIX C

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

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ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

PART I. BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

This Annex describes in some detail Airborne operations from 1964 until June 1969. Included, in addition to the study and evolution of the original long-term agent teams, is the development of the STRATA Teams, employment of singleton agents, and the later development of the diversionary program. These operations were referred to as Airborne operations, or Agent Team operations, until the code word DATA was assigned in 1967. The meanings of other code words appearing in this Annex can be found in Tab A to the general section of this volume.

B. INITIAL POLICY

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Airborne operations assumed responsibility for four teams in North Vietnam, the Camp Long Thanh training facility with approximately 169 agents in training, and several safe houses in Saigon.*

2. Mission. The first mission statement for the airborne section was, "to assist and supervise ARVN counterparts in the accomplishment of small demolition operations, small-scale intelligence collection, temporary interdiction of lines of communication, limited psychological operations, and creation of general harassment in DRV as set forth in OPLAN-34A."*

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History 1964," p. II-8. (SACSA)

C. EVOLUTION OF MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

1. General. The mission and effectiveness of the long term agent teams were in a state of continuous reevaluation from 1965 until the summer of 1968, when all teams were judged as probably compromised. During this period of time, thinking changed from the belief that the teams represented a valuable asset in accomplishing SOG's mission to the later opinion expressed by CINCPAC that the long-term agent teams were a "complete failure in terms of the useful intelligence produced."* In the paragraphs that follow, the mission changes will be traced and the policies outlined that supported the missions. For a summary of evaluation material, see Part IV of this Annex.

2. 1965 Developments

a. New Op-Order. The mission given to the Airborne Section of MACSOG by CINCPAC** in the October 1965 Op-Order reflected the evolution of SOG's mission to emphasis on intelligence collection:

> "34-A guerrilla in-place teams and teams to be infiltrated into NVN will conduct intelligence, sabotage, psychological, and escape and evasion (E&E) operations. 34-A teams are authorized to recruit and support local agents in NVN for intelligence and E&E nets. Physical destruction operations may be conducted against selected targets by 34-A guerrilla teams providing security of intelligence and E&E nets is not jeopardized."**

This mission statement led to the development of meaningful, long-range programs of activating operational areas for intelligence gathering around major routes leading from NVN into Laos.***

b. EWOTS. The Early Warning Observation Teams (EWOTS) concept was developed in 1965 to meet the requirement of the changing mission. MACSOG proposed**** that EWOTS/Roadwatch Operations be

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 160437Z Nov 68. (SACSA)
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC "34A Basic Op Order", DTG 300241Z Oct 65. (SACSA)
*** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV Command History 1965," p. II-A-4. (SACSA)
**** (TS) Msg, MACV, DTG 160712Z Oct 65.

undertaken as a matter of priority in areas south of 20° and that future reinforcement efforts be built around the need to increase team viability and provide capabilities for an expanded intelligence collection. The scope of this effort was to include surveillance over enemy major roads from NVN into Laos.

c. Helicopter Infiltration Concept. The fixed wing aircraft (C-123) available to SOG in 1965 were unsatisfactory for accurately placing and resupplying agent teams. In September 1965, AMEMB Bangkok approved* DATA for OPLAN-34A missions to the extent that unmarked C-123 aircraft could transfer personnel DATA for onward movement. The team was then moved to a landing zone (LZ) DATA for ground infiltration of NVN or flown directly to a LZ in NVN. This approval instituted a major improvement in SOG operations by giving a greater degree of flexibility in choosing staging areas.

3. 1966 Policy

a. New Program. In May 1966, MACSOG published a comprehensive review of OPLAN-34A operations and proposed objectives and programs for the subsequent 15 months.** A brief summary of the proposals for airborne operations is outlined below.

(1) As originally conceived, airborne operations (infiltration teams) were intended to build a resistance movement in NVN which would, "exert pressure against the NVN Government, divert resources and make continuous support of the war in RVN less attractive."*** As discussed earlier in this report, the implementation of the resistance movement was never authorized at the Washington level and, therefore, airborne operations were conducted under amoiguously worded mission statements that permitted sabotage, interdiction and harassment in NVN.***

* (TS) Msg, AMEMB Bangkok, DTG 211037Z Sep 65. (SACSA)
** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "SOG Missions, Objectives and Programs FY-4/66-FY-67 (U)," 10 May 66. (SACSA)
*** (TS) Ibid., p. 6-7.

(2) The program reviewed the interest DATA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken in the capability of DATA agent teams to obtain intelligence.

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"It was determined that maximum emphasis should be placed upon intelligence collection and establishment of civilian contacts with secondary emphasis on psychological operations, E&E and sabotage."*

(3) Based on this re-evaluation, the following concept was prepared for CINCPAC approval.

"(a) Develop an operational area astride every major LOC leading from NVN into Laos and emplacing operational teams in these areas.

"(b) Reorient all in-place teams to the primary mission of intelligence collection by roadwatch, railwatch, and riverwatch.

"(c) Develop civilian contacts in every operational area to expand the intelligence base and provide limited logistical support, thus lessening team reliance on external support.

"(d) Limit operations initially to the development of new operational areas and at the same time make inoperative teams viable again."*

(4) To implement the new concept, team training was altered to place primary emphasis on intelligence gathering. Three types of operational teams were being trained as shown in the brief summary below:

Type	Strength	Mission
A	10 agents	Roadwatch/early warning observation. Organize safe areas. Prepare to receive reinforcements.
B	5 agents	Reinforce Type A team. Establish civilian contacts. Organize and operate intelligence nets. Conduct PSYOPS.
C	10 agents	Reinforce Types A and B teams. Team adds limited strike/interdiction capability to operational area.**

* (TS) Ibid, p.7-8.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV Command History 1966," p.58. (SACSA)

"Each new operational area was to be developed initially by infiltrating a Type A team, reinforce successively by Type B and C teams. Planning provided for further reinforcement as required by broadened missions and/or operational losses."*

b. Seismic Devices and Project BUGS. The emphasis in 1966 on intelligence collection prompted CINCPAC to direct SOG to equip OPLAN-34A teams with Seismic Intrusion Devices (SSID) for emplacing along NVN Routes 103, 137, 15, 1 and to provide teams with immediate roadwatch intelligence reporting by radio -- DATA *

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4. 1967 Developments

a. Development of EWOTS/STRATA Concept. The EWOTS concept was first proposed in 1965.

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. This concept was expanded in response to the need for expanded intelligence collection effort in NVN as expressed by DIA. As finally approved,**** the EWOTS/Roadwatch operations were authorized south of the 20th Parallel on a priority basis with later

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M to MACV Command History 1966," p.58. (SACSA)
** (TS) Ibid., p.60.
*** (TS) Memo, CJCS to SECDEF, "CHINAT Agents for OPLAN 34A Teams (TS)," 10 Nov 1966. (SACSA)
**** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 272139Z Oct 65.

emphasis above the 20th parallel. The task was to be accomplished by adding specially trained intelligence personnel to existing teams as well as introducing new teams. It was envisioned that the operation would include surveillance of every major road from NVN into Laos.

DATA

team concept was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 April 1967,* with concurrence of the State Department.

Only two of eight long-term teams infiltrated DATA into the area between 17°-19° North latitude had survived since 1964.** It was belived that the emphasis on short stay time and mobility in the STRATA team training would enable them to survive and to be successfully exfiltrated. The approved operational area extended from the northern limit of the DMZ to within 50 miles of the CHICOM border and to a depth of 50 nm from the Lao/NVN border. Initial efforts were to be concentrated in the area between the DMZ and 19°N latitude (see Figure B-__). In May 1967, the northern portion of the DMZ was included in the operational area.***. STRATA teams were to be composed of 5-15 indigenous personnel transported by USAF/RVNAF helicopter to Laos or NVN and then overland to a base camp in NVN. Missions were to be 15-30 days. On 31 August 1967, CINCPAC approved the first nine STRATA team targets.****

b. Objectives Plans and Programs. CINCPAC's revised basic op-order of April 1967# was augmented by the follow-on objectives plans and programs for DATA published by MACSOG in May 1967 for FY 1968. The concept of operations is somewhat detailed, but is quoted here to illustrate the thinking of MACSOG at that time on agent team operations DATA

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 071804Z Apr 67. (SACSA)
** (TS) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, "Special Operations-STRATA Team Concepts (S)", 23 Mar 67.
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 241940Z May 67. (SACSA)
**** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 312216Z [illegible] 67. (SACSA)
# (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 252340Z Apr 67. (SACSA)

(1)"Concept. Personnel indigenous to the area of intended employment are recruited and trained for employment in selected operational areas located generally astride major LOC leading from Central NVN into Laos and in other critical areas as required. Agent teams infiltrated into areas in the west and northwest develop resistance/guerrilla forces as authorized among susceptible tribal groups and exploit these forces to conduct guerrilla warfare. intelligence, psychological and E&E operations. DATA Infiltration, reinforcement, resupply and recovery of personnel are principally by air. DATA infiltration and establishment of initial contacts as feasible. Raids and ambushes are used to interdict LOC, harass local NVN forces, and to draw the NVA into a counterinsurgency role. Controlled air strikes are directed against significant targets and strike results reported. Intelligence collection tasks include river, rail, road and trail watch. Teams expand potential resistance/guerrilla forces and extend their areas of influence or control as the situation permits. In the more closely controlled areas of the Delta and along the coast, individual agents or small agent teams are infiltrated to contact vulnerable groups, e.g., DATA and establish resistance organizations to perform intelligence and psychological operations functions. ... In all areas, friendly evading personnel and NVN defectors are secured and evacuated when possible. DATA

(2) It was planned that the missions for agent teams and DATA teams would be conducted by 15 in-place agent teams, representing 100-150 agents, and 6-10 STRATA teams, representing 150-200 agents.*

c. Diversion Operations. Diversion operations were initiated in November 1967.

"In support of DATA guerrilla team operations, it was planned to convince the enemy that there were more teams inside NVN than actually existed. The goal of this program was to establish 18 notional teams by September 1968."**

5. 1968-Mission and Restrictions. The mission of airborne operations in 1968 was stated as follows:

"The DATA program has the mission of collecting military intelligence through DATA and conducting diversionary agent operations designed to deceive enemy security forces and dissipate their resources."***

* (TS) Program, MACSOG, "DATA FY 68 Program (C)," 10 May 1967, p.7-8.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to MACV 1967 Command History," p. G-III 4-6. (SACSA)
*** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV Command History 1968 (U)," p. F-III-4-1.

a. Types of Operations, 1968. Three types of operations were conducted in support of the mission.

(1) Agent Team Operations. Agent team operations functioned as before with a primary responsibility for intelligence collection and secondary responsibility for target acquisition, E&E nets, early warning, selective harassment, psychological operations and assistance to downed aircrews.*

(2) STRATA Operations. STRATA operations had been approved in April 1967. Only two STRATA teams were infiltrated in 1967. Twenty-four (24) teams were infiltrated in 1968.

(3) Diversionary Operations. Diversionary operations were conceived under the code name of DATA in late 1967. The objectives of these operations were:

> "...to divert main force NVN resources to defense and internal security, divert them away from actual clandestine operations, increase the strain on control of the populace, create opportunities for friendly psychological operation, exploitation, harass the enemy in his rear, and collect intelligence where possible."**

b. Bombing Halt Limitations, 1968

"Major significant changes in the TIMBERWORK (C) program in 1968 were caused by the April restriction on air operations north of 20°N, by a security assessment in June which evaluated all the then in-place teams as probably under NVN control, and by the 1 November halt of air activities north of 17°N."**

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV Command History 1968 (U)," p. F-III-4-1.
** Ibid. p. F-III-4-2, F-4.

PART II. RESOURCES (U)


A. GENERAL

Part II, Resources, describes the organization of the Airborne Section of SOG, facilities available, and training conducted at Camp Long Thanh and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Danang. As in many other areas of MACSOG activities, detailed information on the early organization and training within the Airborne Section is not as complete as the records covering the later period of activity.

B. ORGANIZATION

The organization for airborne operations in 1967 is described in the "Brownfield"* report as being under MACSOG operations officer (OP-30). DATA was a staff element under the operations officer that had the responsibility for planning, training, and employment and operational control of agents/agent teams employed against NVN. The airborne operations group included the teams and agents and physical assets under the operational control of OP-34.

1. Diagram. A simplified organization diagram for the Airborne Section was as follows:



* (TS) Report MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 1968, p.1. (SACSA)

2. Counterpart Organization. The Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), counterpart to SOG, was organized in a broad sense much as SOG was organized. DATA

3. Function of the Organization. The planning and coordination of OP-34 in 1967 was described in the Brownfield report as carrying out the following functions:

a. Recommended to CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff specific target areas for the employment of agents/agent teams.

b. Prepared concept of the operations.

c. Coordinated with other MACSOG staff elements to obtain area intelligence, EEI desires, logistical support for special items of equipment, airlift support for infiltration, exfiltration and resupply; establishment of bomb lines around team, radio frequencies, for air/ground communications, cryptographic material, and Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft.

d. Coordinated planning and mission execution with STD.

e. Coordinated with American Embassy Bangkok to obtain DATA when required.


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g. Operational control of all teams was exercised by OP-34.*

4. Reorganization - 1968. Operations commenced in 1968 with OP-34 divided into three branches: OP-34A, agent team operations; OP-34B, STRATA operations; and OP-34C, diversionary operations. The chief of OP-34 was also responsible for the FOB at Danang (Monkey Mountain, FOB), the Joint Translation Center, Hanoi (headquarters for OP-34 and STD counterparts), numerous safe houses in Hanoi and had staff supervision over Camp Long Thanh. On 18 November, STRATA assets were passed to OP-35 for cross-border operations. In the December reorganization of SOG, Camp Long Thanh was designated as the SOG training command and placed under a new training directorate

* (TS) Ibid., p.4.

on MACSOG staff. OP-34 became a staff section with the title of Ground Operations Studies Branch. The Airborne Studies Group was redesignated OP-36 and became a command directly responsible to SOG, with headquarters in the Joint Translation Center. The reorganization took the operational control of TIMBERWORK(C) assets out of the hands of the staff (formerly exercised by OP-34) and placed it in the hands of OP-36, one of several commands under the new organization.* OP-36 was then organized as follows:



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C. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

The resources utilized by the Airborne Section in late 1967 was as follows**:

1. Personnel

a. US (OP-34)-(Included instructors) 13 officers; 33 enlisted men; one civilian (CAS.

b. GVN (STD) (included instructors) - 28 officers; 26 enlisted men; 403 civilian.

c. Long Term Agents - nine teams, 54 agents.

d. STRATA Team Agents - 25.

2. Physical

a. Training facility Camp Long Thanh.

b. Staging area (isolated area) Black Rock.

c. FOB Danang.

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* (TS) History, MACSOG,"Annex F to MACV Command History 1968," p. F III-4-1. (SACSA)
** (TS) Report, MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 1968, TIMBERWORK(C), p.2. (SACSA)

3. (U) Major Items of Equipment

a. 210 Weapons (pistols and rifles)

b. 199 pieces of radio equipment

c. 67 pieces of photographic equipment

d. Office and miscellaneous equipment

4. (U) Vehicles

a. One sedan

b. 16 1/4 ton trucks

c. Three 1/2 ton trucks

d. Seven 3/4 ton trucks

e. Eight 2 1/2 ton trucks

D. AGENT CLEARANCES

A procedure for processing clearances for proposed agents was set up within SOG. The SOG Liaison Bureau and Security Section was responsible for checking with local police, district chief, and American sources and setting up a dossier of various completed forms on each agent. MACSOG Directive No. 604 (Series) contained detailed procedures.

E. AGENT PAY AND ALLOWANCES

1. General. The amount of pay and method of payment were important considerations in the ever present problems of promoting good morale and motivation among agent personnel. A summary of the basic pay for the various agent categories is covered below. For more detail on this subject, see the "Standard Operating Procedures for Airborne Operations Study Group" in the SACSA file.

2. Method of Payment. Personnel and pay records for agent personnel were maintained by the counterpart organization (STD). SOG Finance provided STD Finance a lump sum each month from which agents were paid. A record of all agent pay was then furnished SOG. The individual agent received his pay through the STD case officer concerned. If an agent did not designate another person to receive his pay while the agent was on a mission, the case officer deposited the pay in a savings account of a reputable bank until the agent returned to STD/SOG control.

3. Pay Scales

a. Base Pay. Base pay per month for all agent personnel, civilian or military, was as follows:

(1) Team leader - 16,000$ VN

(2) Assistant team leader - 14,000$ VN

(3) Team member - 12,000$ VN

b. Mission Pay. For short-term missions (10 days or less), 1,000$ VN per day; for long-term missions (over 10 days), 10,000$ VN per month.

c. Military Differential Pay. The Vietnamese military personnel received differential pay which equalized their total earnings with civilian agents.*

d. Family Allowances. Agents who were head of a family were authorized 600$ VN per month for his wife and 400$ VN per month for each child under 16.

e. Recruitment and Inducement Bonus. As set forth in the MACSOG Civilian Personnel Manual, Part II.

f. Radio Operator Bonus. A fully qualified team radio operator received a one-time bonus of 5,000$ VN.

g. Extraordinary Recognition Reward. As recommended by Chief, OP-36 for approval by Chief SOG/Director STD.

h. Prisoner of War Pay, Missing in Action Pay, Disability Gratuity, Funeral Gratuity, Death Gratuity, and Per Diem. See SOP** for details.

i. Singleton Agent Pay. A special arrangement for singleton pay and allowances was approved by SOG in 1969. A one-time payment was made to the agent upon his return from a mission to SOG control. No provision was made for dependent payments. Singleton agents in training were quartered and fed by STD/SOG. In addition to the base pay, singleton agents could be awarded a bonus up to 50,000$ VN depending on the value of information collected on his mission. A summary follows:

* (TS) SOP, Airborne Studies Group, 28 Mar 1969, p. 14,31. (SACSA)
** (TS) Ibid., p.33-38. (SACSA)

Base Pay - 100,000$ VN (Maximum)

Family Allowance - None

Tet Bonus - None

Operational Pay - None

POW/MIA - None

Death Gratuity - None

Performance Bonus - 10,000$ VN (Maximum)*

F. TRAINING

1. General. Training for agent team operations was conducted at Camp Long Thanh, Monkey Mountain FOB, and in Saigon safe houses. As outlined earlier, Camp Long Thanh was under the direction of OP-34 until December 1968.

a. Camp Long Thanh. For detailed discussion of program of instruction and problem areas, see a later section.

b. Monkey Mountain. Monkey Mountain FOB Danang was used as an isolation facility and a launch point for realistic field training for long-term agent teams and, later, the STRATA teams.

2. Recruiting. The problem of recruiting suitable personnel as agents for airborne operations plagued MACSOG from the beginning. The following statement from the 1964 period expressed a problem that was never solved:

* (TS) Ibid., P.14 (SACSA)

"Inability of STS to recruit high quality individuals for agent training has forced the deployment of mediocre teams."*

a. The initial plan for recruiting of agents was divided into three phases as shown below:

(1) Phase I

(a) Indirect Contact. Come in contact with representatives of local area of recruitment for pre-investigation, identification, and collection of preliminary information concerning possible agents for the program. Establish the list of candidate agents.

(b) Desired Qualities. Good health, qualified for jump training. Aged between 21 and 35. Having no more than two children. Being not the main support of the family or the only son. Evidence sought to guarantee anti-communist spirit (e.g., having relative killed by Viet Cong or being ex-cadre of SVN government). Being adventurous people such as: hunters, divers, woodcutters who are familiar with hard life. Being of primary education level or usual readers of daily newspapers.

(2) Phase II. Direct contact with candidate agent to confirm foregoing points. Candidate agent should volunteer to comply with discipline and withstand hardship in training and on mission. Agent may go on mission in-border for a period of one or two years.

(3) Phase III. Case officer contact candidate agent once more to be sure that he has fully understood and accepted the conditions stated above.**

b. 1966, No improvement. The continuing nature of recruiting problems was emphasized by the following statement:

> "During the year, it became increasingly difficult to recruit agents selectively for OPLAN 34A Airborne Teams. The difficulty principally stems from a general scarcity of qualified indigenous personnel, the competition for high caliber individuals posed by the Vietnamese civilian economy, and the huge drainage of manpower for military service. Desertion among agent trainees continued to be a problem, and has had an adverse effect on the ability to maintain team unity. The AWOL/

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History 1964," p. II 19,21. (SACSA)

** (TS) Ibid., p. II-F-2,3. (SACSA)

desertion rate among agent trainees increased from eight percent during March to 21 percent in May. This, coupled with the lag in the recruiting during that period, curtailed the formation of new teams, which in turn resulted in a slippage in the 15 Month Deployment Program. Some of the agent recruits soon became disenchanted with the prospect of operating as intelligence agents in NVN. Further compounding the situation is the hard fact that thus far none of the attempts to bring OPLAN 34A Airborne Teams out of NVN has been successful. In an effort to improve the recruiting and retention programs, the Airborne Operations Section coordinated with STS (RVN counterpart organization) to increase agents' pay and allowances, provide generous provisions for survivors benefits and disability pay, improve the quarters and training facilities, issue better clothing and equipment, and place greater emphasis on motivational indoctrination. Further, a research proposal was submitted to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for a socio-psychological study or Indochinese ethnolinguistic groups to develop diagnostic/ aptitude tests or screening devices. If successfully developed, these should make possible a rapid and reliable identification of such groups which present a high risk of being psychologically ineffective as intelligence agents or operatives. Additionally, some success has been achieved in recruiting prospective agents in Laos. Hopefully, this recruiting effort may be expanded; DATA

c. Ethnolinguistic Study. The Ethnolinguistic Study referred to above was awarded to the American Institute for Research, Pittsburgh, in June of 1967. The original cost estimate for the study was $200,000; however, following a preliminary survey by a research team for the company, a new expanded study at a cost of $832,000 was proposed. Neither MACV nor CINCPAC felt that the potential value of the study was worth the high cost. CINCPAC cancelled the project in February 1968.** (A copy of the research proposal, June 1967, is available in the SACSA files.)

d. Recruiting Procedures - 1967-1968

(1) Sources. Agents were recruited from DATA DATA from military units, POW camps, and from prisoners captured in the maritime operations. The responsibility for identifying and recruiting candidates DATA One STD officer was on permanent duty in Laos, but recruitment of personnel from this area with the basic qualifications required to develop reliable and efficient agents was unsatisfactory.***

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Airborne Operations," 1966 MACV Command History, p. 74.
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 070403Z Feb 68. (SACSA)
*** (TS) Report, MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 1968, TIMBERWORK(C), p.9. (SACSA)

(2) Processing. A Personnel Record Questionnaire and a Name Trace Request was prepared on each prospective agent to facilitate a security check through the Vietnamese National Police, the American Embassy, and the MACV security section. Processing through these agencies took from two to four weeks and identified prospective agents who had a criminal, former agent, VC suspect or undesirable record. In addition, operational personnel had a physical examination by the SOG surgeon and were subjected, conditions permitting, to a polygraph test.*

e. Recruiting Problems - 1967-1968

(1) 1967

"As in previous years, the interrelated problems of recruiting and retention continued during 1967. By becoming more selective, SOG accepted a temporary reduction in the input of new personnel. However, all operational needs were met from agents already on hand or obtained, in small numbers, during the year. The stress of selectivity was intended to produce agent trainees who were highly motivated, therefore, more easily retained, and who were more capable of accomplishing difficult and hazardous missions assigned to them. Whether or not the new system of recruiting established at the end of 1967 would solve the basic problems of personnel selection would be answered in the following year."**

(2) 1968 Agent Teams. In-country recruiting was limited to ten agents: two singleton agents and one eight-man strategic intelligence team that was not deployed to NVN before the November restrictions.

"Third-country recruiting /also/ proved unsatisfactory during 1968. The principal effort, [DATA], resulted in recruitment of personnel unsuitable for duty as agents for a variety of reasons, principally health and lack of ability to be trained as intelligence agents. In addition, the program was found to be compromised and monitored by the NVN Embassy; and was therefore discontinued in September."***

(3) 1968 STRATA Teams. STRATA recruiting efforts in early and mid-1968 were sporadic and unrewarding, partially due to the director of STD personlly turning down the majority of the applicants as being too yound or unexperienced. Those

* (TS) SOP, Airborne Studies Group, 28 March 1969, p.42 (SACSA).
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to MACV Command History 1967," p. G III-4-26, 27.
*** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History" p. F III-4-4

personnel who did enter training, were predominantly deserters from CIDG forces. Toward the latter part of the year, a sustained effort was undertaken to recruit from the military. ARVN officers and NCOs began to enter training in larger numbers. STD remained responsible for spotting and recruiting throughout the year and quality of the STRATA recruit showed definite signs of improvement until the 1 November bombing halt.*

(4) 1968 Diversionary Operations

(a) "Project URGENCY recruiting was accomplished through HUMIDOR SSPL assets on DODO Island solely by SID.

DATA

(b) "Project BORDEN recruiting was done by US personnel from only US division level detention facilities to allow speedy collection and avoid compromise. Authority to collect detainees from normal detainee channels was obtained from MACV J2... Detainees were selected based on four criteria: NVA, healthy, literate, and cooperative. VC were included for the first time in Group 98 which was collected and and trained in December."**

3. Training - Camp Long Thanh

a. History. The airborne operations training center was officially named Quat Thang Camp; the Americans called it camp Long Thanh. The air strip and road network were built by the

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Ibid pp III-4-5.

Japanese in 1943. In March 1963, the RVNAF High Command assumed control of Camp Long Thanh from Binh Hoa Sector. The camp at that time had seven companies of civilian combatants. Two new programs were initiated at Camp Long Thanh with a 12 man Special Forces "A" Team plus a four man augmentation acting as cadre. The two programs were the Combined Military Operations Studies (MOS) and Combined External Operations Studies (EOS). MOS trained four Ranger companies for cross-border operations. EOS trained agent teams for employment in North Vietnam. Initially, groups of six to eight agents were trained in Saigon safe houses. When a program of instruction (POI) was developed at Camp Long Thanh, agents were trained there in groups of 30-40 men. During February 1964, a Special Forces "A" Team, augmented with four men and commanded by NAME arrived. NAME DATA NAME in March. NAME supervised a crash construction program to bring the training and security facilities up to a level to meet requirements. By the end of 1964, the camp was capable of housing and instructing 250 civilian volunteer students.*

b. Original Syllabus. The 1964 syllabus was divided into three phases.

(1) Phase I was scheduled for a total of seven weeks of introductory instruction in the fields of communications, medical, weapons, psychological operations, and three weeks of basic airborne training. Students who did not meet minimum standards were dropped from the program.

(2) Phase II was a period of four weeks devoted to specialization in one of the general subjects covered in Phase I.

(3) Phase III was a four-week schedule devoted to field exercises designed to expose students to all facets of previous training.**

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History 1964," p. II-16 (SACSA).
** (TS) Ibid., p. II-18.

c. 1965 Organization. The US advisors were organized along functional lines with S1, S2, S3 and S4 sections. There was also an organization of training committees to handle the various subjects presented. These subjects were:

(1) Intelligence/psychological operations

(2) Map Reading, land Navigation and Survival

(3) Tactics

(4) Demolition

(5) Weapons

(6) Air Operations

(7) Medical

This "Program of Instruction" was designed to take approximately 21 weeks and included a leadership evaluation program designed to assist in the future selection of team leaders.*

d. 1967 Revision. The syllabus was revised in 1967 into three major areas: (1) field operation; (2) special techniques; and (3) special subjects. Emphasis was placed on developing the first STRATA teams. The number of US personnel (advisors) varied over the year from a low of 18 in June to a high of 42 in January. The VN cadre at the camp ranged between 46 and 60 over the year.**

e. 1968 Review

(1) General. The training of all OP-34 teams (mainly STRATA teams) and singleton agents continued to be conducted primarily at Camp Long Thanh. Field training was conducted near Camp Long Thanh and in the vicinities of Dalat and Danang (Monkey Mountain FOB area). The syllabus for team training was based on a program of instruction developed by the senior advisor, Camp Long Thanh (SALT), based on guidance from Chief OP-34. (Singleton agent training was based on a

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV Command History 1965," p. IIA-D-1-14. (SACSA)
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to MACV Command History 1967," p. G III-4-E-2-2. (SACSA)

specific syllabus developed by case officers geared toward the needs of the agent and his mission.) All training included intelligence collection techniques, observation, target analysis, elicitation techniques, reporting, operational security, cover and subjects relating to infiltration and exfiltration.*

(2) Instructors and Syllabus. The US advisors at Camp Long Thanh averaged 30 in number during 1968. They were organized functionally into sections: S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4. There was also an organization of training committees with US advisors assigned. The committees were:**

(a) Field Operations

1. Weapons
2. Intelligence
3. Tactics

(b) Special Techniques

1. Medical
2. Communications
3. Demolitions
4. Psychological Operations

(c) Special Subjects

1. Basic Airborne Course
2. River Crossing
3. Skyhook
4. Message Pickup

The average strength of the VN instructor cadre during 1968 was approximately 30.

(3) Long-Term Teams Trained

DATA

* (TS) Historical Summary, Airborne Studies Group, "SOG Annual Historical Summary," 5 Jan 69, p. 80. (SACSA)

** (TS) Ibid., p. 106-107.

training as a new team in January 1968. In May 1968, it was decided by SOG ntelligence that the location proposed as an operating area for DATA Subsequently, the team was turned over to the STRATA program for one mission. After the STRATA mission the team resigned.*

(b) Team QUA was a six-man team DATA Two members were given partial training as radio operators, but did not return after requesting emergency leave in May 1968. The other four members were trained for three months but were declared physically unfit and returned DATA in September 1968.*

(c) Team AXE was a team of five NVN Thai Dam and two VN radio operators. The team was trained in early 1968 and transferred to the STRATA program after the 1 April bombing restriction. Three members were lost on missions and the others were separated from the program because of poor health and resignations.**

(d) RED DRAGON ALPHA was planned as a two-man reinforcement element for Team RED DRAGON. The two men were turned over to the STRATA program and subsequently lost on a mission in NVN.**

(e) Team 915 was a nine-man team composed of ethnic North Vietnamese that commenced training in October 1968. Its first mission was not until 1969. This team along with 919, which commenced training in early 1969, were retained under the operational control of the Airborne Studies Group.***

(f) STRATA team basic training was conducted at Camp Long Thanh.***

* (TS) Ibid., p. 81.
** (TS) Ibid., P. 82
*** (TS) Ibid., P. 81, 82

(g) BORDEN agents, part of the diversionary program (FORAE , were trained in an exclusion area of Camp Long Thanh in two phases. The first phase, from 10-21 days, included processing, screening, and orientation. The object of this phase was to assess the potential agents, screen out unsuitable candidates, and gain the cooperation of those retained in training. The training in the phase emphasized orientation in:

> "...the objectives of the project, the freedom and prosperity to be gained in the RVN, and many other idealogical themes such as the resistance of the Vietnamese people to domination, the necessity for free world forces in South Vietnam, what communism means to Vietnam, the Chieu Hoi program and other subjects designed to gain the students cooperation. ...Throughout this phase, unsuitable candidates were returned to normal unit detention facilities but were utilized to spread specific project information among other detainees. This information magnified the size and success of the project and was expected to reach NVN security elements and cause a countering reaction. The second phase was from 7 to 14 days and included basic agent and mission training. Basic training was composed of security, reporting, navigation, inducing defection through use of an ultraviolet secret Chieu Hoi mark, infiltration techniques (helicopter or parachute), rewards, and obligations. Mission training included specific tasks, cover, documentation, and other special subjects as needed (communication, use of dead drops, etc.). All training was kept isolated from other SOG operations. Basic training and all but specific tasks of mission training were conducted in groups to purposely compromise the agents among themselves. They were normally utilized as singletons, where possible, to obtain the maximum effect. Inducing defection by marking potential defectors with UV paste that they were told was a secret Chieu Hoi pass was their primary mission. Collection of intelligence was secondary. Exfiltration, unless specifically planned otherwise, was by defecting again to free world forces."*

f. Current Program - Camp Long Thanh

(1) Camp Long Thanh became the SOG training command (OP-38, Training Study Group) under the staff cognizance of OP-30 (Operations Training and Studies) in late 1968. Commencing in the fall of 1968, for the first time, team leaders and

* (TS) Ibid., P. 84.

Special Commando Unit (SCU) personnel from the cross-border operations were trained at Camp Long Thanh. Formerly, this training had been conducted at the Command and Control Centers. Camp Long Thanh had concentrated on training long-term agent teams, STRATA team, and singleton agent personnel.

(2) A Special Forces B Detachment with seven officers and 24 enlisted assigned provided the guidance to VN counterparts who actually conducted the training. The operating cost of the camp was approximately one million dollars a year.

(3) Figure B-1 shows the number of students trained and the cost of training each student at Camp Long Thanh over a four-year period.

(4) Figure B-2 is a summary of Camp Long Thanh training information including an ethnic breakdown and the AWOL rate.

(5) Figure B-3 is a list of the courses offered at Camp Long Thanh in mid-1969.

(6) Figure B-4 is a diagram of the organization and command relationships in the summer of 1969.

(7) The back-up file for this Annex in SACSA has copies of the Program of Instruction for the Camp Long Thanh courses being given in 1969. Photographs of the camp and various ethnic groups in training are also in the file.

g. Camp Long Thanh Problem Areas. The significant problems encountered by the SALT over the years are cataloged below:

(1) 1964

FIGURE B-1

CAMP LONG THANH STUDENT OUTPUT
(BASED ON AN AVERAGE OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURE OF $37,500.00 PER MONTH)[A/]

YEAR	STUDENT OUTPUT	COST OF TRAINING EACH STUDENT
1966	746	$ 603.00
1967	66	6,818.00
1968	353	1,275.00
1969 (1 JAN - 30 JUN)	868	259.00

A/ RECENT PAY RAISES HAVE BOOSTED THE AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENDITURES OF CAMP LONG THANH TO APPROXIMATELY $40,000.00 PER MONTH AS OF JULY 1969. ESTIMATED TOTAL LOST FOR PHYSICAL YEAR 1969 IS:

JAN THRU JUN 69 =	$224,000
JUL THRU DEC 69 =	240,000
SUB TOTAL	$464,000
ALL OUTSIDE SUPPORT - LOGISTICAL, MAINTENANCE, CONSTRUCTION, ETC.	500,000
TOTAL FOR FY 1969	$964,000

FIGURE B-2

CAMP LONG THANH TRAINING SUMMARY

Year	Ave. No Teams in Training	Ave. Ethnic Breakdown	Ave. Student Strength	Ave. AWOL Rate/Mo.	Remarks
1964	15	Not Avail.	192	Not Avail.	
1965	15	VN-9 Muong-1 Nung-1 Thai-2 Thu-2	191	12	
1966	10	VN-4 Comb-4[a] Dual-2[a]	138	3.6	
1967	8	VN-4 Comb-1[a] Dual-3[a]	93	.7	April-STRATA Training Commenced
1968	4	VN-2 Cambodian-2	65	NA	

a/ Comb - More than two ethnic groups; e.g., (NN, Tho, Thai, Nung, etc.)
Dual - VN+one other ethnic group in most cases. Some dual teams of Tho/Nung and Nung/Mung.

FIGURE B-3


TRAINING ACTIVITIES - 1969

CAMP LONG THANH

Courses	Length
US Reconnaissance Team Leaders School	17 Days
Vietnamese Reconnaissance Team Leaders School	17 Days
Special Commando Unit Basic Training	5 Weeks
US Exploitation Force (Leaders School)	2 1/2 Weeks
Vietnamese CW Communications	16 Weeks
Vietnamese Reconnaissance Team Member Medical Course	1 Week
US Basic Airborne Course	3 Weeks
US Airborne Refresher	1 Day
Vietnamese Basic Airborne Course	3 Weeks
Special Jump Techniques (Ex. Tree Jumping)	2 Weeks
Vietnamese Basic Agent/Long Range Training (STRATA)	8 Weeks
Vietnamese Specialized Agent Training (STRATA Advanced Course)	2 Weeks
Civilian Irregular Defense Group Basic Training	2 Weeks

FIGURE B-4

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR CAMP LONG THANH, TRAINING STUDIES GROUP (OP-38) (U)



a/ In addition to Det B-53 personnel, Special Projects include TDY personnel from OP-36, 18th Military Police Brigade and the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion.
b/ In addition to Det B-53 personnel, the US training group also includes personnel TDY from OP-35 and the C&C Detachments.

(a) Inability of STS to recruit high quality individuals for agents training forced the deployment of mediocre teams.

(b) Agents were not isolated after they had commenced training. Several teams who had actual mission briefings had been allowed to go on leave immediately after their missions aborted.

(c) Viet Cong had a large intelligence network. They, in spite of security checks, probably had spies among the agents, cadre, security battalion, and civilian workers at Long Thanh.

(d) Camp Long Thanh was in an active VC area. Considerable effort was required to maintain local physical security.

(e) Communications with Long Thanh during critical mission periods was subject to compromise.

(f) Several agent teams had been captured in DRV. From radio Hanoi reports and International Control Commission (ICC) publications, it is evident that DRV had a good working knowledge of Long Thanh operations.*

(g) Discipline

1. The discipline of the students at Camp Long Thanh was poor. Contributing factors were

a False recruiting promises which led students to expect preferential treatment.

b Belief of the cadre and STS that civilian students could not be subjected to military discipline even though contracts state that they were.

c Fear of some members of the ARVN cadre to discipline students.

d Reluctance of STS to discard poor students.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History, 1964" (SACSA)

e Lack of close supervision caused the the students to fend for themselves in order to settle problems. The students believe that had a right to collective bargaining with the cadre.

f Failure to enforce existing regulations and and punishments.

g Belief that the agents were all going to die anyway has caused the agents and some of the cadre to believe that the agents should enjoy themselves while they had the opportunity.

h Trained teams after waiting for months for deployment often become stale and hard to handle.

i Recruiting of indivisuals who had questionable reputations in their home communities brought known discipline problems to Camp Long Thanh.

j Agent leaders held popularity (with the students) over mission accomplishment.

2 The following actions were instituted to improve the discipline:

a Set and enforce standard punishments.

b Development of procedure to draft unacceptable students in the Army upon expulsion from the agent program.

c A pre-course basic training period to identify and eliminate individuals of poor potential.

d Assignment of one cadre sergeant per barracks to control the students as well as handle their problems.

e were required to set the example with appropriate dress and bearing.

f Attempts were made to raise recruiting standards. Individuals with good service experience were preferred.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History 1964."

(2) 1965

(a) Stratigic Technical Service (STS). The STS organization for Camp Long Thanh did not provide enough depth in instructor personnel, and in some cases, some of the Vietnamese Instructors were not qualified. Through close coordination between SALT and the Vietnamese Camp Commander, requests went forward through both US and Vietnamese channels for additional qualified instructors. Those instructors who were not qualified to instruct were placed in Assistant Instructor slots in order to allow them to learn their subjects.

(b) Discipline. Throughout 1965 the program was continually hampered by the lack of discipline among the students. In the past, the Camp Commander did not have sufficient power to properly handle the cases of students who had committed offenses, and also the students status was that of a civilian. Action was taken to correct this deficiency by setting up a new list of offenses with appropriate punishment which the Camp Commander could envoke at his level, and also Chief OP-34 prepared a legal agreement which students could understand and sign before entering the program. The document spelled out the powers of the Camp Commander, and punishment which could applied for various offenses.

(c) Interpreter Procurement and Retention

1. The rapid build-up of US Forces in Vietnam resulted in an acute shortage of interpreters, and interpreter procurement became highly competitive. Although MACSOG interpreter pay scales compared favorably with other agencies few competent interpreters would consider employment at Camp Long Thanh due to the unattractive location and demanding duty requirements.

2. All interpreters utilized by this activity DATA and as such they received no government recognition or credit toward their service obligation for duties performed regardless of how ardous or hazardous they may have been. Consequently, many were understandably reluctant to

work in locations where they would have been subjected to enemy fire or participate in hazardous operational or training missions. The problem is particularly acute in the recon teams of the 35A program. SOG is aware of this problem and a search for qualified interpreters is constantly being conducted.

(d) Procurement and Retention of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Personnel

Due to inflationary trends in the Vietnamese economy CIDG pay scales were no longer adequate to attract personnel, and recruiting efforts in the last months of 1965 were almost complete failure. Due to attrition and desertions, the Security Battalion was reduced to 70% of authorized strength. CIDG personnel were able to obtain employment as guards with other units and installations in the Saigon area with comparable pay and without the risks and discomforts of the Security Battalion. A recruitment program is continually being conducted to enlist personnel in the CIDG ranks.

(e) Air Support

Lack of air support in some instances caused a decline in training. Training was planned on numerous occasions which required infiltration and exfiltration by H-34 helicopter. In many cases, information would be received the day prior to scheduled training that a requested H-34 helicopter was not available, thereby hindering an important phase of training. Lack of C-123 aircraft at the required times greatly hindered the training of CP 34A students. Time and again the cancelling of aircraft on the day it was scheduled caused rapid revamping of scheduled training.

(3) 1967

(a) Air Support

On numerous occasions throughout the year air transportation or resupply was planned for an operation and was not available at the time needed. This resulted in unrealistic activities conducted for students who expected to infiltrate under realistic conditions in hostile areas. The

many occasions that air support was planned resulted in plans made and then cancelled which caused serious deflation of student morale after being told that they would get all the support they needed.

(b) Discipline

(a) Students continued to go AWOL throughout the year. The Camp Commander attempted to solve the problem by confining students who went AWOL to a makeshift jail. No apparent success resulted through these measures.

(b) The majority of the problems stemmed from the fact that the students were civilians who were never exposed to real military discipline. A secondary reason for the high AWOL rate was the lack of a specific program of instruction and activities. The students became bored with constant re-refresher training. *

(4) 1958

(a) The inability to get air support for training on numerous occasions throughout the year has a serious effect on student morale and training realism.

(b) Discipline. Students continued to go AWOL or quit just prior to going on actual operations throughout the year. The principal reasons were:

1. Most students were civilians who were not accustomed to military discipline.

2. The students did not sign a contract which would obligate them to serve for a length of time or participate in operational missions.

3. Student screening by STD was too harsh at times and too liberal at others.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to MACV Command History 1967," p G III -4-27, 28 (SACSA).

4. Students did not have a draft exempt status. Some were picked for the draft while on pass or leave.

(c) VN Cadre personnel were not able to instruct in any area except their specialty. * --

4 / STRATA Team Training - 1968. "Training of STRATA teams, after completion of the basic course at CLT, and once operationally ready and transferred to Monkey Mountain FOB (MMFOB), Danang, became the responsibility of the MMFOB Commander and his VN counterpart. During the summer (SW Monsoon) months when STRATA insertions were at their height, training at Danang consisted primarily of specific pre-mission and refresher training. During the last quarter of the year, when first the NE Monsoon and then the bombing hault slowed and then stopped missions in NVN, MMFOB training was characterized by a series of field training exercises in the Dalat area of RVN with the purpose of: (a) improving the teams' efficiency in communications, land navigation, reporting, and forward air guide procedures, (b) maintaining the teams' operational readiness, and (c) preparing the teams' for commitment in the Prairie Fire/Daniel Boone areas in the event operations in NVN continued to be prohibited." **

G. COMMUNICATIONS

Communications with Long term agent teams was through the high frequency radio system . DATA

DATA Short term teams (STRATA) communicated directly with FOB. Danang using the SSB HF radio or via an airborne relay using AW/PRC-25 radios. *

DATA

DATA

* (TS) Historical Summary, Airborne Studies Group, "SOG Annual Historical Summary" 5 Jan 69, p 115,116, (SACSA)
** (TS) ibid. p 82.

DATA

2. RESUPPLY COMMUNICATIONS. Proper communications with active agent teams, just prior to resupply, was particularly important. A message of intent to resupply was sent to the team 10 days prior to the mission being conducted. During the day that resupply was expected to be accomplished, a special broadcast (contact) schedule was forwarded to Bugs. The teams received this schedule seven days prior to resupply. On the day of resupply the appropriate team was notified from one to three hours prior that the aircraft was on its way or had to cancel. **

* (TS) Report, MACJ3, "AD HOC Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 1968, Timberwork (c) p 4 (SACSA).
** (TS) SOP, Airborne Studies Group, 25 March 1969, p 18 (SACSA).

PART III. OPERATIONS (U)

A. INTRODUCTION

Airborne operations are presented in the paragraphs that follow by the various programs that were controlled by the Airborne Section of SOG: Long-Term Agent Teams, STRATA Teams, Singleton Agents, and Diversionary Operations. This presentation will be chronological in a sense because until 1968 the Long-Term Agent Program represented essentially the entire airborne effort. (The first two STRATA teams were infiltrated in late 1967.)

B. BACKGROUND

DATA

Twenty (20) other teams were lost during the infiltration phase in this period. Three teams were resupplied; 27 missions were aborted.

DATA

(See Figure CB-5 for summary of these operations.)

C. GENERAL CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

Initially, agent teams were infiltrated by parachute from the C-123 fixed aircraft or put ashore by boat. (ARES was infiltrated by boat in 1961.) As covered in Part I, in September of 1965,

DATA

for OPLAN 34A missions to the extent that C-123 aircraft could transfer the teams to helicopters for onward movement. Following this clearance, teams were inf ltrated by: (a) direct parachute insertion from C-123 or C-130 (later) aircraft originating from Tan Son Nhut or Camp Long Thanh, or; (b) helicopter operations originating from Nakhon Phanom with refueling stops in Northern Laos if required.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History, 1964," p. II-9. (SACSA).

FIGURE CB-5

SUMMARY OF TEAM HISTORIES, 1961-1964 (U)[a/]

Team Names	Original Date	Number Dropped	Resupplied/Reinforced Date	Resupplied/Reinforced Number	Men Lost and Reason[b/]	Agents	Actions Completed
ARES	Feb 61[c/]	1	None	None	Nineteen killed attempting to resupply by sea.	1	Recruited six agents.
BELL	4 Jun 62	7	18 Aug 62 26 Jul 64 14 Nov 64	0 0 7	Three died, sickness DATA One killed in jump (SOG)	10	Sabotage rail line 31 Aug 63.
EAGLE	28 Jun 64	6	None	None	One died, sickness (SOG).	5	None
EASY	9 Aug 63	8	23 Apr 64 18 Jul 64	0 6	One died, sickness (SOG). Three killed on ambush 16 Oct 64.	10	Contact with relatives 3 Jan 64; recruited two indigenous assets, gave rifles 9 Jun 64; ambush 24 Oct 64.
REMUS	16 Apr 62	6	12 Aug 63 23 Apr 64 22 Oct 64 22 Dec 64	2 3 4 0		19	Road mined, 18 Nov 63; two bridges sabotaged, 19 Aug 64.
TOURBILLON/ COYTS	16 May 62	8	12 Nov 62 27 May 64 24 Jul 64 19 Dec 64	0 7 6 4	Four killed in jump[d/] DATA 3 SOG). Two killed in ambush, 27 Dec 64 (3 CAS/3 SOG).	15	Bridge sabotaged, 8 Dec 62. Bridge sabotaged, 24 Sep 62. Bridge sabotaged, 14 Oct 64.
ATTILA	25 Apr 64	6	None	None	Six teams captured (SOG).	0	None
BOONE	29 Jul 64	9	None	None	Nine DRV announced capture and trial of seven men. One DIA on drop, one unknown (missing).	0	None
BUFFALO	19 Jun 64	10	None	None	Ten DRV announced capture & trial (SOG).	0	None
LOTUS	19 May 64	6	None	None	Six DRV announced capture & trail (SOG).	0	None
SCORPION	17 Jun 64	6	None	None	Six DRV announced capture & trial (SOG).	0	None
					TOTAL ... 24 (CAS) ... 38 (SOG)		

a/ Source: (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV Command History, 1964 (U)," p. II-15.

c/ Infiltrated by sea. DATA

d/ One each killed infiltrating May 62 and May 64. Two killed infiltrating July 64.

TASKER NUMBER _____

DUE DATE _____

REDACT _____ DECLASSIFY _____

DOCUMENTS REMOVED/BEING REVIEWED:

Annex B to Appendix C
Airborne Operations

PAGE(S)

REMOVED

May not be declassified per
State Department

Pages C-b-37 through C-b-61

u. VOI. Four agents infiltrated on 18 October 1967. No contact ever established after infiltration.*

v. Teams 915 and 919. The teams had been recruited in the spring and summer of 1968, but had not completed training at the time of the 1 November bombing halt. Team 915 commenced training at Camp Long Thanh in October and 919 in January 1969. The teams were recruited in SVN from persons who had migrated in the 1950s from NVN to the Danang and Nha Trang areas. Team 915 first mission on 12 January was a 10-day infiltration 20 kilometer MT for a roadwatch mission. The team completed a longer, 20 day, mission in February, also MT Both missions were judged successful. Team 919 performed its first mission, also MT on 9 June 1969. The team was attacked immediately after infiltration and had to exfiltrate with a loss of three men. These two teams have remained under the operational control of OP-36, Airborne Studies Group.

5. Summary. Figure B-15 is an abbreviated chronology of all recorded long-term agent team infiltrations from 1961 through the final insertion in 1967.

E. STRATA TEAM OPERATIONS

1. General Conduct of Operations

a. Authority. By the original authority message for STRATA operations** CINCPAC was authorized to approve STRATA missions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff an information addressee on all messages. CINCPAC approved 15 STRATA targets in a series of messages transmitted from May of 1967 until July 1968. (See STRATA "Authority" file in SACSA.) Mission numbers were assigned by CINCPAC and authority was given to strike an approved target on more than one mission.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to MACV 1967 Command History," p. G-III-4-22. (SACSA)
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, 120052Z Apr 67. (SACSA)

FIGURE B-15

Chronology of Long-Term Agent Team Inserts

Team	Date	How	Pers	Remarks
1. ARES	Feb 61	Sea	1	Radio contact continues in Apr 69
2. ATLAS	Mar 61	Air	4	2 KIA, 2 captured on landing
3. CASTER	May 61	Air	4	Contact lost Jul 63 in Laos
4. DIDO	Jun 61	Air	4	Doubled, played, terminated
5. ECHO	Jun 61	Air	3	Doubled, played til Aug 62, terminated
6. TARZAN	?	Air	6	Insert date unk, last radio contact Jun 63, presumed captured
7. EUROPA	Feb 62	Air	5	Last radio contact 27Jan64 in NVN
8. REMUS	16 Apr 62	Air	6	Reinf 2 men 12Aug63, 3 men 23Apr64, 4 men (Tm ALTER) 22Oct64, 4 men Jan 65, 2 men 21Aug67. 13May68 NVN Announced capture of SVN ranger tm in REMUS area
9. TOURBILLON	16 May 62	Air	8	Reinf 7 men (Tm COOTS) 27May64, 7 men (Tm PERSEUS) 24Jul64, 6 men temporarily (Tm VERSE) 7Nov65, 2 men (Tm TOURBILLON BRAVO) 24Dec66. Reinf radio opr sent duress signal in Jan 67. Tm being used as diversion asset thru Apr 69.
10. EROS	Jun 62	Air	5	Doubled, played, terminated
11. PEGASUS	13 Apr 63	Air	6	Captured soon after landing
12. JASON	14 May 63	Air	5	Captured soon after landing
13. DAUPHINE	4 Jun 63	Air	5	Captured soon after landing
14. BELL	4 Jun 63	Air	7	Reinf 7 men (Tm GRECO) 14Nov64. Last radio contact 19Mar67, dropped 3 Jul 67.
15. BECASSINE	Jun 63	Air	6	Captured soon after landing
16. BART	7 Jun 63	Air	5	Captured soon after landing
17. TELLUS	7 Jun 63	Air	4	Captured soon after landing

FIGURE B-15 (TS) (Cont'd)

18.	MIDAS	10 Jun 63	Air	8	Captured soon after landing
19.	NIKE	10 Jun 63	Air	6	Captured soon after landing
20.	GIANT	Jul 63	Air	6	Captured soon after landing
21.	PACKER	Jul 63	Air	6	Captured soon after landing
22.	EASY	9 Aug 63	Air	8	Reinf 6 men (Tm PISCES) 18Jul64, 5 men (Tm HORSE) May 65, 9 men 17Sep65 & 3 men 18Oct65 (Tm DOG/GECKO). DOG/GECKO redesig EASY ALPHA, separated 30Oct65. EASY ALPHA rejoined in Jul 67. Last radio contact 26Apr68; 7Aug68 NVN newspaper announced capture of 12 SVN Rangers, correctly identified Tm Ldr.
23.	[no name]	12 Aug 63	Air	2	Reinf for Tm REMUS
24.	SWAN	4 Sep 63	Air	6	Captured soon after landing
25.	BULL	7 Oct 63	Air	7	Captured soon after landing
26.	RUBY	5 Dec 63	Air	8	Captured soon after landing
27.	[no name]	23 Apr 64	Air	3	Reinf for Tm REMUS
28.	ATTILA	25 Apr 64	Air	6	Captured soon after landing, Action SS?
29.	LOTUS	19 May 64	Air	6	Captured, tried by NVN
30.	COOTS	27 May 64	Air	7	Reinf for Tm TOURBILLON
31.	SCORPION	17 Jun 64	Air	7	Captured, tried by NVN
32.	BUFFALO	19 Jun 64	Air	10	Captured, tried by NVN
33.	EAGLE	28 Jun 64	Air	6	Jun 68 analysis: Tm believed under NVN control. 3 men still in Tm. Inst'd to move south, began move Nov 68. Still in radio contact 69.
34.	PISCES	18 Jul 64	Air	6	Reinf for Tm EASY
35.	PERSEUS	24 Jul 64	Air	7	Reinf for Tm TOURBILLON
36.	BOONE	29 Jul 64	Air	9	Captured, tried by NVN
37.	ALTER	22 Oct 64	Air	4	Reinf for Tm REMUS
38.	GRECO (CENTAUR Team)	14 Nov 64	Air	7 (28)	Reinf for Tm BELL. Tm destroyed 10Dec64 in C-123 crash on Monkey Mountain, Da Nang. See pg II-J-1, 64 History
	REMUS ALPHA	May 65		5	Part of Tm REMUS inst'd to exfil to Laos. Last contact 21Aug65 vic TJ 785367; "Caching radio, heading for Vientiane (Laos)."
39.	HORSE	May 65	Air	5	Reinf for Tm EASY
40.	DOG/GECKO (EASY ALPHA)	17 Sep 65	Air	9	Reinf for Tm EASY. Later redesig Tm EASY ALPHA (30Oct65). Tm rejoined Tm EASY in Jul 67.

FIGURE B-15 (Cont'd),

41. VERSE	7 Nov 65	Air	8	Infil to Tm TOURBILLON; 2 men killed as result of drop. Tm inst'd Tm TOURBILLON in roadwatch techniques. 21 Dec 65, Tm TOURBILLON gave 3 men to Tm VERSE; VERSE detached. 27Jul67, Hanoi Radio announced capture.
42. ROMEO	19 Nov 65	Helo	10	Oct 66 received msg in clear text: "ROMEO ALREADY CAPTURED." Last radio contact 5Aug68; declared MIA 4Nov68.
43. KERN	5 Mar 66	Air	9	1 man killed on drop, last radio contact 5Sep66, dropped 7Dec66.
44. HECTOR	22 Jun 66	Helo	15	Reinf 11 men (Tm HECTOR BRAVO) 23 Sep 66. HECTOR & HECTOR BRAVO never linked up. BRAVO dropped 28Dec66. Last contact w/HECTOR 15Mar67, dropped 26Jun67.
45. SAMSON	5 Oct 66	Helo	8	LZ in Laos. Last radio contact 2Dec66, dropped 1Mar67.
46. TOURBILLON BRAVO	24 Dec 66	Air	2	Reinf for TOURBILLON. Took in wiretap & electronic sensor devices.
47. HADLEY	26 Jan 67	Helo	11	DATA Foot infil to NVN. Jun 68 analysis: Tm believed captured soon after landing. Used as diversion since Jun 67, told to exfil to Laos. Mar 69 Tm rept'd they were in Laos again & ready for pickup; could not locate.
48. NANSEN	22 Apr 67	Helo	17	DATA Tm never reached NVN, enemy vic LZ, requested exfil. See pg G-III-4-15, 67 History.
49. [no name]	21 Aug 67	Air	2	Reinf for Tm REMUS
50. GOLDFISH	13 Sep 67	Sea	1	Infil by PLOWMAN' Mission 327. Agents had been recruited from detainees on PARADISE. Agents were to remain in-place 60-90 days & exfil by sea. Never contacted.
51. RED DRAGON	21 Sep 67	Air	7	Widely dispersed on infil. US Case Off believed Tm under NVN control, VN Case Off believed Tm OK as result of Jun 68 analysis. Radio contact continues in Apr 69.
52. VOI	18 Oct 67	Air	4	No contact ever estab after infil.

b. Mission. It was originally intended* that STRATA teams would be well indoctrinated DATA and leave leaflets and posters along the trails in their operational areas. However, in August 1968, SOG directed that STRATA teams no longer be tasked with multiple missions on the same operation, e.g., roadwatch, prisoner snatch DATA Subsequently, STRATA teams were charged with only one mission per infiltration, principally: roadwatch, reconnaissance, or prisoner snatch.

DATA **

c. Typical Mission. Once a STRATA team had been assigned a mission objective and a designated area of operations, the selected team was alerted and placed in an isolation area. Concurrent with alerting the team, SOG requested diplomatic clearance from AMEMB, Bangkok, scheduled C-130 for flight of the team from Camp Long Thanh or Danang to Nakhon Phanom, which was the helicopter launch area, and requested helicopter support from the 7/13th Air Force in Udorn, Thailand, if the team was to be infiltrated by helicopter. The C-130 landed at Nakhon Phanom and ground coordination was effected with helicopter crews and Nakhon Phanom AF personnel. During coordination, the STRATA team changed into NVN uniforms. The helicopters were moved adjacent to the C-130, and the team transferred. The helicopter flew a selected route to the objective area. An air CAP of fighter-bomber aircraft was airborne on an on-call basis to support the helicopters and team in the event of emergency. The C-130 orbited over Laos and acted as an airborne command post until the team insertion was declared a success by the case officer. Case officer personnel returned to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Danang and maintained a radio listening watch for approximately 48 hours. Normal radio communication was then turned over to FOB personnel who maintained contact with the STRATA team while the team remained in the mission area.***

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* (TS) Report. MACJ3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 1968, DATA p.6. (SACSA)

** (TS) Historical Summary, Airborne Studies Group, "SOG Annual Historical Summary," 5 Jan 69, p.11. (SACSA)

*** (TS) Report. MACJ3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 1968, DATA p.11. (SACSA)

d. Organizational Change. The bombing halt of 1 November 1968 restricted any further operations. STRATA assets, including the Monkey Mountain FOB, were turned over to OP-35 (Ground Studies Group) for employment in the PRAIRIE FIRE and DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE areas of operation. (The operations of the STRATA teams from November until July 1969 will be covered in the Appendices on Laos and Cambodia.) An evaluation by SOG of STRATA operations under OP-35 resulted in the teams being returned to the control of OP-36 (Airborne Studies Group) on 1 July 1969. The principal factors prompting the return was the deterioration of training and morale resulting from reduced individual attention devoted to the teams under the OP-35 arrangement.

2. Mission Narratives - 1967-1968. Only two teams were inserted in 1967; one of which was exfiltrated. From January 1968 until the bombing pause of 1 November,

> "Twenty teams were successfully exfiltrated with all members, three teams exfiltrated minus missing members, and Team 120 has been missing in its entirety since 17 May. There were twelve meeting engagements with enemy personnel [15 STRATA agents were lost] . . . Nine intelligence reports were forwarded to higher headquarters based upon information gathered by STRATA teams."*

Narratives of all STRATA missions conducted prior to the bombing halt of 1 November 1968 are included below**:

a. "STRATA III composed of 7 VN agents was infiltrated by CH-3 helicopter DATA on 240715Z Sep 67. Team was to move to roadwatch sites along route 101, vicinity of XE 1254 and report real-time intelligence in STRATA Target Area 5. Infiltration was accomplished without incident. No enemy contact but because of difficult terrain, illness of two team members, and lack of water, team was emergency exfiltrated by CH-3 helicopter vicinity of XE 1048 on 281045Z Sep 67."

b. " STRATA 112, composed of 10 VN agents parachute infiltrated into NVN vicinity WE 787854 at 221920Z Oct 67 on STRATA Target 1. Enroute to roadwatch site overlooking junction

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History," p. F-III-4. (SACSA)
** (TS) Memo, CINCPAC Staff, "STRATA Teams", undated.

of route 15 and 101, team made unexpected contact with enemy and requested exfiltration. Four exfiltration attempts by CH-3 helicopters were unsuccessful. Team last heard from 7 Nov 67. Subsequent recon missions failed to locate team and on 11 Jan 68 STRATA 112 was dropped from active agent rolls.

c. " STRATA III, composed of 8 VN agents, infiltrated by CH-3 helicopter into [redacted] at 171547H Mar 68, on STRATA Target 7. Mission of team was to conduct roadwatch along Route 196. Infiltration was without incident; team moved off the LZ and established cache site off the LZ and established a position at XE 454018 at 171800H. At 180700H team moved out toward roadwatch site and at 181345H contacted two squads local militia. After a twenty minute firefight in which three enemy were killed or wounded the team withdrew. Prior to withdrawal team heard three explosions believed to be M-14 anti-personnel mines previously emplaced by team. Team then established an overnight 'safe area' and at 190700H established radio contact with FOB Danang. During day of 19 March team observed other enemy militia activity but had no further contact with enemy. Team heard three more explosions, believed to be other M-14 mines, from the direction of firefight area. At 200700H team contacted 02 FAC aircraft. Team made two additional contacts with FAC and on 221050H was visually located by aircraft observer. Team was extracted by CH-3 at 231345H, vicinity XE 417016. Team found no evidence to determine whether or not significant infiltration traffic is passing through the local militia force of less than company size. No regular NVA activity noted.

d. "STRATA 113, composed of 8 VN agents, infiltrated, vicinity XE 436125, by CH-3 helicopter on 310835Z Mar 68, on STRATA Target 7A. Team established radio contact with FOB, Danang and reported its position on 010755Z Apr 68. No enemy contact reported. Team reported on 030610Z Apr 68 that they had arrived at Base Camp location, vicinity XE 439105. No enemy contact. On 4 April, team conducted reconnaissance in Base Camp area. Due to lack of enemy contact, team mission extended for five (5) days in order to provide ample time for thorough reconnaissance of Route 1961. On 5 April, team reported completion of reconnaissance of Route 1961, no information furnished (at this time) on results of reconnaissance. Team exfiltrated from vicinity XE 417121 at 070805Z Apr 68.

e. " The FAC control of the helicopter insertion of one STRATA team (114) and the extraction of another STRATA team (113) on the same mission is proving to be a sound method for control of helicopters flying through hostile areas and for locating LZ's.

f. "STRATA 114, composed of 8 VN agents, infiltrated on STRATA Target 7B, vicinity XD 484985 at 070747Z April 1968. Team contacted FOB, Danang by voice and CW at 071045Z April and on 080710Z April and reported its position vicinity XD 474989. Team moving toward Route 196, vicinity XD 4599. Team contacted FOB, Danang by radio (CW) on 090015Z April, no enemy contact. At 090830Z April, team contacted six enemy armed with AK 47 rifles. No friendly casualties, enemy casualties unknown. Team instructed to move south to Route 196, vicinity XD 4497. 110130Z April, team contacted FOB. Team located vicinity XD 466992. FOB directed team to move south to XD 4696. CW radio contacts at 120100Z and 120335Z April. Team located XD 458792. Team instructed to cross Route 196, vicinity XD 4496, to take pictures, emplace mines, and leave leaflets. On 13 April team emplaced M-14 mines, left SSPL leaflets and flag vicinity XD 459983 (suspected enemy checkpoint). One hour later team heard explosions from the direction of the emplaced mines. Team exfiltrated by CH-3 from

vicinity XD 432982 at 150920Z April. During exfiltration hoists with jungle penetrators were used for pickup. No friendly casualties and unknown enemy casualties. Excellent PRC 74 voice and CW communications established and maintained throughout the operation. Failure of enemy to pursue team after contact on 9 April indicates that enemy troops are local militia or have specific location, such as way station, to goard.

g. "STRATA 122, composed of 4 VN agents, infiltrated on STRATA Target 2, vicinity XE 363215 at 150523Z May 1968. Radio contact established; team leader reported all members well and no problems encountered on infiltration. On 16 May, team reported its location as XE 354215; stated that upon completion of the infiltration team moved on azimuth of 265 degrees through rugged terrain, observed many trails with footprints and traces with direction of travel toward 200 degrees. Team located vicinity XE 354215 and reported hearing the firing of heavy weapons (at 152300Z May) from an area west of its position (XE 354215). Team plans to remain at XE 354215 and conduct reconnaissance of area. On 17 May, team located XE 352214 and still encountering high rocky terrain. One team member reported ill at 161230Z May and as a result, team will remain temporarily at XE 352214. Team observed jet aircraft strike to its West at 160920Z May and another airstrike to the North. No secondary explosions. Negative enemy contact. On 180140Z May, team reported its location vicinity XE 356214. One team member reported ill; FOB provided medical treatment advise via radio. Team will move to LZ, vicinity XE 337216 for planned extraction on 21 May. On 19 May, team visually sighted at XE 356218 by STRATA FAC observer. Team scheduled for extraction 21 May. On 20 May, team still located vicinity XE 356218. Team extracted vicinity XE 3521 at 220520Z May. Debriefing at FOB, Danang underway.

" Since one member of the team became ill (later illness was diagnosed as severe kidney infection the team determined they could not continue mission (rugged terrain coupled with team member's illness) on 17 May and team requested /exfiltration/ on 22 May. From 17 May until extraction on 22 May the team performed only those activities connected with their security, survival, and exfiltration. Extraction was accomplished by CH-3, using hoist and jungle penetrator.

"No enemy contact, no friendly casualties.

"Since the team did not reach its objective (Route 137) no roadwatch information was provided. Some usable information was reported concerning terrain, flora, and fauna which possibly could be useful survival/evasion/escape information for future operations in the area.

h. "STRATA 111, composed of 7 VN agents, infiltrated on STRATA Target 7C, vicinity XE 4404 at 140544Z May 68. On 15 May team reported its location as XE440036. Negative contact with enemy. On 16 May 68, team reported its location as XE438105, no contact with enemy, and team moving on azimuth of 145 degrees. On 17 May, team located at XE 449098. Team reported hearing rifle fire at 161015Z May at 1,000 meters and 90 degrees from XE 442008 and dogs barking and rifle fire approximately 1,000 meters away on an azimuth of 10 degrees from XE 442008. Negative enemy contact. Team located at XD 452095 at radio contact 180245Z May. Team proceeding on heading of 145 degrees toward Route 196. As of 20 May, team still in vicinity XD 452095, will proceed to roadwatch site. 21 May, radio contact continues; team moving on azimuth of 145 degrees toward roadwatch site. On 23 May contact by air to ground voice

and FOB to team by CW radio. As of 240305Z May team located at XD491936; will move to roadwatch site at XD 444977. On 250010Z May, team 'rogered' for team traffic and continued to move toward roadwatch site. Last contact 270145Z May; extraction planned for 28 May. Team extracted from NVN, vicinity XD518926 at 290445Z May 68. Debriefing underway at FOB, Danang on 30 May 68. Debriefing completed 31 May 1968.

i. "STRATA 120, composed of 6 VN agents, infiltrated on STRATA Target 7D, vicinity XE 5206 at 140533Z May 1968. Radio contact with FOB established at 150900Z May. Team directed to provide situation and location report. On 16 May team reported location as XE 527080 and no enemy contact. Team located at XE 536064 at radio contact 170910Z May and reported experiencing difficulty in movement because of rocky terrain. Team moving east toward target area overlooking SONG LONG DAI river and LANG MO village. Team last heard from on 170910Z May, vicinity XE 536064. Team supposedly split into three two man reconnaissance elements to conduct river watch. Communications should be re-established by 21 May; if not, planned overflight will be conducted 22 May, with observation aircraft using FM radio for air to ground contact. On 22 May negative contact with FOB Danang, ABCCC aircraft or O-2 observer, search continues on 22 May. No contact on 23 May; all emergency search and contact procedures now in effect. No contact on 24 May. Emergency contact procedures still in effect 25 and 26 May; negative contact. Team last reported 170910Z May. Emergency contact procedures included: Danang FOB single sideband, CW and voice radio broadcasts on scheduled and unscheduled basis; ABCCC aircraft transmissions hourly; blind broadcasts over SSPL transmitter; O-2 and A-1 aircraft overflights using FM radio and search for visual signals. Team is presumed missing. O-2 aircraft overflights will continue to look for team on a periodic basis.

j. "STRATA 113, (8 VN) infiltrated vicinity XE 2631, on STRATA Target 2A, on 220424Z May 68. Mission is to conduct roadwatch on Route 137. Negative contact with FOB as of 240500Z May. As of 260030Z May negative contact with FOB. O-2 aircraft overflight scheduled for 26 May. Air to ground contact established 260530Z May via O-2 aircraft. Team located at XE280318; reports difficulty with PRC 74 radio. O-2 observation aircraft flight planned for 25 May; STRATA observer will transmit instructions to team via FM radio. Team contacted by O-2 observer aircraft 29 May, vicinity XE 282326. Resupply will be attempted 30 May. Resupply mission cancelled 30 & 31 May due to weather. Team last heard by O-2 observer aircraft 29 May, vicinity XE 282326. Team contacted by O-2 aircraft on FM radio at 020330Z June. Team reported Base camp located at XE 268325 and roadwatch site at XE 310326. On 2 June team received two (2) resupply bundles in free-fall drop from O-2 aircraft. Team reports negative enemy contact and all team members safe. Team scheduled for extraction 5 June. Team visually sighted by O-2 aircraft observer 040510Z Jun at extraction LZ vicinity XE 279335; scheduled for extraction 7 June. Team extracted from vicinity 279335 at 070328Z June 1968.

k. "STRATA 114 (7 VN) infiltrated vicinity XD 569869, on STRATA Target #13, at 060415Z Jun 68. Mission is roadwatch of Route 1036 (vicinity XD 638848). Contact with team as of 070715Z Jun. Team located at XD 596865 as of 090730Z JUN; negative enemy contact. On 10 JUN team located vicinity XD 628855; team reported hearing bombers and rifle fire 091050Z JUN vicinity XD 623876 ans XD630733. Team reported 101030Z JUN vicinity XD 631865. At 100830Z JUN team reported hearing many bombs approximately 300 meters from their position between 100800Z - 100830Z JUN. A 'no bomb line'

coordinates XD 620840, XD 650840, XD 650870 and XD 620870 has been established in their area effective 110225Z JUN. Team reported many trucks in area moving south on 111500Z JUN. A new 'no bomb line' established XD 6286, XD 6283, and XD 6584, effective 120300Z JUN. At 121300Z JUN team reported (from vicinity XD 634835) a truck park/ motor pool in area XD 637845. Team reported truck convoys (of 30 vehicles each) moving on road between 1330Z and 2100Z hours. Trucks appeared to be heavily loaded military trucks. Air strikes in area have not hit road. At 121315Z JUN team reported that team leader, Ass't team leader, and one (1) radio operator had not returned from reconnaissance. Team contacted FOB 140200Z JUN from vicinity XD 614865 and reported that the three missing team members apparently contacted enemy during morning hours of 12 JUN. Small arms fire and grenade explosions were heard at base camp by the other four team members. No contact with three (3) missing members. Team (-) located by STRATA observer in O-2 aircraft at XD 608868 on 140550Z JUN. Team moving west to extraction LZ. On 15 JUN team (-) contacted vicinity XD 613866 by aerial observer; team continuing to move to LZ, no enemy contact reported. Team (-) contacted FOB Danang at 160330Z and 160700Z and reported location as XD 597865. Team (-), four indigenous members extracted vicinity XD 597865 at 180818Z JUN.

l. "STRATA 115. (7 CAMB) infiltrated vicinity WE 629911, in STRATA Target Area #11, at 190535Z June. Mission is roadwatch trail activity vicinity WE 715900. Negative radio contact as of 210550Z June. Team visually sighted at 220530Z June at WE666906. Team contacted O-2 aircraft on FM radio and sent coded message to STRATA air observer. Team contacted by radio 24 June at WE700920; re-supply scheduled for 250900Z June. Resupplied 26 June. Enemy contact 27 June vic WE 711925. No friendly casualties; one enemy KIA and two WIA. Team position compromised; exfiltrated 290719Z June '68. The exfiltration CH-3 received three hits from small arms approximately 1 KM from LZ; no casualties.

m. "STRATA 111. (7 VN) infiltrated vicinity XD 557921, in STRATA Target Area 13A, at 200531Z June. Mission is roadwatch of Route 1036. At 210230Z June, team reported its location at XD 568912; negative enemy contact, team moving toward roadwatch position on Route 1036. Team visually located at XD 557921 when contacted 220030Z June; negative enemy contact. Team contacted by radio 240145Z June, location XD 629894; negative enemy contact. Enemy contact 24 June vic XD 642893; laid mines and withdrew. Mines exploded shortly after withdrawal. Team safe vic XD 598890. Team reported safe 27 June, moving toward resupply DZ vic XD 586894. Second enemy contact 300925Z June vic XD 572902. One friendly WIA, estimate 3 enemy WIA (possibly DIA). Exfiltrated 300711Z June '68 vic XD 568893. Circumstances surrounding the wounding of one team member and inconsistencies noticed during debriefing have lead to the confinement of the team members during investigation by a SVN security agency and their removal from the STRATA Program.

n. "STRATA 117 (7 CAMB) infiltrated into NVN vicinity XD 440932, on STRATA Target #7E at 270538Z June. Mission was to observe, report, and record amount and identity of all traffic utilizing Rte. 196. Radio contact was established with FOB Danang and at 290600Z team reported its location as XD 472948; no enemy contact. On 30 June team reported its location as XD 464955; no enemy contact. On 2 July, team established roadwatch site at XD 439780; nothing significant reported. On 3/4 July, from a roadwatch site at XD 389750, team reported 'no enemy traffic of any description observed'. Team actually patrolled road and saw no evidence of recent use.

On 5 July, team reported from vicinity XD 435002; no enemy contact. Team exfiltrated from vicinity XD 435002 at 060736Z July. Upon completion of debriefing it was decided that the portion of Rte. 196, designated as STRATA Target 7E, is no longer considered a lucrative target for STRATA operations.

o. "STRATA 118 (7 VN) infiltrated DATA in STRATA Target #2B, at 070931Z JUL 68; no enemy contact. Mission: roadwatch on Rte 137. At 100230Z Jul, team contacted FOB Danang and reported no enemy contact. At 100615Z JUL, team reported to STRATA aerial observer that they had made contact and were pursued by enemy troops; reported all team members safe. Team emplaced M-14 mines in area and withdrew to vicinity XE 295370. Team directed to move to vicinity XE 284351 for extraction. At 110230Z JUL, team reported all members safe and located at XE 305370. On 12/13 JUL, team continued to evade enemy enroute to extraction site located vicinity XE 284351. Team extracted from vicinity XE 292366 at 140825Z JUL 68. Team did not accomplish its surveillance mission of Rte 137. Roadwatch mission against Rte 137 rescheduled for on or about 30 JUL 68.

p. "STRATA 94 (7 VN) infiltrated DATA on STRATA target #13B, at 130652Z JUL 68. Mission: roadwatch Rte 1036 (Bat Lak Road). 15 July radio contact established; team reported being pursued by enemy, no casualties. At 161040Z JUL, team reported its location as XD 612827. On 21 JUL, team reported that it had established base camp at XD 618825; three team members conducted reconnaissance for roadwatch site. Base camp team members reported hearing small arms and explosion from direction of three recon members. Last contact 210855Z JUL. On 23 JUL team reported that the three recon members rejoined remainder of team at base camp; no friendly casualties. Recon element reported (1) that it was unable to reach proposed roadwatch site because of enemy security in area; (2) identified two other enemy-used trails and (3) distributed SSPL materials and took photos of area in vicinity of Rte 136. Team located vicinity XD 614833 on 24 Jul. On 26 JUL team located vicinity XD 594823; extraction scheduled for 28 JUL. Team extracted from vicinity XD 594823 at 280742Z JUL 68. Team failed to accomplish primary mission of roadwatch on Rte 1036. Secondary mission of distribution of SSPL material accomplished. During debriefing, interrogation response variance among team members resulted in the credibility of the team becoming questionable. Further interrogation, evaluation and remedial training underway.

q. "STRATA 93 (7 VN) infiltrated into NVN, vicinity XE 202458, on STRATA target #4, at 150645Z JUL 68. Mission: roadwatch on Rte 101. Located vicinity XE 196467 at 151005Z JUL; reported terrain conditions difficult. At 160745Z team reported its location vicinity XE 198488; one team member sustained leg injury in fall from steep cliff. On 21 JUL, team moved to vicinity XE 194476; because of injured team member and rough terrain team scheduled for extraction on or about 23 JUL. On 17 JUL, team reported a water shortage and requested, thru STRATA aerial observer, directions to nearest water. Team was informed that water available at XE 193467. Team failed to locate water. On 18 and 20 Jul aerial resupply of water attempted; in both instances resupply unsuccessful as water containers were broken upon impact. Team then directed to move to extraction site vicinity XE 194476 and on 23 JUL, team extracted from vicinity XE 196473. Team 93 failed to accomplish assigned mission of roadwatch on Rte 101.

r. "STRATA 115 (7 VN) infiltrated into NVN, vicinity WE 739891 at 210530Z JUL 68, on STRATA Target #11A. Mission: conduct reconnaissance and roadwatch on unnumbered routes vicinity WE 710923. Team located at WE 727906 at 220817Z Jul; no enemy contact. Team located vicinity WE 729911 as of 240700Z Jul 68; no enemy contact. Team located vicinity WE 726912 on 25 Jul; no enemy contact. On 26 Jul, team located vicinity WE 722917; no enemy contact. Team located vicinity WE 714920 on 27 Jul; resupply scheduled for 1 Aug. Team visually sighted by STRATA aerial observer on 31 Jul in vicinity WE 691911; air to ground radio contact established. On 1 Aug, Al-G resupply aborted when team reported DZ insecure; team directed to move to vicinity WE 740890. Last reported location WE 691912 as of 1 Aug. On 4 Aug team reported location vicinity WE 715892; visual and radio contact established with FAC aircraft on 6 Aug 68. Extraction planned for 9 Aug. Last reported location was WE 745891 as of 8 Aug. Team believed to have had contact with enemy forces 7-9 Aug vicinity WE 738891. Aerial search for team underway 9 Aug. Adverse weather 9 thru 11 Aug affected visual search. Aerial observer believed he sighted team vicinity WE 740880 on 12 Aug; observer received beeper signal on URC 10 radio and observed panel atop a 60 ft. tree. Adverse weather in area on 12/13 Aug; extraction planned for 14 Aug. Three (3) team members extracted from vicinity WE 696825 at 140732Z Aug 68; search will be conducted for four (4) missing members.

"Highlights from debrief of team 115: Team observed movements of 15 enemy groups (20-30 men each) on 061030Z Aug; team was located WE 742890 and enemy troops were moving along stream bed from NE to SW. At 070330Z Aug, an enemy platoon moved into team base camp vicinity WE 742890. Ten minutes firefight resulted in one team member WIA and left behind. Three other missing team members last seen during firefight. Prior to evacuation surviving team members distributed SSPL material vicinity WE 711923. Team accomplished primary mission in locating terminus unnumbered four meter wide road (previously reported 8 Jul 68) at vicinity WE 711924. Secondary mission of locating truck park vicinity WE 728913 also accomplished (area was located but no evidence of personnel or vehicle activity). Additional mission of distribution SSPL material was also accomplished at WE 711923. E and E techniques used by the three survivors proved sound; E and E route provided sufficient food and water. From all indications the three missing team members are still evading; aerial search efforts will be continued.

s. "STRATA Team 119 (6 VN) infiltrated DATA at 290558Z Jul 68, on STRATA Target #13C. Mission: roadwatch on route 1036 from vicinity XD 660945. On 31 July, team located vicinity XD 604924; team reported hut and watch tower vicinity XD 595724, no enemy contact. As of 1 Aug, team located vicinity XD 614397; no enemy contact. Team located vicinity XD 627934 on 2 Aug; negative enemy contact. Team located vicinity XD 637937 as of 4 Aug; no enemy contact. On 6 Aug, team reported observing 3 anti-aircraft guns fired from vicinity XD 676944 and enemy security force in vicinity XD 680950; team located vicinity XD 666194. On 7 Aug team reported observing two cars/carts vicinity XD 586846. On 8 Aug team reported sound of estimated enemy platoon firing AK weapons and reported hearing the firing of two rounds of artillery. Team located vicinity XD 653945 on 9 Aug. Team moved toward extraction site vicinity XD 590920; extraction planned for 13 Aug. On 10 Aug, team reported enemy search party in area; extraction planned for 13 Aug. vicinity XD 590920. On 12 Aug, team located vicinity XD 602921. Team reported two members separated from the rest of team (cause unknown); because of adverse weather in area extraction scheduled for 14 Aug. Four (4) team members extracted from vicinity XD 584926 at 140908Z Aug 68; search will be conducted for two (2) missing members.

"Highlights from initial debrief surviving members of team 116: Team leader and scout departed on recon at 100060Z Aug from vicinity XD 62837. Team (-) heard Meo voices at 100700Z Aug in vicinity base camp; team (-) evaded, thus became separated from other two (recon party) members. While evading team observed new trails in area, two trucks vicinity XD 688934; two new roads suspected to be by-pass routes for Rte 1036, and observed many wood-cutters clearing area. Team emplaced M-14 mines vicinity XD 657944 and distributed SSPL material vicinity XD 659940. Team took photos throughout area in vicinity of XD 575924, XD 585919, XD 590923 and XD635935. Other pictures taken but film in possession of team leader who is MIA.

t. "STRATA Team 116 (7VN) infiltrated DATA DATA at 050810Z Aug 68 on STRATA Target #13D. Mission: capture NVA prisoner and place M-14 mines on routes of military traffic. No radio contact on 6/7 Aug. Team located vicinity XD 625844 as of 8 Aug. On 10 Aug, team located vicinity XD 651837. Team located vicinity XD 634845 on 11 Aug. Extraction scheduled for 15 Aug; last radio contact 11 Aug 68. Team located XD 592327 on 15 Aug; extraction planned for 16 Aug. Team extracted for vicinity XD 592828 at 160709Z Aug 68.

"Team had no visual or physical enemy contacts. Prior to extraction team located and investigated deserted "settlement". Area contained several supply; personnel and commo bunkers, and several buildings. Settlement appeared to have been recently used; team booby-trapped commo bunkers with claymore mines. Team did not accomplish primary mission of capturing a prisoner nor were they able to observe Rte 1036. This was team 116's first mission; reporting on settlement area/camp site was thorough and complete to include photos and sketch.

u. "STRATA Team 118 (6 VN) infiltrated DATA DATA at 060544Z Aug 68 on STRATA Target #2C. Mission: roadwatch on Route 137 from vicinity XE 330180. As of 8 Aug, team located vicinity XE 268306. On 11 Aug, team located vicinity XE 281307 and reported being chased by enemy. Team located vicinity XE 287307 as of 14 Aug. On 15 Aug team located XE 293304 and reported enemy (unknown size) in area. On 17 Aug team reported they had observed an estimated enemy Bn. moving NE to SW at XE 298304; team located vicinity XE 291301. Team visually sighted, at XE 263314 at 200700Z Aug by STRATA aerial observer; voice contact established at same time. Team extracted from vicinity XE 26414 at 210641Z Aug 68.

"Debriefing highlights: Team reported visual and/or physical contacts with enemy personnel on 15, 16, 17 and 18 Aug. On 15 Aug three team members on recon observed NVA soldiers fleeing from airstrikes vicinity XE 313321 to XE 296296; airstrikes lasted several hours with sorties of two jets striking approximately every twenty minutes. About 30 NVA soldiers (carrying four wounded) moved toward recon site on morning of 16 Aug; enemy dressed in black uniforms, armed with AK-47's, BAR's and mortars. Recon element was seen by enemy and then recon element withdrew.

"At 161130Z Aug the team members went out to observe Rte. 137; located an enemy base camp vicinity XE 297302. Four enemy soldiers approached team, fired on team and team withdrew from vicinity XE 293301. Enemy searched for team members throughout the night.

"On 18 Aug while three team members were taking photos vicinity XE 306313 a company of enemy appeared; team withdrew after short fire-fight (unknown number enemy casualties; no friendly casualties); team emplaced M-14 mines along route of withdrawal.

"During the period 172300Z - 180050Z Aug team observed body of troops (270 by count, more not counted) moving SW, vicinity XE 298294, on trail parallel to Rte. 137. Troops were dressed in black uniforms, carried machine guns, AK-47's, 50 cal MG, mortars, and larger unidentified weapons.

"Team was not able to observe Rte. 137; observed several usable trails paralleling Rte. 137. SSPL material was placed at XE 306313; photos taken throughout area; M-14 anti-personnel mines emplaced vicinity XE 306313 and XE 300310. Team reported that enemy voices heard spoke with South Vietnamese accents.

v. "STRATA Team 94 (7 VN) infiltrated DATA DATA at 140915Z Aug 68 on STRATA Target #13E. Mission: Roadwatch Rte. 1036. Team located XD 563859 on 15 Aug. On 16 Aug team located XD 556862; reported contact with enemy platoon at XD 581781 on 140830Z Aug. Team extracted from vicinity XD 565860 at 180805Z Aug 68.

"Debriefing highlights: On 14 Aug, four (4) NVA soldiers armed with AK-47's entered team base camp; during a three minute verbal exchange NVA soldiers urged STRATA team personnel to surrender. Team opened fire and killed all four enemy personnel. Team then withdrew from base camp after receiving approximately 500 rounds of small arms fire from estimated enemy platoon. During withdrawal team emplaced thirteen (13) M-14 anti-personnel mines along withdrawal route; no SSPL material distributed.

w. "STRATA Team 93 (7 VN) infiltrated (DATA DATA) on STRATA Target #4A, at 310806Z AUG. Mission: Roadwatch Route 101. No radio contact on 1 SEP. On 2 SEP, team reported enemy activity vicinity XE 252495. On 3 SEP, team reported negative enemy contact; established roadwatch site vicinity XE 249512. At 061420Z SEP, team reported hearing artillery fire to North of roadwatch site; team was unable to contact ABCCC aircraft on 6 SEP. Team reported following information on 7 SEP; from roadwatch site at 249512. Team observed 16 covered transport trucks moving E to W at 031200Z SEP. Trucks moved approximately 30 KM PH and traveled ten minutes apart. Team further reported that one infantry squad patrols Route 101 each day. Team also reported one bomb strike on Rt. 101 near roadwatch site. On 8 SEP, team withdrew from roadwatch site due to enemy activity in area; no enemy contact. On 9 SEP, team reported observing two trucks moving E to W at 091240Z SEP; no enemy contact. Team located vicinity XE 238512 on 10 SEP; no enemy contact. On 11 SEP, team located vicinity XE 263517; reported enemy patrols in area, on contact with enemy. On 12 SEP, team located vicinity XE 268513; no enemy contact. Team extracted from vicinity XE 268513 at 140635Z SEP.

x. "STRATA Team 116 (8 VN) infiltrated DATA DATA on STRATA Target #13F, at 090655Z SEP. Mission: to capture a prisoner. On 14 SEP, first radio contact (voice to FOB); team reported location vicinity XD 595926, no enemy contact. Team established base camp at XD 557921; ambush site established nearby to attempt to capture a prisoner. No radio contact 15/16 SEP. On 17 SEP, team reported termination of ambush site; no enemy activity in area, and team now patrolling vicinity XD 589920 in effort to locate enemy and capture prisoner. No enemy contact or activity through 19 SEP. Extraction on 22 SEP cancelled due to adverse weather; team located and visually sighted at LZ site vicinity XD 557923 on 21 SEP. Team extracted from vicinity XD 557923 at 230710Z SEP. Mission of prisoner capture not accomplished.

"During the period 172300Z - 180050Z Aug team observed body of troops (270 by count, more not counted) moving SW, vicinity XE 298294, on trail parallel to Rte. 137. Troops were dressed in black uniforms, carried machine guns, AK-47's, 50 cal MG, mortars, and larger unidentified weapons.

"Team was not able to observe Rte. 137; observed several usable trails paralleling Rte. 137. SSPL material was placed at XE 306313; photos taken throughout area; M-14 anti-personnel mines emplaced vicinity XE 306313 and XE 300310. Team reported that enemy voices heard spoke with South Vietnamese accents.

v. "STRATA Team 94 (7 VN) infiltrated DATA DATA at 140915Z Aug 68 on STRATA Target #13E. Mission: Roadwatch Rte. 1036. Team located XD 563859 on 15 Aug. On 16 Aug team located XD 556862; reported contact with enemy platoon at XD 581781 on 140830Z Aug. Team extracted from vicinity XD 565860 at 180805Z Aug 68.

"Debriefing highlights: On 14 Aug, four (4) NVA soldiers armed with AK-47's entered team base camp; during a three minute verbal exchange NVA soldiers urged STRATA team personnel to surrender. Team opened fire and killed all four enemy personnel. Team then withdrew from base camp after receiving approximately 500 rounds of small arms fire from estimated enemy platoon. During withdrawal team emplaced thirteen (13) M-14 anti-personnel mines along withdrawal route; no SSPL material distributed.

w. "STRATA Team 93 (7 VN) infiltrated (DATA DATA) on STRATA Target #4A, at 310806Z AUG. Mission: Roadwatch Route 101. No radio contact on 1 SEP. On 2 SEP, team reported enemy activity vicinity XE 252495. On 3 SEP, team reported negative enemy contact; established roadwatch site vicinity XE 249512. At 061420Z SEP, team reported hearing artillery fire to North of roadwatch site; team was unable to contact ABCCC aircraft on 6 SEP. Team reported following information on 7 SEP; from roadwatch site at 249512. Team observed 16 covered transport trucks moving E to W at 031200Z SEP. Trucks moved approximately 30 KM PH and traveled ten minutes apart. Team further reported that one infantry squad patrols Route 101 each day. Team also reported one bomb strike on Rt. 101 near roadwatch site. On 8 SEP, team withdrew from roadwatch site due to enemy activity in area; no enemy contact. On 9 SEP, team reported observing two trucks moving E to W at 091240Z SEP; no enemy contact. Team located vicinity XE 238512 on 10 SEP; no enemy contact. On 11 SEP, team located vicinity XE 263517; reported enemy patrols in area, on contact with enemy. On 12 SEP, team located vicinity XE 268513; no enemy contact. Team extracted from vicinity XE 268513 at 140635Z SEP.

x. "STRATA Team 116 (8 VN) infiltrated DATA DATA on STRATA Target #13F, at 090655Z SEP. Mission: to capture a prisoner. On 14 SEP, first radio contact (voice to FOB); team reported location vicinity XD 595926, no enemy contact. Team established base camp at XD 557921; ambush site established nearby to attempt to capture a prisoner. No radio contact 15/16 SEP. On 17 SEP, team reported termination of ambush site; no enemy activity in area, and team now patrolling vicinity XD 589920 in effort to locate enemy and capture prisoner. No enemy contact or activity through 19 SEP. Extraction on 22 SEP cancelled due to adverse weather; team located and visually sighted at LZ site vicinity XD 557923 on 21 SEP. Team extracted from vicinity XD 557923 at 230710Z SEP. Mission of prisoner capture not accomplished.

y. "STRATA Team 92 (8 VN) infiltrated DATA vicinity WE 714777, at 150502Z SEP on STRATA Target #11B. Mission: area reconnaissance. No radio contact through 17 SEP. On 18 SEP, team reported successful insertion, establishment of cache site at WE 715799, slow movement because of difficult terrain, from vicinity WE 711798 (on 17 SEP) heard three rounds LMG fire and several artillery explosions approximately one mile east of their position. On 19 SEP, team reportedly on heavily used trail vicinity WE 712793. On 21 SEP, team reported having been pursued by enemy during night of 21 SEP. On 22 SEP, team reported its location at WE 724823 and reported two enemy companies using trail in area; further reported having emplaced M14 mines and heard subsequent explosions during night 21/22 SEP; no enemy contact. Team reported its location at WE 720860 as of 240030Z SEP. On 25 SEP team located WE 718860, reported negative enemy contact. Team located at WE 698883 on 26/27 SEP; no enemy contact. Team extracted from vicinity WE 713825 at 280517Z SEP.

NOTE: Subsequent to the 1 November 1968 stand-down STRATA assets were retrained/reoriented for operations in the PRAIRIE FIRE/SALEM HOUSE areas of operation. Operations commenced in the PF/SH AO's in December 1968.

3. Mission Summary. A summary of all STRATA operations* until the bombing halt can be seen in Figure B-16.

4. STRATA Targets. Fifteen STRATA targets were approved by CINCPAC. Figure B-17 identifies the targets and outlines MACSOG justification in each case.*

5. Target Locations. Figure B-18** is an abbreviated list of the 24 STRATA missions conducted in 1968. Figure B-19** is a chart showing the target area of each mission conducted. (The two missions conducted in 1967 and not included on the chart were directed at target areas 5 and 1, respectively.)

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History," p. F-III-4. (SACSA)