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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U):

APPENDIX C

MACSOG OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

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the Special Operations Division office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA).

B.) BACKGROUND

1.) CINCPAC Plan. Military planning for covert actions against North Vietnam commenced on 23 May 1963. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum* "Military Operations in North Vietnam (U)" advised the Secretary of Defense that plans for covert hit and run operations would be developed for implementation by the South Vietnam forces under the guidance of the US military, and with the assistance of DATA . CINCPAC was assigned the responsibility for developing a plan, which upon completion was entitled CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63. The plan was favorably endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 August 1963.**

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b. Unstable RVN Government. The need for early coordination and support from the RVN Government for the plan was counter-balanced by the unstable condition of the relationships between the United States and the Diem regime at this time.** This instability persisted throughout the fall and winter months and delayed bringing the RVN into the planning process until the very eve of the commencement of operations on 1 February 1964.

* (TS) Memo, JCS to SECDEF, JCSM-398-63, 23 May 1963.
** (TS) JCS 2054/611-2, "CINCPAC OPLAN 34-63", 14 Aug 63 (SACSA).

c. SECDEF Views. Secretary McNamara's views on the CINCPAC OPLAN were presented in a draft memorandum to the Secretary of State.* He felt that North Vietnam had enjoyed for some time relative immunity from any substantial penalty for its part in the insurgency in South Vietnam.

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By

bringing in South Vietnamese armed forces, advised by the United States DATA a level of hit-and-run attacks against the North could be attained that would make it clear to the leaders of the North that they would suffer serious reprisals for their continuing support of the insurgency in South Vietnam. Also mentioned in this memorandum was the desired development of a Vietnamese "national liberation movement" which would be the obstensible sponsor of the operations.

2. Honolulu Meeting. The next major step was taken as part of the Honolulu executive session on 20 November 1963. The Secretary of Defense and the DATA ordered a combined plan be developed by COMUSMACV and which would provide for an intensified program of action against North Vietnam.**

a. The Plan. On 15 December 1963, "COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64 DATA Saigon OPLAN TIGER" was issued. CINCPAC forwarded the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 December 1963, recommending approval for the 12-month program.***

b. Interdepartmental Committee. On 21 December, the Secretary of Defense brought OPLAN 34A-64 to the attention of the President and recommended that he form an interdepartmental committee

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* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, DTG 261437Z N63.

*** (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Combined MACV/ Saigon Plan for Actions Against VN", Ser: 000465, 19 Dec 1963.

with representatives from State, Defense, JCS, and DATA to examine the plan and recommend appropriate action. The committee report of 2 January 1964 analyzed the various proposed operation of the Saigon plan and outlined schedule of three phases of four months each to cover the 12-month period. The intensity of destruction was to increase with each successive phase with the purpose of causing reorientation of current North Vietnamese policies.*

c. Implementation. The program was formally implemented by a joint State-DOD DATA message on 19 January 1964.** The recommendations of the interdepartmental committee had been approved by the President for actions covering the first four-month period, 1 February-31 May 1964. The actions selected from the Saigon plan were those considered most feasible, and which promised the greatest return for the least risk. All approved actions would be plausibly denied by the US Government. The views of the committee on deniability by GVN was that certain actions would be more effective if acknowledged by GVN. The views of CINCPAC were requested on this subject.**

d. Formation of MACSOG. The Special Operations Group (SOG) was formally activated on 24 January 1964 by USMACV General Order No. 6, as a separate staff section under COMUSMACV.

MT the organization was redesignated as Studies and Observations Group, with no change in its functions, in late 1964.

* (TS) Memo, SecDef to CJCS, 3 Jan 69.

** (TS) Msg, State-DOD 94963, 19 January 1964 (SACSA).

PART II. 34A/FOOTBOY PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW

A. GENERAL

The paragraphs that follow in Part II introduce the 34A program by summarizing the significant features of the original Saigon OP-Order. With this background, the evolution of the program over the years is traced and the command and control/ clearance procedures are outlined. Finally, the present status of and constraints on the program are described.

B. RATIONALE FOR THE PROGRAM

1. OPLAN 34A

a. Objective. The aim of the plan was: "in concert with other military and diplomatic actions in the Southeast Asia area, to convince the DRV leadership that its current support and direction of war in the Republic of Vietnam and its aggression is Laos should be reexamined and stopped. Since what we are seeking is a change in the political calculations of the DRV, the plan provides means for the development and support of a broad spectrum of operations in and against North Vietnam in direct retaliation to DRV aggressive moves."*

b. Concept of Operations. Operations were to consist of selective actions in four categories. Operations were planned for a 12-month period under conditions short of limited war. The plan was to be conducted in concert with other military, political and military actions in Southeast Asia. The four levels of activity envisioned by the plan are briefly described below:

(1) Category I - Harrassing. "Included are small unspectacular demolition operations, moderate level psychological operations, small-scale intelligence collection actions including tactical reconnaissance probes by small military

* (TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64 Saigon OPLAN TIGER, 15 December 1963, p.2. (SACSA)

units to obtain visual ground intelligence, capture of prisoners, documents and equipment, creation of general harassment, and temporary interdiction of lines of communication."* The expected reaction was to cause an awareness of opposition, embarrassing irritation, possible interruption to movement of material, and increased readiness of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) forces. No major retaliation to Category I activities was expected.

(2) Category II - Attritional. "Included are small-scale resistance operations, airborne and seaborne raids by small forces on important military and civilian installations, and demolition of important facilities."** The goal of these operations was to pose a clear threat of attrition to the physical facilities, security forces and the popular image of the DRV leadership. Reaction was expected in the form of retaliation by Viet Cong (VC) forces in South Vietnam (SVN) and request for aid from Communist China.

(3) Category III - Punitive. "These are MT resistance/physical destruction actions designed to cause damage and/or destruction to facilities or installations critical to the economy, industrial development and security of the DRV. They are designed to cause large-scale internal redeployment of DRV resources and commitment of forces in reaction."*** Actions included raids by company and battalion size forces, covert where possible, but attributable to Republic of Vietnam (RVN) if they became overt. Operations were to be of a magnitude requiring positive and serious measures by DRV to counteract their effects. Retaliation to these operations was expected to range from increased insurgency efforts in RVN/Laos to overt aggression by DRV with DATT support.

* (TS) Ibid., p.4.
** (TS) Ibid., p.5.
*** (TS) Ibid., p.6.

(4) Category IV - Aerial Attacks. "These are aerial attacks conducted against critical DRV installations or facilities, industrial and/or military, such as POL storage areas, thermal power and steel plants, the loss of which would result in crippling effect on the DRV potential to maintain a stable economy and progress in industrial development."* The reaction to these operations was dependent on two major factors: (a) the willingness of DRV to accept significant damage to its homeland in order to continue the war in the south, and (b) the reaction and influence of the DATA DATA It was considered that operations in this category could well escalate the conflict, rather than convince the DRV continuance of the war was unprofitable, and that the United States must be "prepared to follow up with supporting operations in offsetting DRV reactions."*

c. Coordination.* Coordination with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) was not achieved during formulation of the OPLAN. This was to be effected by COMUSMACV/ DATA Saigon, after the plan was approved. US forces were not to be used for operations within the DRV, its territorial waters or air space except as air crews on reconnaissance missions.

d. Resources.** In-country resources available or programmed were considered adequate for most of Category I through IV operations. Specific requirements were listed in Annex A to the OPLAN; general requirements were: (1) NASTY class PTFs must be in-country and operational, (2) electronic countermeasures (ECM) configuration of six additional C-123 aircraft, (3) augmentation of personnel necessary to organize and activate the implementing agency, (4) psychological warfare (PSYWAR) augmentation detachment; (5) availability of two portable beacon type navigational

* (TS) Ibid., p.7-8.
** (TS) Ibid., p.A1.

aids, (6) five radio broadcast studios for conduct of overt and "black" radio operations, (7) aircrews trained in technique of allied mine laying, and (8) installation of flare dispensers for aircraft. An additional resource was considered to be the 800,000 refugees from the DRV, including Meo, Black and Nung tribesmen from which it was believed a few thousand could be picked and successfully trained for special operations.*

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e. Operations. Five types of operations were planned and are briefly described below:

(1) Intelligence Collection. Operations conducted with primary mission of intelligence collection. Included were:

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(b) expand photo reconnaissance, (c) implement COMINT/SIGINT/ELINT operations, (d) expand Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) tactical intelligence missions, (e) assign secondary missions of intelligence to other operations in NVN, (f) intensity intelligence collection probes into the DMZ area.*

(2) Psychological. "Strategic and tactical psychological operations targeted against the DRV leadership and the populace, and will use all available media (leaflets, radio, mail) techniques and tactics to help achieve maximum harassment, division, and the establishment of resistance within the DRV."**

(3) Political Pressure. Operations designed to impart to the DRV leaders that DRV direction and support of aggression in RVN and Laos must cease, or further and more damaging retaliatory action would be taken against NVN. Examples of these operations were:

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MT or actions in the United Nations.**

* (TS) Ibid., p.A-1, B-1.
** (TS) Ibid., p.B-2.

(4) Resistance. "These operations are designed to create pressure on the DRV through the development of organized guerrilla activity in the tribal highland as well as unorganized resistance in the more populous lowlands."*

(5) Physical Destruction. "These are military hit-and-run paramilitary long-term team operations and air attacks with objectives ranging from destruction of military assets to destruction of major DRV economic assets."*

f. Program of Operations. Seventy-two actions were planned over the 12-month period covered by the plan. The types of operations and number in each category are summarized below.*

No.	Type	Category I	II	III	IV
4	Intell. Collection	4			
24	Psychological	14	8	2	
33	Physical Destruction	10	16	7	
11	Aerial Attacks				11

g. Enemy Vulnerability. As contrasted to VC assets in the south, which were difficult to fix and attack, the tangible assets of the DRV were considered well known and static. "Successful offensive operations will inflict moderate to severe damage to certain of these facilities which would hinder, to a limited extent, planned economic development, harass the DRV and remove from it the immunity from attack it currently enjoys. However, such raids would not result in economic chaos or ruin since the DRV is 90 percent an underdeveloped agricultural state nor would the military capability of the DRV be substantially downgraded."**

h. Command and Control. When written, 15 December 1963, the shape and form of the implementing agency had not been resolved. The OPLAN suggests three alternatives for implementing the program: DATA COMUSMACV with the second party

* (TS) Ibid., p.B-3, C-1 to C-5-1.
** (TS) Ibid., p.D-1.

providing the required support, (2) DATA , or (3) DATA

2. OPLAN 34A Review

a. COMUSMACV Comments. In his letter of transmittal,** General Harkins (COMUSMACV) outlined some of the shortfalls, weaknesses, and implications involving the United States inherent in the plan. They were:

(1) Successful implementation of the complete 12-month program would require optimum conditions of weather, internal GVN stability, and bloc reaction. A reduction due to these and other factors up to 50 percent would not be unrealistic.

(2) Initiation of physical destruction operations may escalate the war.

(3) The inherent high loss factor in operations of this type must be weighed against the benefits expected including strengthening the noncommunist countries in Asia, improving RVN morale, and weakening the communist bloc posture.

(4) The GVN position on the plan had not been determined. The United States must be prepared to continue the program beyond the initial 12-month period if full support of GVN is to be gained.

b. CINCPAC Comments. Admiral Felt, in his endorsement, emphasized that the "US Government should be prepared to back up the GVN and be willing to commit US forces in the event reaction from DRV and CHICOMs escalates to a magnitude beyond RVN capabilities."*** In his opinion, however, the Category I and II actions, even if all were successfully executed, would not convince the DRV to cease its support of insurgent activities in the south. The air attacks against selected targets

* (TS) Ibid., P.E-1.
** (TS) Ltr, COMUSMACV to Distribution, "Operations in North Vietnam (S)", ser 00071, 15 Dec 1963.
*** (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Combined MACV- Saigon Plan for Actions against NV," ser: 000465, 19 Dec 1963, p.1.

in Category IV appeared to him to have the highest probability of influencing the DRV leadership. He outlined three problems in implementing the plan:

(1) "Difficulty in maintaining denial of US participation.

(2) "Difficulty in establishing a planning and control organization.

(3) "Difficulty in the RVNAF carrying out above operations and still carrying on with war at home."*

In summary, Admiral Felt was doubtful that the plan would achieve its aim unless it were expanded to include overt US combat support, particularly naval and air support.*

c. Washington Review. The review in Washington by an Inter-Departmental Committee was described in Part I of this volume. Part IV (Operations Summary) analyzes actions proposed in the OPLAN, actions authorized by the Interdepartmental Committee, and actions actually completed.

C. POLICY EVOLUTION

1. Initial Policy and Constraints

a. Control. The OPLAN 34A authors left the question of command and control for later decision. The State-DOD-CAS implementing message** resolved the question as follows:

(1) Overall political control - Ambassador.

(2) Overall operational control - COMUSMACV.

(3) Planning, liaison, logistics, training and advice -

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The message also directed Saigon to bring the GVN into the planning on a discrete basis since their forces would actually conduct the operations. On 21 January, Ambassador Lodge briefed President Minh on 34A operations, stating that the plan had been approved at high levels of the US Government and was now ready for GVN review and, hopefully, early agreement and implementation.

* (TS) Ibid., p.6.
** (TS) Msg, State-DOD 94963, 19 Jan 1964 (SACSA).

b. Operations and Evaluation. Operations were functionally divided by SOG into four sections: Psychological, Airborne, Air, and Maritime (see supporting annexes). On the 33 approved actions in Phase I, 22 had not been completed by 1 June.* The lack of early success and progress was noted by Secretary McNamara in March when he requested JCS and CINCPAC's views on improving the program in several critical areas.** The views of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were summarized in a SACSA memorandum*** to the Secretary of Defense which included the following points:

(1) CINCPAC stated that:

> "The physical destruction operations approved to date were not sure things when the plan was written and approved. The increased state of alert of the DRV, lack of detailed intelligence and instability of the GVN have further decreased the chance of success for these operations. The simple way is to conduct air strikes and aerial mining."***

(2) Limited time since activation of SOG. SOG was formed on 24 January and the Vietnamese counterpart (STS) even later on 12 February.

(3) Lack of motivation of maritime and air operational teams. Failures and losses in these operations has compounded the major problem of recruiting high calibre personnel.

(4) Bad weather and marginal capability DATA C-123 crews has been responsible for poor showing in air operations.

(5) Non-availability of major equipment items, including boats, aircraft and radio equipment.

(6) Lack of adequate intelligence.

(7) Lack of security in RVN activities.

(8) Tighter NVN defense.

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* (TS) Memo, General Anthis to Col Moody, "Operations Against North Vietnam (OPLAN 34A)", 5 June 1964 (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 262339Z Mar 1964.
*** (TS) Memo, General Anthis to SECDEF, "OPLAN 34A," 3 Apr 1964 (SACSA).

(9) A related problem was procurement of personnel to man SOG. A JTD had been submitted for 167 spaces (137 military DATA At that time, DATA the major problem was to fill the other US spaces with properly trained personnel.

c. Phase II. Military planning for Phase II operations was completed in May.* Although the program had a slow start, it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that attempts at infiltration and psychological activities were having an effect on the DRV. It was believed that Hanoi was expending substantial resources in defensive measures. An intensified program was recommended for Phase II as operational capabilities were demonstrated. Thirteen uncompleted actions of Phase I were authorized and eight destructive maritime and airborne operations were proposed. The interdepartmental committee disapproved the recommendation to aerial mine SWATOW bases MT The committee also disapproved the proposals for SOG to develop Meo/non-Meo guerrilla resistance cadres and to interdict Route 7.

DATA COMUSMACV by message*** strongly objected DATA for 34A actions other than in support of SOG as outlined in the implementing instructions. A JCS message**** to CINCPAC in August described efforts being made at the highest level to clarify the command and control confusion introduced into 34A operations by the committee DATA for certain Phase II operations. The essentials of the JCS proposal were that MACV would retain full operational control of 34A

* (TS) JCS 2343/361, "Operational Planning-Vietnam (U)", 13 May 1964
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 122101Z June 1964
*** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV 280351Z June 1964
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 131727Z Aug 64

actions.

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SOG's requests for aid and coordination in moving teams into the area along Route 7

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d. Early Clearance Procedures. Clearance procedures were highly centralized throughout 1964. In addition to the detailed review at the Washington level of Phase I and II proposals, COMUSMACV was required to submit a monthly schedule of 34A actions for comment by CINCPAC and approval at the Washington level. The clearance procedure in effect in October 1964 was summarized in a JCS message as follows:

> "(1) MACV submit monthly schedule.
>
> "(2) This schedule as modified by CINCPAC's comments is submitted for high level approval.
>
> "(3) When obtained, this approval represents final Washington authority for missions; however, MACV must obtain 24-hour prior political clearance each mission from AMEMB Saigon and at the same time provide intentions to JCS where Washington-level notification will be accomplished.
>
> "(4) MACV continue to submit launch, recovery, abort, and spot reports."****

The Gulf of Tonkin incident, 4 August 1964, terminated Phase II operations; plans for Phase III were never completed. When operations were resumed in October, it was stipulated that

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Chronology" undated (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, MACV, DTG 270327Z Dec 65.
*** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 010009Z Jan 66.
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 092026Z Oct 64 (SACSA).

operations would be considered on a monthly basis and each maritime operation would be approved on a case-by-case basis.* Monthly schedules were prepared and submitted for October and November; however, a memorandum in the November file notes that the November program was never approved completely by the DEPSECDEF and that approval was gained in a case-by-case basis.** In October, JCS reduced the lead time in the intent message from 24 hours to 12 hours*** in response to MACV's insistance that the 24-hour requirement was unrealistic.

2. Evolution of Mission

a. Increased Mission and Scope. As a result of a trip to Vietnam 5-12 March 1965 by the Chief of Staff, Army, it was recommended inter alia, that the tempo and scope of SOG activities be increased. This recommendation was approved by the President on 15 March and CINCPAC was requested to present proposals.**** CINCPAC in his reply# proposed to increase the tempo of air operations and maritime operations and, in addition, proposed three new concepts for Washington approval: (1) Recruit and support assets in the DRV for resistance, guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape and intelligence collection, (2) Use US submarines for delivery and recovery of OPLAN 34A agent teams and raiding parties, and (3) Use US manned C-130s for OPLAN 34A missions. All of these concepts were approved by the JCS##; however, Secretary Vance was unable to gain the concurrence of the State Department on proposals (2) and (3) and so informed CJCS on 5 June 1965.###

* (TS) White House/State/OSD Meeting 1 October 1964.
** (TS) Memo for the Record, "JCS 2343/482", 24 Jan 1966 (SACSA).
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 211800Z Oct 64, (SACSA).
**** (TS) Msg, JCS DTG 200019Z Mar 65 (SACSA).
# (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, 270317Z Mar 65 (SACSA).
(TS) JCS 2343/555 "Increase Tempo and Scope 34A", 29 Mar 65 (SACSA)
(TS) Memo, DEPSECDEF to CJCS, "Increase Tempo and Scope of OPLAN 34A (U)", 5 June 1965, (SACSA).

CINCPAC was informed* of this decision and in September, after discussions on the interdepartmental level, the proposal to recruit assets for resistance and guerrilla warfare was also disapproved.** (For further discussion of resistance movement, see Annex A.) Authority was given to recruit and support assets DATA nd intelligence collection missions.**

b. Intelligence Emphasis. At approximately the same time as overt air strikes (ROLLING THUNDER) against the North were commenced, the primary mission of OPLAN 34A operations was changed from punitive operations to those operations more closely designed to provide intelligence information concerning NVN. This change was never formally addressed at the Washington level, but all parties concurred in the various proposals by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC to reorient the program. It was evident that the ROLLING THUNDER strikes were more effective in punitive action than OPLAN 34A.***

(1) Agent Operations and Maritime Operations. By late summer 1965, both team operations and the maritime operations (MAROPS) were engaged in actions designed to improve the intelligence information from NVN. New team members were inserted who were trained in reporting and road watching functions. The MAROPS PTFs were employed in shipping interdiction missions that provided information from the interrogation of NVN fishermen captured from junks and sampans. This information, while low-level, provided the only information concerning internal NVN activities.***

(2) DIA Interest. In September 1965, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) became interested in OPLAN 34A assets for intelligence collection and reporting. DIA stated that they had

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 051434Z Jun 65 (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 241352 Sep 65 (SACSA).
*** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Overview of Operation Plan 34A Operations," undated (SACSA).

ascertained that currently existing DOD collections assets could not provide the broad coverage of detailed information required concerning North Vietnamese military capabilities. They further stated that a definite requirement existed to use OPLAN 34A assets to acquire intelligence on covert military buildup and military capabilities (including SA-2 missile sites) in North Vietnam.*

(3) FIAB. Further interest in the program was evinced in October 1965 when the President's Foreign Intelligence Board (FIAB) members requested an oral briefing concerning the OPLAN 34A assets and capabilities targeted against North Vietnam.*

c. CINCPAC OPORDER. The revised OPLAN 34A**, issued in October of 1965, took account of the change in emphasis and reoriented operations primarily towards intelligence collection, psychological operations, and MT It also authorized the recruiting by 34A teams of local agents in NVN for intelligence and E&E nets. Physical destruction operations were authorized against selected targets providing security of intelligence and MT was not jeopardized. Maritime PTF boats were directed to stop and board DRV shipping above the 17th Parallel. Ships with military cargo were to be sunk and crews captured MT Psychological operations were to include MT MT

d. New Mission Statement. A new SOG mission statement*** was approved by CINCPAC in November 1965. There was concern in JCS**** on two counts concerning the new mission: (1) the original mission

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Overview of Operation Plan 34A Operations," undated (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC,DTG 300241Z Oct 65 (SACSA).
*** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 182128Z Nov 65 (SACSA).
**** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Change in Statement of Mission (U)," 22 Nov 1965 (SACSA).

had been promulgated under a DATA message while the revision had been approved by CINCPAC without departmental coordination, and (2) the new mission gave SOG a major expansion of command and control by extending operations from NVN only to all out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare activities.

e. The salient differences in the two mission statements are set forth below:

Original	Revised
(1) Overall political control in Saigon - Ambassador.	(1) ...with the concurrence of US Embassy.
(2) Overall operational control - COMUSMACV. Planning, liaison, logistics, training and advice - DATA reporting directly to COMUSMACV. Chief of Task Force to be a Colonel level military officer selected by COMUSMACV; DATA	(2) COMUSMACV will exercise his operational control through the normal MACV command channels. Normal staff relationships pertain. DATA as directed by CINCPAC, MACV will advise, train and support RVN military and paramilitary forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare activities, and will exercise operational control of SOG assets.
(3) All operations against North Vietnam will be under the Task Force described above, and all in-country resources of the US Military DATA will be available for support of approved operations.	(3) As directed by COMUSMACV and with the concurrence of the US Embassy, SOG will advise, train, and support counterpart force in out-of-country unconventional warfare and psychological warfare operations.
(4)	(4) SOG will conduct unilateral planning for unconventional warfare activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be prepared when directed to activate and command the JUWTF, SEASIA.
(5) Concurred in by State/DOD	(5) Noted by the Ambassador.*

The anticipated interdepartmental problems over the new mission apparently did not materialize because the 15 month SOG program promulgated the following June used the revised mission statement.

* (TS) Ibid.

f. 15-Month Plan. In April 1966, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to prepare a 15-month plan of SOG missions, objectives and programs.* This document reflected the change in emphasis in the program in these words:

> "As originally conceived, airborne operations in NVN were intended to build a resistance movement which would exert pressure against the NVN Government, divert resources and make continuous support of the war in RVN less attractive. The resistance idea was never warmly received by the State Department and, owing to control procedures in Washington, the resistance mission was never specifically given to SOG. Consequently, airborne operations were conducted during the first 1 1/2 years on ambiguously worded mission statements which generally amounted to permission to conduct sabotage, interdiction and harassment in NVN without civilian contacts. Each operation was to be approved in Washington on a case-by-case basis. Early in 1965, DIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff began to express concern over the intelligence available in NVN, especially in regard to early warning of CHICOM intervention, infiltration into RVN, and Soviet and CHICOM military aid to NVN. The requirements for this intelligence resulted in the Joint Chiefs of Staff studying the capability of SOG to obtain it. There were, at that time, six agent teams in NVN: DATA During mid-1965, SOG began to reorient and revitalize its operations in order to provide clear-cut objectives related to the strategy of the war in RVN and Laos, and to develop a logical program for attaining these objectives. It was determined that maximum emphasis should be placed upon intelligence collection and establishment of civilian contacts with secondary emphasis on psychological operations, escape and evasion and sabotage."**

Team training and composition was modified to meet the revised priorities.

g. STRATA Concept. To support the need for intelligence gathering, the Short-Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition (STRATA) team concept*** was developed in early 1967. The concept of operations involved the employment in NVN of five to 15-man indigenous teams for a stay time of 15-30 days. Teams were to be trained in roadwatching techniques, employment of technical sensors, target acquisition and forward air guide procedures.

h. Revised OP Order. A new CINCPAC basic operation**** order for FOOTBOY was promulgated in April of 1967 and listed the following program objectives:

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* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 030153Z Apr 66 (SACSA).
** (TS) "Missions, Objectives, Programs FY 4/66-FY 4/67," MACSOG, Apr 1966, p.6-7 (SACSA).
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 071804Z Apr 67.
**** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 252340Z Apr 67.

(1) Increase US capability to collect strategic and tactical intelligence in NVN.

(2) Impede the infiltration of enemy resources into RVN.

(3) Foment dissatisfaction with NVN Government policy.

(4) Divert NVN military resources to defense and internal security missions.

(5) Produce an adverse effect on NVN economy.

(6) Increase psychological pressure on NVN by creating the impression that internal opposition exists in NVN.

A change to the Op order, promulgated in May*, added the STRATA concept as an OP 34A mission.

i. New SOG Program. With the Op-Order for guidance, SOG published, in May 1967, its proposed FOOTBOY program for FY 1968. A brief review of the more significant areas of emphasis and policy change are covered in the following paragraphs.**

(1) The US policy did not admit to the possible overthrow of the NVN Government as a means of achieving success in SVN. This policy was based on the fear of Communist China intervention and the fear that a growing resistance movement might not be controlled if the NVN Government should suddenly desire to negotiate a settlement. It was the belief of MACSOG that the above restrictions would be lifted during FY 1968 because of the impatience and pressure within the United States to use additional actions to bring the war to a conclusion.

(2) The selection and reteniton of properly motivated agents was a continuing problem. Candidates being trained at Camp Long Thanh had neither the educational or psychological makeup to fit them for the intended missions. Incentives, primarily financial, were insufficient. The inability to

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 272136Z May 67 (SACSA).
** (TS) MACSOG, "FOOTBOY FY 1968 Program ." 10 May 1967 (SACSA).

successfully exfiltrate teams from NVN was considered highly adverse to the morale of the entire team program.

(3) The level of maritime operations would be dependent on the number of PT boats available. The fiscal year was commenced with only 50 percent of the authorized number of boats (14).

(4) Psychological operations were to be increased in all areas.

j. Reorientation of FOOTBOY

"In order to exploit the demonstrated vulnerabilities of the Vietnamese people and the Hanoi regime, while minimizing the expenditure of human resources, the FOOTBOY program commenced a gradual reorientation in late 1967. The reorientation involved the continuation of efforts to collect the best intelligence information possible within the limitations imposed by the resources available and the environment in NVN while at the same time, emphasizing efforts to exploit psychological vulnerabilities. The latter efforts included a fuller integration of all operations around the central theme provided by the existence of the notional DATA increased use of deceptive operations to incude in Hanoi a belief that extensive agent operations are being conducted in NVN and the gradual inducement of the North Vietnamese population to adapt a posture of non-cooperation with the regime and particularly with the middle and low-level cadres. The ultimate objective of the reorientation was to employ psychological impact on both the regime itself and on the population to create a situation in which the regime perceived a significant threat to its control of the NVN population as a result of its war policies."*

3. Clearance Procedures: Command and Control

a. Background. Clearance procedures through Phase I and II planning and through the fall months of 1964 were covered earlier in this appendix. On 12 December 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve maritime packages of approximately five missions for execution at CINCPAC's discretion. The proposal was approved on 14 December by the Secretary of Defense and authority dispatched to CINCPAC.**

* (TS) Background paper, SACSA, "FOOTBOY - Covert Operations Against North Vietnam (TS)," 9 May 1968.

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 151627Z Dec 64.

b. Consolidation. In January 1965, SACSA consolidated all 34A operations procedures into a single message.* The message codified procedures currently in effect, as developed over the first year of operations.

(1) Air Operations. A 30-day package was required from COMUSMACV to Washington via CINCPAC. Approval of the package constituted authority to launch provided a 12 hour prior message of intent to CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was filed after the flight was cleared with AMEMB Saigon. Silence from higher authority signified approval for MACV to execute.

(2) Maritime Operations. The procedures were essentially the same as for air operations. COMUSMACV submitted a package of maritime missions for approval by CINCPAC and Washington for a 30-day period, or as directed. After the package was approved at the Washington level, COMUSMACV was cleared to launch the missions but was required to send a message of intent to JCS and CINCPAC 24 hours in advance. (The requirement for clearance by AMEMB Saigon was not spelled out for maritime missions). Silence from higher authority signified approval to launch.

(3) Psychological Operations. Psychological operations not conducted as part of air or maritime missions were submitted for each calendar month via CINCPAC to JCS for approval.

c. Discretionary Authority

(1) Maritime Operations. The move toward delegating approval authority from the Washington level to CINCPAC commenced in the maritime operations. In January 1965, CINCPAC was authorized** to approve separate MT missions to meet intelligence requirements without Washington approval. In March 1965, CINCPAC was authorized*** to approve and execute the following missions:

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 212235Z Jan 65 (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 131948Z Jan 65.
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 251842Z Mar 65.

(a) MT

MT

(b) CADO. Psychological deception operation executed by agents, infiltrated and exfiltrated by rubber boats/ PTF transports, on isolated stretches of the NVN coast.

(c) MT

Later CINCPAC designated the code word CADO to cover the three actions. In June 1965, CINCPAC was authorized* to initiate PTF harassment/interdiction missions against Tiger Island at his discretion. In July, CINCPAC was authorized**, at his discretion, to permit PTFs returning from unsuccessful PSYOPS/ INTELL maritime operations to place interdiction/harassment fires on certain coastal targets. Finally, in November, CINCPAC was authorized*** at his discretion to employ PTFs

MT

to deliver psychological leaflets by 81mm mortar rounds.

(2) Air Operations. Throughout the year 1965, there was a parallel move to decentralize control of air operations. In February 1966, authority**** was delegated to CINCPAC for executing OPLAN 34A air missions in the following words:

> "You are authorized to approve for execution specific OPLAN 34A air missions in support of mission concepts and objectives that have been approved at the Washington level."****

Both operational and approval authority now rested with CINCPAC; however, the final political decision still rested in the American Ambassador, Saigon and the State Department in Washington. The requirement for approval of new concepts and/or mission objectives continued to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

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* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 091719Z June 65.
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 081458Z July 65.
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 291649Z Nov 65.
**** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 152235Z Feb 66 (SACSA).

d. 1967 Consolidation. In March 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed* the evolution of discretionary authority to CINCPAC and consolidated the procedures required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority governing the submission and approval of proposed FOOTBOY operations.

(1) MAROPS and AIROPS. CINCPAC was authorized to approve for execution missions whose concepts and objectives had been approved at the Washington level. New concepts had to be coordinated with Embassies Bangkok, Saigon, and/or Vientiane, as appropriate, and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority. A 12-hour prior to launch intent message originated by MACV to CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Silence from higher authority signified approval.


(2) TIMBERWORK/Airborne Procedures. CINCPAC was authorized to conduct TIMBERWORK operations in support of concepts and objectives that had been approved at the Washington level. The requirement for approval to infiltrate new in-place agent teams into NVN continued to rest with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority.

(3) HUMIDOR (C)/PSYOPS. CINCPAC was authorized to conduct HUMIDOR (C) operations in support of mission concepts and objectives that had been approved at the Washington level.

e. STRATA Teams. The STRATA team authority message** issued by CINCPAC in April 1967, specifically spelled out that CINCPAC would approve or disapprove missions for execution and would provide COMUSMACV with infiltration, exfiltration, repositioning, resupply and reinforcement mission numbers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC were to be information addressees on coordination, intent, launch, recovery messages and incident reports.

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 101523Z Mar 67 (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 120052Z Apr 67 (SACSA).

f. Summary. The following chart summarizes the procedures in effect in 1967:



g. Pre-Bombing Halt Procedures. The procedures that had evolved by 1967 were continued up to the bombing halt of November 1968. A summary of basic coordination and approval procedures for the use of SACSA action officers was worded as follows:

(1) Approval for individual operations within already approved concepts has been delegated to CINCPAC. CINCPAC has further delegated authority to MACV. MACV intent to launch messages should reach both CINCPAC and JCS in time for either of those agencies to disapprove the mission. Silence indicates approval.

(2) Approval of an entirely new concept requires formal JCS action - flimsy, buff, green, etc. In most cases, the JCS action will include obtaining SECDEF and STATE approval.

(3) Between the routine operation within approved concepts and the obtaining of approval for entirely new concepts, there is a "gray" area. This area involves those cases where a formal JCS action is not required, but SECDEF and/or State concurrence is needed. As a primary example, once military or political events have dictated an alteration of some type in a FOOTBOY operation by high level authority, the normal channel for reopening the subject is via SACSA to the Chairman, JCS, to the SECDEF.

4. Current Program

a. Reorientation Plan. Incorporating many of the recommendations of the CINCPAC and AD HOC survey teams, MACV/SOG, in February 1968, submitted a proposal for reorientation of the FOOTBOY program DATA The proposal retained the intelligence collection role as an adjunct to a central, integrated psychological effort to implant in the leadership of North Vietnam the fear that by continued prosecution of the war, their control of an increasingly dissatisfied and disillusioned people would be diminished and possibly lost. Upon reaching SACSA, DATA at the time the first bombing halt negotiations were nearing completion.

DATA

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* (TS) Memo, SACSA Staff to General Depuy, "FOOTBOY Operations ', 3 July 1968 (SACSA)

DATA

In view of the continued state of negotiations, the plan has not been considered by the Interdepartmental Committee. However SOG has implemented certain of the proposals within the plan that were within previously approved guidelines.

b. Standdown, 1 April 1968. The restrictions on bombing in NVN imposed by the President on 31 March 1968, set off a long series of messages ** in early April between CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff establishing the new ground rules for FOOTBOY operations. The resulting constraints are summarized below:

MT

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* (TS) Memo, SACSA "Proposed Reorientation of Covert Operations Against North Vietnam," 9 May 1968 (SACSA).
** (TS) See FOOTBOY Authority File.

MT

MT

(3) HUMIDOR (C). Normal operations permitted subject to thematic guidance provided by Washington level and except as restricted by limitations placed on PLOWMAN and MIDRIFF operations. The winddrift of leaflets north of 20-00N from aircraft flying south of 20-00N was implicitly prohibited.

(4) Further restrictions on PLOWMAN imposed by CINCPAC. Operations permitted only to 19-00N and specifically limited as follows:

(a) Firing or delivery of ordnance in the area from 17-00N to 19-00N will be specifically limited to that required for self-defense.

MT

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "FOOTBOY Increased Actions ", 23 May 1968 (SACSA).

c. Reaction to Standdown. The reaction from COMUSMACV to the restrictions was immediate and typical of the comments of others closely associated with the FOOTBOY program.

"MACV recommends that there be no change in the FOOTBOY operations because of the modified bombing program in NVN. MACV has placed increased emphasis on the DATA organization and a lull or cessation of FOOTBOY activities that corresponds to the modified bombing program would be a clear indication to Hanoi MT MT

Several specific proposals were introduced in the months following 1 April with the intent of preserving some of the effectiveness of the program.

(1) Maritime Operations. On 1 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff altered the restrictions** in effect to permit PTF operations up to 20° latitude MT

MT

(2) Other Proposals. In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the area of the MT program be increased from 19°N latitude to 20°. In support of the proposal, CINCPAC had pointed out that the most lucrative area of DATA was between 18°-50'N to 20°-10'N. Because of the uncertainties of the program's direction at this time, it was not until 18 October that the plan was finally disapproved by Deputy Secretary Nitze.*** Proposals to resupply agent teams was held in abeyance until the MACV/CAS survey of agent team security was completed in July. The report of the survey,**** which established that all agent teams were probably compromised, led to the decision in November to drop all

* (TS) Msg, USMACV, DTG 020914Z Apr 68 (SACSA)
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011351Z July 68 (SACSA)
*** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "FOOTBOY , 24 Oct 68 (SACSA)
**** (TS) Ltr, MACSOG, " Security of Agent Teams ", 19 Jul 69

in-place teams at the earliest feasible time. Clearance was granted* in the interim, however, to resupply team DATA in conjunction with the resupply of two DATA teams. On the eve of the complete bombing halt on 1 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCPAC/COMUSMACV** that the proposals for "Gray Singleton Concept" and DATA in coastal hamlets" had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff but was being held in abeyance by higher authority for an indefinite period.

d. Bombing Halt. On 1 November 1968, CINCPAC/COMUSMACV was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*** to discontinue all physical support of TIMBERWORK teams, terminate STRATA operations, discontinue all PLOWMAN missions north of 17-00N and discontinue all air operations over NVN and leaflet operations into NVN.

e. Summary of Current Operations. As a result of the restrictions imposed in April, and those associated with the later bombing halt of 1 November, MACSOG operations were severely curtailed in 1968 and into 1969. Following 1 November, radio broadcasts and letter delivery to NVN were continued; however, the delivery of leaflets, radios and gift kits was stopped. Maritime operations north of 17° were suspended after 1 November; however, assets were utilized for support of cross-beach, in-country operations. STRATA assets were prohibited from being used in NVN, but were utilized in Laos and Cambodia. The long-term agent teams were instructed to exfiltrate and were to be gradually phased out through surfacing by NVN security, permanently going off the air or by exfiltrating. MACSOG air operations were halted on 1 November, but assets were utilized in training or in support of other MACSOG programs.****

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 111529Z Sep 68 (SACSA).
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011927Z Nov 68 (SACSA).
*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 010219Z Nov 68 (SACSA).
**** (TS) Command History, MACV 1968, "Year-end Review Vietnam," 7 Feb 1969. (SACSA)

f. General Constraints. In the preparation of the paper "FOOTBOY - Revised Concept for Covert Actions Against North Vietnam (TS)"* mentioned earlier in this volume, SACSA summarized the limiting factors which had affected the FOOTBOY program from its inception to that time.

"(1) Current US national policy is explicit in denying any intention on the part of the US to bring about the downfall of the Hanoi regime.

"(2) Both by definition as covert actions and by the terms of the original program approval, US involvement in FOOTBOY must be plausibly deniable by the US Government.

MT

"(4) MACSOG troop carrier aircraft are prohibited from entering areas in NVN within effective range of enemy SAM sites. SAM coverage is extensive thus limiting the area in NVN available to troop carrier aircraft (C-123s and C-130s) engaged in initial entry of MACSOG agents, reinforcement of existing agent teams, resupply of programmed and previously activated target areas, and exfiltration as appropriate."*

* (TS) Paper, SACSA, "Proposed Reorientation of Covert Operations Against North Vietnam (TS)", 9 May 1968 (SACSA).

D. POST-HOSTILITIES PLANNING

In November 1968, CINCPAC called a one-day working level conference to review MACSOG programs, in light of the bombing halt, and to consider post-hostility proposals. The discussion and recommendations concerning the FOOTBOY program are quoted below:

DATA

2. "Recommendations:

a. "That SOG be reconfigured as a Joint Special Operations Advisory Detachment.

b. "That STD be reorganized and assigned a new role as the Special Operations Staff element of the JGS.

c. "That the RVNAF be advised and assisted in the development of a small bugh high quality Special Operations capability.

d. "That an appropriate number of PTFs be continued on loan to RVNAF.

e. "That selected VNAF air assets be earmarked for support of an improved GVN Special Operations capability.

f. "That indigenous ground force assets now under SOG control be disbanded and efforts directed toward the improvement of the LLOB (ARVN Special Forces) within the ARVN force structure.

g. "That provision be made for appropriate U.S. advisory detachments for GVN air, ground and naval Special Operations elements.

DATA

i. "That, in the event the USG does not desire to retain the VOF assets, these be transferred to GVN."*

* (TS) Report, CINCPAC, "Conference on MACSOG Programs," 6 Nov 68 (SACSA).

PART III. RESOURCES (U)

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Part III is to provide the reader a brief summary, for continuity, of the organization and facilities utilized by SOG in conducting FOOTBOY The supporting annexes include further detail on resources within each program in FOOTBOY.

B. ORGANIZATION

1. Initial Organization. In February 1964, MACV proposed an initial JTD of 167 personnel, 138 military and 29 civilians. JCS, on recommendation of CINCPAC, approved* a JTD of 128 personnel. At about the same time, CINCPAC authorized a TDY Army augmentation (Special Forces) of one officer and 15 enlisted to assist in the training at Camp Long Thanh. The Navy also provided seven officers and 52 enlisted TDY for maintenance, training and security of the US Naval Advisory Detachment (NAD), Danang.** The organization in January 1965 is shown in Figure C-1.


DATA

2. Evolution of Organization. With the addition of missions, SOG grew in numbers and underwent several organizational changes. By May 1966, four JTD changes had been approved, raising the total manpower level to 266 personnel. A later JTD of October 1967 raised the total to 416 authorized personnel: 155 officers, 251 enlisted and 10 civilians.*** The most recent

* (S) Message, JCS, DTG 141955 Jul 64.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A, 1964 MACV Command History," p. I-2 (SACSA).
*** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F, 1968 MACV Command History," p. F-1 (SACSA).

FIGURE C-1

MACSOG ORGANIZATION OF JANUARY 1965 (U)



a/ Augmented by TDY/TDY MTT's as required.

reorganization, effective 7 December 1968, was undertaken in an effort to more clearly define the line and staff function of SOG (see Figure C-2). Each of the four FOOTBOY Programs had a "Studies Branch" which was a staff agency and a "Studies Group" which was an operations activity. Each of the two divisions (Branch and Group) in the organization was directly responsible to Chief, SOG.

C. FACILITIES

By 1966, the locations of SOG installations supporting FOOTBOY was permanently established as listed below:*

(See Figure C-3 .)

SOG Headquarters - MACV II Compound, Saigon
MAROPS Group, Danang
AIROPS Group, Nha Trang
Airborne Operations Training Camp, Long Thanh
PSYOPS Group, 7 Long Thap Tu, Saigon
Logistics Branch, Two Houses in Saigon

Figures C-4 and C-5 show the resources available to SOG in August 1964 and at the time of the bombing halt in November 1968.

D. TRAINING


Detailed information on training for each of the FOOTBOY Programs is covered in the annexes of this appendix. A brief summary follows.

1. Psychological Operations. Training of the Vietnamese in DATP radio operations was moderately successful in the case of the former and very successful in the case of the latter. Finding Vietnamese with the background and capability to be taught was a problem throughout. Hundreds of applicants were frequently interviewed in order to find one person to place in training as an announcer, for example. The excellent staff developed by DATP can be attributed to the fine caliber of personnel recruited by the senior Vietnamese supervisor. Another problem area was the language barrier between the US advisors and their counterparts. The very limited number of US advisors who could speak or understand Vietnamese greatly complicated efforts to train and supervise the Vietnamese.

* (TS) Report, , "Debriefing," 21 May 1966, p. 5 (SACSA)

FIGURE C-2

MACSOG ORGANIZATION OF DECEMBER 1968 (U)[a/]



a/ (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F, 1968 MACV Command History," p. F-B-1

FIGURE C-3

SOG, FOOTBOY INSTALLATIONS, 1966




FIGURE C-4

OPLAN 34A - RESOURCES STATUS (U)
6 August 1964

PTF STATUS:

PTFs 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 - Operationally ready (All five participated in action on 30 July and 3 August)

PTF 4 - Training proceeding satisfactorily

PTFs 7 and 8 - Crews due to report 1 July. Expect to be operationally ready about 1 Oct 64.

SWIFT CRAFT STATUS:

All three SWIFTs operationally ready.

C-123 STATUS:

Two C-123 aircraft and crews operationally ready and available.

Program Status:

Five aircraft at Clark Air Base, Philippines. One in SVN for test of doppler navigation equipment.

Estimated 30 days in country training before reaching operational readiness.

Seven DATA and three VNAF aircrews completed training at Eglin Air Force Base.

(All DATA and VNAF electronic countermeasures operators have completed training and returned to home country awaiting deployment of aircraft to Vietnam(.

PSYOPS TEAMS STATUS:

Teams in Place	- 13
Training	- 6 Ops teams and agent pool continue training
Readiness	- 6 teams operationally ready
	- 5 teams 95 percent ready
	- Agent pool 65 percent ready
	- 4 teams in holding area

FIGURE C-5

SOG AVAILABLE RESOURCES - NOVEMBER 1968 (U)

MARITIME OPERATIONS	
Patrol Boat, Fast (PTF	- 11 (PTFs 3, 5-7, 10-12, 23-26)[a/]
SWIFTs	- 3 (SWIFTs 1-3)
PTF Crews, VN	- 11 (Crews 1-11)
SWIFT Crews, VN	- 3 (Crews 1-3)
Amphibious Landing Teams	- 4 (Total Strength 78)
AIR OPERATIONS	
C-130E Aircraft (USAF)	- 4 (Assigned to 7th AF - priority to FOOTBOY(C))
C-123 Aircraft (HEAVY HOOK)	- 2
C-123 Aircraft (HEAVY MOW)	- 2
A1G Aircraft (VNAF)	- 6
H-34 Helicopters (VNAF)	- As required for operations
CH-3 Helicopters (USAF)	- As required for operations
F4C Aircraft (USAF)	- As required for operations
C-47 Aircraft (VNAF)	- As required for operations
CHINAT C-123 Aircrews	- 6
VNAF C-123 Aircrews	- 4 (back-up only)
USAF C-123 Aircrews	- 2
USAF C-130 Aircrews	- 5
AGENT TEAM OPERATIONS	
In-Place Teams	- 05 (Total Strength 25)
Teams Available for Infiltration	- 1 (Total Strength 4)
Reinforcements Ready for Infiltration	- 0
STRATA Teams Operationally Ready	- 6 (Total Strength 55)
Additional Personnel in Training	- 81 Personnel
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	
20 KW Transmitter (Short Wave)	- 3
20 KW Transmitter (Medium Wave)	- 1
750 Watt Transmitter (Short Wave)	- 1
Miscellaneous Reproduction Equipment	

a/ Six PTFs lost on operations: (PTFs 14 and 15 grounded on reef; PTF 4 grounded on coast NVN; PTF 9 sunk by enemy air; PTF 8 sunk by friendly PTF by mistake; PTF 16 sunk in collision with PTF-6). Two PTFs withdrawn from Program for FWT (PTFs 1 and 2)

2. Agent Operations. Camp Long Thanh was the center for agent team training from the inception of the program. DATA DATA Starting in late 1968, the camp was made the training center for SOG and courses were set up to train cross-border personnel who had previously been trained at the command and control centers. The two principal problem areas in the operation of CLT were recruiting quality personnel for training and maintaining a high standard of security on the mission of the camp and its trained teams.

3. Air Operations. The training of third country DATA crews for the C-123 program caused some problems early in the program. The training of Vietnamese pilots for the C-123 was not a success and was given up in 1966. The training of US crews for the C-130 aircraft caused no unusual problems.

4. Maritime Operations. Training was conducted in Danang by the US Mobile Support Team for the Vietnamese PTF crews in the areas of maintenance and operational training. The TDY SEAL Detachment was responsible for training the cross-beach teams in the skills necessary for their mission. In 1967, additional maintenance training for Vietnamese personnel was set up at Subic Bay, Philippines.

PART IV. OPERATIONS SUMMARY (U)

A. INTRODUCTION

Part IV, Operations Summary, gives a broad overview of 34A operations from 1964 through 1968. A brief narrative of salient activities in each program for the year is followed by a summary chart of statistical data.

B. PHASE I AND II

The targets that were authorized for Phase I and II actions were approved at the highest level of government. The procedures in effect during the planning cycle have been discussed earlier in this appendix. As noted earlier, there was considerable emphasis on physical destruction operations in Phase I and II in contrast to the later change in emphasis to intelligence and, finally, psychological operations. The comments of Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, during the planning for Phase II showed prophetic insight into the future direction of OP 34A operations:

> "Air strikes and aerial mining are the only physical destruction operations within the current GVN capability that provide sufficient impact to cause DRV to reevaluate their RVN and Laos activities. ... I recommend that Phase II operations concentrate on intelligence collection, propaganda type psychological operations, the development of resistance movement cadre and intelligence nets, physical destruction by air attack and aerial mine laying."*

Figure C-6 is a list of the 55 approved Phase I and II actions. Figure C-7 shows the locations of the five successful physical destruction operations conducted from January-July 1964. A description of three of these actions, all maritime, follows:

a. Action 45A - Hai Khau Storage Area. On night of 12-13 June, a 26-man raiding team landed from PTF 5, fired 75mm recoilless rifles and machine guns at storage and barracks buildings for a period of ten minutes. Several buildings are believed to have been damaged. No resistance was encountered and no casualties were sustained.

* (TS) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Operational Planning, Vietnam (U)," 18 April 1964 (SACSA).

FIGURE C-6

OPLAN 34A - PHASE I AND II
APPROVED ACTIONS (U)[a]/

Action Number	
	INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION:
1	Aerial Photography of Target Areas to be Accomplished 30 Days Prior to Individual Operation.
2	Beach Reconnaissance in Vicinity of Selected Targets
3	COMINT/ELINT
4	Tactical Reconnaissance of Selected Target Areas
	PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
18	
19	

a/ (TS) Report, SACSA, "Red Book," 7 July 1964.

FIGURE C-6 (CONT'D)

Action Number	
	PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS: (Continued)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
	PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION:
29	Interdiction Route 7 by airborne Special Forces
30	Interdiction Route 8 by airborne Special Forces
31	Interdiction Route 12 by airborne Special Forces
32	SEAL Team strike on Vinh Son
33	SEAL Team strike on dredges and buoy tender in Haiphong Channel
35	SEAL Team strike on Ben Thuy

FIGURE C-7



Storage Area (45A)
Ron Security Post
Bridge/Mine (44)
SWATOW (41)
Pump House
NORTH VIETNAM
RAILROADS
ROADS
WATERWAY

FIGURE C-6 (CONT'D)

Action Number	
37	SEAL Team strike on Dong Hoi airfield
41	UDT raid by four-man team on SWATCMs
42	Raid on security post and four coastal defense guns
43	Sabotage Ly Hoa Bridge
44	Sabotage Route 1 Bridges
45	Sneak Attack on Security Post at Mouth of Dong Hoi River
46	Sabotage Two Small Bridges on Route 1
47	Amphibious Infiltration and Road Mining
48	UDT Sneak Attack on Ron Ferry
54	Airdrop Ten-Man Long-Term Team for Hit-and-Run Attack on Lang Son-Hanoi Railway. Team to Remain in area for long-term operation.
55	Airdrop long-term five-man team to operate against Yen Bay-Lao Kay Railway northwest of Yen Bay.

b. Action 44C - Bridge, Route 1. On night of 26-27 June, a Route 1 bridge was attacked by a demolition team of seven men accompanied by a 24-man marine covering force landed from PTF 6. The bridge was destroyed and two bridge guards killed. Four other DRV personnel were killed by the raiders on their return trip to the boats. No casualties were sustained by the raiders.

c. Action 37A - Dong Hai Reservoir Pump House. On night of 30 June-1 July, a 23-man team landed from PTF 5 under fire and assisted by covering fire from PTF 5. (PTF 6 stood by as escort and alternate.) Eighteen rounds of 57mm ammunition was expended against the pump house and the pump house is believed to have been destroyed. DRV casualties are unknown. RVN losses were one wounded and two missing in action; three 57mm recoilless rifles (two spiked before abandonment).*

C. OVERALL 1964 OPERATIONS

1. Airborne Operations. Of the six teams infiltrated by blind drop, five were captured almost immediately. At years end, six viable teams (five infiltrated by [illegible] and one by SOG) were in-place in NVN) with a total strength of 62 agents.

2. Maritime Operations. MAROPS Group acquired a total of eight PTF (including six NASTY class) and three SWIFT boats. Ninety-two primary missions were conducted with no boat losses and 10 personnel lost.

3. Psychological Operations.

DATA

4. Air Operations. Six modified C-123 aircraft were assigned to SOG, but two were lost and replaced by unmodified planes. All operational missions were flown by VNAF and GRC crews. About 60 percent of the missions scheduled in support of 34A were successful.**

* (TS) Memo, SACSA, "34A Operations-Physical Destriction," 1 July 1964 (SACSA).

** (TS) Report "Debriefing," 31 May 1966 (SACSA)

5. Figure C-8 is a summary of 34A actions in 1964.

D. 1965 OPERATIONS

1. Airborne Operations

a. Execution of small demolitions, disruption of lines of communication (LOC), and limited psychological warfare operations continued to be performed by indigenous personnel of varying ethnic origins. With the advent of US bombing of North Vietnam, the emphasis shifted to gathering of intelligence and establishing contacts with the local population to broaden the intelligence base for possible future exploitation.

b. During the year, in-place teams were reinforced and two new teams were infiltrated. Nine teams with a total of 83 were in place at the end of the year.

2. Maritime Operations

a. Covert boat and landing team operations were conducted against the coast of North Vietnam to interdict small coastal shipping, MT , MT to force North Vietnam to increase its coastal defenses.

(1) Six NASTY Class PTFs (Patrol Torpedo Boats, Fast) and three SWIFT boats were available at US Naval Advisory Detachment (USNAD) at the beginning of the year. Four more PTFs were assigned during the year to make a total of 10. However, six PTFs and two SWIFTs were normally all that were available for operations at any one time. This was due to the necessity for overhaul or repair which resulted from the expanded tempo and scope of ooperations.

(2) An average of 148 Vietnamese military or civilian, DATA landing team personnel were operationally ready and in a constant state of training throughout the year.

b. One hundred and fifty-five missions were conducted during 1965. One man was killed in action, 18 were wounded in action, and one PTF was lost.

FIGURE C-3

OPERATION PLAN 34A ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1964 ( ) [a]

MARITIME OPERATIONS (by mis...)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Infiltration (Physical Destruction)	- (-)	- (-)	- (3)	- (-)	- (-)	3 (-)	- (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	3 (6)
MT	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	2 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	4 (-)
Reconnaissance	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)
Bombardments	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	2 (-)	- (-)	2 (-)	2 (-)	1 (2)	8 (2)
AIR OPERATIONS (by missions)													
DATA	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	3 (-)	4 (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	2 (-)	13 [b] (1)
Harassment/Deception	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	2 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	2 [c] (-)
New Teams Infiltrated	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	1 (-)	3 (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	6 (1)
In-Place Teams Reinforced/ Resupplied	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	2 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	1 (2)	- (-)	6 (3)
In-Place Teams Resupplied	- (-)	1 (4)	- (2)	- (-)	- (-)	- (1)	1 (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	2 (-)	4 (9)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS													

DATA

a/ (TS) Report, SACSA, Red Book, 1 February 1966 (SACSA).
b/ Eleven leaflet drops conducted in conjunction with other missions.
c/ Five Deception drops conducted in conjunction with other missions.

NOTE: Figures in parenthesis indicate unsuccessful attempts.

3. Psychological Operations.

MT

4. Air Operations

a. Covert reinforcement and resupply of in-place teams were conducted by fixed wing C-123 aircraft during the year. A total of 22 successful missions were flown.

b. In support of the PSYOPS missions, air operations flew a total of 30 successful covert PSYOPS missions dispensing more than 60 million leaflets and DACA during the year.

c. The VNAF H-34 helicopters were used to infiltrate and exfiltrate SHINING BRASS teams into Laos and infiltrate team ROMEO into NVN.

d. The increased logistical support for SOG units resulted in an increase of tonnage and flying hours for the C-123s. The C-123s flew a total of 3,647 hours, and airlifted 328 tons of equipment.*

5. Figure C-9 is a summary of 34A actions in 1965.

E. 1966 OPERATIONS

1. Airborne Operations

a. The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with Strategic Technical Service (STS) counterpart personnel, continued to recruit, train, equip, and infiltrate agent teams into NVN, and subsequently to resupply and reinforce these teams. The team missions were to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N 1965 MACV Command History," p.2 (SACSA).

FIGURE C-9

OPERATION PLAN 34A ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1965 ( )

MARITIME OPERATIONS (by missions)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Bombardments	9 (2)a/	2 (3)	3 (2)	4 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	18 (7)
Deception (CAD)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (2)	- (-)	- (1)	- (3)
DATA	- (-)	1 (1)	- (4)	1 (2)	6 (-)	- (-)	4 (4)	4 (-)	1 (2)	1 (1)	- (-)	- (1)	18 (15)
PSYOPS DATA	1 (-)	2 (-)	- (2)	2 (-)	12 (2)	26 (-)	3 (1)	4 (-)	3 (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	54 (5)
Kidnap Ashore (SWALLOW)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (1)	1 (5)	1 (1)	- (2)	- (-)	- (-)	2 (9)
Shipping Interdiction (MINT)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	2 (6)	2 (4)	5 (11)
Shipping Interdiction/PSYOPS (MINT/PSYHAR)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	4 (-)	4 (-)
AIR OPERATIONS (by missions)													
Leaflet/Utility Kits	4 (-)	- (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	2 (-)	- (-)	6 (1)	3 (2)	4 (1)	4 (1)	3 (2)	2 (1)	29 (8)
Harrassment/Deception	- (-)	2 (-)	- (-)	4 (-)	1 (-)	- (-)	- (-)	1 (1)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	- (-)	8 (1)
PSYOPS Teams Infiltrated	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
PSYOPS Teams Reinforced/Resupplied	1 (-)	- (2)	- (-)	3 (-)	2 (3)	- (-)	1 (1)	3 (6)	4 (1)	3 (3)	4 (1)	- (-)	21 (17)
PSYOPS Teams Destructive Actions	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS													
MT	263	238	263	255	263	255	263	263	255	263	255	263	3,102
	31	28	31	30	31	30	31	31	30	31	30	31	365
	-	-	-	4½	14	11½	14	32	36	36	36	36	231
	229	150	265	254	12	416	458	469	414	470	490	561	4,188
	5.74	.11	3.5	.43	4.9	.01	17.7	12.5	8.7	7.1	7.2	2.6	70.5
	5,360	4,207	-	600	3,296	1,236	608	4,670	2,722	259	388	1,856	25,202
PSYOPS OPERATIONS	19	14	26	19	25	16	18	20	14	24	17	13	225

a/ Figures in parentheses indicate unsuccessful attempts.

Appendix C

b. At the beginning of the year, there were nine in-place teams, representing a total of 78 agents. During the year, three new teams were infiltrated. Teams were resupplied 28 times. One team and two sub-teams, a total of 22 men, were lost during the year. In addition, 11 agents were killed in action, three died of wounds, and six died of other causes. The year ended with 11 in-place teams, a total of 79 agents.

2. Maritime Operations

a. Covert boat and landing team operations continued to be conducted against coastal shipping and the coast of NVN, with the objectives of interdicting coastwise shipping,

MT

forcing North Vietnam to continue and increase diversion of their assets to coastal defense.

MT

b. Nine NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats were in the inventory at the beginning of the year. Three new NASTY Class PTFs were acquired during the year. At the end of the year, seven NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats remained in the inventory. On the average, seven NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFTs were operationally ready throughout the year, the remainder being down for overhaul or repair.

c. An average of 11 PTF crews were operationally ready throughout the year. Three SWIFT crews were continually operational. Action team strength at the beginning of the year was 134, organized in five teams. At the end of the year, this strength had decreased to 104, organized in four teams.

d. A total of 126 primary and 56 secondary missions were conducted during 1966. Eight men were killed in action, 15 were wounded in action, six were missing in action and five PTFs were lost.

3.) Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations continued with the same type of operations as in CY 1965. However, new facilities were provided, and all programs increased in scope, intensity, and quality.

MT

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4. Air Operations

a. Air operations in support of OPLAN 34A consisted of two types of missions: support of 34A agent teams and PSYOP leaflet, radio and gift kit drops. One hundred and ten missions were completed during the year, employing assets from USAF, VNAF and SOG 1st Flight Detachment. C-123, C-130, A-1, F-4C, and CH-3C aircraft were used for these missions.

b. Air Operations Logistics Section fragged 442 missions in support of SOG activities. A total of 4,891,228 pounds of cargo and 13,893 passengers were airlifted, a considerable increase over CY 65. SOG C-123 and C-130E aircraft were used, augmented with a DATA C-45 and C-47 as SOG operations increased.

5. Figure C-10 is a summary of 34A actions in 1966.

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex M 1966 MACV Command History," p. 3-4 (SACSA).

F. 1967 OPERATIONS

1. Airborne Operations - TIMBERWORK

a. The Airborne Operations Section, in conjunction with their Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) counterpart personnel, continued to recruit, train, equip and infiltrate agent teams into NVN, and subsequently to resupply and reinforce these teams. The team missions were to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage and psychological operations, and render assistance to downed aircrews.

b. OP-34 opened 1967 with eleven in-place teams or a total of 76 agents. During the year, four new teams, two singleton agents and two STRATA teams were infiltrated. Four teams were lost, seven agents killed in action, one died of wounds, five died of non-hostile injuries and three died of disease. Operational teams were resupplied 28 times during the year. The year ended with 11 in-place teams and two singleton agents for a total of 71 agents.

c. Significant accomplishments in the TIMBERWORK area included the infiltration of the STRATA teams, the use of PLOWMAN MT and the first successful exfiltration of an agent team from North Vietnam. Additionally, diversionary operations were begun late in the year with the objective of diverting enemy resources to internal security roles. This was to be accomplished by the establishment of DATA which would be resupplied and broadcast to in concert with false information broadcast to in-place teams considered to be under NVN control.

2. Maritime Operations - PLOWMAN (C)

a. One hundred and twenty-five PLOWMAN missions were launched in 1967 against the shores of North Vietnam for the purposes of maritime interdiction MT and general disruption of NVN coastal areas. Maritime interdiction continued to be most profitable in terms of enemy craft sunk MT MT as well as intelligence collection.

b. Despite the added year of extensive operations, the hardening of NVN coastal defense sites and no respite from adverse weather, seven NASTY Class PTFs and three SWIFT boats remained in the SOG inventory throughout the year.

c. With continuous on-the-job training for boat crews and increased proficiency in boat handling, the utilization of PTFs improved to the extent that even with less boats in the inventory, more missions were completed than in years past. The casualty rate also declined appreciably: one VN KIA, three VN WIA and one VN MIA.

3. Psychological Operations - HUMIDOR

MT.

4. Air Operations - MIDRIFF

a. Air operations in support of the FOOTBOY program consisted of two types of missions: support of agent teams and PSYOP leaflet, radio and gift kit drops. During the year, 582 MIDRIFF missions were scheduled and 294 completed utilizing USAF, VNAF and SOG aircraft.

b. Both the number of missions scheduled by the Air Operations Logistics Section and the amount of cargo airlifted doubled the previous year's figures. Over 860 missions were fragged and over 10 million pounds of cargo airlifted by SOG C-123 and C-130 and DATA C-45 and C-47 aircraft.*

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex G to 1967 MACV Command History," p. G 2-3 (SACSA).

5. Figure C-11 is a summary of 34A actions in 1967.

G. 1968 OPERATIONS

1. Airborne Operations - TIMBERWORK

a. The Airborne Operations Section (redesignated as the Airborne Studies Group in December) continued to administer the TIMBERWORK , agent operations, portion of the FOOTBOY program during 1968 in conjunction with its STD counterpart personnel. Major significant changes in the TIMBERWORK program in 1968 were caused by the April restriction on air operations north of 20°N, by a security assessment in June which evaluated all the then in-place teams as probably under NVN control, and by the 1 November 1968 halt of air activities north of 17°N. TIMBERWORK operations in 1968 were conducted under three subordinate programs: Agent Operations, STRATA, and Diversionary Operations (FORAE).

b. Agent operations opened 1968 with eight in-place teams operational in NVN. Two teams DATA were surfaced by NVN and one team DATA was declared MIA during the year. As a result of the June security assessment, the remaining five teams were being utilized in a diversionary capacity at year's end with plans for termination in the near future. Recruiting and training of singleton agents continued.

c. STRATA operations in 1968 were characterized by a refinement of insertion, extraction and communications techniques. From March until 1 November, 24 STRATA teams were inserted into NVN. One team (120) was lost in its entirely and portions of three others were declared MIA for a total of 15 agents lost. The STRATA Forward Operating Base (FOB) and operational assets were transferred to the operational control of OP-35 in November, and ended the year being effectively employed in the PRAIRIE FIRE/ DANIEL BOONE areas of Laos and Cambodia.

FIGURE C-11

FOOTBOY ACTIONS ATTEMPTED AND ACCOMPLISHED - 1967 ( )

MARITIME OPERATIONS (by missions)	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
	1 a/	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
	(2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(2)
MT	3	2	7	7	7	6	8	5	6	4	4	3	62
	(5)	(5)	(8)	(6)	(5)	(5)	(6)	(6)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(4)	(63)
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	-	-	-	(2)	-	(2)	-	-	-	(1)	-	-	(5)
Team Landing Ops-Ambush/Kidnap Ashore (CADO)	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
	-	-	-	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(12)
Special Reconnaissance	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(-)
AIR OPERATIONS (by mission)													
Leaflet/Gift Kits	12	11	8	12	10	3	7	10	10	8	10	9	110
	(1)	(1)	(1)	-	-	-	(2)	(3)	(3)	(2)	(0)	(4)	(17)
Radio Rebroadcast	-	-	-	-	1	26	23	22	26	14	23	10	145
	-	-	-	-	-	-	(0)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(4)
New Team Infiltration	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	0	-	-	4
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1)	(2)	-	-	(3)
Agent Team Reinforcement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(0)	-	-	-	-	(0)
Agent Team Resupply	5	1	5	2	2	-	0	2	2	4	5	1	29
	(17)	(2)	(7)	(1)	(1)	-	(2)	(0)	(5)	(8)	(10)	(2)	(55)
Agent Team Exfiltration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	-	1
	-	(1)	(1)	-	-	(1)	-	-	(0)	(3)	(3)	-	(9)
Special Reconnaissance	1	2	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	1	1	0	11
	-	(1)	-	-	(2)	(1)	-	-	-	(4)	(7)	(2)	(17)

MT

a/ Figures in parenthesis indicate unsuccessful attempts in addition to the successful missions.

d. Diversionary (FORAE operations were greatly expanded in 1968 with development of three sub-programs: OODLES, URGENCY and BORDEN. Project OODLES was designed to portray an apparently extensive and successful clandestine agent network in NVN. URGENCY

MT

Project BORDEN employed NVA Chieu Hoi ralliers and volunteer prisoners-of-war to convince NVN that a successful penetration of the NVA was being conducted with the mission of inducing defection and collecting intelligence. Feedback during the year proved the success of the diversionary effort and, at year's end, the program remained oriented toward the diversion of NVN/NVA security forces and resources toward a non-existent infiltration of NVA/NVA organizations and units. The effort of the diversionary program was changed after 1 November.

DATA

Project URGENCY ceased with the bombing halt. BORDEN has been redirected to the VC/NVA-controlled areas of RVN, Laos and Cambodia. (Three other phases of the divisionary program are discussed under psychological operations.)

2. Maritime Operations - PLOWMAN

a. One hundred and forty PLOWMAN missions were completed in 1968 targeted against NVN for the purposes of maritime interdiction, MT and general disruption of NVN coastal areas. MINT (Maritime Interdiction) missions continued to be the most profitable in terms of enemy craft sunk

MT

b. During the year, PTF boat assets were increased to 11, enabling maritime operations to be increased to a round-the-clock capability. Seven days a week operations were the goal for 1968 and in August, when the weather was most favorable, this goal was attained.

c. Six special missions were conducted by cross-beach action teams during CY 68. Restrictions imposed by higher authority limited employment of action teams and reduced a possible threat to the NVN mainland. On 1 November, all PLOWMAN(G) operations ceased due to presidential decision.

MT

4. Air Operations - MIDRIFF MIDRIFF operations are air missions over and into NVN in support of other MACSOG FOOTBOY operations. The following statistics are intended only to present an overview of the many MIDRIFF missions and to indicate the scope of MACSOG Combat Air Operations in NVN.

Type Mission	Scheduled	Completed
Resupply	120	16
PSYOPS	80	46
Visual Reconnaissance	10	6
STRATA	131	51
JENNY	365	308